

Memory, Discourse and Interaction

Remembering in Context and History

Lucas M. Bietti

TESI DOCTORAL UPF / 2011

DIRECTOR DE LA TESI

Dr. Teun A. van Dijk (Departament de Traducció i Ciències del Llenguatge)



Mario Guillermo Refojo, in memoriam

Acknowledgements

I have many thanks to offer. The early stage of my research in Barcelona was partly funded by a mobility grant from the Spanish Ministry of Education. Since March 2009 my research has been funded by the co-tutelle Macquarie University Excellence Research Scholarship. My PhD experience also included two visiting fellowships in Germany, one at the Institute of Latin American Studies at the Free University Berlin and the other at the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology (BGHS). My thanks go to the BGHS for having offered me a short term visiting grant.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to those who voluntarily participated in the focus groups and interviews that I conducted during February and March 2008 in Buenos Aires. Without their disinterested participation, life experiences and heated discussions none of this thesis would have ever existed.

Many friends and colleagues provided intellectual and emotional support throughout my entire PhD experience, which began in Barcelona in the summer of 2007 and ended in Sydney three years later. To begin with, I would like to expressly thank my many friends and colleagues from Barcelona who provided advice and support in the early stages of my thesis: Diego Di Tello, Roger Falgas, Fátima Galiana, Alon Lischinsky, Ricardo Medina Audelo, and Agustín Verrastro. Then, I would also like to thank Francisco Ron, Brian Tompkins and Osvaldo Bietti for helping me with the logistics of my focus groups and interviews.

Special thanks are due to my advisors in Barcelona and Sydney: Teun van Dijk for his constant guidance and support, for believing in my work, and for teaching me how important hard work is in the development of an academic career, Annabelle Lukin for giving me the opportunity to continue my thesis at Macquarie University and for her support and detailed critiques of my work; and to John Sutton for encouraging me to continue my work in Sydney and for his academic advice in the field of memory studies.

I am very grateful to my immediate family (Liliana, Mario, and Matias) for their love and emotional support during the most difficult and rough times in my life. My greatest debt is to my wife Ola for always being there, for her endless love, for her constant encouragement and support, for understanding my passion, and for adjusting her life to my travelling PhD experience, which in the last 3 years did not allow us to feel a sense of home.

Abstract

This thesis proposes an integrated social and cognitive approach to discourse processes of autobiographical and collective remembering. This new perspective integrates discursive, cognitive and social approaches in order to examine how acts of situated remembering unfold in everyday life settings. In this thesis, I examine cognitive and discourse processes of remembering related to periods of political violence in Argentina, in general, and to the 1976-1983 military dictatorship, in particular. Previous investigations on memories about periods of political violence in Argentina have not dealt with the cognitive nature of these socially situated acts of memory-making. The empirical studies presented in this thesis examine acts of discursive remembering occurring in public and private settings, and seek to explore the intersection of public and private discourses about Argentina's traumatic past. Autobiographical and collective memories about the Argentinean troubling past is an excellent topic for exploring the interpenetration of the social, cultural, historical, and cognitive mechanisms involved in acts of socially-situated remembering.

Resumen

Esta tesis propone un enfoque socio-cognitivo para analizar procesos discursivos de memoria autobiográfica y colectiva. Esta nueva perspectiva interdisciplinaria en estudios de memoria integra teorías de estudios del discurso, ciencias cognitivas y ciencias sociales con el fin de examinar cómo la reconstrucción y comunicación de memorias individuales y compartidas se desarrolla en situaciones de la vida cotidiana. Se examinan procesos cognitivos y discursivos relacionados a períodos de violencia política en Argentina, en general, y en particular a la dictadura militar de 1976-1983. Investigaciones anteriores acerca de la reconstrucción y comunicación de recuerdos sobre períodos de violencia política en Argentina no se han ocupado de la dimensión cognitiva de estos procesos. Los estudios empíricos presentados en este trabajo se centran en explorar la reconstrucción y comunicación de memorias individuales y colectivas en contextos públicos y privados. De este modo, se propone examinar la intersección de discursos públicos y privados acerca del pasado traumático en Argentina. El análisis discursivo de una perspectiva socio-cognitiva de estos recuerdos individuales y colectivos nos posibilita explorar la interacción de los mecanismos sociales, culturales, históricos y cognitivos responsables de la reconstrucción y comunicación de memorias en actividades de la vida cotidiana.

Preface: My ‘piercing memories’ of the military dictatorship¹

On December 17th, 1976, eighteen year old Eduardo Raúl Germano was abducted in Rosario, Argentina. Following the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the 1976 coup d’état, Gustavo Germano, Eduardo’s brother, began working on the photography exhibition *Ausencias* (Absences). Born in 1964 in the Argentinean Province of Entre Ríos, Gustavo Germano started taking photographs of the journeys he made across Latin America in 1987. He worked as a journalist, photographer and graphic editor for various Argentinean newspapers and in 2001 moved to Barcelona, where he still resides. Five years later he started developing his photographic project *Ausencias* which has been running since October 2007 and has been exhibited in Spain, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, France, Italy, and Switzerland.

Ausencias consists of seven sets of two large scale photographs; in each pair the first photograph is taken prior to 1976, while the second one, taken recently, faithfully recreates the composition of the first, except for the *desaparecidos* (the disappeared) who are conspicuously absent. In one pair of photographs, entitled *The Germano Brothers*, the first is a snapshot taken in 1969 in which Gustavo Germano appears on the left, next to his brothers, with his eldest brother at the extreme right. In 2006, Gustavo Germano took the same picture. He is still on the left, standing next to his brothers, but there is an empty space. The eldest brother, Eduardo Raúl Germano, is missing.

As an Argentinean born in Buenos Aires thirty years ago, I do not have many personal recollections of the period of dictatorship, yet for me Germano’s photographs act as external memory devices (Donald, 1991), enabling me to reconstruct and re-encounter both the largely forgotten and unarticulated personal experiences as well as the socially shared memories about what happened under the dictatorship. In other words, these photographs produce what I term ‘piercing memories’ - malleable reconstructions of a shared past unfolding in the present. Despite the lack of first-hand knowledge and direct suffering – I do not have a missing relative - my ‘piercing memories’ of this traumatic period in Argentinean history are still very emotionally

¹ A version of this paper was recently published as follows: Bietti, L. (2011). My ‘piercing memories’ of the military dictatorship: a personal reflection. *Memory Studies* 4 (1), 83-87 [Special issue on Social Memory and Historical Justice] edited by Chris Healy and Maria Tumarkin. My warm thanks to Maria Tumarkin for her very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

loaded and play a central role in defining my identity and current research: for the last three years I have been developing a project on the discursive reconstruction and uses of collective and autobiographical memories of the violence in Argentina.

In order to provide a better explanation of my memory experiences, I will focus on the following set of photos:



Omar Darío Amestoy and Mario Alfredo Amestoy, 1975.
Ausencias, 1975 © Gustavo Germano. Reprinted with the
permission by the author



Mario Alfredo Amestoy thirty years later
Ausencias, 2006 © Gustavo Germano. Reprinted
with the permission by the author

Sunday, Spring 1975. The Amestoy brothers – Omar Darío and Mario Alfredo – are out in the countryside with their family, fishing and then having a barbecue at a popular spot in the Province of Entre Ríos. Thirty years later, Gustavo Germano could only take a photograph of Mario Alfredo. Omar Darío Amestoy, his wife, María del Carmen Fettolini, and their two children, María Eugenia (aged 5) and Fernando (aged 3) were murdered on the 19th of November 1976 in the tragic event that became known as the Massacre of Juan B. Justo street (Juan B. Justo street is located in the city of San Nicolás).

Roland Barthes's (1982) observations on photography - in particular, his notions of *studium* and *punctum* - can help interpret my memory experiences as triggered by Germano's snapshots. According to Barthes, the *studium* denotes the spectator's attraction to an image aroused by his or her cultural background, interests, and curiosity (Barthes, 1982:27). War and news photographs, for example, are good examples of the *studium* because they are loaded with immense recognizable cultural information. In short, the *studium* refers to a range of photographic meanings available and, to a large extent, obvious to everyone. The *studium* is, of course, inherent in Germano's family photographs. Undoubtedly, my background and personal experience

are sure to arouse an emotional reaction in me when confronted with images, which depict the fate of entire families deeply and irrevocably altered by the military dictatorship. Yet I recognize that the raw, painful evidence from everyday life in extraordinary circumstances can readily awaken empathy and a range of emotional responses in a vast number of people regardless of their backgrounds.

The *punctum*, on the other hand, is the kind of detail that calls forth an intensely private meaning by effectively ‘piercing’ our memories (Barthes, 1982:43). If you agree with Barthes that ‘every photograph is a certificate of presence’ (p.87), then what Germano’s images are showing us is that certification (and, therefore, presence) can be intentionally altered and withdrawn. The absences captured in these images gain their significance and power due to the certification of presence in the first photograph in each series. It is the binaries of presence / absence, past / present, and remembering / forgetting that seem to me to provide the key to understanding the *punctum* here - the subjective memory experience catalysed by an encounter with the images in the exhibition.

In the case of the images of the Amestoy brothers, what strikes me first is the vividness of the 1975 picture, which captures Omar Darío and Mario Alfredo literally ‘in motion’ going down the hill. This lively and moving picture full of youthfulness catches my eye and begins to jog my memories. In the second picture Mario Alfredo still appears ‘in motion’ going down the hill. However, an empty space and his grey hair mark the passing of time and of Argentine history. My life history is located between these two pictures, in a time-frame of thirty years they encompass. It is in this space between the two images that I begin to re-encounter myself in the vividness of my private memories and in the resurfacing of my experiences. This memory experience is not elicited directly by the images, but co-constructed by the interanimation between them and my personal history, which includes memory traces of past experiences: participating in massive demonstrations every March 24th to commemorate the anniversaries of the coup d’état, fragmented evocations of the tragedy in conversations around the dinner table, support I have given over the years to the relatives, friends, and human rights organizations in their search for truth and justice.

I go back in my mind to the first time that I learned what had happened during the dictatorship. I was in fourth grade in 1990 and my social sciences teacher mentioned a book called *Nunca Más* issued by the National Commission of the Disappearance of Persons in 1984. She gave us some explanation of what the book was about, which was

very courageous of her and encouraged us to find that much more about such an important part of recent Argentine history. A few years later I had the opportunity to continue my education at one of the two high schools connected to the University of Buenos Aires. Besides the fact that these schools are widely considered to be the most prestigious public schools in Argentina, they are two of the most politically active. Both were deeply affected by the military dictatorship: at my former high school 34 students and two teachers went missing during the dictatorship. Their disappearance has inspired the creation of several memorials and commemorative practices determined to keep the memories of those missing students and teachers alive in the everyday life of the school. These practices have been further sustained by the social sciences subjects in the school curriculum, in which the tragedy of the military dictatorship has been posited as a central theme.

My encounter with Germano's photographs has worked to bring my past into a present of absences and memories. Conversations with family and friends, scenes of films and fragments of books started coming randomly into my mind. As a child, I remember being told by my father that he had been jailed for a few days in the 1970s due to his 'political activism'. However, the circumstances of his detention were never made clear and this event in my family history was rarely discussed afterwards. I vividly recall being at a barbecue many years ago at a birthday celebration for a friend, when 'El Proceso' came up in discussion. My friend was a fellow member of the rugby team. We had known each other for almost ten years. At that party his parents argued that 'El Proceso' was a 'Dirty War' caused by the 'subversives', who committed terrorist attacks against military targets. I remember my friend's parents supporting their position by referring to a well-known case of the friend of the daughter of the Chief of the Federal Police who blew him up by placing a bomb under his bed. The bomber was a member of an armed, left-wing political organisation in the late 1970s. I could have reacted by saying something, which would have no doubt disturbed the celebration, but at the time I chose to keep silent. Every time I remember this event, I regret adopting such a passive, non-confrontational position.

My 'piercing' memories bring into the present the history of Rodolfo Walsh, an Argentine journalist, writer, playwright and translator, who in March 24th, 1977 published *La Carta Abierta de un Escritor a la Junta Militar* (Open Letter from a Writer to the Military Junta). The next day, after posting several copies of the letter, he was ambushed by a special military group and killed in the shoot-out. Until today, no

one has ever seen his body. In the letter he denounces the crimes and human rights abuses that were being committed by the perpetrators of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship and protests the economic reforms that were being imposed by the regime. My memories catalysed by Germano's images also include several scenes of torture from films about the dictatorship. Why does my memory select those deeply affecting and unsettling scenes? Is it because of their emotional purchase or because they depict the absolute breakdown of humanity? My 'piercing memories' prompted by Germano's images and guided by my *punctum* reinforce my individuality and belongingness at the same time. Many of them may be vicarious, stolen or even involuntary implanted, but they still play a pivotal role in defining my identity in the here and now.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	vii
Preface.....	ix
List of Figures.....	xix
List of Tables.....	xix
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Introduction	1
1.2. A cognitive and discursive approach to remembering	2
1.3. Remembering in Context	4
1.4. Remembering in History	6
1.5. The purpose of this thesis	7
1.6. Thesis overview	8
2. THE CONSTRUCTION OF A ‘COLLECTIVE MEMORY’ IN ARGENTINA.....	11
2.1. Introduction	11
2.2. The national security doctrine in South America.....	14
2.3. Time and actors: from the <i>desaparecidos</i> to <i>Cromañón</i>	15
2.3.1. The return of democracy.....	17
2.3.2. From the early 1990s to the financial crisis of Decemeber 2001	18
2.3.3. Political changes since the administration of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007)	20
2.3.4. Spreading social frameworks of remembrance: the case of <i>Cromañón</i>	22
2.4. Memory research in Argentina	25
2.4.1. The sciences of the mind	26
2.4.2. The social sciences and the humanities	27
2.4.3. Discourse analysis and memory studies	31
2.5. Final remarks	33
3. TOWARDS A COGNITIVE PRAGMATICS OF REMEMBERING.....	35
3.1. Introduction.....	35
3.1.1. Memory studies as transdisciplinary research field.....	35
3.1.2. Discourse and cognitive processes.....	36
3.1.3. A new integrative approach to processes of memory-making.....	37
3.2. Neuro-cognitive approaches to memory research: episodic, semantic and autobiographical remembering.....	38
3.2.1. Episodic memory.....	38
3.2.1.1. The constructive features of episodic remembering.....	39
3.2.2. Semantic memory.....	40
3.2.3. Episodic memory and semantic memory: a necessary integration.....	40
3.2.4. Autobiographical memory.....	41
3.2.4.1. Self-memory systems.....	42
3.3. Memory in socio-cultural psychology: cognitive, social and linguistic organization of memories.....	42
3.3.1. Life scripts.....	43
3.3.2. Autobiographical narratives.....	44
3.3.2.1. Evolution and function of autobiographical narratives.....	45

3.3.2.2. Structure of autobiographical narratives.....	46
3.3.3. A few remarks on socio-cultural approaches to narrative and memory.....	47
3.4. Collective forms of memory: remembering in historical, social and material environments.....	48
3.4.1. Collective memory: narrative templates as cultural tools.....	49
3.4.2. Collective memory: individual memories embedded in social frameworks.....	50
3.4.3. Discursive remembering: memory as action in real life.....	52
3.4.4. Epidemiological perspective on collective memory.....	54
3.4.5. Collaborative remembering: distributed cognition in interactive memory processes.....	56
3.5. Language and cognition: mental models in cognitive and discourse processes.....	58
3.5.1. The organization of experience.....	58
3.5.2. Cultural models.....	59
3.5.3. Situation models.....	60
3.5.3.1. Updating situation models.....	62
3.5.4. The discursive dimension of cognitive processes.....	62
3.5.5. The contextual dimension of cognitive and discourse processes.....	64
3.5.5.1. Context models.....	65
3.5.6. The discursive management of situation and context models.....	68
3.6. The cognitive pragmatics of remembering.....	74
3.6.1. Memory, discourse and cognition in context.....	74
3.6.2. Methods for exploring cognitive and discourse processes of remembering.....	79
3.7. Summary and conclusions.....	84
4. THE COMMEMORATION OF MARCH 24TH, 1976: UNDERSTANDING THE EXCEPTIONALITY OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL DISCOURSE ABOUT THE ‘DIRTY WAR’ IN ARGENTINA...	87
4.1. Introduction.....	87
4.2. Political cognition and commemorative speeches.....	89
4.3. Political uses of discourse strategies.....	91
4.4. Creating times, representing actors.....	92
4.4.1. Commemorating March 24th, 1976.....	93
4.4.2. Making the exceptionality with the military.....	94
4.4.3. Constructing a possible future.....	98
4.4.4. Following the people’s will.....	101
4.4.5. Who they were, who they are.....	103
4.5. Conclusions.....	105
5. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MORAL SELF IN ACTS OF DISCURSIVE REMEMBERING: BEING AN ‘ORDINARY’ MAN WITHIN THE EXPERIENCE OF DICTATORSHIP IN ARGENTINA.....	109
5.1. Introduction.....	109
5.2. Moral self disengagement.....	111
5.2.1. Moral justification of immoral acts.....	112
5.2.2. Neglecting and rejecting the negative consequences of immoral acts.....	113
5.2.3. Neglecting and rejecting personal responsibility.....	113
5.2.4. Neglecting and rejecting the victim.....	114
5.3. Interviewing Paco: an ‘ordinary’ man.....	114
5.3.1. De-centering the self in the interview.....	115

5.3.2. Discourse processes of moral self disengagement and knowledge-management.....	119
5.3.2.1. Justification of immoral acts.....	120
5.3.2.2. Neglecting and rejecting the negative consequences of the immoral act.....	122
5.3.2.3. Neglecting and rejecting the personal responsibility.....	125
5.3.2.4. Neglecting and rejecting the victim.....	128
5.4. Conclusions.....	130
6. ANALYZING EPISODES IN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVES: LINKING THE SELF, CONTEXT AND HISTORY.....	133
6.1. Introduction.....	133
6.2. Going into exile.....	135
6.3. The days before leaving Buenos Aires.....	141
6.4. The exile and its positive consequences.....	144
6.5. Concluding remarks.....	153
7. SHARING MEMORIES, FAMILY CONVERSATION AND INTERACTION.....	157
7.1. Introduction.....	157
7.2. Collective remembering: distributed cognition and family conversation about Argentinean history.....	159
7.3. Family conversation: sharing memories of Argentinean history.....	161
7.3.1. 16 September 1955: The Liberation Revolution.....	162
7.3.2. 24 March 1976: The beginning of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship....	166
7.3.3. 10 December 1983: The return of democracy.....	169
7.4. Conclusion.....	172
8. JOINT REMEMBERING: COGNITION, COMMUNICATION AND INTERACTION IN PROCESSES OF MEMORY-MAKING.....	175
8.1. Introduction.....	175
8.2. Creating agreements through interaction: toward the reconstruction of memories.....	177
8.3. From not knowing to remembering, but not believing.....	186
8.4. Summary and conclusions.....	193
9. CONCLUSIONS.....	195
9.1. The cognitive pragmatics of remembering.....	195
9.1.1. An integrated social and cognitive approach to discursive remembering in real-world activities.....	196
9.2. Cultural models and social representations of the past.....	197
9.2.1. Changing cultural models of the traumatic past in Argentina.....	197
9.3. Situation models: reconstructing memory traces of individual and shared experiences.....	199
9.4. Context models: the relevance of social and material environments in remembering.....	202
9.5. Limitations and future research	205
Bibliography.....	209

List of Figures

3.5.1.1. Diagram 1: Description of Context Models.....	66
4.4.2. Diagram 2. Context models: time frames 2004/1.....	94
4.4.3. Diagram 3. Context models: time frames 2004/2	99
4.4.4. Diagram 4. Context models: time frames 2006.....	101
4.4.5. Diagram 5. Context models: time frames 2007.....	104
5.3. Diagram 6. Context models: Paco’s interview.....	115
8.3. Diagram 7. Context models: Group C3.....	178
8.4. Diagram 8. Context models: Group C1.....	187

List of Tables

5.3.1. Distribution of interaction turns	116
5.3.1. Presence of autobiographical memories.....	118
6.2. Episode 1: Situation models.....	137
6.3. Episode 2: Situation models.....	143
6.4. Episode 3: Situation models.....	147
6.4. Episode transition: Situation models.....	149
6.4. Episode 4: Situation models.....	151

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The purpose of this study is to propose a new cognitive pragmatics of remembering, that seeks to integrate discursive, cognitive and social approaches in order to better understand how processes of memory-making unfold in real-world activities. This study investigates processes of autobiographical and collective remembering in focus groups and non-directive interviews. Hence, in contrast to other studies on social remembering of natural occurring interactions, the communicative situations analyzed in this thesis were artificially created according to my research goals.

It is well known that in socio-cultural situated acts of remembering the interaction between the psychological mechanisms of individuals and situational, cultural, social, and historical mechanisms plays a central role in guiding the processes of memory-making. Memories are commonly formed, shared, consolidated, and transformed in communicative interactions, discourses about the past, pronounced by different social actors, and usually vary in pragmatic ways due to the fact that they are always constructed with reference to the communicative situation.

In this thesis I point out the importance of an interdisciplinary approach in memory studies. It also highlights the importance of integrating the discursive and social features of memory research in discourse psychology with the cognitive aspect of memory processes. The cognitive aspect has been taken into account by social and cognitive psychologists without paying enough attention to the discursive and pragmatic features of memory processes in social groups. One of the purposes of this thesis is to integrate our understanding of the discursive and pragmatic nature of remembering with the cognitive processes that enable the synchronization of individual and shared memories with the social and material environment in which they are communicated.

In this thesis the empirical investigations of everyday remembering depart from the fact that processes of memory-making are not the goal of everyday activities. Remembering is viewed as an action focused on the accomplishment of interactional goals (e.g. to reach consensus about different versions of the past). This socially-situated action coordinates minds, bodies and the physical and the social world. Everyday remembering is situated in dynamically organized environments that cannot be easily reproduced in relevant respects. Thus, it is important to employ ecologically

valid methods that take those dynamically organized environments into consideration. Conversations in general, but also non-directive interviews, are a more natural way for speakers to re-construct and communicate their individual and shared memories than the accomplishment of experimental tasks. In order to examine how processes of memory-making work in both institutional settings (e.g. commemorative speeches given by political leaders in public memorials) and private settings (e.g. family conversations at the dinner table), this study investigates the discursive acts of remembering that are related to periods of political violence in Argentina, in general, and in particular to the 1976-1983 military dictatorship in Argentina.

1.2 A cognitive and discourse approach to remembering

Previous studies by historians, sociologists, linguistics, anthropologists, and psychoanalysts have investigated the social and political uses of autobiographical and collective memories about periods of political violence in Argentina. Most of these studies dealt with the ways in which the elites and the mass media create, reproduce and transform discourses about the past, and how the direct victims and their relatives experienced the terror of being tortured or the abduction and disappearance of a loved one. A large number of these studies (Jelin, 2002, 2007; Robben, 2005a) provide compelling evidence on how social and collective memories about the Argentinean traumatic past work in the society. However, as these investigations were mainly focused on the social and political aspects of remembrance, they have not dealt with the cognitive aspect of this multidimensional phenomenon. As if the analysis of the social and political uses of memories in Argentina ruled out any interest in the cognitive mechanisms underpinning such practices. This thesis aims at building a bridge between the social and political aspects of remembering and the cognitive and discourse processes driving such activities. This is one of the contributions of this thesis to current memory research about periods of political violence in Argentina.

In this thesis, by analyzing the cognitive and discursive processes that are responsible for such situated activities, I explore processes of remembering in institutional and private settings. Social and cultural psychologists (Gergen, 1998; Wertsch, 2002) have examined how narrative forms determine the shape, fixation and changes in autobiographical and collective memories. Cognitive psychologists (Hirst & Manier, 2008; Hirst, 2010; Manier & Hirst, 2008) have provided compelling evidence

of how communication processes drive the construction of autobiographical and collective memories in small groups. However, despite the fact that these approaches draw conclusions about how memory processes function in the mind by means of analyzing discourse processes, they are not based on any discourse theories. A theory of discourse is essential to examine the behavioral realization of the cognitive and discourse processes of remembering in communicative interactions.

On the other hand, discourse psychologists (Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Middleton & Brown, 2005) have done extensive research on how people discursively co-construct memories in conversations. In contrast to the above approaches to autobiographical and collective remembering, discourse psychologists draw their conclusions about the interactional and pragmatic functions of conversational remembering, based on explicit discursive examinations of the linguistic activities in which these processes of remembering unfold. However, discourse psychologists argue that acts of conversational remembering should not be thought of as a ‘window’ to explore how the mind works in these situated activities (see chapter 3). Rather, discourse psychologists claim that conversational remembering is a way of accomplishing some activity in the present through invoking the past in an appropriate a skilled manner (Brown, Middleton & Lightfoot, 2001: 125).

In this thesis I begin to fill the conceptual gap between cognitive oriented approaches to remembering that draw conclusions about how memory function in the mind without a detailed discourse analysis of the communicative interaction in this process unfolds, and the discourse and pragmatic oriented approaches that are mainly interested in analyzing the rhetorical features of conversational remembering, in some cases denying or intentionally disregarding or denying that there are underlying cognitive mechanisms that drive the production and interpretation of discourses about past experiences. The multidisciplinary approach I explain in this thesis tries to account for the interweaving of, cognitive and discourse mechanisms driving processes of autobiographical, and collective remembering. I describe these multifaceted processes via the theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Madden, 2004). By mental models, I mean mental representations of experiences, events and situations. In this thesis, mental models are classified as cultural models, situation models and context models.

The socially-shared knowledge (Goldman, 1999; Jovchelovitch. 2007; Schütz & Luckmann, 1974; van Dijk, 2003) and emotional codes (Röttger-Kössler &

Markowitsch, 2009) of specific communities are the basis of cultural models (Kronenfeld, 2008; Shore, 1996). Epistemic and emotional communities can conceptualize their physical and social environment by means of cultural models that allow them to make strategic inferences about features of information that is not present in their environments. Hence, how people interpret, for instance, their troubling national past in the present depends on the influence exerted by cultural models on the community members, and thus, different social groups may define the same traumatic event either as a war or genocide. However, we need mental models that deal with the individual reconstructions of personal and shared past experiences. Situation models are related to the personal reconstruction and interpretation of past experiences. Therefore, how I remember being stuck in Barcelona for a few days due to the strike of the Spanish traffic air controllers is not merely shaped by my cultural models, but also by my situation models that are constructed and represented in episodic memory when I recall that experience. We construct and update situation models according to our personal interpretations of autobiographical episodes. The construction and updating of situation models can be either conscious or automatic or mixture of both by means of attention, abstraction, and planning capacities.

We do not reconstruct and update the situation models of past experiences in a vacuum. These processes are situated, and thus, depend on personal representations of the material and social environment in which they unfold. Hence, in this study I used a theory of context that helps explain how cognitive and discourse processes of autobiographical and collective remembering are shaped in material and social environments.

1.3 Remembering in context

If we agree on the fact that human cognitive activity is linked to high-level cognitive processes by way of embodied interaction with culturally organized material and social world (Hutchins, 2010b: 712), a detailed description of the context in which processes of autobiographical and collective remembering unfold is essential. Studies in cognitive psychology (Harris, Paterson & Kemp, 2008; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2002; Sutton, Harris, Barnier & Keil, 2010) have shown that the conversational context of remembering directly influences how individual and shared memories are formed and communicated. However, besides stating the key role that context plays in guiding memory processes, these studies do not provide further evidence that would shed light on how context

actually works in shaping cognitive and discourse processes of autobiographical and collective remembering. Moreover, if the context of remembering is crucial in determining how memories are formed and communicated, memory research would need to explicitly account for its methodological limitations for their evident lack of ecological validity. This thesis provides a detailed description of the contexts where communicative situations examined took place, making clear how these contexts shape the cognitive and discourse processes of remembering.

On the other hand, studies in discourse psychology, that are conducted in naturalistic settings where people are engaged in situated activities, show that the context of remembering is crucial in shaping the ways in which people construct and communicate their memories. These investigations take account of the central role that the social relationships, identities and roles of the subjects that are engaged in acts of discursive remembering have. They also take into consideration the influence that the material environment (in terms of setting) has on processes of remembering. However, due to the anti-cognitivist and post-cognitivist stance of discourse psychologists who offer alternatives to cognitive paradigms in psychology, those investigations do not take account of the interlocutors' mental representations of the context where communicative interactions about their past experiences unfold.

In my view, mental representations of the context are defined by schematic categories such as setting, participants, roles and identities, activities, intentions and goals, knowledge, emotions, self, etc. Our representations of the context of remembering underpin both, the reconstruction and updating of situation models of past experiences, and how these representations are discursively and appropriately communicated according to the specificities of the communicative interaction. In research tradition that I use in this thesis, the personal representations of the social and material environments where communicative interactions unfold are defined as context models (van Dijk, 2008b, 2009b). Context models enable us to behaviorally reconstruct cultural and situation models, and thus shape how we communicate the experiences that are reconstructed and represented by those interanimated cultural and situation models. Hence, context models have a marked pragmatic nature. In short, this study accounts for the crucial role that context models play in communicative interactions about past experiences. As noted, this key role has been clearly stated by memory research in laboratory settings as well as in everyday settings but so far no other theory has provided an explicit account of how context works in cognitive and discourse processes

of autobiographical and collective remembering. The incorporation of a socio-cognitive theory of context in memory research creates the basis for a better integration and understanding of the social, cognitive, discursive, and interactional properties that determine the situated reconstruction and communication of memories in real-world activities.

1.4 Remembering in history

This is the first study from a social, cognitive, and interactional perspective on commemoration and remembrance in public and private settings in Argentina. In this work I analyze cognitive and discourse processes of autobiographical and collective remembering about periods of political violence in Argentina. Although the communicative situations that I examine are about different political events in Argentine history from 1945 to 1983, most of the discourses about past experiences examined are about the 1976-1983 military dictatorship. The analysis of memory-making processes in institutional and private settings in relation to Argentina's traumatic past is performed for two main reasons. Firstly, it is relevant because of the increasing importance of revisiting the troubling political pasts, not only in Argentina's, but also in Latin America's post-dictatorship societies. Secondly, due to the growing social significance of revisiting the troubling pasts in Argentina, memory-making is an excellent topic for exploring the interpenetration of the social, cultural, historical, and cognitive mechanisms involved in processes of remembering in both institutional and private settings.

In Argentina, the official discourse about the 1976-1983 military dictatorship has radically changed since 2003, because of the administration of elected president Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007). As I described in chapter 2 below, Néstor Kirchner's administration has promoted and legitimized a different ideological stance from that of the democratic governments that came after the military regime since 1983. This new perspective that has been adopted by the government tries to make the cultural models with which a great part of the society categorized the mass disappearances and systemic human rights violations as a war between left-wing armed, political organizations and the Armed Forces obsolete. In other words, according to this cultural model, there were two conflicting factions but one of them, the side led by the military answered the other in a disproportionate way.

1.5 The purpose of this thesis

This study aims at providing evidence of processes of remembering at two interrelated levels of research in memory studies. First, the goal of this thesis is to introduce a new interdisciplinary theory on memory research in naturalistic settings, the aim of which is to provide a better and integrative account of the cognitive and discourse processes of autobiographical remembering in real-world activities. In order to achieve these theoretical goals, this investigation is guided by the following research questions: i) How are cognitive and discourse processes of autobiographical, joint and collective remembering modeled by the continued interlocking of mental models in the course of ongoing communicative interactions in real-world activities?; ii) What are the differences between reconstructing and updating situation models of past experiences when these experiences are shared and when they are not; and iii) How are memories of historical events synchronized and negotiated by means of cognitive and discourse strategies in groups of intimates and people who do not know each other but are in the same age group?

Second, this study also aims at shedding light on the current practices of commemoration and remembrance related to the 1976-1983 military dictatorship in public and private settings in Argentina. Hence, this thesis has goals specifically related to the Argentinean case, and thus it answers the following questions: i) What are the changes in the political speeches of memory given by the Néstor Kirchner's government in Argentina?; ii) Can we observe autobiographical and collective memories in private settings that remain independent of the changes in cultural models that have been introduced by the Néstor Kirchner's administration since 2003?; iii) What is the interactional goal of communicating memories about the military dictatorship?; and iv) What generational differences can be observed in the manner in which actors (including the speaker), actions and events of the 1976-1983 Military Dictatorship are discursively represented?

In order to accomplish the theoretical and empirical goals of this study, in chapter 4 I explore the political uses of cognitive and discourse strategies employed by Néstor Kirchner in four commemorative speeches to represent actors and events from the past and in the present, and to reinforce the exceptionality of his political stance. Next, I examine linguistic data about an open ended interview with a supporter of the military regime that was born in 1940, as well data about a participant born in 1947 who engages

in discursive acts of autobiographical remembering in a focus group session with other people from the same age group. Subsequently, I examine how three members of one family (focus group of intimates) synchronize and coordinate situation models of individual and shared experiences related to periods of political violence and social instability in Argentina. Cognitive and discourse processes of joint remembering create the right environment for the emergence of collective memories. Finally, I analyze how participants of two focus groups made up of people who did not know each other but belonged to the same age group synchronize and negotiate cultural and situation models related to the experience of dictatorship by means of cognitive and discourse strategies. Interestingly, those processes of synchronization and coordination not only led the participants of the groups to create common ground and consensus on the representations of actors and events related to the military regime, but also common ground and consensus on the participants' mental states during the period of dictatorship and how they describe them 30 years later.

1.6 Thesis overview

Chapter 2 presents a general overview of the historical, political and cultural factors involved in the implementation of state terrorism in Argentina between 1976 and 1983. The chapter also explores how both post dictatorship democratic governments and society are coming to term with such a troubling past. The last section of the chapter reviews some current studies on memory in Argentina. The overall aim of this chapter is to indicate the increasing significance of the topic of the thesis within Argentine society today.

Chapter 3 has two complementary large sections. The first section critically reviews influential developments in memory research, from studies in the neurosciences and cognitive psychology, which have been focused on examining neural and cognitive systems, networks and processes involved in acts of remembering, to studies in socio-cultural and discursive psychology, which have centered on exploring the functions of such memories in situated and meaningful interactions. This critical review especially focuses on pointing out both the contributions and limitations of each perspective. The second section of this chapter introduces my new integrative approach to memory research which seeks to synthesize linguistic, discursive, cognitive, and social-interactionist perspectives in order to better understand the situated reconstruction and

communication of memories. Two examples are presented to show how this interdisciplinary theory works. This section establishes the analytical and methodological patterns that are applied in the following empirical chapters.

Chapter 4 provides a socio-cognitive discourse analysis of four political speeches given by the former president of Argentina, Néstor Kirchner, to commemorate the anniversary of the coup d'état of March 24th, 1976, the date which marks the beginning of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship. By means of a detailed analysis of the discourse strategies that Néstor Kirchner used to legitimate, refer to, and evaluate shared knowledge of the past, this chapter explores the underlying political and rhetorical mechanisms Kirchner used to construct the exceptionality of his political stance (chapter 2). Commemorative discourses delivered by political leaders play a major role in constructing 'sites of collective memory', mainly because they are repeatedly reproduced in the media. They operate by bringing the past into the present, and they do this by selecting an aspect of the past which can be employed for specific interests in the present.

Chapter 5 explores the discursive construction of the moral self in an open-ended interview conducted in March 2008 with an ordinary man born in 1940 in Buenos Aires. The interview was about his memories of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship in Argentina. His memories of the dictatorship were not affected by the ideological changes introduced by Kirchner in 2003. Moreover, the interviewee positions himself on the other side of the ideological spectrum by indirectly supporting the actions committed by the perpetrators of the military regime. This viewpoint in relation to the troubling past represents a marginal stance in Argentina today (chapters 2 and 4). Therefore, it has to be sustained by actions of self-management in order to create a positive self-representation during the communicative interaction. These actions are driven by mechanisms of moral disengagement, which are linguistically realized through discourse strategies in accordance with shifting context models.

Chapter 6 examines the ways in which fragments of life story, embedded in the experience of the dictatorship in Argentina (1976-1983), are cognitively and discursively constructed during a focus group interaction with generational peers. The life story selected for the analysis is divided into three time frames (going into exile, life in exile, and positive consequences in democratic times). The autobiographical narratives which form such a life story are examined in accordance with their internal structure and the description of the participants, events and actions within the story

worlds created in each narrative's structural component (chapter 3). This autonomous and self-dependent life story constitutes a case of subjectivization of the experience of political engagement reported by Néstor Kirchner in chapter 4 and it challenges the memories related by my interviewee in the previous chapter.

Chapter 7 shows the ways in which a shared past is managed, communicated, and negotiated in an everyday family conversation by means of discourse strategies. The conversation was about five historical dates linked to Argentinean political history. By interrelating distributed memories, family members are endowed with the ability to manage distributed knowledge. In order to perform this cognitive task, they make use of a wide set of discourse strategies (chapter 3), such as rejections, corrections, and reminders of shared knowledge of the past.

Chapter 8 explores how focus groups of strangers jointly coordinate processes of identity making by means of the interlocking of their individual experiences during the period of dictatorship and their self-positioning in the here and now. The interlocking of autobiographical memories is performed by discourse strategies (chapter 3) such as agreements and corrections, which are dependent on context models. The dynamics of interaction and communication generate distributed and interactive processes of joint remembering. These interactive processes are far from being a perfect integrating and synchronizing communicative device, i.e., they do not smoothly and un-problematically articulate different interests, personal agendas and cultural models.

Chapter 9 brings the analyses together, indicating the reasons why a new cognitive pragmatics of remembering is useful for better understanding how processes of memory-making unfold in real-world activities. In addition, it discusses the significance of the global findings of the thesis in relation to the different ways of re-constructing and communicating memories about the military dictatorship in Argentina. It also recounts the problems encountered vis-à-vis the new theoretical and methodological approach and the way the data was analyzed, and the ways in which future research may overcome such difficulties. Finally, it is pointed out how this new perspective can contribute to and complement current approaches in the investigation of the functions of memory in everyday contexts.

2. CONSTRUCTING A 'COLLECTIVE MEMORY' IN ARGENTINA: AN OVERVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The discourse of both the previous (2003-2007) and current (2007-2011) governments in Argentina promotes and legitimizes a very different ideological stance to the one taken by the democratic governments which came after the 1976-1983 military dictatorship. This new discourse is trying to make the view that the military dictatorship was a war obsolete (Robben, 2005a; Feierstein, 2007). The model used to interpret the experience of the dictatorship as a war is based on the theory of the two demons. This theory about the origins of the violence became widespread as result of the report *Nunca Más*² 'Never Again' which was issued by the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) in 1984.

This theory sustains the following explanation of the origins of the violence in Argentina: first, there is a left-wing demon which throws society into confusion by means of its extreme violence; second, a right-wing demon which reacts to the former, but with a systemic violence which is much worse; third, we find a passive and innocent society in between these two demons, a society which, when democracy was restored several years later, argued that the process of state terrorism was beyond its control (Crenzel, 2008; Drucaroff, 2002). The following two extracts, taken from the prologue of the 1984 edition of the *Nunca Más*, clearly illustrate that point:

Durante la década del 70 la Argentina fue convulsionada por un terror que provenía tanto desde la extrema derecha como de la extrema izquierda, fenómeno que ha ocurrido en muchos otros países.

During the 1970s, Argentina was torn by terror from both the extreme right and the far left. This phenomenon was not unique to our country.

[...] a los delitos de los terroristas, las Fuerzas Armadas respondieron con un terrorismo infinitamente peor que el combatido, porque desde el 24 de marzo de 1976 contaron con el poderío y la impunidad del Estado absoluto, secuestrando, torturando y asesinando a miles de seres humanos.

[...] the Armed Forces responded to the terrorists' crimes with acts of terror far worse than the ones they were combating, and, after March 24, 1976 they could count on the power and impunity of an absolute state, which they misused to abduct, torture and kill thousands of human beings.

² See the online English version of the *Nunca Más*: <http://www.nuncamas.org/index2.htm>.

The point of departure of the theory of the two demons, what triggers it off, is that national security is put at risk by the first demon and that is responsible for a disproportionate response by the second demon. The condemnation of the military dictatorship since 1983 centers on the means used by the second demon to defeat the first, and maintains that even in war certain rules should be respected. The military dictatorship was a tragedy for the post dictatorial society as a whole, a society which was only able to be a passive bystander to the disappearances of large number of people.

This lack of awareness of what was occurring on the part of society was justified by abstracting the political violence from the historical processes (Feierstein, 2004, 2005, 2007). The theory of the two demons created the view that there were two demonic actors who both wished to take control of the state (Drucaroff, 2002). However, it neglected to mention that a considerable part of society was seeking social change at that time. It should be borne in mind, for example, that the Peronist party was banned from government for more than 17 years after the second administration of Juan Domingo Perón who was overthrown in the 1955 coup d'état. Moreover, several countries in Latin America have been experiencing increasing social and political activism among students, intellectuals and workers since the Cuban Revolution in 1959. This rising social and political activism was one of the main reasons for the emergence of anti-democratic regimes throughout the whole region (O'Donnell, 1997).

However, there has been a new discourse about and new political measures in relation to the traumatic past since the election of the administration of Néstor Kirchner. This has served not only to open the door for the prosecution of perpetrators of the military regime, but also (as I explore in greater detail in chapter four) to legitimize a new way of interpreting the experience of dictatorship. This new way of conceptualizing the military regime is on the genocide model (Feierstein, 2007). In 2003 the government of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) introduced the use of the genocide model in the interpretation of the experience of the dictatorship. The use of this model has been maintained since then by his government and by the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2011). From the point of view of the genocide model the purpose of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship was the annihilation of certain social relations which had began to be dangerous, i.e. unions, political parties, and cooperatives. This annihilation of certain social relations targeted not only the bodies of dissidents, but also the social relations they embodied in an important proportion of Argentinean society. In other words, the new discourse which is based on the genocide

model, maintains that the military dictatorship developed a ‘technology of power’ (Foucault, 2007) to destroy not only the corporality of a specific social relation (e.g. unions, political parties, and cooperatives), but also the very likelihood that it could be something conceivable within Argentinean society (Feierstein, 2007).

The following two examples are taken from the reformulated prologue in the 2nd edition of the *Nunca Más* which was published in 2006 to mark the 30th anniversary of the coup d’état. This new edition does not exclude the previous prologue of 1984, but as it will be shown, renders it anachronistic. The new prologue was signed by the Human Rights Secretary of Néstor Kirchner’s administration.

Por otra parte, el terrorismo de Estado fue desencadenado de manera masiva y sistemática por la Junta Militar a partir del 24 de marzo de 1976, cuando no existían desafíos estratégicos de seguridad para el status quo, porque la guerrilla ya había sido derrotada militarmente. La dictadura se propuso imponer un sistema económico de tipo neoliberal y arrasar con las conquistas sociales de muchas décadas, que la resistencia popular impedía fueran conculcadas.

On the other hand, state terrorism was systemically launched on a large scale by the Military Junta after March 24, 1976, at a time when the guerrillas had already been defeated and were no longer a strategic threat to the security of the status quo. The military government set about imposing a neoliberal economic system which demolished the social triumphs of many decades, the removal of which popular resistance had prevented.

Disciplinar a la sociedad ahogando en sangre toda disidencia o contestación fue su propósito manifiesto. Obreros, dirigentes de comisiones internas de fábricas, sindicalistas, periodistas, abogados, psicólogos, profesores universitarios, docentes, estudiantes, niños, jóvenes, hombres y mujeres de todas las edades y estamentos sociales fueron su blanco. Los testimonios y la documentación recogidos en el NUNCA MÁS son un testimonio hoy más vigente que nunca de esa tragedia.

Their evident purpose was disciplining society by drowning in blood all forms of dissidence or protest. Workers, leaders of the factories internal commissions, union leaders, journalists, lawyers, psychologists, university professors, teachers, students, children, young boys and girls, men and women from all ages and social classes, all of them were their target. The Nunca Más' documents and testimonies are a tragedy's evidence, whose actuality was never as clear as today.

The aims of this chapter are to provide a general overview of the historical, political and cultural reasons behind the implementation of state terrorism in Argentina between 1976-1983, to explore how the following post-dictatorial democratic governments and some sectors of the society (e.g. the relatives of the victims) came to terms with such a traumatic past, and finally to briefly review some current memory research in Argentina.

This chapter is organized in the following way. First, I provide an overview of the historical and political framework in which a military regime emerged, not only in

Argentina, but also in other countries of Latin America. Second, I explore how this political trend towards military regimes within the region created the necessary conditions for the implementation of a terrorist state in Argentina. Third, I examine some of the political strategies used to come to terms with that traumatic period since the return of the democracy in 1983. Fourth, I present a case in which the relatives of the victims of a recent human tragedy adopted and re-contextualized aspects of the social framework of remembrance developed by the relatives of the victims of the military regime. The purpose of this review is to introduce cutting edge memory studies into Argentina and provide a critical assessment of such approaches.

2.2 The National Security Doctrine

At the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, the United States began to sketch out what was going to be called the ‘national security doctrine’ years later (Duhalde 1999; Feierstein, 2004; Izaguirre, 2004; Velásquez Riera, 2002). The persecution of opposing leaders begins in America under the banner of McCarthyism (Figueroa Ibarra, 2004). The ideology of national security is built upon a military viewpoint of a bipolar world, in which two conceptions of life and the world clash. That is to say, it proposes a dichotomy between capitalism and socialism. The former was categorized in terms of democracy, in contrast to the latter which was thought of in terms of totalitarianism. The sense of a subversive enemy is weak today as a result of the defeat of socialism in the Soviet Union.

One of the features necessary for the social construction of the subversive enemy is his ubiquity. The subversive enemy may be a member of the community and, more than that, one of us (Figueroa Ibarra, 2004). His dangerousness is based on his capacity to provoke unexpected reactions that may disturb the internal logic of capitalism (Izaguirre, 2004).

2.2.1. The National Security Doctrine in South America

In Latin America the state of repression inspired by the national security doctrine was known as the ‘Condor Plan’ (Dinges, 2004; Martorell, 1998; McSherry, 2005). Countries such as Argentina (1976-1983), Chile (1973-1990), Uruguay (1973-1985), Brazil (1964-1985), Paraguay (1954-1989), and Bolivia (1964-1982) participated in the coordination of this plan, the outcome of which left thousands of people missing and

even more in exile. Different countries have adopted different ways of coming to terms with this troubling past. In Uruguay, a democratic vote ratified amnesty laws four years after the return of democracy in April 1989 (Achugar, 2008; Marchesi, Markarian, Rico & Yaffe, 2003). However, in 2005, the administration of the elected president Tabaré Vázquez suddenly changed the official discourse about the past (Achugar, 2008). This leftist government changed the government's policy towards the military and raised substantial questions about the military's violations of human rights (Marchesi, Markarian, Rico & Yaffe, 2003). In 2007, the Chilean Supreme Court acknowledged that the military dictatorship of Pinochet (1973-1990) committed crimes against humanity by violating fundamental human rights (Neira & Sterrazza Taibi, 2009). In 2004, the Brazilian government compensated those who were illegally imprisoned by the state police during the military dictatorship (Krischke, 2009). In the meantime, human rights groups had been commemorating the disappearance of more than 300 people during the dictatorship. The official position of the government of Luis Ignacio Lula Da Silva (2002-2006/2006-2011) sustains the view that to avoid the repetition of the past younger generations should learn about what happened during the military regime. In Paraguay, the *archivos del terror* (files of terror) were found in 1992. These files contained a detailed record of the history of the military dictatorship in Paraguay, which resulted in more than 10,000 missing persons and its connections with other regimes in the Southern Cone of Latin America (Cáceres, 2009:43). The government of Fernando Lugo (2008-2013) recently introduced a new law to compensate the relatives of the victims. Lastly, since June 12th, 2009 an official commission in Bolivia, which is led by human rights activists, is investigating the files of the 1964-1982 military dictatorship (Salas, 2009: 45).

As in Argentina, so also in the governments of other countries in the Southern Cone have been legitimizing the victims' narratives by using them as a starting point for the condemnation of past human rights violations.

2.3 Time and actors: from the *desaparecidos* to *Cromañón*

The leaders of the 1976 military junta in Argentina constructed a concept of the negative other: the subversive criminal, who, because of his role in the armed struggle and the ideological offensive, questioned the Christian and Western values of the nation (Robben 2005a, 2005b). In September 1975 Monsignor Victorio Bonamin claimed:

“¿No querrá Cristo que algún día las FFAA estén más allá de su función? El Ejército está expiando la impureza de nuestro país... los militares han sido purificados en el Jordán de la sangre para ponerse al frente de todo el país [...]”. Mons. Victorio Bonamin, (Vicario General del Ejército), 25 de Septiembre de 1975.

“Won't Christ want that the Armed Forces to one day do more than their duty? The Army is expiating the impurity of our country... the military has been purified in a bloody Jordan by putting themselves in front of the whole country [...]” Mons. Victorio Bonamin (Vicar General of the Army), September 25th, 1975.

This homily was delivered before the Army a few months before the coup d'état of March 24th, 1976. This narrative was in accordance with the ideological standpoint held by General Videla in 1976:

“Un terrorista no es sólo alguien con un revólver o una bomba, sino también aquel que propaga ideas contrarias a la civilización occidental y cristiana”

“A terrorist is not merely somebody with a revolver or a bomb, but somebody who also spreads ideas contrary to those of Western civilization and Christianity”

This narrative was a discourse on war which mentioned the non-conventional methods the enemy was using in order to destabilize the status quo. This use of non-conventional methods is the reason why the conflict was named the ‘Dirty War’; and this was how it became known abroad.

"El enemigo vive en nuestro interior y lo que es más grave, está alojado en el interior de muchos argentinos. Por eso nuestro trabajo debe ser total: debe abarcar el cuerpo y el espíritu [...] estamos en una guerra casi civil que no hemos declarado y que nos han declarado [...]" Mons. Olimpo Maresma, 9 de Septiembre de 1976.

"The enemy lives among us and, what is more serious, lives inside many Argentineans. For that reason our work should be total: it should cover both the body and the spirit [...] we are in a quasi civil war, a war which we did not declare, but which they declared on us [...]”. Mons. Olimpo Maresma, September 9th, 1976.

Human rights discourse became the symbol of the democratic transition in 1983. To a greater or a lesser extent, this phenomenon also took place in other countries in Latin America which underwent a period of mass violence and considerable political repression. In contrast to other nations in Latin America which went through experiences of dictatorship, the democratic transition in Argentina was not underpinned by agreement between the former dictatorial regime and the opposing political parties (Jelin, 2002). There were different ideas within the Armed Forces about the future of Argentina after the dictatorship. All, however, shared the same two assumptions: first, the forthcoming democratic government would have to support what had been done against subversion; secondly, it had to guarantee that the Armed Forces would play a

key role in the future democratic scenario. In other words, the Armed Forces must be the ones who guide the way in which political power was channeled by the democratic government.

Prior to the *Guerra de Malvinas* (Malvinas/Falklands war), the demand to know what had happened to those who had been kidnapped was confined to people directly affected by the repression; few middle class people echoed those demands (Landi & Bombal, 1995; Vezzetti, 2003). However, as the crisis of the military regime grew, the demand to know what had happened to those who had been kidnapped gained increasing popularity in society at large (Jelin, 1995; Przeworski, 1995). According to Landi and Bombal (1995) a significant portion of society did not show any intention of forgetting and moving on.

2.3.1 The return of democracy

The demand for justice figured prominently in the election campaign of the winning candidate, Raúl Alfonsín, during the 1983 presidential elections that restored civilian rule. During Alfonsín's presidency (1983–1989) the human rights issue continued to occupy a prominent place in public discourse.

On 15 December 1983, the democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín created the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP). The aim of this commission was to inquire into the fate of those who were kidnapped and other human rights violations perpetrated during the military dictatorship from 1976 to 1983. The Commission was not invested with judicial powers, or with the power to serve summonses, or to compel anyone to give testimony (Crenzel, 2008). When evidence of any criminal act was discovered it could only be transmitted to the regular courts. The report issued recommendations about the legal proceedings to be used when investigating and trying those responsible for crimes committed during the seven years of military dictatorship (Crenzel 2008). The publication of the CONADEP report was followed by the cancellation of immunity and freedom from trial which had been accorded to the principal leaders of the military junta. The trial of those senior ranking officers of the army and the navy who were in power from 1976 to 1983 began on 22 April, 1985. On 9 December 1985, the Federal Tribune sentenced the former Major-General, Jorge Rafael Videla, and the former Admiral, Emilio Massera, to life imprisonment. General Roberto Viola was sentenced to 17 years in prison, Admiral Lambruschini to 8 years, and Brigadier-General Orlando Agosti to 4 ½ years. All these

men were convicted for dozens of murders, as well as illegal deprivation of liberty, torture and theft. This was the first time that former Argentinean dictators had been put on trial and convicted. Consequently, the military became concerned that the government was making an 'attack on their dignity'. Confronting what were still weak democratic institutions, the military, being still in a powerful position, threatened to carry out another coup d'état.

The trial included a portrayal of the passive victims who had no social or political commitment during the period of dictatorship (Crenzel, 2008; Feierstein, 2007). It painted a picture in which the victims were forced to give up their role as active social agents. The victims were harmed by the actions of others, who in this case were the perpetrators. The trial created a judicial framework which was employed to interpret the politics of the conflict. It eliminated any reference to ideologies and political commitment (Feierstein, 2007). The crucial point was to determine whether or not crimes had been committed, without asking why they were committed. According to Feierstein (2007), this line of enquiry in the trials resulted in society not asking what the political reasons of the victims and the perpetrators were. The images of the victims were used in the trials to establish and reinforce the guilt of the perpetrators.

2.3.2 From the early 1990s to the financial crisis of December 2001

The early 1990s were years of limited activity at the institutional level due to the reinforcement and consolidation of the narrative maintained by those in charge of the democratic transition. In the 1990s, this narrative of the past was held by the governments of Carlos Menem (1989-1995/1995-1999). Menem maintained that forgiveness of the crimes was the only way the reconciliation of Argentineans could be achieved. One of the most criticized measures of Menem's administrations was the pardon he granted to Jorge Rafael Videla, Emilio Massera, Leopoldo Galtieri, and other leaders of the 1976-1983 dictatorship, as well as to a number of leaders of armed political organizations, on 29 December, 1990 on the grounds of 'national reconciliation'. This action sparked protests by nearly 50,000 people in Buenos Aires. Former president Raúl Alfonsín called it 'the saddest day in Argentine history'. The pardon was granted after a politically-motivated uprising by a section of the military on 3rd December, 1990, an uprising which Menem forcefully put down.

President Carlos Menem began implementing a policy of privatization and, after a second bout of hyperinflation in 1990, invited economist Domingo Cavallo to come up

with a solution. Cavallo imposed a fixed Peso-US dollar exchange rate in 1991 (Boyer, Neffa, Keifman, Miotti, Queman & Rapoport, 2004). He also adopted far-reaching market based policies, dismantling protectionist barriers and business regulations, while accelerating the pace of privatization (Azpiazu & Schorr, 2004). In this environment of economic recovery, political leaders, the media, and institutions were more concerned with the country's promising future than with looking for reparative justice.

In 1995 the journalist and human rights activist Horacio Verbitsky published a confession by the former navy captain Adolfo Scilingo in his book *El Vuelo* (The Flight). In this confession, Scilingo mentions his active role in the 'Dirty War'. He explains the method used by the navy: drugging dissidents and then dropping them from planes into the Atlantic Ocean in what became known as *vuelos de la muerte* (death flights). At that time, the head of the military hierarchy and the Army's General Chief of Staff, General Martín Balza, showed himself to be a man of strong democratic convictions and a vocal critic of the Malvinas/Falklands War. Balza gave the first official self-criticism of the Armed Forces' involvement in the 1976-1983 dictatorship and the ensuing reign of terror (Verbitsky, 1995). A few months later, *los juicios por la verdad* (truth trials) began throughout the whole country and the human rights organization H.I.J.O.S – Hijos e Hijas por la Identidad y la Justicia contra el Olvido y el Silencio - children of people who disappeared- was founded.

On March 24, 1996, more than 70 000 people filled the Plaza the Mayo in Buenos Aires to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the coup d'état. These 70 000 people were repudiating the murders and the socio-economic policies of the former military regime. During the same period, a judge in Spain, Baltazar Garzón, claimed universal jurisdiction over the crimes committed during the last Argentine dictatorship following a request made by Argentinean residents in Madrid. Garzón ordered hundreds of military officers involved in the political repression from 1976 to 1983 to testify. (Some time later, Chileans living in Madrid put forward a similar prosecution request in relation to Pinochet).

There is another political event which also played a central role in shaping the new discourse about the past introduced since the administration of Néstor Kirchner in 2003. In December 2001, Argentina underwent the worst socioeconomic crisis in its history (Dessein, 2003). This resulted in the emergence of strong criticisms of almost all the social injustices which had arisen because of the policies promoted by former governments. In other words, the economic crisis undermined the legitimacy of politics

and institutions (Pousadela, 2005). The alliance of the social sectors which supported the model adopted during the 1990's broke apart due to the economic crisis which began in 1999 (Boyer, Neffa, Keifman, Miotti, Queman & Rapoport, 2004; Dessein, 2003).

On the 1st December 2001, almost all bank accounts were completely frozen and withdrawals from US Dollar denominated accounts were forbidden in order to prevent the collapse of financial institutions. The resulting protests led to the resignation of the president, Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001). Most of the participants in these protests were independents who did not respond to political parties or specific social movements. In the 2-day long protest, 39 people were killed by the police and security forces.

A structural critique has been elaborated by the government for the first time. It is the work of the 'new state' which emerged in 2003 with the election of Néstor Kirchner as president. This structural critique denounces the different narratives about the past, assumes responsibility for its actions and their consequences, and asks for forgiveness. The promotion of this view by the administration of Néstor Kirchner has enabled him to gain political ground. This view had already, in some sense, been confirmed by a large proportion of the society (Feierstein, 2007). This new official discourse about the past has gained popularity due to its systematic criticism of the previous democratic governments that came after the dictatorship, in general, and of Carlos Menem's (1989-1999) administration, in particular. His economic and social policies were the source of the explosive situation in Argentina in 2001.

2.3.3 Political changes since the administration of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007)

It was not until the administration of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) that the Argentinean government appropriated these historical demands, which had mainly been made by human rights organizations. Kirchner's administration also started to process these claims by taking them to court. It was the first time in twenty years that the national government had become involved in an issue that had, up to that time, been exclusively the focus of human rights organizations.

In 2003 the government assigned a new place to the human rights organizations in the domain of politics. This was highlighted by the reception of *Las Madres de Plaza de*

Mayo (The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo) at Government House. It was also highlighted by the invitation to human rights organizations to take part in the main ceremony commemorating the 193rd anniversary of the May Revolution, and the designation of Eduardo Luis Duhalde³ as Head of the Secretary of Human Rights. In other words, the political power has been implementing a new discourse since 2003. It has introduced new features, but has also recovered the social demands of recent years. As I will show in chapter four, this new official discourse operates by symbolically reorganizing a split image within the society in which representations that grounded the former political legitimacy are not operating with the same effectiveness as they were in the 1990s.

This discourse was proclaimed as a framework for state policy by previously unknown presidential rhetoric. It materialized in the repealing of amnesty laws such as the 1986 *La Ley de Punto Final* (Full Stop Law) and the 1990 *La Ley de Obediencia Debida* (Law of Due Obedience), which opened the door for the prosecution of former junta officials, and in the declaration of March 24 as a national holiday. These political measures created an understanding of the experience of dictatorship in Argentina in binary terms by means of creating two different time-frames, which is in accordance with the populist features of the discourses of Néstor Kirchner. The creation of two different time-frames and some of the populist features of Néstor Kirchner's political speeches will be analyzed in chapter four.

As I have indicated in the previous sections of this chapter, the new discourse about the military dictatorship presents a reformulation of the war-model by which political leaders, the media and a large percentage of society interpreted the dictatorship (Feierstein, 2007; Kaiser, 2005; Robben, 2005a, 2005b). The discourses about individual and collective memories of the violent past in Argentina that are analyzed in this thesis provide specific instantiations of these two different ways of conceptualizing the experience of dictatorship. Hence, they operate as old and new frameworks which enable us to better understand the ideological standpoints communicated by the discourse processes of remembering which are examined in this thesis. However, it should be borne in mind that the discourses about the past that are analyzed in this thesis do not provide us with enough evidence to claim that the new model of genocide, which has become widespread in society since 2003, has replaced the war-model in Argentina today. These claims go far beyond the scope of this thesis.

³ Eduardo Luis Duhalde was a member of an armed, political organization. He went into exile in 1976.

The example that follows illustrates that the social frameworks created by the different ways of remembering and commemorating the 1976-1983 military dictatorship are having a strong influence on the ways in which Argentines understand new traumatic experiences.

2.3.4 Spreading social frameworks of remembrance: the case of *Cromañón*

Cromañón was a nightclub located in the neighborhood of Once, in the City of Buenos Aires. *Cromañón* tragically became known because of a massive fire that began the night of December 30th, 2004 when a rock band called *Callejeros* was playing. The fire caused the worst unnatural tragedy in Argentinean history. 194 people died and more than 1400 were injured as result of the fire.

Since 31st December, 2004 the relatives and friends of the victims have been working together to bring that traumatic past into the present. Their goal is to obtain justice for the death of their loved ones. They have been carrying out a large campaign, which includes massive demonstrations at the City Council and an important presence in the press, in order to achieve this goal.

The relatives and friends of the victims established their own *Plaza de la Memoria* (Square of Memory) next to the nightclub. They created a number of websites, not only as a way of commemorating their children and friends, but also a way for society at large to follow the judicial case and support their struggle for justice⁴ for free. On 19th August, 2009 an oral tribunal in Buenos Aires sentenced the former owner of the nightclub to 20 years in jail. However, the relatives and friends of the victims do not seem to be satisfied with this. They argue that more parties are responsible for the death of their loved ones.

The ways the relatives and friends of those who died in *Cromañón* are commemorating them and what has been done to remember and/or commemorate the victims of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship are remarkable. In both cases, acts of remembrance and commemoration are mediated and carried out by massive demonstrations, memorials, a large presence in the press, and even a *Plaza de la Memoria* (Square of Memory). They also share the same ultimate goal: the attainment of justice. Hence, in the case of *Cromañón*, we find that the relationship between

⁴ Websites run by the relatives of the victims are <http://www.quenoserepita.com.ar/> *Que no se repita* (Don't let it happen again), which has its own newsletter, and <http://www.cromagnon.meti2.com.ar/>.

memory, justice and truth (declared to be the main reason to commemorate the victims of the dictatorship) is operating as a social framework which is shaping acts of commemoration and remembrance. Let me show you a clear example that makes much more evident the similarities in the forms of commemoration carried out to remember the two traumatic events:



Photographs of the faces of the *desaparecidos* of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship



Photographs of the faces of the victims of *Cromañón*.
© Lucas Bietti 2008.

Now we should ask ourselves what are the underlying mechanisms shaping commemorative practices in Argentina? What is their origin? And can we say that the military dictatorship is operating in the social imagery as a metaphor that determines the practices of remembrance of new ‘tragedies’? Much more empirical data and analysis on new practices of commemoration and remembrance across the country would be needed to sustain such claims. Nonetheless, as we can note, memory and remembrance are being promoted as the key for constructing a new social consciousness, the aim of which is to restore justice through the mere acts of remembering and commemorating.

As I have pointed out, this framework is promoted not only by the relatives of the direct victims, (e.g. *Cromañón*, the military dictatorship), but also by the new official discourse maintained by different levels of the government (national, local, etc.). However, in the case of the military dictatorship, commemorative practices are being maintained by both public and private frameworks of memory. This is not the case with *Cromañón*. To summarize, the new social consciousness in Argentina, which is grounded in the need to remember, seems to be driven by Santayana’s famous aphorism, ‘those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it’⁵.

⁵ Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it. (n.d.). *The American Heritage® New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition*. Retrieved August 06, 2010, from Dictionary.com website: <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it>

2.4 Memory research in Argentina

In this section I present a review of current memory research in Argentina. The reason that I include this review here and not in the next chapter on theory on memory and discourse is because it is specifically on Argentina, and to some extent, is in response to the importance of making a ‘collective memory’ in society.

The necessity of remembering presented in the previous section has a strong correlate in the humanities, arts and social sciences not only in Argentina, but also in other countries in the Southern Cone of Latin America. The interdisciplinary field of memory studies in this region has been mainly focused on investigating practices adopted by society to remember political events. In this section I present a review of current memory research in Argentina

New research groups, centers⁶, institutes⁷, university programs⁸, conferences, journals⁹, and museums¹⁰ clearly display to what extent the need to reconstruct the past has crossed into every aspect of the societies which underwent periods of political violence, dictatorship, and so on. The flourishing field of memory studies has been growing hand in hand with a new political trend centered on revisiting a past of conflict and violence in order to promote justice and, above all, to provide grounds which demonstrate that such crimes will never happen again.

The necessity, in the Southern Cone, of revisiting the traumatic pasts has shaped the interdisciplinary field of memory studies to a large degree. Thus, memory studies have been largely focused on issues such as human rights, trauma, and genocide (Feierstein, 2004, 2005, 2007). In the past decade, the signifier ‘memory’ has acquired political connotation in the efforts to sustain processes of democratization within the region. Democratic governments in Latin America have appropriated the signifier ‘memory’ in their attempt to revisit the past in order to re-write national history.

⁶ See Equipo Argentino de Trabajo e Investigación Psicosocial: <http://www.eatip.org.ar/eatip/>; Núcleo de Estudios de Memoria: <http://www.ides.org.ar/grupoestudios/memoria/>; Centro de Estudios sobre Genocidio: http://www.untref.edu.ar/institutos/institutos_ceg.htm; Centro de Estudios “Espacio, Memoria e Identidad”: <http://www.ceemi-unr.com.ar/>; Centro Cultural de la Memoria “Haraldo Conti”: <http://www.derhuman.jus.gov.ar/conti/>; Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales: <http://www.cels.org.ar/home/index.php>; and Memoria Abierta: <http://www.memoriaabierta.org.ar/>.

⁷ See Instituto Espacio Para la Memoria: <http://www.institutomemoria.org.ar/>

⁸ See MA in History and Memory at the Universidad Nacional de La Plata: <http://www.educaedu.com.ar/maestria-en-historia-y-memoria-master-8812.html>, and the Research Program on Social Studies of Memory and Heritage at the Centro de Estudios Avanzados: <http://www.cea.unc.edu.ar/>

⁹ See *Revista Puentes*: <http://www.memoriaenelmercosur.educ.ar/?p=18>

¹⁰ See Museo de la Memoria, Rosario: <http://www.museodelamemoria.gov.ar/index.htm>, and Archivo Nacional de la Memoria: <http://www.derhuman.jus.gov.ar/anm/inicio.html>

2.4.1 The sciences of the mind

Apart from the studies that have been conducted since the mid 80's (Kordon & Edelman, 1986, 2007; Kordon, Edelman, Lagos & Kersner, 1995, 2005) by *El Equipo Argentino de Trabajo de Investigación Psicosocial* (the Argentinean Team of Psychosocial Research Work) analyzing, in clinical settings, both the individual and social psychological effects (e.g. both individual and social trauma) of the police and military repression, the sciences of the mind have contributed little to the better understanding of the influence of political events in the development, consolidation, and transformation of memories within society.

In 1986 Kordon and Edelman published *Efectos Psicológicos de la Represión Política* (The Psychological Effects of the Political Repression), which was the first book on this topic in Argentina. Kordon and Edelman elaborated hypotheses that allowed them to meditate on the effects of the traumatic situations in both the identifying processes and the individual and collective memories. In this sense, Kordon and Edelman held that memories of the political repression were linked to individual and collective identity and to the possibility of a future. Thus, they pointed out the fact that the memories of the dictatorship were not a neutral playing field, but rather a battlefield in which collective identity was legitimated and modeled. They developed some clinical investigations that included interviews with the children of the missing people within this framework. As a result of these interviews and clinical investigations, they concluded that the disappearance of the parents produced specific effects in the constitution of the identity of the children. Among other effects, they found that the interference of the support, the concealment within the family environment of the disappearance of the parents, and the denial emerging from the social context produced different levels of affectation in those children. The cases of illegal appropriation of babies by the perpetrators aggravated these levels of affectation¹¹. Kordon and Edelman maintained that the creation of association by children of the *desaparecidos* may play a central role in coping processes and may thereby mitigate the negative effects provoked by the illegal appropriation of babies.

On the other hand, the vast majority of memory research within the cognitive sciences is conducted using neuroimaging techniques (PET, fMRI) and is oriented

¹¹ For more information see <http://www.collectivememory.net/2008/10/sharing-individual-memories.html>.

toward the study of memory impairment in neurodegenerative pathologies, such as Alzheimer disease (Chemrinski, Petracca, Manes, Leiguarda & Starkstein, 1998) and in variety of other pathologies, including stroke and epilepsy (Manes, Springer, Jorge & Robinson, 1999; Manes, Hodges, Graham & Zeman, 2001). It is only in the last few years that researchers from the cognitive sciences have started to show a significant interest in better understanding individual memory in real-life settings. In a study published in *Behavioural Neurology* (2008), Bekinschtein, Cardozo and Manes investigated the cognitive strategies that the waiters of the Café Tortoni¹² in downtown Buenos Aires employ to enhance their memory capacity for the purpose of matching orders, clients and locations. This paper presents an interesting example which will help us better understand how experts enhance memory in real-world activities. Nevertheless, so far no studies within the cognitive and neurosciences have focused on the ways in which people's memory is affected by political events.

Other less neuroscientific oriented studies in cognitive and social psychology have investigated processes of collective memory making in small groups¹³ (Muller & Hirst, 2010). These studies indicate the cognitive, social, and interactive nature of memory. However, these studies also failed to mention the way in which political events affect memories.

2.4.2 The social sciences and the humanities

Memory research in the social sciences has mainly focused on investigating practices of social and collective memory of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship. Social-scientific studies of memories of political violence have mostly been carried out by sociologists (Calveiro, 1998; Crenzel, 2008; Feierstein, 2005, 2007; Jelin¹⁴, 2001, 2002, 2007; Jelin & Lorenz, 2004; Jelin & Longoni, 2005), anthropologists (Guber, 2001, 2004, Robben,

¹² Founded in 1858, Café Tortoni is one of the oldest cafés in Buenos Aires. Carlos Gardel, Luigi Pirandello, Federico Garcia Lorca, Arthur Rubinstein and Jorge Luis Borges, among many others artists, writers and politicians, sat among its paneled walls, oak tables, and green marble.

¹³ These studies on processes of collective remembering will be critically reviewed in the next chapter.

¹⁴ Elizabeth Jelin is one of the key scholars in social memory studies in Latin America. She was a board member and former director of the United Nations Research Institute for Human Development. Elizabeth Jelin is the head of the Núcleo de Estudios de Memoria at the Institute for Economic and Social Development in Buenos Aires (IDES). Between 1999 and 2001 Jelin was the principal investigator and coordinator of a large research program 'Memoria Colectiva de la Represión: Perspectivas Comparativas sobre los Procesos de Democratización en el Cono Sur de America Latina', which was funded by the Social Science Research Council, NYC. This program awarded 60 research grants to researchers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and the United States. The results of this project came out in a collection of 10 volumes published in Madrid and Buenos Aires by Siglo XXI editores (<http://www.ides.org.ar/grupoestudios/memoria/VolColeccion.jsp>).

2005a, 2005b, 2006; Vecchioli, 2005), communication scientists (Feld, 2002, 2006; Kaiser, 2005), historians (Aguila, 2008; Carnovale, Lorenz & Pittaluga, 2006; Franco & Levin, 2007; Lorenz, 2005, 2009), cultural theorists (Sarlo, 2005; Vezzetti, 2003, 2009), and political scientists (Roniger & Sznajder, 1998, 2009; Sznajder & Roniger, 2005).

Several years before the political changes introduced in Argentina by the administration of Néstor Kirchner in Argentina (2003) and in Uruguay by the administration of Tabaré Vázquez (2005), Roniger and Sznajder (1998) put forward the following argument in a comparative study about the politics of memory in the two countries:

A major trend in these societies' (Argentinean and Uruguayan) confrontation with the legacy of human rights violations has been the almost complete absence of physical lieux de mémoire (tombs, mausoleums, public monuments) which could help to encapsulate and frame the past. Indeed, the creation of lieux de mémoire is sometimes perceived as an intention to separate the sites of commemoration from the living society. This poses a challenge for those who are trying to sustain the memory of their loved ones, as well as presenting problems for society at large. The absence of specific and contained lieux de mémoire is extremely painful for the relatives of those missing victims whose burial sites are unknown and prompts some of them (especially the Argentinean Mothers and associations of victims' relatives) to claim an ever-present role as a living collective memory and ethical collective consciousness. For society at large, the absence of lieux de mémoire keeps the memory of unfulfilled justice and past human rights violations as an open wound and projects the basic disagreements about the past into the public sphere as periodic crisis. (Roniger & Sznajder: 1998: 161)

In sum, these studies were theoretically grounded in the hypothesis that memory is mainly a socio-cultural and political construct. That is, memory is a special type of shared political experience that is shaped by social frameworks of remembrance which enable these experiences to come to light.

Just as many European and American sociologists, historians and anthropologists (Connerton, 1989; Halbwachs, 1992; Levy & Sznajder, 2005, 2006; Misztal, 2003; Olick, 2003, 2007, 2008; Olick & Robbins, 1998) are investigating how social differentiation and political power shape narratives of the past, Argentinean social scientists have also been interested in the roles of the media, politicians, and cultural resources such as memorials and rituals in the processes of legitimizing certain social and collective memories in detriment to others¹⁵. These cultural products, e.g. archive, memorials, museums, films, books and photographs, may be thought of as vehicles of

¹⁵ Social memory research in Argentina tends to be more ideologically loaded than the above mentioned studies undertaken by American and European social scientists mostly because of the current changes in the Argentina's cultural and political dynamics in relation to the 1976-1983 military dictatorship.

memory (Jelin, 2002, 2007), which may be operating to create sites of memory (Nora, 1989) and, thereby, shape collective narratives of the past.

The place of memory, therefore, is the place of political struggle, a struggle which is commonly represented as a struggle against forgetting due to the fact that societies which remember their mistakes in the past tend not to commit the same errors in the present or in the future. Remembering, as opposed to being silent or forgetting, obscures what is actually a contest between rival memories, each with their own oblivions. In the case of the military dictatorship in Argentina, Jelin (2002) states that the erasing and forgetfulness of the past were products of the will or a policy of silence and forgetting on the part of actors who elaborate strategies to hide and to destroy proof and all traces of their crimes, thus impeding people's ability to remember the military dictatorship in the future. In these instances, there were voluntary political acts of destruction of proof and traces of crimes committed during the dictatorship (e.g. pardons and policies aimed at 'national reconciliation'), carried out with the intention of promoting selective forgetfulness. However, the memories of the witnesses could not be manipulated in the same way (except through the physical extermination of the latter).

On the other hand, Jelin points out that all policies of conserving memories have an implicit will to forget when selecting traces to preserve, conserve, or commemorate. However, she does not present any specific cases of selective forgetting in the present politics of memory in Argentina. As I indicate in chapter four, these cases of selective forgetting within the Argentinean context may be related to the consequences of the violent acts (e.g. terrorist attacks) committed by former members of armed, political organizations. This underlies a struggle between competing memories, rather than a struggle against forgetting.

Jelin (2007) maintains that the constitution, the institutionalization, the recognition and the strength of the memories and of the identities feed each other. There are, as much for individual people as for groups and societies, 'peaceful' periods and periods of crisis. In the peaceful periods, when memories and identities are formed, instituted and tied, the questions that may be asked are not urgent enough to cause any reordering or restructuring of memories. Social forms of memory perform a central role at the time of defining social identities. This feature is crucial after periods of mass violence, such as dictatorships involving mass political repression of dissidents. In these social contexts, collective memories form social identities whose cohesion – most of the

time – is based on only one goal: the attainment of reparative justice (Levy & Sznajder, 2005, 2006).

Although the majority of these scholars do not deny that memories must be stored in people's minds most of their investigations are centered on exploring the cultural products arising from processes of societal remembering. In other words, despite the fact that they do not deny that individuals are responsible for retrieving collective memories (Halbwachs, 1992; Jelin, 2002; Olick 2008), they argue that those memories are always shaped and re-shaped by means of social frameworks that allow the emergence of some memories, while leaving others in the dark. Hence, collective memories are not the sum of individual memories or the outcome of sharing autobiographical memories in a specific social setting. This perspective is focused on exploring the social processes which form and legitimate public representations of the past. In other words, collective memories can be thought of as a group of ideas, images and feelings relating to the past and which emerge from the influence exerted by the cultural resources that people share. Hence, it is important to analyze both the way in which societies use their cultural resources of memory, narratives about the past, rituals, memorials, etc. (e.g. *Cromañón*), and the processes that make collective memories generate, legitimate, convey, and transform society.

According to Jelin (2007), power relations and hegemony are always present in memories because of the struggle to appropriate meaning and interpretations of the past (2007: 141). This struggle against silence or forgetting lies at the heart of why memory has become such an emotionally and ideologically loaded concept in Argentina. This struggle is crucial after periods of mass violence, such as the 1976-1983 military. In this social milieu, social frameworks of remembrance (Halbwachs, 1992) facilitated the emergence and consolidation of vehicles of memory – many of them considered to be identity projects – which were aimed at the attainment of reparative justice for human rights abuses in the past¹⁶. In Argentina, the new social framework of remembrance, explained in the first sections of this chapter, have put recent history into the memory of both individuals and 'society' and, in so doing, made the past a living force for

¹⁶ A good example of remembrance and commemorative practices as identity projects is the human rights association HIJOS, which is an acronym for Hijos por la Identidad y la Justicia contra el Olvido y el Silencio (Sons and Daughters for Identity and Justice in the Face of Silence and Forgetting). For more information see: <http://www.hijos.org.ar/>.

designing a new positioning, attitudes, and policies according to specific political interests (Roniger & Snajder, 1998: 134).

The studies referred to above highlight the importance of analyzing practices of social remembrance in Argentinean society. By disentangling how products of social memory work as vehicles of remembrance (Jelin, 2007), these investigations aim at stressing the necessity of remembering the past in order to construct a more democratic society, condemn the traumatic past, and learn from the mistakes committed. Revisiting a past marred by conflict in order to better understand the present and construct a society's future by strengthening the bonds of solidarity and promoting social justice. These goals are in line with the current official politics of memorialization which I will analyze in chapter four.

2.4.3 Discourse analysis and memory studies

Special issues of the *Journal of Language and Politics*¹⁷ (2006) and *Critical Discourse Studies*¹⁸ (2009) featured articles investigating the relationship between traumatic pasts, history, memory and discourse. Except for one article on the military dictatorship in Uruguay, these studies were specifically focused on the Nazi past, right-wing politics in Austria and the United Kingdom, and several issues related to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. The article which analyzes discourse practices of remembrance in Uruguay (Achugar, 2009) is part of a wider and more detailed investigation of the public discourse about the Uruguayan dictatorship (1973-1985). This investigation was published in the monograph *What We Remember: the Construction of Memory in Military Discourse* (Achugar, 2008). In this study, Achugar explores aspects of commemorative speeches in relation to the Uruguayan dictatorship. I will present a more or less detailed review of some relevant features of this study in chapter four (section 4.2.) and then proceed to analyze four commemorative speeches delivered by Néstor Kirchner in Argentina.

In regards to Argentina, the ways in which language and ideology are interwoven in political speeches delivered by political leaders and the military in recent Argentinean history have been explored in numerous studies (Lavandera, 1985a, 1985b; García Negroni, 1988; García Negroni & Zoppi Fontana, 1992; García Negroni & Raiter, 1988; Montero, 2007, 2008, 2009; Pardo & Lorenzo-Dus, 2010). Several of these studies are

¹⁷ See http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_bookview.cgi?bookid=JLP%205:1

¹⁸ See <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=g915188733>

in line with the increasing politicization of memory research in the social sciences which was briefly mentioned earlier in this chapter. They were focused on examining how public memories of political events are strategically constructed in accordance with specific political interests. These public memories are shaped and reproduced in a range of different textual genres: political speeches, military speeches, editorials, textbooks, etc.

In a recently published article on discourse and commemoration of the Malvinas (Falklands) War in the *Journal of Multicultural Discourses*, Pardo and Lorenzo-Dus (2010) explore the British and Argentinean war hero constructions in Argentinean and British TV shows broadcasted for the 25th commemoration of the war in 2007. The authors conclude that the Argentinean constructions of war here are driven by a 'modern' archetype of lone here willing to die for this country, whereas the British are more based on a 'postmodern' archetype of the hero as someone who merely does his job as part of team work. This is the first comparative study on paradigms of commemoration in relation to the Malvinas (Falklands) War in discourse analysis and media studies, and may represent a first step to new interdisciplinary research programs on 'collective memory' and commemorative practices on Argentinean recent history.

Montero (2007, 2008, 2009) has specifically investigated the new discourse about the military dictatorship introduced and maintained by Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007). In these studies, she explores the tensions and complexities of the current process of collective memory-making in Argentina (Montero, 2008: 27). She investigates the role of authority and political decisions in the speeches of Kirchner. In doing so, she provides arguments about the ideological mechanisms underlying the discursive construction of the political identity of the administration in Kirchner in by means of its way of revisiting the traumatic past (Montero, 2009).

As I indicate in chapter four, the systematic and detailed linguistic analysis of Argentina's violent past have shown that the public narratives about the military dictatorship are not mechanically determined by the objective facts about the past, but are rather socially mediated by ideologies in the present. The main aim of those studies was to explore the ideological traits underpinning public speeches about the past by disentangling the strategic relationships between social and textual structures in political discourses. Consequently, little attention has been paid to the key role that the cognitive mechanisms underlying discourse processing (e.g. the role of presupposed knowledge in commemorative speeches in driving inferential processes) play by interconnecting those

social and textual structures, with reference to the military regime. In the next two chapters I argue in more detail that the lack of a cognitive theory of discourse has prevented discourse approaches from providing an exhaustive and integrative picture of the socio-cognitive complexity of discourse processes within the creation of memories.

2.5 Final remarks

This chapter has presented historical, political and sociological evidence in support of the claim that there has been a new ideological stance in relation to the 1976-1983 military dictatorship in Argentina since 2003. These changes in the official mode of conceptualizing the military regime will be explored in detail in chapter four when analyzing the creation of two time-frames in order to promote the exceptionality of the present political stance in relation to the traumatic past. These transformations were contextualized within the Southern Cone of Latin America in the first sections of this chapter.

The example of *Cromañón* was employed to illustrate to what extent the social frameworks of remembrance which were developed to commemorate the victims of the military regime have penetrated the social fabric. It illustrates this by showing that these social frameworks of remembrance are currently being used by the relatives of the victims of new tragedies to drive their search for memory, justice and truth.

The final section aimed to provide a general overview of memory research in Argentina. Due to the increasing politicization of memory, which was clearly illustrated in the previous sections, we are likely to observe a ‘memory boom’ in the social sciences, which will be reflected in the creation of new university programs, institutes, research groups and journals especially focused on exploring practices of social memory within the region. In linguistics and discourse analysis, such a ‘memory boom’ with regards to the narratives about the military dictatorship had been studied after the return of democracy. These studies have been revitalized due to the new official ideological stance maintained since 2003.

I hope this chapter has been useful in illustrating to what extent memory has determined the political, historical, socio-cultural and scientific agendas of the last few decades in Argentina. This crucial relevance of memory was my social and cultural motivation for undertaking the research that will be discussed further in the following chapters.

3. TOWARDS A COGNITIVE PRAGMATICS OF REMEMBERING¹⁹

3.1 Introduction

This chapter has three main sections. The first section (3.2 and 3.4) provides a review of some of the most influential developments in memory research, from the neurosciences and cognitive psychology to socio-cultural and discursive oriented research in the psychological sciences. This review focuses on pointing out both the contributions and limitations of each perspective. This selection of approaches relies on the fact that processes of memory-making are complex activities in which different layers of experience must be interconnected in meaningful ways. The second section of this chapter (3.5) presents the cognitive and discourse approach in which a new pragmatics of processes of memory-making is based on. Finally, the third section (3.6) introduces a new integrative approach to memory research which seeks to synthesize discursive, cognitive and social-interactionist approaches in order to better understand the situated re-constructions, communication and function of memories in real world activities.

3.1.1 Memory studies as transdisciplinary research field

Acts of memory-making are (partly) cognitive processes distributed across brain regions, and thereby, are driven by individuals' nervous system (Roediger, Zaromb & Butler, 2009). Hence, this chapter begins with a review of neuro-cognitive approaches to memory research in laboratory settings. This review points out that recent findings by neuroscientists have provided compelling evidence about the distributed nature of memory processes in the brain (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007). These findings are crucial to rule out the metaphor of memory as a storage information device. Subsequently, I further review some approaches to memory research in cognitive psychology whilst acknowledging the key role that this discipline plays by dictating the agenda of memory studies since 1960's.

Nevertheless, acts of memory-making are not only distributed across brain regions. They are continually being reshaped and re-elaborated by means of interaction

¹⁹ This version is currently in preparation for submission. A shorter version of this paper (poster) was presented at the international conference *Theoretical Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory*, Center for Autobiographical Memory Research, Aarhus University, June 2010.

with other people and cultural resources such as technological devices, textbooks, rituals, commemorations, memorials, and the media (Brown & Hoskins, 2010; Sutton, 2009b). Processes of memory-making always emerge in situated activities, the goal of which goes far beyond the mere act of remembering. Hence, the second part of this review (sections 3.3 and 3.4) deals with socially-oriented cognitive psychology as well as socio-cultural and discursive approaches to memory research, within and outside the boundaries of the laboratory.

Due to the linguistic nature of this study, the review is especially focused on approaches which employ discourse processes as the medium to explore acts of remembering. I argue that epidemiological approaches (based on socially-oriented cognitive psychology) have provided important insights on how individual and collective memories are shaped, transformed and consolidated by language use and communication (Hirst & Manier, 2008). However, by not providing a detailed and pragmatic analysis of talk-in-interaction, these studies do not enable us to better understand how cognitive and discourse processes shape processes of memory-making in communicative interactions in real-world activities.

Finally, I review approaches in discourse psychology (Middleton & Edwards; Middleton & Brown). These studies shed light on the ways in which people jointly and discursively reconstruct memories when they are trying to accomplish interactional goals. These investigations provide a discursive, pragmatic and ecologically valid approach to processes of remembering. These are one of the methodological and theoretical foundations of the new integrative approach I developed in the third section of this chapter (3.6). Nevertheless, these approaches sustain the view that there is no correlation between cognitive mechanisms involved in processes of remembering and the verbalization or embodiment of such past experiences in social interactions. To explain and provide evidence about the interdependences between cognitive processes and embodied discourse practices of memory-making is one of the purposes and challenges of the new integrative approach I develop in the third section of this chapter (3.6).

3.1.2 Discourse and cognitive processes

This section (3.5) provides the discourse foundations of the new integrative approach presented in this chapter. Several studies in cognitive social psychology (Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz & Groll, 2008; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2008) and socio-cultural

psychology (Wertsch, 2002, 2008, 2009) are focused on analyzing discursive practices of remembering in order to find evidence on how memory works. Surprisingly, although they employ discourses of past as their main source of data, these studies show little reflection on the discourse processes enabling the reconstruction of memories. Furthermore, despite stressing the context-sensitive nature of these reconstructions, these studies do not account for the contextual features influencing such situated practices of remembering.

The new integrative approach to memory research that I explained in this chapter account for the interplay between cognitive, and discourse processes in terms of situation models (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; van Dijk, forthcoming; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998; Zwaan & Madden, 2004). However, language users need to accommodate these situation models about the content of past experiences reconstructed in episodic memory, according to the features of the ongoing interaction (e.g. setting, participants, shared knowledge, intentions and goals, etc). Hence, they also need to be endowed with the capacity to construct and update context models (van Dijk, 2008b, 2009b) of the ongoing interaction in order to be able effectively to adapt their discourses about past experiences.

3.1.3 A new integrative approach to processes of memory-making

The third section of this chapter (3.6) provides a new cognitive and discourse based theory to memory research. Despite the fact that a large proportion of studies in memory research are based on investigations of (interactional) cognitive and discourse processes, neither linguistics nor cognitive and social psychologists have proposed an integrative, interdisciplinary and discursive-based theory to memory research.

The aim of this section (3.6) is to propose a new integrative approach to memory research, which brings together linguistics and discourse analysis, on the one hand, with cognitive and social psychology, on the other hand. The communication of memories is an interactive, embodied and socio-cognitive phenomenon sustained by social agreement. That is, the action of communicating past experiences is not driven by the mere transmission of narratives of the past, but also by a situated reconstruction of those experiences in the present, depending on interpersonal/social group goals and pragmatic needs. Hence, I argue that processes of remembering are always action oriented reconstructions of the past, which are highly dynamic and malleable by means of communication and context. The context-dependent meanings of such situated re-

constructions of the past are the basis for the cognitive pragmatics of processes of memory-making. All in all, this new approach aims to provide the grounds for a new ecologically valid theory on memory studies which accounts for the mutual interdependencies between communication, cognition, meaning and interaction guiding remembering processes in the real-world settings.

3.2 Neuro-cognitive approaches to memory research: episodic, semantic and autobiographical remembering

Cognitive psychology has undoubtedly been the main field of memory research for the last 40 years (Danziger, 2008). During this time, cognitive psychologists (Neisser, 1982; Tulving, 1972; Loftus, 1979) have been creating new terms and definitions (e.g. episodic memory, false memory, semantic memory, procedural memory, transactive memory, working memory; among many others) in order to better understand the ways in which human memory functions. In what follows I provide brief definitions of some of those concepts (e.g. episodic memory and semantic memory). Although in processes of memory-making in real-world activities it is quite unlikely to establish clear boundaries between types of memory (Campbell, 2008), the above distinctions are necessary to better understand current memory research in neuro-cognitive and socio-cultural psychology.

3.2.1 Episodic memory

Several neuroscientists, by making use of neuroimaging techniques (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Greenberg, Rice, Cooper, Cabeza, Rubin & LaBar, 2005; Rubin, 2006; Squire, 2004; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006), have indicated that the process of remembering personally experienced past events is based on the interanimation of distributed neural networks. Considering the perceptual richness of the processes of autobiographical remembering, these neural networks are being directly influenced by the parts of the brain involved in sensory and emotional processing (Cabeza, Prince, Daselaar, Greenberg, Budde, Dolcos, LaBar & Rubin, 2004; Markowitsch, Thiel, Reinkemeier, Kessler, Koyuncu & Heiss, 2000; Markowitsch, Vandekerckhove, Lanfermann & Russ, 2003). Investigations using fMRI have shown the dynamic involvement of distributed brain regions during distinct periods of episodic remembering (Prince, Tsukiura & Cabeza, 2007).

Episodic memory (Markowitsch, 2008, 2010a, 2010b; Tulving, 2002) guides the processes by which human beings define themselves and assign meaning to the world. From the *here and now*, episodic memory enables us to reconstruct and re-encounter autobiographical experiences which have occurred throughout the course of our lives. Due to episodic remembering processes human beings are able to compare past experiences with present ones and project themselves into the future by making predictions and inferences that are extremely useful for anticipating possible outcomes of future experiences (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007, 2009; Tulving, 2002).

The patterns of connectivity between neurons, and between different neural networks, led several neuroscientists to claim that episodic remembering is a more constructive, rather than a reproductive activity. Some scholars (Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2007; Schacter, Gutchess & Kensinger, 2009) even maintain that episodic remembering needs to be thought of as a process which does not represent, but rather ‘constructs’ reality. The regulation of these processes of construction of reality may be both innate and acquired in early childhood and shaped by later experience (Schmidt, 2008: 192).

3.2.1.1 The constructive features of episodic remembering

The idea that processes of episodic remembering are constructive in nature is fundamentally grounded in findings on the interlocking of culture, mind and the brain: Bartlett’s influential book *Remembering* (1932) in which he investigated the constructive character and progressive rationalization of exotic stories in a series of re-narrations by English participants according to their cultural schemata; and, secondly, the new neurobiological findings in brain plasticity (Brockmeier, 2010; Edelman, 1990), which show that the brain changes all the time, continuously adapting to new circumstances (Brockmeier, 2010: 24). In current neuro-cognitive memory research, it is hard to find an approach which does not consider the constructive character of episodic remembering.

Recent investigations on episodic thinking about the future (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007; Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Eichenbaum & Fortin, 2009; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2007; Szpunar, 2010) present neurophysiologic and neuroimaging evidence, which indicates that remembering the past and imagining the future are driven by an important overlap in psychological and

neural processes. These findings sustained the view of several neurobiologists and neurochemists (Edelman & Tononi, 2000; Edelman & Changeux, 2001; Maturana & Varela, 1980, 1992) who have introduced solid arguments concerning the constructive character of memory.

The present discussion in (constructivist) neuro-cognitive memory research is what extent episodic remembering is a construction driven by memory traces in the mind which are created by impressions called ‘engrams’ (Ogden & Richards, 1956), which are the residual trace of an adaptation made by the organism in response to a stimulus (Ogden & Richards, 1956: 53), or whether these successive re-constructions which enable us to remember are rather more dependent on and driven by the present context of remembering, which is formed by external symbolic devices called ‘exograms’ (Donald, 1991; Sutton, 2009b; Sutton, Harris, Keil & Barnier, 2010) that act as memory cues.

3.2.2 Semantic memory

Semantic memory (Hart & Kraut, 2007; Tulving & Schacter, 1990), on the other hand, is the type of memory associated with the recollection of factual information and general knowledge of world. This information is organized into networks of related concepts (Tulving & Schacter, 1990) and does not include either the context of recollection (e.g. I know that Quito is the Capital of Ecuador, but I have never been to Quito and I do not remember when or where I learnt that). That is, semantic memory does not involve memory of a specific event in which the self has direct experience. This type of information includes not only unchallenged knowledge of the world, but also opinions and ideologies, and it is derived from episodic memory, that is, personal experiences. Episodic and semantic are two kinds of declarative memory, that is, memories which can be consciously recalled and be communicated and shared with others.

3.2.3 Episodic memory and semantic memory: a necessary integration

It is important to point out the widely accepted distinction between semantic and episodic memory. This differentiation has been the point of departure of hundreds of investigations within the boundaries of the laboratory in cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, several cognitive psychologists (Strack, F. & Förster, 1995, 1998) argued

that even in the ways in which their experimental subjects performed tasks of word-recognition both forms of memory were not independent (1995:353). The interanimation of (at least) both forms of memory is precisely the driving force shaping processes of remembering in everyday life because episodic memories of personal experiences are always based on socially-shared knowledge organized in semantic memory. As I will show in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, when people are engaged in real-world activities in naturalistic settings, semantic and episodic forms of memory are hardly distinguishable. Hence, when we reconstruct and communicate our personal experiences we always relate such autobiographical episodes to relevant social, cultural, and historical knowledge.

In the next sub-section I introduce a more complex concept which attempts to capture the long-term and developmental functionality of human memory experience in everyday life.

3.2.4 Autobiographical memory

Autobiographical memory in neuro-cognitive psychology (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005; Markowitsch 2008; Williams, Conway & Cohen, 2008; Welzer & Markowitsch, 2005; Williams & Conway, 2009) is an integration of features and contents from long-term memory systems – episodic memory, semantic memory and procedural memory. In functional terms, autobiographical memory operates by integrating beliefs and expectations from long-term memory systems (Markowitsch, 2008; Welzer & Markowitsch, 2005). This is why autobiographical memory is always a malleable reconstruction of the past unfolding *in the present*. It is largely sustained by subjective as well as culturally shared social knowledge of the world in which, naturally, a self-schema (who I was, who I am, who I will be, etc.) is also embedded.

Autobiographical memory operates to sustain a network of personal aims over the course of a person's life. For normal healthy humans this ability to reminisce about specific past events is an integral part of our daily lives. We often take it for granted because these autobiographical memories are normally involuntary, and often without any deliberate intent to remember. However, not all humans are capable of autobiographical remembering. Indeed, autobiographical memory develops relatively late (Nelson, 2003), and is also the most fragile kind of memory, the first to be lost in Alzheimer's disease and other debilitating neurodegenerative diseases of the mind.

3.2.4.1 Self-memory systems

Conway's model of the self-memory systems (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway & Williams, 2008; Williams & Conway, 2009) may currently represent the most influential theory about how autobiographical memories are constructed in consciousness. Conway (2005) claims that autobiographical memory is formed by episodic memory and autobiographical knowledge, which is defined as the conceptual generic schematic knowledge of these episodic memories. Thus, autobiographical memory locates human beings in socio-historical time. The interlocking of episodic memories and autobiographical knowledge is carried out by self-networks (Williams & Conway, 2009). Within these networks, memories are networked by their relation to a person's sense of self – more precisely, the particular version of the person's working self, which was active when that memory was formed (Williams & Conway, 2009: 37). The link to the social world is given by the fact that self-networks necessarily extend beyond the brain because individuals or selves belong and exist in relation to social groups. Moreover, processes of autobiographical remembering must meet the criteria set by the goal of the working self. The goals are always in accordance to the demands that the person is performing (i.e. narrating the first time I was robbed). These demands are largely shaped by social groups. Moreover, the self-contribution to memory does not merely concern the enrichment of retrieval cues and organization, but also lead to memory errors (Schacter, Gutchess & Kesinger, 2009: 95).

3.3 Memory in socio-cultural psychology: cognitive, social and linguistic organization of memories

This section begins with a review of current approaches to autobiographical memory and narrative (Bernsten & Bohn, 2009; Bluck & Habermas, 2000; Pasupathi, 2001) in psychology. Then, it provides some information about the evolution and development of autobiographical narratives (Donald, 1991; Nelson, 2003b) and how this process of development leads the construction of narrative schemata (Schmidt, 2008; Bruner, 1990; Wertsch, 2002). These narrative schemata may organize experience in the mind and are the basis for the emergence of actual narratives (Schmidt, 2008). Some of these approaches on memory and narrative (Bruner, 2008; Wertsch, 2008) are focused on

analyzing discourse processes of autobiographical memory. However, they lack either a linguistic or discourse theory driving the analysis.

Finally, I introduce a theory on narrative structure from linguistics (Labov, 2006), which is used in chapter 6 to analyze practices of autobiographical remembering. The purpose of presenting that linguistic approach to narrative is to begin relating cognitive, social and discursive processes in practices of memory-making. These interanimations between the different levels of experience engaged in processes of remembering are explained in detail in section 3.6.

3.3.1 Life scripts

The relation between autobiographical memories and self-narratives is not so simple. A life story schema (Bluck & Habermas, 2000) operates at a mental level as the interface between autobiographical memories and narratives by ordering the life story in temporal, causal and thematic coherence in accordance with a cultural concept of biography. Bluck and Habermas (2000) define a life story schema as skeletal mental representation of life's major components and links (p.121). According to Anderson (1977), a schema is formed by the norms scripts that are used to interpret different domains of experience in the world (life course, how to behave in restaurant, etc.). People use schemata to process and assign meaning to new information.

Moreover, the content of our life stories is constrained by cultural norms that influence what people consider important and unimportant from the perspective of telling a life story (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Berntsen & Bohn, 2009; Rubin, Berntsen & Hutson, 2009; Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008). By life stories I mean an account of the series of events making up one's experience of life, highlighting the most important and contextual relevant aspects (Atkinson, 1998). The cultural norms that determine culturally shared expectations about the order and timing of an event in a prototypical life course are called 'life scripts'. In cognitive psychology (Schank & Abelson, 1977) scripts were defined as organized clusters of information about stereotypical events (e.g. how to behave in a restaurant) which are largely shared and form part of general knowledge organized in semantic memory (van Dijk, 1987: 170). As we notice, the concepts of schema and scripts have been often used to define the similar types of mental representations of recurrent events.

Life scripts are scripts about a person's life-course which depict an idealized life story, which is transmitted from older generations, from socially shared knowledge, and from observations of behavior of other people within the same community and culture. Bernsten and Bohn (2009) highlight that life scripts are part of culturally shared knowledge and, therefore, help to structure a life story (Atkinson, 1998; Linde, 1993), but that the two are not the same. Life stories (Atkinson, 1998; Linde, 1993) are about an individual's life course (i.e. I was born in Buenos Aires where I grew up and went to primary and secondary school, etc.) are contrasted with life scripts, which are clusters for culturally expected transitional events and their timing in the average life course (i.e. getting married and then having a child).

Bernsten and Bohn explain that if a transitional event occurs on time (i.e. being a parent after getting married), it is considered positive according to cultural and societal norms (2009: 65). Life script is a powerful concept that can be applied to future cross-cultural research. My concern is that it could be used to create overgeneralizations by oversimplifying cultural differences. However, these speculations go far beyond the scope of this thesis. More empirical evidence would be needed to point out the limitations of life scripts in cross-cultural research, if cultural differences are not properly taken into account. If cultural differences were taken into consideration, the concept of life scripts would be employed to explore the ways in which particular societies resist or re-contextualize imported (and often dominant) life scripts accordingly to their own socio-cultural dynamics.

3.3.2 Autobiographical narratives

Narratives²⁰ based on personal experiences are one of the most widespread cultural, cognitive and linguistic resources used to construct, communicate, and transform autobiographical memories (Higgins & Rholes, 1978; Pasupathi, 2001; Skowronski & Walker, 2004). Autobiographical narratives must be considered as verbal elaborations based on conscious remembrances of self-experience (Schmidt, 2008). They also play a crucial role in social interactions (Pasupathi 2003; Pasupathi, Weeks & Rice, 2006). People usually use their past experiences in order to both begin and cement new human relationships. Autobiographical memories in narrative forms are also utilized to create a

²⁰ In this thesis the concepts of 'narrative' does not only mean full-scale, crafted, publicly expressed narratives (e.g. memoirs or speeches) but also more fragmentary and on-the-fly stories about one's past.

feeling of connection and intimacy with partners (Pasupathi, 2003). The next subsections provide a brief review of evolutionary, functional as well as structural approaches to narrative research.

3.3.2.1 Evolution and function of autobiographical narratives

In evolutionary terms, the language capacity (linguistic and motor) to form narratives is a skill closely related to the formation of large social groups and cultural complexes (Donald, 1991). In everyday uses narrative capacities may be fully developed in the Upper Paleolithic age. They emerged as social products by playing a key role in the creation of myths which support the coherence and cohesion of the community. Donald (1991) claims that narrative skill is the basic driving force behind language use, particularly speech, due to the fact that it is essential to describe and define events and objects.

In the community, shared narrative skills create the conditions for the construction of a collective version of reality. In developmental terms, narrative skills play a central role in the emergence of autobiographical memory capacities which are developed during the later part of preschool years (Fivush & Nelson, 2004; Nelson, 2003b; Nelson & Fivush, 2004; Reese, Haden & Fivush, 1993). Nelson and Fivush (2004) provide compelling evidence that shows conversations about past events between caregivers and children happen as soon as they (the children) start to talk. These authors (Nelson, 2003a; Nelson & Fivush, 2004) maintain that the ways in which adults talk about past experiences with their children directly influence the nature of the children's autobiographical narratives in the future. The emergence of autobiographical memories generates the grounds for the creation of a self-history which is unique to the self and distinct from self-histories of others (Nelson, 2003b).

The meaning-function of autobiographical narratives (Bruner, 1990, 2008; Gergen, 1998) rests upon the fact that they normally operate by attempting to understand life-events as systematically related. Thus, narrative order in terms of causal and coherent interconnected sequences of episodes, events and actions must be fundamental at the time of giving life a sense of meaning and direction.

Narrative schemata (Bruner 1990; Schmidt, 2008; Wertsch, 2002) are the most natural cultural resources for constructing autobiographical narratives. These schemata should be thought of as by-products of cultural models (Quinn & Holland, 1987; Kronenfeld, 2008; Shore, 1996; see section 3.5.2). Hence, semantic and episodic

memories are highly intertwined in autobiographical narratives, creating an action-oriented socio-cultural self (Nelson, 2003b). Narrative schemata have been acquired by individuals during their socialization (Schmidt, 2008) within specific cultural settings. They function by not only organizing and structuring the verbalization of remembrances, but also the order of the narrated events in individual's minds, and, in doing so, can form a story which can be told and accepted by a possible audience (Schmidt 2008: 193). Bruner (1990) also claims that the perception and remembrance of experiences are organized and ordered in narrative fashion according to narrative schemata. In the last part of this review section (see section 3.6) I provide evidence in support of the argument that the cognitive processes involved in doing and remembering activities seem more complex than the proposal maintained by socio-cultural and constructionist psychologists.

3.3.2.2 Structure of autobiographical narratives

Considering that the autobiographical narratives, which form part of a life story (see 3.3 and 3.3.1) organized according to life scripts (see 3.3.1), are partly discourse resources, it is important to know how they are internally structured. In Labov's theory of narrative structure (Labov & Waletzky, 1967, Labov, 1997, 2006), a narrative is a specific and particular way of story-telling, in which the order of a sequence of independent clauses is interpreted as the order of the events referred to (Labov 2006: 37). Moreover, the extraordinary events that give shape to narratives must be causally linked to each other. This causal relationship between distinct but mutual dependent autobiographical narratives embedded in a particular time-frame of a life story (see sections 3.3 and 3.3.1) are described in detail by using Labov's framework in chapter 6.

According to Labov (2006), the mere existence of a temporal juncture between two independent clauses is the basic condition that every narrative must fulfill. A temporal juncture can be defined as a relation of before-and-after that holds between two independent clauses and matches the order of the events in time (Labov 2006: 37). In addition, narratives are generally composed of the following elements: i) an abstract that functions by inserting the narrative; ii) an orientation that provides categories such as setting, participants and actions within the story-world; iii) a complicating action that justifies the relevance and appropriateness of the narrative as self-experience which goes against routine social episodes; iv) a resolution that basically indicates the point

when the narrator has come to close the sequence of actions; v) an evaluation of actions that can be proposed by the juxtaposition of real and potential events and refers to the reason for telling such a narrative within a specific interaction; and finally vi) a coda which returns to point in time in which the self-experience is being narrated and points out the relevance of the story by connecting it with everyday life or other events that fall outside the story frame.

We must bear in mind that the order of the events that Labov refers to does not necessarily match with the order of events in autobiographical memory (e.g. flashbacks). And it is important to make clear that the order of the above described narrative sections may vary significantly in oral narratives. This occurs because there is not a direct correlation between the representation of events in situation models (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983, Zwaan & Madden, 2004) in episodic memory and how language users reconstruct and communicate them in actual narratives.

The new integrative approach to memory research developed in this chapter applies Labov's theory as a conceptual tool to structure and analyze actual narratives, considered as discursive realizations. It also incorporates Labov's theory on the linguistic cognitive processes of narrative pre-construction responsible for the planning of stories (Labov, 2006). His proposal on processes on narrative pre-construction is appropriate to particularly explain the relationship between silences and topic change in oral narratives. Yet, it does not account for the key role that memory, socially-shared knowledge or interaction plays in the shaping of narratives. All in all, I believe that Labov's approach may be useful to complement socio-cultural approaches to autobiographical memory and narrative which lack a linguistic theory.

In section 3.5 I show that the discourse representations which form autobiographical narratives are built in accordance to situation models (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; van Dijk, forthcoming). Language users accommodate these situation models (what the stories are about) by means of their representations of the communicative interaction.

3.3.3 A few remarks on socio-cultural approaches to narrative and memory

The socio-cultural perspective to memory research presents an interesting approach to study the social functions of autobiographical narratives in everyday life. However, the connection between cognitive processes, narrative schemata and the actual narratives

acting as carriers of memory seems to lack explicit motivation. How are the narrative schemata constructed and represented in the mind? What is the relationship between them and narratives? Are the narrative schemata directly determining actual narratives of the past experiences in social interactions? What is the role of contextual features in such practices? How do these schemata change over time? In my view, these questions are yet to be answered by the socio-cultural approaches to memory and narrative. Furthermore, as normally occurs in the narrative analyses undertaken by socio-cultural psychologists (Gergen, 1998; Wertsch, 2002), the studies investigating the links between memory, narrative schemata and narratives lack an underlying linguistic theory (Bamberg, 2006; Chafe, 1990; Georgeakopoulos, 2006; Labov, 1997, 2006; Quasthoff & Becker, 2004; Schiffrin, 1996; Tannen, 2007), which I think has to be fundamental at the time of analyzing narratives as situated, and embodied cases of text and talk.

3.4 Collective forms of memory: remembering in historical, political, social and material environments

This section provides a survey of relevant theories on collective forms of memory from interdisciplinary approaches in cognitive and social psychology as well as discursive and cultural-historical psychology²¹. Firstly, I review approaches in cultural-historical psychology (Wertsch, 2008) and social psychology (Pennebaker, Rimé & Páez, 1997) to collective memory which employ individual memories to bridge the gap between subjectivities and the social, political and historical environments. Secondly, I present approaches from discourse psychology (Middleton & Brown, 2005), cognitive social psychology (Hirst & Manier, 2008), and philosophical and cognitive psychology (Barnier, Sutton, Harris & Wilson 2008; Sutton, Harris, Keil & Barnier, 2010) which explore the situated and discursive reconstructions of shared memories in social and material environments. Some of these approaches focus more on the pragmatic and action-oriented nature of remembering in social interactions (Middleton & Brown, 2005), while others more on the cognitive processes shaping such practices (Barnier, Sutton, Harris & Wilson, 2008; Hirst & Manier, 2008).

²¹ Studies on collective memory in the social sciences were reviewed in the previous chapter.

3.4.1 Collective memory: narrative templates as cultural tools

Inspired by Vygotsky (1978, 1986) and Luria (1976), Wertsch (2002, 2008, 2009) claims that textual resources (e.g. narratives in textbooks about a collective past) function as mediators between the historical events and our understanding of those events. These narrative resources are schematic templates deeply embedded in socio-cultural frameworks. These schematic templates function to organize specific narratives according to abstract categories. Hence, abstract structures can underlie an entire set of specific narratives, each of which has a particular setting, cast of characters, dates, and so forth (Wertsch, 2009:129). The schematic narrative templates are specific to particular narrative traditions which can be expected to differ from one socio-cultural setting to another (Wertsch, 2009: 129). For this perspective, human action implies a tension between actors and cultural tools such as language and narrative texts. Therefore, cultural tools do not mechanically determine people's behavior, although it is crucial to acknowledge the strong influence that they have.

Wertsch (2002) claims that individual and collective memories are distributed between social actors and texts. This leads us to focus on the way in which social actors and cultural tools interact in a specific social context, rather than on examining how cultural tools, such as textbooks, construct discursive representations of the past or, on the other hand, the way in which people perform the same action. In contrast to other approaches in collective memory (Jelin, 2002; Olick, 2008, see chapter 2), which mainly focus on public and collective representations of the past, the interaction between cultural tools and individuals indicates how important individuals are as memory carriers. Nation states are not the only entities responsible for supplying the modern world with collective memories. However, it should be pointed out that they do play a central role in shaping what should be remembered and what is it better to be forget due to their power and the amount of resources devoted to this issue.

Wertsch (2000, 2008) examined the production and the appropriation of narrative templates about the Russian Civil War of 1918-20 and World War II by different generations of Russians. These studies, based on a content analysis of the narratives collected argued that schematic narrative templates that shape collective memory are tools used to organize and reconstruct an account of the past in practices of collective remembering. Instead of functioning as receptacles of precise and permanent information, these narrative templates function by indicating what should be said by an

individual or group in the community. On the other hand, these studies have some limitations at the time of providing detailed evidence on how templates form, consolidate and transform memories at community levels. Although Wertsch (2000, 2008) draws conclusions about collective memory directly from actual narratives, this approach lacks a linguistic theory guiding the analyses or accounts for the contextual influence determining the ‘appropriateness’ of such narratives.

Collective remembering can be thought of as a mediated action, which implies the interaction between social actors and cultural tools. It is not an action performed only by isolated individuals, or only by cultural tools. Both elements must be related to each other, always taking into consideration that perhaps that relation is in tension. This process has some implications, perhaps the most important are that cultural tools reflect a sociocultural setting and mediated remembering is situated in a socio-cultural context. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that collective memory is distributed and in flux between individuals and cultural tools.

To conclude, Wertsch (2002) proposes an interesting distinction between collective memory and collective knowledge of the past (e.g. history), which I believe can be extremely useful for social scientists and historians to draw a line between those two fields (see chapter 2). Wertsch (2002) argues, firstly, that collective memory belongs to an identity project which is often used by members of social groups and communities to display a picture of heroism, victimhood, etc. Moreover, these social groups and communities carrying such collective memories in form of narrative templates are usually impatient with ambiguity, ignoring counterevidence in order to preserve the established narrative and, thereby, main group cohesion. On the other hand, Wertsch points out that the main actors (e.g. government, political leaders and historians) shaping the collective knowledge of the past, aspire to arrive at an objective truth, regardless of the consequences. Thus, they recognize complexity and ambiguity by revising existing narratives in light of new evidence (e.g. truth commissions).

3.4.2 Collective memory: individual memories embedded in social frameworks

Other approaches in social psychology (Herranz & Basabe, 1999; Pennebaker, Rimé & Páez, 1997; Pennebaker, Páez & Deschamps, 2006; Páez, 2003; Páez, Bellelli & Rimé, 2009) sustain the view that collective forms of memory are able to be found in

individual memories. These approaches investigate how social frameworks of remembrance (Halbwachs, 1992, see chapter two section 2.4.2) determine people's psychological and social revisiting of historical events that represent significant long-term changes to their lives (e.g. genocide, civil war, and natural disasters -see chapter two for concrete examples on Argentina). Pennebaker, Rimé and Páez (1997) agree with Halbwachs (1992) and Wertsch (2002) that formation, maintenance and reproduction of collective memories depend on identity projects of communities and social groups. These social psychologists argue that 'the cross-generational oral transmission of collective events is an adequate definition of what Halbwachs considered collective memory' (Páez, Basabe & González: 1997: 169). Thus, considering the central role that the use of language plays by reflecting social and psychological states, the communication of the details of public events influences how they are organized in memory and remembered in the future. These collective memories operate to provide group cohesion by being persistent for years or even generations (Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997:17).

Several studies from this approach (Herranz & Basabe, 1999; Páez, Basabe, González, 1997; Pennebaker, Páez & Deschamps, 2006) show data from different regions of the world (Europe, Latin America and Japan) about social psychological processes involved in the formation, consolidation and transformation of collective memories in relation to traumatic events in large samples of population. The large samples of cases surveyed (more than 1,300 subjects were part of the study presented in Pennebaker, Páez & Deschamps, 2006) indicate that interests, worldviews and subjective experiences embedded in a specific culture and historical time shape the formation, consolidation, change and oblivion of collective memories. Moreover, the construction of collective memories is determined by closeness to the present and self-relevance. In other words, people tend to consider more relevant historical events, which to some extent can be temporally and physically connected to personal experiences. Although a large proportion of the data collected in these studies comes from self-reports and questionnaires to college students which are far from showing how collective memory works in real-world activities, these investigations provide compelling evidence on how historical and traumatic events shape social representations of the past at national and community levels.

3.4.3 Discursive remembering: memory as action in real life

The approach of discursive psychology to collective memory (Edwards & Middleton, 1986; Edwards, Potter and Middleton, 1992; Iñiguez & Vázquez, 1995; Middleton, 2002; Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Middleton & Brown, 2005, 2008; Norrick, 2005; Reavey & Brown, 2007; Vázquez, 2001; Vázquez & Iñiguez, 1994) maintains that the discourses which form practices of memory-making always emerge from experience in situated communicative interactions. Brown, Middleton and Lighfoot (2001) argue that memory is something that speakers perform, rather than a simple process in the course of routine interaction (2001: 125). Hence, discourses about the past pronounced by different social actors usually vary in pragmatic ways due to the fact that they are always constructed with regards to the communicative situation. Therefore, these scholars prefer to talk about social remembering, rather than collective memory, for the simple reason that this approach is focused on the same act of communicating memories. This perspective holds that discourses about the past do not reflect any internal cognitive process that would be taking place in the actor's minds during a communicative situation.

Discourse psychologists (Edwards, Potter & Middleton, 1992; Middleton & Edwards, 1990) claim that discourses about the past should be thought of as descriptions that may change according to the pragmatic and rhetorical functions for which they were designed. This view is based on a basic assumption in discourse psychology which maintains that what people say does not reveal or express their internal cognitive processes (Edwards & Potter, 2005: 245). One of the purposes and challenges of my new cognitive pragmatics of remembering is precisely to build a bridge between the pragmatic nature of discourses of the past and to the cognitive processes responsible for the communication and interpretation of memories in real-life settings. In section 3.6 I will show that there is a correlation between cognitive mechanisms involved in processes of remembering and the verbalization and embodiment of such past experiences in social interactions. Thus, I argue cognitive and embodied, as well as discursive and pragmatic processes are responsible for the reconstruction and communication of memories in social and material environments.

Discursive psychologists acknowledge that social remembering is an action based on pragmatic goals, which are dependent on the social and conversational context in which the action occurs (Middleton & Edwards, 1990: 40). The study of social

remembering offers important opportunities for understanding how it functions as a social action. Studies in social remembering investigate how practices of memory-making unfold on a social and collective basis by demonstrating the interactional organization of remembering in terms of sequential organization, co-option and pragmatics (Middleton & Brown, 2005: 99). As is the case in investigations in discourse psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Whetherell, 1987), practices of social remembering were studied in a different range of natural settings, e.g. the workplace (Brown, Middleton & Lightfoot, 2001), adopting families (Brookfield, Brown & Reavey, 2008), reconciliation visits of veterans of war (Muramaki & Middleton, 2006), and therapy sessions for children who suffered from child abuse (Reavey & Brown, 2007). They also incorporated the role that technological devices and cultural artifacts, such as email and family photographs, play in everyday processes of remembering. In brief, this ecologically valid research paradigm in memory clearly shows what the role of remembering is in interactional and meaningful communicative contexts.

These studies are undoubtedly endowed with high ecological validity, not only because they were conducted in real-world settings, but also, and fundamentally, due to the fact that they indicate the everyday function and uses of remembering when people are intending to achieve interactional goals. In doing so, they demonstrate that remembering in real-life settings needs to be thought of more as a situated activity or resource in order to achieve specific goals, rather than as instantiations of a storage device or archive located in people's brains. On the other hand, despite the fact that studies in discourse psychology sustain the view that remembering is a situated practice which forms part of real world activities, these studies do not account in detail for the contextual features that influence and shape how memories are communicated. As I will indicate in section 3.5.5.1, the situated reconstructions of past experiences are shaped according to a shifting representation of the context (van Dijk, 2008b, 2009b) which operates to make such discourses of the past appropriate for the communicative interaction.

3.4.4 Epidemiological perspective on collective memory

Hirst & Manier (2008) argue that in order to understand the way in which collective memory works it is necessary to take into account the interaction between the psychological mechanisms of individuals and situational, cultural, social and historical mechanisms. This approach supports the view that memory spreads throughout the community, neither because of the strength of the social practices and cultural resources –the media, memorials, textbooks, films, etc. – nor because of the cognitive efforts made by individuals, but due to the interaction between them. This interaction can be thought of as a distributed system grounded in brain, body and context. That is to say, in order to understand how collective memory functions, it is crucial to consider the interplay between biological and social elements. In contrast to what is usually assumed in the sociological approach to collective memory, the epidemiological approach maintains that the transmission of collective memory is constrained by biological (e.g. synaptic mechanisms of memory) and socio-cultural resources (e.g. memorials) in social practices (e.g. commemorative practices). The social and cultural resources depend on cultural differentiations. One culture may supply mnemotechnic practices that distinguish it from others (Wang, 2004, 2008; Wang & Ross, 2007). These, along with universal psychological limitations, play a key role in the process of reconstructing and propagating shared memories.

Several scholars (Cuc, Koppel & Hirst, 2007; Echterhoff, 2008; 2010; Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz & Groll, 2008; Echterhoff & Hirst, 2009; Kopietz, Hellmann, Higgins & Echterhoff, 2010; Hirst & Manier, 2002, 2008; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2008; Muller & Hirst, 2010) claim that examining conversations about relevant experiences in the construction of social identities is one of the most useful mechanisms for exploring how memory spreads across different groups. Therefore, specific mechanisms of collective memory will never be totally understood if investigators continue leaving aside the problem of reception (Hirst & Manier, 2008: 192). Although cultural models (Holland & Quinn, 1987; Kronenfeld, 2008; Shore, 1996) and situation models (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radavansky, 1998) – see section 3.5.2- shape what deserves to be remembered and forgotten by individuals in order to create, maintain or transform social identities, it is necessary to measure the influence of social practices and cultural resources on community members. This is for the simple reason that, in many cases, the action of sharing memories by community members is what constantly updates

collective memory. I will show in section 3.6 that these interactions depend on the construction of representations of the communicative situation.

Social and cognitive psychologists (Hirst, 2010; Hirst & Manier, 2008; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2008) claim that the sharing of memories across a community is what forms collective memories. Hence, the ways in which members of a community share memories and how these interactive processes shape collective memories are crucial when investigating mechanisms of collective memory making. Furthermore, Hirst and Manier's (2008) definition of collective memory is in accordance with Wertsch's differentiation between collective memory and history. They also support the view that just as autobiographical memory shapes individual identity, collective memory only exist when they play a key role in the shaping of community identity (Hirst & Manier, 2008; Hirst, 2010; Manier & Hirst, 2008).

As collective memories are commonly formed, shared, consolidated and transformed in conversations, several studies (Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz & Groll, 2008; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2008; Hirst & Muller, 2010) investigated how different cognitive, linguistic and interactive phenomena influence processes of collective memory making. Based on the motivation to construct a 'shared reality' (Echterhoff, 2010) between interlocutors while remembering together, along with the 'saying-is-believing effect' (Higgins & Rholes, 1978), which refers to the fact that speakers will usually tune what they say to the attitude of a listener and this can lead to changes in mnemonic representations (Hirst, 2010), these studies indicate that conversational dynamics (e.g. dominant narrator), and the characteristics of the speaker (e.g. expert) and listener (e.g. susceptibility, openness to new experiences) lead to mechanisms of imposition, resistance and forgetting of memories in interactional contexts.

Surprisingly, although these experimental studies in cognitive social psychology in laboratory settings propose explicit connections between language use, communication and memory processes (Echterhoff, 2008), they do not rely on either linguistic or discursive approaches (e.g. interactional pragmatics, discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, conversation analysis) to complement their psychological approach to practices of sharing memories in interactions -besides giving a few references of work done by Paul Grice, Stephen Levinson and Herbert Clark in pragmatics (see Echterhoff & Hirst, 2002). I indicate in section 3.6 that the cognitive, social, pragmatic and interactional features driving discursive processes of joint memory-making need to be integrated in a coherent and multidisciplinary fashion. Otherwise, we will still be

accounting for one aspect (e.g. discursive or cognitive) of this multidimensional practice.

Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz and Groll (2008) acknowledge that communicative goals guide the creation of a 'shared reality' which provides the conditions for the formation and transformation of memories. However, in my view, these goals must always be in accordance with subjective representations of the communicative interaction (van Dijk, 2006, 2008b, 2009b), including the activities and tasks a person is requested to perform (see section 3.5). Hirst and Echterhoff (2002) provided evidence that the conversational context of remembering plays a central role by guiding cognitive processes of editing and formatting responses in conversations about past experiences (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2002:95). Nonetheless, this finding is not incorporated into their later studies on collective memory along with the fact that most of these studies were conducted in laboratory settings. The representations of the context (setting, participants, roles and identities, activities, intentions and goals, knowledge, emotions, self, etc.) underpin process of collective memory making in practices of conversational remembering. Hence, the above mentioned studies on collective memory need to incorporate a theory of context (Givón, 2005; van Dijk, 1999, 2006, 2008b, 2009b), which has to acknowledge the influence exerted by the artificial conditions created by the use of experimental paradigms within the laboratory.

3.4.5 Collaborative remembering: distributed cognition in interactive memory processes

The distributed cognition hypothesis (Hutchins, 1995, 2010a, 2010b; Kirsh, 2006; Sutton, 2006, 2009, Sutton, Harris, Keil & Barnier, 2010) claims that while some mental states and some experiences can be defined internally, there are many others in which the meaning attribution processes are highly influenced by external factors. That is, some social and material elements of the environment can exert a crucial influence in guiding cognitive processes (Clark & Chalmers, 1998).

Approaches to relational remembering in philosophy (Campbell, 2008) and constructive-collaborative remembering in philosophy and cognitive psychology (Sutton, 2003; 2008a) acknowledge that remembering processes are sometimes cognitive practices that individuals perform privately and occur at an intra-individual level (Campbell, 2008: 14; Sutton, 2008a: 40). On the other hand, these approaches

agree on the fact that remembering often occurs in social groups (e.g. partners, friends, family members) in response to their views on our past or their own (Campbell, 2008:14). Thus, the act of sharing memories with others is one of the most common ways to create, maintain and negotiate human relationships. These processes of sharing memories occur through a wide range of activities which play a central role in how we reconstruct and communicate our memories. These activities are embedded in social and material environments which influence our present interests and needs when engaged in processes of remembering. Hence, the social context (e.g. setting, participants and goals) in which these practices of joint remembering unfold strongly influence what and how we remember (Harris, Paterson & Kemp, 2008: 217). In contrast to other perspectives, Campbell (2008) and Sutton (2004) accept the continual change of memories according to the context and goals but simply deny that these changes necessarily rule out accuracy.

Studies in constructive-collaborative remembering (Barnier, Sutton, Harris & Wilson, 2008; Sutton, 2008, Sutton, Harris, Barnier & Keil, 2010) indicate that collaborative remembering in small groups is situated, goal-oriented and, as expected (due to the influence exerted by the previous two features), cognitive processes involving the interplay of our brains, bodies, and the immediate physical and social environment. These studies (Harris, Keil, Sutton & Barnier, 2010; Harris, Keil, Sutton, McIlwan & Barnier, in press) showed that under some circumstances older couples engaged in practices of collaborative remembering are able to remember information that both individuals had forgotten. Harris, Keil, Sutton and Barnier (2010) noted that the mechanisms of collaborative facilitation which allowed better recall were driven by shared strategies, interactive cuing styles and repetition (2010:134).

The conclusions drawn from the studies reviewed above have several important implications for memory research in cognitive psychology. Firstly, they were conducted in naturalistic settings (homes of the older couples). Secondly, they demonstrated that the distributed cognition hypothesis is relevant for memory research. Thirdly, they combined quantitative and qualitative analyses of the data which is quite uncommon in cognitive psychology. On the other hand, despite the fact these studies pointed out the important role that environmental features play in influencing practices of collaborative remembering, they did not provide a description of the context in which such activities occur. Nor did they make explicit how this context influences such practices. Notwithstanding, I agree with one of the authors (Barnier, 2010) that their findings can

have important implications for research projects on everyday remembering in specific environments; for instance to ‘explore whether remembering with intimate others can compensate for decline in an individual’s memory and may even help to protect memory when brain illness strikes’ (Barnier, 2010: 295). In addition, these studies have demonstrated the immense value that new paradigms in cognitive sciences grounded in the distributed cognition hypothesis have in modern memory research. This new paradigm can be extremely useful to investigate not only how small groups create embodied socio-cognitive systems in multimodal interactions about past experiences, but also how we couple with technological devices in order to enhance our capacity for memory processes.

3.5 Language and cognition: mental models in cognitive and discourse processes

This section reviews relevant aspects of the socio-cognitive approach to discourse (van Dijk, 2009a) which form the linguistic basis for my new cognitive pragmatic account of processes of memory-making in real-life settings. In the following sub-sections I argue that the socio-cognitive approach to discourse processes is an appropriate interface between cognition, language use and interactions shaping practices of memory-making. So far studies in this socio-cognitive perspective have not explicitly addressed memory research in detail. In the next section (3.6)

I explicitly integrate relevant theories in memory research with the aspects of the socio-cognitive approach to discourse processes reviewed in this section.

3.5.1 The organization of experience

Although we have the sensation and impression of a stable world, evidence from behavioral and neuroimaging data (Zacks, 2010; Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Zacks, Tversky & Iyer, 2001; Zacks & Swallow, 2007) suggests that the brain automatically segments the ever-changing multimodal (visual, auditory, haptic, action and other sensorimotor experiences) stream of information into hierarchical parts and subparts. The origin of such multimodal stream of information is the activities (e.g. travel by plane) and events which compose such activities (e.g. get to the airport; complete the check-in; buy presents at the duty free-shop).

Despite the fact that this multimodal stream of information is changing, these authors suggest that the human brain segments it into sequences of key moments (Tversky, Zacks & Hard, 2008: 436). Zacks and Swallow (2007) argue that this segmentation depends on bottom-up processing of sensory features (e.g. sound, color, movement), and on top-down processing of conceptual features (e.g. actors' goals, cause-and-effect interactions). Thus, when characteristics of one's environment unpredictably change an event boundary is perceived. Importantly for the scope of this chapter, the ways in which the brain and the mind segment activities and events play a central role in what and how we remember later (Zacks, Tversky & Iyer, 2001).

By pointing this out, I am claiming that the pictures presented by Bruner's narrative organization of experience (Bruner, 1990) or Wertsch's standpoint on how collective memories are formed (Wertsch, 2002) needs to be grounded in accounts of lower level cognitive processes. On the other hand, I am not denying that narrative schemata can order and structure remembrance in discourse and social interactions, but I am arguing that the structuring of memories in narrative schemata is a process that may occur when the stream of multimodal experience was previously segmented into events at the brain and mind level. Moreover, the construction of narrative schemata needs to be grounded in life scripts (see section 3.3.1) if these schemata refer to the life-span or in cultural models (Kronenfeld, 2008; Shore, 1996) if they instantiate more general knowledge.

3.5.2 Cultural models

Although modern theories on perception, cognition and (inter)action have begun to consider human cognitive practices as multimodal processes (Barsalou, 2008; Semin & Smith, 2008; Zwaan & Madden, 2004), as far as I know, there is no theory on multimodal cultural models of perception, cognition and (inter) action. Thus, in this sub-section I refer to the traditional definition of cultural models (Holland & Quinn, 1987; Kronenfeld, 2008; Shore, 1996).

Cultural models (Kronenfeld, 2008; Shore, 1996) are driven by socially shared knowledge (Goldman, 1999; Jovchelovitch, 2007; Schütz & Luckmann, 1974; van Dijk, 2003, 2005, in press) of specific epistemic communities (van Dijk, in press) and emotional codes (Röttger-Kössler & Markowitsch, 2009) of specific epistemic (van Dijk, in press) and emotional communities (Rosenwein, 2006). Emotional codes exert a

crucial influence by shaping the ways in which emotions emerge and are communicated. They also determine the way in which human beings should feel according to their location in a complex network, formed by them being embedded and interacting in social relationships, cultural norms and social institutions. These emotional codes are defined as feeling rules (Röttger-Kössler & Markowitsch, 2009) which differ in varied ways according to social status, gender, age and life experience. Thus, emotional codes need to be thought of as cultural and subject specific sets of feeling rules that change and develop throughout one's life. Hence, how people interpret features of their environment (e.g. actors' goals, cause-and-effect interactions) is in terms of knowledge previously acquired (Wyer & Skull, 1994; Zwaan & Madden, 2004) and emotional codes of their communities.

We normally make inferences about features of the information which were not present in the information provided and, even more, we tend to build connections among these features (Sperber, 2000; Sperber & Wilson, 1995, 2002; Wyer & Carlston, 1994). That is to say, we are endowed with the capacity to construct representations and meta-representations (e.g. representations about others' mental representations, intentions, etc.) which, in many cases are selections from and elaboration on the input information on which they are based. The interpretation of perceptual and conceptual features of the social and material environment relies on cultural and multimodal shared knowledge (e.g. diagrams and other visual images, sounds, smells, language, gestures), and emotional codes which are learnt, structured and transmitted to us from the time we are born. Thus, the individual's conceptualization of the ongoing experience is driven by the values, motivations, emotions and norms of the social and material environment she/he inhabits (see semantic memory, section 3.3.2) Nonetheless, these cultural models guided by social knowledge and emotional codes need to be individuated in a certain way.

3.5.3 Situation models

The individual instantiations of cultural models are carried out by personal and situation models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radavansky, 1998; Zwaan, Radvansky & Witten, 2002). Situation models (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radavansky, 1998) have a marked semantic nature because enable us to construct and represent meanings from what is expressed, conveyed and perceived by sounds (and music), writing, visual images, eye-gaze, hand-pointing, touch, face

expressions and other body movements as part of everyday action and experience. To avoid terminological confusion, ‘semantic’ is used here to refer to capacity of situation models to construct and represent meaning, not to ‘semantic memory’ (see section 3.2.2). That is, the term ‘semantic’ here applies to the meaning, reference, and discourse semantics, not to the socially-shared knowledge organized in semantic memory.

We construct and update situation models when we participate in and interpret activities (e.g. talking about past events, watching the news on TV). Situation models reconstruct and represent specific situations according to personal interpretations of such events. They are organized by a schematic structure consisting of a number of fixed and schematic categories, e.g. temporal and spatial setting (in a various levels of specificity according to their concrete relevance), on-going activities (talking about past events), participants, roles, identities and relationship (including the self), opinions and emotions, knowledge and intentions and goals (van Dijk, 1999). Situation models are reconstructed and represented in episodic memory (see sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.1.1) and supported by socially-shared knowledge and emotional codes driven by cultural models (see 3.5.2).

The construction and updating of these mental models is determined by the cognitive processes of event segmentation explained above (see 3.5.1), understanding of utterance, reconstruction of old models of similar situations in episodic memory (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Madden, 2004), and instantiations of more general personal information, as well as instantiations of cultural models. Situation models create the grounds for everyday action (e.g. buy a coffee to take away) and embodied interaction and communication (e.g. family members sharing memories at the dinner table) and operate to top-down segment activities as discrete units (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). It is important to point out that we do not construct situation models from scratch. The reconstruction and updating of models (e.g. my first full English breakfast in London) implies the re-activation and re-shaping of old models in episodic memory (e.g. my usual breakfast in my hometown Buenos Aires, basically consisting of a strong café latte and two small croissants).

3.5.3.1 Updating situation models

The reconstruction and updating of situation models in episodic memory (for an explanation of the reconstructive nature of processes of episodic remembering see subsections 3.2.1. and 3.2.1.11) is largely driven by working memory processes (Baddeley, 2007; Cowan, 2005). These online processes play a central role in intertwining our brains, bodies and the material and social environment, and thereby, creating the conditions for ‘being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger, 1962). Working memory processes enable us to perceive, decode and interpret these environments, represent the temporally stored information resulting of such processes, as well as retrieve, reconstruct and update situations models in episodic memory (van Dijk, forthcoming). Thus, this new information is kept accessible for further processing (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998) and enables the efficient integration of information from different modalities in situation models.

Several studies in text comprehension (Radvansky, Zwaan, Franklin & Federico, 1998; Zwaan & Madden, 2004) showed that readers keep an integrated situation model in episodic memory while the current model is being constructed by working memory processes. In this way, as Zwaan and Radvansky claimed ‘the updating occurs by forming links between the current model and the retrieved elements of the integrated model’ (1998: 166). This online process keeps running in parallel until we reconstruct and update a complete model in episodic memory. However, we must keep in mind that new situation models are formed only when there are changes in relation to the schematic categories (e.g. setting, participants, intentions and goals, etc.), which affect processing and interaction. These changes are motivated by the processes of event segmentation explained in section 3.5.1.

3.5.4 The discursive dimension of cognitive processes

Most of the new knowledge we learnt is by means of discourse practices, i.e. mass media discourse (TV, internet, newspapers, etc) educational discourse, professional discourse, everyday conversation (van Dijk, forthcoming). Hence, situation models also have to enable language users to understand the meaning of discourse in situated communicative interactions. By discourse I mean a form of language use (spoken, written and signed) and multimodal/multimedia forms of communication. The discursive nature of knowledge becomes even more evident when the topic of the

communicative situations we participate in is about non-observable/present entities (e.g. the economic downtown), fictional characters (e.g. Superman) as well as beliefs (van Dijk, forthcoming). Thus, discourse practices play a central role in the formation, reproduction, consolidation and change of cultural models (see section 3.5.2.) on the one hand, and situation models, on the other (van Dijk, forthcoming). As result, they also affect discourse processes of memory-making as it has been demonstrated by many studies in discourse psychology (see section 3.4.3), cultural-historical psychology (see section 3.4.1), cognitive social psychology (see section 3.4.4) and distributed approaches in cognitive psychology (see section 3.4.5). In the next section I provide a proper integration of relevant aspects of each of these theories in my cognitive pragmatic approach to explore processes of memory-making.

Language users reconstruct and update cultural and situation models when engaged in communicative interactions. For instance when yesterday I told my partner who was out working that I had watched on the BBC how rescue teams could save the lives of 33 miners who were trapped for almost 70 days at 622mts below the surface, I as speaker and she as addressee were continuously reconstructing and updating situation models of the events that I was narrating. I had to discursively ‘recreate’ what I had watched (visual images, facial expressions of joy, etc.) and listened to (spoken language, sounds, etc.) and, thereby, reconstructing a situation model of those events. As addressee, she had to update and reconstruct a situation model of the story I was sharing. Naturally, our models of the events were grounded in cultural models based on socially shared knowledge about mines, rescue teams, media coverage, etc., as well as on emotional codes about traumatic situations. At the same time, this interactive process of sharing my individual memories was not only influenced by our situation models of the events and relevant socially shared knowledge, but also by our representations of the communicative interaction that control how we accommodated our situational models and discourses to the specificities of that context. I explain how these representations of the communicative situation accommodate our cultural and situation models in the next sub-section.

3.5.5 The contextual dimension of cognitive and discourse processes

The interanimation of perceptual, cognitive and discursive processes is an interactive mechanism which provides the properties that determine the online processing of the ongoing communicative interaction. This interanimation controls how a speaker shapes a communicative act, how the addressee interprets such an act, and finally how the entire communication is regulated by joint attention processes (Clark, 1996, 2005; Hutchins, 1995, 2010b; Levinson, 2006b; Semin, 2009). Several studies on cognition and social interaction in real-world settings (Cicourel, 2004, 2005; Enfield, 2009; Enfield & Levinson, 2006; Goodwin, 2007; Hutchins, 2008, 2010a, 2010b) showed that those aspects of human everyday experience are complementary and interdependent. Analyzing discourse and social interaction is essential for the investigation of the interplay of cognitive and affective mechanisms in relation to cultural practices in everyday problem solving and mundane activities (Cicourel, 2006).

By means of situated (my partner and I talking about the rescue of the miners yesterday) and embodied (gestures, touch) discourse and communication, we are endowed with the ability to make strategic inferences about each other's situation models. Such integrative and concrete discourse practices enable us 'to read' other people's minds (Goldman, 2006; Sperber & Wilson, 2002), and, in doing so, obtain the information needed to adapt and re-adapt behavior during the course of social interactions. The re-adaptation of behavior during the ongoing communicative interaction is triggered by the updating of common ground between participants. The concept of common ground (Clark, 1996, 2005; Clark & Brennan, 1991; Enfield, 2006, 2008) refers to the shared knowledge that essential for communication between people. Hence, how we shape discourses depends on changing social contexts (time, place, participants, goals, etc.) –as indicated in several studies on social/collective/collaborative remembering reviewed on section 3.4 (for an extensive review of the literature on context in psychology, linguistics, sociology and anthropology, see van Dijk, 2008b, 2009b).

3.5.5.1 Context models

The pragmatic and personal representation of the social and material environment coordinates and synchronizes situation models, as well as cultural models in communicative interactions, conceived as cooperative actions. In order to meaningfully proceed in social cooperation and interpersonal communication, speakers need to take for granted that, to some extent, their representations are shared with their addressees (Givón, 2005; Tomasello, 2008). In communicative interactions, the sensation that we share goal-specific and relevant situation models with our addressees relies on our subjective and unique representation of the context in which the interaction unfolds. These unique representations of the communicative interaction are defined as context models (van Dijk, 1999, 2006, 2008b, 2009b).

The speaker's context models include a representation of the mind of the interlocutor that may shift constantly from one utterance to the next during live communication. This cognitive and discursive process allows us to make strategic hypotheses about what our addressee knows. A language user's context models are not only about his/her interlocutor's epistemic (knowledge) and deontic states (intentions). Rather, they are constituted by the interplay of the following schematic categories: setting (time and place), current action and participants with their social and cognitive properties such as identities, goals and knowledge (van Dijk, 2006). These elements determine how we communicate the reconstructed and updated experiences in situation models. In this way, how I accommodated my situation models of the rescue of the miners in Chile which were basically about the topic and meanings of such events (what the story was about) depended on my changing pragmatic context models of the communicative situation in which I was sharing my memories.

Here is a brief description of the schematic categories which constitute context models of the situation described above:




Diagram 1: Description of Context models

The pragmatic and communicative relevance of context models relies on the fact that they control the way in which speakers accommodate their utterances to the communicative situation (van Dijk, 1999, 2006, 2008b, 2009b). Context models are like other situation models (van Dijk, 2008b) reconstructed and updated in episodic memory, and employed to conceptualize experiences, but they are specifically for interaction. Therefore, working memory also plays an active role in processes of updating (see section 3.5.3.1 for the reconstruction and updating of situation models).

Nonetheless, in contrast to situation models which reconstruct and represent episodes in memory and indicate what discourses are about in terms of their meanings,

namely, their semantic content, context models as models of communicative interaction have a marked pragmatic nature. Context models are personal, and represent for each participant the unique definition of the current communicative situation. They enable language users to accommodate situation models (rescue of the miners) in the current communicate interaction (van Dijk, 2008b). According to van Dijk (2008b), context models determine what experiences, knowledge, worldviews, emotions may or should be appropriately shared and communicated in the ongoing communicative situation.

Each new communicative interaction does not lead language users to construct completely new context models from scratch (as occurred with situation models). To build a completely new representation for each communicative interaction from scratch would generate too much cognitive effort, and thereby, such cognitive processes would not be efficient. Context models must be partially planned in advance (van Dijk, 2008b). This becomes evident if we take a look at the schematic categories that constitute context models. Every time we engage in a new communicative interaction (my wife and I talking about the rescue of the miners) we have representations of similar communicative situations grounded in cultural models driven by socially shared knowledge and episodic memories of personally experiences of situations alike.

On the other hand, context models need to be dynamic and flexible as well. The language users need to construct and update context models automatically, implicitly and subconsciously. The updating of context models is driven by working memory (see 3.5.3.1) and event segmentation processes (see 3.5.1). However, not every perceptual change provokes a shifting of context models. These changes need to be pragmatically relevant for each language user. Obviously, a shift in setting (time and place) and number of participants engaged in the communicative interaction will automatically cause an updating of context models. Perceived shifting in epistemic (knowledge) and deontic (intentions) states of the participants, as well as, their roles and emotions also affect the online updating and reconstruction of context models. The updating processes are fundamental to represent perceptual changes in multimodal communicative interactions. In this way, as van Dijk puts it, context models are able to:

“[...] represent the experience of time and time change, the embodied feeling of location (“being there”), of perspective and orientation, the visual aspects of the communicative environment, and especially of the other participants and their relevant appearance, movements and gestures, as well as of the visual aspects of written discourse (and its drawings, schemas and pictures), the sounds and intonation of spoken discourse and its paraverbal properties (laughter, etc.), mutual touching (e.g. shaking hands, etc.), and so on.” (van Dijk, forthcoming: XX-XX).

3.5.6 The discursive management of situation and context models

The management of semantic (situation) and pragmatic (context) models is performed by cognitive strategies. Cognitive strategies are online and context dependent mental operations driven by inferential and interpretation processes (van Dijk, 1985; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). By assigning local and global coherence to situated discourse processes, these cognitive strategies establish the meaning of the ongoing interaction. Cognitive strategies are mental processes involved in complex tasks such as speaking, comprehension and communication. These strategies are not always conscious. They operate by integrating in coherent fashion information from different levels of discourse (phonological, morphological, syntactical, semantic and pragmatic). The discursive realization of these strategies is reflected in coherent sequences of moves, which are focused on the accomplishment of an interactional goal. These strategies allow the online monitoring of discourse processing, and thereby, operate to correct misunderstandings that may appear in communicative interactions. That is why they guide the reconstruction and updating of situation and context models. Hence, they determine strategic semantic links between cultural models, situation models and context models. Importantly, these semantic associations (what the discourse interaction is about) are based on individual interests, motivations, and goals (for a detailed explanation on these different levels of discourse processing which is far beyond the scope of this chapter, see van Dijk, 1985, 1989; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983).

On the other hand, language users employ discourse strategies to manage the concrete verbal and non-verbal instantiations of situation models (what the discourses are about) and to make them appropriate for the current communicative interaction defined by context models. We must keep in mind that these discourse strategies may refer to both situation (see 3.5.3) and context (see 3.5.5.1) models. Here is a brief description of each of the discourse strategies that I use to explore cognitive and discourse processes of remembering in the following chapters of this thesis. Not all the discourse strategies listed below are used in each chapter, but just those that are in accordance with their specific goals.

The examples below each description were taken from a data sample of 12 hours of audio recordings consisting of interviews and focus groups. The interviews and focus groups were conducted in February and March 2008 in Buenos Aires. The topic discussed was different periods of political violence in Argentinean history. Chapters five, six, seven and eight provide a detailed analysis of this data. In the next section (3.6.2) I present the method of this thesis.

Implicatures

Implicatures are something meant implicitly or suggested and different from what has been said or not said (Grice, 1989; Levinson, 2000; van Dijk, 2008a). They can either be a part of the meaning of verbal and non-verbal behavior, in terms of socially shared knowledge and personal situation models or dependent on the current context models. The emergence of inferences is often a process governed by cultural, situation and context models.

Grice (1975) pointed out that the trigger of implicatures in communicative interactions is based on the interlocutors' violation of a set of 'maxims of conversation'. These are the maxims of quality ('say what you believe to be true'); relevance ('make what you say relevant and timely'), quantity (don't say more or less than is required'), and manner ('be brief and clear'). Thus, when language users 'violate' these maxims they create the conditions for the emergence of implicatures.

Example:

Lo que sí me acuerdo es (.2) no exactamente la fecha pero de alguna (.) de un par de personas que eran conocidos de mis padres que dijeron "se los llevaron" y yo pregunté "¿A dónde se los llevaron?" "Se los llevaron porque andaban en cosas raras", esa es la explicación que me dieron a mí y con eso me quedé, ¿entendés? (.2) (María, B1: 6.43-7.10)

What I do remember is (.2) I don't remember the exact dates, but some (.) a couple of people my parents knew and they said "they were taken away" and I asked "taken away where?" "They were taken away because they were involved in some funny business", that's the explanation I was given and that's what understood, see? (.2) (María)

The underlined items in the example above show the speaker's 'violation' of maxim of manner. María uses the verb *llevarse* 'take away' instead of *secuestrar* 'kidnap' to refer to the abductions, as well as the nominal phrase *cosas raras* 'funny business' to refer to the political activities of the persons who were kidnapped.

Evidentiality

Evidentiality deals with the source of information for the speaker's utterance. This definition includes both the linguistic meaning of evidentiality, which refers both to ways in which knowledge is acquired – by seeing, hearing, or any other way (Aikhenvald, 2004; Chafe & Nichols, 1986) - and the more argumentative and social oriented meaning, which maintains that discourse is more reliable and credible when it is attributed to recognized experts, institutions, etc. (van Dijk, 2005). Thus, the credible sources can be internal as well as external. Evidentials are extremely important because they can prove that our beliefs are accurate and true, and, in so doing, endow them with the capacity to become socially shared knowledge (Chafe & Nichols, 1986).

Example:

(.4) Yo he visto (.) leído en los diarios en la televisión que tiraban una bomba en una plaza para matar un policía y caía gente que no tenía nada que ver (Paco, A3: 3.15-3.34)

(.4) *I've seen* (.) *read in the newspapers, on television, that they put a bomb to a kill a policeman and people that had nothing to do with anything died* (Paco)

The example shows the speaker using verbs of perception and cognition, and the media as source of knowledge.

Levels, details and precision of description: Granularity

Granularity (Hobbs, 2002; Schegloff, 2000) refers to the degree of detail or precision contained in the communication of knowledge. In practices of remembering, variations in granularity can be found in the description of events in terms of actors and their actions. Dispreferred knowledge will generally be left very general, little specific general, unspecific, and vague (van Dijk, in press). This discourse strategy is useful for examining the underlying reason why some discourses are rich in detail and precision while others are rather vague.

Example:

[..] y toda la gente que había en la agenda la levantaban [...] (Guillermo, B2: 16.58-17.04)

[...] and everyone listed in the address book were taken [...] (Guillermo)

The underlined items of the example above do not enable us to establish a specific referent of the noun *gente* ‘people’. A higher level of detail in the description of the people who were abducted by the perpetrators (e.g. *mi compañeros de clase* ‘my classmates’) would lead to the inclusion of more biographical information in the interaction that may not be looked for Guillermo. Hence, the level of granularity in the linguistic descriptions of past experiences needs to be considered as a strategy of knowledge-management.

Definitions, reformulations and justifications

Participants of communicative interactions introduce new information in terms old information by means of definitions which can be discursively realized in metaphors, comparisons, etc. These definitions can be based on old information which is presented by means of reformulations that in social interactions generally operate by appropriating what others have said.

Example:

Sí, yo vivía en Quilmas y la verdad no sabía nada (.) es decir no tuve ningún allegado que le pasara algo (.) [...] (Laura, B1: 5.57-6.02)

Yes, I was living in Quilmes, and the truth is that I didn't know anything (.) I mean, nothing happened to the people around me (.) [...] (Laura)

In the example we observe Laura defining her mental state (she did not know what was happening) during the period of dictatorship. Subsequently, after *es decir* ‘I mean’, she reformulates and justifies the previous description of her mental state (e.g. she did not know that people were being abducted).

Metaphors

Metaphors (Cienki, 1998; Cienki & Muller, 2008; Lakoff, 1987, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987) add systematicity and coherence to discourse processing by allowing for a number of structured mappings across experiential domains. Thus, a mapping from a familiar source domain to a less familiar target domain involves transferring the logic and structure of the source onto the target, rendering one conceptual mapping but many verbal and non-verbal instantiations that contributes to our understanding of the target. However, the above operations are not rich enough to provide us with very many options to talk about concepts. In consequence, we need a

tool for elaboration and for talking about concepts in more specific terms. Typically, this takes the form of instances of the general classes of objects, human beings and organisms; all of which are very familiar to us in terms of interaction, facilitating the way we cognitively handle and manipulate abstract categories.

Example:

El manual (.) eran re (.) (Risas) como si te dijera que Chávez (Presidente de Venezuela) era un poroto al lado [...] (David Rock, D1: 9.04-9.12)

Textbook, they were, (laughs) as if that Chávez (Venezuelan President) was a peanut in comparison [...] (David Rock)

The example shows David Rock employing a metaphor to create a political analogy between the government of Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina (1946-1955) and Chávez's government in Venezuela in order to justify and back up his negative evaluation of the educative practices under Perón's second term in office. David Rock assumes that all the participants in the interaction know who he is (President of Venezuela since 1999) and what he does (Chávez is accused of limiting the freedom of the mass media, among many other things). This presupposed knowledge allows David Rock to compare Perón to Chávez. The metaphor *era un poroto al lado* 'he was a peanut in comparison' implies that Perón's authoritarianism was much worse than Chávez's.

Rejections and corrections

Examples of rejection play a key role in the communication of memories in groups, which we are likely to find distributed and shared knowledge of the past. Rejections function by creating social agreement, which is crucial in cognitive and discourse processes of joint remembering within social groups. They are usually realized in negations, 'you weren't there', doubts, 'are you sure?', and corrections, 'that was a year ago'. Corrections are generally used to introduce new knowledge organized by situation models which may either validate a previous rejection or lead to a reformulation. Moreover, rejections and corrections often need to be supported by justificatory moves in order to strengthen our credibility as speakers.

Example:

Claro yo puedo yo iba a decir algo (.) más más referido al 45 yo me acuerdo yo tenía 10 años o sea
(David Rock, D1: 8.33-8.41)

No en el 45 no podías tener 10 años (Silvana, D1: 8.41-8.43)

No (.) en el 55 (David Rock, D1:8.43-8.44)

Correcto (Silvana, D1:8.45)

Cuando vino el golpe tenía 10 años (.) (David Rock, D1: 8.45-8.47)

*I can I was going to add something (.) some more detail about 45, I remember I was 10 years old
in other words (David Rock)*

No in 45 you could not have been 10 years old (Silvana)

No (.) in 55 (David Rock)

Right (Silvana)

When the coup happened I was 10 years old (.) (David Rock)

Reminders

Reminders as well as rejections are extremely important in sharing memories within social groups in which knowledge of the past is shared or distributed. The use of reminders, such as ‘do you remember when...?’ in order to bring a shared past into the present for the sake of a specific goal (e.g. to create a feeling of connection between parents and children) makes evident that we are dealing with joint past experience in which memory is distributed among members of social groups. Moreover, reminders function to facilitate the re-construction of shared past experiences among members by means of mechanisms of collaborative facilitation (Harris, Keil, Sutton & Barnier, 2010). They may also act as interactive communicative devices that may trigger the generation of ‘new’ memories. These new memories can be considered cases of ‘implanted memories’ (Loftus, 2005; Newman & Lindsay, 2009), which are strategically constructed in accordance with interactional goals.

Example:

[...] y recuerdo que que por ejemplo tenía los libros de lectura los que se llamaban ¿cómo se llamaban? Esos que te daban para todo el año (David Rock: D1: 8.48-9.03]

El manual (Ángela, D1: 9.03)

El manual (.) eran eran re (.) [...] (David Rock, D1: 9.04-9.06)

[...] and I remember that, for example, I had the reading books which were called what were they called? Those that you have to use for the whole year (David Rock)

Textbook (Angela)

Textbook, they were (.) [...] (David Rock)

Agreements

Conversational agreements (Clark, 2005; Norrick, 2005; Pagliai, 2009; Quasthoff & Becker, 2004) are defined as discourse strategies that enable people to align with each other. In discursive processes of memory making in groups with shared or distributed knowledge, when one member introduces a past event, agreement from the other participants lead to its reinforcement (Pagliai, 2009: 550). Furthermore, we can note a spiral effect in cases in which members are repeatedly involved in the creation of agreements during the co-reconstruction of memories (Pagliai, 2009). This spiral effect may facilitate the creation of shared memories.

Example

Yo pienso que hubo una gran violencia, que hubo una gran violencia porque la otra parte también
(Clarita, B3: 3.45-3.48)

De los dos lados (Dora, B3: 3.48-3.49)

La otra parte también fue e hizo cosas terribles como poner una bomba en la casa Lanbruschini pero, ellos (los militares) tenían el poder y tenían ejercerlo debidamente (Clarita, B3: 3.50-3.58)

Exacto (Nora, B3: 3.59)

I think there was great violence, there was great violence on the other side as well (Clarita)

On both sides (Dora)

The other side also did terrible things, like putting a bomb in Lambruschini's house but, they (the military) had the power and should have exercised it properly (Clarita)

Exactly (Nora)

3.6 The cognitive pragmatics of remembering

This section is organized in the following fashion. First, I provide a summary of which perspectives on memory research previously reviewed are theoretically relevant for this new integrative approach. Second, I integrate the relevant aspects of such approaches with the perspectives on discourse and cognitive processes presented above. Such integration will lead me to introduce the theoretical and methodological principles of the cognitive pragmatics of remembering.

3.6.1 Memory, discourse and cognition in context

These are the theoretical principles guiding the new synthetic approach to memory research that I introduce in this chapter:

- As it has been shown by modern neuro-cognitive studies on memory research (Cabeza & St.Jacques, 2007; Schacter, Addis & Kesinger, 2009; Spuznar, 2010), each process of episodic remembering needs to be considered as a new distributed reconstruction of memory traces or ‘engrams’ in the brain. The social and emotional context plays a central role in guiding sensory and emotional processing (Domínguez-Borràs, Garcia-Garcia & Escera, 2008). As the successive reconstructions of memory traces depend on sensory and emotional processing (Cabeza, Prince, Daselaar, Greenberg, Budde, Dolcos, LaBar & Rubin, 2004), the social and material environment of remembering guides the situated reconstructions of memories.
- Situation models (van Dijk, forthcoming; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983, Zwaan & Radavansky, 1998; Zwaan, Radvansky & Witten, 2002) are reconstructed and updated by everyday personal experiences. A large proportion of the new information derived from such experiences comes from multimodal discourse practices. Situation models involved in the interpretation and production of cognitive discourse processes integrate different types of information processed by different modalities (vision, auditory, etc.). This situated integration causes the reconstruction and updating of old situation models. It is shaped by the reconstructive trait of processes of episodic remembering, and thereby, depends on the social and material environment where it occurs.
- Previous situation models (what discourses are about) may be considered as memory traces or ‘engrams’ organized in episodic memory. In the here and now the reconstructive nature of processes of episodic remembering enables the rebuilding and updating of situation models. Hence, practices of conversational remembering can transform individual and shared memories (Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz & Groll, 2008; Harris, Keil, Sutton, Barnier, 2010a), that is, situation models (what discourses of past experiences are about).
- Situation models are not only grounded in episodic memories. In contrast, they are determined by the interanimation of personal experiences organized in episodic memory and thematically relevant socially-shared knowledge and emotional codes organized in cultural models. In this way, the formation of

situation models is also in accordance with the self-memory-system' model (Conway, 2005; Williams & Conway, 2009; see section 3.2.4.1) used in cognitive psychology to explain the mechanisms underpinning the creation of autobiographical memories. Socially-shared knowledge and emotional codes are the basis for the formation of cultural models (Quinn & Holland, 1987; Kronenfeld, 2008; Shore, 1996). As result, the discourses of the past that we share with others (me telling the story of the miners in Chile) in everyday communicative interactions rely (at least) on the interanimation of episodic and semantic memory processes (Strack & Forster, 1995, 1998).

- The cognitive pragmatics of remembering explores ongoing cognitive and discourse processes of memory-making in interactions, especially focused on topics which reflect how individual and shared memories are embedded in cultural, social, political and historical dynamics. The topics of the memories that we share with others in communicative interactions are determined by situation models and relevant socially shared knowledge derived from broader cultural models. Hence, the memories that we reconstruct and communicate are also embedded in cultural, historical, social and political contexts (Brown, Middleton & Lightfoot, 2001; Brown & Hoskins, 2010; Brown & Lee, 2010; Hirst & Manier, 2008; Middleton & Brown, 2005; Pennebaker, Páez & Rimé, 1997; Reavey & Brown, 2007; Wertsch, 2002).
- We mainly convey our individual memories in autobiographical narratives (Bamberg, 2006; Labov, 2006; Schiffrin, 1996) which play a key role in social interactions (Nelson, 2003b; Pasupathi, 2003). These narratives may be organized by narrative schemata (Bruner, 1990; Schmidt, 2008) according to a life story schema (Bluck & Habermnas, 2000) and life scripts (Berntsen & Bohn, 2009). In my framework, life scripts are derived from socially-shared knowledge about the life course which is organized in cultural models. A life story schema, on the other hand, emerges from the interplay of socially shared knowledge (about the life course) and situation models (what the narratives that make our life story are about). For the sake of conceptual clarity, I will not father use the concepts either of narrative schemata, life story schema or life scripts.

- It has been demonstrated that processes of autobiographical remembering in social interactions (communicative interactions where discourse plays a key role) can alter people's memories by reconstructing and re-writing memory traces (Pasupathi, 2001; Skowronski & Walker, 2004). This is especially the case when family memories are handed down over generations (Welzer, 2010b; Welzer, Moller & Tschuggnall, 2002). Several studies in the cognitive neurosciences (Hupbach, Hardt, Gomez, & Nadel, 2008, Schwabe & Wolf, 2009) have shown that the spatial context in which we remember has a unique role to play in the processes of updating memory traces. These findings in memory research are in accordance with the processes of reconstruction and updating of situation models. However, they lack a proper theory on context (Givón, 2005; van Dijk, 1999, 2006, 2008b, 2009b) which enables them to explore such processes in better detail. Hence, the cognitive pragmatics of remembering is a relevant approach to memory research.
- To define the social ontology of collective memories presents some problems which have been properly addressed by the constructive and collaborative view to collective memory in philosophy and cognitive psychology (Sutton, 2008; Sutton, Harris, Keil & Barnier, 2010). Autobiographical memories are (at least) partly carried on the individual nervous system and may be organized according to situation models. However, as there is no such as thing as a 'collective nervous system', there is no reason to claim that collective memories are totally shaped by the same processes constructing autobiographical memories. Collective memories may be formed by partly shared or overlapped situation models of the same past experiences –e.g. family conversation about last Christmas. The cognitive, interactional and discursive negotiation and synchronization of these partly shared or overlapped situation models are determined by context models of the ongoing communicative interaction. The crucial role that the social and conversational context plays in practices of collective remembering has been demonstrated by several studies in discursive psychology (Middleton & Edwards, 1990: 40), cognitive social psychology (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2002: 95) and constructive-collaborative approaches to collective memory (Harris, Paterson & Kemp, 2008: 217).

- Practices of memory-making are shaped by cognitive and discourse processes by which situation models are able to be shared or overlapped between members of groups. Thus, collective remembering relies on the interanimation of interactive, discursive and cognitive processes. These processes are necessarily intertwined in communicative situations, therefore, negotiated and synchronized by means of context models. This new integrative approach argues that there would not be forms of collective memory without mediating communicative interactions between members of groups who went through the same past events, either as participants or spectators. These members can be either intimates or strangers. The point is that they must have situation models of the same past events, either as participants (me being in Northern Chile witnessing the rescue of the miners) or spectators (me watching live the rescue on the BBC) of the events. Although the fact of having gone through such events is crucial to have memories and not some other kind of beliefs, we can find cases in which the feeling of having gone through the ‘same’ experiences would be sufficient –e.g. ‘false’ memories or implanted memories.
- Context models provide the interface to discursively reconstruct and accommodate autobiographical and collective memories in communicative interactions. They are crucial for accounting for the relational character of practices of autobiographical and collective remembering (Campbell, 2008; Sutton, 2004) in which we reconstruct, share and update situation models of past experiences. Processes of communicating discourses organized in situation models for lived (non-shared) events, as well for negotiating and synchronizing shared events of the past are mediated by context models. These models enable language users to coordinate common ground (Clark, 1996; Enfield, 2008) in communicative interactions. Finally, online discourse processing is regulated by working memory.
- I am especially interested in exploring how we discursively share with others situation models of past experiences according to flexible and shifting context models in real-life settings. Hence, the necessity to develop a conceptual framework to account for the cognitive and discourse strategies (van Dijk, 1985, in press; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) that we employ when communicating,

negotiating and synchronizing autobiographical and collective memories. This is precisely one of the advantages of this approach in comparison to other approaches in memory research which base their investigations on analyzing discourse practices without paying enough attention to either verbal or non-verbal discourse realizations.

- There are some differences in the type of cognitive and discourse strategies responsible for discourse processing. First, there are strategies that work driving interpretation and production processes and create the cognitive basis of the reconstructing and updating of situation models. Second, language users employ discourse strategies (e.g. evidentiality, metaphors, granularity, implicatures etc.) to communicate discourses about situation models according to context models, as well as to negotiate and synchronize common ground between participants (e.g. rejections, reminders, etc) across the ongoing interaction. Importantly, some of these discourse strategies can both refer to the semantic (situation models determining contents and references of our memories) and pragmatic (context models controlling how to accommodate situation models in the ongoing interaction) dimensions of processes of memory-making.

3.6.2 Methods for exploring cognitive and discourse processes of remembering

Unlike complex experimental studies in the laboratory, investigations of the cognitive pragmatics of everyday remembering depart from the fact that processes of memory making are not the goal of everyday activities. In this thesis, I seek to explore how people remember in everyday environments. When remembering in everyday life, the environments for retrieval and successive re-construction of past experiences are highly organized and facilitate recall performance (Cole, Hood, & MacDermott, 1978, 1982; Neisser, 1982, 1997). These environments are populated by human and physical cues which facilitate and trigger processes of successive reconstructions of autobiographical and collective memories. Cole, Hood and MacDermott accurately come to the conclusion that the everyday world consists of dynamically organized environments which are hard to represent in laboratory models of intellectual activity. Thus, the need to employ ecologically valid methods which take those dynamically organized environments into consideration. Conversations in general, but also non-directive

interviews, are a more natural way for speakers to reconstruct and communicate their individual and shared memories than the accomplishment of experimental tasks.

Following the methodological perspective of discourse psychologists (Edwards & Potter, 1992) and conversation analysts (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Sacks, 1992), some studies in conversational remembering (Brown, Middleton & Lightfoot, 2001; Buchanan & Middleton, 1995; Middleton, 1997) were undertaken using recordings and transcriptions of naturally occurring interactions (e.g. reminiscence groups in residential homes and day care centers, and teamwork in intensive care units). That is, these interactions took place without being partially guided by prompts about memories suggested by an interviewer in accordance with specific research goals which go far beyond the situated activity. This naturalistic approach to discursive remembering undoubtedly reflects how and why people use memories in their daily lives and clearly represents a good example of an ecologically valid method for recollecting data for memory research in institutional settings. However, this method for collecting ‘naturally occurring data’ has some limitations, which are related to the degree of specificity of the tasks in which individuals reconstruct and communicate past experiences. It would only be applicable if interactions were fundamentally driven by remembering activities (e.g. reminiscence groups), because otherwise we would need a vast amount of hours of recordings in order to find processes of autobiographical and joint reconstruction of memories.

Some discursive psychologists (Potter & Hepburn, 2005) and conversation analysts (Schegloff, 1997) still believe that this sort of data collection is the most ecologically valid because, in contrast to what occurs in research interviews, participants would not have talked about the research topic, or talked about it in the way they did, without the researcher’s guidance (Taylor & Littleton, 2006: 27-8). If the research goals are directly related to the task from which natural occurring data is collected, that may be the case, but otherwise it would be implausible due to the fact that everyday life cannot be totally recorded.

On the other hand, studies in cognitive ethnography (Ball & Ormerod, 2000; Hutchins, 1995, 2010b; Williams, 2006) have been applying traditional ethnographic methods (Taylor, 1994; Toren, 1996) to investigate cognitive and interactive processes between participants engaged in multimodal interactions in real-world activities (Becvar, Hollan & Huchins, 2005; Hutchins & Nomura, in press). Among these methods, cognitive ethnographers employ participant observation, interviewing and

artifact analysis (Williams, 2006). These studies have been specially focused on exploring collaborative processes in activities of knowledge construction between experts in organization and professional settings (e.g. classrooms, flight decks, scientific laboratories and ship navigation). Thus, cognitive ethnographers examine how material (e.g. tools, technological devices) and social environments (e.g. co-workers) are coordinated in meaningful cultural activities (e.g. flying a commercial plane). Williams claims that ‘cognitive ethnography looks at process: at the moment-to-moment development of activity and its relation to sociocultural (often institutional) processes unfolding on different time scales’ (2006: 838).

The advantages of this method of inquiry for memory research are multiple. Cognitive ethnography may provide the proper analytical tool to explore the multimodal and cognitive dimension of collaborative processes of memory-making in real-world settings. This approach constitutes an ecologically valid method in the cognitive sciences to investigate practices of remembering. Furthermore, considering the discursive approach of the theory presented in this chapter, cognitive ethnography can be a highly relevant method of inquiry for this research.

Most of the studies in cognitive ethnography have been conducted in institutional settings where the cognitive, material and social activities had been previously determined by the social and cultural practice (e.g. navigation, teaching and flying). Thus, as occurred with investigations on remembering in discourse psychology, it is quite unlikely to find real world activities, in which participants would exclusively reconstruct, negotiate discourses about situation models of past experiences -unless we are analyzing reminiscence groups. Of course, we could video and audio record all our participants do in their daily lives looking for communicative interactions in which discourse processes of autobiographical or collective remembering occur. If we were interested in analyzing practices of collective remembering in family, we could do the same by video and audio recording ordinary conversations at the dinner table expecting to find instances in which family members spontaneously negotiate and synchronize partly shared or overlapped situation models of shared experiences. However, video and audio recording each communicative interaction of individuals since they wake up and go to sleep or hundreds of family conversations at the dinner table while looking for discourse processes of autobiographical and collective remembering would be excessively expensive and time-consuming.

Few studies in memory research have explicitly employed cognitive ethnographic methodologies to explore processes of remembering. Computer scientists and neurologists (Wu, Birnholtz, Richards, Baeker & Massimi, 2008) have investigated the cognitive strategies that families create to struggle with amnesia in real-world activities. This study involved the recruitment of ten families which some of their members had severe memory problems. This very interesting study explores the communicative strategies that families create to compensate the memory impairment of one of their members. These communicative strategies include the use of technological devices (e.g. calendars, personal digital assistants (PDAs) and journals) as well as discursive practices. The final aim of the investigation was to show how by means of distributed cognitive processes across participants and technological devices families may work as cognitive systems coping with amnesia (Wu, Birnholtz, Richards, Baeker & Massimi, 2008: 833). Notwithstanding, little attention has been paid to either how family members actually discursively interact or how the incorporation of technological devices trigger extended cognitive processes (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Sutton, 2005, 2006; Sutton, Harris, Keil & Barnier, in press) - apart from providing evidence about how beneficial such cognitive couplings across family members and technological devices may be.

The method of inquiry to explore cognitive and discourse processes of memory-making in communicative interactions has to be ecologically valid and interactionally oriented, being able to capture the cognitive discourse strategies that participants employ when reconstructing, communicating, negotiating and synchronizing discourses about situation models according to flexible context models. It would not be either economically or methodologically feasible to video and audio record hundreds of hours of multimodal human interaction only based on the hope to find some practices of autobiographical or collective remembering. Nor to specifically analyze reminiscence groups because the people who do not participate in such practices would be automatically rejected from the population sample.

I am not only interested in exploring cognitive and discourse processes in interactions in small groups, but also to analyze memory practices which are thematically related to historical, political, social and cultural relevant phenomena. Processes of memory-making in real world-settings go far beyond the mere act of reconstructing, communicating, negotiating and synchronizing discourse about situation models of past experiences according to dynamic context models. They are historically, socially and

culturally situated, and in response to individual and social concerns and goals. Thus, the method of inquiry employed to analyze these complex discourse processes needs to be able to account for such concerns and goals that go far beyond the act of retrieving, reconstructing and updating memories. Hence, I believe that the focus group (Ibañez, 1992; Medina, 2006; Potter & Puchta, 2004) is an adequate and flexible method of inquiry which can be adapted by the researcher to explore situated processes of memory-making and related them to relevant historical, political, social and cultural phenomena. This is the method that I use to explore the cognitive and discourse processes of autobiographical and collective remembering about periods of political violence in Argentina in chapter six, seven and eight of this thesis.

The focus group is a discursive and interactional activity which is helpful in the exploration of situated reconstruction, communication, negotiation and synchronization of discourses about situation models of past experiences in communicative interactions. Context models regulate the dynamics of the interaction (e.g. turn-taking, gesturing) generated during the focus group. The dynamics of the focus group operates as an interaction engine (Levinson, 2006a, 2006b) regulated by changing context models (setting, participants, intentions and goals, etc.) and enabling the participants the negotiation of common ground (Clark, 1996; Enfield, 2006, 2008). This interactional discourse process needs to be conceived as a cooperative action by which the participants are motivated to recreate situation models of individual or (partly) shared experiences on a series of topics under relatively controlled conditions. Topics are previously selected by the interviewer according to her/his research goals. These goals should be able to focus on analyzing discourse processes of remembering in relation to socially relevant issues. The cooperative and collaborative nature of the focus group makes it an adequate communicative device to create the social and cognitive grounds for the discursive co-construction of memories.

The focus groups that I conducted for this thesis were designed to follow some of the features of ordinary conversations in order to fulfill ecological validity. Thus, whenever it was possible, they were conducted in the material environments which were familiar for the participants, being more in accordance with the settings in which they are often engaged in practices of remembering. Familiarity with the setting may have facilitated the distribution of cognitive load in discourse processes of remembering by enabling the participants to rely on material resources such as photos and objects. It is important to bear in mind that the communicative situations were artificially created,

and the only presence of an audio recorder may have intimidated the participants. The focus groups were audio recorded. The audio recordings were transcribed in detail to analyze the ways in which selected participants reconstruct, negotiate and synchronize their individual and partly shared situation models of past experiences by means of discourse strategies according to shifting context models.

The focus groups created the conditions for the engagement of the participants in spontaneous reconstructions and communication of memories. The communication of these memories was focused on the accomplishment of an interactional goal. Such accomplishment guided the selection of topics, events, and how the actions and actors animating such events were cognitively and discursively reconstructed. Moreover, such informal conversations about past experiences enabled interviewers to disguise their goals by bringing up specific topics in a more casual fashion (van Dijk, 1989). Some of the features of the reconstruction and communication of memories in informal conversations were not normally under the speaker's conscious control. This lack of constant self-monitoring enabled the addressees to trigger inferences about the speaker's cognitive processes.

3.7 Summary and conclusions

The aim of this chapter was firstly to indicate the theoretical and methodological contributions and limitations of different approaches in autobiographical and collective memory research. Secondly, I introduced a new integrative approach to memory research which seeks to synthesize linguistic, discursive, and cognitive and socio-interactionist perspectives in order to better understand and explore the ways in which processes of memory-making unfold in real world-settings.

Psychologists and neuroscientists have demonstrated that the neuro-cognitive structure of memory consists of processes distributed across different regions of the brain, rather than a storage device which operates by recording information. The constructive nature of processes of episodic remembering had been previously shown by Bartlett (1932) in his method of serial reproduction. These findings challenge traditional memory research in cognitive psychology which has been largely inspired by and founded on the computer storage metaphor. Nonetheless, since the late 1960's cognitive psychologists have been dictating the agenda in memory studies by creating

new models and categories, establishing differentiations between types of memory, and developing experimental techniques in order to test such conceptual frameworks.

In the last decade, these cognitive models created by cognitive psychologists to better understand how memory works began to be tested by experiments using neuroimaging techniques, the outcome of which was an increasing number of experimental studies integrating theories and methods from the neurosciences and cognitive sciences. At the same time, socio-cultural, developmental and discursive psychologists were undertaking memory research in everyday interactions in a wide range of naturalistic settings. These studies have demonstrated that memory does not only depend on distributed brain processes, isolated from meaningful social activities in which people remember in order to achieve interactional goals. Memory is also a social and cultural phenomenon, which is undoubtedly highly dependent on cognitive processes. However, these cognitive processes unfold in situated interactions which often have a fundamental linguistic and communicative nature. They are focused on the accomplishment of interactional goals that go far beyond the mere act of remembering. Therefore, language use and the social and physical environments in which we usually remember things, play a key role by driving remembering processes.

Cognitive psychologists realized that memory processes are highly dependent on social, historical and cultural features. The growing number of experimental studies on collective memory clearly indicates such a new trend in memory research. Nevertheless, despite the fact that most memory scholars in cognitive sciences agree on the fact that the social and physical environments in which memories are re-constructed and communicated directly influences processes of memory-making, little attention has been paid to the role of context in such situated activities. Subsequently, except for a very few new studies conducted in real-world settings (Harris, Keil, Sutton & Barnier, 2010; Harris, Keil, Sutton, McIlwain & Barnier, 2010; Wu, Birnholz, Richards, Baeker & Massimi, 2008), most empirical research of the social aspects of memory investigate collective processes of remembering under the same artificial conditions and experimental settings in which cognitive psychologists studied how memory works in isolated individuals. The difficulty of applying the findings obtained in the laboratory under experimental conditions relies on the fact that such conditions have little to do with the social activities in which we are engaged in our daily lives. Hence, if the context plays a central role in interactive processes of memory making, and such context does not seem to be accurately reproduced in laboratory settings, the important

and relevant findings obtained in the laboratory can only be partially applicable when proposing generalizations about the function and uses of memory in everyday activities.

On the other hand, discourse psychologists, who have been investigating social processes of memory-making in real-world settings for more than 20 years, have shown little interest in exploring the cognitive processes involved in such communicative interactions. Unlike cognitive psychologists, they have been investigating the discursive and pragmatic nature of remembering activities in detail. However, as discourse psychologists have often neglected the causal correlations and interdependences between underlying cognitive processes and discursive action, their studies only acknowledge the cultural, social and historical features of the physical and social environments in which communicative interactions about past experiences take place. In doing this, they did not deal with the cognitive mechanisms involved in the construction and representation of situation and context models engineering remembering activities.

In the last section of this chapter (3.6) I supported the view that processes of memory-making need to be investigated in real- world activities in which people reconstruct and communicate their situation models of past experiences in order to achieve interactional goals. These dynamically organized physical and social environments usually provide external memory aids which operate to facilitate remembering processes. By means of discourse and communication we have the ability 'to read' other people's minds and make strategic inferences about other people's representations. This ability is crucial for shaping behavior and accommodating talk during communicative interactions. To perform this cognitive task, intimate people and strangers make use of discourse strategies. The shifting of context models creates the condition for the negotiation and synchronization of partly shared situation models between participants engaged in conversations about experiences, enabling them to update common ground and coordinate their different personal agendas and interests.

Finally, by interconnecting discursive, cognitive, and interactional processes, which are distributed, coordinated, and synchronized by context models, I hope that my new synthetic approach to memory research can contribute to a deeper integration of the theories and methods from the cognitive and social sciences so that we may better understand how we remember in everyday life.

4. THE COMMEMORATION OF MARCH 24TH, 1976: UNDERSTANDING THE EXCEPTIONALITY OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL DISCOURSE ABOUT THE 'DIRTY WAR' IN ARGENTINA²²

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the different ways Néstor Kirchner strategically creates two different time-frames (one from the beginning of the dictatorship on March 24th, 1976 to December 2001, when Argentina underwent the worst socio-economic crisis in its history; the other from 2003 to the present) to represent actors from the past and in the present, and to reinforce the current exceptionality of his political stance.

The aim of this chapter is to explore some of the changes (see chapter 2, section 2.3.3) in four political speeches given by Néstor Kirchner (NK) on March 24 (2004, 2006 and 2007). I will especially examine the political uses of discourse strategies employed by NK to construct the time-frames described above and depict actors directly involved in the traumatic events, such as the relatives of those who were kidnapped and the perpetrators of the military regime. This analysis will also shed light on the modes utilized by NK to represent himself as an exceptional political leader endowed with high moral values. The political uses of discourse strategies are closely linked to a variety of situation and context models (see chapter 3, sections 3.5.2, 3.5.3 and 3.5.5.1), which emerge from the interplay between situational, cognitive and socio-historical factors. For instance, descriptions of actors are not usually overtly conveyed, but presupposed by discourse strategies. This is why a detailed examination of the implicit meanings constructed by discourse strategies, and sustained through multimodal situation and context models, may help clarify NK's position on the traumatic past. The discursive analysis of the different ways NK represents time and actors within those time-frames will provide further resources, with which we can better disentangle processes of memory-making in society. This examination will also help us better understand NK's position as a means of constructing hegemony and political consensus in the present;

²² A longer version of this chapter has been accepted for publication and it is currently in press in the *Journal of Language and Politics* (Impact factor: 0.229). It is expected to be published in autumn 2011. I am indebted to the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on earlier versions of this chapter. For more information about the journal please visit: http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_seriesview.cgi?series=jlpl.

and by doing so gaining political legitimacy in the unstable political environment caused by the crisis of December 2001.

The analysis shows that the current changes in the politics of memory in Argentina (see chapter 2, sections 2.3.3. and 2.3.4) are based on binary categorizations of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship, i.e. the war-model vs. the genocide-model (see chapter 2, sections 2.1 and 2.2) which are situated and anchored in the two time-frames described above. The detailed examination of the ways in which NK creates two time-frames in four commemorative speeches provides linguistic evidence to ground the political changes presented in chapter 2. Moreover, it supplies the historical and political framework to situate and understand the discursive processes of remembering that I analyze in the following chapters of this thesis. We must bear in mind that these memories were communicated in interviews and focus groups which were conducted in March and April 2008 in Buenos Aires and some of them are deeply in reaction to the new official politics of remembrance introduced by NK in 2003, especially chapter 5 and 8.

This chapter is organized in the following way. First, I claim that commemorative speeches delivered by politicians influence processes of political cognition (Lars & Sears, 1986) in society. Political cognition (Lau & Sears, 1986; van Dijk, 2002) basically deals with the acquisition, uses and structures of cultural, situation and context models about political situations, events, actors and groups. Scholars working on political cognition (Lau & Sears, 1986; van Dijk, 2002) normally study the organization of political beliefs, the perception of political candidates; political judgment, political discourse; public opinion; impression formation; political group identity, etc.

The examination of the commemorative discourses delivered by NK on March 24th will enable us to explore the construction of political categorizations about the time and actors linked to the experience of dictatorship. Importantly, these political categorizations have an effect on processes of political cognition about military dictatorship in Argentine's society, and thereby, may influence the reconstruction of cultural models (see chapter 3, section 3.5.2) of the traumatic experience, i.e. the war-model vs. the genocide-model (see chapter 2, section 2.1). Second, I examine NK's political uses of discourse strategies to build two time-frames in four commemorative speeches delivered on March 24th. The proposal of two time-frames to conceptualize the experience of dictatorship attempts to strategically simplify the complexity of the

process begun in 1983 when democracy returned to Argentina. However, it has been employed as a way of constructing hegemonic power since 2003 (see chapter 2).

4.2 Political cognition and commemorative speeches

The modifications in the social representations of the military dictatorship in Argentina can be better understood if we explore the discursive representations of time periods and actors involved in the past. One way to do this is to examine the types of political discourse adopted and generated by political leaders. Elite discourses, such as those held by professional politicians, play a central role in shaping possible reconstructions of the past. Due to the large number of resources that they have, professional politicians may exert a strong influence on processes of political cognition (Lau & Sears, 1986). Information about the world's political issues is not only organized and modeled by politicians, but also by the media and opinion leaders. This is why censorship is one of the most widespread measures employed by political leaders to control processes of political cognition within society.

Political cognition (Lau & Sears, 1986) is grounded in a process of perception which filters information in two stages: firstly, the information is mediated by the media, politicians, and opinion leaders, before it reaches the citizens; secondly, a large number of individuals simultaneously undergo processes of meaning attribution initiated by the same social stimuli. For this reason, political cognition can be thought of as a kind of mass cognition (Fiske, 1986). Thirdly, effects of political cognition may have an influence on the fate of millions of people. Throughout history we have witnessed how some forms of political cognition have provoked wars, genocide, and so on. It is a higher mediated form of perception (Lau & Sears, 1986), which makes its discursive nature more salient.

Some authors (Achugar, 2008; Wodak & De Cillia, 2007) claim that commemorative speeches form a specific textual genre of political speech. Achugar argues that commemorative speeches are generally delivered to commemorate and remember specific events in history. She adds that commemorative speeches are interwoven with other discourses by means of intertextual relationships (Achugar, 2008: 177). By intertextual relationships (Fairclough, 1989) I mean the fact that normally current discourses are normally grounded in previous texts, which they attempt to confirm, challenge, or transform.

Commemorative speeches can be broadly thought of as a kind of discourse ‘whose object is to confirm or reconfirm how things are’ (Achugar, 2008: 177). This goal relates commemorative speech to what classical rhetoric denominates epideictic oratory – *genus demonstrativum* (Wodak & Cillia, 2007: 346). Epideictic oratory ‘is thematically linked to honor and disgrace and functionally to praise or blame’ (Wodak & Cillia, 2007: 346). However, Wodak & Cillia (2007) also acknowledge that commemorative speech can also be associated with other forms of rhetoric and textual genres (Wodak & Cillia, 2007: 346).

In the speeches of Néstor Kirchner we will find instances of judicial and deliberative oratory – *genus iudiciale* and *genus deliberativum*. We will observe how the purpose of his commemorative speeches included accusing those responsible for the traumatic past and defending his politics of memory. Moreover, we will also notice the ways in which he attempts to create a new horizon of expectations in Argentinean society by persuading and dissuading his addressees.

Ensinck and Sauer (2003) have shown how a particular event in Polish history – the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw uprising of 1944 – is strategically employed as an instrument in the project of defining a people’s identity. They indicated how commemorative speeches operate by invoking past events in a manner which suits the speaker’s political position in the present. In Ensinck and Sauer’s analysis we observe the ways in which political speeches serve to make sense of the past and the present at the same time. In the same way, the commemorative speeches delivered by Néstor Kirchner to commemorate and remember the victims of the dictatorship on March 24th bring the past into the present by means of reconstructing and communicating discourses organized in situation models (what the discourses about the past are about). Moreover, by selecting some aspect of the past that can be employed for specific interests in the present, Kirchner accommodates these discourses about the past in accordance with his context models of the communicative situation in which he is delivering the speeches.

In regards to Latin America, Achugar (2008) has examined the commemoration speech by the Commander in Chief of the Uruguayan Armed Forces, delivered on May 18th, 2007 to celebrate the origin of the military institution. She has also examined two letters to the editor written by an indicted soldier and by the wives of military officers prosecuted for crimes committed during the dictatorship. The analysis is based on the intertextual relation between texts. Achugar (2008) argues that in Uruguay there is a

shift in military discourse from institutional conditions of production to the more subjective production of narratives by individual military officers and their relatives. However, little attention has been paid to the key role that political cognition (Fiske, 1986; Lau & Sears, 1986; van Dijk, 2008a) play by interconnecting social and textual structures.

Commemorative speeches are outstanding opportunities to legitimize certain representations of past in detriment to others. This is because they are mostly utilized to communicate certain ‘political values and beliefs to construct common characteristics and identities and to create consensus and a spirit of community’ (Wodak & Cillia, 2007: 325), which are always related to the past. Thus, commemorative speeches can be thought of as sites of ‘collective memory’ which are focused on creating, reproducing, and challenging groups of ideas, images, and feelings, mostly associated with memorable collective experiences.

The socio-cognitive relevance of commemorative speeches relies upon the fact that they shape processes of political cognition in society. In the case of the military dictatorship in Argentina, the way of conceptualizing the victims as ‘examples of resistance’, and not as ‘subversives’, may influence common people’s political attitudes in the present. These political attitudes are not only related to new modes of framing the traumatic past, but also to new ways of self-positioning in the present and the future. In the next section, I will explain why a detailed discourse analysis may help us understand the complex relations between commemorative discourses, political cognition, and social forms of memory.

4.3 Political uses of discourse strategies

The discourse strategies (see chapter 3, section 3.6.6) employed in text-production may have a wide array of political functions due to the fact that political communication is a highly goal-oriented performance, by which politicians ‘attempt to get others to share a common view about what is useful, harmful, good-evil, just-unjust’ (Chilton, 2004: 199). They can be used as referential, legitimizing and/or evaluative mechanisms (van Dijk, 2008a), in order to present oneself as a reliable political leader. Text-producers usually employ referential mechanisms to represent social actors and create polarizations. The use of personal pronouns (e.g. we vs. they) is one of the most widely used referential mechanisms. The employment of legitimizing mechanisms is another

important discursive maneuver in political speeches; they are used to support a certain stance in the political world. In the Argentinean case, these discursive mechanisms play a central role in ex-president NK's construction of a positive self-representation as a political agent endowed with high moral standards, which enabled him to condemn the past policies promoted by previous democratic governments since the return of democracy in 1983. Finally, evaluative mechanisms are a wide range of moves utilized to construct negative representations of the out-group.

All in all, we observe that in the commemorative speeches of NK the interplay between social, textual, and cognitive structures is the basis for the connection and synchronization of his subjectivity and the social environment. These interrelationships can be cognitively shaped and discursively conveyed by the referential, evaluative and legitimizing political uses of discourse strategies explained above. However, the particular instantiations of these connections, which are linguistically realized in discourse strategies, are mediated by cultural, situation and context models. For the specific purposes of this chapter, these complex inter-relations between the political uses of discourse strategies, and mental models in the commemorative speeches delivered by NK on March 24th are mainly reflected in binary conceptualizations of time (one from the dictatorship to December 2001, and the other from 2003 to the present), and in a definition of actors within those time-frames. In the following sections, I will explore the construction of two time-frames, which is based on a binary definition of the last 30 years in Argentinean history. The binary definition of time (from the dictatorship to December 2001, and from 2003 to the present), along with the examination of how actors are represented in those two time periods, will enable us to better understand the construction of the exceptionality of the political stance of NK.

4.4 Creating times, representing actors

The creation of different time-frames in the four commemorative speeches reveals to us the way in which ex-president Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) attempts to construct a new time of exceptionality from 2003 to the present in social, moral, and political terms.

By time-frame I mean a period during which something takes place or is claimed to have occurred. The creation of time-frames can be thought of as a move used in the political world to construct binary conceptualizations of the world (Chilton, 2004). The purpose of creating them is to influence processes of political cognition in the audience

by means of facilitating the formation of ‘mental models that are binary in character’ (Chilton, 2004: 203). For instance, by employing referential uses of discourse strategies of definition and categorization (e.g. we vs. they), speakers create polarizations between an in-group and out-group (Forgas, 1981). These strategies may influence the way in which some people in Argentina have begun to define and categorize their middle aged neighbor as a former torturer and not as a kind middle aged man.

In what follows, I will analyze how these processes of categorization are employed, not to create a negative other, but to create a negative time-frame (TF1), which the new time-frame of the administration of Néstor Kirchner (TF2) came to overcome. I will present some examples²³ from the selected data in order to illustrate these processes. The analysis will be based on a detailed description of the uses of the discourse strategies explained in the previous section (referential, evaluative, and legitimizing mechanisms). Before diving into the analysis, I present a brief description of the historical and political circumstances surrounding the commemoration of March 24th in Argentina.

4.4.1 Commemorating March 24th, 1976

On March 24th 2006, ex Argentine president Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) was commemorating the 30th anniversary of the beginning of the ‘worst tragedy in Argentinean history’ at the Military College in Buenos Aires. The same day, March 24th, was implemented as a national public holiday and named *El Día de la Memoria por la Verdad y la Justicia* (The Day of Remembrance for Truth and Justice). The political relevance of the commemorative speeches examined in this chapter can be demonstrated by the way they were received by the three most important newspapers in Argentina²⁴. On March 25th, 2004, *Página/12* published more than ten articles²⁵ about the commemorative speech delivered by Néstor Kirchner at the School of Navy Mechanics. The same day, the front-page of *Clarín* displayed the headline *ESMA:*

²³ For the sake of linguistic analysis, the examples selected are in the original Spanish version.

²⁴ *La Nación* is a right-wing newspaper with a marked liberal and conservatory orientation. It is mostly read by the middle and upper-middle classes in Argentina. Historically, *Clarín* has been the newspaper of reference for the middle classes – with all the ideological variations that this entails. Generally speaking, *Clarín* can today be considered a center-left progressive newspaper. Finally, in contrast to *La Nación* and *Clarín*, *Página/12* is a left-wing newspaper which has always published articles about the 1976-1983 military dictatorship. Some of its columnists are human rights activists who went into exile during the military regime. The readership of *Página/12* is the urban middle-classes.

²⁵ See <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/principal/index-2004-03-25.html> (in Spanish only).

Kirchner pidió perdón en nombre del Estado (ESMA²⁶: Kirchner asked for forgiveness on behalf of the State). *Página/12* and *Clarín* both described the event as a “tipping point” in recent Argentinean history. On the other hand, *La Nación* published several articles about the need for closure in relation to the tragic chapter in Argentinean history, “the return of the seventies”²⁷, and about leaders and governors of the Peronist²⁸ party who did not agree to participate in the commemoration lead by Néstor Kirchner. On March 25th, 2006, the articles of *Clarín* and *Página/12* were about the 100,000 people that filled the streets of Buenos Aires to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the coup d’état and the statements made by Patt Derian (American Vice Secretary of Human Rights during the administration of Jimmy Carter) acknowledging the policies about human rights introduced by the government of Néstor Kirchner. *Clarín* had published a special issue about March 24th, 1976, consisting of 23 articles, the day before. In contrast to this, *La Nación* critiqued some statements made by Néstor Kirchner, in which he was attempting to accelerate the repeal of amnesty laws which favored former perpetrators of the military regime. Néstor Kirchner’s interference in the judicial system, in order to accelerate the trials of former perpetrators, was the common topic discussed by the three most influential newspapers in Argentina after his speech of March 24th, 2006.

4.4.2 Making exceptionality with the military

On March 24th, 2004 the removal of the portraits of two former generals pardoned by ex-president Carlos Menem (1989-1999) from the Military College in Buenos Aires performatively represents the new political stance about the traumatic past. The portraits were of Jorge Rafael Videla and Reynaldo Bignone, two of the leaders of the military junta. Taking into account that fact that these ex-generals were pardoned by ex-president Carlos Menem, it is clear that the political positioning of NK breaks with the ‘reconciliation’ policies promoted by former democratic governments.

²⁶ ESMA stands for Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada (School of Navy Mechanics).

²⁷ The members of the government of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) chronologically belong to the leftist-nationalist groups which accompanied the return of Juan Domingo Perón to power in 1973. Some of Néstor Kirchner’s student friends were abducted and killed by the perpetrators of the 1976-1983 military regime, others went into exile in Spain and Mexico. The ones who did not go missing or into exile, were forced to go underground or abandon political work. The administration of Néstor Kirchner provided an inclusive umbrella for these people who were previously considered outside the mainstream of Argentine politics.

²⁸ See <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/archivo/index-dia.asp?fecha=25/03/2004>

Example 1: Time frame 2004/1

El retiro de los cuadros que procedió a hacer el señor jefe del Ejército, marca definitivamente un claro posicionamiento que tiene el país todo, nuestras Fuerzas Armadas, nuestro Ejército y quien les habla como Presidente y como Comandante en Jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas, de terminar con esa etapa lamentable de nuestro país.

‘The removal of portraits that the Chief of the Army has initiated, marks once and for all, the clear position that the whole country, our Armed Forces, and our Army have as well as the one who speaks to them as President and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, to finish with this unfortunate time in our country’.




Diagram 2. Context models: time frames 2004/1

The creation of a new time-frame (TF2) is legitimized by the standard argument of populism. The topos of populism operates as a legitimizing mechanism which is realized by a rhetorical device of generalization *el país todo* ‘the whole country’, *nuestras Fuerzas Armadas* ‘our Armed Forces’, *nuestro ejército* ‘our Army’. The implicature suggested by choice of a plural first person possessive pronoun *nuestras* in *nuestras Fuerzas Armadas* ‘our Armed Forces’ serves to blur the line between civil society and the military, which is highly important within the Argentinean context.

O'Donnell (1997) claims that in Argentinean history, business and technocratic sectors, together with the military sustained the view that authoritarian measures were necessary when faced with the political mobilization of popular sectors (e.g. unions) as result of processes of modernization and industrialization. Such an authoritarian attitude was carried out by the military by means of coup d'état. Hence, the Argentinean Armed Forces were historically accused of interfering in the country's political processes when they, along with the sectors mentioned above, believed that it was necessary for them to do so, in order to restore the social order (O'Donnell 1997; Rock 2003) and 'put the house in order'.

The definition of the action depicted in the photograph 3 (see next page) *el retiro de los cuadros que procedió hacer el Jefe del Ejército* 'the removal of portraits that of the Chief of the Army has begun' consolidates the new common ground (see chapter 3, section 3.6.5) manifested in the action displayed in the photograph. The definition of the behavior recently ordered to carry out refers to a non-verbal action which determines the shifting of context models in the participants. The action ordered to perform by NK along with the subsequent definition of that behavior updates the shared knowledge of the participants in the (multimodal) communicative interaction. The legitimizing use of the generalization acts as justification for the action just ordered to be performed.

If we take into account that the removal of the ex-generals' portraits was carried out by the Chief of the Army following presidential orders, this action represents clear exhibition of NK's power before the military [setting: the Military College]. Moreover, it metaphorically depicts the transition from a TF1 (pardons, impunity, social injustice) to TF2 (annulment of pardons, trials to former perpetrators, social justice) which NK comes to inaugurate.



Néstor Kirchner (left) ordering the removal of the portrait ex junta leader General Videla © CeDoc Perfil 2004

It is important to point out that processes political cognition are not exclusively determined by the influence exerted by shifting context models in updating common ground about topics related to the political world. Cultural and situation models determine many of the inferential processes about the TF1 that the speech of NK is triggering in his audience. For example, NK's lexical choices *definitivamente* 'once and for all' and *terminar* 'to finish' presuppose that not too far in the past we were likely to find opinions supporting the military dictatorship in public contexts (the media, politicians, members of the Armed Forces, etc). *Definitivamente* 'once and for all' also reminds us of the former democratic governments' failed attempts to condemn ex-perpetrators. The verbal form *terminar* 'to finish' entails that what has finished is the historical time in which someone who speaks about the systematic human rights violations and 30,000 people who disappeared could be overtly categorized as a subversive, leftist, or even terrorist by some sectors of society. The implicatures triggered by these lexical choices are part of the socially-shared knowledge and emotional codes organized in cultural models, on the one hand, and the participants' (and larger audience) episodic memories of personal experiences organized in situation models about the events that NK is taking about, on the other. However, by presenting it

indirectly, NK is trying to avoid being challenged by a potential or real audience (Sbisa, 1999).

Lastly, by means of evaluative mechanisms based on lexical choices, NK justifies why it is necessary *terminar* ‘to finish’ with TF1. The adjective *lamentable* ‘unfortunate’ acts as a negative evaluation of TF1, but that negative evaluation does not come only from NK. In short, the lexical items *definitivamente* ‘once and for all’, *terminar* ‘to finish’, and *lamentable* ‘unfortunate’ are employed to construct a representation of closure that brings a period of impunity to an end.

4.4.3 Constructing a possible future

A few hours later on the very same day, March 24th 2004, NK gave another political speech near the Navy Mechanics School. The participants of the communicative event changed. He was addressing a multitude of 20,000 people whose unfortunate, but privileged members were relatives of the missing people (grandmothers, mothers, and their children) and members of human rights organizations.

Example 2: Time Frames 2004/2

Aquella bandera y aquel corazón que alumbramos de una Argentina con todos y para todos, va a ser nuestra guía y también la bandera de la justicia y de la lucha contra la impunidad. Dejaremos todo para lograr un país más equitativo, con inclusión social, luchando contra la desocupación, la injusticia y todo lo que nos dejó en su última etapa esta lamentable década del 90 como epílogo de las cosas que nos tocaron vivir.

‘That flag and that heart that we light for an Argentina with everyone and for everyone will be our guide and also the flag of justice and of the struggle against impunity. We will sacrifice everything to achieve an equitable country, with social inclusion, fighting against unemployment, injustice and everything that left us in its last stage the lamentable decade of the 90’s as the epilogue of things that we were forced to live through’.




Diagram 3. Context models: time frames 2004/2

NK is bringing into the present something absolutely absent in the speech he gave a few hours before at the Military College. The repetition of the demonstrative pronouns *aquella* ‘that’ and *aquel* ‘that’ is utilized to refer to a time long before TF1. They place the speech in a time frame not mentioned in the discourse given at the Military College. These pronouns, together with the nouns *bandera* ‘flag’ and *corazón* ‘heart’, serve to positively evaluate the distant past or TF0, thereby indicating the political uses of implicatures based on processes of lexical selection. But what is NK referring to when he uses noun phrases such as *aquella bandera* ‘that flag’ and *aquel corazón* ‘that heart’? These noun phrases positively define the victim’s political project of the late 60’s and early 70’s which form part of the cultural and situation models of the addressees of NK’s speech at the School of Navy Mechanics. Montero (2009) claims the discourse of NK is ideologically modeled by some traits of the Peronist youth of the early seventies, which was the social basis for the armed, left-wing political organization *Montoneros*. According to Montero (2009:318), the commemorative speeches of NK attempt to

restore some of the political demands of the Peronist youth, i.e. policies of nationalization of public services, redistribution of wealth, sovereignty, and solidarity.

NK is not only ‘neutrally’ remembering a TF0, but also ideologically evaluating it in positive terms. Taking into account that the primary addressees of his speech are the relatives of the victims and members of human rights organizations, by positively recalling a TF0 NK is legitimizing his political project before the immediate audience of his speech. In this case, remembering must also be thought of as a cognitive and discursive mechanism of legitimization. It is important to examine the manner in which NK defines the historical period that precedes his government (TF1). One lexical item plays a central role in his way of defining the historical period that preceded his government. NK defines the *desocupación* ‘unemployment’, and the *injusticia* ‘injustice’ inherited from the 90’s as an *epílogo* ‘epilogue’. The socio-economic crisis of 2001 (see chapter 2, section 2.3.2) provides the socially shared knowledge needed to interpret what he is referring to. NK defines the end of the TF1 as *lamentable* ‘unfortunate’ and, thereby, negatively evaluating the historical period that preceded his government. Importantly, the lexical item *epílogo* ‘epilogue’ indicates that such unfortunate period has come to an end with his government since 2003.

Now the question is: when does this TF1 begin? NK constructs a TF1 that begins on March 24th, 1976 with *las cosas que nos tocaron vivir* ‘things that we were forced to live through’. He, as well as a large number of the participants in the communicative situation (relatives of those who disappeared, members of human rights organizations, etc.), knows what is meant by *cosas* ‘things’. The implicatures triggered by *cosas* ‘things’ are sustained by both socially shared knowledge and personal knowledge (human rights violations, etc.) organized in cultural and situation models. However, the intended meaning of the lexical item *cosas* ‘things’ partly depends on NK’s representations of his addressees’ knowledge of the events he is talking about, that is, on his context models. We must bear in mind, that if NK had uttered the same token *las cosas que nos tocaron vivir* ‘things that we were forced to live through’ in his speech delivered a few hours before at the Military College, the inferential processes ‘activated’ would have been different (1970’s political violence, terrorist attacks by political armed organizations, etc.).

4.4.4 Following the people's will

On March 24th 2006, NK delivered another speech at the Military College. At that time he was not only commemorating the 30th anniversary of the coup d'état, but also implementing March 24th as a new public holiday: The Day of Remembrance for Truth and Justice. However, in contrast to the speech given two years before at the same place, there was an important difference in terms of the participants involved in the communicative event. On March 24th 2006, NK was not only addressing members of the army, but also the relatives of some of the victims and members of human rights organizations.

Example 3: Time Frames 2006

Nuestra sociedad, en la que casi la totalidad de los sectores políticos, sociales, culturales y económicos rechaza ese pasado, lo juzga críticamente y es por su lucha que los impedimentos jurídicos para los juzgamientos de crímenes contra la humanidad, están derogados y la Justicia desarrolla su tarea con total y absoluta independencia.

‘Our society, in which the totality of the political, social, cultural and economic sectors reject this past, they judge it critically, and it is for their struggle that the legal impediments for the judging of crimes against humanity are abolished and Justice is developing its task with total and absolute independence’.

In example 3 NK employs legitimizing uses of rhetorical devices in order to back up his political stance. The topos of populism is again used to support this positioning. NK utilizes another legitimizing mechanism to present his opinion by means of generalizations. These generalizations operate as a justificatory strategy backing up the positive consequences of the TF2 began in 2003. It seems that on March 24th 2006 all sectors of Argentine society condemned the past. By naming every sector, i.e. *políticos* ‘political’, *sociales* ‘social’, *culturales* ‘cultural’, and *económicos* ‘economic’, NK is not only criticizing the military dictatorship for human rights abuses, but is also suggesting that the consequences of the military regime went far beyond the systematic disappearance of political dissidents. In social and economic terms, NK implies that the outcome of the policies promoted by the military junta leaders did not cease in 1983 with the democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989). This socially shared knowledge partly forms part of cultural models of the socio-economic crisis of 2001 (e.g. images of urban and rural poverty, empty factories).




Diagram 4. Context models: time frames 2006

What NK is claiming is that the present day society condemns an entire historical period of state terrorism, neoliberal politics, and fracturing of the social fabric, which resulted in the worst socioeconomic crisis in Argentine history in December 2001. In other words, what the present day society is condemning is TF1, which comes to an end with the government of NK. It is also important to note the way in which society condemns that TF1. NK depicts society as a number of different social actors, who are self-determined in their action of criticizing TF1. By means of nominalizations *su lucha* 'their struggle', and verbal forms *rechaza* 'reject', *juzga* 'judge' along with the adverb *críticamente* 'critically', NK designs a discursive mechanism driven by lexical items for evaluating society in positive terms. In this way, he creates a representation of a mature society driven neither by any particular political leader nor by any ideological beliefs. In doing so, NK makes an attempt to naturalize his ideological position. If everyone, or almost everyone, agrees on repealing the pardons in order to open the door to prosecute

former perpetrators, there will be no need to install a new top-down politics which seeks justice. NK is merely the voice of a new social consciousness whose aim is to restore justice. He embodies this new social consciousness which criticizes the actors and actions involved in TF1.

4.4.5 Who they were, who they are

On March 24th 2007, NK delivered another speech commemorating The Day of Remembrance for Truth and Justice. In 2007, the setting for this March 24th speech was the ex-detention and torture centre *La Perla* ‘The Pearl’, located in Córdoba City, 800kms away from Buenos Aires.

Example 4: Time Frames 2007

Ustedes saben que hubo dirigentes y militares que hoy se esconden porque tienen miedo de ir ante un Juzgado y eran dueños de la vida de argentinos comprometidos con un país distinto.

‘You know that there were leaders and military men who today hide because they fear going before a judge and they were the owners of the lives of Argentineans committed to a new and different country’.

To begin, it is important to examine the manner in which NK represents former perpetrators and accomplices in relation to different time-frames. NK establishes a binary definition of time by means of the use of the deictic of time *hoy* ‘today’ and the relational verb (Halliday, 1985) *ser* ‘to be’ in the past tense *eran* ‘were’. This binary definition of time, divided into TF1 *eran* ‘were’ and TF2 *hoy* ‘today’, is strategically constructed to depict the same actors in different historical periods. NK employs a referential use of lexical items to set a dichotomy between the actors involved in TF1: *dirigentes y militares* ‘leaders and military men’ and *argentinos comprometidos con un país distinto* ‘Argentineans committed to a new and different country’. Taking into consideration that the immediate addressees of NK’s speech are relatives of some of the victims, this mode of defining their missing loved ones aims to produce not only a positive representation of NK, but also of the TF2 he is constructing.




Diagram 5. Context models: time frames 2007

By viewing the victims of the dictatorship as ‘Argentineans committed to a new and different country’, and as not just passive actors that one day were abducted, tortured, and killed for doing nothing, or just for thinking differently, as the narrative of the democratic transition used to depict (see chapter 2, section 2.3.1), NK seems to be bringing their legacy into the present. We are facing a striking case in which, from the present, NK strategically constructs a positive representation of the victims of the dictatorship in order to influence political behavior in the present. In this case, remembering acts as another mechanism of legitimization, in epistemic, deontic as well as in emotional terms. Moreover, as NK aims to represent himself as a continuator of the victims’ political project in TF0 (prior to the coup d’état) – when he is not speaking before the military – he would be embodying those ideals in the present. This political-emotive-cognitive mechanism creates the basis for the legitimization of NK’s political stance installed in the TF2, not only before the relatives, but also before society.

Outsiders are portrayed by means of another binary definition: who they were in TF1 and who they are today in TF2. The use of an existential verbal form *hubo* ‘there was/were’ (Halliday, 1985) in the past tense enables us to associate *dirigentes* ‘leaders’ and *militares* ‘military’ with the TF1. This makes clear that they are not part of the political and military institutions in today. In TF1 they were *dueños de la vida de argentinos* ‘owners of the lives of Argentines’. That is, they had enough power to commit atrocities and go without any punishment whatsoever. Today, in TF2, those people are hidden because they are afraid of being prosecuted and punished for those crimes. Both the socially shared knowledge of the past (human rights abuses) and the present (new trials against former perpetrators) are presupposed in NK’s definition. We notice how referential (*dirigentes y militares*, ‘leaders and military men’, vs. *argentinos comprometidos*, ‘Argentinean committed’) and evaluative (*dueños de la vida*, ‘owners of the lives’, vs. *tienen miedo*, ‘because of fear’) uses of discourse strategies [e.g. definitions] are employed to create a binary definition of time in which TF2 needs a negative counterpoint (TF1) to reinforce its exceptionality. The role of the leaders and military men in TF1 is contrasted with the position of the leaders and military men in TF2. Moreover, NK presents this contrast without making reference to the change in political power. Lastly, it is important to point out that NK’s depiction of time and actors within those time-frames is overall epistemically legitimated by an introductory meta-discursive resource (Hyland, 2005). *Ustedes saben* ‘You know’ aims at creating consensus with the immediate addressees of NK’s speech, and thereby, lending validity and credibility to NK’s arguments.

4.5 Conclusions

This chapter has presented empirical evidence about the current changes in the politics of memorialization in Argentina. The analysis of the construction of a binary definition of time in the four commemorative speeches provides evidence of how discourse processes of memory-making about the military dictatorship work in institutional settings in Argentina. The analysis of the four extracts from the commemorative speeches delivered by Néstor Kirchner has provided important insight about the political and historical situation in Argentina since 2003. Further empirical evidence will be needed to draw conclusions about how systematic the distinction between time-frames in the speeches of NK is, and what role this political mechanism plays in re-

shaping processes of political cognition about the past and the present. Nonetheless, for the scope of this thesis, this chapter creates the grounds to better understand the topics and political positions discussed in the discourse processes of remembering in private settings (interviews and focus groups) that are analyzed in the next chapters.

The analysis of the political uses of the discourse strategies employed by Néstor Kirchner has indicated the ways in which the commemoration of the anniversary of the coup d'état of March 24th has clearly become an occasion to bring the traumatic past into the present, by strategically focusing on some aspects of the past. As we have seen, processes of social forms of memory-making are employed for specific purposes in the present. In the extracts analyzed, we found that NK's ways of representing actors (military, people who disappeared, Néstor Kirchner's self-representation, etc.) rely on a binary definition of time. In order to highlight the exceptionality of the time period that NK comes to inaugurate, it is necessary to construct a negative counterpoint.

We observed a shift in the representation of NK and the other actors through time. The commemorative speeches delivered in 2004 and 2006 stressed the unity of Argentines (*nuestros militares*, 'our military', *todos*, 'everyone', *la totalidad* 'the totality'). However, as time goes by, we notice the dissolution of this unity. In 2007 the in-group (us) vs. out-group (them) differentiation, e.g. *dirigentes y militares* 'leaders and military men' vs. *argentinos comprometidos* 'Argentines committed to..', makes it more salient. This increasing fragmentation of the unity of Argentines is embedded in a binary definition of time. The binary definition of time results in the creation of two time-frames with which to understand the historical period from March 24th 1976 to the present. A TF1 begins with the coup d'état (March 24th, 1976) and possibly ends with the crisis of December 2001, whose aftermath continues to the present (unemployment, social injustice, impunity of former perpetrators, etc.). This lack of temporal boundaries makes TF1 a vague, but also very effective concept. Its vagueness allows NK to include different types of events within it, events which are not so overtly connected, such as the disappearance of people and the consequences of neoliberal politics. Then, we have a TF2 that begins in 2003 with the government of NK creating the conditions for the emergence of a new social consciousness.

The creation of two time-frames facilitates the construction of binary cultural models, which guide the political cognition of the addressees of these discourses. The binary categorizations of the dictatorship in Argentina, such as *War/Genocide*, *Perpetrators/Victims*, *Impunity/Justice*, are the basis for current political positions about

the traumatic past. However, these dichotomical categorizations need to be situated and anchored in some sort of time-frame in order to be more effective. In being so situated, the dichotomies gain epistemic reality, because they can be thought of as real and true for a time period: TF1 was a period of impunity, materialized in the pardons and reconciliation policies; whereas TF2 is a period of justice, realized in the repealing of the pardons, which opened the door for prosecutions.

Finally, although the binary definition of time remains the same in the four political discourses, we notice some differences in the way Néstor Kirchner defines actors within time-frames, differences which are a result of different political intentions and goals (e.g. exhibition of power before the military, legitimization before relatives of those who disappeared, etc.). The analysis of the discourse strategies shows that NK intends to accomplish those political goals by different means (e.g. appealing to a new social consciousness, remembering victims' political projects, etc.). The exceptionality of the present political discourse about the 'Dirty War' in Argentina seems to be not only related to the commemoration of the victims, the defense of human rights, and the search for justice. As we noticed, these policies about the condemnation of the crimes committed by the military regime have a long history (e.g. The National Commission of Disappearance of Persons and the trials of former junta generals in 1985, see chapter two section 2.3.1). The exceptionality of the discourse of Néstor Kirchner appears in his self-representation as a continuator of the victims' political project prior to the 1976 coup d'état. No other governmental discourse about the 'Dirty War' had restored such a political project for several reasons (e.g. closure, reconciliation policies, to blame left-wing organizations for causing the disproportionate response of the military in 1976). Further investigation will be needed to better understand the ways in which Néstor Kirchner brings the victims' political project of the seventies (which considered violence as a way of doing politics) into the present in accordance with current democratic values and norms, i.e. strong condemnation of political violence.

5. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MORAL SELF IN ACTS OF DISCURSIVE REMEMBERING: BEING AN 'ORDINARY' MAN WITHIN THE EXPERIENCE OF DICTATORSHIP IN ARGENTINA²⁹

5.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide a closer look at the cognitive and discourse processes that are related to strategies of knowledge-management in relation to the traumatic events which occurred during the 1976-1983 military dictatorship in Argentina. The knowledge managed by these strategies is organized in cultural and situation models of the experience of dictatorship. I will present a detailed socio-cognitive discourse analysis of an open-ended interview that I conducted with an 'ordinary' man in March 2008 in Buenos Aires. The interview focused on my interviewee's memories of the military regime. This study shows that the discourse strategies that are under consideration operate to discursively and interactively realize mechanisms of moral disengagement. These mechanisms were the expression of driving goals for my interviewee in the communicative interaction. Therefore, they played a key role at the time that the process of knowledge-management was shaped, a process that was discursively realized by discourse strategies. Apart from providing a significant insight into how my interviewee tries to construct an 'acceptable' moral self, the socio-cognitive discourse analysis of the interview partly shows how the 'new' ways of understanding the experience of dictatorship in institutional settings (e.g. commemorative speeches, see chapter 4) are explicitly challenged in private settings (e.g. interview about autobiographical memories conducted at the interviewee's house). This is one of the contributions of this chapter to the overall purpose of the thesis.

²⁹ A version of this chapter has been recently published in the *Year of Idiographic Science 3* as follows: Bietti, L. (2010). The construction of the moral self in autobiographical memory: being and 'ordinary man' within the experience of dictatorship in Argentina. In S. Salvatore & J. Valsiner (eds.), *Yearbook of Idiographic Science* (pp. 253-276). Rome: Firera & Liuzzo Group. My special thanks to the editors of the *Yearbook of Ideographic Science*, Sergio Salvatore and Jaan Valsiner for their helpful comments. A shorter version titled 'Toward a socio-cognitive approach to the construction of the moral self in autobiographical memory' was presented at the 9th *Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science 2009*. Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Sydney, October 2009.

The cognitive pragmatics of remembering, which was presented in chapter 3, provides the theoretical and methodological framework for exploring my interviewee's strategies of knowledge-management in relation to the military dictatorship. This chapter analyzes the times in which my interviewee spoke and communicated in a way that allowed me to construct a positive representation of him. To do so, my interviewee developed an overall mechanism of impression management (Brewer, 1988; Schlenker, 1980; van Dijk, 1992) based on discourse strategies (see chapter 3, section 3.5.6). The subject of the interview was his autobiographical memories (see chapter 3, sections 3.2.4 and 3.3.2) of the military dictatorship in Argentina. Interestingly, my interviewee did not provide many personal recollections of the military dictatorship, although he was explicitly asked to do so. What he actually did, was to develop a cognitive and discursive mechanism to manage his cultural and situation models (see chapter 3, sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3) of the military dictatorship. By means of discourse strategies, my interviewee manages what he seems to know about the military dictatorship according to his context models (see chapter 3, sections, 3.5.5.1). While this chapter focuses on the discursive construction of the moral self based on my interviewee's memories of the military dictatorship, the analysis is centered exclusively on analyzing the discourse strategies of positive self-representation.

The analysis shows that my interviewee also makes use of discourse strategies of negative other representation to reinforce the positive impression that he tries to create in the conversation. As a result of this discourse process of knowledge-management by highlighting his own positive traits, and others' negative traits (van Dijk, 1992) my interviewee constructs negative representations of the social actors (e.g. human rights organizations) who have been playing a central role in the current politics of memorialization in Argentina (see chapter 2 and 4). Thus, he has to strategically manage socially-shared knowledge (e.g. the genocide - model, see chapter 2, section 2.1) and emotional codes organized in cultural models in order not to break social norms (e.g. defense of human rights). Moreover, the processes of discursive remembering that are analyzed in this chapter occurred in real life-settings (my interviewee's house in Buenos Aires) and following some of the features of the ethnographic interview that will be described in section 5.4.

This chapter is organized in the following way. First, it introduces the different mechanisms of moral disengagement that were expression of the driving goals of my interviewee in the communicative interaction. Second, it points out what were the

structural differences that have been found between the interview selected for the analysis and the other communicative interactions examined in this thesis. These differences indicate that my interviewee provided a smaller percentage of autobiographical narratives related to the period of dictatorship than the other participants from his same age group. I claim that this behavior represents another strategy of knowledge-management.

Finally, this chapter presents a detailed analysis of the interanimation of the mechanisms of moral disengagement, the discourse strategies, and mental models.

5.2 Moral self disengagement

Several mechanisms of moral disengagement were utilized by the media, politicians, companies and ordinary people in order to justify the extreme violence committed by the 1976-1983 military regime in Argentina, or at least to say that what was occurring, such as people disappearing, was not their business. Antisocial individuals with brain impairments, thus unable to feel empathy, guilt or remorse, are not the only ones able to commit horrible and deeply immoral acts towards others. Normal individuals with a well-developed sense of morality are also able to commit such acts (Staub, 1999; Welzer, 2005). Furthermore, many people are able to justify (at least to some extent) their immoral or offensive acts towards others and by doing so they sustain a view of themselves as morally good people (Bandura, 1999, 2002).

Evil actions (Zimbardo, 2007) can be defined by means of three criteria: (1) extreme actions that go beyond normal limits of the social and cultural context in which they occur, (2) underlying intentions of reducing the victim's quality of life, and (3) when committing the act the perpetrator feels no empathy. The concept of evil covers a wide spectrum of different actions. It covers in different degrees, everything from a perpetrator who tortures victims, to passive bystanders who fail to intervene either because 'we didn't know what was going on' or 'they were arrested because they were mixed up in something'. Even though the underlying motives may differ, the different kinds of evil actions have common features due to the fact that the actions are often committed by ordinary people who, under different circumstances, are considerate, emphatic and concerned about doing the morally right thing (Zimbardo, 2007).

The theory of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999, 2002) deals with the question of how normal people, who are morally oriented most of the time, are capable of

committing offensive and dehumanizing acts. This is possible through moral disengagement, defined as a cognitive rationalization of the immoral acts that make them seem as if in accordance with the person's moral principles. By using the cognitive strategy of moral disengagement, you get the opportunity to commit the evil and immoral act, and at the same time, sustain the impression of upholding your moral standards.

Moral disengagement is not to be seen as a personality trait but as a kind of coping strategy arising from the interaction between a person focused on maintaining an acceptable moral self before others and a given situation. Moral disengagement takes place through one or more of four different disengagement loci (Bandura, 1999, 2002): (1) moral justification of the immoral act, e.g. it seems to serve higher moral purposes, (2) neglecting and rejecting the negative consequences of the immoral act, (3) neglecting and rejecting your personal responsibility and (4) neglecting or rejecting the victim.

5.2.1 Moral justification of immoral acts

The cognitive reconstruction of the evil/immoral act is the most effective kind of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999). This is due to the fact that by legitimizing the act one not only makes an unacceptable act acceptable, one also goes a step further and turns the previous immoral and self-condemning acts into a source of positive self-evaluation. The term 'moral justification' means a cognitive reconstruction of the act, so that it is interpreted as serving a purpose that is in accord with socially and morally acceptable norms. Utilitarian thinking often plays a role in the moral justification: one acts contrary to moral standards, but one does it for a greater good. An illustration of moral justification is a police officer who justifies torturing an alleged terrorist, adducing that the ultimate goal of the immoral act is to obtain information in order to prevent potential terrorist attacks. Other strategies of justification rest upon highlighting the comparative advantages of the immoral acts in relation to the consequences of actions carried out by others, which are categorized as more harmful. For instance, a passive bystander may argue that his lack of intervention is much less harmful than the immoral act itself.

5.2.2 Neglecting the negative consequences of immoral acts

The question of whether one has done something wrong is transformed into a question of whether someone has been directly harmed by his/her acts. An everyday realization of this disengagement locus is the car thief who argues that there will be no harm done on the grounds that the owner of the stolen car will be able to obtain a new vehicle because his car is insured. Bandura (1999) claims that if people are not confronted with the suffering of their victims, their willingness to commit immoral acts will increase.

5.2.3 Neglecting and rejecting personal responsibility

The rejection of responsibility is another disengagement mechanism (Bandura, 1999). The perpetrator argues either that the act is committed without the intention to harm the victim or that the circumstances or 'others' have forced the perpetrator to commit the acts. The perpetrator uses a perception of himself as externally controlled and, therefore, without personal responsibility for his immoral acts (Sykes & Matza, 1957; Bandura, 1999). Social-psychological research (Milgram, 1974), as well as historical events such as the Holocaust (Tsang, 2002), show us many examples of how people commit harmful and violent acts because authorities wanted them to do so. We may also find cases in which the person responsible for committing immoral acts feels as if he were a little part of a larger group. Hence, he perceives that his acts do not have major consequences and, in the end, he is not really hurting anybody.

5.2.4 Neglecting or rejecting the victim

The perpetrator argues that it is the victim's own fault that he is subjected to the evil acts. By considering yourself as some kind of avenger and claiming that the rough treatment is the victim's own fault, feelings of guilt are replaced by feelings of doing something right or necessary. This disengagement loci is partly based on a behavior hypothesis in social psychology called 'fundamental attribution error' (Jones & Harris, 1967; Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977). The fundamental attribution error hypothesis maintains that people tend to place heavy emphasis on internal personality traits to explain other's behavior in a particular situation, rather than considering the external factors that facilitate the emergence of such behavior.

Likewise, strategies of dehumanization are usually employed by perpetrators to morally disengage with their victims. The strategies of dehumanization consist of a

progressive process of degradation which ends by removing the victims' rights and personal features, and any kind of characteristic which could provoke empathy with other human beings on the part of the perpetrator. Torture and killing are often legitimized through dehumanization, e.g. in genocides and wars (Tsang, 2002).

5.3 Interviewing Paco: an 'ordinary' man

In February 2008, I was conducting focus groups in Buenos Aires as part of my doctoral project about the discursive reconstruction and uses of collective memory in Argentina. I invited Paco to participate in one of the groups, but he did not respond to either my telephone calls or emails. A few days later, he called me inviting me to come to his house in downtown Buenos Aires. He had agreed to give me an interview. As soon as I arrived at his place, he provided the reasons for not attending the focus group session; he would not feel safe participating in a focus group in an unknown place with people he did not know beforehand.

The interview session had two parts. In the first one, I showed him five images relating to the military dictatorship. In the second part, I presented five historical dates linked to Argentinean history. I asked Paco to do the following: to discuss the historical dates and images and to make an attempt to incorporate his own personal experiences in this discussion. The interview was recorded with an audio device –Olympus Voice Recorder VN-2100PC. Contextual notes, such as important gestures and other non-verbal behaviors were reported.

The interview followed some of the features of the ethnographic interview in order to satisfy ecological validity: i) make the interview situation familiar/comfortable for the interviewee; ii) conduct the interview in his/her space; iii) act like a real person, not as a researcher; iv) do not consult a written list of questions; v) try to approximate ordinary conversation; vi) show interest; and vii) let the interviewee show/tell you what is important and then ask him/her about that. This approach tries to give a fuller picture of the participants' everyday linguistic and cultures practices (Briggs, 1986), where the self-making is constructed and performed meaningfully.

I will now preface the analysis with general description of the context model in Paco's interview. We must bear in mind that context models may be in flux throughout communicative interaction depending on whether the speaker's specific goals and common ground change (see chapter 3, section 3.5.5.1). Nevertheless, we can find some

general and global features that remain relatively constant during the communicative interaction. These general features form the (macro) context model that constitutes the basis for more local and dynamic context models.




Diagram 6. Context models: Paco's interview

5.3.1 De-centering the self in the interview

The distribution of interactional turns (Sanders, 2003) in Paco's interview represents more than 87% of the total words (3,951) of the interview. This figure indicates that Paco was cooperative and followed the conventional rules which govern an interaction of this sort (e.g. open-ended interview focused on autobiographical memories). Moreover, he could either play the role of the interviewer (asking instead of responding to questions) or simply contribute much less or much more than required by his role as an interviewee.

Table 1. Distribution of interactional turns

Participants	Interactional turns
Interviews	89%
Focus groups	92%
Paco	87%

The table displays the same distributional patterns found in five interviews and six focus groups which I conducted for my project on autobiographical and collective memories of periods of political violence in Argentina using the same method. What these figures in table 1 show is that Paco did follow the conventional rules of a communicative interaction focused on his autobiographical experiences. However, in order to know in more detail about whether Paco's distribution of interactional turns has a correlation to the quantity of autobiographical memories communicated, it is necessary to examine what the correlation is between the total number of words in each of Paco's turns and the number of words in his autobiographical narratives.

If we consider that the type of open-ended interviewing format I used does not easily enable us to delineate the beginning and ending of Paco's autobiographical memories (AM), it is necessary to determine the signals which tell us when an autobiographical event begins and ends. The parameters employed were taken and adapted from the coding scheme proposed by Medved and Hirst (2006). Medved and Hirst (2006) claim that the beginning of an autobiographical memory is signaled by a new detail (e.g. events, settings, perceptions and emotions), which defines a new unique occurrence (Medved & Hirst, 2006: 280). Topic changes initiated by the interviewer or participants indicate the end of an autobiographical memory (p. 280).

The percentage of the presence of autobiographical memories in Paco's interactional turns was obtained by conducting a word count. That is, by comparing the total number of words in his turns to the quantity of words he used (in his turns) to construct and communicate autobiographical narratives, I determined to what extent his interventions fulfilled one of the requested tasks, namely, to make an attempt to incorporate his own personal experiences into the discussion. Due to the qualitative and discursively oriented nature of the analysis, filler words, such as *bueno* 'well', and word repetitions were counted. Although digressions often play an important pragmatic role

in autobiographical narratives (e.g. comparing a personal experience with some current state of affairs in order to present the positioning of the self), they were not counted as part of autobiographical memories.

The following extract [23.28-24.53] is used to illustrate what was taken as an autobiographical memory and how the quantity of words was determined.

1. **Paco:** No no (.) en la calle (.) en Plaza de Mayo (.) hizo un cajón de muertos y
2. los quemó a los radicales a la mierda (.) por eso ganó Alfonsín y Alfonsín como
3. presidente no hizo tres carajos, un ministro más pelotudo que otro, la inflación,
4. hubo gente que sacaba (.3) no me voy a olvidar nunca, se me antoja viajar con
5. mi mujer un año de vacaciones y mi hijo chico vamos a Las Leñas, que están
6. de moda en Argentina Las Leñas, el Mal argüe y la puta madre como decir San
7. Martín de los Andes o donde vive el presidente, no me acuerdo la provincia de
8. él, acá hay tantas provincias carajo que más pelos que tengo yo en la cabeza, que
9. tienen hotel y (.2) que el hotel sale 500 dólares la noche, que sé yo
10. **Lucas:** Se se se
11. **Paco:** me acuerdo bien claro que vamos a (.2) mi mujer y yo que vamos a Las
12. Leñas y “eso qué mierda me es” le hago yo, en coche manejando como un
13. cabrón, con lluvia y demás (.3) salió tanto con el asunto de Alfonsín y el
14. ministro “que apuesta al dólar pierde” y los cojones del padre santo, mi mujer
15. pagó en verdes, me salió las vacaciones 100 dólares, gratis, los 15 días en Las
16. Leñas, un lugar hermoso de la Argentina, porque la Argentina no tiene nada que
17. envidiarle a Europa, hay de todo (.) sigue (.) ¿Alguna otra pregunta?

1. *Paco: No no (.) in the street (.) in the Plaza de Mayo (.) he made coffins and*
2. *burn them, the radicals, to hell (.) for that reason Alfonsín won and Alfonsín as*
3. *president didn't do three bloody things, a minister more of a jerk than the other,*
4. *the inflation, people were sacked (.3) I will never forget it, I had a crave to*
5. *travel with my wife for a year long vacation and with*
6. *my little one, we all went to Las Leñas that was fashionable in Argentina Las*
7. *Leñas, the Malargue and the fucking as to say San Martin de los Andes or where*
8. *the president lives, I don't remember his province, here there are so many*
9. *fucking provinces, more than the hair on my head, which have hotels and (.2)*
10. *what hotel cost 500 dollars per night, I don't know*
11. *Lucas: Yeah, yeah, yeah*
12. *Paco: I remember very vividly we went to (.2) my wife and I went to Las Leñas*
13. *and “that means shit to me” I did everything, driving the car like a jerk, with*
14. *rain and what not (.3) there was so much said about Alfonsín and his minister*
15. *‘who betted in US dollars and lost’ and the balls of the holy father, my wife paid*
16. *in greens [US dollars], the vacation cost 100 dollars, the 15 days in Las Leñas,*
17. *a beautiful place in Argentina, because Argentina has nothing to envy Europe,*
18. *Argentina has everything (.) continue (.) are there any other questions?*

Topic: How the devaluation of the Argentinean currency affected a family vacation.
Beginning of memory: (.3) *no me voy a olvidar nunca* (L.4) 'I will never forget it' (L.4)
End of memory: *un lugar hermoso de la Argentina* (L.16) 'a beautiful place in Argentina'
(L.17)
Digressions: from *que están de moda* (L. 5-6) 'that was fashionable' (L.6) *que sé yo* (L. 9) 'I
don't know' (L.10)
Total words: 257
Words in the AM: 112
Presence of AM: 44%

Although the distribution of interactional turns in Paco's interview is in line with the pattern found in the rest of the interviews and focus groups which used the same method, the quantitative analysis of the presence of autobiographical memories indicates some significant differences. Compared with the other participants born between 1930 and 1955, the presence of autobiographical memories in Paco's interactional turns is significantly less than the average 47% and is 22% below the rate of Osvaldo who, besides Paco, is the only participant who provided less autobiographical memories than the average. To protect the identity of the participants, the names displayed in the table were the pseudonyms they agreed to use during the entire sessions.

Table 2. Presence of Autobiographical Memories

Participants	Year of Birth	Total Words	Words in AM	Presence of AM
David Rock	1945	5639	2628	48%
Silvana	1952	1092	654	60%
Guillermo	1947	4319	1621	38%
Carlos	1950	3536	1368	39%
Paco	1940	3566	483	14%
Liliana	1952	1971	912	46%
Chela	1935	836	421	51%
Clarita	1932	1520	612	40%
Marta	1935	2120	1541	73%
Silvana	1930	1223	896	73%
Osvaldo	1935	2221	807	36%

The presence of significantly fewer autobiographical memories needs to be thought of as a cognitive and discursive process driven by the strategic management of knowledge about the period of dictatorship. This strategic knowledge-management is reflected by Paco's mechanisms of moral disengagement. The way in which Paco discursively controls how he wants to be received by me is undoubtedly dependent on his context models of the communicative interaction. These context models include a real audience that is in a position to evaluate the speaker's self-positioning in the moral world. Moreover, we must bear in mind that the interview was being recorded; ergo Paco's strategic knowledge-management also depended on the imaginary audience that might have access to the audio recordings. Hence, the emergence of the moral self is deeply interpersonal and based on social agreement. Paco's reconstruction and communication of fewer autobiographical memories facilitates the emergence of a less self-centered construction during the interview, which may be an operative cognitive and discursive strategy to avoid interpersonal processes of moral self undermining. These quantitative findings about the features of Paco's interactional turns are in accordance with the qualitative analysis of the uses of discourse strategies to linguistically realize mechanisms of moral disengagement. The quantitative findings explained above, together with the qualitative findings from discourse analysis that follows justify the inclusion of this particular interview in the thesis.

5.3.2 Discourse processes of moral self disengagement and knowledge-management

In what follows I will introduce some examples which illustrate the way in which Paco discursively constructs his moral self embedded in the experience of dictatorship. The examples are useful to illustrate how Paco represents himself within the dictatorship in cognitive and, moral and emotional terms. These representations are based on his mental models employed to conceptualize the actions, actors and events that form part of the time-frame 'dictatorship'. The different mechanisms of moral disengagement which were introduced above are discursively realized by means of discourse strategies in accordance with cultural, situational and context models. The analysis will indicate that these mechanisms of disengagement may be considered as expressions of Paco's intentions and goals in terms of the (macro) context models of the interactions that will be examined. Therefore, what will be analyzed are the uses of discourse strategies not

only in relation to mental models in general, but to the specific goals of each interaction in particular. These intentions and goals are associated with the cognitive and interactive mechanisms of moral disengagement.

In short, the sub-sections that follow will present extracts from the communicative interaction that reflect each mechanism of moral disengagement, followed by the analysis of, the discourse strategies that were used by Paco, and the nature of their causal connections within mental models. The socio-cognitive discourse analysis integrates and explores the causal interdependences between Paco's discursive positioning, the discourse strategies, the cultural and situation models of the experience of dictatorship, and the context models of the ongoing interaction.

5.3.2.1 Justification of Immoral Acts

1. Hubo una guerra (.6) entonces le echan toda la culpa a la Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada [1.57-2.09]

There was a war (.6) then they put all the blame on the Navy Mechanics School

2. Uno puede estar de acuerdo que (.) iban a atacar a los militares [6.33- 6.39]

One can agree that (.) they were going to attack the army

3. Hubo metidas de pata de un lado metidas de pata del otro (.) no te se va a discutir (.3) fue una guerra [19.59-20.07]

People from both side put their foot in it (.) that's not arguable it was a war

Throughout the four extracts, Paco provides arguments defining the period of dictatorship as a war. He employs the war-cultural model (see chapter 2, section 2.1) to frame the traumatic experience. The use of impersonal verbal forms such as in examples 1 and 3 *hubo* 'there was' dilutes the responsibility for the origin of the war. This existential verb form (Halliday, 1985; Hernández Diaz, 2006) turns the dictatorship into an event that just happens, like an accident or natural disaster, without referring to the actors or actions involved. The lexical choice *hubo* 'there was' helps Paco achieve his interactional goals [justification of immoral acts]. The definition of the event (military dictatorship) as a war by the use of the verb 'to be' in the 3rd person further reinforces the previous definition. Defining the military dictatorship as a war presupposes a symmetry between agents engaged in the battle. This socially shared knowledge is organized in cultural models of similar experiences of war.

The metaphor *hubo metidas de pata* ‘put your foot in it’ in example 3 functions as a euphemism to define the excesses committed by both the military and the armed, political organizations. This metaphor is grounded in socially shared knowledge of wars that do not make human rights violations an issue that could undermine the war- model. The metaphor mitigates the negative consequences of the actions committed by the military who are depicted as patient *iban a atacar a los militares* ‘they were going to attack the army’ instead of as an agent. Interestingly, only the negative actions/behavior of the military are discursively communicated by the euphemism *meter la pata* ‘put your put in it’, as it focuses on the negative consequences of the actions but not on the immoral intentions that drove their planning. Furthermore, the spatial categorization of the ideological spectrum in terms of opposing *lados* ‘sides’ is another metaphor that acts to conceptually reinforce the symmetry between actors (perpetrators and members of armed-political organizations). Thus, the war-model is also constructed and represented in spatial terms and, thereby, gains justificatory force, backing up Paco’ interaction goal [the justification of immoral acts]. Finally, impersonal pronouns and verbal forms in the 3rd person, as in *uno puede estar de acuerdo* ‘one can agree’, mitigate Paco’s involvement at the time of presenting and evaluating the violent actions. However, the evaluation is a clear discursive realization of the war- model. Violence is justified because it is a key component of the war-model.

The alleged symmetry between agents is strategically presented by means of implicatures (examples 1, 2, 3), thereby avoiding potential confrontations and challenges (Sbisà, 1999). It seems that Paco may be aware that the justification of the immoral acts committed by the military regime perpetrators may be considered to go against the current mode of defining the experience of dictatorship (see chapter 2, section 2.3.3), and it thereby, breaks social norms (e.g. trials against former perpetrators). The war-model also serves to create an interpretative frame in which atrocities can be expected by the real or imaginary audience in which atrocities can be expected. Defining the military dictatorship by means of the war- model is as a justificatory discourse strategy that backs up Paco’s self-representation. In other words, by defining the military dictatorship as war, Paco indirectly justifies the immoral acts of the perpetrators in a way that allows him to maintain positive self-representation or, to at least, avoid making a negative impression on his interlocutor.

The moral justification of the immoral acts becomes even more salient when Paco strategically employs discourse strategies to neglect and reject the negative

consequences of the acts performed by the military. Thus, he tries to manage socially shared knowledge about the experience of dictatorship in order not to undermine the justification of the immoral acts by means of the war-model.

5.3.2.2 Neglecting and rejecting the negative consequences of the Immoral act

4. De la Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada no te puedo decir nada (.) se dicen mil cosas distintas (.) que hubo desaparecidos que hubo que se mató ahí y demás y (.3) de eso nadie puede decir nada [3.08-3.23]

I can't tell you anything about the School of Navy Mechanics(.), people say a thousand different things (.) that that people disappeared there, that there were killings there and the rest (.3) nobody can say anything about that

5. Hay muchas madres que tienen los hijos vivos (.7) y otras están desaparecidos (.) que no se sabe [4.44-5.56]

There are many mothers who have their children alive (.7) others' disappeared (.) no news about them

Example 4 shows Paco's positioning in relation to the School of Navy Mechanics (ESMA), the largest detention and torture center during the military regime. The discussion was triggered by the presentation of the following visual stimulus:



School of Navy Mechanics (ESMA). Between 1976 and 1983 more than 5,000 people were tortured and killed at the ESMA. © Lucas Bietti 2008.

In example 4, Paco distances himself from the public debate about the role of the ESMA during the period of dictatorship. The use of the negative form of a verb of possibility in the first person makes Paco as a voiceless agent. In terms of modality, the choice of the verb of possibility *poder* ‘to be able to’ could lead us to think that either he does not know what happened at the ESMA (dynamic modality) or that he knows but cannot say much about it (deontic modality). According to Palmer (2001), dynamic modality refers to cases in which the conditioning factors are internal (Paco does not know what happened at the ESMA), whereas deontic modality refers to cases in which the conditioning factors are external (Paco knows but cannot say much about it). This example helps us understand the way in which Paco strategically minimizes what he knows about the ESMA. The use of the modal verb, along with the low level of granularity of the events which occurred at the ESMA, plays an important role as a mechanism of knowledge-management in Paco’s discourse. The goal of both strategies of knowledge-management is to ignore the negative consequences of the actions committed by the military regime perpetrators. The strategic minimization of what he knows about the ESMA plays a key role in his attempt to create a positive self-

representation. Acknowledging that the ESMA was the largest detention and torture center during the dictatorship would completely undermine Paco's attempt to create a positive self-representation in his addressee. We know that he has defined the dictatorship by means of a war-model (including certain excesses). However, it would be pretty unlikely that he could justify the immoral acts committed by the military by means of a war-model if he acknowledged what happened at the ESMA. In doing so, he would have broken the social and legal norms that regulate and differentiate what is defined as a war, and what is defined as a mass-killing and/or genocide. Thus, Paco would have completely undermined his attempt to create a positive moral self-representation in his addressee.

Paco employs pronouns in the 3rd person, such as *se dice* 'people say', and existential verbs, as in *hubo* 'there were' to shift away the blame for the disappearances and mass killings away from the Armed Forces. There were no actors involved either in the disappearances (X makes Y disappear) or in the killings (X kills Y). Again, as we noticed, discourse strategies such as implicatures and a low level of granularity in the way of describing the events serve as discursive devices created for knowledge-management. Nonetheless, Paco has to pay an important price for not acknowledging what occurred in the ESMA because those events are today's shared knowledge about the dictatorship in Argentina. Interestingly, Paco decided to ignore the shared knowledge about the role that the ESMA played in the dictatorship so that he would not undermine his attempt to create a positive impression. This example shows how Paco continuously monitors his own behavior (example 4 happened less than one minute after defining the military dictatorship as a war in example 1) by means of partially updated situation and context models, presupposed by defining the dictatorship as a war, that enable him to keep track of what he says.

In example 5, the use of the existential verb in the present tense *hay* 'there are' rules out any kind of personal engagement in the belief. This highly controversial self-positioning (see chapter 2) cannot be expressed by means of an epistemic modalizer (Channell, 1994) such as *creo* 'I think', *me parece* 'it seems to me', etc. In other words, what Paco is saying is that the truth is p, not that he believes that p happened. Then, an adjective *muchas* 'many' along with a pronoun *otras* 'others' are employed to quantify the mothers of the missing people. The implicature triggered by the combination of both forms is that they refer to the large percentage of the mothers. What is more significant is that if some children are alive and others have disappeared, but we do not know about

their fates, there are no reported killings. This is the implicature triggered by the combination of the lexical items that suggest that there would be no crime to be responsible for. Hence, it acts as a justificatory strategy that backs up Paco's goals and intentions, namely, neglecting and rejecting the negative consequences of the immoral acts.

It is important to note the way in which Paco reformulated his position in relation to the fact that many of the children are alive. His 7 second pause may be a signal indicating (more) planned cognitive processes of discourse pre-construction, which in this case would have been motivated by the fact that nobody in his/her right mind would deny (including the more enthusiastic supporters of the military regime) the disappearances of people. These disappearances are an important part of the socially shared knowledge of the military regime in Argentina, which transcends and crosses any ideological standpoint. Thus, Paco strategically decided to reformulate what he said about the status of the people who disappeared, which enabled him to keep neglecting and rejecting the negative consequences of immoral acts, as well as to create a positive moral self-representation in his interlocutor. Finally, Paco endeavored to block inferential processes that may be triggered by the lexical item *desaparecidos* 'disappeared' by means of the topos of uncertainty *que no se sabe* 'no news about them' as a way to avoid the cueing of semantic associations that, after 30 years, logically link disappearances to mass-killings.

5.3.2.3 Neglecting and rejecting the personal responsibility

6. Lucas: ¿En el tiempo, cuál te parece que vendría primero, cuál te parece que vendría después?
 Paco: (.4) Yo he visto (.) leído en los diarios en la televisión que tiraban una bomba en una plaza para matar un policía y caía gente que no tenía nada que ver [7.15 – 7.34]

Lucas: In time, which one (images) do you think come first and which do you think come after?
Paco: (.4) I've seen (.) read in the newspapers, in the television, that they put a bomb in a park to kill a policeman, and people that had nothing to do with anything died

7. Lucas: ¿Por qué había mucho caos (.) por esto por lo otro?
 Paco: No no no en la época de los milicos (.4) yo me acuerdo que era chico, que iba al colegio (.) e: (.7) ya era grande (.4) ya me había recibido trabajaba ganaba bien [25.39-26.02]

Lucas: Why was there so much chaos because of this or that?
Paco: No no no, in the time of the military government (.4) I remember I was a kid, I was in school (.) uh (.) I was grown up (.4) I was graduated I was making good money

Example 6 shows a mediated construction of the self as a knower of what was occurring during the military dictatorship in Argentina. However, verbal forms in the first person referring to actions of perception and cognition (*ver* ‘to see’, *leer* ‘to read’, *acordarse* ‘to remember’, etc), along with the use of the first person pronoun in Spanish *yo* ‘I’, discursively realize discourse strategies of evidentiality. Due to the fact that the distinction between singular and plural grammatical subject are morphologically represented in verbal morphology in Spanish, the use of the pronominal form *yo* is not grammatically required. Speakers tend to omit its use unless expressively seeking to stress their agency. In Paco’s case, the use of *yo* is a mark of evidentiality, backing up his positioning in relation to the event which is introduced after a 4 second pause³⁰. Next, there is another short pause in which he changes the verb of perception and cognition from ‘to see’ to ‘to read’, indicating that he was far removed from the violent events. (see chapter 3, section 3.4.2.2).

The silences and reformulations may reflect cognitive processes of narrative pre-construction (see chapter 3, section 3.4.2.2) in which Paco accommodates his situation models of the events according to his context models of the communicative interaction and his attempt to create a positive self-representation in his interlocutor.

The attribution of violent actions to members of armed, political organizations reinforces the war-model introduced by means of discourse strategies [e.g. metaphors and implicatures] in the previous examples. Moreover, the mention of the collateral damage from the actions committed by armed, political organizations *caía gente que no tenía nada que ver* ‘people that had nothing to do with anything died’ presupposes that there was a third side unintentionally involved in the violent events. These are the arguments employed by the people who still believe that the theory of the two demons is accurate (see chapter 2, section 2.3.1). Although Paco reports that the acquisition of such knowledge was mediated by reliable sources, such as newspapers and television, we observe the use of verbs of perception and cognition. These verbal forms, along with the personal pronoun *yo*, have primordial epistemic functions because they operate as a second-order or meta-evidentiality strategy. Paco’s lexical choices (*yo* and verbal forms) act as meta-evidentiality markers by suggesting that what the media (as source of knowledge) was reporting was true. Interestingly, those reports strengthen and justify the epistemic veracity of Paco’s positioning in relation to the military dictatorship. One

³⁰ The audio recordings along with the contextual notes (see section 5.3) show that after *después* ‘after’ (Lucas), Paco took the floor.

of the goals of this double process of evidentiality is to neglect personal responsibility and involvement in the events. What he knew was mediated by the media, thereby he avoids the so called ‘I was there-effect’ (Pennebaker & Gonzales, 2009: 186), which is often found in communicative interactions about past experiences in relation to experiences epoch-defining events (Brown, Lee, Krslak, Conrad, Hansen, Havelka & Reddon, 2009). Furthermore, this version of the past is, at the same, warranted by his subjectivity and personal experience.

Example 6 comes from the presentation of the historical date 23.09.1973, which is when Juan Domingo Peron was elected president for the third time after 17 years in the exile. My intervention reminds Paco about such an important political event in Argentina’s history. This reminder depicts how even one-on-one interviews about past experiences are grounded in interactive processes of communication in which knowledge of the past is distributed between participants³¹. Next, by expressing the reasons why he forgot what had occurred on the dates we were talking about, Paco neglects responsibility for his involvement in the events. This justificatory discourse strategy carries out two important interactive processes. First, it provides arguments vis-à-vis the reasons why he did not remember what occurred on that historical date, thereby sustaining a positive self-representation. Secondly, by pointing out what his activities were *vivía de mi profesión* ‘I lived now (from my profession)’ and are *yo de la política no vivo*, ‘I don’t make a living from politics’, *no opero más a nadie* ‘I don’t operate anymore’, *vivo de mi jubilación y a la mierda* ‘I live on my retirement fund and fuck it’, Paco is neglecting responsibility for his involvement in the events, even as a passive bystander. His professional activities operate as a justificatory strategy which locates him outside the situation of violence and human rights abuses and helps him to create positive impression in the interaction. .

There may be an issue (which is beyond the scope of this chapter) in relation to way in which he introduces his professional activities, which is discursively reflected in false starts and reformulations indicating more controlled processes of narrative pre-construction. These features will appear again in extract 7 where we notice continuous false starts, contradictions and reformulations. As indicated, this behavior may be motivated by cognitive processes of narrative pre-construction, which seem to be slightly problematic. I argue that perhaps these false starts, contradictions and

³¹ The potentialities of these distributed cognitive processes synchronize the activities of collective remembering, which will be discussed in chapters 7 and 8).

reformulations were caused by conflicts in the way in which he tried to manage different types of knowledge of the past organized in mental models in order to distance himself from the events. Hence, Paco seems to have problems in strategically synchronizing (according to his intentions and goals) what he knows as part of cultural models of the experience of dictatorship, and what he remembers from his own personal experiences (e.g. his own biography or self history), which is organized in situation models. He strategically accommodates these interwoven layers of experience in accordance with some specific features of his context models, such as what inferences he is able to make about his interlocutors' deontic (intentions) and epistemic (knowledge) states³².

5.3.2.4 Neglecting or rejecting the victim

8. Uno como padre tiene que saber en qué en qué anda su hijo (.) dónde va y con y qué amistades tiene [2.15-2.23]

As a parent, one should know what your children are involved in, where they go and what friends they have

9. Hubo tiroteos y que estaban (.) morían gente de ambos lados y quedaban criaturas (.) y los vecinos decían “enfrente vive la abuela” y la abuela no lo quería aceptar al hijo (.) y ahora están con las las Abuelas de Plaza Mayo recuperando hijos y haciendo procesos a la gente después de 30 años (.3) lo que pasó [2.31-2.54]

There were shootings and there were, people from both sides who died and children were left alone, and the neighbors would say “the grandmother lives across the street” and the grandmother didn't want to take the child, and now they are trying to get the children back with the Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo and suing people 30 years after what happened

10. Tenía los papele en orden y a la mierda no me jodían (.) meterían en cana al que estaba en la joda (.) no sé [13.52-13.57]

I had my papers in order and fuck it (.) they couldn't fuck with me, maybe they could put those who were part of the mess in jail (.) I don't know

In 8 the use of lexical choices such as *uno* ‘one’ along with verbs in the 3rd person, are aimed to construct a moral order; parents who do not know X, Y, Z of their children are bad parents for not fulfilling the basic requirements of their role according to our cultural models of parenthood. These models of parenthood form part of socially shared knowledge, and are, therefore, presupposed. *Uno* ‘one’ and verbs in the 3rd person are employed to create a parent-prototype (all parents to be parents must know X, Y, Z) that the mothers of those who disappeared do not fit. This is the implicature triggered by

³² Due to the lack of video recordings, a thorough transcription, and more biographical information about Paco, these are partly speculations.

Paco's positioning, which is not only in accordance with his intentions and goals, that is, neglecting or rejecting the victim, but also goes a bit further by blaming the parents of those who disappeared for their tragic fate.

In example 9 Paco is again instantiating the war-model which he employed to describe the experience of dictatorship. These instantiations are discursively realized by lexical items such as *tirotes* 'shootings', which implies a double sided open fire and, therefore, active agents engaged in combat, and metaphorical conceptualization of the space (battlefield) in terms of *lados* 'sides'. Next, based on the parent-prototype constructed in example 8, he continues to blame the relatives of the missing people by describing them as individuals who did not follow the models of family and parenthood. Not accepting one's own grandchildren after shootings represents a clear violation of the moral standards that govern family life in Western societies. In contrast to what occurred when he assumed that his addressee shared the parent-prototype that he implied, Paco defined what the campaigns carried out of the Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo are about. In such a way, he strategically introduced new knowledge into the communicative interaction, thereby updated the common ground with his addressee. This strategic updating of common ground aimed at showing how contradictory today's campaigns are by demanding the return of the kidnapped grandchildren to their biological families. This is a clear strategy of other negative representations which, as we notice in the next example, matches up with Paco's goals. Blaming the relatives of the victims is a clear example of the fundamental attribution error (Jones & Harris, 1967; Heider, 1958; Ross) by which Paco places emphasis on negative personality traits of the relatives of the victims instead of referring to the external factors that influenced the alleged negative behavior of the relatives of the victims (e.g. the grandmothers might not have taken the babies back from the hands of the perpetrators because they knew that their entire families would have been detained and killed)

There are two striking features of example 9 which are a bit puzzling. First, the lack of marks of evidentiality, that is, how Paco came to know what occurred in those shootings. Secondly, the strategic use of the reported speech as reformulation *enfrente vive la abuela* 'the grandmother lives across the street', which is attributed to the neighbors. Besides the strategic use of the reformulation which is engineered in line with his goal, we cannot find any mark of evidentiality to clarify the source of such

memories³³. The lack of signs of evidentiality does not enable us to know what the source of this knowledge is. The explicit definition of such alleged negative behavior carried out of the grandmothers suggests that this is not socially shared knowledge like the parent-prototype. In other words, the events that Paco reported may form part of his situation models based on individual memories. However, making that explicit would have jeopardized his mechanisms of impression management because it would indicate that he had first-hand knowledge of what happened which would contradict what he claimed in examples 4 and 6, and so undermine his attempt to create a positive self-representation.

In the last example we can see how the main interactional goal of constructing a negative representation of the victims and their relatives was meant to highlight Paco's positive personality traits. The socially shared knowledge presupposed by *estaba en la joda* 'were part of the mess' is conceptually grounded in metaphorical relationships. These relationships connect a space introduced by the combination of the verb *estar* 'to be' and the preposition *en* 'in' with a punishable state of affairs provided by the context-sensitive meaning of lexical items such as *joda* 'mess'. The cognitive and discursive construction of this metaphor is driven by Paco's intentions and goals [blaming the victims], and it argumentatively sustains his positioning in relation to the military dictatorship. Finally, he uses another metaphor to let me know that he was detached from such *joda* 'mess'. He was not bothered because he had *los papeles en orden* 'my (his) papers in order', in contrast to those who were detained. Thus, he is carrying out three significant moves (Enfield, 2009; Goffman, 1981; Goodwin, 2000; Schegloff, 2007). Firstly, he is representing his moral self as in line with the moral standards of society, and thus provides arguments to strengthen his positive self-representations. Secondly, he is justifying the detentions. Thirdly, and most importantly, he is coherently backing up his interactional goal, which is neglecting or rejecting the victim.

5.4 Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to explore the cognitive and discursive mechanisms that guide strategies of knowledge-management related to the 1976-1983 dictatorship in Argentina. To do so, I used a theoretical and methodological approach to examine the

³³ A closer examination of the relationships between discourse strategies of evidentiality and autobiographical memories will be needed to better understand such phenomena.

processes of discursive remembering explained in chapter 3 as well as a theory on the social psychological mechanisms involved in the creation of an acceptable moral self and in the engineering of strategies for impression management. This chapter has shown how my interviewee defined the experience of dictatorship by means of the war-model. This way of categorizing the military has become obsolete in institutional settings ever since the Néstor Kirchner's government was established in 2003 (see chapters 2 and 4). More evidence is undoubtedly needed to argue to what extent the new official mode of conceptualizing the military dictatorship as genocide is being resisted by 'ordinary' people in their communicative interactions in private settings.

The analysis of the construction of the moral self in Paco's self-representation throughout the interview indicates that he attempted to sustain the impression of upholding moral standards by partly constructing negative representation of the victims and relatives of the victims of the dictatorship. His mode of categorizing parenthood is a striking example employed to that end. Paco's discursive realizations by means of discourse strategies, the goal of which was to sustain mechanisms of moral disengagement, indicate the strong influence exerted from the interpenetration of cultural and situation models for the military regime, and how this socially shared knowledge and personal memories were strategically managed according to the context models of the communicative interaction. These mediated multilayered connections are reflected in both quantitative and qualitative terms. In quantitative terms, although the distribution of interactional turns between me and Paco is in accordance with the pattern found in the interviews with the rest of the participants of this larger project, he provides significantly less autobiographical narratives in relation to the period of dictatorship than do the other participants within his generational cohort.

Due to the force of the principle of cooperation in human communication (Grice 1975; Levinson, 2006b), which obliges Paco to include autobiographical events in response to questions focused on his personal experiences of the period of dictatorship, in qualitative terms we noticed a certain lack of marks of evidentiality which were common in the autobiographical memories shared by the other participants in this study (see chapter 6, 7, and 8). However, by distancing himself from the events through the strategies of knowledge-management in examples 4 and 6, Paco tried to create a self-representation as someone who lacks first-hand knowledge about the events that were being discussed. Therefore, claiming that the memories communicated in example 9 were part of his individual experience organized in a situation model -which would

mean that he may have seen or heard of the shootings that he was referring to- would have undermined the positive impression that he was trying to create on his addressee. This finding matches the insecurities and inconsistencies reflected in the false starts and reformulations that occurred in response to being asked to provide autobiographical memories in the other examples. Further evidence and more sophisticated interaction analyses will be needed to better disentangle the complex coordination and synchronization of the mediated multilayer connections presented above.

6. ANALYZING EPISODES IN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVES: LINKING THE SELF, CONTEXT AND HISTORY³⁴

6.1 Introduction

The general aim of this chapter is to examine the complex connection between processes of autobiographical remembering in relation to the 1976-1983 military dictatorship and the narratives constructed and communicated in such practices. In the narratives that follow, in contrast to what we observed in the previous chapter, we notice how the way in which my subject constructs a narrative self fosters a sense of living in history. This results from connecting and synchronizing his autobiographical experiences with larger social milieu, thereby making them much more meaningful.

This chapter explores narrative episodes that illustrate the experience of a political dissident and member of a political organization persecuted by the perpetrators of the military junta during the ‘Dirty War’. The autobiographical narratives analyzed in this chapter form part of the life story of a ‘survivor’ of the military regime -one of the persons who was trying to carry out the political project that the new official discourse about the past come to remember and commemorate since 2003. I examine the ways in which the self is constructed and represented in a life story (see chapter 3, section 3.4.1) shared in a focus group session with members of the same age group (participants who were born between 1945 and 1955). The focus group was held in March 2008 in Buenos Aires³⁵.

The discourse analysis in this chapter is guided by some transitivity analysis (Halliday, 1967, 1985, 1994; Simpson, 1993). Transitivity analysis deals with the ways in which meaning is represented in discourse. According to Halliday (1967), transitivity ‘is the set of options relating to cognitive content and the linguistic representation of extralinguistic experience (p.199). Transitivity analysis will help me to describe how my interviewee linguistically constructs his autobiographical episodes in terms of

³⁴ This paper is currently in preparation for submission. A shorter version of this paper titled “Autobiographical memory, narrative and history: the construction of the self within the experience of dictatorship in Argentina” was presented at the *XVI Oral History Conference. Between Past and Future: Oral History, Memory and Meaning*. Prague, July 2010.

³⁵ In order to protect the identity of the participants, they were asked to choose pseudonyms by which they would identify themselves throughout the entire session.

actions (e.g. verbal choices). The actions described in the autobiographical episodes will be divided into material processes (verbs of doing, e.g. to take out); mental processes (verbs of ‘sensing’, e.g. to remember), verbal processes (verbs of saying, e.g. to tell), and relational processes (verbs of being, e.g. to be)³⁶.

The analysis that follows shows how one of the participants of the focus group, who was born in 1947, positions himself in the present as an individual who has first-hand knowledge of what occurred during the military regime in Argentina. The participant is a psychologist and psychoanalyst living in Buenos Aires. His life story, in view of the dictatorship, is divided into three different autobiographical narratives that are associated with three different time-frames in the course of his life: i) going into exile; ii) life in exile; and iii) consequences in democratic times.

The purpose of this chapter is to show why the cognitive pragmatics of the processes of memory-making that were explained in chapter 3 is an appropriate framework for analyzing practices of autobiographical remembering in narratives. Cognitive pragmatics of remembering enables us to explore how the self embedded in the experience of dictatorship in Argentina, is discursively constructed by means of discourse strategies in relation to situation models (see chapter 3, section 3.5). Situation models are the semantic basis for the autobiographical narratives that the participant of the focus group reconstructed and communicated. It is important to point out that the episodes that form part of the autobiographical narratives cannot be considered to be as transparent mappings of situation models of past experiences. Thus, the order of the episodes in an autobiographical narrative may be independent of the order of the events as constructed and represented in situation models. By ‘episodes’ I mean coherent stretches of discourse about the same topic (Ji, 2002; van Dijk, 1981) that are formed by coherent sequences of events described in topics and actions in which the self plays a central role. Finally, the autobiographical narratives based on situation models of past experiences from the period of dictatorship are constructed according to the characteristics of the ongoing communicative interaction represented in the context models.

The autobiographical episodes that I analyze in this study are divided according to Labov’s model of narrative structure (see chapter 3, section 3.3.2.2). This method will

³⁶ I use the term ‘verb’ to refer to ‘process’ in the transitivity analysis in order to avoid confusion between different uses of the term ‘process’ in this thesis (e.g. cognitive process, interactive process, process of remembering, etc).

enable us to examine in closer detail the ways in which the interviewee gradually and coherently managed and synchronized, in a strategic fashion, the communication of autobiographical memories. Before analyzing each episode of the autobiographical narratives I briefly present a general description of the context model (see chapter 3, section 3.5.5.1) of the focus group formed by participants aged between 50 and 60 years. We must bear in mind that the representations of the communicative interaction may update and re-shape throughout a communicative situation depending on whether there are changes in deontic (intentions) and epistemic (knowledge) states. The description of the context models preceding the semantic analysis will focus on the contextual categories that update throughout the interaction (e.g. current action, knowledge, intentions and goals). Thus, categories such as setting [March 16th, 2008; office in downtown Buenos Aires; participants sat around a desk on which the audio recorder was placed], identities and relationships [Guillermo (1947), Liliana (1952), Carlos (1950), Lucas (1980), strangers] are not described in the context models because they remain constant during the communicative interaction.

6.2 Going into exile

In what follows we will note how Guillermo describes a normal day during the military dictatorship before going into exile. In the course of Guillermo's life story we see that he was a subject directly involved in the historical processes which occurred in the late 70's in Argentina. The autobiographical narrative below was triggered by the question: What was a normal day like during the dictatorship [15.23]?

Episode 1 [16.28-17.23]

1. **Guillermo:** Lo que pasa es los días siempre estaban teñidos de mucho temor, de mucha
2. ansiedad por lo que podía llegar a pasar y por otro sí la sensación que yo tengo del
3. tiempo que era un tiempo muy corto como que uno podía pensar “que puedo hacer
4. hasta pasado mañana” porque no sabía si no iban a levantar porque había otro
5. problema porque a veces caían, caía una agenda en manos de la represión y toda la
6. gente que había en la agenda la levantaban, entonces uno nunca sabía en qué agenda
7. podía estar anotado, entonces bueno esa sensación de no saber en qué momento podían
8. a uno levantarlo era, era terrible, entonces lo que uno hacía era algo para hoy y mañana
9. no sé lo que podía pasar, como en la guerra no sé si vamos a vivir o estar presos,
10. desaparecidos

1. **Guillermo:** *What happens is that the days were always filled with fear, with a lot of*
2. *anxiety for what could end up happening, and on the other hand for the perception that*
3. *I have of the time that was of a very short time, as one that could think 'what I can*
4. *make till the day after tomorrow' because I didn't know if they were going to take one,*
5. *because there was another problem because sometimes, for example an address book*
6. *fell into the hands of the repression and everyone listed in the address book was*
7. *arrested, then one could ever know in what address book your name could be written,*
8. *then well that sensation of not knowing in what moment one could be taken, was*
9. *terrible, then what one did or could do was in the short term as we could not know*
10. *what could happen tomorrow, as in the war I don't know if we are going to live or be*
11. *prisoners missing*

Context models

Current action: introducing his emotional state before going into the exile; presenting actors, perceptions and actions, remembering mental states (thoughts and feelings)

Intentions and goals: frame the autobiographical episode; create expectations in his addressees; justify his emotional state before going into the exile; create a positive representation of the people who were the target of the repression;

Knowledge: human rights violations; notion of time in extreme situations; an incriminatory address book; conditions of warfare

In lines 1-2, by means of the lexical items *temor*, *ansiedad* 'fear', 'anxiety', Guillermo appraises his personal situation while living in Buenos Aires and prior to going into exile. Thus, he introduces his memories of his emotional state during those days. The appraisal of his situation is mainly determined by the likelihood of being detained, tortured or even killed. These are the events presupposed by *lo que podía llegar a pasar* 'what could end up happening'. The abstract acts to frame the unfolding autobiographical narrative by inserting the driving element of Guillermo's story about the time before he left Argentina. This functions to create expectations in the other members of the focus group.

Between lines 2 and 4 Guillermo introduces the actors, perceptions and actions of the autobiographical narrative. The actors are himself and those who are responsible for the action of *levantar* 'to take' (L. 4). What is important to point out is the communication of his perceptual experience in relation to how far back in time he was able to project himself. The impossibility of mapping himself onto the mid-term is closely associated with the situation presented in the abstract. In the likelihood of *ser levantado* 'to be taken', Guillermo summarizes the reasons justifying the abstract and the orientation of

this episode. This is the goal of the implicature discursively instantiated by *ser levantado* ‘to be taken’.

Table 1. Episode 1: Situation models

Narrative structure		Situation models				
Line	Section	Topics	Setting	Participants	Actions	Discourse strategies
1-2	Abstract [16.28-16.38]	fear for the consequences of being detained	Buenos Aires before leaving	Guillermo	to be detained, caught, and killed [implied]	Implicature
2-4	Orientation [16.39-16.50]	sensation of time while living under threat	Buenos Aires before leaving	Guillermo the military [implied]	to think to feel to be taken	Implicature Justification Granularity
4-6	Complicating action [16.50-17.04]	ignoring when he could be caught	Buenos Aires Before leaving	Guillermo The military [implied] all the people	to be taken to get an address book	Implicature Justification Metaphors Granularity
7-8	Evaluation [17.04-17.12]		Buenos Aires Before leaving		to be taken	Implicature
8-9	Resolution and Coda [17.12-17.23]	sensation of time while living under threat	Buenos Aires before leaving	Guillermo we	to do something for today	Granularity Implicature Justification

The specific meaning of the event *ser levantado* ‘to be taken’ can only be reconstructed and assigned by people who went through the experience of the dictatorship (e.g. members of the same generation) or who have an important stock of socially shared knowledge about the vocabulary utilized to refer to the situation in which someone was detained by the perpetrators. Thus, the meaning of the implicature triggered by *ser levantado* ‘to be taken’ can be based on cultural and situation models. Furthermore, only if the participants in the interaction are able to correctly reconstruct and assign the meaning of that action, will they be able to understand the exceptionality of the events, as we observe, that meaning functions to warrant the entire autobiographical episode.

An actor *ellos*³⁷ (contained in the verb morphology) ‘they’ is responsible for a material process (Halliday, 1985) *levantar* ‘to take’ which could have a clear impact on Guillermo and anyone in his position, changing their psychological and physical states. The impact of *ellos* ‘they’ on the material verb is presupposed and, thereby, sustained by Guillermo’s mental models (Guillermo’s representations of the other participant’s knowledge about the same topic). Fear and uncertainty play a crucial role in determining the exceptionality of a normal day in Guillermo’s autobiographical episode. Moreover, the transition from the first person to the impersonal form *uno* ‘one’ is another discourse strategy for managing the level of detail in his description. This low level of granularity is used to generalize his feelings. That is, everyone who was in Guillermo’s position during those times felt the same concern about the way of perceiving time.

The first person (Guillermo) and the impersonal form *uno* ‘one’ are represented as subjects involved in mental processes (Halliday, 1985), e.g., *uno podía pensar* (L.3) ‘one that could think’, *porque no sabía* (L. 3) ‘one didn’t know’. In other cases the mental experience (e.g. *sentir/percibir* ‘to feel/to perceive’) appears nominalized as in *la sensación que yo tengo del tiempo* (L. 2) ‘the perception that I have of the time. Thus, in these verbal selections and nominalizations we observe the description of an inner experience regarding an awareness of his various states of being and reaction to his outer experience. Firstly, in the first example (L.2-3), verbal tense refers to a present evaluation of the past sensation of perceiving time, which is in accordance with the description introduced in the abstract. Secondly, by bringing into the communicative interaction his thoughts regarding his way of perceiving time, Guillermo is not only telling the group what was occurring in the world, but also sharing what he was thinking and feeling during those critical days.

From lines 4 to 6 Guillermo provides what were the usual reasons for being detained. The main events of the complicating action determine what this section of the episode is mainly about. The actors involved in the events are: *toda la gente* ‘everyone’, *uno* ‘one’, *ellos* (implicit) ‘they’ and *la represión* ‘the repression’. In Guillermo’s narrative the nominalization *la represión* ‘the repression’ he creates is metaphorically embodied by *en manos de* ‘in hands of’. Hence, the metaphor keeps a marked animated trait (‘in hands of the repression’ as in hands of the perpetrators), even being a

³⁷ In contrast to English, in Spanish the explicit subject is not required grammatically because the agency is marked in verbal morphology.

nominalization aimed at mitigating agency. Then, the new actors are inserted into the autobiographical episode; these new actors are the people whose names were in the diaries found by the perpetrators. In Guillermo's account these people automatically constitute the target of the repression. What is more significant is that the mere fact of having one's name written down in those diaries is presented as the cause of a potential detention and disappearance.

In the abstract and orientation we noted how the first person became the impersonal form *uno* 'one'. In the complicating action this *uno* 'one' forms part of an undefined participant *toda la gente* 'everyone'. Guillermo, after impersonalizing himself by means of an impersonal form, makes an indistinguishable actor a member who is in serious danger by the mere fact of having his name written down in the wrong address book. So far, neither Guillermo, *uno* 'one', nor *toda la gente* 'everyone' perform any action that could undermine the positive representation that Guillermo is creating. This triggers implicatures that cancel any sort of causal relationship between the military repression and the actions committed by Guillermo, *uno* 'one' or *toda la gente* 'everyone' whose lives were jeopardized. These inferential processes, which were focused on the passivization of the victims, are reinforced by discourse strategies of granularity that operate by remaining quite vague the level of the actors' description. Moreover, in Guillermo's narrative the incriminatory object is a diary that does not meet cultural expectations (e.g. weapons, falsified documentation, etc.) organized in cultural models. Thus, he created a positive representation of the potential victims on the one hand, and a negative representation of the perpetrators on the other. Interestingly, as has already been noted in the abstract, he was one of such potential victims. Taking into consideration that an important number of the potential victims were left-wing political activists and members of guerrilla organizations, the vagueness in their description aims at avoiding the formation of negative attitudes towards them. In this way, the low level of granularity exploits taken-for-granted knowledge which, if it had been made explicit, would have been controversial in the communicative interaction (e.g. members of guerrilla organizations assassinated and kidnapped government officials and foreign company executives). A higher level of granularity in the description of the potential victims may facilitate the reconstruction of cultural and situation models about the crucial role of principle actors that armed, political organizations played in periods of political violence in Argentina. Thus, a higher level of granularity may have created the right conditions for the construction of negative representations of some of the victims.

As we will observe in episode 3 and 4, the creation of negative representations of the victims who were part of political organizations could directly undermine Guillermo's positive self-representation in the communicative interaction.

In the evaluation section, the actors *uno* 'one' and *ellos* (implicit) 'they' and events [to be taken] are the same as in the previous sections. Subsequently, Guillermo negatively evaluates the state of uncertainty that he had to go through. This appraisal is discursively realized by the lexical item *terrible* 'terrible' and justified by the description of the action [to be taken] presented in the complicating action. Guillermo's appraisal operates at two levels: at the narrative level it contributes by making a more cohesive story because it thematically takes up again the topic of the abstract, namely, 'time was short'; and at the interactional level it justifies Guillermo taking the floor by making the story fulfill the basic principle of reportability. As indicated lines 7-8 connect the evaluation with the previous sections of the narrative by presenting a re-elaboration of the orientation, which is causally grounded in the evaluation. It is important to note that in the storyworld the actor remains quite vague in the impersonal form *uno* 'one'. Hence, Guillermo's autobiographical experience may still be a shared one.

The coda of Guillermo's narrative is based on a comparison between his experience and the war, which is a topic that falls outside the story frame. The comparison proposed triggers implicatures structured by socially-shared knowledge (conditions of warfare). Thus, none of them would question the exceptionality of a normal day within that critical social situation. The transition in the tense may be functioning to project the negative consequences of the events [to be taken] into the present, because of the fact that today he would be another missing person. Due to this transition, along with the change in actors from *uno* 'one' to *nosotros* (implicit) 'we', Guillermo's concluding statement seems to reflect his self-positioning in the present in relation to his autobiographical memories. These changes in the way he refers to the target of the repression reflect a growing level of granularity which aims at the increasing subjectivization (e.g. self-relatedness) of the autobiographical episodes that Guillermo is sharing.

6.3 The days before leaving Buenos Aires

In the following narrative Guillermo creates a story-world by which he describes to what extent his life and the lives of his loved ones were under threat. It is important to note that this autobiographical narrative appears 7.53 minutes after the autobiographical narrative analyzed previously. This narrative recursivity sheds some light on the complexity involved in sharing a life story, synchronically fragmented at first glance, in ordinary situated interactions. Interactionally, the next autobiographical story is the response to the question: How was it when you were overseas?

Episode 2 [25.08-25.50]

1. **Guillermo:** Sí bueno, yo estuve tres meses deambulando por las calles durmiendo en
2. distintos lugares donde podía con un bolsito con ropa hasta que me pude ir, hasta que
3. conseguí la documentación para irme porque yo estaba buscado por, por una de las
4. fuerzas, tanto es así que a la semana de que yo me voy, allanan la casa de mi mamá, la
5. encierran en el baño, revisan todo, la dejan encerrada y se van pero bueno (.) suerte
6. que los vecinos escucharon los gritos de ella y la pudieron liberar y bueno (.)
7. obviamente le preguntaban por mí “¿dónde estaba? Blablaba” y ella dijo que yo me
8. había ido hace mucho tiempo del país así que la dejaron tranquila

1. *Guillermo: Yes well, I was for three months wandering the streets sleeping in different*
2. *places where I could with a bag with clothes until I could leave, until I got the*
3. *documentation to leave because I was looking for, for one of the forces so much so that*
4. *in the week that I left, they raided my mum's house they locked her in the bathroom they*
5. *went through everything, they left her locked in and left and well (.) luckily the*
6. *neighbors heard her screams and could they got her out and well (.) obviously they*
7. *asked they asked her “where I was? Bla-bla-bla” and she said that I had left the*
8. *country a long time ago, so they left her alone*

Context models

Current action: introducing a specific autobiographical event; showing how close the danger was; describing what the perpetrators did when they raided Guillermo's mother's house;

Intentions and goals: justify Guillermo's appraisals and behavior; negative representation of the perpetrators

Knowledge: attributions of the Armed Forces; cultural models of perpetrators, motherhood and neighbors

The change in the way he refers to actors whose life course was jeopardized from *uno* 'one', *toda la gente* 'everyone', etc to a sustained first person that unfolds throughout the narrative functions as a clear mechanism to introduce Guillermo's subjectivity into the story-world. Moreover, there is a modification in the way of

representing the actors who embodied the threat: *ellos* (implicit) ‘they’ and *la represión* ‘the repression’ become *una de las fuerzas* ‘one of the forces’. The material conditions by which Guillermo was attempting to avoid being detained, that is *con un bolsito con ropa* ‘with a bag with clothes’ (L.2) should be pointed out. This description suggests the implicature that he was lacking support from social or political organizations. By representing himself as an ordinary man, Guillermo is suggesting that the causes for him being chased were minor.

The subjectivization of Guillermo’s autobiographical episode is largely grounded in the increasing level of granularity in how he describes the actors and events. As we noted, the increasing level of description relies on lexical choices which interactionally function to support the narrative’s reportability within the focus group. The kind of actions carried out by each actor (*yo* ‘I’ and *una de las fuerzas* ‘one of the forces’) in the events described in the abstract present some important distinctions: *yo* ‘I’ is responsible for performing actions determined by behavioral verbs (Halliday, 1985) *deambulando* ‘wandering’ and *durmiendo* ‘sleeping’, material verbs *irse* ‘to leave’ and *conseguí* ‘got’ and modal forms *pude* ‘could’, which do not result in affecting or transforming the state of the other actor described in the storyworld; in contrast to the material verb *buscar* ‘looking for’ carried out by *una de las fuerzas* ‘one of the forces’, the accomplishment of which would affect the continuity of Guillermo’s self throughout his life.

This unwanted consequence is presupposed in Guillermo’s description and forms part of socially shared knowledge organized in cultural models. The subjectivization of the autobiographical narrative, along with how Guillermo describes the events by means of discourse strategies (e.g. granularity and implicatures), functions by legitimizing Guillermo’s emotional state presented in the extract analyzed above and, thereby, sustains a positive self-representation because there are apparently no reasons to be chased and, in terms of the communicative interaction, by supporting reportability requirements.

The short period of time which elapsed between Guillermo’s going into exile and the raid of his mother’s house provides more grounds to persuade the other participants of the group about the proximity of the danger. Such proximity operates as a justificatory strategy backing up both Guillermo’s appraisals and the actions introduced in episode 1 and the abstract of episode 2. It also functions as an index of evidentiality by indicating that the motives for Guillermo’s appraisals and behavior have a source in his own experience. The action attributed to *ellos* (implicit) ‘they’ is a material verb

allanaron ‘raided’, which in Spanish is generally employed to describe a sudden forcible entry into a place by police. Therefore *allanar* ‘to raid’ is an action that can only be carried out by an actor endowed with authority, strength and legality within a certain social environment. This action allows us to be better aware of what the attributions of an actor were vis-à-vis the social norms of that historical period.

Table 2. Episode 2: Situation models

Narrative structure		Situation models				
Line	Section	Topics	Setting	Participants	Actions	Discourse strategies
1-4	Abstract [25.08-25.23]	the military were looking for him being on the Run	Buenos Aires before leaving	Guillermo one of the forces	to wander the street to sleep in different places to leave to get the documentation to look for	Granularity Implicature
4	Orientation [25.24-25.28]		his (Guillermo) mother's house Buenos Aires Before leaving	one of the forces	to raid his (Guillermo) mother's house	Justification Implicature Evidentiality
4-8	Complicating action and resolution	raid at his (Guillermo) mother's house what the perpetrators did to her	his (Guillermo) mother's house Buenos Aires before leaving	One of the forces Guillermo's mother the neighbors	to lock her to go throw everything to leave her locked to leave to hear her screams to get her out to question her to reply to leave her alone	Granularity Evidentiality Implicature

We observe that if lexical chains are created by associating actors and actions we are likely to find that all the verbs attributed to *ellos* (implicit) ‘they’ are negative actions focused on getting information by almost any means (e.g. by reducing

Guillermo's mother freedom). Material actions *encierran* 'locked', *revisan* 'went through', *la dejan encerrada* 'left her locked', *se van* 'left' and *la dejaron tranquila* 'left her alone' and verbal actions *preguntaban* 'asked' result in affecting either Guillermo's mother or her property. In contrast, the verbs attributed to Guillermo's mother and neighbors are positive actions (covering up her son and helping). There are two actions attributed to Guillermo's mother: they are presented by means of a nominalization of a behavioral verb *los gritos de ella* 'her screams' and the other by a verb of saying *dijo* 'said'. Then the neighbors' intervention is narratively manifested by another material verb *podieron liberar* 'got her out', which results in the liberation of Guillermo's mother and represents the resolution of the story. We note how, in the way in which Guillermo narrates the events, the high level of detail of granularity of the descriptions serve to support his intentions and goals.

Now the question is: does Guillermo's story have an evaluation and coda? I claim that it does have both components, but, in contrast to the previous narratives examined they are implicit or presupposed. Firstly, the evaluation can be inferred by the events that form part of the complicating action. Secondly, the coda of the narrative can be suggested counterfactually: if Guillermo had not gone into exile, he would have been detained, which probably means being another *desaparecido*. However, so far, we do not know the reasons why he was chased by one of the Armed Forces.

6.4 The exile and its positive consequences

The self-narrative that follows is composed of two autobiographical episodes: firstly, the activities in which Guillermo was involved during the time he was in the exile, in Colombia; secondly, the positive outcomes of his activities during his time away from Argentina. This story is narrated immediately after the second episode. For the purpose of this analysis, the autobiographical narrative was thematically divided into each of the episodes mentioned above.

Episodes 3 and 4 [25.52-28.38]

1. **Guillermo:** Desde el exterior este yo fui a Colombia, y yo recibí mucha solidaridad de
2. todos los grupos profesionales donde me vinculé, también de la universidad, de los
3. grupos universitarios, y también este me invitaron a dar charlas sobre la situación en la
4. Argentina, en la universidad, di varias charlas, a raíz de eso el cónsul me llamó. y me
5. dijo que no estaba haciendo lo correcto el cónsul argentino, y me dijo que no debería
6. estar haciendo esas cosas porque no me convenía hacer esas cosas yo le dije que yo sabía
7. lo que hacía, este (.2) que no me interesaba (.2)

1. **Guillermo:** *From overseas (.2) I went to Colombia, and I received a lot of solidarity*
2. *from all the professional groups where I linked myself, also from the university, from*
3. *the university groups and also they invited me to give talks on the situation in*
4. *Argentina, in the university, I gave several talks soon after that the consul called*
5. *me and told me, that I was not doing the right thing the Argentinean consul and he told*
6. *me that I should not be doing those things, because it wasn't right for me to do such*
7. *things I told him that I knew what I was doing, that that I was not interested (.2)*

[End of episode 3]

8. **Guillermo:** Este (.2) también en el exterior había mucha solidaridad (.3) porque se
9. formaron grupos en el exterior (.) yo estaba vinculado con un grupo en México que ellos
10. se dedicaban a falsificar pasaportes y nosotros financiábamos conseguíamos el dinero
11. para sacar gente del país, entonces mucha gente se iba por Uruguay se les pasaba la
12. documentación para poder salir porque con la documentación salías y se la vuelven a
13. (no se entiende) en la frontera y el dinero para comprar los pasajes para poder comprar lo
14. que sea para poder salir del país

8. **Guillermo:** *That (.2) also overseas there was a lot of solidarity (.3) because they formed*
9. *groups overseas (.) I was linked with a group in Mexico, that they were working making*
10. *fake passports, and we financed them we got the money to take people out of the*
12. *country, thus a lot of people went to Uruguay they were given the documentation to*
13. *leave because with the documentation you could leave and they once again*
13. *(inaudible) in the border and the money to buy the tickets to be able to buy whatsoever*
14. *was needed to leave the country.*

[End of episode transition]

15. **Guillermo:** Yo estaba en una organización que nos dedicábamos a sacar gente del país
16. (.) inclusive un cosa muy curiosa hace 3 años yo estaba en la casa de un amigo yo soy
17. muy amigo de Jorge Guinzburg (presentador de TV) entonces yo estaba en la casa de
18. él, entonces una amiga de la esposa de él, que es periodista estaba saliendo con el juez
19. Bernasconi estamos hablando del año noventa y pico
20. **Carlos:** Lo ubico (.) lo ubico todo
21. **Guillermo:** Y (.2) estaba la hermana del juez Bernasconi, y entonces me llaman a parte
22. y el juez Bernasconi me dice “bueno, te tengo que agradecer”, la hermana me reconoce
23. a mi le dice al hermano quien era yo “te tengo que agradecer porque yo soy una de las
24. personas que vos sacaste del país, o que vos ayudaste a sacar del país durante la época
25. de la dictadura” ¿No es cierto? Porque la hermana que yo, que era militante de la misma
26. agrupación que yo me había pedido que ayudemos al hermano porque estaba en una
27. situación desesperante entonces le habíamos mandado la documentación y el dinero
28. para que pueda salir del país entonces el famoso juez Bernasconi fue uno de los que
29. salió del país siempre era anónima porque nunca sabíamos quién era, pero en este caso
30. dio la casualidad que la persona, que conocíamos a quien estábamos ayudando

15. **Guillermo:** *I was in an organization, we dedicated ourselves to helping people get out*
16. *of the country (.) I'll tell you something curious that happened 3 years ago, while I was*
17. *at a friend's house, I am good friend of Jorge Guinzburg (TV entertainer) therefore I*
18. *was in his house then a friend of his wife, who is a journalist, was going out with the*
19. *judge Bernasconi we are talking of the year ninety and something*
20. **Carlos:** *I get it (.) I get everything*
21. **Guillermo:** *And (.2) where was the sister of judge Bernasconi, and then they call me to*
22. *aside, and the judge Bernasconi told me 'well, I have to thank you', the sister recognizes*
23. *me and tells her brother who I was 'I have to thank you because I am one of the people*

24. *that you took out of the country or that you helped get out of the country during the time*
25. *of the dictatorship, isn't it?' Because the sister that I, that was a militant of the same*
26. *grouping had requested me to help her brother because he was in an exasperate*
27. *situation, thus we had sent him the documentation and the money so that he could leave*
28. *the country so the famous judge Bernasconi was one of those that left the country it was*
29. *always anonymous because we did not know, who we were helping but in this case it*
30. *gave the chance that we did know who we were helping*

Context models

Current action: describing Guillermo's experience and political activities in exile; describing the positive outcome of Guillermo's political activities in exile; summarizing the previous episode; introducing a specific autobiographical episode; agreeing (Carlos); linking Guillermo's life story with well-known characters

Intentions and goals: create a positive representation of the groups he had ties in exile; create a positive self-representation; frame the autobiographical episode about judge Bernasconi

Knowledge: Guillermo's profession; significance of Guillermo's activities; authority of the Argentinean consul in Colombia; situation during the military regime; identities of Jorge Guinzburg and judge Bernasconi; bonds of solidarity between in-group members;

In lines 1-3 Guillermo inserts a new autobiographical episode, but one from his exile in Colombia. The actors within the abstract of the story which is about to begin are *yo* 'I', *los grupos profesionales* 'the professional groups', and *grupos universitarios* 'the university groups'. The actions determining the events are realized by material verbs *fui* 'went', *me vinculé* 'linked myself' and *recibí* 'received' in which Guillermo plays the roles of agent and patient. By means of lexical selections, *profesionales* 'professional' and *universitarios* 'university', Guillermo adds new knowledge (his activities during his exile) in terms of old (his profession as psychologist and psychoanalyst³⁸) and positively defines the nature of the groups.

Between lines 3-4 Guillermo describes what kind of professional activity he did in Colombia. Guillermo's only action is realized in a nominalization of a behavioral verb (Halliday, 1985) *di varias charlas* 'gave several talks' in a highly institutional setting *en la universidad* 'in the university'. The setting in which the actions (e.g. to give talks) unfolds are crucial for understanding not only Guillermo's political positioning in the past, but also how he is seeking to be known by the other participants in the interaction

³⁸ Guillermo, as well as the other participants of the focus groups, revealed their profession before the session commenced.

in the present. This positive self-representation is given by two main arguments which are presupposed in the communicative interaction.

Table 3. Episode 3: Situation models

Narrative structure		Situation models				
Line	Section	Topics	Setting	Participants	Actions	Discourse strategies
1-3	Abstract [25.52-26.06]	positive reception in Colombia	Colombia university in the exile	Guillermo professional and university groups	to travel to Colombia to receive solidarity to link to professional and university groups to receive invitations to give talks to give talks	Definition
3-4	Orientation [26.06-26.17]	political activities call from the Argentinean consul	Colombia in the exile	Guillermo Argentinean consul	to receive invitations to give talks to give talks to receive a call from the Argentinean consul	Implicature
5-7	Complicating action evaluation and Resolution [26.17-26.32]	warning from the Argentinean consul Guillermo's attitude	Colombia in the exile	Guillermo Argentinean consul	to warn to reply	Implicature Granularity Reformulation

Firstly, few people are invited to give talks in universities; and secondly and more important in the moral order, Guillermo's talks were about the overwhelming situation in Argentina under the rule of the military junta (e.g. human rights abuses, kidnappings, etc.). Next, a new actor appears in Guillermo's story. The Argentinean consul in Colombia carried out an action which was motivated by Guillermo's political activity described above. In Guillermo's account the consul's action was realized by a verb of saying *me llamó* 'called me' which functions by introducing the complicating action of

Guillermo's autobiographical episode and reinforces the presupposed importance of Guillermo's activities.

In the events described in the complicating action, the Argentinean consul performs a verb of saying *me dijo* 'told me', which it is employed to introduce a performative speech act (Searle, 1979). In other words, what Guillermo is telling us is that the Argentinean consulate, by calling him and saying what he said, he may have been warning him. The Argentinean consul, being a high ranking functionary of the military dictatorship abroad, is endowed with the authority to give such a warning. This forms part of a stock of cultural knowledge that Guillermo assumed was shared in the communicative interaction.

What can be inferred from the opposition between the right thing and *esas cosas* 'those things' (L.6) is that to give talks about the situation in Argentina during the military dictatorship (e.g. human rights abuses, kidnappings, etc.) is a bad thing, according to the Argentinean consul. This places the Argentinean consul on the opposite side of the moral spectrum. The implicature to negatively represent the Argentinean consul suggests, by his active opposition to it (Guillermo does things that a representative of the military dictatorship abroad does not like him to do), a clear strategy of positive self-representation within the communicative interaction. The construction of Guillermo's positive self-representation is later reinforced in the evaluation section. The reported self-experience is inserted by means of a verbal process *le dijo* 'told him' which introduces Guillermo's conscious awareness of what he was doing. The implicature triggered by the use of a verb of cognition (Halliday, 1985) *sabía* 'knew' suggests that he was fully aware of the potential negative consequences of his political activities during his exile. That is, the Argentinean consul's warning, previously characterized as a performative speech act, did not fulfill its main goal, which was to make Guillermo stop carrying out his political activities. This is the resolution of the autobiographical episode that he is narrating. Finally, the high level of granularity in which the actions are described along with the strategic reformulation of the telephone conversation between the Argentinean consul and Guillermo, are two discourse strategies that Guillermo uses to achieve his goals.

Table 6. Episode transition: Situation models

Line	Topics	Setting	Participants	Actions	Discourse strategies
8-14	pro-social behavior of the solidarity groups outside Argentina	overseas (outside Argentina) Uruguay the border Mexico during the military regime	Guillermo we groups overseas people	to be linked with to make false passports to get the money to take people out the country to go to Uruguay to give the documentation to leave to buy tickets	Reformulation Implicature Definition

The extract between lines 8 and 14 functions to connect the previous autobiographical episode with the one that begins at line 15. Hence, it plays a crucial role by shaping and re-shaping frameworks organized in situation models (what the stories that Guillermo told were about) and context models (updating the common ground shared by the participants in ongoing interaction). This linking narrative is inserted by means of two pauses (L.8), one of 2 seconds duration, the other of 3 seconds. Compared to the previous episodes, these pauses may reflect more controlled processes of narrative pre-construction and planning because Guillermo was about to say what his political activities in exile were, besides giving talks in institutional settings. The actors responsible for actions inserted in the story are: *grupos en el exterior* ‘groups overseas’ (L. 9); *yo* ‘I’ (L. 9); *un grupo en México* ‘a group in Mexico’ (L.9); *ellos* ‘they’ (L.9); *nosotros* ‘we’ (L.10); and *mucha gente* ‘a lot of people’ (L.11). The definition of *un grupo en México* ‘a group in Mexico’, as well as *yo - nosotros* ‘I-‘we’ is mainly realized by the actions they perform. This way of defining actors is epistemically grounded in a previous definition by which Guillermo positively characterizes both the professional and university groups he was linked to in Colombia and his political activities. Thus, we note how the insertion of new knowledge introduced by a definition is dependent on knowledge previously shared in the communicative interaction, and thus, is updating common ground.

The actions are linguistically instantiated by material verbs (Halliday, 1985) the goal of which is to help the people whose continuity of life was jeopardized. Hence, a

material process such as *dedicaban a falsificar pasaportes* ‘making fake passports’, which is generally associated with crime, within the story that Guillermo is developing, gains a positive meaning during the interaction. Such implicature can only be coherently sustained by operative and causally active mental models. The quantification of the people who were helped to leave Argentina operates by making the actors’ actions more remarkable and receives a positive evaluation in moral terms; this is an implicature based on the knowledge that the level of positive evaluation of pro-social behavior depends on the number of people helped. And by positively representing the actions that the actors carried out, Guillermo is constructing a positive representation of himself within the interaction which is determined by his intentions and goals. Immediately following the episode of transition, Guillermo provides an autobiographical narrative which functions by bringing into a more near present the positive consequences of the pro-social behavior introduced above.

Line 15 summarizes the previous episode of transition. Thus, the reformulation creates an interpretative framework in which the autobiographical episode being told can easily be embedded. In this section of the narrative Guillermo inserts the time, place and participants of the story he is unfolding. The place is the house of a famous Argentinean humorist and TV presenter. The participants represented as actors are: *yo* ‘I’, *una amiga de la esposa de él*, ‘a friend of his wife’ and *la hermana del juez Bernasconi* ‘the sister of the judge Bernasconi’. Definitions *yo soy muy amigo de Jorge Guinzburg* (L.16-7) ‘I am a good friend of Jorge Guinzburg’ (L.17) and implicatures (famous characters make the story more interesting to listen to), the identity of the actors grounded in presupposed knowledge (who they are), which Guillermo assumes to be shared in the focus groups, together with *una cosa curiosa* ‘something curious’ (L.16), are discourse strategies acting as a meta-narrative mechanism in order to create the exceptionality of Guillermo’s autobiographical episode. The verbs which realize the deeds of the actors are of relational character, serving to create interpersonal bounds between the less culturally-known participants.

Table 5. Episode 4: Situation models

Narrative structure		Situation models				
Line	Section	Topics	Setting	Participants	Actions	Discourse strategies
15	Abstract [27.10-27.13]	political activities in the exile	overseas in the exile	Guillermo we people	to take people out of the country	Reformulation
16-20	Orientation [27.14-27.43]	meeting at the Jorge Guinzburg's house	Argentina Jorge Guinzburg's house in Buenos Aires in the 90's after returning from the exile	Guillermo friend of Jorge Guinzburg's wife	To be in Jorge Guinzburg's house To date the judge Bernasconi	Agreements Definition Implicature
21-9	Complicating action evaluation and Resolution [27.47-28.27]	encounter with the judge Bernasconi acknowledgement of Guillermo's helping behaviour while being in the exile rescue of the judge Bernasconi	Argentina Jorge Guinzburg's house in Buenos Aires in the 90's after returning from the exile military regime	Guillermo the judge Bernasconi the sister of the judge Bernasconi same political grouping	to call Guillermo aside to tell to thank for his helping behaviour to recognize to take out of the country to help to request to send documentation and money to leave the Argentina to leave the country to ignore to know to help	Implicature Reformulation Justification Evidentiality Granularity
29-30	Coda [28.27-28.38]	how the groups of solidarity selected the recipients of Help	in the exile during the military dictatorship	we help recipient	to leave the country to ignore to know to help	Implicature Justification

In line 20 Carlos confirms the identity of the participants inserted by Guillermo. In doing so, Carlos makes evident a kind of implicit interactional agreement which has been operating by regulating the dynamic of the group and the distribution of interactional turns. The actors of the events of the complicating action are: *yo* 'I', *la hermana del juez Bernasconi* 'the sister of judge Bernasconi', *el juez Bernasconi* 'judge Bernasconi', and *nosotros* (implicit) 'we'. Guillermo's action is realized by a material verb (Halliday, 1985) *sacaste* (L.24) 'took out' the goal of which is to ensure the judge Bernasconi's continuity of life. A few lines below (L.27), Guillermo's helping behavior

in exile is carried out by a collective actor, *nosotros* (implicit) ‘we’ (the organization he belonged to) whose action is realized by another material verb *le habíamos mandado* ‘we had sent him’. The action instantiated by the material verbs enables us to know the manner in which Guillermo’s pro-social action was performed. The reformulation from the singular to the plural form of the 1st person serves to distribute agency in relation to the helping behavior. Thus, Guillermo tried to create a positive self-representation based on the construction of a humble character. Then, *la hermana* ‘the sister’ of the judge Bernasconi) is represented as an actor carrying out: i) a mental verb *me reconoce* ‘recognizes me’ which functions to create the general conditions for Guillermo’s story to occur; ii) a relational verb *era* ‘was’ linking her life story with Guillermo’s; and iii) a verb of request *me había pedido* ‘had requested me’, presenting the cause for which the judge Bernasconi received help to leave Argentina. *Me había pedido* ‘had requested me’ must also be characterized as a speech act (request) which causes Guillermo to take a particular position and action. The sister’s request generates a profound responsibility in Guillermo’s moral world. The political identification of *la hermana del juez Bernasconi* ‘the sister of the judge Bernasconi’ and Guillermo with the same political organizations, discursively realized by a relational verb (Halliday, 1985) also confirms the expectations triggered by her request. The implicature triggered by the description of the events indicates that Guillermo fulfilled such expectations grounded in socially shared knowledge (how in-group members should behave amongst themselves).

The remaining actor of the events is the receiver and main recipient of the helping behavior: *el juez Bernasconi* ‘the judge Bernasconi’. He is portrayed as performing an extremely important verbal action within the story *agradecer* ‘to thank’, which appears to be repeated and reinforced by a deontic modal verb *tengo que* ‘have to’. It is a speech act not only expressing judge Bernasconi’s attitudes and emotions towards Guillermo but also creating a positive representation of the events within the communicative interaction. In other words, by means of strategically reformulating how the judge Bernasconi positively evaluates the events, Guillermo is indirectly constructing a positive representation of his actions during the focus group session, which may be more pragmatically effective than simply saying “I saved X’s life”. The high level of granularity that Guillermo presents in the reformulation of the judge Bernasconi’s gratitude operates as a strong mark of evidentiality. It represents a compelling instantiation of the story inserted into the episode of transition (L.8-14) and, thereby, justifies the positive outcomes of Guillermo’s helpful behavior. Thus, Guillermo

indirectly reinforced his positive self-representation within the communicative interaction. In line 28 the slight modification in the definition of the actor by means of the lexical item *famoso* ‘famous’, undoubtedly makes Guillermo’s autobiographical episode even more reportable. Subsequently, the further clarification that the famous judge Bernasconi was merely one case triggers the implicature that many people were helped by Guillermo and the organization he belonged to.

The last section of the autobiographical episode relates the judge Bernasconi’s particular case to the larger pro-social practice of helping people whose continuity of life was jeopardized by the perpetrators of the military dictatorship. The explanation of the method employed to select the recipients of help by means of the lexical item *anónima* ‘anonymous’ operates as a mechanism to universalize the help to those whose lives were in serious danger. This justificatory strategy is in line with the altruistic representation introduced in the episode transition.

The disclaimer *pero* ‘but’ was utilized to introduce a concession that is not strong enough to challenge the general claim made in lines 10-1. This move was tried in order to block any sort of implicatures in the rest of the participants of the interaction about in-group preferences at the time of selecting who deserved support to leave Argentina, which could have been suggested in the complicating section. Thus, it argumentatively functions by backing up the altruistic self-representation inserted in the episode of transition (L.8-14).

6.5 Concluding remarks

This chapter is an essential of this thesis. The analysis of the discourse strategies in relation to multimodal mental models of the topics that were discussed and the communicative interaction enabled us to explore the ways in which Guillermo’s autobiographical episodes embody and instantiate the life story and political project of the victims and survivors of the military dictatorship. These life stories and political projects are brought into the present by the new discourse about the past that has maintained by Néstor Kirchner since 2003 (see chapters 2 and 4). The discursive analysis of Guillermo’s interconnected autobiographical episodes, which are linked to his personal experience during and after the period of dictatorship in Argentina, showed the entangled and complex cognitive and interactive processes through which Guillermo’s autobiographical memories, and multimodal mental models were

discursively instantiated by means of discourse strategies. The autobiographical episodes that were analyzed in this chapter show how Guillermo created a sense of living in history by interlocking his life story with the social, cultural and historical milieu. This phenomenon is completely absent in the discourses about the past that were examined in the previous chapter.

The study has indicated the ways in which Guillermo described different topics, in which he discursively constructs strategic representations of the actors (including himself) and actions of the intertwined autobiographical episodes and their internal parts (abstract, orientation, complicating action, evaluation, resolution, and coda). These episodes and actions were coherently structured and synchronized in the way in which he introduced new autobiographical events. Guillermo gradually let us know that he was one of the potential victims of the military dictatorship, who he firstly presented as passive agents, the presence of those names in an address book could be cause for a potential abduction and disappearance. He also gradually provided arguments which indicated that those potential victims (including himself) were not as passive as he depicted during his first and second autobiographical episode.

The process of increasing subjectivization of the autobiographical episodes is finalized in the depiction of Guillermo as a politically engaged agent whose pro-social behavior during exile helped save the lives of numerous Argentines that were being chased by the agents of the military regime. More importantly, it provided the possible reasons why he was being looked for by a member of the Armed Forces. The process of gradual agentization, from being a passive victim to an active political actor during exile, may reflect the influence exerted of shifting context models, as he could perfectly create and maintain a positive self-representation within the focus groups by describing himself as a passive victim, as has already been noted for episode 2. However, by means of discourse strategies for managing and coordinating his autobiographical memories, Guillermo went further and introduced autobiographical episodes 3 and 4, which could have been controversial if his context models (e.g. strategic hypothesis based on inferences from what he already knew of the other participants in terms of shared knowledge about the topics and actions) had been shaped differently.

Finally, the lack of challenges in the form of rejections (e.g. ‘what you are saying is not true/correct/accurate’) from the other participants of the focus group may imply that those autobiographical episodes were not controversial. Thus, it provided the

interactional agreement that was needed to back up Guillermo's autobiographical narratives.

7. SHARING MEMORIES, FAMILY CONVERSATION AND INTERACTION³⁹

7.1 Introduction

Shared memories play a central role in everyday communications. They are usually based on memories of a shared past among group members (e.g. family, friends, partners, etc.). Shared memories are also utilized to create a feeling of connection and maintain a consistent feeling of identity among group members. In this continued negotiation and cooperation with others, what the speaker believes the rest of the participants know about him/her and the autobiographical narrative generally plays a central role. In family conversations, that phenomenon is even more significant because life stories organized in situation models (see chapter 3, section 3.5.3) are many times shared with other family members. As family members go through numerous shared past experiences (e.g. moving from one city to another, the death of a beloved pet, etc.), other members are in a position to reject one family member's autobiographical narrative by simply claiming that he or she is not being accurate. At the same time, to a great extent there would not be the need to provide arguments in order to justify some past actions for the simple reason that family members share a large stock of interpersonal, social and cultural knowledge. This taken-for-granted knowledge is extremely important when constructing and communicating memories within the group.

The aim of this chapter is to show the ways in which a shared past about periods of political violence in Argentina is managed, communicated and negotiated in an everyday family conversation by means of discourse strategies. The analysis of the discourse strategies enable us to examine how the construction and communication of memories, sometimes autobiographical (e.g. David remembering his autobiographical experience as a child in the time of Evita Perón in Argentina) but most of the time, shared and collective (e.g. Silvana recalling when the entire family joined a massive demonstration supporting democracy), unfold in meaningful interactions in real-world

³⁹ A version of this chapter has been published in *Discourse & Society* (Impact factor: 1.300) as follows: Bietti, L. (2010). Sharing memories, family conversation and interaction. *Discourse & Society* 21 (5), 499-523. For further information about this journal:

<http://www.uk.sagepub.com/journalsProdDesc.nav?prodId=Journal200873&crossRegion=eur>

Shorter versions were presented at *Landmarks 2 'Communication and Memory'*, ECREA, School of Advanced Studies, University of London, London, December 2009, and at the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology, Bielefeld, January 2010.

settings (e.g. at the family dinner table). This chapter focuses on analyzing the discourse strategies that family members use to specifically coordinate shared memories of periods of political violence in Argentina (e.g. agreements, rejections, corrections, justifications and reformulations).

Previous chapters of this thesis have shown how cognitive and discourse processes of autobiographical remembering about the military dictatorship in Argentina unfold in communicative interactions. The purpose of this chapter is to extend the scope of previous analyses by examining the ways in which groups of intimate people negotiate and synchronize situation models about periods of political violence in Argentina. This negotiation and synchronization of individual and shared memories about recent Argentinean history enable us to explore cognitive and discourse processes of collective memory-making (see chapter 3, sections 3.4 and 3.6). On the other hand, the examination of these cognitive and communicative mechanisms about periods of political violence in Argentina in general, but of the military dictatorship in particular, allow us to examine how different representations and meanings of the traumatic past are reconstructed and communicated in everyday interactions in private settings. In this way, this study provides some exploratory evidence on to what extent a group of intimate people negotiate old and new official modes of categorizing the military dictatorship in communicative interactions.

The article is organized in the following fashion. First, I present some ideas concerning the ways in which practices of sharing memories in family conversations constitute cases of situated collective remembering. These cases of collective remembering are based on distributed cognitive processes of negotiation and synchronization of shared situation models of past experiences. Second, I analyze fragments of a family conversation/focus group I conducted in March 2008 in Buenos Aires about three highly loaded historical dates in Argentinean history, in order to empirically demonstrate how my new synthetic approach to processes of memory-making (see section chapter 3, section 3.6.1) works.

7.2 Collective remembering, distributed cognition and family conversations about Argentinean history

The act of sharing memories is often realized in practices of collective remembering within social groups in everyday verbal interactions. Each member should be endowed with the ability to make a vast amount of inferences about other members' cognitive and emotional states with little overt information. This ability to make strategic hypothesis about other members' deontic (intentions) and epistemic (knowledge) states is determined by updating context models of the ongoing communicative interaction. Thus, each member's presupposed knowledge of other members and the group as a whole plays a central role in processes of collective remembering. Families are undoubtedly a kind of social group whose long-standing shared memories organized in situation models enable members to interact and work as a distributed socio-cognitive system (see chapter 3, section 3.6.2; Sutton, Harris, Keil & Barnier, 2010; Wu, Birnholtz, Richards & Massimi, 2008) by means of discourse strategies.

Due to the influence of processes of social identification, emotional bonding and shared memories, family members may often constitute a cohesive group. To a large extent, this cohesive group is grounded in enduring situation models (chapter 3, section 3.5.3) of shared past experiences (e.g. previous holidays in France). When remembering together, the cohesiveness of group is usually reflected in uses of pronouns in the first person plural (e.g. 'two years ago we moved to Buenos Aires'; 'nothing can divide us'). It is in this on-the-spot negotiation and reconstruction of the group cohesion that occurs in everyday conversation among family members that the sharing and overlapping of situation models is to a large extent based. This enables family members to correct, justify, reject and remind each other about certain family themes or outcomes of experiences throughout interactions.

In family conversations, shared memories function to structure and synchronize the shareable life story of the family as a group. Family members are strategically engaged in processes of remembering and forgetting, which are modeled according to the specific goals of a particular interaction. In these cases, family members construct a socio-cognitive system shaped by the material and social environment in which they are located. Cognitive processes in these environments do not just occur within the minds of individuals, rather in socio-cognitive systems formed by multiple processing units (Hutchins, 1995; 2010b; Sutton, Harris, Keil & Barnier, 2010; Wu, Birnholtz, Richards,

Baeker & Massimi, 2008). By interrelating shared situation models according to context models in socio-cognitive distributed systems, family members are able to manage and coordinate their shared memories. In order to perform this cognitive task, they make use of a wide set of discourse strategies such as corrections, justifications, rejections, agreements and reminders of shared knowledge of the past. The goal of these socio-cognitive systems in family conversations about shared memories is the construction of emergent family autobiographical narratives that are usually handed down from one generation to the next. The transmission and transformations, due to interaction and communication, of these autobiographical narratives normally function to consolidate and transform the family's identity, depending on changing life conditions during the course of their lives.

Fivush claims that reminiscing is part of everyday interactions within virtually all families (2008: 52). Practices of storytelling in everyday family conversations are usually about events of the day experienced by each member of the family alone depending on their family roles (e.g. how hard work was today; what the teacher explained about the causes of poverty, etc.). These practices may also refer to events the family has experienced together (e.g. previous holidays in France) or to the familiar past (e.g. the parents' engagement; the grandparents' adventures, etc.). Family conversations play a central role at the time of constructing and structuring autobiographical memory and self-development throughout childhood (Fivush, 2008; Fivush et al., 2008). Discourses about shared memories family interactions are justified, corrected, rejected and reminded. That is, family conversations contain everyday cases of argumentative processes being co-constructed by family members (Ochs, Smith & Taylor, 1989; Ochs & Taylor, 1992, 1996; Ochs, Taylor, Rudolph & Smith, 1992; Shoshana Blum-Kulka & Snow, 2002; Tannen, 2006, 2010) by means of discourse strategies. Family conversations constitute an instrument of socialization and change, which is guided by argumentative processes. Conflict is not welcome in these argumentative processes (Arcidiacono, Pontecorvo & Morasso, 2009; Laforest, 2002) because it could undermine the joint construction of a shared family history.

Studies focused on the construction of family history embedded in national history (Welzer & Gudehus, 2007; Welzer, Moller & Tschuggnall, 2002) have shown the mechanisms by which new generations of family members reconstruct shared family stories (e.g. the grandfather's experiences as a member of the German army during the Second World War). These investigations have indicated that these processes of

appropriation and re-signification of older family members' autobiographical stories of the Second World War are guided and shaped by new family members' generational cultural models (e.g. defense of human rights, massive condemnation of the Nazi past, etc.).

The studies on autobiographical and collective memories about Argentinean history were often developed from an interdisciplinary theoretical framework which fruitfully attempts to combine and integrate historical, sociological (Crenzel, 2008; Feierstein, 2007; Jelin, 2002), anthropological (Robben, 2005a, 2005b, 2006) and psychoanalytic (Kordon & Edelman, 1986) approaches to better understand how personal and collective memories are strategically constructed according to specific political interests. Nevertheless, most of these studies focused either on how the direct victims and their relatives experienced the terror of being tortured or the disappearance of a loved one, or on the ways in which the elites and the mass media create and reproduce a hegemonic political discourse about the past. A large number of the above-mentioned studies tended to introduce categories such as cultural trauma (Feierstein, 2007; Robben, 2005a, 2005b) and/or collective memory (Jelin, 2002), without sufficient empirical evidence demonstrating the manner in which 'ordinary' people or families (who were neither victims, nor relatives of the victims nor former perpetrators) jointly negotiate and synchronize individual and shared memories in order to construct – in real and meaningful interactions – collective memories embedded in Argentina's history.

The analysis that follows attempts to provide some empirical evidence in order to support the claim that collective memories embedded in history are not something that exist in external memory devices (Donald, 1991, 1998, 2010) such as commemorative practices, museums, memorials and films, but complex interactive mechanisms by which processes of collective memory-making unfold, connecting individuals' agendas with Argentinean history.

7.3 Family conversation: sharing memories of Argentinean history

In March 2008, I conducted a family conversation in Buenos Aires. The family consisted of four persons: David Rock, father (born 1945), Silvana, mother (1952), Angela, daughter (1983) and Juan Pablo, son (1980). Unfortunately, in 2006 Juan Pablo was diagnosed with cancer and he tragically died a year later. They are a middle-class

family living in one of the trendiest neighborhoods of the city. David Rock is a political economist, Silvana is a psychologist and Angela studies communication at the University of Buenos Aires and works for a consulting group⁴⁰.

In the session, I presented six historical dates linked to Argentinean history, from 1945 to 1983⁴¹. The participants were asked to do the following: to discuss the historical dates and to make an attempt to incorporate their personal experiences in this discussion. Due to the long-standing nature of the group, these personal experiences were usually shared with other family members⁴². The analysis is divided into three historical periods, according to the dates discussed. The selection of these historical dates in detriment to others was based on the fact that they do not merely represent inflexion points in the course of 20th century Argentinean history, but also form part of a semantically and emotionally loaded chain of political events tightly causally related. Before each extract I provide a brief explanation of what occurred in the dates discussed. Then, I describe the multimodal context model of the communicative interaction which enables the negotiation and synchronization of each participant's autobiographical and family shared memories. Some categories of the context models such as setting [Family's house in Palermo, Buenos Aires; March 18th at 9pm], participants and relationship [David Rock (1945), husband-father, speaker-addressee; Silvana (1952), wife-mother, speaker-addressee; Angela (1983), daughter, speaker-addressee; and Lucas (1980), interviewer) remain the same throughout the entire session, therefore, they are not defined in the description of the models.

7.3.1 16 September 1955: The Liberation Revolution

With the death of Evita Perón in July 1952, the support for President Perón among the working classes became less pronounced. Subsequently, Perón's attempt to encourage a separation of the church and state was not positively welcomed by the middle classes or the elite (Robben, 2005a). In June 1955, church leaders excommunicated Perón and

⁴⁰ To protect the identity of the participants, they agreed to choose a pseudonym to be used during the entire session.

⁴¹ For the specific purposes of this article, the data collected from the discussion of 17 October 1945 (Liberation of Perón), September 23rd 1973 (3rd presidency of Perón), and 2 April 1982 (Argentinean landing in the Malvinas/Falklands Islands) will not be discussed because they do not represent instances of joint reconstructions of the family history embedded in Argentinean history. This occurred because either David Rock or Silvana positioned themselves as dominant narrators.

⁴² The family conversation was recorded and then transcribed.

encouraged opponent military officers to plot his overthrow. On 16 September 1955, a nationalist Catholic group from the Army and the Navy began what they called the Liberating Revolution and overthrew Perón's government during his second term as president. The Peronist party was outlawed, and its insignias and slogans were banned, as was the mention of his name (Galasso, 2004).

A child under Peronist rule [8.28-9.42]

1. **Lucas:** Bueno se puede pasar a la otra
2. **David Rock:** Claro yo puedo yo iba a decir algo (.) más más referido al 45 yo me acuerdo yo
3. tenía 10 años o sea
4. **Silvana:** No en el 45 no podías tener 10 años
5. **David Rock:** No (.) en el 55
6. **Silvana:** Correcto
7. **David Rock:** Cuando vino el golpe tenía 10 años (.) yo estaba un año adelantado o sea que
8. estaría en cuarto grado o sea que ya venía de varios años de colegio (.) y recuerdo que que por
9. ejemplo tenía los libros de lectura los que se llamaban ¿cómo se llamaban? Esos que te daban
10. para todo el año
11. **Ángela:** El manual
12. **David Rock:** El manual (.) eran re (.) (Risas) como si te dijera que Chávez era un poroto al
13. lado, por ejemplo
14. **Silvana:** Evita [Perón]
15. **David Rock:** Exactamente (.) las lecciones eran “justicialismo, que hermosa palabra” así
16. empezaba la lección (.) y todo era *La Razón De Mi Vida* y yo la tuve que leer en el colegio y
17. la leí y la tenía y que (.) pero digamos era lo más tendencioso y una cosa así
18. totalitaria total

1. **Lucas:** Okay let's go to the next topic
2. **David Rock:** I can I was going to add something (.) some more detail about 45, I remember I
3. was 10 years old in other words
4. **Silvana:** No in 45 you could not have been 10 years old
5. **David Rock:** No (.) in 55
6. **Silvana:** Right
7. **David Rock:** When the coup happened I was 10 years old (.) I was one year ahead, in other
8. words I would have been in the fourth grade therefore I already had a few years at school (.)
9. and I remember that I had the reading books which were called what were they called? Those
10. that you have for the whole year
11. **Angela:** Textbook
12. **David Rock:** Textbook, they were, (Laughs) as if that Chávez was a useless jerk to the
13. sideline? For example
14. **Silvana:** Evita [Evita Perón]
15. **David Rock:** Exactly, the lessons were ‘justicialismo’, what a beautiful word’ that’s how the
16. lesson began, and everything was *The Reason of My Life* and I had to read at school and I
17. read it and I had it and what, but let's say, it was the most tendentious and something totally
18. totalitarian

Context models

Current action: Communicating individual memories (David Rock); monitoring and supporting (Silvana)

Intentions and goals: Link political events to autobiographical memories (David Rock); collaborate with David Rock (Silvana and Angela); correctness (Group)

Knowledge: 1955 coup d'état; Evita Perón; Chávez' policies; *The Reason of My Life*

In line 4, we notice how Silvana's rejection makes David Rock correct his autobiographical narrative. This occurs because of the long-standing relationship of both participants: at the time of conducting the focus group's session, they had been married for 28 years. Hence, Silvana has enough interpersonal knowledge based on situation models about the biography of his husband (when he was born; where he grew up; what the names of his parent are, etc.) as well as authority to correct her husband. It is important to point out that her authority as someone who is able to reject David Rock's account is given by her role as wife for such a long period of time. In the next turn, David Rock agrees with Silvana and, therefore reformulates his narrative. In this way, David Rock makes the setting of the autobiographical events more accurate according to the group's criteria. Then, Silvana agrees with his husband's reformulation, and thus she creates a common ground between them. So, in this case, the relationship between participants also plays a crucial role in the interaction and it forms part of the context models of the communicative interaction. The process of cooperation between Silvana and David Rock enables him to provide a more coherent and cohesive account of this past experience as a child. This example shows that even when we are communicating autobiographical memories, social agreement and consensus are crucial for supporting group dynamics. In this case, the sharing of situation models about David Rock's biography together with the participants' context models (e.g. relationship) determines the basis for the achievement of consensus and accuracy.

Following David Rock's explicit request for a memory aid in line 9-10, the noun *manual* 'textbook' (L. 11) uttered by Angela, his daughter, facilitates the reconstruction of his autobiographical experiences as a child, which are embedded in the events surrounding the Liberating Revolution that took place in 1955. That is why *manual* 'textbook' functions as a reminder in the interaction between David Rock and Angela by facilitating the reconstruction of David Rock's situation models about his memories

of being a primary student during times of peronism in Argentina. Despite the fact that for obvious reasons Angela's biographical knowledge of her father is much less than Silvana's, she is still in the position to collaborate in the construction of her father's autobiographical narrative. That is, the socially-shared knowledge organized in cultural models about primary education and tools for schooling.

In line 19, *Evita* functions as a new reminder by cuing David Rock's autobiographical memories and negative evaluations of this historical period. *Evita* automatically triggers the reconstruction and communication of a new topic in David Rock's autobiographical remembering processes: the book *La Razón de mi Vida* [*The Reason of my Life*]. David Rock's agreement in line 20 creates the conditions for the co-construction of a new common ground based on the significance of the book *La Razón de mi Vida* [*The Reason of my Life*] for that the primary education of children during the first and second presidency of Peron in general, and David Rock's attempt to link his autobiographical memories from childhood to the historical events in particular. *La Razón de mi Vida* was an autobiography written by Eva Perón and published in 1951. Eva Perón wrote the book after having been diagnosed with cancer and it was utilized as a political manifesto by the Peronist party (the political party led by her husband, Juan Domingo Perón).

What is important is that in 1951 *La Razón de mi Vida* was ordered a mandatory textbook for primary schools in Argentina, hence its association with David Rock's autobiographical memories of childhood. Nevertheless, David Rock takes for granted that the rest of the participants know what he is talking about because, as we notice, he does not provide a further explanation of what the book is about. In so doing, David Rock presupposes that the participants know of the existence of the book, who the author was and what her political purposes were. This presupposed knowledge forms part of his context models which enable him to make strategic inferences about the other participants' epistemic states.

Although David Rock assumes that such presupposed knowledge operates as common ground, he decides to provide an explicit definition *era lo mas tendencioso y una cosa totalitarian total* (L.17-18) 'it was the most tendentious and something totally totalitarian'. This explicit definition serves as an interactive mechanism to make the common ground public (Clark, 2005: 519), and thereby, reinforcing the common ground. Finally, it is important to point out by relating *La Razón de mi Vida* and his autobiographical memories, David Rock is reinforcing his positioning as the most

authorized teller within the group because he is able to link Argentinean political history to his own life story. But, as we saw, he could not do that alone.

7.3.2 March 1976: The beginning of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship

On 24 March 1976, a military junta deposed former president Isabel Perón and took power of the country of Argentina. What followed was a seven-year period of unprecedented human rights abuses, in which approximately 30,000 people were abducted and murdered by the perpetrators of the military regime (Crenzel, 2008; Duhalde, 1999; Feierstein, 2007). Hundreds of babies were born in captivity because their mothers had been kidnapped and were killed soon after giving birth. Relatives of the victims uncovered evidence that some of these babies were being passed off as the adopted children of military officers. The narrative created by the military junta leaders was sustained by a discourse on war which mentioned the non-conventional methods that the enemy (e.g. political, armed organizations) was using in order to destabilize the status quo (Feierstein, 2007). This is why the conflict was named the ‘Dirty War’, and this was how it became known abroad. The enemies identified by the military included not only people who carried out violent acts against the armed forces (e.g. members of guerrilla movements), but also ideological subversives, such as teachers, professors, students, factory workers, journalists and lawyers (*Nunca Más*, 1984/2006).

A large proportion of the bodies of the victims of the military dictatorship were never found. Hence, the victims of the military regime came to be known as the *desaparecidos*. The ‘topos’ of uncertainty concerning the destiny of the people who were detained and disappeared was introduced on 14 December 1979 by former dictator Jorge Rafael Videla. When referring to the missing people, he claimed:

[. . .] As long as (somebody) is missing (*desaparecido*), they cannot have any particular treatment, they are an enigma, a *desaparecido*, they do not have an entity, they are not there, neither dead nor alive, they are *desaparecidos*.

Official statement number one [21.48-22.31]

19. **Lucas:** Bueno vamos a la otra sino a ver
20. **Silvana:** Si no porque si no te llena todo el casete
21. **Lucas:** Claro claro claro
22. **Silvana:** Yo me acuerdo que me desperté a la mañana hacían comunicado número uno
23. como una no sé que comunicado número dos (.) no sé cuantos comunicados había en la
24. misma mañana que era ya
25. **Ángela:** ¿Pero o sea el comunicado número uno no fue de noche?
26. **David Rock:** Sí
27. **Silvana:** Bueno yo me desperté (.2) yo a la mañana (.3) yo me desperté puse la radio y
28. (.) te los pasaban
29. **David Rock:** Creo que fue a la una o algo así
30. **Silvana:** Ya había pasado pero te lo repetían toda la mañana

19. **Lucas:** *Well let's pass to the next topic okay let's see*
20. **Silvana:** *Because if not he (David Rock) will fill up the entire cassette*
21. **Lucas:** *Of course of course*
22. **Silvana:** *I remember that I woke up in the morning, they were making official*
23. *statement number one like a, I do not know what official statement number two (.) I*
24. *do not know how many official statements there were in the same morning, which was*
25. *that*
26. **Angela:** *But what, wasn't the official statement number one during the night*
27. **David Rock:** *Yes*
28. **Silvana:** *Well I woke up (.2) I in the morning (.3) I woke up I put the radio on and, and*
29. *they broadcast them*
30. **David Rock:** *I believe it was at one or around about that time*
31. **Silvana:** *It had already been broadcast but they (the military) repeated it for the whole*
32. *morning*

Context models [21.48-22.31]

Current action: Communicating individual memories (Silvana); monitoring (Angela and David Rock)

Intentions and goals: Link individual memories to the political events (Silvana); consensus (Group); correctness (Group)

Knowledge: Time of the Official Statement #1 (March 24th, 1976)

In line 20, Silvana provides some arguments as to why it is a good idea to move on to a new historical date. She agrees and justifies my decision by blaming her husband for monopolizing the interaction. Silvana's agreement with me functions as a discourse strategy to negotiate interactional turns within the conversation. It should be pointed out that her strategy would probably have been completely different if she was not addressing her husband. By claiming this, I am suggesting that according to her context model of the communicative interaction, her intervention is appropriate and may not be seen as a lack of respect. The immediate consequence of Silvana's strategy and Lucas's agreement (L.21) is her taking the floor. In lines 23-24, she refers to the

comunicado número uno ‘official statement number one’. *Comunicado número uno* was the official statement broadcast by the military junta in the early morning of 24 March 1976. It basically stated that the Armed Forces were taking control of the country and if the military or civil police witnessed any suspicious or subversive activity they would follow the ‘shoot to kill’ policy. In line 25, Angela rejects the veracity of her mother’s account. Angela’s correction of time when the *comunicado número uno* ‘official statement number one’ [L.26] is epistemically grounded in socially-shared knowledge of the period of dictatorship. This rejection is later reinforced by David Rock in line 26 [L.27] when he agrees with her daughter. So, both Angela and her father agree that Silvana is mistaken concerning the time at which official statement number one was broadcast. Due to this rejection, along with the agreement between Angela and David Rock which reinforces such positioning, Silvana begins to reformulate her account. This on-the-spot reformulation of situation models is needed not to undermine the groups’ consensus due to the fact that a new common ground has been negotiated between Angela and David Rock. However, Silvana’s reformulation presents some problems that are discursively realized in false starts and silences (L. 27 [28]). This false starts and silences may reflect more controlled cognitive processes of discourse planning and narrative pre-construction (see chapter 3, section 3.3.2.2) which may aim at shaping a justification argumentatively sustaining the reformulation.

Silvana’s justificatory strategy is based on a kind of subjectivization of her narrative which is reflected in the transition from what they (the military) did: *hacían el comunicado número uno* ‘they (military) made official statement number one’ to what she did: *yo me desperté (.2) yo a la mañana (.3) yo me desperté puse la radio* ‘I woke up (.2) I in the morning (.3) I woke up I put the radio on’. Moreover, in line 29 [30], David Rock provides a possible time at which the *comunicado número uno* could have been broadcast. This correction justifies the new information and warrants the previous rejection posed by Angela. Thus, David Rock’s intervention in line 29 [30] reinforces the new common ground which indicates that Silvana’s account about the time of listening to the *comunicado número uno* ‘official statement number one’ is incorrect. Subsequently, Silvana decides to agree with both of them and makes it clear that what she listened to was a repetition of the original official statement, originally broadcast in the early morning. The disclaimer *pero* ‘but’ generates an apparent concession which enables Silvana to agree on the new common ground on the one hand, and make clear

that what she is reporting of have listening to was actually the *comunicado número uno* ‘official statement number’ and not a product of her imagination.

7.3.3 10 December 1983: The return of democracy

On 10 December 1983, following the collapse of the military dictatorship after being defeated by the British forces in 1982, Raul Alfonsín was declared the winner of the democratic elections held in October and became the new democratic Argentinean president. His political party was the *Partido Radical*, literally translated as ‘the Radical Party’, but in that it represented Argentina’s social democracy. The elected government of Raul Alfonsín (1983–9) wished to restore the political process. It had, therefore, to sketch policies designed to avoid potential conflicts between the discredited Armed Forces, whose leaders were condemned in 1985, and a civil society which had suddenly started to believe in democracy and human rights. The rebirth of the republic involved the condemnation of decontextualized abstract violence, both from the right wing and from the left, who had used Argentina as a battlefield (Crenzel, 2008; Feierstein, 2007).

Groups of officers implicated in the years of state terrorism, who were identified as the *Carapintadas* (Colored Faces), mutinied in two important Army training bases during the long Easter weekend of 1987. Alfonsín was in charge of the negotiations with the rebels. During the intense negotiations of that long weekend, Alfonsín was supported by 150,000 citizens who filled the streets of Buenos Aires, as well as union and political leaders and the media. After securing the surrender of the rebels, Alfonsín appeared at the House of Government and announced that *la casa está en orden* (the house is in order) and concluded his political speech by saying *felices pascuas* (happy Easter). In the last period of Alfonsín’s presidency (1988–9), the country’s economy underwent a time of hyperinflation followed by massive riots and looting.

Family life in democratic times [37.51-39.02]

31. **Ángela:** Yo el recuerdo que tengo del del período así de la presidencia digamos el
32. último te podría decir es ir con mi hermano a comprar la coca viste como que me
33. daban el vuelto para comprarla en el almacén de Doña Rosa y no alcanzaba porque
34. salía aumentaba así aumentaba así todos los días este día era 10,000 australes y al día
35. siguiente salía 15
36. **Silvana:** Cuando no había azúcar me acuerdo yo (.) no había azúcar no había
37. azúcar
38. **David Rock:** Vos tendrías que tener otro recuerdo porque nosotros hemos ido en
39. pascua de la famosa semana santa que se dice felices pascuas a pesar de ser
40. antirradicales fuimos a la plaza con los chicos
41. **Silvana:** ¿Mirá no fue en el 83?
42. **David Rock:** No estoy hablando de la época de los australes tampoco fue en el 83 fue
43. en el
44. **Ángela:** Yo tengo un recuerdo de la cara pintada
45. **David Rock:** Bueno
46. **Silvana:** Pero lo tuyo es anterior
47. **David Rock:** No la cara pintada fue la rebelión Carapintada de Rico (.) y que
48. nosotros fuimos a la plaza vos con la banderita brasileira
49. **Silvana:** Ah
50. **David Rock:** Y tu hermano con una bandera argentina y nosotros agarrados de la
51. mano yendo 48. a la Plaza de Mayo
52. **Angela:** Ah ya me acuerdo

33. *Angela: I the memory that I have of the period of presidency, let's say the last I could*
34. *say, is to go with my brother to buy coke (Coca-Cola), you see, how they gave me*
35. *change to buy it in 33. the warehouse of Lady Rosa, and it was not enough because*
36. *the pricing increased and increased on a daily basis, that day they were 10,000*
37. *'Australes' and the following day it was 15*
38. **Silvana:** *When there was no sugar, I remember, there was no sugar, there was no*
39. *sugar*
40. **David Rock:** *You should have other memories because we have gone during Easter of*
41. *the famous holy week that is called happy Easter in spite of being antiradicals, we*
42. *went to the plaza with the kids*
43. **Silvana:** *Look, wasn't it in 83?*
44. **David Rock:** *I'm not talking of the period of the 'Australes' nor was it in 83, it was in*
45. *85*
46. **Angela:** *I have a memory of a colored face*
47. **David Rock:** *Well*
48. **Silvana:** *But yours was before*
49. **David Rock:** *No the colored face but it was the rebellion colored face with Rico (.)*
50. *and that we went to the plaza you with the Brazilian flag*
51. **Silvana:** *Ah*
52. **David Rock:** *And your brother with an Argentinean flag and us holding hands going*
53. *to the Plaza de Mayo*
54. **Angela:** *Ah now I remember*

Context models [37.51-39.02]

Current action: Co-constructing shared memories; monitoring (David Rock)

Intentions and goals: Link family shared memories to the political events; reinforce group cohesiveness; create a family life story

Knowledge: Alfonsín's administration; hyperinflation; shortage of supplies; military uprising in 1987; 'Happy Eastern'; Rebellion Colored Face; being together that the Plaza de Mayo

In the extract we observe Angela playing a collaborative role in the process of remembering with her parents. Now, she does not only remind or reject her parents' autobiographical memories based on her socially-shared knowledge about the topics they are talking, but she also starts to relate her own personal experiences embedded in Argentinean history. Between lines 31 [33] and 35 [37], by defining the everyday life of her childhood with her older brother, Juan Pablo, Angela let us know about the economic situation of the last couple of years of Alfonsín's administration. Then, David Rock employs a reminder (L.37-39 [40-42]) in order to facilitate the emergence of a shared family autobiographical memory in Angela's account. In so doing, he makes an evident contribution to the construction of a family life story, for which shared memories play a central role. This reminder presupposes that David Rock, Silvana and Angela are able to reconstruct a shared multimodal situation model of being together at the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires when ex president Raul Alfonsín said *felices pascuas* 'happy eastern' after securing the surrender of the military rebels in 1987. The use of the first person in the plural form *nosotros* 'we', along with a strong metaphorical image of family unity *agarrados de la mano* 'us holding hands' (L.50-1 [52-53]), are another discursive realization of that intention of create a family life story which reinforces the group cohesion. The personal pronoun in the 2nd person singular form *vos* 'you' referring to his daughter, Angela, along with the reminder which assumes that she should be able to reconstruct situation models of being together at the Plaza de Mayo reflects how David Rock's context models of the communicative situation work coordinating and synchronizing the interaction. More empirical evidence such David Rock's eye-gaze and gestures when using the reminder and referring to his daughter by means of the personal pronoun *vos* 'you' may be needed to explain in better detailed how his context models determine his behavior.

On the other hand, Silvana makes several attempts to reject and correct her husband's intention to create a new common ground indicating the sharing of situation models of being together at the Plaza. In lines 41 [43] and 46 [48], Silvana tries to reject the historical correctness of her husband by suggesting that he is confusing the historical dates. Nonetheless, David Rock provides enough arguments to justify that his account is right. He takes for granted that the participants in the interaction know what he is referring to by *famosa semana santa* 'famous holy week', *felices pascuas* 'happy Easter'. The social and cultural meaning of these noun phrases is implied in cultural models of one particular event (see beginning of this sub-section) which was highly important for Argentina's democratic consciousness after the 1976–83 military dictatorship. This particular event is brought into the interaction by David Rock's reminder in lines 38-40 [40-42]. Furthermore, it is important to point out what the implicature is of this group of assumptions in general, and of *a pesar de ser antirradicales* 'in spite of being antiradicals' in particular. By communicating his autobiographical but also shared family memories, David Rock is trying to construct a positive representation of Silvana and himself as parents endowed with a high democratic consciousness which they intended to hand down to their children by taking them to the demonstration.

Finally, as we see in the transcript, Angela seems to begin remembering that highly emotional, shared family memory (L. 52 [54]). David Rock's reminder has worked creating the conditions for the reconstruction of Angela's situation models of a shared memory. The reminder has facilitated the formation and consolidation of a collective memory within the group as well as providing an outstanding example of the communicative, social and interactive nature of the cognitive processes involved in processes of collective remembering.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter has extended the scope of chapters 5 and 6 on discourse processes of autobiographical remembering about events related to periods of political violence in general, and the 1976-1983 military dictatorship in particular. This study has shown the cognitive and linguistic mechanisms guiding the co-construction of processes of collective remembering about periods of political instability in Argentina in a group of intimate people. As far as I know, no other investigation either in discourse studies or memory studies has provided empirical evidence on the cognitive and discourse

mechanisms underpinning the joint reconstruction of individual and shared memories in family conversations in real-world settings. Nor it has related these cognitive and discourse mechanisms to relevant historical and political events in national histories. Thus, the relevance of this chapter is twofold: first, it provides a new theoretical and interdisciplinary insight into everyday practices of collective to remembering; and second, it relates such complex cognitive and communicative processes to social, cultural and historical issues which are in the current agenda of the political debates about the reconstruction of a historical memory in Argentina.

Due to the theme of the family conversation, the autobiographical or shared memories were all embedded in significant historical events in Argentinean history. As we noticed in chapter 5 with Guillermo and his memories from the exile, to a large extent, the insertion of the self in history is what conferred the memories with relevance within the group. I believe that the communication of those memories often meant a situated reconstruction of such stories. In so doing, family members reinforced and discursively realized their group identity (e.g. we/us holding hands). This synchronized and cooperative act of collaboration led them to be involved in significant processes of collective memory-making, which should be considered as the milestone of family identity.

This analysis has indicated that the communication of autobiographical and shared memories among Silvana, David Rock and Angela usually implied processes of cooperation negotiation and synchronization among them. To a greater or lesser extent, these collaborative processes could occur due to the existence of overlapping of shared cultural and situation models of the events that are narrated that allowed them to manage their autobiographical memories of their own experiences (being a child), but also of the shared family ones (demonstration all together). The overlapping of situation models was discursively realized in discourse strategies (e.g. rejection, corrections, reformulations, agreements) and in accordance to their context models of the communicative interaction. Across the interaction, these strategies operated by engineering a socio-cognitive distributed system which enabled the participants to synchronize family members' memories, interests and personal agendas. The analysis has indicated the ways in which the discourse strategies interacted in the processes of negotiation, coordination and collaboration within those different levels of experience. These cognitive and discourse processes occurred at individual levels (e.g. Silvana remembering her autobiographical experience on the morning of 24 March 1976) as

well as collective levels among the rest of the participants involved in the interaction (e.g. Angela rejecting her mother's personal story for being inaccurate). The examples examined have shown that beyond the collaborative mechanisms underpinning this socio-cognitive distributed system there were still autonomous selves with different interests and personal agendas. This clearly occurred when Silvana blamed her husband for monopolizing the interaction in line 20, and thus, she explicitly regulated the distribution of interactional turns.

To conclude, it may be the case that the mechanisms regulating the joint reconstructions of the past in the Argentinean case might operate in a different fashion in families from other cultural backgrounds. Thus, this investigation may be a valuable starting point in the designing of new cross-cultural research agendas focused on the examination of the interactive processes by which families from diverse cultural backgrounds, and immersed in different national histories, construct a coherent shared family history.

8. JOINT REMEMBERING: COGNITION, COMMUNICATION AND INTERACTION IN PROCESSES OF MEMORY-MAKING⁴³

8.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore how the participants of two focus groups of strangers conducted in February 2008 in Buenos Aires are cognitively and discursively engaged in joint processes of memory-making about events related the 1976-1983 military dictatorship. The cognitive and communicative engagement of the participants of the focus groups occurs by means of discourse strategies (see chapter 3, sections 3.5.6). This study investigates the cognitive and discursive mechanisms that the participants of both focus groups employ to negotiate and synchronize multimodal cultural and situation models about the experience of dictatorship with strangers who belong to same generational cohort. By means of agreements and reformulations, these mechanisms of coordination and collaboration facilitate the creation and updating of common ground, the aim of which is the reach of consensus between the participants of the groups who lack shared memories.

The cases examined in this chapter show how individual reconstructions of situation models are driven by processes of re-interpretation of memories in the present. I borrowed the term ‘interaction engine’ (Levinson 2006a, 2006b) in order to describe how collaborative processes of coordination and cooperation are the key to better understanding the ways in which practices of joint remembering are generated within the two focus groups. In a few words, Levinson defines the human interaction engine as ‘a set of cognitive abilities and behavioral dispositions which synergistically work together to endow human face-to-face interaction with certain special qualities’ (Levinson, 2006a: 44). Among these qualities we find the ability to respond to actions and intentions, the turn-taking structure given by the reciprocity of roles (e.g. speaker-addressee, giver-taker), their alternation over time, and the expectation for an immediate response (Levinson, 2006a: 45-46). The human ‘interaction engine’ together with the

⁴³ A version of this chapter has been recently accepted for publication in *Memory Studies*. For further information about this journal: <http://mss.sagepub.com/>
Shorter versions were presented at *Critique: An Interdisciplinary Day Conference on ‘Being Critical’*, Loughborough University, June 2009, and at the *2nd International Discourses and Cultural Practices Conference*, University of Sydney, July 2009.

context models determine the structure of the communicative situations which enable the participants to reconstruct and update their situation models of the experience of dictatorship.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that theoretical and methodological framework explained in chapter 3 is useful to analyze how groups of people from the same age group but who did not know each other negotiate and synchronize individual memories in relation to old and new cultural models to interpret the experience of dictatorship in Argentina (chapter 2, sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.3). This chapter complements the analysis presented in the previous chapter on family remembering where the participants were intimates.

Moreover, the analysis of the communicative interaction presented in this chapter sheds light on the ways in which socially-shared knowledge of the military dictatorship is managed in private settings between strangers. Thus, it also contributes to the empirical studies on processes of remembering events related to periods of political violence in Argentina in private settings (see chapters 5, 6 and 7).

The focus groups were formed according to a generational parameter: a) A group of eight people aged between 70 and 80 years (C1) and b) A second group of four people aged between 25 and 40 years (C3). The decision to organize the focus groups according to generational parameters was given based on the fact that it is assumed these two groups went through different generational experiences during the period of dictatorship. The overall method of these two studies was introduced in chapter 3 (section 3.6.2). There are reasons why I decided to analyze the discourse processes of joint remembering in these particular two generational: first, these two generational groups of participants⁴⁴ (born between 1925 and 1935, and 1965 and 1975) were not represented in the previous chapters of this thesis; and second, for different reasons, the cohorts represented by groups C1 and C3 were less affected than the generation born (approximately) between 1940 and 1950 who was the main target of the repression, and their memories are investigated in detail in chapter 5 (see Paco who was born in 1940), chapter 6 (see Guillermo was born in 1947) and chapter 7 (see David Rock and Silvana who were born in 1945 and 1952 respectively).

⁴⁴ To protect the identity of the participants, they agreed to choose a pseudonym, which was used during the entire session.

8.2 Creating agreements through interaction: toward the reconstruction of memories

This section is divided into three sub-sections which show how gradually participants of the group C3 (participants aged between zero and ten years during the period of dictatorship) reconstruct and update situation models about their first-hand recollections during the period of dictatorship in Argentina. The participants of group C3 – Laura (1971), Claudia (1971), Maria (1971), and Alejandro (1967) – were selected due to the fact that they belonged to the generation which spent its childhood and pre-adolescence years under the conditions created by the military regime. One percent of the people who went missing were aged between zero and ten years (CONADEP, 1984).

The extracts analyzed indicate the ways in which discourse strategies regulate and synchronize processes of joint remembering. These processes of joint remembering synchronized by discourse strategies (e.g. agreements, reformulations) create the conditions for the emergence of memories which were unlikely to be retrieved or shared at the beginning of the conversation.

The next extract displays the participants' first reaction after being asked what their memories from the period of dictatorship are. Before presenting the extracts⁴⁵, I introduce a description of the context models of the extracts analyzed.

⁴⁵ The original version in Spanish is followed by the English translation. The line numbers of the English translation are shown in square brackets [x] in the analysis -when they do not match the lines numbers of the Spanish version.




Diagram 7. Description of Context models: Group C3

Group C3. Extract 1 [4.06 – 6.09]

1. **Laura:** Es que no sé, por lo menos me parece que nosotros no (.4) yo no sabía nada, no
2. sé yo le comentaba que yo hasta los doce años, hasta que fue lo de Malvinas o pasó a la
3. democracia yo no sabía que existiera otra forma de gobierno que fuera la (.2) la dictadura
4. militar o que hubiera dictadura miliar en el gobierno (.) eso me parecía lo normal (.)
5. después (.2) ya ahí a los doce o trece años cuando cambió todo, ahí recién es como que te
6. empezás a dar cuenta de que existían otras cosas
7. **María:** Exacto, eso era normal
8. **Claudia:** Lo que yo si viví me acuerdo era como que había mucho miedo, no se podía
9. salir a la calle, era como que te cuidaban (.) yo era muy chica, y nos cuidaban mucho de
10. salir, no llegar tarde o (.2) se cuidaba a la gente de lo que decían, de lo que hacían o de lo
11. que mostraban, era como que todo el tiempo había mucho miedo, pero se no hablaba del
12. tema
13. **Lucas:** ¿En la escuela, casa?
14. **Claudia:** Nadie (.3) todo muy silencioso
15. **María:** No (.3) nosotros no lo vivimos con miedo, no (.4) desde mi casa y (.) mi familia
16. o en mi colegio no recuerdo haberlo vivido con miedo, tal vez porque como te digo era
17. interior de Jujuy, entonces tal vez posiblemente llegaba menos la información o porque
18. al ser un lugar más pequeño no no (.) había tanto e: (.) problemas como acá me imagino
19. pero no no no he vivido con miedo esa época (.) para mí no, es todo lo que nos
20. informamos después, como lo que les pasó a todas ¿Me entendés?
21. **Laura:** : Sí, yo vivía en Quilmas y la verdad no sabía nada (.) es decir no tuve ningún

22. allegado que le pasara algo (.) no sabíamos nada hasta que fue después el cambio de
 23. gobierno cuando empezó lo de la democracia recién ahí te empezabas a dar cuenta o
 24. empezabas a saber qué era lo que había sucedido
 25. **María:** uh
 26. **Claudia:** Sí (.)

1. **Laura:** *I don't know, at least we didn't (.4) I didn't know anything, I was saying that up
 2. until I was twelve, until the Falklands or the return of democracy, I didn't know
 3. that there was a different kind of government other than (.2) the military dictatorship, or
 4. even that there was a dictatorship (.) that seemed normal to me (.) later (.2) when I was
 5. twelve or thirteen, when everything changed, that's when you realize other things exist
 6. **María:** *Exactly, because that was normal*
 7. **Claudia:** *What I did live I remember was that there was a lot of fear, you couldn't go out
 8. to the streets, it was like you were looked after all the time (.) I was very little, and they
 9. looked after us a lot if we went out, or get home late or (.2) people were cautious of what
 10. they said, of what they did or what they showed, it's like there was a lot of fear all the
 11. time, but you wouldn't talk about it*
 12. **Lucas:** *At school, at home?*
 13. **Claudia:** *Nobody (.3) it was all very silent*
 14. **María:** *No (.3) we didn't live in fear, not us (.4) in my house (.) my family or at school, I
 15. don't remember living with fear, maybe because, like I was saying, it was the interior of
 16. Jujuy, so probably there less information was arriving, or maybe because it being a
 17. smaller place, there wasn't (.) so many (.) problems like I imagine there was here (.2) but
 18. no, I didn't live that period with fear (.) not me, it's all that we found out later, like it
 19. happened to everybody, understand?*
 20. **Laura:** *Yes, I was living in Quilmes, and the truth I didn't know anything (.) I mean,
 21. nothing happened to the people around me (.) we didn't know anything until the
 22. government changed and democracy began, that's when you started to realize or know
 23. what had happened*
 24. **María:** *uh huh*
 25. **Claudia:** *Yes(.)**

In line 1, Laura conveys what her situation as a child during the period of dictatorship was like. She uses the 1st person plural form *nosotros* 'we' to establish generational boundaries between the members of the focus group who were born between 1965 and 1975 and other generational groups. She pauses for 4 seconds to give herself time to reformulate her claims while reconstructing situation models of the events she plans to narrate. Since line 2 these events are specifically focused on her personal experience. Pauses of this kind may indicate more controlled cognitive processes of narrative pre-construction (see chapter 3, section 3.3.2.2). We observe another 2 second pause prior to defining the military period as a dictatorship (L. 3-4 [3-4]). Perhaps this may be related to the fact that the military dictatorship is still widely defined as *El Proceso* 'The Process', which stands for *El Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional* 'The National Reorganization Process', and is how the military junta, the media and large sectors of Argentinean society used to define the period.

Next, María agrees with Laura in her mode of remembering how she perceived the military period as a child. Thus, María creates a new common ground (see chapter 3,

section 3.5; Clark, 1996, 2005; Enfield, 2008) with Laura based on the fact of not knowing what was occurring during the dictatorship. However, this common ground does not appear to be totally supported by Claudia's memories in the next turn. The verb *vivi* 'lived', reinforced by the affirmative pronoun *sí* 'yes' and framed as a real recollection 'me acuerdo' *I remember*, functions as a mark of evidentiality sustaining the introduction of an emotional state *miedo* (L.8 [7]) 'fear'. The repetitions of the material verb *cuidar* (L.9-10 [8-9]) 'look after' anticipate the definition of the emotion which determined social behavior during the military dictatorship (L.8 [7-8]). However, the cause of the threat remains implicit. Thus, Claudia appraises the social situation under the conditions created by the military dictatorship.

A couple of turns later, María rejects Claudia's appraisal of the social situation during the military regime. In this way, María tries to maintain the common ground previously created between her and Laura. The use of the negative pronoun *no* 'no' generates expectations in the addressee of María's speech. Such a rejection must be sustained by convincing arguments otherwise María's image as a worthy group member could be damaged. Taking into consideration that the participants of the group do not know each other, the necessity to provide convincing arguments backing up the rejection becomes more salient. Her childhood memories deny the emotional state which determined social behavior introduced by Claudia. Nonetheless, the indices of evidentiality presented by María only refer to her own experience *mi casa* (L. 15) 'my house' [L.14], *mi familia* (L.15) 'my family' [L.14], *mi colegio* (L.16) 'my school'[L.14]. The individualization of her appraisal of the situation is later justified with geographical reasons (L.17 [15-6]). That is, María's lack of knowledge is in accordance with a shared experience – everybody knew later (when democracy returned in 1983) that people were being abducted.

It is interesting to point out the difficulty that emerges at the time of defining the causes that may be provoking fear within the part of society described by Claudia. Two false starts and hesitations (L. 18 [17]) reflect such difficulty, which is overcome by the noun *problemas* 'problems'. We note a low degree of granularity when defining the causes of the social and political situation. Finally, Laura agrees with María's description of the events (L.21 [19]). Such agreement requires an argument to back it up. By reformulating her claims (L.21 [20]), Laura justifies her lack of knowledge and, therefore, the sensation of fear introduced by Claudia. This justification is suggested by *no tuve ningún allegado que le pasara algo* (L.21-22) 'nothing happened to the people

around me' [L.20-1], which triggers the implicature indicating that *she did not know because she was not directly affected*. Then, Laura closes her turn by returning to the topic which she mentioned in the first lines, namely, that she began to find out what had been occurring during the military dictatorship when Argentineans went to the polls in 1983. Thus, Laura returns to common ground about not knowing that she negotiated with Maria at the beginning of the extract.

Due to Claudia's intervention (L.8-12 [7-11]), María and Laura need to reformulate her previous agreement on not knowing what was going on. This agreement created the common ground that the fact of ignoring the human rights violations was 'normal' (e.g. Laura, line 4 and María, line 7 [6]). After Claudia's autobiographical memories rejecting such normality, María and Laura bring such normality closer to the self by means of possessive adjectives *mi casa* 'my house', *mi familia* 'my family' (María, line 15 [14]) and verbal forms in the first person *no tuve ningún allegado que le pasara algo* (Laura, lines 21-22 [20-1]) 'nothing happened to the people around me'⁴⁶. By bringing the normality closer to the self, Maria and Laura are able to still maintain the common ground negotiated at the beginning of interaction. Moreover, the delimitation of the scope of their personal experiences enables them not to challenge Claudia's memories. Despite their lack of agreement with Claudia, neither Laura nor María is attempting to disapprove of Claudia's experience. A strong rejection of Claudia's memories would have caused an unnecessary confrontation during the interaction by undermining the conversational expectations within the focus group (e.g. the search for consensus).

In what follows I demonstrate that the memories which are reconstructed in extract 1 are subject to corrections and new reformulations, which may even contradict the autobiographical memories expressed a few minutes before. The next extract comes 3 seconds after extract 1.

Group C3. Extract 2 [6.14 – 8.41]

27. **Laura:** Perdón (.3) yo, yo lo único que me acuerdo es que decían que no agarrara nada de la
 28. calle, nada más (.) eso la típica del paquete y (.2) que se yo no había que agarrar nada, pero
 29. vos, que se yo (.) yo lo vivía como algo, viste cuando vos le decís a un chico "no agarrés nada
 30. del piso que está con microbios" o así (.2) no no se vivía, yo no lo vivía como algo que podía
 31. ser una bomba o que podía ser algo (.) otra cosa no (.)
 32. **María:** Lo que sí me acuerdo es (.2) no exactamente la fecha pero de alguna (.) de un par de
 33. personas que eran conocidos de mis padres que dijeron "se los llevaron" y yo pregunté ¿A

⁴⁶ The English translation does not reflect the first person in the singular form of the Spanish verb 'tener' in the past tense *tuve* but it keeps the global meaning of original expression uttered in Spanish.

34. dónde se los llevaron”? “Se los llevaron porque andaban en cosas raras”, esa es la explicación
 35. que me dieron a mí y con eso me quedé, ¿entendés? (.2) y bueno después entendí porque se
 36. los llevaron y todo (.3) pero de esa época recuerdo eso “se los llevaron” y que personas que
 37. aparecieron después, sí ellos aparecieron pero después de un, de unos años
 38. **Alejandro:** Yo me acuerdo que hablando de las vueltas y recuerdo ver los falcón verdes
 39. dando vueltas (.) custodiando la escuela y en ese momento en la escuela era donde hablaban
 40. de no agarrar cosas y que estábamos todo el tiempo como observados (.2) e inclusive se
 41. mencionó, yo no lo verifiqué, que había una persona que atendía (.) era una escuela doble
 42. escolaridad y había una persona que trabaja en la cocina, una mujer desagradable dentro de
 43. todo y una vez dijeron “se la llevaron porque le encontraron un arsenal en la casa”, en ese
 44. momento el pensamiento era un poco bueno (.) era una persona desagradable, realmente no
 45. me extrañaría pero (.) me acuerdo de eso, de ver los Falcón verdes, en ese momento yo tenía
 46. conciencia de lo que significaba un Falcón (.2) estoy hablando, no sé, quinto grado

26. **Laura:** *Sorry (.3) I, the only thing that I remember is that they said not to pick up anything
 27. from the streets, that's it (.) the typical story of the package (.2) but you, I don't know (.) for
 28. me, it was like when you tell a kid 'don't pick up anything off the floor because of the germs'
 29. or something like that (.2) no, it wasn't like, for me it wasn't like it could be a bomb or
 30. something (.) something else (.)*

31. **María:** *What I do remember is (.2) not exactly the dates, but some (.) a couple of
 32. people my parents knew and they said 'they were taken away' and I asked 'taken away
 33. where?' 'They were taken away because they were involved in some funny business', that's
 34. the explanation I was given and that's what I understood, see? (.2) well, later I understood
 35. why they were taken and all (.3) but of that period, I remember that 'they were taken away'
 36. and some people reappearing later, yes, they reappeared after a few years*

37. **Alejandro:** *Talking about going round, I remember the green Falcons going round (.)
 38. watching over the school, and at that time the school was where we were told about not
 39. picking up things and that we were sort of being watched all the time (.2) and even I
 40. mentioned, I never verified it, that someone who worked (.) it was a full-day school and there
 41. was a woman who worked in the kitchen, an unpleasant woman and once they said 'they took
 42. her away because they discovered an arsenal in her house', at this time my thinking was
 43. like (.) she was an unpleasant woman, I really wouldn't be surprised but (.) I remember that,
 44. seeing the green Falcons, at this time I was aware of what that car meant (.2) I am
 45. talking about, I don't know, maybe fifth grade*

In line 27 [26] Laura seems to begin remembering something. It is important to point out how this experience is introduced: the usage of an expression of apology is employed to make the other participants anticipate what will be said and may contradict the prior common ground. Laura's apologies for having undermined social agreement (that neither Laura nor Maria knew that people were disappearing) act as a discourse strategy by framing and creating the conditions necessary to insert her childhood experience. As we observed above in regards to María (L.15 [14]), there is a 3 second pause after the apology framing the rejection and correction (L.27 [26]). Laura does not need to re-negotiate the taking of the floor. This lack of overlapping or change in speaker may be provoked by the fact that the other participants expect Laura to back up her rejection. By providing the reasons supporting her rejection, Laura creates an implicit agreement with Claudia (L.8-12 [7-11]), which relies on the fact that both

remember the social fears about how they should have behaved as children. These social fears form part of cultural models of the experience of dictatorship.

The reformulation (L.29-30 [28-9]) that Laura provides as an example depicts a common attitude maintained by many parents towards their children. However, within the communicative interaction it operates as a justificatory strategy by giving arguments as to why she did not know what was occurring during the period of dictatorship. Laura's memories of her childhood experiences (including her memories of the meanings she assigned to such events) warrant her claims about her lack of knowledge. Then, María begins to remember some stories from her childhood as well (L.32 [31]). This behavior may indicate that María is reconstructing situation models about her memory traces of the period of dictatorship which were disregarded less than 2 minutes when she said that she learnt about human rights violations, later, namely, after the end of dictatorship in 1983 (L.19-20 [18-9]). María's memories update the common ground negotiated with Laura in the first extract. Now, it is the case she remembers some autobiographical experiences from childhood. María recalls hearing that people were being abducted. She seems to be reinterpreting her mental states as a child according to her present knowledge (e.g. those people were kidnapped by the military). Thus, for María the re-experiencing of memories during the interaction may create the conditions for the re-description of past experiences.

The new common ground between Claudia María and Laura is based on the fact that they agree on having autobiographical memories which demonstrate that to some extent they knew that something was occurring (e.g. abductions, guerrilla attacks). Based on this updated common ground, Alejandro -who is four years older than María, and Claudia- begins to cooperate by conveying an autobiographical memory from his childhood (L.38 [37]). His narrative not only confirms Laura's memories about the measures taught to children to prevent risks (L.40 [38-9]), but, what is more significant, the abduction of persons introduced by María (L.33 [32]). The use of a verb of perception, *ver* 'to see', serves as an index of evidentiality the aim of which is to reinforce the reliability and non-mediated trait of the memories he is communicating.

Both María (L.33 [32]) and Alejandro (L.43 [41-2]) employ a verb indicating speech, *dijeron* 'they said' to discursively manifest a distancing from reasons they were told by the adults in order to justify the abductions. Nevertheless, Alejandro goes a bit further by providing his own arguments in regards to how, when he was a child of nine or ten years of age, he understood the abductions (L.45-6 [44-5]), rather than

uncritically incorporate and internalize the motives proposed by the adults. Alejandro's move can be thought of as a mechanism used to distance himself from the agreement maintained by Laura and María; he does not merely have memories of events related to the military dictatorship but also he portrays himself as being able to assign meaning to them at the time that the events were experienced⁴⁷.

The piece of interaction that I present next comes after 2.04 minutes discussion (8.43-10.47) about the differences in age between Alejandro (1967), María (1971), Claudia (1971) and Laura (1971), and the lack of information and 1978 FIFA World Cup. The previous 1.03 minute (10.49-10.52) was about which social classes and groups were more affected by the military regime. In a few words, the discussion was centered on which groups were the main target of the kidnappings by the military.

Group C3. Extract 3 [11.53 - 13.29]

47. **María:** Ledesma sí tiene, tenía que ver y (.2) empezando a hacer un poco de memoria con
 48. gente que estaba estudiando (.) e: los padres vivían en Ledesma, los chicos, e: , me refiero a
 49. sus hijos, estudiaban en San Salvador o Tucumán (.) eso sí recuerdo, que se llevaron chicos de
 50. eso lugares, entonces bueno, los padres estaban desesperados (.) entonces bueno (.) toda esa
 51. información me llegaba de lo que escuchaba de mis padres (.2) pero casos puntuales ahí en
 52. Ledesma hubo, hubo varios que después yo me enteré
 53. **Lucas:** ¿Cuándo fue el apagón de Ledesma?
 54. **María:** Para esa época
 55. **Lucas:** Claro (.) para esa época
 56. **María:** Justamente, claro para esa época (.) y hay una persona que tenía (.) un (.2) era líder ahí
 57. por lo que movilizaba dentro del ingenio Ledesma (.2) entonces que es lo hicieron
 58. desaparecer
 59. **Lucas:** Por supuesto
 60. **María:** Era el Dr. Aredez y que después su esposa es la que siguió la lucha y la que formo el
 61. grupo de las madres ahí en Ledesma porque hubo un par de desaparecido si, si (.) pero tiene
 62. que ver todo relacionado con el ingenio, ¿no?
 63. **Claudia:** Eso creo
 64. **María:** Si, es así (.3)

46. **María:** Ledesma is, was involved and (.2) beginning to make one's memories, with people
 47. that were studying (.) uuhh the parents lived in Ledesma, the kids, I mean their children,
 48. studied in San Salvador or Tucumán (.) I do remember that, that they took the kids from those
 49. places, then, well, the parents were desperate (.) then, well (.) all that information I overheard
 50. from my parents (.2) but there were specific cases in Ledesma, there were a few I found out
 51. about later
 52. **Lucas:** When was the night of the blackout in Ledesma?
 53. **María:** Around that time
 54. **Lucas:** Ah (.) around that time
 55. **María:** Of course around that time exactly (.) of course for that period, and there was a
 56. person that had (.) a (.2) he was leader there because he mobilized people within the
 57. Ledesma sugar refinery (.2) then they (the military) caused his disappearance
 58. **Lucas:** Of course
 59. **María:** It was the doctor Arédez and after his wife is the one who then continued the struggle

⁴⁷ Green Ford Falcons were driven by death squads during the period of dictatorship.

60. *and the one who formed the mother's group there in Ledesma because there were a couple of*
 61. *desaparecidos there (.) yes, yes there was (.) yes but it had to do, it all had to do with the*
 62. *sugar mill, isn't it*
 63. **Claudia:** *I believe so*
 64. **María:** *Yes, exactly (.3)*

The updating of common ground, which facilitates the joint construction and communication of memories, which are driven by the participants' intentions and goals, plays a central role in María's search for memories. The situated activity of reconstructing situation models about the experience of dictatorship that enables María to retrieve and to assign new meanings to old memories is reflected in the metaphor that she employs in line 47 [46]; *empezando a hacer un poco de memoria* 'beginning to make one's memories' presupposes that in this case remembering is an action which requires an intentional actor who is willing to remember. Two lines later, María provides a mark of evidentiality, *eso sí recuerdo* 'I do remember that', after a short pause which serves to reinforce the veracity of her memories. In letting us know the source of that autobiographical knowledge, María uses a verb of perception, *escuchaba* 'listened', which operates as a mark of evidentiality. Then, I know that during the military dictatorship there were several massive blackouts in Ledesma⁴⁸ (L.53 [52]), which were intentionally provoked by the military with the assistance of the owners of the sugar mill 'Ledesma'. These blackouts lasted 7 days and were strategically planned in order to abduct workers at the sugar mill, students and political dissidents from their houses at night (Da Silva Catela, 2003).

My intervention acts as a reminder which serves to create common ground between him and María. María and Lucas negotiate this new common ground by expressing their shared knowledge about blackouts. This negotiation is interactionally manifested in the alternation of turns between lines 53 [52] and 59 [58]. The new common ground generates the conditions for María to communicate further memories about the events she is narrating. These reformulated conditions are discursively manifested in the growing level of granularity in the events she is sharing (L.56-8 [55-7] and L. 60-2 [59-62]). Two false starts (L.56 [55-6]) may reflect a certain degree of difficulty in defining the attributes of the new character *el doctor Arédez* 'the doctor Arédez'. Next, María suggests a causal co-relation between Arédez's activities at

⁴⁸ The military, with the help of the owners of the local sugar mill "Ledesma", caused general blackouts in Libertador General San Martín and Cilelegua, two villages in Jujuy. During the general blackout the military abducted hundreds of people, taking them to clandestine detention centres. Thirty of them are still missing.

Ledesma and his kidnapping. This implicature is discursively realized by the logical connective *entonces* ‘so’. The suggestion of such a presupposed causal co-relation occurs after a 2 second pause, which may signal (more) controlled cognitive processes of discourse pre-construction and planning.

In the next section I explore the cognitive and discourse processes of joint remembering in a focus group aged between 70 and 80 years (group C1). The participants born between 1925 and 1935 employ agreements, corrections and reformulations to negotiate and synchronize their individual memories. As it occurred in the communicative interaction analyzed above, the memories conveyed by the participants born between 1925 and 1935 operate at two integrated cognitive levels; one level for facts, e.g. I remember I did X and Y, and a meta-representational memory for one’s own mental states (Bernecker, 2008), e.g. I did not believe X and Y. Due to generational reasons, participants of group C1 were fully aware that people were being abducted and murdered by the military –in contrast to what we have noticed in group C3.

8.3 From not knowing to remembering, but not believing

This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section shows the ways in which the participants of a focus group aged between 70 and 80 years try to portray themselves as members of a society who were not aware of the atrocities that the perpetrators of the military dictatorship were committing. The second sub-section provides empirical evidence on the crucial role that group consensus plays across the interaction.

Despite the fact that the participants of group C1 – Chela (1935), Osvaldo (1935), Carlos (1930), Clarita (1932), Dora (1932), Maria (1935), Nora (1931), and Emilio (1928) – were aged between 40 and 50 years during the period of dictatorship (1976-1983), only 6.8 % of the total number of the missing people belonged to the that age group (CONADEP, 1984).

Before presenting the analysis of the extracts, I provide a description of the context models. The interaction was triggered by the presentation of the following visual stimulus:



Logo of the FIFA World Cup held in Argentina in 1978⁴⁹.




Diagram 8. Description of Context models: Group C1

⁴⁹ The logo of the 1978 World Cup is property of the FIFA.

Group C1. Extract 4 [1.42-4.11]

1. **Clarita:** El mundial de fútbol fue en el 78 (.) fue el año que vino la televisión color acá
2. **Nora:** Nosotros lo ganábamos y no sabíamos lo que estaba pasando en la Argentina
3. **Clarita:** Exacto
4. **Nora:** Que era como que mi hijo me los decía y yo no lo quería creer (.) mi hijo estaba
5. estudiando economía en la facultad (.) me decía “hay campos de concentración, están
6. matando a la gente en la universidad” (.) estábamos entretenidos con el mundial mientras
7. pasado un hecho tan grave como el que pasó que no nos lo vamos a olvidar más
8. **Clarita:** Claro
9. **Nora:** Es una parte de la historia que (.2)
10. **Clarita:** Era todo una gran fiesta por un lado (.) y por otro una gran tragedia (.3)
11. **Nora:** Que no sabíamos
12. **Clarita:** No
13. **Nora:** Lo supimos después, los jóvenes quizás que estaban en la facultad y sabían pero
14. los viejos (.2) los viejos no sabían (.) creíamos que era todo mentira, que no podía ser (.)
15. entonces ese mundial que vivimos con tanto euforia hoy día recordamos (.2) porque
16. somos muy futboleros
17. **Dora:** Y gritamos tanto
18. **Clarita:** Las Malvinas, Galtieri
19. **Nora:** Que desastre
20. **Dora:** Pero se grito también (.) yo fui a todos los actos
21. **Nora:** Yo fui al de Alfonsín cuando estaba
22. **Dora:** No, pero eso es
23. **Nora:** Más antes
24. **Clarita:** Esto fue antes
25. **Dora:** Lo de las Malvinas fue en el 82
26. **Clarita:** Lo de los desaparecidos fue en el 76
27. **Nora:** Sí sí sí (.) sí los chico me acuerdo que contaban que se escapaban de la facultad
28. por las ventanas, mi hijo tiene 51 años, en esa época estaba estudiando económicas, se
29. escapaban por las ventanas, era terrible el medio que tenían, agarraban a cualquiera, los
30. milicos agarraban a cualquiera, al que le tocaba, le tocaba y lo mataban
31. **Clarita:** Yo pienso que hubo una gran violencia, que hubo una gran violencia porque la
32. otra parte también
33. **Dora:** De los dos lados
34. **Clarita:** La otra parte también fue e hizo cosas terribles como poner una bomba en la
35. casa Lanbruschini pero, ellos (los militares) tenían el poder y tenían ejercerlo
36. debidamente
37. **Nora:** Exacto

1. **Clarita:** *The Football World Cup was in 1978 (.) that was the year that color television*
2. *arrived here*
3. **Nora:** *We won and we didn't know what was going on in Argentina*
4. **Clarita:** *That's right*
5. **Nora:** *My son would tell me and I didn't want to believe any of it (.) my son was*
6. *studying economics in the faculty (.) he'd say to me 'there are concentration camps, they*
7. *are killing people at the university' (.) we were distracted by the World Cup while such*
8. *a serious thing was going on, that we will never forget it*
9. **Clarita:** *Of course*
10. **Nora:** *It's a part of history that (.2)*
11. **Clarita:** *On the one hand (.) it was all a big party, and on the other a terrible*
12. *tragedy (.3)*
13. **Nora:** *We didn't know about*
14. **Clarita:** *No*
15. **Nora:** *We knew later, maybe the youngsters at the university knew, but the old people*
16. *(.2) the old people didn't know (.) we thought it was all a lie, it couldn't be possible (.)*
17. *so the World Cup was lived with such euphoria, even today we remember (.2) because*

18. *we're big football buffs*
19. **Dora:** *And we scream so much*
20. **Clarita:** *The Malvinas (Falklands, UK), Galtieri*
21. **Nora:** *What a disaster*
22. **Dora:** *but we scream too (.) I went to all political meetings*
23. **Nora:** *I went to Alfonsín's when he was (.)*
24. **Dora:** *No, but this is*
25. **Nora:** *Much before*
26. **Clarita:** *This was before*
27. **Dora:** *that the thing of Malvinas was in 82*
28. **Clarita:** *The thing of the 'disappeared' was in 76*
29. **Nora:** *Yes, yes, yes (.) I remember the kids talking about people escaping the faculty through windows, my son is 51 years old now, he was in studying economics back then*
30. *(.) they would escape through the windows, it was terrible the fear that they had (.)*
31. *(.) anyone could be taken, the military would take anyone (.) whoever's turn it was (.) that's the way it went and they killed you*
32. **Clarita:** *I think there was great violence, there was great violence on the other side as*
33. *well*
34. **Dora:** *On both sides*
35. **Clarita:** *The other side also did terrible things, like putting a bomb in Lambruschini's house but, they (the military) had the power and should have exercised it properly*
36. **Nora:** *Exactly*

Nora (1935) semantically links the win of the 1978 FIFA World Cup and the military regime and introduces a sense of collective experience by means of the use of *nosotros* 'we' (L.2 [3]), which is then continually employed by other participants in the conversation. Although this is not a multimodal analysis of the interaction (e.g. one that includes descriptions of eye gazes, hand gestures, pointing, etc.), which could capture differences in the referents of the several uses of the personal pronoun in the 1st person plural form, Nora's use of the first 1st person pronoun (L.2 [3]) may have a more inclusive referent (we as Argentines) than the second which is embedded in the verb morphology *no sabíamos* 'we didn't know' (we as participants of this focus group). In other words, the referent of the 1st person pronoun (plural) embedded in the verb morphology is the members of the focus group aged between 70 and 80 years who were not aware of large-scale abductions and torture of people during the dictatorship. This sort of collective experience grounds the sustained use of the 1st person in the plural form, either in the pronominal form or as embedded in verb morphology.

Clarita (L.3, 8, 12 [4, 9, 14]) and Dora (L. 17 [19]) agree with Nora's description of the events. Such agreement among group members serves to morally justify the shared positive attitudes toward the win of the football World Cup and negotiate a new common ground in the communicative interaction, i.e. *estábamos entretenidos con el mundial* (L.6-7) 'we were distracted by the World Cup'[L.7-8]. In short, the massive support of the FIFA World Cup should not be considered as a behavior that helped to

sustain and legitimate the regime. The apparent contradiction between knowing that people were being abducted and, at the same time, participating in the celebrations is further cancelled and justified by making clear that it was only later that they learnt what was occurring (L.13 [15])

Nevertheless, this collective experience based on a new common ground which emerges from the agreement during the interaction is undermined several times by Nora's autobiographical memories (L.4-7, 27-30 [5-8, 29-33]). Nora begins reconstructing situation models about her individual recollections which seems to deny her previous positioning as someone who was not aware of the crimes being committed by the perpetrators of the military regime. The transition from not knowing (L. 2, 11, 13-6 [3, 13, 15-8]) to remembering (L. 5-6, 27-30 [6-7, 29-33]) but not believing (L.4, 14 [5, 16]) must be justified in some way to maintain a coherent moral sense. The change from the 1st person singular pronoun *yo* (L.4) 'I' [L.5] to the plural form *nosotros* (L.6) 'we' [L.7], which is embedded in the verb morphology *creíamos que era todo mentira* (L.14) 'we thought it was all a lie' [L.16], implies that the decision not to believe was shared to a large extent. Interestingly, none of participants rejects Nora's inclusive use of the first plural and tries to distance her/himself from Nora's memories of past mental states. Nora further conceptualizes the identification of *we*-forms with the participants of the interaction (born between 1925 and 1935) by defining those who did not know as *los viejos* (L.14) 'old people' [L.15-6].

Nora defines what was occurring during the period of dictatorship by means of a reformulation of a previous interaction with her son (L.4-7 [5-8]) and by reporting what she listened to (L. 27-30 [29-33]). The source of her knowledge is her son's experiences. These operate as indices of evidentiality supporting Nora's descriptions, which seem to be appropriated (e.g. due to the lack of challenges from other participants) according to her context models. Nora's re-descriptions may also be cases in which the situated act of reconstructing situation models of memories of autobiographical events related to the military regime may facilitate the reinterpretation of past mental states.

It is important to point out that the only instance of rejection and correction within the communicative interaction (L.22-6 [24-8]) aims at providing a more accurate chronology of the historical events (FIFA World Cup in 1978, the Malvinas war in 1982, and the return of democracy a year later). This regulatory interactional mechanism indicates that accuracy in relation to non-controversial issues, such as the

chronology of historical events, may be a shared goal of the group. However, as we noted, this does not occur for more controversial topics such as the description of actions (e.g. abductions), actors (e.g. perpetrators and victims), and, remarkably, the transition from not knowing to remembering but not believing.

In lines 31-2 [34-5] and 34-6 [37-8], Clarita seems to challenge the description of the victims presented by Nora a few lines above (L.29-30 [32-3]). Clarita's description of the human target of the political repression undermines Nora's passive representation (L.29-30 [32-3]). Clarita introduces such differences in the way of defining these actors by the use of both the 1st person singular pronoun *yo* 'I' (see chapter 5, section 5.6.2) and the subjective epistemic modalizer (Papafragou, 2006: 1696) *pienso* 'I think'. Dora agrees with Clarita (L.33 [36]) on defining the political spectrum of the late seventies in metaphorical and spatial terms, i.e. *partes* 'parts' (Clarita) and *lados* 'sides'. Then, the increasing level of granularity in Clarita's description of the actions carried out by members of armed, political organizations (L.34-6 [37-8]) justifies the metaphorical conceptualization in terms of 'parts' or 'sides'. However, the disclaimer *pero* (L.35 [38]) 'but' tries to block inferential processes generated by the spatial conceptualization, which may suggest a symmetry in the consequences of the violent actions performed by both actors. Finally, Nora agrees on the differentiation triggered by the disclaimer and, thereby, reinforces the group's consensus.

From minute 4.42 to 10.12 the participants of the focus group C1 discussed about the following themes: i) Malvinas War (4.44-7.22); ii) the 1978 FIFA World Cup (7.29-8.56); and iii) the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo (9.06-10.08)

Group C1. Extract 5 [10.13-10.32]

38. **Nora:** Yo recuerdo en esa época mi hijo que estaba en económicas y un chico de en frente que
39. era compañero de él le cruzaron dos camiones y se lo llevaron al chico que no tenía nada que
40. ver, le rompieron toda la casa, no lo mataron de casualidad, nada que ver el chico
41. **Clarita:** El problema era figurar en una agenda (.) figurás en una agenda, ya está
42. **Dora:** De otro

40. **Nora:** I remember that my son was studying economics back then and a kid from across the
41. street that studied with him, two trucks came and took him, the kid had nothing to do with
42. anything, they destroyed his house, he was lucky they didn't kill him, he had nothing to do
43. with anything
44. **Clarita:** The problem was even being in an address book (.) they found your name in an
45. address book and that was it (.)
46. **Dora:** Someone else's

6.02 minutes later in the interaction Nora returns to the theme being discussed in extract 4. In line 38 [40], she reformulates the narrative communicated a few minutes before. In this reformulation she shares a more concrete story in which she reiterates a representation of the victims as passive actors who were abducted by the military without any compelling reason. Thus, Nora rejects Clarita's description of the victims in lines 31-2 [34-5] and 34-6 [37-8] in which she metaphorically defined them in spatial terms. Surprisingly, it seems that Nora had agreed on Clarita's description of victims in line 37 [39].

In line 41 [44] Clarita brings into the interaction the *agenda* 'address book' as incriminatory object. The fact of having one's name written down in someone else's address as sufficient reason to be abducted and murdered may form part of socially shared knowledge about the experience of dictatorship (see chapter 6, section 6.2). She is, thus, agreeing with Nora's description of the victims as passive actors but to some extent rejecting her previous definition of the victims as actors who carried out bombings less than 6 minutes before (L.34-6 [37-8]).

Nora's definition of the victims as passive actors (L. 29-30 [32-3]) and her agreement with Clarita's description of them as violent actors who carried out bombings (L. 34-6 [37-8]) seems to reformulate her previous definition a few seconds before. This shows the synchronization of different views about the victims. This synchronization led to the creation of a common ground, namely, that the military was not the only violent actor. 6.02 minutes later, Nora reformulates the events narrated in the first extract and Clarita agrees on her description of the victims (L.41 [44-5]). Thus, the new common ground negotiated in the second extract indicates that the victims were passive actors and, thereby, undermines their agreement 6 minutes before. The coordination of different views about the victims of the military regime is determined by context-dependent cognitive and discursive processes, the goal of which is the reach of consensus between the participants.

The time elapsed between lines 31-7 [34-9] and 38-42 [40-6] (6.02 minutes) may facilitate the re-negotiation of common ground in the mode of defining the victims, without being perceived as a contradiction because both, Nora and Clarita may be less conscious aware of what they expressed a few minutes ago. That is, the attributes of the victims (e.g. violent) at the end of the first extract may be deactivated from the working memory episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000). Baddeley (2000) claims that precisely conscious awareness is assumed to be principal mode of retrieval from the buffer

(p.417). The working memory episodic buffer links information from visual, spatial, and verbal information with chronological order (e.g. the ongoing communicative interaction) to episodic and semantic memory (see chapter 3, sections 3.2.1, 3.2.1.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3), that is to mental models assigning the meanings of the expressions.

8.4 Summary and conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to explore cognitive and discourse processes of joint remembering in two focus groups of strangers by means of discourse strategies (e.g. agreements and reformulations). This chapter has provided empirical evidence to better understand the ways in which two focus groups of strangers who belong to generational cohorts less represented in this thesis, negotiated and coordinated memories (of events and mental states) in private settings. The theoretical and methodological framework used in this study was explained in detail in chapter 3, as well as applied to processes of collective remembering in a family conversation about periods of political violence in Argentina in chapter 7. The cognitive and pragmatic analysis has indicated how the participants of two groups of strangers from different generational cohorts negotiate and synchronize autobiographical memories and socially shared knowledge of the experience of dictatorship.

The analysis has shown how the participants of the focus group C3 gradually began to jointly remember memories from their childhood during the period of dictatorship. The reconstruction of situation models of their memory traces related to their childhood experiences during the ongoing communicative interaction led the participants to create and update the common ground between them. This successive reconstruction and updating of common ground was determined by means of agreements and reformulations. We also observed that the memories that the participants expressed in the interaction were not only about facts but also about their mental states at the time of experiencing the events that they reported. It is important to point out that due to the fact that the participants did not know each other, they did not have a stock of shared memories as it occurred in the family conversation in chapter 7. Although they did not share situation models of past experiences (they did not experience events together), they were not only able to coordinate and synchronize recollections about similar topics (e.g. how they first learnt that people were disappearing) but also about their mental states when experiencing such events (e.g. María's thoughts when listening to her parents justifying the abductions of a couple

people they knew in Jujuy). The discursive coordination of topics and mental states of personal recollections related to the experience of dictatorship enabled them to create and update the common ground in the two extracts analyzed.

The participants of the focus group C1 (also formed by strangers) created and updated the common ground by means of agreements and reformulations, likewise the participants of C3. The updating of common ground, e.g. from not knowing to remembering, but not believing, and the proposal of new ones by reinterpreting memories of mental states (e.g. not believing during the period of dictatorship, but believing today) have indicated that the successive cognitive and discursive re-experiencing of individual memories of specific events influenced how the participants evaluated those memories. The updating of the common ground by means of agreements and reformulations was the common mechanism employed to generate consensus about different versions of the past. The consensus between the participants of C1 was in constant flux, and therefore, created the cognitive and situational conditions for the emergence and coexistence (in a short period of time) of different versions of the past (e.g. representation of the victims) which did not exclude each other for the participants. More data and analysis are undoubtedly needed to explain why and how the reach of consensus overshadowed potential disagreements about the representation of the victims between the participants of C1.

9. CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis I have investigated cognitive and discourse processes of remembering related to periods of political violence in Argentina, in general, and in particular to the 1976-1983 military dictatorship in Argentina. The analysis of memory-making processes in relation to Argentina's traumatic past in institutional and private settings was performed for two main reasons. Firstly, it was conducted because of the increasing importance of revisiting the traumatic political pasts, not only in Argentina's, but also in Latin American's post dictatorship societies. Secondly, the analysis of cognitive and discourse processes of remembering related to the 1976-1983 dictatorship represents an excellent topic for exploring the interpenetration of the social, cultural, historical, and cognitive mechanisms that are involved in processes of remembering in conversation in both institutional and private settings. Moreover, I also explained a new interdisciplinary approach to discourse and cognitive processes in autobiographical and collective remembering in order to explore how people remember in real-world activities. The cognitive pragmatics of remembering approach that I developed and used for this thesis allowed me to analyze the discursive, cognitive and interactional mechanisms that are involved in processes of remembering in everyday life.

9.1 The cognitive pragmatics of remembering

This thesis proposes a new cognitive pragmatics of remembering that seeks to integrate discursive, cognitive and social approaches in order to better understand how processes of memory-making unfold in real-life settings. I began with the assumption that autobiographical and collective memories are usually based on cultural and situational models that may be shared among group members to some extent. Autobiographical and collective memories can be verbally conveyed in a wide range of dynamic physical and social environments, from institutional settings to everyday conversations at the dinner table. These physical and social environments facilitate, trigger, and shape processes of memory reconstructions. Thus, the cognitive and discourse processes of negotiating and synchronizing cultural and situation models are driven by context models in communicative interactions by means of discourse strategies.

9.1.1 An integrated social and cognitive approach to discursive remembering in real-world activities

This thesis has shown the importance of an interdisciplinary approach in memory studies. Processes of remembering are social, cognitive, discourse and embodied acts that unfold in communicative interactions in situated activities. Therefore, the discursively and socially oriented perspective of this thesis partly matches the standpoint maintained by discourse psychologists. They claim that remembering in social groups needs to be considered a social act that is a way of accomplishing some activity in the present through invoking the past (Brown, Middleton & Lightfoot, 2001: 125). However, this work has highlighted the importance of integrating the discursive and social standpoint of memory research in discourse psychology with the cognitive aspect of memory processes. This cognitive aspect has been taken into account by social and cognitive psychologists without paying enough attention to the discursive and pragmatic dimension of memory processes in social groups. One of the purposes of this thesis has been to integrate the discursive and pragmatic nature of practices of remembering with the cognitive processes that enable the synchronization of individual and shared memories with the social and material environment in which they are communicated.

Thus, discursive remembering should be considered not merely a social act that unfolds in communicative interaction. From the theoretical standpoint that I used in the analysis, which I explained in chapter 3, discursive remembering is rather a socio-cognitive act that synthesizes discursive, social, embodied, and cognitive features that need to be coordinated in meaningful ways when people reconstruct and communicate individual and shared memories in social interactions. This complex integration of discourse and cognitive mechanisms is determined by the interpenetration of mental models, and it is (partly) behaviorally realized by means of discourse strategies.

In the following section I discuss the theoretical contribution of this thesis to current memory research. I also explain how the global empirical findings of this thesis related to processes of remembering related to the military dictatorship in Argentina serve to make this new interdisciplinary approach relevant to current memory studies.

9.2 Cultural models and social representations of the past

As I discussed in chapter 3, cultural and situation models shape the reconstruction of individual and shared memories in situated activities. Cultural models are formed by socially shared knowledge and emotional codes of specific epistemic and emotional communities. Thus, the ways in which these communities interpret features of their social and material environment depend on the knowledge and emotions that underpin their cultural models. Cultural models play a key role in understanding of diagrams and other visual images, sounds, smells, language, gestures, etc. They enable community members to make inferences about the characteristics of information that is not present in their social and material environments. In short, cultural models play a crucial role in an individual's interpretation of the perceptual and conceptual features of the environment. These interpretation processes are based on the socially shared knowledge and emotional norms of the communities that we belong to.

Sociologists and some social and cultural psychologists argue that we can find forms of collective memory in personal narratives that do not include individual memories of personal experiences or any mediation of the communicative interactions. In my view, these forms of 'social memory' are largely based on cultural models that are learnt, structured and transmitted to us as members of specific epistemic and emotional communities. Hence, in many cases there are no personal recollections in what sociologists and some socio-cultural psychologists call collective or social memories. Therefore, I rather describe these forms of 'memory' as social representations of a shared past at the national and community level that rely on socially shared knowledge and emotional norms that are based on cultural models of epistemic and emotional communities. In short, cultural models enable individuals to interpret their nation's and community's history, as well as personal and shared memories in communicative interactions. Thus, changes in cultural models throughout both national community history and the individual's course of life exert a crucial influence on how we interpret the past and project ourselves into the future.

9.2.1 Changing cultural models of the traumatic past in Argentina

Discourse practices are crucial in the formation, consolidation and change of cultural models in society. In chapter 4 we observed the ways in which Néstor Kirchner created a new time frame that he came to employ in 2003. This new time frame allows Néstor

Kirchner to officially categorize the military regime by means of the genocide-model, and thereby, to denounce the politics of forgetfulness that are promoted by post-dictatorial governments, and more importantly, to bring the victims' political project into the present. The discourse strategies that he used in the four commemorative speeches were meant to reconstruct cultural models of the events, actors and actions that are part of the experience of dictatorship in Argentina. By Néstor Kirchner ordering the removal of the portrait of ex general Videla, and then defining the social and political meaning of that action by means of political uses of discourse strategies illustrated the ways in which Néstor Kirchner embodied and discursive practices were aimed at producing a new common ground for the traumatic past in Argentina.

The reconstruction and updating of cultural models of the dictatorship in Argentina guides processes of political cognition in society and may be the basis for revisiting of the traumatic past at individual and group level in private settings. New cultural models (e.g. the genocide-model) create the right environment for the reformulation of social frameworks of remembrance (Halbwachs, 1992) which may ease revisiting of individual and shared memories about the traumatic past in Argentina.

The empirical studies that were presented in chapters 5, 6 and 8 show different positions on the reformulated cultural models of the time frame that Néstor Kirchner has come to build in 2003. In chapter 5, Paco's behavior during the interaction indicates that coherence in the construction of a positive self-representation was created at the expense of denying socially shared knowledge of the military regime. Moreover, by explicitly blaming the victims of the dictatorship he did not follow the current emotional norms for the traumatic past. Thus, Paco resisted the cultural models (e.g. the genocide-model) promoted by the administration of Néstor Kirchner in the new time frame. On the other hand, in chapter 6 I noted how Guillermo's autobiographical narrative provides a realization of the cultural models that have been officially promoted since 2003. His autobiographical narrative embodies the political project and social values (e.g. bonds of solidarity and helping behavior) that Néstor Kirchner tried to bring into the present in the four commemorative speeches that were analyzed in chapter 4.

Finally, chapter 8 shows that members of both focus group used various first person plural pronouns such as 'we', 'our' and 'us' in order to construct a sort of shared experience for the period of dictatorship. This process of coordination of individual memories led to the creation and reformulation of common grounds that explicitly manifested agreements on cultural models related to the military regime. The focus

group, formed by participants who were born between 1925 and 1935, contradictorily represented itself as being almost simultaneously aware and unaware of the abductions that happened during the military regime. This contradictory behavior may signal the co-existence of opposing cultural models that are employed to interpret the military dictatorship.

The empirical evidence suggests that the concept of cultural models would need to be further specified by taking into account the histories of individuals and processes of social identification with larger social groups. In other words, due to the fact that cultural models are basically knowledge and emotional norms that are shared by epistemic and emotional communities, it is important to establish better criteria for defining the features that form these communities. What the evidence of this thesis implies is that cultural models were negotiated and synchronized in the communicative interaction by the participants when they were talking about the military regime. By means of discourse strategies, these processes of synchronization were meant to facilitate reaching a consensus, and attempted to prevent the participants from voicing opposing views about the traumatic past (e.g. to minimize the number of rejections).

9.3 Situation models: reconstructing memory traces of individual and shared experiences

As I explained in chapter 3, situation models (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radansky, 1998) we are endowed with the ability to represent and construct interpretations of specific autobiographical episodes. Situation models are constructed and represented in episodic memory and they integrate relevant information from cultural models. When we participate in and understand everyday action we construct and update our situation models according to personal interpretations of such autobiographical episodes. The construction and updating of situation models is shaped by cognitive processes of event segmentation, interpretation of discourse, and the reconstruction of old models for similar episodes. Situation models are also determined by autobiographical knowledge and relevant information (e.g. socially-shared knowledge and emotional codes) about cultural models.

The empirical evidence of this work shows the ways in which the participants in this study reconstructed and updated situation models for their personal experiences related to the military dictatorship. My approach for analyzing cognitive and discourse

processes of autobiographical and collective remembering in real-world activities to a large extent relies on the concept of the situation models. Thus, this thesis tries to show how useful situation models are in exploring memory processes in everyday communicative interactions. This is a new use of the concept of situation models that extends their previous applications in less dynamic interactive environments. In chapter 6, Guillermo's autobiographical episodes presented a process of gradual agentization, from being a passive victim to an active political actor during exile. The lack of challenges from the other participants of the interaction created the right conditions for him to begin this process of gradual agentization by which he ended up portraying himself as an active political actor who took part in saving many lives of persecuted people. Guillermo's behavior towards a gradual agentization of his autobiographical episodes reflects processes of synchronization of cultural models and situation models of socially-shared knowledge, and emotional codes towards the dictatorship, and his embedded personal experiences. This shows that he calculated how he could gradually introduce his personal experiences as an active member of a political organization while avoiding being challenged by the other participants, who may have believed that people like Guillermo were terrorists. These observations match the traditional descriptions of situation models in cognitive psychology and discourse studies.

Despite their highly strategic and planned features, the reconstruction of situation models of memory traces related to experiences from the period of dictatorship was problematic to some extent (e.g. false starts, long silences and reformulations). In chapter 5, due to the dynamic of interview (which was mainly about Paco's personal recollections), and the principle of cooperation in human communication, Paco was put in a position where he felt obliged to introduce his professional activities during the period of dictatorship. In these cases several false starts, reformulations and contradictions indicated more controlled processes of discourse planning, in comparison to how he behaved when he talked about socially shared knowledge of the period of dictatorship. These more controlled processes of discourse planning highlight the difficulties when reconstructing situation models about past experiences that are embedded in the period of dictatorship. These difficulties may imply that the interviewees were engaged in deceptive behavior. A better understanding of the cognitive and discursive difficulties that interviewees have while reconstructing situation models of past experiences related to traumatic pasts has practical implications

in legal actions against serious breaches of human rights, and the role of bystanders and their testimonies in court.

The communicative interaction also led the participants to engage in joint storytelling, and thus the joint reconstruction of situation models about their personal experiences that are embedded in the period of dictatorship. In chapter 8, the memories that were reconstructed and communicated by the participants born between 1925 and 1935, as well as between 1965 and 1975, were about two integrated layers of experience. These integrated layers of experience in the participants' recollections consisted of memories of events (e.g. 'I remember the kids talking about people escaping through the windows'), and memories of the participants' mental states when these events occurred (e.g. 'I didn't want to believe any of it'). The recollection of autobiographical memories that emerged in the situated reconstruction the situation models was driven by the processes of joint remembering. These memories were unlikely to be retrieved or shared by the participants at the beginning of the communicative interaction. The inability to retrieve these personal experiences may have reflected a certain 'inadequacy' of the retrieval cues at the beginning of the interaction. This 'inadequacy' may have been related to a lack of common ground between the participants when the interaction started because a few minutes later they showed that they could access, reconstruct and share their autobiographical memories of the period of dictatorship. More empirical evidence would be needed to explain this phenomenon in better detail.

The analysis points out some of benefits of a situated activity of joint remembering, even in cases where the subjects involved in the communicative interaction do not know each other. Even if the participants lacked shared memories about the events they experienced together, they had the ability to coordinate autobiographical memories about similar events and their mental states when they experienced them. This indicates that the reconstruction and updating of situation models not only of autobiographical events but also mental states when experiencing such events is facilitated by communicative interaction, even when these memories are not about shared experiences in the past. Thus, the interactional and naturalistic features of these analyses serve to expand the theory of situation models for the mental states of individuals engaged in discourse comprehension and production tasks in experimental settings.

The joint reconstruction and synchronization of memories for shared experiences in the past shapes the processes of collective remembering. Thus, processes of collective memory-making are determined by the interaction of individual memories of shared experiences and not just by the influence exerted by external memory devices such as museums, narrative templates, and social frameworks of remembrances, etc shared by community members. Hence, forms of collective memory require mediating communicative interactions between individuals who experienced the same events in the past either as participants or spectators. These mediating processes facilitate the retrieval of autobiographical memories of shared experiences and their analysis provides a first step towards a new theory of collective memory based on the cognitive and discursive synchronization of the individual memories of shared experiences in communicative interactions.

By means of the theory of situation models this new perspective on the processes of collective remembering in naturalistic settings integrates and synthesizes the discursive and pragmatic orientation of the long research tradition for social remembering in discourse psychology (Edwards & Middleton, 1986; Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Middleton & Brown, 2005) with the current approaches to socially-situated remembering in philosophical psychology and cognitive psychology (Harris, Paterson & Kemp, 2008; Sutton, Harris, Keil & Barnier, 2010).

9.4 Context models: the relevance of social and material environments in remembering

As already been discussed in chapter 3, several studies and approaches in memory studies provide evidence that when remembering in everyday life, the social and material environments for retrieval and successive re-construction of past experiences exert a crucial influence in facilitating or inhibiting recall performance (Harris, Keil, Sutton & Barnier, 2010). The human and physical cues that populate these environments shape the reconstruction and updating of cultural and situation models of past experiences. Thus, a theory of context is crucial for enhancing memory research on the functions of discursive remembering in real-world activities in naturalistic settings.

Context models (van Dijk, 2008b, 2009b) are personal representations of the social and material environments where communicative interactions unfold. Interlocutors use context models to behaviorally accommodate their cultural and

situation models and thus make them appropriate for their representation of the communicative interaction. Context models shape the ways in which we communicate the experiences that are reconstructed and updated in cultural and situation models. Hence, they have marked pragmatic nature that complements the semantic role of cultural and situation models when reconstructing past experiences. Context models can be partially planned in advance because we have the ability to reconstruct representations of similar communicative situations. On the other hand, they are dynamic and flexible because interlocutors are able to reconstruct and update them automatically, implicitly and subconsciously when pragmatic and other relevant changes (setting, the participants, the participants' epistemic and deontic states, emotions, etc.) occur in the interlocutors' social and physical environments. Although social and cognitive psychologists have repeatedly acknowledged that the context of remembering plays a key role in guiding memory processes, they do not account in detail for the cognitive and interactional features that determine how memories are reconstructed and communicated. On the other hand, social psychologists, anthropologists and linguists working on context have paid little attention to the influence that context has on shaping memory processes in socially-situated interactions.

The analysis of the cognitive and discourse processes of remembering in chapters 4 to 8 shows the central role that context models play in shaping the synchronization of cultural and situation models that are related to socially shared knowledge, emotional codes, and the individual and shared memories related to the 1976-1983 military dictatorship in Argentina. These processes of negotiation and synchronization are behaviorally realized by means of discourse strategies. The analysis indicates that the mechanisms that Néstor Kirchner employed in trying to achieve his political goals depended on shifting context models. Thus, despite the fact that Néstor Kirchner's intentions and goals in the four commemorative speeches remain the same to a large extent, he used a wide array of discourse strategies in order to legitimize his political standpoint, and this reflected the differences in how he represented the communicative situations.

For occurrences of autobiographical remembering in private settings we observed that Paco's reconstruction and updating of his strategic hypothesis about my epistemic and deontic states made him use discourse strategies to try to prevent me from making negative inferences that could undermine his attempt at face-keeping. The lack of

challenges from the other participants of the focus group in chapter 6 enabled Guillermo to update his context models. The updating of context models, and thus, the negotiation of a new common ground in the interaction, enabled him to strategically calculate how he could gradually introduce his personal experiences. Shifting context models guided Guillermo's online reconstruction of situation models. The analysis suggests that the online reconstruction of situation models is a highly strategic, planned and interactional cognitive and discourse process that is driven by personal intentions and goals (e.g. to avoid the creation of a negative self-representation on the interlocutor), dependent on context models.

For joint and collective remembering we noted how collaborative mechanisms aimed at providing cognitive support to the speaker's reconstruction and communication of memories. These collaborative mechanisms were driven by discourse strategies such as rejections, corrections and agreements, all of which were used according to context models. In chapter 7, rejections, corrections and reminders led to the reconstructions of overlapped and shared situation models in the family conversation. These reconstructions were discursively reflected in repairs and reformulation, the goal of which was the achievement of consensus and accuracy according to the family's criteria. Thus, the family members avoided conflict that could undermine the joint construction of a collective memory based on their shared family history. On the other hand, in chapter 8 the two focus groups of people who did not know each other but belonged to the same age group, the updating of the context models by means of agreements and reformulations was the most common mechanism that was employed to generate consensus about different versions of the past. The consensus among the participants was in constant flux, and thus it created the right conditions for the emergence and coexistence (in a short period of time) of different versions of the past (e.g. representation of the victims) that were not mutually exclusive for the participants.

In sum, the processes of joint and collective remembering that were analyzed in chapters 7 and 8 indicate that consensus and accuracy according to the group's criteria were the main objectives of the participants. And these collaborative processes, which led to consensus and accuracy, were regulated by discourse strategies, the use of which is always determined by context models. Most importantly, reaching a consensus even overshadowed potential disagreements about issues that could have been controversial (e.g. representation of the victims) due to the co-existence of opposing cultural models (the war-model vs. the genocide-model) that were used to interpret the traumatic past.

9.5 Limitations and future research

The new interdisciplinary approach that I explained and used in this thesis is a first step towards a better understanding of the cognitive and discourse processes of autobiographical and collective remembering in everyday environments. Moreover, this thesis is the first attempt to deal with the social, political, cognitive and discursive features of remembering of the military dictatorship in Argentina in public and private settings. Hence, it is the first bridge that links social interaction and social cognition research in memory processes about the troubling and traumatic pasts. More empirical evidence and systematic linguistic analysis of processes of memory-making in public settings (e.g., political speeches, media discourses, commemorative practices and memorials), as well in private settings (e.g. interviews and focus groups) are undoubtedly needed to draw more representative conclusions in regard to the cognitive, material and discursive interpenetration of changing cultural models and individual and shared situation models about the experience of dictatorship in present Argentina. Future memory research on the ways in which periods of political violence and human rights abuse that are reconstructed and communicated in public and private settings will need to account for the multidimensional features of these complex processes.

As my data consisted of political speeches and audio recordings, I focused on the social, cognitive and discursive features of processes of remembering in this work. The focus groups and interviews were useful for the particular purposes of this thesis. However, their open-ended nature made the summarization and interpretation of how processes of autobiographical and collective remembering unfold difficult. Moreover, the participants tended to reconstruct and communicate memories about their own past which were in line with the rest of the group. In this way, some of the participants could have decided not to share some memories because they were in accordance with the general consensus of the group. Another limitation of the focus groups was that in some cases one participant (e.g. David Rock, see chapter 7) dominated the group, and thus the distribution of interactional turns. We must bear in mind that the focus groups of people who did not know each other were not fully confidential or anonymous because their memories were shared with others in the groups. Finally, it is important to point out the interviews and focus groups were artificially created according to my research goals. Hence, they were a middle ground method of inquiry between experimental studies, and

investigations on naturally occurring interactions conducted by discourse psychologists and cognitive ethnographers.

The lack of multimodal data that would have enabled me to analyze the embodied features of memory processes is another limitation of this thesis. Video recordings would enable me the analysis of gestures with referential function that will be essential for exploring how physical events and abstract ideas that are related to past experiences are being constructed, represented and conveyed in imagistic ways. A multimodal analysis will provide compelling evidence about the multimodal features of mental models, and show how gestural imagery is shared between members of epistemic and emotional communities. Moreover, as processes of autobiographical and collective remembering also unfold in material environments populated with memory cues, future research should deal with the role that personal objects loaded with emotional significance play in guiding memory processes in real-world activities. Hence, video recording will be necessary for keeping track of how individuals and groups (literally and figuratively) handle these artifacts while they reconstruct mental models of individual and shared memories in ongoing multimodal communicative interactions.

As context models play a central role in shaping the communicative interactions in which individual and shared memories are reconstructed, synchronized and communicated, more cross-cultural and comparative research on multimodal processes of autobiographical and collective remembering in everyday environments will be needed to examine, for instance, how the roles and power relationships of individuals may facilitate or inhibit the co-construction of memories of shared experiences.

The multimodal features of future research will enable the exploration in better detail how context models are reconstructed and updated in multimodal interactions about past experiences. A better understanding of these processes is essential to provide a more accurate account of how common ground is negotiated and coordinated in communicative interaction about individual and shared memories and thus how it enables the (joint) reconstruction and communication of past experiences that the interlocutors believe are relevant to share with others. This line of research may have some practical implications for understanding cognitive-pragmatic disorders that may result from brain injury and mental illness. Hence, a better insight into how context models are reconstructed and updated in multimodal communicative interactions about past experiences in nonclinical populations may contribute to current neuropsychological research on memory impairments in clinical populations. Moreover,

future investigation of how groups cognitively and behaviorally synchronize and negotiate situation models of individual and shared past experiences according to their shifting context models may also contribute to computer science research so that the design of assistive technologies for people with memory impairments (e.g. multiple wall calendars and personal PDAs) can be improved

In sum, this thesis explained a new cognitive and pragmatic approach to socially-situated remembering that represents a contribution to the development of current agendas in memory research in the cognitive and social sciences. The analysis of discourse and cognitive processes in communicative interactions about the military dictatorship in Argentina enabled me to integrate the social, cognitive, discursive and interactional properties that drive the situated reconstruction and communication of memories in real-world activities. This thesis embodies an explicit attempt to account for the social, cognitive and discursive aspects of the memory processes in communicative interactions in real-world activities. These are the complementary aspects of memory processes in everyday life that should be taken into account in interdisciplinary memory research in the upcoming years.

Bibliography

- Achugar, M. (2008). *What We Remember. The Construction of Memory in Military Discourse*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins
- Achugar, M. (2009). Constructing the past and constructing themselves: the Uruguayan military's memory of the dictatorship. *Critical Discourse Studies* 6 (4), 283-295.
- Acuña, C. (ed.) (1995). *Juicio, Castigos y Memorias. Derechos Humanos y Justicia en la Política Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión.
- Addis, D. R., Moscovitch, M. & McAndrews, M. P. (2007). Consequences of hippocampal damage across the autobiographical memory retrieval network in patients with left temporal lobe epilepsy. *Brain* 130, 2327-2342.
- Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T. & Schacter, D. L. (2007). Remembering the past and imagining the future: Common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and elaboration. *Neuropsychologia* 45, 1363-1377.
- Aguila, G. (2008). *Dictadura, Represión y Sociedad en Rosario. Un Estudio sobre los Comportamientos y Actitudes Sociales en Dictadura*. Buenos Aires: Prometeo.
- Aikhenvald, A. (2004). *Evidentiality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Alabarces, P. (2002). *Fútbol y patria. El fútbol y las narrativas de la nación en Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Prometeo.
- Arcidiacono, F., Pontecorvo, C. and Greco Morasso, S. (2009). Family Conversations: The Relevance of Context in Evaluating Argumentation. *Studies in Communication and Sciences* 9(2): 79–92.
- Atance, C.M. & O'Neill, D.K. (2001). Episodic future thinking. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 5, 533–539.
- Atkinson, J.M., J. Heritage, (eds.) (1984). *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Atkinson, R. (1998). *The Life Story Interview* (Sage University Papers Series on Qualitative Research Methods, Vol. 44). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Austin, J. (1962) *How to do things with words*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Azpiazu, D. & Shorr, M. (2004). Los impactos regresivos de las privatizaciones en la Argentina: ¿"errores de dise-o" o funcionalidad frente a los intereses del poder económico? In: Boyer, R., Neffa, J., Keifman, S., Miotti, L., Queman, C. & Rapoport, M. (eds.), *La Economía Argentina y su Crisis (1976-2001): Visiones Institucionalistas y Regulacionistas*. Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila & CEIL-PIETTE.
- Baddeley, AD. (2000). The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory? *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 4 (11), 417-423.
- Baddeley, AD. (2007). *Working Memory, Thought and Action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Ball, L.J. & Ormerod, T.C. (2000). Putting ethnography to work: the case for a cognitive ethnography of design. *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies* 53, 147-168.
- Bamberg, M. (2006). Stories: big or small: why do we care? *Narrative Inquiry* [Special issue, Narrative – State of the Art] 16 (1), 139-147.
- Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 3: 193-209.
- Bandura, A. (2002). Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency. *Journal of Moral Education*, 31.2: 101-119.
- Barnier, A. (2010). Memories, memory studies and my iPhone: Editorial. *Memory Studies* 3 (4), 293-297.
- Barnier, A. Sutton, J., Harris, C. & Wilson, R. (2008). A conceptual and empirical framework for the social distribution of cognition: the case of memory. *Cognitive Systems Research* 9 (1), 33-51.
- Barsalou, L.W. (2008). Grounded cognition. *Annual Review of Psychology* 59, 617-645.
- Barthes, R. (1982). *Camera Lucida. Reflections on photography* [Trans. Richard Howard]. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Bartlett, F. (1932). *Remembering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baxter, S. (2009). Stigmata. *Eyemagazing Exhibition* (pp.176-182). Geneva: International Museum of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.
- Becvar, A. Hollan, J. & Hutchins, E. (2005). Hands as molecules: representational gestures as cognitive artifacts for developing theory in scientific laboratory. *Semiotica* 156 (1-4), 89-122.
- Becvar, A., Hollan, J. & Hutchins, E. (2008). Representational gestures as cognitive artifacts for developing theories in a scientific laboratory. In M.S. Ackerman, Halverson, C.A., T. Erickson & W.A. Kellog (eds.), *Resources, Co-Evolution, and Artifacts: Theory in CSCW* (pp.117-143). London: Springer-Verlag.
- Bekinschtein, T., Cardozo, J. & Manes, F. (2008). Strategies of Buenos Aires waiters to enhance memory capacity in a real-life setting. *Behavioural Neurology*, 20 (3), 65-70.
- Bernecker, S. (2008). *The metaphysics of memory*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Berntsen, D. & Bohn, A. (2009). Cultural life scripts and individual life stories. In P. Boyer and J. Wertsch (eds.), *Memory in Mind and Culture* (pp.62-82). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berntsen, D. & Rubin, D. (2004). Cultural life scripts structure recall from autobiographical memory. *Memory and Cognition*, 32 (3), 427-442.
- Bietti, L. (2009). Entre la cognición política y la cognición social: el discurso de la memoria colectiva en Argentina. *Discurso & Sociedad* 3 (1): 44-89.
- Bluck, S. & Habermas, T. (2000). The life story schema. *Motivation and Emotion*, 24.2: 121-146.

- Blum-Kulka, S. & Snow, C. (eds.) (2002). *Talking to Adults: The Contribution of Multiparty Discourse to Language Acquisition*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Boyer, R., Neffa, J., Keifman, S., Miotti, L., Queman, C. & Rapoport, M. (eds.) (2004). *La Economía Argentina y su Crisis (1976-2001): Visiones Institucionalistas y Regulacionistas*. Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila & CEIL-PIETTE.
- Brewer, M.B. (1988). A Dual Process Model of Impression Formation', in T.K. Srull & R.S. Wyer (eds.), *Advances in Social Cognition*, Vol. 1 (1-36). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Briggs, C. (1986). *Learning how to ask: A sociolinguistic appraisal of the role of the interview in social science research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brockmeier, J. (2010). After the archive: remapping memory. *Culture & Psychology* 16 (1): 5-35.
- Brookfield, H., Brown, S.D. & Reavey, P. (2008). Vicarious and postmemory practices in adopting families: The construction of the past in photography and narrative. *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* 18 (5), 474-491.
- Brown, S.D. & Hoskins, A. (2010). Terrorism in the new memory ecology: Mediating and remembering the 2005 London Bombings. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 2 (2), 87-107.
- Brown, S.D., Middleton, D. & Lightfoot, G.M. (2001). Performing the past in electronic archives: Interdependencies and in the discursive and non-discursive organisation (organization- OLA) of remembering. *Culture & Psychology* 7 (2), 123-144.
- Bruner, J. (1990). *Acts of Meaning*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bruner, J. (2008). Culture and mind: their fruitful incommensurability. *Ethos*, 36 (1): 29-44.
- Buchanan, K. & Middleton, D.J. (1995). Voices of experience: talk, identity and membership in reminiscence groups. *Ageing & Society*, 15, 457-91.
- Buckner, J. P. & Fivush, R. (1998). Gender and self in children's autobiographical narratives. *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, 12(4), 407-429.
- Buckner, J. P. & Fivush, R. (2000). Gendered themes in family reminiscing. *Memory*, 8(6), 401-412.
- Byrne, R. M. (2002). Mental models and counterfactual thoughts about what might have been. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 6 (10), 426-431.
- Byrne, Ruth M (2005). *The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality*. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.
- Cabeza, R. & St. Jacques, P. L. (2007). Functional neuroimaging of autobiographical memory. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 11, 219-227.
- Cabeza, R., Prince, S. E., Daselaar, S. M., Greenberg, D., Budde, M., Dolcos, F., LaBar, K. S. & Rubin, D. C. (2004). Brain activity during episodic retrieval of autobiographical and laboratory events: An fMRI study using a novel photo paradigm. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 9, 1533-1594.

- Cáceres, M. S. (2009). Paraguay: terror registrado. *Espacios* 2, 42-44.
- Calveiro, P. (1998). *Poder y Desaparición. Los Campos de Concentración en Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Ed. Colihue.
- Campbell, S. (2008). Remembering for the Future: Memory as a Lens on the Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Discussion paper prepared for the Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
- Carnovale, V., Lorenz, F. & Pittaluga, R. (eds.) (2006). *Historia, Memoria y Fuentes Orales*. Buenos Aires: CEDINCI.
- Chafe, W. & Nichols, J. (1986). *Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Chafe, W. (1990). Some things that narratives tell us about the mind. In B. Britton and A. Pellegrini (eds.), *Narrative Thought and Narrative Language* (pp.79-98). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Channell, J. (1994). *Vague language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chemerinski, E., Petracca, G., Manes, F, Leiguarda, R. & Starkstein S. (1998). Prevalence and correlates of anxiety in Alzheimer's disease. *Depress Anxiety* 7 (4), 166-70.
- Chilton, P. (2004). *Analysing Political Discourse*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Cicourel, A. (2006). The interaction of discourse, cognition and culture. *Discourse Studies* 8 (1), 25-29.
- Cienki, A. & Müller, C. (2008). Metaphor, gesture and thought. In R. W. Gibbs, Jr. (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought* (pp. 483-501). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cienki, A. (1999). Metaphors and cultural models as profiles and bases. In R. W. Gibbs, Jr. & G. J. Steen (eds.), *Metaphor in cognitive linguistics* (pp.189-203). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Clark, A. & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. *Analysis* 58: 7–19.
- Clark, A. (2008). *Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Clark, H. H. (2005). Coordinating each other in a material world. *Discourse Studies* 7 (4-5), 507-525.
- Clark, H.H. & Brennan, S. A. (1991). Grounding in communication. In L.B. Resnick, J.M. Levine & S.D. Teasley (eds.), *Perspectives on socially shared cognition* (pp.127-149). Washington: APA Books.
- Clark, H.H. (1996). *Using Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cole, M., Hood, L. & McDermott, R. (1982). Ecological niche picking. In U. Neisser (ed.), *Memory Observed. Remembering in Natural Contexts* (pp.366-373). San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company.

- Cole, M., Hood, L. & McDermott, R. (1978). *Ecological Niche Picking: Ecological Invalidity as an Axiom of Experimental Cognitive Psychology*. New York: Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition and the Institute for Comparative Human Development, The Rockefeller University, NYC. [URL: <http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/MCole/Ecological-Niche.PDF>].
- Connerton, P. (1989). *How Societies Remember*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Conway, M. A. & Pleydell- Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. *Psychological Review* 107, 261-288.
- Conway, M. A. (1995). *Flashbulb Memories*. Brighton, Sussex, England: Erlbaum.
- Conway, M.A. & Williams, H.L. (2008). Autobiographical memory. In H.L. Roediger III (ed.), *Cognitive Psychology of Memory. Vol 2 of Learning and Memory: A Comprehensive Reference, 4 vols.* (pp. 893-909). Oxford: Elsevier.
- Conway, M.A. (2005). Memory and the self. *Journal of Memory and Language* 53 (4), 594-628.
- Conway, M.A., Pleydell-Pearce, C.W., Whitecross, S. & Sharpe, H. (2002). Brain imagining autobiographical memory. *Psychology, Learning and Teaching* 41, 229-264.
- Cowan, N. (2005). *Working Memory Capacity*. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Crenzel, E. (2008). *La Historia Política del Nunca Más*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI editores.
- Cuc, A., Koppel, J. & Hirst, W. (2007). Silence is not golden: A case for socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting. *Psychological Science* 18, 727-733.
- Da Silva Catela, L. (2003). Apagón en el Ingenio, escrache en el Museo. Tensiones y disputas entre memorias locales y memorias oficiales en torno a un episodio de represión de 1976. In E. Jelin P. Del Pino (eds.), *Luchas locales, comunidades e identidades* (pp.64-106). Madrid/Buenos Aires Siglo XXI.
- Da Silva Catela, L. & Jelin, E. (eds.) (2002). *Los Archivos de la Represión: Documentos, Memoria y Verdad*. Madrid/Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Danziger, K. (2008). *Marking the Mind: A History of Memory*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Daselaar, S. M., Rice, H. J., Greenberg, D. L., Cabeza, R., LaBar, K. S. & Rubin, D. C. (2008). The spatiotemporal dynamics of autobiographical memory: Neural correlates of recall, emotional intensity, and reliving. *Cerebral Cortex* 18, 217-229.
- De Ipola, E. (1986) *Investigaciones Políticas*. Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión.
- Dessein, D. A. (ed.) (2003). *Reinventar la Argentina. Reflexiones sobre la Crisis*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.
- Dinges, J. (2004). *The Condor Years: How Pinochet and his Allies brought Terrorism to Three Continents*. New York: New Press.
- Donald, M. (1991). *The Origins of the Modern Human Mind*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

- Donald, M. (1998). Material Culture and Cognition: Concluding Thoughts. In C. Renfrew & C. Scarre (eds.), *Cognition and Material Culture: the Archaeology of Symbolic Storage (181-197)*. Cambridge: The McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research.
- Donald, M. (2010). The Exographic Revolution: Neuropsychological Sequelae. In Malafouris L. & Renfrew C. (eds.), *The Cognitive Life of Things: Recasting the boundaries of the mind (71-79)*. Cambridge: McDonald Institute Monographs.
- Drucaroff, E. (2002). Por algo fue. Análisis del “Prólogo” del Nunca Más, de Ernesto Sábato. *Revista Tres Galgos* 3, November.
- Duhalde, E. L. (1999). *El Estado Terrorista Argentino. Quince años después*. Buenos Aires: EUDEBA.
- Echterhoff, G. & Hirst, W. (2002). Remembering in a social context: A conversational view of the study of memory. In G. Echterhoff & M. Saar (eds.), *Kontexte und Kulturen des Erinnerns: Maurice Halbwachs und das Paradigma des kollektiven Gedächtnisses (pp.75-101)*. Constance, Germany: Universitätsverlag Konstanz.
- Echterhoff, G. (2008). Language and memory: Social and cognitive processes. In A. Nünning & A. Erll (eds.), *Cultural Memory Studies. An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook* (pp.263-274). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Echterhoff, G. (2010). Shared reality: Antecedents, processes, consequences. *Social Cognition* 40, 273–276.
- Echterhoff, G. & Hirst, W. (2009). Social influence on memory. *Social Psychology* 40, 106-110.
- Echterhoff, G., Higgins, E. T., Kopietz, R. & Groll, S. (2008). How communication goals determine when audience tuning biases memory. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 137, 3-21.
- Edelman, G. M. & Changeux, J.P. (eds.) (2001). *The Brain*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Edelman, G. M. & Tononi, G. (2000). *A Universe of Consciousness. How Matter Becomes Imagination*. New York: Basic Books.
- Edelman, G. M. (1990). *The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness*. New York: Basic Books.
- Edwards, D., Middleton, D. & Potter, J. (1992). Toward a discursive psychology of remembering. *The Psychologist* 5, 56-60.
- Edwards, D. & Middleton, D. (1986). Joint remembering: Constructing an account of shared experience through conversational discourse. *Discourse Processes* 9 (4), 423-459.
- Eichenbaun, H. & Fortin, N. (2009). The neurobiology of memory based predictions. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 364 (1521): 1183-1191.
- Enfield, N. J. & Levinson, S. C. (eds.) (2006). *Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition and Interaction*. Oxford: Berg.

- Enfield, N.J. (2006). Social consequences of common ground. In N.J. Enfield & S.C. Levinson (eds.), *Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition and Interaction* (pp.399-430). Oxford: Berg.
- Enfield, N.J. (2008). Common ground as a resource for social affiliation. In I.Kecskes & J.L. Mey (eds.), *Intention, Common Ground and the Egocentric Speaker-Hearer* (pp.223-254). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Enfield, N.J.(2009). *The Anatomy of Meaning: Speech, Gesture, and Composite Utterances*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ensick, T. & Sauer, Ch. (eds.) 2003. *The Art of Commemoration: Fifty Years after the Warsaw Uprising*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Ericsson, K.A. & Kintsch, W. (1995). Long-term working memory. *Psychological Review* 102, 211-245.
- Erll, A. & Nunning, A. (eds.). *Cultural Memory Studies. An interdisciplinary handbook*. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and Power*. London: Longman.
- Feierstein, D. & Levy, G. (eds.) (2004). *Hasta que la Muerte nos Separe. Poder y Prácticas Sociales Genocidas en América Latina*. La Plata: Ediciones Al Margen.
- Feierstein, D. (2007) *El Genocidio Como Práctica Social. Entre el Nazismo y la Experiencia Argentina*. Buenos Aires: FCE.
- Feierstein, D. (ed.) (2005). *Genocidio, la Administración de la Muerte en la Modernidad*. Buenos Aires: EDUNTREF.
- Feld, C. (2002). *Del Estrado a la Pantalla: Las Imágenes del Juicio a los ex Comandantes en Argentina*. Madrid/Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Feld, C. (2006). Quand la télévision argentine convoque les disparus. Modalités et enjeux de la représentation médiatique d'une expérience extrême. *Les temps des médias*, 6.
- Fernandez Neira, C. & Sterrazza Taibi, P. (2009). Chile: el germen del mal. *Espacios* 2, 28-31.
- Figuroa Ibarra, C. (2004). Cultura del terror y guerra fría en Guatemala. In D. Feierstein & G. Levy (eds.), *Hasta que la Muerte nos Separe. Poder y Prácticas Sociales Genocidas en América Latina*. La Plata: Ediciones Al Margen.
- Fiske, S. (1986). Schema-based versus piecemeal politics: a patchwork quilt, but not a blanket, of evidence. In: Richard Lau, David Sears (eds.), *Political Cognition: The 19th Carnegie Mellon Symposium on Cognition*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 41-54. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Fivush, R. (2008). Remembering and reminiscing: how individual lives are constructed in family narratives. *Memory Studies* 1 (1), 49-58.
- Fivush, R. & Nelson, K. (2004). Culture and language in the emergence of autobiographical memory. *Psychological Science* 15(9), 573-577.

- Fivush, R., Bohnek, J.G. & Duke, M. (2008). The Intergenerational Self: Subjective Perspective and Family History, in F. Sani (ed.). *Individual and Collective Self-Continuity*, (pp. 131–44). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Fivush, R., Brotman, M. A., Buckner, J. P. & Goodman, S. H. (2000). Gender differences in parent-child emotion narratives. *Sex Roles* 42(3-4), 233-253.
- Flaskamp, C. (2002). *Organizaciones Políticos-Militares. Testimonio de la Lucha Armada en Argentina (1968-1976)*. Buenos Aires: Nuevos Tiempos.
- Forgas, J. (ed.) (1981). *Social Cognition. Perspectives on Everyday Understanding*. London: Academic Press.
- Foucault, M. (2007). *Security, Territory, Population: Lecture at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Franco, M. & Levín, F. (eds.) (2007). *Historia Reciente. Perspectivas y Desafíos para un Campo en Construcción*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Galasso, N. (2004) La “Revolución Libertadora”, *Cuadernos para la Otra Historia*, (pp. 1–28). Buenos Aires: Centro Cultural ‘Enrique Santos Discépolo’.
- García Negroni, M.M. (1988). La destinación en el discurso político: una categoría múltiple. *Lenguaje en Contexto* 1 (1/2), 85-111.
- García Negroni, M.M. & Raiter, A. (1988). Vers l'Analyse de la Dynamique du Discours. Le Discours du Dr. Tróccoli. *Mots* 17. October.
- García Negroni, M.M. & Zoppi Fontata, M.G. (1992). *Análisis Lingüístico y Discurso Político. El Poder de Enunciar*. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina.
- Georgakopoulou, A. (2006). Thinking big with small stories in narrative and identity analysis. *Narrative Inquiry* 16 [Special issue, Narrative – State of the Art] (1), 122-130.
- Gergen, K. (1998). Erzählung, moralische Identität und historisches Bewusstsein. Eine sozialkonstruktivistische Darstellung. In J. Straub (ed.) *Identität und historisches Bewusstsein* (pp.170-202). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Givón, T. (2005). *Context as Other Minds. The pragmatics of Sociality, Cognition and Communication*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Godoy, R. (ed.) (2002) *Historiografía y Memoria Colectiva. Tiempos y Territorios*. Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila.
- Goldman, A. I. (1999). *Knowledge in a Social World*. Oxford/ New York: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press.
- Goldman, A. I. (2006). *Simulating Minds. The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- González Bombal, I. & Landi, O. (1995). Los derechos en la cultura política. In: Carlos Acuña et al., *Juicio, Castigos y Memorias: Derechos Humanos y Justicia en la Política Argentina* (pp.147-192). Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión.
- Goodwin, C. (2000). Action and embodiment within situated human interaction. *Journal of Pragmatics* 32, 1489-1522.

- Goodwin, C. (2007). Participation, stance and affect in the organization of activities. *Discourse & Society* 18 (1), 53-73.
- Goffman, E. (1981). *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.
- Greenberg, D. L. Rice, H. J., Cooper, J. J., Cabeza, R., Rubin, D. C. & LaBar, K. S. (2005). Co-activation of the amygdala, hippocampus, and inferior frontal gyrus during autobiographical memory retrieval. *Neuropsychologia* 43, 659-674.
- Grice, H.P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. Morgan (eds.), *Syntax and semantics 3: Pragmatics* (pp. 41-58). New York: Academic Press.
- Grice, H.P. (1981). Presupposition and Conversational Implicature. In P. Cole (ed.), *Radical Pragmatics* (pp. 183-98). New York: Academic Press.
- Grice, P. (1989). *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Guber, R. (2001). *¿Por qué Malvinas? De la Causa Nacional a la Guerra Absurda*. Buenos Aires: FCE.
- Guber, R. (2004). *De Chicos a Veteranos*. Buenos Aires: Antropofagia.
- Guelerman, S. (ed.) (2001). *Memorias en Presente. Identidad y Transmisión en la Argentina Posgenocidio*. Buenos Aires: Norma.
- Halbwachs, M. (1992). *On Collective Memory*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Halliday, M.A.K. (1967). Notes on transitivity and theme in English 1-3. *Journal of Linguistics* 3-4.
- Halliday, M.A.K. (1985). *An introduction to functional grammar*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Halliday, M.A.K. (1994). *An introduction to functional grammar* (2nd edition). London: Edward Arnold.
- Harris, C., Keil, P., Sutton, J., Barnier, A. (2010). Collaborative remembering: when can remembering with others be beneficial? In Christensen, W., Schier, E. & Sutton, J. (eds.), *ASCS09: Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science* (pp.131-134). Sydney: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science.
- Harris, C., Keil, P., Sutton, J., McIlwain D.J.F. & Barnier, A.J. (in press). We remember, we forget: collaborative remembering in older couples. *Discourse Processes*.
- Hart, J. & Kraut, M.A. (eds.) (2007). *Neural Basis of Semantic Memory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and Time*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Heider, F. (1958). *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Hernández Díaz, A. (2006). Posesión y existencia. La competencia de haber y tener y haber existencial. In Concepción Company Company (ed.), *Sintaxis histórica de la lengua española. Primera parte: La frase verbal* (pp. 1055-1160). Mexico: FCE-UNAM.

- Herranz, J.K. & Basabe, N. (1999). Generación, polémica pública, clima social y recuerdo de hechos políticos. *Psicología Política* 18, 31-47.
- Higgins, E.T. & Rholes, W.S. (1978). "Saying-is-Believing": effects of message modification on memory and liking for the person described. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 14, 363-37.
- Hirst, W. & Manier, D. (2008). Towards a psychology of collective memory. *Memory* 16 (3): 183-20.
- Hirst, W. & Echterhoff, G. (2008). Creating shared memories in conversation: Toward a psychology of collective memory. *Social Research* 75, 183-216.
- Hirst, W. (2010). The contribution of mnemonic malleability to collective memory, in P. Reuter-Lorenz, K. Baynes, G. Mangun, and E. Phelps (eds.), *The Cognitive Neuroscience of the Mind: a tribute to Michael Gazzaniga* (pp. 139-154). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hirst, W. & Manier, D. (2002). The diverse forms of collective memory. In G. Echterhoff & M. Saar (eds.), *Kontexte und Kulturen des Erinnerns* (pp.37-58). Constance, Germany: UVK.
- Hobbs, J. R. (2002). Granularity. *Proceedings, Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence* (pp.432-435). Los Angeles: California. [URL: <http://www.isi.edu/~hobbs/granularity-web.pdf>]
- Hoskins, A. (2009a). Digital network memory. In A. Erll & A. Rigney (eds.), *Mediation, Remediation and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory* (pp.91-106). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Hoskins, A. (2009b). The mediatisation of memory. In J. Garde-Hansen & A. Reading (eds.) *Save As...Digital Memories* (pp.27-43). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hupbach, A., Hardt, O., Gomez, R. & Nadel, L. (2008). The dynamics of memory: context-dependent updating. *Learning & Memory* 15, 574-579.
- Hutchins, E. & Nomura, S. (in press). Collaborative construction of multimodal utterances. In J. Streek, C. Goodwin & C. LeBaron (eds.), *Multimodality and human activity: Research on human behavior, action and communication*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hutchins, E. (1995). *Cognition in the Wild*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hutchins, E. (2008). The role of cultural practices in the emergence of modern human intelligence. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B* 363, 2011-2019.
- Hutchins, E. (2010a). Imagining the cognitive life of things. In L. Malafouris & C. Renfrew (eds.), *The Cognitive Life of Things* (pp.91-101). Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research.
- Hutchins, E. (2010b). Cognitive ecology. *Topics in Cognitive Science* 2 (4), 705-715.
- Hyland, K. (2005). *Metadiscourse. Exploring Interaction in Writing*. London/New York: Continuum.
- Ibáñez, J. (1979). *Más allá de la sociología. El grupo de discusión: técnica y crítica*. Madrid: Siglo XXI.

Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas –CONADEP- (1984/2006). *Nunca Más*. Buenos Aires: EUDEBA.

Iñiguez, L. & Vázquez, F. (1995). The construction of remembering and forgetfulness: approaches and dismisses concerning the Spanish Civil War. Paper presented at *Annual Meeting of The International Society of Political Psychology*. Washington, July 1995. [URL: <http://antalya.uab.es/liniguez/Materiales/011.pdf>]

Izaguirre, I. (2004). La Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional en América Latina ayer y hoy. In D. Feierstein & G. Levy (eds.), *Hasta que la Muerte nos Separe. Poder y Prácticas Sociales Genocidas en América Latina*. La Plata: Ediciones Al Margen.

Jelin, E. & Longoni, A. (eds.) (2005). *Escrituras, Imágenes y Escenarios Ante la Represión*. Madrid/Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.

Jelin, E. & Lorenz, F. (eds.) (2004). *Educación y Memoria: La Escuela Elabora el Pasado*. Madrid/Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.

Jelin, E. (2001). Fechas de la memoria social. Las conmemoraciones en perspectiva comparada. *Voces recobradas: Revista de Historia Oral* 3, (10). Buenos Aires: Instituto Histórico de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires.

Jelin, E. (2002). *Los Trabajos de la Memoria*. Madrid/Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.

Jelin, E. (2007). Public memorialization in perspective: truth, justice and memory of past repression in the Southern Cone of South America. *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 1 (1), 138-156.

Ji, S. (2002). Identifying episode transitions. *Journal of Pragmatics* 34, 1257-1271.

Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). *Mental Models. Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Jones, E. & Gerald. H. (1967). *Social Psychology*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Jovchelovitch, S. (2007). *Knowledge in Context. Representations, Community, and Culture*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Kaiser, S. (2005). *Postmemories of Terror: A New Generation Copes with the Legacy of the "Dirty War"*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Kendon, A. (2004). *Gesture: Visible Action as Utterance*. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

Kindt, M., Soeter, M. & Vervliet, B. (2009). Beyond extinction: erasing human fear responses and preventing the return of fear. *Nature Neuroscience*.

Kintsch, W., Patel, V. L. & Ericsson, K.A. (1999). The role of long-term working memory in text comprehension. *Psychologia* 42 (4), 186–98.

Kirschke, J. (2009). Brasil: el enlace. *Espacios*, 2, 38-41.

Kirsh, D. (2006). Distributed cognition: a methodological note. *Pragmatics & Cognition* 14 (2), 249-262.

Kopietz, R., Hellmann, J. H., Higgins, E. T. & Echterhoff, G. (2010). Shared-reality effects on memory: communicating to fulfill epistemic needs. *Social Cognition* 28, 353–378.

- Kordon, D. & Edelman, L. (2007). *Por-venires de la Memoria*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Madres de Plaza de Mayo.
- Kordon, D. & Edelman, L. (eds.) (1986). *Efectos Psicológicos de la Represión Política*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana-Planeta.
- Kordon, D., Edelman, L., Lagos, D. & Kersner, D. (2005). *Efectos Psicológicos y Psicosociales de la Represión Política y la Impunidad*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Madres de Plaza de Mayo.
- Kordon, D., Edelman, L., Lagos, D. & Kersner, D. (1995). *La Impunidad: Una Perspectiva Psicosocial y Clínica*. Buenos Aires: Planeta.
- Kronenfeld, D. (2008). Cultural models. *Intercultural Pragmatics* 5 (1), 67-74.
- Labov, W. & Waletzky, J. (1967). Narrative analysis. In J. Helm (ed.), *Essays on the Verbal and Visual Arts* (pp.12-44). Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Labov, W. (1997). Some further steps in narrative analysis. *Journal of Narrative and Life History* 7.1-4, 395-415.
- Labov, W. (2006). Narrative pre-construction. *Narrative Inquiry* 16 (1), 37-45.
- Laforest, M. (2002). Scenes of Family Life: Complaining in Everyday Conversation, *Journal of Pragmatics* 34: 1595–1620.
- Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Lakoff, G. (1987). *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, G. (1993). A contemporary theory of metaphor. In A. Onony (ed.), *Metaphor and Thought* (pp.202-251). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Landí, O. & González Bombal, I. (1995). Los derechos en la cultura política. In C. Acuña (ed.), *Juicio, Castigos y Memorias. Derechos Humanos y Justicia en la Política Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión.
- Lavandera, B. (1985a). *Curso de Lingüística General para el Análisis del Discurso*. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina.
- Lavandera, B. (1985b). Intertextual Relationships: 'Missing People' in Argentina. In D. Tannen (ed.), *Languages and Linguistics: The Interdependence of Theory, Data and Application* (pp.121-139). Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.
- Levinson, S. (2000). *Presumptive Meanings. The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Levinson, S. C. (2006a). Cognition at the heart of human interaction. *Discourse Studies*, 8(1), 85-93.
- Levinson, S. C. (2006b). On the human "interaction engine". In N. J. Enfield & S. C. Levinson (eds.), *Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition and Interaction* (pp.39-69). Oxford: Berg.

- Levy, D. & Sznaider, N. (2005). The politics of commemoration: the Holocaust, memory and trauma. In Gerard Delanty (ed.), *Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory* (pp. 289-297). London/New York: Routledge.
- Levy, D. & Sznaider, N. (2006). Sovereignty transformed: a sociology of human rights, *The British Journal of Sociology* 57 (4), 657-676.
- Linde, C. (1993). *Life Stories: The Creation of Coherence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Loftus, E.F. (2005). Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year investigation of the malleability of memory. *Journal of Learning and Memory* 12 (4), 361-366.
- Lofus, E.F. (1979). *Eyewitness Testimony*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lorenz, F. (2009). *Malvinas: Una Guerra Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.
- Luna, F. (1971) *El 45*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.
- Luria, A. R. (1976). *Cognitive Development: Its Social and Cognitive Foundations* (edited by Michael Cole). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Manes, F., Springer, J., Jorge, R., Robinson, R.G. (1999). Verbal memory impairment after left insular infarction. *Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry* 67, 532-534.
- Manes, F., Hodges, J., Graham, K., Zeman, A. (2001). Focal autobiographical amnesia in association with transient epileptic Amnesia. *Brain* 124 (3), 499-509.
- Marchesi, A., Markarian, V., Rico, A., Yaffe, J. (eds.) (2003). *El Presente de la Dictadura. Estudios y Reflexiones a 30 Años del Golpe de Estado en Uruguay*. Montevideo: Trilce.
- Markowitsch, H.J. (2001). The neural bases of memory. In N.J. Smelser & P.B. Baltes (eds.), *International encyclopedia of the social and behavioral sciences (Vol. 13: Behavioral and cognitive neuroscience)*; eds. R.F. Thompson & J.L. McClelland). Oxford: Elsevier Science. pp. 8593-8599.
- Markowitsch, H.J. (2008). Cultural memory and the neurosciences. In A. Erll & A. Nünning (eds.), *Cultural Memory Studies. An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook* (pp.275-283). Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.
- Markowitsch, H. J. (2010). Autobiographical memory across the life span: brain imaging and neuropsychology. In W. Christiansen, E. Schier & J. Sutton (eds.), *ASCS09: Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science* (pp.224-231). Sydney: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science.
- Markowitsch, H.J., Thiel, A., Reinkemeier, M., Kessler, J., Koyuncu, A. & Heiss, W. (2000). Right amygdalar and temporofrontal activation during autobiographic, but not during fictitious memory retrieval. *Behavioural Neurology*, 12, 181-190.
- Markowitsch, H.J., Vandekerckhove, M.M.P., Lanfermann, H. & Russ, M.O. (2003). Engagement of lateral and medial prefrontal areas in the ecphony of sad and happy autobiographical memories. *Cortex* 39, 643-665.

- Marnier, D. & Hirst, W. (2008). A cognitive taxonomy of collective memories. In A. Erll & A. Nünning (eds.), *Cultural Memory Studies. An Interdisciplinary Handbook* (pp.253-262). Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Martorell, F. (1999). *Operación Cóndor: El Vuelo de la Muerte; la Coordinación Represiva en el Cono Sur*. Santiago de Chile: Lom Ediciones.
- Maturana H.R. (2006). Self-consciousness: how? when? where? *Constructivist Foundations* 1 (3), 91-102.
- Maturana H.R. (2007). Systemic versus genetic determination. *Constructivist Foundations*, 3 (1), 21-26.
- Maturana, H.R. & Varela, F.J. (1980). *Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Maturana, H.R. & Varela, F.J. (1992). *The Tree of Knowledge. The Biological Roots of Human Understanding*. Boston: Shambala Publications.
- McNeill, D. (1992). *Hand and Mind: What Gestures Reveal about Thought*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- McNeill, D. (2005). *Gesture and Thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McSherry J. P. (2005). *Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Medina, R. (2006). *El imaginario político del inmigrante latinoamericano en Cataluña como un acto integrador*. Thesis DEA: Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [<http://www.recercat.net/>].
- Medved, M.I. & Hirst, W. (2006). Islands of memory: Autobiographical remembering in amnestics. *Memory* 14 (3), 276-288.
- Middleton, D. (1997). Conversational remembering and uncertainty: interdependencies of experience as individual and collective concerns in team work. *Journal of language and Social Psychology*, 16(4), 389-410.
- Middleton, D. (2002). Succession and change in the sociocultural used of memory: building-in the past in communicative action. *Culture & Psychology* 8 (1), 79-95.
- Middleton, D. & Brown, S. D. (2005). *The Social Psychology of Experience: Studies in Remembering and Forgetting*. London: Sage.
- Middleton, D. & Brown, S.D. (2008). Experience and memory: Imaginary futures in the past. In A. Erll & A. Nünning (eds.), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook* (pp.241-251). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Middleton, D. & Edwards, D. (eds.) (1990). *Collective Remembering*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to Authority: An experimental view*. New York NY: Harper & Row.
- Misztal , B. (2003). *Theories of Social Remembering*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

- Montero, A. S. (2007). "¡Claro que estoy en campaña!": Exclamación, oposición y verdad en el discurso presidencial (Argentina, 2003-2006). Análisis semántico-argumentativo del marcador *claro que*. *Revista Oralía: Análisis del Discurso Oral* 10, 193-212.
- Montero, A.S. (2008). Justicia y decisión en el discurso presidencial argentino sobre la memoria (2003-2007). *CONfines* 7, 27-41.
- Montero, A. S. (2009). Puesta en escena, destinación y contra-destinación en el discurso kirchnerista (Argentina, 2003-2007). *Discurso & Sociedad* 3 (2), 316-347.
- Muller F. & Hirst, W. (2010). Resistance to the influence of others: limits to the formation of collective memory through conversational remembering. *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 24 (5), 608-625.
- Murakami, K., Middleton, D. (2006). [Grave matters: collectivity and agency as emergent effects in remembering and reconciliation](#). *Ethos* 34 (2), 273-296.
- Neisser, U. (ed.) (1982). *Memory observed: Remembering in Natural Contexts*. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.
- Neisser, U. (1997). The ecological study of memory. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B: Biological Sciences* 352, 1697-1701.
- Nelson, K. (2003a). Self and social functions: Individual autobiographical memory and collective narrative. *Memory*, 11 (2), 125-136.
- Nelson, K. (2003b). Narrative and self, myth and memory: emergence of the cultural self. In R. Fivush & C. Haden (eds.), *Autobiographical Memory and The Construction of a Narrative Self* (pp.131-144). Mahwah, NJ/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Nelson, K. D. & Fivush, R. (2004). The emergence of autobiographical memory: A social cultural developmental theory. *Psychological Review* 111(2), 486-511.
- Newman, E.J. & Lindsay, D.S. (2009). False memories: What the hell are they for? *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 23 (8), 1105-1121.
- Nora, P. (1989). Between memory and history: les lieux de mémoire. *Representations* 26, 7-25.
- Norrick, N. R. (2005). Interactional remembering in conversational narrative. *Journal of Pragmatics* 37, 1819-1844.
- Ochs, E., Smith, R. & Taylor, C. (1989). Dinner narratives as detective stories. *Cultural Dynamics* 2, 238-257.
- Ochs, E. & Taylor, C. (1992). Science at dinner. In C. Kramsch & S. McConnel-Ginet (eds.), *Text and Context: Cross-disciplinary Perspectives on Language Study* (pp. 29-45). Lexington, M.A.: D.C. Heath.
- Ochs, E., Taylor, C., Rudolph, D. & Smith, R. (1992). Storytelling as a theory-building activity. *Discourse Processes* 15 (1): 37-72.
- Ochs, E. & Taylor, C. (1996). The father knows best dynamic in family dinner narratives. In K. Hall (ed.), *Gender Articulated: Language and The Socially Constructed Self* (pp.97-121). New York: Routledge.

- O'Donnel, G. (1997). *Contrapuntos. Ensayos Escogidos Sobre Autoritarismo y Democratización*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Ogden, C. K. & Richards, I. A. (1956). *The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism*. Harcourt, Brace, New York.
- Olick, J. & Robbins, J. (1998). Social Memory Studies: From 'collective memory' to the historical sociology of Mnemonic Practices. *Annual Review of Sociology* 24, 105-140.
- Olick, J. (2007). *The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility*. New York: Routledge.
- Olick, J. (2008). From collective memory to the sociology of mnemonic practices and products. In A. Erll & A. Nunning (eds.), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook* (pp.151-161). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Olick, J. (ed.) (2003). *States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations in National Retrospection*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
- Páez, D. (2003). Represión política y memoria colectiva: el caso chileno. In H. Riquelme (ed.), *Asedios a la Memoria* (pp. 219-247). Santiago, Chile: Eds. Chile-América/Cesoc.
- Páez, D. Bellelli, G. & Rimé, B. (2009). Flashbulb memories, culture and collective memories: psychological processes related to rituals, emotions and memories. In O. Luminet & A. Curci (eds.), *Flashbulb Memories: New Issues and New Perspectives* (pp. 227-246). Hove: Psychology Press.
- Páez, D., Basabe, N. & González, J.L. (1997) Social processes and collective memory: a cross-cultural approach to remembering political events. In J.W. Pennebaker, D. Páez & B. Rimé (eds.), *Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives* (pp.147-174). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Pagliai, V. (2009). Conversational agreement and racial formation processes. *Language in Society* 38 (5), 549-579.
- Palmer, F. (2001). *Mood and modality* (2nd edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pardo, L. & Lorenzo-Dus, N. (2010). The Falklands/Malvinas 25 years on: a comparative analysis of constructions of heroism on Argentinean and British television. *Journal of Multicultural Discourses* 5 (3), 253-270.
- Parnas, A. M. (2009). Uruguay: a la caza de los refugiados. *Espacios* 2, 32-37.
- Pasupathi, M. (2001). The social construction of the personal past and its implications for adult development. *Psychological Bulletin* 127, 651-672.
- Pasupathi, M. (2003). Emotion regulation during social remembering: Differences between emotions elicited during an event and emotion elicited when talking about it. *Memory* 11, 151-163.
- Pasupathi, M., Weeks, T. & Rice, C. (2006). Reflecting on life: Remembering as a major process in adult development. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology* 25, 244-263.

- Pennebaker, J.W., Páez, D. & Rimé (eds.) (1997). *Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives*. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Pennebaker, J.W. & Gonzales, A. L. (2009). Making history: Social and psychological processes underlying collective memory. In P. Boyer. and J.V Wertsch (eds.), *Memory in Mind and Culture* (pp.171-193). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pennebaker, J.W., Páez, D. & Deschamps, J.C. (2006). The social psychology of history: defining the most important events of the last 10, 100, and 1000 years. *Psicología Política* 32, 15-32.
- Potter, J. & Hepburn, A. (2005). Qualitative interviews in psychology: problems and possibilities. *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 2, 281-307.
- Potter, J., Wetherell, M. (1987). *Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour*. London: Sage
- Pousadela, I. (2005). *Que se vayan todos. Enigmas de la Representación Política*. Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual.
- Prince, S. E., Tsukiura, T. & Cabeza, R. (2007). Distinguishing the neural correlates of episodic memory encoding and semantic memory retrieval. *Psychological Science* 18, 144-151.
- Przeworski, A. (1995). *Democracia y Mercado*. Madrid: Cambridge University Press.
- Puchta, C. & Potter, J. (2004). *Focus groups practice*. London: Sage.
- Quasthoff, U. M. & Becker, T. (eds.) (2004). *Narrative Interaction*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Quinn, N. & Holland, D. (1987). Culture and Cognition. In D. Holland & N. Quinn (eds.), *Cultural Models in Language and Thought* (pp. 3-40). London: Cambridge University Press, 3- 40.
- Radvansky, G.A., Zwann, R.A., Franklin, N. & Federico, T. (1998). Retrieval from temporally organized situation models. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition* 24, 1224-1237.
- Raiter, A. & Menéndez, S. (1986). El desplazamiento de un signo ideológico. Análisis lingüístico del discurso político. *Filología XX*, 2. Buenos Aires: Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad de Buenos Aires.
- Ranney, A. (ed.) (1985) *Britain and the Polls, 1983*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Reavey, P. & Brown, S.D. (2007). The embodiment and spaces of memory: child sexual abuse and the construction of agency. *Journal of Social Work Practice* 21 (4), 213-229.
- Reese, E., Haden, C. A. & Fivush, R. (1993). Mother-Child Conversations About the Past - Relationships of Style and Memory over Time. *Cognitive Development*, 8 (4), 403-430.
- Robben, A.C.G.M. (2005a). *Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina*. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press.
- Robben, A.C.G.M. (2005b). How traumatized societies remember: the aftermath of the Argentina's Dirty War. *Culture Critique*, 120-164.

- Robben, A.C.G.M. (2006). Combat motivation, fear and terror in twentieth century Argentinean warfare. *Journal of Contemporary History* 4 (2), 357-377.
- Rock, D. (1993). *Authoritarian Argentina*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Roediger H.L., Zaromb, F.M. & Butler, A.B. (2009). The role of repeated retrieval in shaping collective memory. In P. Boyer & J.V. Wertsch (eds.), *Memory in Mind and Culture* (pp. 139-170). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Romero, L.A. (1997). *Breve Historia Contemporánea de la Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Romero, L.A. (2000). *Argentina. Crónica Total del Siglo XX*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Roniger, L. & Sznajder, M. (1998). The politics of memory and oblivion in redemocratized Argentina and Uruguay. *History and Memory* 10 (1), 133-169.
- Roniger, L. & Sznajder, M. (2009). *The Politics of Exile in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Roseman, I., Abelson, R. & Ewing, M. (1986). Emotion and political cognition: emotional appeals in political communication. In: Richard Lau, David Sears (eds.), *Political Cognition: The 19th Carnegie Mellon Symposium on Cognition*. Hillsdale, 279-294. N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Rosenwein, B.H. (2006). *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol 10, pp. 173-220). New York: Academic Press.
- Röttger-Kössler, B. & Markowitsch, H-J. (eds.) (2009). *Emotions and bio-cultural processes*. New York: Springer.
- Rubin, D. C. (2006). The Basic-Systems Model of Episodic Memory. *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 1, 277-311.
- Rubin, D., Berntsen, D. & Hutson, M. (2009). The normative and the personal life: Individual differences in life scripts and life story events among USA and Danish undergraduates. *Memory* 17, 54-68.
- Sacks, H. (1992). *Lectures on Conversation*. 2 vols. (Edited by Gail Jefferson with introductions by Emanuel A. Schegloff). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Salas, D. (2009). Bolivia: el capítulo menos explorado. *Espacios*, 2, 45-46.
- Sanders, E. (2003). Applying the skills concept to discourse and conversation: the remediation of performance defects in talk-in-interaction. In. Greene & B. Burlison (eds.), *The Handbook of Communication and Social Interaction Skills* (pp. 221-256). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Sarlo, B. (2005). *Tiempo Pasado. Cultura de la Memoria y Giro Subjetivo. Una Discusión*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.

- Sbisa, M. (1999). Ideology and persuasive presuppositions. In: Verschueren, J. (ed.), *Language and Ideology. Selected Papers from the 6th International Pragmatics Conference, vol. 1* (pp. 492-509). Antwerp: International Pragmatics Association.
- Schacter, D. (1996). *Searching for Memory. The Brain, the Mind and the Past*. New York: Basic Books.
- Schacter, D. L., Gutchess, A.H. & Kensinger, E.A. (2009). Specificity of memory: implications for individual and collective remembering. In P. Boyer & J. Wertsch (eds.), *Memory in Mind and Culture* (pp.83-111). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R. and Buckner (2007). The Prospective Brain: Remembering the Past to Imagine the Future. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 8, 657-661.
- Schacter, D.L. & Addis, D.R. (2007). The cognitive neuroscience of constructive memory: Remembering the past and imagining the future. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B*, 362, 773-786.
- Schegloff, E.A. (2000). On granularity. *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, 715-720.
- Schegloff, E.A. (1997). Practices and action: boundary cases of other-initiated repair. *Discourse Processes* 23 (3), 499-545.
- Schiffrin, D. (1996). Narrative as self-portrait: sociolinguist constructions of identity. *Language and Society* 25, 167-203.
- Schlenker, B.R. (1980). *Impression Management: The Self-concept, Social Identity and Interpersonal Relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- Schmidt, S. (2008). Memory and remembrance: a constructivist approach. In A. Erll & A.Nunning (eds.), *Cultural Memory Studies. An Interdisciplinary Handbook* (pp.191-201) Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Schütz, A. & Luckmann, T. (1974). *The Structures of Life-World*. London: Heinemann Education Books Ltd.
- Schwabe, L. & Wolf, O. (2009). New episodic learning interferes with the reconstruction of autobiographical memories. *PloS One* 4 (10): e7519. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0007519
- Searle, J. (1979). *Expression and Meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Semin, G.R. (2004). Language and social cognition. In M. B. Brewer & M. Hewstone (eds.), *Social Cognition* (pp.222-243). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Semin, G.R. (2009). Language, culture, cognition – how do they intersect? In R.S. Wyer, Chi-yue Chiu & Ying-yi Hong (eds.). *Understanding Culture: Theory, Research and Application* (pp.259-270). New York: Psychology Press.
- Semin, G.R. & Smith, E.R. (2008). *Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Shore, B. (1996). *Culture in Mind: Cognition, Culture and the Problem of Meaning*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Simpson, P. (1993). *Language, Ideology and Point of View*. London: Routledge.

- Skowronski, J. & Richard Walker, W. (2004). How describing autobiographical events can affect autobiographical memories. *Social Cognition* 22 (5), 555-590.
- Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1995). *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (2002). Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading. *Mind and Language* 17, 3-23.
- Sperber, D. (ed.) (2000). *Metarepresentations: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Squire, L. (2004). Memory systems of the brain: A brief history and current perspective. *Neurobiology of Learning and Memory* 82, 171–177.
- Staub, E. (1999). The roots of evil: Social conditions, culture, personality and basic human needs. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 3: 179-192.
- Strack, F. & Förster, J. (1995). Reporting recollective experiences: direct access to memory systems? *Psychological Science* 6, 352-358.
- Strack, F. & Förster, J. (1998). Self-reflection and recognition: the role of metacognitive knowledge in the attribution of recollective experience. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 2, 111-123.
- Sutton, J. (2003). Constructive memory and distributed cognition: towards and interdisciplinary framework. In B. Kokinow & W. Hirst (eds.), *Constructive Memory* (290-303). Sofia: New Bulgarian University.
- Sutton, J. (2004). Representation, levels, and context in integrational linguistics and distributed cognition. *Language Sciences* 26 (6), 503-524.
- Sutton, J. (2005). Memory and the extended mind: embodiment, cognition, and culture. *Cognitive Processing* 6 (4), 223-6.
- Sutton, J. (2006). Distributed cognition: domains and dimension. *Pragmatics & Cognition* 14 (2), 235-247.
- Sutton, J. (2008). Between individual and collective memory: interaction, coordination, distribution. *Social Research* 75, 23-48.
- Sutton, J. (2009a). The feel of the world: exograms, habits, and the confusion of types of memory. In A. Kania (ed.), *Philosophers on Memento* (65-86). London: Routledge.
- Sutton, J. (2009b). Remembering. In P. Robbins & M. Aydele (eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition* (pp.217-235). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sutton, J., Harris, C., Keil, P. & Barnier, A. (2010). The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* [Special issue on embodied and extended cognition edited by Richard Menary] 9 (4), DOI 10.1007/s11097-010-9182-y
- Svoboda, E., McKinnon, M. & Levine, B. (2006). The functional neuroanatomy of autobiographical memory: A meta-analysis. *Neuropsychologia* 44 (12), 2189-2208.
- Sykes, G.M. & Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency. *American Sociological Review* 22 (6), 664-670.

- Sznajder, M. & Roniger, L. (2005) From Argentina to Israel: Escape, evacuation and exile. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 37 (2), 351-377.
- Szpunar, K.K. (2010). Episodic future thought: An emerging concept. *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 5 (2), 142-162.
- Tannen, D. (2007). *Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue and Imagery in Conversational Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tannen, D. (2006) Intertextuality in interaction: reframing family argumentation in public and private, *Text and Talk* 4-5: 597-617.
- Tannen, D. (2010). Abduction and identity in family interaction: ventriloquizing as Indirectness. *Journal of Pragmatics* 42 (2), 307-316.
- Taylor, M. (1994). Ethnography. In P. Bainster, E. Burman, I. Parker & C. Tindall (eds.), *Qualitative Methods in Psychology: A Research Guide*. Buckingham, PA: Open University.
- Taylor, S. & Littleton, K. (2006). Biographies in talk: A narrative-discursive research approach. *Qualitative Sociology Review* 2 (1), 22-38.
- Thomsen, D.K. & Berntsen, D. (2008). The cultural life scripts and life story chapters contributed to the reminiscence bump. *Memory* 16, 420-435.
- Tomasello, M. (2008). *Origins of Human Communication*. New York: MIT Press.
- Toren, C. (1996). Ethnography: theoretical background. In J.T.E. Richardson (ed.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods for Psychology and the Social Sciences* (pp. 102-112). Leicester: BPS Blackwell.
- Tsang, J.A. (2002). Moral Rationalization and the integration of situational factors and psychological processed in immoral behavior. *Review of General Psychology* 6 1, 25-50.
- Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving and W. Donaldson (eds.), *Organization of Memory* (pp.381-402). New York: Academic Press.
- Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: from mind to brain. *Annual Review of Psychology* 53, 1-25.
- Tulving, E. & Schacter, D.L. (1990). Priming and human memory systems. *Science* 247, 301-306.
- Tulving, E. & Markowitsch, H.J. (1998). Episodic and declarative memory: role of the hippocampus. *Hippocampus* 8, 198-204.
- Tversky, B., Zacks, J.M. & Hard, B.M. (2008). The structure of experience. In T. Shipley & J.M. Zacks (eds.), *Understanding Events* (pp. 436-464). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1981). Episodes as units of discourse analysis. In D. Tannen (eds.), *Analyzing Discourse: Text and Talk* (pp.177-195). Georgetown: Georgetown University Press.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1987). Episodic models in discourse processing. In R. Horowitz & S.J. Samuels (eds.), *Comprehending Oral and Written Language* (pp.161-196). New York: Academic Press.

- van Dijk, T.A. (1989). Structures and strategies of discourse and prejudice. Social psychological and methodological perspectives. In J.P. van Oudenhoven & T. M Willemsen (eds.), *Ethnic Minorities. Social Psychological Perspectives* (pp.115-138). Amsterdam/Lisse: Swets & Zeilinger.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1992). Discourse and the denial of racism. *Discourse & Society* 3, 87-118.
- van Dijk, T.A. (2002). Political discourse and political cognition. In P. Chilton & C. Schäffner (eds.), *Politics as Text and Talk. Analytical Approaches to Political Discourse* (pp.204-236). Amsterdam : John Benjamins.
- van Dijk, T.A. (2003). The discourse-knowledge interface. In G. Weiss & R. Wodak (eds.), *Critical Discourse Analysis. Theory and Interdisciplinarity* (pp.85-109). Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave-MacMillan.
- van Dijk, T. A. (2005). Contextual knowledge management in discourse production. A CDA perspective. In R. Wodak & P. Chilton (eds.), *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis* (pp.71-100). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- van Dijk, T.A. (2006). Discourse, context and cognition. *Discourse Studies*, 8(1), 159-177.
- van Dijk, T.A. (2008a). *Discourse and Power*. Houndmills: Palgrave.
- van Dijk, T.A. (2008b). *Discourse and Context. A sociocognitive approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van Dijk, T.A. (2009b). *Society and Discourse. How Context Controls Text and Talk*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
- van Dijk, T.A. (forthcoming). *Discourse and Knowledge*.
- van Dijk, T.A. (in press). Discourse, knowledge, power and politics. Towards critical epistemic discourse analysis. In C. Hart (ed.), *Critical Discourse Studies in Context and Cognition*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- van Dijk, T.A. & Kintsch, W. (1983). *Strategies of Discourse Comprehension*. New York: Academic Press.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1985). Sematic discourse analysis. In T. A. van Dijk (ed.) *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, vol. 2 (pp.103-136). London: Academic Press.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1987). Episodic models in discourse processing. In R. Horowitz & S.J. Samuels (eds.), *Comprehending Oral and Written Language* (pp.161-196). New York: Academic Press.
- van Dijk, T.A. (1999). Context and experience models in discourse processing. In H. van Oostendorp & S. Goldman (eds.), *The Construction of Mental Representation during Reading* (pp. 123-148). Hillsdale, NJ : Erlbaum.
- van Dijk, T.A. (2009a). Critical discourse studies: a sociocognitive approach. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (eds.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (pp.62-85). London: Sage.

- Vázquez, F. & Iñíguez, L. (1994). Social psychological processes of political transition: the construction of memory as an axe or governability. [URL: <http://antalya.uab.es/liniguez/Materiales/014.pdf>]
- Vázquez, F. (2001). *La Memoria Como Acción Social*. Barcelona: Paidós.
- Vecchioli, V. (2005). La nación como familia. Metáforas políticas en el movimiento argentino por los derechos humanos. In S. Frederic & G. Soprano (eds.), *Cultura y Política en Etnografías sobre la Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes / Prometeo.
- Velásquez Riera, E. (2002). Historia de la doctrina de la seguridad nacional. *Convergencia* 27 (9), 11-39.
- Velásquez Riera, E. 2002. Historia de la doctrina de la seguridad nacional. *Convergencia* 27 (9), 11-39.
- Verbitsky, H. (1986). *Ezeiza*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Contrapunto.
- Verbitsky, H. (1995). *El Vuelo*. Buenos Aires: Planeta.
- Vezzetti, H. (2003). *Pasado y Presente. Guerra, Dictadura y Sociedad en la Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Vezzetti, H. (2009). *Sobre la Violencia Revolucionaria: Memorias y Olvidos*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). *Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes* (edited by Michael Cole). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1986). *Thought and Language* (edited by Alex Kosulin). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Walsh, R. (1994 [1957]). *Operación Masacre*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones de la Flor.
- Wang, Q. & Ross, M. (2007). Culture and memory. In H. Kitayama & D. Cohen (eds.), *Handbook of Cultural Psychology* (pp.645-667). New York: Guilford Publications.
- Wang, Q. (2004). The emergence of cultural self-construct: Autobiographical memory and self-description in American and Chinese children. *Developmental Psychology* 40 (1), 3-15.
- Wang, Q. (2008). Being American, being Asian: The bicultural self and autobiographical memory in Asian Americans. *Cognition* 107, 743-751.
- Welzer, H. (2005). *Täter. Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.
- Welzer, H. (2008). Communicative memory. In A. Erll & A. Nünning (eds.), *Cultural memory studies. An interdisciplinary handbook* (285-297). Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Welzer, H. (2010a). Re-narrations: how pasts change in conversational remembering. *Memory Studies* 3 (1): 5-17.
- Welzer, H. (2010b). Erinnerung und Gedächtnis. Desiderate und Perspektiven. In C. Gudehus, A. Eichenberg & H. Welzer (eds.), *Gedächtnis und Erinnerung. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch* (pp.1-10) Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler.

- Welzer, H., Moller, S. & Tschuggnall, K. (2002). "Opa war kein Nazi": *Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust in Familiengedächtnis*. Frankfurt Am Main: Fischer.
- Welzer, H. & Markowitsch, H.J. (2005). Towards a bio-psycho-social model of autobiographical memory. *Memory*, 13, 63-78.
- Welzer, H. & Gudehus, C. (eds.) (2007). *Der Krieg der Erinnerung: Holocaust, Kollaboration und Widerstand in europäischen Gedächtnis*. Frankfurt Am Main: Fischer.
- Wertsch, J. (2000). Narratives as cultural tools in sociocultural analysis: official history in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia. *Ethos* 28 (4), 511-533.
- Wertsch, J. (2002). *Voices of Collective Remembering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wertsch, J. (2008). The narrative organization of collective memory. *Ethos* 36 (1), 120-135.
- Wertsch, J. (2009). Collective memory. In P. Boyer & J. Wertsch (eds.) *Memory in Mind and Culture* (pp.117-137). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, H. & Conway, M.A. (2009). Networks of autobiographical memories. In P. Boyer & J. Wertsch (eds.), *Memory in Mind and Culture* (pp.33-61). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, R.F. (2006). Using cognitive ethnography to study instruction. In S.A. Barab, K.E. Hay & D.T. Hickey (eds.), *Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Learning Sciences* (vol. 2, pp. 838-844). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Wodak, R. & De Cillia, R. (2007). Commemorating the past: the discursive construction of official narratives about the "Rebirth of the Second Austrian Republic". *Discourse & Communication* 1 (3), 315-341.
- Wu, M., Birnholts, J., Richards, B., Baeker, R. & Massimi, M. (2008). Collaborating to remember: a distributed cognition account of families coping with memory impairments. In *Proceedings of the ACM CHI 2008 Conference on Human Factors in Computer Systems* (pp. 825-834). Florence, Italy.
- Wyer, R. S. & Carlston, D. E. (1994). The cognitive representation of persons and events. In R.S. Wyer & T.K. Srull (eds.), *Handbook of Social Cognition*, Vol.1: Basic Processes (pp.41-98). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Wyer, R. S. & Srull, T.K. (1994). *Handbook of Social Cognition*, Vol. 1: Basic Processes. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Zacks, J. M. & Swallow, K.M. (2007). Event segmentation. *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 16 (2), 80-84.
- Zacks, J.M. (2010). How we organize our experience into events. *Psychological Science Agenda* 24. [URL : <http://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2010/04/sci-brief.aspx>]
- Zacks, J.M. & Tversky, B. (2001). Event structure in perception and conception. *Psychological Bulletin* 127, 3-21.

Zacks, J.M., Tversky, B. & Iyer, G. (2001). Perceiving, remembering, and communicating structure in events. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 130, 29–58.

Zimbardo, P. (2007). *The Lucifer effect: understanding how good people turn evil*. New York: Random House.

Zullo, J. (1999). A veinte años del golpe de estado. Las lecturas de la prensa desde la Lingüística Crítica. In: A. Raiter, J. Zullo (eds.), *Discurso y Ciencia Social*. Buenos Aires: EUDEBA.

Zwaan, R.A. & Madden, C.J. (2004). Updating situation models. *Journal of Experimental Psychology : Learning, Memory and Cognition*, 30, 283-288.

Zwaan, R.A. & Radvansky, G.A. (1998). Situation models in language and memory. *Psychological Bulletin* 123 162-185.

Zwaan, R., Radvansky, G.A. & Whitten, S.N. (2002). Themes and situation model. In Lauwerse, M. & van Peer, W. (eds.), *Thematics: Interdisciplinary Studies* (pp.35-53). Amsterdam/Philadelphia : John Benjamins.

Periodicals

Clarín

La Nación

Página 12

Le Monde Diplomatique, Edición Cono Sur

The Guardian

New York Times

