Latin-American Interculturalism. A Multicultural Model of Education for Mexico

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For Gloria and Andrea

the brightest stars that shine in my universe

Whenever you find yourself on the side of the majority,

it is time to pause and reflect.

Mark Twain

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses whether multiculturalism is an adequate framework in order to advance in ethnocultural justice in the Latin American region, with a special focus on Mexico. Simultaneously, it analyses whether the claim of interculturalists regarding the need to leave behind multiculturalism is an accurate claim. Despite the critiques directed to multiculturalism, it will be argued that its principles are still adequate for these societies. To arrive to that conclusion, an analysis will be done of the different versions of interculturalism. While doing so, it will bring to the foreground the version of Latin American interculturalism which will be critically analyzed. After doing so, a model of multiculturalism for Latin American societies will be suggested, which puts together the principles of multiculturalism and the concerns of Latin American interculturalists. This model will be called Latin American Interculturalism.

RESUMEN

Esta tesis analiza si el multiculturalismo es una teoría adecuada para avanzar hacia una mayor justicia etnocultural en la región latinoamericana y, con especial énfasis, en México. De manera simultánea, analiza si los reclamos hechos por el interculturalismo con respecto a la necesidad de dejar atrás al multiculturalismo son válidos. Aun cuando el multiculturalismo ha sido arduamente atacado por el interculturalismo, en esta tesis se defenderá que los principios del multiculturalismo son válidos para nuestras sociedades. Para llegar a esta conclusión, se hará un análisis de las distintas versiones de interculturalismo. Con motivo de ello, a su vez, se traerá a debate la versión Latinoamericana de Interculturalismo, la cual será críticamente analizada. Finalmente, se desarrollará y propondrá un modelo de multiculturalismo para las sociedades latinoamericanas, la cual junta los principios del multiculturalismo y las preocupaciones de los interculturalistas en Latinoamérica. Este modelo multicultural será llamado Interculturalismo Latinamericano.

INTRODUCTION

In 2015, the National Institute of Geography and Statistics published its midterm national census where, among other things, shows the current socioeconomic situation of the indigenous population. According to this study, 21.5% of the national population self-identifies as indigenous, which consists in 25,694,928 million people (INEGI 2015: 22).

Moreover, 36% of the indigenous municipalities (where at least 70% of its local population is indigenous) live under a high marginalized situation, and 51.5% live under a high marginalized situation (24). Indigenous populations in Mexico, that is, face serious disadvantages.

But the conditions and situation that indigenous peoples face in Mexico were invisible until the indigenous uprising back in 1994. Back then, in the state of Chiapas, many indigenous citizens rose against what they considered an oppressive State that aimed to assimilate them into the majoritarian culture, misrecognizing their cultural differences.

In 1996 the "Agreements of San Andrés" were signed. These agreements were the result of a dialogue between the State and indigenous organizations. One of the most important consequences of these agreements, was the modification of article 2 of the Mexican Constitution in 2001, which acknowledges the multicultural composition of the country, and the recognition of rights of autonomy and self-determination for these populations. This has motivated an important wave of indigenous studies coming from different approaches, such as anthropology, sociology, legal sciences, political sciences, among others.

However, even though the "indigenous question" became visible with the 1994 uprising, and despite the wave of literature in indigenous studies, indigenous citizens still face serious disadvantages. One of the main concerns of this investigation is to analyze why these disadvantages persist.

One of the main arguments that will be transversal to this investigation is that, although indigenous peoples are cultural minorities, who require their cultural differences to be recognized and accommodated, it has become a *truism* that this is their main claim and their main need. The misunderstanding of the causes of the injustices they face, it will be argued, has led to a misunderstanding on the type of remedies they require to overcome such

injustices. Concretely, while indigenous peoples surely face ethnocultural injustices, they also face other sorts of injustices, which will be identified as "positional injustices" (Young 2007).

Given the situation that indigenous peoples face in Mexico, one plausible solution, some would argue, is that indigenous peoples need to access, and remain in, the education system. If we understand education as a positional good, education becomes a powerful solution for indigenous peoples to overcome their current situation. And, indeed, studies have revealed an important educational lag in indigenous citizens (Schmelkes 2013, UNICEF Mexico, 2010, INEGI 2015).

However, adopting the position that indigenous peoples need to access the education system, and complete the education process, leads to other sorts of problems, which are also some of the concerns that motivated this investigation. Concretely, the problem lies in determining what type of education should the State provide to indigenous populations. The dilemma lies in whether, on the one hand, we must make a strong emphasis in providing the standard knowledge and values –held by the majoritarian culture– so that indigenous students acquire the necessary conditions to compete, with non-indigenous citizens– for opportunities. Or, on the other hand, whether we should provide indigenous communities autonomy, so that they can decide and control the education that is provided within their communities.

The first option implies assimilating indigenous cultures and, consequently, sacrificing cultural diversity. This option, however, is discarded because it is incompatible with the principles of multiculturalism, which are the basis of this dissertation.

The second option, on the other hand, can run the risk of sacrificing personal autonomy of indigenous future citizens and, moreover, constraining them to their current situation of disadvantage. And, even assuming that this option is plausible –which will be analyzed in the following chapters–, the question remains whether this will help overcome the situation that indigenous populations are currently facing, regarding their access to goods, resources and opportunities and, overall, regarding their multiple disadvantages. So, the question remains, what type of education should be provided to indigenous communities? And for this, we need to analyze the principles that must guide an education system within multicultural societies. This is the main objective of this investigation.

Within the wave of indigenous studies that emerged after the 1994 uprising, one of the fields which has produced important literature is precisely the educative field, which has come to be known as "intercultural education". In the Mexican arena two different approaches to intercultural education have been detected during the analysis of this dissertation. The first one was identified as the official discourse of intercultural education because it has been adopted by the Mexican Education System. The second one was identified as "autonomous education discourse", because it is currently defended by some indigenous communities and academics, on the grounds that indigenous communities require autonomy to enable their own education systems (Baronnet 2010, Sartorello 2014 and 2016, Bertely 2007).

These two discourses of intercultural education seem to be at odds. An analysis of both discourses, however, showed that their differences lie in different understandings of what interculturalism is. The third question that motivated this dissertation, hence, was to analyze interculturalism as a theory of ethnocultural justice and for managing the relations between cultural minorities and the State.

If part of the problem in suggesting a model of education within multicultural societies lies in the lack of normative basis or consistent principles that guide the design of such model, then we need to go back and analyze what interculturalism is. Coincidently, in the literature of ethnocultural justice, during the last years interculturalism has come to appear as the latest challenge to multiculturalism.

Unlike the liberal egalitarian critiques of multiculturalism (Barry 2000 and Joppke 2004), interculturalists argue that multiculturalism is an obsolete theory for managing cultural diversity. Moreover, they claim that multiculturalism is not fit for the new forms of diversity and we must move to a post-multiculturalist era called interculturalism. Multiculturalism, they conclude, has failed (Cantle, 2012 and 2016; and Zapata-Barrero, 2013 and 2016).

There are at least two versions of interculturalism currently being debated: the European and Quebecois (Modood 2015). However, during the investigation of this dissertation a third version of interculturalism was identified, which is the Latin American version. Indeed, the Latin American region has also developed its own theory of interculturalism, which has been defended as a more accurate proposal for recognizing and accommodating diversity and difference than multiculturalism (Tubino 2013, Cruz Rodriguez 2013 and 2014, Campos

Solano 2016). Although the three versions of interculturalism have in common their rejection to multiculturalism, each of these has developed in different ways. One of the objectives of this dissertation is to engage the Latin American version of interculturalism to the interculturalism/multiculturalism debate.

For this, the principles of the current version of Latin American interculturalism will be identified and analyzed. An important emphasis will be done on the reasons why Latin American interculturalists have rejected multiculturalism. Moreover, it will be analyzed whether interculturalism, as currently been developed, offers something that multiculturalism does not and whether we should consider this version of Latin American interculturalism as an alternative to multiculturalism or, rather, if we can consider Latin American interculturalism as a multicultural model for Latin American societies. The second option will be defended in this dissertation.

Indeed, it will be argued that multiculturalism is adequate for the Latin American region and that Latin American interculturalism need not oppose multiculturalism. Rather, it is a model for managing cultural diversity in the Latin American region that is compatible with the principles of multiculturalism. For this, however, we need to reconstruct and adjust some features of Latin American interculturalism, which will be done in this dissertation.

Finally, it will be argued that once we identify the basic normative principles of Latin American interculturalism, we can identify the principles that must guide a model of education within multicultural societies, with special focus on the Latin American region and, still more concretely, in Mexico.

The current investigation, however, does not pretend to design an educational model, nor to suggest an education policy, much less pretend to design a school curriculum that is compatible with the principles of Latin American interculturalism. This is something that falls outside the scope of this dissertation. Rather, the intention is to analyze whether multiculturalism and its principles are, indeed, obsolete for our current societies or, instead, we can still adopt them and expect positive results, from an ethnocultural justice approach.

For achieving the purposes of the investigation being presented here, this dissertation is structured as following.

Structure of the Thesis

Because this dissertation is focused on the Latin American region and, more concretely, on Mexico, some context is required in order to understand the problems that emerge when we try to export other models of multiculturalism into this region. Chapter 1 offers a picture of the current situation that indigenous peoples are facing in Mexico.

The intention in this chapter is twofold. First, it presents the legal framework that recognizes the rights of autonomy and self-determination of indigenous communities. Within this legal framework a distinction will be presented regarding the nature of these rights, which will be useful for the arguments developed in further chapters. Concretely, it will be argued that these rights are of two kinds: rights based on the recognition and accommodation of cultural differences; and rights for social justices and substantial equality. Although typically these rights have been subsumed under the rights of autonomy and self-determination of indigenous communities, this distinction needs to be clear because of the implications it has.

The second intention in this chapter is to introduce the two different discourses of intercultural education that are currently been discussed within the Mexican field. For that, it will be necessary first to describe the way both the national education system and the national education curriculum are designed. This chapter will conclude arguing that the difference in these two discourses lies in a different understanding of the concept of interculturalism. And in order to construct a coherent version of intercultural education, it will be argued, we need to determine what interculturalism is. For this, however, it is necessary to analyze the different versions of interculturalism that are currently being defended.

Chapter 2 will introduce these different versions of interculturalism. However, because these versions emerged from a rejection of multiculturalism, it is necessary to analyze the current debate between multiculturalism and interculturalism. The intention at this stage, however, is not to contribute to this debate, but rather to examine the different versions of interculturalism (European and Quebecois), and to analyze whether these versions can be considered a theory for managing cultural diversity. This is necessary, because as it will become clear in the next chapters, some Latin American interculturalists have adopted the

critiques directed towards multiculturalism. Consequently, examining the versions of interculturalism can be helpful to suggest a model for managing cultural diversity adequate for the Latin American region. Finally, this chapter will introduce the different notions of interculturalism that are being proposed in the Latin American region.

Chapter 3 will analyze these notions of interculturalism. In this chapter, the intention is to critically analyze the reasons offered by Latin American interculturalists to argue why multiculturalism must be rejected. Although most of the arguments they offer will be dismissed, this chapter will conclude that there is a genuine concern that needs to be addressed regarding why multiculturalism has not offered many results in this region.

This will be addressed in chapter 4. Here, a distinction between the principles of multiculturalism and the multicultural models will be made. It will be argued that while the first ones are exportable to Mexico, the second ones are not. For this, an analysis will be done regarding the typology of cultural minorities, and it will be argued that indigenous peoples in Mexico do not fit properly within this typology. Indigenous peoples in Mexico, it will be suggested, are a *sui generis* cultural minority that requires a different treatment than other indigenous peoples in other countries. This means that other models that have been successful for indigenous peoples in multicultural countries, will not necessarily be as effective in Mexico.

Moreover, it will be argued that because of the context of these minorities in Mexico, a multicultural model for this country needs to address other sources of injustices that these minorities face. For this, the distinction elaborated by Iris Marion Young (2007) regarding the two different versions of the politics of difference will be recalled. Indeed, according to her, social groups tend to face two different types of injustice: cultural, which is the type of injustice that multiculturalism has typically been concerned. And positional, which is the type of injustice that other social groups face. Although usually cultural minorities face both types of injustice, it is necessary to distinguish them for analytical purposes. This distinction will be useful to argue that a multicultural model for Mexico requires to address these two sources of injustice. With this framework, a model of multiculturalism for Mexico will be developed in Chapter 5.

This model will be presented as Latin American interculturalism. Here, it will be suggested that Latin American interculturalism needs to be composed of three different perspectives, which should tend to address the different sources of injustice that indigenous peoples face. These are the equality, indigenous, and intercultural perspectives. The equality perspective should be concerned with the unequal access to, and distribution of, goods, resources, and opportunities. It is framed under an equality of opportunities rhetoric and, as a consequence, its main strategy should consist in affirmative action programs and group target policies.

The indigenous perspective, on the other hand, is concerned with recognizing and accommodating cultural differences and, as such, it is framed under the mainstream multicultural rhetoric. And finally, the intercultural perspective proposed in this chapter uses some of the ideas of the work of Fidel Tubino, who has argued that we also need to change the focus from indigenous peoples to the majoritarian culture. That is, in order to offer better conditions for indigenous citizens, we need to change the attitude of the majority towards these minorities. And for that, it will be suggested, the majority needs to embrace or cherish some values or practices of indigenous cultures.

Finally, chapter 6 will try to apply this model to the education field. First, a suggestion will be made regarding what each of these perspectives should address in the education field. And secondly, from what was presented in Chapter 1, it will be analyzed whether these perspectives are compatible with the way the education system is designed, concretely, regarding the design of the national education system and the national curriculum.

The analysis offered in this dissertation tries to put together two different and parallel lines of study: on the one hand, the Latin American framework of interculturalism; and on the other hand, the current literature of multiculturalism, including its latest critiques. Although these lines of study have evolved in parallel ways, they are not always incompatible and, moreover, they can complement each other. Finally, it is believed that to strengthen the literature of multiculturalism it is relevant to engage in what has been happening in the Latin American region regarding cultural diversity. This dissertation is an attempt of this.

CONTENT

2. CHAPTER 2. INTERCULTURALISMS. A CRITICAL REVIEW

CHAPTER 1- INTERCULTURAL AND BILINGUAL EDUCATION IN MEXICO. MAPPING THE DEBATE

1. Introduction

During the last three decades the Latin American region has experienced an increasing interest in the cultural diversity of its countries, with special emphasis on indigenous peoples[1]. The term interculturalism has been used in many ways to describe the different tensions that have risen between indigenous peoples and the State (Mateos Cortés and Dietz 2011: 21). This has been catalogued as the era of *post-indigenismo Latinoamericano.*

Mexico entered this era on January 1st, 1994, the same day that the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect (Carbonell 2003:841). That day, members of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) emerged from the mountains and occupied some cities in Chiapas (southern Mexico). Most of the members of the EZLN belonged to indigenous communities of La Selva Lacandona, and they framed their demands in terms of indigenous peoples and their rights (Jung 2008:3, Montemayor 1998).

After a long confrontation between members of the EZLN and the Mexican Army, on February 21 of that same year, the formal negotiations started between the EZLN and the Mexican State. In 1996, both parts signed an agreement, better known as the San Andrés Agreements, which were supposed to end the conflict and set the new relation between the State and the indigenous peoples (Cossío Díaz 1998, Bertely 2007:15-16, Montemayor 1998; Aubry 2002:403-428).

These agreements stipulated, among other things, the recognition of the multicultural composition of the country and the recognition of the existence of indigenous communities. Furthermore, it recognized the rights of autonomy and self-determination of these minorities

[1] In some countries the afro descendent population has received more interest. In Mexico, however, until very recently (2015) these minorities were officially recognized. The debates regarding interculturalism in this country, hence, have been practically focused solely on indigenous peoples.

and, in addition, it established a set of commitments consisting in the adoption of different actions and policies intended to end the situation of poverty and marginalization that indigenous peoples were facing (Gonzalez Galván 2010: 213-237).

As part of the commitments, in 2001 the Constitutional text was modified in a way in which it incorporated, in article 2, the rights recognized to indigenous peoples. These rights are better known as rights of autonomy and self-determination.

With this recognition and immerse in this whole rhetoric and context, a whole wave of literature from different fields has emerged, which mainly discusses the scope of the rights of autonomy and self-determination of indigenous communities (Bertely 2007; Baronnet 2015 and 2015a).

Among these debates, one which has been prominently discussed is related to the education that indigenous peoples should receive. This debate has been named intercultural and bilingual education. There are two main proposals that are currently being defended among scholars and activists. One, which is the official discourse of intercultural education, and the other one, which has been known as "autonomous education" (Baronnet 2010 and 2015).

In this chapter both discourses will be presented. But before doing this, the whole legal framework needs to be introduced. The following section will present article 2 of the Mexican Constitution, followed by the rights recognized in this article. Finally, an analysis of the right to education for indigenous communities will be presented. After doing so, in the second section the two discourses of intercultural education will be analyzed. Finally, section three of this chapter will show some problems with these two discourses, which will be analyzed towards the final chapters if this dissertation.

2. The Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Rights

Although with the uprising of 1994 the situation that indigenous peoples in Mexico were facing became evident to the rest of the population, before this movement emerged there were two legal provisions which stipulated and recognized different rights for these groups. These two legal instruments were the Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO), and article 4 of the Constitutional text (Garcia Ramirez 1996).

In fact, the Constitutional reform of 2001, which incorporated the rights and commitments that were negotiated in the San Andrés Agreements, incorporated very similar rights to those recognized already in the Convention 169 of the ILO. Which means that even before the indigenous uprising, there was a legal framework that recognized special rights for indigenous communities. However, the whole movement together with the San Andrés Agreements had an important effect on the Mexican society, it was because of this movement that the situation indigenous peoples were facing became visible and, at the same time, untenable (Carbonell 2003), which was what pressured the Mexican government to react to these demands.

The fact that a whole article of the constitutional text was dedicated to the rights of indigenous peoples was something symbolic that meant the willingness of the State to set a new relation with these minorities. Therefore, article 2 of the Constitution should be seen as something more than a *simple* recognition of the rights of autonomy and self-determination. It is, in fact, a formal recognition of the multicultural society, and a willingness to adopt a multicultural agenda (Carbonell 2003 and González Galván 2010).

In the following subsection a brief description of article 2 of the Mexican Constitution will be offered, followed by the set of rights recognized for indigenous peoples.

a) Introducing Article 2 of the Mexican Constitution

Article 2 of the Mexican Constitution states as follows:

> The Mexican Nation is one and indivisible. The Nation has a multicultural composition, originally sustained on its indigenous peoples, regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations that originally inhabited the country's current territory at the time of colonization, and who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions.
>
> The fundamental criteria to determine to whom the provisions on indigenous people apply shall be the self-identification of their indigenous identity.
>
> Those communities which constitute a cultural, economic, and social unit settled in a territory that recognize their own authorities according to their uses and customs are the ones that comprise an indigenous folk.
>
> Indigenous peoples' right to self-determination shall be exercised within a framework of constitutional autonomy safeguarding national unity. The constitutions and laws of the Federal District and of the States shall recognize indigenous peoples and communities and shall also include the general principles established in the previous paragraphs of this Article, as well as ethnic-linguistic and land settlement criteria.

A. This Constitution recognizes and protects the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples and communities and, consequently, their right to autonomy, so that they may:

I. Decide the ways of their community life as well as their social, economic, political, and cultural organization.

II. Enforce their own legal systems to regulate and solve their internal conflicts, subject to the general principles of this Constitution, respecting constitutional rights, human rights, and in a relevant manner, the dignity and integrity of women. The Law shall establish the cases and validation procedures by the corresponding judges or courts.

III. Elect, in accordance with their traditional rules, procedures and practices, their authorities or representatives to exercise their form of internal government, guaranteeing the participation of women under equitable conditions before men, respecting the Federal Union Pact and the States' sovereignty.

IV. Preserve and promote their languages, knowledge, and all those elements that constitute their culture and identity.

V. Maintain and improve their habitat and preserve the integrity of their lands as provided in this Constitution.

VI. Attain preferential use and enjoyment of any natural resources located in the sites inhabited and occupied by the communities, save for the ones pertaining to strategic areas as provided in this Constitution. The foregoing rights shall be exercised respecting the nature and classes of land ownership and land tenure set forth in this Constitution and the laws on the matter, as well as the rights acquired by third parties or by members of the community. To achieve these goals, communities may constitute partnerships under the terms established by the Law.

VII. Elect representatives before town councils in those Municipalities with indigenous population.

The constitutions and laws of the Federal District and the States shall recognize and regulate these rights in Municipalities, with the purpose of strengthening their participation and political representation in accordance with their traditions and standards.

VIII. To have full access to State jurisdiction. To protect this right, in all trials and procedures to which they are party, individually or collectively, the particularities of their customs and culture must be taken into account, respecting the provisions of this Constitution. Indigenous people have at all times the right to be assisted by interpreters and counselors who are familiar with their language and culture.

The constitutions and laws of the Federal District and the States shall determine those elements of self determination and autonomy that may best express the conditions and aspirations of indigenous people in each State, as well as the provisions for the recognition of indigenous communities as entities of public interest.

B. In order to promote equal opportunities for indigenous people and to eliminate any discriminatory practices, the Federation, the Federal District, the States and the Municipalities, shall establish the institutions and shall determine the policies needed to guarantee full force and effect of indigenous people's rights and the comprehensive development of their towns and communities. Such policies shall be designed and operated jointly with them.

In order to decrease the needs and lags affecting indigenous towns and communities, authorities are obliged to:

I. Promote regional development in indigenous areas with the purpose of strengthening local economies and improving the quality of life of their people, through coordinated actions among the three levels of government with the participation of the communities. Municipal authorities shall equitably determine the budget allocations that indigenous communities shall directly administer for specific goals.

II. Guarantee and increase educational levels, favoring bilingual and cross-cultural education, literacy, the conclusion of elementary education by students, technical training and medium and higher education. To establish a scholarship system for indigenous students at all levels. To define and develop educational programs of regional content which recognize the cultural heritage of their peoples in accordance with the laws on the matter and consulting it with indigenous communities. To promote respect for and knowledge of, the diverse cultures in the Nation.

III. Assure effective access to health services by increasing the coverage of the national system of health, but benefiting from traditional medicine, and also to support better nutrition for indigenous people through food programs, especially for children.

IV. Improve indigenous communities' living conditions and their spaces for socializing and recreation through actions facilitating access to public and private financing for housing construction and improvements, and also to extend the coverage of basic social services.

V. Foster the incorporation of indigenous women to development by supporting productive projects, protecting their health, granting incentives to privilege their education and their participation in decision making processes regarding community life.

VI. Extend the communication network enabling the integration of communities, by constructing and expanding transportation routes and telecommunication means. To develop the conditions required so that indigenous people and communities may acquire, operate and manage means of communication, in accordance with the terms set forth by the laws on the matter.

VII. Support productive activities and sustainable development of indigenous communities through actions aimed at, allowing them to attain economic self-reliance, applying incentives for public and private investments which foster the creation of jobs, incorporating technology to increase their own productive capacity, and also insuring equitable access to supply and marketing systems.

VIII. Establish social policies to protect indigenous migrants in Mexican territory, as well as in foreign countries, through actions designed to guarantee the labor rights of farm workers; to improve health conditions of women, support children and youth of migrant families with special educational and food programs; to ensure that indigenous people's human rights are respected and promote their cultures.

IX. Consult indigenous people when preparing the National Development Plan and the States and Municipalities plans, and if appropriate, to incorporate their recommendations and proposals.

To guarantee compliance with the obligations set forth herein, the House of Deputies of the Congress of the Union, the Federal District and the State Legislatures and Municipal councils, within the scope of their respective jurisdictions, shall establish specific items allotted to the fulfillment of these obligations in the expenditure budgets they shall approve, as well as the procedures enabling communities to participate in the exercise and supervision thereof.

Notwithstanding the rights herein set forth to the benefit of indigenous individuals, their communities and people, any community equated to them shall have, as applicable, the same rights as the indigenous people, as provided by the Law. (Mexican Supreme Court, 2010: 2-11).

The first sentence of this article which states that "the Mexican nation is one and indivisible" has generated some debates within indigenous scholars. For some, this statement implies the prohibition of secession (Pérez Portilla, 2002). Because this article recognizes the indigenous communities' right to self-determination, a previous clarification is made from the start that stipulated that these rights should be exercised within the State and they are not rights to

leave the State (González Galván 2002). That is, that nothing in article 2 should be used to claim seceding from the Mexican State.

Others argue that, despite the unfortunate statement which opens this article, this is something irrelevant given the fact that indigenous communities are making claims within the Mexican State and not to leave it (Gonzalez Galván 2002: 39). Furthermore, they argue that in their internal and traditional ways of organization, indigenous peoples are not familiar with the modern models of State formations, and so it becomes irrelevant if it recognizes or not the possibility of leaving the Mexican State (Stavenhagen 2010: 114).

However, it is agreed that even though indigenous peoples are not seeking the formation of their own sovereign state, the way this article is introduced is hostile, especially because it is intended to set the new relations between indigenous communities and the State (Gonzláez Galván 2002 and 2010, and Pérez Portilla 2002).

After this first statement, the following paragraph recognizes that the Mexican nation has a multicultural composition originally composed of indigenous peoples who descend from populations that inhabited the territory of the State before the beginning of the colonization process and which still conserve their social, economic, cultural, and political institutions, or part of them.

And given the recognition of the multicultural society and having offered a definition of indigenous peoples, the article states that the recognition of the right to self-determination should be understood within the Constitutional and territorial limits.

Finally, the article offers some criterion to identify indigenous communities for the purposes of the rights enlisted in this article –which will be an important aspect analyzed in further chapters. This criterion is the self-identification of being indigenous and belonging to an indigenous community.

In sum, the first two paragraphs of this constitutional article should be understood as a formal recognition of the multicultural composition of the Mexican society. Additionally, it offers some criteria to identify indigenous peoples for the purposes of the rights further recognized.

b) The Rights Recognized To Indigenous Communities

Followed by the first two paragraphs described above, the article continues by mentioning the different rights recognized to indigenous communities. The latter is divided in two sections. Section A, which recognizes the rights of autonomy; and Section B which establishes a set of actions and strategies that State institutions must pursue to achieve substantial equality and equality of opportunities for indigenous citizens.

The rights of autonomy recognized in article 2, Section A, are the following:

- The right to decide the internal forms of coexistence and of social, economic, political, and cultural organization.
- The right to apply their own legal systems for solving internal conflicts, with the only limits set in the Constitution, and the respect of human rights, making an important emphasis in gender equality.
- The right to choose, according to their practices and traditional procedures, the authority and representatives to exercise their own traditional ways of internal government.
- The right to preserve and strengthen their own languages, knowledge, and all the elements that are constitutive of their culture and identity.
- The right to conserve and strengthen the habitat and their lands.
- The right to accede to the property of their lands and to the use and enjoy the natural resources of the lands they inhabit.
- The right to choose their State representatives in municipalities where indigenous populations represent a majority.
- The right to accede to the State jurisdiction. In order to offer a fair trial, when an indigenous citizen or community is taking part of a criminal procedure, they have the following rights of due process –which are additional to all the rights of due process that any non-indigenous citizen has:
    - To have their practices –*usos y costumbres*- acknowledged.

- To be assisted by an attorney who is knowledgeable of the cultural specificities.
- To be assisted by a translator who is knowledgeable of the cultural specificities and of the indigenous language in question.

Section B establishes that the different levels of government –Federal and local- must adopt the policies required to guarantee and promote equality of opportunities for indigenous citizens and to eliminate any discriminatory practices. These policies must be designed in cooperation with indigenous representatives.

To seek these goals, the authorities above mentioned must:

- Encourage the regional development where indigenous communities are concentrated. This involves strengthening the local economy and the living conditions of indigenous citizens, including the adoption of housing policies.
- Regarding education: a) Guarantee and increase the schooling levels; b) reduce the illiteracy rate; c) promote the conclusion of basic education; d) favor an intercultural and bilingual education; e) design school curriculums that attend to the cultural and linguistic specificities of indigenous populations; f) involve indigenous representatives in the design of such curriculums; g) enact a scholarship program and special funding for indigenous students.
- Regarding health: a) ensure the effective access to public health services; b) increase the medical coverage and the number of medical centers near indigenous regions; c) respect the use of traditional medicine; and d) adopt special programs for nourishment, especially for indigenous children.

As it can be noted, these set of rights, policies, and measures have two different objectives: The first one is that by recognizing the existence of more than one cultural group in the Mexican territory, these rights intend to accommodate the cultural differences in two different ways: one, through forms of territorial autonomy; and the second one, by redesigning institutions in order to include these cultural differences, which will be referred

to as fair terms of inclusion. These set of rights, as it will be retaken in further chapters, follow a multicultural rhetoric.

The second objective is more related with social justice and with achieving substantial equality. The set of rights and policies that pursue this goal are based on the demands that indigenous organizations raised regarding equality of opportunities. Indigenous organizations, that is, not only raised demands of recognition of their cultural difference and, consequently, forms of territorial autonomy or fair terms of inclusion, in addition, they demanded equality of opportunities and, moreover, the right to pursue different life projects. In short, they demanded institutional support that will allow them to overcome their marginal situation (Gonález Galván 2010: 276).

It is important to note, however, that the rights based on the recognition and accommodation of cultural difference (Section A) can be of two kinds: territorial autonomy or fair terms of inclusion, and these rights can exist simultaneously. An example of this, for instance, is regarding the criminal legal systems. Article 2 of the constitution recognizes the right of indigenous communities to solve their internal conflicts according to their own punishment legal system. But in addition, it recognizes special rights of due process for indigenous citizens who face a criminal procedure under the state legal system. These special rights are: a) to have their practices –*usos y costumbres*- acknowledged; b) to be assisted by an attorney who is knowledgeable of the cultural specificities, and c) to be assisted by a translator who is knowledgeable of the cultural specificities and of the indigenous language in question (González Galván 2010: 279).

These special rights of due process are rights based on cultural differences, but they are not rights framed under forms of territorial autonomy, rather, they are rights that seek to include indigenous citizens into the national legal systems, but in a way which is sensitive to their cultural differences and to the disadvantages they tend to face due to these differences. This will be expanded in chapters IV and V.

Summarizing, it is possible to distinguish two broad groups of rights recognized to indigenous peoples, each of which seeks one of these two different objectives: 1) cultural recognition and accommodation, and 2) substantial equality. This distinction is relevant for

the analysis and discussions that will be made in further chapters. In sum, the rights recognized to indigenous peoples can be grouped as follows:

1) Right based on cultural differences:
    a. Rights of territorial autonomy.
    b. Fair terms of inclusion.
2) Rights for social justice and substantial equality.

Finally, it is important to mention the limits of the rights recognized to indigenous communities. These rights of autonomy and self-determination are not absolute rights (González Galván 2010: 277), they are subject to certain limits which are imposed by the Constitution.

The first limit, as it has been mentioned above, is to respect the national unity. Indeed, although it has been argued that typically indigenous peoples in Mexico are not seeking to create their own states and the rights they are demanding are expected to be exercised within the State, the unity of it is still a limit imposed by the Constitution (González Galván 2010: 277 and Stavenhagen 2010: 114).

González Galván has argued that from the limit above mentioned another one emerges, which is the obligation to exercise their rights of autonomy within the framework of the Constitution and of the whole national legal system (2010). In this regard, Cossío Díaz (1998:2) has argued that the rights of autonomy recognized to indigenous peoples should be understood as complementary and subordinated to the national legal system.

Finally, among the limits of the rights recognized to indigenous communities, the constitutional text makes a strong emphasis in the respect for human rights and the promotion of gender equality, which means that the rights of autonomy must be respectful of both.

This is the general constitutional framework of the rights recognized to indigenous peoples. From this constitutional framework extensive literature has been developed analyzing the different rights mentioned above[2]. Here the focus will be set on the right to education.

[2] See, for instance: Carbonell 2003; Cossío Díaz 1998; González Galván 2010; Garcia Ramirez, 1996; Carbonell and Pérez Portilla (coords.) 2002; Stavenhagen 2010.

Concretely, on what does this right imply, and which is the best way to make it effective. For that, the legal framework of the right to education needs to be introduced, which will be done in the following section.

3. Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Education

Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution states the following:

> All people have the right of education. The State – Federation, States, Federal District and Municipalities – will provide preschool, elementary, middle, and high education. Preschool, elementary, and middle educations are considered as basic education; these and the high school education will be mandatory.
>
> Education provided by the State shall develop harmoniously all human abilities and will stimulate in pupils the love for the country, respect for human rights and the principles of international solidarity, independence, and justice.
>
> The State will guarantee the quality in mandatory education, in a way that educational material and methods, school organization, educational infrastructure, and the suitability of teachers and principals ensure the highest learning achievement of students.

According to the education system and to this article, basic and secondary education are mandatory. Basic education comprises preschool, primary school, and junior high, while secondary education comprises high school. All mandatory education will be provided by State institutions and is free of charge (Valadés 1997 and Latapí 2009).

The General Law for Education is the legal instrument that develops the whole education system. There, it is established that in areas where indigenous communities are concentrated, the mandatory education must be provided in their language. Additionally, it stipulates that the education offered to indigenous communities must be intercultural, in accordance to article 2, Section B of the Constitution.

According to such provision, education is regarded as an instrument that will help overcome the discrimination and marginalization that indigenous citizens suffer. In accordance, state institutions must seek to:

- Increase the schooling levels;
- Reduce the illiteracy rates;
- Assure that indigenous students conclude the basic education;
- Offer scholarship programs and special funding for indigenous students;

- Make sure that in areas where there is a high concentration of indigenous population the design of the school curriculum responds to cultural and linguistic specificities, and
- Include indigenous representatives in the design process of school curriculums.

And this seems to coincide with what was stipulated in the San Andrés Agreements regarding education, where the government accepted its commitment to a) respect the "educative tasks" of indigenous peoples within their own territory; and b) to guarantee the quality of the education provided to indigenous students. In order to guarantee this, it was agreed that indigenous representatives would be included in: the designing of the school curriculum, the processes of assigning teachers, and in the creation of vigilance committees (Acuerdos del Gobierno y el Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional sobre Derechos y Cultura Indígenas 1996: 35).

From an analysis of the legal framework regarding the right to education for indigenous citizens, we can conclude it has the following characteristics. First, indigenous citizens, just as all other citizens, have the right to basic education. As mentioned before, basic education is mandatory and free of charge. This fits within the principles of all liberal democracies which recognize the same set of rights to every citizen, regardless of their sex, race, cultural membership, religion, etc. As it will be expanded further, this falls under the liberal egalitarian principles that suggest that every person must enjoy the same set of civil and political rights.

Secondly, however, because it is acknowledged that indigenous populations face socioeconomic disadvantages, education is regarded as a tool that will help them overcome this situation. For the latter, it has been acknowledged that indigenous citizens require additional and complementary measures to achieve these education goals and, consequently, widen their life opportunities. These special measures are intended to, among other goals, increase the schooling levels, reduce illiteracy rates, and assure that indigenous students conclude basic education.

Thirdly, additionally from being disadvantaged social groups, it is acknowledged that indigenous populations are also cultural groups. Therefore, the right to education recognized

to these groups needs to incorporate and include their cultural specificities. As a response to this, the right to education also includes designing the school curriculum in a way that is compatible with both their cultural and linguistic specificities and, moreover, to include indigenous representatives in the design process of such school curriculums.

These three features of the right to education of indigenous communities is what has been called intercultural education. And for making effective this right and what it implies, in 2001 a special office was created called General Office of Intercultural and Bilingual Education (CGEIB from now on). The main function of this office, which pertains to the Ministry of Public Education, is to encourage and coordinate the national education system and, moreover, to assure that respect for cultural and linguistic diversity is warrantied through all the system and in all the education programs and policies enabled (CGEIB, Identidad Institucional 2015: 9). In short, this office oversees the implementation of the intercultural and bilingual education program, which is one of the discourses of intercultural education that will be presented next.

a) Special Program of Intercultural Education

The Special Program of Intercultural Education is a legal instrument that forms part of the National Plan for Development, which is the Public Administration sexennial plan. This Special Program started to be implemented with the creation of the General Office of Intercultural and Bilingual Education, in 2001. Concretely, at the beginning of each presidential period, the President must publish its National Plan for Development which must contain the objectives pursued during his or her presidential period. The National Plan for Development is also divided in different areas. The Special Program of Intercultural Education is one of those areas, in which this program intends to set the goals and objectives pursued by education authorities.

Although called a Special Program of Intercultural Education, this legal instrument does not provide a program *per se* of intercultural education. Rather, it offers a diagnosis of the situation that indigenous students tend to face within the education system; a conceptual framework of interculturalism and intercultural education and the objectives that the education authorities must pursue. In short, it offers some guiding principles that the

education authorities must observe when enabling education programs, policies, and school curriculums.

Furthermore, according to the legal provisions that justify the creation of the General Office of Intercultural and Bilingual Education, the main task of this office is to promote an intercultural focus, inserted and considered in the school curriculums, the education programs, and policies. This means that the intercultural focus is transversal to the whole field of education. This section will describe this program, which will be critically analyzed in the final chapter.

i. The Diagnosis

According to this program, education appears to be meaningful because of its positional potential: it enables children to access life opportunities, and it is an important tool in achieving social justice and equality (CGEIB, Programa Especial de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe 2014: 9-12). However, in the diagnosis presented by the General Office of Intercultural and Bilingual Education, it is acknowledged that the current education programs have failed to tackle discriminatory practices, segregation, exclusion and, violence (25) that indigenous students suffer when accessing to the state educational system. Furthermore, the curriculum and the pedagogic practices are designed for a homogeneous society, ignoring differences such as cultural or socioeconomic (26). And because indigenous students suffer both, in the national evaluations indigenous students are the ones who present the lower grades and the biggest educational lag (33).

According to the diagnosis of this program, the major reasons why indigenous students have the lowest academic achievements are three. First, because the whole education system is designed according to the miscegenation ideology, which conceives society as homogeneous. Among the goals of this ideology is to assimilate all indigenous cultures into the mainstream culture, because it is believed it is on the best interest of indigenous citizens (CGEIB, Programa Especial de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe 2014: 26 and Jimenez Naranjo 2011: 150-151)

Secondly, the education centers tend to reproduce the conditions of inequality that exist in the entire society[3]. For instance, urban education centers are usually bigger and have much better conditions, infrastructure, and staff than those in rural areas (CGEIB, Programa Especial de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe 2014: 26-27). This contrasts positively with what the Special Rapporteur on the right to education of United Nations published, in 2010, regarding the education provided in Mexico, concluding that in this country poor people receive poor education (28).

Finally, the third reason that explains the educational lag of indigenous students is the discrimination and racism they face when accessing the education system. According to the National Commission for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination, 20% of members of ethnic minorities agree that their biggest problem is discrimination. This same study revealed that 40% considers that they do not have equal opportunities for getting a job, and 33% consider they do not have the same opportunities in receiving public founding (27). These numbers reveal that an important portion of indigenous citizens in Mexico perceive they are being treated in a discriminatory way. Among the conclusions of the study conducted by the National Commission for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination, being indigenous or afro descendent in Mexico immediately means increasing the probabilities of receiving none or poor education, lacking access to basic health services, and not receiving a fixed income (30).

According to the diagnosis offered by the CGEIB, what is needed is to move away from an education system that privileges integration and assimilation and adopt one which acknowledges and recognizes the right of a cultural identity and the necessity of fostering relations of equality between different cultural groups (28). Intercultural education, under this perspective, is not a compensatory education. Rather, it is an alternative for the education system in Mexico (28).

ii. The Conceptual Framework

[3] See also Martínez Buenabad Elizabeth, 2015.

In order to redress the situation described above, the actors involved in developing the Special Program of Intercultural and Bilingual Education developed a set of principles that must guide the intercultural education offered. These principles are embedded in their concept of interculturalism[4], which is understood as a project that seeks to reconsider and reshape the social order in a way in which there is a fair communication between the different cultural groups that form a country. Interculturalism, they argue, must seek to form citizens that recognize differences, try to understand them, and dialogue with them. Rather than erasing differences, these must be properly understood and accommodated (41), this is why one of the most acclaimed principles of interculturalism is to establish an intercultural dialogue and the idea of intercultural *convivencia* (Solano-Campos 2016).

Furthermore, for this view of interculturalism, the attitude of the state towards indigenous populations must be transformed from a paternalist and *assistentialist* attitude which reproduces patterns of institutionalized racism and discrimination, towards an attitude that considers them capable of exercising alternative forms of citizenship (CGEIB, Programa Especial de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe 2014: 42). For this transformation to be possible, it suggests the need to reconsider the process of how cultural diversity is first acknowledged, then recognized, and finally valued (43-44).

This project sustains two different dimensions: the epistemic dimension and the ethic dimension (82). Regarding the epistemic dimension, it is argued that there is no unique and superior type of knowledge and that the different kinds of knowledge must be articulated in a way which makes them complementary and equally worthy of value. On the other hand, the ethic dimension advocates for the development of personal autonomy and the ability to choose life projects according to principles or ways of viewing the world, which may vary through different cultures (82).

Under these principles, intercultural education is defined as the set of pedagogic processes oriented to fostering citizens that can understand the world through different cultural views, as well as participating in the social processes of transformation with a respectful attitude

[4] The next two chapters will analyze the different ways of understanding interculturalism, not only in Latin America, but also in Europe and in Canada. There, a critical analysis of these concepts will be done. For now, in order to present the rhetoric behind the official discourse of Intercultural Education, I will only describe the way interculturalism is understood, without mentioning any inconsistency nor making any critical analysis.

towards different cultures and with awareness of the benefits that cultural diversity entails. This requires, additionally, a profound knowledge of one's own culture as well as the cultures of others (CGEIB, Programa Especial de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe 2014: 28 and Ahuja 2004: 49).

In order to achieve the above mentioned, intercultural education has two essential tasks. One consists in making sure that all students fulfill the national education goals, which implies accessing to, and remaining in, the national education system. The second task consists in reconsidering the current relation between different cultural groups that is being taught in education centers.

These tasks require that the national education goals be reconsidered so they can respond to the cultural differences existing in the country, which means that the education offered in each region must be relevant both culturally and linguistically speaking (Ahuja 2004: 49).

An important emphasis is made in the fact that education must be culturally and linguistically relevant. This means that the education provided to all students –indigenous or not– must be useful –relevant– for their sociocultural contexts, and this is why it was mentioned above that the curriculums cannot be homogeneous through all the country. A relevant education, both culturally and linguistically speaking, requires a proper balance in the curriculum, which should incorporate a general basic knowledge –which might be common to all the regions of the country– and another type of knowledge that responds to the context of each region. For instance, in the case of indigenous regions it is commonly suggested that the education they receive must be useful for the realization of their economic activities in a more efficient way. And in addition, it must be emphasized that the education provided in school centers must not be at odds with the cultural principles and values of the community (Ahuja 2004: 50 and CGEIB, Programa Especial de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe 2014: 30).

Finally, regarding the linguistic relevance, the program makes emphasis on the need of offering education to indigenous communities in their language. For this, teachers need to be both knowledgeable of the indigenous language and cultures of the different regions (CGEIB, Programa Especial de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe 2014: 29)

The idea of cultural and linguistic relevance in education is, in fact, transversal to all the objectives established by the Special Program, which will be presented next.

iii. Objectives

The Special Program of Intercultural and Bilingual Education has six objectives which are mainly focused in two fields. One, which is focused on the education that indigenous students receive; and the second one which is focused on the intercultural education that the rest of the students within the whole country must receive.

Although there are six objectives enlisted in the program, given that they are very similar, they have been grouped into three, which represent each of the three official schooling levels.

The first objective of this program is concerned with strengthening the Basic education, making emphasis on the relevance of the education provided and the language in which it is provided. For this, the main strategies are to incorporate in the curriculum some subjects related with the cultural diversity within the territory; incorporate an intercultural perspective in all school programs, including the way schools should deal with cultural diversity and the development of pedagogic practices that allow teachers to attend the cultural differences coexisting in the schooling centers. It also implies the production of school material in indigenous languages and the training of teachers who are knowledgeable of the indigenous language and culture of the region (CGEIB, Programa Especial de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe 2014: 47-51)

On the other hand, this objective also contemplates the need of reshaping the curriculums and programs in non-indigenous public schools to recognize and incorporate the cultural and linguistic diversity in the whole country.

The second objective is similar to the first one, but focused on the Secondary level of education. The difference, however, is that it incorporates the need to focus on preparing students for employment, based on the principal activities and jobs performed in each region of the country. One of the main strategies for this objective is the implementation of what they call “intercultural high schools”, which are institutions of higher education established in rural areas or in regions with big concentration of indigenous communities. These high schools intend to provide an education with cultural and linguistic relevance, which prepares

students for the economic activities of the region (CGEIB, Programa Especial de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe 2014: 49-56).

The third objective is concerned with strengthening superior education. There are two ways this should be implemented: one, which is by strengthening the subsystem of Intercultural Universities[5], and the other is through incorporating an intercultural perspective in the conventional institutions of superior education (59-69).

In sum, the official program of intercultural education is concerned with two broad fields: one is the type of education that must be provided in indigenous communities, assuming that most of the students will be indigenous. Here, the objective seems to be the leveling up of the playing field so that indigenous students can have equal educational opportunities and compete in equal conditions with non-indigenous students for life opportunities.

However, unlike the education policies directed to indigenous communities during most of the last century, which simply aimed at assimilating them into the non-indigenous culture (Jimenez Naranjo 2011 and Garcia Cerda 2007), this new discourse tries to make compatible the standard knowledge with the knowledge of their cultures and with their own way of understanding the world. Whether this is successful or not will be analyzed further.

The second field in which this program is focused on is with how education can help foster a more intercultural society, and for that, it makes emphasis on the fact that intercultural education should be provided in all the country, including non-indigenous schools. The intention, at this point, is that by fostering a citizenship with awareness of the cultural diversity of the country, many prejudices, stereotypes, and discriminatory practices that are still embedded in the Mexican society against indigenous communities could soon be transcended. This is why it is insisted that the education provided by the State to all the country needs to be intercultural.

[5] The subsystem of Intercultural Universities was created in 2002 with the establishment of some intercultural universities through the country, although there is still little evidence of the results of these universities, as it will be shown in further sections. However, among the main goals of this subsystem is to form professionals and intellectuals committed with their regions and communities. The educational offer is focused on the needs and potentials of the region, which means that their curriculum is flexible; and they work in constant contact with the communities nearby (Mateos Cortés and Dietz 2011: 115)

iv. Some Preliminary Results

The Special Program of Intercultural Education has offered some preliminary results of each objective.

Regarding the first objective, which is focused on strengthening the schooling levels in Basic Education with a special focus on culturally relevant curriculums, up to 2016 the CBEIB has published some provisional results, some which will be mentioned next.

- The percentage of education models that have incorporated a cultural and linguistic relevance on the Basic level has progressed from a 25% in 2013 to 40% in 2016, while the goal of the program is to achieve a 50% by 2018 (CGEIB. Logros 2016: 13).

- By 2016, there were 23 teacher training schools offering a bachelor's degree in Basic School teaching with an Intercultural and Bilingual Focus. Which is of a great relevance given the need of teachers specialized in teaching indigenous communities.

As to the second objective, some of the most important achievements are:

- The creation of intercultural high schools. While in 2014 there was only one state in the whole country with intercultural high schools, by 2016 there were 6 states that were implementing this model[6]. In total there are 21 intercultural high schools in the whole country (18-19).

- In 2013 an Intercultural Model for these high schools was developed, replacing the model enabled in 2005. In 2016, the first generation, composed by 105 students subject to this model, graduated.

- The number of indigenous students registered in these high schools has increased since 2013 in the following proportions:

    - Academic year 2013-2014: 52 students registered.

    - Academic year 2014-2015: 475 students registered.

[6] The states are Tabasco, Chihuahua, Guerrero, Puebla, Sinaloa and Yucatán (CGEIB. Logros 201618)

- Academic year 2015-2016: 869 students registered.
- Academic year 2016-2017: 1170 students registered

- Out of the 1170 students registered in the last academic year, there were 701 students funded by the CGEIB, from which 351 are males and 350 females.

Regarding the third objective, these are some of the most important achievements registered by the CGEIB:

- The number of indigenous peoples that have registered in Intercultural Universities has grown, from 2013 to 2016 in a 30%:
  - Academic year 2012-2013: 10.518 students registered.
  - Academic year 2013-2014: 10.972 students registered.
  - Academic year 2014-2015: 12.592 students registered.
  - Academic year 2015-2016: 14.007 students registered.
- Out of the 14.007 students registered in the last academic year, 6456 are male students while 7551 are female students.
- In 2016, the CONACyT (National Council for Science and Technology), which is the main institution that provides scholarships in the country, enabled three different funding programs for indigenous students. One of them is a special program for indigenous female students, which currently has 138 scholarship holders.

Additionally, an important item that is being developed by this program is the implementation of indicators which allow to properly detect and count indigenous students that are being registered in the whole national system, that is, even in regions where there is not a high concentration of indigenous citizens. Additionally, these indicators will work in order to detect different cultural backgrounds in the same class rooms, and they are expected to facilitate the work of educators in this regard, which is especially important for the case of indigenous immigrant families. By 2018, this program is expected to have developed and implemented 40 different indicators. In 2013 and 2014 there were only 6 of these, in 2015, 18 and by 2016 there were 30 indicators.

Finally, it is important to mention that although this program makes an important emphasis on incorporating an intercultural perspective through all the national education system, which would include not only indigenous communities but all the society, there is still no evidence that allows us to evaluate if this is being achieved and whether students of all the country are indeed receiving an education with an intercultural approach.

These are the most visible results this program has offered until now. Some of these achievements are positive, however, it needs to be acknowledged that an intercultural program of education is a long-term project which will probably offer very little immediate results. Some of the data offered here will be retaken in the last chapter in order to analyze and qualify these results.

It was said at the beginning of this section that the CGEIB seeks to promote an intercultural focus within all education policies and programs. This means that the intercultural focus must be transversal to the whole education system, including school curriculums. To understand how this can be possible, it is necessary to understand the National Education Model, which will be presented next.

b) **The National Education Model**

The national education model, which was reformed in 2012 by the new administration, is a document that establishes the principles and goals that the education system must seek. One of the main principles of this Model is what they call "School at the Center" (Escuela al Centro), which consists in providing schools with more autonomy in the design of their curriculums in order to offer a better and a more adequate education to their students. This principle, as it will be argued in the final chapter, is very relevant for the purposes of an intercultural education.

One of the main goals of providing schools with more autonomy is to promote the participation of the entire educational community in the decision-making processes regarding the internal organization of the school; the adjustments of the curriculum and the use of financial resources according to the specific needs of each school center (Modelo Educativo: 22). Providing major autonomy to the teaching centers, it will be argued in Chapter VI, will allow the design of a school curriculum that responds to the cultural specificities of each

region of the country. This, consequently, can offer a viable solution for the needs and demands of indigenous communities.

Under this principle, the education model enabled by the Ministry of Education establishes some guiding lines and general objectives that must be pursued by the education system (44). This means that the school curriculums must be composed of some basic knowledge that must be provided to students and, at the same time, by different types of knowledge according to the social and cultural context of each region of the country. This is compatible, hence, with an education which is both culturally and linguistically pertinent, as described in the previous section.

Two transversal principles of this Model are inclusion and equality. Under these principles, it is acknowledged that within the education system and in school centers students of different cultural and socioeconomic contexts converge, forming a plural community, and schools must be obligated to offer equality of opportunities to all students. Hence, an important emphasis must be given to non-discrimination and toleration (63).

Regarding the principle of equality, the education system and the different school centers must provide an education of quality in all the regions of the country, regardless of their socioeconomic and cultural context. This means that education must be offered equally to all students. Moreover, this principle demands a priority within the education system, which is to ensure that students belonging to disadvantaged social groups access and complete the whole education process (64-65). This might require special funding programs destined to vulnerable social groups, which are necessary for overcoming certain obstacles that prevent or limit members of these groups to access education (64).

As for inclusion, it is necessary to offer conditions for members of disadvantaged social groups to have an effective access to quality education. Additionally, this principle demands that specificities of cultural groups be acknowledged and respected (64). Furthermore, the principle of inclusion must move beyond simply accessing and remaining in the education centers. Rather, it demands that the education system be transformed in a way it could overcome the obstacles these students face, which undermine their effective access to quality education (64-65).

Overall, the National Education Model that has been enabled by the Ministry of Education suggests the principles to be pursued by the education center but, by promoting the principle of "Schools at the Center", leaves great margin of maneuver to schools and other education authorities for the design of their curriculum. However, the Ministry of Education has enabled a National Curriculum which prescribes the different elements that school curriculums must contain.

i. The National Curriculum

According to the National Curriculum, curriculums in all the country must be composed of three different elements. One called "Key Learnings"; the second one called "Personal and Social Development" and the third one called "Curriculum Autonomy" (Propuesta Curricular para la Educación Obligatoria 2016: 61). These three components must incorporate the intercultural focus described in the previous section. In this section, these components will be presented while mentioning how, according to the National Curriculum, an intercultural focus should be incorporated.

The first element, which is "Key Learnings", is defined as a set of contents, practices, abilities, and values which contribute to the development of the intellectual dimension of students. The acquirement of the Key Learnings, according to the National Curriculum, enables students to pursue different life projects and prevents them from being socially excluded (Propuesta Curricular para la Educación Obligatoria 2016: 65).

The Key Learnings are divided into three areas: a) Language and communication; b) Mathematical thinking, and c) Exploration and comprehension of the natural and social world (Propuesta Curricular para la Educación Obligatoria 2016: 65). Given that only the first and last areas are relevant for our purposes, only these will be explained.

In the Language and communication area, the goal is that students acquire reading and writing abilities. The National Curriculum suggests two different assignments in this area for school centers located in non-indigenous regions, or where indigenous communities have very little presence. These two assignments are Spanish Mother Tongue and Literature, and Foreign Language which is usually English, but schools can also offer French as a foreign language (72-75).

As for schools located within indigenous communities, the National Curriculum suggests three different assignments: Indigenous Mother Tongue and Literature; Spanish as a Second Language, and Foreign Language (71-74). It is important to mention, however, that in the National Curriculum it is unclear how indigenous schools should distribute the teaching hours of these three assignments.

On the other hand, the area of "exploration and comprehension of the natural and social world" is composed of many disciplines such as biology, history, geography, social and political sciences and cultural and ethical aspects (113). What is relevant for our purposes is the assignment called "My Entity: Cultural, Geographic, and Historical Diversity". This assignment intends to provide students with the historical, geographical, and cultural knowledge of their entity, which includes the cultural specificities of different regions of the country, including indigenous cultures (113-114).

The second element of the curriculums, called "Personal and Social Development", involves other type of abilities that must be promoted in school centers. These abilities are perceived as essential for the personal development of students and, in addition, they are perceived as complementary to the "Key Learnings". This second element is divided also into three different areas: a) artistic and creative development; b) corporal and healthy development; and c) emotional development (155).

Unlike the "Key Learnings", these areas should not be treated as assignments. Rather, they require different pedagogic approaches and strategies in order to evaluate the progress of students. The ultimate goal of this element is to guide students on how to be themselves and how to coexist in society (155 and 156).

The first area, artistic and creative development, should introduce students to culture and the arts, which, according to the National Curriculum, involves both national folklore and culture (including indigenous folkloric aspects) and culture and arts from other countries (157).

The second area, which is corporal and healthy development, intends to help students develop corporal abilities and, in addition, help them understand the need to keep their bodies healthy. In addition, through sports and games, this area tries to help students acquire values such as companionship, teamwork, fair play, among other values (157).

The third area of this second element, emotional development, is an area that has been included recently in the National Curriculum. Before the new Education Model, the area of emotional development was understood as the parent's responsibility. However, evidence has shown the important role that emotions play during the learning process and, for that reason, this area has now been incorporated into the National Curriculum (173). Broadly, this area intends to advice and guide students on how to control or overcome certain situations. Moreover, it favors resilience; helps maximize cognitive development; reduces the risk of vulnerability; increases positive attitudes while reducing the negative ones, among others (176).

Finally, the third element of the National Curriculum is "Curriculum Autonomy". This third element is guided by the principle of an inclusive education because it seeks to respond to the specific educational needs of students. This element is what allows schools to determine the content of their curriculum and make a proper balance of the teaching hours according to their own context.

This element has also been introduced with the new Education Model of 2012 and intends to provide schools with a wide margin of maneuver for them to respond to the specific needs of their regions and communities. These decisions, moreover, must be taken by the School Council and must involve the opinion of both students and parents (184 and 185). This third element plays a relevant goal for offering a proper and relevant education for students and, as it will be argued in the final chapter, this element appears to be very relevant for the aims of an intercultural education, according to what will be developed in further chapters.

In addition, it will be argued that many educational demands raised by indigenous communities can be fulfilled with this principle. Consequently, it will be suggested that a proper use of this principle can respond to some of the critiques directed towards the state education system. These critiques will be mentioned next.

ii. Some Critiques

Although many scholars agree that there have been significant positive changes ever since this focus was adopted (Jimenez-Naranjo and Mendoza-Zuany 2016), it still has many deficiencies which have nourished, to some extent, the autonomous demands of education.

Mateos Cortes and Dietz have argued that this focus identifies interculturalism with bilinguism, which is unfortunate because it ends up identifying indigenous peoples solely through their language and with not their entire culture (2011: 138-139). Furthermore, by equalizing linguistic issues with cultural ones neither the task of interculturalizing the curriculum nor of challenging the linguistic aspect of it, are dealt with in a satisfactory way.

Additionally, these scholars argue that incorporating an intercultural focus in the curriculum is not enough in order to cope with the problems that indigenous citizens face regarding the education system. In fact, they suggest that this incorporation only works as an ornament and, moreover, it takes for granted that interculturalism in education means incorporating folkloric aspects into the curriculum (139).

Castro Pozo and García Álvarez (2016:16), on the other hand, have argued that the official discourse of intercultural education conceives the intercultural policies as mechanisms that seek to maintain the subordination of indigenous communities and their knowledge.

Finally, Jimenez-Naranjo and Mendoza-Zuany argue that although these programs have brought positive aspects, such as the visibility of indigenous cultures and the improvement on the number of schools within indigenous regions, the subsystem of intercultural education still conserves many discriminatory practices and has not managed to really bring equality to indigenous citizens and this, they argue, is because of the assistentialist and paternalist attitude of the State towards indigenous communities (2016: 61-63).

Indeed, there is an important portion of indigenous communities who remain suspicious of the intercultural program enabled by the State, and this is embedded in the existing tensions since the movement that started on 1994. As already mentioned, this movement was framed under the demands of autonomy rights in order to enable their own traditional ways of social and political organization within their communities. This discourse has been extremely strong in the field of education, where activists and scholars argue that intercultural education consists in recognizing the indigenous communities' right of autonomy to enable their own education and education systems. That is, to have control of the education provided within their communities. This is the second discourse which will be analyzed next.

4. Autonomous Education. The Case of the U*nión de Maestros de la Nueva Educación para México* (UNEM)

The second discourse of intercultural education that will be analyzed in this chapter is the one known as autonomous education. In order to present this discourse, it is important to locate it within the current context of the relations between indigenous organizations and the State.

After the San Andrés Agreements were signed, the indigenous organizations broke relations with the State because they believed the efforts made to comply with these agreements were insufficient. In this context, many indigenous organizations, activists, and scholars started to demand total autonomy for indigenous communities (Hernandez, Mattiace and Rus, 2002: 15-48), which also implied the right to control their education systems (Bertely 2007:15-19).

For these actors, territorial autonomy is necessary to liberalize their societies from the control and domination that the State has exercised, and education is an optimum field for this achievement, which they call "cultural resistance" (Jimenez Naranjo 2011:153).

According to this view, official schools are committing ethnocide by trying to erase cultural differences, impose an occidental knowledge, and justify social and economic inequalities (Carnoy 2000:8). And their proposal of autonomous education is not so much focused on lowering the rate of analphabetism nor on increasing the rates of schooling levels. Rather, their project is oriented to the reconstruction of their cultures (Jimenez Naranjo 2011: 154). By an ethnic appropriation of the official schooling (Sartorello 2014:84), this movement seeks to strengthen their own cultural practices, knowledge, and language (Castro Pozo and García Álvarez 2016: 18).

Under this rhetoric, back in 1994 and given the recent emergence of the indigenous movements, some members of indigenous communities in Chiapas started to work on a project they called "Autonomous Education". The idea was to create an autonomous primary school, which was called La Pimienta, controlled by the community which tried to a) combine theory with practice; b) rescue indigenous cultures; c) make an important emphasis on the relation with –and conservation of– natural resources, and d) where members of the community had voice in the decisions and programs enabled (Gutierrez 2005:110). This was

the first precedent of the idea of autonomous education, which is also the precedent of the case that will be presented in this section.

In his most recent book, Claudio Sartorello (2016) explains the whole process of creation of the UNEM (Teacher Union of a New Education for Mexico), which was created in 1995 and legally registered as a Civil Association in 1997. The creators were originally members of indigenous communities (mainly educators from the tseltal and ch'ol cultures), and non-indigenous academics from the CIESAS –Center for the Investigation and Superior Studies of Social Anthropology[7]. The objectives of the UNEM, in words of their own foundational documents, are: 1) to consolidate an intercultural and bilingual education which contributes to the integral formation of indigenous youth; and 2) to make a profound reform in the education process, in order to implement a communitarian intercultural and bilingual education under the control of the indigenous communities of the state of Chiapas. The education provided under this project should combine school with communal work; link the theory with practice, and school with communitarian ways of life (UNEM 2000).

With help of the CIESAS, indigenous educators received training in pedagogic practices, as well as in developing new methods and a proper curriculum (Sartorello 2016: 58). In order to understand what this proposal encountered, its framework will be presented in the following subsections.

a) The Idea of Interculturalism and Intercultural Education

According to this movement, interculturalism has a different meaning than the one used by the official discourse. The main difference, according to the actors of this movement, is that while the State's use of interculturalism is part of the neoliberal project and is being implemented from the top to the bottom, the idea of interculturalism supported by this movement is intended to emerge from the bottom to the top (Sartorello 2016:120 and Bertely 2007: 23-26).

Interculturalism, according to this movement, consists in a political project of strengthening and politicizing ethnic identities (Sartorello 2016: 120). The intention is to challenge the

[7] In Spanish Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores de Antropología Social.

dominant relations between indigenous and dominant cultures and the different ways in which the latter explode the former.

The notion of interculturalism adopted here responds to that of a counter-hegemonic political project that makes a political use of culture because it is regarded as an ideological battlefield for the control of the production of knowledge and for the cultural and political hegemony (Walsh 2002; Sartorello 2014). This concept, as it can be seen, is embedded in post-colonial studies which will not be analyzed here, but what matters is how this idea has been translated to the education field and, hence, to the foundations of the intercultural and bilingual education developed by the UNEM.

In this context, the education process must be at the service of the goals of interculturalism, which means that it must intend to strengthen the local indigenous knowledge and the central values that characterize such communities. The goal of intercultural education, under this context, is to foster an "ethnic citizenship", which requires precisely to strengthen the communitarian knowledge, principles, and values and then try to incorporate western knowledge in a way which is compatible with the indigenous cosmology (Baronnet 2015 and Bertely, Gasché and Podestá 2008: 391-393). This is one of the main goals of the UNEM.

Indeed, according to the founders of the UNEM, there is a need to articulate and make compatible the two types of knowledge: indigenous and western (Sartorello 2014: 157 and Bertely, Gasché and Podestá 2008: 9). However, the western knowledge must be adapted and included into the traditional knowledge and not the other way around, which is one of the important distinctions between the official discourse of interculturalism and the one analyzed here.

One of the main principles developed by this proposal is the one of "*educación para el arraigo*", which could be translated as "*education for seeding roots in the community*". This principle was incorporated during the design of the curriculum developed by the UNEM. Sartorello explains that during these discussions and debates, the questions that emerged were: what to expect from this process of autonomous education and, moreover, what were the expectations of the indigenous students once they had gone through this educational process (2016: 156).

During these discussions, Sartorello explains that there was a common concern between members of the indigenous communities with the fact that their children were being prepared by the official system to immigrate from their community, given the lack of opportunities in it (2016:158-161). For instance, Arcos Gutierrez shows the discomfort between members of the indigenous community of Zinacantán –in Chiapas– where an intercultural official school for teacher training had been established in the year 2001. They argued that when indigenous students graduated from this school they hardly came back to their communities to teach in the communal schools. Rather, they preferred to seek jobs in other urbanized schools. This, according to the interviewers, was a threat to the community and the continuity of the culture, because indigenous students should come back to the community and for that, the education they received must prepare them for their return to the community (2012: 548-550).

This is why, they argued, an autonomous education has to prepare children for seeding roots in the community and not for emigrating. For this to be possible, they argued that the education received should be relevant for the activities carried out in the community. And this is where standard knowledge is important and should be incorporated (Sartorello 2016: 250-253)

During the design of the curriculum of the UNEM, it was argued that, the standard knowledge had to be at the service of the activities carried out in the community. For instance, all the technology for agriculture or for farming had to be introduced to the children for them to learn better and more productive ways of performing communal activities (Bertely 2007, and Sartorello 2016: 188).

This idea of "*educación para el arraigo*" is viewed as something positive not only because it helps strengthen the local economy but, in addition, because it forms indigenous citizens who consciously make the decision of staying in the community and assume the responsibility of ensuring the continuity of it (Sartorello 2016: 187).

The UNEM has received support from non-indigenous academics and from different NGO's for the elaboration of what they called an intercultural and bilingual curriculum. In addition, they have implemented many educational strategies following the approach of "*educación para el arraigo*" and produced important literature on the subject. However, little has been offered regarding the results of these strategies. Furthermore, there is no evidence to argue

that these strategies have been successful for indigenous citizens, who are the main beneficiaries of these programs. In fact, María Bertely, who is one of the main supporters and leaders of this entire movement has even argued that the importance of the UNEM is not the number of its members, neither the effective implementation of their proposals and curriculum in the indigenous schools, but the will of many indigenous and non-indigenous educators to offer educational alternatives for indigenous communities and, furthermore, the will to create what they call a conscience of "cultural resistance" (Bertely 2007: 27).

Given the lack of data that allows us to know the outcomes of this strategy we cannot offer any preliminary conclusion regarding this proposal of intercultural education.

b) Some Critiques of the Autonomous Education Discourse

One of the main problems with this communitarian model of autonomous education is that because it is a project that has emerged by breaking the relations with the State, it has an insufficient budget and many times it cannot cope with the minimum needs for maintaining the school (Cortes Mateos and Diets 2011: 132; Baronnet 2010). And precisely because of the lack of public funding, many indigenous families end up sending their children to official schools where they receive lunch and sometimes scholarships (Sartorello 2016). Finally, on this point, precisely because it has no institutional recognition, the children who attend this model –which is mainly focused on basic primary education– have no way to incorporate later to the official system.

The second problem that some scholars have pointed out is the fact that it tends to juxtapose the "communal knowledge" with "the other knowledge" and it strengthens the dichotomy between communitarian life versus non-communitarian life (Mateos Cortes and Dietz 2011: 133) and the consequence of this is that it tends to essentialize indigenous cultures.

Because of the above mentioned, Urteaga Castro Pozo and García Alvarez (2016:18-19) argue that this idea of intercultural education runs the risk of generating isolated societies which is unfortunate because it avoids tackling other social problems also faced by indigenous communities, such as discrimination or stereotyping. However, although there are some critiques towards the model of autonomous education, this proposal still has a lot

of legitimacy and it is still being supported by a great number of organizations –indigenous and non-indigenous– and by an important number of academics from many areas and fields.

One of the reasons why this proposal has been positively received by an important number of academics and intellectuals has to do with the fact that the indigenous movement born in 1994 had important effects on the way society regards indigenous communities and indigenous cultures. This is something that will be retaken towards the end of this dissertation, but it is important to mention it here to understand why this proposal of autonomous education has acquired so much strength and legitimacy.

Two versions or approaches to intercultural education have been presented so far. These are the two main discourses that are being currently defended in the Mexican arena and which have generated a lot of debates and literature. So far, however, these discourses and the literature surrounding them have simply been presented as they are.

Although it seems as these two discourses have deep disagreements and it seems difficult to harmonize them, towards the final chapter it will be argued that it need not be this way and, in fact, a proper development of the principles that must guide a program of intercultural education will allow the possibility of making compatible these two discourses of intercultural education.

However, for developing and suggesting the principles that must guide a program of intercultural education in the Mexican arena, it is necessary to analyze different normative concepts that currently remain unclear and are highly contested. For instance, as it was mentioned while presenting both discourses of intercultural education, interculturalism is understood differently in each discourse, and this is problematic, as it was already mentioned.

Part of the problem, indeed, lies in the fact that the notion of interculturalism has been used in many fields and in many senses, to the extent that it currently remains a polysemic concept with no consensus of its actual meaning (Mateos Cortés and Dietz 2011: 34; Castro Pozo and García Álvarez 2016: 9-14). And this is still more prominent in the field of intercultural education. As Mateos Cortés and Dietz argue, the variety of ways of defining and understanding the concept of intercultural education has led to a lack of rigorousness, where

everything can be catalogued as such and this is unfortunate because it generates counterproductive debates (2011:16).

This, however, is not a problem concerning only Mexico nor the Latin American region. For some years now interculturalism has come to appear as a new theory for dealing with cultural diversity in different regions of the world, most prominently, as it will be analyzed in the next chapter, in Quebec and in Europe[8]. This new trend has its birth in what has been known as the backlash of multiculturalism.

A common concern within interculturalists is that multiculturalism has failed to address the real problems regarding cultural diversity in super-diverse societies, such as the ones we are living in now. This is a concern shared by all the different versions of interculturalism that will be analyzed here, including the one of Latin American scholars. And this is relevant, precisely because most of the literature available and the debates regarding intercultural education have incorporated most of the critiques directed towards multiculturalism.

The following chapters will not intend to solve the whole debate regarding interculturalism versus multiculturalism. Rather, they will intend to develop a notion of Latin American interculturalism that we can then apply to a proposal of intercultural education. For that, however, we need first to understand and analyze the critiques that interculturalism does towards multiculturalism. Moreover, we need to determine whether interculturalism offers something that multiculturalism does not and, in case it does, if we should move beyond multiculturalism into interculturalism as suggested until now. This will be done in the following chapters.

[8] See Meer, Modood and Zapata (eds.) 2016

CHAPTER 2. INTERCULTURALISMS. A CRITICAL REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

Within the last years multiculturalism has been attacked by what has been known as interculturalism. As it will be showed in this chapter, there are currently two different versions of interculturalism which, although being different, they share the same critiques against multiculturalism. Indeed, Modood is right to suggest that, "Interculturalism, in its two forms, critiques multiculturalism." (2015:1).

While for some, interculturalism is an intellectually weak tradition than often fails to meet minimal standards of academic rigor or objectivity (Kymlicka, 2012:214), and for others highly rhetorical rather than analytical (Meer and Modood, 2012), interculturalism has managed to be in the centre of the discussions regarding diversity management. Furthermore, part of its success stands in the fact that, together with European politicians, interculturalists have managed to demonize multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 2012 :214) blaming it for creating parallel societies and for not encouraging dialogue among different cultural groups. In short, they claim that multiculturalism is not fit for the new forms of diversity and for the new world in which we are living. Multiculturalism, they argue, has failed (Cantle, 2012 and 2016; and Zapata-Barrero, 2013 and 2016).

The two forms of interculturalism that Modood mentions are the European and the Quebecois. Regarding the former, both Modood and Meer have argued in extent that the features of this proposal are not exclusive of interculturalism and some are also foundational of some versions of multiculturalism. Interculturalism, they argue, has not proven to be a new and different intellectual tradition for dealing with diversity (Meer and Modood, 2013b, 2016, and Modood, 2015 and 2016).

Regarding the Quebecois version, Modood has also argued that the main features of this idea, mainly led by Gerard Bouchard (2011 and 2016), are inaccurate and because it "gives significance to the idea of the right of a national community to use state power to reproduce itself" (2015: 1) it is more keen to a version of nationalism than a model for managing cultural diversity.

What Modood did not take into account when analyzing the different versions of interculturalism is that there is a third form: the Latin American version of interculturalism. This version, it will be argued further, although sharing some claims against multiculturalism with the other two versions of interculturalism, can offer a very different strategy to manage cultural diversity and, beyond this, it offers a different strategy to achieve social justice and equality.

The three versions of interculturalism share some common features, mainly, their rejection towards multiculturalism. However, they are also very different and, in some cases, they are even at odds. This chapter will try to show these similarities and differences.

The intention, however, is not to contribute significantly in the *multiculturalism vs. interculturalism debate* since there are already many scholars engaged in it (Bouchard 2011 and 2016; Cantle 2012, 2015 and 2016; Meer and Modood 2012, 2013a, 2013b and 2016; Modood 2015 and 2016; Zapata-Barrero 2013 and 2016; and Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero 2016). Nevertheless, the analysis offered here will be critical of these versions of interculturalism. The ultimate goal, however, is to bring Latin American interculturalism into this debate and, especially, into the language of the politics of difference[9].

In order to achieve this, the first section of this chapter will describe the European version of interculturalism which will be followed by the Quebecois version. While describing these versions, some problems will be highlighted, which will help reinforce the argument that these forms of dealing with cultural diversity are not better than multiculturalism and, in some cases, they can be a threat to any advancement in achieving ethnocultural justice. Finally, this chapter will end by presenting some features of Latin American Interculturalism which will be critically analyzed in extent in the next chapter.

2. The Backlash of Multiculturalism and the Birth of European Interculturalism

[9] Although in a recent publication Campos-Solano has argued to be doing this, the truth is that those contributions have failed to engage properly Latin American interculturalism with other versions of interculturalism and, specially, with multiculturalism as a version of the politics of difference. If anything, her contributions offer a good review of what *interculturalidad* has meant in the Latin American literature. See Campos-Solano 2013 and 2016.

After the liberal egalitarian critique addressed to multiculturalism and, in general, to the politics of difference, whose one of its most prominent leaders was Barry Brian (2001), claims supporting a rejection of multiculturalism started to spread. While not denying the importance that multiculturalism had in public policy during the 80's and 90's, new actors in this debate suggested that multiculturalism was heading towards an end. European countries, they argued, were retreating from multiculturalism and turning towards civic integration policies[10].

Because a significant amount of citizens in certain countries such as Canada, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands have expressed skepticism and, in some cases, even hostility towards multiculturalism as an integrational model, liberal democracies that in the past were opened to the recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity have turned their back on multiculturalism as a public philosophy and public policy, or so these critics have argued (Maclure 2010: 39).

Joppke, for instance, suggested that although until mid-1990s European countries had adopted an "ethnic minority policy", they then started to turn to a civic integration policy. The main reason why this shift occurred, he argues, was because of the increasing number of countries of origin, which led to a great internal diversification of migrant groups which, at the same time, made it extremely hard to adopt a policy based on a limited number of clearly demarcated ethnic minorities (Joppke 2004: 247-248). Furthermore, the fact that these policies designated minorities as groups within "their own parallel institutions had detrimental effects, fueling their segregation and separation from mainstream society" (Joppke 2004: 248). And finally, and most importantly, these ethnic minority policies were incapable of remedying the most pressing problem that immigrants were facing: unemployment and economic marginalization[11].

[10] This position, however, is not exactly the same as the one of Barry. While the latter never recognized that multicultural policies were important because he believed that it was based in an inadequate approach towards equality, interculturalists suggest that, indeed, multicultural policies played an important role in the recognition of difference but now these policies must be transcended to other type of policies. This is why they argue that multiculturalism has arrived to an end.

[11] It has also been suggested that Rogers Brubaker (2001), by affirming the return of assimilation, also supports the view of a retreat ment from multiculturalism in European countries. However, although Brubaker's article has been commonly cited among the critics of multiculturalism, it has been suggested that the insights of this

According to Maclure, however, these sort of critics –and in general all critics that refer to the backlash of multiculturalism– are directed, if anything, to communitarian multiculturalism. Under this perspective, "a society is a mosaic of cultural communities". These communities relate to each other only through their institutions and representatives and not through their citizens, who in fact live their lives within the standards and rules set by their cultural group and have limited interaction with citizens of other cultural groups. This variant of multiculturalism, indeed, tends to generate political fragmentation along cultural and religious lines, and promotes isolation instead of interaction between different cultural groups (2010: 40).

This is something similar to what Spinner-Halev identifies as *thick multiculturalism*, which consists in cultural groups whose members are not interested in citizenship, nor in making the state a better place for all; they care little about public policies as long as they do not affect their own cultural group. They have interest in the state as long as it provides them support, financial, and otherwise, to achieve their own goals. In this multiculturalist societies, membership to a cultural group is prior to citizenship and, therefore, groups have a better chance of maintaining a robust version of their identity (1999: 65-67).

These forms of multiculturalism, however, do not match with any existing model of multiculturalism implemented by any existing liberal democracy. These have instead adopted a different approach to multiculturalism, which can either be liberal or civic. This will be expanded in the next chapter, but as a brief mention it is valid to say that multiculturalism is liberal when "it is seen as an extension and deepening of the basic human rights traditionally championed by the liberal tradition". From this view, in order to show equal respect to citizens we must recognize and accommodate their cultural differences "insofar as it doesn't impact adversely on the rights and freedoms of others" (Maclure 2010:40). Civic multiculturalism maintains that cross-cultural interaction and deliberation in terms of respect

article are not claiming that "assimilationist models are making a comeback, but rather that *some* forms of integration, such as language acquisition, economic integration and civic participation are seen as desirable by host societies" (Maclure 2010: 44). In fact, Maclure argues that Brubaker's target is, again, the communitarian form of multiculturalism "as well as postmodern celebration of difference and alterity; there is nothing in his analysis that suggests a move away from civic multiculturalism as a public philosophy and public policy: quite de opposite" (2010: 44).

is the best way for new forms of belonging to emerge and in order to strengthen the feeling of solidarity among multicultural societies (Maclure 2010:40).

In short, although the literature regarding the backlash of multiculturalism is broad, there is also plenty of literature that offers answers to these critiques[12]. However, critics to multiculturalism have also occupied other level such as some political discourses within European countries which have argued that, indeed, multicultural policies have proven to be unsuccessful. Angela Merkel, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy, for instance, have claimed that multiculturalism has failed and should be regarded as a policy of the past "which had weakened collective identity and encouraged different cultures to live separate lives" (Barrett 2013:21). This has contributed to the perception, among many citizens and academic scholars, that multiculturalism has, indeed, failed and as a consequence, has fueled the need to move towards a post-multiculturalists era.

The main arguments raised against multiculturalism can be summarized as follows (Barrett 2013, and Kymlicka 2012):

- Multiculturalism encourages members of different cultures to live separately in parallel communities with minimum contact and interaction among each other. This, they claim, generates mistrust and rejection of difference.
- It undermines collective identity, values, and national unity.
- Multiculturalism supports and protects cultural practices that might be morally unacceptable. It additionally encourages religious minorities to fundamentalism and even terrorism.
- The multicultural approach draws away attention from other vulnerable groups.

These arguments are important for the aims of this chapter because they have fueled the latest challenge that multiculturalism is facing today, which is interculturalism in its European version (European interculturalism).

[12] Moreover, arguments in favor of multiculturalism have also consisted in analyzing the different multicultural policies of countries that have adopted multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2012)

The subsequent sections will present the work of two interculturalists: Ted Cantle and Ricard Zapata-Barrero. It is acknowledged that these are not the only scholars defending interculturalism, however, their work is used in this dissertation because, as it will be argued further, their versions of interculturalism depend on rejecting multiculturalism. It is precisely because they challenge multiculturalism and because this challenge has given birth to the so-called debate *multiculturalism vs. interculturalism* that, among all the scholars writing about interculturalism, the concern in the following sections will be mainly on the work of these two scholars.

3. European Interculturalism

In the year 2000 British multiculturalism was affirmed in a report made by the Runnymede Trust, chaired by Bhikhu Parekh, and called: "The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain". There, Britishness was defined as having "systemic, largely unspoken, racial connotations" (Runnymede Trust 2000: 28). This report suggested the need to move to a multicultural post-nation where Britain should be viewed as a "community of communities and individuals". Additionally, it rejected the model of a single political culture in the public sphere, suggesting to move to a more plural model, in which "recognition of cultural diversity happened in the public sphere" (Joppke 2004: 250).

According to Joppke, however, the "reassertion of orthodox multiculturalism proved rather short-lived" (Joppke 2004: 250). Riots in northern English cities motivated a commissioned investigation to study the origins of those riots. This commission was led by Ted Cantle, and its result is now known as the Cantle Report.

This report blamed multicultural policies for generating parallel lives which often do not seem to touch at any point, much less overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges (Cantle Report 2001: 9). Opposing what had been argued in the Parekh report, this report described Britain of certainly one of communities, but without a meta-community which would tie the rest together (Cantle 2016: 136 and Cantle 2012: 164-166).

The Cantle Report suggested a greater sense of citizenship, common elements of nationhood, the use of English as the common language, and, additionally, that the non-white community

had to develop a greater acceptance and engagement with the main national institutions (Cantle Report 2001: 10-19; and Joppke 2004: 250-251).

In short, the Cantle Report urged to move away from multiculturalism. However, according to this report, and to further academic literature offered by Ted Cantle, moving away from multiculturalism did not mean to "turn the clock back to what was perceived to be a dominant or monoculturalist view of nationality" (Cantle Report 2001: 18). While rejecting the classic liberal egalitarian strategy of privatization of cultural differences –thoroughly defended by Brian Barry–, a new model was required which could cope adequately with the different forms of diversity that British society – and Europe– is facing today. This model is interculturalism.

Ted Cantle has argued that multiculturalism is not fit for the new super diverse society and has, instead, slowed down and inhibited the acceptance of difference. Multiculturalism, he continues, failed to adapt to super-diversity and multifaceted aspects of difference and otherness. By remaining firmly rooted in intranational differences, between majority and minority populations, it ignored the situation of other groups such as those based on disability, age, sexual orientation, and gender (Cantle 2016: 133-134).

In short, he argues that multicultural policies have failed to recognize that "difference" is "no longer simply defined by "race" and that identity has become multifaceted and dynamic, developing support for a more intercultural model" (Cantle 2016: 136).

Finally, he accuses multiculturalism for its desire to maintain cultural differentiation. This approach, he argues, failed to recognize that "both minority and majority communities were in a constant state of flux, and that they were not simply adapting to each other but were exposed to external –and often far more profound– pressures" (Cantle 2016: 141).

The notion that multiculturalism conceives identities as something static and ascribed is an idea borrowed by Powell and Sze and has been one of the foundations of interculturalism. These scholars argue that,

> Multiculturalism is a policy based on the notion of personal autonomy. Interculturalism, in contrast, recognizes that in a society of mixed ethnicities, cultures act in multiple directions […] Multiculturalism tends to preserve a cultural heritage, while interculturalism acknowledges and enables cultures to

> have currency, to be exchanged, to circulate, to be modified and evolve (Powell and Sze 2004: 1)[13]

This argument has been the base for the further claim of both Cantle and Ricard Zapata-Barrero who have argued that multiculturalism embodied an element of racial purity, ignoring the fact that European states are now home to many different ethnic, faith, and language groups which are themselves heterogeneous and have no clear boundaries. Furthermore, rather than being concerned with cultural encounter and exchange, multiculturalism emphasizes mainly on the value of diversity. By this, Cantle argues, any relational concept of culture is denied (Cantle 2016: 143).

Ted Cantle, as seen, developed his theory of interculturalism from the commission investigating the origins of the riots in northern England and, although he later expanded his theory to all European countries, many times his ideas are based on the British context. It is uncertain to measure up to what extent his theory can be extrapolated to other contexts. But this has not been an obstacle for interculturalists who, according to a concrete case, have made a whole theory that many times lacks basic normative principles, as it will be discussed in further sections.

Ricard Zapata-Barrero, simultaneously, has claimed to start theorizing European interculturalism as a model that seeks to foster an intercultural citizenship.

According to this scholar, the debates surrounding multiculturalism on the late twentieth century followed a cultural rights-based approach to diversity which was concerned with how to recognize and accommodate, in the public sphere, the cultural practices of minorities. But this has been challenged by interculturalism. (Zapata-Barrero 2016: 53).

This new trend, in Zapata-Barrero's words, has been promoted also by the Council of Europe's *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue "Living Together as Equals in Dignity*" in 2008 and, as mentioned before, by political leaders such as Merkel in 2010 and Cameron in

[13] It is not clear, however, how personal autonomy should be in tension with the recognition of a mixed, multi ethnic society. Additionally, there is no reason to infer that a theory that defends personal autonomy must also be concerned with the preservation of cultural heritage. Sometimes, in fact, is the opposite. Indeed, the reason why people are entitled to exit their cultural group or change some cultural practices is precisely through personal autonomy. This comparison does not offer solid arguments.

2011 who have claimed that the multicultural paradigm had arrived to an end[14]. The reasons of the death of multiculturalism, Zapata-Barrero argues, are mainly due to having promoted segregation, giving rise to ethnic conflicts, failing to promote a common public culture, and not fostering community cohesion (Zapata-Barrero 2016:54 and Barrett 2013).

Multiculturalism, he argues, has failed to promote intergroup relations and contact among citizens from different origins and cultures. In this context, interculturalism offers a *lifeline*, by positioning itself in contrast to both multiculturalism and assimilation, "based on substantial insights on the view of ethnicity and collective identity, as self-ascribed, flexible, and dynamic and emphasizing the need for contact among culturally defined enclaves (which foster neither mutual identification nor interaction)" (54). Its primary normative force, Zapata-Barrero argues, is that interaction among people from different backgrounds matters.

According to these two scholars, interculturalism has three core concepts: the first is interaction, understood as "acting together, sharing a public sphere, and working for some common purpose" (Zapata Barrero, 2016: 56). Secondly, European interculturalism embraces community cohesion (Cantle 2011 and 2016). Finally, because interculturalism recognizes the possibility that individuals change their identities autonomously (Zapata Barrero, 2016: 58), it does not only view the possibility of multiple identities, but also –and mainly– accepts and recognizes that people might have "identities that are always open to change and to processes of autonomous hybridisation" (Zapata Barrero, 2016: 59). The third core concept of interculturalism, then, is the awareness of multiple and changing identities.

This is, in a very broad sense, the context in which interculturalism in Europe was born. As it can be seen already, this new trend opposes to, and firmly rejects multiculturalism. The following subsection will try to show, with more detail, the arguments that interculturalism uses against multiculturalism. It will try to show, that is, the "dividing lines"[15].

[14] In Kymlicka's opinion, however, the turn from multiculturalism to interculturalism in the Council of Europe and European politicians is due to a semantical strategy rather than a turn in the content of these policies. Indeed, Kymlicka suggests that there is no great difference between interculturalism and multiculturalism as adopted by the Council of Europe. However, because the word "multiculturalism" has been demonized, European leaders have decided to change it with the intention of having a better acceptance among states and citizens (Kymlicka 2012 and 2016). Similar arguments are found in Martyn Barrett 2013.

[15] This term is borrowed from the title of the latest book edited by Modood, Meer and Zapata-Barrero, 2016.

a) European Interculturalism and Multiculturalism. The "Dividing Lines"

European interculturalism, although apparently offering an alternative model for how to deal with cultural diversity, is deeply concerned with criticizing and rejecting multiculturalism. Its supporters have used a large amount of energy in making sure that interculturalism is not similar to multiculturalism and that the core features of the former are absent in any version of the latter.

For instance, Zapata-Barrero has argued that "the core of intercultural citizenship is essentially one basic idea: that interaction among people from different diversity attributions matters, *and that this has been overlooked by the multicultural citizenship paradigm, which has mainly concentrated on ensuring the cultural rights of diverse groups*" (Zapata-Barrero 2016: 63. Italics added).

This same scholar has identified three broad markers of difference between multiculturalism and interculturalism (Zapata-Barrero 2016: 56), although the third one is more a conclusion[16] than a marker, so only the first two will be mentioned.

1) *Interculturalism regards the public sphere as a contact zone and it is based on everyday personal experiences in diversity settings, concentrating on the barriers of interaction.*

According to this marker, intercultural policies are intended to facilitate the proper conditions for interaction (Zapata-Barrero 2016: 57). Zapata-Barrero has argued that interculturalism is a technique of bridging differences. Rather than claiming recognition of cultural rights –as multiculturalism does– interculturalism "claims rights to address the obstacles that prevent interaction" (2016: 57). In contrast, he argues that multiculturalism's approach is marginalization, segregation, cultural isolation from mainstream society, and the misrecognition of minority cultural citizens.

> "The normative dimension of [multicultural] literature always attempts to rectify the consequences of this increasing marginalization coming from social and

[16] It refers that interculturalism is a more appropriate framework for dealing with the complexity of current super-diverse societies.

> political structures, and focuses on the principle of equality, understood as redistribution of wealth and recognition of cultural rights" (Zapata-Barrero 2016: 57-58).

Additionally, on this point, Zapata-Barrero mentions that interculturalism accepts the possibility that individuals change their identities autonomously. It rests on the core idea that positive interaction will lead to the reduction of prejudices (Zapata-Barrero 2016: 58).

This is a similar claim made by Ted Cantle, who argues that cohesion and pace can only be achieved by breaking down the traditional and hardened boundaries, but this depends on promoting contact and interaction, which has rarely been part of any multicultural program (Cantle 2016: 141).

Cantle claims that studies based on "contact theory" suggest that contact among individuals from different cultural groups helps to reduce the apparent fear of "others" and promotes intergroup harmony. Furthermore, he coincides that having members of different groups to interact will reduce intergroup prejudices (Cantle 2012:145). He thus accuses multiculturalism for ignoring contributions of other key disciplines, particularly anthropology and social psychology. For instance, he argues that contact theory has rarely been mentioned, although it has proved to be capable of changing peoples' attitudes by disconfirming and undermining stereotypes (Cantle 2015: 5).

He claims, in fact, that opposite to what Meer and Modood have suggested (2011, 2013 and 2016), multiculturalism has neglected the value of cultural encounters, which confirms that no notion of community boundaries, or contact and exchange within groups was ever "foundational" to multiculturalism (Cantle 2015: 5).

In short, in this regard, interaction is the key element that distinguishes multiculturalism from European interculturalism. The importance of interaction for interculturalism lies in the fact that they blame multiculturalism for creating parallel societies, fragmentation and isolation.

2) *The view of diversity that interculturalism has, is based on bridging differences and rejects preconceived categorizations of diversity*.

The second marker of difference between interculturalism and multiculturalism is that the former rejects the ethnicity-based and right-based approach of multicultural citizenship (Zapata-Barrero 2016: 58). Intercultural citizenship's main concern, according to Zapata-

Barrero, is ensuring the basis of contact, communication and interaction and this is why it is "much more exclusively concerned with anti-discriminatory programmes and anti-racist practices than [multiculturalism]" (Zapata-Barrero 2016: 58)

This is why, Zapata-Barrero argues, interculturalism does not approach difference in terms of what the cultural needs of people are, but it rather seeks to ensure the context of promotion of interaction. It therefore rejects categorizing people according to "pre-social attributions. It incorporates all people (without exception, including nationals), without any view of society based on group or ethnic division" (Zapata-Barrero 2016: 58).

In similar words Ted Cantle has written that multiculturalism has failed to recognize that "difference" is "no longer simply defined by 'race' and that their identity has become multifaceted and dynamic" (Cantle 2016: 136). Multiculturalism, he claims, had failed to adapt to super-diversity and to multifaceted aspects of difference, including those based on disability, age, sexual orientation and gender (Cantle 2016: 133-134). Furthermore, he claims that

> a central tenet of multicultural theory was the idea that "thick" or community boundaries helped to protect minorities against assimilation and that heritage should be preserved in the face of the overwhelming hegemony of the majority. […] The desire to maintain cultural differentiation was actually laudable, but this approach failed to recognize that both minority and majority communities were in a constant state of flux (Cantle 2016: 141).

In short, according to these scholars, multiculturalism imposes our ethnic categories to others (Zapata-Barrero 2016: 62) and, thus, does not respect the diversity of identities within the same national-cultural category. Interculturalism, Zapata-Barrero argues, shares "the premise that from a policy point of view, we cannot force people to self-identify with a fixed category of cultural identity according to their own nationalities and cultures of origin" (2016: 60). In this point, both Zapata-Barrero and Cantle seem to build their argument in the fact that multiculturalism is not capable of recognizing non-fixed identities and, because of how the world is conformed today, many people with multiple identities feel they do not match any category imposed by multiculturalism. They argue: "a Moroccan person is not necessarily Muslim", referring to the fact that multiculturalism would assume and expect any Moroccan person to be a Muslim and act in accordance.

These are the main reasons why interculturalist scholars reject multiculturalism and believe they have a better model for managing cultural diversity in European countries. Many have argued that the core concepts of this version of interculturalism are based on a flawed idea of multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2012 and 2016; Meer and Modood 2012 and 2016; and Modood 2015 and 2016). And it will be suggested, in addition, that this theory lacks normative basis in order to be considered a theory of political philosophy that speaks the same language than the one spoken by multiculturalism, which explains why these theories should not be compared, and much less, compete against each other.

Part of the problem with this version of interculturalism lies in the fact that these scholars have been so concerned in offering arguments to reject multiculturalism, that it is difficult to defend that interculturalism is an autonomous theory because its main features depend, to a great extent, in rejecting multiculturalism, and this becomes problematic because they neglect to built a normatively consistent theory for managing cultural diversity.

The problem is exacerbated, however, by the fact that interculturalists have misunderstood multiculturalism. The critiques they make, that is, are based on a caricature of what multiculturalism is (Kymlicka 2012 and 2016), which will be mentioned in the further sections and chapters.

Even though many arguments have been offered as to why the core features of interculturalism are also foundational in many, if not all, versions of multiculturalism (Meer and Modood, 2012) and, as a consequence, interculturalism has little novelty to offer, interculturalists have neglected to accept this.

This inevitably leads to question if interculturalism can be a theory for managing cultural diversity, at least at the same level as multiculturalism. This will be analyzed next.

b) European Interculturalism. A Theory for Managing Cultural Diversity?

Zapata-Barrero has recently claimed to be developing a theory of interculturalism that intends to replace multiculturalism. However, here it will be argued that interculturalism is rooted in a different level than multiculturalism (Meer and Modood 2013 and 2016; Loobuyck 2016; Barrett 2013) and, furthermore, that interculturalism is not a political theory for managing

cultural diversity. Interculturalists, that is, are not making claims on the same theoretical level as multiculturalists. Indeed, multiculturalism is a political theory concerned with the relations between the State and its internal cultural minorities. It is concerned with the principles that must guide the designing of institutions. Interculturalism, on the other hand, seems to be more concerned with the relation between citizens pertaining to different cultural backgrounds and it is mainly framed under sociological terms and in every day practice (Modood 2017).

Loobuyck argues, in this regard, that both models have different objects: interculturalism focuses on social connections between citizens, while multiculturalism focuses on the relation of the State with its cultural minorities. While the first one works in a horizontal way, the latter works on a vertical way. Their relation should not be regarded as an opposition or as a superior/inferior relation, but as a dialectical one: interculturalism can increase the societal support for multicultural policies, and multiculturalism can be stronger with that support (Loobuyck, 2016: 232-233).

However, this still offers little clue to what interculturalism actually is. And because the main defenders of this model have constructed the core features of it based on what multiculturalism is not, it seems difficult to systematize and theorize this model as an autonomous one. Additionally, there are profound problems with interculturalism at a theoretical and practical level, which leads us to discard it as a theory for managing cultural diversity. This will be argued next.

i. Which Are the Principles that Sustain Interculturalism?

It has been insistently repeated here that interculturalism opposes to multiculturalism. Furthermore, that interculturalists seem to be especially concerned with offering reasons in order to attack multiculturalism. Because of this concern, they have neglected to build a consistent theory of interculturalism.

The problem is not that they oppose to multiculturalism, many theorists oppose to multiculturalism, the most prominent example are liberal egalitarians[17]. However, the existence and strength of this theory is not based and does not depend on the rejection of multiculturalism. Liberal egalitarians reject multiculturalism because they believe that a difference-blind approach is the best way to ensure freedom and equality, which are the core values they endorse. This means that when Barry rejects multiculturalism he does it in order to be consistent with the fundamental values he is defending and because, in short, he rejects the need of any differential treatment. If he wishes to be consistent with his theory then he must reject multiculturalism. One can agree or disagree with Barry's arguments, but that does not make them incoherent or normatively weak. In fact, the arguments of liberal egalitarians against multiculturalism are probably the most challenging.

Although all multicultural theories reject the liberal paradigm and the difference-blind principle –which they call *benign neglect*– not all multicultural theories share the same values. This will be further analyzed in the next chapter, but for the sake of clarity it is possible to mention now that some multicultural theories framed under the liberal tradition can endorse different fundamental values, such as autonomy (Kymlicka), toleration, (Kukathas) or pluralism (Spinner-Halev), among others. The fundamental value that sustains each of these theories explains the whole theory, to the extent that although rejecting the liberal paradigm, theories of multiculturalism can take different forms and shapes.

But this is not the case with interculturalism. In order to be a consistent theory that can discuss and debate with multiculturalism, interculturalism needs to uphold some values that respond to a conception of justice, which does not seem to be the case.

Zapata-Barrero suggests that the core value of interculturalism is interaction among people from different cultural backgrounds. Ted Cantle suggests that social cohesion is the main aim of intercultural policies, and both coincide that intercultural dialogue is an important feature of interculturalism. But if we track down these core features we do not find any value nor any particular conception of justice that explains the logic behind them and, in fact –as it will

[17] Brian Barry, in fact, has argued that multiculturalism has nothing liberal in it. Multicultural policies, he argues, are not "well designed to advance the values of liberty and equality, and the implementation of those policies tends to mark a retreatment of both" (Barry 2000: 12)

be argued further– some points of interculturalism seem to be adopting a liberal egalitarian approach which, if true, offers nothing appealing for supporters of ethno-cultural justice.

Moreover, both interculturalists agree on the fact that multiculturalism, by being concerned with protecting autonomy and cultural rights and, hence, creating a ghettoized society, is incapable of dealing with the situation of super diversity that we are immerse in today. Indeed, they argue that people today fail to identify with only one culture and instead their identity is multiple and intersecting. Something similar to a cosmopolitan citizen who, in words of Waldron "may live all his life in one city and maintain the same citizenship throughout. But he refuses to think of himself as defined by his location or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language […] He is a creature of modernity, conscious of living in a mixed-up world and having a mixed-up self" (Waldron 1995: 754). This, however, is not incompatible with the principles of multiculturalism.

Indeed, it is precisely due to personal autonomy that people can choose different and simultaneous forms of identity (Kymlicka 2001). If Cantle is worried about being able to respond to these multiple identity situations he need not reject multiculturalism, but quite the opposite. Spinner-Halev has shown that there is a version of multiculturalism that precisely responds to this point. *Thin multiculturalism*, which opposes to thick multiculturalism discussed earlier, is about members of minority groups pressing for inclusion into the dominant culture. These claims, says Spiner-Halev, are about expanding citizenship.

Contrary to what he identifies as thick multiculturalism, thin multiculturalism is not about celebrating different cultures, but about changing and even expanding the current notion of citizenship in order to include the formerly excluded. According to this account, liberal democracies will work better if citizens relate to one another and if they are willing to compromise and make sacrifices for each other. Rather than only seeking personal interests, citizens must also look for the public good. In short, citizens need to acquire the virtues of good liberal citizens (Spinner-Halev, 1999:67-68).

Under this form of multiculturalism, people can have multiple identities, which is why he identifies this account as *a kind of cosmopolitanism*: "When a devout Sikh serves as a Canadian Mounty, eats hamburgers at home, attends to Toronto where they partake in their own form of cosmopolitan life, then he and his family are living a cosmopolitan life, one that

draws on several cultural traditions. These citizens have both their fellow Sikhs and their fellow citizens" (Spinner-Halev, 1999: 69).

Spinner-Halev is able to argue that multiculturalism is compatible with situations where people might have multiple identities because his line of thinking is framed in the liberal tradition, and as it will be shown in the next chapter, he embraces autonomy and pluralism as the fundamental values of liberalism. But, again, both Cantle and Zapata-Barrero reject any of these values and, in fact, they attack multiculturalism for being concerned with autonomy.

While multiculturalism can cope with the situation of people having multiple identities precisely because it promotes personal autonomy, it is equally capable to cope with another situation neglected by interculturalists, which is the rise of minority nationalism throughout Europe.

Indeed, Ted Cantle has argued that "the prospects for cohesion and peace are enhanced by the breaking down of traditional and hardened boundaries" which depends on the development and facilitation of interaction and contact (Cantle, 2016: 141). Furthermore, he calls for moving to a post-nationalist era and blames multiculturalism for making this impossible, given the fact that by protecting minorities against assimilation, it has encouraged them to create their own parallel societies and expecting majorities to adapt and change (Cantle, 2016: 141).

But Cantle seems to understate the claims of national minorities throughout European countries. Indeed, it is said that we are living in the era of nationalism, meaning that ethno national groups are continuously fighting to maintain their distinct identity, institutions, and the right to engage in their own national project (Kymlicka 2001:208).

It is true that many citizens are now living a kind of cosmopolitan life where they share multiple identities. It is equally true, however, that national identities –especially those of minority nations– have also managed to survive despite the many attempts to assimilate them. Cantle simply neglects this by assuming that citizen's identities are no longer defined by a national or cultural group, rather that they are now multiple and the best way to deal with this

is to move to a post-nationalist era, neglecting the fact that many people are still making nationalist claims –which need not be illiberal, as it will be analyzed in Chapter IV.

However, multiculturalism is not to blame for encouraging this. Minority nationalism in Europe exists since before the word multiculturalism even meant something. Cantle's view cannot cope with this fact, but it cannot –or must not– ignore it either. Doing so would be a very inexact way of analyzing and dealing with diversity and the importance of people being allowed to identify with their own culture or nation and reproduce it. Multiculturalism does not encourage these minority nationalist claims, it only tries to deal with them in a way that better works for each society.

Any form of managing cultural diversity cannot be blind to the real demands of national minorities and, despite the fact that there might be many persons identifying in a more *cosmopolitan* way, there are also many who identify with only one nation and, furthermore, claim the right to preserve their nation. Any form of dealing with cultural diversity other than assimilation cannot ignore these claims without converting into a non-democratic and even oppressive way of dealing with diversity.

As it has been insisted through this subsection interculturalism presents many problems regarding its consistency. Moreover, some of the features of this version are similar to some features of the liberal egalitarian tradition –in the lines of Barry (2001), especially regarding the critiques that this tradition directs towards multiculturalism. This will be argued in further sections.

ii. Zapata-Barrero's Theory as an Updated Color-Blind Approach

Cantle and Zapata-Barrero argue that the new reality of diversity is more complex and community relations are multifaceted, they do not simply revolve around visible majority/minority distinctions neither on fixed categories based on race, nationality, religion, community, etc. We are now facing plural identities that a multicultural approach cannot cope with (Cantle, 2016: 137).

These scholars argue that, because of this reality, interculturalism opposes to a "groupism" approach, which means "to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed", (Zapata-Barrero, 2016: 61). Following Sen

and Brubaker, Zapata-Barrero criticizes the tendency to "reduce people to singular, differentiated identity affiliations, to "miniaturize" people into one dimension of their multiple identities" (2016:62). Overall, he argues that a category of diversity, such as religion "can be a potential basis for a formation, but it must be initially treated from above as a set of individuals, without any entailed generalization" (62).

He calls this the "multicultural citizenship paradox" which tends to view groups in terms of their nationality and from there, it ascribes a certain culture and religion (Zapata-Barrero, 2016: 62). European interculturalism considers the group-based approach to be inaccurate and advocates for prioritizing individual over group rights (Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero, 2016: 11).

Ricard Zapata-Barrero suggests that one of the basic premises promoting intercultural citizenship is the *(positive) interaction* premise, which is concerned with promoting interpersonal contact and, additionally, with overcoming stereotypes and reducing prejudices towards "others". And this ensures that the contact zone be an area of positive interaction rather than an area of conflict. *Social inclusion*, he argues, promotes interpersonal contact, community-building, and overcoming prejudices and stereotypes against "others" (Zapata-Barrero, 2016:67).

However, Zapata does not offer an account on how to identify and bring down prejudices and stereotypes that is not group-based. In the literature of social justice that is concerned with the breaking down of prejudices, especially considering those built around the kind of difference that multiculturalism is concerned with, we can hardly find a suggestion on how to break down prejudices and stereotypes without making a group-based analysis. It is because stereotypes and prejudices are based on negative connotations associated to members of certain social group that we must make comparisons among social groups (Young, 2001). This is the point of any group-based approach and not the creation of parallel societies –which will be expanded in further chapters.

If European interculturalism is more concerned with individual rights rather than group rights, it seems that this theory of interculturalism –especially on Zapata-Barrero's account– is keener to an individualist liberal-egalitarian approach (similar to the one Brian Barry would defend) than a diversity-friendly approach. If this is right, then, it may be the case that Zapata-

Barrero's claims are part of an updated debate between liberal egalitarians and multiculturalists.

On this same vein Zapata-Barrero argues that interculturalism "is much more inclined toward the mainstream, since one of its most important assets is that it does not request specific policies or affirmative action […] Rather, it follows a *mainstreaming public philosophy".* By mainstream public philosophy he refers to "an amalgam of efforts to abandon target-group-specific policy measures […] and to incorporate [interculturalism] as an integral part of generic policies in public domains" furthermore, this mainstream public philosophy can be understood as "an effort to address diversity questions by catering to the entire population, and not only a sector of it, based on some categorization of difference" (Zapata-Barrero, 2016: 71).

The *mainstream public philosophy,* however, seems more similar to *the rule of the majority* and, hence, a *colour-blind approach* which all multiculturalists have rejected. Furthermore, it is a mistake to think that a group-based approach to cultural difference cares about groups "considered as independent source of moral value" (Young, 2001: 6). In fact, the point of using a group-based approach to detect the structures that create stereotypes and prejudices is precisely to promote the well-being of *all* individuals "considered as irreducible moral equals" (Young, 2001: 6). Nothing in a group-based approach suggests a contradiction in the claim that individuals ought to be the final target of policies and programs producing or improving their well-being and, furthermore, achieving social justice (Young, 2001: 17). In addition, the group-based approach is precisely a critique to how the *colour-blind* approach has neglected and been incapable of eliminating the prejudices and stereotypes that exclude members from most disadvantaged groups.

In short, European interculturalism claims to break down prejudices and stereotypes by encouraging and promoting interaction among people of different backgrounds, but rejects to use a group-based approach in order to detect who suffers from prejudice and stereotypes and, furthermore, gives no reasonable solution. It is true, however, that the promotion of interaction among people from different backgrounds can help reduce stereotypes and prejudices, but this is something that no multiculturalist would probably neglect. But in order

to target those citizens that suffer exclusion, due to prejudices and stereotypes, a group-based approach is needed.

By rejecting a group-based approach, Young has showed the difficulty of understanding how structures have been constructed in order to favor some and exclude others, usually people who belong to disadvantaged and culturally different groups (Young 1990 and 2001).[18]

Zapata-Barrero seems to believe that promoting interaction between people belonging to different social and cultural backgrounds will dismantle stereotypes and prejudices and that no special treatment is needed. But by denying a group-based approach we are left with a colour-blind approach thoroughly defended by an individualist account of liberal egalitarianism. It has been argued in extent, however, that this approach fails to cope with structural inequalities that have been created through a process of social relations. As it will be shown in subsequent chapters, the rejection of this liberal paradigm of understanding equality as sameness is the starting point of any politics of difference. If interculturalism is promoting the elimination of the difference treatment, then it is promoting an individualist liberal egalitarian approach that has proven to be an obstacle to achieve substantial equality.

Ethnocultural and social justice requires the detection of structural inequalities which, at the same time, require a group-based approach. So, if interculturalism is actually committed to bringing down stereotypes and prejudices and to include in the national narrative persons from all backgrounds, it must reject a colour-blind approach. The contrary would be an inaccurate retreat in the achievements of the multiculturalist –or diversity management– theories and, more specifically, in the achievement of ethnocultural and social justice.

If these arguments are correct and if we can affirm that interculturalism, at least as spelled out by these two scholars, is an updated version of an individualist liberal egalitarian approach to diversity, then Modood may be correct in affirming that interculturalism opposes to multiculturalism, but he is certainly mistaken to argue that they complement each other.

As it has been argued in this section, European interculturalism has not proven to be an alternative to multiculturalism in the sense that both Meer and Modood have referred to (2012). In addition, interculturalism does not seem to be a consistent theory for managing

[18] This will be expanded in Chapter IV and V.

cultural diversity because it lacks normative basis and it is contradictory. While it embraces some principles found in versions already developed of multiculturalism, it also embraces principles of an individualist liberal egalitarianism and, as a result, it has many inconsistencies, some which were pointed out here. The following section will discuss the Quebecois version of interculturalism.

4. Quebecois Interculturalism

In similar terms as in the British case, in 2007 the Quebecois government created its Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences. This commission was co-chaired by Charles Taylor and Gerard Bouchard, and the result of it was a report commonly known as the Bouchard-Taylor report, but officially called *Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation*.

The testimonies submitted to this commission favored interculturalism for Quebec, understood as a model for integration and the management of ethno cultural diversity. Additionally, this report registered three major consensuses: 1) the rejection of Canadian multiculturalism; 2) the rejection of assimilation and 3) the importance of integration on the basis of fundamental values of Quebec's society (gender equality, secularism, and French language) (Bouchard 2011:437).

But how does Quebec's interculturalism oppose to multiculturalism? This is a question addressed both by Taylor and Bouchard in further academic development. And despite the fact that both co-chaired the commission, they took different paths. However, two things need to be clear before making an analysis of this interculturalism. One is that the reasons for the emergence of an interculturalism in Quebec go back to, at least, 40 years when the Quiet Revolution started in this province. And secondly, that Quebecois interculturalism opposes to Canadian multiculturalism, but this debate is embedded in the Canada-Quebec imbroglio (Taylor 2012:413).

In this section it will be argued that there are, at least, two different accounts of Quebecois interculturalism: one advocated by Taylor and other Quebecois scholars, and another one

defended by Bouchard[19]. It will be argued, moreover, that although Bouchard's account of interculturalism has been taken as *the* account of Quebecois interculturalism, this is misleading and, in fact, this is a minority view of what Interculturalism in Quebec is. At the end of this section the difference between both should be evident.

Finally, because it is misleading to identify Quebecois interculturalism with Bouchard's account, the former will be referred to as *Bouchard's interculturalism*, which will be different from how in recent literature it has been catalogued as "Quebecois interculturalism".

a) Bouchard's Interculturalism

Bouchard has argued that interculturalism is a form of pluralism, which means that both multiculturalism and interculturalism are different incarnations of pluralism. Interculturalism, he claims, is not a "disguised" form of multiculturalism. In fact, he argues that it is inaccurate to establish an exclusive relationship between multiculturalism and pluralism and present them as synonymous (Bouchard 2011: 438 and 2016: 77).

Interculturalism, he argues, promotes (Bouchard 2016: 77-78):

- The protection of civil rights, minority rights, and the practice of reasonable accommodations;
- The vision that minority cultures are fluid. Their members can choose and negotiate their identity and belongings.
- The free expression of religions in the public sphere.
- The support for minority cultures to flourish if they wish that their culture be perpetuated.
- The formation of a national identity as a "work in progress", which includes majority and minority cultures.

[19] Gagnon and Iacovino argue that the ambiguity associated with Quebec's interculturalism has resulted in disagreements about the primary normative objectives of this model (Gagnon and Iacovino, 2016: 122)

In contrast, he argues that multiculturalism has the following five main features –which he shares with European interculturalists (Bouchard 2016: 90):

- A definition of nation as individuals and groups that does not recognize the existence of a national or a majority culture;
- An openness to diversity to the point that it jeopardizes integration and exposes the society to the danger of fragmentation.
- A wide practice of pluralism which tends towards relativism and undermines the fundamental and universal values.
- The promotion of ethno-cultural minorities to the extent that it confines those members who would like to exit or distance themselves from their allegiance;
- Minimum concern for the establishment of a shared culture that would secure the nation's essential symbolic foundations.

Although, as referred to before, these features are based on an over simplistic understanding of multiculturalism, the interest here is not to argue against them. Rather, the aim is to analyze how Bouchard justifies and understands in a greater extent interculturalism. For that, it is necessary to analyze three concepts on this account. First, the different paradigms that distinguish interculturalism and multiculturalism; secondly the *ad hoc* precedence in favor of the majority. and thirdly, the idea of reasonable accommodations. These will be analyzed in order.

i. Diversity and Duality Paradigms

The first element that distinguishes interculturalism from multiculturalism in Bouchard's account is the fact that each concept is framed under a different *paradigm,* by which he understands "large schemas that will help situate the primary intention, or defining outlook, of each model" of managing cultural diversity. These paradigms "structure the public debate of a nation, determine the parameters and the basic issues, inspire the policies and programs of the state and, finally, fuel the perceptions citizens hold of each other" (Bouchard 2011: 441).

Bouchard classifies five different paradigms, although here only two will be referred to, which are the ones that concern interculturalism and multiculturalism respectively[20].

The paradigm of *diversity* holds the premise that in every nation composed by individuals and ethnocultural groups, these are placed in equal footing and are protected by the same laws. Moreover, under this paradigm there is no recognition of a majority culture and, consequently, no minorities either (Bouchard 2016: 93). This paradigm is where multiculturalism is framed on, and because there is no recognition of a majority culture the relationship between majority and minorities is not formalized. Not only Canadian multiculturalism is located under this paradigm, also the United States, Sweden, Australia ,and India (Bouchard 2011: 441).

Interculturalism is framed under the *duality paradigm*. Under this paradigm, diversity "is conceived and managed as a relationship between minorities from a recent or distant period of immigration, and a cultural majority that could be described as *foundational*" (Bouchard 2011: 442).

By foundational, Bouchard refers to any culture resulting from the history of a community that has occupied certain area for a long period of time, forming a settled territory with which it identifies. This culture has created a collective sense of identity expressed through language, traditions, and institutions and shares a common sense of continuity (Bouchard 2011:442)[21].

The majority/minority duality appears as a dichotomy, as an us/them divide. However, according to Bouchard, the duality paradigm does not create this divide, it rather takes it as its point of departure. Interculturalism works in order to foster a sane relation between the majority and minorities. Bouchard mentions, however, the importance of not conceiving the majority and minorities as a fixed set, and despite the fact that the "dual structure is durable, the contents of its two components, as well as the context and modalities of their connections,

[20] The five paradigms, according to Bouchard are Diversity; Duality; Mixité; Homogeneity and multipolarity. For further details on each see Bouchard 2011: 441-444 and Bouchard 2016:93.

[21] This concept is similar to the concept of nation offered by Kymlicka. According to him, a nation is "a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture" (Kymlicka 1995: 11).

are in constant flux" (Bouchard 2011: 446). It would be mistaken, he argues, to conceive a too rigid conception of the majority/minority duality.

One of the main traits of the duality paradigm is the awareness of the majority/minority relationship and the tensions that are associated with such relation. Therefore, interculturalism is more concerned with the anxiety that the majority culture can feel in face of cultural minorities (Bouchard 2011: 445).

Bouchard believes that the majority can feel their rights threatened, as well as its values, traditions, language, memory, identity, and even its security (Bouchard 2011: 445). This feeling of threat can come from different sources; however, this insecurity and mistrust can help perpetuate the *us/them duality*. Interculturalism is concerned with dealing with these tensions and anxieties that majorities might feel. Hence, interculturalism is expected to articulate the tensions between continuity –of the foundational culture– and diversity –brought in by past or recent immigration. The central challenge that interculturalism holds is to alleviate the us/them relation rather than increase tensions between groups (Bouchard 2011: 446).

In the context of Quebec, for instance, Bouchard thinks that the insecurities fueled by the growing presence of immigrants and cultural minorities is justified because of the fragility of francophone Quebec in America. He additionally justifies these insecurities because there are important fundamental values that must be preserved, such as gender equality or the separation of the church and the State (Bouchard 2011:447).

Unlike multiculturalism, interculturalism is concerned "with the interests of the majority culture, whose desire to perpetuate and maintain itself is perfectly legitimate, as much as it does with the interests of minorities and immigrants" (Bouchard 2011: 438-439).

Summarizing this first point, a great difference between this account of interculturalism and multiculturalism is the starting point of each, that is, the different paradigms that frame each model of pluralism. Because interculturalism is framed under the duality paradigm which recognizes the existence of a majority and minorities, it's main concern is that this relation is a peaceful one. However, as mentioned in the last paragraph, interculturalism is especially concerned with the anxieties of the majority culture and with its interest to perpetuate and

maintain itself as a distinct culture, which is another great difference between Bouchard's interculturalism and multiculturalism (Modood 2015 and 2016: Levey 2012 and 2016). The way Bouchard justifies the focus on the anxieties of the majority to perpetuate their culture is because of the impossibility of a neutral sate, which leads to what he calls the *ad hoc* precedence in favor of the majority culture. This will be analyzed next.

ii. State Neutrality and Ad Hoc Precedence in Favor of the Majority

Bouchard agrees on one thing with multiculturalism: State neutrality is nearly impossible. He argues, in similar terms as multiculturalism, that due to this impossibility, a form of cultural interventionism is sometimes necessary and legitimate. Unlike multiculturalism, however, this cultural interventionism serves the views of the majority. In some cases, he argues, it is legitimate to break the neutrality rule and favor the majority (Bouchard 2016:82). For instance, he mentions that

> few people, at least in the Western world, will question the right for a host society to promote a national language or a set of basic liberal values that will be imposed upon immigrants and minorities (freedom of speech, equality, democracy, non-violence and so forth). Yet, in these two cases, it is clear that the violation of strict neutrality serves the views of the majority (2016: 82).

It is true that there will always be some institutional arrangements that favor the majority, language is the most prominent example. But expecting immigrants to adopt the basic values of the host society, especially if these are liberal, does not seem to break the neutrality rule in favor of the majority, because, for instance, immigrants might still be allowed to practice their own religion which probably differs from that of the majority. In general, as it will be insisted in Chapter 4, immigrants have accepted to integrate into the host society, which means to conform to, and adopt their values and culture. However, they try to negotiate fair terms of this inclusion by being allowed to practice their culture, religion, etc. This implies, indeed, breaking the rule of neutrality, but it should not be seen as favoring the majoritarian culture. Rather, it should be seen as a win-win situation. These kind of arrangements, indeed, favor a majority because it is beneficial both for the ethnic minorities and for the cultural majority, but this is different than favoring *the* cultural majority, which is not the case.

Bouchard, however, argues that in some cases it will be legitimate to break the neutrality rule in favor of *the* majority culture. This is what he identifies as a legitimate cultural

interventionism, which is meant to "protect or to restore the symbolic foundation of a society or a nation when it is seriously threatened" (Bouchard 2016: 82-83). This interventionism, however, must have a societal purpose and its strategy must not only be to bolster the majority culture. The purpose that this cultural intervention follows justifies bestowing some privileges of the majority culture, when these privileges help to preserve the symbolic foundation of such cultural majority (Bouchard 2016: 83).

The *ad hoc* precedence in favor of the majority is precisely this cultural interventionism that seeks to preserve the symbolic foundation of the majority culture and to strengthen a national identity (Bouchard 2011: 452). In other words, it is a contextual precedence based on seniority or history legitimately claimed by the majority when it seeks to "preserve the cultural and symbolic heritage that serves as the foundation of its identity and helps ensure its continuity" (Bouchard 2011: 451)

However, Bouchard mentions that this majority precedence should not be understood as an "a priori or formal precedence for the majority, which would result in establishing a hierarchy and creating two classes of citizens" (2016:83). In order to avoid this, he defends a "de facto precedence" as opposed to a "precedence of law". The former, he argues, would constitute a legitimate cultural interventionism in favor of the majority.

Bouchard mentions, in this regard, that it is difficult to set up, in the abstract, the limits of an *ad hoc* precedence and the terms of its application (2011: 459). Thus, he offers a list of some legitimate and some illegitimate forms of cultural interventionism favoring the majority. But by not being clear on the criteria followed in order to make this list, it seems rather arbitrary. For instance, what would be the difference between justifying keeping the cross in the Quebec flag and not justifying keeping the cross on the wall of the National Assembly and public courtrooms? How can the cross in the Quebec flag represent the Quebecois people when not all Quebecois are catholic and many, in fact, belong to different religions, not endorsing the catholic faith? Bouchard does not offer any clear non-arbitrary criteria for these differences[22].

[22] It will be argued further that this has to do with the fact that Bouchard misses to analyze interculturalism in context. This means that there might be a reason for maintaining the cross in the Quebec flag and not in

Finally, on this regard, Bouchard argues that:

> cultural interventionism can be seen as a reasonable accommodation, this time in favour of the majority rather than minorities. Again, this arrangement is justified by the fact that the maintenance of the majority culture, by ensuring the reproduction of the symbolic foundation, will also serve the minorities. Here we are very much in the spirit of interculturalism, which advocates a logic of harmonisation through mutual adjustment (2016: 84).

However, Bouchard acknowledges that there is a danger of abuse by the majority and that there must be some limits to this interventionism in relation to minorities. In other words, he accepts that minorities can suffer some form of assimilation and interculturalism must try to prevent this. The solution he offers is what he calls reasonable accommodation, which is the third, and last, element that needs to be analyzed from this account of interculturalism.

iii. Reasonable Accommodation

Because liberal states have no obligation to be culturally neutral, Bouchard defends that majorities have a right to some form of interventionism. Nevertheless, he accepts that "in return we must recognize for minorities the right to a corrective mechanism to protect themselves against potential abuses by majorities" (2016: 87).

Bouchard briefly argues that there must be limits to cultural interventionism and institutions must offer some solution for minorities that are being disadvantaged. Indeed, he argues that any form of state cultural interventionism, in order to be legitimate, will have to "pass the test of the tribunal" (2016:85).

Regarding the place of minorities, he argues that there must be a reasonable accommodation that will protect minorities from potential abuses. In one paragraph Bouchard explains these reasonable accommodations and in what way they intend to protect minorities:

> The function of these accommodations –or collaborative adjustments– is to permit certain citizens who are victims of discrimination or serious disadvantages (because they are culturally different) to exercise their fundamental rights, unless there are compelling reasons to restrict them (2016: 87).

courtrooms, but in order to understand these reasons we need the contextual facts that are not offered by Bouchard. This is so because he theorizes Quebec's interculturalism in the abstract.

This, however, is striking. Indeed, Bouchard claims to be developing a model of pluralism concerned with fostering a sane relation between a majoritarian culture and other cultural minorities within the same state territory and, furthermore, that this model is better than multiculturalism. But then he argues that, according to this model, reasonable accommodation of minorities implies a permission for certain citizens, victims of discrimination due to their cultural differences, to exercise their fundamental rights unless there are compelling reasons to restrict them.

But this is not different at all to what liberal egalitarianism would advocate for. Indeed, according to this line of thinking, the best way for achieving equality is by treating everybody the same way, rejecting any differential treatment between individuals. This approach argues that by granting the same rights to every citizen justice and equality will be achieved. As a consequence of this, any form of discrimination is thoroughly rejected. Precisely because how people belonging to certain social groups have suffered discrimination and have seen undermined their most fundamental rights, under this approach it is defended that all citizens, regardless of their membership to any social group, shall receive the same treatment and shall see recognized their rights in the same way.

Multiculturalism, however, argues that a difference-blind approach to justice and equality cannot provide substantial equality to members of disadvantaged groups. This is why it defends that this blindness approach must be abandoned and replaced by a differential treatment, as it will be analyzed in extent in the next chapters.

But by defending this idea of reasonable accommodation Bouchard does not seem so convinced to abandon an egalitarianism approach. After all, he is just confirming the most basic principle of any liberal democratic state which is non-discrimination, a basic principle of liberal egalitarianism.

Bouchard's interculturalism, thus, seems to depart in an important way from the logic of multiculturalism. It is true that this account of interculturalism opposes to multiculturalism, but this is because it is not an account that rejects liberal egalitarianism, on the contrary, it maintains the principles of this approach.

It is true, however, that while liberal egalitarians defend state neutrality and believe this to be possible, Bouchard accepts that neutrality is impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, the impossibility of a state neutrality is what gives him reasons precisely to favor the majority culture, which turns out being the same that liberal egalitarianism would do. Therefore, he is not actually offering any different ways of approaching the claims of minority cultures.

So, while multiculturalists are trying to make the impossibility of a state neutrality less harmful for minority cultures, Bouchard's interculturalism seems to be working on opposite directions, that is, reaffirming the non-neutrality of the state and the privilege of a majority. The effects of this do not seem to be any different than a model of cultural blindness. That is, a liberal egalitarian approach.

Bouchard's intentions, however, might not be to defend a version of liberal egalitarianism. The problem, it will be argued next, is that from a particular situation which is the one that Quebec and English Canada are facing, he tries to theorize a general and abstract model for managing cultural diversity. By doing this, his intentions can be misunderstood. Indeed, Quebec's interculturalism must be understood not in the abstract, but in the historical context and, as said earlier citing Taylor, in the Canadian/Quebec imbroglio.

The following subsection will present another version of Quebec's interculturalism. After this, some further problems with Bouchard's interculturalism will be mentioned.

b) Understanding Quebecois Interculturalism and Canadian Multiculturalism

Contrary to Bouchard's account, Taylor argues that interculturalism in Quebec does not oppose to Canadian multiculturalism and in fact they are very similar policies once spelled out. "But it nevertheless has been politically imperative to use a different name" (Taylor 2012:413). The reasons for this, however, have little to do with how multiculturalism has been accused of slowing down, even defeating, integration and that it encouraged immigrants to retreat into their communities of origin, encouraging ghettoization (Taylor 2012). This negative, ghetto-inducing idea, although widely shared in Europe and in Bouchard's view, is rejected by Taylor.

In fact, Taylor has pointed out that an "anti-multicultural rhetoric in Europe reflects a profound misunderstanding of the dynamics of immigration into the rich, liberal democracies of the West. The underlying assumption seems to be that too much positive recognition of cultural differences will encourage a retreat into ghettos, and a refusal to accept the political ethic of liberal democracy itself" (2012: 414) but this, he claims, is all wrong.

The major motivations of immigrants are usually to find opportunities of work, education, self-expression, for themselves and especially, for their children. As long as they are able to secure these, he argues, they are happy to integrate. It is only when this hope is frustrated that a sense of alienation and hostility can grow, and may generate rejection of the mainstream. "Consequently, the European attack on "multiculturalism" often seems to us a classic case of false consciousness, blaming certain phenomena of ghettoization and alienation of immigrants on a foreign ideology, instead of recognizing the home-grown failures to promote integration and combat discrimination" (Taylor 2012: 414)

Taylor suggests that while the arguments to reject multiculturalism are mistaken, there are, nevertheless, strong reasons to adopt the term "interculturalism" in Quebec. These have more to do with the historical context of both of English Canada and Quebec, than with the content of both policies.

In similar terms, Waddington and others argue that, indeed, multiculturalism is a dirty word in Quebec, but this has nothing to do with the fact that Quebecois are xenophobic. Unlike Europe,

> skepticism about multiculturalism in Québec has little to do with the popular perception that multiculturalist policies encourage isolationism among immigrant groups […] Instead, Québec's opposition to multiculturalism is grounded in the belief that the Canadian government's policy of multiculturalism is a betrayal of Québec's historical status within the Canadian federation and undermines Québec's grounds for seeking greater political autonomy from Canada (Waddington, Maxwell *et al,* 2012: 3)

And in these same lines, Gagnon and Iacovino have called the attention to the fact that "the ideal of multiculturalism must not be confused with the Canadian policy" (Gagnon and Iacovino 2016: 121)

It seems as if the debate *interculturalism versus multiculturalism* in the Canadian arena takes a very different form than the one in Europe. Indeed, excluding Bouchard, the rest of the Quebecois scholars reject the critics against multiculturalism –in the sense of generating parallel societies and inducing ghettoization– and, in fact, they believe them to be a misunderstanding of it.

In order to argue in what sense interculturalism in Quebec differs from Canadian multiculturalism, Taylor distinguishes two levels for the term "multiculturalism". One level corresponds to a generic term for the "ensemble of policies introduced with the combined goals of recognizing diversity, fostering interaction and producing/maintaining equality" (2012: 415). This generic term has two sub-species: multiculturalism (in *strict sense*) and interculturalism.

A multicultural challenge, in the generic sense of the word, arises when differences on the status of citizens are encouraged by State institutions and policies, but for this to be possible, these inequalities must be questioned. The age of multiculturalism, he argues, is "the age in which this kind of inequalities has come to seem more and more indefensible" (416). These challenges can be solved by a range of policies that must share in common the goal of transforming the culture of interaction in order to remove inequalities. But for this to happen in addition to specific policies,

> We also need an articulated account of what we're doing, we need to articulate what the new culture of interaction will be, and the way it differs from the old. We need to give some expression to the new footing on which we want to be with each other, having set aside the inequalities and exclusions which characterized the old. We need a narrative of the transition we're trying to bring about (416).

This is what Taylor calls rhetoric, and it is precisely a difference in rhetoric which distinguishes both Canadian multiculturalism and Quebecois interculturalism.

The rhetoric behind both policies is intimately related to each other because, in a sense, both are responses to the relation between English Canada and Quebecois during the last 50 years, when the Quiet Revolution in Quebec took place (Gagnon and Iacovino 2016 :109-119). As a response to the claim of Quebec to be recognized together with English Canada as "two founding peoples", the then Prime Minister Pearson created a Royal Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism. This commission called for a "two nations" conception of

Canada, where English Canada and French Canada would be recognized equally as founding nations, each enjoying majority status. However, the results of this commission were soon challenged by a third force, which were groups representing immigrants and ethno-cultural communities who "sought recognition of their cultural contributions to Canada, and felt that they would be relegated to second-class citizenship status if the country was to be formally defined as bicultural and bilingual" (Gagnon and Iacovino 2016: 118-119).

As a response, Trudeau opted for a policy of official multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. This meant that "language could be dissociated from culture, and individuals would be free to decide whether or not to actively preserve their ethno-cultural identities" (Gagnon and Iacovino 2016: 119). This approach, according to Gagnon and Iacovino, implied a primacy of individual rights: the right to associate and exit from their ethno-cultural communities; the language participation in Canadian society was left to individual choice, and, furthermore, that Canada was defined as a single bilingual host society.

However, although the outcome of these historical facts are said to represent both the view of the third force and the two nations, this multicultural turn in Canada could never be accepted in Quebec. This story just did not suit for Quebecers (Taylor 2012: 417) who have seen their identity threatened for a long period of time.

First, in Quebec around 70% of the population descends from the original francophone settlers. Secondly, their language, culture, and religion have been under a continuous threat of assimilation. And regarding language, they have been facing a triple threat: first that they are surrounded by an Anglophone Canadian majority; secondly, in all North America there is an English language domination; and thirdly, that English is becoming a kind of *lingua franca*. These threats have planted in Quebec's society a great concern for their language and identity, and the way in which immigrants integrate into Quebec's society turns out to be extremely important for these concerns either to grow or to disseminate.

This fears, however, are not unfounded. Indeed, before the Quiet Revolution took place, the "normal path of immigrants to Quebec […] was to integrate into the English minority" (Taylor 2012: 418) which meant integrating into the Canadian majority. After a declining birth-rate in Quebec, efforts were made to reverse this, which culminated in a major language legislation in the 1970s. This meant that children of immigrants were integrated into the

francophone society, which helped preserve the language in that province. However, this had to be done by special policies which had the task of integrating immigrants into the francophone culture. In contrast, Taylor mentions the example that in Toronto there is no need to do anything in order to ensure that immigrant's children integrate into the Anglophone society.

As seen, there are many particular reasons why in Quebec the multicultural Canadian story could not be accepted. But additionally, Taylor mentions that in a generic sense, multiculturalism is understood as including both policies that recognize difference and that work for integration. Nevertheless, the prefix "multi" can be more associated with the former while the prefix "inter" with the latter. And this is, in fact, a great difference between these policies.

Because of the status of Quebec as a minority nation within a majority Anglophone society in North America, Quebecers must be concerned with the way immigrants integrate into their society. In other words, they must make sure that they integrate into the francophone *way of life* and not the Anglophone. This is why Quebec could not accept the Canadian multicultural premise that there is no official culture because they have been fighting for years to be recognized as a founding nation.

In fact, Kymlicka has argued that the final outcome of Canadian multiculturalism, "as a symbol for identification is paradoxically analogous to the civil thrust of the United States in its failure to differentiate between national minorities and ethno-cultural communities" (Gagnon and Iacovino 2016: 124). While the former seek self-determination the latter seek inclusion.

Quebec's story inspiring interculturalism is different from the one inspiring Canadian multiculturalism. "Quebec society has been engaged in a long-term project not only to survive as a francophone society, but to flourish; and indeed, to flourish as a democratic society based on equality and human rights" (Taylor 2012: 418). This long-term project of nation-building does welcome and invite foreigners to join it as full members, which means learning their language and become integrated into the society. Immigrants are expected to learn French, through the language courses provided freely to them. Additionally, they are expected to "abide by liberal and democratic principles and seek to participate in political

and economic life" (Maclure 2010: 42). In turn, Quebec's duty is to "provide them with the means for a successful socio-economic integration and valorize and accommodate immigrants' distinct cultural heritage and commitments, within the limits of a liberal-democratic regime" (Maclure 2010:42).

There are, indeed, certain basic elements of Quebec's society that immigrants should adopt or adapt, and interculturalism expects this to be so[23]. These are, according to Taylor, French language, human rights, equality, non-discrimination, and democracy. But beyond these, there is an indefinite zone of customs, common enthusiasms and differences which he calls "folkways". Some of these folkways, however, can surely cause a sense of fear among Quebecers (for instance, feminine mutilation or costumes and practices that can harm certain human rights).

But these fears are not any different from those suffered by any society that has adopted multicultural policies. A balance of these different ways of life must be achieved in order to avoid becoming an assimilationist state, but to maintain the common values of society. This is a challenge faced by any society facing a multicultural challenge and not a specific problem, neither of Quebec nor of the intercultural policies enacted in this province. "The push towards assimilation undercuts the intercultural scenario, as indeed, it goes against any form of multiculturalism in the generic sense" (Taylor 2012:420). After all, Quebec – as a host society– faces the same challenges that any host society faces when integrating immigrants.

Once the rhetoric behind the intercultural story in Quebec and the Canadian multicultural policy is understood, it seems quite clear that they are not very different from each other once spelled out, but there are important reasons to distinguish them.

[23] This is not incompatible from the classic distinction drawn by Kymlicka regarding the sources of diversity (1995). Indeed, ethnocultural minorities seek integration and this means finding a proper balance between their own cultural traditions –or ways of life– and the limits defined by the legal framework. This is what Maclure has called the basic terms of a moral contract between immigrants and the host society. But this does not depart from Kymlicka's right based approach to multiculturalism.

So once having the picture of the debate between multiculturalism and interculturalism in Quebec, we can return to Bouchard's account of interculturalism in order to make some final comments.

c) Final Comments on Bouchard's Interculturalism

There are many tensions between the two versions of interculturalism just analyzed. For a start, while Taylor suggests that both policies of interculturalism and multiculturalism are very similar once spelled out, Bouchard has argued that interculturalism is not a "disguised" form of multiculturalism and, furthermore, that the former is a different and better way of managing cultural diversity.

Secondly, Bouchard fails to distinguish between communitarian multiculturalism and civic and/or liberal multiculturalism (see section 1 of this chapter). While his critics of multiculturalism might be more adequate to a communitarian multiculturalism, no liberal democracy that has adopted multiculturalism can be said to adopt a version of communitarian multiculturalism (Maclure 2010: 40), and this is precisely why Taylor, for instance, rejects these critics towards multiculturalism. Indeed, Taylor argues that the difference between interculturalism and multiculturalism has nothing to do with the fact that the latter is identified as a *ghetto-induced* idea.

However, rather than comparing the two versions of Quebecois interculturalism, it is more useful to point out some normative problems in Bouchard's account.

Bouchard's first strategy for distinguishing multiculturalism from interculturalism is showing the different paradigm that frames each model. As mentioned earlier, he defends that the former is framed on a diversity paradigm while the latter on a duality paradigm, and that the main difference is that in the former there is no recognition of a majority culture –and no minorities either– and on the latter there is a recognition of a majority –and foundational– culture. In short, there is a recognition of a majority and of minorities.

In fact, the Canadian multicultural policy does not recognize any status of majority culture. It recognizes that there are different cultural groups –Quebecois, other immigrant groups, indigenous peoples, and English Canadians- but it fails to recognize any of these groups as a majoritarian or dominant culture. However, as already mentioned, there are strong reasons

for this strategy. Mainly, that by recognizing French and English Canada as foundational nations, other immigrant minorities (the third force) claimed to be relegated as second class citizens. Canada's intention with declaring no dominant culture was to give a solution to the multicultural and multi-ethnic challenge it was facing.

The multicultural policy in Canada was a reaction to a "variety of potentially fragmenting forces –globalization, the intensification and diversification of immigration, Quebec and indigenous peoples' struggles for recognition, etc." (Maclure 2010: 43), and this is why the federal government decided to conceive the policy of multiculturalism as a tool for forging national unity and increasing social cohesion.

However, multiculturalism as a political idea does recognize –as a fact– the existence of a majoritarian or a dominant culture. This does not mean, however, that the majoritarian or dominant culture has any precedence over minorities and, in fact, multiculturalism defends quite the opposite: that majority and minority groups have an equal status. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to argue that multiculturalism does not recognize any majority nor minorities, doing so would imply that it neglects to recognize the relations of domination and cultural oppression that the former can impose to the latter.

Bouchard might frame the Canadian multicultural policy in what he calls the diversity paradigm, but he is mistaken in making a generalization and including multiculturalism –as a normative concept– in this paradigm.

The second flaw in Bouchard's interculturalism is that he seems to theorize interculturalism in a non-contextual way, and he fails to analyze Quebecois interculturalism in the context of the relations between Quebec and Canada.

By neglecting to analyze interculturalism in this way, he ends up giving an inaccurate account of what interculturalism in Quebec actually means. For instance, he argues that the duality paradigm, where interculturalism operates, recognizes a majority culture and, because of the status of foundational culture, it has the right to flourish and secure its continuity, which implies enjoying an *ad hoc* precedence it is favor.

This difference of paradigms and the focus on the majority has been subject of many debates in recent literature (most prominently Modood 2015 and 2016; and Levey 2013 and 2016).

However, interculturalism in Quebec is not concerned with establishing, *per se*, a superiority of the Quebecois culture in face of other minorities. What is at stake here, as already explained, is the struggle that Quebec has faced for years for their culture to flourish, the difficulties it faced due to the fact that Quebec is surrounded by an Anglophone majority in North America.

Quebecers, indeed, are a majoritarian culture within Quebec's province. They are, however, a minority culture within Canada. Quebec is, in short, a *fragile majority*.

MacAndrew argues that there are some contexts where there is an ambiguity between majority and minority. For instance, Canada has a clearly identifiable majority community, but there is an ambiguity of ethnic dominance in regions where another group constitutes the demographic majority, such as Quebec. When this is the case, she argues, the concepts of *majority* and *minority* must always be used with care (McAndrew 2013:4-5).

Bouchard seems to treat Quebec as a majority but, at the same time, he defends the rights for Quebec as a minority nation, that is, the right to flourish and the right to be recognized as a foundational culture –which could actually be framed in the rights of autonomy and self-determination that a national minority might claim from the state–, and this is ambiguous[24]. By neglecting the importance of the contextual facts in his account, Bouchard presents a very different account of Quebec's interculturalism, distorting the real struggles of the Quebecois and even tending to a retreat on the achievements of ethnocultural justice.

It needs to be acknowledged that interculturalism is a response to how the Canadian multicultural policy neglected to recognize Quebec as a founding nation, and there are strong reasons for Quebecers to feel rejected by this and, furthermore, to generate policies that reinforce the feeling of being a foundational nation struggling for their continuity.

Interculturalism in Quebec defends that Quebec is a host society and, as such, rather than allowing immigrants to integrate into the language and culture of their choice, because the fragility of Quebec in reference to the rest of North America, it welcomes immigrants to

[24] Although he uses different terminology he argues that "majorities and minorities exist because of the willingness of their respective members to perpetuate their culture and identity. And this is a choice that must be respected" (2016:80). It seems as if Bouchard is justifying rights of autonomy for national minorities, which does not differ from a right-based approach of multiculturalism.

integrate, but according to Quebec's culture. This is rather different than just defending, in an abstract way, the right of foundational nations to have a cultural precedence, as Bouchard does.

All seems, in fact, that interculturalism in Quebec is less concerned with declaring a kind of *superiority* in face of other minorities, especially immigrant minorities, than it is concerned with vindicating their status as a foundation nation within Canada. It is important, however, to analyze interculturalism in Quebec in context, because precisely due to the complex relation between Quebec and Canada, the way in which immigrants integrate can result in heated public debates.

McAndrew argues, in this regard, that "when fragile-majority societies open their doors to immigrants, they provide us with a fascinating opportunity to observe […] the potential to transform newcomers into scapegoats for old conflicts […] The choice of immigrants for one competing system of schooling over another can become an issue of heated public debate and give rise to tensions and conflicts" (McAndrew 2013: 5).

Furthermore, McAndrew suggests that in these situations, policymakers have to devise new formulas to reconcile the fragile majority's fight for survival "with the need to create a new civic identity that includes both recently arrived groups and the community with which this fragile majority has historically been in conflict" (2013:5). And if we analyze in this context, the struggle of Quebec, then there is a strong reason for this policy, but this is very different to what Bouchard has presented us as interculturalism

This leads to the third flaw in Bouchard's account of interculturalism, which is that he misses to identify the real target of Quebec's interculturalism. It is not immigrants, but English Canada and the long and complex relation that these two actors have had. Additionally, it is not multiculturalism the opponent of interculturalism, but the Canadian multicultural policy which is at odds with Quebec's interculturalism.

There are many things to be said about Bouchard's interculturalism. The interest here has been one main point, that because of the very complex and concrete situation that Quebec's interculturalism involves, it is problematic to neglect the contextual facts and elevate interculturalism as a general theory for managing cultural diversity. This subsection has tried

to offer the problems that emerge when doing this, and overall, the analysis of Quebecois interculturalism has tried to show that, indeed, interculturalism has not proven to be any different than multiculturalism.

Finally, the last section of this chapter will introduce the Latin American version of interculturalism, while next chapters will offer a critical analysis of this version of interculturalism.

5. Introducing Latin American Interculturalism

The notion of interculturalism in the Latin American region is not a recent one. For nearly 50 years sociologists have studied this concept, resulting in plenty of literature from a sociological and anthropological approach. However, it has been only recently that interculturalism in this region has been spelled out through the language of political philosophy as a model for managing cultural diversity.

In the last few years interculturalism in the Latin American region has claimed to be an alternative to multiculturalism and, in many points, it opposes to the latter. However, in similar terms than European interculturalism, those who defend this version seem to focus very much on arguing why interculturalism should not be confused with multiculturalism, and this interest in arguing why interculturalism is better, makes it difficult to identify the main features of Latin American interculturalism.

For a start, however, the interest of analysis will be solely with those interculturalists who have tried to spell out Latin American interculturalism through the language of political philosophy. This excludes the literature from a sociological, anthropological, and historical approach.

As a model for managing cultural diversity, there is still plenty of accounts of interculturalism (Cortés Mateos and Dietz 2011). In the following sentences some of the different meanings will be mentioned.

According to Antón (1995) and Arangueren (1998), interculturalism is a set of socio-personal processes generated by the interaction of different cultures guided by a relation of reciprocal cultural exchange. This implies the recognition and comprehension of other cultural groups,

respect for them, communication and interaction between them, and in general, the promotion of attitudes that favor cultural diversity (Escarbajal 2004: 25).

Poole (2003) has a broader scope of the notion of interculturalism. According to him, interculturalism is the ability to recognize, harmonize, and negotiate all the forms of difference existing in society. According to this broader scope, interculturalism plays a fundamental role in inculcating democratic values and political responsibility (Escarbajal 2004: 25).

Another notion of interculturalism is one which refers to it as a way of decentralizing points of view and to widen up the visions we have of the world (Escarbajar 2004). This notion of interculturalism is widely shared by scholars such as Walsh (2009), Tubino (2001, 2002 and 2013) and Cruz Rodriguez (2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2014a and 2015). These three authors agree that interculturalism is a decolonizing project and, as such, it must be concerned with eliminating the hierarchies of social positions imposed by the colonial order, which are mainly based on race. Interculturalism's goal is to achieve social justice among different cultural groups within the same state territory (Cruz Rodriguez: 2014a)

Despite the fact that there are different notions of interculturalism, they all share in common that interculturalism implies dialogue, respect, peaceful coexistence (*convivencia*), cultural exchange, and the elimination of the structural causes that produce inequalities between different cultural groups (Recasens 2004: 4; Escarbajal 2004:25). These are the core features of Latin American Interculturalism which will be developed in the following subsection.

a) Core Features of Latin American Interculturalism

As it was described in the first chapter, the uprising of indigenous movements during the last two decades played an important role in the idea of interculturalism as a model for managing cultural diversity, which explains why interculturalism's first target is cultural domination. According to Walsh (2009), Cruz Rodriguez (2014a) and Quijano (2000), injustices between cultural groups have their origin in colonialism. The idea of colonialism, according to these authors, refers to the fact that a foreign state's government imposes hierarchies between groups based on race (Cruz Rodriguez; 2014: 70).

Walsh has argued that in Latin America there are states whose society is pluricultural but are dominated by the idea of a monocultural state. In these states, white elites have occupied the highest and most powerful positions while indigenous peoples are confined to the lowest and most marginal positions, following the old "caste" system imposed during colonial times. Interculturalism, thus, must aim for structural changes and must seek to achieve equality between different cultural groups.

The first core feature of interculturalism in the Latin American region, hence, is to fight against the cultural domination that indigenous peoples –and other groups, such as afro descendants– are facing.

For this to be possible, however, the causes of these inequalities must be attacked. Interculturalists believe that in order to achieve substantial equality a structural transformation is needed (Walsh 2009: 43-44; Tubino 2007: 195-196; Cruz Rodriguez 2014: 71). These scholars argue that interculturalism should be a transformative policy. The second core feature of interculturalism, hence, is the generation of transformative actions and substantial equality.

Walsh has argued that Interculturalism means the contact and exchange between cultures in equal terms and equal conditions (2009:14). However, the fact that interculturalism is a "decolonizing project" and it advocates for the disappearance of inequalities between different cultures does not prevent that cultural conflicts emerge (Walsh 2009; Cruz Rodriguez 2014). This is why, Walsh argues, a dialogue between cultural groups is necessary and the mere fact of tolerating in isolation the different cultural groups is not enough if we are seeking equality between groups. Intercultural dialogue and coexistence –*convivencia*– understood in this context is the third core feature of interculturalism (Campos-Solano, 2013 and 2016).

In sum, according to the literature available regarding interculturalism as a model for managing cultural diversity, the three core features of it are 1) the opposition to cultural domination; 2) the generation of transformative actions and substantial equality, and 3) an intercultural dialogue which will allow peaceful coexistence between different cultural groups.

Interculturalism in Latin America can offer an appealing strategy for managing cultural diversity in this region. However, as spelled out by its defenders, it presents many normative problems that need to be addressed. This will be done in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3. DISMANTLING LATIN AMERICAN INTERCULTURALISM

3.1. Introduction

The two previous chapters started to introduce the idea of interculturalism in the Latin American region. As it was mentioned in both chapters, interculturalism is a concept currently used in different ways and in different fields. But generally, it refers to situations related with indigenous peoples and their relations with the state.

A current argument that Latin American interculturalists use for presenting their theory is that interculturalism offers a better way for managing cultural diversity in this region than multiculturalism. Indeed, it is symptomatic of all versions of interculturalism to oppose to multiculturalism. This means that we need to carefully analyze these claims and try to understand why this is a recurrent argument among interculturalists. This is something that Modood has been doing in the last years regarding both European and Bouchard's versions of interculturalism, but this also needs to be done with the version of Latin American Interculturalism, which will be done in this chapter.

However, before analyzing the critiques of Latin American interculturalism against multiculturalism and given the fact that one of the premises held in this dissertation is that all versions of interculturalism part from a misunderstanding of multiculturalism, the first section of this chapter will mention basic notions of multiculturalism that will be useful to understand the flawed critiques directed towards it.

The second section of this chapter will analyze and address the critiques that Latin American interculturalists direct towards multiculturalism, which will give the opportunity to analyze other features held in different versions of multiculturalism. These critiques are, briefly, the following.

First, Latin American interculturalists argue that multiculturalism consists only in affirmative action programs and, as such, it fails to address ethnocultural justice, promoting, rather, the

creation of parallel societies. Secondly, they argue that multiculturalism consists in only tolerating cultural practices and differences rather than recognizing them and making proper accommodations. And thirdly, they claim that multiculturalism imposes liberal values over non-liberal societies assuming that liberal conceptions are morally superior. Consequently, multiculturalism only recognizes as equal those cultural minorities that endorse liberal values. Each of these critiques will be addressed in the following sections.

2. The Idea of Multiculturalism

The term multiculturalism has a great variety of meanings and covers a variety of ways of responding to the fact of diversity in societies (Glazer, 1997: 12-13). Modood and Meer assert that it is a "polysemic" concept, encapsulating a variety of sometimes contested meanings (Modood and Meer, 2011:179). While in some parts of the world it can be used to describe the fact of pluralism, in others it can be used as a political term meant to include all groups marked by difference and historic exclusion (Modood and Meer, 2011).

However, the present analysis is focused on the multiculturalism that grows out of policy developments, where the Canadian case has been one of the most emblematic example for being among the first countries (together with Australia) to endorse it, and which was first theorized as a political idea by Charles Taylor (1992) and Will Kymlicka (1995).

According to this approach, multiculturalism is not a mere fact, but a political concept filled with normative and political principles. Its genesis, according to Modood, can be found in "a matrix of principles that are central to contemporary liberal democracies". Multiculturalism is "a child of liberal egalitarianism, but like any child, it is not simply a faithful reproduction of its parents" (Modood, 2007: 8).

Even though multiculturalism can have different meanings, it is undeniable that the strongest account of multiculturalism is that offered by Will Kymlicka, better known as the *liberal culturalist approach*. In its more general formulation, this approach sustains that the liberal-democratic states "should not only uphold the familiar set of common civil and political rights of citizenship, but should also adopt various group-specific rights or policies which are intended to recognize and accommodate the distinctive identities and needs of ethnocultural

groups" (Kymlicka 2001: 47). This is the approach that will be adopted through all this dissertation.

According to the *liberal culturalist approach*, the reason why minority cultures need protection lies in the fact that cultures have an instrumental value. They provide its members with meaningful ways of life. The autonomy of individuals, that is, "their ability to make good choices amongst good lives– is intimately tied up with access to their culture, with the prosperity and flourishing of their culture, and with the respect accorded [to] their culture by others" (Kymlicka 2001: 21). This means that the reasons for protecting and preserving cultural minorities through cultural rights are instrumental reasons, which emphasize on the role that cultural membership plays in promoting individual freedom or autonomy (Kymlicka 2001: 47). Minority rights protect these cultural contexts of choice (Kymlicka, 1995; 76-99).

Among the *liberal culturalist approach*, however, there are other two recurrent reasons for protecting cultural groups. The first one recognizes that cultures can also be valuable *per se*. In other words, cultures have an intrinsic value which is worthy of protection. According to this vision, cultures represent something very valuable about human creativity which must be preserved. To let cultures die or extinguish under this approach, is to lose something of intrinsic value (Kymlicka 2001: 48).

And secondly, the importance of respect and recognition for identity is a deep human need. Ignoring or misrecognizing someone's identity infringes a profound harm to the self-respect of those misrecognized (Kymlicka, 2001: 47-49). In fact, according to Taylor (1992: 25) the misrecognition of a group's identity is a form of oppression. Additionally, according to Modood (2007: 52-53) not only the denigration of a group's identity constitutes a form of oppression, but it is also a form of inequality *per se* which threatens other forms of equality, such as equal dignity.

Although these last two arguments are important and will not be ignored in the following chapters, the basic argument for the need of protecting cultural groups will be the instrumental meaning of culture. This remark might be irrelevant for the purposes of this chapter, but are fundamental for the development of further chapters.

In the following sections many versions of multiculturalism will be presented, both within the liberal tradition and non-liberal one. However, and despite the different versions of multiculturalism available, Latin American interculturalists only refer to the version of multiculturalism offered by Will Kymlicka.

Analyzing other versions of multiculturalism will reveal that the critiques directed by Latin American interculturalism have already been largely discussed in the literature of multiculturalism. This chapter will conclude that, so far, Latin American Interculturalism seems not to offer any novelty as a theory of the rights of minorities.

3. Multiculturalism and Interculturalism in Latin America. Engaging in a Debate

There is a common perception among Latin American interculturalists that multiculturalism is not able to cope with diversity within Latin American societies because it is focused only on affirmative action programs and toleration. Scholars argue that because this is the main focus of multiculturalism, it fails to offer plausible solutions for the inequalities between different cultural groups within this region.

The following subsections will try to dismantle this perception of multiculturalism. Moreover, they will try to show a) the differences between group differentiated rights and affirmative action programs and b) the relation –sometimes extremely complex– between toleration and multiculturalism.

Overall, the intention will be to argue that multiculturalism is not what Latin American interculturalists think it is and that, in fact, both versions have many things in common and they are, to some extent, compatible. This will set the field for the analysis that will be offered in the following chapters.

a) Multiculturalism and Affirmative Action

Cruz Rodriguez argues that "from a multicultural approach the policies for managing diversity are principally affirmative action, which are temporal measures implemented by the state to eliminate historical inequalities, provide equality of opportunities or repair past

wrongs" (Cruz Rodriguez 2013: 69. Original text in Spanish). In a similar vein, Fidel Tubino argues that "multicultural policies are affirmative action, intercultural policies are transformative action […] They may be complemented by multicultural affirmative action policies […], but such policies may never take their place" (Tubino 2013: 617). Because multiculturalism is only focused on affirmative action policies, they claim that it fails to address ethnocultural justice and only generates more prejudices and stereotypes, leading to parallel societies. Even though, as it will be argued in next sections, some claims of Latin American Interculturalists are in certain degree accurate, the claim that multiculturalism is reduced to affirmative action programs is based on a misunderstanding which must be addressed.

To do this, a few things need to be said about affirmative action programs, such as what can we understand by them and where in the philosophical debate they are located. After doing this, the relation between affirmative action programs and multiculturalism will be analyzed, with the intention to show why, although related, they are not the same. Concretely, the goal is to argue why multiculturalism should not be understood as an affirmative action program.

i. Affirmative Action

Affirmative action programs are remedies that try to correct the unfair distribution of goods and resources of members belonging to disadvantaged groups. Proponents of these measures argue that the liberal ideal of equal treatment tends to reinforce rather than eliminate existing inequalities. What is required is a differentiated treatment which will level the playing field for members of social groups who suffer disadvantage (Rees 1998: 34-36).

There are many reasons for justifying the need of these measures, such as: compensation for past discriminatory practices or historic injustices; the need for political representation of subjugated groups; to enhance access to specific public goods (Browne 2013: 865); or to guaranty equality of opportunities to members of discriminated groups (Rosenfeld 1991). However, despite the different ways in which they can be justified, it is necessary to bear in mind that this debate is generally located within the liberal ideal of equality of opportunities and of a fair distribution of goods and resources. Indeed, its defenders tend to believe that: a) discrimination is the primary wrong that groups suffer and that this can be remedied by b)

making a strong emphasis on a fair distribution of goods and resources (Young 1990: 193-198), which requires some kind of intervention that will guarantee a fair share in the distribution for disadvantaged groups.

Affirmative action programs are often subdivided in weak and strong. Weak affirmative action programs can be understood as special measures "aimed at alleviating disadvantage or underrepresentation experienced by those with any of the "protected characteristics"" (Browne 2013: 863). Mainly age, disability, gender, race, religion, sex and sexual orientation.

According to Pojman (1998), by *weak affirmative action* we should understand those policies that will increase the opportunities of disadvantaged people to attain social goods and offices. The goal is to achieve equality of opportunities to compete and not equal results. These policies may include the dismantling of segregated institutions, widespread advertisement to groups not previously represented in certain privileged positions, special scholarships for the disadvantaged classes, among others.

Some examples of weak affirmative action programs in the field of education can be to redress women's disadvantage compared to men by offering special courses addressed solely for women; or training courses for women who return to study or work after a period of child-care (Rees 1999: 170). In employment, many weak affirmative action programs intend to consider "the fact that women have prime responsibility for childcare", and they can take the form of flexible hours, part-time or shift work, etc. (Rees 1998: 170).

Strong affirmative action programs, on the other hand, are more aggressive kind of measures which seek to bring members of underrepresented groups, usually groups that have suffered discrimination, into a higher degree of participation in some beneficial program (Rosenfeld 1991:43). Strong affirmative action programs typically take the form of "quota" programs (Rosenfeld 1991: 144; Browne 2013: 863-865).

Precisely because affirmative action programs are mostly concerned with the "distribution of positions within hierarchies rather than with challenging the structural *status quo* which reinforces systems of oppression in those hierarchies" (Rees 1999:35), these measures have a corrective nature that usually seeks to achieve some goal. Consequently, they are temporal measures that intend to disappear once this specific goal is fulfilled.

The temporal characteristic of these measures is what distinguishes affirmative action from other group-conscious policies. Indeed, although affirmative action policies are group-conscious policies because they are directed to members of disadvantaged groups, they are framed under the liberal distributive paradigm. By diverging temporally from a group-neutral set of norms, its ultimate goal is to achieve neutrality and difference-blindness (Rosenfeld 1991: 222). This is what Young has called an assimilationist ideal. This ideal identifies justice and liberation as the transcendence of group differences, and the primary principle of justice under this approach is equal treatment (1990:157-159).

For the assimilationist ideal "equal social status for all persons requires treating everybody according to the same principles, rules, and standards" (Young 1990:158). Under this logic affirmative action supporters suggest departing temporally from the equal treatment principle as a means to an end which is liberal equality (Young 1990: 174). Moreover, affirmative action supporters believe that a differential treatment need not be incompatible with liberal equality nor with the principle of nondiscrimination. They argue, that is, that affirmative action programs are perfectly in line with liberal equality (Rosenfeld 1991; Rees 1998).

However, Young suggests another way of understanding affirmative action policies. For her, affirmative action programs do challenge directly the principles of liberal equality. Moreover, they challenge the primacy of the principle of nondiscrimination and the assumption that people should be treated as individuals rather than as members of social groups. However, by being embedded in the equal opportunity discussion, the affirmative action debate is only an instance of the distributive paradigm of justice. "It defines racial and gender justice in terms of the distribution of privileged positions among groups, and fails to bring into question issues of institutional organization and decision-making power" (Young 1990:193). Thus, it represents a very narrow conception of social justice.

Moreover, both supporters and opponents of affirmative action programs have focused on discussing if these measures depart from or are consistent with the principle of nondiscrimination (Fiss 1976: 129). Instead of being caught in this debate, Young suggests that we should deny the assumption made by both defenders and opponents of affirmative action policies, which consists in assuming that discrimination is the primary wrong that groups suffer.

By changing the focus of concern, supporters of affirmative action policies could positively acknowledge that these policies discriminate, but that this need not be problematic because a differentiated treatment is justified as long as it seeks to eliminate the oppression that groups suffer. For this shift of focus to be possible, however, we need to acknowledge that the primary wrong that groups suffer is oppression and not discrimination (Young 1990: 194-195).

By accepting that the primary wrong that groups suffer is oppression rather than discrimination, affirmative action programs can have positive effects. Indeed, Young argues that strong affirmative action policies in institutions can contribute to the acceptance of formerly excluded groups. Additionally, these policies can counteract the group-related biases embedded in the way institutions are designed and in how decision-makers act, which puts members of certain social groups –such as women or Blacks– at a disadvantage. Finally, the inclusion and participation of members of excluded groups in institutions and decision-making positions and bodies brings the advantage of group representation, which is not only important in itself, but it also incorporates their unique perspectives and experiences in the decision-making processes (Young 1990:198).

Understood under these terms, the purpose of affirmative action policies, Young suggests, is not to compensate for past discrimination nor to level up the opportunities of disadvantaged groups. The primary purpose of these policies is "to mitigate the influence of current biases and blindness of institutions and decision-makers " (198).

In Young's concept, affirmative action policies are helpful because of the results they can offer, but they are insufficient. While distributive issues of justice are certainly important, it is a mistake to focus solely on distribution because doing so obscures other sources of injustice that cannot be attended by distribution (Young 1990).

Indeed, a focus on distributive justice, Young argues, tends to assume that the institutional structures which create the rules and patterns of distribution are designed correctly. Moreover, the positive effects that might accompany affirmative action measures, although welcome, remain insufficient because they do not challenge the way institutions are designed. Finally, by thinking of affirmative action as a measure to avoid discrimination, people tend

to think that if discrimination is eliminated, then disadvantaged social groups will no longer suffer oppression and domination. Affirmative action policies, that is, have a minor effect in altering the structures of oppressed and privileged groups and, despite being beneficial in mitigating some of the biases in the allocation of positions and goods in society, they are incapable of tacking structural problems that affect disadvantaged groups (Young 1990).

In sum, there are two different approaches to affirmative action programs. One, which is embedded in the liberal conception of justice and thinks of affirmative actions as a differentiated treatment necessary to achieve a fair distribution of goods and resources and to avoid discrimination against vulnerable groups. And a second approach, which is defended by Young, and perceives affirmative action policies as useful but insufficient to address oppression, which is the main wrong that groups tend to face. For the purposes of distinguishing affirmative action programs and group-differentiated rights and addressing the critiques that Latin American interculturalists direct towards multiculturalism, this analysis will refer to the first approach of affirmative action policies, that is, the one embedded in the liberal conception of justice.

The second approach to affirmative action programs, on the other hand, will be resumed in further chapters. There, it will be argued that by acknowledging the limits of affirmative action programs, these policies are still necessary as long as they are pinned to a major social justice project. For now, however, what needs to be clear is the difference between affirmative action policies and group differentiated rights, which is the main goal of the following section.

ii. Group Differentiated Rights

The set of group differentiated rights which multiculturalism advocates for are also group-conscious rights and policies. Indeed, they are differentiated rights directed to members of cultural and religious groups, and they rest on the assumption held by multiculturalists that some forms of cultural differences "can only be accommodated through special legal or constitutional measures, above and beyond the common rights of citizenship" (Kymlicka 1995:26). Minority rights, that is, must be understood as a set of rights and policies additional from the set of civil and political rights recognized to any individual.

In short, multiculturalism challenges the assumption made by liberal egalitarians who affirm that the basic set of civil, political and social rights that define citizenship in most democratic countries are enough in order to accommodate the interests that people have due to their ethnic identity (Kymlicka and Shapiro 1997: 4).

In the following chapters it will be argued that multiculturalism involves much more than just group differentiated rights, and that these are better understood as responses to how different cultural minorities react when they face a majoritarian nation building project. So, for the aims of this section it will only be said that minority rights can be understood as a wide range of "public policies, legal rights and exemptions, and constitutional provisions from multiculturalism policies to language rights to constitutional protections of Aboriginal treaties"[25] (Kymlicka 2001: 17).

Indeed, there is no fixed catalogue of group differentiated rights and these can take very different forms which depends, in great measure, on the type of ethnocultural group and the demands they are raising. However, the two most known and analyzed types of ethnocultural groups are national minorities and ethnic groups –in the next chapter a broader typology of ethnocultural groups will be presented.

National minorities are usually functioning societies which operate in their own culture, with their own social and political institutions, and a common language different from the majoritarian culture of the state where they are settled. Typically, these groups were settled in that territory before the creation of the state and they maintain an important bond with their homeland. These groups are sub classified as stateless nations and indigenous peoples (Kymlicka 1995).

Ethnic groups, on the other hand, are groups of people who descend from immigrants and still conserve some of their cultural or religious practices. These groups have accepted to adopt the values and costumes of their host society, and they seek to negotiate fair terms of their inclusion. They claim, that is, to have their practices accommodated in the public sphere (Kymlicka 1995).

[25] Against the adoption of group rights and, more concretely, against the nomenclature see Yael Tamir (1999: 158-180).

In short, the main difference between both groups is that while the first one aims to preserve their difference as a nation within a State, the latter seeks fair terms of integration. These differences have led to the development of different types of group differentiated rights. National minorities usually seek self-government rights and special representation rights while ethnic minorities usually seek polyethnic rights.

Self-government rights imply granting political autonomy or territorial jurisdiction to national minorities and they seek to ensure the full and free development of the minority cultures and the best interest of their people (Kymlicka 1995: 27). Special representation rights are understood as a corollary of self-government, because a minority's right to self-government would be seriously undermined if an external body –conformed by non-members of the minority affected– "could unilaterally revise or revoke its powers, without consulting the minority or securing its consent" (Kymlicka 1995: 32).

On the other hand, polyethnic rights, which may be better understood as group-specific measures, are intended to "help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society" (Kymlicka 1995: 31). These measures have been implemented in many countries as, for instance, exemptions from laws and regulations that may harm them or their cultural or religious believes, like the exemption sought by Sikhs in Canada which allows them not to wear a helmet while riding a motorcycle.

From what has been briefly mentioned, it can be noticed that there are some similarities between affirmative action policies and group differentiated rights. The first similarity is that they both challenge the principle of liberal equality –difference-blindness– and adopt a differentiated treatment. Both group differentiated rights and affirmative action policies reject that an equal treatment to every member of society is the best way to ensure substantial equality. Moreover, both types of rights and policies must be understood as additional or complementary protections from the basic set of civil and political rights, and not as an alternative to them. Finally, among their similarities is that they are both group-conscious measures which target disadvantaged social groups.

Despite these similarities, they have important differences, which explain why they must not be confused or viewed as the same thing. The first difference is that, as mentioned above, affirmative action policies are embedded in the liberal conception of justice which understands justice in terms of distribution. Affirmative action policies, under this logic, will lead to correct the unfair distribution that affects members of disadvantaged groups.

Indeed, these measures are allocated in the distributive paradigm and so they are rooted in the debate regarding equality of opportunities. They intend to ensure that members of discriminated social groups have equality of opportunities. The ultimate goal of these measures is that gender, race, nationality, religion, or any other characteristic –that historically has been used as a marker to exclude people– should not be relevant in the allocation of positions and goods. In a way, it seeks to transcend these differences in order to achieve difference blindness. This means that the ultimate goal of affirmative action is to achieve equality understood as sameness or as blindness. Affirmative action policies, that is, temporally reject the principle of nondiscrimination as a means in order to achieve a major end which is equality in liberal terms (Young 1990).

In contrast, group differentiated rights are not mainly concerned with the achievement of equality of opportunities. A group-rights multiculturalism, while sharing basic liberal principles such as the defense of personal autonomy and choice, is rooted in the politics of difference. As such, it acknowledges that distribution is an important aspect of justice, but it rejects to narrow down justice to issues of distribution. Social justice, under this perspective, involves much more than a *simple* fair distribution of goods, resources and opportunities (Young 1990: 155-159). For multiculturalism, as a version of the politics of difference, equality involves the participation and inclusion of all groups, and this "sometimes requires different treatment for oppressed or disadvantaged groups" (Young 1990:158). Social justice, under this conception, requires policies according some kind of special treatment to disadvantaged social groups.

In similar words, Kymlicka has suggested that multiculturalism forms part of the human-rights revolution, which has contributed to replace the earlier catalogue of hierarchical relations into relationships of liberal-democratic citizenship (Kymlicka 2012:6).

Framed under these terms, multiculturalism is concerned with the inequalities that members of cultural groups suffer due to their cultural differences. Because inevitably state neutrality will favor the majoritarian culture and disadvantage members of minority cultures, the state must adopt an active role in recognizing, protecting, and accommodating the cultural differences of all members of society. What is required is granting a special treatment to members of these groups. These special treatments are group differentiated rights.

Moreover, multiculturalism is concerned with the inequalities between members of the majoritarian cultural group and members of minority cultures. These inequalities have their roots in the fact that a neutral state inevitably supports and promotes the majoritarian culture, securing the cultural structure of its members, while this does not occur for members of minority cultures. The importance of securing the cultural structure and cultural practices of individuals lies in the role that culture has for the development of personal autonomy, because it is this cultural structure which provides the context of choice, so that people can make meaningful life choices[26].

It is clear, then, that while affirmative action policies seek to achieve equality of opportunities, group differentiated rights seek to ensure the flourishing of minority cultures as an instrument for the development of personal autonomy and context of choice. The ultimate goal of the latter is not the flourishing of culture *per se*, but to a) secure the cultural structure of national minorities and b) to set fair terms in the inclusion of ethnic minorities. Overall, as it will be further expanded in the next chapters, the ultimate goal of multiculturalism is to reshape the way institutions are designed in order to incorporate the perspectives of all other cultural minorities that inhabit within the state territory.

The second substantial difference between affirmative action programs and group differentiated rights is the temporal characteristic. Indeed, it was said previously that affirmative action programs are temporal measures, which by departing from the general principle of non-discrimination, intend to strengthen the liberal conception of equality.

[26] Margalit and Raz have suggested that the autonomy of individuals, understood as their ability to make good choices amongst good lives, is tied up with access to their culture, the prosperity and flourishing of their culture. (Margalit and Raz 1990)

Affirmative action programs, in short, are temporal measures while group differentiated rights are not.

In this regard, Kymlicka has argued that group differentiated rights should not be understood as temporary measures nor as a remedy for certain forms of oppression. Furthermore, self-government rights, he argues, contrary to being temporal measures are "often described as "inherent", and so permanent (which is one reason why national minorities seek to have them entrenched in the constitution)" (Kymlicka 1995:39). Furthermore, both self-government and polyethnic rights do not seek to eliminate group differences. Because they seek to protect cultural differences they should not be regarded as temporal measures, they are not intended to disappear in the foreseeable future (Kymlicka 1995: 31).

In similar terms Young has argued that while the logic in which affirmative action programs is embedded is compatible with what she calls the assimilationist ideal which broadly suggests that in the long run group differences shall be transcended; the nature of group differentiated rights fall within what she identifies as a "culturally pluralist democratic ideal" where group-conscious policies are supported not as a "means to the end of equality, but also as intrinsic to the ideal of social equality itself. Groups cannot be socially equal unless their specific experience, culture, and social contributions are publicly affirmed and recognized" (Young 1990: 174). This, indeed, is where the core difference between affirmative action policies and group differentiated rights lies.

It is easy to see the difference between self-determination rights and affirmative action programs. Less easy is, however, the difference between polyethnic rights and affirmative action policies. Indeed, Kymlicka has argued that this is a common confusion in countries which have adopted a multicultural agenda. Many policies intended to eliminate discrimination and prejudice that members of vulnerable social groups suffer, have been considered part of the multicultural policies in states such as Canada, Australia and United Kingdom. These policies, he argues, are primarily directed "at ensuing the effective exercise of the common rights of citizenship" and do not qualify as group-differentiated rights (Kymlicka 1995: 31).

Indeed, some affirmative action programs have been confused with polyethnic rights. For instance, reserving a number of places in universities for African-Americans has often been confused with group differentiated rights when, in fact, they would qualify as an affirmative action policy. This is so because of the reason offered above: the goal is to equalize opportunities. In this concrete case, the goal is to offer the same opportunities for accessing to universities to members of a historically excluded and disadvantages group, such as African-Americans.

In contrast, many schools offer special menus for students, who due to their religious or cultural practices require special dietary restrictions. These types of measures would qualify as a multicultural policy. The difference between the former and the latter are the goal they seek: while affirmative action policies seek equality of opportunities and a fair distribution of the positions available in the schools or universities, a multicultural policy seeks to make space for different cultural and religious practices.

Finally, special representation rights can also be easily confused with affirmative action programs, especially those policies consisting in reserving seats in the parliaments for members of vulnerable social groups, such as women. But again, these policies follow a different logic than those defended by multiculturalism –although they are not incompatible. In the case of gender *quotas*, which is the paradigmatic example of a strong affirmative action policy –although there might be other effects attached to these programs (see Lepinard 2013) –the intention is to bring women into the decision-making processes and, as a consequence, to offer equality of opportunities for women in these spaces. The fact that women are not included in the decision-making and democratic processes is suspicious, for which women need to be included (Young 1997a). Just as affirmative actions' own nature, these policies are temporal and intend to disappear once women are, in fact, equally represented as men.

The logic that these programs follow is rather different than the special representation rights advocated by multiculturalism. As mentioned above, special representation rights are a corollary of self-government. They are required to assure that any decision taken will consider the interest of national minorities. Just as the other group differentiated rights, these rights do not have a temporal condition because they are not directly seeking to eliminate any disadvantage for members of vulnerable groups to participate in democratic processes. The

need of these type of rights is justified because members of national minorities need to defend their interests and simultaneously need to participate in the decisions taken by the State to which they belong. Although these set of rights can be similar to strong affirmative action programs, the subtle differences are important in order to distinguish both.

Although it needs to be clear that there is an important difference between affirmative action policies and group differentiated rights, the perspective that will be adopted in the following chapters is that these need not be incompatible and, in fact, they are both necessary and should be implemented simultaneously.

This can be seen in the Multicultural Policy Index (MPI) developed by Kymlicka and Banting where affirmative action programs for disadvantaged immigrant groups are considered among the eight public policies that are the most common forms of multicultural policies (Kymlicka 2012b: 7).

In similar terms, it will be held in the following chapters that pinned to a major social justice project, affirmative action programs are necessary because they can bring positive outcomes. The next chapters will elaborate more deeply on these issues, however, for the aims of this section, which are rather narrow, it is only necessary to point out the main differences between group differentiated rights and affirmative action policies, to argue that that the way in which Latin American interculturalists think of multiculturalism is mistaken.

b) Multiculturalism and Toleration

Besides identifying multiculturalism as an affirmative action policy, Latin American interculturalists also understand multiculturalism as a simple form of toleration. This, they claim, makes Latin-American Interculturalism better because it goes beyond toleration, into coexistence and interaction among cultures.

Cruz Rodriguez argues that “the ideals of interculturalism are greater than those of multiculturalism, because they try to go beyond coexistence, tolerance, and formal equality and seeks to achieve respect and substantial equality among cultures” (Cruz Rodriguez 2013:53).

It is odd, however, that multiculturalism is identified as toleration given the fact that there is an extended debate regarding the relation between multiculturalism and toleration, especially within the liberal tradition. In this debate it has been argued, among other things, that group differentiated rights must have limits and those limits must be found in the basic principles of liberalism. The question then, is, what cultural non-liberal practices are we supposed to tolerate?

There is, it will be argued in the following paragraphs, a complex relation between multiculturalism and toleration, and the group differentiated rights approach sometimes stands in tension with the principles of toleration. For these reasons it is mistaken to think of multiculturalism and toleration as the same.

i. Toleration in Multiculturalism. The Limits of Group Rights

Toleration has played an important role in the development of a liberal theory of minority rights. In concrete, the debate seems to show that the relation between toleration and minority rights can sometimes be thought as a zero-sum game, because there might exist, or some scholars suggest, a tension between individual autonomy and toleration as the fundamental value in liberal theory.

In Kymlicka's account of multiculturalism, group differentiated rights are classified as internal restrictions and external protections. The latter are provisions sought to protect national minorities from external pressures and seek to promote equality between minorities and majority groups. Internal restrictions, on the other hand, are provisions within the minority culture that tend to restrict the basic civil or political liberties of its members (Kymlicka 1995: 152). Indeed, there might be some cultural minorities that seek to enjoy group differentiated rights in order to restrict the liberty of the members within the community. This is seen in liberal theory as a restriction to personal autonomy. Since Kymlicka endorses a liberalism where the fundamental value is personal autonomy, he claims that these rights are illiberal and should not be granted by a liberal state or, at least, they are inconsistent with the liberal tradition.

This means that the version of multiculturalism defended by Kymlicka is one which advocates for minority rights only to the extent that these minorities are governed by liberal

principles. In short, Kymlicka suggests that liberalism seeks equality between cultural groups, which is granted by external protections; and freedom within the cultural groups, which means rejecting internal restrictions.

However, there are some minorities that do not value personal autonomy as much as many liberals do. For instance, many minorities desire the ability to reject liberalism and to organize their society according to non-liberal and traditional lines. Many scholars and an important part of society would agree that it is legitimate to intervene in the way some minorities organize their community when they do not respect liberal principles and, furthermore, oppress members within their groups. These minorities, they suggest, should not be tolerated[27].

This creates a dilemma: either we tolerate illiberal societies and suppress –or put at risk the sake of– individual autonomy[28], or while embracing individual autonomy as a fundamental value, we behave intolerant towards groups that do not share the same values that we do. The deepest question here is whether liberal societies have a legitimate reason to impose liberalism to illiberal societies.

Kymlicka shows this dilemma within the liberal tradition as follows: "I suggested earlier that a theory of minority rights which precludes internal restrictions is impeccably liberal, since it is grounded firmly in the value of individual freedom. Yet others would view my theory as illiberal, precisely because its unrelenting commitment to individual autonomy is intolerant of non-liberal groups" (1995: 154).

On a similar way, Parekh tries to show the problem that every society faces when it includes minorities that depart from the values and practices endorsed by liberalism. He argues that "to tolerate them all indiscriminately is both to abdicate moral judgement and to compromise

[27] See, for instance, Rob Reich 2005: 209-226, where he argues that minority groups should not be allowed to decide whether their children should attend or not public schooling. According to Reich, when parents are exempted from the obligation of enrolling their children to public schools because of their traditional practices it undermines children's autonomy and choice and, hence, the state should not tolerate this. A similar argument is found in Amy Gutmann 1995: 557-579.

[28] As was the fundamental debate in the Yoder case. See Gutmann 1995: 557-559 and Rob Reich 2005: 209-226. Against these positions see Spinner-Halev 2000: 68-96.

commitment to society's own values; to disallow them all is to be guilty of extreme intolerance" (Parekh 1996: 251).

This tension between toleration and minority rights may lay on the fact that whether and how far any practice can be tolerated will always be determined by its compatibility with the conception of justice (Kukathas 1997: 73). When the fundamental value of liberalism that is upheld is autonomy, Kukathas suggests that the question that has to be asked is "whether or not toleration –of a particular cultural practice– is consistent with the commitment to autonomy which is at the heart of society's common oral standpoint" (Kukathas, 1997: 74).

While Kymlicka's theory of minority rights embraces personal autonomy as a fundamental value of liberalism[29], Kukathas suggests that this approach offers insufficient toleration to minority communities and is at risk of intolerance and of moral dogmatism (Kukathas 1997: 78). Indeed, contrary to Kymlicka, Kukathas suggests that the fundamental value of liberalism is toleration. A society is a liberal one, he argues, to the extent that it is tolerant (Kukathas 2003: 23).

In order to understand Kukathas approach, it is important to acknowledge first what he considers to be a good society. For that, he uses the metaphor of an archipelago: a liberal society is better understood as an archipelago, a society of societies which "neither is the creation nor the object of control of any single authority" (Kukathas 2003: 23).

Under this approach, "a society is a liberal one to the extent that it is tolerant of difference or dissent, and illiberal to the extent that it does not" (Kukathas 2003: 24). Furthermore, a liberal society may contain illiberal communities or associations.

This approach which embraces toleration as a fundamental principle of liberalism is clearly at odds with Kymlicka's version of minority rights. In fact, according to Kukathas approach, since a liberal society must tolerate illiberal communities within it, the only limit to this

[29] A view shared by Amy Gutmann who argues that it is individual autonomy and not tolerance what should have primacy at least in relation to the education that children from minority groups receive (1995). And in a more general way, other liberals such as Eamonn Callan and Steve Macedo agree that autonomy is the key liberal virtue.

illiberal societies, rather than the protection of individual autonomy, is the right to free association and its corollary, the right to exit -which will be further analyzed.

In short, individual autonomy can be in tension with toleration. What follows from this is that in the field of ethnocultural justice any theory embracing individual autonomy as its fundamental principle will be in tension with other theories embracing toleration. Multiculturalism, consequently, is not a *simple* form of toleration. Moreover, rather than being reduced to toleration, Kymlicka's multiculturalism –which is the reference of Latin American Interculturalists– has generated serious concerns and debates regarding the cultural practices liberals are willing to tolerate[30]. This shows another mistake in how interculturalists in Latin-American have understood multiculturalism. Concretely, multiculturalism is not a simple form of toleration.

However, there is another point in the relation between toleration and multiculturalism which is necessary to mention, and which will help understand why multiculturalism and toleration are not the same thing. This emerges from the claim of some multiculturalists of the need to go beyond toleration.

ii. Beyond Toleration

It has many times been claimed that we should be tolerant of cultures or ways of life which differ from our own. But some go further to argue that more than toleration, minority cultures are owed a form of recognition. In debates about multiculturalism it is widely claimed that toleration is not enough and that we must go beyond towards some form of politics of recognition to properly address contemporary forms of cultural diversity (Laegaard 2013: 52).

According to Laegaard, this common claim among multiculturalists is based on a specific understanding about the concept of toleration and recognition. Mainly that while the first one consists on non-interference despite disapproval, recognition means active accommodation expressing public affirmation (Laegaard 2013: 52).

[30] On this respect, one of the most prominent debates is the one held by liberal feminists who see a tension between feminism and multiculturalism, see Susan Okin 1999 and Shachar 1999.

Toleration, on this classical understanding, "means to put up with differences one dislikes or disagrees with", so it assumes a possibility of intolerance (Lægaard 2010:23). Toleration is negative in two senses: first, it assumes a negative attitude towards a certain practice; and secondly, the act of tolerating consists in refraining from acting in a specific way.

This concept of toleration has also been identified by Rainer Forst as the *permission conception.* According to this conception, toleration is a relation between an authority or a majority and a different or dissenting minority –or minorities– (Forst 2007: 294). In this understanding of toleration, the authority gives qualified permission to the minority to live according to their beliefs or practices under the condition that the minority accepts the dominant status of the majority/authority, and as long as these different practices are exercised within the limits of the private sphere. In short, this conception of toleration means that there is an authority that could interfere suppressing the practice of the minority but, nevertheless, it decides to tolerate it, while the minority accepts its dependent position (Forst 2007: 294-295).

Under this conception of toleration, however, there is clearly no intention of recognizing and accommodating difference so that in the public domain members belonging to cultural minorities can freely express their identity. In a sense, this conception of toleration is totally the opposite of what any politics of recognition seeks (and which will be explained more thoroughly in the following sections) because it allows members of minority cultures to practice their beliefs in the private domain, which is a classic principle of the liberal egalitarian tradition. However, it is enough for now to note that unlike this conception of toleration, which involves a twofold negative attitude, recognition is thought to be a positive relationship. The politics of recognition usually consist in the public expression of "a positive attitude to some difference, e.g. "identities" marking groups off from each other" (Lægaard 2010:24). This positive attitude is taken to either justify or "to be expressed through "policies of recognition" involving positive acts" such as group differentiated rights, and other multicultural policies (Lægaard 2010:24).

Because of the way toleration is understood under this conception, there are two main reasons why, according to multiculturalists, we must go beyond toleration. First, that the conditions that must hold for toleration to occur are problematic: there must be a dominant group that,

despite rejecting a specific practice or believe and having the power over the non- dominant group to repress that certain practice, it decides to tolerate it. This means that there is no equal relation between cultural groups, to which multiculturalism opposes.

The second reason for going beyond toleration is the act of toleration itself, because understood as non-interference it is not enough to secure inclusion and equality which is the real goal of multiculturalism (Laegard 2013: 54). Rather than simply restraining from not repressing certain practices, it is argued that the state should assume an active role in recognizing and accommodating difference, therefore, multiculturalism rejects the idea of state neutrality or benign neglect.

Very related to the claim that multiculturalism is a simple form of toleration and that Latin American Interculturalism goes beyond toleration, there is another claim that is similar to the latter, and will be analyzed next.

According to Latin American Interculturalists, their proposal is better than multiculturalism because the latter fails to be neutral. While endorsing liberal values, they argue that multiculturalists impose liberalism to other minority groups that might not share the same liberal values. This will be analyzed next.

c) Multiculturalism and Liberal Values

According to Latin American Interculturalists, multiculturalism imposes liberal values to every social group regardless of their own conception of the good. With this, they claim that multiculturalism assumes that the liberal conception is morally superior to the conception that other cultures might embrace. Multiculturalism, they argue, recognizes other cultures as different but not as equal, and it will only recognize cultural groups as equal when they embrace liberal values. Accordingly, multiculturalism is a colonial imposition to other forms of life organization (Cruz Rodrigues 2013).

In contrast, for Latin American Interculturalism there is no superior culture or tradition. Liberalism comes to appear as one culture amongst many different cultures, acknowledging that there are other conceptions of the good that must be equally accepted. This makes

interculturalism neutral and multiculturalism as lacking neutrality because its point of reference will always be liberal values.

This idea has been debated, in political philosophy and within the multiculturalist debate, from two different approaches. One takes place among liberals and is similar –but not identical– to the debate between toleration and autonomy previously mentioned; and the other one among non-liberals who challenge the legitimacy of liberals to impose their values to illiberal societies. In the following both debates will be mentioned. In the first case ideas of Spinner-Halev and Kukathas will be mentioned, and on the second case the work of Bhikhu Parekh will be recalled. These two debates will be contrasted with the claims of Latin American Interculturalism. It will be argued that while the diagnosis may be adequate, the solution given is not. After all, it will be concluded that any theory of ethnocultural justice will be facing the same problems and that Latin American Interculturalism is no exception to that, nor does it offer a better solution.

i. The Illiberalism of Multiculturalism

Cruz Rodrigues is one of the interculturalists that finds Kymlicka's classification of group rights suspicious, especially regarding the internal restrictions. He argues that by rejecting internal restrictions as a way of protecting individual autonomy, this theory imposes liberal values and, hence, fails to respect the different conceptions of the good. Liberals have been discussing this for a while. And while the debate is similar to the previous one between toleration and individual autonomy because it goes back to the fundamental value of liberalism, it is still different. The main controversy among liberals who discuss this, is if a right based approach of multiculturalism that protects individual autonomy over other values is sufficiently liberal or, on the contrary, is an illiberal theory. Trying to analyze deeply this debate is not the main objective, and so only those points relevant for this discussion will be mentioned.

The question is still how a liberal state should respond towards illiberal societies among it while not departing from liberal values. This issue, as already mentioned, is deeply related to which is the fundamental value of liberalism and, since there is no unique answer, the debate can turn out to be endless.

Spinner-Halev, for instance, argues that when liberals expect the institutions of civil society to mirror the norms of liberalism they dangerously undermine pluralism, which we ought to accept as an inevitable outcome of liberty (2005: 157). Hence, he tries to show that liberalism must be able to tolerate "minority groups that do not adhere to some liberal norms, while also granting some protection to the minorities within the minority group" (2005: 157). Autonomy and pluralism, according to Spinner-Halev, are fundamental for a liberal society.

When debating which should be the limit of minority rights, Spinner-Halev has two main concerns: first, that individual autonomy must be secured to as many individuals as possible. This means, as it will be explained further, that there must be an effective right to exit the cultural minority. Secondly, that liberalism should not "reach into the confines of every group and insist that each group adheres to liberal principles" (Spinner-Halev 2005: 158).

The right to exit that Spinner-Halev argues for is based on the fact that, given the plurality of people's interests and values in society, we must accept that people will wish to join different groups with different structures. This is something a liberal state must respect as long as people can leave these groups. This right to exit must be effective, and for this to be possible, Spinner-Halev suggests a minimal standard which includes "freedom from physical abuse, decent health care and nutrition, the ability to socialize with others, a minimal education – basic literacy in the basic subjects of reading, math, science, etc.- and a mainstream liberal society" (2005: 160). Exit is only meaningful, he argues, if people can take the choice to leave the group and can enter a society that cultivates different ways of life.

Spinner-Halev argues against those who believe that the protection of individual autonomy justifies a kind of intervention that restricts certain cultural practices accusing them for taking liberalism to an "alarmingly interventionist" path (2005: 161). To be sure, he suggests that "liberals that argue for ending all forms of discrimination or supporting a robust version of autonomy are placing one liberal value very much above others" (2005: 161). Furthermore, he continues, liberalism is at danger of becoming imperialistic by trying to root out all forms of life that are non-liberal. Contrary to what these scholars suggest when elevating autonomy as the most fundamental value, Spinner-Halev suggests that liberalism's strength lies precisely in the ability of balancing different and important values such as autonomy,

pluralism, tolerance, and equality. He argues that there is no reason to give up one value over the other.

Liberals such as Amy Gutmann (1995), Rob Reich (2000 and 2005) or Susan M. Okin (1999) maintain that some group rights undermine individual autonomy of some members which otherwise would be protected in the mainstream society. This, according to Spinner-Halev, is a flawed argument because it's based on an ideal liberal society which hardly matches in practice and that, after all, autonomy is not as popular in the mainstream culture as these liberals wish. Liberals, he argues, should understand that some people have good reasons to opt out from public schools and mainstream institutions and join non-liberal structures. It is a mistake to think that "a world without poverty or oppression, and where everyone was treated with respect, would be a world where everyone embraced all liberal values" (Spinner-Halev 2005: 166).

Finally, on this respect, Spinner-Halev argues that if we "ought to respect the ideal of autonomy, we need to respect the choice that some do make to belong to patriarchal institutions". By using one liberal value to justify intervention into group norms and practices which respect the minimal standards suggested, these arguments are close to being illiberal.

Spinner-Halev's account on how liberalism should respond to non-liberal communities is important for the point made here because it is a conciliating account. Indeed, he does not advocate for one single principle of liberalism as the fundamental principle and he argues that, instead, these should be balanced. However, while some liberals may suggest that the minimal standard argument for the right of exit is insufficient in protecting individual autonomy and, moreover, it gives the State a very small role in protecting it; some others, such as Chandran Kukathas, would argue that it is still very interventionist and too robust (Spinner-Halev 2005: 160).

Kukathas argues that neither the state nor the groups have any responsibility in ensuring the well-being of any of their members, not even children (Spinner-Halev 2005:161 and Kukathas 2003). The right to exit, he defends, is sufficiently protected when individuals can walk away from the community, regardless of the cost of this action. While it is true that Kukathas is aware of the harm that some minority groups can infringe to some of its

members, he also argues that even liberal democracies infringe harm to individuals. Why, he asks, should we trust the state more than we trust the group?

It was mentioned previously that Kukathas idea of a liberal society is one which is tolerant of difference or dissent, and illiberal to the extent that it is not. A good society, that is, should be ordered according to norms of mutual tolerance or civility where people accept that different groups "live by different moral beliefs, but also recognize that no group has the right to compel anyone to become, or to remain, a member" (Kukathas 2003: 75). A good society, according to him, is not a unity governed by a shared conception of justice, but a regime of toleration "in which disparate and conflicting standards of morality and justice co-exist" (2003: 76).

In this society individuals are free to associate and live according to the moral standards that they accept in good conscience. This also means that they are free to refuse to live according to moral standards they cannot abide. A good society, then, is a free society where the freedom of association is upheld and where difference and dissent are tolerated (Kukathas 2003: 76).

What is important for the point of this section is that, according to Kukathas theory, it is not appropriate to develop a theory of a good society by appealing to the interests of existing societies because, for a start, those interests exist or take their particular shape only because of certain particular and historic circumstances and not because they are part of some natural order (2003:77-79). This is why for Kukathas, a liberal society is one which must accept and tolerate illiberal ways of living. As said before, Kukathas regards society as an archipelago composted of associations where some may be liberal, but some others may not, and this is totally compatible with liberalism.

Kukathas rejects that a liberal state ought to intervene in the way that members of communities reproduce certain traditional practices because he argues that the state is not legitimated to play an active role on such issues. In a sense, in fact, Kukathas has been catalogued as a libertarian because he suggests a minimal intervention of the state (Kukathas 2003, ch. 3 and 6).

This is why Kukathas embraces political liberalism rather than a comprehensive one. Any plausible liberalism, he suggests, must be a political liberalism, "one which [describes] a political order which [is] not hostage to a particular "comprehensive" moral doctrine" (Kukathas 2003:16). What distinguishes political from comprehensive liberalism is that it tries to establish liberalism as a minimal moral conception. So, the theory he advances is a kind of political liberalism because "it tries to account for what is important for all human beings in order to explain why liberal political order is one that all persons can have sufficient reason to accept. But it tries to do so without appealing to the substantial moral conceptions some liberal thinkers have tried to uphold" (Kukathas 2003:17).

In his theory, as already mentioned, it is not individual autonomy nor freedom the most valuable good, but toleration. While rejecting that cultural groups are entitled to any group differentiated right, he argues that all individuals are entitled to a right of association and –its corollary– the right to exit such association. Accordingly, a liberal society can be composed of liberal communities but also of illiberal ones (Kukathas 2003:25), because an account of political liberalism is incompatible with a State deciding what should be accepted and what not within a cultural community –therefore, the minimal moral conception. As long as members have the right to associate and exit each cultural community, the State has no authority over the members' choice –to join or remain in that community, neither does it have a legitimate claim to interfere in practices considered illiberal.

This version of the right to exit is much more drastic than that proposed by Spinner-Halev, who defends the right to association and exit but under a condition which he calls the minimal standard. The difference is because while Spinner-Halev tries to defend a pluralist liberalism, one where all the fundamental values of liberalism are balanced, Kukathas tries to defend a political liberalism which maintains that toleration is the fundamental value of liberalism and association and exit the fundamental rights. Both scholars, however, reject that liberalism ought to intervene in cultural practices or in the ways of life of certain groups. As showed before, they consider this interventionist position incoherent with liberalism.

It is important to notice, however, that even within liberal thinkers there is a debate of whether liberal values must be imposed to non-liberal communities or not. The interest here was to show that this debate has also taken place within the liberal tradition and that one must not

reject liberalism in order to find suspicious the imposition of liberal values. However, interculturalists in Latin America reject the imposition of liberal values but do not justify why they only offer a brief alternative that, unfortunately, lacks sufficient normative background.

Cruz Rodriguez argues against Kymlicka's internal restrictions, saying that they prevent the possibility of cultural minorities to exercise their traditional practices such as different forms of private property or forms of government different from democratic representation (Cruz Rodriguez 2014a:254). Gaitán-Barrera and Azeez in a similar sense argue that indigenous peoples regard "political principles, political representation and participation via political parties as not only foreign to, but conflicting their traditional forms of government. As such, the movement calls for a traditional indigenous governing structure divested of modern Western forms of government, systems of political representation and political parties" (Gaitán-Barrera and Azeez 2015: 192). Furthermore, these two scholars argue that Kymlicka's "stern commitment to defend individual autonomy from internal restrictions imposed by cultural structures and ascribed identities utterly undermines the right of indigenous people to recover, revitalize, and establish their own historical socio-politico principles and economic structures" (2015:192).

These scholars seem to be rejecting liberalism and challenging the legitimacy of liberals to impose their principles to non-liberal communities. This is a very complex debate between liberals and non-liberals. Bhikhu Parekh most prominently has rejected to accept the liberal premise in the first place. However, he continues, even if we accepted that liberal societies are entitled to ask its members to live by the basic liberal values, deep disagreements would remain concerning which are these values (Parekh 2000: 112-112). In short, he challenges the legitimacy of liberalism, just as some Interculturalists do. For that reason, in the following subsection a deeper analysis will be made of this theory.

ii. A Theory of Minority Rights Beyond Liberalism? Parekh and Latin American Interculturalism

According to Parekh, when Kymlicka insists that autonomy is the central liberal value and that "culture should be judged primarily in terms of its ability to provide its members with a

meaningful and worthwhile options" and cultivate their personal autonomy (Parekh 2000: 100), he is stating that –although he does not say it implicitly– "a culture that encourages autonomy and choice is better or richer than, and in that sense superior to, one that does not" (Parekh 2000: 100).

This is a similar claim made by Interculturalists in Latin America. Indeed, they argue that while imposing liberal values, multiculturalism assumes that the liberal conception is morally superior to other conceptions, which makes multiculturalism recognize differences between cultural groups but does not recognize them as equal. While only recognizing another cultural group as equal when it adopts liberal values, multiculturalism turns out to be a colonial imposition to other forms of life organization (Cruz Rodriguez 2013 and 2014).

In a similar way, Gaitán-Barrera and Azeez accuse Kymlicka for "imposing this re-phrased and re-packaged liberalism upon the material world" and managing to "maintain the status quo while simultaneously discounting alternative indigenous definitions of autonomy. In other words, Kymlicka manages to incorporate non-liberal indigenous political positions and arguments by reframing them in the language and 'grammar of liberalism'" (2015: 191-192)

Parekh has offered more reasons that challenge liberalism than Latin American Interculturalists, so the following will be an analysis of his work.

Parekh argues that liberal beliefs and values have no authority over non-liberal members of society. The only reason for asking non-liberal communities or individuals to respect liberal values, he continues, is because a big majority adopts the beliefs and values of liberalism. But still, Parekh argues, Kymlicka is incapable of providing enough arguments as to why illiberal communities ought to respect liberal values and, furthermore, they could be complaining of moral intolerance when asked to live by them (Parekh 2000: 106-107).

Additionally, according to Parekh, because Kymlicka expects non-liberal communities to act according to liberal values, he fails to "appreciate them in their own terms [and] he does not respect them in their authentic otherness" (2000: 108). Hence, he suggests that we must be fair both to liberal and illiberal cultures, which calls for the need of a theoretical framework capable of appreciating and accommodating plural understandings of culture.

Parekh not only takes issue with Kymlicka's multiculturalism, but in general with liberalism. He argues that liberals continue to absolutize liberalism which takes them to make liberalism their central frame of reference, "divide all ways of life into liberal and non-liberal, equate the latter with illiberal, and to talk of tolerating and rarely of respecting or cherishing them" (Parekh 2000: 110). Liberals, he argues, need to break away from this "crude binary distinction" if they ought to do justice to alternative ways of life and thought, and this is only possible, Parekh claims, if they stop absolutizing liberalism and making it their central point of comparison. This, in turn, requires liberals to accept the "full force of moral and cultural pluralism and acknowledge that the good life can be lived in several different ways, some better than others in certain respects but none is the best" (Parekh 2000: 110).

In short, Parekh argues, like Spinner-Halev and Kukathas, that we ought to accept that western society is characterized by an "interplay of several mutually regulating and historically sedimented impulses, some liberal, some non-liberal, some others a mixture of both, yet too complex to fall into either category" (2000: 112) and that is something we must accept to live with and not expect every society to embrace liberal values.

Parekh's strategy to reject liberalism is to talk of a multicultural society rather than a liberal one. In his view liberal societies are accepted as much as any other non-liberal society. A multicultural society, according to Parekh, is an alternative to a new mode of constituting the modern state and perhaps even new types of political foundation. Furthermore, every multicultural society, he argues, must liberate "its political imagination from the spell of the dominant theory and its assumption of a single and universally valid model of a properly constituted state" (Parekh 2000: 194-195).

For a multicultural society to be successful –for what Parekh understands stable, united and diverse– it needs certain conditions which are "a consensually grounded structure of authority, a collectively acceptable set of constitutional rights, a just and impartial state, a multicultural constituted common culture and multicultural education, and a plural and inclusive view of national identity" (Parekh 2000: 236).

However, it seems that even while rejecting liberalism as the standard of evaluation of what should and should not be accepted, the question remains: how should we respond to cultural practices that –instead of categorizing them as non-liberal– may harm basic human rights?

Parekh is aware that some cultural practices can harm basic human rights and that we need to do something about that. Indeed, he argues that a multicultural society is likely to include communities that may exercise cultural practices that offend the values of the majority. The dilemma lies in the fact that, on the one hand, it cannot tolerate these practices because "it has a duty both to raise its voice against morally outrageous practices and to safeguard the integrity of its own moral culture" (Parekh 2000: 263). On the other hand, however, by disallowing all the practices it disapproves "it would be guilty of moral dogmatism and extreme intolerance and would miss the opportunity to take a critical look at its own values and practices" (2000: 264).

In order to decide which practices to recognize and accommodate, Parekh argues that we need some guiding principles because every society requires, for its survival and good functioning, "at least some agreement on what values and practices should regulate the conduct of their collective affair" (2000: 268). These values are lived at three levels: constitutional, legal and civic relation between its members. Altogether they form what Parekh calls the operative public values.

These operative public values are originated in the conception of the good of a dominant majority, but over time they have become part of the society's moral structure. This, however, does not mean that they are static. One of their main features is that they change in response to changes in society's circumstances. Overall, since the operative public values represent the shared moral structure of society's public life, they provide the acceptable starting point for any debate on minority practices.

Because these operative public values generally represent a particular conception of the good life, they are likely to discriminate against those whose conception of the good is different and in many ways, contrary to these values. However, Parekh argues that what characterizes these operative public values is precisely the fact that they are not static. Indeed, it will occur that some practice will offend these values, and these situations should be regarded as an

opportunity to periodically asses these values and change them if the whole society considers it to be necessary[31].

For this to be possible, it is essential that a dialogue between cultures takes place, or what Parekh calls, an intercultural dialogue. This dialogue between cultural groups allows the operative public values of society to change. Furthermore, he argues that when "a minority practice offends against [the operative public values] it invites disapproval. However, that is not a reason to disallow it. The practice forms part of the minority way of life, and society owes it to its minority to explore what the practice means to it, what place it occupies in its way of life, and why it considers it valuable" (2000: 270).

This does not mean that the operative public values are a non-negotiable standard for evaluating minority practices. Instead, while engaging in an intercultural dialogue, some kind of consensus might produce between the mainstream society and the minority in question. Parekh seems to be advocating for some kind of consensus between the values of the majority culture and the cultural practices of minority cultures that might harm these values. However, it is necessary to ask ourselves if this is a plausible solution. Moreover, we need to analyze if this dialogue a) offers a solution to the challenge that illiberal practices pose to liberal societies and, b) if it offers any novelty from what has been already offered by Kymlicka's theory of minority rights. In short, we need to evaluate whether this idea of the operative public values and the intercultural dialogue solves the dilemma posed at the beginning.

It was already mentioned how Parekh criticizes Kymlicka's theory of minority rights. Concretely, he rejects the legitimacy of the internal restrictions and he calls for a multicultural society instead of a liberal one where other conceptions of the good life are equally accepted. Moreover, he affirms that because of the concern with individual autonomy and choice, and since culture is only valuable as a condition for both, Kymlicka expects minority nations to be internally liberal "otherwise they would undermine the very basis of their right to collective autonomy" (2000: 107). Furthermore, he affirms that because Kymlicka fails to appreciate illiberal cultures in their own terms he misses to respect them in their authentic

[31] Here, however, one might say that the final decision will always lie in the majoritarian culture and, hence, we would be talking of a subordinated cultural group and on the conditions for toleration under the terms described previously.

otherness, which takes him to subvert “their inner balance and identity and transforms them into something they are not” (2000: 108). In short, Parekh, just as the Latin American scholars mentioned earlier, accuse Kymlicka for imposing liberalism to illiberal societies.

However, in the following paragraphs it will be suggested that while these critiques might be legitimate, the solutions are unsuccessful. Moreover, it will be suggested that a proper reading of the idea of internal restrictions in Kymlicka’s work does not lead to imposing liberal values to illiberal cultures and, finally, that the need for an intercultural dialogue is also immersed in Kymlicka’s proposal.

Indeed, there is nothing in Kymlicka’s theory that can be interpreted as an imposition of liberal values, and this is something that he himself has affirmed. Although Kymlicka’s theory rejects that minority group claims are legitimate when they seek to restrict basic human rights, concretely, the right of individuals to choose and revise their own conception of the good life-, his theory is far from suggesting an interventionist strategy to tackle these cultural practices.

Kymlicka’s solution, just like Parekh, consists in a dialogue between majority and minority groups. Indeed, he emphasizes “that liberals cannot simply presuppose that they are entitled to impose liberal norms on non-liberal groups. And I argued that any enduring solution will require dialogue” (Kymlicka 1995: 163–70; and Kymlicka 2001: 62-64). Although he argues that internal restrictions are incompatible with the liberal tradition, he still recognizes that there is no legitimacy in imposing liberal values. The state, that is, can only try to “liberalize” those communities through dialogue and not through assimilation.

Parekh’s concern is that Kymlicka's multiculturalism is incapable of offering an acceptable solution when facing a situation of illiberal cultures within liberal societies. And, indeed, Kymlicka himself has accepted that this is a genuine problem. However, Parekh’s solution does not seem to be any better and, in fact, it faces the same problems than any liberal theory of minority rights faces.

Parekh’s solution still needs to deal with extremely hard cases and with no certain, much less unanimous answers. There will always be supporters and opponents of any given solution.

So, despite the fact that the diagnosis is correct, and because it is, indeed, a problem that liberal multiculturalism face, the solution offered by Parekh will still face the same problems.

Moreover, Parekh's proposal is incapable of overcoming the relations of domination between the majoritarian culture and the cultural minorities. The fact that through an intercultural dialogue the operative public values might change, implies that minority cultures need to convince the majority culture that their practices should be accepted. This means that the conditions for toleration prevail: a dominant group and a dominated one.

A very similar reasoning goes for Latin America Interculturalism. Although these scholars maintain that unlike multiculturalism interculturalism does not regard liberalism as the standard norms and it rather considers it one, among different conceptions of the good, it still does not suggest any other alternative. Just like Parekh, they might be right in their diagnosis of the problem but they lack a plausible solution.

So far, then, interculturalists have not offered any good reason for abandoning multiculturalism and embracing interculturalism. The last point that will be analyzed regarding the critiques that interculturalists direct to multiculturalism is the so-called neutrality claim, where only a few comments will be made in this regard.

Latin American Interculturalism presents itself as a neutral way for managing cultural diversity. This neutrality claim is rooted in the fact that multiculturalism imposes liberal values: it has a liberal bias. In contrast, for interculturalism, there is no superior value and liberalism is equally worthy than any other alternative. This is why they claim that interculturalism has a neutral feature that lacks in any version of multiculturalism and this is what makes interculturalism better than multiculturalism.

However, this critique seems to be inaccurate. The rejection of neutrality and the difference-blindness approach is precisely what distinguishes multiculturalism from liberal egalitarianism.

Indeed, it has already been mentioned and it will be insisted in further chapters, that one of the core features of multiculturalism –as a version of the politics of difference– is the rejection that a neutral state is possible and desirable.

Neutrality, it has been continuously argued, is impossible. “Any political theory, including a theory of toleration or liberal neutrality, must be predicated on some view of what human life is like” (Waldron 1992: 759). Although liberal egalitarians claim to be neutral, this apparent neutrality favors and strengthens the culture of the majority and, simultaneously, disadvantages those of minorities.

Indeed, multiculturalism repudiates the liberal idea of benign neglect –which is based on the idea of neutrality as a difference-blind approach. It is in the most basic essence of multiculturalism that states must not be neutral nor pretend to be neutral, because that apparent neutrality, actually favors the dominant culture and damages the rest of cultural minorities.

Secondly, it is not neutral in the sense that Latin American Interculturalists mean, because, as cited above, a political theory of justice cannot be neutral and, even in a minimal way, it must outline the skeletal of what goods should be at stake. While Kymlicka’s multiculturalism is framed in the liberal values and outlines individual autonomy and freedom; Kukatha’s liberalism endorses toleration as a fundamental value, and Spinner-Halev’s defends a pluralist view: defending both plurality of liberal values in the State and a plurality of groups (Spinner-Halev 2005: 158).

So indeed, multiculturalism is not neutral. But it is not neutral because a neutral attitude towards difference disadvantages members of cultural minorities and, moreover, it strengthens and perpetuates the deep structures that keep these groups at a disadvantage. States endorsing a politics of multiculturalism must engage in an active role towards difference.

d) Kymlicka’s Dichotomy of Ethnocultural Groups

According to Cruz Rodriguez, Kymlicka’s dichotomy of cultural diversity (national minorities and polyethnic minorities) is inaccurate for the Latin-American context. He claims that his version of Interculturalism has a better and more analytical scope for identifying cultural groups.

According to this scholar, despite the fact that both intellectual traditions acknowledge the unequal relation between cultural groups, liberal multiculturalism –meaning Kymlicka– only takes into consideration the numerical aspect when identifying minorities and majority cultures. In contrast, Latin American Interculturalism acknowledges that the importance of the unequal relation between cultures is not the numerical aspect, but the existence of a relation of domination. Indeed, there are cases in which a minority is the dominant group of a big majority, the most obvious case was the Apartheid, but as Cruz Rodriguez notices (2014a:248), states such as Bolivia are composed by a majority of indigenous communities, who have, until very recently, been governed by the non-indigenous minority.

Neus Torbisco (2000 and 2006) has elaborated a very complete definition of how to understand a national minority. According to her, although the term of national minority is vague and there is probably not an exact definition of it, it does have some elements that allow us to identify it as a group of people normally numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, which is in a non-dominant position, and whose members possess an ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population of the state where they belong. Additionally, these members aim to conserve the elements that make them distinct from the majority (Torbisco 2000: 43). Torbisco suggests that although many times a national minority is numerically inferior, this element must not be taken as essential in a definition of a national minority, because the other two features of the definition are rather relevant (Torbisco 2000:45).

Kymlicka seems to understand a national minority in those terms. He argues that the model of nation-states was characterized for having a dominant national group, whose identity, language, history, culture, and religion was privileged. This dominant group "was usually the majority group, but sometimes a minority was able to establish dominance –e.g. whites in South Africa under the apartheid regime, or criollo elites in some Latin American countries" (Kymlicka 2003: 149)

Liberal multiculturalism acknowledges the relation of domination between different cultural groups rather than focusing on a simple numerical factor. Multiculturalism tries to substitute precisely these relations of domination for relations of equality between cultural groups. The claim raised by interculturalists in this regard is, hence, mistaken. However, in the following

chapters it will be analyzed whether indigenous peoples in Latin America fit under the typology of ethnocultural groups offered by Kymlicka.

e) Beyond Coexistence and Parallel Societies

The final apparent difference between multiculturalism and Latin American Interculturalism is that, according to the latter, the former is only interested in managing a peaceful coexistence between different cultural groups that inhabit the same state territory and this, they argue, generates parallel societies and possible fragmentation.

In contrast, interculturalism in Latin America is concerned with interaction between cultural groups and, hence, it tries to foster a national unity where all cultural groups are united, while still preserving their different cultural identities. Interculturalists call for cultural exchange, mutual knowledge, and dialogue between cultures (Cruz Rodriguez 2014a: 254; and 2013: 55). In fact, they argue that multiculturalism lacks "an integrative element to breach differences among various cultural groups […] Latin American scholars contrast multiculturalism with [interculturalism] as focusing on recognition rather than dialogue, as encountering affirmative action rather than "transformative" action, as creating parallel societies rather than integrated societies, as promoting tolerance but not *convivencia*, as describing rather than constructing" (Campos Solano 2013:626).

This claim is very similar to the one made by interculturalists such as Zapata-Barrero, Cantle, and Bouchard, which were analyzed in the previous chapter. In short, they claim that unlike multiculturalism, interculturalism "aims to facilitate dialogue, exchange, and reciprocal understanding between people of different background" (Wood et al. 2006: 9).

However, it is not clear to "what extent this can be claimed as either a unique or distinguishing quality of interculturalism when dialogue and reciprocity too are foundational to most, if not all, accounts of multiculturalism" (Meer and Modood 2011: 8). Indeed, Meer and Modood wonder "what makes communication unique for interculturalism in a manner that diverges from multiculturalism?" (2011:8). After all, as it was just mentioned, intercultural dialogue is also fundamental for many versions of multiculturalism.

Taylor, for instance, also advocates for an intercultural dialogue, showing "how central a concern with dialogue and communication is to multiculturalism too" (Meer and Modood 2011: 10). To be sure, he argues that:

> [O]ur identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning some in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being (Taylor 1992: 25-26).

Modood and Meer have dismissed the claim while interculturalism promotes dialogue and social cohesion, multiculturalism does not. To be sure, they have shown how unity and intercultural dialogue are also foundational features of multiculturalism. Their arguments will not be repeated here, but the conclusion that neither version of interculturalism has, so far, shown to be better or different than multiculturalism, is shared.

4. What is Left of Latin American Interculturalism?

This whole chapter made a critique to the idea of Latin American Interculturalism. More concretely, it tries to challenge the critiques that Latin American Interculturalists direct to multiculturalism.

At first glance, it could seem that Latin American Interculturalism, just as it has been suggested of other versions of interculturalism, does not offer anything new or different than multiculturalism and, if anything, it is rooted in a false idea and sometimes a caricature of multiculturalism. Additionally, it is important to note that their critique to multiculturalism can only by partial because they only refer to Kymlicka's multiculturalism. And although Kymlicka is, indeed, the most prominent multiculturalist, there are other versions of multiculturalism that are important to take into consideration.

It has been argued that most of the claims of Latin American Interculturalism are either mistaken or already discussed in other versions of multiculturalism. This leads us to question what is left of Latin American Interculturalism.

The following chapters will reformulate the notions of Latin American Interculturalism. It would be suggested that it is useful to see it as a multicultural model for Latin American societies rather than as an alternative to it. For this to be argued, the next chapter will explore under what conditions multiculturalism can be exported to Latin American societies. The fifth chapter will then elaborate a model of multiculturalism called Latin American Interculturalism.

CHAPTER 4- EXPORTING MULTICULTURALISM TO MEXICO

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapters offered an analysis of the three versions of interculturalism. The main concern when doing so was to understand in what way these versions oppose to multiculturalism and whether they can actually be considered an alternative to it. The conclusion of this analysis has suggested that neither version of interculturalism has offered something genuine and, furthermore, some versions can actually be interpreted as a retreat on the achievements of ethnocultural justice.

The following chapters will construct a model for managing cultural diversity adequate for the Latin American region and, especially, for Mexico. This model will keep the name of Latin American Interculturalism, but it will be developed within the framework of multiculturalism and not as an alternative to it, much less as in opposition.

Following that goal, the present chapter will argue that multiculturalism is exportable to Latin American societies. However, it will be suggested that the diversity of these societies, especially in Mexico, differs from other multicultural societies which have been used as examples to construct models of group differentiated rights.

A distinction will be drawn between the principles of multiculturalism and the different multicultural models of group differentiated rights. While the former can be exportable to Latin American societies, it will be argued that the latter can not. Moreover, it will be argued that we need to develop a multicultural model of group differentiated rights that responds to the needs and demands of the ethnocultural groups existing in the Mexican society.

But before developing such model, which will be done in the next chapter, this chapter will offer arguments as to why we must not abandon the multicultural framework. For this, section 1 will analyze some aspects of multiculturalism that are relevant to the aims of understanding the difference between multicultural principles and multicultural models. Concretely, the relation between Nation Building Projects and Minority Rights will be presented. This analysis will lead to argue that the form in which states might adopt group differentiated rights will depend on the way their national minorities have responded and reacted to the

nation building project which, simultaneously depends on the type and nature of cultural minorities.

Section 2 will try to categorize indigenous peoples in Mexico. There, it will be argued that these minorities do not fit within the typology of ethnocultural groups typically conceived by scholars of multiculturalism. Moreover, after analyzing the type of group that indigenous peoples in Mexico is, it will be argued that it is a *sui generis* group, which requires different types of remedies than other indigenous peoples in western societies usually require.

Section 3 will argue that, in addition to being cultural groups, indigenous peoples in Mexico face other sorts of injustice which will be called positional injustice. Because both sorts of injustice have important and complex effects, it will be argued that these groups require a multicultural model that responds or tries to address both sorts of injustices.

Finally, section 4 will analyze the boundaries of multiculturalism, which will be useful for the discussions held in further chapters.

2. Understanding Multiculturalism

In order to analyze whether the principles of multiculturalism are exportable to Latin American societies, it is required to recall three important notions intimately related about multiculturalism. One is its origins and its principles, the second one is the relation between multiculturalism and the Nation Building projects, and the third one is the type of ethnocultural groups that multiculturalism is concerned with. This will be analyzed during this section.

a) Multiculturalism. Origins and Principles

Multiculturalism needs to be understood as part of the human rights revolution which rejects the liberal ideals of equality, claiming for the need to move from a formal conception of equality to substantial equality (Young 1990).

According to the liberal egalitarian tradition, the best way for ensuring rights and opportunities to every citizen, including members of cultural minorities, is by ignoring ascribed characteristics that "historically served as markers of inferiority and exclusion" (Young 2001, 4). Liberal egalitarians suggest that, because members of certain national,

cultural, or religious groups have suffered discrimination in the access to rights and opportunities due to their membership to those groups, the better way for achieving equality is by ignoring those characteristics and adopting a *blind-difference approach*. This means being neutral "with respect to the ethnocultural identities of its citizens, and indifferent to the ability of ethnocultural groups to reproduce themselves over time" (Kymlicka 2001: 24). If anything, this approach suggests, ethnocultural identities should be treated just as religious identities: they should be understood as pertaining to the private sphere.

After World War II liberals believed that by protecting emphatically all human rights, minorities would be properly protected. This logic suggested that, rather than protecting directly vulnerable groups through special group rights, it would be enough to guarantee the basic civil and political rights to all individuals regardless of their group membership. If these basic human rights were thoroughly protected, specific rights attributed to members of specific ethnic or national minorities would not be required (Kymlicka 1995, 3-4).

However, this idea of *benign neglect* was challenged by the politics of multiculturalism by arguing that one of the goals of a multicultural state should be to equalize the relations of these different cultural groups. But in order for this to be possible, the idea of *benign neglect* must be abandoned because, by claiming neutrality, the State is actually reinforcing the culture of the dominant majority and forcing other cultural minorities to either assimilate or accept permanent marginalization (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001: 28).

Multiculturalism calls for an active role and for the abandonment of the idea of *benign neglect*. The idea, in short, is that the State must be regarded as not pertaining to a single majoritarian and dominant group, but to all cultural minorities within it. This implies recognizing and accommodating cultural differences rather than asking members of culturally different groups to assimilate into the standards of the majority. Under this perspective, it is expected that State policies encourage the sustaining of two or more societal cultures within a single country (Kymlicka 2001: 26).

In short, a multicultural state should endorse, mainly, three principles: 1) the rejection of the ethnocultural neutrality model; 2) the rejection of the nation-building project that demands assimilation, and 3) the acknowledgment of the damage that both the ethnocultural neutrality ideal and the nation-building process caused to members of minority groups, which involves

also the will to remediate this situation (Kymlicka 2003: 150-151). With this, all cultural groups should perceive that the State also belongs to them and not only to the dominant majority (Kymlicka 2001:252). Minority groups should feel at home in the State (Spinner-Halev 2012).

Complementary to this, in order to stress the point of this chapter, we also need to understand multiculturalism in relation to the majoritarian Nation Building projects. This relation is relevant in order to properly distinguish the principles of multiculturalism from the models of group differentiated rights. This will be explained next.

b) The Dialect of Nation Building and Minority Rights

Many liberal democracies have, at some point, engaged in a nation-building process where the goal has been to integrate all members of cultural minorities into the domains of the majoritarian culture. This process has usually intended to assimilate every member of cultural minorities in order to create a single nation state and suppress differences. In short, these nation-building processes promoted a common national language and a single societal culture.

A nation-building project can serve for illegitimate and illiberal goals, such as assimilation, cultural imperialism, xenophobia, or chauvinism[32]. In this regard, for instance, Miller suggests that nationalism can be illiberal when individuals are expected to subordinate their aims to common purposes. Furthermore, according to this notion, there are no ethical limits "to what nations may do in pursuit of their aims", and in many cases, they are justified in using force to "promote national interests at the expense of other peoples" (Miller 1995).

But nationalism and the nation-building projects can also be liberal and, as a consequence, promote liberal and legitimate goals. This is what liberal nationalists have tried to defend. According to this view, a nation building project is liberal because it "places reflection,

[32] According to Mills, nationalism is illiberal when embracing four essential beliefs: first, "that the characters of human beings are profoundly shaped by the groups to which they belong; second, that such groupings are quasi-organic in nature, such that the ends of their individual members cannot be dissociated from the good of the whole; third, that the ultimate ends that individuals pursue are to be interpreted as the values of one specific national grouping, rather than as having a universal and transcendent status; fourth, that the interests of the nation are to be regarded as supreme, and nothing is to be allowed to obstruct its pursuit of these interests" (Miller 1995: 7-8).

choice, and internal criticism at its center, and rejects the notion that nationalism must necessarily "exalt the idea of the nation above all other ideas"" (Tamir 1993: 79). Moreover, liberal nationalists suggest that the liberal principles –and in particular personal autonomy– can only be achieved within a national political unit (Tamir 1993 and Kymlicka 2001a). The main characteristic of liberal nationalism, according to Tamir, "is that it fosters national ideas without losing sight of other human values against which national ideals ought to be weighed" (Tamir, 1993: 79).

In short, liberal nation-building projects can generate a sense of solidarity, common identity, and membership, which will motivate citizens to make sacrifices for each other and create a political unit where the principles of justice can function properly. Liberal nation-building projects, these theorists conclude, can bring social equality and political cohesion.

A nation-building model, hence, need not be associated with illiberal goals, nor with illegitimate aims. But even when engaging in a nation building project, which adopts liberal principles, it inescapably privileges members of the majority culture. This is so because ethnocultural neutrality has appeared to be indefensible and unfeasible and, rather than being neutral, it inevitably promotes the dominant culture and puts members of minority cultures at a disadvantage. Taylor explains it as follows:

> If a modern society has an 'official' language, in the fullest sense of the term, that is, a state‐sponsored, ‐inculcated, and ‐defined language and culture, in which both economy and state function, then it is obviously an immense advantage to people if this language and culture are theirs. Speakers of other languages are at a distinct disadvantage (Taylor 1997: 34).

Under this situation, members of minority cultures face three choices: either they conform to the dominant patterns –for instance, they learn the dominant language–; they face marginalization and exclusion; or they try to negotiate the terms in which they might take part of this nation-building project.

The focus will be made on the last option, where minorities have responded in different ways, mainly three: a) they have accepted integration to the majority culture, but they seek to negotiate the terms of this integration in a more fair way –such is the case of immigrants; b) they have negotiated forms of rights and powers needed to maintain their own societal

culture, which means creating their own economic, political, and educational institutions operating in their own language –such as the case of national minorities; or c) they have accepted marginalization and demanded to be "left alone on the margins of society", just as ethnoreligious isolationist groups have demanded, such as the Amish (Kymlicka 2001a: 22).

Each of these options requires different strategies, some which will soon be analyzed, but they all have in common one thing: they are responses of ethnocultural groups against the dominant-liberal nation-building project. The answer to all these strategies is called group differentiated rights.

These rights, as it has been mentioned previously, encompass a whole range of constitutional rights, legal arrangements, public policies, etc., that are intended to deal with the demands and needs of ethnocultural groups. This means that these set of rights will be different and will seek different ends, according to each ethnocultural group.

This leads us to the last point that needs to be analyzed in this chapter, which is the type of ethnocultural groups we are dealing with, their demands and expectations from the State, and the way they have responded or reacted to the majoritarian nation building project.

c) The Classic Typology of Ethnocultural Groups

In the first wave of literature in multiculturalism, Kymlicka was concerned mainly with two ethnocultural groups: ethnic minorities and national minorities. National minorities are "groups that formed complete and functioning societies on their historic homeland prior to being incorporated into a larger state" (Kymlicka 1995: 11). Within national minorities Kymlicka also suggested a subcategory: Stateless nations and indigenous peoples. There are no clear and universally accepted criteria to distinguish both groups, however, one criterion to identify them is the role that these groups played in the process of state-formation. Stateless nations generally were contenders but losers in this process, their aim and desire has usually been a state of their own. In contrast, indigenous peoples were not contenders in that process

and they kept isolated from it, which explains why they retained their pre-modern ways of life until very recently (Kymlicka 2001:123)[33].

But despite the different ways in which they were incorporated into the State, both stateless nations and indigenous peoples have resisted the state nation-building project by fighting to retain their own societal culture. For this, they have demanded some form of autonomy that allows them to exercise control over their own social and political institutions. These demands can sometimes be seen as a sub nation-building project. Minorities can make use of the same tools that the dominant culture uses in order to promote a common sense of identity, control over language and curriculum in schools, control over their official calendar in order to have their official holidays, control over the official language in their institutions, etc. (Kymlicka 2001a: 27-29). This is the reason why both Stateless nations and indigenous peoples have been grouped together: their demands have typically been to obtain some form of territorial autonomy.

Ethnic groups, on the other hand, are formed by groups of immigrants who have taken the decision to leave their original homeland and emigrate to another society (31). Over time, with the subsequent generations of these groups in the new country of residence they "give rise to ethnic communities with varying degrees of internal cohesion and organization" (32).

Unlike national minorities, these groups have accepted the expectation that they will soon integrate into the larger societal culture. And what they have tried to seek is to renegotiate the terms of this integration. Concretely, they seek an integration that will allow them and support them to maintain the different aspects of their ethnic heritage, such as their own customs regarding food, dress, or religious practices. And for this, the institutions of the larger society must be adapted to provide greater recognition and accommodation to these different ethnic identities. These adaptions can vary, but examples of them are: adopting an official calendar which includes other religious holidays, dietary restrictions in schools, dress

[33] This can lead to a second distinction between both groups. While Stateless nations are still struggling to have a state of their own, indigenous peoples are usually struggling for their traditional forms of organization within the State (González Galván 2002)

code exceptions, permission for praying hours during working time, etc. (Kymlicka 2001: 32-34).

Kymlicka's dichotomy of ethnocultural groups was soon challenged by a series of critics who argued that it did not capture the whole range of cultural minorities that are typically found in western countries[34]. As a response to these critics, Kymlicka expanded his typology of ethnocultural groups to five categories: national minorities –which kept the same subcategories: indigenous peoples and Stateless nations–; immigrants; metics; isolationist ethnoreligious groups and African-Americans (Kymlicka, 2001 chapters 3, 8 and 9, and 2001a).

Each of these groups are differently conformed, they have different needs and demands and, as a consequence, they have responded in different ways towards the majoritarian nation-building project. As a consequence, the sort of responses offered by multiculturalism vary from group to group. These responses, in a broad way, can be called "group differentiated rights", as it was mentioned previously.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the typology of ethnocultural groups offered above, together with the type of solutions developed for them, must not be understood as the only type of ethnocultural groups existing in multicultural countries. Although typically those are the type of groups found, it is a mistake to think that this typology is a fixed one and that all cultural minorities must fit within one of these categories. As a result of this, it is also mistaken to assume that the different solutions offered until now for these ethnocultural groups will also work for other type of ethnocultural groups. Soon, in fact, it will be argued that indigenous peoples in Mexico do not fit within this typology of ethnocultural groups.

As it is understood here, multiculturalism is not reduced to the different arrangements offered to ethnocultural groups such as group differentiated rights –autonomy rights, exemptions, multilingual education, different types of accommodation, etc.–. Rather, multiculturalism consists in the set of political principles that reject the notion of a single nation-state and, in general, reject the liberal egalitarian principles. Moreover, multiculturalism must be

[34] Among these critics, mainly, Iris Marion Young, Tariq Modood, Bhikhu Parekh and Jeff Spinner-Halev.

understood in the context of the majoritarian nation-building projects and its effect towards minority groups, as analyzed above.

In short, we must keep in mind the following: multiculturalism requires the State to abandon the idea of *benign neglect* and to assume an active role in the way it relates with different cultures. Additionally, it requires to offer the same conditions to every cultural minority as it does to the majoritarian culture, which means that the state must be willing to recognize and accommodate these cultural differences.

Overall, we can reduce the principles of multiculturalism to four, which were previously mentioned: 1) the rejection of the ethnocultural neutrality model; 2) the rejection of the nation-building project that demands assimilation; 3) the acknowledgment of the damage that both the ethnocultural neutrality ideal, and the nation-building process caused to members of minority groups, which involves also the will to remediate this situation, and finally, 4) cultural groups are all equal and should stand in the same level (Kymlicka 2003: 150-151).

These are the principles that we can, and should, export to Latin American countries. What remains problematic, however, is to categorize the cultural minorities that exist in these countries into the typology of the ethnocultural groups. That is, indigenous peoples in the Latin American region should not be understood –at least not all of them– as indigenous peoples under the typology of ethnocultural groups developed above.

As a consequence, the models of group differentiated rights that have typically been used for indigenous peoples in other western countries should not be exported to our region. And this is why it is important to understand the relation between multiculturalism and the nation building projects. Indeed, we need to understand that the different models of group differentiated rights available needs to be adequate for all the different cultural minorities and their demands, which will depend to great extent on the way they have reacted towards the pressures of the nation building projects.

There are many reasons why indigenous peoples in our regions should not be regarded solely under the typology of indigenous peoples offered above. The following section will analyze this in extent, where it will be argued that we are in need of developing our own category of ethnocultural groups and, as a consequence, our own model of group differentiated rights

which responds adequately to these groups and our specific contexts. For this, the analysis will be focused on Mexico, but many similarities can apply in other countries of the Latin American region.

3. Categorizing Indigenous Peoples in Mexico

The previous section argued that the principles of multiculturalism are perfectly exportable to Latin American societies and, more concretely to Mexico. The problem emerges, however, when it is assumed that the diversity in this country is similar to the diversity in other western countries which have usually served as models in the theorizing of group differentiated rights, concretely, regarding indigenous peoples (examples will be offered below).

The reason why this is so important to acknowledge, is because there has been a tendency within the literature of multiculturalism to treat indigenous peoples in the Latin American region as national minorities under the terms mentioned in the above section (Ibarra Palafox 2005: 124-125, González Galván 2010, Perez Portilla 2002, Cruz Rodriguez 2013). While it will be argued that some indigenous peoples in this region might be regarded as national minorities, it is a mistake to think of all indigenous peoples as such, especially in Mexico.

This section will first offer three arguments as to why indigenous peoples in Mexico fall outside the scope of national minorities in Kymlicka's typology of ethnocultural group. After, it will argue that indigenous peoples in Mexico are a *sui generis* type of ethnocultural group. As a consequence we need to develop a multicultural model for these type of minorities, which will be presented in the next chapter.

a) Indigenous Peoples in Mexico as National Minorities?

It was mentioned previously that what makes national minorities seek some form of territorial autonomy is the fact that they conserve a societal culture, which provides the members of these minorities a full range of life opportunities. According to Kymlicka, a societal culture is a "culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language" (Kymlicka, 1995: 76). It might be said that

there are three nuclear elements of a societal culture: territorial concentration, a common language, and social and political institutions.

National minorities seek territorial autonomy in order to engage in their own nation-building project precisely because they conserve their societal culture, which provides them the context of choice so every person can choose a way of life but, additionally, where they develop a sense of social self and group identity (Modood, 2007: 31).

Based on this, it has been argued by many Mexican scholars that indigenous peoples in Mexico –and in many Latin American countries- have their own societal culture because they still conserve some of their social and political institutions, they have a historical homeland which they inhabit, and they speak a common language (Ibarra Palafox 2005: 124-125, González Galván 2010, Perez Portilla 2002). And this is how they have been defined in legal instruments. For instance, article 2 of the Mexican constitution describes indigenous peoples as *groups who descend from populations that inhabited the territory of the current country before colonization, and still conserve some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions*[35].

However, if we analyze more deeply the way in which indigenous peoples are conformed, as well as their demands, we can see that not all of these groups fall within the typology of national minorities. Many, in fact, lack the nuclear elements of a societal culture and this has important consequences for developing a multicultural model for the Mexican society, as it will be explained further.

b) Do Indigenous Peoples Conserve a Societal Culture?

In Mexico 9.8% on the national population is identified as indigenous peoples, organized in around 400 different indigenous communities. Among these, there are eleven different linguistic families with 62 variations (CDI, 2015). This means that there are many different

[35] In similar terms, article 1 of the 169 ILO Convention defines indigenous peoples as groups who "descend from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions"

cultural groups within the category of *indigenous peoples*, each of those cultural groups have different languages, practices, and ways of living (Aragón Andrade 2007: 13-14).

This first remark is important because it differs from other countries that deal with indigenous peoples and which usually serve as examples when theorizing indigenous politics. For instance, in New Zealand when we refer to indigenous peoples we are usually talking about the Maori people, while in Canada, the Inuit, and in the Nordic countries, the Sami. Each these groups, although with some variation, share a basic cultural structure, and this facilitates the design of a model of group differentiated rights which have turned out to be effective.

Take, for instance, the case of New Zealand where the Maori is the second largest ethnic group in the country. After the European ethnic group which constitutes 75% of the population, 15.6% of the population is Maori (Statistics New Zealand, 2014)[36]. Precisely because virtually all indigenous peoples in New Zealand are Maori, multicultural policies are more effective. An example of this is the fact that, together with English and the sign language, the Maori language has been recognized as the official language in this country. This would be very challenging in Mexico due to the existence of nearly 62 indigenous languages[37].

In Norway, according to the United Nations Regional Information Center for Western Europe, the Sami have their own Parliament and receive education in their mother tongue.

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[36] Available at http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/snapshots-of-nz/nz-in-profile-2015/about-new-zealand.aspx

[37] Bolivia is facing a similar situation. In 2009, the Constitution of this country recognized Spanish along with the 36 indigenous languages spoken in the country, as official languages. However, out of this diversity, according to the National Census of 2012, 69% of the population speaks Spanish, 17% speaks Quechua and 10% speaks Aymara. On the bottom of the list four people speak Araona, five people speak Canichana and Moré and six people speak Pacawara. In fact, there is more Vietnamese speakers (10) than some indigenous speakers. This situation bounds us to analyze the problems that emerge when so many languages are recognized as official languages. In the case of Bolivia, because this recognition has been approved in the level of the constitution, one of the commitments is that all legal provisions should be translated into all the 36 indigenous languages, which means that all legal provisions shall be translated into Araona, which only has five speakers. The results of these attempts, according to Cancino (2014) is that not all official provisions have been equally translated to all the indigenous languages recognized as official languages. And, although there is no consensus on the data available, there are more provisions available in the indigenous languages with more speakers than with less speakers. With this, we can see that although the intentions of recognizing all indigenous languages as official languages might be good and legitimate intentions, they are also difficult to achieve when facing great diversity, as is the case with Latin American countries (Cancino 2015).

And this is feasible, in part, because there is only one cultural group and because they are mostly territorially concentrated in different areas of the four countries where they are settled[38]. And regarding the Inuit population in Canada something similar occurs. While approximately 60,000 Inuit live in Canada, of these nearly, 45,000 live concentrated in what has been traditionally their lands, while only 15,000 live in other Canadian cities (2011 Nationl Household Survey).

In contrast, indigenous peoples in Mexico, as a category, do not share a basic cultural structure. As mentioned above, there are eleven different linguistic families, and the northern indigenous peoples –the Huave– have little in common with the southern– the Mayas- and these two have little in common with the indigenous peoples of the center of the country – the Huichol. Speaking of an indigenous culture in Mexico is problematic given that there are many different indigenous cultures.

As a consequence, it is inaccurate to give the same treatment to all the indigenous communities because their conditions and contexts are very different. Indeed, there are some groups which preserve more of their societal culture than others, who have, in fact, lost their homeland or their language. Indigenous citizens throughout the country are attached in different degrees to their culture and their traditional institutions, which is clearly an obstacle to think of them as a single ethnocultural group (Hernández, Mattiace and Rus, 2002: 15).

The second fact that needs to be taken into consideration is the way they are territorially settled. According to the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples in Mexico (CDI 2015), 60% of the indigenous population in the country is settled in municipalities where more than 40% of the local population self-identifies as indigenous. Thus, a big percentage of the indigenous population is not territorially concentrated and live surrounded by non-indigenous peoples, which means that many indigenous peoples operate within the non-indigenous way of life and, as a consequence, they have lost or replaced many of their traditional practices and institutions (Mattiace, 2002: 83-117)[39].

[38] http://www.unric.org/en/indigenous-people/27307-the-sami-of-northern-europe--one-people-four-countries

[39] This is increasing in the last decades due to the need of indigenous citizens to immigrate from their communities to major cities in order to find life opportunities. Rebeca Barriga Villanueva (2008) offers an insightful case study of the situation that indigenous immigrant children face in urbanized cities.

In addition, and although the Mexican state is a Federation, the political division is not designed as a response to the different indigenous groups –nor national minorities– that inhabit the territory. As a consequence, indigenous communities can be, and many times are, settled across two different states or across municipalities.

In this regard, although Mexico is a federal system and there is a constitutional recognition of it being a multicultural state, it is not a *Multinational federation,* where the borders of the subunits are drawn in such a way that allows groups demanding self-government to form regional majorities. This is unfortunate, given the fact that these types of arrangements are intended to enable national majorities to exercise self-government (Kymlicka 2001a: 30). However, because this is not how the Mexican federal system is arranged, providing autonomy rights to indigenous communities becomes both normatively and empirically problematic. Autonomy rights require that the group enjoying it be territorially concentrated.

All this situation (the variety of indigenous cultures in Mexico; the fact that they are not territorially concentrated and that the federal system is not multinational) suggests that recognizing autonomy rights to indigenous peoples is not the only solution and, at times, can be very problematic.

The core problem of this seems to be that not all indigenous peoples in Mexico preserve their societal culture. Given this, the typical solution that multiculturalism offers for national minorities demanding some sort of territorial autonomy is not feasible. This leads to acknowledging that not all indigenous peoples in these societies can be regarded solely as national minorities.

This leads to a second problem, which is the lack of criteria to identify indigenous peoples for the purposes of offering group differentiated rights. This will be analyzed next.

c) Identifying Indigenous Peoples

Identifying cultural minorities has always been problematic. Any attempt to define them has always resulted in contested debates regarding the term minority. However, for the purposes of this discussion, it is enough to recall the criteria offered in Chapter 3. It was said that cultural minorities can be identified as a group of people normally numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, which are in a non-dominant position, and whose members

possess an ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristic differing from those of the rest of the population of the state to which they belong. Furthermore, these members aim to conserve the elements that differentiate them from the majority (Torbisco 2000: 43).

Additionally, according to Kymlicka's typology of ethnocultural groups, national minorities are territorially concentrated in what they consider their homeland, they share a common language, and well-functioning institutions. In short, national minorities have both a societal culture and they share a nation-building project within their subunit.

However, it is precisely because of the first problem that has already been analyzed –the way they are settled throughout the country and the different degrees in which they can be attached to their culture– that identifying indigenous peoples in Mexico in the terms mentioned above is problematic.

Instead of having well identified territories of different cultural groups (different indigenous communities and non-indigenous communities) the Mexican society is more like a continuum of diverse population. On one side of the continuum we find cultural groups that still preserve many elements of their ancestors such as language, attachment to the land, beliefs and practices, knowledge, etc. –or what is known as societal culture– and on the other extreme we find individuals from European descent that are little –or not at all– attached to any indigenous or pre-Hispanic culture. But from one extreme to the other, we find many different and diverse populations –such as peasants or indigenous migrants who have left their community and lost their societal culture–, forming something similar to a *multicultural continuum.*

Furthermore, if within this continuum we only focus on the indigenous population –which is nearly 10% of the national population– we still find another sub-continuum, not only because there are so many indigenous cultures in the country, but most importantly, because indigenous members are attached in different degrees to their culture. In this sub-continuum we find on one extreme, groups of people who are territorially concentrated, have a strong attachment to their indigenous culture, share a common language, and still conserve some of their traditional institutions, something similar to a national minority in Kymlicka's terms (such is the case of some communities in Chiapas belonging to the Tzotzil and Tzetzal cultures (Rus and Collier, 2002: 157-199)). On the other extreme of this sub-continuum,

however, we find citizens who, although identify as indigenous, they have lost many of their traditional practices, are no longer settled in their traditional homeland, might not speak their mother tongue, and have replaced their way of living to a more non-indigenous way of life. Within this continuum, we find different degrees of attachment to the indigenous cultures, which is problematic for the purposes of identifying indigenous peoples in the same terms as national minorities have been generally identified.

This problem becomes more obvious with the criteria developed by the CDI for the identification of indigenous citizens. According to this commission, the first criterion to identify an indigenous citizen is whether a person lives in an "indigenous home" and/or speaks an indigenous language[40]. The second criteria is if the person was either raised or surrounded by at least one family member who speaks –or spoke– an indigenous language, or raised according to certain indigenous traditions, whether or not she speaks an indigenous language.

With these criteria many Mexicans could qualify as indigenous. This is because a great majority of Mexicans come from indigenous descent and were raised following some indigenous practices. In fact, many national festivities have their origins in indigenous cultures and many Mexicans practice these festivities. But, nevertheless, because they are immersed in the non- indigenous majoritarian society, they are not considered indigenous citizens[41], although some might suffer from similar disadvantages as indigenous citizens because of their membership to other vulnerable social group.

It is true, however, that many Mexicans who have indigenous origins do not identify as such. This need not be problematic for these purposes, given the fact that –as it was presented in the first chapter– the conscience of their indigenous identity is a fundamental criterion when

[40] An indigenous home is where at least one of the family members (parents, grandparents, or great grandparents) speaks an indigenous language.

[41] Regarding the problems that the indigenous rights movement is facing in the international arena because of the problems of developing a criteria for identifying them see: James Anaya (1996); Will Kymlicka (2001) Chapter 6; Will Kymlicka (2011).

trying to identify indigenous peoples. This situation simply means that, although descending from pre-Hispanic cultures, the person no longer should be identified as indigenous[42].

However, it might be problematic when we face groups of people that lack a societal culture and do not preserve many indigenous institutions –language included–, and still identify as indigenous. There seems to be a dilemma here: either we accept that simply self-identifying as indigenous is a sufficient requirement to enjoy group differentiated rights and a differentiated citizenship; or we essentialize the indigenous category and only recognize group differentiated rights to those who conform to what we consider should be an indigenous citizen. Both scenarios can be problematic.

This reinforces the argument made in this chapter that thinking of indigenous peoples in Mexico solely as falling within the category of national minorities is problematic because we leave behind many indigenous peoples that do not fulfill these criteria. Moreover, the rights of autonomy recognized in the constitution are useless for many indigenous citizens and even communities, precisely because they lack the conditions to exercise them. And this is one of the reasons why many indigenous demands are not based on territorial autonomy.

Finally, in order to argue that indigenous peoples in Mexico do not fall within Kymlicka's typology of ethnocultural rights, it is necessary to recall the type of demands that these groups are raising. This will be done in the next subsection, where it will be argued that the type of demands differs from those raised by indigenous peoples as national minorities.

d) Indigenous Demands

According to the typology of ethnocultural groups sketched out by Kymlicka, indigenous peoples –as national minorities- demand rights of territorial autonomy in order to organize internally according to their culture. More concretely, in order to live according to their societal culture. And these demands of territorial autonomy are part of the way in which

[42] However, this does pose another set of problems which will be analyzed towards the end of this chapter. This is related with the fact that, although probably many citizens who have indigenous origins might not self-identify as indigenous and might not be seeking to enjoy group differentiated rights, they still can suffer from discrimination, exclusion and other forms of oppression given their indigenous characteristics.

indigenous peoples react towards a majoritarian nation-building project. In Mexico, however, the demands that indigenous peoples are making are multi-natured.

Chapter 1 presented the current situation of the rights recognized to indigenous peoples in Mexico. That chapter explained that these rights (recognized in article 2 of the Mexican Constitution) are derived from the San Andrés Agreements, which were signed between the Mexican government and the different indigenous organizations.

An emphasis to the different types of rights recognized in that article was drawn. These rights were grouped as follows: a) Rights based on cultural differences, which were subdivided into rights of territorial autonomy and fair terms of inclusion; and b) Rights for social justice and substantial equality.

Rights of territorial autonomy are only one type of rights that indigenous peoples in Mexico are demanding. In fact, some rights based on the recognition of cultural difference are more similar to those that typically polyethnic groups are demanding, rather than national minorities. And the reason to this, is precisely because not all indigenous peoples in the country conserve a societal culture and their conditions are not optimum in order to engage in a sub nation-building project within their territory.

As it was shown in the first chapter, some indigenous communities are indeed exercising their rights of territorial autonomy and organizing internally according to their traditional institutions. But this is only possible in those regions of the country –such as the state of Chiapas– where indigenous peoples conform a majority, and this is not the case for many other indigenous citizens, who are demanding other sorts of rights –such as fair terms of inclusion or of substantial equality.

And still, if we focus on the demands of territorial autonomy that some Mexican indigenous peoples are raising, it is unclear that this type of demands are compatible with multiculturalism. As it was showed in Chapter 1, these demands follow a more communitarian logic which tends to repress personal autonomy and choice. So still thinking of these demands of autonomy as part of the type of rights that multiculturalism advocates for is problematic.

Finally, assuming that all the demands raised by indigenous peoples in Mexico are of territorial autonomy obscures the different ways in which indigenous citizens relate to their culture, obscuring also their different needs and the other sorts of demands. In sum, the type of demands that indigenous peoples are raising in Mexico differs from the type of demands that typically national minorities –including indigenous peoples– are claiming.

This argument, along with the two previous arguments, suggest that indigenous peoples in Mexico do not fit under the typology of ethnocultural groups offered by multiculturalism. In this subsection, hence, it has been argued that although indigenous peoples have usually been a subcategory of national minorities, in Mexico, these groups should not be analyzed only under these terms.

Summarizing, the three reasons offered in this subsection in order to argue why indigenous peoples in Mexico should not be regarded solely as national minorities were: 1) that many indigenous peoples in Mexico lack a societal culture; consequently, 2) we lack criteria for their identification and, finally, 3) the type of demands they are raising are multi-natured and not necessarily compatible with multiculturalism. This does not mean, however, that multiculturalism is useless or inadequate for the Mexican society, neither that Mexican indigenous peoples should not be regarded as ethnocultural groups. It means, rather, that we need to develop a different model of multiculturalism and that we need to analyze the type of group that indigenous peoples in Mexico is.

In order to do this, the following section will try to categorize indigenous peoples in Mexico as an ethnocultural group. Taking as a precedent the African-American category, it will be argued that Mexican indigenous peoples is a *sui-generis* group or, in terms of Kymlicka, a hard case.

4. Indigenous Peoples in Mexico as a *Sui Generis* Ethnocultural Group

It has been argued above, that the principles of multiculturalism are exportable to Mexico, while the current models of group differentiated rights are not, or at least, are insufficient. This was concluded by analyzing the relation between multiculturalism and the nation-building project, where it was said that each model of group differentiated rights must be

compatible with both the characteristics of the specific ethnocultural group and the reaction towards the nation building project. The previous section offered reasons as to why indigenous peoples in Mexico are different from indigenous peoples of other countries, both by the way they are conformed and by the way they have reacted towards the nation building project. As a consequence, the models of group differentiated rights developed until now are helpful, but insufficient for these groups.

The next step for developing a model of group differentiated rights adequate for this society is to analyze the type of group that indigenous peoples in Mexico is, which will be done in this subsection.

For this, it is useful to analyze the situation of African-Americans and the way this group has been categorized within Kymlicka's typology of ethnocultural groups. Although being a category of ethnocultural groups, African-Americans are a *sui generis* category due to their unique process of conformation and history.

Most Blacks in the US are not immigrants, they come from Black slaves brought against their own will to the United States, during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth century (Young 1997, Spinner-Halev 1996). Additionally, unlike immigrants who are usually encouraged to integrate, Blacks were prevented from integrating into the institutions of the majoritarian culture, which kept them marginalized from society until very recently. Unlike national minorities, Blacks lack a homeland in the US, plus a common historical language. In fact, they come from from different African cultures with different languages. And not only was there no attempt to keep them together according to their ethnic background, but they were split up even among family members and, finally, they were prohibited from recreating their own culture (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001 chapter 9 and 2001a).

Before the Civil War, Blacks in the US were slaves who were legally prohibited from enjoying any civil and political rights. But after the Civil War they still faced a system of institutional segregation. Given this, Blacks have retained and developed their own cultural practices and their own functioning institutions apart from the dominant American

institutions[43]. And even after slavery ended, they ensured to maintain their Black culture and identity separate from the mainstream culture (Spiner-Halev, 1996: 113-114).

Precisely because they were prevented from integrating and they kept segregated from social and political institutions, Blacks had to create their own institutions, forming what can be said, an institutionally complete society separate from the dominant society (Kymlicka 2001: 181). Despite this, it is inaccurate to compare this type of societal culture to those of typical national minorities. While the former was created due to an expressed rejection, institutional discrimination, and legal segregation, national minorities exist today because of different historical and contextual processes[44].

Because of these historical and unique circumstances, African-Americans in the US have raised two different demands over the last half century. On the one hand they have raised demands similar to those of immigrants, consisting on integration as full citizens, making a strong emphasis in non-discrimination policies, which were thoroughly fought for in the 1950s and 1960s. The second set of demands rejects the former because it considers the mainstream society to be oppressive to Blacks (Spinner-Halev 1996: 113). Rather than seeking integration as full citizens and given the fact that they had developed a Black culture, these demands took a form of Black Nationalism demanding and promoting a Black Nation (Kymlicka 2001a: 46 and Brooks, 1996: 121-123).

However, none of these demands has been successful nor totally feasible[45]. As to the integration demand, although there has been a formal recognition of the need to integrate African-Americans as full members of the American society, Blacks still face many obstacles, which prevent them from gaining access to a full range of life opportunities. Brooks argues, in fact, that racial integration has been an unsuccessful civil rights strategy because it has not helped most African-Americans achieve racial equality (1996: 1).

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[43] Spinner-Halev argues that African-American culture is a distinctive American culture. For instance, they combined African and American elements in music, which gave a unique form of Black music which gave them hope, pleasure, and inspiration. Additionally, they created their own forms of communication, which whites could not understand (1996:114)

[44] This is not to say, however, that national minorities do not suffer discrimination by the majoritarian cultural group. But the contexts have been different, and it is possible to affirm that the intensity and brutality of the discrimination that African-Americans suffered is a very unique one.

[45] In his book, Brook (1996) analyses both strategies of integration and separation and why these have failed.

Blacks in the US are still among the poorest in the country, they still suffer multiple forms of discrimination and stereotyping. Additionally, they are still not receiving adequate education nor treatment in public schools; they are still living in poor neighborhoods (Spinner-Halev 2010), and they are still not able to "protect their social and economic interests through the political process" (Brooks, 1996: 104; Banks 2007).

The second option is not even feasible, because of the similar reasons that indigenous peoples face in Mexico. They are not territorially concentrated, they do not share a common and distinct language from that of the majority, and they do not share one single cultural structure –as mentioned above, they descend from many different African cultures. In Brook's terms, Black Nationalist movements have merely been "a dream that would be problematic even if it could come true" (1996: 189)[46].

Because of this *sui generis* situation, none of the classic models proposed by multiculturalism are enough to cope with African-Americans' needs and demands. This calls for a variety of measures that may include historical compensation for past wrongs, affirmative action programs and special assistance in integration; political representation, etc. But some of these different demands, however, seem to be pulling in different directions: some might seek integration, while others might seek to reinforce separation. Nonetheless, they are responses to the different and complex reality that African-Americans face. In this regard, Kymlicka suggests that, "a degree of short-term separateness and colour-consciousness is needed to achieve the long-term goal of an integrated and colour-blind society" (2001a: 47).

Something similar occurs with indigenous peoples in Mexico. Previously, it was shown how indigenous peoples are conformed, which showed as well that these groups do not fit in the classic model of national minorities. But additionally, it was argued that the demands that these groups are raising are not compatible with multiculturalism and, furthermore, some are not feasible, which coincides with the set of demands that African-Americans raise, both regarding their Black Nationalism and their demands for inclusion.

[46] Brooks offers a more complete and detailed account of the different movements of Black separatism and concrete reasons of why they have all failed. I do not have the space to engage in this topic, so I only make reference to the reasons why Black Nationalism is not feasible in terms of multiculturalism

The situation of indigenous peoples can be rather complex. While they do not fit neatly in any of the ethnocultural groups that multiculturalism is concerned with, they share many elements. For instance, while they do not fit within the category of immigrants, they share some of their demands: they wish to be included in equal terms into the majoritarian institutions without having to suppress their different identity. However, because of their history of social relations, they still suffer from structural inequalities which prevents them from being included and enjoying the status of full citizens.

On the other hand, although still preserving some of their practices and institutions, they do not fit within the category of national minorities for the reasons explained above. But furthermore, the way these groups are conformed plays an important role here. Indeed, typical national minorities are groups of people who share a common national project with which they positively identify. In the case of indigenous peoples –and African-Americans as well– their shared identity was created because of how they have been excluded and stereotyped through history. African-Americans were bound to create their own institutions as a matter of survival (Spinner-Halev, 1996: 113-114). And indigenous peoples conserved part of their institutions also because they were excluded from enjoying and participating in the majoritarian institutions.

These groups have suffered not only cultural misrecognition, additionally, they have been strongly excluded and discriminated, and this cannot be disregarded in any model of ethnocultural justice.

Indigenous peoples in Mexico, that is, are cultural minorities facing a very complex and *sui generis* situation. This compels us to analyze another dimension of the injustice they suffer, which is what will be called here, following Iris Young's latest work, positional difference.

5. Indigenous Peoples in Mexico as Positional Groups

In one of her latest works, Young intended to recover some issues of injustice, ways of thinking about justice and difference that had, back in the 1990s, motivated the line of thinking called the politics of difference. The main concern in Young's latest work was to notice how –mistakenly– it had become a truism that the politics of difference is equivalent

to the politics of identity (2007: 60) which, in short, consists in attending claims of justice that are based on cultural differences.

The social movements of the 1960s and forwards involved claims of feminism, anti-racist, and gay liberation among others. The concern was that the idea of equality defended by liberal egalitarianism was a problem for social justice. Substantial equality was needed, which required attending differences rather than ignoring them. However, entering the 1990s, in the context of ethnic politics and the raising of nationalism, a second way of understanding the politics of difference emerged. This focused on the differences of nationality, ethnicity, and religion within States, and argued that public accommodation and support of cultural difference is compatible, and even required, by liberal democratic states. This, in short, is the basic idea behind multiculturalism.

There are, Young argued, at least two different versions of the politics of difference: one, which was theorized according to the liberation movements of the 1960s, and which she called the politics of positional difference. And the other one: which is concerned with the movements in the 1990s, identified as the politics of cultural difference. Both versions share the same concerns against the liberal paradigm, state neutrality, and the concept of equality as sameness: they reject the principles defended in the liberal egalitarian tradition. However, they differ in the way they understand the constitution of social groups and in the issues of justice they emphasize (Young 2007: 66).

Although Young tried to argue that we must embrace both approaches, the politics of cultural difference has gained more weight and importance among the public discourse and political theorists. This shift of focus, she argued, is unfortunate because it tends to obscure important issues of justice, institutional racism, and structural inequalities (2007:60). And this is occurring also in countries such as Mexico, where indigenous demands for autonomy have come to appear as the main demands among indigenous peoples and have obscured the other sources of injustice that indigenous citizens are facing.

According to Young, the politics of positional difference is concerned mainly with issues of injustice in the context of structural inequalities. Persons suffer this kind of injustice when institutions and practices operate in a way which limits the opportunities to achieve wellbeing – due to the position of their social group. On the other hand, persons suffer culture–based

injustice when they lack the freedom to express themselves as they wish, according to the values of the culture with which they identify, or when their group situation is such that the cost they have to pay in order to pursue their distinct way of life is highly significant, both in political and economic terms (Young 2007: 63). And in addition, this is a cost that no member of the majoritarian group would have to bear because of how institutions are designed to favor the majoritarian culture.

While it is true that the second kind of injustice is usually the basis for structural inequalities because these are often built on perceived cultural differences, thinking of justice solely on the grounds of group cultural differences tends to obscure issues of structural inequalities. Young's concern was to argue that social justice requires attending both sources of injustice and, hence, adopting both versions of the politics of difference.

In similar terms, Courtney Jung –who spent years in Chiapas analyzing the moral force of the Zapatistas' demands– has argued that there are political and normative distinctions among the struggles that different groups worldwide are engaging in. Inferring that struggles of, say, indigenous peoples for territorial autonomy and Turkish guest workers for German citizenship fall within the scope of a cultural prism distorts the conceptions of the problem and the possible solutions (Jung 2008: 17). But furthermore, even inferring that the struggles of indigenous peoples in New Zealand and of indigenous peoples in Mexico for territorial autonomy fall under the same rhetoric is problematic and distorts both the problem and the solutions.

In sum, the main difference between these two versions of the politics of difference is twofold: first, the way in which they understand the constitution of social groups and, second, the issues of justice with which they are concerned. It is important to note that many disadvantaged groups suffer from both types of injustice. However, at the moment, these sources of injustice will be analyzed separately.

According to Young, we can find the perfect version of the politics of cultural difference in Kymlicka's account of multiculturalism. And furthermore, Kymlicka's concept of a national minority, which was already analyzed in extent, is the perfect example of how a cultural group looks like.

On this account, it is required to promote and achieve equality among cultural groups that inhabit the same state territory. According to Young, cultural minorities suffer from an inequality of freedom because their ability to live according to their own forms of expression is limited. Under this circumstance, multiculturalism demands special rights and policies that will protect and enable minority cultures to flourish (Young 2007: 76). In short, this version of the politics of difference requires mutual accommodation, recognition of diverse cultural groups, and freedom of cultural expression.

This version of the politics of cultural difference has been –and will be– analyzed thoroughly. The following section will expand on the politics of positional difference. Concretely, on the way positional groups are conformed; the requirements under this approach and, finally, why indigenous peoples in Mexico fall within the scope of this version.

a) Positional Difference: Groups and Claims of Justice

According to the politics of positional difference, groups are constituted through structural social processes that position people among social axes that generate status, power, and opportunity for the development of their capacity or for their acquisition of goods (Young 2007: 64).

For Young, these groups must be understood in relational terms –as opposed to essentialist ones. Relational social groups are product of social relations and, therefore, are fluid and intersecting (Squires 2001: 18-19). For this approach, groups matter not because they are considered independent sources of moral value, but rather because through group-based judgements we are able to identify sources of unjust inequalities. Groups matter because they are positioned by social structures that constrain –or enable– individual lives in ways beyond their individual control (Young 2001: 6).

What makes these groups as such are not individuals sharing cultural attributes that generate a sense of identity or attachment among its members –as is the case of national minorities. Rather, it is the set of relationships, assumptions, and stereotypes which exclude and marginalize some people and, overall, constrain their options at the same time, that they expand those of others (Young 2001:11).

In these terms, people are defined by the social position of the group to which they belong, and this position has broad implications for how people relate to one another. Such is the case of class, race, ethnicity, age, gender, religion (Young 2001: 15), but also indigeneity in Latin America.

Courtney Jung has argued that the origins of structural groups lie in the way political elites have used particular markers to set the boundaries of citizenship and organize access to power and resources. This, she claims, is rather different than other groups formed by different forms of human social organization or attachment (Jung 2008: 14-17). And this is paramount, she suggests, because the legitimacy of the claims of each structural group will depend on their historically embedded structural position and not on whether they claim "race", "gender, or "ethnicity" as their organizing principle (Jung 2008: 18).

A historical embedded structural position means that we need to be able to tell a plausible story that explains why certain groups are in a worst position than others and why some individuals are less well-off than others. There are strong reasons for making judgments of inequalities based on group membership and not simply among individuals, because only through a group-based approach we can determine whether inequalities are structural and not merely by poor choices, bad luck, or accidental. A structural story, that is, explains how:

> institutional rules and policies, individual actions and interactions, and the cumulative collective and often unintended material effects of these relations reinforce one another in ways that restrict the opportunities of some to achieve well-being in the respects measures, while it does not so restrict that of the others to whom they are compared, or even enlarge their opportunities (Young, 2001:16).

It is important, however, to distinguish this structural story from historical injustices, because although the latter helps to explain the present inequalities between social groups, it follows a different logic which does not interest us for now. A neat clarification of this is offered by Spinner-Halev (2012) who distinguishes historical injustices from what he calls enduring injustices.

According to this author, there are some groups who suffered injustice in the past but that still suffer from injustice in the present, this is what he calls an enduring injustice. An enduring injustice has a historical and contemporary component (Spinner-Halev 2012: 58), which means that, although all enduring injustices are also historical injustices, the opposite

is not true: not all historical injustices persist today and, in addition, not all present injustices are enduring injustices. Many immigrants, Spinner-Halev argues, have suffered injustices in the past, but this injustice is not an enduring one if their children or grandchildren do not suffer them. Similarly, the Huguenots in France suffered great injustices centuries ago, but today they have recovered of such injustices. These are historic injustices.

An injustice is an enduring one when we can tell a story that allows us to tie past injustices with the present ones. There is a causality argument that, although in some cases it can be hard to prove, in many others it allows us to explain the present injustice. This is the case of African-Americans in the USA as well as many indigenous peoples whose misery was caused by how State policies excluded them and treated them harshly[47].

Drawing the link between present injustices and past injustices helps us understand why and which past injustices need attention today. The answer does not lie in the fact that history has been unjust for some groups, nor in the need to compensate for past wrongs. Rather, it is because their present is also unjust and, furthermore, unless we are able to change the course of action, the future also appears to be unjust for them. What really matters, Spinner-Halev argues, is to "begin with present injustices, trace them backward and then project them forward" (2012: 56).

We are still missing, however, to explain how the historical injustice has endured through time to the extent that it is the main cause of how social groups are positioned today. This is because they go through a normalization process which makes us believe that differences in social positions are normal and that the position that social groups acquire is not rooted in past injustices.

According to Young, a normalization process consists on a set of social processes where the experiences and capacities of the dominant social segment are elevated as standards used to judge everybody. During this process, the attributes, characteristics, values, or ways of life that are exhibited by the majoritarian dominant culture appear to be "normal" and, in addition, are qualified as being the "best". The effect of this is that other people who do not

[47] But, despite this, we do not know what would have happened had this not occurred. We cannot know if indigenous ways of life would be more authentic or if they would have assimilated anyway, but maybe in a less harmful way. But, in any case, we can suppose that their position today would be different and better.

fit these attributes or fail to conform to these standards due to their bodily capacities, their membership to cultural groups, their group-specific socialized habits, or ways of life, tend to suffer stigmatization and disadvantage (Young, 2006a: 95).

According to the politics of positional difference, groups are relational, ambiguous, shifting, and without clear borders. In addition, they are contextualized, which means that group differences "will be more or less salient depending on the groups compared, the purposes of the comparison, and the point of view of the comparers" (Young 1990: 171). Finally, the positions of these groups are able to be explained according to stories of injustice and oppression that occurred in past events. These past events allow us to understand why groups are better or worst positioned and allows us to make judgments of injustice due to inequalities among different individuals belonging to different social groups.

On account of the politics of difference, what is required is to offer institutional conditions so that every person is capable of developing their capacities and exercising their full rights as citizens (Young 1990: 39). This requires the identification of structures that constrain peoples' life opportunities due to their membership to disadvantaged social groups, followed by introducing policies and strategies that will allow social transformations.

The framework just developed here, explains the current situation that indigenous peoples are facing today and, furthermore, offers a plausible explanation of the inequalities they suffer compared to non-indigenous. Indigenous groups, in short, share insights of both cultural and positional approaches, precisely because the former leads to the latter. In these cases, claims of justice require a hybrid model which puts together both approaches, and which will be presented in the following chapter.

In similar terms, Castles (2007:25) has argued that a multicultural public policy should have two dimensions, one which he calls *recognition of cultural diversity*, and another one which he calls *social equality for members of minorities*. The former would require developing social spaces for intercultural communication and accommodation and, moreover, to adapt institutions, institutional structures and practices in such a way as to remove all cultural biases.

On the other hand, social equality for members of minorities requires actions by the state in order to ensure that members of minority groups enjoy equal opportunities for participating in all areas of society. Here, Castles claims, education is extremely important because it is what provides access to other opportunities and to social and economic outcomes (25). The educational issue will be retaken in the last chapter. What is important here is to highlight the fact that in certain societies, multicultural models need to make an important emphasis in these two dimensions. Balancing properly these two dimensions is not an easy task and many problems can emerge, some which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

The final section of this chapter will be focused on drawing some boundaries in the scope of multiculturalism. Young's distinction between different versions of the politics of difference suggests that multiculturalism is only suitable for addressing claims of justice of some certain groups –cultural groups–, but many groups are both cultural and positional. These groups need a set of different and complex responses.

However, not all positional groups fall within the category of cultural groups, and this is important in order to distinguish positional groups that also fall within the scope of multiculturalism from those that are merely positional. This is especially important in the case of Modood's version of multiculturalism. By mentioning some problems with this theory, the final section of this chapter will argue that there is a need for setting boundaries regarding the scope of multiculturalism.

6. Multiculturalism and Its Boundaries. A Comment on Modood's Theory of Multiculturalism

As it has been presented in the previous chapters, there is a common concern among scholars with the fact that multiculturalism has failed to address the challenges posed by diversity in different societies worldwide. Some of these concerns are fueled by a misunderstanding of the whole principles of multiculturalism, which has already been mentioned to a great extent. However, these concerns are also fueled by the fact that too many expectations have been put in multiculturalism.

It is currently expected that multiculturalism solves most of the problems related with all sorts of diversity. Fraser (1997), for instance, takes for granted that sexual minorities fit within the scope of multiculturalism; and Cantle (2016) argues that multiculturalism has failed to address the situation of gays, lesbians, women, and the disabled. Despite this, it will be argued in this section that these groups do not fall within the scope of multiculturalism. The tendency has been to expect multiculturalism to solve the situation of many social groups and then blame it for failing. However, it needs to be recalled that multiculturalism is only expected to solve the situation of some groups, concretely, cultural groups.

In reality, however, it is not as easy as it seems to distinguish cultural groups from positional groups because, as it has been said before, usually oppressed social groups suffer from both types of injustice, at least to some degree of intensity. Cultural groups are often also positional groups. Their cultural difference is what justifies their rejection by the dominant culture and what explains their position in society. It all might be a matter of intensity and in the sources of oppression, but cultural groups will usually suffer some oppression which will make them also positional groups.

However, not all positional groups are cultural groups. And those groups which are merely positional should not fall within the scope of multiculturalism. This will be argued in the following paragraphs by analyzing Modood's version of multiculturalism.

Modood's concern is, concretely, the political accommodation of minorities formed by immigration from non-western countries into Western Europe and, still more concretely, into Great Britain. His overall goal is to develop a proper account of multiculturalism which responds to the diversity found in European countries. This is why he starts by arguing that Kymlicka's version of multiculturalism distorts, "even marginalizes, some of the specific contemporary issues in relation to the politics of post-immigration, especially in western Europe" (Modood 2007: 3).

Kymlicka's theory, he argues, "may reflect the Canadian or North American provenance […] and Kymlicka's own political concerns with the rights of Native North American and Quebecois but they do not properly speak to the distinctive, multicultural political challenges in Britain and western Europe more generally" (34). Furthermore, he argues that this theory excludes, or at least marginalizes the status and concerns of post-immigration ethnic and

religious minorities. By granting more attention and more generous rights to national minorities than to polyethnic groups, he accuses Kymlicka's multiculturalism from having a "multinational bias" (Modood 2007: 33-35).

Modood's critique of Kymlicka's multiculturalism is embedded in the work of Bhikhu Parekh (2000). In this regard, he argues that the first mistake that Kymlicka does is to frame his theory under the liberal tradition and, hence, to embrace liberal values such as individual autonomy and choice, for which a societal culture is needed in order to secure both. This, Modood argues, is an inadequate start for a theory of post-immigration multiculturalism because ethnic minorities lack a societal culture (Modood 2007: 35).

Consequently, Modood makes a shift in the normative starting point for his theory of multiculturalism and adopts, as a starting point, what he calls "the politics of recognition of difference or respect for identities that are important to people" (Modood 2007: 35). According to this starting point, the cultures need not be societal, but must be cultures or identities that matter to people who are marked negatively by difference. These negative markers are the cause of alienation, inferiorization, stigmatization, stereotyping, exclusion, and discrimination (Modood, 2007: 35-39).

This negative difference is formed by "the sense of identity that groups so perceived have of themselves" (Modood 2007:37). Based on Taylor's ideas, Modood argues that this difference is perceived by both the outsiders of the group and by the inside out. This makes difference the basis of discrimination, alienness, or inferiority, which diminishes equal membership in the wider society. Modood insists that, rather than talking about cultures, we should talk about differences because the difference is not only constituted from the "inside", from "the side of a minority culture, but also from the outside, from the representations and treatment of the minorities in question" (39).

This version of multiculturalism is concerned with understanding how collectivities are being targeted and about generating collective responses to overcome these targets. Modood's multiculturalism is not about culture per se, but about turning the negative and stigmatic status of people marked by difference into a positive feature of societies. This means that "multiculturalism is characterized by the challenging, the dismantling and the remaking of public identities" (41- 43).

In short, Modood's version of multiculturalism can be summarized as follows:

> it begins with a concept of negative difference and seeks the goal of positive difference and the means to achieve it, which crucially involve the appreciation of the fact of multiplicity and groupness, the building of group pride amongst those marked by negative difference, and political engagement with the source of negativity and racism. This suggests neither separatism nor assimilation but an accommodative form of integration […]. This is justified by an extended concept of equality, not just equal dignity but also equal respect. While the focus is not on anything so narrow as normally understood by "culture", and multicultural equality cannot be achieved without other forms of equality […], its distinctive feature is about the inclusion into and the making of a shared public space in terms of equality of respect as well as equal dignity (Modood 2007:61-62).

With this in mind, in what follows, it will be argued that Modood's version of multiculturalism is actually a version of the politics of positional difference, where its main focus is, precisely, to challenge the disadvantaged positions that some social groups have acquired due to a complex set of relations of oppression.

For arguing this, we need to recall that Modood is: 1) concerned with ethnic and religious minorities who descended from non-western immigrants, and 2) committed to develop a theory of multiculturalism for these groups. Nevertheless, it is to be also recalled that these groups constitute a category in Kymlicka's typology of ethnocultural rights. The question is, then, in what way is Modood's multiculturalism different from Kymlicka's?

Indeed, according to Kymlicka, polyethnic groups do not usually have the option of engaging in a nation-building project because they tend to be too small and dispersed, furthermore, they do not seem to seek forms of territorial autonomy. Typically, members of these groups intend to integrate into the larger cultural majority. What they seek, as mentioned already, are fair terms of their inclusion and this is why, under Kymlicka's framework, these groups do not enjoy autonomy rights as they do enjoy other types of group differentiated rights.

But Modood is unsatisfied with this answer and, furthermore, his intention is to offer a proper and different version of multiculturalism for these groups. In what way, it must be asked, can this be different? A plausible answer is that Modood's actual concern is not so much negotiating fair terms of inclusion, but rather overcoming the institutional discrimination and the varied forms of oppression that these groups suffer.

This seems more obvious when he claims that multiculturalism ought to be more concerned with tackling stereotypes, prejudices and forms of discrimination. Overall, it seems as if his main concern is the way cultural differences have led to positional differences. And if this is correct, his multiculturalism is intended to address groups that are both cultural and positional.

But although these seem to be Modood's intentions, his theory faces an important normative problem: it lacks non-arbitrary criteria to define the groups it is concerned with. That is, when Modood argues that his version of multiculturalism is concerned with *cultures or identities that matter to people who are marked negatively by difference* he can include, as he does, cultural groups such as cultural or religious minorities –Muslims or Sikhs, who's cultural differences have led to positional differences. But this can also include sexual minorities, the disabled or even women who, indeed, fall within the scope of the politics of difference but it is not clear that they fall within the scope of cultural difference (at least not in the terms of cultural differences we are adopting here).

Excepting the fact of intersectionality where, for instance, Muslim women can be both a cultural and positional group as well as Black women, feminists' claims in general, just as sexual minorities and disabled, have little insights of cultural groups. Their claims of justice fall within the scope of positional difference. But according to Modoods multiculturalism, these groups would also fall within its scope because they are groups of people who share an identity marked by negative connotations. Furthermore, because of their differences and their failure to conform to the standards of the dominant culture, they suffer from exclusion, discrimination, domination, etc.

Modood's multiculturalism faces the problem of being unclear with what type of groups and injustices it is concerned with. We know that he is not concerned with how cultural groups should negotiate fair terms of their inclusion to the majoritarian culture, because this would be similar to what Kymlicka has already developed, and Modood has shown his discomfort with it. So there seems to be two options: either he is concerned with: a) how groups of people who do not conform to the dominant cultural group suffer injustices due to a history of relations of oppression; or b) in arguing that people's identities must be respected and celebrated because these have an intrinsic value.

But whichever the answer is, the fact that he is concerned with identities that are important to people, weakens his theory because, just as Jung argues, we lack the evidence to know that there is a unique relationship between culture and identity and, furthermore, that this relationship is stronger than other forms of identity. And, as a result, his theory turns out to be too ambitious because if we owe protection to bonds that people are deeply attached to, how can we stop with culture? Because intense preferences are everywhere, this logic can be extended to many other forms of affiliation that may mediate individual identity, which could include all sorts of markers such as race, religion, sexuality, class, profession, etc. (Jung 2008:15).

That is, we lack non-arbitrary reasons to argue that cultural and religious identity is stronger than any other kind of identity. In fact, we have no way to know that religious identity plays a more important role to fans of a football club than their membership to this sports association. And, as a consequence, this theory of multiculturalism takes distance from cultural groups and culture-based demands.

What this shows is that there must be boundaries in the type of groups that multiculturalism is concerned with, and it must be clear that this will depend on the way groups are conformed and on the nature of their demands. We cannot expect the disabled to fall within the scope of multiculturalism because they are not cultural groups –in the terms of the politics of cultural difference– neither by the way they are conformed, nor by their claims of justice, and the same applies to sexual minorities[48].

The task of identifying groups that fall within the scope of multiculturalism –despite the fact that they might also fall within the scope of positional differences– must be done in concrete terms, and one must take into account what has been argued through this whole chapter: first, the type of groups we are facing. This implies analyzing the way these groups are conformed, their situation of disadvantage compared to other groups, and if there is a structural story that explains this disadvantage. Secondly, the nature of their demands, whether they are demands of cultural recognition, accommodation or fair terms of their inclusion; or whether they are

[48] Although Fraser (1997 and 2000), for instance, conceives sexual minorities to fit within the scope of multiculturalism because they are groups that are culturally different. However, the concept of culture she uses is rather different than the one we are using in multiculturalism. In the next chapter an analysis of Fraser's Recognition-Redistribution dilemma will be made, where more about this will be said.

demands of substantial equality, nondiscrimination and, overall, of challenging the social hierarchies.

Indigenous peoples in Mexico, it has been argued, fall within both versions of the politics of difference. They are both cultural and positional groups. In Kymlicka's terms, these are hard cases, or *sui generis* groups, in similar terms than African-Americans. And according to their complex historical situation, a model is needed which addresses issues of ethnocultural justice and of social justice. This model will be elaborated in the next chapter, which will be presented as Latin American Interculturalism.

CHAPTER 5- PRESENTING LATIN-AMERICAN INTERCULTURALISM

5.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter it was argued that while indigenous peoples in Mexico do not fit within the ethnocultural typology offered by Kymlicka, this does not mean that multiculturalism is not an adequate framework for this society. Although it was argued that we must not abandon multiculturalism, given the complex situation that indigenous peoples in Mexico are facing, we also need to consider another dimension of the injustice that affects them, which is that of positional differences.

It was argued that indigenous peoples in Mexico face cultural and positional injustice in an intense and interrelated way and, as a consequence, any model of multiculturalism needs to attend both sources of injustice in order to be successful. A set of complex strategies are required which, although they have not been totally developed, we have a precedent of them in the work developed by Fidel Tubino.

Indeed, although in previous chapters it was argued that Latin American interculturalism, as presented until now, has not proven to be an alternative version to multiculturalism and, furthermore, it does not seem to offer any novelty not contemplated already in the different accounts of liberal multiculturalism, Fidel Tubino's work does not seem to diverge from the principles of multiculturalism and, furthermore, seems to be compatible with the model intended to be developed in this chapter. This version of interculturalism is presented by Tubino as "critical interculturalism".

Critical interculturalism opposes to what Tubino calls "functional interculturalism", which emerged from the indigenous mobilizations of the last decades. Functional interculturalism is focused on the *revalorization* and strengthening of ethnic identities, including the defense of ancestral territory and intercultural and bilingual education (2007: 4-5). Functional interculturalism is the basis of the discourse of autonomy education which was presented in Chapter 1.

For Tubino, the problem with functional interculturalism is that it is based on inaccurate principles which, rather than promoting social justice, they ignore it. By focusing on the need of recognizing cultural differences it neglects other sorts of injustices, that citizens who belong to cultural minorities suffer. Moreover, it does not challenge the postcolonial system and the social hierarchies imposed by it (6).

By being focused on strengthening and revaluing indigenous identities, indigenous movements and the literature supporting these have failed to see and understand the legitimate demands of indigenous peoples (1). Additionally, Tubino argues that there is no reason to defend the conservation of languages and cultures as an end. Cultures do not possess "a timeless essence that must be "saved" from external influence. They are temporal, changing, realities in process; change is their essence" (2013: 611). By trying to revive these cultures, we are falling to "a nostalgic call for a return to an idealized past that never existed" (2013: 618).

Interculturalism, he argues, should not aim to conserve the essence of aboriginal cultures because cultures are changing realities (2013: 611). In fact, he argues that the idea of *folklorization* –which is the tendency to view culture as an intrinsic value worthy of protection– is "banalization, trivialization, and the reduction of a culture to its external expressions" (2013: 616).

According to Tubino, this approach of interculturalism as *folklorization* must be abandoned and replaced by what he calls critical interculturalism, which is a project that seeks, what he defines as, social transformation. A project that seeks gradual restructuring of the general framework of society (2007: 8). Critical interculturalism, in Tubino's words, seeks to develop a critical theory of recognition which not only attends cultural differences, but also challenges the way in which social groups have been positioned, which resembles with what was defined previously regarding positional difference.

This account of interculturalism points to the "need of a radical restructuring of the historically pronounced uneven relations of wealth and power that have existed between Europeans and their descendants, on the one hand, and indigenous and other subordinated groups, on the other hand during the last half millennium" (Sinnigen, 2013: 605). These relations have been characterized by an ongoing process of conquest, exploitation, and

resistance of the indigenous peoples. Interculturalism calls for the need of creating the necessary conditions for "a new social configuration that allows historically marginalized indigenous groups and others, primarily Afro-Latinos, to pursue cultural, political and economic equality in nations refounded on an anti-colonial basis" (Sinnigen, 2013: 605).

These ideas are not totally defined nor developed in the work of Fidel Tubino, there are still many inconsistencies, mainly, as mentioned in previous chapters, with how he understands multiculturalism. However, the principles that define critical interculturalism seem to be compatible with the principles of multiculturalism defined in the previous chapter. To be clear, it rejects the idea of cultural neutrality because of the damages that this liberal ideal has brought to minority groups. Consequently, it rejects the nation-state model, and in fact, it strongly argues in favor of rethinking this model overall. And finally, it argues that cultural minorities must be properly recognized and included into the national narratives, concretely, he advocates for a multicultural state (Tubino, 2013: 608).

Furthermore, Tubino seems to agree even in the most contested point of Kymlicka's multiculturalism –and overall of the liberal tradition– which is the defense of personal autonomy. Indeed, he argues that critical interculturalism must enable citizens to choose their own culture. Citizens must be free to choose their own beliefs, traditions, practices, and the possibility to also question them and reject them (2007: 7). Intercultural citizens, Tubino argues, must have the right to construct their own cultural identity and not to be restricted to reproduce the cultural identity that has been inherited. This is compatible with liberal versions of multiculturalism which defend personal autonomy and choice. So, after all, it might be the case that Tubino's account of interculturalism is not incompatible nor different than multiculturalism, at least on its principles.

The version of interculturalism defended by Fidel Tubino is an appropriate starting point for the version of interculturalism intended to be developed in this chapter. This is because it is compatible with the principles of multiculturalism and, furthermore, it acknowledges that the diversity found in the Latin-American region is rather complex due to the two sources of injustice analyzed in the previous chapter. Social and ethnocultural justice in these societies, that is, require remedies for both cultural and positional differences, but neither of these should be relegated nor obscured by the other.

In this chapter a three-dimensional project will be presented, composed by the following perspectives: equality perspective, indigenous perspective and intercultural perspective. Each of these dimensions will be presented and analyzed in turn, but before doing that, it is necessary to make some remarks regarding the theoretical background of this three-dimensional project.

2. Latin American Interculturalism and Mainstream Equality

In the previous chapters liberal multiculturalism was presented as a theory concerned with the relations of the minorities and the state. It was shown that multiculturalism emerges from the complex and diverse reactions that minorities might have when facing the nation-building project.

But multiculturalism must also be understood as part of a major project, that is, as part of the liberating social movements that emerged in the 1960s and which questioned and challenged the different relations of oppression existing between dominant cultures and dominated minorities (Kymlicka 2013: 4). These social movements proclaimed that an emphasis on non-discrimination was not enough in order to liberate minorities from their oppressed situation, stressing the need to go beyond non-discrimination, into an era of recognition and accommodation of difference[49].

As a response to the mobilizations of minority groups, multiculturalism takes part in the greater task of redefining social relations, concretely, those related with ethnocultural groups and which include turning the catalogue of uncivil and illiberal relations into liberal-democratic citizenship (Kymlicka 2013: 6). That is, to reshape the institutions in a way in which they accommodate differential claims of minorities, which explains the different multicultural policies that form part of a multicultural agenda. These policies, which were described in previous chapters, are the means through which multiculturalism seeks "to convert older hierarchies into new relations of liberal democratic citizenship" (Kymlicka

[49] Tully argues that the politics of recognition is a concept used to describe the different political struggles for the appropriate forms of political recognition and accommodation of different social and national minorities (2000)

2013: 6), and because of this common goal with the claims of other social groups, these struggles have borrowed arguments and strategies from each other.

Many liberation movements share common concerns and symptoms and, as a consequence, they face similar challenges. But liberation movements and their theorizing have progressed, until very recently, in parallel ways and sometimes pulling in different directions. However, within gender theory some scholars have come to recognize that it makes "no sense to look at gender equality in isolation from other forms of equality. Equality can no longer be considered in isolation from diversity" (Squires 2005: 367). Furthermore, some recent developments in gender theory can be equally accessible and applicable to other areas and fields (Booth and Bennett 2002: 431).

It makes sense that we seek to extrapolate some strategies and arguments used to achieve gender equality to the field of ethnocultural justice. Especially, those debates that have been fruitfully discussed in what has been called gender mainstreaming and the different strategies used to achieve gender equality.

Gender mainstreaming is a policy adopted especially by the European Union to "promote equality between men and women in all activities and policies at all levels" (Booth and Bennett 2002: 430). It is a deliberate and systematic approach that seeks to incorporate a gender perspective in all procedures and policies (Hankivsky 2004). What will be analyzed here is not the different debates that this strategy and its implementation have created, but some normative arguments that have been used to advance this strategy. Especially, what is relevant for the aims of this chapter is to acknowledge some challenges that have emerged in the field of gender equality because, as it will be shown, they are similar to the ones that can emerge from the model presented next.

For the moment, however, what needs to be said before presenting the three-dimensional project is that the former has been inspired by an approach which considers that gender mainstreaming will only achieve its potential if it is viewed as a set of complementary and cumulative strategies. Under this approach, gender mainstreaming appears as a project for achieving gender equality that uses different strategies, which Squires has identified as inclusion, reversal, and displacement (2005: 366-373).

These strategies correspond to different conceptions of gender equality, that is, the equality perspective, the difference perspective, and the diversity perspective. The strategy of inclusion aims to include women where they have been historically excluded, to include women in the –until now– male domain (Squires 1999: 123). In contrast, the strategy of reversal seeks to revalue what has been devaluated and to recognize what has been traditionally excluded. It seeks to reverse the way men and women have been positioned and re-center political theory around women. That is, to put women in the center (Squires 2001: 11-12). Finally, the strategy of displacement seeks to deconstruct gender itself. Rather than re-centering political theory around female, it seeks to "decenter political theory with respect to gender altogether" (Squires 2001:12).

The displacement strategy entails a transformation of the norms and structures, but for this to be possible it is necessary to highlight the ways in which institutions, policies, and laws perpetuate inequalities by privileging particular norms (Squires 2005: 369). Because of the transformative potential of this strategy, it has been argued that here is where gender mainstreaming lies (Squires 2005 and Verloo 2005). But neither of these strategies can be successful on its own, and even though gender mainstreaming might be located in the displacement strategy, the complementary approach of gender mainstreaming that is being used here, suggests that the three strategies are required in order to achieve gender equality and, furthermore, in order to achieve the transformative potential of gender mainstreaming (Squires 2005 and Booth and Bennett 2002). In this regard, Squires has argued that mainstreaming should be viewed as a broad strategy which incorporates all three perspectives when and as appropriate.

Booth and Bennett (2002) have suggested that the mainstreaming strategy is dependent of three important supports: the equal treatment perspective, the women's perspective, and the gender perspective. By using a "three-legged equality stool" metaphor, they argue that gender equality can only be achieved by implementing, simultaneously and in different degrees, these three strategies, according to different situations and contexts.

According to this concept, the equal treatment perspective –which is coherent with the inclusion strategy named by Squires– is concerned with actions that guarantee women the same rights and opportunities as men. The women's perspective recognizes that women are

a disadvantaged group which requires special provisions in order to rectify past experiences of discrimination that have become institutionalized. Finally, the gender perspective promotes actions that seek the transformation of the way society is organized, that is, to a fairer distribution of human responsibilities (433-435). However, under this perspective the focus shifts from women to gender, because for a fairer distribution of human responsibilities to be possible, what is needed is also to transform men's roles. Furthermore, this approach also moves away from the model of women as a homogeneous group and it recognizes that women are diverse, attending to other factors such as class, age, race, ethnicity, and so on. (438)[50].

What is useful of these developments is the idea that gender equality can only be achieved by combining a set of different strategies which, rather than being incompatible, they are complementary. This is something also discussed by Sandra Fredman (2016: 713-714). According to her, substantive equality requires abandoning the idea of embracing one single principle of equality, as it has usually been discussed by liberals. Because inequalities are multifaceted in nature, Fredman suggests a four-dimensional approach to substantial equality, consisting in 1) redressing disadvantage; 2) addressing stigma, stereotyping, prejudice, and violence; 3) enhancing voice and participation; and 4) the accommodation of difference in order to achieve structural change.

Following these ideas, and because of the complexity of the situation of indigenous peoples in Latin American societies, both by how they are composed and the type of demands they are claiming, it will be suggested that any multicultural model for these societies must incorporate different, cumulative, and complementary strategies in order to achieve ethnocultural justice. This does not mean, however, that conditions allow for *simply* exporting the strategies that have been used for achieving gender equality, but it allows us to borrow and adjust some arguments that have been used in feminist circles.

3. Presenting Latin American Interculturalism

[50] Others who agree that gender equality can only be achieved through a complementary set of strategies are Lombardo and Meier (2006), Verloo (2005).

In what follows, Latin American interculturalism will be presented as a three-dimensional project, consisting in an equality perspective, an indigenous perspective, and an intercultural perspective.

These strategies will group together the different demands and needs that indigenous peoples in Mexico are raising. The equality perspective will group all demands that seek to achieve equality of opportunities and a fairer distribution of goods and resources. For that, and because these demands are framed under a distributive framework, it will be argued that the equality strategy seeks precisely to level up the playing field through different measures and actions that are characterized for being group-target policies.

The indigenous perspective will group those demands that seek recognition and proper accommodation of cultural differences. This perspective is framed under a classic multicultural rhetoric and, hence, advocates for group differentiated rights that need not be solely territorial autonomy rights but can also include fair terms of inclusion into the public institutions. Concretely, this dimension seeks to incorporate an indigenous perspective into the way institutions are shaped.

Finally, the intercultural perspective puts together those demands that seek to go beyond a *simple* inclusion of the indigenous perspectives in the State institutions and in the policy making processes. What this perspective should pursue, in addition, is to change the attitude of members of the majoritarian culture towards indigenous cultures and the activities that these groups value.

While it can be perceived that these perspectives follow different logics, it will be noticed that they intermingle and conflate to the extent that it is not always easy to disseminate them. Hence, it must be kept in mind that in any of these perspectives we are always dealing with groups who suffer from cultural misrecognition and from structural disadvantages. These different strategies must be seen as an integral project and not in isolation.

a) Equality Perspective

It has already been mentioned that most liberation movements emerged in the 1960s and so on with the concern that the basic set of civil and political rights were not being enough to achieve substantial equality. These movements, however, did not neglect that the recognition

and effectiveness of these rights was important, rather, that a formal recognition of these rights was not enough for members of disadvantaged groups to enjoy them. Concretely, that the principle of non-discrimination and difference-blindness were preventing members of certain disadvantaged groups from enjoying the whole set of civil and political rights and from having access to equality of opportunities.

This is the rhetoric where affirmative action programs are embedded in, and it's the same rhetoric where the equality perspective is located. According to this perspective indigenous peoples come to appear as disadvantaged groups. Here, we are not moving under a framework of cultural differences, neither are we concerned with the way in which these differences are accommodated. We are mostly concerned with the disadvantages that members of these groups face in terms of access to, and distribution of, resources and equality of opportunities.

The typical way we have to redress these disadvantages is through affirmative action programs, which were analyzed in chapter 2. There, it was mentioned the different ways in which affirmative action programs have been justified. Most of these justifications are embedded in identifying justice as a fair distribution of goods, resources, and opportunities.

Lepinard has argued that, although these programs are limited in scope, they can be pinned to a major social justice project and, overall, to a transformative project (2014). For this, affirmative action programs must form part of a discourse of social justice and, furthermore, must be complemented by other strategies that seek a social transformation. This is why it must be considered that the equality perspective is only useful to the extent that it forms part of a three-dimensional project.

However, the equality perspective is not limited to affirmative action programs, it also encompasses other special programs that intend to provide indigenous citizens with equality of opportunities and, rather than being catalogued as affirmative action programs, they are better captured as policies targeting specific groups.

For instance, the second part of article 2 of the Mexican Constitution establishes that State institutions must provide equality of opportunities and seek to eliminate institutional discrimination, for which special programs and policies must be enabled. An example of

these special programs are the special vaccination campaigns for indigenous children, or the special nutritional campaigns that are often enabled by the government.

In addition, this perspective is concerned with some of the following demands and commitments that both the indigenous organizations and the Federal Government signed in 1996, and which currently form part of the Constitutional text: To impulse and strengthen the local economy where indigenous communities are settled; increase schooling levels of indigenous students, which also involves enabling special programs for scholarships and funding; special health and housing campaigns; more budget designated at building better roads and highways which can communicate remote indigenous communities to the nearer major cities, among others.

Drawing on the different strategies used in gender theory, it could be argued that the equality perspective operates under a strategy of inclusion because it *simply* seeks to add indigenous citizens into the dominant terrain. In the field of gender, under this perspective what is problematized is the exclusion of women, and the solution is to extend dominant values to all, regardless of their gender (Verloo 2005: 346). Similarly, what is problematized for the equality perspective is the exclusion of indigenous peoples and what is required is to espouse equality politics.

Because under this perspective it is argued that "no individual should have fewer human rights or opportunities than any other" (Rees 1998: 29), any cultural difference –or difference in general– should be irrelevant for the distribution of goods and resources and for pursuing life opportunities. To the extent that this is not achieved, special actions are required. But the final goal of this perspective is that when distributing goods and resources, any cultural difference should be irrelevant.

Following the four-dimensional concept of substantial equality proposed by Fredman, this dimension is similar to the first one, which she calls "redressing disadvantage", where she suggests that the first step for achieving substantial equality is, indeed, tackling inequalities understood in socio-economic terms (2016: 728-730).

Finally, the different actions that must be adopted under the equality perspective allow us to think of this perspective as a corrective remedy. In this regard, for instance, Fraser has argued

that these remedies intent to correct "inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework that generates them" (Fraser 1995: 82). It is true that this perspective is a very limited one and does not attack the sources of inequalities. Nevertheless, when taken as part of an integral project, this perspective plays an important role, as it will become clear in the next pages.

b) Indigenous Perspective

Under this perspective it is acknowledged that it is insufficient to simply include indigenous citizens into the institutions already shaped by the dominant culture, because this implies expecting indigenous citizens to assimilate to a culture that has always been hostile and, furthermore, because it puts indigenous citizens at a disadvantage by failing to conform to the standards imposed by the majoritarian culture. What this perspective focuses on is on recognizing and accommodating cultural differences[51].

Typically, this perspective should adopt a more multicultural discourse of group differentiated rights. Indeed, under this perspective we can address demands such as the recognition of the indigenous legal systems in order to solve their internal conflicts; respect and recognition of their own electoral processes within their own communities; special provisions in criminal proceedings, such as the right of a translator and the consideration of their different practices; special seats reserved in the representative bodies, and so on.

These set of rights, which are recognized in the Constitution, in principle fall within the scope of group differentiated rights proposed by the liberal multiculturalist account, defended mainly by Kymlicka. And in Mexico, there are some indigenous groups that are exercising these rights. For instance, the Purepecha Community of San Francisco Cherán has recently won a trial where their right to elect their own representatives through their traditional processes has been recognized (Aragón Andrade 2015: 73).

Although this is a case of territorial autonomy, not all the group differentiated rights recognized to indigenous peoples follow this logic. Some of the rights that fall within this

[51] Cruz Rodríguez, Edwin. 2013b; González Galván, Jorge Alberto. 2010; Ibarra Palafox, F., 2005; Kymlicka, Will. 2011; Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. 2004; Taylor, Charles. 1994; Tubino, Fidel. 2001; Villoro, Luis. 2010; Young, Iris Marion. 1990 and 2007;

perspective consist in rights for fair terms of their inclusion, which is an important distinction from Kymlicka's models of group differentiated rights. As it was shown in the previous chapter, usually indigenous peoples –as national minorities– seek forms of territorial autonomy, while ethnic minorities seek fair terms of their inclusion. But in Mexico, it was said in the previous chapter, we find both types of demands. As a consequence, this perspective should include both sorts of group differentiated rights: territorial autonomy –when justified and required– and fair terms of inclusion.

An example of this was already offered in Chapter 1, but it is useful to mention it again here. Article 2 of the Constitution recognizes the indigenous criminal systems and recognizes the right of the indigenous communities to solve their internal conflicts according to such legal system (González Galván, 2010). Here we are on the presence of an autonomy right, concretely, the right to apply their own punishment legal system.

But additionally, this same article recognizes the right of indigenous members to access to the state legal system and recognizes special rights of due process for indigenous citizens who are facing a criminal proceeding, which are intended to provide an equal trial due to their cultural differences. These special provisions are: a) to have their practices –*usos y costumbres*– acknowledged; b) to be assisted by an attorney who is knowledgeable of the cultural specificities and c) to be assisted by a translator who is knowledgeable of the cultural specificities and of the indigenous language in question (González Galván 2010: 279). These second set of rights fall within the scope of rights of fair terms of their inclusion, which would be the second dimension of the indigenous perspective.

It must be ensured that an indigenous perspective is always considered when adopting decisions that concern, not only indigenous communities and citizens directly, but also indirectly. In this regard, for instance, one of the main complaints of the indigenous uprising back in 1994 was the fact that the Federal Government had signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) not only not consulting indigenous communities, but even ignoring the consequences that this trade would have in their lives, activities, and their means of production (Pérez 2007: 6-9). Incorporating an indigenous perspective in all decision-making processes might bring better outcomes for indigenous peoples and, furthermore, might contribute to redress the relations between the State and the indigenous communities.

Summarizing, the indigenous perspective focuses on how State institutions should recognize and accommodate indigenous differences. The latter is suggested in two ways: one, by recognizing autonomy rights to some indigenous communities which, by still preserving their cultural structure, fit under the typology of indigenous peoples offered by Kymlicka. And secondly, by including in fair terms the indigenous narratives and cultural differences. Here it is assumed that we can no longer expect indigenous citizens to assimilate into the dominant cultural practices. Rather, we must be willing also to change the way institutions are shaped in order to incorporate an indigenous perspective.

Patten argues that an identity is recognized in the public sphere when public institutions are designed in a way that they fit or reflect, at least to some degree, the character of such identity. Two or more identities are recognized equally when the same kinds of institutional or jurisdictional resources and spaces are devoted equally to the recognition of two or more identities (Patten 2000: 196-197). Through recognizing group differentiated rights, which can be either territorial autonomy rights or fair terms of inclusion, the indigenous perspective seeks to achieve the recognition of minority cultures in public institutions, in the terms described by Patten.

Of course, this does not mean that in practice there will not be problems regarding how to include this indigenous perspective. It was argued previously that there are many different indigenous cultures through all the country, which directly affects the way we incorporate an indigenous perspective. The question which immediately emerges is which indigenous culture to incorporate? At this level of analysis, no single answer can be provided, but this might not be so problematic for Mexico given the fact that, because it is a Federation, member states have their own jurisdictions in order to make the adjustments that better suit their situation.

It could be said that the indigenous perspective works under a similar logic than the reversal strategy referred to by Squires (1999: 119-123; Squires 2005: 368-369). This, because it seeks to revalue that which has been devalued and recognizing that which has been traditionally excluded. It rejects the existing norms and suggests replacing them for new ones that are decentered from the dominant culture.

Additionally, it is also consistent with one of the dimensions suggested by Fredman, which is the accommodation of difference to achieve structural change (2016:713). According to her, substantive equality recognizes that characteristics such as race, ethnicity, nationality, etc. are valuable for people's identity and, hence, these should be properly recognized and accommodated. However, the concern is not directly in protecting these cultural differences, but the detriment that is usually attached to such difference. The goal should be to remove the detriment attached with difference, but not necessarily the difference per se (734-735).

In short, the indigenous perspective intents to reverse the way institutions are designed, in order to incorporate an indigenous perspective. Pinned together with the following perspective, it will be argued that this model can offer potential transformations.

c) Intercultural Perspective

As mentioned before, Fidel Tubino argues that critical interculturalism is not interested with revaluing and strengthening indigenous cultures because these do not have an intrinsic value. Rather, it should seek to overthrow stereotypes and prejudices, and in general the relations of oppression that members of minority groups suffer, especially indigenous peoples. However, this does not mean that indigenous identities are not important. In fact, these identities must be strengthened and transformed from a marker of discrimination, exclusion, and marginalization, to a marker of pride, that is, to something similar to an indigenous pride. This is why he advocates for the need of turning negative connotations associated with difference into positive ones (Tubino 2013: 617), which resembles one of the most prominent points of Modood's theory of multiculturalism (see Chapter 4).

Indeed, Modood argues that multiculturalism "begins with a concept of negative difference and seeks the goal of positive difference and the means to achieve it, which crucially involve the appreciation of the fact of multiplicity and groupness, the building of group pride amongst those marked by negative difference, and political engagement with the source of negativity and racism" (Modood 2007: 61).

However, both Modood and Tubino seem to fail in offering normative basis for their idea of "turning negative differences into positive features of society". After all, what does this mean and how can this be achieved through public policies? Furthermore, what is the objective

with such transformation? Both Modood and Tubino remain ambiguous as to what this turning means. This gap will try to be fulfilled here.

A first remark that needs to be done is that when both Modood and Tubino argue that we must turn negative differences into positive assets of society, they are not calling for an indiscriminate celebration of difference nor saying that cultural differences have an intrinsic value. Both scholars agree with Young, in that the need of recognizing cultural differences should be understood as a means to achieve economic and political justice (Young 1997a: 147). What is required is to generate a sense of group pride that will lead to claims of cultural recognition, which serve as a means to achieve, overall, substantial equality. The revaluation of cultural difference, in short, can lead to economic and political justice (Young 1997a:148).

However, the previous two perspectives, under their own scope of application, also serve this goal. As a matter of fact, it was previously argued that the gradual recognition and accommodation of cultural differences can lead to reshaping the way institutions are designed, replacing the relations of domination and oppression to relations of equality. And for this to be possible, corrective remedies are required, which is where the equality perspective comes into play. So, one might ask what the novelty of an intercultural perspective is.

To answer this, we need to recall the "three-legged equality stool" metaphor suggested by Booth and Bennett. As it was mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, these scholars suggest that gender mainstreaming consists in a three-dimensional project formed by an equality perspective, a woman's perspective, and a gender perspective. This last perspective, it was said, promotes actions that seek the transformation of the way society is organized, that is, to a fairer distribution of human responsibilities (433-435). But unlike the other two perspectives, here there is a change of focus: rather than focusing on women and their needs in order to achieve equality, it focuses on gender overall, operating under the assumption that for a fairer distribution of human responsibilities to be possible, a transformation of men's roles is also needed.

To understand this perspective with more precision, and then draw a parallel with the intercultural perspective, we need to dig a little more into what the gender perspective is concerned about and for this, we need to take a closer look into some developments in gender

theory. Most feminists, agree that the exploitation of women is deeply tied to the fact that women do most of the unpaid work of caring (Held 2006, Okin 1989). Femininity, that is, has constructed women as carers (Held 2006: 548).

Traditionally, it is agreed, women are expected to do most of the caring work which is usually unpaid or badly payed, making them less able to engage in paid work than men and this, simultaneously, subordinates women (Okin 1989).

Many feminists have claimed that given this situation, it is required not only to extol caring and its value but also to make a fairer distribution of the tasks of caring in society. And this is the attempt with the gender perspective suggested by Booth and Bennet. Indeed, men need to value the tasks of caring, but in addition, they need to get involved in them for women to be truly equal. According to Held, extolling care and failing to be concerned "with how the burdens of caring are distributed contributes to the exploitation of women" (Held 2006: 548).

By valuing care and making a fair distribution of the burdens of it, feminists suggest, we can get closer to achieve women's liberation. And this is plausible because all human beings are, at some point of their lives, dependent and in need of care. Hence, every member of society, men included, benefits from caring activities. Because the dominant group –men– have also an interest in these activities, valuing them and decentering them from women's responsibilities is required if we are aiming a more equal society.

Now we need to draw a parallel of this logic to the ethnocultural field in order to develop the intercultural perspective. The first thing that needs to be said of this perspective is that it moves away from a direct focus on indigenous peoples. This is the main difference with the other two perspectives which maintain a direct focus on indigenous peoples and advocate for group-target policies.

An intercultural perspective needs to move away from this narrow focus and seek to change the attitude of the dominant culture, which is something that Tubino has already pointed out. In order to improve the situation of the dominated and discriminated, he suggests, we need to change also the attitude of the perpetuators of domination and discrimination (Tubino 2001:193 and 2013: 616).

In short, the first difference of the intercultural perspective in relation to the other two perspectives is in its focus. Although it forms part of a project which is concerned with the way indigenous peoples suffer from injustices and seeks to remedy their situation, it needs to be acknowledged that this will only be possible if, in addition to the previous two perspectives, we are able to also change the attitude of the dominant groups towards the dominated. However, following the logic described above, the way in which we will be able to change the attitude of the dominant group towards the dominated is by appreciating some set of values which characterize the dominated group. That is, we need to change the attitude of the dominant group towards these practices, activities, values, views and cosmologies. This is why it was mentioned above that men need to value caring activities and need to get involved in them.

This change of attitude can be possible if the dominant segment is convinced that it will benefit from valuing these activities. In gender, it appears clear that men benefit from the caring activities and it is on their interest that these activities are valued and respected, moreover, it is in their interest that these activities are performed, and this is why they might be willing to potentially do them.

When men progressively get involved and committed with caring we have immediate positive effects for women. Mainly, that these activities cease to be labeled as activities reserved for women. As a consequence, by appreciating caring activities and making these practices more valuable, it becomes more attractive to both men and women, which helps decentering the whole responsibility of caring. This leads to facilitating the conditions for women to access payed jobs which, as a consequence, contributes to their non-subordination to men. And although men might not see a direct benefit from assuming care responsibilities, the fact is that they also benefit from them and these cannot be simply ignored and undone. Moreover, many men have come to acknowledge that the fact that they participate in these activities is also positive for them, because decentering these activities from women has a corollary, which is to delude the masculine responsibilities of being the main providers, which is intimately related with how masculinity has been constructed and with how men's identities are developed (Messner 1997: 272 and Brandth and Kvande 1998: 299).

This is not to say that men will easily and with no resistance concede in a fairer distribution of caring activities because this implies giving up their privileged position, and this is why still today and for a foreseeable future, women will keep on struggling in this regard. However, for the point stressed out here, in the field of gender equality we can identify certain activities –caring activities– which have traditionally been labeled as women's responsibility and which, furthermore, have created the division of labor and women's subordination to men. Therefore, we need to change the attitudes of men towards these caring activities, both in detaching them from femininity and in a fairer distribution of caring responsibilities.

If we wish to draw some parallels for the intercultural perspective we then need to identify something similar to what care has represented in women's positioning, but for the case of indigenous peoples. That is, we need to identify an activity, practice, or value, that has been viewed as exclusively pertaining to indigenous cultures but, moreover, it is in part because of this or these activities that indigenous peoples have turned out to be dominated. And in addition, these activities or practices need to be valuable for the dominant culture. The dominant group needs to also benefit from them.

This means that it is not enough to generate a sense of group pride in order to ameliorate the situation of indigenous peoples in Mexico. Indigenous citizens can be extremely proud of their cultural origins and still suffer discrimination or marginalization from the majoritarian culture. What is required, in addition, is to change the attitudes of the dominant culture towards indigenous citizens by making them value positively some practices and activities that are characteristic of these cultures.

Usually, however, state institutions have little margin of maneuver in trying to change the relations between citizens (mainly, because people within these institutions tend to belong to the dominant group), and among that margin of maneuver, one of the most important fields with potential transformations and where State policies can actually change these relations is through education, which suggests that intercultural education should not be solely concerned with the education indigenous students receive, neither with how educational institutions are designed in order to incorporate an indigenous perspective. In addition, intercultural programs of education must be addressed to the whole society, this is what Tubino defines as intercultural education for everybody (Tubino 2013: 619 and Cruz Rodriguez 2015: 203).

In the education field the intercultural perspective consists in adopting some principles and values that have traditionally been associated with indigenous cultures and introducing them to the dominant culture, stressing the importance of these values and why the dominant culture should appreciate them, value them and, ultimately, embrace them. This will be further analyzed in the next chapter.

Unlike the other two perspectives, the intercultural perspective draws away the direct focus from indigenous peoples and rather focuses on the dominant culture. Concretely, it should focus on changing the attitudes of the former towards indigenous peoples and, more concretely, on those activities that characterize indigenous peoples. By doing this, in addition to moving towards a more equal and just society, some problems and critiques directed to multiculturalism can be avoided.

First, many critiques of multiculturalism –including Latin American interculturalists– have accused it of generating parallel societies (Cruz Rodriguez 2013a and 2014a and Tubino 2001 and 2002). Indeed, they blame multiculturalism for being so concerned in recognizing and accommodating cultural differences, that it has led to an isolation of different cultural groups, generating parallel societies, rather than social cohesion within the country (Mattiace, Hernández y Rus, 2002: 15-26).

This risk, however, can be avoided with the intercultural perspective, because while the indigenous perspectives can, indeed, work to strengthen and reaffirm the different indigenous communities and this, as a consequence, can lead to a degree of isolationism, the consequence of the intercultural perspective is precisely to generate a sense of social cohesion within different cultural groups and its members. Embracing some values of indigenous cultures, strengthening intercultural relations between them, and, as a consequence, avoiding the creation of parallel societies which scholars seem to be extremely worried about, can change the attitude and the hostile relations between cultural groups.

Secondly, this perspective can also solve the tensions that may arise between a multicultural State and its intercultural citizens, which Kymlicka (2003) has pointed at. Ideally, there should be a synergy between a multicultural State and intercultural citizens. It is equally important, Kymlicka suggests, that states adopt a multicultural model –embracing the principles of multiculturalism previously mentioned– as it is that citizens are willing to accept

and sustain this multicultural state and the principles it embraces (2003:153). If most citizens do not support this, it is very likely that a multicultural state will not succeed.

An intercultural citizen, therefore, supports the principles of multiculturalism but, in addition, also adopts personal positive attitudes towards diversity. Rather than being fearful or, at best, indifferent about other cultures and people, an intercultural citizen is open to these differences and is willing to learn about them, furthermore, he does not regard his own culture as superior (157). Under these terms, intercultural citizens seem like a positive proposition: while promoting individual self-development, it reduces inter-group conflicts. This, at the same time, creates social cohesion and a sense of solidarity, but furthermore, intercultural skills can contribute to overcome prejudices and institutional practices of discrimination. When citizens embrace the principles of multiculturalism and adopt intercultural skills, transformative changes can start occurring, hence the importance of the intercultural skills and of the intercultural perspective.

However, problems can emerge if we are not able to stress the kind of intercultural citizens we need (2003:159). Concretely, citizens might embrace multicultural principles, might even support the multicultural agenda and, in fact, might even have intercultural skills but, nevertheless, they are more interested in focusing on other cultural groups rather than on the ones with whom they share states.

Indeed, citizens can be open to other cultures and to learning other ways of thinking and views of the world, but this need not mean they are interested in learning about their fellow cultures, rather the opposite. In Mexico, for instance, English is much more valued as a second language than Nahuatl, because learning English opens a wide range of options that are not opened by learning Nahuatl. And learning English history will probably increase the chances of Mexican citizens to aspire for a US residency than learning pre-Hispanic history. Mexican citizens, that is, might be open to intercultural exchange but this does not mean that they are open to engage in one with indigenous cultures, they might be –as many are– indifferent to these.

And without having this interaction with indigenous cultures, most probably a great majority of Mexican citizens cannot feel empathy towards indigenous citizens and their struggles. They may, as many do, think that their struggles are legitimate, and their claims should be

addressed, but they are not engaged in them. The perception they have of these groups might be a paternalistic one, or of condescendence. Indeed, one thing is to agree that indigenous peoples must have their rights respected and their claims addressed, and other very different is to engage in the struggles against structural discrimination and inequalities that they face. While the former is possible by simply accepting the multicultural principles, the latter seems difficult if the dominant culture is not willing to change its attitude towards minorities and their values and make sacrifices for them.

When citizens embrace and accept multicultural principles and a multicultural state they are inevitably accepting that cultural minorities should have the same rights and status than the majoritarian culture. But this does not mean, as argued above, that members of different cultural groups feel empathy and solidarity for each other, much less that they are open to a cultural exchange or to intercultural relations. This, in fact, is what happens in countries such as Switzerland, where citizens of the Italian minority are more interested in establishing bonds with their Italian fellows than with the German minority in Switzerland (Kymlicka 2003).

In some cases, such as Switzerland, this might not be problematic. After all, these countries are amongst the most democratic, prosperous, and peaceful countries (Kymlicka 2003: 155), furthermore, most Swiss citizens seem to accept the rights of each minority, and some see this as a multicultural success (Kymlicka 2003). But this is problematic in countries such as Mexico –or the whole Latin American region– precisely because of the deep inequalities described in the previous chapter.

In these societies the majoritarian culture needs to feel empathy towards cultural minorities and cultural minorities need to feel they are respected and treated equally as the majoritarian culture. And this can only be possible if, in addition to the other two perspectives, the majoritarian culture cherishes and embraces some values and practices characteristic of indigenous cultures. If this is achieved the tensions that may arise between a multicultural state and intercultural citizens, referred to by Kymlicka, might also be avoided.

It is acknowledged, however, that the intercultural perspective is the most challenging of the three perspectives precisely because its ultimate goal is that the dominant culture gives up part of its dominant position in favor of the most disadvantaged. It was mentioned previously

that this is the current struggle in gender equality because, although men benefit from the caring activities, they still resist to a fair distribution of these responsibilities. As a matter of fact, in countries such as Norway, where men are starting to accept a fairer distribution of childcare, surveys show that they still resist to perform household activities or, in general, activities not directly related with childcare. Moreover, those who are willing to assume part of these responsibilities seem to be doing this to help their female partners, but they still think that these activities are women's responsibility (Brandth and Kvande 2002: 299).

Trying to change the attitude of the dominant culture towards minority groups and especially towards the activities that these groups value, can be very challenging because this change in attitude involves giving up part of the privileged position in favor of the most disadvantaged one. In the field of ethnocultural diversity in the Latin American region, indigenous cultures are cultural minorities which are, in addition, amongst the most disadvantaged groups. And this disadvantage is due to a set of social relations of domination, which means that the disadvantaged position of these groups is directly related to the privileged position of a dominant segment. As a consequence, trying to change the disadvantaged position of indigenous peoples needs necessarily a change in the privileged position of others, and this is not easy to achieve because privileged groups will hardly be willing to give up their position.

This does not mean, however, that there is no space for making progress in the field of ethnocultural justice in this region. And even though, at least for the foreseeable future, it seems hard to radically change the relations of domination of these groups, still little achievements can be done towards that direction. Fortunately, there have been some achievements in this regard after the indigenous movements of 1994, which tells us that change is possible.

Indeed, before these movements, many Mexicans did not acknowledge the real situation that members of indigenous cultures faced because they were not visible. Once the indigenous movement emerged, many Mexicans became aware of their situation and acquired empathy towards them, raising awareness of their privileged position for belonging to the dominant culture (Van der Haar, 2005: 17-18; Montemayor, 1998; Meneses *et at*, 2012), and at the same time, of the disadvantaged position of indigenous members. As a consequence, it

contributed to change the attitude of some segments of the dominant culture towards indigenous citizens.

Moreover, this has led to a whole revaluation not only of indigenous citizens, but most prominently of their culture, practices, and ways of life. Many scholars and an important segment of the majoritarian culture value very positively many aspects that characterize indigenous cosmology and their ways of life, such as traditional medicine, which will be exemplified briefly. They are, that is, valuing some practices that characterize indigenous cultures, which is precisely what we are looking for with this perspective.

In short, the intercultural perspective must be seen as a long-term project. As something which we should be moving towards, for which we need the intervention of the other two perspectives. The last section of this chapter will analyze the way these perspectives should coexist harmoniously and ways in which some possible clashes or contradictions be avoided. Before doing that, however, an example of how each one of these different perspectives affects the same field, specifically that of health and medicine, will be presented.

i. An Intercultural Health System

Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution recognizes the right of every person to have its health protected. The right to health care is also recognized in other international instruments of human rights such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 25; the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, article 12; the additional Protocol of the American Convention of Human Rights, article 10.1, among others.

This means that every citizen, regardless of their ethnic origin, gender, religion, or whatsoever, should enjoy the same rights to health. However, studies have revealed that citizens identified as pertaining to an indigenous community have worst health than non-indigenous and, in addition, less access to health services. For instance, life expectancy of indigenous citizens is 7 years less than non-indigenous. An indigenous citizen has higher probabilities of dying from a curable disease: in the case of tuberculosis the probability is twice as much; in the case of diarrhea it is three times as much; and from birth complications, it is 3.5 times more probable (Zolla 2007). Under these circumstances a strong emphasis on the equality perspective is required to properly take care of the indigenous population.

This perspective would need to adopt special health programs for indigenous communities, such as special vaccination campaigns; the construction of health centers near different indigenous communities, enabling special nutritional programs, and so on. All these programs intend to provide effectively health care. That is, to make effective their rights just as any other citizen in the country. According to this perspective by making a group-based analysis what is problematized is the lack of health care of a group of people identified as indigenous. The solution is to make extensive the health care services to those groups by enabling group target policies.

On the other hand, many indigenous communities practice traditional medicine, and this is a very important feature of their cultures (Zolla 2012). Here is where the indigenous perspective should have incidence on the health care system. According to this perspective, indigenous communities should have a right to practice their traditional medicine, but furthermore, they should count with institutionalized support in order to strengthen and reproduce these practices. However, as Campos Navarro (2010) shows, students do not learn traditional medicine in medical schools, which can be problematic given the fact that nearly 10% of the Mexican population belongs to indigenous communities, and that many indigenous patients reject being treated by non-traditional health professionals.

While the equality perspective helps make visible the disadvantages that indigenous citizens are facing regarding their health, and at the same time enables short term programs to ameliorate their situation, the indigenous perspective brings to the foreground an important feature of many indigenous cultures, which is their traditional medicine.

This leads to the intercultural perspective. Under this perspective it is expected that members of the majoritarian culture change their conception, which is usually a negative one, of traditional medicine (Campos Navarro 2010). More concretely, they need to change their attitude towards these practices, and for this, they need to see a benefit from it. Studies have revealed that the use of certain medical plants can help cure some illnesses or diseases in a more effective and healthier way than western medicines (Faguetti 2011: 148-149). Using these remedies can bring positive benefits for our wellbeing in many ways (Campos Navarro, 2010; Zolla 2000 and 2002).

Revaluing traditional medicine is required. By changing the negative connotation of these practices into positive ones, the majoritarian culture can not only benefit from these practices, but also change its attitude towards them and, as a consequence, towards other traditional practices of indigenous peoples. While currently many of these practices, including traditional medicine, are rejected and seen as inferior, if we are able to stress and disseminate the positive benefits of traditional medicine, this perception can change. The majoritarian culture can adopt some of these practices rather than always trying to impose western medicine to indigenous cultures. This is, pretty much, the essence of the intercultural perspective.

As it can be noted, these three perspectives interact and affect the same situation from different approaches. Neither of these perspectives on its own will be able to give a proper answer to the situation, we need these three perspectives interacting simultaneously but in different degrees of intensity. This will be broadened in the following section.

4. The Harmonious Interaction of the Three Perspectives

Latin American interculturalism has been presented as a three-dimensional model composed by an equality perspective, an indigenous perspective, and an intercultural perspective. It was said at the beginning of this chapter that although these perspectives were being separated for analytical purposes, they are intended to work simultaneously, and, in fact, they depend on each other to be successful. The model proposed here cannot be successful unless it manages to incorporate these three strategies simultaneously or in different degrees, according to the context and the timing.

In this section a more detailed analysis will be offered as to how these perspectives can work harmoniously. This, indeed, is not an easy task and some problems can emerge. However, these problems can be solved if we are able to understand the scope and function of each of these perspectives and the moments in time in which each of them should have more or less intensity.

The equality perspective is immersed in the equality of opportunities rhetoric and, as it was already analyzed, it works as a corrective and temporal remedy. It seeks to correct the unjust distribution of goods, resources, and opportunities. Precisely because it is immersed in the

distributive aspect of justice, it is unable to attack the sources and causes of the distribution. This strategy is an important tool in the present and as long as group disadvantages persist. It is a short-term strategy, that pinned to a major project of ethnocultural justice, it must intend to disappear in a long-term feature. We should aim to not require this type of measures in the long run. The equality perspective, that is, should have a strong intensity in the present and this intensity must be deluded progressively, until we reach a point in which this perspective is no longer necessary.

In the example offered above regarding special health care programs for indigenous populations, these programs are temporal measures which are intended to disappear in the future. Their function is to level up the access to health services for indigenous populations and ameliorate their health situation, but once this is achieved these special programs are intended to disappear. Their function is not to attack the sources and causes of health problems of indigenous populations, many which are related with their marginal conditions of living.

But if the patterns and sources that generate this unequal distribution of goods, resources, and opportunities are not the focus of the equality perspective, it seems nearly impossible for this perspective to disappear if it is not accompanied by other strategies that attack the structural patterns of inequality. And here is where the other two perspectives come into play.

The indigenous perspective, it was mentioned above, is in charge of recognizing and accommodating cultural differences. It is not enough to simply include indigenous cultures into the national narratives. What is required, is to reshape State institutions, in order to incorporate an indigenous perspective. This recognition and accommodation, it was said, can be of two different types: one which recognizes autonomy rights to those indigenous communities that still preserve their cultural structure. And secondly, by including indigenous narratives and their cultural differences into the national narratives, which means changing and reshaping the way institutions are designed, in order for them to incorporate an indigenous perspective.

Unlike the equality perspective, the indigenous perspective can or cannot disappear in the long run, but this is something irrelevant for our model. Indeed, the need of group differentiated rights and the indigenous perspective should exist as long as cultural minorities

exist and make claims of recognition and accommodation of their cultural difference. This is so, because the indigenous perspective treats indigenous peoples mainly as cultural minorities, rather than as disadvantaged groups. While not ignoring nor being indifferent of the disadvantaged situation they suffer, its scope is limited to recognize and properly accommodate cultural differences.

This, however, does have an important impact on how indigenous peoples are perceived by the dominant culture and, moreover, in improving their disadvantaged situation. Reshaping institutions in a way in which they incorporate indigenous narratives and by also incorporating an indigenous perspective in decision making processes, already contributes to the awareness of their current situation and their needs, and this generates a sense of solidarity by the dominant culture. The indigenous perspective, that is, also contributes to the elimination of the disadvantages that indigenous peoples currently face and, in addition, contributes to achieving the aims of the intercultural perspective. Although it might be a permanent strategy, or it will depend on the existence of cultural minorities making claims of recognition and accommodation, it still contributes to improve the relations between cultural groups, which is one of the ultimate goals of the Latin American Intercultural model suggested here.

Finally, the intercultural perspective should be seen as a long-term project. It was previously mentioned that the puzzle cannot be completed if we are unable to change the attitude of the dominant culture towards the minority cultures, which requires changing the way the activities, practices, and values of indigenous cultures are perceived by the dominant group. The focus should not only be on indigenous peoples, but also on changing or transforming the status of majorities, which requires us to change how the dominant majority relates with the dominated minorities. But for this to be possible, we require certain conditions that can only be achieved with the success of the other two perspectives. Indeed, the other two perspectives, by working under group-target policies, bring to the foreground the situation that indigenous peoples are facing and this helps the ends of the intercultural perspective. Making visible the current situation of indigenous peoples, that is, helps raise awareness, solidarity, and empathy from members of the dominant culture to members of dominated minorities.

What this means is that the intercultural perspective is also required in the present but its intensity is rather smoother than the other two perspectives. Its intensity must be increased progressively, as the effects of the other two perspectives start taking shape.

Because the intercultural perspective seeks to change the attitudes of members of dominated groups, this perspective will be fundamental in any education program or policy, as it will be insisted in the following chapter.

Up to here, things seem to be quite simple for the way the different perspectives interact and the moments in time in which they should have more or less intensity. But things can get complicated if we are not able to stress out the scope of each one of these perspectives and, moreover, the scope of the model suggested here.

One potential problem can emerge from the directions these perspectives can take, which may seem contradictory at times. For instance, the equality perspective is concerned with correcting the disadvantages that indigenous citizens suffer due to belonging to certain social groups. The aim, in the long run, is that ethnicity –and any other marker– should be irrelevant for the distribution of goods and resources.

Simultaneously, one of the possible effects of the intercultural perspective is the tendency of groups being deluded. Indeed, when cultural groups engage in an intercultural exchange – which is what the intercultural perspective seeks– there is a possibility that these groups will fuse, and their borders will delude. A consequence can be the deconstruction of such groups.

Hence, it can be argued that one of the possible effects is that both the equality and intercultural perspective pinned together pull in opposite directions than the indigenous perspective. More concretely, that while the indigenous perspective seeks to maintain group differences, the first two, work together to vanish group differences. And when both are focused on the same social group we find ourselves with the dilemma to either vanish differences or reaffirm them. This is something similar to what Fraser (1995) calls the redistribution/recognition dilemma. Regardless of whether this dilemma is an authentic problem or not, what needs to be analyzed here is if this dilemma applies in the way the different perspectives of this model interact. This will be analyzed in the following subsection after presenting such dilemma.

5. Fraser's Recognition/Redistribution Dilemma

According to Fraser there are two sorts of injustices today which require different remedies. One is the socioeconomic injustice which is rooted in the political-economic way in which society is structured. Examples of this sort of injustice are exploitation, economic marginalization, and deprivation (1995: 70-71). The second sort of injustice is of cultural or symbolic misrecognition and it is rooted in "social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication" (71). Examples of this sort of injustice are cultural domination, non-recognition, and disrespect.

Each of these sorts of injustice have different remedies. Economic injustice calls for the restructuring of the political economy, which can include a redistribution of income, reorganization of the division of labor, and in general, the transformation of basic economic structures. These set of remedies are called "redistribution". In contrast, the remedy for cultural injustice is a cultural symbolic change, which could involve the revaluation of disrespected identities or the recognition and positive valorization of cultural diversity, among others. The set of remedies for cultural injustices receive the name of "recognition". Justice today, Fraser notes, "requires *both* redistribution *and* recognition" (1995:69).

However, the problem arises when both sorts of injustices and their remedies interfere. This is what Fraser calls the "recognition-redistribution dilemma", and she describes it as follows:

> Recognition claims often take the form of calling attention to, if not performatively creating, the putative specificity of some group, and then of affirming the value of that specificity. Thus they tend to promote group differentiation. Redistribution claims, in contrast, often call for abolishing economic arrangements that underpin group specificity […]. They tend to promote group de-differentiation (74).

The result of both remedies appears to be mutually contradictory in their aims. While the politics of recognition promotes group differentiation, the politics of redistribution tends to undermine this differentiation (74).

The problem is exacerbated, Fraser suggests, with collectivities who suffer from both types of injustice. These collectivities, which she calls "bivalent", face disadvantages due to both cultural and political economic injustices. They suffer, that is, maldistribution and

misrecognition, and in these cases, "neither redistributive remedies alone nor recognition remedies alone will suffice. Bivalent collectivities need both" (78), but both remedies pull in opposite directions. We are, Fraser argues, facing a dilemma: the recognition-redistribution dilemma.

To what extent, it is necessary to analyze here, does this dilemma affect the three-dimensional model being proposed? It will be argued that it does not affect and that there is no contradiction nor dilemma in the way the different perspectives interact, as long as we are able to understand their own scope of application. But although it will be argued that this dilemma is not a problem here, it is helpful to address important aspects of this model. Mainly, in order to be able to distinguish the different sources of injustice that indigenous peoples are facing, and the different types of remedies proposed –and their scope– in order to tackle these injustices.

It needs to be recalled that although these three perspectives belong to the same multicultural model and are focused on the situation that indigenous peoples in Mexico are facing, they move under a different rhetoric: one, on how indigenous peoples have been positioned and face structural inequalities, and the other, on how indigenous peoples are cultural minorities whose differences should be properly recognized and accommodated. While the equality perspective moves under the first rhetoric, the indigenous perspective moves under the second one, and the intercultural perspective can be seen as transversal to both.

The equality and intercultural perspective pinned together indeed work to vanish or delude both the unfair distribution of goods, resources and opportunities *and* the structural inequalities positioning indigenous peoples as among the most disadvantaged groups in the Mexican society. In the words of Fraser, these perspectives pinned together seek to address socioeconomic injustices[52].

This, however, need not mean that the effects of these two perspectives is to delude indigenous peoples as cultural minorities. Indigenous peoples as a cultural group are not expected to disappear under the effects of these perspectives. In fact, we lack evidence to

[52] This does not mean that the intercultural perspective only works in order to overcome this sort of injustice. It also works in order to overcome cultural misrecognition. As said before, it is difficult to separate all these perspectives because they are intimately related.

argue that indigenous groups exist mainly and most prominently because of their disadvantage in socioeconomic terms. Historical facts suggest that indigenous peoples also exist because of a cultural difference component, which has led to other sorts of disadvantage. As a consequence, we cannot affirm that if they cease to be disadvantaged they will disappear as cultural minorities. The intention of these perspectives is to eliminate what Fraser would call, the socioeconomic source of injustice without seeking to eliminate the cultural differences which characterize indigenous peoples in Mexico.

It is true, however, that one possible scenario –which was already mentioned– is that by engaging in an intercultural exchange both indigenous groups and the majoritarian group can fuse or transform, and this can, indeed, delude, or even deconstruct indigenous groups. This is something that can occur, in the long run, as a consequence of the intercultural perspective, but it is not one of the goals of this perspective nor of this model.

On the other hand, the indigenous perspective is concerned with what Fraser calls the second source of injustice, which is that of misrecognition. Its interest, that is, lies in the way people belonging to cultural groups are being misrecognized and excluded due to their cultural differences. However, nothing in this perspective suggests that its main interest is the preservation of cultural minorities *per se* even though it advocates for the recognition of group differentiated rights. It is inaccurate to think that the indigenous perspective is concerned with preserving cultural minorities as an end in itself, or that just as multiculturalism, it is "eager to recognize and revalue group differences" (Fraser 1997:174). The instrumental value of culture for multiculturalism has already been thoroughly discussed in previous chapters.

In short, there not seems to be a contradiction in the way these perspectives interact. Concretely, the redistribution/recognition dilemma is not a problem here. While the indigenous perspective is not concerned with maintaining and preserving cultural groups, the equality and intercultural perspective pinned together are not concerned with deluding cultural groups. It is important to distinguish the two different sources of injustice that are being concentrated in the same group and to distinguish the remedies of each of these sources. This will allow us to see more clearly that there need not be any contradiction between these perspectives.

What can we expect from the interaction of these perspectives? Ideally, we should expect that structural inequalities and the disadvantages that members of indigenous cultures suffer be eliminated, which need not mean that indigenous identities and cultures also tend to disappear nor that we are aiming necessarily to deconstruct such groups. Our concern, that is, is not on whether cultural minorities are conserved, vanished, or transformed. This falls outside the concerns of our model. What matters is that if these minorities exist and wish to practice their culture and maintain their cultural differences, this should be possible without having to pay a cost.

A similar aim is found in Sandra Fredmans' (2017: 734-735) multidimensional approach to substantive equality. Indeed, she argues that we should seek to eliminate the disadvantages that cultural minorities might suffer without having necessarily to eliminate cultural minorities.

This, however, clashes again with Fraser's work. Concretely, Fraser argues that social justice will only be achieved by adopting transformative rather than corrective remedies, which will be described below. According to this, Fraser would reject that the model suggested here can offer any transformation because it adopts corrective remedies. This will be challenged next.

a) Corrective Remedies vs. Transformative Remedies

The previous subsection described the redistribution/recognition dilemma proposed by Fraser while analyzing if this dilemma was problematic for the way the different perspectives of the Latin American interculturalism model interact.

In order to advance in other aspects of this model, it seems right to analyze the solution that Fraser offers for such dilemma, with special attention to the critique she makes of what she calls, affirmative remedies and its failure to address social injustices.

According to her, there are two approaches that can redress the two different types of injustices previously mentioned –the economic and cultural. One can finesse the dilemma and the other one can just exacerbate it. She calls them transformation and affirmation, respectively.

Affirmative remedies for injustice are those remedies which seek to correct "inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework that generated them" (82). Transformative remedies, in contrast, are remedies that aim to correct "inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework" (82).

Fraser applies these solutions to what she considers two sources of injustice. Regarding cultural injustice, she argues that affirmative remedies are associated with *mainstream multiculturalism* because by redressing "disrespect by revaluing unjustly devalued group identities" it leaves the contents of those identities and the group differentiations underlying them intact. In contrast, transformative remedies are those associated with deconstruction because they "redress disrespect by transforming the underlying cultural-valuational structure". Furthermore, she suggests that by destabilizing these identities and differentiations, transformative remedies not only raise the self-esteem of members of these groups but, additionally, "they would change *everyone's* sense of belonging, affiliation, and self" (83).

For economic injustices, on the other hand, an affirmative remedy would be the liberal welfare state because it seeks to redress maldistribution but leaves intact the structures that generate them. On the other hand, a transformative remedy is socialism because it would redress the unjust distribution by transforming the whole political-economic structure (84).

The next step would be, then, to combine the transformative remedies of both the cultural and economic injustices, which would avoid falling into the recognition/redistribution dilemma. To be sure, Fraser applies these remedies to women and blacks because she considers these to be bivalent groups which suffer from both sorts of injustices. Redressing gender and race injustices, she argues, "requires changing both political economy and culture, so as to undo vicious circles of economic and cultural subordination" (88).

In the case of women, the combination of these remedies would be as follows. The first scenario would be to combine the affirmative remedies of both redistribution and recognition. Affirmative redistributive remedies would include affirmative action; assuring women their fair share of existing jobs and educational places "while leaving untouched the nature and number of those jobs and places". As to affirmative recognition remedies, these would

include cultural feminism: “the effort to assure women respect by revaluing femininity, while leaving unchanged the binary gender code that gives the latter its sense” (89).

But this, she argues, does not really respond to the situation of disadvantage suffered by women. Affirmative redistribution “fails to engage the deep level at which the political economy is gendered” (89). By being mainly focused at combating attitudinal discrimination, it does not attack the source of the problem which is the gendered division of paid and unpaid labour, nor the gendered division of occupations within paid labour. The result is not only to underline gender differentiations, but additionally, it marks women as deficient and insatiable, “as always needing more and more”, to the extent that women can come to appear as privileged, recipients of special, and undeserved treatment. This approach, rather than redressing injustices of distribution, can “end up fueling backlash injustices of recognition” (89).

The problem is exacerbated, Fraser suggests, when we add the affirmative recognition strategy of cultural feminism. This approach calls attention to women's putative cultural specificity or difference which only has the effect of “pouring oil into the flames of resentment against affirmative action”. Furthermore, the cultural politics of affirming women’s specificity appears “as an affront to the liberal welfare state’s official commitment to the equal moral worth of persons” (89).

Something similar would occur with race when pairing affirmative redistribution with affirmative recognition. Affirmative redistribution would include affirmative action programs, and the effort to provide people of color spaces in jobs and universities, among others. But this, Fraser suggests, fails to redress the way in which political economy is racialized and, hence, it fails to attack racialized division of exploitable and surplus of labor or of menial and intellectual occupations. As a result, it marks people of color as deficient and insatiable “always needing more and more”.

Affirmative recognition would imply cultural nationalism and reassure respect to people of color by revaluing blackness while leaving unchanged the binary black-white codes (90). But this is again problematic. Affirming black differences –or Black Nationalism, as Fraser calls it– appears as an affront to the liberal welfare state, which fuels the resentment against affirmative action and a backlash of misrecognition (90-91).

Because affirmative remedies are insufficient and only generate more problems without even promoting justice, Fraser suggests combining the transformative remedies of redistribution and recognition.

In gender, transformative redistribution would consist in "some form of socialist feminism or feminist social democracy" (89). Transformative recognition, to redress gender cultural injustices consists in "feminist deconstruction aimed at dismantling androcentrism by destabilizing gender dichotomies" (89). This combination, she suggests, is much less problematic than the former.

> The long-term goal of deconstructive feminism is a culture in which hierarchical gender dichotomies are replaced by network of multiple intersecting differences that are demassified and shifting. This goal is consistent with transformative socialist-feminist redistribution. Deconstruction opposes the sort of sedimentation or congealing of gender difference that occurs in an unjustly gendered political economy. Its utopian image of a culture in which ever new constructions of identity and difference are freely elaborated and then swiftly deconstructed is only possible, after all, on the basis of rough social equality (89-90).

As for race, transformative redistribution consists in "anti-racist democratic socialism or anti-racist social democracy", while transformative recognition consists in anti-racist deconstruction which should aim to dismantle Eurocentrism by destabilizing racial dichotomies.

Fraser suggests, in short, that the recognition/redistribution dilemma can be solved if we adopt transformative remedies. Moreover, she argues, only by adopting these sorts of remedies will we be closer to achieve social justice. However, it will be argued here that this dichotomy is misleading and that we can, in fact, achieve social justice by combining affirmative and transformative remedies, as the model proposed here suggests, which means that we need not reject affirmative remedies, as Fraser suggests we do.

What needs to be done is show the way in which these perspectives are complementary and why we need to combine both affirmative remedies with transformative ones. Although the equality perspective is rooted in what Fraser considers affirmative remedies, which do not

attack the structural processes that generate inequalities, this strategy is necessary for two reasons. First, it corrects current inequalities, which is necessary to offer the conditions for every citizen to engage and pursue their own life projects; and secondly, it can help foster a sense of awareness of disadvantaged groups. It is unclear that affirmative action programs will create resentment towards disadvantaged groups and, furthermore, that these groups will appear as "always needing more and more". Contrary to this, affirmative action programs can help raise awareness of the structural inequalities that prevail and the need to correct them. As Lepinard argues, affirmative action programs, when contextualized under a discourse of social justice, can help generate social transformations and achieve substantial equality (2014).

The equality perspective can help the major goals of Latin American interculturalism by: a) making visible the structural inequalities that members of cultural minorities suffer, and b) improving temporarily the situation of these citizens. This makes the equality perspective necessary to clear the path of the other two perspectives. These are the reasons why we need not abandon these remedies, as Frasers model would suggest.

The indigenous perspective has similar effects as the equality perspective. While it is concerned with offering the conditions for citizens, belonging to cultural minorities, to practice their culture freely, without being repressed for doing so, its ultimate goal is to reshape the way institutions are designed, in order to introduce an indigenous perspective.

As long as cultural minorities of this sort are making claims of recognition and accommodation, these must be properly addressed. But this has further effects, it also helps foster the acceptance of all citizens that live in a multicultural country, where many views of the world are equally valuable, which contributes to changing the attitude of members of the dominant culture towards indigenous groups and their cultures.

The indigenous perspective, in short, contributes in two different ways: one, which is the way institutions are shaped and, in a sense, has the goal to decenter them from the dominant culture by assuming an active role regarding cultural differences –or rejecting *benign neglect* attitude towards cultural differences. And the second one, which works together with the other two perspectives by bringing to the foreground issues of indigenous peoples, helps

raise awareness of their situation of disadvantage and need, which contributes to changing the attitude of non-indigenous citizens towards them and towards their cultural practices.

The effects of these two perspectives contribute to the goals of the intercultural perspective. It was previously mentioned that this perspective seeks to change the attitude of the dominant segments towards the dominated, and for this to be possible, the dominant segment needs to value and embrace a set of practices and activities that are characteristic of indigenous cultures and from which it can also benefit.

This perspective, unlike the two others, does not make use of group-target policies. And because of this, it must be seen as a long-term project. Indeed, this perspective is the most complex one, since it requires: 1) that indigenous citizens are offered the means and the conditions to achieve their life projects; 2) that institutions be shaped in a way sensitive to how these cultures view the world and, in addition, that they incorporate these perspectives in the design of such institutions and in the decision-making processes. This can only be achieved if we adopt the first two perspectives with a strong intensity in the present. And this, simultaneously, proves that we need not reject what Fraser calls affirmative remedies and that we can make them useful in order to achieve social justice.

While Fraser argues that transformative remedies are the only ones capable of tackling both sorts of injustice, she does not offer any reason as to why transformative remedies cannot be accompanied by corrective remedies. It does not follow that the latter cannot complement the former. As long corrective remedies and group-target policies are tied to a major social justice project, there seems no reason as to why we should not count with them. This either/or option is misleading, and this is why it has been suggested that any model of ethnocultural justice in Latin American societies must consist in a set of complementary and cumulative strategies which must be properly balanced when and as required.

The following chapter will apply these strategies to suggest which should be the principles that must guide any education program in multicultural societies within the context of Latin American countries.

CHAPTER 6.- TOWARDS A PROGRAM OF INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION. APPLYING THE MODEL OF LATIN AMERICAN INTERCULTURALISM

6.1. Introduction

The previous chapter suggested and developed a model of multiculturalism that might be adequate for Latin American societies. This model was called Latin American Interculturalism, and it was argued that it must be composed of three different and complementary dimensions or perspectives: the equality, the indigenous, and the intercultural perspectives.

This chapter will suggest a way in which these perspectives can be integrated into the education system. It will be argued that they are compatible with the principles of the national education system previously analyzed in chapter 1. Concretely, with the principles of "School at the Center" and "curriculum autonomy".

The principle of "Schools at the Center", as previously explained, consists in providing schools with more autonomy in the design of their curriculums, which enables offering a better and more adequate education to students. And as for "curriculum autonomy", it was described as part of the principle of an inclusive education, since it seeks to respond to the specific educational needs of students. This element is what allows schools to determine the content of their curriculum and make a proper balance of the teaching hours according to their own context. Both principles are complementary.

Here these two principles will be recalled in order to show how the different perspectives can be integrated and, moreover, in order to argue that they are compatible with how the education system is designed.

However, the fact that these perspectives are compatible with the design of the education system, does not mean that they are currently being implemented. Hence, some suggestions will be offered as to how to incorporate these perspectives. More concretely, some strategies or lines of action will be suggested regarding each perspective.

This will lead to some possible tensions between the different perspectives. Some of these tensions will be addressed and some will not because they fall out of the scope of this dissertation. Finally, it will be acknowledged that some of the tensions between the different perspectives cannot be foreseen now, and so we will have to wait or solve them on a case by case situation.

This chapter will conclude that the way in which the national education system is designed, is compatible with the aims of an intercultural model of education. This means that the problems seem to arise during the application, implementation, and interpretation of this model and not during its design.

2. Equality Perspective

The equality perspective, as it has already been said, should be concerned with providing equality of opportunities. In the field of education, the first thing that needs to be recalled is the legal framework that recognizes the right to education of indigenous peoples (which was developed in Chapter 1).

The right to education, as it was already mentioned, is recognized in article 3 of the Constitution where it is established that every person has the right to receive education and access to the state education system. Mandatory education, which is provided by the State institutions and is free of charge, comprises preschool, primary school, junior high, and high school (Valadés 1997 and Latapí 2009). At a fist level, the equality perspective requires that these rights be effective for indigenous students, more concretely, the equality perspective should oversee that indigenous students have effective access to the education system and, moreover, have the conditions to remain in it and achieve their education goals.

However, indigenous students tend to face more disadvantages than non-indigenous students, both in the access to the education system and during the education process itself. Current studies have revealed that two out of three children between the ages of six and 16, that do not attend school are indigenous (Schmelkes 2013: 7). Furthermore, 14% of indigenous students between eight and 14 years old are illiterate, while the non-indigenous students' illiteracy rate in that same age group is 2.4% (Schmelkes 2013: 8 and Bertely 2005). This

shows that indigenous students face a disadvantage in the access to the education system (SEP 1014: 7-15).

There are many reasons why indigenous children are not having access to the education system. For instance, 36% of indigenous children between the ages of six to 14 are working. This number is twice as large as the national average of working children (UNICEF Mexico, 2014), which suggests that an important number of indigenous children are not attending school because of this[53]. And in addition, although there is no information available on this regard, scholars coincide in the fact that there is an insufficient number of basic schools in, or nearby indigenous communities (Arcos Gutierrez 2012: 548-550). Although in the last years there has been an increase in the number of public schools near indigenous communities, many communities are still miles away from schools which makes the regular attendance more difficult and a higher effort is required (Arcos Gutierrez 2012: 550; Sistematización de Prácticas Paradigmáticas de la Educación Indígena en Mexico 2013: 110)[54]. Since data tells us that indigenous students are facing disadvantages in the education system, the equality perspective needs to enable special policies –group target policies– to redress these disadvantages.

It needs to be held in mind, however, that these policies consist mainly in temporal measures that seek to correct the symptoms of the problem, not that seek to redress the causes of the problem –this is what the other two perspectives will tend to do. Because of this, the equality perspective and the group target policies that fall within it must be understood as short-term strategies that seek to correct the current inequalities that indigenous students face. Precisely because its short-term vision, this perspective needs to be understood as part of a bigger project of ethno-cultural justice that comprises not only short-term group target policies. In addition, it must comprise long-term strategies that seek to redress the causes of such inequalities, which is what the other two perspectives intend to do.

[53] Which reflects, at the same time, the disadvantaged situation in which many indigenous families live, given the fact that they need the working force of their children to provide the basic needs to their homes.

[54] These are two reasons that explain why indigenous students are not accessing to the state education system, which are directly related with the education institutions. This does not mean that there are other major and structural reasons why indigenous students are not accessing the education system, but they fall out of the scope of the educative arena.

The type of measures that the equality perspective needs to enable must address, among other things, a guarantee and increase in the schooling levels; reduce the illiteracy rate and promote the conclusion of basic education (this, according to article 2 of the Mexican Constitution). Different measures can be employed to achieve this, some of which are currently being enabled by the education authorities. For instance, in 2013 the Ministry of Education enabled a special program *called Inclusion and Equality Education* which targets three main groups: indigenous students, immigrant students and students with disabilities. According to this program, the highest priority should be given to these groups to overcome the educational disadvantages they face (SEP 2013: 5-21).

This priority, in the case of indigenous students, has consisted in scholarships for indigenous students, including indigenous women and mothers; funding programs for renewing school infrastructures, especially for incorporating new technology such as internet or computers; special funding for constructing new schools near indigenous communities; special programs for preparing indigenous teachers, among other programs that seek to level up the educational opportunities of indigenous students (SEP 2014: 21-23)[55].

Other type of measures can fall within the equality perspective. For instance, within the literature of multicultural education, from a pedagogic focus, James Banks has argued that one of the dimensions of a multicultural education is what he calls *equity pedagogy*. This refers to how teachers must modify their teaching practices in ways that facilitate the academic achievements of students from different cultures (2007: 84). The main goal of the *equity pedagogy* is to help students who are members of cultural minorities achieve their education goals, that is, to complete the education process. Therefore, the *equality pedagogy* is understood as part of the equality perspective.

In short, among the different measures that can be adopted as part of the equality perspective there is also place for adopting teaching practices that guide, advise, and assist indigenous students during their education process. Although in the National Curriculum there is no

[55] An interesting measure for this has been adopted by some regions in the state of Oaxaca where special funding has been provided for the functioning of shelters for indigenous students, whose communities are far away from the school. These shelters allow them to live there during the school days, having all their expenses covered, and going back to their homes for the weekend (SEP 2017: 136).

mention of this, neither in the Official Program of Intercultural Education, this is not incompatible with the national education system, nor with the National Curriculum, given the fact that these policies foresee the adoption of teaching practices that can be more sensitive to the disadvantages that indigenous students tend to suffer. Moreover, within the National Curriculum, it was mentioned in chapter 1, there is an element called "Personal and social development", and within this element there is space for incorporating some type of counseling for indigenous students.

This leads to another important strategy that can be adopted by the equality perspective, which consists in enabling compensation programs for indigenous students facing some sort of disadvantage.

In this regard, in the theory of pedagogy and cultural diversity, there has been a line of thought which has defended compensation programs for students' members of cultural minorities, or low income and disadvantaged families (Banks 2007:49-50).

This line of thought, called cultural depravation, defends that when low-income students and members of cultural minorities do not perform successfully in school it is due to their dysfunctional social and cultural environment. People facing poverty and living in disorganized families, homes, and communities, experience "cultural depravation" which leads to cognitive deficits (49). Accordingly, because these cultural deficits are due to the environment in which people grow, schools have a responsibility to help low-income and minority students achieve their goals. Schools, that is, need to compensate for their deprived cultural environment (50), which leads to compensation programs for low-income students or members of cultural minorities.

Here, an important precision needs to be done. For the equality perspective, indigenous peoples are a disadvantaged group, which require group target policies to ameliorate their current situation. Under this perspective, cultural differences –although not ignored and difficult to detach– are secondary. By enabling compensation programs for indigenous students, hence, it is not understood that cultural differences lead to a "cultural deficit", which needs to be compensated by special programs. Rather, that indigenous students tend to face a disadvantage in the education system given their situation as a disadvantaged social group.

This is an important distinction, by enabling these special programs it does not mean that members of cultural minorities have a cultural deficit. Cultural minorities, that is, have a strong, rich, and diverse culture which consists in languages, values, cultural practices, behaviors, and different perspectives that need to be acknowledged and valued (50-52). This is what scholars in the field of pedagogy have called cultural difference theory.

Scholars supporting this line of thought argue that if cultural minorities tend to fail to do well in school is not because of their deprived culture, but because their culture is different from the one taught in school and because their culture is not being properly incorporated into the design of the school curriculum (51).

For the difference-cultural theorists, schools and not cultural groups should be held responsible if members of cultural minorities suffer from low academic achievements because the school should be designed in a way in which it respects, incorporates, and reflects the cultures of these minorities and, additionally, must adopt teaching strategies that are consistent with their cultural characteristics. Under this perspective, that is, schools and in general the education system need to be designed in a way in which students pertaining to cultural minorities can keep ties with their cultural practices and communities and, at the same time, develop competency in the standard knowledge and values of the mainstream culture (51-52).

According to what has been discussed and developed in the previous two chapters, however, these two lines of thought need not be in opposition, rather, they should be complementary. But again, it needs to be clear that the equality perspective treats indigenous peoples as disadvantaged social groups[56], and this might be a reason why in some cases, compensatory education can be a viable solution to address certain disadvantages that these students might face within the education system. On the other hand, the claims of the cultural-difference

[56] In this regard, for instance, scholars tend to argue that –and data available supports this affirmation– indigenous students learn much slower than average non-indigenous students. And this, they claim, is intimately related with their undernourishment. Indeed, in 2006, 32% of indigenous children under the age of five were less tall than average. Additionally, the mortality rate in indigenous children was 60% higher than in their non-indigenous counterparts (UNICEF Mexico: 2014; Schmelkes 2013: 8 and Bertely 2003).

theorists fall within the scope of the indigenous perspective, which will be analyzed in the following subsection.

Usually, among the literature regarding intercultural education in Mexico, it is highly criticized the way in which the Special Program of Intercultural Education has mainly focused on providing equality of opportunities and not attending other aspects that are required –and which will be analyzed in the following subsections[57].

It is true that a special program of intercultural education needs to go beyond simply trying to provide the same educational opportunities to indigenous students than to non-indigenous because of the reasons already mentioned in previous chapters. However, this perspective and the results it can provide need not be rejected because, as mentioned in the previous chapter, they are essential for the other two perspectives to work and, moreover, for the whole three-dimensional project proposed in the previous chapter to be effective.

Understood under these terms, if we retake some of the provisional results offered by the General Office of Intercultural and Bilingual Education regarding the Official Program of Intercultural Education, we might see that, after all, some of these results should not be underestimated. Take, for instance, the fact that in 2010, 18.4% of indigenous citizens completed primary school while 17.6% completed secondary school, which means that nearly most of the indigenous students who completed primary school also had access to and completed secondary school. This, in addition, means that most of the indigenous students who complete primary school tend to complete the basic education[58], which might be something remarkable according to the scope of the equality perspective.

This is an important and positive contribution, if we understand it as part of a major project of ethnocultural justice. Just as argued in the previous chapter, multiculturalism –and any multicultural model– also shares the concern that goods, resources, and opportunities must be distributed fairly (Young 1990: 193-198). Although this discourse is immersed in the equality of opportunities rhetoric, it does not mean that it must be rejected, on the contrary,

[57] These critiques were mentioned in chapter 1.

[58] Recall that, according to the Mexican Constitution, basic education comprises preschool, primary school and junior high, and secondary education comprises high school. Both basic and secondary education are considered mandatory. See Chapter 1.

its contributions must be welcomed. What needs to be highlighted is that this approach is insufficient on its own, it requires to be complemented by the other two perspectives which are more concerned with tackling and overcoming the patterns that generate inequalities for members of different cultural groups and, simultaneously, to recognize and accommodate cultural differences. As it will be referred to further, not only these perspectives need to be incorporated but, in addition, efforts should be done to avoid any type of conflict or tension between them.

However, although positive results have been obtained by this education program regarding the goals of the equality perspective, the results are only numerical. That is, we lack information or data that allows us to know if there has been any modification regarding teaching practices in education centers. Part of the problem of this, as it will be insisted on the next subsection when analyzing a case study, might lie in the fact that these different adjustments need to be done in a micro-level and not in a national program. In fact, the analysis that will be done in the next sections will lead to the conclusion that, any program of intercultural education needs to be designed at a micro level and not at a national level which, in fact, is consistent with the "autonomy curriculum" element that was described in chapter 1. This will be confirmed as we advance the other two different perspectives.

3. Indigenous Perspective

In the field of education, the indigenous perspective should be concerned with the type of education provided in indigenous communities. The Mexican legal framework specifies that the education offered in indigenous communities or where indigenous peoples are highly concentrated, should address, in the curriculum, the cultural and linguistic specificities of indigenous populations, for which indigenous representatives need to be involved in the design of such curriculums (article 2 of the Mexican Constitution. See Chapter 1).

This can be possible with the two principles that have been enabled by the National Model of Education, which are "schools at the center" and "curriculum autonomy". These principles, as was said in Chapter 1, have been incorporated precisely to decentralize the design of the school curriculums, giving more autonomy to schools and communities so that they enable curriculums that respond to the cultural specificities of each region of the country.

These principles appear to be essential for the goals of the indigenous perspective, and an example of this will be offered shortly. Indeed, with these principles guiding the design of the education model and the school curriculums, it is possible to enable programs that are adequate for indigenous communities and for regions with a great concentration of indigenous citizens. In addition, a proper interpretation and application of these principles can help reconcile the two different discourses of intercultural education that were presented in Chapter 1. To show this, an example will be provided in the final part of this section, showing how indigenous school has managed to make compatible the "key learnings" of the national curriculum while, at the same time, has designed a curriculum that responds to, and incorporates, the cultural specificities of that indigenous community.

However, at this point, what needs to be stressed out is that the indigenous perspective must not be simply translated into including indigenous folklore into the school curriculum (Martínez Buenabad 2015), which is something that currently happens in many cases. For instance, according to a study published by the Ministry of Education, in primary schools of the state of Chihuahua indigenous students are encouraged to attend school with their traditional dresses and to speak in their indigenous language (Raramuri). But at the same time, the parents of these students complain that the teachers of such schools have failed to acknowledge their culture and to adopt teaching practices that incorporate indigenous values and knowledge (SEP 2017: 113), which confirms that these strategies have consisted in making an emphasis on the folkloric aspects, ignoring the point of incorporating an indigenous perspective in the education program.

This has often been known as "soft multiculturalism", which consists in extolling colorful and "culturally vibrant" customs of certain cultural minorities, while members of these minorities still face low socioeconomic status and high levels of inequality (Castles 2007: 26). In similar terms, the literature of post-multiculturalism has claimed that multiculturalism "is characterized as a feel-good celebration of ethnocultural diversity, encouraging citizens to acknowledge and embrace the panoply of customs, traditions, music, and cuisine that exist in a multiethnic society" (Kymlicka 2012: 4). But as previous chapters have pointed out, the notion of multiculturalism that has been here adopted is rather different than this folkloric notion. And following this logic, the indigenous perspective seeks to make compatible

mainstream knowledge with indigenous knowledge and indigenous values. And this requires going beyond simply *folklorizing* the school curriculum.

This means, for a start, offering the conditions so that indigenous students remain during the whole education process. It was mentioned in the previous subsection that indigenous students not only have difficulties having access to the education system but, in addition, they struggle to remain in it. According to a recent study conducted by UNICEF-Mexico regarding indigenous youth, it was revealed that the major causes of quitting school among indigenous students is due to discrimination, a sense of exclusion and demotivation in the fact that they had a very hard time in catching up with their non-indigenous classmates (UNICEF 2014: 9-16). The indigenous perspective, that is, implies redesigning the school curriculums in a way in which it sends the message that indigenous cultures stand on equal footing as mainstream culture. Indigenous students, that is, need to feel they are part of the education system.

This coincides with what Castles has argued: given the fact that schools play an important role in fostering and developing self-esteem, if one's culture is treated as inferior or simply ignored, one consequence can be the rejection of such system (Castles 2007: 30). And, on the contrary, if the different cultures are being properly incorporated into education programs, this can motivate indigenous students to remain during the whole schooling process.

It is undeniable that western knowledge needs to be taught in schools given the fact that this type of knowledge is relevant for having access to life opportunities. Subjects such as physical and mathematical sciences might have an important weight in the curriculum since these subjects are essential for the realization of most professions. It would be contrary to the principles of multiculturalism to support an educative curriculum that gives extra weight to indigenous knowledge, instead of giving certain types of western knowledge required for accessing life opportunities.

But this does not mean there is no space for incorporating into the curriculum some aspects of the knowledge developed by pre-Hispanic cultures, that have been passed to indigenous cultures which still coexist today. Moreover, as it will be exemplified further, mainstream knowledge can still be taught to indigenous students by applying teaching practices and

methods that are keener to their values and ways of social organization, and not necessarily through a traditional teaching method which might clash with their cultural values –this will become clear when analyzing the case study.

Stephen May has argued, in this regard, that a critical account of multicultural education must unmask the way in which the mainstream cultural knowledge has been accorded with cultural and linguistic capital while not with minority cultures. The consequence of this has been that minority students are enforced to lose their ethnic, cultural, and linguistic specificities as the "necessary price of entry to the civic realm" (May 1999: 31). We need to distinguish, he suggests, the *cultural arbitrary* in schools, which are the particular–dominant forms of knowledge that have been recognized by the education system as cultural capital, with what he calls *cultural necessary*, which is the essential or necessary knowledge that the education system believes it needs to transmit students to widen their life opportunities.

There are, May argues, structural alternatives that can be employed for providing the necessary knowledge which are inclusive of the values and practices of both majority and minority cultures and, at the same time, which do not suggest a hierarchy of knowledge (1999:32).

Moreover, according to May, a critical account of multiculturalism in education needs to incorporate and recognize the differing cultural knowledge that children bring from their cultural groups and, at the same time, help the students understand, as mentioned already above, the processes "by which alternative cultural knowledge [has come] to be *subjugated*, principally through the hegemonies and misrepresentations" (May 1999: 32). This leads to revaluing the previously subjugated knowledge and, as such, leads to the intercultural perspective, which will be analyzed in turn.

Despite this, it is undeniable that tensions will arise when designing the school curriculum and during the decision-making processes of the education system. However, as a general principle, efforts must be done to ensure the transmission of the basic mainstream knowledge required to widen indigenous students' life opportunities and, at the same time, ensure that their set of values, which are characteristic of indigenous cultures, be transmitted. These tensions and possible solutions, however, need to be solved on a case by case situation.

However, what matters the most and is more relevant is that the values and cosmology of indigenous cultures are not displaced by the values of the mainstream culture, which could be done by, among other things, the implemented teaching practices –which will be expanded when analyzing the case study.

All this suggests that for the indigenous perspective to be successful it is required that indigenous communities and local authorities be highly engaged in the design of the school curriculums and in the local education systems, which is possible given the two principles that were analyzed in chapter 1: schools at the center and curriculum autonomy.

This, in addition, is compatible with the need of offering indigenous students an education that is relevant, both culturally and linguistically speaking. This was also presented in chapter 1 as the need to provide an education that responds to the cultural contexts of each region of the country, meaning that although there are specific learning goals that all education systems must pursue, there is space for adjusting the curriculum in a way that it responds to the cultural specificities of certain regions of the country. This allows to incorporate indigenous practices, knowledge and language and, moreover, to make mainstream knowledge compatible with the values, knowledge, and cultural context of indigenous cultures.

Examples of this are found in schools in the states of Chihuahua, Queretaro, and Campeche. In these schools which are established in indigenous communities or where indigenous populations are highly concentrated, according to a study made by the Ministry of Education, parents and leaders of these communities are very engaged in the adjustments to the curriculum so that they suit well the cultural specificities of their cultures, including their language so that indigenous students turn out bilingual (SEP 2014: 106, 115 and 151). In some interviews with teachers of such schools, they express the importance of a flexible curriculum which allows them to make the goals expected of each subject compatible with the cultural specificities of their culture (115).

However, there is one case that should be analyzed in order to understand how the indigenous perspective can be incorporated within the design of the education system and the school curriculum. This example will be analyzed in the following subsection.

a) **The Tetsijtsilin Secondary School**

Morales Espinosa (2012) offers a case study of a rural secondary– state school called Tetsijtsilin located in a region of the state of Puebla called Tzinacapan. In this region live nearly 6000 people and a great majority of them are indigenous citizens of the Maeual culture, which is a derivate of the Mayan culture and most of them speak Nahuatl (Morales Espinosa 2012: 22). The case of the Tetsijtsilin rural secondary school reveals the way in which schools located near indigenous communities can deal with the cultural diversity of their students and, more concretely, on how schools can manage to articulate a curriculum which incorporates both the mainstream knowledge and the different indigenous knowledges, values, and practices (Salmerón Castro 2012: 10).

This school was created in 1977 by some indigenous citizens who saw the need of having a secondary rural school near their communities. As all other secondary state schools, this school offered –and still offers– a specific curriculum implemented through all the country. However, in 198,2 its founders, as well as parents of students attending this school saw the need of adjusting the curriculum to cope with the cultural specificities of students. Concretely, they agreed to go beyond the national secondary education program because it was inadequate for their context (Beaucage 2012: 97).

Additionally, they claimed the need to establish a bond between the school and the community, where the teaching practices and knowledges offered in school could be useful for the agricultural activities held in those communities and which are the main economic activities. This had to be done simultaneously with the transmission of mainstream knowledge that could help widen their life opportunities (Repetto Becerra 2012: 90 and Beaucage 2012: 98). Finally, parents also agreed on the importance of teaching Nahuatl, which is the first language of most of these citizens (Morales Espinosa 2012: 25). Overall, the people involved in this project claimed the need to provide local education authorities –including school boards– more control and margin of maneuver in the design of the curriculum and in the implementation of teaching practices (28)

Morales Espinosa shows how this school has managed to adjust the national curriculum to incorporate the cultural specificities of these indigenous communities and, in addition, to keep a link between the school and the community (see also Salmerón Castro 2012: 9-10 and Repetto Becerra 2012: 90-91). For instance, in the national curriculum for secondary rural

schools, the subject of Technologic Education tries to train students for using technologic development in their working life and, in addition, to train them in the way that technologic development can be used to improve production. In short, this subject tries to train students in the use of new technologies to be incorporated into working life.

What this school has done, however, is adapt the content of this subject in such a way that what is taught there has a direct application to the economic activities of their communities and, moreover, that the content of this subject does not contravene the values of their culture (Yinclan and Zúñiga Lázaro 2012: 93). In this regard, Morales Espinosa argues that one of the main reasons to reorient the content of this subject was to respect and strengthen the productive activities of the region; to extol their cultural practices and, moreover, to promote the cultural values of their communities (2012: 34-35).

Five main activities of traditional agriculture, which are incorporated into the subject of Technologic Education, are held in this school: 1) vegetable growing, which has the purpose to rescue the domestic growing of food to help families with their diets; 2) cultivation of fruit trees and trees for timber. The purpose of this area is to help with the reforestation of the region and to learn the growing processes of these trees. 3) the rescue of wild plants with healing properties. The purpose of this is to promote research of the healing properties of these plants, their growing process, their different uses, their scientific names etc. 4) Elaboration of organic fertilizer by having their own compost. The purpose of vermi-compost (using earth worms to break down organic waste) is to promote the recycling of organic waste to produce natural fertilizer. And finally, 5) permanent production, which promotes the growing of corn, beans, peppers, and different flowers (Morales Espinosa 2012: 34-35).

All these activities have a direct and positive impact on the community and, moreover, establish a continuous exchange of knowledge between students, teachers, and the rest of the community who are also engaged in these activities. This helps strengthen the link between the school and the community, which was one of the main goals with the creation of this school (Morales Espinosa 2012: 36).

Additionally, the subject of Arts has also been adapted to the cultural specificities of these communities. The school offers different workshops which include traditional art craft, carpentry, traditional music, traditional dance, hand-craft, and ceramics (36). These activities

comply with the requirement of the national curriculum which assigns 120 minutes per week to these subjects, making the goals of the national curriculum compatible with the cultural specificities of these communities (Yinclan and Zúñiga Lázaro 2012: 95).

Finally, this school offers Nahuatl as a subject, which is taught once a week, in a session of one hour per week. To incorporate this subject and, at the same time, offer English as the national curriculum requires, out of the three hours per week that were destined to English, one hour was subtracted to the latter and destined to Nahuatl. In this subject not only grammar is taught, in addition, it tries to strengthen and transmit the Nahuatl culture and cosmology. As a result of 30 years of teaching this subject, this school has published a dictionary in Nahuatl, which contains 6850 words that are commonly used in this region (Morales Espinosa 2012: 38). Moreover, the students that graduate from this school are among the few people trained in Nahuatl, which gives them important opportunities as translators in different public institutions among the region (Morales Espinosa 2012: 38-29).

In addition to the basic subjects that must be taught according to the national curriculum and from the adaptations teachers of this school have done in some subjects, different projects, which seek to bring closer the school to the community and the knowledge transmitted with their cultural values, have been implemented. Concretely, Morales Espinosa argues, these projects have two main characteristics: a) they link together the educative tasks with productive tasks; and b) help to strengthen the productive skills of students so that in the long-term, they can improve their productive capacities for their families and the community (29).

Currently, there are two types of projects that are being enabled in this school. One type are the agroindustry projects, which consist in recollecting, transforming, and extracting natural resources which, simultaneously, provide some income once these products are commercialized. One of these projects is what they call "the coffee of our school"[59] which consists in producing coffee. This project involves current students, alumni, and parents, and it is a continuous project that goes from planting the coffee to selling it (30).

[59] In Spanish "cafecito de la escuela" and in Nahuatl "Kaifetsin Tamachtiloyan"

A second type of projects are the environmentalist projects, which focus in promoting the value of natural resources and the environment. One of these projects is what they call "our new paper"[60] which consists in rescuing traditional techniques to produce paper. This project also intends to generate awareness on the students regarding the impact of waste and its impact on the environment. To produce paper, students must be engaged in recycling their waste and recollecting paper waste, which is later transformed to notebooks, folders, cards, envelopes, etc. (31).

Another project framed under the environmentalist projects is the one called "little doctors"[61]. This project seeks to strengthen the use of traditional plants and traditional medicine. It consists in cultivating some medicine plants and preparing some products of traditional medicine, such as creams, infusions, cough syrup, etc. (32).

Finally, it is important to mention that most of the teachers of this school are not from an indigenous origin. This, according to Morales Espinosa is something positive because it helps establish a dialogue between different cultures and this, she says, contributes to gradually change the attitudes of members of the majoritarian culture towards indigenous cultures and citizens, together with their prejudices and stereotypes (2012: 39).

The case of the Tetsijtsilin secondary rural school shows the way a school curriculum can be designed, making mainstream knowledge compatible with indigenous cultural practices, values and knowledges. Indeed, workers of this school have managed to fulfill the goals established by the national education program and, at the same time, incorporate indigenous values and knowledge into the school curriculum.

As it has already been mentioned, indigenous communities have commonly demanded that schools keep a strong link with the community and extol their cultural values. This is something that the Tetsijtsilin secondary school has managed to do, not only by adjusting the content of the curriculum in some areas, where this is possible, but by implementing teaching practices that are keener to the communal cosmology of indigenous cultures.

[60] In Spanish "nuestro papel nuevo" and in Nahuatl "Toyankuikamauj".
[61] In Spanish "médicos chiquitos" and in Nahuatl "Tapajtianij tsikitsitsin"

This project has brought positive outcomes in many ways. First, because it helps students achieve their education goals by offering an education which is culturally relevant for them. Students attending this school, given their indigenous origins, feel they belong there and that their culture is being respected and welcomed (Salmerón Castro 2012: 10). Consequently, this has strengthened the identity of these students by extolling their cultural specificities rather than being marginalized because of them (Morales Espinosa 2012: 40). Indigenous students attending this school, that is, feel their identity is being respected and accommodated, and this is of great importance for the goals of any multicultural model and any program of multicultural education.

In addition, by adjusting the content of the school curriculum and the subjects, this school offers an education which is relevant for the activities held out in this region. Students who graduate from this school are well prepared to perform the activities held out in their communities. However, this does not mean that they are only trained for this. Rather, the school curriculum still provides students with mainstream knowledge required to pursue other life opportunities (Beaucage 2012: 95-96)[62], which means that their life projects are not been limited nor obstructed by only transmitting certain type of knowledge and training.

This case shows how both the equality and the indigenous perspective can be applied and have positive outcomes. It is true, however, that this is only one case. But this case is precisely what allows us to say that an indigenous perspective can be compatible with the state education system. However, this can only be successful if local schools and education authorities, together with indigenous leaders have a major role in the design of their school curriculums, which is possible given the way the new Education Model has been designed.

Although there are positive outcomes of the previously presented project, it can also present some problems. It is important that indigenous citizens receive a proper education that will enable them and train them to perform their local economic activities in a better way. There is no question that this must be one of the goals of an education program for indigenous citizens, given the fact that education plays a fundamental role in the outcome of citizens'

[62] Some examples of students, who have graduated from this school and are now pursuing different life projects, are offered in a book published by the Ministry of Education and the CGEIB: Gutiérrez González, Oscar and Morales Espinosa, María del Coral (comp.) 2012.

lives. But this is not enough. Indeed, we cannot neglect the transmission of mainstream knowledge that will enable indigenous students to compete, in equality of conditions, with non-indigenous for the access of superior education and, eventually, for any other job position or life opportunity in general.

In the case of the Tetsijtsilin secondary school we know that in 2011, its students were evaluated through the national system of evaluation in education (prueba Enlace) and their results were on the average of the national level (Yinclan and Zúñiga Lázaro 2012: 94). This seems to mean that, in this case, the transmission of mainstream knowledge has not been overlooked, as it was mentioned before. However, it should be a high priority that any project like this one must not overlook the transmission of the necessary knowledge required to expand the life opportunities of these students.

And this leads to another point which might be a concern for some scholars. Indeed, it has been argued that offering a differentiated education for members of cultural minorities can lead to sacrifice the development of personal autonomy and predestine them to lead certain ways of life (See Reich 2005 and Gutmann 1995), and this could apply to indigenous students too. The problem with this, lies on the fact that indigenous populations are also among the most disadvantaged social groups. Consequently, by limiting indigenous students' life projects we might be also predestining them to live a disadvantaged life, making it extremely hard for them to overcome these disadvantages.

And this situation seems to lead to Frasers' recognition-redistribution dilemma. According to her, as it has been mentioned before, two are the sources of injustice that some social groups suffer (which she calls bivalent collectivities): one is economic and the other one is cultural. Each of these sources of injustice, she claims, requires two different remedies: redistribution and recognition, respectively. The dilemma we face with these groups, Fraser suggests, is that these two different remedies pull in opposite directions. Remedies of recognition tend to promote group differentiation, while claims of redistribution, by calling for the abolishment of economic arrangements that underpin group specificity, tend to promote group de-differentiation (Fraser 1995: 74).

Applied to our example, this dilemma would suggest that in the field of education, tackling one sort of injustice is incompatible with tackling the second source of injustice. Concretely,

this tension would suggest that offering an education that responds to cultural specificities of indigenous cultures and that intends to prepare indigenous future citizens for preforming the tasks of their community leads, at the same time, to reinforcing the disadvantages that these groups suffer. And contrary to this, offering an education that enables indigenous students to pursue different life projects and that enables them to escape from their disadvantaged position, requires us to put aside their cultural specificities and support an education that makes a strong emphasis on mainstream knowledge and values.

But this dilemma can be avoided just as it has been argued in the previous chapter. Indeed, we need to distinguish the different sorts of injustice and, although acknowledging that they are ingrained and related, they need to be separated. In this case, the indigenous perspective is more concerned with the cultural source of injustice, but this need not mean that it neglects the positional injustice that indigenous groups face. Hence, one of the challenges of the indigenous perspective is to offer an education that is culturally relevant for indigenous students, which means incorporating also their knowledges and values, but without neglecting to offer also the mainstream knowledge required to pursue different life projects.

A proper balance needs to be made between both sorts of injustices. And the fact that the Tetsijtsilin secondary school has been able to do this, means that such dilemma can be avoided (Beaucage 2012: 95-96: Morales Espinosa 2012b: 36-37). Moreover, if the design of the curriculums is adequate, rather than predestining indigenous students to live an indigenous way of life, which implies being disadvantaged, the opposite can be achieved. Cultural specificities might be properly recognized, while eliminating their group disadvantages, which is one of the goals of the model of Latin American interculturalism developed in the previous chapter and, especially, one of the goals of the indigenous perspective.

In short, the indigenous perspective in the field of education requires redesigning both the national education program and the school curriculums in a way in which indigenous knowledge and values are incorporated. This means, first, that the national education program must consist on a set of principles that must be observed by local authorities when designing the curriculum of their schools. And secondly, that school curriculums must be designed in a way in which they incorporate different indigenous knowledges and make them compatible

with the mainstream knowledge. In addition, it requires that the teaching practices be compatible with the values of the indigenous cultures. According to how the new Education Model is designed, which was explained in chapter 1, the requirements of the indigenous perspective are compatible with such model.

This perspective, however, can be more effective in regions where indigenous citizens form a majority. The case of the Tetsijtsilin secondary school is successful precisely because it is established in a region where a great majority of settlers are indigenous. In this case it is easier to enable school curriculums and education polices that achieve its goals. However, just as mentioned in Chapters I and IV, nearly 40% of the indigenous population in the country live in regions where they do not conform a majority. In these cases, indigenous students attend mainstream education centers, and, consequently, face different problems and require different sorts of remedies.

In these cases, the indigenous perspective should also be incorporated while designing school curriculums and programs. The curriculum can incorporate, in certain subjects, some aspects of indigenous knowledge. For instance, in the subject of earth and space sciences it could incorporate the knowledge developed by indigenous cultures before the arrival of the Spanish conquers and which has been passed from generation to generation and still forms part of the indigenous cosmology (Sosa 1984).

Another example, mentioned in the previous chapter, refers to traditional medicine. Currently traditional medicine is stigmatized by doctors who practice and teach medicine and, consequently, it is not taught in medical school. Despite this, there are doctors specialized in traditional medicine who are trying to show how certain practices can benefit everybody – and not only indigenous members– which is a powerful reason for why it should be incorporated into the medical school curriculum (Zoya 2012 and Dimas Huacuz forthcoming 2018). The indigenous perspective, in this case, would require that medical schools incorporate traditional medicine as part of the program. This can bring positive effects first, for indigenous students, because they can perceive that their medical knowledge is being properly accommodated into the school curriculums. Secondly, for indigenous populations who are demanding to be treated using to traditional medical practices. And thirdly, it can help foster the intercultural perspective –which will be analyzed shortly. Indeed, among the

effects of incorporating traditional medicine into the school curriculum, not only future doctors can learn it and enrich their knowledge and their personal development, but in addition, they change their attitude towards these practices and, eventually, transmit them not only to indigenous patients but in general to whoever can benefit from them.

Moreover, this need not be met only in graduate school, it can also be met in basic school. Within the national curriculum, primary school establishes a subject called “health care”, which teaches the basic parts of the body and its functioning. These subjects could also incorporate aspects of indigenous cultures, which need not be incompatible with the rest of the mainstream health knowledge. Rather, they can complement it and enrich it.

Indeed, there are many cases in which indigenous knowledge can be incorporated into the school curriculums in education centers, where indigenous students do not conform the majority. This, in addition, contributes to the intercultural perspective. Before analyzing this perspective, it is necessary to mention that the indigenous perspective is a transversal project that need not disappear.

Contrary to the equality perspective, the indigenous perspective should form part of any project of ethnocultural justice as long as indigenous cultures exist and, moreover, as long as these minorities keep making claims of cultural recognition and accommodation. In this regard, the indigenous perspective once adopted and implemented adequately can accompany any project of ethnocultural justice. Its life will only depend on the existence of cultural minorities that are making claims of cultural recognition and accommodation.

4. Intercultural Perspective

The intercultural perspective, it was said in the previous chapter, changes its focus from indigenous groups to the dominant culture because its goal is to change the attitude of the former towards the later. More concretely, it seeks to change the way the dominant cultural group perceives certain practices and values that are characteristic of indigenous cultures. It seeks, that is, an attitudinal change from the dominant majority toward the values and practices of cultural minorities.

Achieving an attitudinal change from majority towards minorities is something that scholars from the practice of multicultural education have been worried about. Banks, for instance,

argues that a multicultural program of education should help students acquire knowledge, values, and skills needed to operate within a democratic system and to pursue different life opportunities. But additionally, education must also provide the skills, values, and knowledge required to interact positively with people from diverse ethnic, racial and cultural groups, with whom they share a common nation project (Banks 2007: 2).

This is what Banks calls the *prejudice reduction dimension* of education, which also refers to the need of implementing strategies and practices to help eliminate racial attitudes and biases that students tend to develop against members of minority cultures (2007:85).

In similar terms, May argues that a critical account of multiculturalism in education should be concerned not only with recognizing and accommodating cultural differences, but also in accepting that these cultural differences have led to relations of inequality between members of different cultural groups. By attaching cultural capital to the dominant culture –including knowledge and practices– the education system is reaffirming that there is one culture superior than the others and, consequently, schools tend to reinforce the perception that minority cultures are worthless. Therefore, members of these minorities are kept in a marginal situation and tend to face structural discrimination and disadvantage[63]. May argues, consequently, that a critical account of multiculturalism in education must not only recognize and incorporate different types of knowledge that students acquire in their communities and bring into school. In addition, it must overcome such hierarchies that have been reinforced in teaching practices (1999: 30-33). Behind this idea, as it will be further analyzed, lies the intercultural perspective.

Similarly, in this regard, Kalantzis and Cope (1999:245-247) have argued that a project of multicultural education will be unsuccessful if it fails to focus on the dominant segments of society. Typically, it has been widely criticized by pedagogy scholars, that multicultural education has only focused its attention to the education offered to members of minority

[63] Behind this lies the idea that was analyzed in Chapter 4 regarding the normalization process. There, it was said that a normalization process occurs when the experiences and capacities of the dominant social segment are elevated as standards used to judge everybody. During this process, the attributes, characteristics, values, or ways of life that are exhibited by the majoritarian dominant culture appear to be "normal" and, in addition, are qualified as being the "best". The effect of this is that other people who do not fit these attributes or fail to conform to these standards due to their bodily capacities, their membership to cultural groups, their group-specific socialized habits, or ways of life, tend to suffer stigmatization and disadvantage (Young, 2006a:95).

cultures and, consequently, it has failed to also focus on transforming the attitudes of the majoritarian culture towards minority cultures.

This is what the intercultural perspective in the field of education should try to address, which means that the first important point of the intercultural perspective in the field of education is being concerned with the type of education that non-indigenous students receive. More concretely, with how to change the attitude of members of the majoritarian culture towards minority cultures within the education system and through the education provided.

However, while with the other two perspectives we do find some insights of them in the National Education System, we lack these insights for the intercultural perspective. Indeed, while the outcomes of the intercultural perspective are compatible with the aims of the education system overall, nothing from the different laws and policies can be said to fall within this perspective. This means that we need to build it.

In the previous chapter, it was argued that the main strategy the intercultural perspective needs to endorse is valuing positively certain aspects, characteristic of indigenous cultures. This was argued by drawing some parallels with gender theory, concretely, with caring activities. It was said, that is, that men need to value the tasks of caring, but in addition, they need to get involved in them, which will decenter gender roles and allow women to liberate themselves from the oppression and the inequality they generally face compared to men (see Chapter 5).

In the field of ethnocultural justice, we need to find a set of values that are characteristic of indigenous cultures, which can be incorporated into the education system and be transmitted to all students. In the following lines, it will be suggested that an alternative can be to adopt the principles of the notion of “buen vivir”.

The concept of “buen vivir”, which in English could be translated as “living good”, is a concept that is still under construction, but that in recent years has become a central part of indigenous studies and indigenous thought. This concept rescues and collects different values of indigenous cultures and their way of understanding well-being, which differs from the western ideals of development and welfare (Acosta and Gudynas 2011:76). Moreover, this way of understanding well-being is intimately related to the preservation of the environment

and of nature, and it extols values such as solidarity and reciprocity (Acosta and Gudynas 2011:77). However, although this concept highlights the importance of rescuing some values of indigenous cultures, it also incorporates "western values" such as equality and freedom (Acosta and Gudynas 2011: 76, and Villagomes and Cunha del Campo 2014: 37). It would be a mistake, many scholars argue, to think of "buen vivir" as an attempt to return to the past, or of simply reviving indigenous ways of life that are already extinct. On the contrary, the idea of "buen vivir" offers many new alternatives that can help societies lead a better and more sustainable life in the present and in the future (Acosta and Gudynas 2011: 80-83).

Ecuador and Bolivia have incorporated this concept in their Political Constitutions in 2008 and 2009 respectively. In the case of Bolivia, the idea of "vida buena" or "good life" comes from the Aymara *suma qamaña* and it was introduced in the Political Constitution as a guiding principle of State institutions. As a principle, it stands on equal footing than other constitutional principles such as equality, inclusion, dignity, freedom, gender equality, and social justice (Acosta and Gudynas 2011: 77). In the case of Ecuador, on the other hand, it is expressed in Kichwa as *sumak kawsay,* and it has been incorporated into the constitution as a right, concretely, it was incorporated as the rights of "buen vivir" and they include a wide variety of rights such as alimentation, clean environment, water, communication, education, housing, health, etc. (Acosta and Gudynas 2011: 76).

Overall, and for the purposes of this work, the idea of "buen vivir" represents an alternative to the current concept of development and to the social and political organization of State institutions (Pallasco 2012:118). Under this concept, the idea of well-being suggests leaving behind material consumption, individualism, and competition. Rather, it seeks to develop spiritual dimensions which, at the same time, have a strong link to both the community and nature.

Acurio Paéz argues that "buen vivir" advocates for replacing our current ethic for what he calls an ethic of care –which he does not intend to relate it with the feminist literature of ethics of care. He calls it this way because he argues that "buen vivir" has two main premises: 1) caring for one self in our bodies, our minds, and our spirit; and 2) caring for others, which includes caring for public goods and resources (2012: 112).

There are different versions and variants of "buen vivir" that have proliferated through different indigenous cultures in Latin America. Although these different versions vary according to the own cultural specificities of the different indigenous cultures, they all share the basic notion of leading our lives without harming others, including the environment. Its basic principles, hence, are solidarity, reciprocity and a strong link to both the community and nature (Acosta and Gudynas 2011: 80). In short, the concept of "buen vivir" has come to appear as an alternative to the current way in which states are organized and to the current understanding of development (Acurio Páez 2012: 111).

Adopting the concept of "buen vivir" would mean, among other things, that we must rethink the values that are being transmitted and embrace other values that will allow us to lead better lives and to protect our communities and environment (Acosta and Gudynas 2011). We need, these scholars suggest, to construct new forms of citizenship through diversity and a sane relation with nature, and this is where education plays a crucial role (Villagomez and Cuhna del Campo 2014 :37; Acurio Páez 2012: 112). Education must transmit these principles, rather than those based on competition and individualism. Indeed, the current education system is guided by meritocracy, competitiveness, and individualism, and putting extreme pressure to students from the time they begin the schooling process (Carnoy 1977; Young 2006; May 2007). This, consequently, generates a sense of hostility and a lack of empathy among students, resulting in the adoption of these individualistic values once they become citizens. This is the critique that indigenous scholars raise against the education system as a whole, and as mentioned in Chapter 1, when presenting the autonomous discourse of intercultural education, this is one of the main complaints of the supporters of this project.

There is plenty of literature that supports the idea that the values transmitted through the education system play a role in the perpetuation of social groups positioning. Moreover, the education system seems to be perpetuating disadvantages between social groups. Young, for instance, argued that providing education –or quality education– to the future citizens has become the responsibility of parents and their socioeconomic status, rather than of communities (2006: 93), and that meritocracy only reinforces the position that students have due to their membership to certain social groups. Given that the education system transmits the idea that one must compete to achieve success in life, it helps perpetuate the idea of losers

and winners (Young 2006: 95-96), and this endures the structural inequalities, which were analyzed in previous chapters.

It is not the intention of this chapter to engage in these discussions, but it is assumed that, indeed, the values that are currently been transmitted to future citizens through the education system have failed to overcome many obstacles that disadvantages students face. Concretely, it seems that the education system reinforces the privileges of a few and the disadvantages of the majority. And this leads to legitimizing a hierarchical division of labor (Young 2006: 96).

But all these critiques against the education system are rooted in the values that are being transmitted through it, which means that replacing these values might be something necessary and positive for society. Concretely, adopting the values of the idea of "buen vivir" might benefit the whole society and, at the time, help overcome structural inequalities and institutionalized discrimination that indigenous students face in the education system and once they become citizens.

Therefore, bringing to the foreground the values implicit in the notion of "buen vivir" through the education system might be a plausible strategy for the intercultural perspective. These principles must be transversal to the entire education system. This is compatible with what indigenous scholars have suggested, and this can be useful for the purposes of the intercultural perspective in the field of education.

Indeed, if we take the concept of "buen vivir" as a contribution of indigenous cultures, as something that the mainstream society can value and embrace and, moreover, can benefit from, then the intercultural perspective can start taking shape and fulfilling its goals. We now need to analyze how this can be incorporated into the education system, and although this depends, to a great extent, on pedagogues and specialists in the design of education programs and the education system, we can still say something on this regard.

First, we need to remark the fact that we are not talking about indigenous knowledge being incorporated into the curriculum. This is something that concerns the indigenous perspective, as it was already mentioned in the previous section. Rather, the intercultural perspective refers to the adoption of indigenous values. One suggestion, as it has been argued, could be adopting the values attached to the notion of "buen vivir". The transmission of these values

through the education system can offer a great difference on how future citizens are being prepared and, consequently, it can start changing the type of values that society embraces.

By extolling the values of "buen vivir", the majoritarian culture can benefit by leading better and more prosperous lives. By making an emphasis on this concept within the education system, non-indigenous students can start valuing positively indigenous ideologies and, moreover, can adopt these set of values, which will lead to a change of attitude towards indigenous cultures and practices.

However, at this stage, this is just a suggestion that can and should be explored. But we have no evidence of knowing if this can work. Indeed, we have no precedence of the effects that extolling the values of "buen vivir" will bring to society and, consequently, to indigenous citizens. Even Ecuador or Bolivia, where the ideology of "buen vivir" has been incorporated as principles that must guide all institutional designs, including the education system, cannot yet offer significant results of how embracing the values of "buen vivir" can transform society and lead to substantial equality.

This is so, because the intercultural perspective is a long-term project, and incorporating the principles of "buen vivir" into the education system is something that needs to be gradually done. Moreover, the other two perspectives need to be more intense in the present and in the short-term, given the fact that these two perspectives can bring to the foreground the knowledge, practices, and values of indigenous cultures, and this, simultaneously, prepares the field for the intercultural perspective. That is, for transmitting the values and principles inserted in the concept of "buen vivir".

Despite this, it is important to acknowledge that adopting the values of "buen vivir" and adopting an intercultural perspective is something that requires political will and, just as in the case of the gender perspective where men struggle to let go of their privileges, the same can occur under this logic with the dominant group struggling to let go of their privileges. Regardless of this, adopting the values of "buen vivir" and an intercultural perspective falls within the scope of ethnocultural justice and, as a consequence, it is something that must be pursued gradually.

In short, it is suggested here that the intercultural perspective in the field of education requires us to extol the ideology of "buen vivir". This might mean that this ideology needs to be a guiding principle of the entire education system, that is, it needs to be transversal to all entire education design, including the school curriculums.

It is very premature to know what to expect by introducing the concept of "buen vivir" during the design of the education system. A first effect of this could be some kind of symptoms that can lead to, in the long term– the vanishing of group positions, especially the position indigenous groups are currently facing. Given the fact that indigenous citizens, both in and outside the education system, face structural inequalities and institutionalized discrimination, extolling their values and making the majoritarian culture also embrace them, can overcome these obstacles and the negative attitudes towards these citizens. A desirable scenario of inserting the concept of "buen vivir" as part of the intercultural perspective in the field of education would be, hence, overcoming the disadvantaged position of indigenous citizens and, consequently, aspiring to a more equal society.

A second scenario could also be the dissolution of indigenous and non-indigenous categories. Just as analyzed in the previous chapter, this is one of the possible effects of Latin American interculturalism. But this need not be a negative thing. Cultural groups, it has been assumed from the beginning of this dissertation, evolve and change. The goal of any multicultural model and, especially, of Latin American interculturalism is not the preservation of cultural groups nor of cultural specificities. Which means that cultural groups can or cannot change, evolve, or even delude. This is something irrelevant for us. What matters instead, is that if cultural groups exist, their cultural differences must be recognized and accommodated as equally as the majoritarian culture. And this requires not only the incorporation and adoption of an indigenous perspective as described before. It requires, in addition, that the values of indigenous cultures also form part of the national narratives and this is the task and the goal of an intercultural perspective.

However, if this second scenario happens and, indeed, indigenous and non-indigenous categories disappear, this might lead to the indigenous perspective being obsolete or, at least, it will require its modification and adjustment. This can seem to be a future tension between the indigenous and the intercultural perspective, but it should not be seen that way. As

mentioned above, multiculturalism is not concerned with the preservation of cultural minorities and, as a consequence, the indigenous perspective is not concerned with it neither. The fact that the categories of indigenous and non-indigenous groups disappear might require an adjustment of different perspectives, which means that this model needs to be revised and adjusted continuously.

As to the intercultural perspective, it seems that at least in the short-term, it should be adopted as general principles that must guide the design of education programs and school curriculums. Unlike the indigenous perspective and given the fact that achieving the goals of the intercultural perspective is much more complex, this perspective should be incorporated as general principles that can guide the national program of intercultural education.

There are still many challenges that need to be addressed regarding how to achieve ethnocultural justice through education. Many challenges escape the scope of this investigation, and many others, in fact, cannot be foreseen now. However, the goal of incorporating indigenous values into the education program might make a great difference in the long run for the situation that indigenous citizens face within the education system and once they become citizens but, moreover, introducing these values and adopting them as part of the national narrative can also benefit the majority of future citizens and not only indigenous members. Adopting the values of "buen vivir" can contribute to fostering a better and more equal society.

5. Final Comments. Integrating the Three Different Perspectives

This chapter has offered some suggestions on how to improve the education system in order to be compatible with the principles of multiculturalism and of ethnocultural justice. For this, it has suggested a way in which the three different perspectives can engage in the same education project. This does not mean that tensions will not arise between the different perspectives that have been presented. But these tensions need to be solved on a case by case situation, although efforts have been done to anticipate some of these tensions and offer some possible solutions.

In addition, it has also been argued that these perspectives are compatible with the way the legal framework regarding education is designed. But moreover, the legal framework is also

compatible with the autonomic discourse of intercultural education (described in chapter 1). Indeed, it was said in chapter 1 that this discourse rejects the state education system because it claims that an intercultural education must be translated as recognizing autonomy to indigenous communities so that they can engage in their own education project.

But this need not be incompatible with the principles of the National Education Model. The demands of the indigenous defenders that are framed under the autonomic discourse of intercultural education can be met with the way the legal framework is designed. It seems, then, that the problem does not lie on the design of the legal framework but in its implementation and interpretation.

Moreover, it seems that the problem lies on the current impasse of the relations between indigenous organizations and the State. As it was mentioned in Chapter 1, ever since the 1994 uprising, the relations between indigenous organizations and the State have been of confrontation. This has led to a total rejection from many indigenous organizations of all State institutions. And this, simultaneously, leads indigenous supporters to argue that the state education system is obsolete and needs to be rejected (see Chapter 1).

For what has been analyzed during these chapters, however, although some improvements can be done in the design of the education system, the major problem does not lie on its design, but on how it has been implemented. The way the different perspectives can interact in the education system and improve it, has been analyzed here.

A second problem regarding the implementation of the education program cannot be discussed here because it falls within the scope of analysis of other disciplines, such as pedagogy or public administration. Although a first important step is setting the principles that must be observed and the objectives that must be pursued by any education model of intercultural education, which has been done here.

CONCLUSIONS

Mexico is a multicultural state recognized as such in article 2 of the Mexican Constitution. This recognition was one of the main consequences of the indigenous uprising in 1994. Article 2 of the Mexican Constitution also establishes the rights recognized to indigenous communities. From these rights, we can distinguish two different groups. One which seeks cultural recognition and accommodation; and another one which seeks substantial equality. Among the first group of rights, we can also find two different types: rights of territorial autonomy and rights of fair terms of inclusion.

According to the Mexican legal framework, the right to education for indigenous citizens has the following characteristics:

- Indigenous citizens, just as all other citizens, have the right to basic education, which is mandatory and free of charge. This fits within the principles of all liberal democracies, which recognize the same set of rights to every citizen, regardless of their sex, race, cultural membership, religion, etc.

- By acknowledging that indigenous citizens face socioeconomic disadvantages, special and complementary measures are required to achieve the education goals and, consequently, to widen their life opportunities. Concretely, according to article 2 of the Constitution, these special measures must lead to increase the schooling levels, reduce illiteracy rates, and assure that indigenous students conclude the basic education.

- Additionally, because indigenous peoples are recognized also as cultural groups, their right to education also involves designing the school curriculums and, in general, the education system to incorporate their cultural specificities and, moreover, in a way which is compatible with their cultural values.

Despite this recognition of being both a Multicultural state and of group differentiated rights for indigenous peoples, indigenous citizens still face multiple disadvantages regarding education. Given these –and other– disadvantages, a whole wave of what has been called intercultural education has emerged. However, there are deep disagreements of what an

intercultural education must seek. Part of these disagreements lie on the fact that interculturalism still remains a highly contested concept, not only in the Latin American region but also in other countries.

Three different versions of interculturalism are currently being discussed in the literature of ethnocultural diversity: the European, the Quebecois and the Latin American. One of the main intentions in this dissertation was to engage Latin American interculturalism into the discussion, which was done in Chapters 2 and 3.

Although the three different versions of interculturalism are rather different, they share the fact that they oppose multiculturalism for the following reasons:

- Multiculturalism encourages members of different cultures to live separately in parallel communities with minimum contact and interaction among each other. This, they claim, generates mistrust and rejection of difference.
- It undermines collective identity, values, and national unity.
- Multiculturalism supports and protects cultural practices that might be morally unacceptable. It additionally encourages religious minorities to fundamentalism and even terrorism.
- The multicultural approach draws attention away from other vulnerable groups.

Chapter 2 analyzed the European and Quebecois versions of interculturalism. From there, the conclusions are the following:

European Interculturalism. An analysis of this version led to the conclusion that it is not a theory of ethnocultural justice given that it lacks normative basis. In addition, it was concluded that it lacks a set of core values needed to make this theory consistent. A consequence of this, is that it falls into different contradictions. Finally, it was concluded that European Interculturalism has been built under some critiques of multiculturalism. Consequently, while being concerned with arguing why multiculturalism has failed, supporters of interculturalism have failed to offer an alternative theory of ethnocultural justice.

Quebecois Interculturalism. An analysis of the Quebecois version of interculturalism, led to other set of conclusions. One first conclusion was that there are two different versions of interculturalism in Quebec. One defended by Gerard Bouchard, and the second one defended by other Quebecois scholars, among them, Charles Taylor.

Regarding Bouchard's version of interculturalism, it was concluded that it departs from the principles of a theory for managing cultural diversity. The three features which, according to him, distinguish interculturalism from multiculturalism can lead to a decline in the achievements of ethnocultural justice. This conclusion is based on an analysis of the three core features of Bouchard's interculturalism:

- The duality paradigm is where interculturalism is framed. According to this paradigm, diversity consists in the existence of minorities that have immigrated and a cultural majority which he identifies as *foundational*. Under this paradigm, there is a formal recognition of the majority and minority cultures, and interculturalism is supposed to ameliorate the relationship between these groups. However, what distinguishes this situation is that the majority can tend to feel anxiety towards minority cultures. Interculturalism is supposed to attend these anxieties, which explains adopting an *ad hoc* precedence in favor of the majority.

- The *ad hoc* precedence in favor of the majority stipulates that it is justified to break the rule of state neutrality –given its impossibility– to favor the majority and, consequently, to attend their anxieties referred to above. State neutrality is, indeed, impossible to achieve, and multiculturalists have argued that by claiming to be neutral, the State and its institutions are supporting the majoritarian culture and excluding minority cultures. What is required, instead, is to adopt an active role, designing and redesigning policies in ways in which different minority cultures are included. This implies adopting a differentiated treatment towards minority groups so that they can practice, in equal conditions, their culture without being excluded or at a disadvantage for that. But adopting an *ad hoc* precedence in favor of the majority is totally contrary to this logic. It means recognizing the impossibility of a state neutrality but supporting the majoritarian culture, which offers nothing appealing to minority groups.

- Finally, Bouchard recognizes that minorities can face injustices and, hence, a reasonable accommodation is required to avoid these injustices. Reasonable accommodation means allowing citizens victims of discrimination or serious disadvantages due to their cultural differences, to exercise their fundamental rights, unless there are compelling reasons to restrict them. This, it was concluded, is not different than adopting the liberal-egalitarian principles.

The analysis of Bouchard's interculturalism and of the other version of Quebecois interculturalism led to a second conclusion, which is that Bouchard's account of interculturalism is a version of minority nationalism that can be applicable to the context and situation that Quebec faces with the Canadian majoritarian group, but by abstracting it and making it a theory for managing cultural diversity, this version of interculturalism does not seem to offer anything not offered already by some versions of minority nationalism and by the liberal-egalitarian principles. Quebec's interculturalism, it was concluded, must be understood in its historical context and in the way the relations between Quebec and English Canada currently stand.

From the analysis made in Chapter 2, it was concluded that neither the European and Quebecois versions of interculturalism offer any novelty not offered already by multiculturalism. The conclusions that Modood and Meed arrived to regarding these two versions of interculturalism, were confirmed in this dissertation.

However, these two versions of interculturalism, mainly in their critiques against multiculturalism, have been the basis of the still-under-construction version of Latin American interculturalism. This was the reason why it was relevant to analyze and understand them. The way Latin American interculturalism has been developed until now, led to another set of conclusions, which will be presented next.

Just as in the other versions of interculturalism, in the Latin American region this concept is being used in different ways and with different approaches. This has generated a whole set of misunderstandings that have led to interculturalism meaning a lot of things and, at the same time, nothing in concrete.

Interculturalism in Latin-America has been constructed under the critiques addressed to multiculturalism. These critiques, it has been argued, are misleading because they are based on flawed notions of multiculturalism. Chapter 3 was dedicated to analyzing these critiques and to argue why they are inaccurate. However, from the analysis made there, it was concluded that there is a genuine concern among interculturalists in the Latin American region regarding the adequacy of multiculturalism for these societies. This lead to the need of analyzing whether multiculturalism can be exported to these societies and under what conditions.

Multiculturalism can be exported to Latin American societies. However, we need to specify what exactly can be exported and what not. For that, a distinction was made between the principles of multiculturalism and the different multicultural models available and developed by multicultural states. While the principles of multiculturalism can, and should, be adopted by Latin American societies, the mistake lies on trying to apply different multicultural models to these societies.

The principles of multiculturalism can be reduced to: 1) the rejection of the ethnocultural neutrality model; 2) the rejection of the nation-building project that demands assimilation; 3) the acknowledgment of the damage that both the ethnocultural neutrality ideal and the nation-building process caused to members of minority groups, which involves also the will to remediate this situation, and 4) the recognition that all cultural groups are equal. That is, equality among cultural groups.

The models of multiculturalism, on the other hand, are a different set of group-differentiated rights that have been enabled by different multicultural countries. In order to understand why these cannot be exported to Latin American societies, it was required to analyze the typology of cultural minorities developed until now, and whether indigenous peoples in Latin America fit within this typology.

It was argued that the models of multiculturalism have been developed according to how different cultural minorities have responded to the nation-building project. This is why any multicultural model that tries to be exported to Latin American societies will fail, unless it is designed for minorities such as the ones existing in the Latin American region.

After analyzing the typology of ethnocultural minorities offered by Kymlicka, it was concluded that indigenous peoples in the Latin American region do not fit that typology, but, however, share different features of many of the minorities contemplated in this typology. From this analysis it was concluded that indigenous peoples in Latin America, and more concretely, in Mexico, are a *sui generis* ethnocultural group, for the following reasons:

- Not all indigenous peoples in Mexico conserve their societal cultures, which means that not all indigenous peoples fall within the typology of national minorities sketched out by most of the theories of multiculturalism. Moreover, because not all indigenous peoples are territorially concentrated, trying to export a multicultural model based on group rights of territorial autonomy does not cover the whole range of needs and demands of these minorities. Not all indigenous peoples, it is concluded, can be regarded solely as national minorities.

- On the other hand, although not being a minority that has immigrated, indigenous peoples in Mexico share some similar demands than immigrants. Concretely, they wish to be included in equal terms into the majoritarian institutions without having to suppress their different identities and cultural practices.

- Finally, although indigenous peoples have a very different historical context than African Americans in the US, their situation is similar in the fact that they conform a heterogeneous group that does not fit in any category of ethnocultural diversity. This is why, it was concluded, just as African-Americans, indigenous peoples are a *sui generis* cultural minority.

- The diversity encountered in Mexico is more like a multicultural continuum rather than a society where cultural groups are clearly identifiable. If we fail to acknowledge this, any solution provided by multiculturalism will probably be a partial solution.

Indigenous peoples in Mexico not only face ethnocultural injustices. They also face positional injustice, which was defined as a situation in which institutions and practices operate in a way that limits the opportunities of a group of people to achieve well-being due to the position of their social group. For this approach, groups are constituted through structural social processes that position people among social axes that generate status, power,

and opportunity for the development of their capacity or for their acquisition of goods (Young 2007: 64). Although most cultural minorities face some degree of this dimension of injustice, indigenous peoples face this injustice with great intensity. Because of this, it was concluded that any multicultural model adequate for the Mexican society needs to attend both dimensions of the injustices they face.

A conclusion of this was the need to develop a multicultural model that is adequate for Latin American societies and, more specifically, for Mexico. Moreover, it was concluded that part of the critiques of Latin American scholars against multiculturalism lie on the fact that, precisely, we lack a multicultural model for our societies. Chapters 4 and 5 developed this model, and chapter 6 suggested how it can be implemented within the education system. This model was presented as Latin American interculturalism.

Given the fact that indigenous peoples are a *sui generis* cultural group and, as a consequence, we lack a precedence of a multicultural model that can work for these groups, arguments and discussions developed in other set of literature helped construct this model. Because liberation movements share similar concerns and critiques against the liberal project, it makes sense to extract some of the arguments and strategies that have been used in other areas, such as gender theory. Special attention was given to the concept of gender mainstreaming but, more concretely, to an approach that suggests that gender equality can only be achieved by using complementary and cumulative strategies.

Booth and Bennett (2002) have suggested that the mainstreaming strategy is dependent of three important supports: the equal treatment perspective, the women's perspective and the gender perspective. Gender equality, they suggest, can only be achieved by implementing these strategies. And this was confirmed by analyzing Fredman's suggestion for achieving substantial equality. According to her, we need to abandon the idea of embracing one single principle of equality. Inequalities are multifaceted in nature, for which we need to adopt a four-dimensional approach to substantial equality, consisting in 1) redressing disadvantage; 2) addressing stigma, stereotyping, prejudice, and violence; 3) enhancing voice and participation; and 4) the accommodation of difference in order to achieve structural change.

Three different perspectives or dimensions were detected as necessary for a model of multiculturalism within the Latin American region. These are the equality, the indigenous

and the intercultural perspective. Each of these dimensions addresses different sources of injustice that minority cultures face in Mexico and, moreover, addresses the current claims of these groups.

The equality perspective is framed under the equality of opportunities rhetoric. According to this perspective, indigenous peoples are a disadvantaged group, and the main concern is to address the disadvantages that members of these groups face in terms of access to, and distribution of, goods, resources, and opportunities. Because it is embedded in an equality of opportunities rhetoric, this strategy is an important tool in the present and as long as group disadvantages persist. It is a short-term strategy that pinned to a major project of ethnocultural justice it must intend to disappear in a long-term future.

This perspective, that is, should have a strong intensity in the present and this intensity must be gradually dissolved, until we reach a point in which it is no longer necessary.

In the field of education, this perspective requires that indigenous citizens, just as any other citizen, to have the conditions to make the rights of education recognized in the Mexican Constitution effective. This perspective, that is, should oversee that indigenous students have effective access to the education system and, moreover, have the conditions to remain in it and achieve their education goals.

However, because indigenous students face more disadvantages than non-indigenous students both in the access to the education system and during the education process, the equality perspective needs to adopt special measures that will redress these disadvantages. These measures typically consist in temporal policies that seek to correct the symptoms of the problem, not redress the causes of such problem. This perspective, that is, should adopt a short-term strategy to correct the current inequalities that indigenous students face.

The type of measures adopted under this perspective need to guarantee and increase the schooling levels; reduce the illiteracy rate and promote the conclusion of basic education. In addition, under this perspective there is space for other sorts of measures, such as compensation programs or the adoption of teaching practices that guide, advise and assist indigenous students during their education process.

The second perspective is the indigenous perspective, which is framed under the mainstream multicultural logic. Under this perspective, indigenous peoples are cultural minorities and their cultural differences must be properly recognized and accommodated.

Because of how indigenous peoples are conformed through the different regions of the country, this perspective consists in typical rights of territorial autonomy, but also in fair terms of inclusion. This conclusion was arrived to in Chapter 1, when analyzing the nature of the different rights recognized to indigenous peoples in article 2 of the Constitution. An important difference between the indigenous perspective and other models of multiculturalism addressed to indigenous peoples, lies on the fact that this perspective includes both types or rights, that is, territorial autonomy and fair terms of inclusion. And this is so because, as it was analyzed in chapter 4, indigenous peoples in Mexico are a *sui generis* minority.

This perspective should exist and be enabled as long as cultural minorities exist and make claims of recognition and accommodation of their cultural differences.

In the field of education, this perspective should be concerned with the type of education provided to indigenous students. This requires that the curriculum includes the cultural and linguistic specificities of indigenous populations. And this, it was concluded, is compatible with the two principles that sustain the current National Model of Education, which was presented in chapter 1. These principles are "schools at the center" and "curriculum autonomy".

These two principles were incorporated with the aim to decentralize the design of school curriculums and to provide more autonomy to schools and communities so that they can enable curriculums that respond to their cultural specificities. It was concluded that these principles are essential for the goals of the indigenous perspective. Moreover, these principles can help reconcile the two different discourses of intercultural education that were present in Chapter 1 and that currently stand at odds.

After analyzing the case of the Tetsijtsilin secondary school, it was concluded that the indigenous perspective is compatible with the demands and needs of indigenous

communities. Moreover, with this example, it was able to argue that the indigenous perspective can offer positive results.

The indigenous perspective in the field of education, it was defended, requires redesigning both the national education program and the school curriculums in a way in which indigenous knowledges and values are incorporated. This requires, first, the adoption of a set of principles that must be observed by local authorities when designing the curriculum of their schools. Secondly, that school curriculums be designed in a way in which they incorporate different indigenous knowledges and make them compatible with the mainstream knowledge. And finally, that the teaching practices be compatible with the values of the indigenous cultures. This, it was concluded, is compatible with the National Education Model.

Finally, the intercultural perspective puts together some ideas developed both in Tariq Modood's account of multiculturalism and in Fidel Tubino's account of interculturalism, which he calls "critical interculturalism". These ideas lie on the fact that negative prejudices that majorities have against minorities need to disappear. Modood argues that multiculturalism needs to turn negative differences into positive features of society; and in similar terms, Fidel Tubino argues that critical interculturalism needs to change the attitude that majorities have against minorities. This, it was concluded, needs to be the objective of the intercultural perspective.

Modood suggests that for this we need to generate a sense of group pride. However, it was argued that this is insufficient and that minorities might develop a sense of group pride while still being excluded and discriminated by the majority and the way institutions are designed. A strategy is required to change the attitudes of the majority towards minorities that goes beyond generating a sense of group pride. Since neither scholar suggests how to do this, some parallels were drawn with gender theory, concretely with the gender perspective developed under Booth and Bennet, the three-dimensional project for gender equality.

One first conclusion was that the intercultural perspective needs to change its focus. That is, unlike the other two perspectives that focus on indigenous peoples and operate under group-target policies, the intercultural perspective needs to move away from this focus and rather, focus on the majoritarian culture and the way it perceives and values indigenous cultures.

This is one of the bases of Tubino's work, who has argued that to improve the situation of the dominated and discriminated against we need to change also the attitude of the perpetuators of domination and discrimination (Tubino 2001:193 and 2013: 616).

A second conclusion was that, to draw some parallels with the gender perspective developed by Booth and Bennet and, as a consequence, for the intercultural perspective to work, we need to find a set of values which characterize indigenous cultures and, at the same time, which we can value positively. It was suggested that this can be done by valuing the idea of "buen vivir".

Although the concept of "buen vivir" is still under construction and might have different meanings in different regions of Latin America, all of these meanings share in common some principles, such as solidarity, reciprocity, and a strong link both with the community and nature. According to the supporters of "buen vivir", society must embrace and transmit values that will allow us to lead better lives and protect our communities and environment.

According to this concept, we need to construct new forms of citizenship through diversity and a sane relation with nature, for which we must transmit these principles, rather than those based on competition and individualism.

It was suggested that by extolling the values of "buen vivir" the majoritarian culture can benefit by leading more prosperous lives. And by incorporating these values into the education system, it was argued, non-indigenous students can start valuing positively indigenous ideologies and, hence, start changing their attitude against indigenous cultures and practices. This, it was argued, is the ends of the intercultural perspective.

This perspective, it is suggested, can help avoid one of the main critiques that scholars from interculturalism have directed towards multiculturalism, which consists in blaming it for being so concerned in recognizing and accommodating cultural differences that it has led to an isolation of different cultural groups, encouraging the creation of parallel societies, rather than social cohesion. However, by embracing some values of indigenous cultures and changing the attitude of the majority towards these minorities can generate a sense of social cohesion within different cultural groups and its members, avoiding this possible risk that, according to critiques, multiculturalism encourages.

Finally, it was argued that the intercultural perspective is a long-term project that requires the other two perspectives for it to be effective. Indeed, it was suggested that the three-dimensional project needs to be regarded as an integral project which requires the three dimensions in order to fulfill its goals. The intercultural perspective, concretely, is the most complex perspective, and it will require a long period of time to show its effects.

After developing these perspectives and analyzing how they could be effective within the education system, it was concluded that these perspectives and, in general, the three-dimensional project suggested here, are compatible with the principles used to design the National Education System.

In addition to this, among the normative analysis that was made in the elaboration of this dissertation, it was arrived at other important conclusions, which will be presented next.

Nancy Fraser's Dilemma. Among Latin American scholars, the work of Nancy Fraser has had an important impact. In fact, many of the critiques that these scholars direct towards multiculturalism seem to have their roots on the work of Fraser, concretely, on her recognition-redistribution dilemma. This dilemma was analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5. The intention was to analyze whether this dilemma has any impact on the proposal made in those chapters, that is, whether this dilemma affected in some way, the three-dimensional project presented as Latin American interculturalism.

Indigenous peoples, it was said, face two dimensions of injustice: cultural and positional. And this is similar to the two types of injustice that Fraser has identified: misrecognition and misdistribution. According to her, the remedies to these injustices are contradictory and problems will arise when we are at the presence of social groups that face these two types of injustices.

Fraser suggests two different remedies for these situations. One which, according to her, will only exacerbate the problem and another one, that will offer a plausible solution. The first one is what she calls affirmative remedies, and the second one, she calls transformative remedies. While the former only seek to correct the inequitable outcomes of the social arrangements that produce those inequalities, leaving intact the causes that produce them, transformative remedies seek to redesign the structure, in a way that does not reproduce such

inequalities. Affirmative remedies need to be rejected, while transformative remedies need to be adopted.

However, according to the three-dimensional project suggested, both affirmative and transformative remedies are required. The question is, hence, whether Fraser's critique is correct and whether Latin American interculturalism, because of incorporating affirmative remedies, can fail to achieve its goals. It was argued, in this regard, that affirmative remedies can be useful because they can offer positive results which must be welcomed and are necessary for advancing to a more just society. However, these remedies need to be pinned to a major social justice project, which goes beyond simply correcting inequalities. It was concluded, hence, that Fraser's dilemma seems to be mistaken, at least for the purposes of this dissertation.

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