Women in Executive Office in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Presence, Portfolios and Post-Ministerial Occupation

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Als meus pares

ABSTRACT

This thesis is focused on women in executive office. Whereas the literature on women's political representation in national parliaments is now well established, analyses of women in cabinets are rather limited. The dissertation goals are threefold. Firstly, it examines women's access to executive office, seeking to answer the question about which factors explain the access of women to executive office, with a time series and cross section perspective. Secondly, it pays attention to routes to political office and the gendered patterns underlying portfolio allocation, especially the distribution of prestigious portfolios. Thirdly, it explores the determinants affecting ex-ministers' post-ministerial occupation, as well as how the positions that women and men ministers hold in cabinets may shape their subsequent careers. This dissertation seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of women's participation in executive office in 23 advanced industrial democracies. Simultaneously, it aims at expanding both the general literature on executives and gender and politics.

RESUM

Aquesta tesi se centra en la dona al poder executiu. Mentre que la literatura ha estudiat extensament la representació política de les dones en els parlaments nacionals, les anàlisis sobre la representació de les mateixes en els governs són limitades. En aquesta tesi s'estableix un triple objectiu. En primer lloc, s'examina l'accés de les dones al govern, tractant de descobrir quins factors expliquen l'accés de les dones a càrrecs executius, tan al llarg del temps com comparativament. En segon lloc, se centra en quines són les rutes d'accés als ministeris; com també en els patrons de gènere subjacents a l'assignació de carteres, especialment en la distribució de les carteres prestigioses. En tercer lloc, s'estudia quins són els factors que incideixen a l'hora d'explicar l'ocupació post-ministerial dels ex-ministres, també s'analitza si la posició ministerial que els i les ministres ostenten al govern condiciona les seves carreres posteriors. Aquesta tesi pretén oferir una visió global de la participació de les dones als governs en 23 democràcies industrials avançades. Al mateix temps, té com a objectiu la contribució tant a la literatura general sobre els executius com a la literatura de gènere i política.

AGRAÏMENTS

El procés d'elaboració de la tesi pot tenir infinitats de metàfores. Però, al final, no he pogut evitar caure en la típica, ja que per a mi fer la tesi ha estat molt similar a fer un port d'alta muntanya. Ha estat costosa al començament, però especialment feixuga al final. Es necessita constància, esforç, dedicació, paciència, però sobretot, com passa al ciclisme, és imprescindible tenir uns bons *gregaris* per tal d'arribar al cim. I jo he tingut uns *gregaris* de luxe, que m'han anat subministrant consells, correccions, suport i ànims; essencials per arribar a assolir aquest port.

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Les Franqueses del Vallès, 26 d'Octubre.

“Toda, toda la obra de la revolución está ahí por hacer. Lo siento con vehemencia, con ímpetu, con todo el fuego y la voluntad de mi alma″

Frederica Montseny (1932). [Primera dona ministra en la història d’Espanya (1936-1937)]

“La Historia no la doblegó, su pasión era eterna. Abandonó la sumisión y tomó conciencia.”

Accidente (2014). [Juntos ellos y ellas]

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1. Introduction

For a very long time, male dominance in politics was assumed, and those few women who were in politics were considered as tokens in a male world. Gradually however, we have witnessed a steady increase in the number of women legislators and ministers (Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013: 230). The decades spanning the 1970s to the 1990s registered a significant increase in women's representation. However, this does not imply that male dominance has been overcome. Women are still under-represented in political life in advanced industrial democracies, in both parliaments and cabinets. However, in recent years women's presence in parliament has increased from 13% in the 1980's, to 20% in the 1990s, to 25% in the 2000s. Similarly, in cabinets women's accounted for 9% of ministers in the 1980s, 20% in the 1990s, and 28% in the 2000s (Quality of Government, 2010). Historically, access to executive office has been considerably more difficult for women when compared to access to parliaments (Reynolds 1999: 572). There are still more men than women in cabinet leadership positions, with only 13% of women being presidents or prime ministers in advanced industrial democracies (WGWL 2014). [1]

While women's presence in parliaments has been extensively studied, there has been a lack of scholarly research with a gender perspective on the executive office. The fact that research on

[1] In 2014 there are four female Prime Ministers in advanced industrial democracies: Angela Merkel in Germany (2005), Helle Thorning in Denmark (2011) and Erna Solberg in Norway (2013),

executives is still limited and that women have historically been absent from cabinets explains this gap in the literature. More recently however, gender and politics scholars have set out a research agenda for explaining and evaluating women's presence in the executive branch of government (Annesley et al. 2014). Building on this burgeoning research, this dissertation seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of women's participation in executive office in 23 advanced industrial democracies. Simultaneously, it aims at expanding the general literature on cabinets by addressing some of the existing gaps. Given that the number of female national ministers has notably grown since the 1990s, a bigger sample is now available, making it possible to explore in greater depth various aspects of women's representation in executive office. Given the limited amount of empirical evidence, it is necessary to establish first a solid empirical research in the descriptive dimension of political representation, namely the degree of similarity between representatives (in this case, ministers) and represented with regards to the main socio-demographic variables. Subsequently, scholars could go further and study the other important representational dimensions (Pitkin 1967), since descriptive representation is the condition to achieve not only substantive representation (the congruence between representatives' actions and the interests of the represented, including both responsiveness and accountability), but also symbolic representation (the extent to which the represented feel fairly and effectively represented) (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Celis et al. 2008).

1.1. Why cabinets? Why Women?

As it has been mentioned, this dissertation deals with two sets of literature: studies of cabinet composition and the body of work relating to gender and politics. In this section, I argue why these fields of study require more scholarship attention. Why is it relevant to study cabinets? Firstly, the study of ministers, their selection and deselection, as well the political consequences of being a minister, is still limited (Dowding and Dumont 2009). This lack of research on cabinets is especially remarkable since the executive branch is 'the most visible locus of political power' and, in terms of the pinnacle of power, cabinet ministers represent important potential recruits for the position of chief executive, which is the most powerful political actor (Bauer and Tremblay 2011). The government is the leading actor in setting the political agenda and introducing new legislation. Cabinet ministers control substantial portions of the national budget and are responsible for not only initiating but also implementing policies. Secondly, most of the previous studies are single-case and descriptive analyses, which has not allowed identifying cross-national patterns, particularly the impact of institutional factors on cabinet composition, distribution of power within government and ministers' post-office careers.

Why is it important to study the gender composition of the executive power? For one thing, it is one indicator of the extent to which women enjoy equal opportunities to men. Also, the existence

of gender biases in the gender composition of executives are likely to have a potential impact on women's substantive and symbolic representation. If we assume that women's presence is necessary to affect policy, examining the processes that help or hinder women's access and the distribution of power in cabinets is crucial (Annesley et al. 2014). Indeed, women's presence in cabinet might be very effective in bringing new issues to the political agenda due to the greater power and higher media and public attention received by governments over parliaments. Likewise, as Annesley et al. (2014) have argued, where there exists parity, cabinets are more likely to achieve their symbolic goal of reducing gendered stereotypes about women's political capacities and making women's inclusion in executive office part of the overall expectation of democratic governance. Whereas the literature on women's political representation in national parliaments is now well established, comparative analyses of women in cabinets are rather limited. Women's descriptive representation in the legislative and executive branches might need different explanatory models due to different routes to office (appointment versus election). For instance, cabinets are usually appointed by a single individual, while deputies are elected by voters. As Franceschet and Thomas (2011: 3) point out, "ministers, even when appointed from the ranks of sitting members of parliament, have not 'campaigned' for their job in the same public way as elected legislators".

1.2. Goals of the dissertation

In bridging the two sets of literatures on executives and gender and politics, this dissertation seeks to make a contribution to both. On the one hand, by expanding the general literature on cabinets by reporting information on ministers' profiles, their distribution in cabinet portfolios and their post-ministerial occupation across countries. On the other hand, by analysing the gendered dynamics of the executive branch, finding out which factors account for women's descriptive representation in cabinets, and by analysing how gender operates in the distribution of power within cabinets or how it affects women's subsequent careers. Specifically, the aims of the dissertation are threefold. Firstly, it examines women's access to executive office, seeking to answer the question about which factors explain the access of women to executive office. Secondly, it pays attention to routes to political office and the gendered patterns underlying portfolio allocation, especially the distribution of prestigious portfolios. Thirdly, it explores the determinants affecting ex-ministers' post-ministerial occupation, as well as how the positions that women and men ministers hold in cabinets may shape their subsequent careers.

Figure 1.1. Goals of the dissertation



Firstly, the primary aim of this dissertation is to disentangle which factors account for women's presence in the cabinets of advanced industrial democracies. Most analyses have tended to emphasise cultural over political factors to explain the access of women to the executive branch (Studlar and Moncrief 1997, Reynolds 1999, Siaroff 2000). This approach is the so-called 'time-lag theory', according to which women's representation will increase gradually through a constant, maybe even irreversible process towards permanent gender balance. However, as Dahlerup and Leyenaar (2013) argue, adopting this conventional wisdom may contribute to a lack of progress. If gender balance comes with development, then no political intervention is needed, such as the implementation of gender quotas. Indeed, recent studies have concluded that political variables are more important than cultural variables for explaining women's presence in executive office (Krook and O'Brien 2012). By exclusively focusing on advanced industrial democracies that share similar levels of democratisation and development, this

dissertation is better suited to examine the specific impact of political factors. On the other hand, most previous studies have sought to explain the relative amount of women in executive power from a cross-sectional perspective (with the exception of Davis 1997, and Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005), and have thus been unable to assess whether some factors operate differently across time (Reynolds 1999, Siaroff 2000, Krook and O'Brien 2012). I will seek to fill this gap by adopting a cross-national and a longitudinal perspective (1980-2010), which provides an opportunity to track how women's presence in cabinet has evolved across both time and space. In addition, the dataset used allows us to partially examine the impact of party gender-quotas on executives, with this effect being measured and appreciated for the first time. It is important to note that, although party quotas are not applied directly to governmental composition, this measure might indirectly promote women's representation in executive office too, since it forces to revise the selection and nomination of candidates within political parties.

Secondly, when studying women's descriptive representation in executives, it is not only the number of women in cabinets that is important, but also how these women are distributed within the structures of power. In this vein, the second aim of this dissertation is to analyse which are the determinants for portfolio allocation. The allocation within cabinets is decisive for the distribution of power (control over policy and to act as gatekeepers) and visibility of the different ministers. Although the sexual horizontal

segregation (the disproportional presence of men in the most prestigious portfolios) has already been documented (Borrelli 2002, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005, Krook and O'Brien 2012), previous studies have failed to disentangle whether it can be explained by supply- or demand-side factors. Are differences due to the dissimilarities in sociodemographic characteristics and political resources between men and women ministers? Or is there an institutional discrimination against women ministers through which they are allocated to less prestigious portfolios despite their having similar resources to men?. With a few exceptions (Winter 1991; Escobar-Lemon and Taylor-Robinson 2009), most previous studies on social backgrounds, routes to power and political ambitions are descriptive case-study analyses (Austen-Smith and Banks 1990, Blondel and Thiébault 1991, Almeida et al. 2005, Dowding and Dumont 2009). Thus, cross-national analyses are very much needed and they would allow examining the effect of institutional factors.

Thirdly, given that both access to executive office and portfolio allocation are strongly gendered, the third aim of this dissertation addresses the central question of whether post-ministerial occupations similarly present differential patterns for women and men. While previous research has focused on how ministers' credentials determine which portfolio they are appointed to, the post-ministerial occupation of former cabinet office-holders remains basically unexplored and the few existing studies have predominantly adopted a descriptive approach (Blondel, 1991; Nichols, 1991). This omission is critical since portfolio allocation

might provide different political or professional opportunities in subsequent careers. Several ex-ministers keep playing a relevant role in politics, business or civil society after leaving office, as is the case for ex-prime ministers and presidents, which may raise 'revolving door' issues and expose conflicting interests between politics and business (Heclo, 1988; Donahue, 2003; Theakson and de Vries, 2012). Portfolios vary in their degree of parliamentary contact, the amount of media attention they receive, the relative authority within the cabinet, and the career opportunities they may eventually create (i.e. the extent to which they can be used as a stepping stone to other relevant offices). Since previous studies on cabinets literature have not drawn clear theoretical expectations regarding post-ministerial occupation, this dissertation seeks to expand the literature by undertaking some theory building. Additionally, the breadth of the dataset used will enable me to not only assess the potential gender bias in post-ministerial occupations, but to move beyond national boundaries as well as to draw broader lessons on post-ministerial occupations while taking into account the effects of institutional variables.

1.3. Methodological approach

Most of the previous studies regarding women's presence in executives are cross-sectional studies (Reynolds 1999, Siaroff 2000) and those dealing with portfolio allocation or post ministerial office are descriptive single-case analyses (Austen-Smith and Banks 1990, Blondel and Thiébault1 1991, Nichols 1991, Siaroff 2000, Almeida

et al. 2005, O'Malley 2006, Dowding and Dumont 2009). Thus, our understanding about women's presence in cabinet, their profiles, portfolio allocation and post-ministerial careers remain fairly limited in longitudinal and cross-national analyses. To overcome these deficits, I have set up two different and original datasets. On the one hand, a database with macro level and longitudinal information has been created to analyse the factors that account for women's presence in cabinets. This dataset has compiled the gender composition of cabinets for 23 advanced industrial democracies from 1980 to 2010. The dataset also includes information on countries' socio-cultural, political and institutional factors. The analysis starts in 1980, in order to examine longitudinal evolution, from governments with very few women appointed to the most recent increases, exploring which factors have become more relevant over time. Hitherto, this is the largest sample examined recently by scholarly research on gender and cabinets, with 203 observations. On the other hand, a database with individual and cross-national information has been produced. This original dataset incorporates information on ministers' profiles and routes to political office (before being appointed to cabinet), portfolio allocation (once appointed) and the post-ministerial occupation (once cabinets are terminated). The information collected has been used to analyse the gender portfolio allocation, as well as the potential gender impact of post-ministerial occupation. The dataset includes 396 individuals who have held the rank of cabinet ministers in 23 advanced industrial democracies in the period 2004-2011. In addition, this cross-national dataset will allow the

examination of the effects of institutional variables on portfolio allocation and post-ministerial occupation.

1.4. Structure of the dissertation

The forthcoming chapters address the three main research questions of the dissertation. The second chapter focuses on the factors accounting for women's presence in executives. This chapter seeks to tease out if this gap is explained by cultural factors or by political factors. In addition, I explore how explanatory factors have evolved over time. The third chapter examines ministers' profiles and the determinants of portfolio allocation, paying particular attention to gender biases. Given that there is a gendered distribution of portfolios, where women are still under-represented in the most prestigious ones, this chapter attempts to analyze if this fact is explained by an individual's characteristics or if it depends on the gendered political institutions. The fourth chapter, co-authored with my supervisor Tània Verge, explains the role of political capital resources and gender in post-ministerial occupation. Since both access to executive office and portfolio allocation are strongly gendered, the chapter addresses the central question of whether post-ministerial occupations similarly present differential patterns for women and men. Finally, a concluding chapter summarizes and discusses the main findings and contributions to the literature on both cabinets and gender and executives, and suggests several avenues for further research.

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2. Still a 'male business'? Explaining women's presence in executive office

Abstract

This chapter aims to account for cross-national and over-time variation in women's participation in cabinets. Specifically, it focuses on some key political factors which have not been tested yet, such as the effectiveness of party gender quota. Previous literature has mainly centred on structural variables (such as the degree of democratisation and economic development). Using an original longitudinal cross-sectional sample of 23 advanced industrial democracies, this chapter provides new evidence that some important political factors should be considered. It finds that countries with a specialist system have a higher percentage of women in cabinet than generalist systems, left-wing parties in government appoint more women, they are more likely to receive a ministerial post when the governing party has adopted gender quotas, and an increasing number of women in parliament boost women in cabinet. Furthermore, the chapter also shows that these political variables perform differently throughout time, and that political factors have become more relevant in recent decades.

2.1. Introduction

Women have traditionally been under-represented in political institutions. One of the most unexplored and important gender gap is found in executive office. Nowadays, the proportion of women in political cabinets is still remarkably low, although women constitute over half the population and their participation in the labour market and their levels of educational attainment have greatly increased over the last thirty years. While some improvements have been made in this regard, we find a mixed picture when comparing women's presence in executive office across countries. For instance, in Spain, 50 per cent of the cabinet members of the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2008) were women, and the Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates

notably increased the proportion of women appointed to his cabinet from 13 per cent in 2005 to 29 per cent in 2009. However, in 2010, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, only filled 17 per cent of his cabinet posts with women. Likewise, in Italy, Silvio Berlusconi's cabinet, formed in 2008, contained only 13 per cent women. Berlusconi even noted that Zapatero's government was "too pink" (i.e. it included too many women) and that Italy was not ready for parity as "it isn't easy to find women who are qualified".[2] Thus, significant cross-national variation leads us to ask: Which factors explain the presence of women in executive office?

Whereas the literature on women's political representation in national parliaments is now well established, comparative analyses of women in cabinets are rather limited. The most obvious reason for this gap is that women have historically been absent from cabinets, leaving researchers with a very small sample to examine cross-national variation. This lack of research on executive power is especially remarkable when one considers that cabinets are the *locus* of power. In other words, the government is the leading actor in setting the political agenda and the introduction of new legislation. Particularly, in parliamentary democracies, most policy

[2] *The Times*, "Silvio Berlusconi angers Spain for mocking female cabinet", 17/04/2008.

initiatives are put forward by governments rather than by party parliamentary groups[3].

Although the literature on women in parliaments has developed diverse explanations, women's presence in cabinet requires other models to account for cross-national dissimilar levels, since these institutions have different natures. Firstly, regarding access to these bodies, cabinets are appointed by a single individual, while deputies are elected by voters. As Franceschet and Thomas (2011:3) point out, "ministers, even when appointed from the ranks of sitting members of parliament, have not 'campaigned' for their job in the same public way as elected legislators". Secondly, cabinets have implications that differ from those of parliament. That is, governments might be more effective in bringing new issues to the political agenda and creating new legislation due to the greater power and higher media attention received. Furthermore, the greater visibility and prominence of cabinets means that substantive and symbolic representation is more relevant in executive power (see Annesley and Gains 2010, Franceschet and Thomas 2011: 4). These different features make cabinets a distinct institution to analyse gendered dynamics, and may demonstrate that previous explanatory factors related to women's representation in parliament might not be applicable, while other new factors may become relevant to account for women's representation in the executive. For instance, electoral systems have an important role in determining women's

[3] Although the governing party's parliamentary group does not act as an independent actor, it will only promote policy initiatives when the government actually supports them.

presence in parliament (Darcy et al. 1994; Paxton 1997; Galligan and Tremblay 2005; Rudein 2012) but they may not play a role in explaining the presence of women in cabinet[4]. Conversely, the type of ministerial recruitment may only affect the presence of women in cabinet but not their numerical representation in parliaments.

Hitherto, the burgeoning literature on gender and cabinets still presents some important deficits that require further attention. Firstly, most analyses have tended to emphasise cultural over political factors (Studlar and Moncrief 1997, Reynolds 1999, Siaroff 2000). For example, Reynolds (1999) found that Catholic countries perform better in women's recruitment to executive office, which contradicts some analyses that propose that Catholicism is less sensitive to gender equality than Protestantism (Wilcox 1991). Previous studies have compared governments across different types of regimes (i.e. democracies, authoritarian and populist administrations), which might potentially veil the effect of political variables. Recent studies have concluded that political variables are more important than cultural variables (Krook and O'Brien 2012). However, by combining presence and portfolio allocation as the dependent variable disentangling which factors are more relevant for boosting women's presence in cabinets is troublesome. By exclusively focusing on advanced industrial democracies, which share similar levels of democratisation and

[4] A president or prime minister selects cabinet members, not an electoral system. An electoral system only can have an effect in order to determine women in parliament.

development, this chapter is better suited to examine the specific impact of political factors.

In addition, most previous studies have sought to explain the relative amount of women in executive power from a cross-sectional perspective (with the exception of Davis 1997, and Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005), thus being unable to assess whether some factors operate differently across time (Reynolds 1999, Siaroff 2000, Krook and O'Brien 2012). This chapter fills this gap by adopting a longitudinal perspective which provides an opportunity to track how women's presence in cabinet has evolved both across time and space. Specifically, the chapter explores cross-country and over-time variation in women's participation in the governments of advanced industrial democracies for the period 1980-2010. This original sample allows us to examine the effect of variables hitherto omitted in the literature on women in cabinets, such as the effectiveness of party gender quotas on executives, being this effect measured and appreciated for the first time.

The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: The second section reviews the literature on gender and cabinets and draws several hypotheses. The third section describes the method, variables and data employed in this study. The fourth section presents the empirical evidence. And finally, the fifth section discusses the main findings.

2.2. Women's representation in cabinets

As Figure 1 shows, there is no clear pattern of female representation in parliaments and cabinets across advanced industrial democracies in 2010. Whereas women's representation is higher in cabinets than in parliaments in eleven countries, the opposite is true in twelve countries. Cross-national variation in women's presence is noteworthy, although the mean of parliaments and cabinets are similar, 26.6% and 26.7% respectively, the range of values is different. That is, while the percentage of women in parliament varies from 9% to 45%, the percentage of women in cabinets comprises 6% to 52%.

[Figure 2.1. about here]

Studies on women in executive office have typically adopted most of the explanations produced by research on women in parliament. Following Krook and O'Brien (2012) I classify previous factors into three categories. The first component, 'sociocultural factors', refers to women's status in society (both socio-structural and cultural variables), which affect the pool of available women. The second category, 'political institutions' concerns the structure of political institutions; it has been conceptualised as the degree of openness of the political system to women. The third category, 'representation in politics', argues women's presence in political elites shapes both the supply (pool of available women) and demand (openness of the institutions) for more females in cabinets. Let us

now set the theoretical expectations derived from these categories to explain the levels of women in cabinet office.

2.2.1. Socio-cultural factors

2.2.1.1 Socioeconomic factors

How is the pool of women restricted by structural factors? Although no formal requisites[5] apply for seeking cabinet appointment, there are several informal requirements for being certified as eligible. Political elites, including ministers, derive disproportionately from the highly educated and from certain professions (Norris 1985, Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Reynolds 1999). Indeed, three-quarters of all ministers in post-war Europe have had a university degree (Thiébault. 1991:21). Traditionally, women have not had access to the same educational and professional opportunities as men. Since women are educationally and occupationally segregated (Nermo 1999, Polavieja 2008), they will be disadvantaged with regards to the most valued skills and financial capital to run for office. In this vein, improved access to education and greater inclusion of women in the labour market is considered to contribute to women's inclusion in politics (Norris 1997, Raaum 2005, Bergqvist 2011). However, previous results do not confirm this relationship. For instance, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005:85) show that the percentage of women in the workforce has a statistically irrelevant effect, and that higher enrolment in tertiary

[5] With the exception of nationality or age requirements.

education actually translates into lower percentages of female ministers. It should be noted, however, that previous studies have included underdeveloped countries in their samples, where women are predominantly employed in the primary sector and have lower educational levels. As a result, they occupy low prestige jobs, a situation which is unlikely to increase the supply of women with background similar to the men who currently serve in cabinet. Given that, this research focuses on advanced industrial democracies, where we may find a refined relation between structural factors and women in cabinet than previous analyses. Advanced industrial democracies have a higher percentage of women with tertiary educational levels, making women more likely to be appointed to cabinet positions than in underdeveloped countries. The first hypothesis is posited as follows:

H1: The higher the level of women's education, the more women in cabinets there will be.

2.2.1.2. Cultural factors

The second set of 'sociocultural factors' explanations deals with cultural factors. Attitudes and values towards gender equality have traditionally created substantial barriers to women's political participation. An egalitarian culture and positive attitudes towards women's participation in public life, facilitates women's access to political office (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 131). Culture affects

attitudes, values and beliefs about the appropriate division of roles between women and men. Indeed, cross-sectional analyses of women in parliaments show that gender attitudes strongly affect the number of women in legislatures, and this factor is even stronger than other political variables, such as the use of a proportional electoral system (Paxton and Kunovich 2003: 99, Rudein 2012: 106). These studies have used the Gender Equality Scale (GES) as a cultural measure. However, this variable is not appropriate for longitudinal analyses, as the questions that integrate the scale have varied over time. [6] Following Reynolds (1999), I will use religion as a proxy for culture, since cultural barriers to women's representation are often drawn from individuals' religious inclination. It has been argued that, in Western Europe, citizens of predominantly Catholic countries are markedly less supportive of gender equality than citizens of countries with Protestant majorities (Inglehart 1981, Wilcox 1991).

H2: The larger the percentage of Protestants in a country, the higher the level of women there will be in cabinets.

[6] It is a 0-100 scale composed of five items where respondents are required to answer whether they agree or disagree with the following statements: "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do", "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women", "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl", "A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled", and "A woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man".

2.2.2. Political institutions

The political institutions side concerns to the role of political institutions influencing government formation. Specifically explanatory factors refer to the characteristics of the political system as well as to the considerations of the selectors and their environment, namely presidents and the political parties they belong to. These factors are grouped into: (i) political system effects, that is, factors related to the characteristics and practices of institutions in each country; and (ii) party organisation effects, understood as the norms and procedures of the parties in government.

2.2.2.1. Political system factors

At the systemic level, the first factor to be considered is the type of ministerial recruitment. Davis (1997:47) shows that women's presence is lower in generalist ministerial systems than in specialist systems. Under specialist systems, ministers are selected on their expertise in a particular policy area rather than on their past political experience. In actual fact, many ministers are selected from outside the ranks of parliament, so cabinets present greater permeability to political outsiders thereby benefitting women. Conversely, under generalist systems, ministers tend to have a long-standing political background and are usually selected from inside the ranks of parliament. One can argue that the number of women in the lower house might directly affect the supply of potential female ministers with experience in political office (Reynolds 1999, Siaroff 2000,

Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005). Nonetheless, as parliamentary committees' chairs and other relevant positions such as party bench spokesperson, which might be stepping stones to the cabinet, are usually occupied by men (Valiente et al. 2005), women are disadvantaged in generalist systems. Thus, this hypothesis can be expressed as follows:

H3: Women's representation is expected to be lower in generalist ministerial systems than in specialist systems.

Second, when distributing offices, the number of available positions is crucial (see, Alozie and Manganaro (1993) for electoral candidacies). Therefore, the likelihood of appointing more or less women is related to the number of seats (ministries) that a cabinet contains. In smaller cabinets group diversity might be undermined, that is, it may be less likely that individuals from groups that have traditionally been excluded, such as women, get appointed. Given that most party leaders and top-level cadres are men, they are more likely to be selected as ministers (Shedova 1997, Niven 1998). Seemingly, coalitions follow the same logic: When the senior party trades cabinet seats to other partners for government stability, intra-party competition for the available posts sharpens, thereby increasing the likelihood of men being appointed. Under single-party governments, in contrast, the party can fill all cabinet posts, potentially enabling it to diversify the profiles of those appointed. Therefore:

H4a: The larger the number of seats in a cabinet the more women will be appointed.

H4b: Coalition governments will include fewer women than single-party cabinets.

2.2.2.2. Party organisation factors

Regarding party ideology, left-wing parties are more committed to gender equality than right-wing parties. Furthermore, ideology is found to be a strong predictor of women's representation in parliament (Caul-Kittilson 2006). Nonetheless, scholars have found that the ideology of the party(ies) in government does not affect the presence of female ministers (Davis 1997, Reynolds 1999), and that centrist governments include more women than left-wing governments (Siaroff 2000). The inability to establish a clear relationship between a government's ideology and the presence of women in executive office might be due to different reasons. On the one hand, as has already been highlighted, some studies have only examined a small sample while others have included non-democratic countries in their research, so the right-left position has not been comparable. On the other hand, previous studies have not analysed in any depth the most recent period of time, and the relationship between a government's ideology and female representation in cabinet might be more relevant in recent years due to the role of post-modernisation. Whereas in the past, the lines of ideological conflict were based upon cleavages of class conflict; in recent times, the rise of post-modernist values has changed many

issues, among which is the diminishing difference in gender roles (Inglehart 1977). Hence, the New Left[7] may be more open to promote women's representation than the traditional left. So, the fifth hypothesis is the following:

H5: Left-wing parties are expected to promote more women to cabinet positions than centre and right-wing parties.

Hitherto, studies of gender and cabinets have not included the variable 'gender quotas'. Up to 1980, gender quotas were used in ten countries around the world. By the end of the 1980's, twelve new countries had also introduced them, and throughout the 1990's, quotas appeared in over fifty countries. Overall, quotas are nowadays in use in over a hundred countries (Krook 2009: 4). Through party quotas, political parties voluntarily assume the obligation to include a certain proportion of women in party offices and electoral lists (or a certain proportion of each sex when the quota follows a gender-neutral formulation). Alternatively, legislative quotas are imposed on all political parties competing in elections. Both legislative and party quotas are generally found to increase the presence of women in parliament (Dahlerup 1998; Caul 2001; Yoon 2004; Dahlerup 2006; Tripp and Kang, 2008; Verge 2012). This study only focuses on party quotas since legislative

[7] Parties that value post-materialism (emphasising autonomy, environment and permissiveness in social policy) over materialism (stressing economic growth and security).

quotas are only applied in 5 countries in our sample[8]. Although party quotas are not applied to governmental composition, one might expect that this mechanism would indirectly promote women's representation in executive office too, as parties using quotas are committed to equality values. A good illustration of this relationship is the Norwegian case, when in 1983 the Norwegian Labour Party adopted a gender quota. When the party got into power, the cabinet that they formed was almost gender-balanced by applying the party quota to the composition of the cabinet (see Inhetveen 1999). Accordingly, the last hypothesis holds that:

H6: Party quotas are expected to stimulate the incorporation of women in national governments.

2.2.2.3. Women's representation in politics

Krook and O'Brien's (2012) work suggests that political elites are the combined result of the supply of women available to run for office and the demand for female aspirants on the part of politics. That is, countries that have high rates of women in parliament may affect, on one hand, the greater pool of potential female appointees, since women in parliament are stepping-stones to the cabinet and they accumulate experience in that area. In addition, women's presence in parliament may contribute to an increase in gender

[8] There are only five countries that have adopted legislative quotas: Belgium (1994), France (2002), Greece (2009), Portugal (2006) and Spain (2007). As it is a longitudinal dataset, it ultimately only counted 9 observations out of 203, and this number of cases is not enough to establish robust conclusions.

equality attitudes[9]. As Davis (1997: 64) said, increasing levels of female parliamentarians creates "an irreversible process of change" in attitudes and expectations about women in politics that would lead to larger numbers of women in cabinets. On the other hand, women in parliament are critical actors with a positional power and they may form strategic coalitions with other women and influence men's behaviour regarding the cabinets' selection (Childs and Krook 2009). Thus it can be expected that:

H7: The higher the percentage of women in parliament, the higher the level of women there will be in cabinet.

Finally, this research focuses on women's representation in government. In this sense, the increment of women's representation by one party might encourage other parties within the same country to introduce them too (Matland and Studlar 1996). At the executive level, one might expect that when some parties start to promote women actively; other parties will move to emulate them. Larger parties will feel increased pressure to respond by more actively promoting women themselves. Once women are in positions of power, no matter how they got there, it will become more difficult in the future to exclude them (Caul-Kittilson 2006). Following the previous example -the Norwegian case, it also illustrates the effect of promoting within a country. As I have said previously, in 1983 the Norwegian Labour Party adopted a cabinet that was almost

[9] Although some authors argue that attitudes affect the proportion of women in parliaments (Rudein 2012).

gender-balanced. This case was followed by the three subsequent Prime Ministers who belonged to the Conservative and Christian People parties (Inhetveen 1999). In other words, parties might feel pressured to nominate more women if one of their political rivals starts to promote women's representation.

H8: Women's representation in previous cabinets is expected to stimulate the incorporation of more women in by subsequent governments.

2.3. Data and methods

To test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, I rely on an original dataset of cabinet composition for 23 advanced industrial democracies from 1980 to 2010. The field still lacks an updated longitudinal database on cabinet ministers, and this collection of data fills this gap. As I said above, I am focusing exclusively on advanced industrial democracies in order to control for the most relevant structural variables, which have a strong impact on women's rights and on egalitarian attitudes, hence, it might show clearly the effect of political factors. The analysis starts in 1980, in order to examine longitudinal evolution, from governments with very few women appointed to the most recent increases. This three-decade period allows us to explore which factors have become more relevant over time with 203 observations. As Figure 2 shows, women's representation in cabinets has followed an incremental trend over time –the mean during the 1980-1989 was 9.3 per cent,

in the 1990-1999 it was 19.9 per cent, and in the 2000-2010 it was 28.3 per cent. The highest value achieved was in Finland in 2007, with women forming 60 per cent of the cabinet. In every country at least one woman has been included since 1996. The countries included in the dataset are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, and the United Kingdom.

Since the database is characterised by repeated observations (different years) on the same fixed political unit (country), a panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) is used. The advantage of this technique is that it allows testing more complicated models than purely cross-sectional or time-series data (Hsiao 2001:5). Time-Series-Cross Sectional (TSCS) data typically display both contemporaneous correlations across units and unit level heteroskedasticity, making inference from standard errors produced by ordinary least squares incorrect. PCSE models account for these deviations from spherical errors and allow for better inference than linear models estimated from TSCS data (Baliey and Katz 2011). This methodology is appropriate as long as it controls for the fact that the percentage of women in cabinet at *t* time is not independent from what happened in *t-1* –i.e., the errors are not independent from one period to the next one. In addition, this methodology takes into account cluster and pairwise effects on the country which is used to control for the correlation between *vi* and *xi* (heteroskedasticity),

thus controlling for the idiosyncratic factors of each country. This is a novelty with respect to previous studies that have assumed that there is no correlation between *vi* and *xi* (Davis 1997, Escobar-Lemmon et al 2005).

[Figure 2.2. about here]

Following previous studies (Davis 1997, Escobar-Lemmon et al. 2005), the dependent variable measures the proportion of cabinet portfolios held by women (excluding the prime minister) rather than the absolute number of women in cabinets in order to account for cross-national variation in cabinet size. Data on the composition of cabinets has been collected from the *Keesing's World News Archive*, which compiles information on every government formation throughout the world, including cabinet appointments, reorganisations, and mid-term reshuffles. The composition of cabinets was recorded yearly but the dataset used here only contains post-electoral cabinets, since longitudinal analyses cannot be run with repeated year observations. As the distribution of values of the dependent variable is skewed to the left, the dependent variable has been logarithmically transformed to obtain a more log-normal distribution.

The main independent variables used in order to test the hypotheses, have been selected according to the different factors identified by the literature (socio-structural, cultural and political variables):

- *Socio-structural:* 'Women in tertiary education' is measured as the ratio of female to male gross enrolment rates in tertiary education. This indicator has been collected from the World Bank dataset.

- *Cultural:* To measure cultural attitudes most studies on women in parliament take the gender equality scale from the World Value Survey. As has already been stated, this variable cannot be used in longitudinal analyses as the question has varied throughout the years and it was not collected before 2000. For this reason, a proxy is used for culture: the percentage of Protestants (time-invariant) in each country, which has been collected from the US State Department's *International Religious Freedom Report 2004*.

- *Structure of political institutions:*
    - (i) 'Type of ministerial recruitment' distinguishes 'generalist' systems coded as 0 and 'specialist' systems coded as 1. [10] This classification has been created following Davis' (1997) and Siaroff's (2000) indexes.
    - (ii) 'Cabinet size' has been calculated as the number of seats (ministers) of each government.

[10] There are 10 countries are classified as are generalist systems, whereas 12 countries are included in the specialist systems. All presidential and semi-presidential systems are classified as specialist. Generalist: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand. Specialist: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, USA.

- (iii) The variable 'Coalition' captures whether the government includes more than one party (1) or not, i.e. single-party governments (0).
- (iv) 'Ideology PM' captures whether the prime minister's party is left-wing, centre, or right-wing. This variable is borrowed from the Quality of Government and Parliament and Government composition dataset (ParlGov). In contrast to previous studies in the field, ideology can be easily compared, as it is a standardised measure among advanced industrial countries.
- (v) In order to control for time effects, I use a dummy variable for each ten-year lapses of time[11].
- (vi) Data on 'party quotas' are based on the Global Database of Quotas for Women (IDEA) run by the Quota Project, and cross-checked against various other sources, including party websites, handbooks and country experts. This variable describes when the voluntary party quota was adopted by the prime minister's party and what minimum percentage of women is required.

- *Women's representation in politics*:
  - (i) In other to taking account political elites, the percentage of women in parliament has been

[11] Three polynomial time variables were included in the model: time (year-1980), time^2, and time^3, the results with these variables were similar to obtained results.

included. This variable is based on data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU).

- (ii) The inclusion of Lag dependent variable one election is motivated by theoretical and methodological reasons. This variable allows it to draw substantive conclusions testing for potential time effects. Simultaneously, the introduction of lag is useful to eliminate almost all serial correlation across time error, since it implicitly includes lagged error terms into the specification (Beck 2006:4).

2.4. Empirical findings

In this section, I present the empirical evidence which is displayed in Table 1 and Table 2. Table 1 shows the results of these models using panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). Model 1 exclusively includes sociocultural factors. The variable 'women in tertiary education' is positive and statistically significant. Cultural measure reveals the same trend. The percentage of Protestants in a country is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that countries with larger Protestant majorities have more women in cabinet. The two subsequent models also test 'political institutions' and 'women's representation in politics' hypotheses by including political and representational variables as well as a direct measure of time. Interestingly, Model 2 shows how the inclusion of these variables reverses the sign and the significance of some 'sociostructural' factors. The percentage of women enrolled in

tertiary education becomes statistically non-significant, and the percentage of Protestants shifts to a negative coefficient, showing that political institutions have higher explanatory power than sociocultural factors, thus rejecting H1 and H2.

Model 2 also presents evidence concerning the political factors. The systemic level variable has the expected sign. Specialist ministerial recruitment has a positive effect on levels of female ministers and reaches statistical significance at the $p<0.5$ level. As posited in H3, specialist countries tend to field more women in executive office than generalist systems. That is, in countries with a specialist system of recruitment, the proportion of women in cabinet rises by 3.4%. One could argue that this effect is conditioned by the number of women in parliament, but this finding holds even when controlling for this last factor. Regarding the factors affecting the number of cabinet seats available, the sign of the coefficients takes the expected direction. On the one hand, the impact of cabinet size is positive, meaning that the larger the number of seats in a cabinet, the larger the number of women appointed as ministers. On the other hand, the variable coalition has a negative effect thereby indicating that fewer women are appointed in coalition governments than in single-party cabinets. Nevertheless, none of the two variables are statistically significant, thus I cannot accept H4a or H4b. [12]

[12] It should be noted that various interactions effects have been tested in all the models reported, with no significant results. In particular, no significant interaction was observed between coalition and party ideology, type of

As regards the party organization, as suggested in H5, party ideology is statistically significant at the $p<0.5$ level. In the light of the results, left-wing parties in government appoint more women than right-wing parties. Party ideology emerges as a strong predictor for the percentage of women in cabinets. Thus, a country where the government's ideology is left-wing is estimated to include about 2.83 more female ministers than other ideologies. The coefficient for centre parties is also positive but not significant. These results contradict previous findings that disregarded party ideology as a relevant variable (Davis 1997; Reynolds 1999, Siaroff 2000). Also, the hypothesis H7 is accepted, the variable 'percentage of women in parliament' is positive and significant at the $p<0.1$ level. The marginal effects are positive indicating that when the percentage of women in parliament increases, women's representation in cabinets also augments. Yet, this variable only becomes statistically significant when a threshold of 20% of women deputies is reached. For example, whereas a country with 20% women in parliament increases 2.62 points the marginal effect over women's representation in cabinet, it does so by 3.61 points in countries with 40% women deputies.

[Table 2.1. about here]

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government (minority/majority status) and coalition nor type of recruitment and percentage of women in parliament.

However, as previously said, the composition of each government is not independent of the previous one in the same country, and that serial autocorrelation is likely to be present. In order to correct for this and to test for any potential within-country contagion on women's representation in cabinets, model 1 and model 2 introduce a lag-dependent variable ('lagged dv'). This variable is positive, albeit not statistically significant in any model, which indicates that previous governments within the same country do not determine the percentage of women in subsequent governments, rejecting H8. This result might be explained by the variables 'ideology' and 'quotas'. That means that party ideology and party quotas have a stronger impact on the presence of women in cabinet than the 'lagged variable'.

As party ideology is highly correlated with party quotas, the two variables cannot be included at the same time.[13] Model 3 addresses whether the adoption of a party quota may increase women's presence in executive office. Party quota is shown to have a strong and positive effect, enabling me to accept H6. One point increase in party quotas means that the percentage of women in cabinet goes up by 2.87 points. That is, prime ministers, whose party has adopted a voluntary quota, will appoint more female ministers than prime ministers from parties that have not assumed quotas. This effect is slightly stronger than the ideology factor. The analysis suggests that

[13] In order to distinguish more accurately the effects of ideology and party quotas, which are correlated, an interaction has been introduced. This interaction term does not reach statistical significance meaning that the effect of party quotas is not different across party ideology, although it should also be noted that very few right-wing parties have adopted quotas.

party quotas do introduce intra-party "contagion" into executive office. Regarding the remaining variables there are no relevant changes in model 3, compared to the previous analysis; that means that the variables have similar coefficients as previous models. As occurred with the 'women in parliament' variable, the effect of party quotas is only statistically significant when a certain threshold is achieved. Thus, adjusted predictions indicate that party quotas only have an effect on 'women in executive' when parties' quota reserves at least 20% of positions for women. Specifically, the marginal effect shows that parties with a 20% quota appoint 2.74 more women in the executive than those not having such measure while parties having assumed a 50% quota select 2.96 more women than the rest.

The time variables show negative coefficients, implying that in previous decades cabinets are less likely to appoint women than nowadays (2001-2010). Given the trends presented in Figure 2, these results are not surprising: over time, there are more women in executive office. During the period 2001-2010, women had a greater chance to be appointed to a cabinet post. Thus, the model shows that a cabinet nominated in the 1980s or in the 1990s contained 18 and 7 points fewer women, respectively, than a cabinet formed during the 2000s.

As previously highlighted, this chapter also seeks to disentangle whether and how the effects of political and cultural factors have been modified over time. Table 2 splits the sample into two subsets

of cases: 1980-1995, for the first period, and 1996-2010, for the second period. The reason for using 1995 as the cutting point is that by the mid-1990s several international calls had been launched urging states to increase women's presence in decision-making positions, including the United Nations Beijing Platform of Action (1995); the European Union IV Equality Plan of Equality of Opportunities (1996), and the Council of Europe's recommendation 96/694/EC.

Some relevant differences between the two periods are evident. Table 2 shows that time has a strong effect on the different variables. In the 1980-1995 period, only one coefficient associated with 'sociocultural factors' variables is statistically relevant to determine the number of women in government, namely the percentage of women enrolled in tertiary education. Among political factors, the variables that achieve statistical relevance are: type of recruitment (specialist systems being more advantageous to women's presence), cabinet size (larger cabinets appoint more women) and ideology (centrist parties tend to appoint more women). Regarding women's representation in politics, the percentage of women in parliament in this period is not statistically relevant. Turning to the 1996-2010 subset, supply factors have a distinct impact on the dependent variable. The percentage of women in tertiary education is negative and is statistically not significant. Regarding the proportion of Protestants, this variable becomes positive and significant in the 1996-2010 period. As expected, women will fill more cabinet positions in countries with a higher

percentage of Protestants. The relevance of this variable in the second term could be due to the fact that the percentage of Protestants captures the Scandinavian countries, which have higher percentage of Protestants, and are more committed with gender equality.

In this second period (1996-2010), some political factors appear as key explanatory variables. It is worth noting that the effect of the type of ministerial recruitment becomes negative and non statistically significant. Whereas the results reported in model 1 and 2 showed that specialist systems recruited more women for executive office than generalist systems, in the period 1996-2010 the opposite prevails. That is, in the last period, generalist systems tend to include more women in cabinet than specialist systems. This may suggest that the increasing presence of women in parliaments in recent times can help women in obtaining access to cabinet in generalist systems. As I have explained above, generalist systems tend to select ministers from inside the ranks of parliament, and women have gradually been appointed to the stepping-stone positions, such as chairs of committees, thus facilitating their access to cabinet.

There are some interesting results regarding the number of available position. On the one hand, cabinet size has the expected positive relationship (the larger the number of seats a cabinet has the higher the percentage of women appointed) in the first period, while in the second period cabinet size inverts the sign of its coefficient. This

could be explained by the strong effect of other political variables, which may diminish the effect of 'number of seats'. On the other hand, turning to coalitions, the analysis shows that, from 1996 to 2000, women are more likely to be appointed in single-party governments than in coalition cabinets, as suggested in the theoretical section, whereas in the previous period this variable was not significant.

[Table 2.2. about here]

Another interesting difference found in the analysis of these subsets is related to party ideology. The variable 'left-wing party', which was non-significant in the period1980-1995, has a strong and positive effect in the second period while the effect of centrist parties becomes much weaker. So, when a left-wing party leads the government, women's representation rises by 16.1%. This confirms our previous expectations: in recent years New Left values have become more relevant, incorporating group representation into left-wing parties' platforms (see Caul-Kittilson 2006). Likewise, party quotas are only significant in the second period, since it is in this last term that voluntary party quotas have an effective implementation or quotas rates are higher. In this sense, governing parties that have adopted gender quotas appoint 12.9% more women than those that have not embraced positive action within their organisation. Another expected effect concerns the variable 'women in parliament'. This factor, which was statistically non-significant in the 1980-1995 period, has a strong effect in the 1996-2010 period.

This result might be explained by the low levels of women's representation in all parliaments in the early 1980s.

In these models, the lag variable and the time variables are control variables. The lag variable is negative in all the periods, although it is only statistically significant in the 1980-1995 period. That is, the first period is statistically relevant for women's presence in previous governments within the same country, to determine the percentage of women in the subsequent one. It is likely that this effect is not significant in the second period, due to the relevance of other political variables. The time variable is positive and significant in all the models. This measure of time has been calculated as $year_{ui}$ minus baseline year ($year_{ui}$ -1980), since in this analysis I could not introduce the dummy variable for decades due to the fact that the dataset is split into two periods of time.

To sum up, sociocultural, politics institutions and women's representation in politics variables behave differently throughout time. Thus, sociocultural variables have an impact on the two periods analysed, however in each period, different sociocultural factors are relevant to account for women's presence in cabinet. Conversely, political factors and women's representation in politics have had more impact in recent decades. In the 1996-2010 period, some of the political variables and women's representation in politics appear as explanatory variables to account for women's presence in cabinet, such as coalitions, party ideology, party quotas and women in parliament.

2.5. Conclusions

This chapter has shed new light on the under-studied area of gender and cabinets. Specifically, it has sought to disentangle which factors are associated with the presence of women in cabinet in advanced industrial democracies from 1980 to 2010. While previous analyses have predominantly focused on cultural factors using cross-national analysis, this chapter shows that several political variables need to be taken into consideration in longitudinal perspective to improve the understanding of the appointment of women.

Empirical evidence supports most of the hypotheses drawn in this study. Concerning sociocultural factors, the analysis shows that women in tertiary education and a country's percentage of Protestants do not achieve statistical significance or their coefficients shift sign when models control for political, representational and time factors. This means that political and representational factors are more important than sociocultural factors. Regarding political institutions, the type of ministerial recruitment affects women's presence in cabinets, with specialist systems appointing more women to the cabinet. However, the empirical analysis does not provide enough support to conclude that the number of available seats has a significant effect on the appointment of women to cabinets – neither cabinet size nor coalition. Conversely, party organisation matters for the appointment of women to cabinets in advanced industrial democracies. Left-wing governments correlate positively with

women's representation in the executive. In addition, analysis confirms that parties with gender quotas increase women's presence in cabinet. Although more refine is needed on methodological aspects, party quotas are even a stronger factor to raise women in cabinet than others political factors as party ideology. As regard to 'women's representation', women in parliament are also relevant factor to explain women in cabinets. However, the contagion of women's presence in executive office is not confirmed.

This chapter has also addressed how the impact of sociocultural, political and representational factors have evolved over time. The findings suggest that while some 'sociocultural' factors are important for explaining women in cabinet office, especially in the 1980-1995 time period, some political variables have emerged in recent decades as strong explanatory factors to account for the presence of women in cabinet. The empirical analysis shows that as time goes by generalist systems have become more important to women's presence in cabinets due to the gradual increment of women in parliament. Coalitions matter in the second period (1996-2010), showing that this type of cabinet includes fewer women. Seemingly, left-wing ideology, party quotas and women in parliament turn into a relevant factor to explain the incorporation of women in executive office.

So, these findings are also highlighting that these political and representational factors, which affect positively to women's presence in executives -as party ideology, party quotas and

percentage of women in a parliament -, may be more easily modified than sociostructural variables. Thus, it may be more important pushing for the empower women in politics through these measures than waiting the slow process required for changing the structural variables. Although other types of quota should be taken into account by gender and cabinets' literature, party quotas have proven an effective for increasing women in cabinets, thus the implementation of these would be an effective measure to guarantee gender parity cabinets. Indeed, the adoption of party quotas may produce contagion across institutional arenas. That is, when party assumes a gender quota this would indirectly promote women's representation on both cabinets and parliaments.

Finally, this chapter opens several avenues for further research. Firstly, research on women's descriptive representation should go beyond counting proportions and turn attention to the effects of women's appointments. On the one hand, there are grounds to believe that horizontal segregation (gender-biased allocation of portfolios) affects subsequent careers. For one thing, portfolios vary in the degree of media attention they receive, the relative authority within the cabinet, and the career opportunities that they may eventually create. On the other hand, horizontal segregation might also affect duration of tenure, specifically its impact on government reshuffles. Secondly, one can argue that the prime minister's gender may also affect the number of women appointed to ministerial posts. Provided that office-holders at the cabinet level are recruited to a large extent through personal networks (see Kopecký and Mair

2012), and that these networks present an acute gender bias –they are basically composed of and by male peers who provide each other with contacts for career progression (Bochel and Bochel 2000) – female prime ministers may be expected to include more women in cabinets than male prime ministers. Unfortunately, this analysis cannot be carried out for national governments. To the best of my knowledge, I have used the largest sample examined recently by scholarly research on gender and cabinets and which has 203 observations - still, I can only find 17 observations of female prime ministers over-time (which correspond to 8 female prime ministers). Yet, other governments may provide the opportunity to examine whether, to what extent, and under what conditions, female prime ministers may 'let the ladder down' to other women.

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Tables and figures

Figure 2.1. Women's representation in advanced industrial democracies (%) (2010)



Source*:* Own elaboration based on Quality of Government (2010).

Figure 2.2. Women in cabinets in advanced industrial democracies (1980-2010)



Source: Own elaboration.

Table 2.1.: Panel-corrected standard errors analysis: Full model (1980-2010)

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Gender Equality			
Women in tertiary education	0.010(.005)**	0.005(.007)	0.006(.006)
Protestants	0.053(.023)**	-0.009(.004)**	0.010(.021)
Political Institutions			
Specialist		0.811(.399)**	0.591(.335)*
Coalition		-0.146(.200)	-0.185(.200)
Cabinet size		0.023(.018)	0.017(.019)
Left-wing parties		0.250(.107)**	
Centre parties		0.417(.368)	
Women in Politics			
Party quotas			0.007(.003)*
Women in parliament		0.050(.015)***	0.048(.015)***
Lagged dv	0.052(.099)	0.004(.101)	0.013(.103)
Period			
1980-1990		-0.536(.329)*	-0.479(.323)
1990-2000		-0.231(.188)	-0.194(.179)
Constant	-2.602**(1.193)	0.769(.944)	0.061(1.310)
Observations	174	174	174
Wald	12505.03	8555.42	343.35

Dependent variable: (Log) Percentage of women in cabinet.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

Table 2.2. Panel-corrected standard errors analysis by periods

	1980-1995		1996-2010	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Gender Equality				
Women in tertiary education	0.021(.011)*	0.022(.011)**	-0.001(.010)	-0.006(.010)
Protestants	-0.012(.048)	-0.024(.041)	0.049(.015)***	0.053(.017)***
Political Institutions				
Specialist	1.886(.514)***	1.776(.511)***	-0.289(.185)	-0.104(.225)
Coalition	0.049(.322)	0.019(.318)	-0.065(.162)***	-0.066(.159)
Cabinet size	0.053(.016)***	0.048(.015)***	-0.069(.044)	-0.080(.046)*
Left-wing parties	0.284(.185)		0.301(.088)***	
Centre parties	0.901(.453)**		0.155(.130)	
Women in Politics				
Party quotas		0.006(.005)		0.006(.003)**
Women in parliament	-0.012(.029)	-0.011(.027)	0.031(.012)**	0.036(.012)***
Lagged dv	-0.312(.123)**	-0.298(.111)***	-0.072(.165)	-0.073(.164)
Period				
Time	0.120(.048)**	0.120(.043)***	0.039(.021)*	0.029(.017)*
Constant	-2.305(3.065)	-1.416(.2.654)	0.528(.830)	0.516(.779)
Observations	78	78	96	96
Wald	691.46	11716.59	135,11	755.49

Dependent variable: (Log) Percentage of women in cabinet.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

3. Gender biases in portfolio allocation: Examining the cabinets of advanced industrial democracies

Abstract

Portfolio allocation is decisive for the distribution of power and public visibility among cabinet ministers. Indeed, some portfolios have been defined as the core of government. In examining the factors that explain ministerial appointments to the most prestigious portfolios, this chapter will pay special attention to the operation of gendered patterns in cabinet formation. While the sexual segregation of portfolios has already been documented, the fact that most previous studies are predominantly single-case descriptive analyses has not allowed the unpacking of the underlying individual and institutional determinants behind this phenomenon. To fill this gap, this chapter uses an original dataset of ministerial appointments from 23 advanced industrial democracies, covering the period 2004–2011. The results show that factors such as educational level, seniority in politics, former ministerial experience and political resources increase the likelihood of being appointed to a prestigious portfolio. Nonetheless, some of these factors have heterogeneous effects across gender – inasmuch as they provide an advantage only to men, such as experience in party office, expertise in the purview of the portfolio and seniority in politics. Simultaneously, other factors such as having children only diminish women's chances of getting a prestigious portfolio. Additionally, no significant differences are found across type of recruitment. Portfolio allocation under specialist and generalist systems presents very similar patterns.

3.1. Introduction

Although cabinet formation is an important political event, the understanding of ministerial selection, especially beyond national boundaries, is still poorly documented, and comprehensive cross-country analyses are still pending (Strøm, Müller and Bergman 2008; Dowding and Dumont 2009). Presidents and prime ministers may use cabinet appointments to send a clear signal about what policies they wish to implement and what social groups they wish to prioritise (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009). Portfolio allocation is also decisive for the distribution of power and public

visibility among cabinet ministers. Indeed, not all portfolios have the same value within a national executive (Druckman and Warwick 2005). To put it differently, ministries are not equally important in the government (Browne and Franklin 1973: 458). Portfolio allocation usually determines how influential ministers will be over governmental policy decisions (Druckman and Warwick 2005: 18).

Hitherto, the question of who gets the most prestigious portfolios remains partially unanswered. To fill this gap, this chapter will examine the factors that explain ministerial appointments to the most prestigious portfolios in a broad sample of cabinets across advanced industrial democracies. It will pay special attention to the operation of gendered patterns in cabinet formation. Although the sexual horizontal segregation (the over-representation of men and women in different types of ministries) of portfolios has been already documented, and in particular the disproportionate presence of men in the most prestigious portfolios (Borrelli 2002, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005, Krook and O'Brien 2012), previous studies have not managed to disentangle whether it can explained by supply- or demand-side factors. While supply-side explanations emphasise the individual characteristics of candidates, the gender biases and even the overt or covert discrimination exerted by the selectors are the focus of demand-side accounts (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Are there differences in the resources and characteristics that women and men bring to the pool of available and qualified ministers for the distribution of the most

prestigious portfolios? Or do prime ministers and presidents discriminate against women ministers by allocating them less prestigious portfolios despite possessing resources that are as valuable as their male counterparts?

Previous studies on portfolio allocation have been predominantly single-case descriptive analyses (Austen-Smith and Banks 1990, Blondel and Thiébault 1991, Almeida et al. 2005, Dowding and Dumont 2009) which have not allowed the unpacking of the underlying individual and institutional determinants behind this phenomenon. The only exceptions are the works by Winter (1991) and Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009). While the former is now outdated and did not examine gender biases, the latter cannot capture the effect of institutional factors since the sample is reduced to presidential systems with a specialist type of recruitment (i.e. USA and Latin American countries). To overcome these problems, the empirical analysis of this chapter builds on an original dataset of ministerial appointments from 23 advanced industrial democracies, including both parliamentary and presidential democracies as well as specialist and generalist systems, for the period 2004–2011.

The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The first section reviews the types of classification used to define the importance of the various portfolios. The second section develops the theoretical expectations on the individual and institutional factors that may account for appointments to prestigious portfolios.

The third section describes the method, variables and data used in this study. The fourth section presents the empirical evidence. Finally, the last section discusses the main findings and concludes.

3.2 Classifying portfolios

The specialized literature has identified several ways of comparing cabinet portfolios. In this section, I review the most common classifications and assess them in the light of methodological consistency and robustness. Table 1 presents all classifications and compares their portfolio distribution.

Firstly, some scholars have classified portfolios into high, medium and low prestige portfolios. Erikson (1997) and Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson (2005) determine 'prestige' according to the resources (i.e., budget and personnel) and expected public attention portfolios receive. Typically, and to name but a few, high-prestige portfolios include economy or defence; medium-prestige ministries cover health or education; and finally, low-prestige portfolios include culture or family. This classification presents some problems. According to Desserud (1997), budgetary authority over high-spending departments might not necessarily be a good indicator of political power. Furthermore, federal or decentralized countries differ in where the major responsibilities for certain functions lie. Since departmental resources may be unevenly distributed across tiers of government in different countries,

comparisons between countries with different levels of decentralization may be problematic.

Secondly, cabinet portfolios have been categorized as having a stereotypically 'feminine', 'masculine', or 'neutral' policy domain (Davis 1997, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson 2009, Krook and O'Brien 2012). This classification is based on whether the ministry's competencies deal with aspects traditionally associated with the public sphere (masculine) or the private sphere (feminine) – with the neutral category including those portfolios that do not fit clearly into either of the first two groups. As Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009) note, some caveats are worth mentioning. On the one hand, this classification mixes two different aspects, namely policy domain and prestige, and an automatic association is made between masculine portfolios and high prestige and feminine portfolios and low prestige. Indeed, when this classification is combined with the previous one, we find a mixed picture, with some masculine portfolios having a low or medium prestige, such as science and technology or agriculture (see Table 1). On the other hand, this classification may suffer from an endogeneity effect since the assessment of the policy domains is measured in practice through the gendered distribution of portfolios (proportions of men and women in each category). That is, this classification groups as feminine portfolios those ministries traditionally allotted to women regardless of the importance of the specific portfolios.

[Table 3.1. about here]

Thirdly, other authors have constructed an indicator of portfolio relevance based on expert rankings (Laver and Scholield 1990, Skjeie 1991). Warwick and Druckman (2005) have conducted the most recent expert survey providing a classification of portfolio salience in 14 European governments with experience with coalitions. The distinguishing feature of this survey is that experts were asked to provide cardinal ratings for portfolios. Saliency typology has numerous advantages since it is country-specific and allows cross-national comparison. However, guidelines are not provided to experts who then distinguish the saliency of ministerial posts according to their own rule. As Studlar and Moncrief (1999: 384) suggest, "to rank cabinet ministers' prestige is a problematic task for some countries where specialists in regional politics often focus on one region, the one where their university is located". In addition, experts usually rank portfolios through pre-established classifications that do not build on the specific country characteristics. Furthermore, the fact that the countries sampled had at least some experience with coalition governments might affect the classification of the results. Under other coalitional formula or single-party governments, the rating of the saliency of portfolios might well differ.

Finally, portfolios have been classified as 'inner' or 'outer'. 'Inner' portfolios constitute the president's closest advisors and have regular access to him/her (such as defence, treasury, home office and foreign office), while "outer" portfolios deal with specialized

areas and may not even have regular access to the president (Weisberg 1987; Cohen 1988). This classification was developed in the US context which might make it unsuitable for other countries (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson 2014: 3). Nonetheless, I argue that the inner/outer classification is the one that allows for higher standardization. For one thing, the inner category substantially (if not completely) overlaps with high-prestige and masculine portfolios, as can be seen in Table 1. Furthermore, although portfolios and their importance may vary cross-nationally, inner portfolios represent the traditional 'core' of government and are found in every cabinet and in every country, thereby facilitating cross-sectional analyses. Another advantage of this classification is that, in most cases, inner portfolios are not combined with other ministerial areas, thus facilitating the classification of portfolios. For all these reasons, the inner/outer classification will be the one used in the empirical examination of the determinants of individual and institutional factors shaping portfolio allocation. I will now turn to the theoretical expectations that underlie these factors.

3.3. Individual and institutional factors determining portfolio allocation

Previous research has shown that ministers' social and political background might affect the portfolio they obtain within the government (Winter 1991, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009). This study distinguishes different individual variables (level and field of education, expertise, political background and gender)

and includes institutional factors that have not previously been considered, such as the type of ministerial recruitment. In this section, the theoretical expectations about the key factors that account for portfolio allocation are discussed and developed.

The first set of factors deal with educational variables. Ministers' educational levels may shape their skills, knowledge and performance in cabinet. Although most ministers have been to university or to college (Blondel and Thiébault 1991, O'Malley 2006, Kerby 2009), one may expect that presidents or prime ministers will tend to appoint to inner portfolios those ministers with the highest educational credentials to secure an effective departmental performance. Thus, the first hypothesis posits that *ministers with higher education credentials are more likely to be appointed to inner portfolios* (H1a). Similarly, inner portfolios might require legal expertise to deal with the complexities of these ministries. Indeed, most finance ministers have a legal rather than an economic educational background (Hallerberg and Wehner 2012: 5). Therefore, in light of previous findings, we posit that *ministers with an educational background in law are more likely to be appointed to inner portfolios* (H1b).

Another individual variable which might matter for portfolio allocation is ministers' policy expertise. Policy expertise measures whether ministers have "substantial experience relevant to the policy purview of their portfolio" (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2014: 6). Inner portfolios are crucial for presidents and

prime ministers, so they will tend to appoint expert ministers in order to strengthen the core of government with qualified skills. While previous research has not found this factor to matter for inner portfolios (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009; Winter 1991), Winter (1991) asserts that this result can be explained by the large proportion of ministers in his dataset who have expertise (79%). By using an original and larger dataset, this expectation can be tested in a more robust way. In this vein, the second hypothesis expects *ministers with expertise in the purview of their portfolio to be more likely to obtain an inner portfolio* (H2).

Political background is important regarding ministerial positions since the skills and abilities acquired within a previous political career might also be transferred into the cabinet. Political background can be divided into three different variables: seniority, experience in public office, and experience in party office. Seniority refers to the level of political experience office-holders have, and it captures the extent to which a minister is a political insider (i.e. number of years the minister has been in public office). Those who had been in public office for many years could arguably be regarded as being more 'accomplished' politicians than those with shorter political careers (Winter 1991). In the sense that they might be more experienced in knowledge, skills and in dealing with complex situations, as well as having more political connections. Thus, *the longer the political career (seniority) the more likely to get an inner portfolio* (H3a).

Regarding experience in public office, while some scholars have considered "positions in local, regional government and parliamentary positions or previous ministerial experiences [to] help toward a ministerial career" (Winter 1991: 53), others have only taken into account parliamentary experience, since it has been considered as the most socialising agent to ministers. This chapter only includes former ministerial experience since executive office is the apex of a political career where politicians may have the chance to specialize in specific fields and acquire connection with other powerful actors (Blondel 1991, Etzion and Davis 2008). In so doing and by only taking into account ministerial experience, it allows me to distinguish between the effect of having experience at a higher echelon of politics and the experience in other political arenas, such as parliamentary experience, already captured by seniority in politics. So, one could expect that former experience as a minister offers valuable skills and political connections to be appointed to an inner portfolio. This idea can be expressed as follows: *Ministers who have former experience as ministers are more likely to be appointed to prestigious portfolios* (H3b).

Government has traditionally been considered as 'party government', since a fair number of party officials are usually found in cabinets (Winter 1991). Holding a position in the national party bodies may constitute a valuable organizational resource to obtain a ministerial post. Recent studies show that ministers who have held party office are not more likely to be appointed to prestigious portfolios (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson

2009). However, previous results might be influenced by the exclusive focus on presidential systems, where parties do not play a key role as they do in parliamentarian systems. Thus, as this study has included a substantial number of parliamentary countries, it can be expected that *ministers having held party office are more likely to be appointed to a top portfolio* (H3c).

The literature on gender and cabinets accounts for the lower presence of women in cabinets (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005, Krook and O'Brien 2012). Yet, knowledge is still rather limited about how women ministers are distributed among portfolios. Although previous studies have admitted that women ministers were too few in number to analyse their portfolio allocation based on individual characteristics (Blondel and Thiébault 1991), research using aggregate data has reported a pervasive sexual segregation in portfolio allocation (Borrelli 2002, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005, Krook and O'Brien 2012). There are grounds to believe that gender is not an isolated factor to obtain an inner position, but that it interacts with other social and political factors, such as those presented above. Specifically, similar levels of policy expertise and political backgrounds might have heterogeneous effects across gender. Also, having children might affect differently women and men ministers due to women's higher constraints in the reconciliation of work and family time and the gender-unfriendly operation of political institutions (see Campbell and Childs 2013). Therefore, *I expect*

*women to be less likely to be appointed to inner portfolios than men, regardless of their individual characteristics (*H4).

Finally, institutional factors should be included in the equation, since individual characteristics are nested into a particular institutional system. Previous research has neglected the effect of different types of ministerial recruitment, which strongly correlates to systems of government. [14] In other words, most presidential systems are considered specialist systems, whereas some parliamentary systems are treated as generalist, albeit with a substantial number of specialists. This distinction is relevant since the type of recruitment might impact on ministers' profiles and subsequent portfolio assignment. Blondel and Thiebault (1991: 13-14) have suggested that ministers' profiles vary across types of recruitment. However, this theoretical expectation has not been empirically tested yet.

Under specialist systems, ministers are selected based on their expertise in a particular policy area rather than on their past political experience. Many ministers might be selected from outside the ranks of parliament, which suggests a greater permeability to political outsiders. This might benefit those ministers who are more educated and have a stronger expertise but less seniority in public office. Instead, under generalist systems, ministers tend to have a long-standing political background, and are usually selected from inside the ranks of parliament (Davis 1997). Similarly, party politics

[14] The correlation between these variables is 0.384 ($p<0.01$)

is not a key factor in ministerial appointments under presidential systems (Weisberg 1987, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009) whereas under parliamentary systems, the role of parties in politics is stronger (Müller 2000). For this reason, I expect ministers appointed under generalist systems to have held party office and have more seniority in politics. The level of education and expertise under generalist systems may be less important. In addition, generalist systems might have fewer women in important positions since relevant parliamentary positions or party office, which are stepping stones to the cabinet, are usually occupied by men (Shedova 1997, Valiente et al. 2005). This leads me to posit that *specialist and generalist systems prioritize different personal and political characteristics in the appointment to inner portfolios* (H5).

3.4. Data and methods

To study ministers' profiles and portfolio allocation, I have created an original dataset including information on ministers' profiles and routes to political office (before appointed in cabinet), and portfolio allocation (once appointed). I have obtained this information from biographical sketches from national parliaments, governments' official websites, newspaper reports and from *Who's who in politics*. Moreover, I collected the different portfolios that ministers have held from *Keesing's World News Archive*. Most of these variables are coded following the reference codebook of the study, *'Selection and Deselection of Political Elites'* (SEDEPE 2010). The dataset includes 396 individuals who have held the rank of cabinet

minister in 23 advanced industrial democracies in the period 2004-2011 (excluding prime ministers and presidents). Women ministers represent 30% of the sample, a significantly higher percentage than previous studies, in which women represented barely 18% of the sample (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009) or a meagre 6.2% (Thiébault 1991). The scope of this analysis has been limited to advanced industrial democracies in order to achieve a certain degree of homogeneity in the levels of socio-economic development across the observed units, while letting type of recruitment vary. The analysis focuses on democracies from North America, Europe and Australasia, to allow for the expansion of previous recent research which has mainly focused on the US and Latin America. The cases that have been considered in this study are cabinets terminated between one and four years before the data was collected (July 2012 - January 2013) (see appendix).

The dependent variable is defined following Cohen (1988). I coded as inner portfolios those that represent the core of government: finance/treasury/budget, economy, foreign affairs, defence and interior. These portfolios take value 1, while all the rest take value 0. I have also coded vice-presidencies as inner ministries since, in parliamentary countries, the vice-president is a powerful figure with important powers. In most countries, the portfolios are not single portfolios, but are combined with other portfolios. For example, education might be coupled with science in one country, while in others we might find a combination of education and labour. Following Warwick and Druckman (2006), the criterion adopted to

deal with this complexity is to identify the core-units post, that is, only the preeminent portfolio of the couple is coded.

The independent variables used to test my hypotheses are the following:

- *Education:* Dichotomous variable that captures ministers' educational attainment. Secondary and tertiary education take value (0), and post-tertiary education (MA/PhD) is coded as (1).
- *Field of study:* Categorical variable that classifies the different fields of study in engineering (baseline), economics, social sciences and law.
- *Expertise in the field of their portfolio:* Dichotomous variable constructed following Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009). Expertise in the field of portfolio captures whether ministers have an educational background or previous political/work experience in the specific purview of their portfolio.
- *Seniority:* Dichotomous variable defined as (1) if the minister has been in any political office for 10 or more years (at the national, regional or local level), or not (0).
- *Public office:* Dichotomous variable that codes whether a minister has previously held a position in the national executive (1) or not (0).

- *Party office:* Measures if ministers held party office (national party executive bodies) before their ministerial appointment (1), or not (0).
- *Women*: Female ministers are coded as (1), and male ministers are coded as (0).
- *Type of recruitment:* Distinguishes between 'generalist' systems (0) and 'specialist' systems (1).[15] This classification has been created following Davis' (1997) and Siaroff's (2000) indexes.
- *Children:* Dichotomous variable, which captures if a minister has children (1) or not (0).

To properly address the main aims of this chapter, I will run a logistic regression since the dependent variable is binary (inner/outer portfolios). Cluster errors are used with a view to correcting the correlation among errors.

3.5. Empirical findings

Do the individual characteristics of ministers explain the sexual horizontal segregation found in portfolio allocation? To illustrate the social and political background of ministers and their

[15] 10 countries of the sample are generalist systems whereas 12 countries are included in the specialist systems (Davis 1997). All presidential and semi-presidential systems are classified as specialist. Generalist: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand. Specialist: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, USA.

differences across sexes firstly I look at the prototype profile of ministers, using the mode of the different variables considered. As can be seen in Table 2, 54% of cabinet members hold a graduate degree and they have specialised mostly in social science (35%) and law (33%). 60% of ministers have not had expertise in their portfolio. Also, their previous occupation has been 'politician' in most cases (88%), with 72% of them having national legisaltive experience and 46% having previous ministerial experience. Furthermore, 58% of ministers have had more than 10 years service in politics. While most ministers are affiliated to a political party, only about a third have held an office in their parties' national executive bodies. Most of them have either more than three children (36%) or two children (33%). The majority of ministers in the sample were born between 1951 and 1970 (65%), meaning their average age is 60 year old at the time of holding office.

Women only represent 16.5% of inner portfolios while they account for 30% of ministers. However, the results show that female and male ministers have more similarities than differences in their social and political background. Ministers are similiar in education, expertise and party office across gender. Gender differences are more pronounced in socio-demographic characteristics than in political background. Women are significantly more likely to have a social science educational background, compared to men who are more specialized in law. Also, women are more likely to be younger than male ministers. The average age for female ministers is 51 years old – 10 years younger than male ministers. In addition, Table

2 shows that women in ministerial positions have had to forego having children. While just 9.1% of male ministers do not have any children, the figure for female ministers raises to 45%. The only political background difference between men and women is seniority. The percentage of women who have more than 10 years of seniority is lower than men's, 51% and 61% respectively. This is probably because women are, in general, younger than their male counterparts and have entered politics later. Therefore, the disimilarities in profiles between men and women are concentrated more in social than in political characteristics. This is important since the latter are those which shape the ministers' qualification, and are therefore, the key determinants of portfolio allocation. These results suggest that supply-side factors are not explaining the sexual horizontal segregation.

[Table 3.2. about here]

Table 3 displays evidence of the determinants of appointments to inner portfolios using a logistical regression. The first model includes all the variables to account for profiles in inner portfolios. The subsequent models incorporate interaction terms to identify the potential 'demand-side' differences between male and female ministers, that is, if at similar characteristics and resources women are disadvantaged in access to inner portfolios, sexual segregation may be attributed to the discrimination of selectors (i.e. presidents and prime ministers). Model 1 in Table 2 illustrates which individual factors are important in getting an inner portfolio. In line

with hypothesis H1a, the level of educational matters. Having a postgraduate degree is positive and statistically relevant. This means that those individuals that have a postgraduate degree are 14% more likely to get an inner portfolio than ministers with a lower educational level. Contrary to hypothesis H1b, neither 'economics' nor 'law' have a positive or significant effect. Therefore, having a specialized education in law is not important when selecting ministers for inner portfolios.

[Table 3.3. about here]

The results also show a positive correlation for 'expertise' but, like in Winter (1991) and Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009), it does not achieve statistical relevance, thus rejecting hypothesis H2. Related to political background, seniority, which is defined as ministers that have 10 years or more in any political level is positive and achieves statistical significance. [16] Those ministers, who have a long trajectory in politics, that is, who have served more time in any political level, are 12% more likely to be appointed to inner portfolios (H3a). Also 'public office' has the expected sign and is statistically significant (H3b). Being an ex-minister increases the likelihood of being appointed to inner portfolios by 9%. Furthermore, ministers who have held party office are 8% more likely to get into inner portfolios than ministers who have not

[16] The model has also been run including seniority as a numerical variable, that is, defined as the number of years at any political level, and it is statistically significant.

occupied these positions (H3c). These results permit me to accept H3a H3b and H3c.

As regards other individual characteristics, the variable 'women' is negative and statistically significant. This means that being a female minister reduces the likelihood of being appointed to an inner portfolio by about 20% compared to male ministers, accepting H4. As for the control variable, 'children', it is also negative but not statistically significant. In other words, those ministers who have children are equally likely to obtain an inner post in cabinet than those who do not have any children.

In order to test if 'demand-side' discrimination exists – if women with equal resources to men are less valued by the selector to be appointed to an inner portfolio – different interactions have been included in subsequent models. It should be noted that when adding the interactions, all other factors included in previous models behave similarly across gender. Model 2 adds the interaction term 'partyoffice*sex'. Previous models have shown that having held a party office is an important factor in being appointed to an inner portfolio. However, the interaction term, supported by Graph 1a, shows that this effect is not homogeneous across sex. Thus, for men, it is positive and statistically relevant to have held a position in party office. However, for women it does not have the same relevance, having experience in party office has no effect on her appointment chances This different effect could be explained by the party positions that women and men occupy. Usually, party

positions, which may be stepping-stones to ministerial positions, are occupied by men (like party leaders and top-level cadres). Parties are not gender-neutral structures but are still male-dominated organizations with embedded gender power relations (Caul-Kittilson 2006; Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013, Verge and De la Fuente 2014). Power brokers in politics are predominantly men with selection practices usually biased toward the 'in-group' which may disadvantage women in regard to access to prestigious positions (Niven 1998, Tremblay and Pelletier 2001).

[Graph 3.1. about here]

In Model 3, a second interaction has been included, 'expertise*sex', in order to show whether expertise operates differently through gender. This interaction term is also statistically relevant. As Graph 1b indicates, men are more likely to achieve inner portfolios than female ministers with the same expertise, as found by Borrelli (2002) in the US case. Model 4 incorporates the interaction 'children*sex'. As Graph 1c illustrates, the interactive term is negative and statistically significant for female ministers with children, meaning that women with children have fewer opportunities to hold an inner portfolio than men with children. In this light, motherhood might reduce the opportunities for achieving an inner ministerial position. Society remains deeply gendered, with women undertaking most domestic work, including childcare (Hook 2010). As previous studies on parliaments have pointed out, motherhood affects the pool of available women, since political life

is extremely time consuming and women find it more difficult to balance work and family time (Verge et al. 2014, Childs and Webb 2012). As Table 2 illustrates, 45% of women in cabinets do not to have children, with the mean of children for women (1.6) being lower than for men (2.4). Furthermore, as political institutions are gendered (Kenny 2007, Krook and Mackay 2011), not only do these women have to deal with politics in male-oriented organizations, with a gendered bias in political recruitment, but they also have to work in family-unfriendly contexts (for example, where there are long working hours and/or ministers may live and work in two different locations). This institutional configuration through non-codified rules and norms may constrains women as political actors (Chapell and Waylen 2013).

Model 5 introduces the interaction 'seniority*sex'. As can be seen in Graph 1d, this term is statistically significant, meaning that men are more likely to be appointed to an inner portfolio than women with the same seniority. This pattern may support the 'old boy network' theory, where networks of male peers provide each other with information and contacts to facilitate their presence in inner portfolios (Blochel and Blochel 2000). Senior posts are a scarce resource and men are still not willing to share this resource with women since they are newcomers to politics (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009: 6). Overall, cabinets' selectors seem to be actively discriminating against women since they systematically appoint more men than women into inner portfolios despite no relevant gender differences in terms of resources and capacities.

These results are robust since analyses have also been undertaken with different dependent variables. [17]

[Table 3.4. about here]

Finally, marginal effects have been designed in order to assess the effects of the type of recruitment on ministers' profiles. This is the unique indicator which allows the comparison of two different groups, in this case, specialist and generalist systems. Table 4 shows the probability of being appointed to an inner cabinet post for each type of recruitment. Results do not support Blondel and Thiebault's (1991) theoretical expectation that ministers' profiles vary across type of recruitment. The most important factor in being appointed to an inner portfolio is the variable 'sex'. Female ministers are 20% less likely to be appointed to these cabinet positions than males in generalist systems. Interestingly, and contrary to my expectations, specialist systems are slightly worse for female ministers than generalist systems, with a woman's likelihood of being appointed to an inner portfolio registering 22% less than men. The second factor that matters for the appointment to an inner post is the level of educational attainment. Those ministers that have a postgraduate education in generalist systems have 12% more chances of being appointed to an inner portfolio. In specialist systems, having had a formal education provides a 14% increase in

[17] The same analyses have been carried out with Druckman and Warwick's (2005) classification (saliency portfolios). The interactive terms are also found to be significant.

those attaining an inner ministry (14%) than in generalist systems. The third key factor that accounts for being appointed to an inner portfolio is 'seniority'. Thus, in generalist systems, those ministers that have seniority are 12% more likely to be selected as inner ministers, which contrary to theoretical expectations, is a similar percentage to those in specialist systems (13%). In addition, ministers who have held a party office in generalist systems have about 7% more probabilities of holding an inner portfolio than those who have not held any position in party office. This factor is similar under specialist systems (8%). Furthermore, ministers with 'public office' are 9% more likely to be nominated to an inner portfolio for both systems. Additionally, ministers with expertise in their portfolios are appointed in 3% more cases than those who do not have experience in their portfolios for both types of recruitment. Consequently, the routes to achieving an inner ministry position are fundamentally similar for both types of recruitment, which leads me to reject H5.

3.6. Conclusions

This chapter has sought to disentangle which individual and institutional factors are important in determining portfolio allocation and the potential differences across gender and type of recruitment. Concerning previous background, the analyses demonstrate that educational level matters. Those ministers who have a postgraduate degree are more likely to get an inner position. Regarding political background, seniority is important for deciding

the position of ministers in cabinet. Those ministers who have a long trajectory in politics are more likely to be appointed to an inner portfolio. Furthermore, having political experience as a minister is a determining factor when appointing ministers to inner posts. The findings suggest that ministers who have held party office are more likely to get inner ministries than ministers who have not occupied these positions. The results confirm that gender reduces the likelihood of being appointed to an inner portfolio, particularly women ministers are less likely to be appointed to an inner portfolio compared to men ministers.

The analysis also sought to disentangle if the over-representation of men in the most prestigious portfolios can be explained by supply-(individual characteristics) or demand-side factors (openness of selectors to women). The results show that female and male ministers present more similarities than differences. The few gender differences are more pronounced in socio-demographic characteristics than in political background. This finding is important since political resources are stringer determinants of portfolio allocation. Accordingly, supply-side factors do not explain the sexual gender segregation. Precisely because women ministers have similar political resources to their male peers, the chapter demonstrates that prime ministers and presidents discriminate against women ministers by allocating them to less prestigious portfolios. Women with the same political resources as men are systematically undervalued. Specifically, the results show heterogeneous effects of political resources across gender. Having

held party office is not relevant for getting a top portfolio for female ministers while it is for male ministers. Whereas men with expertise in the purview of their portfolio are more likely to be appointed to inner portfolios, the likelihood does not increase for women experts. Also, women with the same seniority as men are less likely to be selected as an inner minister. In addition, having children only negatively affects female ministers. In light of these results, it can be concluded that cabinets are still male-dominated and gendered institutions.

The chapter also shows that there are no relevant differences across type of recruitment in the determinants for allocating inner ministerial positions, the socio-demographic and political factors being rather similar across systems. Finally, a greater understanding about how portfolio allocation operates together with the resulting political consequences will require further study. There are grounds to believe that the gender-biased allocation of inner portfolios might affect subsequent careers. Portfolios vary in their degree of parliamentary contact, the amount of media attention they receive, the relative authority within the cabinet, and the career opportunities they may eventually create (i.e. the extent to which they can be used as a stepping stone to other relevant offices). This omission in the literature is critical since portfolio allocation might provide different political or professional opportunities for ministers' subsequent careers.

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Table 3.1 Distribution of Ministries by Inner/Outer, Prestige and Policy Domain

	Core		Prestige			Policy Domain		
Portfolios	**Inner**	**Outer**	**Higher**	**Medium**	**Lower**	**Masculine**	**Neutral**	**Feminine**
Vice-president	x		x			x		
Defence	x		x			x		
Finance	x		x			x		
Economy	x		x			x		
Home Office	x		x			x		
Foreign Affaires	x		x			x		
Agriculture		x		x		x		
Fisheries		x		x		x		
Communication		x		x		x		
Construction		x		x		x		
Enterprise		x		x		x		
Industry		x		x		x		
Labour		x		x		x		
Religious affaires		x		x		x		
Science and Technology		x			x	x		
Transportation		x		x		x		
Justice		x		x			x	
Environment		x		x			x	
Public works		x		x			x	
Planning and Development		x		x			x	

Table 3.1 (cont.) Distribution of Ministries by Inner/Outer, Prestige and Policy Domain

	Core		Prestige			Policy Domain		
Portfolios	**Inner**	**Outer**	**Higher**	**Medium**	**Lower**	**Masculine**	**Neutral**	**Feminine**
Civil Service		x						
Energy		x		x			x	
Housing		x		x			x	
Minority affairs		x			x		x	
Parliamentary affairs		x			x		x	
Displaced Persons		x			x		x	
Regional affairs		x			x		x	
Reform		x			x		x	
Sports		x			x		x	
Tourism		x			x		x	
Children and Family		x			x			x
Culture		x			x			x
Women's affairs		x			x			x
Health		x		x				x
Social Welfare		x		x				x
Heritage		x			x			x
Education		x		x				x
Youth		x		x				x
Aging		x		x				x

Note: Druckman and Warwick's (2005) classification has not been included since each portfolio is coded differently according to countries' characteristics.

Table 3.2. Ministers' profiles by gender and type of recruitment (in percentage)

			All		Generalist		Specialist	
	Total (N)	Total (%)	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Education								
No college	29	7.14	7.09	7.26	2.88	6.82	11.19	7.50
Graduate degree	220	54.19	56.38	49.19	69.06	56.82	44.06	45.00
Post-graduate degree	157	38.67	36.52	43.55	28.06	36.36	44.76	47.50
Fields of Study								
Science	41	11.14	10.16	13.39	9.45	9.76	10.85	15.49
Economy	75	20.38	22.27	16.07	15.75	21.95	28.68	12.68
Social Science	129	35.05	31.64	42.86***	34.65	36.59	28.68	46.48
Law	123	33.42	35.94	27.68	40.16	31.71	31.78	25.35
Occupation								
Private sector	31	7.35	6.44	9.45	2.01	0	10.96	14.63
University	18	4.27	3.73	5.51	1.34	4.44	6.16	6.10
Politician	373	88.39	89.83	85.04	96.64	95.56	82.88	79.27
Expertise	165	39.86	40.34	38.71	31.08	26.67	50	45.57

Notes: *P*-values are for a chi-square test (where percentages are reported) or a one-tailed t-test of means (where means are reported). Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

Table 3.2. (cont.) Ministers' profiles by gender and type of recruitment (in percentage)

			All		Generalist		Specialist	
	Total (N)	Total (%)	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Seniority								
0-2 years	74	18.05	15.38	24.19*	10.20	17.78	20.86	27.85
2-10 years	97	23.66	23.08	25.00	22.45	26.67	23.74	24.05
+10 years	239	58.29	61.54	50.81*	67.35	55.56	55.40	48.10
Mean years served	410	14.50(0.07)	15.59(0.71)	12.12(0.89)	15.26(0.79)	12.84(1.32)	15.93(1.20)	11.70(1.19)
Experience								
Elected office								
Legislative experience	324	72.33	81.08	69.42***	93.29	93.48	65.91	54.67
Regional experience	56	12.9	14.86	9.92	14.02	8.7	15.91	10.67
Local experience	92	23.6	20.61	25.62	9.76	8.7	34.09	36
Appointed								
Ministerial experience	203	46.38	48.32	48.36	51.81	45.65	43.94	50
Public sector	71	17.54	16.13	16.94	14.2	10.64	18.44	20.78
Private sector	102	26.28	21.96	30.58	18.29	21.74	26.52	36

Notes: *P*-values are for a chi-square test (where percentages are reported) or a one-tailed t-test of means (where means are reported). Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

Table 3.2. (cont.) Ministers' profiles by gender and type of recruitment (in percentage)

			All		Generalist		Specialist	
	Total (N)	Total (%)	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Party Activism								
No Member	13	3.11	3.06	3.23	0.67	0	5.56	5.06
Member	303	71.06	71.53	73.60	76.00	71.11	66.90	75.00
Party Office	117	25.83	28.47	26.40	24.00	28.89	33.10	25.00
Gender	425	-	70.12	29.88	76.92	23.08	64.35	35.65
Children								
0	75	20.89	9.13	44.92***	9.73	43.90***	8.59	45.45***
1	36	10.03	6.22	17.80***	6.19	14.63	6.25	19.48
2	120	33.43	40.25	19.49***	37.17	21.95	42.97	18.18**
+3	128	35.65	44.40	17.80***	46.90	19.51	42.19	16.88
Mean children	359	2 (0.07)	2.41 (1.23)	1.16 (1.32)	2.36 (0.10)	1.19 (0.19)	2.32 (0.94)	1.10 (0.14)
Year born								
1930-1950	127	30.02	32.43	24.41	31.08	24.44	33.78	24.39
1951-1970	275	65.01	64.19	66.93	64.19	64.44	64.19	68.29
+1970	21	4.96	3.38	8.66***	4.73	11.11	2.03	7.32
Mean age	424	53.6 (0.04)	60.5 (8.5)	51.34 (8.4)	54.03 (0.74)	50.35 (1.44)	55.16 (0.65)	51.89 (0.92)

Notes: *P*-values are for a chi-square test (where percentages are reported) or a one-tailed t-test of means (where means are reported). Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

Table 3.3. The determinants of appointments to Inner portfolios (logistic regression)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Potsgraduate	0.856***	0.888***	0.848***	0.870***	0.856***
	(0.271)	(0.269)	(0.276)	(0.258)	(0.272)
Economics	-0.487	-0.42	-0.501	-0.458	-0.488
	(0.423)	(0.435)	(0.421)	(0.433)	(0.428)
Social Sciences	-0.0517	-0.0157	-0.0572	-0.112	-0.0513
	(0.418)	(0.433)	(0.417)	(0.392)	(0.423)
Law	0.512	0.542	0.503	0.459	0.504
	(0.363)	(0.355)	(0.367)	(0.360)	(0.358)
Expertise	0.24	0.237	0.298	0.206	0.249
	(0.274)	(0.276)	(0.290)	(0.280)	(0.272)
Seniority	0.737**	0.749**	0.732**	0.768**	0.622*
	(0.307)	(0.308)	(0.306)	(0.303)	(0.335)
Public Office	0.553*	0.553**	0.553**	0.550*	0.531*
	(0.283)	(0.280)	(0.281)	(0.294)	(0.289)
Party Office	0.495*	0.777**	0.496*	0.572**	0.494*
	(0.264)	(0.336)	(0.265)	(0.273)	(0.262)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
DV: Inner portfolio (value 1)

Table 3.3. (cont.) The determinants of appointments to Inner portfolios (logistic regression)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Women	-1.233***	-0.878**	-1.144***	0.301	-1.645***
	(0.289)	(0.393)	(0.363)	(0.654)	(0.564)
Children	0.0254	0.0791	0.0187	1.156**	0.00897
	(0.381)	(0.349)	(0.391)	(0.56)	(0.381)
Partyoffice*sex		-1.119			
		(0.811)			
Expertise*sex			-0.23		
			(0.558)		
Children*sex				-2.132**	
				(0.860)	
Seniority*sex					0.549
					(0.750)
Constant	-2.075***	-2.255***	-2.078***	-3.123***	-1.967***
	(0.456)	(0.460)	(0.460)	(0.582)	(0.454)
Observations	315	315	315	315	315

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
DV: Inner portfolio (value 1)

Graph 3.1: Predicted Probabilities





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Graph 3.1 (cont.): Predicted Probabilities





Table 3.4. Marginal effects of independent variables by type of recruitment

	Generalist systems	Specialist systems
Post-graduate degree	0.127**	0.140**
Economics	-0.076	-0.084
Social Sciences	-0.004	-0.004
Law	0.085	0.094
Expertise	0.034	0.038
Seniority	0.123**	0.136**
Public Office	0.088**	0.097**
Party Office	0.075*	0.083*
Female	-0.202***	0.223***
Children	0.004	0.004

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

Appendix

List of countries and cabinets included in the empirical analysis:

- Australia (2007-2010);
- Austria (2007-2011);
- Belgium (2007-2008);
- Canada (2006-2008);
- Denmark (2007-2009);
- Finland (2007-2010);
- France (2007-2010);
- Germany (2005-2009);
- Greece (2007-2011);
- Iceland (2007-2009);
- Ireland (2007-2008);
- Italy (2008-2011);
- Japan (2007-2009);
- Luxembourg (2004-2009);
- Netherlands (2007-2010);
- New Zealand (2005-2008);
- Norway (2005-2009);
- Portugal (2005-2009);
- Spain (2008-2011);
- Sweden (2004-2006);
- Switzerland (2008-2009);
- United States of America (2004-2009);
- United Kingdom (2007-2010).

4. Post-ministerial occupation in advanced industrial democracies: The role of political capital resources and gender

Co-authored with Tània Verge

Abstract

While previous research has focused on how ministers' credentials determine which portfolio they are appointed to, the post-ministerial occupation of former cabinet office-holders remains basically unexplored and the few existing studies have predominantly adopted a descriptive approach. This chapter fills this gap by providing theoretical and empirical leverage over the types of post-office occupation departing ministers hold. While controlling for institutional factors, the chapter seeks to tease out the contribution of political capital resources to explaining post-ministerial occupations. Also, given that both access to executive office and portfolio allocation are strongly gendered, it addresses the central question of whether post-ministerial occupations similarly present differential patterns for women and men. The empirical results of a cross-national comparison of 23 advanced industrial democracies suggest that seniority in politics, party office and policy expertise shape the distribution of post-office occupations, and that the impact of some of these political capital resources differs by type of ministerial recruitment – i.e. generalist or specialist. Results do not show, though, any effect for the type of portfolio (inner or outer) held while in cabinet. Strong gendered post-ministerial patterns are not found either, although some intriguing gender differences are observed.

4.1. Introduction

Among top national politicians, ministers enjoy the highest visibility and prestige, right after presidents and prime ministers. Being a minister is 'the apex of a political career' but, for this very same reason, to cease being a minister can be conceived of as 'a form of decline' (cf. Blondel, 1991: 153). Given the concentration of power in the executive branch, for most ministers, sitting in cabinet might be the end rather than a stepping stone to other

positions (Savoie, 1999: 241-2). Furthermore, sitting at the top may be relatively brief since cabinet is typically a short-term political office (Nichols, 1991: 160). Ministers may be political professionals, subject specialists, long-term or transient ministers but the median duration of ministerial careers is one single appointment (Bright, Döring and Little, 2012: 18). Therefore, as a popular saying goes, a minister can only aspire to eventually become an ex-minister.

This notwithstanding, the rewards of cabinet office may well expand beyond it thanks to the political and/or business connections gained while in office (Wong, 2002). Ministers' behavior is shaped by both policy concerns and strategic considerations (Dowding and Dumont, 2009: 2). Personal ambitions or perceptions of opportunities to fulfill those ambitions may lead cabinet members to weigh the costs and benefits of cabinet service for their future career (Nichols, 1991: 154; Theakston and de Vries, 2012). Not all former ministers, though, might have forged political or business links while in office nor may they wish to use such links to access new positions carrying power, status or wealth. For example, whereas Maria Van der Hoeven, a Dutch ex-minister of Economic Affairs (2007-2010 cabinet) became chief executive director of the International Energy Agency once the cabinet terminated, Jacqueline Cramer, who served in the same cabinet as minister of Environmental Planning, returned to her previous career as university professor. We can ask then, does serving in executive

office increase the likelihood of moving to other prestigious positions or is it just a career *tout court*?

Research on political elites in cabinets has mainly focused on routes to political office, how ministers are hired and fired, and how ministers' credentials determine which portfolio they are appointed to (Thiébault, 1991; O'Malley, 2006; Strøm, Müller and Bergman, 2008; Dowding and Dumont, 2009; Kerby, 2009; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2009, 2014). Conversely, post-ministerial careers have received scarce scholarly attention and the few existing studies have predominantly adopted a descriptive approach and are now outdated (Blondel, 1991; Nichols, 1991). As noted by Keane (2009: 282-3), the subject of ex-office holders is 'under-theorized, under-researched and under-appreciated'. The relevance of such a study has to do with the fact that several ex-ministers keep playing a relevant role in politics, business or civil society after leaving office, as it is the case for ex prime ministers and presidents, which may raise 'revolving doors' issues and expose conflicting interests between politics and business (Heclo, 1988; Donahue, 2003; Theakson and de Vries, 2012). Likewise, as Adolph (2013: 33) argues for central bankers, ministers' policy choices might be based on their career ambitions thereby potentially acting as agents of 'shadow principals'.

This chapter fills this gap by providing theoretical and empirical leverage over the types of post-office occupation departing ministers hold. Firstly, while controlling for institutional factors, we

seek to tease out the contribution of political capital resources to explaining post-ministerial occupations. Secondly, given that both access to executive office and portfolio allocation are strongly gendered (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2009; Krook and O'Brien, 2012; Dahlerup and Leyenaar, 2013), we address the central question of whether the post-office occupation of former ministers similarly presents differential patterns for women and men. Until very recently, the low proportion of women in cabinets did not allow studying this issue. In advanced industrial democracies, women accounted for 9% ministers in the 1980s, 20% in the 1990s, and 28% in the 2000s (Claveria, 2014). Therefore, the chapter aims to make a contribution to both the consolidated research on cabinets and the burgeoning literature on gender and executives.

Our original dataset includes information from cabinets of 23 advanced industrial democracies. The breadth of this dataset will allow us not only to move beyond national boundaries but also to draw broader lessons on post-ministerial occupations while taking into account the effects of institutional variables. The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the positions departing ministers hold right after leaving office and sets a simple typology to cluster post-ministerial occupations. It also elaborates on the theoretical expectations shaping 'life after cabinet office'. Section 3 presents the data and methods used and Section 4 discusses the results of the empirical analysis. The final section concludes and suggests new avenues for further research.

4.2. Life after office for departing ministers

As said in the introduction, the study of post-tenure careers of ex-office holders at the cabinet level remains an unexplored area, with the exception of the burgeoning literature on former presidents and prime ministers (Schaller and Williams, 2003; Keane, 2009; Theakston and de Vries, 2012; for regional prime ministers, see Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2011). To our knowledge, Blondel (1991) and Nichols (1991) are the only scholars having explored ex-ministers' post-office occupation. In his longitudinal study (1945-1984) of 14 Western democracies, Blondel identified the following post-ministerial occupations: cabinet re-appointments, parliamentary office, local and regional offices, and new careers (public enterprise, private business or international positions). He found that, among those ministers not returning to cabinet, 32% moved to the national parliament, 30% went back to their previous career, and 33% started a new career (Blondel, 1991: 161). Nichols' study, based on U.S. cabinets (1789-1981), clustered post-ministerial occupations into politics, law (private), general business (for profit, consultancy) and other private sector (non profit, academia…) where she located, respectively, 34%, 24%, 26% and 16% of American ex-ministers (Nichols, 1991: 196).

While Nichols classification is strongly determined by the US political and economic context, Blondel did not provide clear coding instructions and thus his classification cannot be properly replicated. Building on the work of these two authors, we suggest a

new typology with six categories. Since we focus on the immediate post-office position, it is necessary to distinguish those departing ministers who are appointed again in the subsequent cabinet, from those who are not. Among the latter, some of them might keep active in politics at other elective, appointed or partisan positions. Other ex-ministers might use the connections, prestige or reputation obtained while in cabinet to access new positions. In this case, we distinguish between those moving to private business as advisors or members of corporate boards from those that land in an international organization – including multilateral organizations, think tanks, and embassies. Finally, some ex-ministers fade away from public life and go back to their previous job. Of course, former cabinet holders may also retire, this decision being usually determined by age and health condition at the time of leaving the government. Table 1 compares our typology against Blondel's and Nichols' classifications.

[Table 4.1. about here]

The remainder of this section addresses Keane's (2009: 282) call for developing theoretical expectations on 'life after office' for departing ministers. We do so by drawing hypotheses for the various post-ministerial occupations we have identified but 'retirement', which is a residual category. It should be noted that scarce scholarly research in this topic leads us to adopt an exploratory approach and to build on the broader literature on political elites. In developing our theoretical expectations we will

assess both how individual resources may shape ministers' likelihood to moving to a specific post-ministerial occupation and the ways in which a key socio-demographic variable such as gender might trump ex-ministers' post-office options. As Schlesinger (1966: 118) points out, 'political careers do not proceed chaotically. There are patterns of movement from office to office'. The actual opportunity for ministers to reach a specific position depends on their individual resources (Stolz, 2003: 242). With regard to individual resources, we will mainly focus on 'political capital resources', including seniority in public office, type of portfolio held while in cabinet, partisan connections and policy expertise, a cluster of resources which we partially borrow from Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson's (2014) study on portfolio allocation.

4.2.1. Seniority

Seniority refers to the level of political experience office-holders have. As a political capital resource, it captures the extent to which a minister is a political insider. On the one hand, senior politicians might be highly valued by presidents and prime ministers since they have more experience in dealing with complex situations. Ministers in charge of promoting a controversial policy are similarly bound to need political skills (cf. Beckman, 2006: 127). Also, law-and-order departments –i.e. justice, defense, interior and foreign affairs– tend to require more experienced politicians than social and economic portfolios (Thiébault, 1991: 21; Rodríguez-Teruel, 2011).

Furthermore, ministers with long-standing seniority usually hold multiple ministries along their careers (Bright, Döring and Little, 2012: 17). Accordingly, we posit that *political insider ex-ministers are more likely to be re-appointed to cabinet* (H1). On the one hand, elites' political background is a key asset to getting a new political position (Borchert and Stolz, 2011: 109; De Winter, 1991: 53, see also Kerby, 2009). As noted by Riddell (1993: 251), many ex-ministers do re-adjust to the back-bench after being on the front-bench. This might entail moving from government to the national parliament, to governmental advisory boards or regulatory agencies, or to other elective or appointive positions at the regional level. In this vein, we expect that *ministers with a long-standing seniority in public office are more likely to get a new office in politics* (H2).

4.2.2. Inner portfolio

The portfolio departing ministers held while in office may also affect their future occupation. Firstly, some portfolios are more valuable than others (cf. Bright, Döring and Little, 2012: 3). Ministers holding 'core' or inner portfolios (such as defence, economy, finances, interior and foreign affairs) constitute the president's (or prime minister's) closest advisors and have more regular access to him/her than other ministers (Cohen, 1988; Borrelli, 2002). This might place them in a better position to keep their position in subsequent cabinets. Therefore, *ministers having held inner portfolios are more likely to be re-appointed into cabinet* (H3). Secondly, some departing ministers may be able to capitalize

on their prestige to land in private business as members of corporate boards or permanent advisors. As Etzion and Davis note (2008: 161), 'government service can serve as a conduit for joining the ranks of the corporate elite'. The information and experience acquired by ministers are highly appreciated by companies, particularly by large corporations in pursuit of close access to the government and bureaucracy (Blondel, 1991: 155). Our premise is that connections to interest groups, lobbies and business are not randomly distributed across cabinet portfolios. Ex-ministers having served in inner portfolios are better equipped with these assets. Therefore, *ministers having held inner portfolios are more likely to move to private business* (H4).

4.2.3. Party office

Party membership is not a requisite to be appointed as minister. Cabinets usually include ministers affiliated to the party(ies) in government as well as independent (non-affiliated) ministers (Neto and Strøm, 2006; Yong and Hazell, 2011). This being said, party membership brings organizational resources. Among other things, it provides access to party patronage, namely the 'power of parties to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life' (Kopecký and Mair, 2012: 3). Through 'institutional control' parties can reward their members with positions in the public administration, the governing boards of public sector companies, advisory committees and regulatory bodies, as well as secure them safe positions in electoral lists (see Kopecký and Spirova, 2012; Ennser-

Jedenastik, 2014). In this vein, we posit that *ministers holding party office are more likely to pursue their post-ministerial occupation in the political field* (H5). Similarly, *ex-ministers with party office will be more likely to access an international position* (H6), since some of these positions are in the hands of political parties to distribute (Blondel, 1991: 169) and the foreign service has been found to be largely touched by party patronage (Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova, 2012: 371).

4.2.4. Policy expertise

Policy expertise measures whether ministers have 'substantial experience relevant to the policy purview of their portfolio' (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2014: 6). Subject-expert ex-ministers might have been appointed to develop a specific policy or reform, thus empowering the government with qualified skills. Yet, democratic governments are not predominantly composed of expert ministers (Blondel, 1985: 196). A specialized knowledge might broaden the career prospects of these ministers to other arenas. Recently cross-border governmental organizations and civil society networks have expanded in unprecedented ways providing 'exes' with new opportunities, including advisory or advocacy roles (Schaller and Williams, 2003; Keane, 2009). For this reason, we expect *policy-expert ministers to be more likely to occupy an international position* (H7). Alternatively, precisely because of their subject expertise, these former ministers might envision cabinet office as a short break in their professional career. Returning to their

previous occupation is also easier for political outsider ministers since they have spent less time away from their original jobs and thus require no (or lesser) professional recycling. Although some professional politicians might also satisfy the criteria of policy expertise (Bakema and Secker, 1988), especially through their past political experience (Beckman, 2006), most specialized experts tend to be civil servants or university professors (Blondel, 1991). So, we posit that *policy expert ex-ministers are more likely to return to their previous occupation* (H8).

4.2.5. Gender

Women and politics researchers have pointed out women's relative scarcity of political capital resources compared to men. Firstly, the pervasive gender segregation of core portfolios, be they classified as 'inner', 'prestigious' or 'masculine' (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2009, Krook and O'Brien, 2012; Jacob et al., 2014), might prevent women from establishing both closer connections to the prime minister and links with business. Secondly, power brokers within political parties are predominantly men whose selection practices are usually biased toward the 'ingroup' (Niven, 1998; Tremblay and Pelletier, 2001), which may disadvantage women in regard to access to party patronage. Thirdly, women generally serve shorter political careers (Schwindt-Bayer, 2011; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2009). While this might indicate that women have lower political ambition than men, it should be noted that differential socialization patterns are still pervasive and

reconciliation of public life with family responsibilities is still tougher for women due to pervasive gendered social norms (Elder, 2004; Lawless and Fox, 2010). Also, the gender biases underpinning selection processes and broader gendered institutional settings, where male-oriented, family-unfriendly and often sexist culture prevails, might discourage women from pursuing a political career (Maestas et al., 2006; Celis and Wauters, 2010; Dolan et al., 2010).

Women politicians have also been found to leave public office when they feel they can no longer contribute to the policymaking process (Lawless and Theriault, 2005; Vanlangenakker et al., 2013). The international arena, though, might provide women with new avenues to pursue their advocacy for civil rights, peace, healthcare, education, children and the position of women in society, the substantive areas women have been found to specialize in (Schwindt-Bayer, 2006), as illustrated for example with the increasing number of women permanent representatives at the UN (Haack, 2014: 43). Simultaneously, transnational NGOs and advocacy groups championing values that resonate with women's traditional concerns have flourished and their impact in global governance is increasingly evident (Winslow, 1995; Tinker, 1999).
Overall, we posit that *women's relative deprivation of political capital resources compared to men will make them less likely to be appointed to public office (government or politics) or to be hired by private business. Conversely, women will be more likely to return to their previous job or to land in international organizations* (H9).

4.3. Data and methods

The initial dataset included 425 departing ministers from 23 advanced industrial democracies (see appendix 1), of which 70% are men and 30% women. Former ministers having retired right after leaving executive office as well as those who died while in office or very soon thereafter have been excluded from the empirical analysis. Prime ministers and presidents also need being excluded since their prominent position in cabinet provides them with much more power than ordinary ministers, which leaves us with 409 individual observations. Following Nichols (1991), we only examine those ministers integrating post-election cabinets, that is, the initial appointees of newly elected presidents. This selection of our units of observation is methodologically supported. As argued by Nichols (1991: 157), 'since in-term replacements, as opposed to initial appointments, are made in a different political context and reflect different presidential needs, the individuals appointed may also vary in the career paths by which they move to and from the cabinet'.

The ex-ministers included in our dataset belong to the post-election cabinets terminated between one and four years before the data was collected (July 2012/January 2013). The time span between cabinet termination and the observations is deliberately short since we are exclusively interested in the occupation ex-ministers hold right after leaving cabinet office. For each individual minister the dataset includes pre-cabinet, post-cabinet and biographical information,

which was obtained from both biographical sketches provided by national parliaments and governments' official websites as well as newspaper reports. Information on the portfolio ministers held was extracted from the Kessing's World News Archive. In coding the different variables, we followed SEDEPE's (2010) codebook.

As described in the previous section, our dependent variable, namely post-ministerial occupation, has five main categories: (i) New ministerial appointment in the cabinet formed after new elections have been held; (ii) Politics; (iii) Private business; (iv) International position, and (v) Return to previous job. Since our dependent variable includes alternative categories, in order to determine the factors shaping post-office occupation we will run a multinomial logit model. The independent variables comprise both political capital resources and gender. Given that the basic opportunity structure for post-ministerial occupations is also determined by institutional features we control for several systemic variables. Provided that the 23 countries are all economically advanced, socioeconomic factors are already controlled for. The empirical analysis includes the following independent variables:

- *Seniority*: This numerical variable counts the number of years a departing minister accumulates in any (appointed or elective) political office at any tier of government (national, regional or local) before being appointed as minister.

- *Inner portfolio*: Following Cohen (1988), the portfolios coded as relevant represent the core of government: finance/treasury/budget, economy, foreign affairs, defence and interior. Vice-presidencies have also been coded as inner portfolios. The variable takes value 1 for inner portfolios, and 0 otherwise.

- *Party office*: This variable captures whether ministers hold party office at the national level before or during their first ministerial appointment (1) or not (0). Non-partisan (independent) ministers are also coded as 0.

- *Policy expertise*: This dichotomous variable is constructed following Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2014). Expertise in the field of portfolio means that ministers have university education or previous professional experience in the purview of their portfolio. Although a more generous definition might also include political experience in the area of responsibilities of the portfolio, it produces larger differences when comparing governments (Beckman, 2006: 121), therefore we stick to the stricter definition.

- *Women*: Women ministers take value 1 while men ministers 0.

- *Type of recruitment*: It distinguishes generalist systems (0) from specialist systems (1). This classification follows Davis' (1997) and Siaroff's (2000) indexes. Our cross-national database includes 10 generalist systems under

which ministers are typically recruited from parliament (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand and UK), and 12 specialist systems where cabinets tend to be more populated with political outsiders (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and US).

- *Winner party*: Although one of the possible post-ministerial occupations is to re-enter cabinet, this option is only available when the party of the former minister is back into government after the new elections. Thus, this variable controls whether ex-ministers can actually be re-appointed into cabinet (1) or not (0).

- *Multilevel systems*: This variable captures whether countries have a regional tier of government (1) or not (0).

- *Legal restrictions*: This variable controls for the legal time restrictions (measured in months) imposed on ex-ministers with regard to membership of supervisory boards or management of companies in receipt of state contracts.

We acknowledge that all positions may not be equally appealing to politicians in terms of power, prestige and privileges. Although ex-ministers' ambition should also be considered, it is extremely difficult to grasp in quantitative analysis, so it will not be dealt with here – for a critical discussion on the impact of personal ambition, see Nichols (1991). Other systemic variables such as form of

government (presidentialist, semi-presidentialist or parliamentary) cannot be included either in the empirical models since it highly correlates with type of recruitment (0.384, $p<0.01$). Similarly, ex-ministers age must be excluded due to strong correlation with seniority (0.377, $p<0.01$).

4.4. Empirical analysis

Before proceeding to the analysis of post-ministerial occupations, we will first turn to the main descriptive characteristics of ex-ministers and their post-office distribution. As can be seen in Table 2, 32% of ministers had held an inner portfolio. This proportion is much higher among men ministers (39%) than among women ministers (17%), with statistically significant differences ($p<0.01$). Slightly over a quarter of ex-ministers held party office while in cabinet and almost 40% of them had policy experience in the purview of their portfolio. Although more male ministers than female ministers had held party offices or had policy expertise, differences are not statistically significant. In regards to seniority, a higher proportion of women can be considered political outsiders, with statistically significant differences. While 24% of female ministers had less than two years of political experience prior to their cabinet appointment, this is the case for only 15% of male ministers ($p<0.1$). Conversely, 61% of male ministers had over ten years of political experience, versus 51% of female ministers. Women ministers also tend to leave cabinet at an earlier age than their male peers since they are also younger at their first entry:

47.2% women ministers exited cabinets before their 50th birthday while only 32% men ministers did so. Finally, 85.4% of ex-ministers included in the dataset served the full term and only 14.5% were fired or resigned, with a similar pattern for men and women ministers.[18]

[Table 4.2. about here]

Where do departing ministers go after cabinet termination? Table 3 shows the frequency of ex-office holders' positions. The most popular post-cabinet occupation is politics (43%), followed by government (27%). Some ex-ministers are occupied in private business (13%), international positions (9%) and, to a lesser extent, return to their previous job (8%). Female and male ex-ministers show very similar patterns of post-cabinet positions and no statistically significant differences are found, which might well be due to the relatively low number of observations some categories include. From a descriptive point of view, the main gender differences are a lower frequency of women ex-ministers in politics and a higher frequency of women ex-ministers in international positions.

[18] Although it goes beyond the scope of this chapter, it should be noted that the reasons for exiting cabinet significantly differ by gender. Whereas the most common reason for men ministers is having obtained another office within or outside the government (35%, versus 19% for women), for women ministers it is dismissal – forced resignation in a general context of cabinet reshuffle (54%, versus 31% for men). Leaving for low departmental performance presents a similar occurrence in both male and female ministers (25% and 27%,

[Table 4.3. about here]

To determine the factors that lie behind the different post-ministerial occupations we have run a multinomial logistic regression. This technique does not provide direct coefficients for each category. Instead, coefficients are compared to those of the baseline category, which makes its interpretation not so straightforward. For example, provided that the reference category is D in a multinomial logit model with four categories the comparison is between the likelihood of event A with that of event D, that of event B with that of event D, and that of event C with that of event D (Liao, 1994). Table 4 summarizes the coefficients of the multinomial logistic regression for each category of our dependent variable (post-ministerial occupation) compared to those of the category 'politics', the baseline in our model. We have chosen this category since it is the most populated, as also found by Nichols (1991) and Blondel (1991), which allows us distinguishing this occupation from the other four alternatives. As 'politics' is the baseline category in the multinomial logistic regression its coefficients cannot be directly obtained. However, we can provide a global overview of the determinants of post-ministerial position using the average marginal effects, as displayed in Table 5. This strategy helps us compare the effect of explanatory factors across categories and allows for a clearer assessment of our hypotheses.

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respectively), but doing so due to sexual or corruption scandals only affects the former (10%).

Firstly, regarding political capital resources, as Table 4 shows, seniority matters chiefly to getting a political office, be it in government or in other political arenas. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant for all the non political post-ministerial occupations, namely private business, international positions and previous job. The comparison between the categories government and politics does not produce statistically significant differences, meaning that for both of them seniority is a valuable political resource. In Table 5 we can also see that departing ministers with more seniority have a higher probability of being re-appointed as a minister or getting a political position compared to less experienced politicians. Conversely, increased seniority depresses the probability of holding any other post-ministerial occupation. Therefore, we can accept H1 and H2.

Secondly, the multinomial regression shows that having served in an inner portfolio is not statistically significant for any post-ministerial occupation (Table 4). This indicates that ministers having held such portfolios are not more likely to obtain a prestigious position in government or in the private sector compared to ministers who get a new political position, thus rejecting both H3 and H4. The marginal effects show that inner portfolio produces on average a positive probability of returning to the previous job and of getting an international position for those ministers having served in core portfolios and a negative probability of getting a position in the private sector, in politics or in government for those who did not (Table 5). The fact that this variable does not reach statistical

significance in any category might suggest that some core portfolios have more influence in the private sector or are more valuable for corporations than others. For example, interior or foreign affairs ministers might have fewer connections to business than finance or budget ministers. Also, some outer portfolios might well be strongly connected to business, such as public works, energy and communications. [19]

Thirdly, holding party office mainly matters to getting a new position in politics. The coefficient is negative for all the categories of the dependent variable and its absence strongly determines moving back to the previous job ($p<0.01$) (Table 4). The probability of getting new political positions for former ministers who have party office is on average 9.3% points higher than for those lacking this political capital resource (Table 5), which leads us to accept H5. Partisan resources thus pay off in terms of gaining access to other offices in the political field to the patronage capacity of ministers' party. It should also be noted that the only other category with a positive probability is international positions. However, ministers with party office only increase 2% points their probability of moving to the international arena vis-à-vis independent ministers. This might indicate that international post-ministerial positions might not necessarily be regarded as a political reward. Therefore, we cannot confirm H6.

[19] We have also tested in our model a different classification of portfolios following Escobar-Lemon and Taylor-Robinson's (2014) economic, central and social portfolios clusters. This classification produces no statistically significant effects either.

Fourthly, as to policy expertise, the coefficient is negative for both politics and government and positive for the remaining post-ministerial occupations. Statistical significance is only reached in the category returning to the previous job (Table 4). For this reason, we refute H7 but confirm H8. Policy expertise is not a determinant resource to getting an international position but its probability is on average 2% points higher than for those lacking subject expertise (Table 5). However, as expected, the likelihood of returning to the previous job is 11% points higher for those ministers who are experts in the purview of their portfolio than for non policy-expert ministers. As said, most specialized expert ministers tend to be civil servants or university professors, for whom single-term appointments are more common.

Concerning gender, Table 4 shows that the most relevant effect resides in international positions, where more women are found ($p<0.1$). As can be seen in Table 5, the probability of getting an international position is on average 5% points higher for female ministers than for male ministers, which stands in sharp contrast with the category politics. The probability of getting new political offices is 5.8% lower for female ministers than for male ministers. Women's probability of being re-appointed in government is also 1.4% lower than men's. Conversely, women's probability of returning to their previous job is 1.9% higher than men's. Private business post-ministerial occupations show a similar likelihood for both sexes. Overall, these results lead us to partially accept H9.

[Table 4.4. about here]

With regard to systemic variables, the coefficient for specialist systems is positive and statistically significant for private business, that is, departing ministers under specialists systems are much more likely to get a position in corporations than to achieve other political positions, while the opposite is true for ex-ministers under generalist systems (Table 4). Looking at the average margin effects, we can see that under specialist systems departing ministers are 6.2% more likely to getting a job in private business and 2.7% more likely to achieving an international position than their peers under generalist systems. The probability of obtaining a political position is 13% points lower for departing ministers under specialist systems (Table 5). As previous research had noted, professional politicians are more common under generalist systems (Davis 1997, Borchert and Stolz 2011). Similarly, Blondel (1991: 173) found that ex-ministers moving to private business are predominantly concentrated in the 'less parliamentary' countries as well as in the UK whose type of ministerial recruitment is specialist.

The control variable 'winner party' has a positive coefficient for ex-ministers who are re-appointed in cabinet.[20] As already said, this variable captures whether ex-ministers' parties have won the

[20] We have also tested in a separate logistic regression model whether ministers who have been reshuffled are less likely to be re-appointed. This variable proves to be significant at the 1% level. As reshuffle only affects the 'government' category it has been excluded from the multinomial logistic regression.

elections or have joined the winning coalition, that is, if ex-ministers can actually be re-appointed into cabinet. The remaining systemic variables (multilevel and legal restrictions) do not reach statistical significance in any post-ministerial occupation.

[Table 4.5. about here]

Finally, given that the probability of getting a post-ministerial position may be accounted not by a single variable but by the combination of various variables, we have defined two ideal political profiles: political insiders and political outsiders. 'Insider' ministers are characterized as politicians who have a long-standing seniority (14 years or longer) prior to them being in cabinet, hold a party office and have served in an outer portfolio. This typical profile is set under generalist systems. Outsiders are qualified as more specialized ministers, with low seniority (two years at most), no party office and having held an inner portfolio. They also served under specialist systems. Table 6 presents the marginal effects for these two profiles and distinguishes male and female ex-ministers.

Among male political insiders, their highest probability is to get a political position (84%). Their likelihood of being occupied in private business (7%), international positions (1%) or moving back to their previous job (7%) is significantly lower. For female political insiders, post-ministerial occupations present the same order but some differences are worth noting. Women's probability of obtaining a political position is lower than men's (75%) but

women's likelihood of getting an international position is higher (14%). With regards to political outsiders, it comes as no surprise to find a relatively low likelihood of getting a political position but gender differences are sustained (33% for male ministers and 23.5% for female ministers). Like in the previous profile, women have a higher likelihood of obtaining an international position (26%, versus 17.5% for men) and of returning to their previous job (28%, versus 24% for men). Both male and female political outsiders have a much higher probability of being hired in private business (25% for men and 22% for women).

[Table 4.6. about here]

4.5. Conclusions

This chapter has build on the most under researched aspect of cabinets' literature, namely 'life after office', and aimed at contributing to the burgeoning research on gender and cabinets. It has shows that the most popular post-ministerial occupation is political office, followed by cabinet re-appointments and business positions. To a lesser extent, ex-ministers are also occupied in international positions and some of them return to their previous job. Therefore, serving in executive office is not just a career *tout court* but it increases the likelihood of moving to other prestigious positions in politics, the international arena or the private sector. Our empirical results indicate that post-ministerial occupations are shaped by different political capital resources. On the one hand,

while seniority and party office are especially relevant to getting a position in politics, policy expertise leads former ministers to return to their previous job. On the other hand, departing ministers with lower seniority or no party office experience have higher chances to land in private business or international positions. The type of portfolio held while in office is not a crucial variable for any post-ministerial position.

With regards to gender, patterns of post-ministerial occupation are rather similar among male and female ex-ministers. While no statistically significant differences are found, the largest descriptive differences indicate that women are less likely to obtain a position in politics or government, irrespective of them being political insiders or outsiders, but they are more likely to be occupied in international positions. This suggests that, despite the absence of strong gendered post-office dynamics, remaining in the core of politics is still tougher for women than for men. Our results also indicate that systemic factors matter, particularly the type of ministerial recruitment. Generalist systems offer departing ministers higher chances of obtaining new jobs in politics than specialist systems. This is consistent with the fact that, under generalist systems, ministers tend to have a long-standing seniority in politics and are usually selected from inside the ranks of parliament.

Given that our analysis only includes cross-sectional data, further comparative research is needed to go beyond immediate post-ministerial occupations and examine post-ministerial careers through longitudinal analyses. Finally, we also call scholars to refine some explanatory variables, such as the type of ministerial

profiles and connections corporations might be interested in when hiring ex-ministers. Also, further research could aim at classifying post-ministerial occupations hierarchically in order to determine the prestige of post-ministerial positions and to establish whether departing ministers move down or move up in both their post-ministerial occupations and careers.

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Table 4.1. Classifications of post-ministerial occupation

Blondel (1991)	Nichols (1991)	Our classification
1. Government (ministers)		1. Government (ministers)
2. Parliament	1. Politics (including elective, appointive, and partisan offices)	2. Politics (including elective, appointive, partisan offices as well as public enterprise)
3. Executive positions local/regional		
4. Public enterprise	2. Other private sector (academic, non-business…)	3. Back to previous job
	3. Law (private)	4. Private business (profit, consultancy, corporate boards members)
5. Private business	4. General Business (non-profit, consultancy)	
6. International position		5. International position (multilateral organizations, think tanks, and embassies)
7. (Retirement)		6. (Retirement)

Table 4.2. Basic descriptives of departing ministers

		Total (N)	Total (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)
Reshuffle		61	14.5	13.6	16.9
Relevant portfolio		144	32.6	39.1	17.5***
Party office		117	25.8	28.5	26.4
Policy expertise		414	39.8	40.3	38.7
Seniority (years)	0-2	74	18.1	15.4	24.2*
	3-10	97	23.7	23.1	25.0
	+ 10	239	58.3	61.5	50.8*
Age (at exit)	31-40	30	7.2	5.6	11.0**
	41-50	122	29.4	26.4	36.2**
	51-60	178	42.9	45.8	36.2
	61-70	85	20.5	22.2	16.5

Notes: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

.

Table 4.3. Distribution of post-ministerial occupations

	Total (N)	Total (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)
Government	111	27.1	26.9	27.6
Politics	176	43	45.5	37.4
Private business	53	13	13	13
International position	37	9.1	7.3	13
Previous job	32	7.8	7.3	8.9

Note: No statistically significant differences are found by sex

Table 4.4. The determinants of post-ministerial occupation

	Government	Private business	International position	Previous job
Seniority	-0.011	-0.047**	-0.048***	-0.137***
	(0.0204)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.039)
Inner portfolio	-0.259	0.039	0.392	0.605
	(0.410)	(0.471)	(0.466)	(0.625)
Party office	-0.432	-0.641	-0.129	-1.573**
	(0.400)	(0.571)	(0.563)	(0.765)
Policy expertise	-0.088	0.213	0.57	1.964***
	(0.366)	(0.321)	(0.383)	(0.555)
Women	0.123	0.177	0.716*	0.449
	(0.323)	(0.328)	(0.407)	(0.454)
Type of recruitment	0.851	0.979**	0.707	0.451
	(0.919)	(0.474)	(0.576)	(0.559)

Notes: Multinomial logistic regression. DV: Post-ministerial occupation. Baseline category: Politics. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

Table 4.4. (cont.) The determinants of post-ministerial occupation

	Government	Private business	International position	Previous job
Winner party	17.745***	-0.012	0.343	0.465
	(0.515)	(0.416)	(0.528)	(0.629)
Multilevel system	0.891	-0.376	0.087	-0.469
	(0.988)	(0.673)	(0.654)	(0.631)
Legal restrictions	-0.018	0.007	0.001	-0.024
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Constant	-17.064***	-1.220**	-2.096***	-1.344*
	(1.235)	(0.505)	(0.735)	(0.757)
Observations	364	364	364	364

Notes: Multinomial logistic regression. DV: Post-ministerial occupation. Baseline category: Politics. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

Table 4.5. Average marginal effect

	Government	Politics	Private business	International positions	Previous job
Seniority	0.003 (0.002)	0.008 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.007 (0.002)
Inner portfolio	-0.042 (0.049)	-0.008 (0.048)	-0.010 (0.037)	0.027 (0.039)	0.034 (0.041)
Party office	-0.024 (0.036)	0.093 (0.069)	-0.024 (0.033)	0.019 (0.043)	-0.063 (0.026)
Policy expertise	-0.040 (0.038)	-0.077 (0.049)	-0.017 (0.024)	0.025 (0.036)	0.110 (0.031)
Type of recruitment	0.052 (0.084)	-0.129 (0.082)	0.062 (0.041)	0.027 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.030)
Winner party	0.562 (0.057)	-0.387 (0.061)	-0.095 (0.033)	-0.049 (0.040)	-0.029 (0.031)
Multilevel system	0.088 (0.088)	-0.020 (0.088)	-0.042 (0.048)	0.004 (0.043)	-0.029 (0.032)
Legal restrictions	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)

Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4.6. Marginal effects for different ministerial profiles

	Men insider	Women insider	Men outsider	Women outsider
Government	0.0001 (0.0007)	0.0001 (0.00007)	0.0001 (0.00008)	0.00009 (0.00006)
Politics	0.840 (0.069)	0.758 (0.104)	0.333 (0.092)	0.235 (0.068)
Private business	0.074 (0.041)	0.0833 (0.083)	0.247 (0.081)	0.217 (0.077)
International position	0.075 (0.040)	0.143 (0.093)	0.175 (0.061)	0.260 (0.090)
Previous job	0.009 (0.007)	0.014 (0.013)	0.243 (0.090)	0.286 (0.133)

Insider: Seniority: 14 years, Relevant Portfolio: 0, Party Office: 1, Specialist: 0.
Outsider: Seniority: 2 years, Relevant portfolio: 1, Party Office: 0, Specialist: 1.
Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix

List of countries and cabinets included in the empirical analysis:

- Australia (2007-2010);
- Austria (2007-2011);
- Belgium (2007-2008);
- Canada (2006-2008);
- Denmark (2007-2009);
- Finland (2007-2010);
- France (2007-2010);
- Germany (2005-2009);
- Greece (2007-2011);
- Iceland (2007-2009);
- Ireland (2007-2008);
- Italy (2008-2011);
- Japan (2007-2009);
- Luxembourg (2004-2009);
- Netherlands (2007-2010);
- New Zealand (2005-2008);
- Norway (2005-2009);
- Portugal (2005-2009);
- Spain (2008-2011);
- Sweden (2004-2006);
- Switzerland (2008-2009);
- United States of America (2004-2009);
- United Kingdom (2007-2010).

5. Conclusions

This dissertation has explored cabinets with a gender perspective in a comprehensive manner. Taken together, the three empirical chapters presented have sought to better specify the determinants of women's presence in executive office, how power is distributed within cabinets and the role of political resources and gender on post-ministerial occupation. This thesis contributes to the broader scholarship on the executive branch, by showing how gender is one of the key factors shaping both recruitment to cabinet and the internal distribution of power within the executive branch. The aims of this dissertation have been addressed from a cross-national and longitudinal perspective. The next sections summarize and discuss the main findings and the last section suggests new avenues for further research.

5.1. Women's under-representation in cabinets

This dissertation contributes to the literature on gender and politics with different and novel insights. Regarding the factors that account for the presence of women in cabinet, the analysis shows that political and representational factors are more important than socio-cultural factors. It finds that; countries with specialist systems have a higher percentage of women in cabinet than generalist systems have; left-wing parties in government appoint more women; and an increasing number of women in parliament boost the number of women in cabinet. In addition, the analysis confirms that parties

with gender quotas increase women's presence in cabinet. This is important since this factor has not been included in previous studies and, although more refinement is needed on methodological aspects, party quotas are an even stronger factor for increasing the amount of women in cabinet than other political factors, such as party ideology.

This dissertation has also addressed how the socio-cultural, political and representational factors have evolved over time. The findings suggest that while some socio-cultural factors are important for explaining women in cabinet office, especially in the 1980-1995 period, some political variables have emerged in recent decades as stronger explanatory factors to account for the presence of women in cabinet. Therefore, the results challenge the time-lag theory, showing that the increase of women's presence in cabinet is not only due to the development of the country, but to other political factors, especially party quotas. As Dahlerup and Leyenaar (2013) note, party quota produces a long-term effect rather than an episodic change. This dissertation shows that the party-quota effect only manifests itself in the later period (1996-2010), when a significant number of parties have adopted party quotas and when they have reserved at least 20% of positions for women. It should be noted the effect of party quotas on cabinet composition is an indirect effect since this measure is not usually enforced on the executive branch. Still, the adoption of party quotas may produce a spill-over effect across institutional arenas, that is, when a party assumes a gender

quota, it promotes women's representation on both cabinets and parliaments.

5.2. Gendered segregation of cabinet portfolios

This dissertation has shown that the distribution of inner portfolios is determined by both socio-demographic characteristics and political resources. Educational level matters for achieve an inner portfolio. Those ministers who have a postgraduate degree are more likely to get an inner position. Seniority is also a key asset. Ministers who have a long trajectory in a political position are more likely to be appointed to inner portfolios. In addition, having political experience in the higher echelons help ministers obtain an inner portfolio. Furthermore, those ministers who have held party office are more likely to get inner ministries than independent ministers. Female ministers are less likely to be appointed to an inner portfolio compared to male ministers. Given that female and male ministers are more similar than different in both their socio-demographic characteristics and political background, and that the few existing differences are more pronounced in the former, we can conclude that the gender segregation of portfolios is chiefly explained by demand-side factors rather than by supply-side factors. Female ministers with the same social and political background than men are less likely to be appointed to an inner portfolio. Indeed, political resources such as policy expertise, seniority and party office have a heterogeneous effect across gender. These resources only increase male ministers' likelihood of being appointed to inner portfolios. Also, having children only negatively

affects female ministers in the pursuit of an inner portfolio. Thus, prime ministers and presidents are discriminating against women in the allocation of portfolios.

This finding offers relevant insights to the gender and politics literature. Firstly, if women ministers' policy expertise matters less for their being appointed to a specific portfolio, they might land in portfolios they are not experts in, which exposes them to more criticism on their performance (Verge and De la Fuente 2014: 73). As a consequence, women might be more likely to be reshuffled out of their cabinet position or they may have more difficulties in building a political career. This criticism may also impact negatively on women's symbolic representation. Undervaluing women ministers may reduce levels of citizen trust in women politicians. Secondly, this dissertation shows that while women have had to forego having children in order to be promoted in politics, men have not faced this dilemma. It confirms that institutions are gendered, with women having to deal with male-oriented and family-unfriendly contexts, where mothers are discriminated against. Taken all together, the results question the existence of equal opportunities for women ministers within cabinets.

5.3. Gender-neutral post-ministerial occupations?

The dissertation also provides new theoretical grounds and novel empirical evidence relating to the types of post-office occupation

that departing ministers hold. The empirical results suggest that seniority in politics, party office and policy expertise shape the distribution of post-office occupations, and that the impact of some of these political capital resources differ by type of ministerial recruitment – i.e. generalist or specialist. The results do not show, though, any effect on the type of portfolio (inner or outer) held while in cabinet. Despite both access to executive office and portfolio allocation are strongly gendered, the patterns of post-ministerial occupation are rather similar among male and female ex-ministers. One may argue that it is more difficult to discriminate against women who have survived the odds and made it to government and who have been able to navigate around all the barriers presented above.

This notwithstanding, while no statistically significant gender differences are found in post-ministerial occupation, the largest descriptive differences indicate that women are less likely to obtain a position in politics or government, irrespective of their being political insiders or outsiders, but they are more likely to be employed in international positions or to return to their previous occupation. This suggests that, despite the absence of strongly gendered post-office dynamics, remaining in the core of politics is still tougher for women than for men. The gender biases underpinning selection processes and the broader gendered institutional settings, might well discourage women from pursuing a political career.

5.4. The impact of institutional factors on executive dynamics

This dissertation not only contributes to the gender and politics literature, but also to the scholarship on executives. Specifically, it has provided a concrete measurement of the impact of institutional factors on executive dynamics, such as type of ministerial recruitment, a previously neglected macro-level variable. While the aggregate analysis indicates that the type of ministerial recruitment affects women's presence in cabinets, the individual analysis illustrates that there are no large differences across type of recruitment in the determinants of portfolio allocation, contrary to what Blondel and Thiébault (1991) had suggested. This lack of difference may be due to the fact that most of the ministers in specialist systems are also recruited from the political field, and the ministers' profiles are similar in both systems. One cannot disregard the fact that lack of differences between types of ministerial recruitment might also be accounted for the type of sample analyzed. To better capture the factors that account for ministers' appointment, we should look at the pool of potential ministers. However, this limitation is barely solved, given that is impossible to disentangle who is and who is not a potential ministerial candidate. Last, concerning post-ministerial occupation, results indicate that generalist systems offer departing ministers higher chances of obtaining new jobs in politics than is the case in specialist systems. This is consistent with the fact that, under generalist systems, ministers tend to have a long-standing seniority in politics and are usually selected from inside the ranks of parliament.

5.5. Avenues for further research

This dissertation opens up several avenues for further research. Firstly, studies could examine whether prime minister's gender may affect the number of women appointed to ministerial posts. Provided that office-holders at the cabinet level are recruited to a large extent through personal networks (see Kopecký and Mair 2012), and that these networks present an acute gender bias (Bochel and Bochel 2000), female prime ministers may be expected to include more women in cabinets than male prime ministers. Unfortunately, a cross-national analysis cannot be carried out yet. To the best of my knowledge, I have used the largest sample examined recently by scholarly research on gender and cabinets (203 observations) and, still, only 17 observations of female prime ministers are found within the time frame used (that correspond to 8 female prime ministers). Yet, other tiers of governments (either regional or local) may provide the opportunity to examine whether, to what extent, and under what conditions, female prime ministers may 'let the ladder down' to other women.

Secondly, as mentioned above, the gender difference in expertise in the area appointed entails women might be exposed to more criticism. Therefore, it would be interesting to study if women are more likely to be reshuffled out of their cabinet, or if there are differences regarding the reason for being reshuffled compared to men. Also, the gender horizontal segregation may impact negatively on the evaluation of women politicians. Further research could

explore how public opinion assesses different ministers across gender, particularly how stereotypes about women's political capabilities may influence ministers' evaluation.

Thirdly, further cross-national research is needed to go beyond immediate post-ministerial occupations and examine post-ministerial careers through longitudinal analyses. Also, some explanatory variables, such as the type of ministerial profiles and the connections with corporations, could be refined, since these factors might be relevant for hiring ex-ministers. Likewise, post-ministerial occupations could be classified hierarchically in order to determine the prestige of post-ministerial positions and to establish whether departing ministers move up or down in both their post-ministerial occupations and careers.

Finally, as said in the introduction of the dissertation, studies on women's descriptive representation in cabinets need to be complemented with research on the substantive and symbolic effects of their presence. It is especially relevant to analyze how power is internally distributed within ministries and what role ministers play in policy-making, specifically under what circumstances are women enabled to affect policy-making. Similarly, qualitative research is needed to map the informal or unwritten rules shaping the gendered ministerial recruitment and portfolio allocation as well as to identify the conditions that bring effective power in ministries. Overall, more research in the field is

required to fully grasp the gendered dynamics of the executive branch.

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