The Role of News Consumption on Influencers' Facebook Pages in Threat Perception and Political Conservatism During Times of COVID-19

A Comparative Study between the USA, Spain, and Egypt

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Report submitted by Reham Gamal Ahmed Salem Omar **in order to be eligible for a doctoral degree awarded by the Universitat Jaume I**

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Abstract

This doctoral thesis tends to explore the news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the impact of such exposure on shaping threat perception. It also examines the correlation between the possible cultivated threat perception and political conservatism in its core aspects, inequality preference and resistance to change among Facebook users. For this, we used a quantitative methodology by disseminating an online survey of young adults (18-35 years) in the USA, Spain, and Egypt (n=1309). Results showed that the emergence of the COVID-19 health crisis led to the revival of the legacy media's role in citizens' news consumption habits as people turned to official media entities on Facebook to get their information. In addition, news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages has the same cultivation impact as consuming news on any offline platform. Yet we detected some variations from the TV context. Nowadays young people are aware of the negative impact of their news consumption on shaping their reality. However, being aware did not mediate the cultivation effect of fear and terror due to hype news exposure. Such feelings of fear and threat led people to become very suggestible to any recommendation presented to them by digital influencers. In this sense, news consumption on Facebook influencers' pages shaped people's security preferences and political ideology in terms of being more politically conservative. Moreover, it led to a high degree of contradiction, confusion, and thus uncertainty, which interrupted the youths' ability to know how they think, feel, and believe, consequently reinforcing the threat perception.

Keywords

Facebook influencers, news consumption, cultivation theory, threat perception, political conservatism, youths.

1 Introduction

Over the past decades, the breakthrough in digital technology helped bring the news instantly as it occurs nationally or internationally to viewers everywhere. In September 11 event, the people were able to watch a live video of the terrorist attack as it happens, when two airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center in 2001. As a result of these technical capabilities, media news coverage became a primary source of information for individuals worldwide. Moreover, the public concern, interest, and reliance on mass media news coverage have significantly increased after the severe terrorist attacks that have been taking place worldwide since September 11 and up till now in 2022; by terrorist groups such as Daesh, Al Qaeda, etc. A similar situation has been repeated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the lockdown of a large part of the world population. In this context, the media and news have once again become essential to the lives of citizens (Casero-Ripollés, 2020a). Several scholars argued that people in transitional periods, catastrophes, pandemics, and crises rely heavily on news coverage to know what is going on to stay safe.

In this sense, the mass media act as a significant link between the people and news; therefore, it can have the ability to influence not only thoughts, beliefs, and ideologies but also perception, attitude, and behavior (Eugenis, 2013). The role of news media in shaping people's perceptions and opinions about important political, economic, health, and social issues has long been the focus of many researchers. In their book, McCombs et al. (2011) argued that daily news consumption has a significant role in altering our thoughts, feelings, beliefs, perceptions, behavior, and attitude, thus shaping our opinion about different matters. They added that this process of shaping public opinion starts with initial attention to various news media and their content. Such exposure leads to information acquisition and the formation of attitudes and beliefs.

Likewise, Al-Ameri (2013) argued that the interpretations of news coverage of mass media news shape people's perception of the world. McCombs (2002) also added that we in the media cannot tell you what to think of, but we can tell you what and how to think about it. In this regard, there has been a noticeable relation between news exposure, perception, political ideologies, attitude, and behavior formulation. Researchers have found that political thoughts and ideologies derive from the viewer's access to news media. News consumers tend to store the information they are exposed to procedurally. Consequently, all the retentions they have accumulated, experiences, and views are dominated by the sights, sounds, values, and thoughts of news programs, videos, and images they have frequently watched (Gerbner & Gross, 1994; Terzic, 2000; Eugenis, 2013).

Many scholars have proposed models dealing with threat messages and their effects. The way traditional media (i.e., TV, print, etc.) has covered topics including natural disasters, terrorism, crime, and murders throughout history has influenced the public's perception of threat and led to the mean world syndrome due to the cultivation impact. Some researchers argued that offline media have always been the leading actor in setting the agenda, triggering public debate, affecting public opinion, and even shaping the decision-making process due to its central position in any country (Casero-Ripollés & López-Rabadán, 2014). However, the emergence of social media has changed the media environment and the dynamics of the social influence of the traditional media system (Casero-Ripollés, 2018).

With the emergence of social media, the proximity to news became even closer to the audience. Previous studies showed that people turned to social network sites to get their daily news. Several research findings indicated that people nowadays depend on social media as their primary source of information during crises, pandemics, and natural disasters (Bodrunova et al., 2018). Social media has become one of the leading news sources for more than (70%) of the American Population (Newman, 2019).

One of the most important social network sites is Facebook. This digital platform, which has more than 2.5 billion active users worldwide, exposes people to news and information either incidentally or purposefully through following news sources. Users mainly consume news on Facebook by following Social Media Influencers (SMIs') Facebook pages, such as the accounts of public and political actors, journalists, media editors, and news organizations. It is worth noting that news organization is still perceived as the most credible source of news, particularly when it comes to political, economic, health, and social topics. Users turn to news organizations to know about any critical issue; therefore, news organizations are a significant source of influence on Facebook, Twitter, etc. Casero-Ripollés (2020b) claimed that news agencies play a vital role in the digital context. He found that they receive the highest value in importance, authority, and popularity among social media users (i.e., Twitter).

Within the same framework, scholars found that youths on social media rely heavily on social media influencers (SMIs) as their primary source of political news (Hodson & Petersen, 2019). Some scholars defined SMIs as news organizations, politicians, writers, opinion leaders, experts, and political journalists (Hodson & Petersen, 2019). Deborah, Michela, and Anna (2019) argued that online users tend to perceive information posted on social media by SMIs as trusted and reliable compared to the information provided through traditional media. SMIs represent "a new type of independent third-party endorser who can shape audience perception and attitudes through blogs,

tweets, and the use of other social media" (Deborah, Michela, & Anna, 2019). It is worth noting that SMIs can disseminate threat messages and exaggerate fear levels among users, especially when they report on adverse events or when they pass on false information or write bogus, vague, incomplete, and inaccurate material to comment on incidents (Deborah, Michela, & Anna, 2019).

In this regard, there has been a shortage in examining news consumption on SMIs (i.e., news organizations), particularly on Facebook, and how this exposure may breed the cultivation impact of threat perception during times of crisis, pandemics, terrorism, and catastrophe. The cultivation hypothesis has been widely used to explain the relationship between threat perception and television news viewership (Morgan & Shanahan, 2010). Thus, it should be re-examined in the context of news consumption on SMIs' Facebook pages. Within this framework, this doctoral thesis explores the news reception and consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the impact of such exposure on shaping threat perception. It also tends to examine the correlation between the possible cultivated threat perception and political conservatism among Facebook users who consume news on such pages.

1.1 Significance

The significance of this study comes from its ability to connect four main essential concepts: news consumption and reception, social media influencers (SMIs), threat perception, and political conservatism.

1.2 Aim

Based on the Motivation Cognition Model, Social Network Analysis, and Cultivation theories, this study aims to explore news consumption on SMIs' Facebook pages and how it may breed the cultivation effect of threat perception. Moreover, whether news consumption on SMIs had driven people to feel threatened and, consequently, become politically conservative, accept the status quo, and resist change.

1.3 Objective

The objective of this thesis is to explore and examine the following:

- The frequency of receiving news from influencers' Facebook pages/accounts.
- The frequency of consuming news on influencers' Facebook pages/accounts.
- The cultivation impact of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages/accounts on threat perception.
- The correlation between threat perception and political conservatism among Facebook users who receive, expose, and consume news on influencers' Facebook pages/accounts.

2 Literature Review

2.1 News consumption on social media

Digital communication technologies led to the rise of new social media forms known as social network sites that developed social ties and are mostly available free of charge and easily accessible (Ju et al., 2014; Hermida et al., 2012). The emergence of social media has brought a new communication environment that affected the entire information and communication process system (Casero-Ripollés, 2018). In this regard, social media is "a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 and allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content" (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). Through social network sites, users have an efficient channel to communicate with the speaker (Hermida et al., 2012; Ju et al., 2014). Moreover, it is one of the most influential online forces with more than one billion users who actively use these networks for communication and engagement with the world (Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017).

In sum, these social networks are websites that help users connect and make new relationships (Ju et al., 2014). Each site has its nature, feature, and interface. However, most of them share similar characteristics. Boyd and Ellison (2010) argued that these web-based services help users to create a public or private profile within a controlled system. In addition to making a list of users, they want to connect and share things with, view, and share their profiles and connections with their created list (Boyd & Ellison, 2010).

Accordingly, social media is incorporated into people's everyday life and has become a worldwide phenomenon (Valenzuela, 2013). In this sense, more than (65%) of people living in the US, UK, Spain, South Korea, and many other middle eastern countries use one or more social network sites (Newman et al., 2020). Poushter et al. (2018) found that (53%) of people across 39 countries use online social network sites like Facebook or Twitter. The number is even higher across the Middle Eastern courtiers than in other regions, where (68%) said they use social network sites. It is worth noting that younger adults are more likely to use these networks than their older counterparts. This generational gap is prominent in all the surveyed countries where the percentages of young adults aged between 18 and 36 years old who use social media are (92%) in Argentina, (86%) in the USA, (87%) in the UK, (83%) in Spain, and (81%) in South Korea (Poushter, Bishop & Chwe, 2018). It

is worth noting that social media users are defined as people who use social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc. (Poushter, Bishop & Chwe, 2018).

Several scholars argued that the rise of social network sites and their significant usage among people had changed the news industry, starting from the production and distribution practices to the consumption of news and political information (Masip, Suau-Martínez, & Ruiz-Caballero, 2018; Casero-Ripollés, 2018; Pentina & Tarafdar, 2014). Scholars explained that it increased the production and distribution of news due to the lack of barriers to information and that social media users became involved in the news distribution process (Casero-Ripollés, 2020b; Casero-Ripollés, 2018; Pentina & Tarafdar, 2014). Also, people customize the type of information and news they want to receive and select the push notification option to be updated with the current affairs (Casero-Ripollés, 2018). Casero-Ripollés (2020b) argued that this led to the proliferation of various media entities with a digital nature that competes to grape the public's attention. He added that it reinforced the struggle to influence the audience.

In the same context, currently, the media system is no longer targeting a predominately passive audience nor relying on a limited number of information sources (Masip, Suau-Martínez, & Ruiz-Caballero, 2018). According to the uses and gratification theory, active audience depends on platforms that satisfy their different needs, including news acquisition, surveillance, identity construction, social relationships, and entertainment (Katz, 1974; Masip, Suau-Martínez, & Ruiz-Caballero, 2018). Citizens can now choose different formats and spaces for their news consumption based on their needs (Masip, Suau-Martínez, & Ruiz-Caballero, 2018). Therefore, social media offer new venues for learning, reflecting, and participating (Masip, Suau-Martínez, & Ruiz-Caballero, 2018). Some research findings indicated that social media use could increase trust and strengthen members' connections and relationships (Valenzuela, 2013). With its easy interface, availability, and nature, social media has become an information provider and a significant source of news that changed the news consumption habits of citizens (Boukes, 2019). Also, it plays a pivotal role in keeping users updated with current events and exposing them to a wide range of information (Hermida et al., 2012).

Such sites are regarded as essential news outlets where the average number of people who rely on online news sources, including social media, is (73%) in the USA, (79%) in the UK, (83%) in Spain, and (85%) in South Korea (Newman et al., 2020). Further, Newman et al. (2016) argued that young adults count on social network sites to obtain their news compared to the older generation, who still rely on TV as a primary source of information. They revealed that about (60%) of young adults in Spain depend on social network sites to get their daily news compared to (46%) in the US. Likewise,

Hermida et al. (2012) explained that social media users are more open to getting news and information via their social networks. Networked users become more used to the idea of following a news organization and journalist to get their news (Hermida et al., 2012; Holt, 2016). Johnson and Kaye (2014) indicated that heavy users (who frequently use and rely on a particular platform) are more likely to perceive social media as more credible than medium and light users.

For this, news organizations have incorporated social media in distributing news and communicating with users. Journalists have also embraced it into their daily life to post and promote their content, develop relationships, and extend audience reach (Farhi, 2009; Boukes, 2019). Thus, most news outlets are present on different platforms of social media to increase the traffic to their websites (Boukes, 2019; Hermida et al., 2012). In this regard, news media organizations such as CNN, New York Times, etc., and political actors have pages and accounts on various social network sites (i.e., Facebook, Twitter, etc.) due to their unprecedented popularity (Boukes, 2019). In this sense, such sites currently serve as a space for personal communication and an essential platform for sharing and consuming news (Holt, 2016; Weeks & Holbert, 2013).

In this respect, several research findings indicated that people rely on social network sites for obtaining their news. Sveningsson (2015) found that Swedish students are more interested in consuming news through social media. Participants explained that social media makes the information more relevant and adds a new perspective to the news stories. They also place a high value on the immediateness features of news on social media. The surveyed sample said they use social network sites like Facebook and Twitter as the primary news source about public affairs. Besides, they get most of their news and information from trusted adults, friends, family, and relatives on their social media networks.

Similar research findings showed that (81%) of the Dutch population acquires their daily news from online sources, and (47%) reported using social media for this purpose by following the Facebook and Twitter accounts of traditional news organizations (Swart, Peters & Broersma, 2018). Additionally, Weeks and Holbert (2013) found that the more people use these sites for news consumption, the more likely they will share it within their network of friends, relatives, family members, etc. They also found that social media news consumption increases news circulation just like news exposure in the offline context, which increases the sharing of political discussions and information on different matters.

In light of this, social media news consumption can be regarded as a "link economy and ink economy" (Masip, Suau-Martínez, & Ruiz-Caballero, 2018). There are only a few news sources in the ink economy and traditional ways of transmitting news through radio, TV, and newspaper.

Moreover, the news content could not be easily shared with friends. Unlike the link economy, where sharing news and information is more straightforward than any time before; besides, there are plenty of news media sources (Masip, Suau-Martínez, & Ruiz-Caballero, 2018). Also, Valenzuela (2013) argued that social media could act as an information hub by providing mobilizing information and news stories that are not available on other channels. He added that it allows users to exchange their views, ideas, and opinions with other people in their network. Despite this media landscape Mangerotti et al., (2021) argued that there is no clear social network parameter in the age of social networks adding that different social network sites i.e., Twitter represent an open source of action that is very dynamic, vast, and have no journalistic filters or mediation.

Social media plays a central role in modern politics (Valenzuela, 2013). It currently serves as an essential forum for the diffusion of political information (Johnson & Kaye, 2014). Holt et al. (2013) found that frequent news consumption through social media among youths is a stimulus for political knowledge, thus participation. In addition, Saldaña et al. (2015) argued that social media is an essential source of political news and content that contributes to the political process. Anderson and Caumont (2014) found that (46%) of social network users discuss political issues and news stories on sites like Facebook and Twitter. Respectively, social media increase people's motivation to follow hard news and public-oriented information in comparison to any time before (Valenzuela, 2013).

In this sense, social network sites are paving the way in the news industry. Users are exposed to news in various ways, either purposefully by following up news organization pages or incidentally by stumbling on a shared link by a friend (Valenzuela, 2013; Boukes, 2019). It is worth noting that news dissemination on social media takes place on three levels. First, private individuals comment on current news matters on their social media networks. Public individuals who have many followers read these comments and perhaps share them within their network, and last is the public level posted from news organizations (Sveningsson, 2015). Most news distributions come from the third level when the first and second levels (private and public people) share, recommend, like videos and articles, and then post them within their network (Sveningsson, 2015). Though, the impact of news dissemination can still take place, shaping the reality perception, attitude, and behavior, whether people are exposed to news purposefully or incidentally (Valenzuela, 2013; Boukes, 2019; Masip, Suau-Martínez, & Ruiz-Caballero, 2018).

In this framework, many scholars argued that the effect of news content on social network sites is like the impact of offline news content (Boukes, 2019; Saldaña, McGregor & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015; Valenzuela, 2013). A positive consequence of these platforms is the ability to keep citizens well-

informed, whereas there are many sources of information without any extra financial costs (Boukes, 2019; Saldaña, McGregor & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015; Valenzuela, 2013). In this regard, scholars said that both online and offline content could act as a pathway to learning about current affairs and news, hence shaping the world's perception and reality (Boukes, 2019; Saldaña, McGregor & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015; Valenzuela, 2013).

Additionally, previous studies showed that frequent news consumption could shape the perception of social reality, public issues, political causes, and social unrest (Valenzuela, 2013). Consistent with previous studies, Perrin (2015) highlighted the influential impact of social network news consumption on shaping perceptions, attitudes, and political behavior. The effect can extend to include the level of stress. Several research studies indicated a strong connection between news consumption on social media, shaping political ideologies, perception, political participation, and engagement, particularly for online activities (Mahmmood, 2017; Saldaña, McGregor & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015).

2.2 Incidental News Exposure

People nowadays are embedded in an "ambient news" environment (Hargreaves & Thomas, 2002). Various news and information became pervasive and constantly available to us (Hermida, 2010). Scholars argue that many people seize the advantage of this news ambient by staying updated. Many online or hybrid media channels, social media platforms, or conversations online have eased the way to stay updated on local, national, and international issues facing the world (Newman et al., 2018). The increasing news consumption supports this assumption through social media (Newman et al., 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020).

It is worth noting that relying on the ambient information environment might affect the surveillance consumption of news media (Boulianne, 2011). Surveillance consumption of media can be defined as the constant attention to the news to get information and news related to one's environment (David, 2009; Norris, 1996). The surveillance factor is critical as it is associated with greater political interest, knowledge, and participation (Boulianne, 2011). Surveillance is currently declining due to the prevalence of multiple media choices (Hopmann et al., 2016).

Also, the ongoing news flow of unsolvable matters and issues that are facing the world can either pose a challenge for some citizens to keep up with the fast pace of news flow or lead to news boredom and avoidance, which result from news fatigue (Trilling & Schoenbach , 2012; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). The widespread news on social media and other online platforms led to the

emergence of incidental news exposure (Casero-Ripollés, 2018; Newman et al., 2018; Hermida, 2010; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). People become accidentally exposed to news and information on different matters while browsing through social media, though not actively pursuing it (Newman et al., 2018; Hermida, 2010; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017).

In other words, social media users are exposed to news through their network sharing, posts, comments, likes, discussions on current affairs, etc. Almost more than half of young people, (53%), in 27 countries unintentionally find news online as a constant way of staying informed (Newman et al., 2018). In addition to the highly receptive algorithms that control which information is included or excluded in each social network site (SNS) user's feed (Kümpel, 2020; Hermida, 2010; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). Kümpel (2020) said that the user and system-driven customization shape incidental news exposure. He explained that user-driven customization refers to the notion that social media users actively adjust their social network environment to receive and consume the news, information, and content on different political and public matters by following journalists, news organizations, and media outlets. While system-driven customization refers to the occasion where the system concludes what the user might be interested in consuming based on past activities, interactions, stay times, and actions of one's network.

Mitchelstein et al. (2020) stated that several elements could eliminate the probability of incidental news exposure and reinforce the purposeful and active consumption of news. Among these elements are the presence and degree of a local, national, or international conflict, each country's political system, threats due to natural disasters, terrorism, health epidemics, and the telecommunication policies that regulate radio news bulletins every hour. These elements are also regarded as outside factors beyond users' control. Bobok (2016) added other factors that could nurture the tendency of social media users to consume news and information incidentally, among which are information overload, contagion bias, homophily, and systematic algorithms. It is worth noting that users can still decide to consume news more about certain national events and incidents. In many ways, people can avoid the negative consequences of incidental exposure by following credible news stories from reliable news sources such as conventional news from well-known and prestigious news organizations, trusted journalists, and opinion leaders (Sveningsson, 2015).

Several research findings indicated that incidental news exposure (INE) could positively affect knowledge gain and political involvement, while other studies showed otherwise as people do not actively seek information (Kümpel, 2020). Lee and Kim (2017) claimed that incidental news exposure could significantly influence individuals' recalling and recognition of information in news stories. They explained that the actual reading process mediates the effect on recalling. In other

words, whether people consume news incidentally or actively, the time taken to read news governs the learning process.

Another possible scenario is that people who constantly consume news incidentally are active users through being part of an extensive news network; as a result, they are more likely to encounter news incidentally when they are online (Lee & Kim, 2017). Newman et al. (2018) concluded that high news selective environments are accompanied by more incidental exposure through social media. Furthermore, they said that the impact of incidental news exposure is more substantial among young people and those who have a low interest in the news. Even though these groups usually consume less news, they gain more information from their exposure than those who seek news from a more comprehensive array of sources.

2.3 Echo chamber

Within the same framework, incidental news exposure and the wide dissemination of news on social media can have a negative impact when it exposes people to information and news coming from like-minded friends and users on their social network (Masip, Suau-Martínez, & Ruiz-Caballero, 2018; Holt, 2016). This exposure might establish a solo sphere of like-minded people, who post and share information that complies with their political beliefs leading to an echo chamber effect (Masip, Suau-Martínez, & Ruiz-Caballero, 2018; Holt, 2016; Pentina & Tarafdar, 2014). Echo chamber means that people are not exposed to counterarguments, undesired news stories, or politically different voices and news content which could lead to acceptance of fake news as an accurate reflection of reality. This argument holds true as people tend to believe information from friends, relatives, or someone familiar with their network. (Masip, Suau-Martínez, & Ruiz-Caballero, 2018; Holt, 2016; Anspach, 2017; Pentina & Tarafdar, 2014).

Another research study found that when news and information are shared by one of the family members, friends, or relatives within the social network of a user, the impact of such news is maximized and can serve as an effective heuristic when choosing content on social media (Anspach, 2017). Moreover, social media can make one-sided news salient to millions of people who may have otherwise disregarded it (Anspach, 2017). In the same context, Bessi et al. (2016) and Anspach (2017) argued that online users are actively selecting information that matches their prior perceptions, beliefs, ideologies, and attitude. Thus, they learn to create and join groups with the same views leading to an echo chamber effect and filter bubble. In other words, people can become more interested in news consumption due to several factors, including the influence of family and

friends -referred to as contagion and due to the efforts of the news organization to be more aware of the audience preferences (Kümpel, 2020).

In sum, Kwon (2011) concluded that the social influence of Facebook could take place on three sub-mechanisms which are direct recommendation, social contagion, and network embeddedness. He added that compliance with any message becomes more substantial when people are exposed to several direct contacts. For instance, Facebook has a social contagion effect where indirect exposure to information (through user's shared posts) can lead to the exact impact of the direct recommendation and exposure.

Likewise, Holt (2016) emphasized that group polarization is a frequent side effect of using social media due to emotional contagion. "Group polarization refers to the well-established finding that following group discussion, individuals tend to endorse a more extreme position in the direction already favored by the group" (Lee, 2007). Other scholars added that news consumption on social network sites might lead to the echo chamber effect, reinforcing and increasing political polarization (Bergström & Belfrage, 2018). Risius et al. (2019) identified echo chambers as online platforms that expose users to confirming views and discredit any alternative or different voices. This echo chamber could lead to political polarization as well as radicalization. Besides, it can increase the circulation of fake news, boost certain ideologies, and lead to socially destructive actions due to misperceptions. In this sense, some research findings indicated that social media reinforces echo chambers' creation through homophily (which is building a connection with like-minded people) and depersonalization. Which are supported by the Social Identity Theory (Bergström & Belfrage, 2018; Risius et al., 2019).

On the other hand, Vaccari and Valeriani (2021) examined the impact of social media on democratic participation among internet users. They found that social media do not trigger “filter bubbles” as it exposes users to ample political content that confirms and contradicts their political views. Yet, social media boosted online and offline political participation and involvement. In addition, it increased political equality in Western democracies.

Other scholars added that people rely on social media as a news platform because it offers multiple political views from different sources (Diehl, Weeks, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2016). A report finding indicated that most social media news consumers said that the news they encounter on social media seldom matches their own political opinions (Sumida et al., 2019). For instance, among every ten people in France, only one finds the news on social media in line with their political views (Sumida et al., 2019). Also, social engagement might lead to more varied networks and political discussions with people who have different opinions (Diehl, Weeks, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2016). In a similar vein,

Beam et al. (2018) clarified that exposure to counter-attitudinal news increase over time and could lead to depolarization. They also argued that consuming recommended news (through personalized social or computer algorithms) increases exposure to counter-attitudinal information. Within this framework, exposure to counter news in one's Facebook newsfeed might construct a 'citizen' identity rather than a 'partisan' identity. In the same context, Vaccari and Valeriani (2021) argued that accidental exposure reinforces consuming political news and enables different political entities to connect with segments that were hard to reach through traditional means of communication.

Diehl, Weeks, and Gil de Zúñiga (2016) found that political discussion on shared news stories positively correlated with changing political attitudes, opinions, and perceptions on different matters. They also added that social and non-political use of social media could lead to evolving beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes. For example, when people visit these platforms for a social reason, such as connecting with a family member, friend, and relative, they might encounter different political views and news that make them reconsider their stances. (Diehl, Weeks, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2016). Accordingly, consuming news from a counter perspective can enlighten users and lead them to reconsider their initial ideas, views, perception, and attitude in the light of new consumed information (Anspach, 2017).

In this sense, social media users do not perceive the news as truthful news unless it comes from news organizations (Sveningsson, 2015). Sumida et al. (2019) revealed that more than half of social media news consumers in eight surveyed European countries (including France, Spain, UK, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, and Denmark) are aware of the news sources they see on social media. Yet, few of them indicated that they ignore the news sources they encounter there.

This report shows that frequent exposure to social media news is partially linked to identifying well-known sources. For instance, users who get daily news from social media are more apt than those who get information less frequently from these sites to be aware of the news sources they view. Moreover, those who often get news on social media are more likely to value the news media. Additionally, (80%) of heavy social media news consumers perceive the role of news media as very important in comparison to the medium or light consumers. However, they are more pessimistic about the overall news media performance in investigating government actions and being neutral. This latter finding was very evident among the younger adults who gave lower percentages on the news performance. (Sumida et al., 2019). In sum, even though social media might have led to several societal complications, it contributed to democracy in a way that achieved equality between those who are active and inactive (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2021).

2.4 The news-finds-me perception

Another outcome of incidental exposure is the emergence of news find me (NFM) perception (Weeks & Lane, 2020). In this regard, social media can boost the idea of being well informed about political and public affairs even if they do not purposefully seek news (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017; Müller, Schneiders, & Schäfer, 2016; Lee & Xenos, 2019; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). This feeling of being well informed – referred to as NFM perception augments the user's subjective knowledge regardless of their actual political understanding (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017; Müller, Schneiders, & Schäfer, 2016; Lee & Xenos, 2019; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). Such feelings might also divert them from searching and verifying news in different sources, therefore affecting their overall learning about politics (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017; Müller, Schneiders, & Schäfer, 2016; Lee & Xenos, 2019; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2013). Based on NFM perception, people believe they are well informed without actively seeking news. Moreover, important information will eventually find them one way or another. (Casero-Ripollés, 2018)

The NFM perception is defined according to three aspects. First, is the perception of being well informed without intentionally following the news. Second, important news will find one anyhow via social media use, interaction with friends, and social connections. Third, there is no necessity to actively search for news and information as the news will find me anyway (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). Remarkably, the perception of NFM is not the same as news avoidance, as the latter requires an active cognitive effort to avoid news (Doyle, 1999). Also, NFM does not mean disinterest in following the news. In this sense, NFM can be defined as the perception of being well informed without actively seeking the news; moreover, vital information will "find one" anyhow. (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017).

In their study, Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2018) argued that NFM perception might be an important factor in using social media sites for news. It also may enhance news exposure by encountering news on one's network. In this sense, users who have this perception believe that social media fulfills their need to be updated with public affairs and political events, increasing their reliance on social media as a primary source of news. They added that those who believe that news will find them without purposely obtaining it would follow this beneficial network to maintain the perception of being well informed without actively seeking information. In this sense, consuming news through social media enhances the NFM perception, consequently boosting the use of social media as a news source.

On the other side, the emergence of NFM perception among social media users raises many concerns about having an objective and well-informed citizenry. Users might have created a false belief of being well informed without actively following the news by relying on their social network for news or information. In the same context, a recent study showed that people with a high level of NFM perception infrequently use traditional news sources and are less knowledgeable about politics over time (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). Some researchers argued that even though NFM perception is associated with news exposure, it can only enhance political knowledge when it is actively obtained. In this sense, Mitchelstein et al. (2020) argued that the occurrence of incidental news exposure -which leads to NFM perception, primarily requires active exposure. They clarified that those users must purposively seek and follow news media or make an environment that is more or less favorable to incidental news exposure. Thus, following news organizations' and media outlets' accounts on social media is similar to listening to the radio or watching TV as ambient sound inside the house.

This argument means that people are active in choosing to avoid, ignore, skip, share, and engage with the news (Mitchelstein et al., 2020). As soon as people are exposed incidentally to news, they can either seek extra information or even adjust their social environment to continue receiving news on a selected matter. For example, by enabling/disabling push notifications or unfollowing particular social media pages and accounts (Mitchelstein et al., 2020).

In sum, some practices indicate a willingness for further news engagement at present and increase the likelihood of encountering news at a future time (Mitchelstein et al., 2020). It is worth noting that the younger generation holds higher levels of NFM perception than their older counterparts (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). Accordingly, this generation might be detached from institutionalized politics (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). Consistently, Rosengard et al. (2014) found that college students hold a high level of NFM perception. Furthermore, they prefer to receive the information rather than actively look for it. Thus, they tend to build an environment that allows them to receive news and information coming from journalists, news organizations, and news providers.

On examining the impact of NFM perception on political knowledge and interest, as well as electoral participation in a representative sample from the United States (N=997), Gil de Zúñiga and Diehl (2019) found that there is a negative relation between NFM perception and political knowledge as well as interest. Likewise, NFM perception leads to an indirect negative impact on voting. This study also showed that personalized information shared on one's network feed could inform and engage the public.

Thus, there are two research streams in this area. The first supports the notion that NFM leads to pro-democratic consequences, as it reinforces and boosts the tendency to participate in politics (Bennett et al., 2018). Also, it keeps citizens updated and briefed on the ongoings through stumbling across news and counter-attitudinal argument (Lu & Lee, 2019); users' consumption of these contents depends on the last active state through following news organizations, journalists, and media entities (Mitchelstein et al., 2020). Other scholars also argued that each media technology could stimulate political participation and interest differently. Hence, the shift in one's news surveillance consumption (from traditional news media to social networks) can affect perception, political attitude, and behavior (Lu & Lee, 2019).

Yet, the other line of research implies the opposite. The reliance on social media for news consumption reduces knowledge about current issues and affairs as they include much tabloid news and fake information (Lee & Xenos, 2019; Yamamoto et al., 2018; Chadwick et al., 2018). Also, the reliance on one's networks and news feed on social media can reinforce people's perception that they will receive the news they consider essential, and that this consumption will make them well informed about public affairs (Lee & Xenos, 2019; Yamamoto et al., 2018; Chadwick et al., 2018). However, Ross et al. (2022) argued that the reliance on one's network for news and information consumption might lead to 'filter bubbles,' echo chambers, and 'information cocoons', which are dominated by homogenous opinion and political perspectives. He added that instead of looking for various political views, news, and information sources, users become reliant on what is shown and presented to them through their network that might be controlled by a few influencers and occupied by fake news, rumors, and command algorithms.

In examining the NFM perception, Gil de Zúñiga and Diehl (2019) said there are two reasons for the negative impact of NFM perception. First, depending on social networks for political news, opinion, and information makes people greatly reliant on the political profile of their social network. Besides, if politics is not the core of the network, the algorithmic and self-curated information filters will be less likely to present rich and varied exposure to political information. Similarly, people are more vulnerable to getting inaccurate information and news coming from fake sources; therefore, they are more influenced by the impact of fake news, which they consider true and accurate.

Concisely, Bimber (2003) stressed that new media technologies changed the way people consume news and information. They added that it also had a significant impact on the flow of information. People might have developed a misleading belief of being well informed without actively following the news due to the NFM perception. Scholars argued that this perception could have a reverse impact on the news consumption rates, especially in traditional news outlets (Hopmann et al., 2016).

It also can increase the reliance on untrusted news sources on social media leading to distorted world perception (Hopmann et al., 2016). Thus, the role of interest in news consumption is becoming a pivotal factor in today's news ambient environment.

2.5 Fake news

In sum, Shu et al. (2017) and Sveningsson (2015) argued that news consumption on social media is a double-edged sword that can reinforce information dissemination, thus motivating people to seek out and consume news more than ever before. On the other side, it can be a fertile ground for widespread fake, biased, fragmented, inaccurate, low-quality news coming from unverified sources and one-sided perspectives of what happens in society (Spohr, 2017; Shu et al., 2017; Sveningsson, 2015). In his study, Spohr (2017) said that people on social media usually share and publish any news story without fact-checking and having editorial mechanisms in place. Thus, a single user or social media account that does not have any record or status can, in some instances, reach as many readers as a traditional media outlet. He added that at least one news content in each person's social media feed comes either from a media outlet and news organization account or from posts shared from one's network. Balcázar et al. (2022) examined the news protocol, objectives, and categorization of 12 news agencies in Latin America and found that such agencies were linked to controversy, disinformation, and public debate during the COVID-19 pandemic.

On this, Resende et al. (2019) argued that (70%) of the news being shared on social media is fake. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) explained that the nature of the social media platform makes it a very conducive environment for the generation and circulation of fake news. Shu et al. (2017) added that the low cost of creating a social media account makes this platform a vibrant environment for spreading and producing fake news for propaganda reasons. This news sometimes is produced by malicious accounts that might not be humans, such as social bots, cyborg users, and trolls (Shu et al., 2017). A social bot is a malicious account created to impose harm and spread fake news on social media. These accounts are controlled by computer algorithms that produce content and engage with humans or other bot users (Shu et al., 2017). On this, López-López et al. (2021) linked disinformation and fake news as a particular phenomenon that involves introducing Artificial Intelligence with its use by political parties. They explained that some political parties make use of sustain an algorithmic democracy with great effects on the forms of information and participation in an increasingly widened public space. In this regard, Resende et al. (2019) claimed that humans are more likely to share fake news than robots.

Within this framework, fake news is news stories that are deliberately and verifiably incorrect, thus misleading the readers (Resende et al., 2019). Such deceptive and false news can intentionally influence people's attitudes, perceptions, and ideology; therefore, it can affect any country's whole democratic process and political field (Resende et al., 2019; Shu et al., 2017; Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). In this regard, Chavero and Intriago (2021) carried out content analysis of the information that the Ecuadorian government showed as verified fake news, they argued that fake news is being used as a political tool to hide the real crisis. Moreover, many studies showed that bot users distorted the US presidential election in 2016 by generating misleading news and information that corrupted the online discussions, leading to emotional responses (Shu et al., 2017). Besides, Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) found that most US young adults recall and believe most of the fake news and articles they consumed during the election period with higher exposure to pro-Trump articles than pro-Clinton. Thus, spreading fake news on Facebook is being used as an advertising strategy of political parties (Cano-Orón, Calvo, López García, & Baviera, 2021).

Several scholars argued that the main issue is that people usually tend to believe the information and news that conform to their preferred candidate (Shu et al., 2017; Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Moreover, they are more likely to consume and believe news due to two main psychological factors. Social credibility is when people are more likely to consider a source as credible if other users within one's network view it as so. This belief holds accurate when there is no or lack of available information. The second factor is heuristic frequency when people are more likely to favor info they constantly hear or read, even fake news (Shu et al., 2017). Previous studies showed that repetition and increased exposure to a given message or information could generate acceptance and positive perception about it (Shu et al., 2017). In this sense, people who consume news on social media are less likely to build a true reflection of the world, as it can cultivate a distorted perception of reality. (Shu et al., 2017; Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Resende et al., 2019). Within this framework, Newman et al. (2020) found that less than (50%) of people trust news on social media, whereas only (14%) in the US and (23%) in Spain trust news. It is worth noting that the abovementioned report was conducted during the health pandemic of COVID-19.

It is worth noting that the vast widespread and distribution of disinformation and fake news on social networks during the pandemic led to the rise of several solutions, manuals, and endeavours to counter such dilemma, especially that fake news is spreading even faster than real information (Tuñón, 2021; Tuñón & Sánchez del Vas, 2022). For instance, several fact checking platforms were established to verify the huge amount of disinformation generated by the pandemic creating a big halo of transparency and accuracy on the other side (Torres-Toukoumidis et al., 2021; Tuñón &

Sánchez del Vas, 2022). Thus, the politics of disinformation is currently being used in new techniques and methods (López-García et al., 2021). One of such techniques is the use of clickbait that are links designed to attract users' attention and trigger them to follow such links to view such content online (Palau-Sampio & Carratalá, 2022). On this, Palau-Sampio and Carratalá (2022) argued that the emergence of pseudo media which are websites that simulate traditional media contribute to this disinformation environment through publishing polarized content that are widely spread online due to the use of clickbait techniques (Palau-Sampio & Carratalá, 2022). In sum, disinformation is not only a matter of sending hoaxes online, as it is a multidimensional phenomenon that is widely connected with politics (Valera-Ordaz, Requena-i-Mora, Calvo, & López-García, 2022).

2.6 Social media news consumption during the COVID-19 pandemic

People's reliance on news media coverage significantly increased during times of uncertainty and crisis to obtain accurate information about the situation – this holds true, particularly at the time being where people around the globe are facing a health crisis that led to complete lockdown and other preventive measures (De Coninck et al., 2020; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020; Dalrymple et al., 2016). It is worth noting that during times of threat (i.e., war, terrorism, health crisis, economic crisis), various news coverages on different platforms can have the same impact on fear and anxiety levels. Thus, different news frames will not differ from one entity to another (De Coninck et al., 2020). It is usually associated with anxiety and fear levels, where an overly sensationalized coverage heightens fear and stress (De Coninck et al., 2020). Relying on the social amplification theory, the more people consume news and information on social media or any other platform, the more confused -many if not most of them will be. They added that once confusion reaches a certain point, the information quality becomes subjective to personal bias confirmation and verification, leading to anxiety, fear, etc. (Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020).

We are currently living in a time of health threat, where people are witnessing the rapid spread of coronavirus (COVID-19) disease, which erupted at the end of December 2019 till we write this thesis and has reached all parts of the world (De Coninck et al., 2020; Limaye et al., 2020). In compliance with the COVID-19 pandemic, world countries adopted restrictive and public health measures to slow down the spread of the virus among citizens, i.e., hand washing, closing non-essential establishments, lockdown, restriction on travel, social distancing, etc. (De Coninck et al., 2020; Limaye et al., 2020). With a total of more than two million cases worldwide, coronavirus

disease (COVID-19) has resulted in a great disturbance to an individual's life in all aspects (Limaye et al., 2020). In many ways, COVID-19 brought changes to every part of our life, including business, economy, education, social life, and media environment, including news consumption, production, and distribution (Vraga, Tully, & Bode, 2020).

In an unusual scene different from other historical pandemics such as H1N1, this disease is spreading among people who are well connected worldwide through their mobile devices (Limaye et al., 2020). Also, the widespread COVID-19 and its subsequent endorsed measures of complete lockdown and physical distancing changed people's media habits significantly (Casero-Ripollés, 2020a; Limaye et al., 2020; Newman et al., 2020). People turned to official and trusted online news sources more than ever before (Limaye et al., 2020; Newman et al., 2020). In this regard, Casero-Ripollés (2020a) found that the COVID-19 pandemic boosted the news consumption rate among people who usually stayed distant from the information. He added that such an effect reduced the news consumption gap among citizens, which means that a broad category of people unlike before started to consume the news regularly to stay safe and healthy. In sum, this transformation contributes to democracy in terms of impartiality and accessibility regarding public affairs (Casero-Ripollés, 2020a).

Also, Newman et al. (2020) found that the news and social consumption of online and social media substantially increased in most surveyed countries during the pandemic. The lockdown rushed the adoption of new digital tools among people with different age segments; many started to join online groups or participate in a video conference for the first time (Limaye et al., 2020; Newman et al., 2020). Additionally, the physical distance measure has intensified people's reliance on social network sites to engage and interact with one another and share information on the virus (Limaye et al., 2020; Newman et al., 2020). In this regard, online portals' social media and legacy media became the most used and leading platforms for disseminating information (De Coninck et al., 2020; Casero-Ripollés, 2020a).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, social media played a vital role in the information process, where people turned to social media seeking news and information (Newman et al., 2020). Casero-Ripollés (2020a) argued that social media affected people's lives and media habits on national and international levels. Hence, the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic were evident in the media and journalism industry. He found that news has become an essential part of the citizens' daily life since the outbreak of this pandemic. He added that the emergence of this health crisis led to the revival of the legacy media's role in citizens' news consumption habits as people turned to online media entities to get their information.

Some scholars argued that the role of social media during this health crisis varied between spreading fake and inaccurate information and between supporting people in a time of need, anxiety, depression, and isolation. In this regard, some argue that it played an active and positive role in providing a very effective way to amplify reliable, trustworthy information (Newman et al., 2020; Gallotti et al., 2020). Further, it increased people's interest in the news, even those who were less keen on following up or consuming news (Casero-Ripollés, 2020a; Newman et al., 2020; Gallotti et al., 2020).

Accordingly, it reduced the information gap regarding news consumption among citizens. Therefore, it might have contributed to democracy by providing equality and accessibility to the news about public affairs and national issues (Casero-Ripollés, 2020a). Andersen (2020) stated that conforming to the taken preventive measures during the health crisis of COVID-19, which included social distancing and general hygiene, was mediated by social media use and news consumption. Therefore, it highlighted the significant role of truthful and consistent communication of political leaders, influencers, and media personnel. Other studies claimed that COVID-19 forced different political systems to be transparent in responding to public concerns (Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020).

Conversely, other scholars believe that social media has a negative role as it is currently dominated by exaggerated news on terrorism, pandemics, disasters, and tragic content (Daniel Ong'ong'a & Demuyakor, 2020). Many recent research findings indicated that there is more fabricated, fake, and misleading news on social media platforms on the current health crisis COVID-19 (Bridgman, 2020; Cinelli et al., 2020; Daniel Ong'ong'a & Demuyakor, 2020; WHO, 2020; Ouedraogo, 2020; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020; Vraga, Tully, & Bode, 2020; Gallotti et al., 2020; Kamil & Rathaur, 2020; Kyriakidou et al., 2020). In contrast, traditional media boosted public health measures like social distancing (Bridgman, 2020). More precisely, those who obtained their news from media organizations on social media were more knowledgeable about the situation. Yet, there was no significant evidence that those who relied on other sources were less informed, despite some increased levels of fear contrary to the other group (Newman et al. 2020).

In the same context, the World Health Organization statement showed that there is massive misinformation across traditional and social media in the first couple of months of the COVID-19 pandemic. The report described this misinformation as Infodemic. Infodemic is defined as an enormous amount of misleading information and rumors that make it hard to identify and differentiate reliable sources (WHO, 2020). Moreover, it stated that we should fight the Infodemic alongside the pandemic of COVID-19 (WHO, 2020). The Infodemic of COVID-19 revolves around

three main types: the origin, development, preventive measure, and treatment of the virus (Vraga, Tully, & Bode, 2020; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020).

In relevance, Bridgman (2020) found a positive relationship between social media consumption and misperception about COVID-19. It is worth noting that such misperceptions are, in turn, connected with less compliance with required safety measures such as social distancing (Bridgman, 2020). Also, misinformed users believe that health experts exaggerate the pandemic's severity (Motta, Stecula, & Farhart, 2020). Alarmingly, misleading information about COVID-19 on social network sites such as Facebook goes viral at a much faster pace and broader reach than any correct information (Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020). Cinelli et al. (2020) argued that the dissemination pace or pattern was not affected by the accuracy or inaccuracy of information. They added that the main sharing drive of information is related to the interaction among citizens, offered either by a specific social media or/and by the engagement pattern of groups of users on the topic.

To understand the level of fake news proliferation during pandemic crises and the dependence of people on social media for news and staying updated, Allcott et al. (2020) claimed that polarized media and political environment can lead to the spread of misinformation and fake news, as in the case of US during the outbreak of COVID-19. Additionally, news consumption of right-leaning media outlets on social media (media entities that produce inaccurate information about the origins and treatment of the virus) can also increase misperception and lead to misinformed citizens (Motta, Stecula, & Farhart, 2020). Ouedraogo (2020), on the other side, argued that there are psychological factors that cause the propagation of fake news and ease its extensive dissemination via social media platforms. He explained that people under stress -as in the situation during the COVID-19 lockdown, are irrationally adopting spontaneous reactions of sharing fake and inaccurate information on social media without paying attention to its accuracy or source (Ouedraogo, 2020).

Even though there was an information flow spike across the world that kept people updated on the current health crisis regarding the number of infected, mortality, cured, etc., such massive circulation of misinformation led to negative news coverage. Thus, leading to panic, stress, fear, and other severe psychological backlashes (Kamil & Rathaur, 2020).

Within the same framework, the amplification of the virus's repercussions on social media led to a chaotic sphere of incivility as well as misinformation (Gallotti et al., 2020; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020). Thus, the spread of fake news and misleading information about this new disease of COVID-19 led to severe psychological effects on people as it heightened stress, anxiety, and fear levels among people (Bergen-Cico, 2020; Mansell, 2015; Ahmed et al., 2020; Rommer et al., 2020; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020; Sood, 2020). By examining the psychological impact of the news

exposure on social media such as Facebook during the current pandemic of COVID-19, it was found that there is a higher rate of anxiety, fear, depression, harmful alcohol user, and less mental well-being than usual (Mansell, 2015; Ahmed et al., 2020; Rommer et al., 2020; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020; Sood, 2020). Results showed that the impact on younger people (aged between 21-40) was more intense in terms of their mental well-being and alcohol use (Ahmed et al., 2020).

In short, the uncertainty connected with COVID-19 shared news on social media produced significant psychological and psychiatric turbulences (Mansell, 2015; Ahmed et al., 2020; Rommer et al., 2020; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020; Sood, 2020). For example, it led to post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, fear, panic disorders, and behavioral disorders (Sood, 2020). Ahmad & Murad (2020) added the effect severity depends on several factors, including the user's level of consumption, sex, age, and level of education. Consistent with the previously stated findings, Sloan et al. (2021) found that people were more worried about others, including their family members, the elderly, and healthcare personnel, than exposed to dying.

Also, heavy news consumers exhibit higher levels of anxiety and fear than light and medium consumers (Sloan et al., 2021). The cultivation theory can justify this finding. On this, Manzoor and Safdar (2020) examined the cultivation impact of consuming social media news during the COVID-19 pandemic and found a strong cultivation effect. They added that these networks, such as Facebook, cultivated fear among upper and middle socioeconomic statuses. They explained that such categories were spending much more time on the platform than the lower class, who were less frightened of the virus as their news consumption was far less than the other two socioeconomic categories.

Furthermore, many scholars examined the relationship between social media news consumption, political ideology, and behavioral change during the current pandemic of COVID-19. Bridgman (2020) found an association between misinformation, behavior, and attitude. Moreover, Van Holm et al. (2020) revealed that people with liberal and moderate political ideologies tend to make fewer travel trips than conservatives, who are more likely to change their behavior and plans based on the current government recommendations due to the health crisis. Additionally, Limaye et al. (2020) explained that the dissemination of scientifically inaccurate news and information had been utilized as a political tool to affect public opinion and shape their perception of government performance. The shared information via multiple online and offline sources misled the people and created a confusing state of doubting the UK government's claims on the human impact of the pandemic (Kyriakidou et al., 2020).

Overall, Manzoor and Safdar (2020) concluded that social media has the most devastating role in cultivating high levels of threat and fear due to the nature of these platforms that enable everyone to share their views. Further, low media literacy and the inability of many people to differentiate between factual, opinion, fake, and accurate information make it very hard for people to avoid the cultivated impact of fear and terror during this health crisis. Vraga, Tully, and Bode (2020) argued that media literacy is an essential foundation to combat the misinformation dilemma on social media by giving users the tools to identify and consume high-quality information (Mansell, 2015).

Thus, it is crucial to monitor the accuracy of the news, shared information, and consumption during this pandemic. (De Coninck et al., 2020; Limaye et al., 2020; Bergen-Cico, 2020). Bergen-Cico (2020) explained that most media entities are for-profit, thus designing their content to maximize viewer engagement with their product to attract advertisers. Moreover, they rely on fear, crime, and rage to keep people attended with their news media, particularly -with the potential of social media that increase engagement levels. Ultimately, Bergen-Cico (2020) said people do not need that much information shared on social media to be informed. For instance, tuning in to the news for 1 hour is quite enough to be informed.

2.7 Facebook as a news source

Facebook is one of the most used, foremost, leading, and visited social network sites in terms of time spent and the number of viewed pages (Ju et al., 2014; Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017; Holt, 2016; Kwon, 2011; Tremayne, 2017; David et al., 2019). It has played an important role since its establishment in 2004 (Ju et al., 2014; Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017; Holt, 2016; Kwon, 2011). As of the second quarter of 2020, Facebook reported that it has 1.79 billion daily active users (DAU) and an average of 2.7 billion monthly active users (Statistica, 2020). It is worth noting that there are 2.6 billion users in the USA, 38 million in Egypt, and 22 million in Spain (Facebook, 2020).

In this regard, Facebook is defined as a social network site that allows users to communicate with a particular group, publicly or privately (Tremayne, 2017; Valenzuela, 2013). It enables users to post notes, photos, videos, and status updates, where one of the significant features of Facebook is making one's posts and actions salient among their network (Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017; Valenzuela, 2013; Oeldorf-Hirsch & Sundar, 2015). Valenzuela (2013) added that it lets people track the updates of their network and stay updated through the newsfeed home page, in addition, to following and joining shared interest groups and pages.

Gritckova (2016) argued that Facebook connects users and provides billions of people with unlimited access to information and news. He added that it currently serves as an essential platform for information and news exchange among people worldwide. Thus, the news is one of the most shared information among people of different ages, socioeconomic, and education levels (Oeldorf-Hirsch & Sundar, 2015; David et al., 2019). Several scholars argued that those who share and post news on their profiles act as opinion leaders to their network list by passing information that exists somewhere else, more personally related to their network (Oeldorf-Hirsch & Sundar, 2015; David et al., 2019). Through social media, people can connect with political groups, news organizations, journalists, and other influencers on Facebook. Such connection exposes users to news stories, political information, analysis, etc., which they can share or discuss with each other's (Mahmmood, 2017; Saldaña, McGregor & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015).

In this sense, millions of people worldwide use Facebook to get and share news and information (Tremayne, 2017; David et al., 2019). Newman et al. (2020) stated that (44%) of Spanish people use Facebook for news compared to (35%) in the US. Besides, Sveningsson (2015) found that the study participants use social network sites like Facebook and Twitter as the primary news source about public affairs. Moreover, they get most of their news and information from trusted adults, friends, family, and relatives on their social media networks. Similar research findings showed that (81%) of the Dutch population acquires their daily news from online sources, and (47%) reported using social media for this purpose by following the Facebook and Twitter accounts of traditional news organizations (Swart, Peters & Broersma, 2018).

Facebook is a good platform for news production, distribution, and consumption (Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017). In this sense, the information dissemination on Facebook is unique. A user can directly recommend a page, group, article, etc., and post it to his network, or an automated computer advertisement would tell users who among their social network is following a particular page or doing a particular activity (Kwon, 2011). Hermida et al. (2012) added that Facebook users value their network that facilitated news acquisition through connecting with journalists, political actors, and news organizations directly (Sveningsson, 2015; Ju et al., 2014). It is worth noting that the importance of online news on social media has greatly increased where users vary between active news consumers (63%) and passive users in terms of checking headlines without following the link (Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017). According to a published report by the American Associated Press (2015), more than one billion active users share more than 70 pieces of information, such as links to articles and news each month. In the same framework, (69%) of Facebook users said they get their daily news from Facebook pages (i.e., news organizations, journalists, etc.) (AP, 2015).

Johnson et al. (2020) claimed that (47%) of Facebook users' primary motivation for visiting this platform is getting information and staying updated with current affairs.

Similar findings indicated that young people have turned to social media to get updated news about politics and public affairs (David et al., 2019). Also, there is (88%) of millennials get news from Facebook regularly, and more than half of them do so daily (AP, 2015). In this regard, Limaye et al. (2020) referred that people unsurprisingly turned to social media sites such as Facebook for obtaining information and guidance about this new virus. Newman et al. (2020) said that (43%) of people got their news about the COVID-19 pandemic from traditional news sources on social media, particularly Facebook. On this matter, some studies referred that most young adults are exposed to news on Facebook incidentally rather than intentionally (Chan, 2016; Hermida, 2010). Some scholars explained that Facebook incidental news exposure could occur while checking news updates that appear on the user's profile wall (Chan, 2016; Hermida, 2010; Tremayne, 2017).

The previous data show that Facebook is more than a communication tool as it is being used for news dissemination and consumption (Gritckova, 2016; David et al., 2019). David et al. (2019) said that (66%) of social media news consumers get their news more frequently from Facebook compared to any other network. Gritckova (2016) illustrated that this platform regularly develops new ways to make news consumption more accessible and convenient for readers. For example, the instant articles and algorithm news options refine the searching for essential data in the form of algorithms (which shape the users' newsfeed based on their news reading as well as information searching patterns, the popularity of a news item, as well as the users' friends' preferences on the platform).

Furthermore, Schrøder (2014) added that users could select some news media platforms in favor of others due to the "worthwhileness equation", which has seven dimensions and can be listed as follows: Time (means that the platform is worth the time spent on it), connectivity (news content that helps the audience stay connected with their network and the society), normative pressure (the way of using the news medium or not depending or conforming with the accepted standards among others), participatory (the ability of participants in a news medium to interact), price (the price affordance and worth of a news medium), technological appeal, and situational fit (the way a news medium is suitable for the time and place of its use).

In this respect, people seek information about politics and current affairs to satisfy their need to be informed (Boukes, 2019). The most common way of acquiring knowledge and being informed was through mass media in the past decade. Nowadays, citizens have turned to social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter to obtain news (Bergström & Jervelycke Belfrage, 2018). According to

Newman et al. (2019), the most used social network site in Spain is Facebook; (73%) have Facebook accounts, with (47%) using it for news, (52%) share news, and (27%) make comments on the news. Other scholars found similar results in the US, where Facebook is the most used network, with (66%) are on the platform, (39%) using Facebook for news, (37%) sharing news, and (29%) making comments on the news. Accordingly, Facebook enables news organizations to connect with billions of users and build rapport relationships through their created pages (Gritckova, 2016; Boukes, 2019).

Olmstead et al. (2011) analyzed the traffic rates on twenty-five US news websites. They found that Facebook is the visiting drive for the five most viewed sites. Another research finding indicated that a single post by a news organization or journalist is sent on an average of 15.5 times more, which means that social recommendations could significantly increase the outreach of the message and news source (Gritckova, 2016). It is worth noting that such pages became the primary source of news for many Facebook users who usually have personal and social motivations for using these pages (Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017; Gritckova, 2016; Hermida, 2012).

In this sense, many news organizations started to use Facebook as an alternative publishing platform due to its unique features to reach many audiences and readers (Ju et al., 2014; Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017). Hence, most traditional news organizations have Facebook pages that they keep updated (Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017; Ju et al., 2014).

Mahmood and Sismeiro (2017) found a (12.5%) increase in the number of users who access Facebook news pages. Hence, Facebook became the window that reflects the world for its users (Gritckova, 2016). There are contradicting research findings on the positive and negative effects of Facebook like the overall impact of social network sites that we discussed before, where some argue that Facebook can have a negative effect on staying updated, gaining knowledge, and shaping reality as well as perception, while others claim the opposite. In this regard, Boukes (2019) and David et al. (2019) found that frequent usage of Facebook can increase knowledge acquisition and civic as well as political engagement. Other research findings showed that Facebook positively affects political outcomes (David et al., 2019). This positive effect usually occurs among users with a high political interest compared to less interested ones (Boukes, 2019).

On the other side, other scholars argued that Facebook could have a reverse impact on acquiring knowledge and reduce citizens' information about current affairs (Cacciatore et al., 2016; Müller et al., 2016). For instance, Newman et al. (2020) said that more than half of the global sample consider Facebook the leading source for spreading fake information almost everywhere, unlike WhatsApp. Likewise, Ahmad and Murad (2020) said that Facebook was the most used network among social

media users in Iraqi Kurdistan during the outbreak of COVID-19. They explained that it had a significant role in spreading fake and inaccurate information, upsurging panic, fear, and anxiety levels among users, who mainly relied on this platform for obtaining their information and news.

In addition to being misinformed, Müller et al. (2016) said that people might get a heuristic feeling of being informed by streaming their Facebook newsfeed and timeline. He explained that a cognitive scheme is activated by seeing a news headline shared by a news organization which can reinforce a false heuristic inference of being informed and may eventually decrease the likelihood of informing oneself about the news via other platforms. Gritckova (2016) added that the personalized news feature on Facebook might lead to a distorted world by exposing users to one point of view or dropping important information. He said people usually seek information that adheres to their belief system and disregards the opposing point of view and knowledge. In a similar vein, Mahmood and Sismeiro (2017) argued that homophily and social influence are the main driving reasons for news consumption. News consumption on Facebook is greatly influenced by homophily, which means that people prefer to connect with users who hold similar beliefs. Homophily eventually leads to an echo chamber effect (Schmidt, 2017).

In relevance to the previously mentioned part on the echo chamber, many research studies support the assumption that news consumption on Facebook leads to echo chamber effect and polarization, which could be the main problem behind misinformation. As discussed earlier, the echo chamber effect occurs when users focus on certain narratives and follow polarized groups that reinforce their worldview. Arguably, news consumption on Facebook increases political discussion. In this respect, arguments and explanations of such endorsed narratives might increase group polarization, thus negatively affecting the users' emotions and perceptions about different matters (Schmidt et al., 2017; Schmidt, 2017). Narayanan et al. (2019) found that Facebook incorporates links to extremists, sensational and conspiratorial news sites, and content. However, they did not find any junk news, hate speech, or pornography. They concluded that the percentage of polarized political news and information shared on Facebook is huge in India compared to any other examined country. It is worth noting that India has the highest number of Facebook users compared to any country in the world, with over 251 million, followed by the US (World Stats Report, 2020).

2.8 News consumption on influencers' Facebook pages/accounts

Due to the high levels of internet penetration worldwide, news seekers started to vary their news sources as they have access to multiple platforms (Park, 2018). In this respect, Facebook is an essential platform for information, opinion, expression, political content, and news consumption. It has a wide range of accounts, groups, and pages that provide people with information about current affairs, politics, and breaking news (Boukes, 2019; Chan, 2016). It allows people to connect with Facebook influencers such as political and public actors, news organizations, journalists, opinion leaders, and activists' pages on Facebook (Chan, 2016). Several studies found that Facebook users seek information about politics and current affairs by following opinion leaders such as news organizations, journalists, politicians, and public actors' accounts/pages (Boukes, 2019). Park (2018) argued that online opinion leaders are more appealing to users who like to vary their news sources. In the same context, Casero-Ripollés (2021) argued that different social media platforms are dominated by some users -namely social media influencers (SMIs)- who have an extended influence on others. Park (2018) argued that online opinion leaders/influencers play an active role as agenda creators and information providers. Based on previous studies, youths on Facebook rely heavily on SMIs as their primary source of political news (Chan, 2016; Boukes, 2019).

It is worth noting that following a journalist, news organization, or media editor on Facebook has a more decisive influence on news reception and perception. Some scholars found that Facebook users who follow news organizations' accounts exhibit higher usage of the platform in terms of intensity and duration, leading to higher news reception (Dietrich & Haußecker, 2017). Research findings showed that (30%) of Facebook users follow and connect with Facebook influencers (Chan, 2016). Vraga et al. (2015) added that Facebook users rely on opinion leaders to know and understand important news and information. Also, opinion leaders draw users' attention to the news they would have missed, in addition to playing an essential role in disseminating and explaining the ongoing events (i.e., public, and political affairs) (Bergström and Jervelycke Belfrage, 2018). Further, people are more likely to believe the information and news from opinion leaders – a person or entity with many followers (Holt, 2016; Bergström & Jervelycke Belfrage, 2018). Thus, news consumption and opinion leadership concepts are highly correlated (Vraga et al., 2015).

Within this framework, it is crucial to track the origin of opinion leaders' concept, which goes back to 1948, as stated by Lazarsfeld and Katz. They defined it as those who can share ideas and information that influences other people's opinion, perception, attitude, and behavior. Many terms refer to the same concept of opinion leadership: experts, opinion leaders, influencers, and social

connectors (Goldenberg et al., 2009). Park (2018) argued that online opinion leaders share information and news they consume from multiple sources, including traditional and social media platforms, to meet the requirements of today's audience. He also found that they are more likely to share links and references to news stories on traditional media.

It is worth noting that the concept of influencers is related to the two-step flow of information theory, which Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet initiated (1948). They argued that there are three main actors in the information dissemination process: mass media, opinion leaders, and citizens. The primary theory assumption is that the media effect occurs on two levels. First, the impact reaches opinion leaders -namely influencers-, who filter the content they consume and then pass the important ones to the public, who are affected later by what is shared by the opinion leaders (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948). More precisely, the information flows from the media to the opinion leaders, who then convey and interpret the information to the rest of the population. The concept of two flows of information regained its power with the emergence of digital technology and social media (Messing & Westwood, 2014).

In a more detailed analysis, Casero-Ripollés (2020a) argued that news agencies currently play a significant role in the information flow on various digital platforms. They act as a primary news producer and disseminator due to their neutrally balanced news coverage, based on fact-checking and multi-angled interpretation of events. As a result, they are prevalent and followed by many users on the social network platforms, such as Twitter. Besides, they dominate the political discussion on social network sites such as Twitter. Also, people play an active role in the news media coverage by disseminating content that can shape public opinion, perception, and behavior (Casero-Ripollés, 2021).

More concisely, people historically used to rely on known sources for news, such as TV programs, newspapers, etc. Currently, people choose certain pages, organizations, journalists, or media entities as news sources, in addition to the network algorithms (Messing & Westwood, 2014). Hence, influencers and their interpersonal networks are equally essential in the two-step flow of news as well as information, it takes two levels from an opinion leader to a follower and then from the follower to his network of friends and peers (Messing & Westwood, 2014; Bergström & Jervelycke Belfrage, 2018; Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017). In this sense, the effect of influencers takes place on their followers and goes viral on their followers' networks (Bergström & Jervelycke Belfrage, 2018; Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017). For instance, Park (2018) found that online news consumers reflect the opinion, perception, and analysis of online opinion leaders/ influencers on Twitter.

In other words, the pattern of social influence goes through two levels: from influencers (i.e., news organizations, professional editors, etc.) to users with a vast network, then from these individuals to their friends, peers, relatives, etc., in their network. Accordingly, friends and relatives can act as prominent influencers in the consumption process by directing content consumption (Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017). In sum, news audiences are currently taking part in the distribution process (i.e., sharing news on their social media and controlling what other audiences get to read) (Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017).

In this regard, social media influencers SMIs can be defined as opinion leaders who have assertive, extroverted, and socially active with followers (Bobkowski, 2015). Those can be news organizations, political actors, politicians, writers, experts, and political journalists (Hodson & Petersen, 2019; Bobkowski, 2015). Similarly, Casero-Ripollés (2021) identified SMIs as opinion leaders, journalists, media personnel, editors, and experts in political talk shows. This scholar found that media and political elites are currently regarded as digital influencers in the same context. They have a very decisive role in controlling the digital public debate on social network sites such as Twitter; thus, they hold a very high level of digital authority.

In this sense, one of the required features of social media influencers is to have a digital influence and authority. Casero-Ripollés, Alonso-Muñoz & Marcos-García (2022) examined the factors that enable political actors' authority and digital influence. They found that the ideology, career, and position of political actors are essential factors for gaining digital influence and authority (Casero-Ripollés, Alonso-Muñoz & Marcos-García, 2022). In this regard, these scholars argued that the politicians' position influences the content that gets the most' likes' on social media sites such as Facebook. Barnett and Vishwanath (2017) added other features of influential people: being well-connected, knowledgeable, innovative, interactive, engaging with their network, and respected by others, as well as having a considerable number of followers.

SMIs represent "a new type of independent third-party endorser who shapes audience perception and attitudes through posts, blogs, tweets, and the use of other social media" (Deborah, Michela & Anna, 2019). In other words, Enke and Borchers (2021) identified social media influencers as third-party players who create many well-connected networks that impact organizational sponsors via content production, dissemination, consumption, and interaction on various social media network sites. Any social media influencer has a well-planned social media communication strategy, which is adopting effective communicative activities that help achieve the organizational goals.

Dubois and Gaffney (2014) argued that SMIs' interest in current political affairs affects their communicative strategies. The main drive of the communicative strategy of SMIs can be divided

into four main categories: informing, opining, constructing a community, and creating a personal identity/brand (Casero-Ripollés & López-Rabadán, 2014). In this sense, Casero-Ripollés (2021) identified the difference between the SMI categories in their communication strategy. For instance, journalists are more likely to use humor and interact with their followers. Media editors are objective and tend to promote their media organization. At the same time, experts play an informative role in sharing news as well as information and providing analysis of the current political and public affairs, in addition to criticizing and interacting with their followers through direct messaging and comments. They also found that the four segments tend to express their opinion, whether negative or positive and build rapport with their audience.

Subsequently, Facebook influencers are described as well connected to diverse and extensive users by engaging in several virtual group activities (Kwon, 2011). Moreover, they influence other people's opinions and perceptions (conscious and unconscious) (Johnson & St. John III, 2020). Deborah, Michela, and Anna (2019) argued that online users tend to perceive information posted on social media by SMIs as trusted and reliable compared to the information provided through traditional media. Alshareef (2017) asserted that most Saudi Arabians expressed their trust in the news being shared on Facebook by news organizations, journalists, and political actors.

Hence, journalists, media outlets, and news organizations have integrated social media, particularly Facebook, into their channels of communication to reach a large audience and increase the "on-go news consumers" (Gritckova, 2016; Boukes, 2019; Chan, 2016). In this sense, Gritckova (2016) argued that news became an essential part of the platform in the past year. He added that several international media outlets such as BBC News, The New York Times, and The Guardian turned to Facebook to increase their exposure. For instance, BBC News now has more than 50 million Facebook followers worldwide, the New York Times 16 million, and The Guardian has 8.2 million (Facebook, 2020). This finding shows that professional editors, journalists, and media outlets are still the most trusted, visited, and credible news source for most users on Facebook (Alshareef, 2017; Gritckova, 2016). On a different approach, Facebook users tend to follow a limited number of pages and sources. Schmidt et al. (2017) argued that the more active a user is, the more likely they rely on a small number of news sources, consequently "determining a sharp community structure among news outlets."

In this sense, Sveningsson (2015) argued that respondents prefer Facebook news stories and articles that journalists and news organizations post. David et al. (2019) said that those who are more politically engaged and interested tend to follow public and political actors as well as news pages on Facebook. In this context, news organizations and journalists are the leading influencers on

Facebook (Sveningsson, 2015; Tandoc, 2019; David et al., 2019; Cho et al., 2015). They post news stories on their accounts/pages, which then are shared by ordinary users (Tandoc, 2019). David et al. (2019) and Cho et al. (2015) found that opinion leaders, governmental, official institutions, journalists, news organizations, and public and political actors' Facebook pages are the primary sources of news consumed on Facebook. Glowacki et al. (2018) support the previous notion that most of the shared news on Facebook and Twitter comes from professional news sources. Less than (1%) of the shared political news and information comes from political party pages. They also added that Facebook has a limited percentage of junk news, as most of the information comes from professional content posted by a news organization. Further, they revealed that Facebook users prefer to share political news from news organizations and professional editors and journalists rather than parties or political candidates directly.

Previous research studies showed that people perceive news stories shared by influencers (i.e., news organizations) as more credible and trusted than non-news organizations (Johnson & St. John III, 2020). Also, news organizations are still regarded as the most reliable, credible news sources on Facebook (Johnson & St. John III, 2020). Turcotte et al. (2015) argued that people tend to follow news organizations and media outlets on Facebook to consume news (Holt, 2016). Thus, we can infer that the source credibility and knowledge are still essential factors in news consumption on social media networks (Bergström & Jervelycke Belfrage, 2018).

In sum, influencers currently connect news and citizens (Johnson & St. John III, 2020; Cho et al., 2015). They shape how news affects people's opinions, perceptions, and behavior (Cho et al., 2015). Within this context, Bergström & Jervelycke Belfrage (2018) claimed that influencers' role is vital in passing on the news. They added that many of their study participants realize the function of the influencer as mediators – in terms of filtering, coding, interpreting, and decoding salient content. Also, the study participants expressed their reliance on influencers for obtaining daily news and interpretations; they also consider them as a prerequisite for staying updated with the news. They explained that this stem from the users' deep need for guidance in orienting themselves within the news events along with its explanation.

Consequently, most young users follow official media outlets to stay informed and updated about world ongoings (Gritckova, 2016). Moreover, they are aware of who is the source of news on Facebook and value the opinion of their network friends (Gritckova, 2016). In this regard, Tandoc (2019) stressed the importance of news sources on Facebook when the motivation is high. He found that when the motivation is high, the participants perceived news stories as more credible when posted by news organizations than when their Facebook friends shared them. Kang et al. (2011)

explained that people tend to engage in systematic processing of information when motivation is high. In contrast, the lower the motivation level, the more likely the individual is to adopt the heuristic cues. According to the HSM (heuristic system model), a message is perceived to be more credible when the source is reliable and trustworthy (Kang et al., 2011; Kwon, 2011; Tandoc, 2019; Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999; Chang et al., 2018). Heuristic information processing involves minimal cognitive needs, unlike systematic processing, which demands comprehensive scrutiny and mental effort (Kang et al., 2011; Kwon, 2011; Tandoc, 2019; Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999). Some scholars argued that those who seek online information tend to minimize their cognitive effort and use heuristic cues that focus on source credibility (Kang et al., 2011; Kwon, 2011; Tandoc, 2019; Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999). As audiences refer to their interpersonal connections to help them evaluate the information they encounter on social media, thus minimizing their cognitive efforts (Kang et al., 2011; Kwon, 2011; Tandoc, 2019; Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999).

Furthermore, Bergström and Jervelycke Belfrage (2018) found a correlation between the importance of the topic and reliance on influencers as a primary source of information. Young et al., (2016) explained that users turn to news organizations and professional editors for getting news about epidemics, catastrophes, crimes, economy, politics, terrorism, foreign affairs, and the environment. Yet, they consume topics on human rights, abortion, and LGBTQ rights through news shared by their peers and other social media sources.

Nevertheless, other studies revealed that people are more influenced when a user's friend shares the news story due to the proximity of the source and homophily, which act as heuristic cues that increase the message's credibility (Kwon, 2011). Consistently, Facebook users are more interested in the news shared by friends and family members within their network. Marchi (2012) claimed that personal connection with one's social network acts as a news 'filter' that brings many stories to the youths' attention and helps them identify their relevance to them through shared commentaries. Therefore, the impact of news circulated by influencers can go beyond direct exposure to include indirect exposure.

In the same framework, Turcotte and his colleagues (2015) argued that Facebook users tend to trust a media outlet when its news and articles are shared and recommended by their friends. Hence, Facebook Influencers take advantage of the social influence and homophily effects by targeting the most influential users (have many followers or/and friend list in their network) and users with possible avid readers to attract a more considerable number of audiences (Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017). In this sense, David et al. (2019) argued that a single post by a news organization or journalist is sent on an average of 15.5 times more, which means that social recommendations could increase

the outreach of the message and the news source significantly. Accordingly, following politically active Facebook friends means more exposure to political content and news through indirect contact with news organizations' posts (David et al., 2019).

Previous literature on the impact of traditional news media showed that it affects knowledge of current affairs and, therefore, shapes perception (Bobkowski, 2015). Similarly, connecting with influencers – considered news sources - on Facebook can also have a powerful impact on shaping people's perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and behavior (Chan, 2016). Many scholars have discussed the role of influencers in affecting others' perceptions. They found that their experience and status among people are the main reason behind their effect (Chan, 2016).

David et al. (2019) added that consuming news from these sources could shape perception, as well as ideologies, and lead to political engagement. They found that following political officials or institutions on Facebook shapes perception and leads to higher levels of interest and engagement among respondents. Likewise, Deborah et al. (2019) found that influencers can disseminate threat messages and exaggerate fear levels among users, especially when reporting adverse events, passing false information, or writing bogus, vague, incomplete, and inaccurate material and comments on incidents. Bene (2017) stressed that consuming political news on Facebook leads to a negative perception of the ongoing occurrences. He added that the majority's perception, political behavior, and attitude are being shaped by the minority that shares and disseminates political information and news. In addition, the Facebook effect takes place in the long term by shaping perceptions and, therefore, political ideology and behavior (Bene, 2017). In this regard, news consumption on news organizations' and journalists' Facebook pages referred to as influencers can shape mass opinion and perception of reality (Tang & Lee, 2013; Schmidt, 2017). Also, communicating with official representatives and the public as well as political actors leads to heavy exposure to political information, persuasive messages, or even direct mobilization attempts (Tang & Lee, 2013; Schmidt, 2017).

Based on Casero-Ripollés (2021) definition of SMIs and Casero-Ripollés's (2020b) main findings, the information flow on digital platforms is currently dominated by news agencies that possess digital authority and control the political discussion as well as news circulation. Therefore, we define SMIs as opinion leaders who are well-connected news providers, have an extensive network of followers, and are informative, engaging, and respected by others. This definition can include online news agencies, journalists, media personnel, and editors.

2.9 Perception of Threat

It is significant to offer a clear definition of threat perception to examine the effect of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages on threat perception and how such perception might trigger political conservatism.

Xin et al. (2020) argued that we live in a risk society. He explained that digital and scientific advancements in all fields and their subsequent impact on the environment, i.e., climate change, nuclear and chemical weapons, etc., heighten people's risk and threat perception. Slovic (2000) added that such perception could affect compliance level as a subsequent attitude toward this stimulus -risk perception-, which usually encompasses uncertainty, severity, and vulnerability (Sjöberg, 2000; Dalrymple et al., 2016).

Further, there is a positive correlation between risk perception and the levels of uncertainty and severity (Dalrymple et al., 2016); the more an event is uncertain and severe, the higher the risk perception it creates. Contrariwise, Yang et al. (2015) showed that risk perception might lead to information deficiency and negatively impact attitude.

On the other side, several scholars argued that such a perception could have a positive contribution. By triggering pro-attitude and increasing the commitment, motivation, knowledge, and skills level thus respond effectively to the source of the threat (Ho et al., 2013). This finding is supported by the psychological and philosophical aspects. Some psychological researchers argued that uncertainty could raise awareness and motivate fast reactions as well as decisions during emergencies and dilemmas (Bhattacharyya, 2021). Hence, uncertainty can act as a very important stimulus to acquire knowledge and stay alarmed. Also, some philosophers referred to the notion of "knowledge of knowing nothing" as proposed in Socrate's apology (West & Platon, 1979). This means that the most important drive for knowledge is being aware of not knowing. Once, people become aware of their lack of knowledge, they start to read and study to improve themselves (West & Platon, 1979).

In this regard, many scholars explained that the influence of such perception, whether negative or positive depends on the individual's characteristics. For instance, Liobikienė and Juknys (2016) found that people with high self-transcendence values are more vulnerable to a high-risk perception, and thus more likely to adopt a pro-environmental attitude towards climate change. It is worth noting that Sinkkonen and Elovainio (2020), and Slovic (1999) defined risk perception as a subjective concept that is affected by many factors, including personality traits, culture, and socioeconomic status. Slovic (1999) extended their argument that there is no objectivity in such

perception as the risk or threat assessments are politicized. Thus, it is a subjective process that leads to a distorted outcome.

In a similar vein, Stein (2013) argued that threats are understood through the individual's perception. He added that perception is the systematic mental process of observing, understanding, feeling, acquiring, and recognizing that prompts action when exposed to a stimulus. He explained that there are three main elements of the mental process of perception: arousing state, information process, and creation process of assumptions and inferences. In this sense, 'threats' are constructed socially through a general mood of communicated understanding and emotions of experts, political leaders, and public conversations on different media platforms.

In this sense, a threat can be defined as the ability of an individual, group, association, or any entity to impose a destructively and severe effect on others (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007; Stein, 2013). There are two types of 'Threats': the first is a personal threat that aims at the individual, while the second is a group threat that targets mass audiences (MacKuen, Erikson & Stimson, 1992). In this regard, Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero (2007) argued that news media rely on the second type presented in the context of military, security, economic, religious, social, sex, and social threats. Contrariwise, personal safety, income, beliefs, health, and value threats can present personal threats. Thus, a personal threat can take the form of something that harms an individual. It is worth noting that news media can create a group threat that represents a personal threat (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007). For instance, an American working in the textile production field may consider exports from China a group threat against Egypt and a personal threat against their income. This example means that an individual can perceive economic, security, and military power as a source of threat (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007).

Consequently, power can use the threat as a function. Power is the ability to get someone to perform a particular action or do something they did not originally intend to (Dahl, 1957). Additionally, power can be broadened to shape people's preferences and activities to match certain agendas, ideologies, etc. (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007; Stein, 2013; Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 1974). For instance, when an event threatens people's existence, they will be more accepting of restrictive measures to survive (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007; Stein, 2013; Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 1974). This is supported psychologically by Maslow's hierarchy of need, which is a theory of human motivation in psychology that classify human needs into five categories (McLeod, 2007). They are listed in the following order: physiological needs, safety, love and belonging, esteem, and self-actualization. Those needs are ordered hierarchically meaning that an individual must meet the basic ones before achieving others. Based on this hierarchy, the need for safety comes before the love and

belonging needs. Therefore, people will prioritize being safe and secure before achieving a sense of belonging. (McLeod, 2007; Christian, 2015).

Over and above, Stein (2013) added that threats could either be verbal or physical. He illustrated that verbal threat is a set of well-structured statements that prevent people from doing a particular act; for example, if you do not follow the guidelines, specific damage will occur. Officials frequently use verbal threats to take actions such as increasing border troops, declaring an emergency state, cutting aid, and withdrawing ambassadors from other countries (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007; Stein, 2013). Threat perceptions can also affect the political processes, particularly in authoritarian governments, even without general elections (Sinkkonen & Elovainio, 2020).

In this regard, Obaidi et al., (2018) and Stephan and Stephan (2000) argued that there are four types of threats: realistic threats, intergroup anxiety, symbolic threats, and negative stereotypes. They explained each type as follows. Realistic threats are the ingroup members' fear that the outgroup members would try to take over their available resources or jeopardize their existence in power or pose a threat to their well-being. For example, these might include threats to one's existence, economic and political power, individual security as well as health safety (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Campbell, 1965; Allport, 1954). Intergroup anxiety is the fear of the negative consequences of contact with specific outgroups. For instance, people who have intergroup anxiety fear that they get embarrassed, judged, feel uncomfortable and unsafe, or judged by the outgroup members.

On the other hand, symbolic threats are those related to differences in the ingroup's worldview, values, and beliefs and the outgroup where the ingroup feels their values are threatened. Such differences can make the ingroup feel that the outgroup threatens their ethics, morals, views, and attitudes (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Campbell, 1965; Allport, 1954). Therefore, these threats are significantly connected to a group's sense of identity (Campbell, 1965; Allport, 1954). Finally, the negative stereotypes include threats within the group itself which means threats to the ingroup. According to the threat theory, when negative stereotype takes place within a particular group, the members of this group tend to be more anxious and worried about their performance, which therefore might hinder their ability to perform well with their full power (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Campbell, 1965; Allport, 195).

In this doctoral thesis, the realistic threat is what we aim at investigating since the study hypothesizes that the shared news by SMIs can make people threatened by out-groups whether through internal (within the country) or external (foreign threats to the government) factors.

2.10 Media and Threats

In this section, we will discuss the role of media in shaping threat perception. Based on the previous literature review, people nowadays largely depend on social media sites for getting their news. Facebook is considered one of the leading social network sites for news consumption. People rely on influencers (i.e., news organizations' accounts and pages) to get their daily news and explanation. Therefore, the information flow on digital platforms possesses digital authority and controls the political discussion and news circulation (Casero-Ripollés, 2020b).

People depend on the media to get information and explanations of local and international events (Ridout, Grosse & Appleton, 2008). Each media system interprets events based on political, cultural, and business interests (Tahat, 2011). For instance, news media can call violent perpetrators either freedom fighters or terrorists; they can call an act a suicide or an act of martyrdom. Furthermore, new media can shape people's opinions, perceptions, and behaviors about current affairs and policy preferences through simple wording or framing (Ridout, Grosse & Appleton, 2008; Tahat, 2011).

According to Al-Ameri (2013), people's behavior results from their perception of reality, which may not be consistent with the real world due to their reliance on news media depictions that differ from the real world. It's important to emphasize that the impact of the media on people's behaviors varies, as it depends on many variables, such as the level of media dependency, political knowledge, education, and socio-economic status (Ridout, Grosse & Appleton, 2008).

Ognyanova and Ball-Rokeach (2015) asserted that political systems depend on the media to disseminate social values and maintain order; no matter what kind of political system it is, it may not be so explicit in democratic countries. Yet, media are and always have been considered a political manipulation tool. The media utilize different techniques to propagate the desired political ideas and instigate desired perceptions and behaviors from the public. One media meticulously designed propaganda technique commonly deployed by regimes is exaggerating, scapegoating, and inciting fear (Black, 1977; Klaehn, 2017).

Al-Ameri (2013) argued that news media tend to expose people, almost daily, to threats in the form of violence and bloody scenes, whether in the news, drama, or any other form of programming which doesn't reflect reality. He added that such depictions usually result in the emergence of the mean world syndrome. Based on the cultivation theory, which is part of this thesis's theoretical framework Nellis and Savage (2012) found that frequent news consumption of threats can endorse fear and mistrust among people, leading to a distorted worldview. In this sense, many scholars

argued that consuming fake news can lead to threat perception and increase the fear level (Deborah et al., 2019).

The strategy of disseminating threat messages or fear appeals through news media is especially prominent in times of political dissent or instability since the aim is to drive people to call for stability and maintain the status quo, which naturally contradicts the characteristics of the post-revolutionary euphoria (Le Bon et al., 2001). As discussed earlier, there are four types of threats: realistic threats, intergroup anxiety, symbolic threats, and negative stereotypes (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

Shoshani and Slone (2008) found that threats in media depictions influence the audience's attitudinal and emotional responses, adding that continuous coverage of pandemics, terrorism, and violent images such as the forms of threat in conflict areas, affect people's perception of the conflict and increase the fright rate. Moreover, it increases the fear of victimization, anxiety, anger, readiness to settle with the enemy to end threats, avoidance of public areas, pain, and stereotypical image of other groups. Similar findings by Komaili (2004) showed that framing terrorism can also affect the perception of out-group members leading to the rise of discrimination, stereotyping, and demands for restricting the immigrants' flow.

Komaili (2004) as well as Nellis and Savage (2012) added that news media threats could affect aspects of one's personality by showing certain traits. One can exhibit an amplified loyalty to the in-group and hostility to other groups. Thus, frequent coverage of terrorism, economic crises, and health epidemics can lead to fear and willingness to sacrifice some liberties to maintain security, in addition to adopting safety measures at the expense of freedom (Komaili, 2004; Al-Ameri, 2013; Nellis & Savage, 2012). Furthermore, Ridout, Grosse, and Appleton (2008) argued that the perception of external threats influences the public's local and foreign policies. Such preferences are reflected in the government's decisions and strategies.

In this regard, the news media coverage of the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States included official statements that Al Qaeda executed the terrorist operation. It has shaped public opinion in supporting the war on terrorism to prevent any potential attack or threat (Al-Ameri, 2013; Komaili, 2004). Subsequently, it gave the administration of the United States a valid reason to attack other countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, Komaili (2004) added that such terrorist attacks led the people of North America to perceive immigrants as a threat to their lives and, consequently, support any administrative policies against them.

Feelings of threat and danger can induce different behaviors ranging from conformity to calling for change and opposition. This behavior depends on the degree of threat, whether it is existential,

meaning threatening one's existence, or partial existential, which is having an urge for a better existence. However, more threats can drive people to rationalize the status quo and become more politically conservative (Sinkkonen & Elovainio, 2020; Al-Ameri, 2013; Komaili, 2004). In sum, people's views, perceptions, behavior, etc., are shaped by their news consumption, and news media coverage on digital platforms plays a significant role in constructing threat perception (Sinkkonen & Elovainio, 2020).

2.11 Stimulating Fear and Terror Perception

Researchers have used many theories that support the finding that media depiction, usually mean and vicious, thus leads to threat perception (Nellis & Savage, 2012; Rubin et al., 2003). According to Gallup polls, one out of three people thinks that they or their family members will be victims of a terrorist attack due to hype news coverage on terrorism (Nellis & Savage, 2012). Thus, we can argue that frequent exposure to TV news stories about bombings, killings, beheadings, and similar events over a long period stimulates the belief that a potential terrorist attack will occur in the future (Nellis & Savage, 2012; Rubin et al., 2003). It is worth noting that several scholars found that exposure to this type of news can cultivate higher degrees of fear, worry, and threat among women and the elderly than men or youths (García-Castro & Pérez-Sánchez, 2018; Scarborough et al., 2010).

Romer, Jamieson, and Aday (2003) found a positive correlation between news exposure and threat perception within this framework. They surveyed 2,300 Philadelphians to measure the effect of TV news exposure on fear and threat perception. The findings indicated that news coverage of terror events cultivated a sense of terror and fear among the audience. Moreover, news coverage raises risk perception, mainly reporting local events (Romer, Jamieson, & Aday, 2003). Another scholar conducted a telephone survey on 532 participants living in Washington DC and New York City in the US and found that TV news stories increase the risk perception among viewers since these stories portray images and information that cultivate a sense of uncertainty and fear (Nellis & Savage, 2012).

Significantly, news content can lead to various degrees of fear and threat among viewers; for example, health, political, economic, and social topics covered in the news can lead to higher levels of danger in comparison to infotainment news (Ridout, Grosse & Appleton, 2008; Sotirovic, 2001). In this sense, we can argue that news exerts great power in influencing perception, ideology, and

attitude, mainly when it deals with social problems and terror-related issues (Ridout, Grosse & Appleton, 2008).

2.12 Political Ideology

Several scholars believe that ideology is a powerful force that can drive people to sacrifice their lives, commit atrocities, or do acts of generosity and courage just for the sake of their belief systems (Jost & Amodio, 2012). In this sense, ideology has become one of the most critical topics of investigation among researchers in various fields and disciplines. Elordi (2005) argued that ideology helps individuals cooperate and interact by gaining knowledge of each other's perceptions, preferences, and behavior and decoding these preferences into a set of actions. He added that ideology has a vital role in the communication process that takes place either between elite and ordinary citizens or among ordinary people; thereby, it enhances our understanding of how political preferences, attitudes, and behavior are constructed.

In this respect, Erikson and Tedin (2003) defined ideology as the set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved. Many researchers added that ideology helps explain the social world, solve life problems, and motivate social, epistemic, and existential needs and motives (Jost et al., 2009). Jost et al. (2009) said ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured.

He explained that ideologies attempt to explain and envision the world as it should be through building a schema of assertions regarding historical events, current realities, future expectations, and human nature, in addition to identifying suitable means of achieving social, economic, and political ideals. Different ideologies represent people's philosophies of their life regarding how a society should function and control.

Tedin (1987) defined political ideology as an interrelated set of attitudes and values about the proper goals of society and how they should be achieved. Ideology has two distinct and at least analytically separate components—affect and condition (McQuesten, 2008). Jost et al. (2009) added every definition of an ideological belief system carries with it certain assumptions concerning its degree of cognitive organization, affective and motivational qualities, and capacity for instigating action. Accordingly, ideology explains people's actions, values, and beliefs that affect their political behavior.

Previous studies found that political ideology affects people's attitudes toward political, social, and public issues. Cacciatorea et al. (2016) defined political ideology as the belief system that includes cognitive, emotional, and motivational elements that affect behavior. It also provides a clear explanation of how communities should work to achieve social justice and order. It is worth noting that political ideology can influence consumer decision-making regarding their activities, social relations, and affiliations to a specific organization or party; it can also go beyond that to control the things people like and dislike (Feldman & Stenner, 1997).

It is worth mentioning that there are many types of political ideologies. However, for this doctoral thesis, we will focus on political conservatism activated by threat, uncertainty, ambiguity, and disgust.

2.13 Political Conservatism and Threats

Ideologies such as conservatism fluctuate in different societies and at different times. Hence various definitions of conservatism exist that are relatively consistent. Jost et al. (2003) proposed the model of motivated social cognition, which this paper is applying; they built their explanation of conservatism on what Wilson (Jost et al., 2003) stated in his hybrid definition of conservatism. According to Wilson (1973), conservatism is resistance to change and the tendency to prefer safe, traditional, and conventional forms of institutions and behavior.

Furthermore, political conservatism is applauding the ruling authority, accepting their control, and having a social system in which groups are organized unequally and hierarchically (Matthews et al., 2009). However, O'Hara (2011) did not consider a conservative person like other scholars. According to O'Hara (2011), a politically conservative person is concerned with change and not necessarily opposing it. In contrast, a conservative seeks to increase the benefits of change and eliminate harm.

The relationship between political conservatism and threats has been inspected based on different theoretical frameworks. Motivated social cognition is a political conservatism model that was widely used to determine the correlation between these two variables (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Matthews et al., 2009; Nail, 2010; Willer, 2004; Crawford et al., 2013). However, other theories were used to examine these variables, such as the causal model of personality, social situation, worldview, ideological attitude, motivated closed-mindedness model, and the system justification theory.

Many classic works on conservatism found an association between political conservatism and threats. Oxley et al. (2008) described conservatism as a syndrome originating from anxiety and threats. For instance, when a threatening environment surrounds children, they cope with it by obeying parental authority. Threats have also found their way into religious rhetoric, as Oxley et al. (2008) explained that pastoral calls to conservatism, especially during times of crisis and anxiety. He added that a thousand angry thou-shalt-not dominate the religious discourse and appeal to the spirituality and faith of people.

Deductively, the plethora of research on conservatism and particularly political conservatism in relation to threats generally established a positive correlation between both. One of the most threatening events in the United States that have been widely examined regarding political attitudes is the 9/11 terrorist attacks. When Bonanno and Jost (2006) investigated the 9/11 survivors' political orientations, they found that Democrats and liberals shifted to political conservatism after the event took place because of depression, patriotism, and seeking revenge.

Not just survivors but also regular people have been affected by these events; Nail and McGregor (2009) measured the political attitudes of young adults before and after 9/11. He found that both liberals and conservatives respondents shifted to have a more conservative attitude following the event. In their longitudinal study, Matthews et al. (2009) explained that the perceived intergroup and realistic threats could motivate political conservatism.

Moreover, conservatism is not only related to psychological but also to physiological responses. Oxley et al. (2008) examined physiological responses to threats in a group of 46 adults. They found that those who are physiologically responsive to threats tend to be more politically conservative than those with a lower physical sensitivity. Consistently, Jost and Amodio (2012) hypothesized that when someone consumes new or unexpected information, specific neuro-cognitive processes are stimulated to deal with this information, which might shape or change political orientation. This physiological perspective of examining the effects of threats supports the psychological hypotheses and the relationship between threats and conservatism.

In times of threat, being conservative means accepting the status quo and inequality (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Oxley et al., 2008). Conservatives tend to be happier and more satisfied with their lives since they can rationalize this inequality and their need for stability (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Oxley et al., 2008; Crawford et al., 2013).

However, relating political conservatism to exposure to threat messages in the media has been scarcely deliberated. In their study, Watson and Riffe (2013) noted that the negative representation of immigrants affects the public acceptance of the state's policies in dealing with refugees. Similar results were found by Esses et al. (2013), pointing out that representing refugees in American mass

media as a threat to the nation led to dehumanizing the immigrants. Dehumanization manifests the desensitization effect as indicated in Bushman's and Anderson model (2009). The model examined the desensitization effect of media exposure to violence. Dehumanizing the victims of violent acts could be a cognitive consequence of desensitization. This effect leads to the possible behavioral outcome of unwillingness to help others.

Lerner (1958) explained that even though it might seem that the desensitization theory contradicts the concept of political conservatism and feelings of threat, it can be regarded as a process or a chain of possible effects. He added that feeling of threat could drive people to the need for closure, acceptance of inequality, and the urge to maintain the status quo. Subsequently, lead people to some level of desensitization and feelings of numbness to preserve the "stable" status quo through a process of turning a blind eye or closed-mindedness, as opposed to trying to rectify and challenge these threats (Lerner, 1958).

Nevertheless, studies that directly examine the relationship between the represented threats on social network sites and political conservatism are scarce. Thus, this doctoral thesis aims to add value to the existing literature by tackling the concept of political conservatism in political communication, psychology, and political science.

3 Theoretical framework

3.1 Cultivation Theory

The Cultivation Theory is deeply rooted in sociology, but it has lent itself to a broad spectrum of applications in many other disciplines and contexts. George Gerbner first coined it in the late 1960s to examine the effects of the television phenomenon (Morgan & Shanahan, 2010). The theory generally posits that high viewership of television programming might lead to believing the real world to be congruent with the television world.

Though the beliefs of the high exposure group are generally not cultivated in the low exposure group, naturally due to their low exposure to television, interaction with the increased exposure group could affect them, individually and as a society (Gerbner & Gross, 1994; Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2015; Signorielli, 2009).

Violent content has been a consistent topic of interest to cultivation researchers, and for a good reason (60%) of television programs contain violence (Signorielli, 2003). As a result of the consistent salience of violent content, messages, and images found within television programming, violent characteristics and negative perceptions of the world have often been an outcome variable of interest in scholarly work (Cheung & Chan, 1996; Gross & Aday, 2003; Nabi & Riddle, 2008; Perse, 1990; Romer et al., 2003; Signorielli & Morgan, 1990).

The theory assumes that television misrepresents reality; therefore, heavy viewers tend to perceive their social reality as being a mirror to the television reality, which is different than the real world, thus leading to misconceptions and unreal perceptions (Yamamoto et al., 2016; Mullings, 2012). The primary hypothesis of this theory proposes that "heavy viewers will be more likely to perceive the real world in ways that reflect the most stable and recurrent patterns of portrayals in the television world" (Signorielli and Morgan, 1990, pp. 9-10).

The theory has differentiated between light and heavy viewers in terms of television exposure as an independent variable. Television not only plants ideas into people's minds, but it also keeps consolidating and reinforcing them. Scholars listed some of the cultivation effects: fear of victimization, unwillingness to help others, desensitization, cultural identity, stereotypes, social learning, and modeling. (Busselle & Van den Bulck, 2019; Potter, 2014; Jamieson & Romer, 2015; Morgan et al., 2014)

In television violence, early studies have shown that heavy viewers tend to overestimate the prevalence of violence in the real world and express more significant fears than their light viewer counterparts (Belden, 2010; Mullings, 2012). Gerbner and several scholars added that the "Mean World Syndrome" is essentially a manifestation of the cultivation effect, entailing that heavy TV viewers tend to perceive the world as a more violent, dangerous, and mean place than it is (Mullings, 2000).

Bushman and Anderson (2009) explained that fear of victimization is connected to the Mean World Syndrome; heavy viewers tend to perceive the world as an unsafe place full of crime. They explained they are more likely to develop a sense of fear of real-life crime and being victimized by exaggerated violent media content. The fear of being victimized makes heavy viewers more prudent, skeptical, paranoid, and cautious when helping strangers.

This doctoral thesis uses the cultivation theory to measure the relationship between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages (i.e., news organizations) and feelings of threat, as the theory postulates.

3.1.1 Facebook as a cultivation medium

Many scholars found that different media exposure can lead to the same cultivational impact; thus, we can apply traditional mass communication theories to digital media. In this regard, Moreno and Koff (2016) reused the proposed concept of Shanahan and Morgan (1999), which postulates that there is an underlying consistency between the content of the messages we consume and the nature of the symbolic environment in which we live even if the delivery technology of the media changes. They explained that no matter what media platform we use, the content and intentions behind our consumption are similar and consistent over time and via different media channels. Many scholars have historically supported this notion and described shifting from one media to another as changing new bottles for old wine (McLuhan, 1964). This argument was evident when the film industry took message content from TV, which did the same with radio programming.

In a similar vein, Morgan et al. (2015) explained that even though receiving and consuming different types of stories, i.e., news, reality programs, fiction, etc., has dramatically changed, the essential aspects of the content are still the same. Thus, the cultivation impact can still be present whether people view stories online or offline. In this respect, Dietrich and Haußecker (2017) added that even

though the amount of negativity on Facebook is relatively less than on TV news media, breaking news still follows the same guidelines as other news media. They explained that breaking news could either grab attention and increase traffic to news media websites or lead to users' avoidance. Further, Facebook offers a never-ending news stream which might lead to the cultivation effect (Dietrich & Haußecker, 2017).

Considering this, there is an amble of research findings that indicate that news consumption on social media cultivates threat and risk perception just like TV news consumption, yet other scholars null this hypothesis. Roche et al. (2016) said that online news consumption is not connected with fear and anxiety levels. Accordingly, their results showed little support for the cultivation hypothesis in the context of online news consumption. Kim (2008) provided a possible explanation that online news consumers have the chance to search and get extra information about any given story from multiple sources that provide them with many angles. He explained that people could also check official statements and governmental websites for factual data, which could lessen their fear level and void the cultivational impact. Beckett and Sasson (2003) added that the dynamic nature of online news users might also be an essential factor that minimizes the effects of their consumption, unlike the passive state of TV news viewers. Likewise, Roche et al. (2016) said that people might also look for information and news that conform to their pre-existing beliefs, ideologies, and attitude. Thus, such information has a minimal effect on their beliefs.

On the other side, Graziano and Gauthier (2018) believe that online incivility in user comments may negatively affect perceptions about the discussed topic. They also added that the self-selection option on social network sites, i.e., Facebook, may counter the validity of the cultivation theory. Moreover, Shi (2018) investigated the cultivation impact of social media news consumption among international students in the US. He found that international students exhibited minimal fear when consuming news on Facebook and Twitter compared to other social network sites such as WeChat and Weibo. He also added that social media has a broader influence on young adults due to their frequent presence and daily life consumption. In this aspect, Hermann et al. (2020) considered Facebook a source of cultivation that can positively contribute to intergroup relations. Contrariwise, it can cultivate a negative perception and attitude toward the outgroup members by increasing social anxiety and fear levels.

Through analyzing the news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages, i.e., news organization and their impact on the Germans' world view and threat perception, Dietrich and Haußecker (2017) showed that Facebook news reception and consumption is affected by the frequency and intensity of the overall platform usage. They added that most of the news consumption on this platform occurs

incidentally. More significantly, they found a relationship between the time spent on the platform, perceived threat, and negative worldview. Furthermore, the effect of news reception on threat perception was very evident with the right-wing authoritarianism users. Hermann et al. (2020) stressed that the views of Facebook users reflect almost the same ideas and meanings of the world presented on Facebook. For instance, they found that Facebook usage can affect perception and attitude by cultivating ethnic diversity perceptions and related attitudes; they explained that this perception is mediated by diversity perceptions related to users' immediate social environment.

Several scholars argued that Facebook differs from other traditional media forms, including TV, where content is less socially distant (Dunbar, 2016; Grasmuck et al., 2009). TV portrayals are usually characterized by their social distance from the viewer's personal life and instant sphere of activity (Adoni & Mane, 1984). On the other side, news and information on Facebook are considered socially and personally close to the user's activity sphere and personal life due to the nature of this platform which consists of a tied network of friends and relatives (Dunbar, 2016; Grasmuck et al., 2009).

Shanahan and Morgan (1999) said the content of messages is more germane than the technology with which they are delivered. In this regard, Hermann et al. (2020) argued that Facebook has a more cultivation effect on perceptions and attitudes in different areas than TV. They added that the user-generated and customized content is complemented by mass media material (such as links, images, news, videos, brand-related content, etc.). In relevance to TV impact, Facebook can contribute to cultivating attitude change processes either directly or indirectly via social reality perception. They concluded that Facebook use might boost certain perceptions and change the attitude in terms of both the close and more socially distant environments of users, unlike the cultivation impact of TV, which is only related to the remote social environment of viewers.

Shrum and O'Guinn (1993) argued that memory accessibility and heuristic availability could explain the cultivation impact on perception. They explained that frequent presentation of certain portrayals on TV boosts its accessibility in the viewer's memory. The ability of viewers to recall these constructs from memory can affect their judgments and perceptions. It is worth noting that the ease of recalling is directly related to the frequency of exposure to such constructs.

In this regard, there are two types of cultivation judgments: the first and second order. First-order cultivation judgments rely on the availability and retrieval of information from the extended memory that forms the judgment (Hawkins & Pingree, 1982; Morgan et al., 2015; Shrum et al., 2004). It depends on the frequency, possibility, and prevalence of global events absorbed from TV content (Hawkins & Pingree, 1982; Morgan et al., 2015; Shrum et al., 2004). As for the second-

order judgments, Shrum et al. (2004) explained that this is related to the stimulus process of forming an opinion, stereotyping, impression, values, and thus attitude (Hawkins & Pingree, 1982; Morgan et al., 2015; Shrum et al., 2004). Many scholars described it as the beliefs deduced from the first-order information or attitudes complying with first-order perceptions of social reality (Potter, 1991; Rössler & Brosius, 2001). In sum, Shrum and Lee (2012) explained this process as the more people watch TV, the more likely their attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values match the constructs presented on the TV. On this matter, Hermann et al. (2020) stated that Facebook use has a strong first-order cultivation impact on perceptions in terms of close and distant social environments. Moreover, there was also an indirect effect on attitude via first-order information related to the close social environment.

Like TV, Facebook can create symbolic environments that convey stories and values yet are more fragmented and personalized (Tsay-Vogel et al., 2018). This finding means that the content is created and shared by each user. Further, the platform is also interactive and subjective to the influence of individuals through their active engagements and participation (i.e., comments), which are considered an integral part of the overall message delivery and contribute to the information process. Therefore, Morgan et al. (2015) said that the continued consumption of this information cultivates the social reality perception of users. They explained that such relevance and salience of messages facilitate the availability and retrieval of corresponding data from memory and lead to the cultivational impact.

3.2 Motivated Social Cognition Model

This model was proposed by Jost et al. (2003). The model assumption is based on understanding the situational circumstances of threat, fear, and uncertainty that act as causes of political conservatism. This model is distinguished from the previously mentioned theories because it considers the individual variations and the situational characteristic. This situational orientation renders the model of motivated social cognition to generalizability, where it becomes a part of human nature regardless of political views (Nail, 2010).

This model significantly contributed to the literature examining the relationship between certain psychological motives or predictors (independent variables) and political ideologies, namely political conservatism (dependent variables). According to this model, political conservatism has two aspects: resistance to change and hierarchical inequality preference (Jost et al., 2003; Aspelund et al., 2013). Matthews et al. (2009) used in their study the System Justification and Social

Dominance Orientation (SDO) scales to measure the abovementioned aspects. Though, Jost et al. (2003) argued that System Justification and SDO scales could only measure the inequality aspect of political conservatism. Most scholars examined political conservatism using the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale to measure the first aspect and SDO to measure the second core element of the ideology (Aspelund et al., 2013).

These scales faced criticism from some scholars who argued that such measurements are designed to measure political conservatism in western countries and are not compatible with non-western countries (i.e., Soviet). Thereby, Aspelund et al. (2013) proposed an alternative scale that measures both aspects and can be adapted to cross-cultural contexts. The 21-item Schwartz Portrait Value Questionnaire PVQ consists of two parts: conservation, which corresponds to resistance to change measure, and self-enhancement, which corresponds to inequality preference (Aspelund et al., 2013; Chowdhury, 2019).

This research focused on the two core aspects of political conservatism: resistance to change and hierarchical inequality preference in the American, Spanish, and Egyptian contexts using PVQ. The model assumes that situational circumstances make people's political ideologies more conservative during instability, threat, and transitional periods. The portrait values questionnaire PVQ which is part of this model is used to measure the 10 core human values which are:

- Power: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources (social power, authority, wealth, preserving my public image).
- Achievement: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential).
- Hedonism: pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgence).
- Stimulation: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an exciting life).
- Self-direction: independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring (creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals).
- Universalism: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (broadminded, wisdom, social justice, equality, a world at peace, a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment).
- Benevolence: preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible).

- Tradition: respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self (humble, accepting my portion in life, devout, respect for tradition, moderate).
- Conformity: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms (politeness, obedient, self-discipline, honoring parents, and elders).
- Security: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self (family security, national security, social order, clean, reciprocation of favors).

The conflicts and congruities among all ten fundamental values yield an integrated structure of values. Two orthogonal dimensions can summarize this structure:

- Self-enhancement vs. Self-transcendence: On this dimension, power and achievement values oppose universalism and benevolence values.
- Openness to change vs. Conservatism: On this dimension, self-direction and stimulation values differ from security, conformity, and traditional values.

Hedonism shares elements of both openness and self-enhancement.

We used the PVQ scale to measure political conservatism in its two-core values inequality preference and resistance to change. We measured resistance to change by conservatism's core values, including security, conformity, and tradition. On the other side, we examined inequality preference through self-enhancement, including the core values of power and achievement.

3.3 Social Network Theory

Borgatti et al. (2009) argued that one of the most significant areas in social studies is the idea that individuals nowadays are engaged in thick webs and networks of social ties, relationships, and interactions. Social network theory is an interdisciplinary theory that can explain many world phenomena since we can use it in various fields, including social media studies. It can examine how a node (i.e., influencer) is connected within his network. Wasserman and Faust (1994) defined social network theory as a social structure consisting of social actors who interact in terms of nodes and ties. They added that nodes could be identified as the individual actors within the network, while ties are the interaction between these actors.

Based on this theory, the attributes of a node (i.e., social class) are less significant than their ties (relationships) with other nodes in the network (Newman et al., 2006). Meaning that the more the network size is, the more evident these patterns will be. Thus, the success of any actor depends on

their position and the structure of their network. In other words, the local interactions within the elements and the size of the network make the system successful (Freeman, 2004; Newman et al., 2006).

More specifically, Little (2010) said that social network theory provides an excellent theoretical framework for understanding the network structure and resources at multiple levels of analysis. He added that any social network comprises ties and relationships (Freeman, 2004; Newman et al., 2006; Kadushin, 2004; Borgatti et al., 2009), which means that a network encompasses subjects that can be referred to as nodes, along with the relation between these nodes (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Kadushin, 2004; Musolesi & Mascolo, 2007; Borgatti et al., 2009).

Borgatti et al. (2009) and Kadushin (2004) referred to three types of networks. First, ego-centric, the term ego indicates a person connected to everyone within the network. Hence, an ego network is the social world of a node (Golbeck, 2013; Chung et al., 2005). In other words, these are linked with a single node or individual—for instance, a node's friends or all the enterprises that have the same business. Golbeck (2013) explained that people or nodes usually know each other in this network.

Second, socio-centric networks, which refer to the personal communication or networks in a box, such as the connection between kids in a class, work colleagues, managers, and executives in a company or organization, are all examples of closed system network (Wellman, 1926; Garton et al., 1997). The underlying assumption is that group members interact more than a randomly selected group of similar size. Sociocentric network analysts are interested in identifying structural patterns in cases that can be generalized (Wellman, 1926; Garton et al., 1997). Last, open system networks can be defined as networks that do not have boundaries; unlike the latter, they are outside the box (Kadushin, 2004). For example, the connection with the elite, chain of influencers, decision-makers, etc.; this is the most exciting network of all types.

In this sense, the central notion in social networks revolves around nodes where each node represents an individual (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). At the individual level of nodes, nodes' outcomes and future characteristics depend on their position in the network structure (Jones & Volpe, 2011). Accordingly, social network analysis has three general levels: micro, meso, and macro (Jones & Volpe, 2011). For this study, the micro-level is what we intend to examine. More briefly, this includes the actor level, which starts by looking at either an individual actor or a small group of actors in a specific social context, using the snowballing method as social ties are traced. The smallest unit of the social network analysis is called the actor. It focuses on the network features

such as the size, strength, and solidity of ties, position, centrality, image, function, respect, credibility, and roles (de Nooy, 2009; Jones & Volpe, 2011).

On the same matter, Little (2010) explained that at a micro-level, a headteacher in a school might function as a single actor to represent her school where the network ties, as well as relationships with other headteachers, are the channel for the content flow on the network (resources). On the other side, the macro-level represents the relationships of the headteachers with schools that establish a network structure (Gnyawali, 2001).

Wasserman and Faust (1994) argued that the relationship between nodes could be directional, symmetrical, or non-directional. When two nodes in a network like or follow each other have more than one relationship between two nodes, this can be called a multiplex relationship. Kadushin (2004) explained that a relationship could go beyond liking to include the sharing of multiple resources. Moreover, there can be a flow between these nodes (Scott, 1988), per se liking can lead to exchanging items and gifts. Scott (1988) added that the flow of resources is vital in the network theory. In sum, network ties and relationships between nodes are significant because they may establish channels for the flow of various content to and from nodes (Scott, 1988; Kadushin, 2004). In this framework, solid social relationships can increase social capital and enable access to many resources (Little, 2010). Three essential factors can create a network tie among nodes which are homophily, geographical proximity, and resource sharing – which increase content and resource flow (Kadushin, 2004; Borgatti et al., 2009). First, homophily means the contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people (Verbrugge, 1977; Lawrence & Shah, 2020; Kadushin, 2004). Also, it can be defined as sharing one or more common features or traits in the same social class (Lawrence & Shah, 2020). More specifically, similarity can be explained by sex, race, age, education, occupation, status, values, or other salient attributes (McPherson et al., 2001).

Pairs can be labeled as homophilous when they have greater matching characteristics than expected among the population of their network (Verbrugge, 1977; Kadushin, 2004). Additionally, Borgatti et al. (2009) demonstrated that node homogeneity refers to the similarity of actors (nodes) in terms of their conduct or internal structures. In this regard, some scholars assumed that a pair of actors are more likely to adopt a novel or innovation simultaneously. They referred that those actors (nodes) become homogeneous when they experience similar social environments; when two nodes connect with the same environmental forces, they are more likely to adapt by being identical (Borgatti et al., 2009).

There are several causes of homophily. Burt (1982) argued that standard norms could bring nodes with common features or attributes together. A second cause for homophily is structural location. Feld and Carter (1998) explained that two nodes might have the exact characteristics because both operate in the same arena and vice versa. They added that the structural location could produce homophily; this can occur when two nodes share similar attributes as both work in the same field and vice versa. It is worth noting that there is a positive correlation between homophily and connection level, which means that the higher the homophily is, the more likely two nodes will be connected.

Second, geographical proximity can contribute to and support the development of network ties. Some scholars argued that distance and proximity predict the existence of frequent interaction network ties, that is, participation in a social network (Little, 2010). Kadushin (2004) added that nodes are more likely to interact together when they are equal and geographically close to each other. Domhoff (1967) said that Propinquity could be defined as being in the exact location at the same time. For instance, people are more likely to communicate, interact, and connect if they go to the same school at the same or at different times; this is a homophily case. Third, resource acquisition is related to better performance. The more nodes are tied up in a network, the better the performance will be due to the acquisition of a variety of shareable content and asset-specific resources (Little, 2010). Several researchers claimed that social network effects are due to the direct transmission from one node to another, leading to the contagion of ideas (the flow of resources along network channels from one node to another) (Lin, 1999). We should note that the consequence of social networks on the overall outcome is linked to two main categories: homogeneity and performance (Borgatti et al., 2009). Performance indicates the outcome of a node in relevance to some good (Valente, 1996). For instance, an actor's centrality forecasts their ability to influence, innovate, as well as to perform well (Valente, 1996).

Little (2010) argued that the relationship between nodes within the network has three main characteristics: network structure, connectedness, and centrality. He explained that connectedness occurs when nodes make more relations within the network. Connectedness increases and creates more avenues for gaining resources. Hence, more connectedness facilitates stronger ties and greater trust. He added that such social capital increases access to information, data, news, and resources; thus, creating a greater range and extent of available resources within the network. He also stressed that it affects the cultural cohesion within a single network which can boost shared behavioral norms of resource sharing.

The second network structure feature is network centrality which is the node's position. It means that nodes with more ties are placed in the center and core of the network (Freeman et al., 1979). On the other side, those with fewer ties and connections are positioned more peripherally (Freeman et al., 1979). Some research studies have connected the centrality of an individual with power and influence (Powell et al., 1996; Shipilov & Li, 2008). Centrality can increase visibility and influence within the network and diffuse more resources (Borgatti et al., 2009). Kadushin (2004) said that it could be measured by the number of ties a node has and it is a strategic resource for any entity, organization, etc. He added that higher centrality could affect the flow of assets, information, and status, creating resource asymmetries. For instance, the more a node can develop ties and increase its centrality, the more influence and visibility the node will have within the network.

Kadushin (2004) explained that a node could act as a strategic advisor as the interaction between nodes flows through a given node. An indicator of eliteness" is the situation in which others more often choose a node in a pyramid of choices. Accordingly, the level of node centrality is related to the importance or prominence of a node in the network (Freeman et al., 1979). In their study, Padgett, and Ansell (1993) explained centrality in terms of the potential power that a single actor or individual may breed. They added that a powerful actor might consider their interest, manipulate, or distort the flow of shared resources within the network. They extended their argument that the position of a node in a social network is significant as it determines in part the opportunities and constraints that it encounters, thus playing an essential role in the outcome of a node. This is the network thinking behind the popular concept of social capital, which in one formulation posits that the rate of return on an actor's investment in their human capital (i.e., their knowledge, skills, and abilities) is determined by their social capital (i.e., their network location) (Borgatti et al., 2009).

Borgatti et al. (2009) concluded that social connection could bind nodes together to form a new entity that can have different attributes compared to its main constituent properties. Therefore, binding is a crucial element of the performance benefits of structural holes: the absence of connection between a pair of nodes in the ego network. They added that the ego network refers to the actors who directly connect to a focal node, together with the set of ties among actors of the ego network. In this sense, Burt (2009) argued that egos with many structural holes are better actors in a competitive setting. He added that the absence of structure holes around an actor or node means that the actor's contacts bound, interact, communicate, and coordinate together, forming a solid entity for negotiation. It is worth noting that this is the main idea behind the benefits of syndicates, political coalitions, and worker unions (Borgatti et al., 2009).

4 Hypotheses

Apart from the make-up of the belief system and its motives, this study focuses on the news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and whether it breeds threat perception. Besides, explore the correlation between cultivated threat perception and political conservatism in relevance to news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. It is worth noting that political conservatism is broken down, in this case, into its conceptual components, which are resistant to change and inequality preference (Jost et al., 2003). The doctoral thesis hypotheses as adopted to the American, Spanish, and Egyptian contexts are:

4.1 H1. There is a positive correlation between influencers' Facebook pages and news consumption on Facebook.

We employed the quantitative method of online survey by disseminating self-administered questionnaires to a quota sample of young adults aged between 18-35. The main aim was to examine their level of news consumption and reliance on influencers' Facebook pages as a primary source of information and news using a scale from 1-10 to measure their level of news consumption, usage, and reliance on such Facebook pages.

4.1.1 Independent variable: Following influencers' Facebook pages.

4.1.2 Dependent variable: News consumption.

4.2 H2. There is a positive correlation between the extent of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the degree of perceived threat cultivated among young adults.

We used the quantitative method of online survey by disseminating self-administered questionnaires to a quota sample of young adults aged between 18-35. The primary assumption is that heavy news consumers of influencers' Facebook pages are the most affected by having higher levels of threat, fear, and uncertainty resulting from circulated news on the platform, i.e., terror occurrences,

pandemics, and other violent content. Consequently, medium consumers of news on influencers' Facebook pages are moderately affected and have a lower degree of fear and threat perception. Finally, light consumers are the least affected by the cultivation impact.

4.2.1 Independent variable: The extend of news consumption.

4.2.2 Dependent variable: The degree of perceived threat.

4.3 H3: There is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and resistance to change.

We used the quantitative method of online survey by disseminating self-administered questionnaires to a quota sample of young adults aged between 18-35. We used the PVQ scale to measure political conservatism in its two dimensions: resistance to change and inequality preferences. The central hypothesis is that those with higher threat perception levels are more resistant to change.

4.3.1 Independent variable: The level of perceived threat.

4.3.2 Dependent variable: Resistance to change.

4.4 H4: There is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and inequality preference.

We used the quantitative method of online survey by disseminating self-administered questionnaires to a quota sample of young adults aged between 18-35. We used the PVQ scale to measure political conservatism with its two dimensions: resistance to change and inequality preferences. The central hypothesis is that those with higher threat perception levels are more inclined toward inequality preference.

4.4.1 Independent variable: The level of perceived threat.

4.4.2 Dependent variable: Inequality preference.

5 Operational and Conceptual Definitions

5.1 Light, medium, and heavy viewers

Gerbner et al. (1998, 1994) divided TV viewers into three segments: light, medium, and heavy viewers (Belden, 2010). Light TV viewers are defined as those who consume less than 2.5 hr./ day, medium viewers watch about 2.5 to less than 3.5 hr./day, while heavy viewers watch TV more than or equal to 3.5 hr./day (Mullings, 2012). This categorization roughly matches the definition provided by Barwise and Ehrenberg (1988), which indicated that light viewers watch less than 2.2 hr./day (15 hr./day); medium viewers 2.2 - 3.5 hr. / day (16 – 24 hr./day); and heavy viewers more than 3.5 hr./day (24 hr./day) (Mullings, 2012).

5.2 Social media influencers SMIs

We define SMIs as opinion leaders who are news providers and well-connected, have an extensive network of followers, and are informative, socially active, engaging, and respected by others. This can include online news agencies, journalists, media personal, and editors (Casero-Ripollés, 2021; Bobkowski, 2015). It can also include news organizations, politicians, writers, experts, political journalists, and citizens (Hodson & Petersen, 2019; Bobkowski, 2015). This study focused on news consumed on the Facebook pages of news organizations, directly and indirectly, either incidental or purposeful exposure. Accordingly, we define Facebook influencer pages as the accounts of news agencies/organizations, journalists, media personnel and editors, politicians, and political parties. Below are some examples of the most followed news sources (SMIs) on FB, based on the latest record on Facebook 2021:

English news providers: BBC news (53 M), BBC news Arabic (13.4M), CNN (37.8M), CNN international (18.6M), Global news (61.6 M), Aljazeera English (13M), Euro news English (2M), MSNBC (2.40M), RT (6M), France 24 (10M), Sky news (8.6M), fox news (18.75M).

Arabic news providers: Aljazeera channel (25M), Youm7 (21M), RT Arabic (17.6M), Sky news Arabic (15.8M), AlmasryAlyoum (11.8M), Masrawy news (8M), Extra news (8.18M), Middle East News Agency – MENA (433, 500k).

Spanish News providers: ElPaís (6.3M), Elmundo (2.8M).
Politicians: Pedro Sánchez (370K), Podemos (1,417,491M), Barack Obama (55.9M), Joe Biden (10.40M), Donald Trump (35.35 M), AbdelFattah Elsisi (9.036 M), PSOE (226,304K).

5.3 Perception

The systematic mental process of observing, understanding, feeling, acquiring, and recognizing prompts action when exposed to a stimulus (Stein, 2013).

5.4 Threats

We aim at measuring the realistic threat. We define this as the news consumption on influencers' pages that can threaten people by out-groups, whether internal (within the country), external (foreign threats to the government), or both, as we are currently experiencing the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic worldwide (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

5.5 Conservatism

According to Wilson (1973), it is resistance to change and the tendency to prefer safe, traditional, and conventional forms of institutions and behavior. Thus, political conservatism is broken down, in this case, into its conceptual components, which are resistance to change, accepting the status quo, and inequality preference.

6 Methodology

6.1 Method

We used the survey method by disseminating online questionnaires. We employed a non-probability quota as well convenient sample (N=1309) of young adults aged 18-35. The survey was disseminated online by the market research service of Qualtrics on August 10, 2021, and once we reached the target sample size, the survey was closed on September 5, 2021.

It is worth noting that all the collected data were treated anonymously, and participants had a free will to either participate or withdraw from the survey at any moment. Within this framework, we affirm that we applied all the ethical procedures in the treatment of the research data.

6.2 Survey

This study aims to examine the news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and its effect on the level of the perceived threat and the effect of threat in shaping political conservatism. For this, the survey is the most suitable and cost-effective method of collecting a large amount of data from large samples (Elareshi & Gunter, 2012). Some scholars defined a survey as a means for gathering information about the characteristics, actions, or opinions of a large group of people (Glasow, 2005). The survey is commonly used in social, psychological, and mass media studies; it offers the opportunity to implement studies with different designs and answer wide research questions. Moreover, it can be tailored to measure the phenomena of interest (Visser, Krosnick, & Lavrakas, 2000).

In addition, the cultivation analysis employs a survey as a method to explore the amount of TV viewership and its impact on attitude, perception, beliefs, and behavior (Morgan & Shanahan, 2010). Also, it is used to describe the demographic structure of the sample, assess needs, and identify current attitudes, perceptions, as well as behavior about different issues that exist in society (Glasow, 2005; Mullings, 2012; Morgan & Shanahan, 2010; Visser, Krosnick, & Lavrakas, 2000; Elareshi & Gunter, 2012).

In this regard, the survey method enables scholars to collect a large amount of information from extensive samples drawn from the population, and thus results can be generalized (Visser, Krosnick, & Lavrakas, 2000; Elareshi & Gunter, 2012). Accordingly, we chose a survey as the research method by disseminating an online questionnaire.

6.3 Population

This study investigates the research hypotheses in three countries: the USA, Spain, and Egypt. The main reason for selecting these countries is that they represent three different political and media systems. According to the Reporters Without Borders press freedom ranking (2021), each stated country has a different rank. Egypt came as a non-free country (166/180) and was described to have an alarming press freedom situation. The report added that online platforms such as social media became the only venue for independent news circulation. The United States scored (44/180) labeled as somehow free; press freedom suffered during President Donald Trump's administration. Spain (29/180) came in the top country with press freedom; however, the report indicated ambiguity due to the breakthrough by the far-right party VOX in the 2019 elections, which came in third place in terms of votes. VOX has distinguished itself by its campaign against the media, with its supporters' igniting hatred against journalists on social media and physically harassing them on the ground. Therefore, it would be very interesting how the political and media system can affect the consumption, perception, ideologies, and, hence, users' behavior. Also, it would be beneficial to identify the points of similarities and differences between these three pivotal countries. [1]

In sum, the researcher selected these countries to compare people who have different media and political systems and examine how their perceptions, values, and ideologies may differ significantly.

6.4 Sample

After drafting the survey design, the next step is to select a proper sampling method that enables the researcher to reach a sample that carries the exact characteristics of the population (Visser, Krosnick, & Lavrakas, 2000).

For this, the researcher applied a non-probability quota as well as a convenient sample. Many scholars argued that N=400 is enough to have statistically valid results. However, we used a larger sample size to generalize and generate more statistically valid results. Thus, we had a sample size

[1] https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2021

of N=1309. The quota divided the sample based on their age and country. We targeted an equal sample size of each country with the following: the USA (n=436), Spain (n=437), and Egypt (n=436).

We targeted youths aged 18-35 in each of these countries. This age group strongly correlates with youths' age definition by CAPMAS2; moreover, UNESCO defined individual youth as a person between the age where he/she may leave compulsory education and the age at which he/she finds his/her first employment. The African Youth Charter also described youth as every person between 15 and 35 years.

The reason for selecting young adults is because they rely on social media (i.e., Facebook) as their primary medium of obtaining news (David et al., 2019). Several research findings indicated that young adults are much more likely to use these networks than their older counterparts. For instance, the percentages of young adults aged between 18 and 36 years old who use social media are (92%) in Argentina, (86%) in the USA, (87%) in the UK, (83%) in Spain, and (81%) in South Korea (Poushter, Bishop & Chwe, 2018). Likewise, Newman et al. (2016) argued that young adults count on social network sites to obtain their news compared to the older generation, who still rely on TV as a primary source of news. They also revealed that (60%) of young adults in Spain depend on social networks to get their daily news compared to (46%) in the US. Considering this, Shi (2018) concluded that social media has a broader influence on young adults due to their frequent presence and consumption of these platforms, including Facebook.

Furthermore, youths are the future policymakers who will set policies, rules, and regulations; moreover, they are the audiences of the present and the future (Elareshi & Gunter, 2012). Also, during the maturation period (late teens and early 20s), youths begin to acquire a large amount of news and information that will later shape their political perceptions, preferences, and approaches (Elareshi & Gunter, 2012). Consequently, we chose this age group to investigate the research hypotheses.

6.5 Measures

We designed the questionnaire to measure four variables: news consumption on Facebook, following influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception, and political conservatism. It is worth

2 Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics is the official statistical agency of Egypt that collects, processes, analyzes, and disseminates statistical data and conducts the census.

noting that we adapted some of the items measuring news consumption and SMIs from the studies of Ridout et al. (2008) and Müller et al. (2016).

The questionnaire started with a filtering question to eliminate the non-Facebook users since we are examining the news consumption on Facebook. The questionnaire is then divided into four main categories. The first category consists of the demographic questions measuring the country, sex, age, education, and political ideology.

The second category consists of 7 questions (Q6-Q12) aiming to measure hypothesis 1: There is a positive correlation between following influencers' Facebook pages and news consumption. This category seeks to measure the frequency of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages.

We measured the dependent variable (news consumption) through 4 questions (Q6-Q9). We measured the independent variable (following influencers' Facebook pages) with three questions (Q10-Q12).

In sum, through this category, we divided users into heavy, medium, and light consumers and measured the following: The news consumption on Facebook. The news consumption on influencer Facebook pages either directly or through incidental exposure. The frequency of news exposure on Facebook. The frequency of news consumption on influencers' pages. The cognitive selection and processing of news exposure on Facebook. We adapted some of the items in this category from Ridout et al. (2008) and Müller et al. (2016).

The third category (Q13-Q15) investigates hypothesis 2: There is a positive correlation between the extent of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the degree of perceived threat cultivated among young adults. Through this category, we aim to measure the overall feeling of threat (dependent variable). We drafted a set of items portraying the dangers that people might fear or encounter (this set of threats is highly present in the circulated news). We also added two extra items from Altemeyer's Dangerous World Scale to examine the mean world syndrome, thus the cultivational impact of Facebook.

The fourth category (Q16. PVQ scale) answers H3 and H4. Hypothesis 3: There is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and resistance to change. Hypothesis 4: There is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and inequality preference. We used the PVQ scale to measure political conservatism in its two-core values inequality preference and resistance to change. We measured resistance to change through the conservatism dimension, which encompasses security, conformity, and traditional values. On the other side, we examined inequality preference through self-enhancement, including the core values of power and achievement. This

scale includes short verbal portraits of different people that capture the person's values without explicitly identifying values as the topic of investigation.
Thus, we inferred the respondents' values from their self-reported similarity to those described in terms of values. To measure this, we used a 10-point scale which we recodified into 5 points Likert scale on the SPSS. Later, we recodified these variables into three categories to label the sample as not as this person, somewhat like this person, like this person.
We added one last question, 17, to measure the other human core values of the PVQ, which have two dimensions: openness to change and examining the values of self-direction and stimulation. The second is self-transcendence which measures benevolence and universalism of human core values. Moreover, hedonism shares elements of both openness and self-enhancement. We added only one item to measure each of these values due to the length limitation of the questionnaire.
Thus, we have five items in this question. We asked participants to read each description and think about how much each person is like or not like him.

6.5.1 Questions

6.5.1.1 News consumption

Participants were asked to self-assess with which frequency they find news posts while skipping their Facebook newsfeed? They chose between 10 points scale recoded into five as follows: 1. Never, 2. Rarely, 3. Sometimes, 4. Often, 5. Always. The aim is to measure the frequency of news exposure on Facebook. Thus, divide users into heavy, medium, and light, based on the frequency of finding news posts on their feed.

Followed by with which frequency do they read news posts that they encounter at least briefly (i.e., headline) while skipping through their Facebook newsfeed? They chose between 10 points scale, later recodified into 5 points scale as following 1. Never, 2. Rarely, 3. Sometimes, 4. Often, 5. Always. Through this, we aim to measure the cognitive processing of news. This question also counts the attention given to news posts they encounter.

Afterward, we asked them about the frequency they read the details of the news posts they encounter while skipping through their Facebook newsfeed? They chose between 10 points scale, later recodified into 5 points scale as following 1. Never, 2. Rarely, 3. Sometimes, 4. Often, 5. Always. This question should measure the level of cognitive processing of the news, attention, and interest

in the encountered news posts. Categories were recodified into three levels do not read, sometimes read, and read news posts.

Last, we asked them to determine on a scale from 1-10 how many of the news posts they encounter on Facebook come from the shared posts of their friends, family relatives, and other people they follow? 10 points were recodified into 5 points scale as follows: 1. Never, 2. Rarely, 3. Sometimes, 4. Often, 5. Always. This question measures the incidental news exposure on Facebook and whether people are intentionally exposed to the news by following any news source or unintentionally through the posts shared by their network.

Ultimately, we created a new variable which we named news consumption on Facebook. It is the composite score of news consumption items.

6.5.1.2 Following influencers' Facebook pages

We asked the respondents a dichotomous yes/no question that examine if the participants follow any Facebook news page (such as daily newspapers, national/international network TV news, local TV news, news agencies/organizations, political party, politicians, journalists, editors, etc.) to stay updated about current affairs. The aim is to measure the direct news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages to stay updated. We used this question as a filter to exclude those who do not follow influencers' Facebook pages in testing the hypothesis.

Then we asked participants to select all the news sources they follow on Facebook to stay updated, with multiple response options. This question aims to pinpoint the most followed influential news pages on Facebook.

Afterward, we listed several influential news sources – namely influencers on Facebook; we asked participants to self-assess with which frequency they consume news through each of them on Facebook. Answers were recodified into 5 points on Likert scales: never, rarely, sometimes, often, and always. The aim is to measure the frequency of news exposure on influencers' Facebook pages and to divide participants into light, medium, and heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages.

Accordingly, we provided participants with a set of different general influential news sources, which are: Journalist (individual)-analyst or opinion-maker (intellectual, political writer, political analyst, etc.) -politician (individual)-political party (organization) - member of government and officials

(i.e., president, prime minister, minister, governor, etc.) - activist (citizen, social movement, protest, movement, etc.) - newspaper (print, digital) - TV news channel (national, international) - news agency - radio station.

Finally, we created a composite score of these items to divide the participants into light, medium, and heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages.

6.5.1.3 Threat perception

We asked participants to indicate the level of safety they generally feel while living in their country (Egypt /Spain/US), where one is the less safe and ten is the highest. This question examines the people's ability to express their overall feeling of safety in relevance to their news exposure on Facebook. We compared the consistency between their general sense of security and their fear on the list of items they might encounter in daily life. It is worth noting that data was recoded into 5 points Likert scale: very unsafe, unsafe, neutral, safe, and very safe.

Then, we asked participants to express their attitude (1-10, where one strongly disagrees and ten strongly agree) toward a set of statements portraying threats that people might fear or encounter (this set of threats are highly present in the circulated news). This set of items aims at measuring the level of perceived threat. We recoded the answers into 3 points Likert scale disagree, neutral, and agree.

The last threat question is a scale from Duckitt's (2001) study to measure the dangerous worldview. It is worth noting that we have summed the threat scale into two items only that examine the cultivational impact (mean world syndrome).

Finally, we created a composite score of the 12 threat items -namely threat perception, based on the sum of all items.

6.5.1.3.1 Threat Scale

The social worldview is conceptualized as a group of beliefs about the social world, assumptions about people's nature, expectations of their behavior towards oneself, and how to respond to them (Duckitt, 2001). People are divided between two extremes regarding how threatening they believe the social world is. One extreme presents the belief that the world is a dangerous place full of bad people threatening good ones. On the other extreme, there is the belief that the world is safe where most people are good.

This thesis used two items out of the 10-item scale used in Duckitt (2001), composed of 8 items from Altemeyer's Dangerous World Scale and two more items coined by Duckitt. We should note that the original Dangerous World scale, as put by Altemeyer, is a 12-item scale. Due to the difficulty in reaching the original reference by Altemeyer and the similarity in purpose between this study's aim and Duckitt's scale, Duckitt's scale was used to measure the Dangerous Worldview beliefs.

The threat scale was measured using a scale from 1-10 ranging from "strongly disagree" which scored 1 to "strongly agree" which scored 10. The higher a respondent scores on the threat scale, the more they perceive the world as a scary and dangerous place and vice versa.

6.5.1.4 The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) Scale

This thesis measured political conservatism by examining its two components of resistance to change and inequality preference. The C scale and the RWA scale focused on measuring political conservatism. Nonetheless, these scales measure conservatism in American and Western countries' contexts which may be different in the case of Egypt and other Arab countries (Aspelund, A. et al., 2013). Schwartz, S. (2003) has developed a 21-item Portrait Value Questionnaire PVQ that encompasses measuring conservatism versus openness to change and self-enhancement versus self-transcendence in various cultures through measuring universal motivating values. In this case, conservation stands for resistance to change, a core aspect of political conservatism, while self-enhancement stands for inequality preference (Aspelund, A. et al., 2013).

PVQ relies on fundamental human needs values (Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz (1992) argued that the essential aspect of values is their underlying goal or motivation. He based his theory on three main universal human requirements from which different values are derived. These are the biological needs, coordinated social interaction requisites, and group needs for survival and welfare. The resulting motivational values model consists of ten values that affect human action at any point, as shown in (figure 1).

Moreover, these ten essential values are cross-cultural that are structured circularly. The theory also discusses the compatibilities and conflicts between these values; the closer they are to each other, the more harmonious they are. The farther they are, the more different and maybe opposing one another (Chowdhury, 2019).

The values can be listed as follows:

- Self-directional values (define our goals and ambitions in life).

- Stimulative values (the power and well to move forward to accomplish the aspirations).
- Hedonistic values (rely on the pleasure factor and immediate need gratification).
- Achievement values (define personal success and competence).
- Power values (connected with societal norms, control, and personal resources).
- Security values (consists of personal safety, harmony, interpersonal relationships, and self-control).
- Conformity values (operate through conforming to societal norms and standards).
- Traditional values (involving respect, community support, commitment, and acceptance of customs and culture).
- Benevolent values (connected with preserving and enhancing the welfare of self and others close to us).
- Universal values (appreciation, tolerance, and general acceptance of the nature of things around us).

Ultimately, the PVQ organized these ten values in four main aspects, which are: a self-directional domain (that operates on openness and flexibility to change), a universal value domain that is (influenced by transcendence), a traditional values domain (motivated by the laws of conservation), and power value domain (governed by self-enhancement) (figure 1).

It is worth noting that the PVQ scale measures to what extent people see themselves as similar with the 21 items using a 5-point scale from “very much like me,” which scores five to “not like me at all,” which scores 1. However, for obtaining better measures, we used a 1-10 scale.

Figure 1. Four domains of Schwatz's theory of values



6.5.1.4.1 Resistance to change

We used question 16 to measure resistance to change through security, conformity, and traditional values of conservatism. Each of those is measured by asking respondents to state from 1-10 to what extent they believe this person is like him; 1 means not like him at all, and 10 means very much like him. For this study, we recoded the answers into 3 points Likert scale, not like this person, somewhat like this person, and like this person. At the end of this, we created a composite score merging the three values to examine resistance to change and thus test our hypothesis.

6.5.1.4.2 Inequality preference

We measured the inequality preference through power and achievement values of self-enhancement. We asked respondents to state from 1-10 to what extent they believe this person is like them. Where 1 means not like him at all and 10 means very much like him. For this study, we recoded the answers

into 3 points Likert scale, not like this person, somewhat like this person, and like this person. At the end of this, we created a composite score merging the two values to examine inequality preference and thus test our hypothesis.

6.5.1.4.3 Openness to change

We measured openness to change through self-direction and stimulation values. We then created a composite score of openness to change items, and we added hedonism as it shares common elements with both dimensions (openness to change and self-transcendence). We checked their reliability. We added only 1 item out of the 2 items that should examine each value due to the questionnaire length limit.

6.5.1.4.4 Self-transcendence

We measured self-transcendence through benevolence and universalism values. We then created a composite score of self-transcendence items, and we added hedonism as it shares common elements with both dimensions (openness to change and self-transcendence). We added only 1 item out of the 2 items that should examine each value due to the questionnaire length limit.

6.6 Reliability and Validity

There are two vital aspects in the research field required in any research type, whether qualitative or quantitative (Mullings, 2012). Wimmer and Dominick (2013) stated that preliminary testing is essential for using any scale to guarantee reliability and validity. Thus, a measurement must include both to produce good quality data that indicates the phenomena of interest.

As defined by Wimmer and Dominick (2013), reliability is the degree to which results are stable and consistent over time and are reproduced by using a similar methodology. There is internal and external validity. First internal validity refers to the ability of a measurement device to examine what it is supposed to measure without contamination from other variables. In addition, external validity is the ability to generalize results over the whole population (Mullings, 2012; Wimmer & Dominick, 2013). It is worth noting that both validity and reliability are related, yet a reliable measure is not necessarily valid.

Wimmer and Dominik (2013) pointed that face validity is one of the easiest and most common types of validity that can be used; face validity is achieved by measuring device to see, whether, on the

face, it measures what it appears to measure. Once the study's validity is measured, we can measure the reliability. The reliability of a survey can be significantly affected by random error, which is considered a major concern in the research field (Mullings, 2012).

Within this framework, the designed questionnaire has a high reliability (α=0.925) and therefore, excellent internal consistency. We also used face validity to ensure that the questions measure what it is supposed to. Moreover, we disseminated the questionnaire to a small number (n=65) drawn from the three countries before completing the data gathering. Results of the pretest showed that the questions were straightforward, well organized, and phrased. Further, we examined the validity of each item of the questionnaire using the Pearson correlation two-tailed test. Each question was significant with the composite score of all questions, and thus valid (Table 1).

Table 1. Internal validity test of correlation

Question	Correlation	Composite score of all questions
how often do you find news posts while skipping your Facebook newsfeed? (1) means Never and (10) means Always	Pearson Correlation	.517**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
how frequently do you read the news posts that you encounter at least briefly (i.e., headline), while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed? (1) means Never and (10) means Always	Pearson Correlation	.585**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
how often do you read the details of the news posts that you encounter while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed? (1) means Never and (10) means Always	Pearson Correlation	.632**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
how many of the news posts that you encounter on Facebook comes from the shared posts of your friends, family relatives, and/or other people you follow? (1) has the lowest value and (10) has the highest value	Pearson Correlation	.509**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
Do you follow any of the news pages on Facebook (e.g., daily newspapers, national/international network TV news, local TV news, news agencies/organizations, journalists, editors, etc.) to stay up to date about current affairs?	Pearson Correlation	.423**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
how frequently do you consume news through Journalist (individual)	Pearson Correlation	.665**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000

	N	1309
how frequently do you consume news through - Analyst or opinion maker (intellectual, political writer, political analyst, etc.)	Pearson Correlation	.682**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
how frequently do you consume news through - Politician (individual)	Pearson Correlation	.689**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
how frequently do you consume news through - Political party (organization)	Pearson Correlation	.690**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
how frequently do you consume news through - Member of Government and officials (i.e., president, prime minister, minister, governor,	Pearson Correlation	.665**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
how frequently do you consume news through - Activist (citizen, social movement, protest movement, etc.)	Pearson Correlation	.650**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
how frequently do you consume news through - Newspaper (print or digital)	Pearson Correlation	.673**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
how frequently do you consume news through - TV news channel (national/international)	Pearson Correlation	.659**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
how frequently do you consume news through - News agency	Pearson Correlation	.682**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
how frequently do you consume news through - Radio station	Pearson Correlation	.635**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country	Pearson Correlation	.286**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309

I fear from bombs and explosives that I may encounter any time.	Pearson Correlation	.487**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
I feel threatened by the economic performance of the country.	Pearson Correlation	.413**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
I am afraid about my family's general safety.	Pearson Correlation	.488**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	Pearson Correlation	.443**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
I think the spread of diseases is an imminent threat.	Pearson Correlation	.477**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
I think COVID-19 pandemic threatens my life.	Pearson Correlation	.490**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
I think most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is either fabricated, fake, and/or misleading.	Pearson Correlation	.341**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
I think publishing more news related to Covid- 19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people	Pearson Correlation	.356**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
I think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19.	Pearson Correlation	.453**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
Although it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it really isn't so in real life.	Pearson Correlation	.431**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
I feel that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime whenever I consume news on Facebook.	Pearson Correlation	.472**

	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.	Pearson Correlation	.453**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
It is very important to him that his country be safe from threats from within and without. He is concerned that social order be protected.	Pearson Correlation	.443**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
It is acceptable for him to give up some civil liberty rights in order to maintain national security.	Pearson Correlation	.461**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.	Pearson Correlation	.423**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.	Pearson Correlation	.460**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
He thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that people should be satisfied with what they have.	Pearson Correlation	.394**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires.	Pearson Correlation	.401**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
It is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He wants people to do what he says.	Pearson Correlation	.487**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.	Pearson Correlation	.416**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
Being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people.	Pearson Correlation	.422**

	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
It is very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.	Pearson Correlation	.450**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free to plan and to choose his activities for himself.	Pearson Correlation	.370**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life.	Pearson Correlation	.376**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
it's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for other people.	Pearson Correlation	.350**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He wants justice for everybody, even for people he doesn't know.	Pearson Correlation	.290**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure.	Pearson Correlation	.369**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).		
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).		

7 Findings and Analysis

This chapter presents and discusses the survey results through a detailed presentation of the sample characteristics and the results of the data analysis of the research hypotheses. The collected data was analyzed using SPSS version 27.0. The survey was disseminated online by Qualtrics panelists on August 10, 2021, and once we reached the target sample size, the survey was closed on September 5, 2021. It is worth noting that we used various parametric and non-parametric statistical methods; including, frequencies, means, and percentages. Chi-square, independent sample T-Test, Kruskal Wallis, and Spearman's test for correlation are used to examine the significance level of the results based on the level of P-value <0.05.

We divided the questionnaire into four main categories. The first category consists of the demographic questions measuring sex, age, education, and political ideology. The second category consists of 7 questions (Q6-Q12) aiming to measure hypothesis 1: There is a positive correlation between following influencers' Facebook pages and news consumption on Facebook. The third category (Q13-Q15) answers hypothesis 2: There is a positive correlation between the extent of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the degree of perceived threat cultivated among young adults. We should measure the overall feeling of danger through this category, followed by a set of items portraying threats that people might fear or encounter (this set of threats are highly present in the circulated news). We should also measure the mean world syndrome and the cultivational impact of Facebook.

The fourth category (Q16. PVQ scale) aims to answer hypotheses 3 and 4; hypothesis 3: There is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and resistance to change; hypothesis 4: There is a positive correlation between the level of the perceived threat and inequality preference. We used the PVQ scale to measure political conservatism in its two-core values inequality preference and resistance to change. We added another question (Q17) to assess the other core values of the PVQ to enrich the results.

It is worth noting that we structured this section to include a detailed analysis of the total sample (n=1309), USA (n=436), Spain (n=437), and Egypt (n=436).

7.1 Description of sample characteristics and demographics

7.1.1 Sex

In total, we targeted 1309 responses based on non-probability quota as well as convenient sampling from Egypt (33.3%) (N=436), Spain (33.4%) (N=437), and the United States of America (33.3%) (N=436). Among which are males (49.4%) (N=646), females (50.4%) (N=660), and non-binary/third sex (0.2%) (N=3).

We observed more males in the USA, with males (23.4%) and (38.3%) females. On the contrary, more females in Spain (62%) females and (37.5%) males. Almost equal distribution in Egypt, with (50.9%) females and (48.9%) males (Table 2).

Table 2. Sex

Sex	Country						Total	
	Spain		Egypt		United States of America			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	164	37.5%	213	48.9%	269	61.7%	646	49.4%
Female	271	62.0%	222	50.9%	167	38.3%	660	50.4%
Non-binary / third sex (please mention)	2	0.5%	1	0.2%	0	0%	3	0.2%
Total	437	100%	436	100%	436	100%	1309	100%

7.1.2 Age

This thesis targets youths aged 18-35 years. Age categories include 18-24 years (24.5%), 25-29 years (33.2%), 30-34 years (33.6%), and 35 years (8.6%).

Within each sex, we found that almost one-quarter of males and females aged 18-24 years: (23.9%) were females, (24.9%) were males, and (66.7%) were non-binary/third sex (n=3). While more males and females were observed in the other two age categories with close distribution percentages: (35.9%) females, males, and (33.3%) non-binary/third sex aged 25-29 years. There are (33.5%) females and (33.9%) males aged 30-34. Finally, there are (6.7%) females and (10.7%) males aged 35 years.

In the USA, we found the highest percentage is 30-34 years (39.7%) followed by 25-29 years (35.6%) and 18-24 years (14.9%). While the lowest percentage among 35 years (9.9%). Among these categories, we find that males represented the following: (40.5%) aged 30-34 years, (31.6%) aged 25-29 years, (17.1%) aged 18-24 years, and (10.8%) aged 35 years. As for females, (41.9%) 25-29 years, (38.3%) 30-34 years, (11.4%) aged 18-24 years, and the lowest was among those aging 35 years, with (8.4%).

Similarly, in Spain, we noticed that the dominating age among 30-34 years (35.5%), and the lowest across 35 years (11.4%).

Furthermore, there are (29.3%) of males aged 30-34 years, followed by 25-29 years (27.4%), 18-24 years (25%), and the lowest percentage was across 35 years, with (18.3%). Likewise, the highest score among females is 30-34 years (39.5%), and the least among 35 years (7.4%).

On the other side, those aged 25-29 years were the most dominant age in Egypt (36.9%) followed by 18-24 years (32.8%), 30-34 years (25.7%), and the lowest 35 years (4.6%). We found the highest percentage among males is 18-24 years (34.7%), and among 25-29 years (42.3%) across females. On the other side, we found a minor percentage among males (4.7%) and females (4.5%) among 35 years (Table 3).

Table 3. Age

Age	Country						Total	
	Spain		Egypt		United States of America			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
18-24 years	113	25.9%	143	32.8%	65	14.9%	321	24.5%
25-29 years	119	27.2%	161	36.9%	155	35.6%	435	33.2%
30-34 years	155	35.5%	112	25.7%	173	39.7%	440	33.6%
35 years	50	11.4%	20	4.6%	43	9.9%	113	8.6%
Total	437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

7.1.3 Education

Most respondents have either received a bachelor's degree or are university undergraduates. The rest holds post-graduate studies or attained a master's degree (M=3.83; SD=1.352).

In detail, more than half of the sample holds a bachelor's or a higher degree (54.8%) with a bachelor's degree (40.2%) followed by undergraduate university (29.4%). The distribution of education

degrees is as follows: (9.6%) master's degrees, (8.9%) elemental study degrees, (5%) doctoral degrees, (2%) high school/equivalent degrees, and (2.3%) uneducated. There are (1.7%) of other degrees added by the respondents. These "others" are college degree (0.8%), associate degree (0.5%), vocational degree (0.2%), Grado superior (0.2%), Grado Medio (0.07%), FP Peluqueria (0.07%), and self-educated (0.07%) (Table 4).

The following are the highest percentages of education across different age groups. Among the uneducated (n=30), we noticed that the highest rate in this category is for those aged 25-29 years (46.7%) followed by 18-24 years (23.3%) and the lowest is among 35 years (10%). Like the uneducated category, the lowest percentage in elemental studies (n=116) is (7.8%) among 35 years, while the highest is among 30-34 years (46.6%). As for undergraduate university (n=385) the highest among 18-24 years (42.6%) followed by 30-34 years (27.3%), and the lowest among 35 years age category (9.6%). The percentages of those who hold a bachelor's degree (n=526) varied, where the highest score of those who have a bachelor's degree is among 25-29 years (38.8%) followed by 30-34 years (34.2%) and the lowest are across 35 years (7.4%). 30-34 years scored the highest (48.4%) among those who hold a master's degree (n=126) followed by 25-29 years (34.9%) while 18-24 years scored the most negligible score (4.8%). Also, we found that both 25-29 (61.5%) and 30-34 years (24.6%) have the highest percentages as doctoral degree holders (n=65) and the lowest was among the youngest age category 18-24 years (6.2%).

Based on our data analysis there is (73%) of those who hold master's and doctoral degrees (n=191) are 30-34 years. However, (61.5%) of those with a doctoral degree (n=65) are 25-29 years, and almost half of those holding master's degrees (n=126) are 30-34 years. Also, more than (83%) of those aged 18-24 years (n=321) and (67%) of those aging 35 years (n=113) are university students or hold bachelor's degrees. About (66%) of those aged 25-29 years (n=435) and (58%) 30-34 years (n=440) have bachelor's or higher degrees (master's or doctoral degrees).

Females represent more than (67.7%) of those who hold a doctoral degree (n=65). Furthermore, (70%) of those who are uneducated (n=30) are males. The percentages of the other educational categories among males and females were so close to each other. For example, males (39.3%) and females (40.9%) hold bachelor's degrees; males (29.3%) and females (29.7%) are undergraduate students. There are males (9.4%) and females (9.8%) who hold master's degrees. There are (3.3%) of males and females (6.7%) who have a doctoral degree. As for elemental studies, there are males (9.3%) and females (8.5%). In addition, males (3.3%) and females (1.2%) are uneducated.

Table 4. Education

Education	Country						Total	
	Spain		Egypt		United States of America			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Not Educated	1	0.2%	1	0.2%	28	6.4%	30	2.3%
Elemental studies	33	7.6%	18	4.1%	65	14.9%	116	8.9%
Undergraduate student	189	43.2%	86	19.7%	110	25.2%	385	29.4%
Bachelor's degree	137	31.4%	288	66.1%	101	23.2%	526	40.2%
Master's degree	58	13.3%	28	6.4%	40	9.2%	126	9.6%
Doctoral degree	14	3.2%	8	1.8%	43	9.9%	65	5.0%
Others (please mention)	5	1.1%	1	0.2%	19	4.4%	25	1.9%
High school/equivalent degree	0	0.0%	5	1.1%	21	4.8%	26	2.0%
Associate degree	0	0.0%	1	0.2%	6	1.4%	7	0.5%
Vocational degree	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	3	0.7%	3	0.2%
Total	437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

7.1.3.1 Education: USA

In the US, we noticed that (50%) of Americans are either undergraduate students (25.2%) or bachelor's degree holders (23.2%). The second (50%) are divided as follows: elemental studies (14.9%), doctoral degree (9.9%), master's holders (9.2%), not educated (6.4%), high school/equivalent degree (4.8%), associate degree (1.4%), and other degrees (4.4%). We noticed that many females (22.8%) are undergraduate students followed by doctoral degrees (19.2%), elemental studies (18.6%), and bachelor's degree holders (16.8%). At the same time, most of the males are bachelor's degree holders (27.1%) and undergraduates (26.8%). Moreover, almost all age categories are either bachelor's degree holders or undergraduate students. (Table 4)

7.1.3.2 Education: Spain

While in Spain, about (71%) of the participants are both undergraduate students (43.2%) and bachelor's degree holders (31.4%). We noticed a minor percentage of participants hold doctoral degrees (3.2%), and master's degrees (13.3%) compared to the US. Both males and females have close percentages in terms of education, with males (44.5%) and females (42.8%) being undergraduate students. There are females (32.5%) and males (29.3%) who hold bachelor's degrees. In addition, about (44.5%) of all age categories are undergraduate students, followed by bachelor's degree holders (30%). (Table 4)

7.1.3.3 Education: Egypt

In Egypt, there were some variances compared to the US and Spain, with more than (85%) being either bachelor's degree holders (66.1%) or undergraduate students (19.7%). We observed very close numbers across males and females with females (69.4%) and males (62.4%) being bachelor's, and males (20.7%), as well as females (18.9%), being undergraduate students. We found that almost (80%) of those aging 25-35 are bachelor's degree holders. Whereas (53.8%) of those aged 18-24 years are undergraduates and (35.7%) are bachelor's holders. (Table 4)

7.1.4 Political ideology

Our last question in the demographic block aims to measure the political orientation of respondents. For this, we asked respondents where they would place themselves on the political spectrum ranging from 1 to 10, 1 means (far Left), and 10 means (far right). Variables were recodified into 3 points on the Likert scale using SPSS.

The normality test also showed that the data is not symmetric; the Kolmogorov significance is less than 0.05. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that assumes the normal distribution of data.

Descriptive statistics showed that most of the respondents fall in the middle of the continuum: center (44.8%), far left (9.9%), left (18.8%), right (15%), and far-right (11.5%) (M= 2.99; SD=1.09). Accordingly, the total percentage of the overall left side percentage (28.7%) outweighs the right side (26.5%), with a marginal difference of (2.2%) (Table 5).

As for the political ideology across sex, we found that almost half of both males and females are in the center of the political continuum, with males (45.5%), females (44.1%), and non-binary/third sex (66.7%). By calculating the sum of both left, far left (n=375) as well as right, far-right (n=347), we found the following: almost half of males and females fall in the center of the political continuum, as for the other (50%), we noticed that there are males (28.2%), females (26.3%), and non-binary/third sex (33.3%) fall in the left side of the continuum (n=375): while males (26.8%), females (29.1%) fall in the right side (n=347). Thus, more males have left political orientation and more females are right.

More precisely, the frequencies within each political level show some sex differences in political orientation. Out of far-right participants (n=150) there is females (64.7%). Moreover, (18.8%) difference points between males and females who are right (n=197), with males (59.4%) and females (40.6%). The distribution among males and females on the other political ideologies is almost equal. It is worth noting that (66.7%) of non-binary/third sex are center, and (33.3%) are far left.

As for political ideology among age, older age categories are sloping towards the right side. With almost half of the sample in the center, the other half varied between the left and right. There is (47.3%) far-right (n=150) age 25-29 years while (41.6%) of right participants (n=197) age 30-34 years.

By adding both left, far left (n=375) as well as right, far-right (n=347), we found that almost half of all age categories fall in the center, and the other (50%) of all levels vary as follows: 18-24 years lean towards the left side, with (20.2%) difference points from the lowest score. As for 25-29 years, are leaning to the right side of the continuum, with an (11.4%) difference points between their total score on the right and the left. Both age categories, 30-34 years and 35 years have a similar variation of about (4%) to the right.

Considering merging far left, left and right, and far right, the political ideology of different levels of education showed that (73.8%) of doctoral degree holders (n=65) right, (15.4%) center, and (10.8%) are left. Even though (40.5%) of master's degree holders (n=126) are in the center, (34.1%) are right, and (25.4%) left. Likewise, (52.6%) of elemental studies (n=116) fall in the center, while (25.8%) right and (21.6%) left. On the other hand, (48.1%) of undergraduate students (n=385) are center, while (33.8%) are left and (18.1%) are right. There are (45.6%) of those who hold bachelor's degrees (n=526) center, (27.6%) left, and (26.8%) right. Last, (43%) of uneducated (n=30) have left, (40%) center, and (16.7%) are right wings.

We also used the Kruskal Wallis test to examine statistically significant differences between different categories of education, age, and sex (independent variable) on political ideology (ordinal

dependent variable). We found that the distribution of political ideology is not the same across categories of education, p=0.001. Similarly, the distribution of political ideology across different age levels is not the same p=0.026. On the contrary, the distribution is the same across sex categories, where the p-value was insignificant, p=0.550.

Table 5. Political Ideology

Political Ideology	Country						Total	
	Spain		Egypt		United States of America			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Left	163	37.3%	88	20.2%	124	28.4%	375	28.6%
Center	194	44.4%	224	51.4%	169	38.8%	587	44.8%
Right	80	18.3%	124	28.4%	143	32.8%	347	26.5%
Total	437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

7.1.4.1 Political Ideology: USA

The highest political ideology across the USA participants is center (28.8%) followed by right (32.8%) and left (28.4%) (M= 2.04; SD=0.782).

As for the political ideology among sex, we observed that most females are right (38.3%) followed by the center (37.1%), and the least left (24.6%). At the same time, most males are center (39.8%) followed by left (30.9%) and right (29.4%) (Table 5).

Most of the age categories are center (40%) followed by left, except those aged 25-29 years, with the majority right (36.8%) followed by the center (34.2%). Also, the second prevailing ideology across 30-34 years falls on the right side of the political continuum (32.9%).

To gain a deeper insight into our participants' political ideology, we observed that most uneducated participants are left (46.4%) and center (39.3%) followed by the right (14.3%). Most elemental studies, undergraduate students, master's degrees, high school, associate degrees, and other listed degrees are more to the center. On the other side, most of those who hold doctoral, bachelor's, and vocational degrees fall on the right side of the political spectrum.

7.1.4.2 Political Ideology: Spain

Like the US participants, the primary political ideology across the Spanish respondents is the center (44.4%) (M=1.81; SD=0.722)**.** In comparison, the second highest is left (37.3%) followed by right (18.3%) unlike in the USA (Table 5).

There were slight differences across males and females as the majority are center (45%), with males exceeding females by (5.2%). The second prevailing ideology across sex that we noticed is left, with (36%) females outweighing males with (7%). The most minor ideology is the right, with males (19.5%) overtopping females (17.7%).

We noticed that most of the age segments are center (43.9%) followed by the left except among 35 years who inclined toward the center (38%) and the right (34%).

As for the political ideology across different educational levels, we noticed that most education levels fall in the center, except more than (50%) of doctoral degree holders are right-wing, while most bachelor's degrees (43.8%) fall on the left.

7.1.4.3 Political Ideology: Egypt

Like the American and Spanish participants, most Egyptian respondents are inclined to the center (51.4%). The second most utmost ideology is the right (28.4%) and the left (20.2%) the same as the USA (M=2.08; SD=0.693) (Table 5).

There were nearly no differences across sex, where more than half of both males and females are center, with close percentages followed by the left with females (29.3%) surpassing males (27.7%). The least common ideology across sex is right, with males (21.1%) and females (19.4%).

We noticed that about (63%) of different age segments are centered, followed by the right except those aged 18-24 years, where the second-highest ideology across them is left with (30.8%).

Like prior findings, around (44%) of all education categories fall in the center except the majority of those who have elemental studies (50%) and not educated (100%) (n=1), who fall on the right.

7.2 Correlation between following influencers' Facebook pages and news consumption on Facebook

In this section (Q6-Q12) we aim to investigate the first hypothesis which assumes a positive correlation between following influencers' Facebook pages and news consumption on Facebook. To measure this, we used a 10-point scale which we recodified into 5 points on the SPSS. Later, we recodified these variables into three categories to label the sample into light, medium, and heavy news consumers. In this sense, the dependent variable that we intend to examine is news consumption and the independent variable is following influencers' Facebook pages.

7.2.1 News exposure and consumption on Facebook

We measured the dependent variable through 4 questions (Q6-Q9). We used 10 points rating scale from 1-10 to get more precise answers. We later recorded them on 5 points Likert scale. To categorize participants into light, medium, and heavy news consumers as the cultivation theory postulates, we had to recodify the variables on 3 points Likert scale. However, to save valuable data, we integrated the 3 points Likert scale and the 5 points Likert scale analysis to enrich the results and provide in-depth analysis. It is worth noting that we used several non-parametric statistical measures as the data is asymmetrical. Hence, we used the Kruskal Wallis test, Spearman's, and T-Test to find consistency and correlation and test our alternate hypotheses.

7.2.1.1 Frequency of encountering news posts on Facebook

In question 6 we asked participants to self-assess with which frequency they find news posts while skipping their Facebook newsfeed? They chose between 10 points scale recoded into five as follows: 1. Never, 2. Rarely, 3. Sometimes, 4. Often, 5. Always. The aim is to measure the frequency of news exposure on Facebook. Thus, divide users into heavy, medium, and light, based on the frequency of finding news posts on their feed. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test result showed that the data is asymmetrical and had a negatively skewed distribution, (M=3.62; SD=1.168).

Descriptive statistics showed that most of the sample is exposed to the news while skipping their news feed, with the following: never (6.5%), rarely (10.6%), sometimes (24.1%), often (32.4%), and always (26.4%). By recoding these categories into 3 (never, sometimes, always) based on the frequency of finding news posts on the newsfeed; we get the following: never (17%), sometimes (24.1%), and those who are frequently encountering "always" present more than half of the sample (58.8%) (Table 6).

Table 6. Encounter news posts on Facebook newsfeed

Statement	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Q.6 how often do you find	Never	51	11.7%	83	19.0%	89	20.4%	223	17.0%
	Sometimes	88	20.1%	117	26.8%	111	25.5%	316	24.1%

news posts while skipping your Facebook newsfeed?	Always	298	68.2%	236	54.1%	236	54.1%	770	58.8%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

We analyzed the frequency of encountering news posts across sex, age, education, and political ideology, in the total sample size (n=1309).

First sex, there are males (n=646) never (18.3%), sometimes (25.7%), and always (56%). As for females (n=660), never (15.8%), sometimes (22.4%), and always (61.8%). Last, non-binary/third sex (n=3), never (33.3%), sometimes (66.7%), and always (0%). These frequencies show that almost more than (60%) of sex encounter news posts while skipping their newsfeed on Facebook, with females more than males.

As for age categories, 18-24 years (n=321): never (23.7%), sometimes (27.1%), and always (49.1%). Within those 25-29 years (n=435) there is never (16.3%), sometimes (24.4%), and always (59.3%). Among 30-34 years (n=440) there is never (13%), sometimes (22.5%), and always (64.5%). Whereas 35 years (n=113) has never (16.8%), sometimes (21.2%), and always (61.9%).

Findings showed that those who frequently encounter news posts are those aged 30-34 years (64.5%) followed by 35 years (61.9%) and 25-29 years (59.3%). In contrast, the younger people have the highest score in terms of never finding news posts while skipping newsfeed (23.7%). Kruskal Wallis test for frequent exposure to news across different sex categories show a statistically significant difference p value = 0.001.

We also reported the frequency of news exposure across different education categories. Nearly more than (50%) of all education categories find new“ posts ”always." These are the most evident percentages: elemental studies (n=116) (53.4 %) always, (25.9%) sometimes, and (20.7%) never. Similarly, undergraduate students (n=385) (57.9%) always, (22.9%) sometimes, and (19.2%) never. Bachelor's degree (n=526) (60.3%) always, (25.3%) sometimes, and (14.4%) never’ Master's degree holders (n=126) also showed similar percentages, with (62.7%) always, (23%) sometimes, and (14.3%) never.

While the educational level with the highest score to find news posts is the doctoral degree (n=65), with (80%) always, (13.8%) sometimes, and only (6.2%) never finding news posts. On the contrary, the majority of uneducated (n=30) vary between sometimes (43.3%) and (30%) always. Kruskal Wallis test revealed that there is a statistically significant difference across different educational levels p-value < 0.001.

As for the political ideology and frequency of encountering news posts, we found that more than half of the three categories (left, center, and right) always find news posts. Whereas (72.6%) right (n=347), (57.1%) left (n=375), and (51.8%) center (n=587) always. The other (50%) across different categories fluctuated between sometimes and never, with the following: (30.2%) center, (21.3%) left, and (17%) right sometimes encounter news posts; (21.6%) left, (18.1%) center and (10.4%) right never encounter news posts. Kruskal Wallis test showed a statistically significant difference across different political ideology levels, p-value < 0.001.

7.2.1.1.1 Frequency of encountering news posts on Facebook: USA

For most American participants, we observed that (54.1%) either always or often find news posts while skipping their newsfeed on Facebook, (25.5%) sometimes, and (20.4%) never or rarely exposed (M= 2.34; SD=0.796) (Table 6).

We did not notice significant differences between males and females. However, more females (59.3%) than males (50.9%) always/often find news posts. Followed by (27.9%) males and (21.6%) females sometimes; (21.2%) males and (19.2%) females either never or rarely find news posts.

Among all age categories there is about (53.4%) of either always or often find news posts while skipping their newsfeed on Facebook. On the other hand, 18-24 years have the highest score across the different age groups of never encountering news posts (32.3%).

Consistent with the prior findings, most education categories always/often find news posts while skipping their newsfeed. Yet, the majority of uneducated (42.9%) sometimes find news posts. Last, we observed that the preponderance of all political ideologies always/often finds news posts, whereas the highest score to find news posts is among the right participants with (65%).

7.2.1.1.2 Frequency of encountering news posts on Facebook: Spain

In relevance to the US, there is (68.2%) of the Spanish participants either always or often find news posts while skipping their newsfeed, while (20.1%) sometimes, and (11.7%) are never or rarely (M=2.57; SD=0.693) (Table 6).

The majority of both males and females either always or often find news posts with (70%). In addition, there is (22%) males and (18.8%) females sometimes, followed by (12.2%) females and (10.4%) males either never or rarely. There is (67.65%) of all age categories said they are always or

often finding news posts. We recognized relative percentages across different education categories where the majority always or often find news posts while skipping their newsfeed on Facebook.

7.2.1.1.3 Frequency of encountering news posts on Facebook: Egypt

In Egypt, we found more than (54%) either always or often find news posts while skipping their newsfeed on Facebook, (26.8%) sometimes, and (19%) never or rarely find news posts (M=2.35; SD=0.781) (Table 6).

Males and females reported close percentages were about (54%) across each either always or often; while (27.5%) females and (25.8%) males sometimes; In addition, (20.7%) males and (17.6%) females either never or rarely. There is about (54.8%) of age segments said they always or often encounter news posts. It is worth noting that 18-24 years have the highest score in terms of never encountering news posts on Facebook at (29.4%).

As in Spain, most education segments in Egypt always/often find news posts while skipping their Facebook newsfeed. However, most of the doctoral degree holders said they sometimes encounter news posts (62.5%).

7.2.1.2 Frequency of reading Facebook news posts briefly

In question 7 we asked participants to self-assess with which frequency do they read news posts that they encounter at least briefly (i.e., headline) while skipping through their Facebook newsfeed? They chose between 10 points scale, later recodified into 5 points scale as following 1. Never, 2. Rarely, 3. Sometimes, 4. Often, 5. Always. Through this, we aim to measure the level of cognitive processing of the news. This question also counts the attention given to news posts they encounter. The data is asymmetric and has a negatively skewed distribution, (M=3.58; SD=1.202). More than (59.8%) of the sample read at least the headline of news posts they encounter on their newsfeed, with (8.4%) saying they never read the headline, (9.9%) rarely, (21.9%) sometimes, (34.9%) often, and (24.9%) always. By recodifying the variables into reading, sometimes read, and do not read, we concluded that there is (59.8%) read followed by sometimes read (21.9%), and (18.3%) do not read the news they encounter briefly (Table 7).

Table 7. Read Facebook news posts briefly

Statement	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Q.7 how frequently do you read the news posts that you encounter at least briefly (i.e., headline), while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed?	Never	51	11.7%	69	15.8%	119	27.3%	239	18.3%
	Sometimes	91	20.8%	80	18.3%	116	26.6%	287	21.9%
	Always	295	67.5%	287	65.8%	201	46.1%	783	59.8%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

Interestingly, we found that (80%) of those who always encounter news posts while skipping their newsfeed, read the news headlines, followed by those who sometimes encounter the news with (40%), and those who never or rarely encounter news are the least to read, with (23.8%).

Similarly, the percentage of females who read the news posts briefly (67.1%) is higher than males (52.5%). The other (50%) males varied between sometimes reading (24.5%) and do not read (23.1%). We noticed only (13.3%) of females do not read and (19.5%) sometimes read the news posts at least briefly.

Running the non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test showed a statistical difference across different categories of those who find news posts on Facebook and read news posts briefly p-value less than 0.05. Also, there was a statistical difference across sex categories $p = 0.001$.

By examining the age category with the highest percentage in terms of reading news posts briefly. We found that (60%) of all age categories read the news posts at least briefly.

Kruskal Wallis test showed that the distribution of briefly reading news posts is statistically the same across age categories p-value is more than 0.05, $p=0.253$.

On the other side, almost half of the uneducated do not read the news posts at least briefly. On the other hand, nearly (90%) of doctoral degrees, (70%) of master's degrees, (60%) of bachelor's degrees, and (56.1%) of undergraduate students read the news posts headlines at least briefly. Moreover, around (30%) of the educational categories indicated that they sometimes read. We can infer that the uneducated represent most of the sample who do not read news posts at least briefly. It is worth mentioning that most of them are the least to encounter news posts.

In addition, we discerned that more than 70% of those who fall on the right side of the political continuum are the most likely to read news posts briefly compared to the left side (56%) and the

center (54%). In addition, there is (27.8%) of the center political ideology, (21.1%) left, and (13%) right sometimes read.

We run the Kruskal Wallis test for reading news posts at least briefly across education and political ideology. P-value indicated that there is statistical significance across education categories test statistic= 84.175, p=0.001. Similar findings were found across political ideology categories test statistic= 28.178, p=0.001.

7.2.1.2.1 Frequency of reading Facebook news posts briefly: USA

The data collected in the USA is asymmetrical (M=2.19; SD=0.837). We found that (46.1%) of American respondents either always or often read news posts they encounter at least briefly, while (26.6%) sometimes and (27.3%) either never or rarely (Table 7).

We observed more than 58% of females read news posts briefly compared to (38.7%) of males. It is worth noting that most of all age categories either always or often read news posts briefly except those aged 18-24 years, where (40%) either never or rarely read news posts briefly. We noticed that (50%) of the uneducated respondents never/rarely read, followed by (40%) who hold elemental studies.

Most other higher education categories are more likely to read news posts, with the highest scores among the doctoral and master's degrees; (86%) doctoral and (65%) master's degrees. Also, most of the right (65.7%) and the center (38.5%) read the news posts at least briefly, unlike most of the left (37.9%) who rarely or never.

We noticed that (70%) of those who always encounter news posts while skipping the newsfeed are more likely to briefly read such news, compared to those who sometimes (20.7%) and rarely encounter news posts (15.7%).

7.2.1.2.2 Frequency of reading Facebook news posts briefly: Spain

In Spain, we found that there are (67%) always or often read news posts briefly, (20.8%) sometimes, and (11.7%) either never or rarely do (M=2.56; SD=0.694). The data is left-skewed and not normally distributed (Table 7).

We observed that (60%) of Spanish males and females read the headlines, with more females (70.5%) than males (62.8%). Unlike the USA, about 67.7% across all age segments either always or often read news posts briefly. High percentages across all education categories, either always or

often read the headlines of news posts; we found the highest scores among those who hold doctoral degrees (78.6%), bachelor's degrees (71.5%), master's degrees (69%), and undergraduate students (64%).

There were minimal differences across various political ideologies. Approximately, there is (70%) of all political ideologies read news posts briefly, with right and left achieving the same percentage (75%) and the center scored (57.7%).

Also, there is (81.5%) of those who always encounter news posts on their news feed are more likely to read the news posts briefly, followed by (44.3%) of those who sometimes exposed and (5.5%) are rarely or never encounter news posts.

7.2.1.2.3 Frequency of reading Facebook news posts briefly: Egypt

Like Spain's findings, we discovered that most of the Egyptians (65.8%) always or often briefly read news posts, (18.3%) sometimes, and (15.8%) either never or rarely do in Egypt (Table 7). The data is left-skewed (M= 2.50; SD=0.754).

As in the USA and Spain, Egyptian females are more likely to read news posts at least briefly compared to males, with (69.8%) of females and (62%) of males.

As for the age categories, we found that (68.1%) read news posts briefly. As in Spain, most education categories read the news posts briefly (100%) doctoral, (75%) master's, (67.4%) bachelor's degrees holders, followed by the undergraduate (59.3%) and (55.6%) elemental studies.

Consistent with the obtained figures, we found that most political ideologies read news posts at least briefly, where the right is the most likely to read (79.8%) followed by the center (62.5%) and the left (54.5%).

Like prior findings, those who are always exposed to news posts while skipping their newsfeed are more likely to read news briefly (83.9%) followed by those who are sometimes exposed (53.8%) and never or rarely represented (31.3%).

7.2.1.3 Frequency of reading the details of news posts on Facebook

In question 8 we asked participants to self-assess with which frequency they read the details of the news posts they encounter while skipping through their Facebook newsfeed? They chose between 10 points scale, later recodified into 5 points scale as following 1. Never, 2. Rarely, 3. Sometimes, 4. Often, 5. Always." This question should measure the level of cognitive processing of the news,

attention, and interest in the encountered news posts. Categories were recodified into three levels do not read, sometimes read, and read news posts.

By observing the histogram curve, the data is asymmetric with Kurtosis = -0.746 and skewness -0.357. In addition, the test of normality also rejects the null hypothesis that the data is normally distributed, test statistic of Kolmogorov-Smirnov=0.196, with df (1309), p< 0.001.

The frequency table shows that there are (30%) often, (27.5%) sometimes, (17.6%) always, (14.3%) rarely, and (10.2%) never read the details of news posts they encounter on Facebook. In this sense, around (50%) of the sample read the news details while (27.5%) sometimes read (M=3.31; SD= 1.211) (Table 8).

Table 8. Read the details of news posts on Facebook

Statement	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Q.8 how often do you read the details of the news posts that you encounter while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed?	Never	92	21.1%	104	23.9%	125	28.7%	321	24.5%
	Sometimes	136	31.1%	99	22.7%	125	28.7%	360	27.5%
	Always	209	47.8%	233	53.4%	186	42.7%	628	48.0%
Total		437	100.0 %	436	100.0 %	436	100.0 %	1309	100.0 %

We recoded these variables into do not read, sometimes read, and read. Through checking the sex differences, we found that there are (51.5%) females in comparison to males (44.4%) read the details of news posts; whereas (28%) males and (20.9%) females do not read, and (27.6%) males as well as (27.6%) females sometimes read the details of news posts. It is worth noting that the non-binary/third sex represents only three people, where 2 of them do not read and one reads. There is statistical significance across the sex categories with test statistic 10.530, $p < 0.005$.

Regarding different age segments, there are (50%) 30-34 years, (48.7%) 35 years, (28%) 25-29 years, and (40.5%) 18-24 years who read the details of news posts they encounter. However, almost 25% of all age groups sometimes read. We concluded that the younger ages have the least score in

terms of reading the details of news (40%) and the highest score of never reading the details (33%). The distribution across different age segments is not the same, p-value less than .05.

As for the education categories, most uneducated (46.7%) and elemental studies (39.7%) never or rarely read the details of the news posts they encounter. Yet, most doctoral degrees (81.5%), master's degrees (56.3%), bachelor's degrees (52.1%), and undergraduate students (41.8%) read the details of news posts they encounter.

The percentage of those who sometimes read ranged between (26%) and (30%), with the least score among the doctoral degree holders (6.2%) who sometimes read and (12.3%) don't read the details of news posts. There is a statistical difference across educational categories, p=0.001.

Consistent with the other two questions, more than (67%) of those who fall on the right side of the political continuum read the details of the news posts they counter on Facebook compared to (42.9%) on the left. The center varied between reading (39.7%) and sometimes reading (34.3%). Also, there is (31%) left, (25.9%) center, and (15%) right wings do not read the news details. Likewise, the distribution is not the same across the political ideology categories with p< .001.

Interestingly, we found that (64.7%) of those who always encounter news posts while skipping their newsfeed, read the details of the news. Whereas (39.6%) of those who sometimes find news posts, sometimes read the details. Additionally, more than (50%) of those who never encounter news posts, do not read the details of news posts.

Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test revealed that the distribution of reading news posts details is not the same across the categories of find news posts while skipping Facebook newsfeed, p-value .000.

7.2.1.3.1 Frequency of reading the details of news posts on Facebook: USA

The collected data in the USA context is asymmetrical as it is somehow left-skewed (M= 2.14; SD= 0.834). There are (42.7%) of American respondents always or often read the details of news posts, (28.7%) sometimes read, and (28.7%) either never or rarely read (Table 8).

Data revealed more than (50%) of females and (37.5%) of males always or often read the details of news posts they encounter with females outweighing males. In addition, there are (28.1%) of females and (29%) of males sometimes read; (33.5%) of males and (21%) of females either never or rarely read the details of news posts.

Those aged 25-29 years read the details of news posts (45.8%) followed by 30-34 years (45.1%), 35 years (37.2%), and 18-24 years (32.3%).

As in the previous question, those who hold higher education levels in the USA either always or often read the details of the news posts they encounter with the following: doctoral degrees (86%), master's degrees (57.5%), bachelor's degrees (45.5%), high school (42.9%), undergraduate (36.4%), elemental studies (24.6%), and not educated (21.4%).

As for the political ideology of American youths, we found that those who fall on the right side of the political spectrum are more likely to either always or often read the details of the news posts followed by the left and the center; the right (65.7%), the left (33.9%), and the center (29.6%).

Further data analysis showed that there is more than 65% of those who always encounter news posts while skipping their newsfeed always read the details of the news posts, followed by (20.7%) who sometimes find news posts, and (12.4%) of those who rarely or are never exposed to news posts while skipping their newsfeed.

In the same context, there is about (73%) of those who read the news post headlines either always or often read the details of news posts on Facebook, followed by (24.1%) of those who sometimes read the headlines of news posts, and the least is among those who never or rarely read news posts headlines (8.4%).

7.2.1.3.2 Frequency of reading the details of news posts on Facebook: Spain

Like the case of the USA, the collected data in Spain is left-skewed (M=2.27; SD= 0.786). Also, there is (47.8%) either always or often read the details of news posts, (31.1%) sometimes, and (21.1%) never or rarely read the details (Table 8).

Both males and females had relative percentages whereas (48.7%) females and (46.3%) males either always or often read; (32.1%) females and (29.9%) males sometimes read; (19.2%) females and (23.8%) males never or rarely read. We also noticed that most of all age categories read the details of the news posts they encounter, with the older ages scoring higher compared to the younger whereas the highest score was among 35 years (58%) and the least is (41.6%) among 18-24 years.

Those who hold higher education degrees are more likely to read the details of the news posts they encounter. The highest percentage to always read or often is across the doctoral degrees (64.3%) followed by the master's degrees (51.7%), bachelor's degrees (48.9%), undergraduate students (45%), and elemental studies (45.5%).

We inspected that (65%) of the right-wing are more likely to read the details of news posts, followed by the left (47.9%), and the center wings (40.7%), who always or often.

Moreover, there are (60%) of those who always encounter news posts while skipping their newsfeed read the details of the news posts. In contrast, (27.3%) of those sometimes exposed to news posts and (11.8%) of those who rarely or never encounter news posts, read the details of news posts.
To that effect, more than (60%) of those who read the news posts' headlines always read the details of the news. Followed by (24.2%) of those who sometimes read the headlines, and the least is among those who never or rarely read news posts headlines (17.6%) read the details of such news.

7.2.1.3.3 Frequency of reading the details of news posts on Facebook: Egypt

The data is not normally distributed in Egypt (M=2.30; SD=0.829). There are more than (53%) of the sample either always or often read the details, (22.7%) sometimes, and (23.9%) never or rarely read the details of news posts they encounter (Table 8).
Regarding sex, we found (51%) of males and females read the details of news posts, with females outdoing males. There are females (55.4%) and males (51.6%) who either always or often read; females (21.6%) and (23.9%) males sometimes read; females (23%) and males (24.4%) either never or rarely read the details of news posts they encounter.
There are (53.3%) either always or often read the news details among various age groups, with the highest score among 30-34 years (66.1%), and the lowest across 18-24 years (43.4%). As prior findings, the highest scores among different education groups to read the details of the news posts they encounter are the doctoral degrees (87.5%) followed by the master's degrees (64.3%), high school (60%) (n=3), bachelor's degrees (55.9%), undergraduate students (41.9%), and elemental studies (38.9%).
Also, there are more than (71%) of those who fall on the right side of the political continuum are more likely to read news posts details followed by the left (46.6%) and the center (46.4 %).
In addition, (70.8%) of those who always encounter news posts while skipping their newsfeed, always read the details of news posts compared to (41%) of those who sometimes and (21.7%) of those who rarely or never encounter news posts while skipping their newsfeed.
We found that (68%) of those who read news posts headlines either always or often read the details of the news. Moreover, there are about (36.3%) of those who sometimes read the headlines, and (10.1%) who never or rarely read news posts headlines, read the full details.

7.2.1.4 Frequency of encountering news posts on Facebook shared by people's own network

In question 9 we asked participants to determine on a scale from 1-10 how many of the news posts they encounter on Facebook come from the shared posts of their friends, family relatives, and other people they follow? Ten points were recodified into 5 points scale as follows: 1. Never, 2. Rarely, 3. Sometimes, 4. Often, 5. Always. This question measures the incidental news exposure on Facebook and whether people are intentionally exposed to the news by following any news source or unintentionally through the posts shared by their network.

The skewness is 0.428 and Kurtosis is -0.683 (M=3.45; SD=1.2). This finding means that the data is skewed and not symmetrical. Whereas the p-value is significant (p=0.001) in Kolmogorov-Smirnov, thus we reject the null hypothesis of normality.

More than (50%) of the sample indicated that they always/often encounter news posts through the shares of their network of family, friends, etc., (26.2%) sometimes, and (21.4%) said never/rarely (Table 9).

Table 9. Encounter news posts shared by people's own network

Statement	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Q.9 how many of the news posts that you encounter on Facebook comes from the shared posts of your friends, family relatives, and/or other people you follow?	Never	77	17.6%	104	23.9%	100	22.9%	281	21.5%
	Sometimes	110	25.2%	121	27.8%	112	25.7%	343	26.2%
	Always	250	57.2%	211	48.4%	224	51.4%	685	52.3%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

We also found that most of those who never encounter news posts through the shares of their network (44%), do not read the news posts briefly, while the majority of those who sometimes (53%) and always (73.1%) encounter news posts through the shares of their network, always read the headlines of these news posts. Similarly, most of those who always (63.1%) and sometimes (40.8%) encounter news posts through the shares of their network always read the details of this news (Table 10).

Table 10. Encounter news posts through shares of network, read headlines and full details of news posts

Statement	How many of the news posts that you encounter on Facebook comes from the shared posts of your friends, family relatives, and/or other people you follow?						Total	
	Response	Never		Sometimes		Always			
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Read the news posts briefly (i.e. headlines)	Do not read	124	44.1%	51	14.9%	64	9.3%	239	18.3%
	Sometimes read	57	20.3%	110	32.1%	120	17.5%	287	21.9%
	Always read	100	35.6%	182	53.1%	501	73.1%	783	59.8%
Total		281	100.0%	343	100.0%	685	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Read the full details of the news posts	Do not read	148	52.7%	74	21.6%	99	14.5%	321	24.5%
	Sometimes read	77	27.4%	129	37.6%	154	22.5%	360	27.5%
	Always read	56	19.9%	140	40.8%	432	63.1%	628	48.0%
Total		281	100.0%	343	100.0%	685	100.0%	1309	100.0%

Within sex categories, there are about (56.5%) of females and (48.3%) of males always encounter news posts shared by their network or people they follow; (24.8%) females and (27.6%) males sometimes; (18.8%) females and (24.1%) males said they never, which means that their network never shares the news posts they encounter.

This result shows that females who encounter news posts shared by their network are more than males. Also, those aged 25-29 years are the majority to find news posts shared by their network, with (54.9%) followed by 30-34 years (53.4%), 35 years (48.7%), and the least is 18-24 years (48.6%). Around (29%) of all age groups said they sometimes encounter news posts shared by their network, compared to (17%) who said never.

In a similar vein, almost half of all education segments said that most of the news posts they encounter are shared by their network, with (81.5%) doctoral degrees, (60.3%) master's degrees, (53%) bachelor's degrees, (47.5%) undergraduate student, (45.7%) elemental studies, and (40%) uneducated. In contrast, (36.7%) uneducated, (26.5%) undergraduate students, and (25%) elemental studies said never.

It is worth noting that the education categories who said they "never" encounter news posts shared by their network are less than (20%) and the least score was among doctoral degrees.

The majority of (70%) of the right-wing participants always encounter news posts shared by their network. Nevertheless, there are (47.5%) left and (44.6%) center wings always. Additionally, there are (32.5%) center, (25.9%) left, and (15.9%) right sometimes. Last, (26.7%) left, (22.8%) center, and (13.5%) right said they never encounter news posts shared by their friends.

As for the statistical significance between this question across the different categories of age, sex, education, and political ideology, the independent samples Kruskal Willis result was found significant across age categories p-value = .045, sex p = .007, education p=.001, and political ideology p = .001.

7.2.1.4.1 Frequency of encountering news posts on Facebook shared by people's own network: USA

The data collected in the USA is asymmetrical with Kurtosis -1.266 and Skewness -0.565 (M= 2.28; SD= 0.815). More than (51%) of the sample indicated that they always/often encounter news posts through the shares of their network of family, friends, etc., (25.7%) sometimes, and (22.9%) said never/rarely (Table 9).

We found that females (58.1%) are more likely to encounter news posts shared by their network than males (47.2%); (24.6%) females and (26.4%) males sometimes.

In addition, (17.4%) of females and (26.4%) of males never; this means that their network either never or rarely shares news posts they encounter. Also, those aged 25-29 years are the majority to find news posts shared by their network (58.7%) followed by 30-34 years (48%), 35 years (46.5%), and the least 18-24 years (46.2%).

Further, most education categories encounter news posts shared by their network. In this sense, (88.4%) doctoral degrees, (70%) master's degrees, (48.5%) bachelor's degrees, (41.8%) undergraduate students, (41.5%) elemental studies, and (39.3%) uneducated, are always or often encountering news posts shared by their network. As for the political ideology, we found that right-side participants (71.3%) are the most likely to see news posts shared by their network, followed by the center, (42.6%), and the left side, (40.3%).

7.2.1.4.2 Frequency of encountering news posts on Facebook shared by people's own network: Spain

Similar to the USA, the data collected in Spain asymmetrical, kurtosis -0.849 and skewness -0.813 (M=2.40; SD=0.770). There is about (57.2%) of the Spanish respondents indicated that they always/often encounter news posts through the shares of their network of family, friends, etc. Also, (25.2%) sometimes, and (17.6%) said never/rarely (Table 9).

Like the USA results, Spanish females (59.8%) are more likely to encounter news posts shared by their network than males (53%); (24.4%) females and (26.8%) males sometimes; (15.9%) of females and (20.1%) of males said they never do; this means that their network either never or rarely shares the news posts they encounter.

Most of all age groups encounter news posts shared by their network, whereas those aged 18-24 years are the highest among all, with (61.1%) followed by 30-34 years (57.4%), 25-29 years (57.1%), and the least score is among 35 years (48%). In relevance with prior findings, (77%) across all education segments either always or often find news posts shared by their network.

Also, those who fall on the right side of the political continuum scored the highest in encountering news posts shared by their network (66.3%) followed by the left side (56.4%) and the center (54.1%).

7.2.1.4.3 Frequency of encountering news posts on Facebook shared by people's own network: Egypt

The data collected in Egypt is asymmetrical just like the case of Spain and the USA, with kurtosis -1.333 and skewness -0.478 (M= 2.25; SD= 0.815). Half of the Egyptians either always or often encounter news posts shared by their network of family, friends, and relatives, (27.8%) sometimes, and (23.9%) are never or rarely (Table 9).

As in Spain and the USA, the majority of Egyptian females (50.9%) and males (46%) either always or often encounter news posts shared by their network; (25.7%) females and (29.6%) males sometimes; (23.4%) of females and (24.4%) of males are either never or rarely encounter news posts shared by their network.

As in Spain, the highest score across all age segments in terms of encountering news posts shared mainly by their network is among Egyptians aged 18-24 years, followed by those aged 30-34 years (57.4%), 25-29 years (57.1%), and the least is across 35 years (48%).

Further, most education groups find news posts shared by their network of friends, family, and relatives. However, the majority of those who hold a high school or equivalent degree (40%), either never or rarely do, and (40%) of them sometimes, in comparison to (20%) who are always or often encounter news posts shared by their network.

On the other side, (50%) of other educational groups said they always or often encounter news posts shared by their network of friends, family, relatives, etc.

Like the Spanish context, (72.6%) of the right side always encounters news posts shared by their network, followed by the left (40.9%) and the center (37.9%).

7.2.1.5 Analysis of the composite variable news consumption on Facebook

Initially, we used principal factor analysis to test the validity of the news consumption items as a scale. Thus, we examined the factorability of the four news consumption items. For this, we used several well-recognized criteria for the factorability of a correlation. First, we noticed that all the items correlated together with at least 0.3, suggesting reasonable factorability. Also, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin of sampling adequacy is 0.769; thus, above the commonly recommended value of 0.6, Bartlett's sphericity test was significant (X2 (6) = 1555.990, p < 0.000) (Table 11).

Table 11. KMO and Barlett's Tests

KMO and Bartlett's Test		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		0.769
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	1555.990
	df	6
	Sig.	0.000

Finally, the commonalities were above 0.4, confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items. Given these overall indicators, factor analysis was suitable for all four items. Principal components analysis yielded one component/construct – which we named news consumption on Facebook, with eigenvalue 2.457 and accounts for 61.424 of variance. Again, the four items loaded in a meaningful way on the component, item1= 0.770, item2= 0.838, item3= 0.836, item4= 0.680. The four items showed a good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.788), with a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.5 (Table 12).

Table 12. Reliability statistics

Reliability Statistics	
Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.788	4

Thus, we created a new variable which we named news consumption on Facebook. Which is the composite score of news consumption scale items. The frequency distribution showed that there are (41.4%) light news consumers, (32.6%) medium news consumers, and (26%) heavy news consumers on Facebook (M=1.85; SD= 0.807) (Table 13).

Table 13. News consumption on Facebook – Composite variable

Statement	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
News Consumption on Facebook – Composite variable	Light	148	33.9%	176	40.4%	218	50.0%	542	41.4%
	Medium	173	39.6%	138	31.7%	116	26.6%	427	32.6%
	Heavy	116	26.5%	122	28.0%	102	23.4%	340	26.0%
Total		437	100.0 %	436	100.0 %	436	100.0 %	1309	100.0 %

Even though most males (47.2%) and females (35.6%) are light news consumers on Facebook there are more females (31.2%) than males (20.7%) in terms of heavy news consumption on Facebook. Also, more medium news consumers across females (33.2%) than males (32%). The highest score across age categories in terms of being heavy news consumers is 25-29 years (28.7%) followed by 30-34 years (28.2%), 35 years (26.5%), and the least score is among 18-24 years (19%).

Furthermore, most age segments are light news consumers on Facebook, with 18-24 years (48.6%), 25-29 years (40.9%), 30-34 years (37.7%), and 35 years (37.2%). In addition, we found that (36.3%) of 35 years, (34.1%) of 30-34 years, (32.4%) of 18-24 years, and (30.3%) of 25-29 years are medium news consumers.

Many of all education categories are light news consumers. The highest score among education groups who are light news consumer is the uneducated (n=30) (76.7%), associate degree (n=7)

(71.4%), high school/equivalent degree (n=26) (53.8%), elemental studies (n=116) (50.9%), undergraduate student (n=385) (47%), bachelor's degree (n=526) (36.5%), master's degree (n=126) (34.1%), as well as vocational degree (n=3) (33.3%); and the least score among the doctoral degree (n=65) (15.4%).

On the contrary, the highest percentages in terms of heavy news consumers are across doctoral degrees (66.2%), master's degree (n=126) (30.2%), bachelor's degree (n=526) (26.4%), high school/equivalent degree (n=26) (23.1%), undergraduate student (n=385) (22.6%), elemental studies (n=116) (16.4%), and uneducated (n=30) (13.3%).

As for medium news consumers, we found that there is (66.7%) vocational degree, (37.1%) bachelor's degree, (35.7%) master's degree, (32.8%) elemental studies, (30.4%) undergraduate student, (28.6%) associate degree, (23.1%) high school, and (10%) not educated.

Like previous findings, the right-wing (44.4%) is the heaviest news consumers followed by the left (21.3%) and the center wings (18.1%). Most of the center (49.9%) and the left (43.2%) unlike the right wing (25.1%) are light news consumers. There is (35.5%) left, (32%) center, and (30.5%) right-wing participants, medium news consumers.

7.2.1.5.1 Analysis of the composite variable news consumption on Facebook: USA

Through analyzing the data collected in the USA, we found that Q6, Q7, Q8, and Q9 correlated with at least 0.420. The result of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling adequacy is 0.769, and Bartlett's test of sphericity is significant (X2 (6) = 621.760, p<0.001) (Table 14). Finally, the commonalities were all above 0.5.

Table 14. KMO and Barlett's Tests - USA

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		0.769
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	621.760
	df	6
	Sig.	0.000

Principal components analysis yielded one component/construct – which we named news consumption on Facebook, with eigenvalue 2.572 and accounts for 64.310 of variance. Once again, the four items loaded in a meaningful way on the component, item1= 0.765, item2= 0.871, item3=

0.846, item4= 0.717. The four items showed an excellent internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.814), with a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.520. We calculated the composite score to have a new variable – news consumption on Facebook (M=1.73; SD=0.815) (Table 15).

Table 15. Test of Reliability - USA

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.814	4

Summary statistics results in the USA revealed (50%) light news consumers, (26.6%) medium, and (23.4%) heavy news consumers on Facebook (Table 13).

Most American males and females are light news consumers, with more males (56.5%) than females (39.5%). Also, more males (27.1%) than females (25.7%) are medium. However, more females (34.7%) than males (16.4%) are heavy news consumers.

Likewise, most age segments are light consumers, with (51.5%). However, we observed the highest scores among 18-24 years (61.5%) followed by 35 years (48.8%), 30-34 years (48%), and 25-29 years (47.7%). We noticed that the highest percentages across heavy news consumers are 25-29 years (29%), 30-34 years (23.7%), 35 years (23.3%), and 18-24 years (9.2%). We also reported the highest scores among medium news consumers among 18-24 years (29.2%) followed by 30-34 years (28.3%), 35 years (27.9%), and 25-29 years (23.3%).

Most of the uneducated (78.6%), elemental studies (61.5%), undergraduate student (58.2%), bachelor's degree (47.5%), master's degree (27.5%), doctoral degree (14%), high school (52.4%), and associate degree (66.7%) are light news consumers. Thus, the highest among all education segments to be light news consumers are the uneducated followed by elemental studies and undergraduate students.

On the other side, there are (7.1%) uneducated, (27.7%) elemental studies, (23.6%) undergraduate student, (33.7%) bachelor's degree, (47.5%) master's degree, (7%) doctoral degree, (23.8%) high school, and (33.3%) associate degree medium news consumers.

In this sense, the highest medium news consumers scores are among master's and bachelor's degrees.

Last, uneducated (14.3%), elemental studies (10.8%), undergraduate students (18.2%), bachelor's degrees (18.8%), master's degrees (25%), doctoral degrees (79.1%), high school (23.8%), and associate degrees (0%) are heavy news consumers.

Accordingly, doctoral degrees followed by the master's degree holders were the most to be heavy news consumers.

Like prior findings, the right0wing participants (43.3%) have the highest score compared to the center (14.8%) and the left (12.1%) to be heavy news consumers. In contrast, the left (62.9%) are more than the center (58.6%) and the right (28.7%) to be light news consumers. Last, more right participants (28%) than the center (26.6%) or the left (25%) are medium news consumers.

7.2.1.5.2 Analysis of the composite variable news consumption on Facebook: Spain

Through analyzing the obtained data in Spain, we found that Q6, Q7, Q8, and Q9 correlated together with at least 0.2. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling adequacy is 0.708, and Bartlett's test of sphericity is significant (X2 (6) = 369.085, p < .001) (Table 16).

Table 16. KMO and Barlett's Tests - Spain

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		0.708
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	369.085
	df	6
	Sig.	0.000

Finally, the commonalities were all above 0.3. Principal components analysis yielded one component/construct – which we named news consumption on Facebook, with an eigenvalue of 2.168 that accounts for 54.189 of variance. Once again, the four items loaded in a meaningful way on the component, item1= 0.786, item2= 0.817, item3= 0.797, item4= 0.497.
The four items showed an excellent internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.701) (Table 17).

Table 17. Test of Reliability - Spain

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.701	4

We created a composite score of the news consumption on Facebook items (M=1.93; SD=0.775). Therefore, there are (33.9%) light news consumers (39.6%) medium news consumers, and (26.5%) heavy news consumers on Facebook (Table 13).
Most males varied between light and medium news consumers, with (39%) light and (39%) medium. While many females are medium news consumers on Facebook (39.9%). It is worth noting that

there are more females (29.5%) than males (22%) who are heavy news consumers; in addition to (30.6%) of females who are light news consumers.

The highest score across age categories to be heavy news consumers is 30-34 years (30.3%), followed by 35 years (26%), and 25-29 years (24.4%), whereas the least is among 18-24 years (23.9%). Furthermore, many age segments are medium news consumers, with 35 years having the highest score (46%) followed by 25-29 years (39.5%), 30-34 years (38.7%), and 18-24 years (38.1%). Those aged 18-24 years have equal percentages in terms of being medium (38.1%) and (38.1%) light news consumers; also, the rest has various percentages in terms of being light news consumers, with 25-29 years (36.1%), 30-34 years (31%), and 35 years (28%).

The percentages across different education groups greatly varied between light, medium, and heavy. In this regard, the majority of uneducated (100%), elemental studies (39.4%), and bachelor's degree (45.3%) are medium; while the other groups scored as follows: master's degree (34.5%) and doctoral degree (35.7%).

On the other side, those who scored higher as light news consumers are master's degrees (37.9%) followed by undergraduate students (37.6%), elemental studies (33.3%), and bachelor's degrees (28.5%), and doctoral degrees (21.4%). Similarly, the doctoral degree (42.9%) had the highest score in terms of being heavy news consumers followed by a master's degree (27.6%), elemental studies (27.3%), and bachelor's degree (26.3%), and undergraduate student (25.4%).

As for the political ideology across Spanish youths, we found that (44.3%) center, (27.5%) right, and (24.5%) left are light news consumers. There is (46%) left, (36.3%) right, and (35.6%) center are medium news consumers on Facebook. Also, there are (36.3%) right, (29.4%) left, and (20.1%) center-wing participants heavy news consumers. These findings mean that most left-wing participants are medium news consumers on Facebook and center participants are light, whereas the right varied between medium and heavy, with (36.3%).

7.2.1.5.3 Analysis of the composite variable news consumption on Facebook: Egypt

In relevance to the analyzed parts in the USA and Spain, we found that the collected data in Q6, Q7, Q8, and Q9 correlated with at least 0.419 in Egypt. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling adequacy is 0.772, and Bartlett's test of sphericity is significant ($X2\ (6) = 598.374$, $p < .001$) (Table 18).

Finally, the commonalities were all above 0.564. Principal components analysis yielded one component/construct – which we named news consumption on Facebook, with eigenvalue 2.576

and accounts for 64.388 of variance. Once again, the 4 items loaded in a meaningful way on the component, item1= 0.775, item2= 0.823, item3= 0.856, item4= 0.751.

Table 18. KMO and Barlett's Tests - Egypt

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		0.772
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	598.374
	df	6
	Sig.	0.000

The four items showed good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.814), with a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.523. Thus, we created a new variable named news consumption on Facebook, which is the composite score of news consumption scale items.

The frequency distribution showed (40.4%) light news consumers, (31.7%) medium news consumers, and (28%) heavy news consumers on Facebook (M=1.88; SD=0.818) (Table 13).

Most of both sexes are light news consumers, with males (41.8%) more than females (38.7%). Similarly, more males (32.9%) than females (30.6%) are medium. Yet, there are more female (30.6%) than male (25.4%) heavy news consumers.

The majority of age segments in Egypt are light news consumers except for 30-34 years, who are medium. Moreover, 18-24 years (51%), 25-29 years (37.9%), 35 years (35%), and 30-34 years (31.3%) are light news consumers. In addition, 30-34 years (36.6%), 25-29 years (30.4%), 35 years (30%) and 18-24 years (29.4%) are medium. Besides, 35 years (35%), 30-34 years (32.1%), 25-29 years (31.7%), and 18-24 years (19.6%) are heavy.

Many education groups in Egypt are light except the master's degree and doctoral degree holders who are medium. For this, the light news consumers percentages are as follow: uneducated (100%), associate degree (100%), high school (60%), undergraduate student (53.5%), elemental studies (44.4%), bachelor’s degree (36.5%), master’s degree (35.7%), and doctoral degree (12.5%). The medium news consumers percentages are listed as following: doctoral degree (50%), bachelor’s degree (34.4%), elemental studies (38.9%), undergraduate student (24.4%), master’s degree (21.4%), high school (20%), uneducated (0%), and associate degree (0%). The highest scores of heavy news consumers are among master's degrees (42.9%), doctoral degrees (37.5%), bachelor's degrees (29.2%), undergraduate students (22.1%), and high school (20%), and elemental studies (16.7%).

Most of the right political ideology participants are heavy news consumers (50.8%) followed by the left (19.3%) and the center (18.8%). Whereas the majority of the left (50%) and the center (48.2%) are light compared to the right (19.4%). The highest score in terms of being medium news consumers is the center (33%) followed by the left (30.7%), and the right (29.8%).

7.2.2 News consumption and exposure on influencers' Facebook pages

We measured the independent variable by three questions (Q10-Q12). We used 10 points rating scale from 1-10, ranging from the least to the most. To get more precise answers, we then recoded them into 3 points Likert scale.

7.2.2.1 Following news pages on Facebook to stay updated

Question 10 is a dichotomous yes/no question that asks if the participants follow any Facebook news page (such as daily newspapers, national/international network TV news, local TV news, news agencies/organizations, political party, politicians, journalists, editors, etc.) to stay updated about current affairs. The aim is to measure the direct news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages to stay updated. It is worth noting that we used this question as a filter to exclude those who do not follow influencers' Facebook pages in testing the hypothesis.

The data distribution is left-skewed, Kolmogorov Smirnov was found significant p =.001, with Kurtosis -1.225 (should be around 3) and Skewness -0.501, which should be about 0 to be normally distributed (M=1.76; SD=0.427). This means that the data is asymmetrical. It is important to know how the dataset is situated to have a better understanding of the data, thus using the best statistical tests that answer our hypotheses. In this case, we adopted non-parametric tests.

Our data revealed that there is (76.1%) said yes and (23.9%) said no (Table 19). In this regard, (76.1%) of the sample follow news pages on Facebook, with more than (81%) females and (70.4%) males. This result shows that females are more interested in following news pages in comparison to males. The percentage across age groups was almost the same with about 72% saying they follow. Also, we found that uneducated (50%) and elemental studies (56.9%) are the least to follow news pages. While the highest is doctoral degrees (96.9%) followed by master's (83.3%) and bachelor's degrees (81.2%). In addition, we noticed that most of those who follow Facebook news pages (n=996) are center-wing (44.9%) followed by the right (29%) and left-wing participants (26.1%).

Moreover, there are (32.5%) of those who follow Facebook news pages are light, (36.5%) medium, and (30.9%) heavy news consumers on Facebook.

Table 19. Follow Facebook news pages to stay updated

Statement	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Q.10 Do you follow any of the news pages on Facebook (e.g. daily newspapers. national/international network TV news. local TV news. news agencies/organizations. journalists. editors. etc.) to stay up to date about current affairs?	No	84	19.2%	63	14.4%	166	38.1%	313	23.9%
	Yes	353	80.8%	373	85.6%	270	61.9%	996	76.1%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

In more depth, we found that (68.1%) of those who follow Facebook news pages (n=996) always read the headlines of the news, (20.9%) sometimes read the headlines, and (11%) do not read. Also, there is (56.4%) always read, (27.4%) sometimes read, and (16.2%) do not read the full details of the news (Table 20).

***Table 20*.** Read news headlines and details among participants who follow news pages

Statement	Response	Spain		Egypt	USA		Total	
		N	%	N	N	%	N	%
Frequency of reading news posts at least briefly (i.e. headline) on Facebook	Do not read	28	7.9%	42	40	14.8%	110	11.0%
	Sometimes read	72	20.4%	67	69	25.6%	208	20.9%
	Always read	253	71.7%	264	161	59.6%	678	68.1%
Total		353	100.0%	373	270	100.0%	996	100.0%
Frequency of reading the details of the news posts on Facebook	Do not read	58	16.4%	66	37	13.7%	161	16.2%
	Sometimes read	108	30.6%	88	77	28.5%	273	27.4%
	Always read	187	53.0%	219	156	57.8%	562	56.4%
Total		353	100.0%	373	270	100.0%	996	100.0%

7.2.2.1.1 Following news pages on Facebook to stay updated: USA

The data collected in the USA is left-skewed, Kolmogorov Smirnov is significant p <0.001 (M=1.62; SD= 0.486). This means that the data is asymmetrical. It is important to know how the

dataset is situated to have a better understanding of the data and thus use the best statistical tests that answer our hypotheses. In this case, we adopted non-parametric tests. Almost (70%) of the American youths said they follow news pages on Facebook and (38.1%) said they do not (Table 19).

There are more females (71.3%) who follow news pages on Facebook than males (56.1%), with a (15.2%) difference point. The majority across all age segments said they follow news pages on Facebook except those aged 18-24 years with (53.8%) of them do not follow. The highest percentage across all segments that follow the most vary among 30-34 years (65.9%) and 25-29 years (65.8%) followed by 35 years (55.8%).

We observed that (97.7%) of those who hold doctoral and (82.5%) master's degrees follow news pages compared to (59.1%) undergraduate students, (58.4%) bachelor's degree holders, (53.6%) uneducated, (42.9%) high school or equivalent degrees, and (46.2%) elemental studies said they follow. There are more right-side participants (75.5%) compared to (56.8%) center and (53.2%) left who follow news pages.

As for the news consumption on Facebook across those who follow Facebook news pages, we found that most of the American youths who follow Facebook news pages vary between light (33.7%) and medium news consumers (33.7%) (Table 21).

Table 21. News consumption on Facebook across participants who follow news pages

USA		
Response	N	%
Light	91	33.7%
Medium	91	33.7%
Heavy	88	32.6%
Egypt		
Response	N	%
Light	130	34.9%
Medium	124	33.2%
Heavy	119	31.9%
Spain		
Response	N	%
Light	103	29.2%
Medium	149	42.2%
Heavy	101	28.6%

7.2.2.1.2 Following news pages on Facebook to stay updated: Spain

Kolmogorov Smirnov test of normality showed that the data collected in Spain is asymmetrical with a p-value < 0.001, left-skewed (M= 1.81; SD=0.394). This means that the data is asymmetrical. It is important to know how the dataset is situated to have a better understanding of the data and thus use the best statistical tests that answer our hypotheses. In this case, we adopted non-parametric tests.

There are (80.8%) of the Spanish youths follow news pages on Facebook, while only (19.2%) said they do not (Table 19). Females scored higher than males, with (82.7%) females in comparison to (78.7%) males.

The analysis of the data showed more than (78%) of all age segments follow news pages, where those aged 25-29 years are the highest (84%) and 35 years the lowest (78%). We noticed that doctoral degree holders are the highest (92.9%) followed by undergraduate students (82%), master's degrees (81%), bachelor's degrees (81%), as well as elemental studies (72.7%).

As for the political ideology, we noticed that the right and center are more likely to follow news pages than the left, with (82.5%) right, (82.5%) center, and (77.9%) left.

Moreover, as for the level of news consumption on Facebook across those who follow Facebook news pages, data showed that most of the Spanish youths (42%) are medium news consumers on Facebook (Table 21).

7.2.2.1.3 Following news pages on Facebook to stay updated: Egypt

The data collected in Egypt is left-skewed, whereas the Kolmogorov Smirnov test of normality showed that the data is not normally distributed with a p-value < 0.000 (M=1.86; SD=0.352). This means that the data is asymmetrical. It is important to know how the dataset is situated to have a better understanding of the data and thus use the best statistical tests that answer our hypotheses. In this case, we adopted non-parametric tests.

The analysis of the data revealed more than 85% of the Egyptian sample follow news pages on Facebook, while (14.4%) said they do not (Table 19). There is a (6%) difference between females (88.7%) and males (82.2%) who said they follow news pages on Facebook. The majority across all age segments, follow news pages, with more than (76.2%). The lowest score to follow was found among those aged 18-24 years and the highest among those aging 35 years (95%) followed by 30-34 years (93.8%) and 25-29 years (87%). Consistently, we found that doctoral (100%), master's

(89.2%), and bachelor's degree holders (89.2%) have the highest scores in terms of following news pages; followed by the undergraduate (74.4%) and the elemental studies (66.7%).
We observed that the right-side participants have the highest score among the political ideologies, with the following percentages right (92.7%), the center (85.3%), and the left (76.1%). As for the news consumption on Facebook across those who follow Facebook news pages, we noted that most of the Egyptian youths (34.9%) are light news consumers (Table 21).

7.2.2.2 Most followed news pages on Facebook

In question 11 we asked participants to select all the news sources they follow on Facebook to stay updated, with multiple response options. This question aims to pinpoint the most followed influential news pages on Facebook (Table 22).

Table 22. Most followed Facebook news pages

Most followed news sources on Facebook		Spain	Egypt	USA	Total
BBC news/ BBC TV/ BBC News Arabic	Count	95	240	122	457
	% Within Q1_Country	21.7%	55.0%	28.0%	
	% Of Total	7.3%	18.3%	9.3%	34.9%
Global News	Count	44	79	90	213
	% Within Q1_Country	10.1%	18.1%	20.6%	
	% Of Total	3.4%	6.0%	6.9%	16.3%
CNN/ CNN International	Count	92	174	179	445
	% Within Q1_Country	21.1%	39.9%	41.1%	
	% Of Total	7.0%	13.3%	13.7%	34.0%
Aljazeera channel/Aljazeera English/Aljazeera Arabic	Count	7	158	28	193
	% Within Q1_Country	1.6%	36.2%	6.4%	
	% Of Total	0.5%	12.1%	2.1%	14.7%
Euro news (English / non-English	Count	79	56	19	154
	% Within Q1_Country	18.1%	12.8%	4.4%	
	% Of Total	6.0%	4.3%	1.5%	11.8%

MSNBC	Count	9	52	91	152
	% Within Q1_Country	2.1%	11.9%	20.9%	
	% Of Total	0.7%	4.0%	7.0%	11.6%
Russia Today/Russia Today Arabic	Count	13	77	13	103
	% Within Q1_Country	3.0%	17.7%	3.0%	
	% Of Total	1.0%	5.9%	1.0%	7.9%
Washington post	Count	29	56	75	160
	% Within Q1_Country	6.6%	12.8%	17.2%	
	% Of Total	2.2%	4.3%	5.7%	12.2%
The guardian	Count	44	67	41	152
	% Within Q1_Country	10.1%	15.4%	9.4%	
	% Of Total	3.4%	5.1%	3.1%	11.6%
Financial times	Count	28	40	27	95
	% Within Q1_Country	6.4%	9.2%	6.2%	
	% Of Total	2.1%	3.1%	2.1%	7.3%
Los Angeles times	Count	16	24	36	76
	% Within Q1_Country	3.7%	5.5%	8.3%	
	% Of Total	1.2%	1.8%	2.8%	5.8%
The daily telegraph	Count	10	32	12	54
	% Within Q1_Country	2.3%	7.3%	2.8%	
	% Of Total	0.8%	2.4%	0.9%	4.1%
The wall street journal	Count	15	27	44	86
	% Within Q1_Country	3.4%	6.2%	10.1%	
	% Of Total	1.1%	2.1%	3.4%	6.6%
New York times	Count	76	84	109	269
	% Within Q1_Country	17.4%	19.3%	25.0%	
	% Of Total	5.8%	6.4%	8.3%	20.6%
HuffPost	Count	40	17	45	102
	% Within Q1_Country	9.2%	3.9%	10.3%	
	% Of Total	3.1%	1.3%	3.4%	7.8%
US Today	Count	11	16	75	102

	% Within Q1_Country	2.5%	3.7%	17.2%	
	% Of Total	0.8%	1.2%	5.7%	7.8%
Bloomberg	Count	16	19	24	59
	% Within Q1_Country	3.7%	4.4%	5.5%	
	% Of Total	1.2%	1.5%	1.8%	4.5%
Sky news (Arabic-English)	Count	7	132	9	148
	% Within Q1_Country	1.6%	30.3%	2.1%	
	% Of Total	0.5%	10.1%	0.7%	11.3%
Fox news	Count	47	59	114	220
	% Within Q1_Country	10.8%	13.5%	26.1%	
	% Of Total	3.6%	4.5%	8.7%	16.8%
El País	Count	248	8	6	262
	% Within Q1_Country	56.8%	1.8%	1.4%	
	% Of Total	18.9%	0.6%	0.5%	20.0%
El mundo	Count	208	15	8	231
	% Within Q1_Country	47.6%	3.4%	1.8%	
	% Of Total	15.9%	1.1%	0.6%	17.6%
Marca	Count	125	22	5	152
	% Within Q1_Country	28.6%	5.0%	1.1%	
	% Of Total	9.5%	1.7%	0.4%	11.6%
ABC	Count	115	41	74	230
	% Within Q1_Country	26.3%	9.4%	17.0%	
	% Of Total	8.8%	3.1%	5.7%	17.6%
La Vanguardia	Count	144	5	8	157
	% Within Q1_Country	33.0%	1.1%	1.8%	
	% Of Total	11.0%	0.4%	0.6%	12.0%
El Correo	Count	49	6	3	58
	% Within Q1_Country	11.2%	1.4%	0.7%	
	% Of Total	3.7%	0.5%	0.2%	4.4%
El periodico	Count	79	3	4	86

	% Within Q1_Country	18.1%	0.7%	0.9%	
	% Of Total	6.0%	0.2%	0.3%	6.6%
Youm7	Count	1	308	12	321
	% Within Q1_Country	0.2%	70.6%	2.8%	
	% Of Total	0.1%	23.5%	0.9%	24.5%
AlmasryAlyoum	Count	0	235	8	243
	% Within Q1_Country	0.0%	53.9%	1.8%	
	% Of Total	0.0%	18.0%	0.6%	18.6%
Extra news	Count	0	110	7	117
	% Within Q1_Country	0.0%	25.2%	1.6%	
	% Of Total	0.0%	8.4%	0.5%	8.9%
Masrawy news	Count	1	177	7	185
	% within Q1_Country	0.2%	40.6%	1.6%	
	% of Total	0.1%	13.5%	0.5%	14.1%
Middle East News Agency – MENA	Count	3	64	8	75
	% Within Q1_Country	0.7%	14.7%	1.8%	
	% Of Total	0.2%	4.9%	0.6%	5.7%
President AbdelFattah Elsisi	Count	1	148	2	151
	% Within Q1_Country	0.2%	33.9%	0.5%	
	% Of Total	0.1%	11.3%	0.2%	11.5%
Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers	Count	1	139	1	141
	% Within Q1_Country	0.2%	31.9%	0.2%	
	% Of Total	0.1%	10.6%	0.1%	10.8%
Tahya Masr	Count	2	95	3	100
	% Within Q1_Country	0.5%	21.8%	0.7%	
	% Of Total	0.2%	7.3%	0.2%	7.6%
Rassd	Count	1	109	4	114
	% Within Q1_Country	0.2%	25.0%	0.9%	
	% Of Total	0.1%	8.3%	0.3%	8.7%
Others	Count	84	19	104	207

	% Within Q1_Country	19.2%	4.4%	23.9%	
	% Of Total	6.4%	1.5%	7.9%	15.8%
Total	Count	437	436	436	1309
	% Of Total	33.4%	33.3%	33.3%	100%

Consistent with the literature review, the most followed news page across the three countries (Egypt, Spain, United States) is the BBC (n=457) followed by CNN (n=445). Even though each of the examined countries has its news sources on Facebook, the BBC was the highest among them. We also noticed that (43.2%) of those who follow BBC are right. As an initial observation, most Egyptians follow BBC news (55%) while almost (60%) of the Spanish most followed news page is El País. The result varies in the US; Americans' answers shattered across three main pages: BBC (28%), Fox News (26.1%), and New York times (25%).

7.2.2.2.1 Most followed news pages on Facebook: USA

In the USA, we found that most American youths follow CNN (41.1%). The other most followed pages are the BBC (28%), Fox News (26.1%), New York times (25%), MSNBC (20.9%), and Global News (20.6%) (Table 22).

The right participants have the highest score in terms of the following: BBC (44.1%), Global News (33.6%), CNN (49.7%), New York times (29.4%), and Fox News (30.8%). In contrast, there were more left (24.2%) compared to (20.3%) right and (18.9%) center, to follow MSNBC.

7.2.2.2.2 Most followed news pages on Facebook: Spain

In Spain, we found that El País is the most followed news page among Spanish respondents with (56.8%). Followed by El Mundo (47.6%), La Vanguardia (33%), Marca (28.6%), ABC (26.3%), BBC (21.7%), CNN (21.1%), New York times (17.4%) (Table 22).

In general, those who fall on the center of the political continuum are the highest in following the abovementioned pages compared to the other two ideologies. For example, we noticed that (62.4%) of the center (55.2%) left and (46.3%) right follow El País.

7.2.2.2.3 Most followed news pages on Facebook: Egypt

In Egypt, data showed that the majority of Egyptians follow Youm7 (70.6%) followed by BBC (55%), CNN (39.9%), Aljazeera (36.2%), Sky News (30.3%), Masrawy News (40.6%) (Table 22). Most of those who follow Youm7 are center (75.4%), left (69.3%), and right (62.9%).
Likewise, there is (58.9%) center, (52.3%) left, and (50%) right following the BBC. Masrawy News has (44.6%) center, (42.7%) right, and (27.3%) left. Those who fall on the right side of the continuum have the highest percentages (44.4%) followed by (40.2%) center and (33%) left in terms of following CNN. Similarly, (39%) right, (39%) center, and (22.7%) left, follow Aljazeera.

7.2.2.3 Influential news sources on Facebook

In question 12 we listed several influential news sources – namely SMI on Facebook, we asked participants to self-assess with which frequency they consume news through each of them on Facebook. Answers were recodified into 5 points on Likert scales, never, rarely, sometimes, often, and always. The aim is to identify the SMI on Facebook in addition to examining the extent of news consumption on such pages.
Journalist (M=2.85; SD=1.359); analyst or opinion-maker (M= 2.78; SD=1.316); politician (M= 2.60; SD=1.351); political party (M=2.53; SD=1.367); member of government and officials (M=2.74; SD= 1.396); activist (M= 2.80; SD=1.364); newspaper (M=3.23; SD=1.414); TV news channel (M= 3.41; SD=1.353); news agency (M=3.07; SD= 1.379); radio station (M= 2.76; SD= 1.444).
Descriptive statistics showed that TV news channel (national/international) is the most followed influential news source on Facebook (53%) followed by a newspaper (digital/print) (50%) and news agencies (43.24%). On the contrary, we noticed that the least followed news sources on Facebook are political parties (51.03%), politicians (50%), members of government/officials (44.7%), analysts or opinion-maker (41.79%), activists (41.41%), a radio station (44.08%), as well as a journalist (40.87%) whereas participants either never or rarely follow them (Table 23).

Table 23. Influential news sources on Facebook

News source on Facebook	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Journalist (individual)	Never	144	33.0%	178	40.8%	213	48.9%	535	40.9%
	Sometimes	141	32.3%	92	21.1%	84	19.3%	317	24.2%

	Always	152	34.8%	166	38.1%	139	31.9%	457	34.9%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Analyst or opinion maker (intellectual. political writer. political analyst. etc.)	Never	176	40.3%	172	39.4%	199	45.6%	547	41.8%
	Sometimes	144	33.0%	100	22.9%	110	25.2%	354	27%
	Always	117	26.8%	164	37.6%	127	29.1%	408	31.2%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Politician (individual)	Never	227	51.9%	196	45.0%	224	51.4%	647	49.4%
	Sometimes	99	22.7%	99	22.7%	91	20.9%	289	22.1%
	Always	111	25.4%	141	32.3%	121	27.8%	373	28.5%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Political party (organization)	Never	217	49.7%	227	52.1%	224	51.4%	668	51%
	Sometimes	116	26.5%	100	22.9%	86	19.7%	302	23.1%
	Always	104	23.8%	109	25.0%	126	28.9%	339	25.9%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Member of Government and officials (i.e. president. prime minister. minister. governor.	Never	216	49.4%	155	35.6%	214	49.1%	585	44.7%
	Sometimes	110	25.2%	95	21.8%	96	22.0%	301	23%
	Always	111	25.4%	186	42.7%	126	28.9%	423	32.3%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Activist (citizen. social movement. protest movement. etc.)	Never	158	36.2%	186	42.7%	198	45.4%	542	41.4%
	Sometimes	135	30.9%	84	19.3%	97	22.2%	316	24.1%
	Always	144	33.0%	166	38.1%	141	32.3%	451	34.5%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Newspaper (print or digital)	Never	85	19.5%	136	31.2%	177	40.6%	398	30.4%
	Sometimes	101	23.1%	83	19.0%	78	17.9%	262	20%
	Always	251	57.4%	217	49.8%	181	41.5%	649	49.6%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
TV news channel (national/international)	Never	71	16.2%	107	24.5%	144	33.0%	322	24.6%
	Sometimes	104	23.8%	86	19.7%	93	21.3%	283	21.6%
	Always	262	60.0%	243	55.7%	199	45.6%	704	53.8%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
News agency	Never	139	31.8%	132	30.3%	170	39.0%	441	33.7%
	Sometimes	119	27.2%	83	19.0%	100	22.9%	302	23.1%
	Always	179	41.0%	221	50.7%	166	38.1%	566	43.2%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Radio station	Never	171	39.1%	201	46.1%	205	47.0%	577	44.1%
	Sometimes	118	27.0%	94	21.6%	77	17.7%	289	22.1%
	Always	148	33.9%	141	32.3%	154	35.3%	443	33.8%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

7.2.2.3.1 Influential news sources on Facebook: USA

The analysis of the data in the case of the USA offers us the following results; journalist (M= 2.68; SD=1.475); analyst or opinion-maker (M= 2.69; SD=1.415); politician (M= 2.56; SD=1.412); political party (M= 2.57; SD=1.469); member of government and officials (M= 2.62; SD=1.417); activist (M= 2.69SD= 1.398); newspaper (M= 2.91; SD= 1.493); TV news channel (M= 3.14; SD= 1.446); news agency (M= 2.91; SD= 1.438); radio station (M= 2.72; SD= 1.519).

The most followed influential news sources on Facebook among American youths are TV news channel pages (national/international) (45.6%), preceded by newspapers (digital/print) (41.5%) which respondents either always or often follow. On the other side, the most unfollowed influential news sources whereas participants either never or rarely follow are politicians (51.4%), political parties (51.4%), members of government/officials (49.1%), journalists (48.9%), radio stations (47%), analyst or opinion-makers (45.6%), and activists (45.4%) (Table 23).

7.2.2.3.2 Influential news sources on Facebook: Spain

The analysis of the data in the case of Spain offers us the following results; journalist (M= 2.97; SD= 1.183); analyst or opinion-maker (M= 2.73; SD= 1.161); politician (M= 2.51; SD= 1.263); political party (M= 2.54; SD= 1.229); member of government and officials (M= 2.54; SD= 1.266); activist (M= 2.88; SD= 1.246); newspaper (M= 3.57; SD= 1.198); TV news channel (M= 3.64; SD= 1.191); news agency (M= 3.06; SD= 1.240); radio station (M= 2.86; SD= 1.324).

Data statistics showed that the TV news channel (national/international) is the most followed influential news source on Facebook (59.9%) followed by a newspaper (57.4%), news agency (40.9%), and journalist (34.8%). On the contrary, we found the least followed influential sources on Facebook that people never or rarely follow are politicians (51.9%), a political party (49.6%), members of government/officials (49.5%), analysts or opinion-makers (40.3%), radio stations (39.1%), and activists (36.2%) (Table 23).

7.2.2.3.3 Influential news sources on Facebook: Egypt

The data analysis in the case of Egypt revealed the following results; journalist (M= 2.89; SD= 1.390); analyst or opinion-maker (M= 2.92; SD= 1.350); politician (M= 2.73; SD= 1.368); political party (M= 2.48; SD= 1.395); member of government and officials (M= 3; SD= 1.446); activist (M=

2.83; SD= 1.436); newspaper (M= 3.22; SD= 1.461); TV news channel (M= 3.46; SD= 1.365); news agency (M= 3.25; SD= 1.433); radio station (M= 2.70; SD= 1.481).

We noticed that the most followed influential news sources on Facebook are TV news channels (national/international) (55.7%) followed by news agencies (50.7%), newspapers (digital/print) (49.8%), and members of government/official (42.7%). On the other hand, the most unfollowed influential news sources on Facebook among the sample are political parties (52%), radio stations (46.1%), politicians (44.9%), activists (42.6%), journalists (40.9%), and analyst or opinion-maker (39.4%), where people never or rarely follow (Table 23).

7.2.2.4 Analysis of the composite variable – Frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages

We used the dichotomous question 10 and the 10 items in question 12 as a scale to examine the independent variable. For this, we conducted a principal factor analysis to test the scale's validity and reduce any dimension/item that does not load well. The factorability of the 11 items of the independent variable, frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages on Facebook, was examined. We used several well-recognized criteria for the factorability of a correlation.

First, we noticed that all the items correlated together with at least 0.3, suggesting reasonable factorability. Second, we found that Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling adequacy is 0.935, which is above the commonly recommended value of 0.6, and Bartlett's test of sphericity is significant (X2 (55) = 9003.562, p<0.000) (Table 24).

Table 24. KMO and Barlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		0.935
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	9003.562
	df	55
	Sig.	0.000

This gives us confidence that our variables are significantly correlated altogether. Finally, the commonalities were all above 0.5, further confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items. Given these overall indicators, factor analysis is suitable for all 11 items. The 11 items showed an extremely high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.923), with a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.524 (Table 25).

Table 25. Reliability statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.923	11

Finally, we created a composite score of the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages, based on the sum of the 11 items which had primary loadings on the factor. Higher scores indicate consuming news on influencers' Facebook pages heavily, while lower scores mean light consumption. For this, we recoded the variables into three categories based on the cultivation categorization. Thus, we recoded never/rarely into light consumption, sometimes to medium, and often/always recoded into heavy news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. In this respect, data showed there is (35.1%) light, (32.2%) medium, and (32.7%) heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (M= 1.98; SD= 0.823) (Table 26).

We found more females (34.7%) than males (30.8%) to be heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages. However, there are more males (32.5%) than females (32.1%) medium news consumers; also, more males (36.7%) than females (33.2%) are light.

Most 18-24 years (44.2%) and 35 years (32.7%) are light news consumers. Other age groups scored as follows: 25-29 years (33.3%) and 30-34 years (30.7%). On the other hand, most 25-29 years (36.1%) and 30-34 years (34.5%) are found to be heavy, while other ages scored as follows: 18-24 years (26.2%) and 35 years (31%). We observed that the highest percentage in terms of medium news consumption level is among 35 years, followed by 30-34 years (34.8%), 25-29 years (30.6%), and the least is across those aged 18-24 years (29.6%).

The majority of associate degree (85.7%), uneducated (66.7%), high school (57.7%), elemental studies (51.7%), undergraduate student (41.8%), bachelor's (28.7%), master's (19.8%), and doctoral degree holders (7.7%) are light. While many masters' degree (34.9%), undergraduate student (34.3%), bachelor's degree (32.9%), elemental studies (31%), uneducated (26.7%), high school (26.9%), doctoral degree (18.5%), and associate degree (14.3%) are medium. Last, the majority of doctoral (73.8%), master's (45.2%), bachelor's degree holders (38.4%), undergraduate students (23.9%), elemental studies (17.2%), high school (15.4%), and uneducated (6.7%) are heavy news consumers of influencers' Facebook pages.

As for the political ideology, there are more right-wing (56.2%) than the center (25.2%) and left-wing participants (22.7%) to be heavy. Also, the center (35.4%) compared to the left (33.6%) and the right (25.4%) are medium. On the other side, there are more left (43.7%) than the center (39.4%)

and the right (18.4%) to be light news consumers. Further, we noticed that most heavy news consumers are right-wing (45.6%).

Table 26. Level of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages

Item	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages	Light	130	29.7%	144	33.0%	185	42.4%	459	35.1%
	Medium	168	38.4%	127	29.1%	127	29.1%	422	32.2%
	Heavy	139	31.8%	165	37.8%	124	28.4%	428	32.7%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

In more depth, through filtering those who follow news pages only (n=996), we found most of the participants are heavy news consumers of influencer's Facebook pages (41%) followed by medium (35.6%) and light (23.4%) (Table 27).

Table 27. News consumption on influencers' Facebook pages among those who follow news pages on Facebook

Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Light	76	21.5%	94	25.2%	63	23.3%	233	23.4%
Medium	149	42.2%	117	31.4%	89	33.0%	355	35.6%
Heavy	128	36.3%	162	43.4%	118	43.7%	408	41.0%
Total	353	100.0%	373	100.0%	270	100.0%	996	100.0%

7.2.2.4.1 Analysis of the composite variable – Frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages: USA

The analyzed data in the USA showed that all the items correlated together with at least 0.375, suggesting reasonable factorability. Second, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling adequacy is 0.951, which is above the commonly recommended value of 0.6, and Bartlett's test of sphericity is significant (X2 (55) = 4048.243, p<.000). This result gives us confidence that our variables are significantly correlated altogether (Table 28).

Table 28. KMO and Barlett's Tests - USA

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		0.951
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	4048.243
	df	55
	Sig.	0.000

Finally, the commonalities were above 0.645, except Q10 with 0.348, confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items. Given these overall indicators, factor analysis is suitable for all 11 items.

We used principal components analysis because the primary purpose is to identify and compute composite scores for the factors underlying the short version of frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. Initial eigenvalues indicated one component that met our cut-off criterion. The component has an eigenvalue of 7.344 and accounts for (66.766%) of the variability. The rotated component matrix showed that all the items loaded meaningfully with the element with the least 0.803 and the highest 0.863. However, the dichotomous Q10 had a relatively low value yet meaningful compared to other items, 0.590.

The 11 items showed an extremely high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.948), with a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.629 (Table 29).

Table 29. Reliability test - USA

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.948	11

Based on the results of the principal components analysis, we created a composite score for the component – frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages, based on the sum of the 11 items which had primary loadings on the factor. Higher scores indicated heavy consumption while lower scores meant light. For this, we recoded the variables into three categories, light (42.4%), medium (29.1%), and heavy (28.4%) (M= 2.86; SD= 0.831) (Table 26).

Most of the American males (44.6%) and females (38.9%) are found to be light. Yet, we observed more females (35.3%) than males (24.2%) be heavy. In addition, more males (31.2%) than females (25.7%) are medium. More precisely, most age segments are light with about 46.2%. However, we noticed that 25-29 years (33.5%) followed by 30-24 years (30.6%) have the highest scores in comparison to 35 years (20.9%) and 18-24 years (15.4%), being heavy news consumers. Additional,

30-34 years (30.1%), 25-29 years (29%), 35 years (27.9%), and the least score among18-24 years (27.7%) are medium news consumers.

Most education groups in the USA are light consumers with about 55% except the majority of master's (50%) and doctoral degree holders (88.4%) who are heavy. The obtained percentages regarding medium news consumption are as follows: uneducated (28.6%), elemental studies (27.7%), undergraduate student (33.6%), bachelor's degrees (35.6%), master's degrees (37.5%), doctoral degrees (2.3%), high school (19%), and associate degree (16.7%).

Consistent with previous findings, most right-wing participants (57.3%) unlike the center (16%) and the left (12.1%) are heavy. In contrast, the majority of the left-wing (54%) and the center (49.7%) unlike the right (23.8%) are light. Furthermore, there is more center (34.3%) than the left (33.9%) and the right (18.9%) to be medium news consumers. We also noticed that most heavy news consumers have the right orientation (66.1%).

Further analysis in the USA revealed that most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (60.5%) in comparison to medium (13.4%) and light (5.4%), are heavy news consumers on Facebook. Also, light news consumers (78.9%) followed by medium (47.2%) and light (9.7%) are light news consumers on Facebook. Besides, medium news consumers on influencer's Facebook pages have the highest score (39.4%) compared to the medium (29.8%) and light (15.7%) to be medium news consumers on Facebook.

7.2.2.4.2 Analysis of the composite variable – Frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages: Spain

The analyzed data in Spain showed that all the items correlated together with at least 0.163, suggesting reasonable factorability. Second, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.892, which is above the commonly recommended value of 0.6, and Bartlett's test of sphericity is significant ($X2 (55) = 2467.576$, $p<.000$) (Table 30).

This gives us confidence that our variables are significantly correlated altogether. Finally, the commonalities are all above 0.5, except Q10 with 0.286, further confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items. Given these overall indicators, factor analysis is suitable for all 11 items.

Table 30. KMO and Barlett's Test - Spain

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		0.892
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	2467.576
	df	55
	Sig.	0.000

We used principal components analysis because the primary purpose is to identify and compute composite scores for the factors underlying the short version of the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. Initial eigenvalues indicated that two components met our cut-off criterion. In contrast, component one has a 5.352 eigenvalue and accounts for (32.586%) of the variability, while component 2 has 1.410 eigenvalues and accounts for (28.888%) of the variability in all 11 items/variables. The rotated component matrix showed that almost all the items loaded meaningfully with component 1, with the least 0.676 and the highest 0.767. However, the dichotomous Q10 had a relatively low value yet meaningful compared to other items, 0.596. The 11 items showed an extremely high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.893) (Table 31).

Table 31. Reliability test - Spain

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.893	11

Based on the results of the principal components analysis of the collected data in Spain, we created a composite score for the component -news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages, based on the sum of the 11 items which had primary loadings on the factor. Higher scores indicated heavy consumption on influencers' Facebook pages, while lower scores mean light exposure. For this, we recoded the variables into three categories light (29.7%), medium (38.4%), and heavy (31.8%) (M= 2.02; SD= 0.785) (Table 26).

There are females (42.1%) than males (32.9%) to be medium. In contrast, more males (40.2%) are heavy in comparison to females (26.9%). While females (31%) preceded males (26.8%) in terms of being light news consumers. Also, most age groups are found to be medium with about 39%. Yet, the highest age group to be heavy is 35 years followed by 18-24 years (31.9%) and 25-29 years (31.9%). Also, 30-34 years have the least score to be heavy news consumers with (29.7%). Last,

18-24 years have the highest score in terms of being light (32.7%) followed by 30-34 years (30.3%), 25-29 years (29.4%), and 35 years (22%).

The highest score across the education category to be heavy is among doctoral degrees (50%) followed by bachelor's (37.2%), master's degree holders (36.2%), undergraduate students (27%), and elemental studies (21.2%). On the contrary, we found the highest score of being light news consumer is among those not educated (n=1) (100%), elemental studies (39.4%), undergraduate student (36%), bachelor's (24.1%), master's (22.4%), and doctoral degree holders (7.1%). In like manner, the highest score of medium news consumers were found among doctoral (42.9%), master's degree holders (41.4%), elemental studies (39.4%), bachelor's degree (38.7%), and undergraduate students (37%).

Finally, we found that the right-wing participants have the highest score being heavy news consumers (47.5%) followed by the left (30.7%) and the center (26.3%). Additionally, there are more center participants (39.7%) than the right (38.8%) and the left (36.8%) to be medium news consumers. Also, there are more light news consumers among the center-wing (34%) than the left (32.5%) and the right (13.8%). Further analysis demonstrated that most heavy news consumers are center (36.7%) and left (36%) in Spain.

In addition, many heavy (46.8%) and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (43.5%) are medium news consumers on Facebook compared to only (26.9%) light. While most light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (63.1%) are light news consumers on Facebook followed by medium (28%) and heavy (13.7%). As for the heavy news consumers on Facebook in Spain, we observed that the highest score is among heavy (39.6%), medium (28.6%), and light consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (10%).

7.2.2.4.3 Analysis of the composite variable – Frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages: Egypt

The analyzed data in Egypt showed that all the items correlated together with at least 0.225, suggesting reasonable factorability. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.927, above the commonly recommended value of 0.6, and Bartlett's test of sphericity is significant ($X2 (55) = 2759.164$, $p<.000$) (Table 32).

This result gives us confidence that our variables are significantly correlated altogether. Finally, the commonalities were above 0.504, except Q10 with 0.236, confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items. Given these overall indicators, factor analysis is to be suitable for all 11 items.

Table 32. KMO and Barlett's Test - Egypt

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		0.927
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	2759.164
	df	55
	Sig.	0.000

We used principal components analysis because the primary purpose is to identify and compute composite scores for the factors underlying the short version of the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. Initial eigenvalues indicated that two components met our cut-off criterion. In contrast, component one has 6.019 eigenvalues and accounts for (32.711%) of the variability, while component 2 has 1.049 eigenvalues and accounts for (31.542%) of the variability in all 11 items/variables. The rotated component matrix showed that all the items loaded very well with component 1, with the least 0.681 and the highest 0.827. However, the dichotomous Q10 had a relatively low value yet meaningful compared to other items, 0.483. The 11 items showed an extremely high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.914) (Table 33).

Table 33. Reliability test - Egypt

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.914	11

Based on the results of the principal components analysis, we created a composite score for component 1- namely news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages, based on the sum of the 11 items which had primary loadings on the factor. Higher scores indicated heavy consumption levels while lower scores mean less consumption. For this, we recoded the variables into three categories light (33%), medium (29.1%), and heavy (37.8%) (M= 2.05; SD= 0.841) (Table 26).
There are more Egyptian females (43.7%) than males (31.9%) to be heavy. Also, we found more light news consumers among males (34.3%) than females (31.5%). In addition, there are (33.8%) of males and (24.8%) of females are medium news consumers. Most 25-29 years (41.6%) and 30-34 years (47.3%) are heavy; with 35 years (35%) and 18-24 years (26.6%). While most 35 years (45%), 30-34 years (34.8%), 25-29 years (26.1%), and 18-24 years (25.9%) are medium news consumers. Besides, many 18-24 years (47.6%) are light news consumers, with 25-29 years (32.3%), 35 years (20%), and 30-34 years (17.9%).

Most of the not educated (n=1) (100%), elemental studies (n=18) (38.9%), undergraduate students (n=86) (48.8%), and associate degree (n=1) (100%) are light; with high school (n=5) (40%), bachelor's degree (n=288) (28.8%), master's degree (n=28) (25%), and doctoral degree holders (n=8) (0%) are light. Further, the majority of bachelor's (42%) and master's degrees (57.1%), doctoral degree holders (37.5%), elemental studies (33.3%), and undergraduate students (22.1%) are heavy. In addition, we noticed that the highest score across all education segments who are medium news consumers is among doctoral degree (62.5%), high school (60%), bachelor's degree (29.2%), undergraduate student (29.1%), elemental studies (27.8%), and master's degree (17.9%).
Also, most right-wing participants (60.5%) followed by the center (31.3%) and the left (22.7%) are heavy news consumers in Egypt. On the other hand, most left-wing participants (50%) followed by the center (36.2%) and the right (15.3%) are light. Also, there are more center (32.6%) than the left (27.3%) and the right (24.2%) to be medium news consumers. We noticed that most heavy news consumers are right-wing (45.5%) in Egypt.
Further analysis revealed that most light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages, are light news consumers on Facebook compared to the medium (37.8%) and heavy (11.5%). On the other hand, most medium consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (42.5%) are medium news consumers on Facebook followed by light (18.8%) and heavy (34.5%). On contrary, the majority of those who heavily consume news on influencers' Facebook pages (53.9%) are also heavy news consumers on Facebook followed by medium (19.7%) and light (5.6%).

7.2.3 Testing Hypothesis 1

H1: There is a positive correlation between influencers' Facebook pages and news consumption on Facebook.
Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in this section is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test to find correlation and ordinal regression to find the effect on the dependent variable.
To run correlation and regression tests, we used the two newly created variables representing the dependent and independent variables - the composite score of the scale of each variable.
Primary findings showed that following influencers' Facebook pages is weakly associated with encountering news while skipping one's newsfeed on Facebook rho = 0.406, $p < 0.001$. There is a weak positive relationship between reading news briefly on Facebook and following influencers' Facebook pages rho=0.464, $p<0.001$. However, there is a moderate positive correlation between

following influencers' Facebook pages and reading the details of the news rho= 0.551, p <0.001 (Table 34).

Based on the results of the study, Spearman's rho 1- tailed correlation test between the two scales (following influencers' Facebook pages) and (news consumption on Facebook) showed a moderate positive correlation between news consumption and following influencers' Facebook pages rho=0.546, p < 0.001. This result means that the more people follow influencers' Facebook pages, the more they consume news on Facebook. In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association (Table 34).

Table 34. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation

Item	Spearman's rho	Following influencers' Facebook pages - Composite variable
News Consumption on Facebook - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.546**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
How often do you find news posts while skipping your Facebook newsfeed? (1) means Never and (10) means Always	Correlation Coefficient	.406**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
How frequently do you read the news posts that you encounter at least briefly (i.e. headline). while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed?	Correlation Coefficient	.464**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
How often do you read the details of the news posts that you encounter while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed?	Correlation Coefficient	.551**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
How many of the news posts that you encounter on Facebook comes from the shared posts of your friends. family relatives. and/or other people you follow?	Correlation Coefficient	.392**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309

Overall, following influencers' Facebook pages is moderately associated with news consumption. Though, to gain a deeper understanding of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, ordinal logistic regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between following influencers' Facebook pages and news consumption on Facebook. Following influencers' Facebook pages (scale) in the ordinal regression analysis -namely the predictor variable- contributed to the model. Based on the ordinal regression results, the explanatory variable X improves the model,

because of variation decrease from 475.723 to 38.825, X2 (1) = 436.898, p < 0.001. This finding suggests that there is a significant difference between the baseline model to the final model.

In addition, the model fits the data Pearson X2 (3) = 3.1, P=0.364. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the observed data is consistent with the fitted model. Further, the parameter estimates had a positive effect B=1.454, SE= (0.76), Wald= (367.519), p < .001. Thus, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (1.454) = 4.280, 95%) CI (1.305,1.603) for every unit increase of the independent variable. This result means that for every 1 unit increase in terms of following influencers' Facebook pages, there is a predicted increase of 4.280 in news consumption. Hence, there is strong evidence of an association between the two variables. Finally, we found all curves to have the same slope -2LL of parallel lines X2 (1) = 3.019, p-value 0.082. Hence, accepting the null hypothesis of proportional odds assumption that the odds ratios across all categories are the same.

In sum, following influencers' Facebook pages was a significant positive predictor of news consumption. Whereas every unit increase in following influencers' Facebook pages, there is a 1.454 increase in the log-odds of being at a higher level on news consumption, p < 0.001. In addition, the odds ratio indicates that the odds of being at a higher level on news consumption increase by a factor of 4.280 for every unit increase in following influencers' Facebook pages.

7.2.3.1 Testing Hypothesis 1: USA

Our initial findings in the USA showed a weak positive correlation between following influencers' Facebook pages and encountering news posts while skipping one's newsfeed rho= 0.461, p<0.001, and a moderate positive correlation with reading news briefly on Facebook rho=0.540, p < 0.001. Also, there is a moderate positive correlation between following influencers' Facebook pages and reading the details of the news rho= 0.611, p <.001 (Table 35).

We run the correlation test between the two newly created variables of following influencers' Facebook pages and news consumption on Facebook of the collected data in the USA. Results showed that there is a moderate positive relationship rho=0.613, p<0.001. This finding means that the more Americans follow influencers' Facebook pages, the more they consume news on Facebook. In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association.

Table 35. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation - USA

Item	Spearman's rho	Following influencers' Facebook pages - Composite variable
News Consumption on Facebook - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.613**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
How often do you find news posts while skipping your Facebook newsfeed? (1) means Never and (10) means Always	Correlation Coefficient	.461**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
How frequently do you read the news posts that you encounter at least briefly (i.e. headline). while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed?	Correlation Coefficient	.540**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
How often do you read the details of the news posts that you encounter while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed?	Correlation Coefficient	.611**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
How many of the news posts that you encounter on Facebook comes from the shared posts of your friends. family relatives. and/or other people you follow?	Correlation Coefficient	.433**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436

We used ordinal logistic regression to expand our understanding of the relation between the dependent and independent variables. Following influencers' Facebook pages in the ordinal regression analysis, the predictor variable contributes to the model. Based on the ordinal regression results, the explanatory variable X improves the model, due to variation decreased from 226.347 to 32.785, X2 (1) = 193.562, $p < 0.001$. This result suggests that there is a significant difference between the baseline model to the final model.

In addition to the significance of the model result, we found the goodness of fit insignificant Pearson X2 (3) = 4.61, P=0.202. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the observed data is consistent with the fitted model.

Further, the parameter estimates had a positive effect B=1.759, SE= (1.42), Wald= (153.038), $p < 0.001$. Thus, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (1.759) = 5.804, 95%) CI (4.387,7.679) for every unit increase of the independent variable. This finding suggests that for every 1 unit increase in terms of following influencers' Facebook pages, there is a predicted increase of 5.804 in news consumption. Hence, there is strong evidence of an association between the two variables. Finally, we found that all curves have the same slope -2LL of parallel lines X2

(1) = 0.022, p-value 0.883. Hence, accepting the null hypothesis of proportional odds assumes that the odds ratios across all categories are the same.

In sum, following influencers' Facebook pages was a significant positive predictor of news consumption in the USA. Whereas every unit increase in following influencers' Facebook pages, there is a 1.759 increase in the log-odds of being at a higher level on news consumption, $p < 0.001$. In addition, the odds ratio indicates that the odds of being at a higher level on news consumption increases by a factor of 5.804 for every unit increase in following influencers' Facebook pages.

7.2.3.2 Testing Hypothesis 1: Spain

Our initial results in Spain showed a minimum positive correlation between following influencers' Facebook pages and encountering news posts while skipping one's newsfeed rho= 0.257, $p<0.001$, and a weak positive correlation with reading news briefly on Facebook rho=0.327, $p < 0.001$. Also, there is a weak positive correlation between following influencers' Facebook pages and reading the details of the news rho= 0.461, $p <0.001$ (Table 36).

We run the correlation test between the two newly created variables of (following influencers' Facebook pages) and (news consumption). Results showed a weak positive association rho=0.402, $p<0.001$. This finding means that the more people follow influencers' Facebook pages, the more they will consume news on Facebook. In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association.

Table 36. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation - Spain

Item	Spearman's rho	Following influencers' Facebook pages - Composite variable
News Consumption on Facebook - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.402**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	437
How often do you find news posts while skipping your Facebook newsfeed? (1) means Never and (10) means Always	Correlation Coefficient	.257**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
How frequently do you read the news posts that you encounter at least briefly (i.e. headline). while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed?	Correlation Coefficient	.327**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	437
How often do you read the details of the news posts that you encounter while	Correlation Coefficient	.461**

skipping through your Facebook newsfeed?	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	437
How many of the news posts that you encounter on Facebook comes from the shared posts of your friends. family relatives. and/or other people you follow?	Correlation Coefficient	.233**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	437
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		
a. Where do you live? = Spain		

Based on the obtained results and to better understand the independent variable effect on the dependent variable, ordinal logistic regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between following influencers' Facebook pages and news consumption. Following influencers' Facebook pages (scale) in the ordinal regression analysis, the predictor variable contributes to the model. Based on the ordinal regression results; the explanatory variable X improves the model because of variation decrease from 113.13 to 38.157, X2 (1) = 75.056, $p < 0.001$. This finding suggests that there is a significant difference between the baseline model to the final model.

Further, the parameter estimates had a positive effect B=1.032, SE= (0.125), Wald= (68.562), $p < .001$. Thus, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (1.032) = 2.805, 95%) CI (2.200,3.578) for every unit increase of the independent variable. This result means that for every 1 unit increase in terms of following influencers' Facebook pages, there is a predicted increase of 2.805 in news consumption. Hence, there is strong evidence of an association between the two variables in Spain.

In sum, following influencers' Facebook pages was a significant positive predictor of news consumption. Whereas every unit increase in following influencers' Facebook pages, there is a 1.032 increase in the log-odds of being at a higher level on news consumption, $p < 0.001$. In addition, the odds ratio indicates that the odds of being at a higher level on news consumption increase by a factor of 42.805 for every unit increase in following influencers' Facebook pages.

7.2.3.3 Testing Hypothesis 1: Egypt

Like previous results in the USA and Spain, our data analysis in Egypt revealed a weak correlation between following influencers' Facebook pages and encountering news posts while skipping one's newsfeed rho= 0.469, $p<0.001$; as well as reading news briefly on Facebook rho=0.470, $p < 0.001$. Further, there is a moderate positive correlation between following influencers' Facebook pages and reading the details of the news rho= 0.546, $p <0.001$ (Table 37).

Spearman's correlation test results showed a moderate positive correlation between following influencers' Facebook pages and news consumption rho=0.583, p<0.001. Hence, the more Egyptians follow such pages, the more they will consume news. In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association.

Table 37. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation - Egypt

Item	Spearman's rho	Following influencers' Facebook pages - Composite variable
News Consumption on Facebook - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.583**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
How often do you find news posts while skipping your Facebook newsfeed? (1) means Never and (10) means Always	Correlation Coefficient	.469**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
How frequently do you read the news posts that you encounter at least briefly (i.e. headline). while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed?	Correlation Coefficient	.470**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
How often do you read the details of the news posts that you encounter while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed?	Correlation Coefficient	.546**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
How many of the news posts that you encounter on Facebook comes from the shared posts of your friends. family relatives. and/or other people you follow?	Correlation Coefficient	.491**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		
a. Where do you live? = Egypt		

We used ordinal logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship between following influencers' Facebook pages and news consumption. Following influencers' Facebook pages (scale) in the ordinal regression analysis, the predictor variable contributes to the model. Based on the ordinal regression results, the explanatory variable X improves the model, because of variation decrease from 198.803 to 29.082, X2 (1) = 169.721, p < 0.001. This finding suggests that there is a significant difference between the baseline model to the final model. In addition, we found the goodness of fit insignificant Pearson X2 (3) = 0.305, P=0.959. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the observed data is consistent with the fitted model.

Further, the parameter estimates had a positive effect B=1.571, SE= (0.134), Wald= (138.045), p < 0.001. Thus, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (1.571) = 4.810, 95%) CI (3.700,6.253) for every unit increase of the independent variable. This result means that for every 1 unit increase in terms of following influencers' Facebook pages, there is a predicted increase of 4.810 in news consumption. Hence, there is strong evidence of an association between the two variables. Finally, we found all curves to have the same slope -2LL of parallel lines X2 (1) = 0.157, p-value 0.692. Hence, accepting the null hypothesis of proportional odds assumption that the odds ratios across all categories are the same in Egypt.

In sum, following influencers' Facebook pages was a significant positive predictor of news consumption. Whereas every unit increase in following influencers' Facebook pages, there is a 1.571 increase in the log-odds of being at a higher level on news consumption, p < 0.001. In addition, the odds ratio indicates that the odds of being at a higher level on news consumption increase by a factor of 4.810 for every unit increase in following influencers' Facebook pages.

7.3 Cultivation effect of influencers' Facebook pages on threat perception

In this section (Q13-Q15), we aim to explore hypothesis 2 stating that there is a positive correlation between the extent of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the degree of perceived threat cultivated among young adults. Through this category, we should measure the overall feeling of threat (dependent variable), followed by a set of items portraying the dangers that people might fear or encounter (this set of threats is highly present in the circulated news). In addition, we aim to examine the mean world syndrome and the cultivational impact of Facebook through the last set of questions. Later, we conducted several statistical tests to understand the correlation between the participants' answers and the ability to report their level of safety and their news consumption. To measure this, we used a 10-point scale which we recodified into 5 points on the SPSS. Later, we recodified these variables into three categories to label the sample as not threatened, somehow threatened, and threatened.

In this sense, the dependent variable we aim to examine is threat perception and the independent variable is news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages.

7.3.1 The cultivation effect of threat perception

We used 10 points rating scale from 1-10 to get more precise answers; we then recoded them into 5 points Likert scale. To categorize participants into not threatened, somehow threatened, and threatened, as the cultivation theory postulates, we had to recodify the variables into 3 points Likert scale. However, to avoid losing valuable data, we integrated the 3 points Likert scale and the 5 points Likert scale analysis to enrich the results and provide in-depth analysis. It is worth noting that we used several non-parametric statistical measures as the data is asymmetrical. These tests include the Kruskal Wallis test, Spearman's, ordinal logistic regression, and T-Test for finding consistency and correlation and testing our alternate hypotheses.

7.3.1.1 Individual sense of safety

On a continuum from 1-10, we asked participants to indicate the level of safety they generally feel while living in their country (Egypt/Spain/US), where 1 is less safe and 10 is very safe. This question examines the people's ability to express their overall feeling of safety in relevance to their news exposure on Facebook. We compared the consistency between their general sense of security and their fear on the list of items they might encounter in daily life through the answers to this question. It is worth noting that data was recoded into 5 points Likert scale: very unsafe, unsafe, neutral, safe, and very safe.

The data is left-skewed, Kolmogorov Smirnov is significant <0.001, with Kurtosis -307 (should be around 3) and Skewness -0.675, which should be about 0 to be normally distributed (M= 3.67; SD= 1.140). Descriptive statistics showed more than 60% of the participants either feel very safe or safe living in their country, with the following: (36.4%) safe, (26.4%) very safe, (20.6%) neutral, (11%) unsafe, and only (5.5%) very unsafe (Table 38).

Table 38. Level of safety people generally feel

Item	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country	Unsafe	53	12.1%	81	18.6%	82	18.8%	216	16.5%
	Neutral	87	19.9%	76	17.4%	107	24.5%	270	20.6%
	Safe	297	68.0%	279	64.0%	247	56.7%	823	62.9%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

Our data analysis showed (65%) of both sexes feel either very safe or safe, with more males (64.2%) than females (61.7%). Moreover, approximately (20.6%) feel neutral, and (16.5%) feel either very unsafe or unsafe across sex.

As for the age categories, we did not notice any significant difference across all age segments, yet 25-29 years reported a higher percentage (30.6%) in comparison to others in terms of feeling very safe, followed by 35 years (27.4%), 18-24 years (24.9%), and 30-34 years (23.2%).

The distribution was almost the same across education categories. However, we found some variances with doctoral degree holders achieving the highest score in feeling very safe (66.2%) followed by master's degree holders (34.1%). On the other hand, almost (50%) of those who have "other" education feel either unsafe or very unsafe, followed by high school (38.5%) and elemental studies (26.8%).

We observed significant differences across political ideologies. There is more than (79%) of the right side either very safe (42.4%) or safe (37.5%). In contrast, the other two ideologies have close percentages, with the left (28.4%) outweighing the center (55.7%) in terms of feeling safe or very safe. We observed that (19.4%) left are either unsafe (12.5%) or very unsafe (6.9%). Also, there is (25.7%) center followed by (22.1%) left and (10.4%) right-wing participants, neutral.

An initial analysis showed that the USA (18.9%) is the highest in either feeling unsafe (12.2%) or very unsafe (6.7%), followed by Egypt (18.6%) and Spain (12.1%). On the contrary, we noticed that Spain (68%) is the highest in feeling either safe (49%) or very safe (19%), followed by Egypt (63.9%) and the USA (56.7%). We analyzed this part in detail in each country.

Measuring the safety level in relevance to news consumption on Facebook, we found that more than (76%) of heavy Facebook news consumers feel safe (44.7%) or very safe (31.8%) followed by medium (66.7%) and light (51.3%). On the other side, light news consumers on Facebook (23.9%) are the most likely to feel unsafe (23.9%) or very unsafe (7.7%).

As for the frequency of news consumption on influencers' pages, we found more than (78%) of heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages feel safe (36%) or (42.1%) very safe. Also, (59%) of medium consumers on such pages feel either safe (41%) or very safe (18%). In addition, (52%) of light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages, feel either safe (32.7%) or very safe (19.6%). In comparison, around (25%) of light news consumers on such pages feel unsafe (7.4%) or very unsafe (16.8%)—followed by medium (15.5%) while heavy represented only (5.8%). Further analysis showed that most heavy (78%), medium (59%), and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (52.3%) reported feeling safe (Table 39).

Table 39. News consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and feeling safe

Spain									
Item	Response	Light news consumers		Medium news consumers		Heavy news consumers		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Level of safety you generally feel	Unsafe	28	21.5%	18	10.7%	7	5.0%	53	12.1%
	Neutral	28	21.5%	40	23.8%	19	13.7%	87	19.9%
	Safe	74	56.9%	110	65.5%	113	81.3%	297	68.0%
Total		130	100.0%	168	100.0%	139	100.0%	437	100.0%
Egypt									
Level of safety you generally feel	Unsafe	32	22.2%	24	18.9%	25	15.2%	81	18.6%
	Neutral	29	20.1%	25	19.7%	22	13.3%	76	17.4%
	Safe	83	57.6%	78	61.4%	118	71.5%	279	64.0%
Total		144	100.0%	127	100.0%	165	100.0%	436	100.0%
USA									
Level of safety you generally feel	Unsafe	51	27.6%	23	18.1%	8	6.5%	82	18.8%
	Neutral	51	27.6%	43	33.9%	13	10.5%	107	24.5%
	Safe	83	44.9%	61	48.0%	103	83.1%	247	56.7%
Total		185	100.0%	127	100.0%	124	100.0%	436	100.0%
General									
Level of safety you generally feel	Unsafe	111	24.2%	65	15.4%	40	9.3%	216	16.5%
	Neutral	108	23.5%	108	25.6%	54	12.6%	270	20.6%
	Safe	240	52.3%	249	59.0%	334	78.0%	823	62.9%
Total		459	100.0%	422	100.0%	428	100.0%	1309	100.0%

7.3.1.1.1 Individual sense of safety: USA

The data collected in the USA is asymmetrical with Kurtosis -0.593, Skewness -0.521, (M= 3.58; SD=1.190). More than (56%) of the American participants feel either safe (30.3%) or very safe (26.4%) living in their own country and (24.5%) neutral, whereas (18.8%) feel either unsafe (12.2%) or very unsafe (6.7%) (Table 38).

There were minor variances between American males and females, whereas (58.4%) of males and (53.9%) of females were very safe or safe. In addition, more males (19%) than females (18.6%) feel unsafe or very safe. On the other side, females (27.5%) outdid males (22.7%) in feeling neutral.

Even though we noticed that (49.2%) of the younger age segment 18-24 years feel safe, yet about (16.9%) feel unsafe and (33.8%) of them are neutral. It is worth noting that 25-29 years are the highest across all other age segments in terms of feeling safe (61.9%) followed by 30-34 years (56.6%) while 35 years have the least score to feel safe with (48.8%). Further, 35 years have the highest percentage of feeling very unsafe or unsafe (27.9%), preceded by 30-34 years (18.5%), and 25-29 years (17.4%).

As for the education segments' level of feeling safe in the USA, we noticed that (95.3%) of those who hold doctoral degrees feel either safe or very safe, followed by master's degrees (82.5%), bachelor's degrees (60.4%), undergraduate students (49.1%), not educated (46.4%), and elemental studies (38.5%). Furthermore, the highest among all education segments who feel unsafe or very unsafe is elementary studies (33.8%), followed by undergraduate students (20%) and uneducated (21.4%). Moreover, (32.1%) uneducated, (30.9%) undergraduate students, (27.7%) elemental studies, (27.7%) bachelor's degree, (15%) master's degree, and (2.3%) doctoral degree feel neutral.

On the political ideology, results showed that (75.5%) of right-side participants feel either safe or very safe, compared to (49.2%) left and (46.2%) center. Moreover, (24.2%) of the left preceded by the center (21.3%) and the right (11.2%) feel very unsafe or unsafe. It is worth noting that center-wing participants are the most to feel neutral (32.5%) followed by the left (26.6%) and the right (13.3%).

In connection with news consumption on Facebook in the USA, we found that heavy news consumers are the least to feel unsafe. Thus, there is (78.4%) of heavy, (62.9%) of medium, and (43.1%) of light news consumers on Facebook feel either safe or very safe. Relatedly, (25.7%) light, (14.7%) heavy, and (9.5%) medium news consumers feel either very unsafe or unsafe. Additionally, (31.2%) of light news consumers feel neutral compared to (27.6%) of medium and (6.9%) of heavy. Also, there are (83.1%) heavy, medium (48%), and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (44.9%) who feel either safe or very safe. On the contrary, light (27.6%), medium (18.1%), and heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (6.5%) feel either unsafe or unsafe. The highest score to feel neutral is among medium news consumers on influencers'' Facebook pages (33.9%) followed by light (27.6%) and heavy (10.5%). Hence, our analysis showed that most heavy (83%), medium (48%), and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (44.9%) reported feeling safe (Table 39).

7.3.1.1.2 Individual sense of safety: Spain

The data collected in Spain is asymmetrical, Kurtosis 0.337, Skewness -0.776 (M= 3.72; SD=0.967). We found (2.7%) very unsafe, (9.4%) unsafe, (19.9%) neutral, (49%) safe, and (19%) very safe. Thus, (68%) of Spanish participants feel very safe or safe, followed by neutral (19.9%), and only (12.1%) either feel very unsafe or unsafe (Table 38).

We noticed more Spanish females to feel unsafe or very unsafe (12.9%) as well as neutral (21%) than males (10.4%) who feel unsafe or very unsafe, and (18.3%) neutral. On the other side, (71.3%) of males and (66.1%) of females feel safe or very safe.

We found that 30-34 years are the most across age segments to feel unsafe or very unsafe (14.8%) as well as neutral (24.5%), followed by 35 years (12%) who feel unsafe or very unsafe and (20%) neutral, 25-29 years (11.8%) feel unsafe or very unsafe and (18.5%) neutral. In comparison, the least score is among 18-24 years (8.8%) to feel either unsafe or very unsafe and (15%) neutral. Likewise, 18-24 years were the highest to feel either safe or very safe with (76.1%), 25-29 years (69.7%), 35 years (68%), and 30-34 years (60.6%).

As for the education segments, we noticed that most of them feel safe or very safe, with the highest score among doctoral (85.7%), master's (74.1%), bachelor's degree holders (73%), undergraduate (63%), and elemental studies (60.6%). However, (21.2%) of those who hold elementary studies, (14.3%) undergraduate students, (9.5%) bachelor's degrees, (7.1%) doctoral, and (5.2%) master's degrees, either feel unsafe or very unsafe. It is worth noting that (22.8%) of undergraduate students and (20.7%) of master's degree holders feel neutral; followed by elemental studies (18.2%), bachelor's degree (17.5%), and doctoral degree holders (7.1%).

The right-wing participants in Spain were the highest in feeling either safe or very safe (80%), followed by the left (65.6%) and the center (64.9%). We did not notice major differences in feeling unsafe or very unsafe, with the center (12.4%), the left (12.3%), and the right (11.3%). Besides, the left (22.1%) and the center (22.7%), have almost the same percentage in feeling neutral, with (0.6%) difference points; while the right had the lowest score (8.8%), in terms of feeling neutral.

By examining feeling safe in relevance to news consumption on Facebook in Spain, we found the least percentage of feeling safe is among light news consumers on Facebook (58.1%), followed by medium (72.3%) and heavy (74.1%). In other words, light news consumers were the highest in feeling unsafe or very unsafe (20.9%), followed by heavy (9.5%) and medium (6.4%). There were almost equal percentages among news consumption levels regarding feeling neutral. With the lowest

score among heavy (16.4%) and the highest score among the medium (21.4%) followed by the light (20.9%).

Within the same framework, there are (81.3%) heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages who feel safe or very safe; with (15.8%) difference points between medium news consumers (65.5%); and (24.4%) difference points with light (56.9%). Also, heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have the least score to feel either very unsafe or unsafe (5%), followed by medium (10.7%) and light (21.5%). Hence, our analysis showed that most heavy (81.3%), medium (65.5%), and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (56.9%) reported feeling safe (Table 39).

7.3.1.1.3 Individual sense of safety: Egypt

The data collected in Egypt is asymmetrical with Kurtosis -0.502, Skewness -0.724, (M= 3.72; SD=1.241). About (63%) of the sample feel safe (30%) or very safe (33%), and (18.6%) feel unsafe with (7.1%) unsafe and (11.5%) very unsafe; finally, (17.4%) feel neutral (Table 38).

We did not notice significant variances across sex. There are (66.2%) of males and (62.2%) of females who feel very safe or safe. Also, (20.7%) of females and (16%) of males feel very unsafe or unsafe. Both have almost the exact percentages of feeling neutral, with (17.8%) of males and (17.1%) of females.

Likewise, there is (65%) across all age categories in Egypt who feel either very safe or safe. We noticed that the younger age segment 18-24 years are the highest in terms of feeling either very unsafe or unsafe (22.4%), followed by 25-29 years (17.4%), 30-34 years (16.1%), and the least score is among those aged 35 years (15%). We observed the highest score across 18-24 years (20.3%) and the least across 25-29 years (13.7%) in terms of feeling neutral.

We observed that those with doctoral degrees are the highest in feeling either safe or very safe (87.5%), followed by bachelor's degrees (66.7%), and master's degrees (57.1%). Even though (54.7%) of the undergraduate students feel either safe or very safe, (30.2%) said they feel unsafe or very unsafe, and (15.1%) feel neutral. It is worth noting that the highest segment that feels neutral is across master's degree holders (25%), followed by bachelor's degrees (17%).

We found that right-wing participants are the highest in feeling either safe or very safe (84.7%), followed by the left (58%) and the center (54.9%). In addition, the highest to feel either very unsafe or unsafe is the left (26.1%), followed by the center (21.9%), and the right (7.3%). In like manner, (23.2%) center, (15.9%) left, and (8.1%) right-wing participants feel neutral.

Our results showed that (77%) of heavy news consumers on Facebook feel either very safe or safe, followed by medium (63%) and light (55.7%). On the contrary, (24.4%) of light news consumers on Facebook, (16.7%) medium, and (12.3%) heavy, either feel unsafe or very unsafe. As for feeling neutral, the highest score was found among medium (20.3%), followed by light (19.9%), and heavy (10.7%).

Similarly, heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (71.5%) are less frightened compared to medium (61.4%) and light (57.6%). Hence, the highest percentage across the three categories who feel either unsafe or very unsafe is among light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (22.2%) followed by medium (18.9%) and heavy is the least (18.6%). Therefore, our analysis demonstrates that most heavy (71.5%), medium (61.4%), and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (57.6%) reported feeling safe (Table 39).

7.3.1.2 Analysis of the individuals' sense of safety

We run Spearman's rho correlation test to find an association between news consumption on Facebook and the general feeling of safety. We found a positive correlation between news consumption on Facebook and feeling safe rho= 0.247, p< 0.001. This result means that the more people consume news on Facebook, the more they feel safe. Similarly, a positive correlation exists between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the general feeling of safety rho= 0.250, p < 0.001 (Table 40).

Table 40. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between individual sense of safety, news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages

Item	Spearman's rho	Indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country
Composite variable - News consumption on Facebook	Correlation Coefficient	.247**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
Composite variable - News consumption on influencers' Facebook pages	Correlation Coefficient	.250**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		

7.3.1.2.1 Analysis of the individual' sense of safety: USA

In the USA, we found a weak positive correlation between news consumption on Facebook and level of safety rho=0.332, p<0.001. Likewise, there is a positive relationship between the level of safety and news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages rho=0.357, p<0.001 (Table 41).

Table 41. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between individual sense of safety, news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages - USA

Item	Spearman's rho	Indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country
Composite variable - News consumption on Facebook	Correlation Coefficient	.332**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
Composite variable - News consumption on influencers' Facebook pages	Correlation Coefficient	.357**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		
a. Where do you live? = USA		

7.3.1.2.2 Analysis of the individuals' sense of safety: Spain

In Spain, there is a positive correlation between news consumption on Facebook and level of safety rho=0.185, p<0.001. Likewise, there is a positive relationship between the level of safety and news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages rho=0.272, p<0.001 (Table 42).

Table 42. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between individual sense of safety, news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages - Spain

Item	Spearman's rho	Indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country
Composite variable - News consumption on Facebook	Correlation Coefficient	.185**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	437
Composite variable - News consumption on influencers' Facebook pages	Correlation Coefficient	.272**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	437
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		
a. Where do you live? = Spain		

7.3.1.2.3 Analysis of the individuals' sense of safety: Egypt

In Egypt, our analysis showed a positive correlation between news consumption on Facebook and level of safety rho=0.196, p<0.001. Likewise, there is a positive relationship between the level of safety and news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages rho=0.112, p<0.001 (Table 43).

Table 43. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between individual sense of safety, news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages - Egypt

Item	Spearman's rho	Indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country
Composite variable - News consumption on Facebook	Correlation Coefficient	.196**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
Composite variable - News consumption on influencers' Facebook pages	Correlation Coefficient	.112**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.010
	N	436
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		
a. Where do you live? = Egypt		

7.3.1.3 List of items representing sources of threat

In question 14, we asked participants to express their attitude (1-10, where one strongly disagrees and ten strongly agree) toward a set of statements portraying threats that people might fear or encounter (this set of threats are highly present in the circulated news). This question aims at measuring which of these items represents a threat to participants. We recoded the answers into 3 points on the Likert scale disagree, neutral, and agree.

Adding to the former question, (35.5%) of participants are afraid about their family's general safety, (21.8%) felt neutral, and (42.6%) are not afraid (M= 1.93; SD is 0.882) (Table 44). It is worth noting that (33.9%) of those who feel either safe or very safe living in their country are worried about their family's general safety.

The highest threat among the surveyed sample is the spread of diseases with (52.7%) either agreeing or strongly agreeing (M= 2.27; SD= 0.845). This source of the threat was followed by the country's

economic performance, with (44%) either agreeing or strongly agreeing (M= 2.12; SD=0.86) and the COVID-19 pandemic, with (40.8%) (M=2.06; SD=0.871) (Table 44).

On the other side, the least perceived threat among participants is fear of bombs and explosives that they might encounter, with (52.6%) either strongly disagreeing or disagreeing (M= 1.79; SD=0.892)—followed by lack of free speech and democratic rights (34.6%) (M= 1.91; SD=0.881) (Table 44).

About the COVID-19 pandemic, around (50%) of the participants think that publishing more news related to Covid- 19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people, whereas (23.5%) are neutral (M= 2.21; SD=0.849). Further, more than (53%) think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of COVID-19 (M= 2.32). Nearly (39.2%) either disagree or strongly disagree that most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is fabricated, fake, and misleading, whereas (32.2%) either agree or strongly agree (M=1.93; SD=0.842) (Table 44).

We noticed some differences between males and females where the top perceived threat items for both are the same. This finding includes the spread of diseases with females (56.1%) exceeding males (49.2%); economic performance, (48.9%) females excelling (38.9%) males; COVID-19 pandemic, (43.5%) females overtopping (38.1%) males.

The fourth perceived threat item for females who agreed or strongly agreed, is the family's safety, with (42.3%) surpassing males (13.8%). Even though the lack of free speech and democratic rights among females (35.2%) was higher, it is ranked as the last perceived threat item, yet was the fourth perceived threat item among males (34.2%). The sixth item for females (37.3%) was the seventh for males (25.2%) which is the fear of bombs and explosives. It is worth noting that males did not exceed (50%) on all the items mentioned above, unlike females whose answers varied between (57%) and (35.2%).

As for the Covid pandemic, more than (50%) of males and (57%) of females think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19. Also, around (50%) of both think that publishing more news related to Covid-19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people. Yet, most males (42%) and females (36.5%) disagree or strongly disagree that most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is either fabricated, fake, or misleading.

By examining the variances across age categories, the most significant finding is that more than (40%) of 25-29 years are afraid about their family's general safety compared to other ages. Even though the COVID-19 pandemic is a significant threat across most age categories, (43%) of 18-24

years do not think it threatens their lives. There were no significant differences across education categories, except that some scored higher than others. For instance, feeling afraid about the family's general safety and lack of free speech and democratic rights were very high across doctoral degree holders.

We noticed some differences across political ideologies categories. Such variances were evident among right participants who scored high in some items. In other words, they perceived almost all items to be sources of threat, unlike different political ideologies. For instance, (49.3%) of right participants fear bombs and explosives, unlike the majority of left and center wings. Similar, (52.4%) of right participants are afraid about their family's general safety, and (49.3%) are threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.

We observed insightful percentages across the three analyzed countries. Even though fear of bombs and explosives was not labeled as a source of threat across the three countries, some scored much higher, with (60%) Egypt, (56%) the USA, and (43%) Spain either strongly disagreeing or disagreeing. Further, unlike the majority in Spain and Egypt, (41.1%) of Americans think that most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is fake, fabricated, and misleading. Although most of the three countries believe there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises, the US scored higher among those who disagree or strongly disagreed, with (28.4%) the USA, (18.1%) Spain, and (17.9%) Egypt.

By exploring the differences across news consumers on Facebook, we found that heavy news consumers either achieved a higher score than medium and light or perceived some items as threats, unlike most medium and light news consumers. In this respect, (50%) of heavy news consumers on Facebook fear bombs and explosives, unlike the majority of medium (31.4%) and light(19.4%) who disagree or strongly disagree. Similarly, (53.5%) of heavy news consumers on Facebook are afraid about their family's general safety unlike the majority of the two categories, who are not worried. Further, (53.2%) of heavy news consumers fear the lack of free speech, unlike medium (32.1%) and light (24.9%). It is worth noting that the majority of medium (38.2%) and heavy news consumers (59.1%) perceive the COVID-19 pandemic as a threat to their life unlike most light news consumers (31.4%).

On the other hand, heavy news consumers have higher percentages on other items, including perceiving economic performance as a source of threat, with (59.1%) heavy, (45.4%) medium, and (33.4%) light. The spread of disease is an imminent threat, with (69.4%) heavy news consumers. Publishing more news related to COVID-19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people, with (60.9%) heavy, (51.1%) medium, and (39.3%) light.

Last, more than (70%) of heavy news consumers, (54.3%) medium, and (41.3%) light think there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of COVID-19. The majority of heavy news consumers (44.1%) think most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is fabricated, fake, and misleading, unlike the majority of medium (42.6%) and light (39.1%) who disagree or strongly disagree.

As for the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and threat items, most heavy news consumers scored high on almost all threat items. The data showed that many heavy news consumers on these pages (54.7%) are worried about their family's general safety in comparison to medium (24.6%) and light news consumers (27.7%). While most light (50%) and medium news consumers (48.1%) are not worried (Table 45). Moreover, most heavy news consumers (51.4%) compared to medium (28%) and light (25.1%) are threatened by a lack of free speech and democratic rights. While the majority of medium (47.2%) and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (51.2%) are not threatened (Table 46).

Table 44. List of threat items scale

Item	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
I fear from bombs and explosives that I may encounter any time.	Disagree	187	42.8%	259	59.4%	243	55.7%	689	52.6%
	Neutral	79	18.1%	56	12.8%	74	17.0%	209	16.0%
	Agree	171	39.1%	121	27.8%	119	27.3%	411	31.4%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0 %	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
I feel threatened by the economic performance of the country.	Disagree	108	24.7%	173	39.7%	133	30.5%	414	31.6%
	Neutral	102	23.3%	101	23.2%	116	26.6%	319	24.4%
	Agree	227	51.9%	162	37.2%	187	42.9%	576	44.0%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0 %	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
I am afraid about my family's general safety.	Disagree	175	40.0%	200	45.9%	183	42.0%	558	42.6%
	Neutral	100	22.9%	81	18.6%	105	24.1%	286	21.8%
	Agree	162	37.1%	155	35.6%	148	33.9%	465	35.5%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0 %	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	Disagree	195	44.6%	196	45.0%	181	41.5%	572	43.7%
	Neutral	125	28.6%	72	16.5%	87	20.0%	284	21.7%
	Agree	117	26.8%	168	38.5%	168	38.5%	453	34.6%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0 %	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
	Disagree	85	19.5%	135	31.0%	118	27.1%	338	25.8%

I think the spread of diseases is an imminent threat.	Neutral	108	24.7%	79	18.1%	94	21.6%	281	21.5%
	Agree	244	55.8%	222	50.9%	224	51.4%	690	52.7%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0 %	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
I think COVID-19 pandemic threatens my life.	Disagree	146	33.4%	159	36.5%	157	36.0%	462	35.3%
	Neutral	125	28.6%	100	22.9%	88	20.2%	313	23.9%
	Agree	166	38.0%	177	40.6%	191	43.8%	534	40.8%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0 %	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
I think most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is either fabricated. fake. and/or misleading.	Disagree	140	32.0%	235	53.9%	138	31.7%	513	39.2%
	Neutral	154	35.2%	102	23.4%	119	27.3%	375	28.6%
	Agree	143	32.7%	99	22.7%	179	41.1%	421	32.2%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0 %	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
I think publishing more news related to Covid- 19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people.	Disagree	98	22.4%	146	33.5%	119	27.3%	363	27.7%
	Neutral	108	24.7%	104	23.9%	96	22.0%	308	23.5%
	Agree	231	52.9%	186	42.7%	221	50.7%	638	48.7%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0 %	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
I think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid-19.	Disagree	79	18.1%	78	17.9%	124	28.4%	281	21.5%
	Neutral	110	25.2%	102	23.4%	121	27.8%	333	25.4%
	Agree	248	56.8%	256	58.7%	191	43.8%	695	53.1%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0 %	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

Table 45. Family's general safety and news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages

General									
Item	Response	Light news consumers		Medium news consumers		Heavy news consumers		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
I am afraid about my family's general safety.	Disagree	227	49.5%	203	48.1%	128	29.9%	558	42.6%
	Neutral	105	22.9%	115	27.3%	66	15.4%	286	21.8%
	Agree	127	27.7%	104	24.6%	234	54.7%	465	35.5%
Total		459	100.0%	422	100.0%	428	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Spain									

I am afraid about my family's general safety.	Disagree	52	40.0%	71	42.3%	52	37.4%	175	40.0%
	Neutral	36	27.7%	39	23.2%	25	18.0%	100	22.9%
	Agree	42	32.3%	58	34.5%	62	44.6%	162	37.1%
Total		130	100.0%	168	100.0%	139	100.0%	437	100.0%
Egypt									
I am afraid about my family's general safety.	Disagree	73	50.7%	75	59.1%	52	31.5%	200	45.9%
	Neutral	27	18.8%	31	24.4%	23	13.9%	81	18.6%
	Agree	44	30.6%	21	16.5%	90	54.5%	155	35.6%
Total		144	100.0%	127	100.0%	165	100.0%	436	100.0%
USA									
I am afraid about my family's general safety.	Disagree	102	55.1%	57	44.9%	24	19.4%	183	42.0%
	Neutral	42	22.7%	45	35.4%	18	14.5%	105	24.1%
	Agree	41	22.2%	25	19.7%	82	66.1%	148	33.9%
Total		185	100.0%	127	100.0%	124	100.0%	436	100.0%

Table 46. Lack of free speech and news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages

General									
Item	Response	Light news consumers		Medium news consumers		Heavy news consumers		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	Disagree	235	51.2%	199	47.2%	138	32.2%	572	43.7%
	Neutral	109	23.7%	105	24.9%	70	16.4%	284	21.7%
	Agree	115	25.1%	118	28.0%	220	51.4%	453	34.6%
Total		459	100.0%	422	100.0%	428	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Spain									
I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	Disagree	60	46.2%	78	46.4%	57	41.0%	195	44.6%
	Neutral	46	35.4%	45	26.8%	34	24.5%	125	28.6%
	Agree	24	18.5%	45	26.8%	48	34.5%	117	26.8%
Total		130	100.0%	168	100.0%	139	100.0%	437	100.0%
Egypt									
I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	Disagree	84	58.3%	67	52.8%	45	27.3%	196	45.0%
	Neutral	21	14.6%	24	18.9%	27	16.4%	72	16.5%
	Agree	39	27.1%	36	28.3%	93	56.4%	168	38.5%
Total		144	100.0%	127	100.0%	165	100.0%	436	100.0%
USA									
I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	Disagree	91	49.2%	54	42.5%	36	29.0%	181	41.5%
	Neutral	42	22.7%	36	28.3%	9	7.3%	87	20.0%
	Agree	52	28.1%	37	29.1%	79	63.7%	168	38.5%
Total		185	100.0%	127	100.0%	124	100.0%	436	100.0%

7.3.1.3.1 List of items representing sources of threat: USA

In the USA, our data showed (33.9%) of youths afraid about their family's general safety, while (24.1%) feel neutral and (42%) are not afraid (M = 1.92; SD= 0.869) (Table 44).

The top source of threat is the spread of diseases, with (51.4%) either agreeing or strongly agreeing (M= 2.24; SD= 0.853). This item was followed by the COVID-19 pandemic threat, with (43.8%) either agreeing or strongly agreeing (M= 2.08; SD= 0.891). Fear of the economic performance also received high percentages, with (42.9%) either agreeing or strongly agreeing (M= 2.21; SD= 0.849) (Table 44).

The majority of the USA participants did not perceive other items as sources of threat. For instance, (55.7%) disagreed or strongly disagreed that they fear bombs and explosives (M= 1.72; SD=0.867). Similarly, most participants didn't consider the lack of free speech and democratic rights a threat, with (41.5%) disagreeing, (20%) neutral, and (38.5%) agreeing (M=1.97; SD= 0.895) (Table 44).

Concerning the COVID-19 health crisis, we noticed that (41.1%) of the American youths agree that most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is either fake, misleading, or fabricated, whereas (27.3%) are neutral and (31.7%) disagree (M= 2.09; SD= 0.848). Nearly 50.7% think that publishing more news about the pandemic on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people (M= 2.23; SD= 0.852). Further, (44%) agree or strongly agree that there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis (M= 2.15; SD= 0.837) (Table 44).

Most American males (46.1%) and females (59.9%) consider the spread of diseases an imminent threat. As for females, economic performance is the second-highest source of danger, with (52.7%) and the third source of threat for males, with (36.8%) who agreed; whereas fear of COVID-19 is the second threat item that received the highest scores among males, with (40.5%) and females (49.1%). Only the majority of females (45.5%) are afraid about their family's general safety, while most males (48%) are not afraid. Lack of free speech was also a source of threat to many females (44.3%) compared to most males (44.2%) who strongly disagree or disagree.

There were slight differences in percentages regarding the COVID-19 pandemic in the USA. Both males (37.9%) and females (46.1%) agree or strongly agree that most of the circulated news about COVID-19 on Facebook is fake, misleading, and fabricated. Similarly, males (46.1%) and females (58.1%) think that such news coverage about COVID-19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic. Last, many males (42%) and females (46.7%) think there should be filters and specific policies on Facebook news coverage during a humanitarian crisis.

We noticed that all age categories are not afraid of bombs and explosives, with (57.6%) who either strongly disagree or disagree. Likewise, around (44.7%) disagree or strongly disagree that they are afraid about their family's general safety. However, those aged 25-29 years had almost equal percentages of either agreeing (38.1%) or disagreeing (38.7%).

Also, only the majority of 25-29 years consider the lack of free speech and democratic rights a source of threat, (42.6%); in comparison to most other age segments who disagree or strongly disagree.

On the contrary, most 25-29 years (47.1%) and 30-34 years (43.4%) consider the economic performance a source of threat; 18-24 years were equally divided between agree (33.8%) and disagree (33.8%). Yet, most of those aged 35 years (41.9%) do not perceive economic performance as a source of threat. In addition, around (55.2%) of all age segments except those aged 18-24 years (35.4%) think that the spread of diseases is an imminent threat. Further, there are (46.1%) believe that COVID-19 threatens their lives except for those aged 18-24 years, whereas the majority (52.3%) disagree or strongly disagree.

Around 40% across all age categories think most of the circulated news about COVID-19 on Facebook is fake, misleading, or fabricated. Likewise, (50%) of all age categories think that news coverage on Facebook about COVID-19 has spread fear and panic. Subsequently, (42.5%) think there should be specific policies and filters on Facebook news coverage during any humanitarian crisis across age categories.

Once again, about 57% across education segments are not afraid of bombs and explosives. Similarly, approximately 55% across all segments perceive the spread of diseases as an imminent threat except for most of the uneducated (42.9%) who do not. Moreover, most uneducated (39.3%), elemental studies (44.6%), undergraduate students (41.8%), and high school/equivalent degree (57.1%) strongly disagree or disagree that the COVID-19 pandemic threatens their lives. The majority of bachelor's (46.5%), master's (55%), doctoral (86%), and associate degree holders (50%) either strongly agree or agree that it threatens their lives.

As for economic performance as a source of threat, most elemental studies (50%) do not consider it a source of threat, whereas around 49% of other segments feel threatened by economic performance. In addition, many doctoral degree holders (88.4%) feel afraid about their family's general safety, unlike most other segments who are not worried (52.1%).

There are some variances related to lack of free speech and democratic rights, whereas most undergraduate students (40.9%), doctoral degree holders (81.4%), and high school or equivalent degrees (42.9%) are afraid of it. On the contrary, uneducated (57.1%), elemental studies (43.1%),

bachelor's degree (56.4%), and master's degree (55%) are not threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.

Regarding whether the American youths think most of the circulated news about COVID-19 is fake, misleading, or fabricated, most uneducated (39.3%), bachelor's degree (36.6%), master's degree (45%), and doctoral degree (83.7%) agree. On the other hand, many elemental studies (43.1%), high school/equivalent degree (42.9%), and associate degree (83.3%) strongly disagree or disagree. It is worth noting that most undergraduates (36.4%) are neutral and (34.5%) of them either agree or strongly agree.

Almost 54% of all education segments in the USA either agree or strongly agree that publishing more news about COVID-19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people. Yet the majority of associate degree holders (66.7%) either disagree or strongly disagree. Finally, most of the undergraduate students (40%), bachelor's degrees (46.5%), master's degrees (52.5%), doctoral degrees (79.1%), and high school/equivalent degrees (38.1%) either agree or strongly agree that there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis. In contrast, most of the elemental studies (38.5%) and associate degrees (100%) either disagree or strongly disagree, while the majority of uneducated (39.3%) are neutral.

We detected that (52%) of the three political ideologies participants in the USA either agree or strongly agree that the spread of diseases is an imminent threat. It is essential to point out that many right-wing participants scored very high on all threat items. Unlike the majority of the left (76.6%) and center-wing participants (56.2%) who are not afraid of bombs and explosives, (49%) of right-wing are worried. We found some differences across the three ideologies in terms of economic performance. Most right (62.2%) are threatened, while many center (34.3%) are neutral and left (38.7%) are not threatened. Also, most of the left (54.8%) and the center (44.4%) are not worried about their family's general safety, compared to the majority of right (54.5%) who are afraid. Likewise, about 60% of the right-wing compared to only (25.8%) left and (31.4%) center feel threatened by the lack of free speech.

In relevance to the spread of COVID-19, we found that (53.8%) of the right and (45.2%) of the left either agree or strongly agree that it threatens their lives. Unlike most of the center (40.8%) who disagree or strongly disagree that it threatens their lives.

Nearly 60% of the right-wing in the USA think that most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is fake, fabricated, or misleading; dissimilar to the majority of the left (40%) and the center (36.1%), who strongly disagree or disagree. Many of the right (68.5%) and the center (42.6%) either agree or strongly agree that publishing more news about COVID-19 on Facebook has spread

fear and panic among people, yet the left was equally divided between strongly agree or agree (41.1%) and strongly disagree or disagree (41.1%).

Additionally, the center varied between strongly agree or agree (34.9%) and neutral (34.9%), on whether there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis. Whereas (63.6%) of the right-wing either agree or strongly agree and (37.1%) of the left are neutral.

Akin to previously stated results, data demonstrates that heavy news consumers on Facebook scored very high on all items. In this regard, (63.7%) heavy, (24.1%) medium, and (11.9%) light, fear bombs and explosives. Also, (66%) heavy and (43.1%) medium news consumers compared to light (32.1%) feel threatened by the economic performance. Most heavy news consumers scored very high in feeling worried about their family's general safety (66.7%) unlike light (17.9%) and medium (35.3%). Also, (66.7%) heavy, (37.1%) medium, and (26.1%) light news consumers feel threatened by the lack of free speech. Notably, all three categories scored very high on perceiving the spread of diseases as an imminent threat, with (76.5%) heavy, (52.6%) medium, and (39%) light either agree or strongly agree. Merely the majority of heavy (73.5%) and medium (42.2%) either agree or strongly agree that COVID-19 threatens their lives, whereas the majority of light (44.5%) strongly disagree or disagree.

Similarly, most heavy (61.8%) and medium news consumers (39.7%) in the USA agree or strongly agree that the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is fake, misleading, or fabricated. In contrast, many light news consumers are divided between either strongly disagree or disagree (33%) and (34.9%) neutral. However, around 56% across the three categories think that publishing more news on Facebook has spread fear and panic. In addition, (68.6%) heavy, (48.3%) medium, and (29.8%) light think there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis.

Consistent with news consumption on Facebook findings, we noticed that heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages scored high on all items. In this sense, (64.5%) heavy, (7.9%) medium, and (15.7%) light fear bombs and explosives. There are (63.7%) heavy and (36.8%) medium who feel threatened by the economic performance. Yet, most medium news consumers (36.2%) are not threatened by the economic performance. Heavy news consumers scored very high (66.1%) on feeling afraid about their family's general safety compared to medium (19.7%) and light (22.2%). Similarly, (63.7%) heavy, (29.1%) medium, and (28.1%) light either agree or strongly agree about being threatened by a lack of free speech. It is worth mentioning that most medium news consumers (42.5%) and light (49.2%) strongly disagree or disagree on the abovementioned.

The three categories of heavy (73.4%), medium (42.5%), and light (42.7%) in the USA scored very high in agreeing or strongly agreeing that the spread of diseases is an imminent threat. In connection, (74.2%) of heavy, (37%) medium, and (28.1%) light, think that COVID-19 threatens their lives; however, most light (49.7%) and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (37%) either disagree or strongly disagree.

As for Facebook news coverage on COVID-19 in the USA, (58.1%) heavy and (34.6%) medium think that the circulated news about COVID-19 on Facebook is fake, fabricated, or misleading. In comparison, most light (37.8%) either disagree or strongly disagree.

On the other hand, around 52.1% of the three categories think that publishing more news about COVID-19 has spread fear and panic. Also, (75%) of heavy, (37.8%) of the medium, and (27%) of light agree or strongly agree that there should be filters and specific policies for new coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis. In addition, (41.1%) light, (25.2%) medium, and (12.9%) heavy, either strongly disagree or disagree on the abovementioned; similarly, there is a relatively high percentage among light (31.9%) and medium (37%) in terms of being neutral.

It is worth noting that we checked the frequencies of some threat items among heavy, medium, and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages in the USA. For instance, we found that many heavy news consumers on these pages (66.1%) are worried about their family's general safety in comparison to medium (19.7%) and light news consumers (22.2%). While most light (55.1%) and medium news consumers (44.9%) are not worried (Table 45).

Moreover, we found many heavy news consumers (63.7%) compared to medium (29.1%) and light (28.1%) are threatened by a lack of free speech and democratic rights. While the majority of medium (42.5%) and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (49.2%) are not threatened (Table 45).

7.3.1.3.2 List of items representing sources of threat: Spain

Regarding Q13, our collected data in Spain revealed that there are (37.1%) of youths reported feeling afraid about their family's general safety, while (22.9%) feel neutral and (40%) are not afraid (M= 1.97; SD= 0.879). It is worth noting that (47.2%) of those who feel generally unsafe, (48.3%) who feel neutral, and (32%) safe, are afraid of their family's general safety (Table 44).

The highest threat item among the Spanish youths is the spread of diseases, with (55.8%) either agreeing or strongly agreeing (M= 2.36; SD= 0.789). This source of threat is followed by the country's economic performance, with (51.9%) of the sample either agreeing or strongly agreeing

(M=2.27; SD= 0.833) and fear of bombs and explosives that they might encounter, (39.1%) (M= 1.96; SD= 0.905). On the other side, the least perceived threat is the COVID-19 pandemic, with (38%) (M= score of 2.05; SD= 0.845) followed by a lack of free speech and democratic rights (26.8%) (M= 1.82; SD= 0.827) (Table 44).

As for the COVID-19 pandemic in Spain, around 53% think publishing more news related to Covid-19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people, whereas (24.7%) are neutral (M= 2.30; SD= 0.813). Further, more than (56.8%) think there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19 (M=2.39; SD= 0.775). On the other side, (32%) disagree or strongly disagree that most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is fabricated, fake, and misleading, whereas (32.7%) either agree or strongly agree (M= 2.01; SD= 0.809) (Table 44).

We have noticed some differences between Spanish males and females where the highest two perceived threat items for both are the same. These items are the spread of diseases, with males (57.3%) outweighing females (55%), and economic performance, with (52.8%) of females surpassing (50.6%) of males. Fear of COVID-19 pandemic received the third-highest percentage among males (39.6%) excelling females (36.9%); whereas fear of bombs and explosives is the third among females (40.6%) and the fourth among males (37.2%). The fourth perceived threat for females is the family's safety, with (37.3%) of females outdoing males (36.6%), with (0.7%) difference points, and is considered the fifth threat among males. Even though fear of the lack of free speech and democratic rights ranked as the sixth item across both, it was higher among males (30.5%) than females (24.7%).

As for COVID-19 health crisis, more than (54%) of Spanish males and (57%) of females think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises. Also, around 53% of both think publishing more news related to the pandemic on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people. On the other side, most males (36%) strongly agree or agree that the circulated news on Facebook about the pandemic is fabricated, fake, and misleading. In contrast, most females were neutral (39.1%), agree (30.6%), and disagree (30%) on the abovementioned.

Even though around 52% of all age segments in Spain feel threatened by economic performance, it was relatively higher among 35 years (56%) and received a low percentage across 18-24 years (44.2%). Also, (54%) of those aged 35 years obtained higher percentages in fear of bombs and explosives followed by 25-29 years (41.2%), 30-34 years (36.8%), and 18-24 years (33.6%).

Results showed that most 35 years (46%) and 25-29 years (38.7%) are afraid about their family's general safety. At the same time, the majority of the other two age groups are not, with (50%) of 18-24 years and (41%) of 30-34 years. More than 55% of 18-24 years, (42%) 25-29 years, and (42%) 30-34 years do not feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights. Unlike 35 years who are more concerned about it, with (36%) threatened and (34%) not threatened.

In addition, all age groups in Spain think the spread of diseases is an imminent threat, with nearly (56%). Furthermore, all age segments, except most of 18-24 years, believe that the COVID-19 pandemic threatens their lives. Many 25-29 years (51.1%) and 30-34 years (36.1%) disagree that most of the circulated news about COVID-19 is fake, fabricated, or misleading, whereas (32.7%) of 18-24 years think it is. As for those aging 35 years, they had almost equal percentages between those who agree and disagree.

In sum, the top two perceived threat items across all age segments in Spain were the spread of diseases and economic performance. The COVID-19 pandemic represented the third-highest threat to those aged 25-29 years and 30-34 years. On the other side, fear of bombs and explosives is the third-highest item among 18-24 years and 35 years.

Further, more than 53% of all age segments think that publishing more news about COVID-19 has spread fear and panic among people. In addition, (55%) across all age segments think there should be filters for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of COVID-19.

The majority of those with doctoral degrees (71.4%) and elemental studies (54.5%) fear bombs and explosives. Around 52% across all education categories feel threatened by the economic performance, except doctoral degree holders, whereas those who feel threatened (42.9%) and not threatened (42.9%) have equal percentages. Most doctoral degree holders (42.9%) and elemental studies (40%) are afraid about their family's general safety. The majority of education categories do not feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights, except for doctoral degrees where (42.9%) consider it a source of threat.

All education categories in Spain consider the spread of diseases as an imminent threat with (53%). Over (41%) of both undergraduate students and bachelors think that COVID-19 threatens their lives. Unlike the majority of the other education categories. Furthermore, there are (42.9%) of doctoral degree holders and (34.9%) of undergraduate students think most of the circulated news about COVID-19 on Facebook was fabricated, fake, or misleading. On the other side, most bachelor's (35%) and master's degree holders (39.7%) do not think it is. Many education segments think that publishing more news about COVID-19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic. In addition, they

believe that there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during any humanitarian crisis, such as the spread of COVID-19.

We noticed some differences across political ideology categories. Such variances were evident among the right-side participants. The majority of right-wing consider all items as sources of a threat except for a lack of free speech and democratic rights, with (32.5%) believing it is a source of danger and (32.5%) do not. Most of the left and the center respondents considered the economic performance and spread of diseases as sources of threat. In contrast, only the majority of the center and the right regarded the COVID-19 pandemic as a threat. It is worth noting that many right and center-wing participants think that the circulated news about Covid on Facebook is either fake or misleading (34.55%), unlike the majority of the left who do not. In addition, most of the three political ideology participants think that publishing more news about COVID-19 on Facebook has spread panic; they also think there should be a content filter during a humanitarian crisis.

Regarding Facebook news consumption frequency in Spain, most news consumers on Facebook consider economic performance (52.4%) and the spread of diseases (56.7%) as imminent threats. Similarly, around (53.5%) think that publishing more news about COVID-19 has spread fear and panic. Also, (57%) think there should be filters and policies regulating news coverage on Facebook during the crisis. Yet, heavy and medium news consumers on Facebook fear bombs and explosives, with about (44.6%). In addition, (41%) think that COVID-19 threatens their lives; however, most light news consumers on Facebook (37.2%) do not think. Last, heavy news consumers scored higher percentages on all threat items. Also, the majority of heavy (46.6%) and medium news consumers on Facebook (35.3%), either disagree or strongly disagree that most of the circulated news about COVID-19 on Facebook is fake; unlike most light news consumers who either agree or strongly agree (37.2%).

In a similar vein, most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages scored high on almost all items; except if they think that most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is fake or misleading, with (35.3%) disagree or strongly disagree, (35.3%) either strongly agree or agree, and (29.5%) neutral. In addition, (41%) of heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages, (46.4%) medium, and (46.2%) light, are not threatened by a lack of free speech and democratic rights.

It is worth noting that we checked the frequencies of some threat items among heavy, medium, and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages. Data revealed that many heavy news consumers on these pages (44.6%) are worried about their family's general safety in comparison to

medium (34.5%) and light news consumers (32.3%). While most light (40%) and medium news consumers (42.3%) are not worried (Table 45).

Moreover, we found most of the heavy (41%), medium (46.4%), and light (51.2%) are not threatened by a lack of free speech and democratic rights (Table 46).

7.3.1.3.3 List of items representing sources of threat: Egypt

Through analyzing the data collected data in Egypt we found (35.6%) of the Egyptian youths are afraid about their family's general safety, (18.6%) neutral, and (45.9%) are not scared (M= 1.90; SD=0.897).

Egyptians labeled two items as their primary sources of threat, the spread of diseases as an imminent threat (50%) (M= 2.20; SD= 0.884) and the threat of the COVID-19 pandemic (40.6%) (M= 2.04; SD=0.878)) (Table 44).

The other items are not labeled as sources of threat by many Egyptian youths. In this regard, (60%) either disagree or strongly disagree that they fear bombs and explosives they may encounter anytime (M= 1.68; SD= 0.879). Also, (45%) of Egyptians do not feel threatened by a lack of free speech and democracy rights (M= 1.94; SD= 0.912). Egyptian youths are equally divided between disagreeing (39.7%) and agreeing (37.2%) of being threatened by the country's economic performance (M= 1.97; SD= 0.877)) (Table 44).

On COVID-19 health crisis, (53%) of Egyptian youths think most of the circulated news on Facebook about the pandemic is fake or misleading, while only (22.7%) think otherwise (M= 1.69; SD= 0.819). Accordingly, there are (42.7%) do not believe that publishing more news about the pandemic has spread fear and panic (M= 2.09; SD= 0.869). In addition, around 60% think there should be filters and specific policies on Facebook news coverage during a humanitarian crisis (M= 2.41; SD= 0.869)) (Table 44).

We found some variances across sex. Many Egyptian females perceive economic performance as a threat compared to most males, with (41.4%) females and (32.4%) males. Also, more females (45%) than males (24%) are afraid about their family's general safety. Further, (47.3%) of females and (33.8%) of males think the COVID-19 pandemic threatens their lives. On the other side, most of both sexes don't perceive bombs and explosives, freedom of speech, and democratic rights as sources of threat. However, both agreed that the spread of diseases is an imminent threat, with (46.9%) of males and (54.5%) of females.

In addition, more than (60%) of Egyptian males and (48%) of females think the circulated news on Facebook on COVID-19 is fake or misleading. The majority of females (50%) in comparison to (35.2%) males think that publishing more news on COVID-19 has spread fear. Last, both believe that there should be filters and specific policies on Facebook news coverage during a humanitarian crisis: males (54%) and females (63.5%).

We observed some differences across 25-29 years with (42.2%) of them feeling threatened by the economic performance and (45.3%) are worried about their family's safety; in contrast to most all age segments. Also, 25-29 years are equally divided between agree (41%) and disagree (41%) being threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights. Our data showed that (60%) of all age segments do not perceive bombs and explosives as a source of threat. Also, (42%) of them do not consider economic performance as a threat, (60%) do not feel worried about their family's safety, and (50%) do not feel threatened by the lack of free speech.

It is worth noting that many age segments in Egypt perceive the spread of diseases as an imminent threat. While most of those aged 18-24 years (41.3%) and 35 years (45%), considered the COVID-19 pandemic as a primary source of threat, while many 25-29 years (44.1%) and 30-34 years (40.2%) do not perceive it as a threat.

Further, there are (55.4%) of different age segments in Egypt think most of the circulated news on Facebook about the pandemic is fake. Also, around (57.95%) of all age segments believe there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis. In addition, approximately (47.8%) think that publishing more news about COVID-19 has spread fear and panic among people. Except among those aged 18-24 years where the majority (46.2%) disagree.

The primary source of threat to all education segments in Egypt is the spread of diseases, with elemental studies (50%), undergraduate students (45.3%), bachelor's (52.1%), master's (57.1%), doctoral (50%), and high school or equivalent degree holders (60%) agree. Most of the following education categories perceive the COVID-19 pandemic as a threat to their lives, elemental studies (61.1%), undergraduate students (41.9%), bachelor's (39.2%), master's degree holders (50%) who agree that it threatens their lives. While most doctoral degrees (62.5%) and high school/equivalent degrees (80%) disagree that it threatens their life.

Also, the majority of different education groups in Egypt are not afraid of bombs and explosives. In addition, they are threatened by the lack of free speech or democratic rights. Yet, most master's degree holders (64.3%) are afraid about their family's general safety compared to other segments. Similarly, many bachelor's (40%), master's (43%), and high school or equivalent degree holders

(60%) consider economic performance as a source of threat. Yet, the following segments do not perceive the abovementioned item as so: elemental studies (61.1%), undergraduate students (47.7%), and doctoral degrees (62.5%).

There are (55%) of all education groups in Egypt think most of the Facebook circulated news on COVID-19 is fake. Likewise, more than 50% of them believe there should be specific policies on news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis. We detected some differences in whether the circulated news about COVID-19 spread fear among people, whereas most elemental studies (50%), bachelor's (44.4%), and master's degree holders (53.6%) think it spread fear. In comparison, undergraduate students (44.2%) and doctoral degrees (75%) believe it did not spread fear.

Like the previously stated findings, about 55% of the three political ideologies in Egypt consider the spread of diseases an imminent threat. We also observed that most of those who fall on the right side consider almost all the items as sources of danger. For example, there are (46.8%) right, (30.7%) left, and (16.1%) center fear of bombs and explosives they might encounter anytime; (47.6%) right, (31.8%) left, and (33.5%) center feel threatened by the economic performance; (50%) right, (39.8%) left, and (31.7%) center feel threatened by lack of free speech and democratic rights. Most of the right (49.2%) right and left (42%) are afraid about their family's general safety, whereas only (25.4%) center, feels worried. Further, both the right (58.1%) and the left (40.9%) think that the pandemic threatens their lives compared to the center (30.8%). Our data revealed that (53%) of the three political ideologies disagreed that most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is either fake or misleading; (60%) of them also think that there should be specific policies and filters for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis. As for whether publishing more news about COVID-19 has spread fear and panic among people, both the left (51.1%) and the right (58.9%) agreed; on the other side, (40.2%) of the center disagreed.

By examining the differences among Facebook news consumers in Egypt, we noticed more than 58% are not afraid of bombs and explosives. Both heavy news consumers on Facebook (62.9%) and medium (53.6%) consider the spread of diseases as an imminent threat unlike most of the light (42%) who do not. We found that heavy news consumers consider all the listed items as sources of danger. For instance, (52.5%) heavy, (36.2%) medium, and (27.3%) light feel threatened by the economic performance. Also, (50.8%) heavy, (30.4%) medium, and (29%) light are afraid about their family's general safety. There are (52.5%) heavy, (35.5%) medium, and (31.3%) light who feel threatened by the lack of free speech. Both heavy (59%) and medium news consumers (38.4%) think that current health crisis threatens their lives, compared to (29.5%) light. Considering the spread of the pandemic, (53%) disagreed that most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is

either fake or misleading; yet most heavy (52.5%) and medium news consumers (44.9%) think that publishing more news about the pandemic on Facebook has spread fear and panic, unlike light consumers with the majority (35.8%) think otherwise.

In the same manner, many heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages consider all the list of items as sources of threat. For instance, (44.8%) heavy, (18.1%) light, and (16.5%) medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages fear bombs and explosives. There is (53.9%) heavy, (29.9%) medium, and (24.3%) light who feel threatened by the economic performance. Moreover, (54.5%) heavy, (30.6%) light, and (16.5%) medium news consumers who are afraid about their family's general safety; (56.4%) heavy, (28.3%) medium, and (27.1%) light, feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights; (67.3%) heavy and (43.8%) light consider the spread of diseases as an imminent threat, whereas only (37.8%) medium news consumers on such pages who consider it as so.

It is worth noting that we checked the frequencies of some threat items among heavy, medium, and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages in Egypt. Data showed that many heavy news consumers on these pages (54.5%) are worried about their family's general safety in comparison to medium (16.5%) and light news consumers (30.6%). While most light (50.7%) and medium news consumers (59.1%) are not worried (Table 45).

Moreover, we found many heavy news consumers (56.4%) compared to medium (28.3%) and light (27.1%) are threatened by a lack of free speech and democratic rights. The majority of medium (52.8%) and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (58.3%) are not threatened (Table 46).

7.3.1.4 Analysis of threat items

We run Spearman's rho correlation test to find an association between the overall feeling of safety (Q13) and feeling afraid about one's own general family safety. We found there is a minimum negative correlation rho= -0.153, $p < 0.001$. This result means that the more people feel safe, the less they are worried about their family's general safety. We found a positive correlation between item 6, "I think COVID-19 threatens my life," and item 8, "I think publishing more news related to COVID-19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people" rho= 0.159, p 0.001. This finding means that the more people consider COVID-19 threatens their lives, the more they think publishing more news has spread fear and panic (Table 47).

Furthermore, there is a weak positive relationship between item 7 (I think most of the circulated news on Facebook is fabricated, fake, or misleading), and item 9 (I think there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis as the spread of COVID-19) with rho= 0.319, p <0.001. It is worth mentioning that there is a positive association between item 6, "I think COVID-19 threatens my life," and item 9, "I think there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis as the spread of COVID-19" rho= 0.251, p<0.001. Taking this into account, the more people think COVID-19 threatens their life the more they favor restrictive measures for news coverage on Facebook (Table 47).

Table 47. *Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between threat items*

Item	Spearman's rho	Indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country	I am afraid about my family's general safety.	I think the spread of diseases is an imminent threat.	I think Covid-19 pandemic threatens my life.	I think most of the circulated news on Facebook about Covid-19 is either fabricated. fake. and/or misleading.	I think publishing more news related to Covid- 19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people	I think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19.	I feel threatened by the economic performance of the country.	I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	I fear from bombs and explosives that I may encounter any time.
Indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.153**	0.007	.050*	-0.016	0.044	.107**	-.183**	-.184**	0.040
	Sig. (1-tailed)		0.000	0.407	0.035	0.280	0.056	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.072
	N	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309
I am afraid about my family's general safety.	Correlation Coefficient	-.153**	1.000	.444**	.423**	.281**	.248**	.218**	.487**	.511**	.549**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309
I think the spread of diseases is an imminent threat.	Correlation Coefficient	0.007	.444**	1.000	.645**	.202**	.202**	.272**	.364**	.307**	.384**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.407	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309
I think Covid-19 pandemic threatens my life.	Correlation Coefficient	.050*	.423**	.645**	1.000	.217**	.159**	.251**	.293**	.253**	.386**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.035	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309
I think most of the circulated news on Facebook about Covid-19 is either fabricated. fake. and/or misleading.	Correlation Coefficient	-0.016	.281**	.202**	.217**	1.000	.518**	.319**	.357**	.331**	.193**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.280	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309
I think publishing more news related to Covid- 19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people	Correlation Coefficient	0.044	.248**	.202**	.159**	.518**	1.000	.469**	.235**	.274**	.192**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.056	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309
I think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19.	Correlation Coefficient	.107**	.218**	.272**	.251**	.319**	.469**	1.000	.204**	.216**	.191**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309
I feel threatened by the economic performance of the country.	Correlation Coefficient	-.183**	.487**	.364**	.293**	.357**	.235**	.204**	1.000	.546**	.335**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
	N	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309
I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	Correlation Coefficient	-.184**	.511**	.307**	.253**	.331**	.274**	.216**	.546**	1.000	.302**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000
	N	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309
I fear from bombs and explosives that I may encounter any time.	Correlation Coefficient	0.040	.549**	.384**	.386**	.193**	.192**	.191**	.335**	.302**	1.000
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.072	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	N	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309	1309

7.3.1.4.1 Analysis of threat items: USA

The data presented in this section is the analysis of the USA case. By running two and one-tailed Spearman's rho correlation coefficient tests in the USA, the correlation was found insignificant between the overall feeling of safety (Q13) and feeling afraid about one's own general family safety, p 0.234. On the other side, we found a minimum positive correlation between item 6, "I think COVID-19 threatens my life," and item 8, "I think publishing more news related to COVID-19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people" rho= 0.094, p 0.025 (Table 48).

This result means that the more American youths consider COVID-19 threatens their lives, the more they think publishing more news has spread fear and panic. In addition, there is a weak positive relationship between item 7 "I think most of the circulated news on Facebook is either fabricated, fake, or misleading," and item 9, "I think there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis as the spread of COVID-19" rho= 0.454, p <0.001. It is worth mentioning that there is a minimum positive association between 6 "I think COVID-19 threatens my life" and item 9 "I think there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis as the spread of COVID-19" rho= 0.279, p<0.001 (Table 48).

Table 48. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between threat items - USA

Item	Spearman's rho	Indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country	I am afraid about my family's general safety.	I think the spread of diseases is an imminent threat.	I think Covid-19 pandemic threatens my life.	I think most of the circulated news on Facebook about Covid-19 is either fabricated. fake. and/or misleading.	I think publishing more news related to Covid- 19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people	I think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19.	I feel threatened by the economic performance of the country.	I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	I fear from bombs and explosives that I may encounter any time.
Indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-0.035	.132**	.161**	.124**	.128**	.194**	-0.037	-0.015	.102*
	Sig. (1-tailed)		0.234	0.003	0.000	0.005	0.004	0.000	0.223	0.376	0.017
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I am afraid about my family's general safety.	Correlation Coefficient	-0.035	1.000	.402**	.431**	.293**	.281**	.337**	.476**	.541**	.599**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.234		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I think the spread of diseases is an imminent threat.	Correlation Coefficient	.132**	.402**	1.000	.675**	.161**	.128**	.268**	.327**	.248**	.401**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.003	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I think Covid-19 pandemic threatens my life.	Correlation Coefficient	.161**	.431**	.675**	1.000	.143**	.094*	.279**	.274**	.203**	.421**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.001	0.025	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I think most of the circulated news on Facebook about Covid-19 is either fabricated. fake. and/or misleading.	Correlation Coefficient	.124**	.293**	.161**	.143**	1.000	.555**	.454**	.353**	.376**	.179**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.001		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I think publishing more news related to Covid- 19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people	Correlation Coefficient	.128**	.281**	.128**	.094*	.555**	1.000	.485**	.300**	.397**	.206**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.004	0.000	0.004	0.025	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19.	Correlation Coefficient	.194**	.337**	.268**	.279**	.454**	.485**	1.000	.303**	.259**	.258**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I feel threatened by the economic performance of the country.	Correlation Coefficient	-0.037	.476**	.327**	.274**	.353**	.300**	.303**	1.000	.561**	.366**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.223	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	Correlation Coefficient	-0.015	.541**	.248**	.203**	.376**	.397**	.259**	.561**	1.000	.355**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.376	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I fear from bombs and explosives that I may encounter any time.	Correlation Coefficient	.102*	.599**	.401**	.421**	.179**	.206**	.258**	.366**	.355**	1.000
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.017	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).											
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).											
a. Where do you live? = United States of America											

7.3.1.4.2 Analysis of threat items: Spain

The data presented in this section is the analysis of the Spanish case. The nonparametric Spearman's rho correlation coefficient two-tailed test in Spain showed a minimum negative correlation between the overall feeling of safety (Q13) and feeling afraid about one's own general family safety rho=-0.244, p<0.001. We found a minimum positive correlation between item 6, "I think COVID-19 threatens my life," and item 8, "I think publishing more news related to COVID-19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people" rho= 0.123, p 0.005. This result means that the more people

consider COVID-19 threatens their lives, the more they think publishing more news has spread fear and panic (Table 49).

Moreover, there is a weak positive relationship between item 7 "I think most of the circulated news on Facebook is either fabricated, fake, or misleading." And item 9, "I think there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis as the spread of COVID-19" rho= 0.362, p <0.001. It is worth mentioning that there is a minimum positive association between 6 "I think COVID-19 threatens my life" and item 9, "I think there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis as the spread of COVID-19" rho= 0.135, p <0.002 (Table 49).

Table 49. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between threat items - Spain

Item	Spearman's rho	indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country	I am afraid about my family's general safety.	I think the spread of diseases is an imminent threat.	I think Covid-19 pandemic threatens my life.	I think most of the circulated news on Facebook about Covid-19 is either fabricated. fake. and/or misleading.	I think publishing more news related to Covid- 19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people	I think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19.	I feel threatened by the economic performance of the country.	I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	I fear from bombs and explosives that I may encounter any time.
indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.244**	-.108*	-.112**	-.107*	-0.061	-0.008	-.199**	-.272**	-.118**
	Sig. (1-tailed)		0.000	0.012	0.010	0.013	0.103	0.431	0.000	0.000	0.007
	N	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437
I am afraid about my family's general safety.	Correlation	-.244**	1.000	.393**	.388**	.171**	.130**	.080*	.416**	.470**	.554**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.048	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437
I think the spread of diseases is an imminent threat.	Correlation Coefficient	-.108*	.393**	1.000	.616**	.147**	.221**	.189**	.329**	.334**	.368**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.012	0.000		0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437
I think Covid-19 pandemic threatens my life.	Correlation Coefficient	-.112**	.388**	.616**	1.000	.201**	.123**	.135**	.270**	.296**	.352**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.010	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.005	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437
I think most of the circulated news on Facebook about Covid-19 is either fabricated. fake. and/or misleading.	Correlation Coefficient	-.107*	.171**	.147**	.201**	1.000	.533**	.362**	.252**	.296**	.124**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.013	0.000	0.001	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.005
	N	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437
I think publishing more news related to Covid- 19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people	Correlation Coefficient	-0.061	.130**	.221**	.123**	.533**	1.000	.548**	.198**	.230**	.113**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.103	0.003	0.000	0.005	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.009
	N	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437
I think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19.	Correlation Coefficient	-0.008	.080*	.189**	.135**	.362**	.548**	1.000	.125**	.168**	.141**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.431	0.048	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000		0.004	0.000	0.002
	N	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437
I feel threatened by the economic performance of the country.	Correlation Coefficient	-.199**	.416**	.329**	.270**	.252**	.198**	.125**	1.000	.422**	.254**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004		0.000	0.000
	N	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437
I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	Correlation Coefficient	-.272**	.470**	.334**	.296**	.296**	.230**	.168**	.422**	1.000	.370**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000
	N	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437
I fear from bombs and explosives that I may encounter any time.	Correlation Coefficient	-.118**	.554**	.368**	.352**	.124**	.113**	.141**	.254**	.370**	1.000
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.007	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.009	0.002	0.000	0.000	
	N	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437	437
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).											
a. Where do you live? = Spain											

7.3.1.4.3 Analysis of threat items: Egypt

The data presented in this section is the analysis of the Egyptian case The nonparametric Spearman's rho correlation coefficient two-tailed test in Egypt showed a minimum negative correlation between the overall feeling of safety (Q13) and feeling afraid about one's own general family safety rho=-0.203, p<0.001. We found a minimum positive correlation between item 6, "I think COVID-19 threatens my life," and item 8, "I think publishing more news related to COVID-19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people" rho= 0.254, p 0.001. This result means that the more people

consider COVID-19 threatens their lives, the more they think publishing more news has spread fear and panic (Table 50).

Furthermore, there is a minimum positive relationship between item 7 "I think most of the circulated news on Facebook is either fabricated, fake, or misleading." And item 9, "I think there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis as the spread of COVID-19" rho= 0.211, p <0.001. In addition, there is a weak positive association between 6 "I think COVID-19 threatens my life" and item 9, "I think there should be filters and specific policies for news coverage on Facebook during a humanitarian crisis as the spread of COVID-19" rho= 0.336, p <0.001 (Table 50).

Table 50. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between threat items - Egypt

Item	Spearman's rho	indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country	I am afraid about my family's general safety.	I think the spread of diseases is an imminent threat.	I think Covid-19 pandemic threatens my life.	I think most of the circulated news on Facebook about Covid-19 is either fabricated. fake. and/or misleading.	I think publishing more news related to Covid- 19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people	I think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19.	I feel threatened by the economic performance of the country.	I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	I fear from bombs and explosives that I may encounter any time.
indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.203**	-0.030	0.055	-0.064	0.054	0.074	-.318**	-.284**	.087*
	Sig. (1-tailed)		0.000	0.264	0.128	0.090	0.131	0.063	0.000	0.000	0.035
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I am afraid about my family's general safety.	Correlation Coefficient	-.203**	1.000	.524**	.452**	.331**	.304**	.231**	.554**	.530**	.496**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I think the spread of diseases is an imminent threat.	Correlation Coefficient	-0.030	.524**	1.000	.644**	.257**	.247**	.354**	.414**	.357**	.363**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.264	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I think Covid-19 pandemic threatens my life.	Correlation Coefficient	0.055	.452**	.644**	1.000	.292**	.254**	.336**	.337**	.276**	.385**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.128	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I think most of the circulated news on Facebook about Covid-19 is either fabricated. fake. and/or misleading.	Correlation Coefficient	-0.064	.331**	.257**	.292**	1.000	.428**	.211**	.393**	.328**	.213**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.090	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I think publishing more news related to Covid- 19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people	Correlation Coefficient	0.054	.304**	.247**	.254**	.428**	1.000	.411**	.158**	.213**	.216**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.131	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19.	Correlation Coefficient	0.074	.231**	.354**	.336**	.211**	.411**	1.000	.163**	.234**	.154**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.063	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.001
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I feel threatened by the economic performance of the country.	Correlation Coefficient	-.318**	.554**	.414**	.337**	.393**	.158**	.163**	1.000	.655**	.326**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.	Correlation Coefficient	-.284**	.530**	.357**	.276**	.328**	.213**	.234**	.655**	1.000	.235**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
I fear from bombs and explosives that I may encounter any time.	Correlation Coefficient	.087*	.496**	.363**	.385**	.213**	.216**	.154**	.326**	.235**	1.000
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.035	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	
	N	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436	436
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).											
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).											
a. Where do you live? = Egypt											

7.3.1.5 Perception of mean world syndrome

In question 15 we asked participants to express their attitude toward two extra items on a scale from 1-10, where 1 strongly disagrees and 10 strongly agree. We aim at measuring the mean world syndrome, which is a vital outcome of the cultivation effect of news consumption on Facebook. We recoded answers into 3 points Likert scale disagree, neutral, and agree. As for the first item, "although it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more

dangerous and chaotically is not so in real life." We found (40%) of the sample either agree, (33.2%) neutral, and (27.5%) disagree (M= 2.12; SD= 0.809) (Table 51).

We did not observe significant differences across sex categories regarding the first item, whereas the majority agreed, with more females (40.8%) than males (37.6%). Also, most age categories agree, with the highest score among 25-29 years, followed by those aged 35 years (40.7%). However, we identified significant differences across education categories where doctoral degrees (73.8%) are the highest to agree followed by bachelor's (43.2%) and master's degree holders (39.7%). We also marked some variances across different political ideologies. Most of the right (56.2%) agree, unlike most of the left (35.2%) who disagree or the majority of the center who are neutral (40.2%). Furthermore, (57.9%) of heavy news consumers on Facebook agree that it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic; it is not so in real life, in comparison to (28.2%) light and (38.6%) medium. Additionally, (56.8%) of those who heavily consume news on influencers' Facebook pages, (36%) medium, and (26.1%) light agree with the abovementioned.

As for item 2, we found almost equal percentages among those who agree, neutral, and disagree in terms of "feeling that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime they consume news on Facebook," where (36.4%) agree, (35.8%) disagree, and (27.9%) neutral (M= 2.01; SD= 0.850). We found most females (41.2%) agree compared to most males who disagree (39.2%). The highest scores across age and education categories to agree are among 25-29 years (42.3%) and doctoral degree holders (66.2%). It is worth noting that (51.9%) of the participants who fall on the right side of the political continuum agree that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime they consume news on Facebook. Consistent with the cultivation theory findings, we noticed more than (52%) of heavy news consumers on Facebook feel chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime they consume news on Facebook, compared to (25.8%) of light and (37.2%) of medium. Similar percentages were observed among those who heavily consume news on influencers' Facebook pages (52.6%), light (25.1%), and medium (32.2%).

Table 51. Mean world syndrome

Item	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Although it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic. it really isn't so in real life.	Disagree	109	24.9%	116	26.6%	135	31.0%	360	27.5%
	Neutral	169	38.7%	132	30.3%	133	30.5%	434	33.2%
	Agree	159	36.4%	188	43.1%	168	38.5%	515	39.3%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
I feel that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime whenever I consume news on Facebook.	Disagree	166	38.0%	156	35.8%	146	33.5%	468	35.8%
	Neutral	127	29.1%	118	27.1%	120	27.5%	365	27.9%
	Agree	144	33.0%	162	37.2%	170	39.0%	476	36.4%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

7.3.1.5.1 Perception of mean world syndrome: USA

The analyzed data in the USA offered the following results. As for the first item, "although it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it really is not so in real life," (38.5%) agree, (30.5%) neutral, and (31%) disagree (M= 2.08; SD= 0.831). "I feel that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime they consume news on Facebook," we found (39%) agree, (33.5%) disagree, and (27.5%) neutral (M= 2.06; SD= 0.851) (Table 51).

We noticed that most American males (36.4%) and females (41.9%) agree on "it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, but it isn't so in real life." On the other hand, most males (36.1%) in comparison to females (29.3%) disagree on "I feel that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime whenever I consume news on Facebook." In contrast, most females (47.3%) unlike males (33.8%) agree.

Many 25-29 years (41.3%) and 30-34 years (40.5%) agree on "although it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it isn't so in real life." In contrast, most 18-24 years (36.9 %) are neutral, and many 35 years (39.5%) disagree; 30-34 years (38.2%) and 35 years (44.2%) disagree on "I feel that chaos and anarchy could

erupt anytime whenever I consume news on Facebook, whereas most of those aged 25-29 years (47.1%) agree, and most of 18-24 years (41.5%) are neutral.

Concerning item one across different education categories in the USA, we observed that most elemental studies (35.4%), bachelor's degrees (36.6%), master's degrees (52.5%), and doctoral degree holders (86%) agree. On the other hand, most uneducated (57.1%), high school/equivalent degree (42.9%), and associate degree (50%) disagree, and the majority of undergraduates (40%) are neutral.

Regarding item 2, we noticed the highest scores of those who disagree among the uneducated (53.6%), elemental studies (41.5%), high school/equivalent degree (38.1%), and associate degree (66.7%). On the other side, bachelor's degrees (40.6%), master's degrees (57.5%), and doctoral degree holders (81.4%) have the highest percentages in terms of agree. Like the results of item 1, most undergraduate students (40%) are neutral.

In item one, we noticed some variances across the three political categories in the USA. Most of the left (47.6%) compared to the center (40.2%) and the right (19.6%) disagree. In contrast, most of the center (40.2%) unlike the left (26.6%) and the right (22.4%) are neutral; furthermore, many right (58%) agree, with the left (25.8%) and the center (31.4%).

In item two, we observed some differences across the three ideologies in the USA, where most of the left (41.1%) and the center (35.5%) disagree, and most of the right (54.5%) agree. On item 1, most medium news consumers on Facebook varied between agreeing (39.7%) and being neutral (39.7%). In comparison, most heavy news consumers (66.7%) agree; many of the light are neutral (33.9%) and disagree (41.3%). As for item 2, most of both medium (40.5%) and heavy (70%) agree on the contrary most of the light news consumers on Facebook (43.1%) disagree.

In like manner, many light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (43.8%) disagree. About 42% of medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages are neutral, and most heavy (62.1%) agree. We also observed close percentages in item 2, whereas many light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (48.1%) disagree, and medium (37%) are neutral. In contrast, the majority of heavy (67%) agree.

7.3.1.5.2 Perception of mean world syndrome: Spain

The analyzed data in Spain offered the following results. As for the first item, "although it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it is not so in real life," about (36.4%) of the Spanish youths agree, (38.7%) neutral, and

(24.9%) disagree (M= 2.11; SD= 0.776). we found (33%) agree, (38%) disagree, and (29.1%) neutral (M= 1.95; SD= 0.842) on item 2 "I feel that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime they consume news on Facebook" (Table 51). Most of the Spanish males (39.6%) and females (38.4%) are neutral; followed by agreeing, with more males (38.4%) than females (35.1%) on "it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it isn't so in real life." Likewise, most Spanish males (37.8%) and females (38%) disagree on "I feel that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime whenever I consume news on Facebook."

Many 18-24 years (34.4%) and 25-29 years (42.9%) agree that "although it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it isn't so in real life," whereas most 30-34 years (41.3%) and 35 years (42%) are neutral.

We observed some variances across age groups for item 2 in Spain, "I feel that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime whenever I consume news on Facebook." Most of those aged 18-24 years (38.9%) and 30-34 years (40 disagree; 25-29 years (40.3%) agree; 35 years (36%) neutral.

As for item 1, we noticed some differences across education categories in Spain, whereas elemental studies were divided equally between neutral (39.4%) and agree (39.4%), most undergraduate (39.2%) and master's degrees (44.8%) are neutral. In comparison, most bachelor's (40.9%) and doctoral degree holders (64.3%) agree. On the second item, we observed that most undergraduate students (41.3%), bachelor's degrees (37.2%), and master's degrees (41.4%) disagree. On the other side, both elemental studies (48.5%) and doctoral degrees (42.9%) agree.

We detected some similarities across the different political ideologies on items 1 and 2 in Spain. The majority of the left (39.3%) and the center (40.7%) are neutral, whereas most right (47.5%) agree on item 1. Also, most of the left (40.5%) and the center (38.7%) disagree while many of the right, (38.8%) agree on item 2.

Most heavy news consumers on Facebook (47.4%) unlike the medium (35.8%) and light (28.4%) agree on item 1. In comparison, most light (43.2%) and medium news consumers (42.2%) unlike heavy (27.6%) feel neutral about item 1. As for item 2, most heavy news consumers (37.1%) agree; on the opposite side, light news consumers (43.9%) and medium (35.8%) disagree.

Further analysis showed that the majority of light (43.1%) and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (44%) are neutral, while most heavy (51.8%) agree on item 1. Consistently, many of the light (45.4%) and medium (36.3%) disagree compared to the majority of heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (43.2%) who agree on item 2.

7.3.1.5.3 Perception of mean world syndrome: Egypt

The analyzed data in Egypt offered the following results. There is bout (43.1%) of the Egyptian youths agree, (30.3%) are neutral, and (26.6%) disagree (M= 2.17; SD= 0.819) on "although it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it is not so in real life," Also, there is (37.2%) agree, (35.8%) disagree, and (27.1%) neutral (M= 2.01; SD= 0.855) on item 2, "I feel that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime they consume news on Facebook" (Table 51).

The majority of Egyptian males (38.5%) and females (47.3%) agree, followed by neutral with more males (31.9%) than females (28.8%) on "it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it isn't so in real life." However, on item 2, data showed that most Egyptian males (44.1%) in comparison to females (27.5%) disagree; whereas most Egyptian females (45.4%) unlike males (28.6%) agree with item 2 "I feel that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime whenever I consume news on Facebook."

Similarly, our data showed about (47%) of age segments in Egypt agree that "although it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it isn't so in real life." In contrast, only the majority of 30-34 years (41.3%) and 35 years (42%) are neutral. More than 38% of 18-24 years and 25-29 years agree on "I feel that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime whenever I consume news on Facebook, whereas about 40% of 30-34 years and 35 years disagree.

As for Item 1, some education categories varied between agreeing and disagreeing in Egypt. For instance, undergraduate students (36%), high school/equivalent degrees (40%), and master's degrees have close percentages in terms of feeling neutral or disagreeing. On the other hand, most elemental studies (50%) and bachelor's degrees (38.2%) agree. Further, most of the right-wing participants (59.7%) and left (43.2%) agree on item 1. Yet, most of the center (39.7%) are neutral. As for item 2, most of the left (40%) and the right (57.3%) agree, unlike most of the center (40.2%) who disagree.

Many medium (41.3%) and heavy news consumers on Facebook (60.7%) agree on item 1; whereas most light (34.1%) are neutral. In like manner, most medium (38.4%) and heavy news consumers on Facebook (51.6%) agree in comparison to most light (39.8%) who disagree on item 2.

Within the same framework, many medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (40.9%) and heavy (57%) agree, while most of the light (36.8%) disagree on item 1. The majority of the three categories heavy, medium, and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages

scored differently from each other on item 2. With most of the light (43.8%) disagree, and the majority of medium (34.6%) are neutral. In contrast, about 50% of heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages agree with item 2.

7.3.1.6 Analysis of the composite variable of threat perception

We used question 13, the nine items in question 14, and the extra two items in question 15 as a scale to examine the dependent variable threat perception. For this, we conducted a principal factor analysis to test the scale's validity and reduce any dimension/item that does not load well. The factorability of the 12 items of the dependent variable -threat perception, was examined. We used several well-recognized criteria for the factorability of a correlation.

First, we observed that most of the items correlated together, suggesting reasonable factorability. Second, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling adequacy was 0.823, above the commonly recommended value of 0.6, and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant ($X2$ (66) = 4548.083, $p<0.000$). These results give us confidence that our variables are significantly correlated altogether. Finally, the commonalities were all above 0.5, confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items. Given these overall indicators, factor analysis is suitable for all 12 items. The 12 items showed an extremely high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.906).

Finally, we created a composite variable of the 12 threat items -namely threat perception, based on the sum of all items. Higher scores indicated higher threat perception. For this, we recoded the variables into three categories, low (34.8%), moderate (34.8%), and high threat perception level (30.3%) ($M=1.95$; $SD= 0.806$) (Table 52).

We noticed more females (36.5%) than males (24.1%) to have high threat levels and more males (39%) than females (30.9%) with a low threat. Further, more males (36.8%) than females (32.6%) are moderate. Those aged 25-29 years followed by 35 years (33.6%), 30-34 years (29.3%), and 18-24 years (23.7%) have high threat levels. On the contrary, most of those aged 18-24 years (37.7%) scored very high in having moderate threat perception, preceded by 30-34 years (35.7%), 25-29 years (32.9%), and 35 years (31.9%). Last, 25-29 years (32%), 35 years (34.5%), 30-34 years (35%), and 18-24 years (38.6%) have low threat perception.

The majority of the uneducated (56.7%), elemental studies (37.1%), high school (50%), and associate degrees (57.1%) have low threat perception. At the same time, most bachelor's degrees (35.7%), undergraduate students (36.4%), and master's degrees (37.3%) have moderate threat

perception levels. The majority of doctoral degrees (70%) were followed by master's degrees (33.3%), bachelor's degrees (28.9%), undergraduate students (28.6%), elemental studies (26.7%), high school (23.1%), and uneducated (13.3%) have high threat perception.

Similar to previous findings, those with right political ideology have high threat perception (47.8%) compared to the left (25.6%) and the center (23%). Most of the center (41.6%) has a low threat level, followed by the left (35.7%) and the right (22.5%). Also, most of the left (38.7%) have a moderate threat, preceded by the center (35.4%) and the right (29.7%).
It is important to note that most heavy news consumers on Facebook (53.5%), followed by medium (28.8%) and light (17%) have high threat perception. While most of the light (47.4%), preceded by the medium (30.4%) and the heavy (20.3%) have a low threat. Further, many medium news consumers have moderate threat levels compared to light (35.6%) and heavy news consumers on Facebook (34.8%). Consistently, heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (52.6%) followed by medium (22.3%) and light (17%) have high threat perception. The majority of light (49.5%) preceded by medium (34.1%) and heavy (19.9%) have low threat perception. There are medium (43.6%), light (33.6%), and heavy (27.6%) with moderate threat perception.

To deepen the analysis, we run crosstabulation between political ideology and level of threat perception only among participants who follow Facebook news pages (n=996). Data demonstrates that most left-wing (40%) have moderate threat levels, followed by the center (36.7%) and right-wings (27.3%). Moreover, a majority of center-wing (37.8%) hold a low threat in comparison to the left (30.8%) and right wings (20.1%). On the other side, most of the right-wing (52.6%) have high threat levels in comparison to the left (29.2%) and center (25.5%) (Table 53). Similarly, most females who follow Facebook news pages (39.8%) have high threat perception in comparison to males (27.9%). Yet, most males who follow Facebook news pages (36.3%) have moderate threat perception levels (Table 54).

Table 52. Threat perception level - Composite variable

Item	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Composite variable – Threat perception	Low	117	26.8%	172	39.4%	167	38.3%	456	34.8%
	Moderate	159	36.4%	155	35.6%	142	32.6%	456	34.8%
	High	161	36.8%	109	25.0%	127	29.1%	397	30.3%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

Table 53. Political ideology and threat level among participants who follow Facebook news pages

General									
Item	Response	Left		Center		Right		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Composite variable – Threat perception	Low	80	30.8%	169	37.8%	58	20.1%	307	30.8%
	Moderate	104	40.0%	164	36.7%	79	27.3%	347	34.8%
	High	76	29.2%	114	25.5%	152	52.6%	342	34.3%
Total		260	100.0%	447	100.0%	289	100.0%	996	100.0%
Spain									
Composite variable – Threat perception	Low	29	22.8%	49	30.6%	12	18.2%	90	25.5%
	Moderate	52	40.9%	53	33.1%	22	33.3%	127	36.0%
	High	46	36.2%	58	36.3%	32	48.5%	136	38.5%
Total		127	100.0%	160	100.0%	66	100.0%	353	100.0%
Egypt									
Composite variable – Threat perception	Low	21	31.3%	86	45.0%	30	26.1%	137	36.7%
	Moderate	29	43.3%	75	39.3%	34	29.6%	138	37.0%
	High	17	25.4%	30	15.7%	51	44.3%	98	26.3%
Total		67	100.0%	191	100.0%	115	100.0%	373	100.0%
USA									
Composite variable – Threat perception	Low	30	45.5%	34	35.4%	16	14.8%	80	29.6%
	Moderate	23	34.8%	36	37.5%	23	21.3%	82	30.4%
	High	13	19.7%	26	27.1%	69	63.9%	108	40.0%
Total		66	100.0%	96	100.0%	108	100.0%	270	100.0%

Table 54. Sex and threat level among participants who follow news pages on Facebook

General							
Item	Response	Male		Female		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
Composite variable – Threat perception	Low	163	35.8%	144	26.7%	307	30.8%
	Moderate	165	36.3%	181	33.5%	347	34.8%
	High	127	27.9%	215	39.8%	342	34.3%
Total		455	100.0%	540	100.0%	996	100.0%
Spain							
Composite variable – Threat perception	Low	34	26.4%	56	25.0%	90	25.5%
	Moderate	43	33.3%	84	37.5%	127	36.0%
	High	52	40.3%	84	37.5%	136	38.5%
Total		129	100.0%	224	100.0%	353	100.0%
Egypt							
	Low	76	43.4%	61	31.0%	137	36.7%

Composite variable – Threat perception	Moderate	72	41.1%	65	33.0%	138	37.0%
	High	27	15.4%	71	36.0%	98	26.3%
Total		175	100.0%	197	100.0%	373	100.0%
USA							
Composite variable – Threat perception	Low	53	35.1%	27	22.7%	80	29.6%
	Moderate	50	33.1%	32	26.9%	82	30.4%
	High	48	31.8%	60	50.4%	108	40.0%
Total		151	100.0%	119	100.0%	270	100.0%

7.3.1.6.1 Analysis of the composite variable threat perception: USA

We used the collected data in the USA of question 13, the nine items in question 14, and the extra two items in question 15 as a scale to examine the dependent variable (threat perception level). For this, we conducted a principal factor analysis to test the scale's validity and reduce any dimension/item that does not load well. The factorability of the 12 items of the dependent variable, threat perception, was examined. We used several well-recognized criteria for the factorability of a correlation. First, we recognized that most of the items correlated together, suggesting reasonable factorability. Second, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling adequacy was 0.836, above the commonly recommended value of 0.6, and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant (X2 (66) = 1836.888, p<0.000). This finding gives us confidence that our variables are significantly correlated altogether. Finally, the commonalities were above 0.506 confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items. Given these overall indicators, factor analysis is suitable for all 12 items. The 12 items also showed an extremely high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.938).

Most USA youths have low threat perception (38.3%), moderate (32.6%), and low (29.1%) (M= 1.91; SD= 0.817) (Table 52). There are more American females (40.1%) than American males (22.3%) who have high threat perception. On the contrary, most American males (41.3%) unlike females (33.5%) have low threat perception. As for the moderate threat perception, there are more American males (36.4%) than American females (26.3%). The highest education group in the USA to have low threat perception was found among associate degrees (n=6) (66.7%), uneducated (n=28) (57.1%), high school (n=21) (52.4%), elemental studies (n=65) (43.1%), bachelor's degree (n=101) (42.6%), undergraduate (n=110) (36.4%), master's (n=40) (30%), and the least is doctoral degree (n=43) (11.6%). On the other side, the most to have high threat perception levels are doctoral degrees (81.4%), master's degrees (35%), undergraduate students (26.4%), bachelor's degree (25.7%), high school (23.8%), elemental studies (16.9%), and the least is the uneducated (14.3%).

As for moderate threat perception, the highest scores are among elemental studies (40%), undergraduate students (37.3%), master's degree (35%), associate degree (33.3%), bachelor's degree (31.7%), not educated (28.6%), high school (23.8%), and doctoral degree (7%).

American youths with right political ideology have high threat perception (52.4%) compared to the center (19.5%) and the left (15.3%). Oppositely, most of the left (49.2%) and the center (43.8%) unlike the right (22.4%) have low threat perception. Similarly, the center (26.7%) and the left (35.5%) more than the right (25.2%) have a moderate threat perception. In a similar vein, (62.7%) of heavy news consumers on Facebook, (29.3%) of the medium, and (13.3%) of light have a high threat perception. In contrast, (54.1%) light, (31.9%) medium, and (11.8%) heavy news consumers on Facebook have low threat perception. Additionally, (38.8%) medium, (32.6%) light, and (25.5%) heavy news consumers on Facebook have moderate threat perception levels.

We inspected some differences across heavy, medium, and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages in the USA. Most heavy (64.5%) unlike medium (18.9%) or light (12.4%) have high threat perception. On the contrary, most light (56.2%) unlike the majority of medium (34.6%) and heavy (15.3%) have low threat perception. Furthermore, many medium (46.5%) have moderate threat levels compared to light (31.4%) and heavy (20.2%).

To deepen the analysis, we analyzed the level of perceived threat among the right, center, and left political ideologies who follow Facebook news pages in the USA. Data demonstrates that most left-wing (45.5%) have low threat levels, followed by the center (35.4%) and right-wings (14.8%). Moreover, many of the center-wing (37.5%) hold a moderate threat in comparison to the left (334.8%) and right wings (20.3%). On the other side, most of the right-wing participants (63.9%) have high threat levels in comparison to the left (19.7%) and center (27.1%) (Table 53). Similarly, we found most females who follow Facebook news pages (50.4%) have high threat perception in comparison to males (31.8%). Yet, most males who follow Facebook news pages (35.1%) have low threat perception (Table 54).

7.3.1.6.2 Analysis of the composite variable threat perception: Spain

We used the collected data in Spain of question 13, the nine items in question 14, and the extra two items in question 15 as a scale to examine the dependent variable. For this, we conducted a principal factor analysis to test the scale's validity and reduce any dimension/item that does not load well. The factorability of the 12 items of the dependent variable, threat perception, was examined. We used several well-recognized criteria for the factorability of a correlation.

First, we noticed that most of the items correlated together, suggesting reasonable factorability. Second, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling adequacy was 0.792, above the commonly recommended value of 0.6, and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant (X2 (66) = 1351.664, p<.001). This figure gives us confidence that our variables are significantly correlated altogether. Finally, the commonalities were above 0.404 confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items. Given these overall indicators, factor analysis is suitable for all 12 items. The 12 items also showed an extremely high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.857). For this study, we used all 12 threat items like a scale since the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.792 and has high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.857).

Therefore, we found the following percentages in Spain; there is low (26.8%), moderate (36.4%), and high threat perception among Spanish participants (36.8%) (M= 2.10; SD= 0.792) (Table 52). Most Spanish males (38.4%) have high perception threat than females (36.2%). Also, more Spanish males (27.4%) than females (26.6%) have a low threat perception. In addition, (34.1%) of males and (37.3%) of females have moderate levels. Moreover, 35 years have high threat perception (46%), followed by 25-29 years (43.7%), 30-34 years (34.2%), and the least score is among 18-24 years (29.2%). It is important to note that most 18-24 years (39.8%) and 30-34 (36.8%) have moderate threat perception levels.

In addition, many elemental studies (45.5%), undergraduate students (35.4%), and doctoral degrees (57.1%) have high threat perception. While most bachelor's degrees (39.4%) and master's degrees (41.4%) have moderate threat perception. Those with right political ideology have a high threat perception (47.5%) compared to the left (33.7%) and the center (35.1%). It is worth noting that the majority of the left (41.7%) have moderate threat perception compared to the center (33%) and the right (33.8%). Furthermore, most of the heavy news consumers on Facebook have a high threat level (52.6%) compared to light news consumers (26.4%) and the medium (35.3%). Whereas most of the light news consumers (40.5%) and medium (41%) in comparison to the heavy (24.1%) have a moderate level. In like manner, the majority of light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (40.8%) and medium (41.1%) have a moderate threat perception in comparison to heavy (26.6%); it is worth noting that most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have high threat perception (51.1%) unlike medium (34.5%) and light (24.6%).

To deepen the analysis, we run crosstabulation between political ideology and the level of threat perception among participants who follow Facebook news pages in Spain. Data demonstrates that most left-wing (40.9%) have moderate threat levels followed by the center (33.1%) and right-wings (33.3%). Moreover, the majority of center-wing (36.3%%) and right-wing (48.5%) hold high threat

levels in comparison to the left (36.2%) (Table 53). Similarly, we found that most females who follow Facebook news pages (37.5%) have high threat perception and moderate threat perception (37.5%). Unlike most males who have high threat perception (40.3%) (Table 54).

7.3.1.6.3 Analysis of the composite variable threat perception: Egypt

We used the collected data in Egypt of question 13, the nine items in question 14, and the extra two items in question 15 as a scale to examine the dependent variable. For this, we conducted a principal factor analysis to test the scale's validity and reduce any dimension/item that does not load well. The factorability of the 12 items of the dependent variable, threat perception, was examined. We used several well-recognized criteria for the factorability of a correlation.

First, we noticed that most of the items correlated together, suggesting reasonable factorability. Second, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling adequacy was 0.818, above the commonly recommended value of 0.6, and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant (X2 (66) = 1656.166, p<.001). These figures give us confidence that our variables are significantly correlated altogether. Finally, the commonalities were above 0.580 confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items. Given these overall indicators, factor analysis is suitable for all 12 items. The 12 items also showed an extremely high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.908). We used all 12 threat items as a scale for this study since the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.818 and had high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.908).

Therefore, the obtained results in Egypt showed that there is low threat perception (39.4%), moderate threat (35.6%), and high threat perception (25%) (M= 1.86; SD= 0.791) (Table 52). Most Egyptian males (45.1%) have low threat perception compared to females (34.2%). Also, more Egyptian males (39.4%) than females (31.5%), have moderate. Accordingly, more Egyptian females (34.2%) than males (15.5%) have high threat perception. We also noticed that the majority of all age segments have low threat perception where 35 years have the highest percentage (50%) followed by 30-34 years (42%), 18-24 years (40.6%), and the least to have low threat perception is among 25-29 years (35.4%). Furthermore, the highest to have moderate perception is among 18-24 years (39.2%) followed by 35 years (35%), 30-34 years (34.8%), and 25-29 years (32.9%). The highest threat perception is among 25-29 years (31.7%) followed by 30-34 years (23.2%), 18-24 years (20.3%), and the minor percentage of having a high threat perception is among 35 years (15%).

Most of the uneducated (n=1) (100%), doctoral degree (62.5%), undergraduate (44.2%), high school/equivalent (n=5) (40%), elemental studies (n=18) (38.9%), bachelor’s degree (38.5%) have

low threat perception, whereas the least scores among master's degree (n=28) (25%). Also, most of the master's degrees (42.9%) followed by elemental studies (27.8%), bachelor's degrees (26%), doctoral degrees (25%), high school/equivalent (20%), undergraduate students (16.3%) have high threat perception levels. In addition, the highest scores of having a moderate threat perception are among undergraduate students (39.5%), bachelor's degree (35.4%), elemental studies (33.3%), master's degree (32.1%), and doctoral degree (12.5%). Right political ideology has a high threat perception (42,7%) followed by left (25%) and center (15.2%). Further, the center (48.2%) followed by the left (37.2%) and the right (25%) have a low threat perception. In addition, the left (37.5%) preceded the center (36.6%) and the right (32.3%) in having a moderate threat perception.

Likewise, heavy news consumers on Facebook (46.7%), medium (20.3%), and light (13.6%) have high threat perceptions. In contrast, light (51.1%), medium (37.7%), and heavy (24.6%) have low threat perception levels. In addition, the medium (42%), light (35.2%), and heavy news consumers on Facebook (28.7%) have moderate threat perception.

Similarly, most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (44.8%) followed by light (16%) and medium (9.4%) have high threat perception levels. There is light (54.2%), medium (46.5%), and heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (21.2%) have low threat perception. Moreover, there is medium (44.1%), heavy (33.9%), and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (29.9%) with moderate threat perception level.

To deepen the analysis, we analyzed the level of threat perception among the right, left, and center political ideology participants who follow news pages on Facebook in Egypt. Data demonstrates that most left-wing (43.3%) have moderate threat levels, followed by the center (39.3%) and right-wings (29.6%). Moreover, a majority of center-wing (45%) hold a low threat in comparison to the left (31.3%) and right wings (26.1%). On the other side, most of the right-wing (44.3%) have a high threat level in comparison to the left (25.4%) and center (15.7%) (Table 53). Similarly, we found most of the females who follow Facebook news pages (36%) have high threat perception in comparison to males (15.4%). Yet, most males who follow Facebook news pages (43.4%) have low threat perception (Table 54).

7.3.1.7 Testing Hypothesis 2

H2: There is a positive correlation between the extent of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the degree of perceived threat cultivated among young adults.

Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in this section is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test to find correlation and ordinal regression to detect the effect on the dependent variable.

We used the composite variables of threat perception, news consumption on Facebook, and influencers' Facebook pages to run the correlation coefficient test. We found a weak positive relationship between news consumption on Facebook and threat perception level rho= 0.313, p<0.001. Likewise, a weak positive relationship between frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and threat perception rho= 0.329, p< 0.001 (Table 55). Furthermore, we excluded all those who do not follow news pages on Facebook (namely influencers on Facebook). We found a positive correlation between those who consume news through following news pages on Facebook and the level of perceived threat rho= 0.289, p< 0.001 (Table 56). In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association and support our alternate hypothesis. Taking this into account, the more people consume news on influencers' Facebook pages, the more their level of threat perception.

To gain a deeper understanding of our results we found a minimum positive correlation between the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the family's general safety rho=0.211, p<0.001; threat by the lack of free speech and democratic rights rho=0.206, p< 0.001; and preferring filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19 rho=0.251, p<0.001.

Table 55. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception, news consumption on Facebook and on influencers' Facebook pages

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - threat perception
Composite variable - News consumption on Facebook	Correlation Coefficient	.313**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
Composite variable - News consumption on influencers' Facebook pages	Correlation Coefficient	.329**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		

Table 56. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between news consumption on Facebook and threat perception

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - threat perception
Composite variable - News consumption on Facebook	Correlation Coefficient	.289**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	996
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		

In addition, we used the ANOVA test for a variance to check if there is any statistical difference between the means of the three political ideology wings among those who follow Facebook news pages (n=996). Thus, a one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of political ideology on threat perception levels in left-wing, center-wing, and right-wing conditions. There was a significant effect of the amount of political ideology on threat perception remembered at the $p<.05$ level for the three conditions [$F(2, 993) = 29.366$, $p = 0.001$]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the left-wing condition ($M = 1.98$; $SD = 0.776$) was significantly different than the right-wing condition ($M = 2.33$; $SD = 0.789$). However, the center-wing condition ($M = 1.88$; $SD = 0.787$) did not significantly differ from the left, yet significantly differed from the right-wing conditions. Taken together, these results suggest that the more we move toward the right-wing the more threat perception levels we yield. Specifically, our results suggest that individuals with an inclination towards the right side of the political continuum, have higher threat levels. Thus, this shows a significant difference between some of the condition means.

We run the test with the other demographics of education and age among participants who follow Facebook news pages (n=996). The ANOVA test revealed a statistical difference between the means of the independent groups of education [$F(9, 986) = 3.640$, $p = 0.001$] and age [$F(3, 992) = 4.967$, $p = 0.002$]. Moreover, the independent sample t-test also showed that the mean score of males is statistically significantly different than the mean of females $t(993) = -4.133$, $p = 0.001$.

Even though we found a positive correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the perceived threat level, we conducted ordinal regression to understand better the independent variable's impact on the dependent variable. We used ordinal regression analysis to examine the relationship between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and threat perception. Therefore, we started by measuring the impact of our two independent variables on the dependent variable, which is the threat perception scale. The model was found significant were the

predictor variables, news consumption on Facebook, and influencers' Facebook pages improved the model, because of a variation decrease from 315.460 to 123.835 X2 (2) = 191.625, p < .001.
In addition, the parameter estimates of news consumption on Facebook had a positive effect B= 0.486, SE= (0.077), Wald= (39.942), p < 0.001; similar, the estimates of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages had a positive effect B= 0.559, SE= (0.076), Wald= (54.442), p < 0.001.
Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.486) = 1.626, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.398, 1.892) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption. This result means that for every 1 unit increase in news consumption on Facebook, there is a predicted increase of 1.626 in the level of perceived threat. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable. Likewise, the estimated odds ratio also favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.559) = 1.748, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.506, 2.030) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. In other words, for every 1 unit increase in consuming news on influencers, there is an expected increase of 1.748 in the level of threat perception.

7.3.1.7.1 Testing Hypothesis 2: USA

We tested H2 in the case of USA. Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in the USA case is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test for finding correlation and ordinal regression to identify the effect on the dependent variable. We found a positive weak relationship in the USA between news consumption on Facebook and threat perception level rho= 0.440, p< 0.001. Likewise, there is a weak positive relationship between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and threat perception rho= 0.451, p< 0.001 in the USA (Table 57). Furthermore, we excluded all those who do not follow news pages on Facebook. We found a weak positive correlation rho= 0.431, p< 0.001 between those who consume news through following news pages on Facebook and the level of perceived threat (Table 58). In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association and support our alternate hypothesis. This implies that the more American youths consume news on influencers' Facebook pages the higher their threat perception is.
In addition, we conducted Spearman's test for correlation among several items. For instance, we found a positive correlation between the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the family's general safety rho=0.351, p<0.001; the lack of free speech and democratic

rights rho=0.240, p< 0.001; and preferring filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19 rho=0.374, p<0.001.

Table 57. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception, news consumption on Facebook and on influencers' pages - USA

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - threat perception
Composite variable - News consumption on Facebook	Correlation Coefficient	.440**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
Composite variable - News consumption on influencers' Facebook pages	Correlation Coefficient	.451**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		
a. Where do you live? = United States of America		

Table 58. Non-parametric test of Spearman's correlation between news consumption and threat perception - USA

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - threat perception
Composite variable - News consumption on Facebook	Correlation Coefficient	.431**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	270
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		
a. Where do you live? = United States of America		

To deepen the analysis, we also used the ANOVA test for a variance to check if there is any statistical difference between the means of the three political ideology wings in the USA. Thus, a one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of political ideology on threat perception levels in left-wing, center-wing, and right-wing conditions. There was a significant effect of the amount of political ideology on threat perception remembered at the p<.05 level for the three conditions [F (2, 433) = 28.176, p = 0.001]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the left-wing condition (M = 1.66; SD = 0.731) was significantly different than the right-wing condition (M = 2.30; SD = 0.814). However, the center-wing condition (M = 1.76; SD = 0.760) did not significantly differ from the left, yet significantly differed from the right-wing conditions.

We reconducted the test with the demographic of age among American youths who follow Facebook news pages. ANOVA test revealed a non-statistical difference between the means of the independent groups of age [F (3, 266) = 1.168, p = 0.322]. It is worth noting that we could not perform the ANOVA on the independent groups of education in each country, as some groups have less than two participants. Moreover, the independent sample t-test also showed that the mean score of males is statistically significantly different than the mean for females t (268) = -3.101, p = 0.002.

Even though we found a positive correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the perceived threat level, we conducted ordinal regression to understand better the independent variable's impact on the dependent variable. Ordinal regression analysis examined the relationship between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and threat perception.

We aim at measuring the effect of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages on the level of perceived threat in the USA. Therefore, we started by measuring the impact of our two independent variables on the dependent variable, which is the threat perception scale. The model was found significant were the predictor variables, news consumption on Facebook, and influencers' Facebook pages improved the model, because of a variation decrease from 215.298 to 88.283 X2 (2) = 127.015, p < 0.001. In addition, the parameter estimates of news consumption had a positive effect B= 0.704, SE= (0.145), Wald= (23.526), p < 0.001; similar, the estimates of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages had a positive effect B= 0.803, SE= (0.143), Wald= (31.508), p < 0.001. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.704) = 2.021, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.530, 2.670) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption. These figures mean that for every 1 unit increase in the amount of news consumption on Facebook, there is a predicted increase of 2.021 in the level of perceived threat. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable in the USA.

Likewise, the estimated odds ratio also favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.803) = 2.232, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.689, 2.950) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. In other words, for every 1 unit increase in consuming news on influencers on Facebook, there is an expected increase of 2.232 in the level of threat perception. Finally, we detected that all curves have the same slope -2LL of parallel lines X2 (2) = 4.158, p-value 0.125. Hence, accepting the null hypothesis of proportional odds assumes that the odds ratios across all categories are the same.

7.3.1.7.2 Testing Hypothesis 2: Spain

We tested H2 in the case of Spain. Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in the Spain case is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test to find correlation and ordinal regression to find the effect on the dependent variable. Hence, we found a positive relationship between news consumption on Facebook and threat perception level rho= 0.181, p< 0.001 in Spain. Likewise, there is a positive relationship between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and threat perception rho= 0.196, p< 0.001 in Spain (Table 59). Furthermore, we excluded all those who do not follow news pages on Facebook in Spain. We found a positive correlation rho= 0.186, p< 0.001 between Spanish youths who consume news by following news pages on Facebook and the level of perceived threat. In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association and support our alternate hypothesis (Table 60). This means that the more Spanish youths consume news by following news pages on Facebook, the higher their perception of threats will be.

In addition, we used Spearman's test for correlation among several other items. However, we did not find a significant relation between the extent of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the family's general safety p=0.164; lack of free speech and democratic rights p=0.052. Nevertheless, we found a positive correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and preferring filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19 rho=0.113, p<0.018.

Table 59. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception, news consumption on Facebook and on influencers' pages - Spain

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - threat perception
Composite variable - News consumption on Facebook	Correlation Coefficient	.181**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	437
Composite variable - News consumption on influencers' Facebook pages	Correlation Coefficient	.196**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	437
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		
Where do you live? = Spain		

Table 60. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between news consumption and threat perception - Spain

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - threat perception
Composite variable - News consumption on Facebook	Correlation Coefficient	.186**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	353
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		
a. Where do you live? = Spain		

To deepen the analysis, we also used the ANOVA test for a variance to check if there is any statistical difference between the means of the three political ideology wings in Spain. Thus, a one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of political ideology on threat perception levels in left-wing, center-wing, and right-wing conditions. There was a non-significant effect of the amount of political ideology on threat perception remembered at the $p<.05$ level for the three conditions [$F(2, 434) = 3.014$, $p = 0.050$].

We reconducted the test with the demographic variable of age among participants who follow Facebook news pages. ANOVA test revealed a statistical difference between the means of the independent groups of age [$F(3, 349) = 2.693$, $p = 0.046$]. It is worth noting that we could not perform the ANOVA on the independent groups of education, as some groups have less than two participants. Moreover, the independent sample t-test was statistically not significant, thus there is no difference between the mean score of males and females, $p>0.05$.

Even though we found a positive correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the perceived threat level, we conducted ordinal regression to understand better the independent variable's impact on the dependent variable. We used ordinal regression analysis to examine the relationship between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and threat perception. Therefore, we started by measuring the impact of our two independent variables on the dependent variable, which is the threat perception scale.

We found the model significant were the predictor variables, news consumption on Facebook, and influencers' Facebook pages improved the model, because of a variation decreased from 110.933 to 87.731 $X2 (2) = 23.203$, $p < 0.001$. Furthermore, the goodness of fit was insignificant Pearson $X2 (14) = 17.122$, $P= 0.250$. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the observed data is consistent with the fitted model.

In addition, the parameter estimates of news consumption had a positive effect B= 0.308, SE= (0.126), Wald= (5.988), p < 0.014; similar, the estimates of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages had a positive effect B= 0.361, SE= (0.124), Wald= (8.401), p < 0.004.
Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.308) = 1.361, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.059, 1.749) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption. This figure means that for every 1 unit increase in the amount of news consumption on Facebook, there is a predicted increase of 1.361 in the level of perceived threat. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable. Likewise, the estimated odds ratio also favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.361) = 1.434, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.121, 1.835) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. In other words, for every 1 unit increase in consuming news on influencers' Facebook pages, there is an expected increase of 1.434 in the level of threat perception.

7.3.1.7.3 Testing Hypothesis 2: Egypt

We tested H2 in the case of Egypt. Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in the Egyptian case is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test to find correlation and ordinal regression to find the effect on the dependent variable. In this sense, we found a positive relationship between news consumption on Facebook and threat perception level rho= 0.294, p< 0.001 in Egypt. Likewise, a positive relationship between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and threat perception rho= 0.337, p< 0.001 (Table 61). Furthermore, we excluded all those who do not follow news pages on Facebook. We found a positive correlation rho= 0.273, p< 0.001 between Egyptian youths who consume news on Facebook through news pages and the level of perceived threat. In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association and support our alternate hypothesis (Table 62).
In addition, we conducted Spearman's test for correlation among several items. For instance, we found a minimum positive correlation between the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the level of threat to family's general safety rho=0.212, p<0.001; lack of free speech and democratic rights rho=0.285, p< 0.001; and preferring filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19 rho=0.213, p<0.001.

Table 61. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception, news consumption on Facebook and on influencers' pages - Egypt

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - threat perception
Composite variable - News consumption on Facebook	Correlation Coefficient	.294**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
Composite variable - News consumption on influencers' Facebook pages	Correlation Coefficient	.337**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		
a. Where do you live? = Egypt		

Table 62. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between news consumption and threat perception across those who only follow influencer pages - Egypt

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - threat perception
Composite variable - News consumption on Facebook	Correlation Coefficient	.273**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	373
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		
a. Where do you live? = Egypt		

To deepen the analysis, we used the ANOVA test for a variance to check if there is any statistical difference between the means of the three political ideology wings in Egypt. Thus, a one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of political ideology on threat perception levels in left-wing, center-wing, and right-wing conditions. There was a significant effect of the amount of political ideology on threat perception remembered at the $p<.05$ level for the three conditions [$F(2, 433) = 17.768$, $p = 0.001$]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the left-wing condition ($M = 1.88$; $SD = 0.785$) was significantly different than the right-wing condition ($M = 2.18$; $SD = 0.807$). However, the center-wing condition ($M = 1.67$; $SD = 0.726$) did not significantly differ from the left, yet significantly differed from the right-wing conditions.

We reconducted the test with the demographic variable of age among participants who follow Facebook news pages. ANOVA test revealed a statistical difference between the means of the independent groups of age [$F(3, 369) = 3.024$, $p = 0.030$]. It is worth noting that we could not perform the ANOVA on the independent groups of education, as some groups have less than two

participants. Moreover, the independent sample t-test showed a statistically significant difference between the mean score of males and females t (370) = -4.122, p = 0.001.

Even though we found a positive correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and the perceived threat level, we conducted ordinal regression to understand better the independent variable's impact on the dependent variable. Ordinal regression analysis examined the relationship between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and threat perception. We aim at measuring the effect of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, on the perception of threat. Therefore, we started by measuring the impact of our two independent variables on the dependent variable, which is the threat perception scale.

The model was found significant were the predictor variables, news consumption on Facebook, and influencers' Facebook pages improved the model, because of a variation decreased from 157.417 to 97.513 X2 (2) = 59.904, p < .001. In addition, the parameter estimates of news consumption had a positive effect B= 0.388, SE= (0.135), Wald= (8.212), p < 0.004; similar, the estimates of following influencers' Facebook pages had a positive effect B= 0.591, SE= (0.134), Wald= (19.543), p < 0.001. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.388) = 1.474, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.128, 1.926) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption. These figures mean that for every 1 unit increase in the amount of news consumption on Facebook, there is a predicted increase of 1.474 in the level of perceived threat. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable.

Likewise, the estimated odds ratio also favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.591) = 1.805, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.385, 2.353) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. In other words, for every 1 unit increase in consuming news on influencers' Facebook pages, there is an expected increase of 1.805 in the level of threat perception. Finally, we found all curves to have the same slope -2LL of parallel lines X2 (2) = 4.512, p-value 0.105. Hence, accepting the null hypothesis of proportional odds assumes that the odds ratios across all categories are the same.

7.4 Correlation between threat perception and political conservatism

In question 16 we aim to test hypothesis 3 assuming a positive correlation between the level of the perceived threat and resistance to change. In addition, we intend to examine hypothesis 4 suggesting a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and inequality preference. We used the

PVQ scale to measure political conservatism in its two-core values inequality preference and resistance to change. We measured resistance to change by conservatism's core values, including security, conformity, and tradition. On the other side, we examined inequality preference through self-enhancement, including the core values of power and achievement. This scale includes short verbal portraits of different people that capture the person's values without explicitly identifying values as the topic of investigation. Thus, we inferred the respondents' values from their self-reported similarity to those described in terms of values. To measure this, we used a 10-point scale which we recodified into 5 points Likert scale on the SPSS. Later, we recodified these variables into three categories to label the sample as not like this person, somewhat like this person, like this person.

7.4.1 Measuring conservatism as the core dimension of resistance to change

We used question 16 to measure resistance to change through security, conformity, and traditional values of conservatism. Each of those is measured, by asking respondents to state from 1-10 to what extent they believe this person is like him, 1 means not like him at all, and 10 means very much like him. We recoded the answers into 3 points Likert scale, not like this person, somewhat like this person, and like this person. At the end of this, we created a composite score merging the three values to examine resistance to change and thus test our hypothesis.

7.4.1.1 Measuring the human portrait value security

This value is measured through three items which are: it is important for him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety; it is important to him that his country be safe from threats from within and without. He is concerned that social order be protected; it is acceptable for him to give up some civil liberty rights to maintain national security.

7.4.1.1.1 Danger avoidance

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important for him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety (M=2.48; SD= 0.743). There are (62%) of the participants said they are like or very much like this person, (22.2%) somehow like, and (15.1%) not like or very much not like this person (Table 63).

Females outweighed males by more than 10% in terms of being like this person, with (68.2%) females and (57.4%) males. Also, we found more males (25.1%) than females (19.4%) who said they are somewhat like this person; further, males (17.5%) outweighed females (12.4%) in terms of not being like this person.

The collected data showed around 60% across age categories said they are like or so much like this person whereas the highest score across them was 25-29 years (68.5%) followed by 30-34 years (61.1%), 18-24 years (60.1%), and the least score among 35 years (54%). About 23% said they are somewhat like this person, with 35 years achieving top score (26.5%) preceded by 30-34 years (25.7%), 18-24 years (20.9%), and 25-29 years (18.4%). 35 years have the highest percentage of not being like this person (19.5%) followed by 30-34 years (13.2%), 25-29 years (13.1%), and 18-24 years (19%).

Most education categories are like this person except the uneducated (n=30) where (50%) said they are not like this person; elemental studies (n=116) (48.3%), undergraduate students (n=385) (48.3%), bachelor's degree (n=526) (71.5%), master's degree (n=126) (64.3%), doctoral degree (n=65) (89.2%), high school (n=26) (61.5%), and associate degree (n=7) (57.1%). Around 23% across education segments said they are somewhat like this person, and (18.8%) are either not or very much not like this person.

The highest score across political ideologies of being like this person is the right-wing (72.9%) followed by the center (60.8%) and the left (56.3%). We observed that the left (20%) more than the center (15.3%) and the right (9.5%) is not like or very much not like this person. There were relatively close scores in terms of being somewhat like this person, with about (21.7%).

7.4.1.1.2 Protecting social order

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is essential to him that his country be safe from threats from within and without. He is concerned that social order is protected (M=2.57; SD= 0.689). We found that (68.2%) of the participants said they are like or very much like this person, (20.3%) somehow like, and (11.5%) are either not like or very much not like this person (Table 63).

There are more females (70.6%) than males (66.1%) who are either like or very much like this person; whereas more males (21.2%) than females (19.2%) somewhat like this person; additionally, males (12.7%) outweighed females (10.2%) in terms of either not like or very much not like this person. Most age categories scored very high of being like or very much like this person, with

around (67.5%); whereas the highest score was among those aged 25-29 years (69.7%) and the least score among 35 years (64.6%).

We noticed the highest score of being somewhat like this person among 35 years (23.9%) followed by 30-34 years (21.8%), 18-24 years (19.9%), and 25-29 years (18.2%). Further, the top score of not being like this person is among 18-24 years (11.5%) and the lowest score among 30-34 years (10%).

Most of all education categories scored very high in being like this person, with (64%). Yet, most uneducated (n=30) scored higher in being not like or very much not like this person (36.7%) than other groups.

In addition, there are (79%) right, (66.3%) center, and (61.3%) left who either like or so much like this person. We noticed more left-wing (16.5%) than the center (11.2%) and the right (6.3%) in terms of not being like or very much not like this person. Last, the right (14.7%) has the lowest percentage compared to the center (22.5%), and the left (22.1%) of being somewhat like this person.

7.4.1.1.3 Maintain national security

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is acceptable for him to give up some civil liberty rights to maintain national security. It is worth noting that we added this statement to the PVQ, and it wasn't part of the scale (M=2.02; SD= 0.847). Most of the participants are like this person (36.7%) followed by not like or very much not like this person (35.1%), and somewhat like (28.3%) (Table 63).

There were slight differences across sex. Females (38.2%) excelled over males (35.1%), with around 3.1% points in terms of either like or very much like this person. There is a different point of 1.1% between females (28.8%) and males (27.7%) who somewhat like this person. Yet, males (37.2%) outweighed females (33%) of either not like or very much not like this person.

Most of 35 years (40.7%) either do not like or very much not like this person, followed by 18-24 years (36.1%), 30-34 years (34.1%), and the least score among 25-29 years (33.8%). In addition, most 25-29 years (40.5%) and 30-34 years (35.7%) said they are very much like or like this person, with 30-34 years (35.7%) and 18-24 years (33%). There were slight variances in being somewhat like this person across age, with 18-24 years scoring the highest (30.8%) and 35 years have the lowest percentage.

Furthermore, most of the uneducated (53.3%), elemental studies (42.2%), undergraduate (36.4%), high school (50%), and associate (85.7%) are not very much like or not like this person. On the

other side, most bachelor's degrees (42.2%), master's degrees (39.7%), and doctoral degrees (73.8%) are like this person. As for being somewhat like this person, the undergraduate students (35.8%) scored the highest, preceded by the elemental studies (27.6%), master's degree (26.2%), bachelor's degree (25.1%), not educated (23.3%), high school (15.4%), associate degree (14.3%), and doctoral degree (12.3%).

We found that the right political ideology participants scored higher (55.9%) compared to the center (30%) and the left (29.3%) in terms of being like or very much like this person. Most of the left (42.1%) and the center (36.8%) are not like or very much not like this person with only (24.5%) right. The highest score of being somewhat like this person is among the center (33.2%) followed by the left (28.5%) and the right (19.6%).

To enhance the analysis, we found most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (58%) accept giving up some liberty rights to maintain national security, followed by medium (30%) and light (24%). On the other side, a majority of light (46%) and medium news consumers on such pages (36%) do not accept, compared to heavy news consumers (23.1%) (Table 64).

7.4.1.1.4 Analysis of the composite variable security value

We created a composite variable of the security items; therefore, we checked their reliability. The three items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.637). However, to increase this value, we reviewed the scale if an item was deleted and found that deleting item 3 will increase Cronbach's alpha value to 0.824. Accordingly, we removed item three since this item wasn't part of the PVQ scale, and we just added this item to deepen the analysis. It is worth noting that these items showed a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.669.

Within this framework, we divided participants into low, moderate, and high-security levels (M=2.56; SD= 0.725). About 71% have a high-security level, (15.6%) have a moderate and (14%) have a low-security level (Table 63).

Females (73.8%) have higher security levels than males (67.3%), with 6.5% different points.

More males (17.5%) than females (13.8%) have moderate. Also, males (15.2%) with low-security levels outweighed females (12.4%). Around 71% across all age segments have a high-security level, with 25-29 years having the highest score (74.7%) and 35 years the lowest (62.8%). On the other side, (14%) have a low security, with 18-24 years having the highest score (16.2%) and 30-34 years having the lowest score of (12.3%). Additionally, (15.6%) have a moderate security level, with 35 years the highest score (21.2%), and 25-29 years the lowest (11.7%).

We noticed that most of the uneducated (46.7%) have a low-security level. In contrast, more than 70% across educational categories have a high-security level with the highest score among doctoral degrees (89.2%) followed by bachelor's (79.7%) as well master's degrees (72.2%); the lowest obtained scores were among the uneducated (30%), associate degree (42.9%), and elemental studies (58.6%). As for the moderate level, we found that associate degree (57.1%), uneducated (23.3%), undergraduate (20.8%), high school (23.1%), elemental studies (17.2%), and master's degree (15.9%) scored the highest. On the opposite, a doctoral degree (6.2%) and a bachelor's degree (10.6%) have the lowest scores.

Like previous findings, (80%) right, (68.1%) center, and (65.6%) left have high security. There is more center (16.7%) than the left (15.2%) and the right (14.1%) with a moderate security level. Also, the left (19.2%), center (15.2%), and right (6.3%) have a low-security level.

There were slight differences across news consumers on Facebook, with heavy news consumers having the highest score (86.5%) followed by medium (72.8%) and light (58.5%). Moreover, more light news consumers (18.6%) in comparison to the medium (17.3%) and heavy (8.5%) have moderate. On the other side, light (22.9%), medium (9.8%), and heavy (5%) have low security levels,

We noticed that heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have the highest score of security (86.4%) followed by medium (69.2%), and light (56.6%). In addition, light (18.7%), medium (19.4%), and heavy (8.4%) have moderate security levels.

Most of those with low (59.1%), moderate (68.8%), and high (86.5%) threat perception levels have a high-security level. We noticed that there are (19%) moderate threats and (9.9%) high threat levels, having a moderate security level. There are more participants with low threat perception (23.9%) than moderate (12.3%) and high (3.6%), having a low-security level.

We excluded all participants who do not follow news pages on Facebook (n=996) to check the percentages across those who only consume news through Facebook news pages. We found that (87.3%) of heavy news consumers, (75.5%) of medium, and (62.7%) of light have a high-security level. Further, (18%) light, (17%) medium, and (8%) heavy, have a moderate security level. On the other side, (19%) light, (7.4%) medium, and (4.5%) heavy have low-security levels. Among those participants who follow news pages on Facebook (n=996), there are about 80% of high, moderate, and low threat perception levels with high-security levels, with the following scores: high threat perception (87%), moderate threat, (73%), and low threat (64%); similarly, there are (15.6%) low threat level, (18.4%) moderate threat, and (9.6%) high threat, having a moderate security level; in

addition, there are (20%) low threat, (8.9%) moderate threat, and (3.5%) high threat, having a low-security level.

7.4.1.2 Measuring the human portrait value conformity

This value is measured through two items which are: he believes that people should do what they are told. He thinks people should always follow rules even when no one is watching; it is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.

7.4.1.2.1 Abidance by the rules

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: he believes that people should do what they are told. He thinks people should always follow the rules even when no one is watching (M=2.22; SD= 0.838). We found that (48.8%) like or very much like this person, (26.4%) are not like or very much not like this person, and (24.8%) are somewhat like this person (Table 63).
Our data showed that there are more females (51.8%) than males (45.8%) either like or very much like this person. While more males (26%) than females (23.6%) somewhat like this person. Also, more males (28.2%) than females (24.5%) either do not like or very much do not like this person. Around 48% across age segments either like or very much like this person, with 25-29 years have the highest score (50.6%) and 35 years have the lowest score (41.6%). About 26% across all age segments is somewhat like this, with 35 years having the highest score and 18-24 years the lowest. On the contrary, (26.7%) do not like this person, with 35 years having the highest score (28.3%) and 25-29 years having the lowest (24.4%).
Like prior results, most uneducated (40%), elemental studies (41.4%), high school (38.5%), and associate degree (71.4%) are not like this person. At the same time, (56.4%) of all other education categories either like or very much like this person with a doctoral degree (76.9%), bachelor's degree (57.6%), master's degree (50%), and undergraduate student (41.3%).
We found that the right (64%) more than the center (44.8%) and the left-wing participants (41.1%) are like or very much like this person. There are more left (33.9%) than the center (27.8%) and the right (15.9%) not being like or very much not like this person. Last, (27.4%) center, (25.1%) left, and (20.2%) right somewhat like this person.

7.4.1.2.2 Compliance with social norms

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong (M=2.32; SD= 0.804). There are (53.2%) like this person, (25.4%) somewhat like this person, and (21.5%) are not. We noticed more females (51.8%) than males (45.8%) who like or very much like this person (Table 63).

On the other side, more males (26%) than females (23.6%) somewhat like this person. Also, more males (28.2%) than females (24.5%) are not like or very much not like this person.

Most age segments are like this person, with the highest score among 25-29 years (50.6%) followed by 18-24 years (49.2%), 30-34 years (48.6%), and 35 years (41.6%). Additionally, those aged 35 years scored higher (30.1%) than 25-29 years (25.1%), 30-34 years (24.3%), and 18-24 years (23.4%) being somewhat like this person. Around (26.7%) are either not like or very much not like this person, with 35 years having the highest score (28.3%) followed by 18-24 years (27.4%), 30-34 years (27%), and the least is 25-29 years (24.4%).

Most uneducated (40%), elemental studies (41.4%), high school (38.5%), and associate degree (71.4%), either not like or very much not like this person. On the other side, around (57%) of different education groups either like or very much like this person, with doctoral (76.9%), bachelor's degrees (57.6%), master's degrees (50%), and undergraduate (41.3%). Approximately, (25%) are somewhat like this person, with uneducated (33.3%) achieving the highest score, followed by undergraduate students (28.6%) and associate (28.6%), and the least obtained score is across the doctoral degree (10.8%), followed by master's degree (22.2%) and bachelor's degree (23.8%).

The right-wing participants (48.8%) followed by the center (44.8%) and the left (41.1%), said they are like or very much like this person. Whereas the left (33.9%) more than the center (27.8%) and the right-wing participants (15.9%) are not like or very much not like this person. There are relatively close percentages of being somewhat like this person, with the center (27.4%), the left (25.1%), and the right (20.2%).

7.4.1.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable conformity value

We created a composite variable of conformity items; therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.763). It is worth noting that these

items showed a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.596 (M=2.29; SD= 0.837). Most participants have a high conformity level (54%), followed by low (24.6%) and moderate (21.4%) (Table 63).

Even though most of both sexes have high conformity levels, there are some variances. There are 8.6% difference points between females (58.3%) and males (49.7%) who have a high level of conformity. Also, more males (24.6%) than females (18.2%) have moderate conformity levels. There are (25.7%) of males and (23.5%) of females who have low conformity levels.

We found (54%) across age categories have a high conformity level, with the highest score among 25-29 years (56.1%) followed by 18-24 years (54.2%), 30-34 years (53.9%), and 35 years (46%). In addition, almost 22% have a moderate conformity level, with those aged 35 years (23.9%) scoring the highest and preceded by 18-24 years (19.6%), 30-34 years (23.2%), and 25-29 years (20.2%). Also, (24.6%) have a low conformity level, with the highest among 35 years (30.1%) and lowest among 30-34 years (23%).

Most uneducated (53.3%), elemental studies (40.5%), and high school (46.2%) have a low conformity level while most of the associate degrees (57.1%) have a moderate conformity level. Almost all other education categories scored very high, in terms of having a high conformity level, with the highest among doctoral degrees (81.5%), bachelor's degrees (63.3%), master's degrees (57.9%), undergraduate students (45.2%), high school (42.3%), elemental studies (37.1%), uneducated (30%), and the least score among associate degree (0%).

As for the political ideology, we observed that almost all categories have a high level of conformity, with (69.5%) right, (48.4%) left, and (48.5%) center-wing participants. Moreover, the center (25.7%) scored higher than the left (19.7%), and the right (15.9%) had a moderate conformity level. In addition, there are more left (31.7%) than the center (25.9%) and the right (14.7%) with a low conformity level.

Most heavy news consumers on Facebook (73.8%), medium (58.1%), and light (38.4%) have high conformity levels. At the same time, about 22% have moderate conformity levels, with (27.5%) light, (21.3%) medium, and (11.8%) heavy. Light news consumers scored the highest (34.1%) having a low conformity level than the medium (20.6%) and heavy (14.4%).

Likewise, most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (76.4%), medium (47.2%), and light (39.4%) have high conformity levels. There is a 22% moderate conformity level, with the highest score across medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (27.3%), preceded by light (24%) and heavy (12.9%). On the contrary, light (36.6%), medium (25.6%), and heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (10.7%) have low conformity levels.

Similarly, high (71.4%), moderate (50%), and low (43.8%) threat perception levels, have high conformity levels. Also, about 22% have moderate conformity levels, with moderate threat perception having the highest score (27.7%), followed by low (22.2%) and high threat perception levels (13%). In addition, around 25% have a low conformity level, with low threat perception (34%) surpassing moderate (22.3%) and high (15.6%) threat perception levels.

By excluding those who do not follow news pages on Facebook we found that most heavy news consumers (74%), medium (60%), and light news consumers (41.4%) have high conformity levels. There are more light news consumers (27.2%) compared to medium (20.6%) and heavy (11.7%) with a moderate conformity level. Likewise, (21%) have a low conformity level, with the highest among light news consumers (32%) followed by medium (19%) and heavy (14%). About 59% of those with high, moderate, and low threat perception levels, have high conformity levels, whereas those with high threat perception levels (72%) overtopping low threat (48%) and moderate (55%). Around 20% have a moderate conformity level, with the moderate threat level (25%) outweighing the low (19.5%) and high (16%). Also, there is low threat perception (33%), moderate (21%), and high (13%) with low conformity levels.

7.4.1.3 Measuring the human portrait value tradition

We measured tradition through the following items: he thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that people should be satisfied with what they have; religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires.

7.4.1.3.1 Satisfaction state

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: he thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that people should be satisfied with what they have (M=2.16; SD= 0.844). There are (44.5%) like this person, (29%) are not like this person, and (26.4%) are somewhat like this person (Table 63).

There are slight differences between males and females with a difference of 1.3% between females (45.3%) and males (44%) who are like this person. There is a 1% difference point between males (26.9%) and females (25.9%) who are somewhat like this person. Likewise, a very minimal difference of 0.3% between males (29.1%) and females (28.8%) who are not like or very much not like this person.

Most age categories expressed being like this person (43.4%), with the highest score among 25-29 years (47.8%), followed by 18-24 years (44.2%), 30-34 years (43%), and 35 years (36.9%). In addition, around (27.3%) of age categories are somewhat like this person, with the highest score among 35 years (31%) followed by 18-24 years and 30-34 years (28%); the lowest score among 25-29 years (22.5%). Further, the highest score in terms of not being like this person is among 35 years (30.1%), and the lowest is among 18-24 years (27.7%).

Most education segments, (54.3%) are like this person except the majority of the uneducated (53.3%) are not like this person. It is worth noting that the highest score of being like this person, among doctoral degrees (75.4%) followed by high school (50%) and bachelor's degree (47.9%). In contrast, the lowest score among the uneducated (20%) and associate degree (28.6%). Additionally, the lowest score regarding not being like this person is among high school degrees (11.5%) followed by doctoral degrees (18.5%). There is (28%) across education categories who are somewhat like this person, with the highest score among high school (38.5%) and undergraduate student (29.1%), while the lowest score among doctoral degree (6.2%) and uneducated (26.7%).

We Observed that most of the right (59.9%) and the center (40.2%) compared to the left (37.1%) are like this person. Whereas most of the left (38.4%) compared to the center (28.4%) and the right (19.9%) are not like this person. Furthermore, there are more center participants (31.3%) than the left (24.5%) and the right (20.2%) being somewhat like this person.

7.4.1.3.2 Abidance by religion rules

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: religious belief is essential to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires (M=2.09; SD= 0.896). More than (44%) like or very much like this person, (36.1%) not like this person, and (18.9%) somewhat like this person (Table 63).

There are more males (46%) than females (43.8%) who said this person is like or very much like me. Also, more males (20.4%) than females (17.6%) said this person is somewhat like me. In addition, more females (38.6%) than males (33.6%) think this person is not or so much not like them.

Most age segments (44.2%) said they are like or very much like this person, with the highest score across 25-29 years (46.2%) and the lowest among 35 years (29.8%). On the other side, (37.5%) said they are not like or very much not like this person, with the highest among 35 years and the lowest

score among 18-24 years (34.6%). Around 19% across all age categories said they are somewhat like this person, with 30-34 years the highest (22.3%) and 35 years the lowest (15.9%).
Most uneducated (50%), elemental studies (45.7%), undergraduate student (41.3%), master's degree (40.5%), high school (53.8%), and associate degree (57.1%) said they are not like or very much not like this person. Conversely, many bachelor's degrees (53.2%) and doctoral degrees (72.3%) are like or very much like this person. Around (17.6%) somewhat like this person, with the uneducated (30%), master's degree (20.6%), and undergraduate student (20.3%) have the highest score while doctoral degrees (4.6%) and high school (15.4%) have the lowest score.
As for the political ideology, we noticed most of the right (66.9%) and the center-wing participants (42.1%) are like this person, compared to (29.1%) of the left. Most of the left (53.1%) are not like this person, compared to the center (34.9%) and the right (19.9%). Around (18%) are somewhat like this person, with the center (23%) more than the right (18.9%) and the left (17.9%).

7.4.1.3.3 Analysis of the composite variable tradition value

We created a composite score of traditional items. Therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.702). There are (42.7%) high traditional level, (26.7%) moderate, and (30.6%) low (M=2.12; SD= 0.848).
Most of the males (43.2%) and females (42.3%) have a high traditional level. Also, there are (27.6%) males and (25.8%) females have a moderate traditional level (Table 63).
Females (32%) outweighed males (29.3%) in terms of having a low traditional level. Most age segments have high tradition levels, whereas the highest scores across 30-34 years (43.9%) followed by 25-29 years (42.8%), 18-24 years (42.7%), and 35 years (38.1%). About 27% have a moderate traditional level in comparison to 30.6% with a low traditional level. The highest score among age categories with moderate tradition level is 18-24 years (31.2%), and the lowest score among 35 years (23%). In addition, the highest score across low tradition level is 35 years (38.9%), and the lowest score among 18-24 years (26.2%). It is worth noting that most bachelor's degrees (50.6%), master's degrees (42.1%), and doctoral degrees (72.3%) have a high traditional level.
We observed some variances across the different political ideologies. The majority of the right (65.7%) and the center-wing participants (39.9%) have a high traditional level, whereas the majority of the left (42.9%) have a low traditional level. We also found more heavy news consumers on Facebook (59.7%) and medium (41.9%) than light (32.7%), with a high traditional level. Further, light news consumers (30.3%) more than medium (27.9%) and heavy (19.4%) have a moderate

traditional level. Last, light news consumers (37.1%) overtopped both medium (30.2%) and heavy (20.9%) to have a low traditional level. Likewise, most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (63.6%) have a high traditional level. At the same time, many light (40.1%) and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (35.1%) have low tradition levels.

We excluded all the participants who do not follow news pages on Facebook to examine consuming news on through these pages. We found that many news consumers, whether light (37.7%), medium (42.9%), or heavy (61.7%) have a high traditional level. Furthermore, the high threat perception level achieved the highest score in terms of having a high traditional level (60%) followed by moderate (42%) and low threat (38%).

7.4.1.4 Analysis of the composite variable conservatism dimension

We created a composite variable of the three values together security, conformity, and tradition (M=1.92; SD= 0.768). We found that most of our sample has moderate conservatism levels (40.4%), (33.8%) have low, and (25.7%) have high conservatism levels (Table 63). Most males (40.6%) and females (40.3%) have a moderate level. Also, more males (35.4%) than females (32.1%) have a low level of conservatism. Females (27.6%) excelled over males (27.6%) in terms of having high conservatism levels.

Data showed around 26% across age segments have a high conservatism level, with the highest score among 25-29 years (29.9%) and the lowest score across 35 years (23%). In addition, (39%) across age segments have a moderate level, with the highest among 30-34 years (43.6%) and the lowest among 35 years (32.7%). Further, (35.7%) have a low level, with the highest score among 35 years (44.2%) and the lowest among 25-29 years (32.2%).

Most of the undergraduates (43.4%), bachelor's degrees (43%), and master's degrees (42.9%) have a moderate conservatism level. Whereas most of the doctoral degrees (69.2%) have a high conservatism level. On the opposite side, most uneducated (66.7%), elemental studies (45.7%), high school (53.8%), and associate degree (71.4%) have a low conservatism level.

In connection with the literature review, findings showed that most of the right-wing participants (45.8%) have a high conservatism level compared to the center (21.5%) and the left (13.9%). Most of the left (46.7%) have a low level than the center (34.6%) and the right (18.7%). While most of the center (44%) has a moderate level followed by the left (39.5%) and the right (35.4%).

Heavy news consumers on Facebook are the most to have high conservatism level (46.8%) followed by medium (24.1%) and light (13.8%). In addition, medium news consumers (46.6%) followed by

light (39.3%) and heavy (34.4%) have a moderate conservatism level. Furthermore, many light news consumers (46.9%) preceded by the medium (29.3%) and the heavy (18.8%) have a low conservatism level.

The majority of participants who have high threat levels (43%) were found to have high conservatism levels. Also, many participants with low threat levels (46%) have low conservatism while the majority of participants with moderate threat levels (45%) have moderate conservatism levels.

Through analyzing the data of those who consume news on influencers' Facebook pages, whether light, medium, or heavy. We found some variances across heavy, medium, and light news consumers. About (30.1%) of the three categories have high conservatism level, with the following percentages (49%) heavy, (27%) medium, and (16%) light. While more than (40%) have a moderate level and (29%) have a low conservatism level.

Similar findings were found among participants who follow news pages on Facebook (n=996), we found that (45%) of those who have high threat perception levels (n=342) have high conservatism levels; followed by those who have moderate threat levels (n=347) (24%) and low threat level (n=307) (20%). In sum, there is (40.7%) across different threat levels have moderate conservatism, (30%) have high conservatism levels, and (29.2%) with low conservatism levels.

Moreover, Spearman's test of correlation revealed that there is a weak positive correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and conformity level rho= 0.306, p< 0.001.

Table 63. Core values of conservatism dimension across the three countries

Item	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.	Not like me	49	11.2%	41	9.4%	108	24.8%	198	15.1%
	Somewhat like me	116	26.5%	64	14.7%	110	25.2%	290	22.2%
	Like me	272	62.2%	331	75.9%	218	50.0%	821	62.7%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
It is very important to him that his country be safe from threats from within and without. He is concerned that social order be protected.	Not like me	35	8.0%	35	8.0%	80	18.3%	150	11.5%
	Somewhat like me	98	22.4%	52	11.9%	116	26.6%	266	20.3%
	Like me	304	69.6%	349	80.0%	240	55.0%	893	68.2%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
It is acceptable for him to give up some civil liberty	Not like me	165	37.8%	119	27.3%	175	40.1%	459	35.1%
	Somewhat like me	149	34.1%	105	24.1%	116	26.6%	370	28.3%

rights in order to maintain national security.	Like me	123	28.1%	212	48.6%	145	33.3%	480	36.7%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times. even when no-one is watching.	Not like me	120	27.5%	71	16.3%	154	35.3%	345	26.4%
	Somewhat like me	124	28.4%	96	22.0%	105	24.1%	325	24.8%
	Like me	193	44.2%	269	61.7%	177	40.6%	639	48.8%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.	Not like me	83	19.0%	74	17.0%	124	28.4%	281	21.5%
	Somewhat like me	118	27.0%	99	22.7%	115	26.4%	332	25.4%
	Like me	236	54.0%	263	60.3%	197	45.2%	696	53.2%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
He thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that people should be satisfied with what they have.	Not like me	145	33.2%	98	22.5%	137	31.4%	380	29.0%
	Somewhat like me	114	26.1%	104	23.9%	128	29.4%	346	26.4%
	Like me	178	40.7%	234	53.7%	171	39.2%	583	44.5%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires.	Not like me	260	59.5%	34	7.8%	179	41.1%	473	36.1%
	Somewhat like me	89	20.4%	78	17.9%	81	18.6%	248	18.9%
	Like me	88	20.1%	324	74.3%	176	40.4%	588	44.9%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Security value – Composite variable	Low security	47	10.8%	39	8.9%	97	22.2%	183	14.0%
	Moderate security	74	16.9%	40	9.2%	90	20.6%	204	15.6%
	High security	316	72.3%	357	81.9%	249	57.1%	922	70.4%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Conformity value - Composite variable	Low conformity	105	24.0%	66	15.1%	151	34.6%	322	24.6%
	Moderate conformity	97	22.2%	89	20.4%	94	21.6%	280	21.4%
	High conformity	235	53.8%	281	64.4%	191	43.8%	707	54.0%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Low tradition	186	42.6%	52	11.9%	163	37.4%	401	30.6%
	Moderate tradition	144	33.0%	95	21.8%	110	25.2%	349	26.7%
	High tradition	107	24.5%	289	66.3%	163	37.4%	559	42.7%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity. tradition. security)	Low conservatism	161	36.8%	75	17.2%	207	47.5%	443	33.8%
	Moderate conservatism	224	51.3%	173	39.7%	132	30.3%	529	40.4%
	High conservatism	52	11.9%	188	43.1%	97	22.2%	337	25.7%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

Table 64. National security and news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages

General									
Item	Total	Light news consumers		Medium news consumers		Heavy news consumers		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
It is acceptable for him to give up some civil liberty rights in order to maintain national security.	Not like me	210	45.8%	150	35.5%	99	23.1%	459	35.1%
	Somewhat like me	140	30.5%	147	34.8%	83	19.4%	370	28.3%
	Like me	109	23.7%	125	29.6%	246	57.5%	480	36.7%
Total		459	100.0%	422	100.0%	428	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Spain									
It is acceptable for him to give up some civil liberty rights in order to maintain national security.	Not like me	55	42.3%	66	39.3%	44	31.7%	165	37.8%
	Somewhat like me	43	33.1%	61	36.3%	45	32.4%	149	34.1%
	Like me	32	24.6%	41	24.4%	50	36.0%	123	28.1%
Total		130	100.0%	168	100.0%	139	100.0%	437	100.0%
Egypt									
It is acceptable for him to give up some civil liberty rights in order to maintain national security.	Not like me	57	39.6%	26	20.5%	36	21.8%	119	27.3%
	Somewhat like me	44	30.6%	37	29.1%	24	14.5%	105	24.1%
	Like me	43	29.9%	64	50.4%	105	63.6%	212	48.6%
Total		144	100.0%	127	100.0%	165	100.0%	436	100.0%
USA									
It is acceptable for him to give up some civil liberty rights in order to maintain national security.	Not like me	98	53.0%	58	45.7%	19	15.3%	175	40.1%
	Somewhat like me	53	28.6%	49	38.6%	14	11.3%	116	26.6%
	Like me	34	18.4%	20	15.7%	91	73.4%	145	33.3%
Total		185	100.0%	127	100.0%	124	100.0%	436	100.0%

7.4.1.5 Testing Hypothesis 3

H3: There is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and resistance to change.

Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in this section is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test to find correlation and ordinal regression to identify the effect on the dependent variable. We used the newly created variables of resistance to change (tradition, security, and conformity) and threat perception to run the correlation coefficient test.

We started by running the Spearman's rho correlation coefficient one-tailed test between threat perception and each of the following security, conformity, and tradition. We found a positive correlation between the level of threat perception, security level rho= 0.275, p< 0.001; conformity rho=0.234, p< 0.001; and traditional level rho=0.199, p<0.001.

By running a correlation test between the composite variable of the three values together and threat perception, we found a positive correlation between resistance to change and threat level rho=0.277, p<0.001. This finding means the more you have threat perception, the more you will be resistant to change (Table 65). In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association and support our alternate hypothesis.

We also examined the correlation between resistance to change and the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. Results indicated a significant weak positive correlation between the frequency of news consumption on such pages and the level of resistance to change rho=0.365, p<0.001. In other words, the more people consume news on influencers' Facebook pages, the greater they will be resistant to change.

Besides, we conducted Spearman's test for correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and some conservatism items. Statistical results showed a positive correlation between the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and giving up some civil liberty rights to maintain national security rho=0.272, p< 0.001; as well as with security value rho=0.278, p<0.001; and conformity rho=0.311, p<0.001.

Table 65. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between security, conformity, tradition, conservatism, and threat perception

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat perception level
Security value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.275**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309

Conformity value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.234**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.199**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.277**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).		

Furthermore, we used the ANOVA test for a variance to check if there is any statistical difference between the means of the three political ideology wings. Thus, a one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of political ideology on conservatism level in left-wing, center-wing, and right-wing conditions. There was a significant effect of the amount of political ideology on the conservatism level remembered at the $p<.05$ level for the three conditions [$F(2, 1306) = 62.439$, $p = 0.001$]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the left-wing condition ($M = 1.67$; $SD = 0.706$) was significantly different than the right-wing condition ($M = 2.27$; $SD = 0.757$) and from the center-wing condition ($M = 1.87$; $SD = 0.738$). Taken together, these results suggest that individuals with higher levels toward the ride side of the political continuum have higher conservatism levels. Accordingly, this shows significant variance between the three-condition means.

Even though we found a positive correlation between perceived threat and resistance to change, we conducted ordinal regression to better understand the independent variable's impact on the dependent variable. We used ordinal regression analysis to examine the relationship between threat perception and resistance to change. We aim at measuring the effect of the perception of threat on resistance to change. Therefore, we started by measuring the impact of our independent variable on the dependent variable, which is resistance to change. We found the model significant where the predictor variable, level of perceived threat, improves the model because variation decreases from 149.721 to 44.108 $X2 (1) = 105.612$, $p < 0.001$. In addition to the significance of the model result, we found the goodness of fit insignificant Pearson $X2 (3) = 6.941$, $P= 0.074$. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the observed data is consistent with the fitted model.

In addition, the parameter estimates of threat perception had a positive effect $B= 0.672$, $SE= (0.066)$, $Wald= (102.673)$, $p < 0.001$. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly $\exp(0.672) = 1.959$, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.678, 2.177) for every unit increase of

the independent variable -threat perception. Accordingly, for every unit increase in the threat level, there is a predicted increase of 1.911 in the level of resistance to change. Consequently, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable. Furthermore, we noticed all curves to have the same slope -2LL of parallel lines X2 (1) = 0.576, p-value 0.448. Hence, accepting the null hypothesis of proportional odds assumption that the odds ratios across all categories are the same.

To gain a deeper understanding of the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable, we used ordinal logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship between news consumption on Facebook, influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception, and resistance to change. We observed that the predictor variables of following influencers' Facebook pages, news consumption, and threat perception in the ordinal regression analysis contribute to the model. Based on the ordinal regression results, the explanatory variable X improves the model because of a variation decrease from 543.684 to 290.331, X2 (3) = 253.353, $p < 0.001$. This finding suggests that there is a significant difference between the baseline model to the final model.

In addition, the parameter estimates of news consumption on Facebook had a positive effect B= 0.370, SE= (0.079), Wald= (22.153), $p < 0.001$; similar, the estimates of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages had a positive effect B= 0.595, SE= (0.078), Wald= (57.518), $p < 0.001$; Also, the estimates of threat perception had a positive effect B= 0.419, SE= (0.071), Wald= (35.160), $p < 0.001$.

Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.370) = 1.448, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.239, 1.686) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption on Facebook. This result means for every unit increase in the amount of news consumption on Facebook; there is a predicted increase of 1.448 in the level of resistance to change. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable. Likewise, the estimated odds ratio also favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.595) = 1.812, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.581, 2.142) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages.

In other words, for every unit increase in consuming news on influencers' Facebook pages, there is an expected increase of 1.812 in the level of resistance to change. Finally, the estimated odds ratio also favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.419) = 1.520, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.321, 1.735) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception. Hence, for every 1 unit increase in threat perception level, there is an expected increase of 1.520 in the level of resistance to change.

We found All curves to have the same slope -2LL of parallel lines X2 (3) = 4.297, p-value 0.231. Hence, accepting the null hypothesis of proportional odds assumes that the odds ratios across all categories are the same. Thus, we can support the possible causality between news consumption on Facebook, news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception, and resistance to change.

7.4.1.5.1 Retesting the hypothesis on some participants

It is worth noting that we excluded all the participants who do not follow news pages on Facebook. We found a positive correlation between threat perception and resistance to change rho=0.246, p<0.001. More precisely, there is a positive correlation between threat perception and each of the following: security rho= 0.226, conformity rho=0.214, and tradition rho=0.172, p<0.001 (Table 66).

Table 66. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between security, conformity, tradition, resistance to change, and threat perception

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Security value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.226**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	996
Conformity value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.214**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	996
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.172**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	996
Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.246**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	996

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

7.4.2 Measuring self-enhancement as a core dimension of inequality preference

We measured the inequality preference through power and achievement values of self-enhancement. We asked respondents to state from 1-10 to what extent they believe this person is like them. Where 1 means not like him at all and 10 means very much like him. For this study, we recoded the answers into 3 points Likert scale, not like this person, somewhat like this person, and like this person. At the end of this, we created a composite variable merging the two values to examine inequality preference and thus test our hypothesis.

7.4.2.1 Measuring the human portrait value power

Power value is measured through two statements, it is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do; he wants people to do what he says, and it is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.

7.4.2.1.1 Giving orders

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He wants people to do what he says (M=1.84; SD= 0.848). There is (45.4%) not like this person, (25.4%) somewhat like this person, and (29.2%) like this person (Table 67).

Data showed around (45.4%) of males (45.7%) and females (45%) are not like this person; (25%) somewhat like this person, with more males (26.5%) than females (24.5%); (29.2%) like this person, with more females (30.5%) than males (27.9%). Similarly, the obtained scores across different age categories were very close. Also, we did not detect significant differences across educational categories. It is worth noting that most doctoral degree holders (72.3%) are like this person, unlike most other education categories. Most right-wing participants (51%) are like this person, unlike the majority of the left (55.7%) and the center (48.9%) who are not like this person.

7.4.2.1.2 Being wealthy

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things (M=1.99; SD= 0.841). There is (35.8%)

not like this person, (34.8%) like this person, and (29.3%) somewhat like this person (Table 67). We found more males (36.1%) than females (35.5%) being not like this person; more females (36.4%) than males (33.3%) being like this person; we also noticed slight difference points 2.5% between males (30.7%) and females (28.2%) who are being somewhat like this person. We found that most of those aged 25-29 years (40.2%) are like this person, unlike most other age groups who are not like this person. We also noticed that most bachelor's degrees (40%), master's degrees (45.2%), and doctoral degree holders (67.7%) are like this person. At the same time, most other education categories are not like this person. Additionally, many right-side participants (51%) in comparison to the left (24.3%) and the center (32%) are like this person. In addition, most of the left (43.5%) and the center (37.5%) compared to the right (24.8%) are not like this person.

7.4.2.1.3 Analysis of the composite variable power

We created a composite variable of power items. Therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.737). There are (32.5%) high power levels, (24.2%) moderate, and (43.3%) low (M= 1.89; SD= 0.864).

Most sexes have low power levels (43.3%); (32.5%) high power and (24.2%) moderate power levels (Table 67).

We noticed that males overtopped females in terms of having a low power level with a 0.6% point, and moderate power with a 3.5% difference. While females overtopped males in terms of high-power level with a 2.5% difference. Similarly, most age categories have low power levels. Yet 35 years scored the highest (53.1%) compared to other age segments in terms of having low power levels. The majority of doctoral (72.3%) and master's degree holders (42.1%) unlike most other segments have high power levels. Furthermore, most right-side participants (52.2%) have a high-power level, unlike most of the left (55.2%) and the center (46%) who have a low power level. As for the news consumption level on Facebook, we found that most heavy news consumers (48.8%) have a high-power level compared to medium (34%) and light (21%); while many light (51.7%) and medium (40.7%) have low power level.

We observed that most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (54.2%) have a high-power level, whereas many light (58%) and medium (45.5%) have low power levels.

Also, most of those with high threat perception levels (48.4%) have high power levels, unlike most with low threat levels (52.2%) and moderate threat levels (44%) who have low power levels.

Through analyzing the participants who follow news pages on Facebook (n=996) only, we found most news consumers with about (37.4%) have high power levels followed by low (38.2%) and moderate power levels (24.4%). Even though the majority have high-power levels, most light news consumers (44%) and medium news consumers (39%) have low power levels, whereas most heavy news consumers (51%) have high power levels. Besides, most of those who follow news pages on Facebook with high threat perception (52%) have a high-power level compared to low threat perception (28%), and moderate threat levels (31.1%). On the other side, most low threat levels (46%) and moderate threat levels (42%) have low power levels, compared to the high threat level (28%).

7.4.2.2 Measuring the human portrait value achievement

We measured achievement through the following two items: being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people; and it is very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.

7.4.2.2.1 Being successful

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people (M=2.17; SD= 0.853). There is (46.8%) like this person, (28%) somewhat like this person, and (25.2%) not like this person (Table 67).
Data showed that most males (47.2%) and females (46.1%) are like this person; (46.6%) not like this person, with females (29.1%) outweighing males (28.9%). In addition, close scores were identified among males (23.8%) and females (25.8%) as being somewhat like this person.
Furthermore, only the majority of those aging 35 years (43.4%) are not like this person. In comparison, most other age groups are like this person, with the highest score among 25-29 years (53.8%). In like manner, most elemental studies (44.8%), undergraduate students (35.6%), and associate degrees (57.1%) are not like this person. It is important to note that a doctoral degree (80%) scored the highest in terms of being like this person followed by a bachelor's degree (54.8%) and a master's degree (53.2%). Even though most different political ideologies are like this person, there are more right participants (62.2%) than the center (42.4%) and the left (38.7%). Additionally, there are more left (36.3%) than the center (30%) and the right (19.9%) in terms of not being like

this person. Moreover, the center has the highest score (27.6%) and the right have the lowest score (17.9%) being somewhat like this person.

7.4.2.2.2 Being impressive

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does (M=2.22; SD= 0.821). There is (46.8%) not like this person, (28%) somewhat like this person, and (25.2%) not like this person (Table 67). We did not notice significant variances between males and females, where both have almost equal percentages. However, we noticed that those aged 25-29 years have the highest score of being like this (52%) followed by 30-34 years (46.4%). On the contrary, 35 years have the highest score of not being like this person (29.2%) and the lowest score was found among 18-24 years (24%) and 25-29 years (24.6%). We observed that 18-24 years have the highest score of being somewhat like this person (34.3%) and 25-29 years have the least (23.4%).

Besides, we observed the highest score among doctoral degrees (78.5%) of being like this person, followed by bachelor's (51.9%) and master's (46.8%). Oppositely, most of the uneducated (40%) are not like this person. There are more right participants (63.1%) than the left (41.9%) and the center (40.4%). Also, there are more left (30.9%) than the center (25.9%) and the right (17.9%) in terms of not being like this person. Moreover, the center (33.7%) overtopped the left (27.2%) and the right (19%) in terms of being somewhat like this person.

7.4.2.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable achievement

We created a composite variable of achievement items. Therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.857). It is worth noting that these items showed a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.610 (M= 2.21; SD= 0.859). There is (49.9%) high achievement level, (21.6%) moderate, and (28.5%) low (Table 67).

We did not notice significant differences across both sexes. Similarly, we did not notice notable differences across age; however, 25-29 years scored the highest in terms of having a high achievement level (54.9%) and 35 years had the least score (40.7%). On the other hand, 35 years have the highest score in terms of having a low achievement level (36.3%) and 25-29 years have the least score (25.7%).

Also, we observed that the majority of uneducated (40%) and associate degrees (57.1%) have low achievement levels in comparison to the majority of other education categories that have a high level of achievement; with a doctoral degree (83.1%) having the highest score followed by bachelor's degree (57.2%) and master's degree (54.8%) having high achievement levels.

We noticed that there are more right participants (65.7%) than the left (42.7%) and the center (45.1%) had high achievement levels. Whereas the left (34.7%) overtopped the center (30.5%) and the right (18.4%) in terms of low achievement levels; though we observed very close percentages in terms of having moderate levels, with the right (15.9%), the left (22.7%), and the center (24.4%). There are more heavy news consumers on Facebook (63.5%) than medium (51.3%), and light (40.2%) who have high achievement levels. Besides, there are relatively more light news consumers (24.7%) than medium (23%) and heavy (15%) who have moderate achievement levels. Light news consumers (35.1%) outweighed medium (25.8%) and heavy (21.5%) with low achievement levels. Precisely, heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have higher scores (70.3%) compared to medium (44.1%) and light (36.2%) in terms of having high achievement levels. On the other side, most light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (40.3%) have low achievement levels, unlike the majority of the two other categories that have a high level. As for those with moderate achievement levels, we noticed that medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have the highest score (27.7%), followed by light (23.5%) and heavy has the least score (13.6%).

Also, those with high threat perception have the highest score in terms of high achievement level (64.1%), followed by low threat perception (42.8%), and moderate threat level (45.3%). In addition, about (28.5%) across different threat perception levels have low achievement levels, with low threat levels having the highest score (34%) preceded by moderate threat levels (28.8%) and high threat perception (21.4%) having the least score. Moreover, those who have moderate threat levels (25.9%), low threat (23.3%), and high (14.6%) have moderate achievement levels.

By excluding those who do not follow news pages on Facebook (n=996), we found (26%) low achievement, (20.6%) moderate achievement levels, and (53.5%) high achievement levels across different news consumption levels. Most news consumers have a high achievement level, with heavy news consumers reaching the highest score (64.3%) followed by medium (53%), and light (43.8%). Also, we noticed that light news consumers (24.4%) have the highest score in terms of having a moderate achievement level preceded by medium news consumers (22.3%) and heavy news consumers (14.6%). As for low achievement levels, we noticed that light news consumers have the highest percentages (31.8%) compared to medium (24.7%) and heavy (21.1%).

Among those participants who only follow news pages on Facebook, we noticed that those with high threat perception (66.7%) followed by low threat perception (45.3%) and moderate (47.8%) have high achievement levels. Further, (20.6%) have a moderate level of achievement, with those who have moderate threat perception having the highest percentage (24.8%). On the other side, (25.9%) have low achievement, whereas those with low threat perception have the highest score (32.2%).

7.4.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable self-enhancement dimension

We measured inequality preference through self-enhancement. Thus, we created a composite variable of self-enhancement by adding the values of power and achievement (M= 1.85; SD= 0.789). There is (39.7%) low self-enhancement, (35.6%) moderate self-enhancement, and (24.7%) high self-enhancement (Table 67). Both males (38.4%) and females (40.9%) were found to have low self-enhancement with more females than males. Moreover, males (39%) excelled over females (32.3%) in terms of having moderate self-enhancement. On the other side, more females (26.8%) than males (22.6%) were found to have high self-enhancement.

As for different age segments, we found that 35 years have the highest percentage of low self-enhancement, followed by 30-34 years (41.1%). Oppositely, 25-29 years have the highest score (32.2%) of high self-enhancement and 18-24 years have the lowest (19.6%).

We observed most doctoral degree holders have the highest score (66.2%) of high self-enhancement, unlike most bachelor's degrees (36.9%), master's degrees (34.9%), and high school (42.3%) who have moderate self-enhancement level. On the other hand, most uneducated (56.7%), elemental studies (51.7%), undergraduate students (47.8%), and associate degrees (57.1%) have low self-enhancement levels.

We noticed that most right-wing participants (44.1%) have high self-enhancement, unlike the majority of the left (46.4%) and the center (44.6%) who have low self-enhancement. There are more left-wing (39.2%) than the center (25.6%) and the right (31.7%) have moderate self-enhancement. Most heavy news consumers on Facebook (41.8%) have high self-enhancement, with medium (25.5%) and light (13.3%). At the same time, the majority of light (48.5%) and medium (37.7%) have low self-enhancement. Moreover, light news consumers (38.2%) excelled over medium (36.8%) and heavy (30%) having a moderate self-enhancement.

Also, most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (53.4%) and medium (42.7%) have a low self-enhancement. Unlike the majority of heavy who have high self-enhancement

(47.4%). Also, many medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have a moderate self-enhancement (41.2%). Consistent with the previous findings, most of those with high threat perception has high self-enhancement (42.7%) compared to (16.4%) low threat and (18.1%) moderate threat levels. On the other hand, many of those with low threat levels (48%) and moderate threat perception levels (40.6%) have low self-enhancement. However, those with moderate threat levels (41.3%) scored higher than the other two threat levels in terms of having moderate self-enhancement.

By excluding those who do not follow news pages on Facebook, we found (35.9%) low self-enhancement, (34.6%) moderate, and (29.4%) high self-enhancement across heavy, moderate, and light news consumers. Most heavy news consumers have high self-enhancement (44.2%). There are light (39%), medium (37%), and heavy (28%) who have moderate self-enhancement. We noticed that most light (42.9%) and medium news consumers (37%), unlike heavy (27.9%), have low self-enhancement. Similarly, most of those who follow news pages on Facebook and have high threat perception (46.2%) have high self-enhancement; while most of those with moderate threat levels (40.6%) have moderate self-enhancement, and those with low threat perception (45%) have low self-enhancement.

Table 67.Self-enhancement dimension across the three countries

Item	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
It is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He wants people to do what he says.	Not like me	247	56.5%	135	31.0%	212	48.6%	594	45.4%
	Somewhat like me	111	25.4%	118	27.1%	104	23.9%	333	25.4%
	Like me	79	18.1%	183	42.0%	120	27.5%	382	29.2%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.	Not like me	202	46.2%	102	23.4%	165	37.8%	469	35.8%
	Somewhat like me	133	30.4%	120	27.5%	131	30.0%	384	29.3%
	Like me	102	23.3%	214	49.1%	140	32.1%	456	34.8%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people.	Not like me	181	41.4%	52	11.9%	148	33.9%	381	29.1%
	Somewhat like me	131	30.0%	91	20.9%	96	22.0%	318	24.3%
	Like me	125	28.6%	293	67.2%	192	44.0%	610	46.6%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
It is very important to him to show his abilities. He wants	Not like me	138	31.6%	72	16.5%	120	27.5%	330	25.2%
	Somewhat like me	142	32.5%	103	23.6%	121	27.8%	366	28.0%
	Like me	157	35.9%	261	59.9%	195	44.7%	613	46.8%

people to admire what he does.									
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Power scale - Composite variable	Low power level	245	56.1%	117	26.8%	205	47.0%	567	43.3%
	Moderate power level	106	24.3%	108	24.8%	103	23.6%	317	24.2%
	High power level	86	19.7%	211	48.4%	128	29.4%	425	32.5%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Achievement - Composite variable	Low achievement level	169	38.7%	63	14.4%	141	32.3%	373	28.5%
	Moderate achievement level	115	26.3%	72	16.5%	96	22.0%	283	21.6%
	High achievement level	153	35.0%	301	69.0%	199	45.6%	653	49.9%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Inequality preference - measured through self-enhancement (power - achievement) Composite score	Low self enhancement	237	54.2%	91	20.9%	192	44.0%	520	39.7%
	Moderate self enhancement	143	32.7%	183	42.0%	140	32.1%	466	35.6%
	High self enhancement	57	13.0%	162	37.2%	104	23.9%	323	24.7%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

7.4.2.4 Testing Hypothesis 4

H4: there is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and inequality preference.

Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in this section is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test to find correlation and ordinal regression to identify the effect on the dependent variable. We used the newly created variables of self-enhancement (power and achievement) and threat perception to run the correlation coefficient test.

We started by running the Spearman's rho correlation coefficient one-tailed test between threat perception, power, and self-enhancement. We found a positive correlation between the level of threat perception and the power level rho= 0.218, p< 0.001. However, we found a minimum positive correlation between threat level and achievement rho=0.182, p< 0.001 (Table 68).

By running a correlation between the two newly created composite variables and threat perception, we found a positive correlation between self-enhancement and threat level rho=0.243, p<0.001. This

result means the higher threat perception people have, the more self-enhancement they hold, thus high inequality preference (Table 68). In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association and accept the alternate hypothesis. Taking this into account, the hype threat perception correlates positively with self-enhancement -which we used to measure inequality preference. Our further analysis also revealed a positive weak correlation between both the level of self-enhancement and frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages rho=0.341, p<0.001.

Table 68. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between self-enhancement and threat perception

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Power scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.218**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
Achievement - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.182**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309
Inequality preference - measured through self-enhancement (power - achievement	Correlation Coefficient	.243**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	1309

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Furthermore, we used the ANOVA test for a variance to check if there is any statistical difference between the means of the three political ideology wings. Thus, a one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of political ideology on self-enhancement levels in left-wing, center-wing, and right-wing conditions. There was a significant effect of political ideology on self-enhancement at p<.05 level for the three conditions [F (2, 1306) = 50.873, p = 0.001]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score of the right-wing condition (M = 2.20; SD = 0.803) was significantly different than the left-wing condition (M = 1.68; SD = 0.712) and from the center-wing condition (M = 1.75; SD = 0.764). Taken together, these results suggest that individuals with higher levels toward the ride side of the political continuum have more self-enhancement levels. Accordingly, this shows significant variance between the three-condition means.

Even though we found a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and self-enhancement, we conducted ordinal regression to understand better the independent variable's impact on the dependent variable. We used ordinal regression analysis to examine the relationship between threat perception and self-enhancement. We aim at measuring the effect of threat perception on self-enhancement. Therefore, we started by measuring the impact of our independent variable on the dependent variable, which is self-enhancement.

We found the model significant where the predictor variable, perceived threat level, improves the model because of variation decrease from 145.509 to 63.356 X2 (1) = 82.153, $p < 0.001$.

In addition, the parameter estimates of threat perception had a positive effect B= 0.594, SE= (0.066), Wald= (81.851), $p < 0.001$. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.594) = 1.811, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.590, 2.064) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception. For every unit increase in the threat level, there is a predicted increase of 1.811 in the level of self-enhancement. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable.

To gain a deeper understanding of the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable, we used ordinal logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship between news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception, and self-enhancement. The predictor variables of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, as well as threat perception in the ordinal regression analysis, were found to contribute to the model. Based on the ordinal regression results, the explanatory variable X improves the model because of variation decrease from 487.578 to 291.689, X2 (3) = 195.889, $p < 0.001$. This finding suggests that there is a significant difference between the baseline model to the final model.

However, the parameter estimates of news consumption on Facebook was insignificant p=0.074. Yet, we found the estimates of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages significant and had a positive effect B= 0.654, SE= (0.078), Wald= (69.718), $p < 0.001$; Also, the estimates of threat perception had a positive effect B= 0.361, SE= (0.070), Wald= (26.509), $p < 0.001$. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.654) = 1.924, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.650, 2.243) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. In other words, for every 1 unit increase of consuming news on influencers' pages, there is an expected increase of 1.924 in the level of self-enhancement. Finally, the estimated odds ratio also favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.361) = 1.435, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.249, 1.649) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat

perception. In other words, for every 1 unit increase of threat perception level, there is an expected increase of 1.435 in the level of self-enhancement.

7.4.2.4.1 Retesting the hypothesis on some participants

It is worth noting that we excluded all the participants who do not follow news pages on Facebook (n=996). We found a positive correlation between threat perception and self-enhancement rho=0.230, p<0.001 (Table 69). In more depth, we found a positive correlation between the level of threat perception and power rho=0.202, p<0.001; also, a positive correlation between threat perception and achievement rho=0.174, p<0.001. This result means that the more people consume news through following influencers' Facebook pages, the more they will have self-enhancement, thus inequality preference.

In light of the previously published findings indicating that most right-side participants have a high conservatism level. Thus, we excluded the right-wing political ideology participants to enhance our understanding by examining the correlation between threat level and conservatism in its two core values (inequality preference and conservatism) among the left and the center participants (n=962). We found a positive correlation between threat perception and resistance to change among the left and the center-wing participants rho=0.204, p<0.001. Likewise, there is a positive correlation between self-enhancement and threat perception rho=0.131, p<0.001 (Table 70) (Table 71).

Table 69. Non-parametric Spearman's test of correlation between power, achievement, self enhancement, and threat perception among participants who follow Facebook news pages

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Power scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.202**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	996
Achievement - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.174**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	996
Inequality preference - measured through self-enhancement (power - achievement	Correlation Coefficient	.230**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	996

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Table 70. Spearman's test of correlation between power, achievement, inequality preferences and threat perception among the left and center-wing participants

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Power scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.111**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	962
Achievement - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.110**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	962
Inequality preference - measured through self-enhancement (power - achievement	Correlation Coefficient	.131**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	962

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Table 71. Spearman's test of correlation between security, conformity, tradition, resistance to change, and threat perception among the left and center-wing participants

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Security value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.269**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	962
Conformity value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.190**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	962
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.127**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	962
Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.204**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	962

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

7.5 Correlation between threat perception and political conservatism: USA

7.5.1 Measuring conservatism as the core dimension of resistance to change

7.5.1.1 Measuring the human portrait value security

7.5.1.1.1 Danger avoidance

In the following section we will present the analyzed data of the USA case. We asked the American youths to express their attitude toward the following: it is important for him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety (M=2.25; SD= 0.828). The analysis of the data in the case of the USA revealed that there are (24.8%) not like this person, (25.2%) somewhat like this person, and (50%) like this person (Table 63).

Most American males and females are like this person, with about (51.7%). There are more males than females who are not like this person or somewhat like this person. Likewise, most age groups reported being like this person (48%). The top age group for being like this person is 25-29 years (56.1%) whereas the highest score for not being like this person among 18-24 years (35.4%). Moreover, the highest percentage of being somewhat like this person is 30-34 years (30.6%). In like manner, (54.1%) across education categories like this person with the highest score among doctoral degree holders (93%) and the least score among the uneducated (25%). In contrast, most uneducated (46.4%) reported not being like this person.

The right-wing Americans have the highest score of being like this person, with more than (66%) with (43%) left and (40%) center. We noticed that the left (31.5%) excelled over the center (29.6%) and the right (13.3%) in terms of not being like this person. At the same time, there is more center (29.6%) than the left (25%) and the right (20.3%) being somewhat like this person.

7.5.1.1.2 Protecting social order

We asked the American youths to express their attitude toward the following: it is important to him that his country be safe from threats from within and without. He is concerned that social order is protected (M=2.37; SD= 0.775). There is (18.3%) not like this person, (26.6%) somewhat like this person, and (55%) like this person (Table 63).

We noticed more American females than males being like this person, with a difference of 8.8%. At the same time, American males overtopped females, either being somewhat like this person, with a different percentage of 6.2%, or not being like this person, with a difference of 2.5%.
Data showed more than (55%) across age categories in the USA are like this person, with those aged 35 years having the highest score (58.1%) and 18-24 years with the least score (53.8%). We did not notice significant differences between those being somewhat like this person and not being like this among age groups. Most uneducated (40%) are not like this person, unlike the majority of other education groups who are like this person, with the highest score among doctoral degree holders (88.4%). Most of the right (74.1%), center (47.9%), and left (42.7%) are like this person in the USA. There is (26.2%) somewhat like this person, (18.7%) not like this person, the highest score among the left (29%) of not being like this person and the center (33.1%) of somewhat being like this person.

7.5.1.1.3 Maintain national security

We asked the American youths to express their attitude towards the following: it is acceptable for him to give up some civil liberty rights to maintain national security (M=1.93; SD= 0.855). There is (40.1%) not like this person, (26.6%) somewhat like this person, and (33.3%) like this person (Table 63). Both males and females have very close percentages of not being like this person, with (40%). Yet, we noticed more females (37.1%) than males (30.9%) in terms of being like this person. Even though most age groups in the USA reported not being like this person (40%), most of those aged 25-29 years said they are like this person (39%). Around 27% somewhat like this person within age groups, with the highest score among 30-34 years (30.1%) and the least among 35 years (16.3%). Most of the master's (42.5%) and doctoral degree holders (83.7%) said they are like this person. At the same time, the majority of other education groups reported not being like this person, with the highest score among associate degrees (83.3%) and the uneducated (57.1%). The left (45.2%) and the center-wing participants (46.7%) are not like this person. Unlike the majority of right (55.9%) who reported being like this person. We noticed that the center (33.7%) excelled over the left (29%) and the right (16.1%) in terms of being somewhat like this person. Further analysis showed that most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (73.4%) accept giving up some liberty rights to maintain national security, followed by medium (15.7%) and light (18.4%). On the other side, the majority of light (53%) and medium news consumers on such pages (45.7%) do not accept, compared to heavy news consumers (15.3%) (Table 64).

7.5.1.1.4 Analysis of the composite variable security value

Through the collected data in the case of USA, we created a composite variable of security items. Therefore, we checked their reliability. The three items showed good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.657). However, to increase this value, we checked the scale if an item was deleted and found that deleting item 3 will increase Cronbach's alpha value to 0.785. Accordingly, we removed item 3, especially since this item wasn't part of the PVQ scale, and we added it to deepen the analysis. It is worth noting that these items showed a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.522.

Within this framework, we divided the American youths into low, moderate, and high-security levels (M= 2.35; SD= 0.821). There is (22.2%) low security, (20.6%) moderate security, and (57.1%) high-security levels (Table 63). Even though both sexes have a high-security level, we noticed more females than males having a high-security level, with a difference of 10.3%. Hence, males outweighed females in terms of having low and moderate security levels. Likewise, most age groups have a high-security level, with the highest score across 25-29 years (62%) and the least among 18-24 years (52.3%). On the contrary, the highest percentage of low-security levels among 35 years (27.9%) and 18-24 years (27.7%).

Unlike most education categories which have a high-security level, the majority of uneducated have a low-security level (46.4%). It is worth noting that we found that the highest score to have a high-security level is doctoral degree holders (93%).

The right-wing Americans have the highest score of high-security level (72.7%) followed by the left (51.6%) and the center (47.9%). While the left (33.1%) has the highest percentage in terms of low security; additionally, the center has the highest percentage of having a moderate security level (24.9%). As for news consumption level on Facebook and influencers' Facebook page variables, we noticed that majority of these groups have a high-security level, with the top score among heavy news consumers on Facebook (90%) and influencers' Facebook pages (85.5%). At the same time, the highest percentage of low-security levels is light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (36.8%) and light news consumers on Facebook (33%). Also, many of those who have high (80.3%) and moderate threat levels (59.2%) have high-security levels. On the contrary, more than (51%) of those with low threat perceptions have low security levels.

7.5.1.2 Measuring the human portrait value conformity

7.5.1.2.1 Abidance by the rules

We asked the American youths to express their attitude towards the following: he believes that people should do what they are told. He thinks people should always follow the rules even when no one is watching (M=2.05; SD= 0.871). There is (35.3%) not like this person, (24.1%) somewhat like this person, and (40.6%) like this person (Table 63). Most males and females said they are like this person, with females (44.9%) more than males (37.9%). On the other side, more American males than females are not like this person and somewhat like this person.

Many age groups in the USA reported being like this person, except 18-24 years (38.5%) who reported not being like this person. The highest score among age groups who said they are like this person is 25-29 years (47.7%) and the highest of being somewhat like this person is 18-24 years (32.3%). As for the education categories, we noticed that most uneducated (39.3%), elemental studies (50.8%), undergraduate students (45.5%), high school (42.9%), and associate degree (66.7%) are not like this person. On the other side, many bachelor's (50%), master's (50%), and doctoral degree holders (88.4%) are like this person. Unlike most of the left (44.4%) and the center (41.4%) who reported not being like this person, the majority of the right-wing participants are like this (67.1%). Also, the center scored very high in terms of being somewhat like this person (32%).

7.5.1.2.2 Compliance with social norms

We asked the American participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong (M=2.17; SD= 0.843). There is (28.4%) not like this person, (26.4%) somewhat like this person, and (45.2%) like this person (Table 63).

Most females (51.5%) and males (41.3%) are like this person. Males outweighed females in terms of either not being like this person or somewhat like this person.

About (45.2%) across age categories reported being like this person, with the highest among 30-34 years (48.6%). We also noticed that those aged 18-24 years have the highest score of being somewhat like this person (36.9%). On the contrary, 35 years have the highest percentage of not being like this (41.9%).

As for the different education segments, we noticed that most of the uneducated (57.1%), high school (42.9%), and associate degrees (50%) are not like this person, whereas most undergraduate students (36.4%) are somewhat like this person. On the other side, many bachelor's degrees (51.5%), master's degrees (60%), and doctoral degrees (90.7%) are like this person. We found that the center participants are equally divided between not like this person (33.7%) and somewhat like this (33.7%). In contrast, most of the left (38.7%) and the right (65.7%) are like this person.

7.5.1.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable conformity value

We created a composite variable of conformity items in the case of USA; therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.766). It is worth noting that these items showed a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.621 (M=2.09; SD= 0.882). The analyzed data in the USA showed that there are (34.6%) low conformity, (21.6%) moderate conformity, and (43.8%) high conformity (Table 63). Most males (40.5%) and females (49.1%) have high conformity levels. There are more males (24.5%) than females (16.8%) with moderate conformity; we did not notice a significant difference in terms of low conformity between males (34.9%) and females (34.1%).

Likewise, most age groups in the USA have high conformity, with the highest among 25-59 years (48.4%). On the other side, the highest score with moderate conformity level is between 18-24 years (26.2%); in like manner, those aged 35 years have the highest percentage in terms of low conformity (44.2%). We noticed that many uneducated (57.1%), elemental studies (43.1%), undergraduate students (42.7%), high school (50%), and associate degrees (50%) have low conformity. In comparison, most bachelor's (51.5%), master's (60%), and doctoral degree holders (90.7%) have high conformity levels.

Like previous findings, most of the right-wing Americans (68.5%) have high conformity levels, unlike the majority of the left (42.7%) and the center (42.6%) who have low conformity levels. As for news consumption on Facebook, influencers' Facebook pages, and threat perception levels, we found that most heavy and medium news consumers on Facebook have high conformity levels. Similarly, heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages and those who have high and moderate threat perceptions have high conformity levels. On the other side, most of the light news consumers on Facebook, light and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages, as well as those with low threat perception levels have a low conformity level.

7.5.1.3 Measuring the human portrait value tradition

7.5.1.3.1 Satisfaction state

We asked the American participants to express their attitude towards the following: he thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that people should be satisfied with what they have (M=2.08; SD= 0.838). There is (31.4%) not like this person, (29.4%) somewhat like this person, and (39.2%) like this person (Table 63). Most males (40.9%) and females (36.5%) are like this person. Yet, more American females (32.3%) than males (27.5%) are somewhat like this person. Both have very close scores in terms of not being like this person with a 0.5% difference.
We noticed many of the 18-24 years (40%) and 35 years (40%) being somewhat like this person, whereas most 25-29 years (47%) and 30-34 years (39%) are like this person. There were variances across the education groups. The majority of uneducated (57%) are not like this person; in addition, most of the undergraduate students (40%) and associate degrees (50%) are somewhat like this person. On the other side, most elemental studies (39%), bachelor's degrees (41%), doctoral degrees (79%), and high school (52%) are like this person. Moreover, many right-side participants (60%) are like this person. In contrast, the majority of the left (36.3%) and the center (36.7%) are not like this person.

7.5.1.3.2 Abidance by religion rules

We asked the American youths to express their attitude towards the following: religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires (M=1.99; SD= 0.903). The analyzed data revealed that there is (41.1%) not like this person, (18.6%) somewhat like this person, and (40.4%) like this person.
Many American females (44.9%) and males (42.8%) reported being like this person (Table 63). Most of all age groups in the USA are not like this person, with 35 years having the highest score, except most 30-34 years who reported being like this person, with (41.6%). In addition, the majority of uneducated (54%), elemental studies (49%), high school (67%), and associate degrees (67%) are not like this person. On the contrary, most undergraduate students (40%), bachelor's degrees (44%), master's degrees (45%), and doctoral degrees (81%) are like this person. Likewise, (68.5%) of right-wing participants are like this person whereas most of the left (57%) and the center (47%) are not

like this person. It is worth noting that the center (24%) outweighed both the left (19.4%) and the right (11%) in terms of being somewhat like this person.

7.5.1.3.3 Analysis of the composite variable tradition value

We created a composite score of traditional items; therefore, we checked their reliability in the case of USA. The two items showed moderate internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.684). It is worth noting that these items showed a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.514 (M=2; SD= 0.866). The analyzed data in the USA offered the following results. There are (37.4%) low tradition, (25.2%) moderate tradition, and (37.4%) high tradition (Table 63). We noticed that (39%) of females have a high tradition level unlike most males (37%) who have a low level. It is worth noting that there are (26%) of males and (23%) of females have moderate tradition. Most 18-24 years (35.4%) have a moderate tradition, 25-29 years (35.5%) and 35 years (48.8%) have a low tradition level. On the other side, more than (41%) of 30-34 years have a high tradition level.

We observed similar variances across the education segments. Most of the uneducated (68%), elemental studies (40%), and associate degrees (50%) have a low-tradition level. In addition, most undergraduate students (36%), high school (42.9%), and associate degrees (50%) have a moderate-tradition level. On the contrary, many bachelor's (44%), master's (40%), and doctoral degree holders (79%) have high tradition levels.

Consistent with the previously stated findings, most of the right-wing Americans (67%) have a high tradition level, unlike most of the left (48%) and the center (44%) who have low tradition levels. We noticed more left (33%) than the center (30%) and the right (13%) having moderate traditional levels.

Moreover, the majority of heavy (73%) and medium news consumers on Facebook (38%); heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (75%), and those with high threat perception (68%), have high tradition levels. At the same time, most of those who have moderate threat perception has a moderate tradition level. On the other side, light (48%) and medium news consumers on Facebook (36%); heavy (39%) and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (52%) in addition to participants who have low threat perception (58%) have low tradition levels.

7.5.1.4 Analysis of the composite variable conservatism dimension

Through the collected data in the USA, we created a composite variable of the three values: security, conformity, and tradition to examine conservatism (M= 1.75; SD= 0.797). In this respect, the analyzed data in the USA showed that there is (47.5%) low conservatism, (30.3%) moderate, and (22.2%) high conservatism levels (Table 63). Most males (49.1%) and females (44.9%) have low conservatism levels. Further, males (32%) outweighed females (26.9%) having a moderate conservatism level. Yet, we noticed more females (28%) than males (18.6%) with high conservatism levels.

Likewise, most age groups in the USA have low conservatism levels, with the highest score among 35 years (55.8%). In addition, the highest score of having moderate conservatism among 18-24 years (41.5%). On the other hand, we noticed that 25-29 years scored the highest score (27.7%) having high conservatism levels.

The majority of doctoral degree holders in the USA (79%) have high conservatism, while most master's degrees (42.5%) have moderate conservatism. On the contrary, the other education groups have low conservatism, with the highest score among associate degrees (83%) and the uneducated (71.4%). Like prior findings, about 50% of the right participants have high conservatism, unlike the majority of the left (60.5%) and the center (58%) with low conservatism levels. It is worth noting that the center (32%) followed by the left (32%) and the right (27%) have moderate conservatism levels.

We observed that most heavy news consumers on Facebook (63%), on influencers' Facebook pages (63%), and those with high threat perception (52%) have high conservatism levels. On the other side, light news consumers (66%) and medium news consumers on Facebook (43%); heavy (65%) and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (59%), in addition to low (68%) and moderate threat perception levels (48%) have low conservatism levels. Furthermore, the highest scores holding moderate conservatism levels are among medium news consumers on Facebook (39.7%), those with moderate threat perception (39%), and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (35%).

7.5.1.5 Testing Hypothesis 3

H3: There is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and resistance to change.

Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in the USA is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test to find correlation and ordinal regression to identify the effect on the dependent variable. We used the newly created variables of resistance to change (tradition, security, and conformity) and threat perception to run the correlation coefficient test.

We started by running the Spearman's rho correlation coefficient one-tailed test between threat perception and each of the following security, conformity, and tradition. We found that there is a weak positive correlation between the level of threat perception and security level rho= 0.391, p< 0.001; as well as between threat level and conformity rho=0.376, p< 0.001; also, a weak positive correlation between threat perception and traditional level rho=0.404, p<0.001 (Table 72). Our data analysis revealed a weak positive correlation between resistance to change and threat level rho=0.448, p<0.001. This result means the more American youths have threat perception, the more they will be resistant to change (Table 72). In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association and support our alternate hypothesis.

We examined the correlation between resistance to change and the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages in the USA. Results indicated a significant moderate positive correlation between frequency of news consumption on such pages and level of resistance to change rho=0.529, p<0.001. In other words, the more American youths consume news on influencers' Facebook pages, the greater they will be resistant to change. Besides, we conducted Spearman's test for correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and several conservatism items. Statistical data showed a positive correlation between the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and accepting to give up some civil liberty rights to maintain national security rho=0.408, p< 0.001; security rho=0.365, p<0.001; and conformity rho=0.457, p<0.001.

Furthermore, we used the ANOVA test for a variance to check if there is any statistical difference between the means of the three political ideology wings in the USA. Thus, a one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of political ideology on conservatism level in left-wing, center-wing, and right-wing conditions. There was a significant effect of the amount of political ideology on the conservatism level remembered at the p<.05 level for the three conditions [F (2, 433) = 52.853, p = 0.001].

Table 72. Spearman's test of correlation test between security, conformity, tradition, conservatism, and threat perception - USA

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Security value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.391**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
Conformity value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.376**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.404**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.448**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = United States of America

Even though we found a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and resistance to change, we conducted ordinal regression to have better insight into the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable. We used ordinal regression analysis to examine the relationship between threat perception and resistance to change. We aim at measuring the effect of the perception of threat on resistance to change. Therefore, we started by measuring the impact of our independent variable on the dependent variable, which is resistance to change. We found the model significant where the predictor variable, perceived threat level, improves the model because of variation decrease from 137.264 to 39.161 X2 (1) = 98.103 $p < 0.001$. In addition, the parameter estimates of threat perception had a positive effect B= 1.183, SE= (0.125), Wald= (89.302), $p < 0.001$. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (1.183) = 3.263, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (2.547, 4.180) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception. This finding means that for every unit increase in the threat level there is a predicted increase of 3.263 in the level of resistance to change. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable.

For a deeper understanding of the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable, we used ordinal logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship between influencers' Facebook pages, news consumption, threat perception, and resistance to change. The predictor variables of influencers' Facebook pages, news consumption, and threat perception in the ordinal regression analysis, were found to contribute to the model.

Based on the ordinal regression results, the explanatory variable X improves the model because of a variation decrease from 400.730 to 196.619, X2 (3) = 204.112, p < 0.001. This finding suggests that there is a significant difference between the baseline model to the final model.

The parameter estimates of the three independent variables had a positive effect and were found significant p<0.001. The parameter estimates of threat perception B= 0.676, SE= (0.139), Wald= (23.663), p<0.001; news consumption on Facebook B= 0.723, SE= (0.153), Wald= (22.334), p<0.001; news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages B= 0.869, SE= (0.154), Wald= (31.898), p<0.001. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.676) = 1.965, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.501, 2.574) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception; and of nearly exp (0.723) = 2.061, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.528, 2.780) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption; in addition, of nearly exp (0.869) = 2.383, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.760, 3.228) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. These figures mean that for every 1 unit increase in the threat level, news consumption on Facebook, and influencers' Facebook pages, there is a predicted increase of 1.965, 2.061, and 2.383 in the level of resistance to change. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variables with the dependent variable.

7.5.1.5.1 Retesting the hypothesis on some participants

We excluded all the right wing participants and reconducted the correlation test to check if there is a correlation between resistance to change (conservatism) and threat perception among the left and the center wing American youths; we found a weak positive correlation rho=0.341, p<0.001 (Table 73). We also retested our variables by excluding all the Americans who do not follow news pages on Facebook (n=270). We found a weak positive correlation between threat perception and resistance to change among those who follow news pages on Facebook rho=0.467, p<0.001. Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between threat perception and each of the following: security rho=0.345, p<0.001, conformity rho=0.409, p<0.001, and tradition rho=0.408, p<0.001 (Table 74).

Table 73. Spearman's test between security, conformity, tradition, resistance to change, and threat perception pages - USA

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Security value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.343**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	293
Conformity value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.283**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	293
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.331**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	293
Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.341**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	293

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = United States of America

Table 74. Spearman's test of correlation between security, conformity, tradition, resistance to change, and threat perception pages - USA

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Security value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.345**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0,000
	N	270
Conformity value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.409**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	270
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.408**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	270
Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.467**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	270

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = United States of America

7.5.2 Measuring self-enhancement as the core dimension of inequality preference

7.5.2.1 Measuring the human portrait value power

7.5.2.1.1 Giving orders

In the following section we will present the analyzed data of the USA case. We asked the American youths to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He wants people to do what he says (M=1.79; SD= 0.848). The analysis of the data in the case of the USA offers us the following results. There is (48.6%) not like this person, (23.9%) somewhat like this person, and (27.5%) like this person (Table 67).

Even though most American males and females are not like this person, males outweighed females, with 5.5% difference points. Also, there are more American males (26.8%) than females (19.2%) being somewhat like this person. Yet, there are more females (35%) than males (22.7%) who are like this person. The highest score of not being like this person is 35 years (67.4%) whereas the highest percentage of being like this person among 25-29 years (33.5%).

As for the education categories in the USA, we noticed that most master's (42.5%) and doctoral degree holders (79.1%) are like this person. At the same time, the majority of other education segments reported not being like this person, with the highest score among elemental studies (69%) followed by the uneducated (64%). We also noticed that bachelor's degrees (30.7%) and associate degrees (33.3%) represented the highest percentages of being somewhat like this person. More than (62%) of the left and (56%) of the center are not like this person. Yet most right participants (51%) are like this person. We found more center (27%) than the left (23%) and the right (21%) being somewhat like this person.

7.5.2.1.2 Being wealthy

We asked the American participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things (M=1.94; SD= 0.835). Data showed (37.8%) not like this person, (30%) somewhat like this person, and (32.1%) like this person (Table 67). Most males and females are not like this person, with a marginal difference of 0.2%. Yet more American females (36%) than males (30%) are like this person. Moreover, more American males (32.3%) than females (26.3%) are somewhat like this person.

Many 30-34 years (43.4%) and 35 years (58.1%) are not like this person. Whereas most of 18-24 years (43.1%) are somewhat like this person. On the other side, about 42% of 25-29 years are like this person. Also, we observed differences across education groups where most master's (47.5%) and doctoral degree holders (79.1%) are like this person. On the contrary, the majority of education groups reported not being like this, with the highest score among associate degrees (66.7%) and elemental studies (52.3%). Further, the highest percentages of being somewhat like this person among elementary studies (33.8%) and undergraduate students (36.4%). Around 55% of the right-wing participants are like this person. In addition, (44%) of the left and (44%) of the center are not like this person. Moreover, there are more left (38%) than the center (30%) and the right (23%) who are somewhat like this person.

7.5.2.1.3 Analysis of the composite variable power value

We created a composite variable of power items in the USA; therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.777). It is worth noting that these items showed a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.512 (M= 1.82; SD= 0.857). The analysis of the data in the case of the USA offers us the following results. There are (47%) low power, (23.6%) moderate power, and (29.4%) high power levels (Table 67).

We did not observe significant differences between males and females where most of them have low power levels, with 1.5% difference points. In addition, there are more females (34.1%) than males (26.4%) who have high power levels. Further, more males (26%) than females, reported a moderate power level.

Likewise, most age groups in the USA have low power levels; the highest score is 35 years (70%). On the contrary, the highest score with a high-power level is across 25-29 years (37.4%) whereas the highest percentage with a moderate power level is among 18-24 years (35.4%). Many education segments have low power levels except the majority of master's (45%) and doctoral degree holders (79.1%) who have high power levels. It is worth noting that the highest score of having low power is among associate degrees (66.7%), and elemental studies (64.6%); moreover, undergraduate students (31.8%) and associate degrees (33.3%) have the highest percentages of moderate power levels. Around 52% of the right-wing participants have high power levels, whereas most of the left-wing (61%) and the center (53%) have low power levels. Further, there are more center (27.2%) than the left (23.4%) and the right (19.6%) with moderate power levels.

In like manner, most heavy news consumers on Facebook (63%), heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (69%), and participants with high threat perception (65%) have high power levels. Unlike most light (60%) and medium news consumers on Facebook (42.2%); light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (68%) as well as medium (47%); those who have low threat (65%) and moderate threat perceptions (48%), who reported low power levels.

7.5.2.2 Measuring the human portrait value achievement

7.5.2.2.1 Being successful

We asked the American participants to express their attitude towards the following: being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people (M=2.10; SD= 0.878). There is (33.9%) not like this person, (22%) somewhat like this person, and (44%) like this person (Table 67).

Data showed that most American males (42.4%) and females (46.7%) are like this person; there were minimal differences regarding being somewhat like this person and not like this person across sexes. Likewise, most age groups are like this person, with the highest score among 25-29 years (52.3%); however, only the majority of 30-34 years (38.7%) are not like this person. We noticed some variations across the education segments. Most of the segments are like this person, except the uneducated (50%), elemental studies (45%), and associate degree (66.7%), who reported not being like this person. Furthermore, around 65% of the right-wing participants are like this person, dissimilar to the majority of the left (41.1%) and the center (40.2%) who are not like this person.

7.5.2.2.2 Being impressive

We asked the American youths to express their attitude towards the following: it is very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does (M=2.17; SD= 0.833). There is (27.5%) not like this person, (27.8%) somewhat like this person, (44.7%) like this person (Table 67). Most males (44.2%) and females (45.5%) are like this person; there were no significant variations across males and females in terms of not being like this person and somewhat like this person.

Also, more than half of 25-29 years and (43.4%) of 30-34 years are like this person. While around 40% of 35 years are not like this person. It is worth noting that 18-24 years varied between either

being like this person (40%) or somewhat like this person (40%). Most uneducated (42.9%) and elemental studies (41.5%) are not like this person. At the same time, most other education groups in the USA are like this person, with the highest score among doctoral degrees (86%). We noticed that most right participants (62.2%) and left (40.3%) are like this person. While most of the center (35.5%) are somewhat like this person.

7.5.2.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable achievement value

We created a composite variable of achievement items in the USA. Therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.877). It is worth noting that these items showed a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.636 (M= 2.13; SD=0.874). The data analysis in the USA showed that there are (32.3%) low achievement, (22%) moderate achievement, and (45.6%) high achievement levels (Table 67).The majority of males (44.2%) and females (47.9%) have high achievement levels.

We noticed that only the majority of Americans aged 35 years have low achievement levels, unlike most other age groups, with high achievement levels; the highest score among high achievement is 25-29 years (52%). Similarly, most of the uneducated (43%), elemental studies (48%), and associate degrees (67%) have low achievement levels, unlike the majority of all other education segments, which have high achievement levels. About 40% of the left-wing and (37%) of the center have low achievement levels, whereas most of the right (67%) have high achievement levels. We noticed that most heavy (72%) and medium news consumers on Facebook (47%); heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (77.4%); those with high (74%) and moderate threat perceptions (39%) have high achievement levels. On the other side, many light news consumers on Facebook (39%); light (43%), and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (36.2%); low threat perception participants (48%), have low achievement levels.

7.5.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable self-enhancement dimension

Through the collected data in the USA, we measured inequality preference through self-enhancement. Thus, we created a composite variable of self-enhancement by adding the values of power and achievement (M= 1.80; SD= 0.800). The data showed that there are (44%) low, (32.1%) moderate, and (23.9%) self-enhancement levels (Table 67). Most American males (44%) and females (44%) have a low-enhancement level. Yet, there are more females (29%) than males (20%)

who have high self-enhancement levels. In addition, most 18-24 years (46.2%) have a moderate self-enhancement. Most age groups have a low self-enhancement, with the highest score among 35 years (62.8%) and the lowest score being 25-29 years (39%). Moreover, those aged 25-29 years have the highest self-enhancement percentage (33.5%).

In addition, most of the master's (38%) and doctoral degree holders (79%) have a high self-enhancement, unlike the rest of other education categories, which have a low self-enhancement. Like previous findings, many of the right-wing American youths have a high self-enhancement (47.6%) unlike most of the left (51%) and the center (53%) who have low self-enhancement.

We noticed that most heavy news consumers on Facebook (57%), heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (62%), and high threat perception participants (58%), have high self-enhancement. In contrast, the majority of light (56%) and medium news consumers on Facebook (42%); light (60%) and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (50.4%); participants with low (62%) and moderate threat perception levels (44.4%), have low self-enhancement.

7.5.2.4 Testing Hypothesis 4

H4: there is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and inequality preference.

Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in the USA case is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test to find correlation and ordinal regression to identify the effect on the dependent variable. We used the newly created variables of self-enhancement (power and achievement) and threat perception to run the correlation coefficient test.

We started by running Spearman's rho correlation coefficient one-tailed test between threat perception, power, and achievement. We found a significant weak positive correlation between the level of threat perception and the power level rho= 0.421, p< 0.001. Also, there is a weak positive correlation between threat level and achievement rho=0.353, p< 0.001 (Table 75).

Further analysis revealed a significant weak positive correlation between self-enhancement and threat level rho=0.445, p<0.001. This result means the more you have threat perception, the more self-enhancement you have, thus high inequality preference (Table 75). In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association and accept the alternate hypothesis. This finding means that high threat perception correlates positively with self-enhancement -which we used to measure inequality preference in the USA.

For deeper analysis, we examined the correlation between self-enhancement and frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. We found a positive weak correlation between both the level of self-enhancement and frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages rho=0.468, p<0.001. Furthermore, we used the ANOVA test for a variance to check if there is any statistical difference between the means of the three political ideology wings. Thus, a one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of political ideology on self-enhancement levels in left-wing, center-wing, and right-wing conditions. There was a significant effect of the amount of political ideology on self-enhancement remembered at the p<.05 level for the three conditions [F (2, 433) = 30.993, p = 0.001].

Table 75. Spearman's test of correlation between self enhancement and threat perception - USA

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Power scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.421**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
Achievement - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.353**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
Inequality preference - measured through self-enhancement (power - achievement	Correlation Coefficient	.445**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = United States of America

Even though we found a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and self-enhancement, we conducted ordinal regression to have a better insight into the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable. We used ordinal regression analysis to examine the relationship between threat perception and self-enhancement. We aim at measuring the effect of threat perception on self-enhancement. Therefore, we started by measuring the impact of our independent variable on the dependent variable, which is self-enhancement. The model was found significant where the predictor variable, level of perceived threat, improved the model because of variation decrease from 151.680 to 52.495 X2 (1) = 99.185, p < 0.001. Further, the parameter estimates of threat perception had a positive effect B= 1.190, SE= (0.124), Wald= (91.632), p < 0.001. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (1.190) = 3.286, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (2.566, 4.209) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception. For every unit increase in the threat level, there is a predicted increase

of 3.286 in the level of self-enhancement. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable.

Moreover, we used ordinal logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship between news consumption on Facebook, influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception, and self-enhancement. We found the predictor variables of news consumption on Facebook, influencers' Facebook pages, and threat perception in the ordinal regression analysis contribute to the model. Based on the ordinal regression results, the explanatory variable X improves the model because of variation decrease from 351.201 to 196.292, X2 (3) = 154.909, p< 0.001. These figures suggest that there is a significant difference between the baseline model to the final model. However, the parameter estimates of news consumption on Facebook were insignificant, p=0.084. On contrary, the estimate of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages was found significant and had a positive effect B= 0.816, SE= (0.150), Wald= (29.445), p <0.001. Likewise, the estimate of threat perception level was found significant and had a positive effect B= 0.785, SE= (0.136), Wald= (33.522), p <0.001. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.816) = 2.262, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.682, 3.042) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. In other words, for every 1 unit increase of consuming news on influencers' pages, there is an expected increase of 2.262 in the level of self-enhancement. Similarly, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.785) = 2.193, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.675, 2.872) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception. In other words, for every 1 unit increase of threat perception, there is an expected increase of 2.193 in the level of self-enhancement.

7.5.2.4.1 Retesting the hypothesis on some participants

Based on the literature review, most of the right-side USA youths have a high conservatism level. Thus, we excluded the right-side political ideology participants to examine the correlation between threat level and conservatism in its two core values (inequality preference and conservatism) among the left and center-wing participants (n=239). We found a positive correlation between threat perception and resistance to change rho=0.341, p<0.010. Likewise, there is a minimum positive correlation between self-enhancement and threat perception rho=0.270, p<0.001 (Table 76). Furthermore, we excluded all the participants who do not follow any of the news pages on Facebook to examine the correlation between threat perception and self-enhancement among those who follow news pages on Facebook. There is a positive weak correlation rho=0.463, p<0.001. More precisely,

there is a positive correlation between threat perception and each of the following: power rho=0.439, p<0.001 and achievement rho=0.382, p<0.001 (Table 77).

Table 76. Spearman's test of correlation between power, achievement, self enhancement, and threat perception among left and center-wing participants - USA

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Power scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.249**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	293
Achievement - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.241**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	293
Inequality preference - measured through self-enhancement (power - achievement	Correlation Coefficient	.270**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	293

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = United States of America

Table 77. Spearman's test of correlation between power, achievement, self enhancement, and threat perception among participants who follow Facebook news pages - USA

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Power scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.439**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	270
Achievement - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.382**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	270
Inequality preference - measured through self-enhancement (power - achievement	Correlation Coefficient	.463**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	270

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = United States of America

7.6 Correlation between threat perception and political conservatism: Spain

7.6.1 Measuring conservatism as the core dimension of resistance to change

7.6.1.1 Measuring the human portrait value security

7.6.1.1.1 Danger avoidance

In the following section we will present the analyzed data of the Spanish case. We asked the Spanish Participants to express their attitude toward the following: it is important for him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety (M=2.51; SD= 0.689). The data analysis showed (11.2%) not like this person, (26.5%) somewhat like this person, and (62.2%) like this person (Table 63). There were close percentages between males and females. Yet we noticed more females (63.1%) than males (61.6%) being like this person; more males (29.3%) than females (25.1%) somehow like this person; more females (11.8%) than males (9.2%) are not like this person. The majority of age groups are like this person. However, 25-29 years scored the highest for being like this person (72.3%) followed by 30-34 years (54%). The highest score of not being like this person was across 18-24 years (18.6%); as for those who are somewhat like this person, we noticed that 35 years scored the highest, with (36%). Those who hold doctoral degrees (78.6%) followed by bachelor's degrees (67.2%) have the highest scores in terms of being like this person. As for being somewhat like this person, we remarked that undergraduate students (31.7%) had the highest score. On the other hand, those who hold doctoral degrees have the highest score, not being like this (21.4%). Like prior findings, the right-wing participants achieved the highest score of being like this person (73.8%). The left achieved a relatively higher score (27.6%) regarding being somewhat like this person and not being like this person, with 14.7% difference points compared to other ideologies.

7.6.1.1.2 Protecting social order

We asked the Spanish participants to express their attitude toward the following: it is important to him that his country be safe from threats from within and without. He is concerned that social order

is protected (M=2.62; SD= 0.631). Moreover, (69.6%) like this person, (22.4%) somewhat like this person, and (8%) are not like this person (Table 63).

We did not find a significant difference between Spanish males and females. As for age categories, 25-29 years have the highest score (77.3%) in terms of being like this person, 35 years had the highest percentage in terms of being somewhat like this person (30%), and 18-24 years have the highest in terms of not being like this person (14.2%). The majority of different education levels are like this person. In addition, the majority of political ideologies are like this person with (80%) right-wing participants.

7.6.1.1.3 Maintain national security

We asked the Spanish youths to express their attitude toward the following: it is acceptable for him to give up some civil liberty rights to maintain national security (M=1.90; SD= 0.807). There is (37.8%) not like this person, (34.1%) somewhat like this person, and (28.1%) like this person (Table 63). We observed that males (31.1%) more than females (26.6%) are like this person. Yet, more females (38.4%) than males (36.6%) are not like this person; also, females (35.1%) outweighed males (32.3%) in terms of being somewhat like this person.

We noticed that 25-29 years have the highest percentage of not being like this person (42%). At the same time, the majority of 30-34 years have the highest score in terms of being somewhat like this person (36.1%). On the other side, 35 years has the highest score (32%) of being like this person. Most of the elemental studies (36.4%), doctoral degrees (50%), and master's degrees, (36.2%) are like this person. On the other side, most bachelor's degrees (37.6%) are somewhat like this person. As for different political ideologies, most of the right (48.8%) compared to the left (20.9%) and the center (25.8%) are like this person. On the contrary, most of the left (46%) are not like this person. Also, most of the center (39.7%) are somewhat like this person.

To enhance the discussion on this item, we noted that most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (36%) accept giving up some liberty rights to maintain national security, followed by medium (24.4%) and light (24.6%). On the other side, most light (42.3%) and medium news consumers on such pages (39.3%) do not accept, compared to heavy news consumers (31.7%) (Table 64).

7.6.1.1.4 Analysis of the composite variable security value

We created a composite variable of security items in the case of Spain; therefore, we checked their reliability. The three items showed good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.579). However, to increase this value, we checked the scale if an item was deleted and found that deleting item 3 will increase Cronbach's alpha value to 0.701. Accordingly, we removed item 3, since it wasn't part of the PVQ scale, and we added it to deepen the analysis. It is worth noting that these items showed a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.542.

Within this framework, we divided the Spanish youths into low, moderate, and high-security levels (M= 2.62; SD= 0.673). There is (72.3%) of this study's participants with high-security levels, (16.9%) have moderate, and (10.8%) with low-security levels (Table 63). Most males (74.4%) and females (71.6%) have a high-security level. We noticed more females (11.8%) than males (7.9%) having low-security levels, whereas more males (17.7%) than females (16.6%) have moderate security levels.

Most age categories in Spain have high security (72.3%), with the highest score among 25-29 years (82.4%) and the least across 35 years (66%). On the other hand, (10.8%) have a low-security level, with 18-24 years having the highest score (16.8%) and the lowest score among 35 years. Additionally, 35 years have the highest score (30%) and 25-29 years (8.4%) the lowest in terms of having a moderate security level. Bachelor's degree holders have the highest percentage of holding a high-security level (79.6%) while the highest score with low security is among doctoral degrees (21.4%), and undergraduate students have the top score of having a moderate security level (24.9%).

Most of the three ideologies in Spain have a high-security level, with the highest percentage among the right (81.3%) followed by the center (70.6%) and the left (69.9%). In addition, the center (17.5%) has the highest score followed by the left (16.6%) and the right (16.3%) in terms of holding a moderate security level. Also, the highest percentage with a low-security level is the left (13.5%) followed by the center (11.9%) and the right (2.5%).

Even though most news consumers on Facebook have a high-security level, the highest score is among heavy (81%) followed by medium (72.8%) and light news consumers (64.9%). On the other side, (20.3%) light, medium (6.4%), and heavy (5.2%) have a low-security level. Also, (14.9%) light, (20.8%) medium, and (13.8%) heavy have moderate security levels.

Heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have the highest security level (83.5%). In contrast, light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have the highest score of low-security levels (19.2%) and moderate security levels (20.8%). We found most of the three threat

perception levels have high-security levels; high threat perception scored the highest (86.3%) followed by moderate (67.9%) and low threat perception (59%). On the other side, those with low threat perception (22.2%) achieved the highest score followed by moderate (10.7%) and high (2.5%) in terms of low-security level. Further, moderate threat levels (21.4%) followed by low (18.8%) and high (11.2%) have moderate security levels.

It is worth noting that Spearman's correlation test revealed a minimum positive correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and security level rho=0.190, $p<0.001$. This means that the more Spanish youths consume news on such pages the higher their security preference.

7.6.1.2 Measuring the human portrait value conformity

7.6.1.2.1 Abidance by the rules

We asked the Spanish youths to express their attitude toward the following: he believes that people should do what they are told. He thinks people should always follow the rules even when no one is watching (M=2.17; SD= 0.831). Data showed that there is (27.5%) are not like this person, (28.4%) somewhat like this person, and (44.2%) like this person (Table 63).

We did not notice significant differences between Spanish males and females. With more males being like this person (45.1%) than females (43.5%); and more males (29.9%) than females (27.7%) are somehow like this person; lastly, females (28.8%) overtopped males (25%) who are not like this person. The highest percentage across those being like this person among 30-34 years (47.7%) and the lowest among 35 years (40%). Also, those aged 35 years scored the highest score of being somewhat like this person (32%) followed by 25-29 years (31.1%). On the other hand, the highest score of not being like this person is 18-24 years (30.1%), and the lowest score among 30-34 years (24.5%).

We observed the maximum score among bachelor's degrees (52.6%) and the minimum among elemental studies (36.4%) of being like this person. It is worth noting that (50%) of doctoral degree holders are not like this person. The right-wing participants (51.2%) excelled over the left (44.2%) and the center (41.2%) being like this person. There are more left (30.7%) than the center (28.4%) and the right (18.8%) not being like this person. Yet, more center (30.4%) than the right (30%) and the left (25.2%) are somewhat like this person.

7.6.1.2.2 Compliance with social norms

We asked the Spanish respondents to express their attitude toward the following: it is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong (M=2.35; SD= 0.780). The analyzed data revealed that there is (54%) like this person, (27%) somehow like this person, and (19%) not like this person (Table 63).

We noticed more Spanish males (57.3%) than females (52.4%) being like this person; more males (28%) than females (26.2%) being somewhat like this person. On the other side, more females (21.4%) than males (14.6%) are not being like this person.

Further, the highest percentage of being like this person is among 25-29 years (61.3%) whereas the lowest score is 35 years (44%). On the other hand, the top percentage of not being like this person is 35 years (26%) and the lowest among 30-34 years (15.5%). Moreover, 35 years have the highest score (30%) being somewhat like this person, and the least score is among 25-29 years (21%). Likewise, around 70% of bachelor's reported being like this person, whereas the highest score of not being like this person is the doctoral degree (28.6%).

It is worth noting that the majority of the three political ideologies in Spain are like this person with the highest among the right-wing (66.3%) followed by the center (53.6%) and the left (48.5%). About (27%) somewhat like this person, with more center (28.4%) than the left (27.6%) and the right (22.5%). Besides, there is (19%) are not like this person, with more left (23.9%) than the center (18%) and the right (11.3%).

7.6.1.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable conformity value

We created a composite variable of conformity items in the case of Spain. Therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.714). It is worth noting that these items showed a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.544 (M=2.30; SD= 0.831). Most Spanish youths have high conformity levels (53.8%) followed by low (24%) and moderate (22.2%) (Table 63).

There are more Spanish females (26.6%) than males (19.5%) with low conformity. Also, there are more males (27.4%) than females (19.2%) who have moderate conformity levels. As for the high conformity levels, both have almost equal percentages, with females (54.2%) overtopping males (53%) with a different point of 1.2%.

30-34 years have the top score of holding high conformity (57.4%), whereas 35 years have the lowest (42%). In addition, the highest percentage of having a low conformity level is among 35 years (28%), and the minimum score among 25-29 years (21.8%).

Likewise, data showed that there are (53.8%) high conformity across different education categories, with the highest among bachelor's degrees (67.2%) and the minimum score among doctoral degrees (42.9%). Moreover, there is a (24%) low conformity level, with the highest score among doctoral degrees (35.7%) and the least among bachelor's degrees (17.5%). Also, about (22.2%) have moderate conformity levels, with the highest score among master's degrees (24.1%) and the minimum score among bachelor's degrees (15.3%).

The right-wing Spanish respondents have the highest score having a high conformity level (63.7%) compared to the left (52.8%) and the center (50.5%). On the other side, there are more left (30.1%) than the center (22.2%) and the right (16.3%) with low conformity levels. In addition, the center (27.3%) excelled over the right (20%) and the left (17.2%) had moderate conformity levels.

Moreover, there are more heavy news consumers on Facebook (66.4%) than medium (56.1%) and light (41.2%) with high conformity levels. Though light news consumers (31.8%) surpassed the medium (19.1%) and the heavy (21.6%) had low conformity levels. Similarly, the light (27%) has a higher percentage than the medium (24.9%) and heavy news consumers (12.1%) hold a moderate conformity level.

Likewise, heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have the highest score of high conformity levels (68.3%) followed by medium (50.6%) and light (42.3%). In addition, the highest percentage have low conformity is among light (31.5%) whereas the lowest score is among heavy (16.5%). In addition, light (26.2%) has the top score holding a moderate conformity level, whereas heavy has the lowest score (15.1%).

It is worth noting that those with high threat perception scored higher (66.5%) than moderate (49.7%) and low (41.9%) having high conformity levels. On the other hand, there is more low threat perception (30.8%) than moderate (28.3%) and high (14.9%) with low conformity. Additionally, participants with low threat perception (27.4%) hold a higher score than moderate (22%) and high (18.6%) having a moderate conformity level.

7.6.1.3 Measuring the human portrait value tradition

7.6.1.3.1 Satisfaction state

We asked the Spanish respondents to express their attitude toward the following: he thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that people should be satisfied with what they have (M=2.08; SD= 0.857). The analysis of the data in the case of Spain revealed the following results. There are (33.2%) not like this person, (26.1%) somewhat like this person, and (40.7%) like this person (Table 63).

More Spanish males are like this person (45.1%) than females (38.4%). Moreover, there are more males (26.2%) than females (25.8%) being somewhat like this person. More females (35.8%) than males (28.7%) are not like this person.

As for the age, most age groups are like this person. We noticed that 25-29 years have the highest percentage of being like this person (44.5%) whereas 18-24 years have the lowest score (38.1%). In contrast, 25-29 years scored the highest, and 30-34 years scored the least in not being like this person. Further, 18-22 years have the highest score (29.2%) and 25-29 years have the minimum score of being somewhat like this person.

Similarly, most education categories in Spain are like this person. The highest score being like this person is among doctoral degrees and the lowest is among undergraduate students (45.5%). On the contrary, the doctoral degree holders also scored the highest in not being like this person (35.7%) and bachelor's degrees have the least score (31.4%). Additionally, the bachelor's degree has the highest score of being somewhat like this person (29.2%) whereas the doctoral degree has the least score (7.1%).

Likewise, most of the right-wing Spanish respondents (51.2%) and the center (38.1%) are like this person. The majority of the left (39.9%) are not like this person. Moreover, there is more center (32%) than the left (21.5%) and the right (21.3%) being somewhat like this person.

7.6.1.3.2 Abidance by religion rules

We asked the Spanish youths to express their attitude toward the following: religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires (M=1.61; SD= 0.802). There is (59.5%) not like this person, (20.4%) somewhat like this person, and (20.1%) like this person (Table 63).

Most Spanish males (50.6%) and females (64.9%) are not like this person. Further, more males (22%) than females (19.6%) are somewhat like this person. On the other side, more males (27.4%) than females (15.5%) are like this person.

Most age categories in Spain are not like this person, with 18-24 years scoring the highest (64.6%) and 30-34 years (52.9%) achieving the least. Also, 30-34 years have the highest score of being somewhat like this person (24.5%) and 18-24 years have the least score (16.8%). 30-34 years scored the highest (22.6%), in terms of being like this person, whereas 25-29 years scored the most negligible score (18.5%).

Similarly, most education segments in Spain are not like this person, with the highest score for bachelor's degrees (62.8%) and the least score among doctoral degrees (50%). As for those who are somewhat like this person, we found the highest among master's degrees (25.9%) and the lowest score among doctoral degrees (14.3%). Further, the highest score in terms of being like this person is among doctoral degrees (35.7%) and the lowest is among bachelor's degrees (17.5%). Unlike prior findings, most political ideologies, including the right, are not like this person, with the left (71.8%) more than the center (57.7%) and the right (38.8%). There is (21.6%) center, (20.4%) right, and (17.2%) left, are somewhat like this person. Even though most of the right is not like this person, they scored higher than the other two categories with (37.5%) compared to the center (20.6%) and the left (11%).

7.6.1.3.3 Analysis of the composite variable tradition value

We created a composite variable of traditional items in Spain. Therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed low internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.338). Our data analysis of the Spanish case showed that most Spanish participants have a low tradition level (42.6%), moderate (33%), and a high tradition of (24.5%) (M=1.82; SD= 0.800) (Table 63).

Most sexes in Spain have a low tradition, with more females (46.9%) than males (35.4%); more males (31.1%) than females (20.3%) have a moderate tradition level. On the contrary, more males (31.1%) than females (20.3%) have high traditional levels. Likewise, most age categories have a low tradition, with 25-29 years (44.5%) overtopping the other age categories and 30-34 years have the lowest score (41.3%). We noticed that 18-24 years have the highest score (40.7%) of having a moderate tradition level, whereas 30-34 years have the least score (29%). Also, 30-34 years have the highest score with a high tradition level (29.7%) and 25-29 years have the least score (17.7%).

Likewise, most education segments in Spain have a low tradition level except doctoral degree holders who have a high tradition level. Around 40% of the right participants have a high tradition level compared to the left (16.6%) and the center (24.7%). There is (53.4%) left and (39.2%) center with a low tradition level compared to (28.7%) right. Additionally, there is more center (36.1%) than the right (31.1%) and the left (30.1%).

Most news consumers on Facebook, light (47.3%), medium (42.8%), and heavy (36.2%) have a low tradition level. Followed by moderate tradition, with (33.8%) light, (34.7%) medium, and (29.3%) heavy. We noticed that heavy consumers have more percentage (34.5%) compared to the medium (22.5%) and the light (18.9%) of having a high tradition level.

Similar findings showed that most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (53.8%) and medium (45.2%) have a low tradition level. On the other side, most heavy (40.3%) have a high tradition level. As for threat perception level, we noticed that participants with high threat perception levels (35.4%) have a high tradition level compared to moderate threat level (23.3%) and low threat level (11.1%). On the other side, most of those with low threat perception (53.8%) and moderate threat perception (42.1%) have low tradition levels compared to those with high threat perception (34.8%).

7.6.1.4 Analysis of the composite variable conservatism dimension

We created a composite variable of the three values together security, conformity, and tradition (M= 1.75; SD= 0.653) in the Spanish case. The analysis of the data demonstrated that most of the Spanish respondents has moderate conservatism levels (51.3%), with (36.8%) having low, and (11.9%) having high conservatism levels (Table 63).

Many of the Spanish males (52.4%) and females (50.6%) have a moderate level. Also, there are more females (39.9%) than males (31.7%) with a low level. At the same time, more males (15.9%) than females (9.6%) have a high conservatism level—almost equal percentages in terms of moderate conservatism level, with more males (52.4%) than females (50.6%).

It is worth noting that most age categories have moderate conservatism levels. Even though the scores were so close across different age categories, we noticed that the highest score of holding a moderate conservatism level among 25-29 years (55.5%) and the lowest score among 35 years (46%). As for the high conservatism level, the top score was found among 30-34 years (14.2%) and the least score among 35 years (10%). On the contrary, the highest score with a low conservatism level is 18-24 years (44.2%) and the least is 25-29 years (31.9%).

Doctoral degree holders are divided between low and moderate conservatism levels, with (35.7%) in each. Most other education groups have a moderate conservatism level, with the minimum score across doctoral and the highest score among bachelor's degree holders (58.4%). The highest percentage having a low conservatism level is among undergraduate students (42.3%) and the lowest among bachelor's degrees (29.2%). Also, the topmost of having a high conservatism is across the doctoral degree (28.6%) and the least among undergraduate students (8.5%).

Most left-wing participants (45.4%), center (56.7%), and right (50%) have moderate conservatism levels. On the other side, there is (47.2%) left, (33.5%) center, and (23.8%) right with a low conservatism level; in addition, (26.3%) right, (9.8%) center, and (7.4%) left with a high conservatism level.

Likewise, heavy (50%), medium (56.1%), and light news consumers on Facebook (46.6%) have moderate conservatism levels. In addition, more light news consumers (45.9%) than medium (34.1%), and heavy (29.3%) have low conservatism levels. In addition, there are more heavy news consumers (20.7%) than the medium (9.8%) and light (7.4%) having a high conservatism level. Moreover, the majority of light news consumers on influencers' pages on Facebook (50%) have low conservatism levels compared to the medium (37.5%) and heavy (23.7%). Also, most medium (56.5%) and heavy (49.6%) have a moderate conservatism level compared to light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (46.2%). It is worth noting that heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages achieved the highest score (26.6%) in contrast to light (2.8%) and medium (6%) having high conservatism levels.

Many of those with low threat perceptions (52.1%) have low conservatism levels, compared to the majority of moderate (53.5%) and high threat perceptions (53.4%) with moderate conservatism levels. Furthermore, there are (23.6%) of participants with high threat perception (6.9%) moderate, and (2.6%) low, who have a high conservatism level.

7.6.1.5 Testing Hypothesis 3

H3: There is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and resistance to change.

Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in Spain is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test to find correlation and ordinal regression to identify the effect on the dependent variable. We used the newly created variables of resistance to change (tradition, security, and conformity) and threat perception to run the correlation coefficient test.

We started by running Spearman's rho correlation coefficient one-tailed test between threat perception and each of the following security, conformity, and tradition. We found a minimum positive correlation between the level of threat perception and security level rho= 0.266, p< 0.001; as well as conformity rho=0.204, p< 0.001; and traditional level rho=0.206, p<0.001 (Table 78). Further, we found a weak positive correlation between resistance to change and threat level rho=0.303, p<0.001. This result means the more the threat perception level, the higher the resistance to change -namely conservatism level (Table 78). In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association and support our alternate hypothesis.

To obtain a deeper analysis we examined the correlation between resistance to change and the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. Results indicated a significant positive correlation between the frequency of news consumption on such pages and the level of resistance to change rho=0.284, p<0.001. In other words, the more Spanish youths consume news on influencers' Facebook pages, the greater they will be resistant to change. Besides, we conducted Spearman's test for correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and several conservatism items. Statistical data revealed a positive correlation between the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and giving up some civil liberty rights to maintain national security rho=0.108, p< 0.024; security value rho=0.218, p<0.001; and conformity rho=0.201, p<0.001.

Furthermore, we used the ANOVA test for a variance to check if there is any statistical difference between the means of the three political ideology wings. Thus, a one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of political ideology on conservatism level in left-wing, center-wing, and right-wing conditions. There was a significant effect of the amount of political ideology on the conservatism level remembered at the p<.05 level for the three conditions [F (2, 434) = 11.939, p = 0.001].

Table 78. Spearman's test of correlation between t security, conformity, tradition, conservatism, and threat perception - Spain

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Security value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.266**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	437
Conformity value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.204**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000

	N	437
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.206**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	437
Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.303**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	437

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

a. Where do you live? = Spain

Even though we found a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and resistance to change in Spain, we conducted ordinal regression to understand better the independent variable's impact on the dependent variable. We used ordinal regression analysis to examine the relationship between threat perception and resistance to change. We aim at measuring the effect of the perception of threat on resistance to change. Therefore, we started by measuring the impact of our independent variable on the dependent variable, which is resistance to change.

We found the model significant where the predictor variable, level of perceived threat, improved the model because of variation decrease from 76.720 to 35.547 X2 (1) = 41.173, $p < 0.001$. In addition to the significance of the model result, the goodness of fit was insignificant Pearson X2 (3) = 7.159, P= 0.067. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the observed data is consistent with the fitted model.

In addition, the parameter estimates of threat perception had a positive effect B= 0.774, SE= (0.124), Wald= (39.008), $p < 0.001$. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.774) = 2.169, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.700, 2.767) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception. Accordingly, for every 1 unit increase in the threat level, there is a predicted increase of 2.169 in the level of resistance to change. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable.

We also used ordinal logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship between news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception, as well as resistance to change. The predictor variables of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, as well as threat perception in the ordinal regression analysis, was found to contribute to the model. Based on the ordinal regression results, the explanatory variable X improves the model because of a variation decrease from 256.659 to 186.808, X2 (3) = 69.851, $p < 0.001$. This result suggests that there is a significant difference between the baseline model to the final model.

Besides the significance of the model result, the goodness of fit was insignificant Deviance X2 (49) = 73.538, P= 0.013. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the observed data is consistent with the fitted model. The parameter estimates of news consumption on Facebook were insignificant p= 0.330. However, the estimates of consuming news on influencers' Facebook pages had a positive effect B= 0.610, SE= (0.136), Wald= (20.055), p < 0.001; Also, the estimates of threat perception had a positive effect B= 0.688, SE= (0.127), Wald= (29.212), p < 0.001. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio also favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.610) = 1.840, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.405, 2.409) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. In other words, for every 1 unit increase in consuming news on influencers on Facebook, there is an expected increase of 1.840 in the level of resistance to change. Finally, the estimated odds ratio also favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.688) = 1.990, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.552, 2.552) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception. In other words, for every 1 unit increase in threat perception level, there is an expected increase of 1.990 in the level of resistance to change.

7.6.1.5.1 Retesting the hypothesis on some participants

It is worth noting that we excluded all the Spanish participants who do not follow news pages on Facebook. We found a minimum positive correlation between threat perception and resistance to change among the Spanish youths who follow news pages on Facebook (n=996) rho=0.280, p<0.001. Additionally, a positive minimum correlation between threat perception and each of the following: security rho=0.233, p<0.001, conformity rho=0.183, p<0.001, and tradition rho=0.188, p<0.001 (Table 79).

Table 79. Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception and resistance to change - Spain

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Security value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.233**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	353
Conformity value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.183**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	353
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.188**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	353

Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.280**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	353

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

a. Where do you live? = Spain

7.6.2 Measuring self enhancement as the core dimension of inequality preference

7.6.2.1 Measuring the human portrait value power

7.6.2.1.1 Giving orders

In the following section we will present the analyzed data of the Spanish case. We asked the Spanish participants to express their attitude toward the following: it is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He wants people to do what he says (M=1.62; SD= 0.774). The collected data in Spain showed that there are (56.5%) who are not like this person, (25.4%) are somewhat like this person, and (18.1%) are like this person (Table 67). The majority of Spanish males and females are not like this person, with more females (60.5%) than males (50%). Yet, more Spanish males are somewhat like this person (28.7%) than females (23.6%); also, more males (21.3%) than females (15.9%) are like this person. We noticed that most age groups are not like this person with the highest score among 18-24 years (61.9%) and the lowest score among 30-34 years (48.4%). Moreover, the top score in terms of being like this person among 30-34 years (18.7%). Most elemental studies (51.5%), undergraduate students (58.2%), bachelor's degrees (64.2%), and master's degrees (43.1%) are not like this person. Furthermore, the majority of the doctoral degree (57.1%) are like this person. Also, about (25.5%) are somewhat like this person across the different education categories. Most of the three political ideology categories are not like this person.

7.6.2.1.2 Being wealthy

We asked the Spanish youths to express their attitude toward the following: it is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things (M=1.77; SD= 0.803). There are (46.2%) who are not like this person, (30.4%) are somewhat like this person, and (23.3%) are like this person (Table 67). Most males and females are not like this person. It is worth noting that there were very marginal difference points between males and females. Most age categories are not like

this person. As for the education categories, most elemental studies (63.6%), undergraduate students (49.2%), bachelor's degrees (43.1%), and doctoral degrees (42.9%) are not like this person. Moreover, most of the master's degrees are somewhat like this person (26.2%). Most of the left-wing (50.9%) and the center (48.5%) are not like this person, unlike most of the right (35%) who are like this person.

7.6.2.1.3 Analysis of the composite variable power value

We created a composite variable of the items of power value in Spain; therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.656). The analysis of the data in the case of Spain offers us the following results. There are (19.7%) high power level, (24.3%) moderate, and (56.1%) low (M=1.64; SD=0.792) (Table 67). Most males (50.6%) and females (59.4%) have a low power level. In addition, more males (28.7%) than females (21.4%) have a moderate power level; further, there is a very marginal difference between males (20.7%) and females (19.2%) who have high power levels. Like prior findings, the majority of age categories have a low power level. There is an (18.8%) high power level, with 30-34 years achieving the highest score (23.9%) and 35 years (16%) having the lowest score. Almost (50%) of educational categories have a low power level, except most doctoral degree holders, with a high-power level (42.9%). It is worth noting that the majority of the three ideologies have low power levels. We also found that most news consumers on Facebook have low power levels. Additionally, many heavy, medium, and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have a low power level. As for threat perception and power level, we found that most participants with high, moderate, and low threat perception have low power levels.

7.6.2.2 Measuring the human portrait value achievement

7.6.2.2.1 Being successful

We asked the Spanish participants to express their attitude toward the following: being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people (M=1.87; SD= 0.828). Data revealed that there is (41.4%) like this person, (30%) somewhat like this person, and (28.6%) are not like this person (Table 67). We noticed more females (42.4%) than males (39.6%) who like this person; almost close percentages between females (31.7%) and males (27.4%) being somewhat like this

person. Additionally, Spanish males (32.9%) surpassed females (25.8%) in being like this person. Likewise, most age categories are not like this person. It is worth noting that most doctoral (50%) and master's degree holders (37.9%) are like this person. On the other side, many elemental studies (57.6%), undergraduate students (44.4%), and bachelor's degree holders (36.5%) are not like this person. Most of the left-wing (44.8%) and center-wing (44.8%) are not like this person. Unlike most of the right (46.3%) who are like this person.

7.6.2.2.2 Being impressive

We asked the Spanish participants to express their attitude toward the following: it is very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does (M=2.04; SD=0.821). There is (31.6%) who are not like this person, (32.5%) who somewhat like this person, and (35.9%) like this person (Table 67). We did not notice a significant difference between males and females. Yet, the main difference detected between males (38.4%) and females (34.7%) is among those who are like this person. There are (40.7%) of 18-24 years being somewhat like this person, (44.5%) of 25-29 years being like this person, and most of 30-34 years (36.1%) and 35 years (40%) are like this person. Similarly, (45.5%) elemental studies, (40.9%) bachelor's degrees, (36.2%) master's degrees, and (50%) doctoral degrees are like this person. On the other side, most of the undergraduate students (36.5%) are somewhat like this person. Most right-wing (52.5%) are like this person, unlike most of the left-wing (36.8%) who are not like this person nor most of the center (37.6%) who are somewhat like this person.

7.6.2.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable achievement value

We created a composite variable of achievement items in Spain. Therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.180) (M= 1.96; SD= 0.859). The analysis of the data revealed that there are (38.7%) with low achievement levels, (26.3%) with moderate achievement, and (35%) with high achievement levels (Table 67). Most Spanish males (38.4%) have high achievement levels, unlike most females (41%) who have low achievement levels. Both males (26.8%) and females (26.2%) have almost equal percentages in terms of holding moderate achievement levels.

Data demonstrated that there are (41.2%) of 25-29 years and (36.8%) of 30-34 years have high achievements. Whereas (43.4%) of 18-24 years and (38%) of 35 years have low achievement levels;

also, there is (27%) have moderate achievement levels. Furthermore, most elemental studies (51.5%) and undergraduate students (41.8%) have low achievement levels. On the contrary, bachelor's (37.2%), master's (43.1%), and doctoral degree holders (57.1%) have high achievement levels. The majority of left-wing (42.3%) and center (41.8%) have low achievement levels whereas the majority of right (53.8%) have high achievement levels.

Similarly, most heavy news consumers on Facebook (44%) and medium (33.5%) have a high achievement level. We noticed many medium news consumers varied between high and moderate achievement levels. On the opposite side, the majority of light news consumers have a low achievement level (45.9%). Likewise, heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook have a high achievement level (48.2%); light (51.5%) and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook (35.7%) have low achievement levels. Likewise, most of those with high threat perception levels have a high achievement level (46.6%). Whereas most low (41.9%) and moderate threat perception levels (44%) have low achievement.

7.6.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable self-enhancement dimension

We measured inequality preference through self-enhancement through the collected data in Spain. Thus, we created a composite score of self-enhancement by adding the values of power and achievement (M=1.59; SD= 0.710). Our data analysis of the Spanish case showed that there are about (54.2%) with low self-enhancement levels, (32.7%) with moderate self-enhancement, and (13%) with high self-enhancement (Table 67). More females (57.2%) than males (49.4%) with low self-enhancement. Moreover, males (35.4%) excelled over females (31%) holding a moderate self-enhancement level. In addition, more males (15.2%) than females (11.8%) have high self-enhancement. As for self-enhancement across different ages, most age groups have low self-enhancement. Also, many doctoral degrees (57.1%) have a moderate self-enhancement, whereas most other groups have a low self-enhancement. There is about 45% of the right-wing participants a moderate self-enhancement. Also, (55.8%) of the left-wing and (61.3%) of the center have a low self-enhancement. Similarly, most of the news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have low self-enhancement. It is worth noting that most high, moderate, and low threat perception levels have a low self-enhancement.

7.6.2.4 Testing Hypothesis 4

H4: There is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and inequality preference.

Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in Spain is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test to find correlation and ordinal regression to identify the effect on the dependent variable. We used the newly created variables of self-enhancement (power and achievement) and threat perception to run the correlation coefficient test.

We started by running Spearman's rho correlation coefficient one-tailed test between threat perception and power and self-enhancement. We found a minimum positive correlation between the level of threat perception and power level rho= 0.144, p< 0.001. Also, a minimum positive correlation between threat level and achievement rho=0.156, p< 0.001. Further analysis revealed a significant positive correlation between self-enhancement and threat level rho=0.185, p<0.001. This finding means people have threat perception, the more self-enhancement you have, thus high inequality preference (Table 80). In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association and accept the alternate hypothesis. This result means that increased threat perception correlates positively with self-enhancement -which we used to measure inequality preference.

To gain a deeper understanding of our dependent variable, we analyzed the correlation between self-enhancement and frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. We found a positive correlation between both the level of self-enhancement and the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages rho=0.226, p<0.001.

Furthermore, we used the ANOVA test for variance to check if there is any statistical difference between the means of the three political ideology wings. Thus, a one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of political ideology on self-enhancement levels in left-wing, center-wing, and right-wing conditions. There was a significant effect of the amount of political ideology on self-enhancement remembered at the p<.05 level for the three conditions [F (2, 434) = 9.907, p = 0.001].

Table 80. Spearman's test of correlation between self enhancement and threat perception - Spain

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Power scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.144**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.001
	N	437
	Correlation Coefficient	.156**

Achievement - Composite variable	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.001
	N	437
Inequality preference - measured through self-enhancement (power - achievement	Correlation Coefficient	.185**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	437

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

a. Where do you live? = Spain

Even though we found a positive correlation between the perceived threat level and self-enhancement, we conducted ordinal regression to understand better the independent variable's impact on the dependent variable. We used ordinal regression analysis to examine the relationship between threat perception and self-enhancement. We aim at measuring the effect of threat perception on self-enhancement. Therefore, we started by measuring the impact of our independent variable on the dependent variable, which is self-enhancement. We found the model significant where the predictor variable, level of perceived threat, improves the model because variation decreases from 46.474 to 31.777 X2 (1) = 14.697, $p < 0.001$. In addition to the significance of the model result, the goodness of fit was insignificant Pearson X2 (3) = 2.473, P= 0.480. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the observed data is consistent with the fitted model.

Further, the parameter estimates of threat perception had a positive effect B= 0.457, SE= (0.120), Wald= (14.363), $p < 0.001$. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.457) = 1.579, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.246, 2.000) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception. Accordingly, for every unit increase in the threat level, there is a predicted increase of 1.579 in the level of self-enhancement. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable. Furthermore, all curves have the same slope -2LL of parallel lines X2 (1) = 0.018, p-value 0.893. Hence, accepting the null hypothesis of proportional odds assumption that the odds ratios across all categories are the same.

Moreover, we used ordinal logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship between news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception, as well as self-enhancement. The predictor variables of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, as well as threat perception in the ordinal regression analysis, were found to contribute to the model. Based on the ordinal regression results, the explanatory variable X improves the model because of a variation decrease from 211.347 to 179.334, X2 (3) = 32.013, $p< 0.001$. These figures suggest that there is a significant difference between the baseline model to the final model. In addition to the significance of the model result, the goodness of fit was insignificant Pearson X2

(49) = 50.177, P= 0.427. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the observed data is consistent with the fitted model.

Even though the model was significant, the parameter estimates of news consumption on Facebook were insignificant p=0.753. On the contrary, the estimate of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages was significant and had a positive effect B= 0.501, SE= (0.134), Wald= (14.056), p < 0.001. Likewise, the estimate of threat perception was significant and had a positive effect B= 0.359, SE= (0.123), Wald= (8.502), p < 0.004. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.501) = 1.650, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.267, 2.149) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. In other words, for every 1 unit increase of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages, there is an expected increase of 1.650 in the level of self-enhancement. In like manner, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.359) = 1.433, 95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.123, 1.827) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception. In other words, for every 1 unit increase in threat perception, there is an expected increase of 1.433 in the level of self-enhancement. Furthermore, all curves have the same slope -2LL of parallel lines X2 (3) = 6.653, p-value 0.084. Hence, accepting the null hypothesis of proportional odds assumption that the odds ratios across all categories are the same.

7.6.2.4.1 Retesting the hypothesis on some participants

Based on the literature review, most of the right-side Spanish youths have a high conservatism level. To provide a more in-depth approach, we excluded all the right-side political ideology participants. We conducted the correlation coefficient test between threat perception level and conservatism in its two core values (inequality preference and conservatism) across the left and the center participants (n=357). We found a positive correlation between threat perception and resistance to change rho=0.274, p<0.001. Likewise, there is a minimum positive correlation between self-enhancement and threat perception rho=0.152, p<0.001 (Table 81) (Table 82).

In addition, we excluded Spanish youths who do not follow news pages on Facebook. We found a minimum positive correlation between threat perception and each of the following: power rho=0.137, p<0.005, achievement rho=0.185, p<0.001, and self-enhancement rho=0.191, p<0.001 (Table 83).

Table 81. Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception and inequality preference among left and center wing participants - Spain

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Power scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.118*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.013
	N	357
Achievement - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.138**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.005
	N	357
Inequality preference - measured through self-enhancement (power - achievement	Correlation Coefficient	.152**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.002
	N	357

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = Spain

Table 82. Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception and resistance to change among left and center wing participants – Spain

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable – Threat level
Security value – Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.283**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	357
Conformity value – Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.209**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	357
Tradition scale – Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.163**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.001
	N	357
Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.274**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	357

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = Spain

Table 83. Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception and inequality preference among participants who follow Facebook news pages – Spain

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable – Threat level
Power scale – Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.137**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.005

	N	353
Achievement – Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.185**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	353
Inequality preference – measured through self-enhancement (power – achievement	Correlation Coefficient	.191**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	353

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

a. Where do you live? = Spain

7.7 Correlation between threat perception and political conservatism: Egypt

7.7.1 Measuring conservatism as the core dimension of resistance to change

7.7.1.1 Measuring the human portrait value security

7.7.1.1.1 Danger avoidance

In the following section we will present the analyzed data of the Egyptian case. We asked the Egyptian participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important for him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety (M=2.67; SD= 0.642). Our data showed that there are (9.4%) are not like this person, (14.7%) are somewhat like this person, and (75.9%) are like this person (Table 63). Even though most Egyptian males and females are like this person, there are more females (81.1%) than males (70.9%). However, more males (11.3%) than females (7.2%) are not like this person; similarly, more males (17.8%) than females (11.7%) are somewhat like this person.

As for the age categories in Egypt, we noticed that most age groups are like this person, with the highest across 30-34 years (79.5%) and the lowest across 18-24 years (71.3%). It is worth noting there are relatively close percentages across the different age categories, with (9%) difference points between the highest and lowest score among those who are not like this person. Also, there is a 6.8% difference points between the highest and lowest score among those who are somewhat like this person. Besides, most education categories are like this person, with the highest score among

doctoral degrees (87.5%) and the least score among high school (60%). Additionally, the right-wing Egyptian participants have the highest score (79.8%) compared to the left (71.6%) and the center (75.4%) being like this person. We noticed more center (17%) than the left (14.8%) and the right (10.5%) who are somewhat like this person; whereas the left represented the highest (13.6%) compared to the center (7.6%) and the right (9.4%) in terms of not being like this person.

7.7.1.1.2 Protecting social order

We asked the Egyptian youths to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him that his country be safe from threats from within and without. He is concerned that social order be protected (M=2.72; SD= 0.602). There is (80%) being like this person, (11.9%) somewhat like this person, and (8%) not being like this person (Table 63). We did not observe significant differences across males and females of being like this person, somewhat like this person, and like this person. With most Egyptian males (80.3%) and females (80.2%) being like this person. Furthermore, most age categories are like this person, with the top score among 30-34 years (85.7%) and the lowest among 25-29 years (77.6%). Many education categories are like this person. Also, the majority of the three political wings are like this person.

7.7.1.1.3 Maintain national security

We asked the Egyptian respondents to express their attitude towards the following: it is acceptable for him to give up some civil liberty rights to maintain national security (M=2.21; SD= 0.846) (Table 63). There is (27.3%) who are not like this person, (24.1%) somewhat like this person, and (48.6%) are like this person. Even though most males (43.7%) and females (53.2%) are like this person, females outweighed males. In addition, we noticed more males (33.3%) than females (21.6%) who are not like this person; also, more males (23%) than females (25.2%) who are somewhat like this person. Similarly, about 50% of age groups are like this person, with 35 years achieving the highest score (55%) and 18-24 years obtaining least score (41.3%). As for education segments, the doctoral degree holders obtained the highest score in terms of being like this person (62.5%) and undergraduate students had the least score (37.2%).

The right-wing Egyptians has the highest percentage (60.5%) followed by the left (50%) and the center (41.5%) being like this person. On the other side, there are more left (30.7%) than the center

(31.3%) and the right (17.7%) who are not like this person. Also, there is more center (27.2%) than the right (21.8%) and the left (19.3%) being somewhat like this person. Furthermore, we found that most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (63.6%) and medium (50.4%) accept giving up some liberty rights to maintain national security, unlike light news consumers (29.9%) who disagree. On the other side, the majority of light (39.6%) compared to medium (20.5%) and heavy news consumers (21.8%) do not accept (Table 64).

7.7.1.1.4 Analysis of the composite variable security value

We created a composite variable of security items in the case of Egypt. Therefore, we checked their reliability. The three items showed good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.602). However, to increase this value, we examined the scale if an item was deleted and found that deleting item 3 will increase Cronbach's alpha value to 0.846. Accordingly, we removed item 3, since it was not part of the PVQ scale, and we just added it to deepen the analysis. It is worth noting that these items showed a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.596.

Within this framework, we divided the Egyptian participants into low, moderate, and high-security levels (M= 2.73; SD= 0.614). There are (81.9%) high-security levels, (9.2%) moderate security levels, and (8.9%) low-security levels. There are no significant differences across ages, whereas the majority have high-security levels. However, we noticed that 35 years have the highest score (20%), and 30-34 years have the least score (5.4%) in terms of low-security levels. Also, doctoral degree holders have the highest percentage (87.5%), and high school has the lowest score (60%) in terms of holding high-security levels.

Moreover, there are more right-wing participants (86.3%) than the center (81.3%) and the left (77.3%) to have a high-security level. In contrast, there are more left (10.2%) than the center (8.9%) and the right (8.1%) with a low-security level. Also, there are more left (12.5%) than the center (9.8%) and the right (5.6%) have a moderate security level. As for the news consumption on Facebook, most light (73.9%), medium (85.5%), and heavy news consumers (89.3%) have a high-security level. Similarly, heavy (89.7%), medium (82.7%), and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (72.2%) have a high-security level. We observed that those with high threat perception have the highest percentage of high-security level (91%) followed by moderate threat perception (85%) and low threat perception (74%).

It is worth noting that Spearman's correlation test revealed a minimum positive correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and security level rho=0.191, $p<0.001$. This

means that the more Egyptian youths consume news on such pages the higher their security preference.

7.7.1.2 Measuring the human portrait value conformity

7.7.1.2.1 Abidance by the rules

We asked the Egyptian participants to express their attitude towards the following: he believes that people should do what they are told. He thinks people should always follow rules even when no one is watching (M=2.45; SD= 0.758). Data showed that there are (16.3%) are not like this person, (22%) somewhat like this person, and (61.7%) are like this person (Table 63). We noted that there are more Egyptian females (67.1%) than males (56.3%) who are like this person. Hence, males (20.7%) transcended females (12.2%), in terms of not being like this person. Additionally, there are almost close percentages between males (23%) and females (20.7%) being somewhat like this person. Also, most age, education, and political ideology groups are like this person. The highest score among education groups to be like this person are doctoral degree holders (88%) and the lowest score among elemental studies (39%).

7.7.1.2.2 Compliance with social norms

We asked the Egyptian participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong (M=2.43; SD= 0.766) (Table 63). We found that there are (17%) who are not like this person, (22.7%) who somewhat like this person, and (60.3%) who are like this person. We noticed more females (63.5%) than males (57.3%) who are like this person. Also, there are more males (21.1%) than females (13.1%) not being like this person. We observed close percentages between males (22%) and females (23%) being somewhat like this person. Most age categories are like this person with the highest among 35 years (70%) and the lowest among 25-29 years (58.4%). Similarly, most elemental studies (n=18) (38.9%) are not like this person, unlike the other education segments that are like this person. In addition, (71%) of the right, (55%) of the center, and (60%) of the left are like this person. On the contrary, more left (21.6%) than the center (17%) and the right (14%) are not like this person. Moreover, the center (28%) shone both the left (19%) and the right (15%) in terms of being somewhat like this person.

7.7.1.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable conformity value

We created a composite variable of conformity items in Egypt. Therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.630) (M=2.49; SD= 0.744). The results of the data analysis of the Egyptian case showed (15.1%) with a low conformity level, (20.4%) have moderate conformity, and (64.4%) have a high conformity level (Table 63). Most of the females (70.3%) more than males (59%) have a high conformity level. Yet, there are more males (22.5%) than females (18%) with a moderate conformity level. Also, more males (18.8%) than females (11.7%) have a low conformity level.

The majority of age categories have high conformity levels, with 35 years achieving the highest score (75%) and 18-24 years having the lowest score (62.9%). Similar findings among different education segments with most of them having high conformity levels. It is worth noting that doctoral degree holders have the highest score (100%) followed by master's degrees (71.4%). While high school (40%) has the least score in terms of having high conformity levels. Many right-wing participants (74.2%) followed by the center (61.2%) and the left (59.1%) have high conformity levels. In contrast, the center (22.3%) overtopped the left (21.6%) and the right (16.1%) had a moderate conformity level. Further, there is (19.3%) left, (16.5%) center, and (9.7%) right with low conformity levels.

As for news consumers on Facebook, we found that most light (54%), medium (70%), and heavy news consumers (74%) have high conformity. Similar findings were obtained among heavy, medium, and light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages who have high conformity levels. Further, we noticed that high threat perception level participants have the highest conformity level (74%) compared to moderate (63%) and low threat perception (59%).

7.7.1.3 Measuring the human portrait value tradition

7.7.1.3.1 Satisfaction state

We asked the Egyptian participants to express their attitude towards the following: he thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that people should be satisfied with what they have (M=2.31; SD= 0.816). There is a (22.5%) who are not like this person, (23.9%) who

are somewhat like this person, and (53.7%) like this person (Table 63). We noticed a significant difference points between females (60.4%) and males (47%) who are like this person. In addition, more males (26.3%) than females (18.5%) are not like this person; and more males (26.8%) than females (21.2%) are somewhat like this person. The majority of all age, education, and political ideology groups are like this person. On this, there are more right participants (65.3%) than the left (50.9%) and the center (44.3%) who are like this person. On the other side, there are more left (38.6%) than the center (21%) and the right (13.7%) not being like this person; further, the center (28.1%) transcended the right (21%) and the left (17%) being somewhat like this person.

7.7.1.3.2 Abidance by the rules

We asked the Egyptian respondents to express their attitude towards the following: religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires (M=2.67; SD= 0.616). There are (7.8%) are not like this person, (17.9%) somewhat like this person, and (74.3%) are like this person (Table 63). There are more females (77.5%) than males (79.9%) who are like this person, whereas males (20.2%) outdid females (15.8%) being somewhat like this person. A very close percentage was detected between males (8.9%) and females (6.8%) who are not like this person. In addition, the majority of age, education, and political ideology groups are like this person. Yet we noticed that doctoral degree holders have the highest percentage of being like this person (88%) and master's degrees had the least score (68%). Likewise, there are more right participants (83.9%) than the left (70.5%) and the center (70.5%) who are like this person. Also, the left (12.5%) exceeded the center (6.3%), and the right (7.3%) are not being like this person. The center (23.2%) overtopped the left (17%) and the right (8.9%) being somewhat like this person.

7.7.1.3.3 Analysis of the composite variable tradition value

We created a composite variable of traditional items, and we checked their reliability. The two items showed a moderate internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.599) (M=2.54; SD= 0.698). Our data analysis of the case of Egypt showed that there are (66.3%) high tradition level, (21.8%) moderate tradition levels, and (11.9%) low tradition levels (Table 63). More females (71.6%) than males (61%) have a high tradition level, whereas males (24.4%) surpassed females (18.9%) having moderate tradition levels. Also, we noticed more males (14.6%) than females (9.5%) with low traditional levels.

There are more right-wing participants (81%) than the center (64%) and the left (52.3%) to have high tradition levels. Data also showed that most light (59.1%), medium (70%), and heavy news consumers on Facebook (73%) have a high tradition level. Similarly, most heavy (74.5%), light (64.6%), and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (57.5%) have high traditional levels. It is worth mentioning that participants with high threat perception levels have the highest percentage in terms of holding high tradition levels (78%) followed by moderate threat perceptions (64%) and low threat perceptions (61%).

7.7.1.4 Analysis of the composite variable conservatism dimension

We created a composite variable of the three values security, conformity, and tradition (M= 2.26; SD= 0.733). The data analysis of the Egyptian case offers us the following results. There is a high conservatism level of (43.1%), moderate conservatism of (39.7%), and a low conservatism level of (17.2%) (Table 63). Even though most males and females have high conservatism levels, we noticed more females (49.1%) than males (37.1%). On the other side, more males (41.8%) than females (37.8%) have moderate conservatism levels. Also, males (21.1%) outdid females (13.1%) who have a low conservatism level.

Those aging 35 years obtained the highest score (50%) having a high conservatism level and the highest score with a low conservatism level (20%) compared to the other age groups. Most education segments have a high conservatism level except for the majority of elemental studies, which have a low conservatism level. We noticed that doctoral degree holders have the highest score of holding high conservatism (87.5%). Most of the right-wing (55%) compared to the center (40.2%) and the left (34.1%) have high conservatism levels. There is more center (42%) and left (39.8%) with a moderate conservatism level than the right (35.5%).

Furthermore, most light news consumers on Facebook have a moderate conservatism level, unlike the majority of medium and heavy news consumers who have high conservatism levels.

In the same context, most light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have a moderate conservatism level, while the majority of heavy and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have high conservatism levels. As for threat perception levels, we noticed that (60%) of those who have high threat perception levels, and (42%) with moderate threat perception levels, have high conservatism levels. While the majority of those who have low threat perception levels (44.8%) have a moderate threat perception.

7.7.1.5 Testing Hypothesis 3

H3: There is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and resistance to change.

Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in Egypt is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test to find correlation and ordinal regression to identify the effect on the dependent variable. We used the newly created variables of resistance to change (tradition, security, and conformity) and threat perception to run the correlation coefficient test. We started by running the Spearman's rho correlation coefficient one-tailed test between threat perception and each of the following security, conformity, and tradition. We found a minimum positive correlation between the level of threat perception and security level rho= 0.184, p< 0.001; conformity rho=0.132, p< 0.001; and traditional level rho=0.125, p<0.001 (Table 84). By running a correlation between the composite variables of the three values and threat perception, we found a minimum positive correlation between resistance to change and threat level rho=0.193, p<0.001. This result means that the more Egyptian youths have threat perception, the more they will be resistant to change (Table 84). In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association and support our alternate hypothesis.

To obtain a deeper analysis we examined the correlation between resistance to change and the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. Results indicated a significant positive correlation between the frequency of news consumption on such pages and the level of resistance to change rho=0.231, p<0.001. In other words, the more Egyptian youths consume news on influencers' Facebook pages, the greater they will be resistant to change. Besides, we conducted Spearman's test for correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and several conservatism items. Statistical data showed a positive correlation between the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and giving up some civil liberty rights to maintain national security rho=0.262, p< 0.001; security value rho=0.188, p<0.001; and conformity rho=0.207, p<0.001.

Furthermore, we used the ANOVA test for a variance to check if there is any statistical difference between the means of the three political ideology wings. Thus, a one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of political ideology on conservatism level in left-wing, center-wing, and right-wing conditions. There was a significant effect of the amount of political ideology on the conservatism level remembered at the p<.05 level for the three conditions [F (2, 433) = 7.397, p = 0.001].

Table 84. Spearman's test of correlation test between security, conformity, tradition, conservatism, and threat perception - Egypt

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Security value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.184**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
Conformity value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.132**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.003
	N	436
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.125**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.004
	N	436
Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.193**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = Egypt

Even though we found a positive correlation between the perceived threat and resistance to change, we conducted ordinal regression to understand better the independent variable's impact on the dependent variable. We used ordinal regression analysis to examine the relationship between threat perception and resistance to change. We aim at measuring the effect of the perception of threat on resistance to change. Therefore, we started by measuring the impact of our independent variable on the dependent variable, which is resistance to change. We found the model significant where the predictor variable, level of perceived threat, improve the model because of a variation decrease from 48.882 to 31.852 X2 (1) = 17.030, $p < 0.001$. In addition to the significance of the model result, the goodness of fit is insignificant Pearson X2 (3) = 1.890, P= 0.596. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the observed data is consistent with the fitted model.

In addition, the parameter estimates of threat perception had a positive effect B= 0.480, SE= (0.117), Wald= (16.773), $p < 0.001$. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.480) = 1.616, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.283, 2.035) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception. Accordingly, for every 1 unit increase in the threat level, there is a predicted increase of 1.616 in the level of resistance to change. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable. Furthermore, all curves have the same slope -2LL of parallel lines X2 (1) = 0.974, p-value 0.324.

Hence, accepting the null hypothesis of proportional odds assumption that the odds ratios across all categories are the same.

For a thorough understanding relevant to the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable, we used the ordinal logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship between news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception, as well as resistance to change. The predictor variables of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, as well as threat perception in the ordinal regression analysis, was found to contribute to the model. Based on the ordinal regression results, the explanatory variable X improves the model because of a variation decrease from 214.251 to 177.044, X2 (3) = 37.207, $p < 0.001$. This finding suggests that there is a significant difference between the baseline model to the final model. Besides the significance of the model result, the goodness of fit was insignificant Pearson X2 (49) = 51.143, P= 0.390. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the observed data is consistent with the fitted model. We found the parameter estimates of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, as well as threat insignificant $p>0.05$. Therefore, we do not support the causality among the dependent and independent variables.

7.7.1.5.1 Retesting the hypothesis on some participants

We excluded all the right-wing participants and re-conducted the correlation test to check if there is a correlation between resistance to change (conservatism) and threat perception among the left and the center participants. Our analysis showed a minimum positive correlation rho=0.131, $p<0.01$ (Table 85). We also retested our variables by excluding all the participants who do not follow news pages on Facebook (n=373). We found a minimum positive correlation between threat perception and resistance to change among those who follow news pages on Facebook rho=0.183, $p<0.001$. Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between threat perception and each of the following: security rho=0.184, $p<0.001$, conformity rho=0.143, $p< 0.003$, and tradition rho=0.126, $p< 0.008$ (Table 86).

Table 85. Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception and resistance to change among left and center participants - Egypt

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Security value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.179**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.001
	N	312

Conformity value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	0.070
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.109
	N	312
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	0.069
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.114
	N	312
Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.131*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.010
	N	312

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = Egypt

Table 86. Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception and resistance to change among those who follow Facebook news pages - Egypt

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Security value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.184**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	373
Conformity value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.143**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.003
	N	373
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.126**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.008
	N	373
Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.183**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	373

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = Egypt

7.7.2 Measuring self enhancement as the core dimension of inequality preference

7.7.2.1 Measuring the human portrait value power

7.7.2.1.1 Giving orders

In the following section we will present the analyzed data of the Egyptian case. We asked the Egyptian participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him to be in

charge and tell others what to do. He wants people to do what he says (M=2.11; SD= 0.848). The collected data in Egypt showed that there are (31%) who are not like this person, (27.1%) are somewhat like this person, and (42%) are like this person (Table 67). Females outweighed males in terms of being like this person, with 5.2% difference points. They also excelled males with 5.3% in terms of being somewhat like this person. On the other side, we found more males (36.2%) than females (25.7%) who are not like this person. As for the age distribution, we found that most age groups are like this person, yet those aged 35 years varied between being like this person and somewhat like this person with (40%). As for education, we noticed that many undergraduate students diversified between somewhat like this person and like this person with (31,4%). In contrast, elemental studies varied between being like this person and not like this person with (38.9%). Most of the education categories reported being like this person. Similarly, the majority of right-side participants (64.5%) are like this person. Most of the left (38.6%) are not like this person, while the majority of the center varied between like and not like this person, with (35.3%).

7.7.2.1.2 Being wealthy

We asked the Egyptian respondents to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things (M=2.26; SD= 0.813). There is (23.4%) are not like this person, (27.5%) are somewhat like this person, and (49.1%) are like this person (Table 67). Most males (45.5%) and females (52.3%) are like this person. We noticed more males (26.8%) than females (20.3%) who are not like this person. Moreover, there is a very slight difference between males (27.7%) and females (27.5%) who are somewhat like this person. Similarly, most age and education groups are like this person. Except for elemental studies who are somewhat like this person. Consequently, there is (52.4%) who are like this person with the highest score among doctoral degree holders (62.5%) and the least score among elemental studies (33.3%). Likewise, most left (40.9%), center (45.5%), and right (61.3%) are like this person.

7.7.2.1.3 Analysis of the composite variable power value

We created a composite variable of power items through the collected data of Egypt. Therefore, we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.670) (M= 2.22; SD= 0.841). Based on the obtained results in the Egyptian case we found that there are (26.8%) with a low power level, (24.8%) have moderate power, and (48.4%) have a high-power

level (Table 67). Most males (45.1%) and females (51.8%) have high power levels. We noticed more males (31.5%) than females (22.5%) with low power levels. There are relatively close percentages between males (23.5%) and females (25.7%) who have a moderate power level. Likewise, the majority of age groups have a high-power level. Unlike most education categories that have high power, many participants with elemental studies have moderate power levels. In addition, (28.6%) of the left-wing has a low power level whereas most of the center (43.3%) and the right (66.1%) have a high-power level.

Furthermore, most light news consumers on Facebook (36.4%), medium (52.9%), and heavy (60.7%) have high power levels. Similarly, most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (64.2%) and medium (43.3%) have a high-power level. By contrast, most light has a low power level (40.3%). Additionally, we noticed that many participants with low (41.3%), moderate (44.5%), and high threat perception levels (65.1%) have high power levels.

7.7.2.2 Measuring the human portrait value achievement

7.7.2.2.1 Being successful

We asked the Egyptian youths to express their attitude towards the following: being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people (M=2.55; SD= 0.698). There are (11.9%) are not like this person, (20.9%) are somewhat like this person, and (67.2%) are like this person (Table 67). More females (70.3%) than males (64.3%) are like this person. Yet more males (21.6%) than females (20.3%) are somewhat like this person. We noticed that males (14.1%) excelled over females (9.5%) in terms of not being like this person. The majority of age, education, and political ideology participants are like this person.

7.7.2.2.2 Being impressive

We asked the Egyptian participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does (M=2.43; SD= 0.760). There is (16.5%) are not like this person, (23.6%) are somewhat like this person, and (59.9%) are like this person (Table 67). More females (64%) than males (55.9%) are like this person, though males (26.8%) transcended females (20.3%) in terms of being somewhat like this person. We also found more males (17.4%) than females (15.8%) who are not like this person. As for the age and

education groups reported being like this person. Likewise, most of the left (60%), center (54%), and right-wing participants (71%) are like this person.

7.7.2.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable achievement value

We created a composite variable of achievement items, and we checked their reliability. The two items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.781). It is worth noting that these items showed a moderate inter-item correlation r= 0.518 (M= 2.55; SD= 0.734). Our data analysis of the Egyptian case showed that there are (14.4%) low achievement levels, (16.5%) moderate achievement levels, and (69%) high achievement levels (Table 67). Females (73%) more than males (65.3%) have higher achievement levels. Yet more males (15%) than females (13.5%) have low achievement levels. Additionally, males (19.7%) excelled over females (13.5%) in terms of having a moderate achievement level. Most political ideologies, age, and education categories have high achievement levels with doctoral degrees followed by high school and master's degrees having the highest percentages of high achievement levels. Furthermore, the right and the left wings achieved the highest scores of having high achievement levels with (71.8%) and (71.6%).

As for news consumers on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, we noticed that most of them have high achievement levels. However, the highest score with high achievement levels was found among heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (83.6%). In like manner, most of those with a high level of threat perceptions have a high achievement level (78.9%) followed by moderate threat perception participants (68.4%) and low threat perception levels (63.4%).

7.7.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable self-enhancement dimension

We measured inequality preference through self-enhancement. Thus, we created a composite score of self-enhancement by adding the values of power and achievement (M= 2.16; SD= 0.745). The data analysis of the Egyptian case demonstrated that there are (20.9%) with low self-enhancement levels, (42%) with moderate self-enhancement levels, and (37.2%) with high self-enhancement levels (Table 67). We noticed some differences across sex, whereas most of the females (43.2%) have high self-enhancement levels, unlike most males (46%) who have moderate self-enhancement. Both have close percentages of low self-enhancement, with more males (23%) than females (18.5%).

Moreover, most 18-24 years (48.3%), 30-34 years (42%), and 35 years (60%) have moderate self-enhancement levels, whereas most 25-29 years (43.5%) have high self-enhancement levels. In like manner, most bachelor's (40.2%), master's (46.4%), and doctoral degree holders (75%) have high self-enhancement. On the other hand, most elemental studies (55.6%) and undergraduate students (52.3%) have a moderate self-enhancement. High school degrees varied between high and moderate with (40%) in each. Regarding political ideology, we observed that most of the right participants (53.2%) have high self-enhancement levels, whereas the majority of the left (48.9%) and the center (44.6%) have a moderate self-enhancement. Also, more than (50%) of heavy news consumers on Facebook have high self-enhancement compared to light (23.9%) and medium news consumers on Facebook (42%). Further, there are more light news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (47.7%) than medium (39.9%) and heavy (36.1%) who have moderate self-enhancement. Similarly, light (28.4%), medium (18.1%), and heavy (13.1%) have low self-enhancement levels.

In addition, heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (55.2%) excelled over light (22.2%) and medium (30.7%) in terms of having high self-enhancement. At the same time, most of the light (43.8%) and medium news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (50.4%) have moderate self-enhancement levels; heavy news consumers also represented (33.9%). Furthermore, light (34%), medium (18.9%), and heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages (10.9%) have low self-enhancement levels. In the same context, we noticed that (60%) of those with high threat perception have high self-enhancement levels, compared to (29.7%) with low threat perception and (29.7%) with moderate threat perception. On the contrary, many participants with low threat perception (41.3%) and moderate (52.9%) have moderate self-enhancement compared to (27.5%) of the participants with high threat perception.

7.7.2.4 Testing Hypothesis 4

H4: There is a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and inequality preference.

Based on the abovementioned results, the collected data in Egypt is asymmetrical. Thus, we used Spearman's test to find correlation and ordinal regression to identify the effect on the dependent variable. We used the newly created variables of self-enhancement (power and achievement) and threat perception to run the correlation coefficient test. We started by running Spearman's rho correlation coefficient one-tailed test between threat perception with power and self-enhancement. We found a significant positive correlation between the level of threat perception and the power level $rho = 0.193$, $p < 0.001$. Also, there is a positive correlation between threat level and achievement

rho=0.140, p< 0.002 (Table 87). Our analysis also showed a significant positive correlation between self-enhancement and threat level rho=0.232, p<0.001. This finding means the more Egyptian youths have threat perception, the more self-enhancement they have, thus high inequality preference (Table 87). In this sense, we reject the null hypothesis of no association and accept the alternate hypothesis. This finding means that increased threat perception correlates positively with self-enhancement -which we used to measure inequality preference.

To gain a deeper understanding of our dependent variable, we analyzed the correlation between self-enhancement and the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. We found a positive correlation between both the level of self-enhancement and the frequency of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages rho=0.319, p<0.001.

Furthermore, we used the ANOVA test for a variance to check if there is any statistical difference between the means of the three political ideology wings. Thus, a one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of political ideology on self-enhancement levels in left-wing, center-wing, and right-wing conditions. There was a significant effect of the amount of political ideology on self-enhancement remembered at the p<.05 level for the three conditions [F (2, 433) = 8.141, p = 0.001].

Table 87. Spearman's test of correlation test between self enhancement and threat perception - Egypt

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Power scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.193**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436
Achievement - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.140**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.002
	N	436
Inequality preference - measured through self-enhancement (power - achievement	Correlation Coefficient	.232**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	436

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

a. Where do you live? = Egypt

Even though we found a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and self-enhancement, we conducted ordinal regression to understand better the independent variable's impact on the dependent variable. We used ordinal regression analysis to examine the relationship between threat perception and self-enhancement. We aim at measuring the effect of threat

perception on self-enhancement. Therefore, we started by measuring the impact of our independent variable on the dependent variable, which is self-enhancement. We found the model significant where the predictor variable, level of perceived threat, improved the model because of variation decrease from 67.892 to 41.769 X2 (1) = 26.133, $p < 0.001$.

Further, the parameter estimates of threat perception had a positive effect B= 0.600, SE= (0.118), Wald= (26.095), $p < 0.001$. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.600) = 1.823, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.443 2.303) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception. Accordingly, for every 1 unit increase in the threat level, there is a predicted increase of 1.823 in the level of self-enhancement. Thus, there is strong evidence of an association between the independent variable with the dependent variable. Furthermore, all curves have the same slope -2LL of parallel lines X2 (1) = 0.060, p-value 0.806. Hence, accepting the null hypothesis of proportional odds assumption that the odds ratios across all categories are the same.

To gain a deeper understanding of the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable, we used ordinal logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship between following influencers' Facebook pages, news consumption, threat perception, and self-enhancement. The predictor variables of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, as well as threat perception in the ordinal regression analysis, was found to contribute to the model. Based on the ordinal regression results, the explanatory variable X improves the model because of a variation decrease from 252.074 to 193.798, X2 (3) = 58.277, $p< 0.001$. These figures suggest that there is a significant difference between the baseline model to the final model.

However, we found the parameter estimates of news consumption on Facebook insignificant at p=0.279. On the contrary, the estimate of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages was found significant and had a positive effect B= 0.572, SE= (0.137), Wald= (17.317), $p <0.001$. Likewise, the estimate of threat perception level was found significant and had a positive effect B= 0.379, SE= (0.125), Wald= (9.277), $p <0.002$. Consequently, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.572) = 1.771, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.358, 2.310) for every unit increase of the independent variable -news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. In other words, for every 1 unit increase in consuming news on influencers on Facebook, there is an expected increase of 1.771 in the level of self-enhancement. Similarly, the estimated odds ratio favored a positive relationship of nearly exp (0.379) = 1.461, (95%) Wald CI for Exp (B) (1.141, 1.872) for every unit increase of the independent variable -threat perception. Consequently, for every 1 unit increase in threat perception, there is an expected increase of 1.461 in the level of self-

enhancement. Furthermore, all curves have the same slope -2LL of parallel lines X2 (3) = 0.564, p-value 0.905. Hence, accepting the null hypothesis of proportional odds assumption that the odds ratios across all categories are the same.

7.7.2.4.1 Retesting the hypothesis on some participants

Based on the literature review, most of the right-side participants have a high conservatism level. Thus, we excluded the right-wing participants to examine the correlation between threat level and conservatism in its two core values (inequality preference and conservatism) among the left and the center participants (n=312). We found a positive correlation between threat perception and resistance to change rho=0.131, p<0.010. Likewise, there is a positive correlation between self-enhancement and threat perception rho=0.144, p<0.005 (Table 88) (Table 89). Furthermore, we excluded all the Egyptian youths who do not follow any of the news pages on Facebook to examine the correlation between threat perception and self-enhancement among those who follow news pages on Facebook. We found a positive correlation rho=0.233, p<0.001. More precisely, there is a positive correlation between threat perception and each of the following: power rho=0.201, p<0.001 and achievement rho=0.110, p<0.017 (Table 90).

Table 88. Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception and inequality preference among the left and center wings - Egypt

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Power scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.097*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.044
	N	312
Achievement - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.105*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.032
	N	312
Inequality preference - measured through self-enhancement (power - achievement	Correlation Coefficient	.144**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.005
	N	312

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = Egypt

Table 89. Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception and resistance to change among the left and center wings - Egypt

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Security value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.179**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.001
	N	312
Conformity value - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	0.070
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.109
	N	312
Tradition scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	0.069
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.114
	N	312
Resistance to change - measured through conservatism (conformity, tradition, security)	Correlation Coefficient	.131*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.010
	N	312

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = Egypt

Table 90. Spearman's test of correlation between threat perception and inequality preference among those who follow Facebook news pages - Egypt

Item	Spearman's rho	Composite variable - Threat level
Power scale - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.201**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	373
Achievement - Composite variable	Correlation Coefficient	.110*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.017
	N	373
Inequality preference - measured through self-enhancement (power - achievement	Correlation Coefficient	.233**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000
	N	373

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
a. Where do you live? = Egypt

7.8 Measuring openness to change and self-transcendence dimensions

This question measures the other human core values of the PVQ, which have two dimensions: openness to change and examines the values of self-direction and stimulation. The second is self-transcendence which measures benevolence and universalism of human core values. Moreover,

hedonism shares elements of both openness and self-enhancement. We added only one item to measure each of these values due to the length limitation of the questionnaire. Thus, we have five items in this question. We asked participants to read each description and think about how much each person is like or not like him.

7.8.1 Measuring openness to change dimension

We measured this dimension through three items which are: it is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free to plan and to choose his activities for himself; he looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life; he seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure

7.8.1.1 Measuring the human portrait value self-direction

We asked the participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free to plan and to choose his activities for himself (M=2.70; SD= 0.594). There are (7.1%) not like this person, (16%) somewhat like this person, and (76.9%) like this person (Table 91). We did not observe significant differences across sex where most of the males (74%) and females (79.7%) are like this person. Likewise, most age, education, and political ideology groups reported being like this person, with the highest score across age among 35 years (81%) and the least score among 30-34 years (75.2%). Also, the highest score across different education groups was among doctoral degrees (91%) and the least among the uneducated (53.3%). Additionally, the right-wing participants (85%) scored higher than the left (76%) and the center (73%) in terms of being like this person.

7.8.1.2 Measuring the human portrait value stimulation

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: he looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life (M=2.34; SD= 0.779). There is (19.1%) not like this person, (28%) somewhat like this person, and (52.9%) like this person (Table 91).
We noticed more females (54.1%) than males (51.9%) in terms of being like this person. Also, more females (20.5%) than males (17.8%) who are not being like this person. Yet, there are more males

(30.3%) than females (25.5%) who are somewhat like this person. There were minimal differences across age categories, with most of them being like this person and the highest among 25-29 years (58.2%) while the lowest is 30-34 years (49.3%).

Furthermore, the majority of the uneducated (43.3%) are somewhat like this person. Also, the associate degrees had equal scores between somewhat like this person (43%) and like this person (43%). Most other education groups reported being like this person, with the highest among doctoral degrees (80%) and the lowest among the uneducated (26.7%). In addition, most of the left (48.3%) and the center wings (47.2%) are like this person, with the right achieving the highest score (67.7%). There are more center (31.7%) than the left (29.3%) and the right (20.2%) being somewhat like this person. Also, the left (22.4%) overtopped the center (21.1%) and the right (12.1%) of not being like this person.

7.8.1.3 Measuring the human portrait value hedonism

We asked respondents to express their attitude towards the following: he seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure (M=2.60; SD= 0.626). There are (7.6%) not like this person, (24.4%) somewhat like this person, and (68%) like this person (Table 91). More females (71%) than males (65%) are like this person. However, more males than females are not like this person or somewhat like this person with minimal difference. We did not notice significant differences across age, education, and political ideology groups, where most of them reported being like this person. Thus, the highest score among age groups is 25-29 years (68.5%) and the least among 35 years (65.5%). Likewise, the doctoral degrees (86.2%) had the top score, and the uneducated (43.3%) had the least score of being like this person. Similarly, there are more right participants (76.9%) than the left (66.7%) and the center (63.5%) who are like this person.

7.8.1.4 Analysis of the composite variable openness to change dimension

We created a composite variable of openness to change items and added hedonism as it shares common elements with both dimensions (openness to change and self-transcendence). We checked their reliability. The three items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.757). We divided the respondents into three categories not open, somehow open, and open to change (M=2.67; SD= 0.659). The data analysis showed that there is (10.5%) not open, (12.4%) somehow open, and (77.1%) open to change (Table 91). There are more females are open to change (79.1%) than males

(74.9%), yet more males (14.7%) than females (10.2%) who are somehow open to change. Likewise, most age, education, and political ideology groups are open to change. In this regard, 25-29 years (80.7%) were the most open and 18-24 years (73.8%) had the least score of being open to change. Similarly, the highest score of being open to change among education groups is among doctoral degrees (92.3%) and the least score is the uneducated (53.3%). Likewise, there are more right participants (85.9%) than the left (74.7%) and the center (73.4%) who are open to change. As for the news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception level, resistance to change, and self-enhancement. We found that the majority of all these categories are open to change. We found the highest scores among heavy news consumers on Facebook (87%) and on influencers' Facebook pages (90.9%), participants with high threat perception (87%), high resistance to change (92%), and high self-enhancement (94.4%).

7.8.2 Measuring self-transcendence dimension

We measured this dimension through the following items: it's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for other people; it's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for other people.

7.8.2.1 Measuring the human portrait value benevolence

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: it's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for other people (M=2.66; SD= 0.618). There is (7.8%) not like this person, (18.8%) somewhat like this person, and (73.4%) like this person. We noticed more females (75.8%) than males (70.9%) who are like this person (Table 91). The majority of age, education, and political ideology segments are like this person. The highest score across age was among 18-24 years (77%) and the lowest among 35 years (70%) being like this person. Also, doctoral degrees (86%) had the highest and the uneducated (46.7%) had the least score in terms of being like this person. Additionally, there are more right participants (80%) than the left (75.2%) and the center (69%) who are like this person.

7.8.2.2 Measuring the human portrait value universalism

We asked participants to express their attitude towards the following: he thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He wants justice for everybody, even for people he doesn't know (M=2.69; SD= 0.607). There is (7.6%) not like this person, (16.2%) somewhat like this person, and (76.2%) like this person (Table 91). Most males (73%) and females (80%) are like this person. We did not notice significant differences across age, education, and political ideology where most of them are like this person. The highest score of being like this person among age categories is 35 years (81%) and the least is 25-29 years (74.5%); further, the doctoral degree had the highest (91%) and the uneducated had the least score (47%). Also, there are more right participants (80.1%) followed by the left (77.9%) and the center (72.7%) who are like this person.

7.8.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable self-transcendence dimension

We created a composite score of self-transcendence items, and we added hedonism as it shares common elements with both dimensions (openness to change and self-transcendence). We checked their reliability; three items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.796). We divided the respondents into three categories: low, moderate, and high self-transcendence; the scale (M=2.75; SD= 0.582). We found that (7.6%) have low self-transcendence, (9.5%) moderate, and (82.9%) have a high self-transcendence level (Table 91).

The majority of the sample regardless of their sex, age, education, and political ideology categories have high self-transcendence. Yet, there are more females (86%) than males (80%). Both 18-24 years (84.1%) and 35 years (84.1%) have the highest self-transcendence levels. Likewise, the doctoral degrees (94%) and the right participants (87%) have the highest scores of holding high self-transcendence levels.

In the same context, most of the newly created composite variables of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception level, resistance to change, and self-enhancement categories have high self-transcendence. The highest scores were among heavy news consumers on Facebook (92.1%) and influencers' Facebook pages (92.1%), participants with high threat perception (88.7%), high resistance to change (94.4%), and high self-enhancement (94.4%).

Table 91. Self-transcendence and openness to change dimensions

Item	Response	Spain		Egypt		USA		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free to plan and to choose his activities for himself.	Not like me	23	5.3%	31	7.1%	39	8.9%	93	7.1%
	Somewhat like me	68	15.6%	58	13.3%	83	19.0%	209	16.0%
	Like me	346	79.2%	347	79.6%	314	72.0%	1007	76.9%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life.	Not like me	95	21.7%	78	17.9%	77	17.7%	250	19.1%
	Somewhat like me	144	33.0%	95	21.8%	127	29.1%	366	28.0%
	Like me	198	45.3%	263	60.3%	232	53.2%	693	52.9%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
it's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for other people.	Not like me	28	6.4%	33	7.6%	41	9.4%	102	7.8%
	Somewhat like me	84	19.2%	72	16.5%	90	20.6%	246	18.8%
	Like me	325	74.4%	331	75.9%	305	70.0%	961	73.4%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He wants justice for everybody. even for people he doesn’t know.	Not like me	19	4.3%	31	7.1%	50	11.5%	100	7.6%
	Somewhat like me	73	16.7%	61	14.0%	78	17.9%	212	16.2%
	Like me	345	78.9%	344	78.9%	308	70.6%	997	76.2%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure.	Not like me	32	7.3%	24	5.5%	44	10.1%	100	7.6%
	Somewhat like me	124	28.4%	76	17.4%	119	27.3%	319	24.4%
	Like me	281	64.3%	336	77.1%	273	62.6%	890	68.0%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Openness to change - Composite variable	Not open to change	42	9.6%	41	9.4%	55	12.6%	138	10.5%
	Somehow open to change	62	14.2%	37	8.5%	63	14.4%	162	12.4%
	Open to change	333	76.2%	358	82.1%	318	72.9%	1009	77.1%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%
Self-transcendence - Composite variable	Low self-transcendence	27	6.2%	26	6.0%	47	10.8%	100	7.6%

	Moderate self-transcendence	39	8.9%	35	8.0%	50	11.5%	124	9.5%
	High self-transcendence	371	84.9%	375	86.0%	339	77.8%	1085	82.9%
Total		437	100.0%	436	100.0%	436	100.0%	1309	100.0%

7.8.3 Measuring openness to change and self-transcendence dimensions: USA

7.8.3.1 Measuring openness to change dimension

7.8.3.1.1 Measuring the human portrait value self-direction

In the following section we will present the analyzed data of the USA case. We asked the American participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free to plan and to choose his activities for himself (M=2.63; SD= 0.642). Data showed that there is (8.9%) not like this person, (19%) somewhat like this person, and (72%) like this person (Table 91). Most males (70%) and females (76%) are like this person. Likewise, the majority of age, education, and political ideology groups reported being like this, with the highest among 35 years (74.4%) and the lowest score among 30-34 years (70.5%). Also, the highest score among doctoral degrees (93%) and the least among the uneducated (53.6%). Additionally, the right participants (84%) scored higher than the left (68%) and the center (65.1%) being like this person.

7.8.3.1.2 Measuring the human portrait value stimulation

We asked the American youths to express their attitude towards the following: he looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life (M=2.36; SD= 0.764). Our data analysis showed that there are (17.7%) not like this person, (29.1%) somewhat like this person, and (53.2%) like this person (Table 91). There are more females (56.3%) than males (51.3%) being like this person. Also, more females (19.8%) than males (16.4%) who are not like this person. Yet, more males (32.3%) than females (24%) are somewhat like this person. Most age groups are like this, with the highest among 18-24 years (59%) and the lowest among 30-34 years (48%). We found that the majority of the uneducated (42.9%) are somewhat like this person. While the other education groups reported being like this, with the highest among doctoral degrees (88.4%) and the lowest

among the uneducated (28.6%). In addition, most of the left (41.9%) and the center (45%) are like this person with the right achieving the highest score (72.7%). We also found more center-wing participants (34.9%) than the left (33.1%) and the right (18.9%) in terms of being somewhat like this person. The left (25%) overtopped the center (20.1%) and the right (8.4%) is not like this person.

7.8.3.1.3 Measuring the human portrait value hedonism

We asked the American participants to express their attitude towards the following: he seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure (M=2.53; SD= 0.672). There is (10.1%) not like this person, (27.3%) somewhat like this person, and (62.6%) like this person (Table 91). More females (65%) than males (61%) are like this person. Also, females (28.7%) outweighed males (26.4%) being somewhat like this person. However, more males (12.3%) than females (6.6%) are not like this person. Furthermore, 30-34 years (64.2%) had the highest and 35 years (58.1%) had the least scores of being like this person. Similarly, most education groups are like this person, except the majority of the uneducated who are somewhat like this person (43%). It is worth noting that the highest score among education segments is doctoral degree holders (88.4%) and the least among the uneducated (39.3%). Similarly, there are more right participants (74.1%) than the left (61.3%) and the center (53.8%) who are like this person.

7.8.3.1.4 Analysis of the composite variable openness to change dimension

We created a composite score of openness to change items to measure this dimension among the American participants, and we added hedonism as it shares common elements with both dimensions (openness to change and self-transcendence). We checked their reliability. The three items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.804). We divided the American respondents into three categories not open, somehow open, and open to change (M=2.60; SD= 0.702). The analysis of the data in the case of the USA offers us the following results. There is (12.6%) not open, (14.4%) somehow open, and (72.9%) open to change (Table 91). There are more open to change among females (75%) than males (72%), yet more males (16.4%) than females (11.4%) who are somehow open to change. Likewise, the majority of age, education, and political ideology groups are open to change. In this regard, the highest score of being open to change is 25-29 years (75.5%) and doctoral degrees (93%); while the lowest scores among 35 years (67.4%) and the uneducated (53.6%). Likewise, there are more right participants (83.9%) than the left (68.5%) and the center (66.9%)

who are open to change. The majority of participants with different levels of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception level, resistance to change, and self-enhancement, are open to change. The highest scores were among heavy news consumers on Facebook (89.2%) and influencers' Facebook pages (90.3%), high threat perception (89%), high resistance to change (95%), and high self-enhancement (96.2%).

7.8.3.2 Measuring self-transcendence dimension

7.8.3.2.1 Measuring the human portrait value benevolence

In the following section we will present the analyzed data of the USA case. We asked the American youths to express their attitude towards the following: it's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for other people (M=2.61; SD= 0.654). The data analysis revealed that there is (9.4%) not like this person, (21%) somewhat like this person, and (70%) like this person. We noticed more females (74.9%) than males (66.9%) being like this person (Table 91). The majority of age, education, and political ideology groups are like this person. The highest scores of being like this person among 35 years (72.1%), doctoral degrees (86%), and right-wing participants (82.5%). On the other side, the lowest scores of being like this person among 30-34 years (68.8%), the uneducated (42.9%), the left (66.9%), and the center (61.5%).

7.8.3.2.2 Measuring the human portrait value universalism

We asked the American participants to express their attitude towards the following: he thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He wants justice for everybody, even for people he doesn't know (M=2.59; SD= 0.687). There is (11.5%) not like this person, (17.9%) somewhat like this person, and (70.6%) like this person (Table 91). Similarly, most males (67.7%) and females (75.4%) are like this person. We did not notice significant differences across age, education, and political ideology where the majority are like this person. The highest scores of being like this person among 35 years (76.7%), the doctoral degree holders (93%), and the right-wing participants (78.3%). While the least scores of being like this person are 18-24 years (64.6%) the uneducated (46.4%), the left (70.2%), and the center wings (64.5%).

7.8.3.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable self-transcendence dimension

We created a composite variable of self-transcendence items in the USA, and we added hedonism as it shares common elements with both dimensions (openness to change and self-transcendence). We checked their reliability and the three items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.820). We divided the American respondents into three categories: low, moderate, and high self-transcendence (M=2.67; SD= 0.662). The data analysis revealed that there are (10.8%) low self-transcendence, (11.5%) moderate, and (77.8%) high self-transcendence levels (Table 91). The majority of sex, age, education, and political ideology categories have high self-transcendence. Yet, there are more females (80.8%) than males (75.8%) with high self-transcendence. Also, 35 years (81.4%), doctoral degrees (93%), and the right participants (84.6%) represented the highest scores of having high self-transcendence levels. In like manner, most participants with different levels of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception level, resistance to change, and self-enhancement categories have high self-transcendence levels. The highest scores are heavy news consumers on Facebook (92.2%) and influencers' Facebook pages (91.1%), high threat perception (85.8%), high resistance to change (93.8%), and high self-enhancement (96.2%).

7.8.4 Measuring openness to change and self-transcendence dimensions: Spain

7.8.4.1 Measuring openness to change dimension

7.8.4.1.1 Measuring the human portrait value self-direction

In the following section we will present the analyzed data of the Spanish case. We asked the Spanish participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free to plan and to choose his activities for himself (M=2.74; SD= 0.547). Our data analysis showed (5.3%) not like this person, (15.6%) somewhat like this person, and (79.2%) are like this person levels (Table 91). Most of the males (77.4%) and females (80.1%) are like this person. Likewise, the majority of age, education, and political ideology groups are like this person, with the highest scores among 35 years (82%), doctoral degrees (85.7%), and the right participants (82.5%).

7.8.4.1.2 Measuring the human portrait value stimulation

We asked the Spanish youths to express their attitude towards the following: he looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life (M=2.24; SD= 0.785). Data demonstrated that there are (21.7%) not like this person, (33%) somewhat like this person, and (45.3%) are like this person (Table 91). More males (48.2%) than females (43.5%) are like this person. At the same time, we found more females (23.6%) than males (18.9%) are not like this person. Yet, there are almost equal percentages between males (32.9%) and females (32.8%) being somewhat like this person. Most of all age segments are like this person, with the highest among 35 years (46%) and the lowest score among 25-29 years (54.6%). Similarly, most of all the education groups are like this person, with the highest among doctoral degrees (64.3%) and the lowest score among the elemental studies (36.4%). In addition, most of the left (42.9%), the center (41.2%), and the right (60%) are like this person.

7.8.4.1.3 Measuring the human portrait value hedonism

We asked the Spanish participants to express their attitude towards the following: he seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure (M=2.57; SD= 0.626). There is (7.3%) not like this person, (28.4%) somewhat like this person, and (64.3%) are like this person (Table 91). More females (66.1%) than males (61%) are like this person. We did not notice a notable difference across age categories where the highest score among age groups is 25-29 years (65.5%) and the lowest score is 35 years (62%). Further, most education segments are like this person, with the highest score among doctoral degrees (71.4%) and the lowest score among undergraduate students (59.8%). Similarly, there are more right participants (71.3%) than the left (64.4%) and the center (61.3%) being like this person.

7.8.4.1.4 Analysis of the composite variable openness to change dimension

We created a composite score of openness to change items in Spain, and we added hedonism as it shares common elements with both dimensions (openness to change and self-transcendence). We checked their reliability. The three items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.761). We divided the Spanish respondents into three categories not open, somehow open, and open to change (M=2.67; SD= 0.645). The analysis of the Spanish case showed the following results. There

is (9.6%) not open, (14.2%) somehow open, and (76.2%) are open to change (Table 91). Females are more open to change (76.8%) than males (75%), yet more males (15.9%) than females (13.3%) are somehow open to change. Likewise, most of all, age, education, and political ideology segments are open to change. In this regard, the highest score being open to change across age categories is 25-29 years (83.2%) and the least score among 18-24 years (70.8%). Similarly, the highest score among education groups among doctoral degree holders (85.7%) and the lowest among elemental studies (66.7%). Likewise, there are more right participants (86.3%) than the left (74.2%) and the center (73.7%) who are open to change. As for participants with different levels of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception level, resistance to change, and self-enhancement. We found the majority of all these categories are open to change. The highest scores among heavy news consumers on Facebook (81%) and influencers' Facebook pages (86.3%), high threat perception (83.2%), high resistance to change (92.3%), and high self-enhancement (89.5%).

7.8.4.2 Measuring self-transcendence dimension

7.8.4.2.1 Measuring the human portrait value benevolence

In the following section we will present the analyzed data of the Spanish case. We found that there is (9.6%) not open, (14.2%) somehow open, and (76.2%) are open to change (Table 91). Females are more open to change (76.8%) than males (75%), yet more males (15.9%) than females (13.3%) are somehow open to change. Likewise, most of all, age, education, and political ideology segments are open to change. We asked the Spanish participants to express their attitude towards the following: it's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for other people (M=2.68; SD= 0.589). There is (6.4%) not like this person, (19.2%) somewhat like this person, and (74.4%) like this person. We noticed more females (76%) than males (71.3%) are like this person (Table 91). Most of all age, education, and political ideology segments are like this person; the highest age score is 18-24 years (81%) and the lowest is 35 years (62%). Also, the doctoral degrees (78.6%) had the highest and the elemental studies (63.6%) had the lowest scores, being like this person. Additionally, there are more right participants (75%) than the left (80.4%) and the center (69.1%) who are like this person.

7.8.4.2.2 Measuring the human portrait value universalism

We asked the Spanish respondents to express their attitude towards the following: he thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He wants justice for everybody, even for people he doesn't know (M=2.75; SD= 0.526). Our data indicated that there is (4.3%) not like this person, (16.7%) somewhat like this person, and (78.9%) like this person (Table 91). Similarly, most males (75.6%) and females (81.2%) are like this person. We did not notice significant differences across age, education, and political ideology where most of them are like this person. The highest score of being like this person across age categories is 25-29 years (82.4%) and the least is 18-24 years (77%); further, the doctoral degree holders had the highest score (78.6%), and the undergraduate students had the lowest score (75.7%). Also, there are more left (82.8%) followed by the right (77.5%) and the center (76.3%) who are like this person.

7.8.4.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable self-transcendence dimension

We created a composite variable of self-transcendence items from the collected data in Spain, and we added hedonism as it shares common elements with both dimensions (openness to change and self-transcendence). We checked their reliability, and the three items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.763). We divided the Spanish respondents into three categories: low, moderate, and high self-transcendence (M=2.79; SD=0.540). The analysis of the Spainsh case showed that there is (6.2%) low self-transcendence, (8.9%) moderate, and (84.9%) high self-transcendence levels (Table 91).

Most sex, age, education, and political ideology categories hold high self-transcendence levels. Yet, there are more females (87.1%) than males (81.1%) with high self-transcendence levels. 25-29 years represented the highest score of having high self-transcendence, with (88.2%). Likewise, the doctoral degrees (92.9%) and the left participants (87.7%) have the highest scores of high self-transcendences. Like openness to change, most participants with different levels of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception level, resistance to change, and self-enhancement categories, have high self-transcendence. With the highest scores among heavy news consumers on Facebook (92.2%) and influencers' Facebook pages (90.6%), high threat perception (89.4%), high resistance to change (94.2%), and high self-enhancement (93%).

7.8.5 Measuring openness to change and self-transcendence dimensions: Egypt

7.8.5.1 Measuring openness to change dimension

7.8.5.1.1 Measuring the human portrait value self-direction

In the following section we will present the analyzed data of the Egyptian case. We asked the Egyptian participants to express their attitude towards the following: it is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free to plan and to choose his activities for himself (M=2.72; SD= 0.585). The data revealed (7.1%) not like this person, (13.3%) somewhat like this person, and (79.6%) like this person (Table 91). Most males (77%) and females (82%) are like this person. Likewise, the majority of age, education, and political ideology groups are like this person, with the highest among 35 years (90%) and the least score among 18-24 years (78.3%). Also, the highest score across different education groups among master's degree holders (89.3%) and the least among the elemental studies (72.2%). Additionally, the right participants (87.9%) scored higher than the left (81.8%) and the center (74.1%) being like this person.

7.8.5.1.2 Measuring the human portrait value stimulation

We asked the Egyptian youths to express their attitude towards the following: he looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life (M=2.42; SD= 0.777). We found (17.9%) not like this person, (21.8%) somewhat like this person, and (60.3%) like this person (Table 91). There are more females (65.3%) than males (55.4%) who are like this person. Moreover, males (18.8%) excelled over females (17.1%) in terms of not being like this person. In the same context, 35 years (85%) achieved the highest, and 18-24 years (57.3%) had the least score of being like this person. Similarly, master's degree holders (64.3%) had the highest and high school (40%) the lowest. In addition, the majority of the left (67%), center (54%), and right (66.9%) are like this person.

7.8.5.1.3 Measuring the human portrait value of hedonism

We asked Egyptian youths to express their attitude towards the following: he seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure (M=2.72; SD= 0.561). We

noted that there are (5.5%) not like this person, (17.4%) somewhat like this person, and (77.1%) like this person (Table 91). More females (80.6%) than males (73.2%) are like this person. 35 years (90%), doctoral degrees (100%), and right participants (83.9%) achieved the highest score being like this person. In addition, 25-29 years (75.2%), elemental studies (72.2%), the left (78.4%), and center wings (72.8%) had the least score being like this person.

7.8.5.1.4 Analysis of the composite variable openness to change dimension

We created a composite score of openness to change items from the collected data in Egypt, and we added hedonism as it shares common elements with both dimensions (openness to change and self-transcendence). We checked their reliability. The three items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.791). We divided the Egyptian respondents into three categories: not open, somehow open, and open to change (M=2.73; SD= 0.622). On this, data showed (9.4%) not open, (8.5%) somehow open, and (82.1%) open to change (Table 91). There are more females open to change (85.1%) than males (78.9%). Yet more males (11.7%) than females (5.4%) are somehow open to change. Likewise, the majority of age, education, and political ideology segments are open to change. In this regard, the highest scores of being open to change are 35 years (90%), doctoral degrees (100%), master's degrees (89.3%), and right participants (87.9%). The least scores among those who are like this person are 18-24 years (76.2%), elemental studies (72.2%), the left (84.1%), and the center wings (78.1%). As for the news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception level, resistance to change, and self-enhancement, we found most of these categories are open to change. With the highest scores among heavy news consumers on Facebook (90.2%) and influencers' Facebook pages (95.2%), those with high threat perception (90.8%), high resistance to change (90.4%), and high self-enhancement (95.1%).

7.8.5.2 Measuring self-transcendence dimension

7.8.5.2.1 Measuring the human portrait value benevolence

In the following section we will present the analyzed data of the Egyptian case. We asked the Egyptian respondents to express their attitude towards the following: it's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for other people (M=2.68; SD= 0.607). We found (7.6%) not like this person, (16.5%) somewhat like this person, and (75.9%) like this person. We

noticed more females (76.1%) than males (75.6%) like this person (Table 91). The majority of age, education, and political ideology segments are like this person; the highest scores are 35 years (85%), doctoral degrees (100%), master's degrees (78.6%), and the right-wing participants (79%). Whereas the least scores among those who are like this person are 25-29 years (73.3%), high school (40%), bachelor's degrees (75%), the left (77.3%), and the center (73.7%).

7.8.5.2.2 Measuring the human portrait value universalism

We asked the Egyptian participants to express their attitude towards the following: he thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He wants justice for everybody, even for people he doesn't know (M=2.72; SD= 0.588). There is (7.1%) not like this person, (14%) somewhat like this person, and (78.9%) like this person (Table 91). Similarly, most males (77%) and females (80.6%) are like this person. We did not notice significant differences across age, education, and political ideology categories, with most of them, being like this person. The highest score of being like this person among age categories is 35 years (95%) and the lowest score among 25-29 years (75.2%); further, the doctoral (100%) and master's degree holders (85.7%) had the highest scores whereas the elemental studies (72.2%) had the lowest score being like this person. Also, there are more right participants (83.9%) than the left (79.5%) and the center (75.9%) being like this person.

7.8.5.2.3 Analysis of the composite variable self-transcendence dimension

We created a composite variable of self-transcendence items and added hedonism as it shares common elements with both dimensions (openness to change and self-transcendence) from the collected data in Egypt. We checked their reliability, and the three items showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.789). We divided the Egyptian respondents into three categories: low, moderate, and high self-transcendence (M= 2.80; SD= 0.529). The analysis of the collected data in Egypt showed (6%) low self-transcendence, (8%) moderate, and (86%) high self-transcendence levels (Table 91). The majority of sex, age, education, and political ideology categories have high self-transcendence levels. Yet, there are more females (88.7%) than males (83.1%) with high self-transcendence. 35 years represented the highest score with high self-transcendence levels, with (95%). Likewise, doctoral degrees (100%), master's degrees (85.7%), and right participants (89.5%) have the highest scores having high self-transcendence levels. In the

same context, the majority of participants regardless of their level of news consumption on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, threat perception, resistance to change, and self-enhancement, have high self-transcendence levels. On this, we found the highest scores among heavy news consumers on Facebook (91.8%) and influencers' Facebook pages (93.9%), participants with high threat perception (90.8%), high resistance to change (94.7%), and high self-enhancement (93.8%), have high self-transcendence level.

8 Discussion of the results

This thesis examines the impact of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and threat perceptions on triggering political conservatism during the pandemic of COVID-19. In the following chapter, we discuss our four main takeaways: First, the consumption of news on Facebook. Second, consumption of news through influencers' Facebook pages which are the pages of news agencies, newspapers, journalists, politicians, opinion leaders, etc. Third, threat perception and mean world syndrome as a result of news exposure to several news topics portrayals on influencers' Facebook pages during the pandemic of COVID-19. Lastly, political conservatism in its two dimensions resistance to change and inequality preference, as an outcome of threat perception. Our work, therefore, sheds light on the significant role of cultivation theory in the context of Facebook as an influential social media platform that has more than 2.89 billion monthly active users as of the second quarter of 2021 (Statista, 2021).

8.1 Facebook news consumption

Our results make several relevant as well as new contributions to prior findings on news exposure on Facebook. The data showed more than 60% of this study's participants encounter news posts while skipping their newsfeed on Facebook, with about 55% incidentally exposed to news through the shares of their network. These figures were almost the same across the American, Spanish, and Egyptian youths where the majority are exposed to news posts while scrolling through newsfeeds. This outcome reinforces the argument of some scholars that the widespread news on social media and other online platforms led to the emergence of incidental news exposure (Casero-Ripollés, 2018; Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018; Hermida, 2010; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). Moreover, people become accidentally exposed to news and information on different matters while browsing through their newsfeeds (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018; Hermida, 2010; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017).

In line with past work stressing some elements that could eliminate the probability of incidental news exposure, and reinforce the purposeful and active consumption of news, such as the presence and degree of a local, national, or international conflict, each country's political system, threats due to natural disasters, terrorism, health pandemics, etc. (Mitchelstein et al., 2020). Our original data

showed more than 60% of youths read the news posts they encounter on Facebook at least briefly and about 50% read the news posts in full detail. This result relates to several published research findings arguing that high incidental news exposure could lead to cognitive processing of this information through reading the news either partially (headlines) or in full to stay updated, leading to knowledge gain (Kümpel, 2020). Also, it highlights the importance of Facebook as a crucial news platform that connects users and provides billions of people unlimited access to information and news. In addition, it acts as a pathway to learning about current affairs and news, hence shaping the world's perception and reality (Boukes, 2019; Saldaña, McGregor & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015; Valenzuela, 2013; Gritckova, 2016).

Within this framework, we genuinely infer that incidental and purposive news exposure on Facebook can keep the audience informed of the ongoings. For instance, more than 73% of those who encounter news through the shares of their network read the headlines of this news. Also, about 65% of them read the full details of these news posts. Moreover, our original data revealed about 80% consume news purposively by following influential Facebook news sources to stay updated about current affairs. Around 70% of them read the headlines and 60% read the full details of news posts they encounter. Our results did not change across the three examined countries where most youths in Egypt, Spain, and the USA read the news posts on Facebook briefly and in detail. This outcome supports the findings of Sveningsson (2015), claiming that people can avoid the negative consequences of incidental exposure to social media by following reliable news sources such as conventional news from well-known and prestigious news organizations, trusted journalists, and opinion leaders

These novel results indicate that regardless of different media systems and political environments, the pandemic (i.e., COVID-19) can lead to a high degree of news consumption and readership among youths on Facebook. In addition, it shows that Facebook acts as a significant platform for news readership among users who either incidentally or purposefully encounter news posts on their newsfeed. This enriches the argument on incidental and purposive exposure to news on Facebook. As we stressed that incidental news exposure could significantly influence individuals' recalling and recognition of information in news stories because the actual reading process mediates the effect on recalling. In other words, whether people consume news incidentally or purposively, the time taken to read news governs the learning process. (Lee & Kim, 2017; Mahmood & Sismeiro, 2017)

Building on these results in the context of Facebook, several scholars argued that people consume news more frequently during times of catastrophe, war, pandemic, economic crisis, political tension, etc. (De Coninck et al., 2020; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020). In this regard, our results highly align with

the aforesaid, as we are currently facing a health crisis that led to a complete lockdown and other preventive measures. Therefore, about 60% of our participants whether living in the USA, Spain, or Egypt vary between heavy and medium news consumers. This novelty implies that under threat, the frequency of news consumption does not change with different political and media systems. This original finding also underlines the critical role of Facebook influencers in news production, distribution, and consumption among users during COVID-19.

8.2 Influential news sources on Facebook (SMI)

Our research emphasizes the important role of influencers on Facebook in the news dissemination as well as exposure during the pandemic of COVID-19. Moreover, it underlines their strong role in either informing or misinforming users. In this respect, we originally found that about 80% of our sample across three different countries with different media and political systems follow news pages on Facebook to stay updated. This finding can be interpreted through prior research findings claiming that youths rely on SMIs' as an important source of news to stay updated (Deborah, Michela, & Anna, 2019; Johnson & St. John III, 2020; Bergström & Jervelycke Belfrage, 2018).

Our research findings also support the findings of previous literature highlighting the crucial role of Facebook in easing news accessibility, readership, and consumption. Therefore, many journalists, media outlets, and news organizations have integrated social media, particularly Facebook, into their channels of communication to reach a large audience and increase the "on-go news consumers" (Boukes, 2019; Chan, 2016). Through the work of our study, we genuinely identified the most influential pages and actors on Facebook in the USA, Egypt, and Spain. In this respect, the data revealed that the most followed news pages on Facebook among the Spanish, American, and Egyptian youths are as follow: BBC, CNN, Euro News, The New York Times, Global News, El País, El Mundo, Youm7, Almasry Alyoum, Masrawy, Aljazeera, Rassd, and the Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers.

In connection to this outcome, Gritckova (2016) explained that news became an essential part of the platform in the past year with several international media outlets such as BBC News, The New York Times, and the Guardian turning to Facebook to increase their exposure. Adding that Facebook regularly develops new ways that made news consumption more accessible and convenient for readers. For example, the instant articles and algorithm news options refine the searching for essential data in the form of algorithms (shape the users' newsfeed based on their news reading as well as information searching patterns, the popularity of a news item, as well as the users' friends'

preferences on the platform) could nurture the tendency of social media users to consume news and information (Messing & Westwood, 2014; Kümpel, 2020; Bobok, 2016; Gritckova, 2016).

In addition, we significantly identified the main influential actors as well as sources in the news dissemination and production on Facebook. Thus, contributing to previous literature that were mainly focusing on SMIs in the context of Twitter. Our analysis revealed that legacy media is still perceived as the most important news source among youths on Facebook. For instance, the most followed influential news sources on Facebook by the American, Spanish, and Egyptian youths are TV news channels, newspapers, and news agencies. Over and above, more than one-third of this study's participants highly perceive Facebook pages of radio stations as influential news sources. In addition, about 45% of the Egyptian youths follow members of government and officials to stay updated. On the other side, our data analysis shows less than 30% of our sample perceive politicians, political parties, analysts, or opinion makers as influential news sources on Facebook.

These original findings convey that journalist, news organizations, or media editors on Facebook has a more substantial influence on news reception and perception. Such results also align with recently published studies claiming that traditional media is still highly consumed and trusted by the audience during the outbreak of COVID-19. Also, offline media use digital technology and social network sites (i.e., Facebook) to disseminate their messages more broadly and expand their outreach (Limaye et al., 2020; Newman et al., 2020). Accordingly, we highlight the power of influencers on Facebook in either informing or misinforming users during the COVID-19 pandemic. Taken together, these results show that the widespread of COVID-19 and its subsequent endorsed measures of complete lockdown and physical distancing changed people's media habits significantly (Casero-Ripollés, 2020a; Limaye et al., 2020; Newman et al., 2020). In more depth, people turned to official and trusted online news sources more than ever before (Limaye et al., 2020; Newman et al., 2020). Per the findings of Casero-Ripollés (2020a), we believe that the emergence of this health crisis led to the revival of the legacy media's role in citizens' news consumption habits as people turned to official media entities on Facebook to get their information. Accordingly, our work reveals that newspapers, professional news agencies, TV channels, radio stations, and media outlets are the most visited and consumed pages on Facebook during the pandemic of COVID-19. This result aligns with the findings of several published studies arguing that professional editors, journalists, and news agencies are still the most trusted, visited, and credible news sources for most users on social media (i.e., Twitter) (Alshareef, 2017; Gritckova, 2016; Marcos-García, Viounnikoff-Benet & Casero-Ripollés, 2020). Consequently, our findings contribute to the existing literature on SMIs by identifying the influential news sources, in the context of Facebook.

In connection with previous studies, our results indicate that news agencies act as primary news producers and disseminators due to their neutrally balanced news coverage, fact-checking, and multi-angled interpretation of events; as a result, they are prevalent and followed by many users on Facebook (Casero-Ripollés, 2020b). Thus, we found a significant positive relation between news consumption levels on Facebook and influencers' Facebook pages, in the three investigated countries. This implies that the more Egyptian, Spanish, and American youths follow influencers' Facebook pages, the greater they consume news. Taking this into account, about 65% of our sample are either medium or heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages. This original finding demonstrates that influencers on Facebook currently play a very essential role in shaping people's perceptions and beliefs of the ongoing events.

8.3 Cultivation effect

Consequently, we can assume that news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages can have the same impact as consuming news on any offline platform (i.e., TV, Newspaper, etc.). Through applying traditional mass communication theories to digital media, we significantly found that news exposure can lead to the same cultivational impact regardless of the platform being used. Moreover, news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages during times of threat -as in COVID-19 cultivated threat perception among young people. Our statistical analysis demonstrated a significant relation between news consumption, news trust, mean world syndrome, and threat perceptions. Meaning that the more American, Spanish, and Egyptian youths consume news on influencers' Facebook pages, the more they perceive the world as a mean place, and the higher their threat perception is. Over and above, the more youths trust the circulated news posts on Facebook, the higher their threat perception will be. Therefore, many heavy news consumers have high threat perception levels and mean world perception. Through these finding we infer that Facebook news exposure during COVID-19 cultivated fear and terror of the unknown future and development of this disease.

These novel findings shed light on McLuhan's (1964) description of shifting from one media to another as changing new bottles for old wine. Meaning that different media can have the same impact since they are presenting the same content but on a different channel. Within this framework, our data analysis revealed that the majority of heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have high threat perception levels, unlike most medium consumers who have moderate threat levels and light news consumers who have low threat levels. This new outcome in the context of

Facebook aligns with the primary assumption of the cultivation theory, stating that those who consume more are the most affected, followed by those who consume moderately and lightly (Yamamoto et al., 2016; Mullings, 2012). In this regard, we found a statistical significance between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and threat perception level. This suggests that even though the cultivation theory was developed in the 1960s (Gerbner et., 1994), it has a significant impact nowadays, with digital technology and social network sites, which have affected every aspect of our lives, including our news consumption habits, with more than 53% of heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages holding high threat perception levels compared to medium (22.3%) and light (17%).

After controlling for demographics and political beliefs among those who follow news pages on Facebook (n=996). The three political ideologies have either moderate or high threat perception levels, with the right-wing participants holding higher threat perception levels than the left and center wings which have moderate levels. This result indicates that news exposure on influencers' Facebook pages did not only cultivate high threat perception levels among right-wing people but also left and center-wing during times of threat. In addition, it aligns with some research studies suggesting a correlation between threat perception and right-wing ideology. In this sense, we found a statistical variance between the three political wings among participants who follow Facebook news pages (n=996). Meaning there is a difference of means between the right, center, and left wings in terms of their threat perception degree. This revelation supports the argument of several scholars who connected political beliefs with threat perception level. They explained that each of the three political ideologies hold different degrees of threat, with the right-wing ideology showing higher levels in comparison to the left and center-wings when exposed to a stimulus (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Jost et al., 2003; 2018). Reflecting on this, consuming news on influencers' Facebook pages during COVID-19 stimulated fear, terror, and threat perception in various degrees among the three political ideologies, with the right-wing holding high threat perception compared to the center and left wings.

In line with previous studies suggesting that the effect of frequent news consumption on women and younger people (aged between 18-35) is more intense, thus cultivating higher degrees of fear, worry, and threat (Ahmed et al., 2020; García-Castro & Pérez-Sánchez, 2018; Scarborough et al., 2010). We found that most females in Egypt and the USA, as well as males in Spain, have high degrees of threat perception and mean world syndrome compared to their counterparts. Also, those aging 25-29 years exhibited higher threat perception levels and mean world syndrome in comparison to other age groups. Our thorough observation of the data revealed that these categories were spending much

more time on the platform consuming news than their counterparts, who were less frightened as their news consumption was far less than the other categories. Accordingly, we infer that each of these groups had high threat levels as they were consuming news on such pages much more than the rest.

More importantly, we reveal that news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages did not only cultivate threat perception among youths but also a very high degree of contradiction, confusion, and thus uncertainty. Such contradiction was very evident in the responses of our participants on several matters. For instance, the majority of our sample believe that the circulated news on Facebook is exaggerated and there should be filters as well as policies that govern news coverage on this digital platform. On the other hand, they do not perceive the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 as fake, fabricated, or misleading. Also, feeling unworried about their family's general safety and at the same time think that COVID-19, as well as the spread of diseases, are imminent threats to their existence while feeling safe. This novel finding suggests that contradiction can lead to a high degree of uncertainty, thus contributing to threat perception. In this regard, many recent studies showed that the uncertainty connected with COVID-19 shared news on Facebook produced significant psychological and psychiatric turbulences (Ahmed et al., 2020; Rommer et al., 2020; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020; Sood, 2020). Moreover, it led to post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, fear, threat, panic disorders, and behavioral disorders (Sood, 2020).

Another new and significant contribution of our study shows that young people can be aware of the cultivation impact of their news consumption yet get affected. Our data indicate that most of our respondents are aware that things appear on the circulated news on Facebook as more dangerous and chaotic than in real life. Not to mention that the majority also believe that publishing more news related to COVID-19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people. Also, they feel that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime they consume news on Facebook. Despite being aware most of our respondents have either high or moderate threat perception levels. This novel outcome adds to the previous studies examining the cultivation theory.

Taken together, these results suggest that even though the cultivation theory is still valid in the context of Facebook, there are some variations from the TV context. Young people nowadays are aware of the negative impact of their news consumption on shaping their reality. However, being aware did not mediate the cultivated effect of fear and terror due to hype news exposure. In-depth, our data shows that the cultivation effect of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages can occur even if users were aware that such news depictions are not a real reflection of reality. This original finding negates the main assumption of the cultivation theory as postulated by George

Gerbner that TV viewers perceive media depictions as a real reflection of reality and therefore heavy TV viewers are more likely to perceive the world as a mean place full of crimes in addition to being afraid of victimization (Gerbner & Gross, 1994; Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2015; Signorielli, 2009). In our case, most news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages have high to moderate threat perception levels as well as mean world syndrome regardless of being aware that these news portrayals on Facebook are exaggerated, fake, and have spread fear as well as panic among people. On top of that, the results showed more than 50% of heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages are threatened by a lack of free speech and democratic rights. Yet, expressed their willingness to give up their civil liberty rights to maintain national security. Our analysis revealed that the more youths consume news on influencers' Facebook pages, the more they are threatened by a lack of free speech as well as democratic rights. Also, the higher their news exposure, the greater their preference to sacrifice their civil liberty rights. It is worth noting that these results did not differ in the American, Spanish, and Egyptian contexts. This implies that heavy news consumers might have reached a saturation level of demanding a more diverse coverage that provides them with different and more critical voices. Also, it could point out one of the possible outcomes of the echo chamber effect, which prevents people from being exposed to information and views about current events that contradict their preexisting beliefs. (Masip et al., 2018; Holt, 2016; Anspach, 2017; Pentina & Tarafdar, 2014). Thus, thinking that they are not being exposed to different views due to a lack of free speech. Within this, we genuinely infer that the echo chamber effect is evident in the context of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages. Accordingly, it might have led to a new type of threat among heavy news consumers which is a lack of free speech and democratic rights due to not being exposed to counterarguments.

This study's findings also show how news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages has a far-reaching cultivation effect on shaping people's security preferences regardless of the political and media systems of their country. Most heavy news consumers on influencers' Facebook pages expressed their willingness to give up their civil liberty rights to maintain national security, with more than 70% in the USA and Egypt and about 40% in Spain. The novelty of this finding is that it did not vary under different media and political environments. Considering that each of the investigated countries (the USA, Spain, and Egypt) has a different rank in the Reporters Without Borders press freedom. For instance, Egypt came as a non-free country and was described to have an alarming press freedom situation; the USA was labeled as somehow free where press freedom suffered during President Donald Trump's administration; Spain came in the top countries with press freedom.

Taking together, these results imply that under the feeling of threat people will be more willing to give up their civil liberty and freedom rights to survive. This notion is supported psychologically by Maslow's hierarchy of needs which indicates that human beings prioritize safety/security over other needs (Christian, 2015; McLeod, 2007). Within this, news coverage during the COVID-19 pandemic portrayed the full lockdown and precautionary measures (i.e., physical distance, etc.) as the only way to maintain survival. Thus, frequent and heavy exposure to these depictions over a period, consequently, might have led youths to accept curbing some of their freedoms to survive.
Overall, these outcomes show that news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages has the same cultivation impact on people regardless of their country's political and media system. Moreover, the cultivation effect of news consumption on Facebook is very intense, yet different than other offline mediums. With Facebook, people are aware of the negative effect of their news exposure on their perception, yet they are still affected. Also, news exposure led to a high degree of contradiction, and consequently uncertainty that reinforces threat perception. In this regard, many recent studies showed that the uncertainty connected with COVID-19 shared news on Facebook produced significant psychological and psychiatric turbulences (Mansell, 2015; Ahmed et al., 2020; Rommer et al., 2020; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020; Sood, 2020). Moreover, it led to post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, fear, threat, panic disorders, and behavioral disorders (Sood, 2020). In sum, hype news consumption during times of threat, as in the case of COVID-19, led to a high degree of uncertainty. This can be explained that frequent news consumption through different platforms can have the same impact as it usually leads to confusion, anxiety, fear, and stress. Once these feelings reach a certain point, the information quality becomes subjective to personal bias, confirmation, and verification, leading to even more uncertainty, anxiety, fear, and threat (De Coninck et al., 2020; Nguyen and Nguyen, 2020). Through this, we can infer that heavy and medium news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages during the COVID-19 pandemic led to confusion and contradiction thus a high degree of uncertainty, that contributed to and reinforced threat and mean world perceptions.

8.4 SMIs, cultivation effect, and political conservatism

Feelings of threat and danger can induce different behaviors ranging from conformity to calling for change and opposition, and this depends on the degree of threat, whether it is existential, meaning threatening one's existence, or partial existential, which is having an urge for a better presence. Correspondingly, we found a significant positive relationship between threat perception level,

resistance to change, and inequality preference. This original finding means the higher the threat perception among young adults is, the more they will resist change and prefer inequality. The novelty of this outcome is that it did not vary among youths living in the USA, Spain, and Egypt. Given that each of these countries has a different score on the reporters without borders press index. Furthermore, the more people are inclined to the right side of the political continuum, the more they are resistant to change and prefer inequality. About 45% of the left-wing participants reported low conservative and self-enhancement levels. Unlike the majority of the center showing moderate and the right having high levels. This result correlates with previous studies that linked political conservatism with the right-wing. Suggesting that those with right-wing ideology are more politically conservative, resist change, and prefer inequality (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Jost et al., 2003; 2018).

Over and above, some research studies claimed that news coverage can have the ability to influence thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, preferences, as well as ideologies (Eugenis, 2013). In this sense, frequent news exposure on influencers' Facebook pages during the COVID-19 pandemic had a very intense cultivation effect on people's perceptions and preferences. For instance, it shaped people's security preferences which is one of the human core values of conservatism. About 70% of young people have high-security preference levels. The statistical analysis showed a significant correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and security level, with the USA having the strongest correlation in comparison to Egypt and Spain. This new outcome implies that during times of threat (i.e., COVID-19) news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages can shape people's preferences for tightened security environment regardless of the political and media system of their countries. Moreover, it can lead to a security preferences proliferation among people with different political ideologies. For instance, not only do the majority of right-wing participants have high-security levels but also many of the left and center wings. Knowing that the left and center are less likely to prefer tighten security measures.

Our work also reveals that news exposure on influencers' Facebook pages reinforces restraint of actions leading to a greater conformity level among youths, with about 60% having high conformity. Moreover, it affects respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provides, with about 55% having a high tradition level. In this regard, our findings highlight a significant correlation between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages, conformity, and tradition values. Taking together, these new results show that the more people consume news on such pages, the higher their conformity and traditional values, especially during times of pandemics.

Examining political conservatism in its two dimensions (resistance to change and inequality preference) and connecting it with news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages has been scarcely deliberated. For this, we significantly demonstrate that about 50% of heavy news consumers on such pages exhibit high levels of conservatism, self-enhancement, and thus high political conservatism. Further, medium and light varied between low and moderate levels as the cultivation theory postulates. These new and original data show that heavy news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages can lead to a high degree of political conservatism among youths, regardless of their political ideology. About 50% of the left and center-wing participants have moderate political conservatism levels, given that they vary between heavy and medium news consumers.

Taking this into account, Facebook influencers can affect people to become more resistant to change. Meaning the more people consume news on influencers' Facebook pages, the more they are resistant to change. Also, news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages has a far-reaching effect on preferring inequality, with around 60% either having high or moderate levels among youths in Egypt, Spain, and the USA. In this respect, we found a positive correlation between frequent exposure to news on influencers' Facebook and inequality preference. This means that news exposure can lead to a higher preference for control or dominance over people and resources, thus inequality among people. Whereas most heavy and medium consumers of influencers' Facebook pages have a high-power level. According to the PVQ, power is explained as a desire to possess social dominance, authority, and wealth in addition to preserving their public image (Schwartz, 1992).

These novel results convey that despite the political belief of people, the cultivation effect in the context of Facebook can still occur to a certain degree, particularly during times of pandemics. As more threats can drive people to rationalize the status quo and become more politically conservative (Sinkkonen & Elovainio, 2020; Al-Ameri, 2013; Komaili, 2004). People's views, perceptions, behavior, etc., are shaped by their news consumption, and recently news media coverage on Facebook plays a significant role in constructing threat perception, which later could shape their ideology preferences. Our findings also highlight that the cultivation effect due to heavy news exposure on Facebook has put people into a highly suggestible state, which means they are easily influenced by any notion presented to them in the form of precautionary measures, policies, endorsed actions, etc. To expand this argument, we assume that under the feeling of worry, fear, threat, and uncertainty people can become very suggestible to any recommendation made to them by digital influencers who influence their decisions, ideology, and security preferences. Given that

such feelings of threat and uncertainty are reinforced and triggered by their news exposure frequency.

Another significant contribution of this study shows contradiction with the primary assumption of the motivated social cognition model, which postulates that some dimensions refute others. For instance, self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence and openness to change vs. conservatism. The novelty of our data showed that about 95% of young adults with high conservatism levels are open to change. Similarly, around 95% of high self-enhancement have high self-transcendence. These signs of contradiction among our sample reflect a high degree of uncertainty. Several psychological scholars found that the pandemic, mortalities, and illnesses within families, social and political unrest, terrorism, social isolation, job loss due to the complete and partial lockdown, etc., contributed to the sense of uncertainty among people worldwide (Bhattacharyya, 2021). Building on this, we infer that there is a significant amount of uncertainty among youths that interrupted their ability to know how they think, feel, or believe. Thus, uncertainty can lead to contradiction, confusion, frustration, misperception, and thus threat perception.

On the other hand, uncertainty can have its upsides. While it breeds fear, anxiety, worry, contradiction, and confusion, thus threat perception, it can stimulate the senses and the intellect. Yet, uncertainty can only act as a positive stimulus for learning and getting improved, when acknowledged by participants. This notion is supported from the psychological and philosophical fields. Some psychological researchers argued that uncertainty could raise awareness and motivate fast reactions as well as decisions during emergencies and dilemmas (Bhattacharyya, 2021). Hence, uncertainty can act as a very important stimulus to acquire knowledge and stay alarmed. Also, some philosophers referred to the idea of "knowledge of knowing nothing" as proposed in Socrate's apology (West & Platon, 1979). This means that the most important drive for knowledge is being aware of not knowing. Once, people become aware of their lack of knowledge, they start to read and study to improve themselves (West & Platon, 1979). This draws our attention to a new and original finding among our sample who exhibited high degrees of uncertainty which might have reinforced self-directional, stimulative, hedonistic, benevolent, and universal values. With about 70% of youths scored very high in all the aforesaid values. It is noteworthy that the results did not vary despite examining three countries with three different political environments and media landscapes.

9 Limitation and Future studies

The empirical results reported herein should be considered in light of some methodological limitations. In this regard, some of the values obtained in the statistical Spearman's test for correlation between our variables were relatively low. This can be due to having a non-linear relation rather than a linear one, which results in smaller values than expected correlation coefficients. Though reporting moderate values, our data indicate that there is a relationship that can be a starting point for future studies that go deeper with new data and more countries about these correlations.

Also, some important items should have been addressed in the survey questions. These questions include some measuring items of openness to change, and self-transcendence dimensions as stated in the PVQ. For instance, we used two items to measure openness to change values (self-direction and stimulation values) instead of four. Similarly, we added three instead of six measuring items of self-transcendence values (hedonism, benevolence, and universalism) due to the questionnaire length limit. Consequently, we could not measure each value of the abovementioned thoroughly. This might have affected the depth of our analysis concerning the dimensions of openness to change and self-transcendence. Therefore, results could have varied if they were fully examined. It is worth noting that PVQ's main assumption, is that openness to change versus conservatism dimension. While self-transcendence versus self-enhancement. In this sense, it would be very interesting for other scholars to address this deficiency and include those missing elements in future studies.

Another limitation is related to the questionnaire length. Even though we had to eliminate the abovementioned items to avoid this limitation, the questionnaire was still overlong, since we are measuring many dependent variables. This had a negative effect on the response rate and data quality. We tried to address this limitation by setting a minimum speeding check to eliminate any participant who takes less than six minutes to complete the survey. Accordingly, it took a long time till we reached the target sample size.

Last, there is a limitation related to the lack of previous studies on our topic of investigation. For instance, there is a scarcity of research that linked political conservatism in its two dimensions with news consumption in general and on influencers' Facebook pages. Also, very few studies examined the cultivation theory in the context of Facebook. Thus, we had to develop a new research typology with these multi-disciplinary concepts. Also, due to a lack of published work in this area, we could

not sufficiently compare our results with other research studies conducted before the COVID-19 pandemic.

9.1 Future studies

This thesis is a starting point for future studies and investigations. One possible future area of investigation is to reexamine the variables in a different timeframe since we are examining the cultivation effect of news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages during times of threat, responses are therefore influenced by the pandemic. Accordingly, reconducting the study at a different time might yield different results and enrich the literature in this multi-disciplinary field. Besides, comparing the results during and post times of threat.

Referring to our limitation mentioned above, it would be beneficial to reconduct the study using all the 21 items of the PVQ that measure conservatism, self-enhancement, self-transcendence, and openness to change. This would enhance our understanding and enrich the research findings in this interdisciplinary area. As it might yield different results than ours, accordingly, reaching different conclusions.

A recommendation to further advance this research would be to focus on one of the Scandinavian countries, i.e., Norway, which has been at the top of all democracy and free speech rankings for years. Accordingly, compare our study's results with one of the most freely labeled countries in the world. In addition, support or refute the explanations provided in this study.

Future studies should encompass more extensive content analyses of influencers' Facebook pages into research, showing how and why, for example, consumption of news can impact an individual's perception of threats leading to conservatism. Further, analyze the portrayals of Facebook news coverage on topics related to terrorism, pandemics, economic deficiencies, wars, etc. This is very important to fully understand what is being presented and in which way. Given that no code of ethics governs the process of news dissemination on Facebook, thus, the results might be shocking in comparison to other offline platforms.

Further studies should also integrate a more diverse sample concerning age groups to be more explanatory. The sample in this research focused on youths aging 18-35 years. More variety in education levels is also essential. In this sample, the number of participants with low education levels was not big and did not allow testing previous findings on the effect of education on cultivation effects.

Finally, future studies need to incorporate concepts from other disciplines in social sciences (i.e., political science, anthropology, environmental science, management, marketing, religion, psychology, economics, education, sociology, etc.) that have examined similar areas of study. Combining such literature within communication studies stimulates new areas of research that can address the effects of online and digital media on society. Examining the media without understanding the greater frame under which they function might hinder the ability to analyze, interpret the data, and reach significant conclusions.

10 Conclusion

Regardless of different political and media systems, the pandemic (i.e., COVID-19) can lead to a high degree of news consumption and readership among youths on Facebook. In addition, Facebook acts as a significant platform for news readership among users who either incidentally or purposefully encounter news posts on their newsfeed. Our results enrich the argument on incidental and purposive exposure to news on Facebook, with most of our respondents reading the news posts they encounter on Facebook either briefly or in full detail. Furthermore, the emergence of this health crisis led to the revival of the legacy media's role in citizens' news consumption habits as people turned to official media entities on Facebook to get their information. Accordingly, our work reveals that newspapers, professional news agencies, TV channels, radio stations, and media outlets are the most consumed pages on Facebook during the pandemic of COVID-19. In this respect, more than 60% of our participants whether living in the USA, Spain or Egypt vary between heavy and medium news consumers.

News consumption on influencers' Facebook pages can have the same impact as consuming news on any offline platform (i.e., TV, Newspaper, etc.). One major outcome of news consumption is the cultivation effect. We found statistical significance between news consumption on Facebook influencers' pages and threat level, in this respect. The more people consume news on Facebook influencers' pages, the higher their threat perception is. This finding implies that despite the fact that the cultivation theory was developed in the 1960s, it has a significant impact nowadays, with digital technology and social network sites. These sites have affected every aspect of our lives, including our news consumption habits.

Even though the cultivation theory is still valid in the context of Facebook, there are some variations from the TV context. Young people nowadays are aware of the negative impact of their news consumption on shaping their reality. However, being aware did not mediate the cultivated effect of fear and terror due to hype news exposure. Thus, news consumption on Facebook had a more far-reaching negative effect. It did not only cultivate fear and terror person but also shaped people's security preferences and political ideology during the COVID-19 pandemic; with most heavy news consumers holding high security, conservatism, and inequality preferences regardless of the political and media systems of their country. Over and above, it cultivated a high degree of contradiction,

confusion, and thus uncertainty. Such uncertainty among youths interrupted youths' ability to know what they think, feel, and believe, consequently reinforcing and boosting the threat perception.

Feelings of threat and danger induce different behaviors ranging from conformity to calling for change and opposition, and this depends on the degree of threat, whether it is existential, meaning threatening one's existence, or partial existential, which is having an urge for a better presence. In this regard, our results showed that high threat perception boosts political conservatism. This means that people with higher threat perception levels are more politically conservative than those with lower threat levels. This finding did not vary among youths living in the USA, Spain, and Egypt. Given that each of these countries has a different score on the reporters without borders press index. Generally, exposing people to unlimited news on Facebook has led to a negative rather than a positive outcome on people's perceptions. Thus, instead of being informed and reassured, they felt frustrated, confused, and uncertain. Such feelings led them to prefer a more restrictive and controlled news environment. We found a positive relationship between news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages and preferring filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of COVID-19. This means that heavy news consumption on such pages leads to acceptance of imposing filters on news coverage. Furthermore, heavy news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages during the pandemic had an impact on people's preference for a more restrictive security environment. Hence, accepting curbing freedoms and civil liberty rights; about 40% of those who follow news pages on Facebook accept giving up their civil liberty rights to maintain national security. In addition, more than 60% have high security, conformity, and tradition levels, thus conservatism.

To conclude, the results of this thesis highlight how news consumption on influencers' Facebook pages during the pandemic has a far-reaching negative impact on youths beyond the threat of the virus itself. We show that Facebook influencers currently play a great role in creating a state of suggestibility in which youths become influenced by any notion presented to them in the form of precautionary measures, policies, etc. Thus, shaping their preferences, ideologies, and perception of their surroundings.

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12 Appendices

12.1 Questionnaire (English version)

1. Do you have an account on Facebook?

1. Yes
2. No (if no, please exit the survey. Thank you very much for your participation).

2. Age:

1. 18 – 24 years
2. 25 – 29 years
3. 30 – 34 years
4. 35 years

3. Sex:

1. Male
2. Female
3. Others (please mention) ----------

4. Education:

1. Not educated
2. Elemental studies
3. Undergraduate student
4. Bachelor's degree
5. Master's degree
6. Doctoral degree
7. Others (please mention) ----------

5. On a scale from 1 – 10, where would you place yourself on the political spectrum?

(1) means Far left and (10) means Far right

Far left **Far right**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

6. On a scale from 1 – 10, how often do you find news posts while skipping your Facebook newsfeed?

(1) means Never and (10) means Always

Never **Always**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

7. On a scale from 1 – 10, how frequently do you read the news posts that you encounter at least briefly (i.e., headline), while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed?

(1) means Never and (10) means Always

Never **Always**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

8. On a scale from 1 – 10, how often do you read the details of the news posts that you encounter while skipping through your Facebook newsfeed?

(1) means Never and (10) means Always

Never **Always**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

9. Approximately, how many of the news posts that you encounter on Facebook comes from the shared posts of your friends, family relatives, and/or other people you follow?

(1) has the lowest value and (10) has the highest value

Lowest value **highest value**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

10. Do you follow any of the news pages on Facebook (e.g., daily newspapers, national/international network TV news, local TV news, news agencies/organizations, journalists, editors, etc.) to stay up to date about current affairs?

1. Yes
2. No

11. Please select all the news sources that you follow on Facebook to stay updated. (You can choose more than one answer)

1. BBC news/ BBC TV/ BBC News Arabic

2. Global News
3. CNN/ CNN International
4. Aljazeera channel/Aljazeera English/Aljazeera Arabic
5. Euro news (English / non-English)
6. MSNBC
7. Russia Today/Russia Today Arabic
8. Washington post
9. The guardian
10. Financial times
11. Los Angeles times
12. The daily telegraph
13. The wall street journal
14. New York times
15. HuffPost
16. US Today
17. Bloomberg
18. Sky news (Arabic-English)
19. Fox news
20. El País
21. El mundo
22. Marca
23. ABC
24. La Vanguardia
25. El Correo
26. El periodico
27. Youm7
28. AlmasryAlyoum
29. Extra news
30. Masrawy news
31. Middle East News Agency – MENA
32. AbdelFattah Elsisi
33. Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers
34. Tahya Masr
35. Rassd
36. Others (please mention) ----------

12. On a scale from 1 – 10, how frequently do you consume news through each of the following influential news sources on Facebook? (1) means Never and (10) means Always

	Never									**Always**
News sources	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Journalist (individual)										
2. Analyst or opinion maker (intellectual, political writer, political analyst, etc.)										
3. Politician (individual)										
4. Political party (organization)										
5. Member of Government and officials (i.e., president, prime minister, minister, governor, etc.)										

6. Activist (citizen, social movement, protest movement, etc.)										
7. Newspaper (print or digital)										
8. TV news channel (national/international)										
9. News agency										
10. Radio station										

13. On a scale from 1 – 10, indicate the level of safety you generally feel in your country

(1) means very unsafe and (10) means very safe

Very unsafe **Very safe**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

14. On a scale from 1 – 10, express your attitude toward each of the following statements by checking in the box the answer that best describes your personal feeling.

(1) means strongly disagree and (10) means strongly agree

	Strongly disagree									Strongly agree
Statement	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. I fear from bombs and explosives that I may encounter any time.										
2. I feel threatened by the economic performance of the country.										
3. I am afraid about my family's general safety.										
4. I feel threatened by the lack of free speech and democratic rights.										
5. I think the spread of diseases is an imminent threat.										
6. I think COVID-19 pandemic threatens my life.										
7. I think most of the circulated news on Facebook about COVID-19 is either fabricated, fake, and/or misleading.										
8. I think publishing more news related to Covid- 19 on Facebook has spread fear and panic among people										
9. I think there should be filters and a specific policy for news coverage on Facebook during humanitarian crises such as the spread of Covid- 19.										

15. On a scale from 1 – 10, express your attitude toward each of the following statements by checking in the box the answer that best describes your personal feeling.

(1) means strongly disagree and (10) means strongly agree

	Strongly disagree									Strongly agree
Statement	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Although it may appear on the circulated news on Facebook that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it really isn't so in real life.										
2. I feel that chaos and anarchy could erupt anytime whenever I consume news on Facebook.										

16. Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description carefully and think about how much each person is or is not like you by checking in the box the answer that best describes your personal feeling. (1) means Not like me at all and (10) means very much like me.

Statement	**How much this person is like you?**									
	Not like me at all									very much like me
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.										
2. It is very important to him that his country be safe from threats from within and without. He is concerned that social order be protected.										
3. It is acceptable for him to give up some civil liberty rights in order to maintain national security.										
4. He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.										
5. It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.										
6. He thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that people should be satisfied with what they have.										
7. Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires.										

8. It is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He wants people to do what he says.										
9. It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.										
10. Being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people.										
11. It is very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.										

17. Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description carefully and think about how much each person is or is not like you by checking in the box the answer that best describes your personal feeling.

(1) means Not like me at all and (10) means very much like me.

Statement	**How much this person is like you?**									
	Not like me at all									Very much like me
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free to plan and to choose his activities for himself.										
2. He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life.										
3. It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for other people.										
4. He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He wants justice for everybody, even for people he doesn't know.										
5. He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure.										

Thank You

12.2 Questionnaire (Spanish version)

1. ¿Tiene una cuenta en Facebook?

1. Si

2. No (en caso negativo, salga de la encuesta. Muchas gracias por su participación).

2. Edad:

1. 18 - 24 años

2. 25 a 29 años

3. 30 - 34 años

4. 35 años

3. Género:

1. Hombre

2. Mujer

3. Otros (mencione) ----------

4. Educación:

1. Sin estudios

2. Estudios elementales (graduado escolar)

3. Estudios secundarios (bachiller o FP)

4. Licenciatura o Grado universitario

5. Máster

6. Doctorado

7. Otros (por favor mencione) ----------

5. En una escala del 1 al 10, ¿dónde se ubicaría ideológicamente en el espectro político? (1) significa Extrema izquierda y (10) significa Extrema derecha

Extrema izquierda Extrema derecha

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

6. En una escala del 1 al 10, ¿Con qué frecuencia encuentra publicaciones de noticias mientras mira o consulta el feed de noticias de Facebook? (1) significa Nunca y (10) significa Siempre.

Nunca Siempre

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

7. En una escala del 1 al 10, ¿con qué frecuencia lee brevemente o superficialmente (es decir, titulares) las publicaciones de noticias que encuentra mientras mira el feed de noticias de Facebook? (1) significa Nunca y (10) significa Siempre

Nunca Siempre

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

8. En una escala del 1 al 10, ¿con qué frecuencia lee con detalle o en profundidad las publicaciones de noticias que encuentra mientras mira el feed de noticias de Facebook? (1) significa Nunca y (10) significa Siempre

Nunca Siempre

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

9. Aproximadamente, ¿cuántas de las publicaciones de noticias que encuentra en Facebook provienen de las publicaciones compartidas de sus amigos, familiares y / u otras personas a las que sigue? (1) tiene el valor más bajo y (10) tiene el valor más alto

El valor más bajo El valor más alto

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

10. ¿Sigue alguna de las páginas de noticias en Facebook (por ejemplo, periódicos, canales de televisión nacional o internacional, agencias de noticias, periodistas, radio, etc.) para mantenerse al día sobre la actualidad?

1. Si

2. No

11. Seleccione todas las fuentes de noticias que sigue en Facebook para mantenerse actualizado. (puede elegir más de una respuesta).

1. BBC noticias / BBC canal / BBC noticias árabe
2. Global News
3. CNN / CNN Internacional

4. Canal Aljazeera / Aljazeera inglés / Aljazeera árabe
5. Euronews
6. MSNBC
7. Russia Today
8. Washington Post
9. The Guardian
10. Financial Times
11. Los Angeles Times
12. The Daily Telegraph
13. The Wall Street Journal
14. New York Times
15. HuffPost
16. US Today
17. Bloomberg
18. Sky News
19. Fox News
20. El País
21. El Mundo
22. Marca
23. ABC
24. La Vanguardia
25. El Correo
26. El Periódico
27. Youm7
28. AlmasryAlyoum
29. ExtraNews
30. Masrawy News
31. MENA (Middle East News Agency)
32. AbdelFattah Elsisi

33. Gabinete de ministros de Egipto

34. Tahya Masr

35. Rassd

36. Otros (mencione)----------

12. En una escala del 1 al 10, ¿con qué frecuencia lee noticias a través de cada una de las siguientes fuentes de noticias influyentes en Facebook? (1) significa Nunca y (10) significa Siempre

	Nunca									**Siempre**
Fuentes de noticias	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Periodista (individual)										
2. Analista político o creador de opinión (tertuliano, articulista, intelectual, etc.)										
3. Político (individual)										
4. Partido político (como organización)										
5. Miembro del Gobierno (por ejemplo: presidente, primer ministro, ministro, gobernador, etc.)										
6. Activista (ciudadano, movimiento social, movimiento de protesta, etc.)										
7. Periódico (impreso o digital)										
8. Canal de noticias de televisión (nacional/internacional)										
9. Agencia de noticias										
10. Cadena de radio										

13. En una escala del 1 al 10, indique el nivel de seguridad que siente en su país. (1) significa muy inseguro y (10) significa muy seguro

muy inseguro muy seguro

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

14. En una escala de 1 - 10, exprese su actitud hacia cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones marcando en el cuadro de la respuesta que mejor describe su sentimiento personal. (1) significa totalmente en desacuerdo y (10) significa totalmente de acuerdo

	Totalmente en desacuerdo									Totalmente de acuerdo
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Temo las bombas y atentados que pueda encontrarme en cualquier momento.										
2. Me siento amenazado por la situación económica del país.										
3. Temo por la seguridad general de mi familia.										
4. Me siento amenazado por la falta de libertad de expresión y derechos democráticos.										
5. Creo que la propagación de enfermedades es una amenaza inminente.										

6. Creo que la pandemia de COVID-19 amenaza mi vida.										
7. Creo que la mayoría de las noticias que circulan en Facebook sobre COVID-19 son fabricadas, falsas y engañosas.										
8. Creo que publicar más noticias relacionadas con COVID-19 en Facebook ha sembrado el miedo y el pánico entre la gente.										
9. Creo que debería haber filtros y una política específica para la cobertura de noticias en Facebook durante crisis sanitarias como la propagación de COVID-19.										

15. En una escala del 1 al 10, exprese su actitud hacia cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones marcando en la casilla la respuesta que mejor describa su sentimiento personal. (1) significa totalmente en desacuerdo y (10) significa totalmente de acuerdo

Totalmente en desacuerdo Totalmente de acuerdo

La frase	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. A pesar de que puede parecer por las noticias que circulan en Facebook que las cosas están empeorando constantemente y son cada vez más peligrosas y caóticas, realmente no es así en la vida real.										
2. Siento que el caos y la anarquía pueden estallar en cualquier momento cuando leo noticias en Facebook.										

16. Aquí describimos brevemente el perfil de algunas personas. Por favor lea cada descripción cuidadosamente y piense su nivel de coincidencia con los modelos de persona que le ofrecemos a continuación marcando en el cuadro de la respuesta que mejor describe su sentimiento personal. (1) significa No es como yo en absoluto y (10) significa es como yo totalmente.

	¿Cuánto se parece a ti esta persona?									
	No es como yo en absoluto									Es como yo totalmente
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Para esta persona es importante vivir en un entorno seguro. Evita cualquier cosa que pueda poner en peligro su seguridad.										
2. Para esta persona es muy importante que su país esté a salvo de amenazas internas y externas. Le preocupa que se proteja el orden social.										
3. Para esta persona es aceptable abandonar algunos derechos civiles de la libertad con el fin de mantener la seguridad nacional.										
4. Esta persona cree que la gente debería hacer lo que se le dice. Cree que la gente debe seguir las reglas en todo momento, incluso cuando nadie está controlando su cumplimiento.										
5. Para esta persona es importante comportarse siempre adecuadamente. Quiere evitar hacer cualquier cosa que la gente diría que está mal.										

6. Esta persona piensa que es importante no pedir más de lo que tienes. Cree que la gente debería estar satisfecha con lo que tiene.											
7. La creencia religiosa es importante para esta persona. Se esfuerza por hacer lo que exige su religión.											
8. Para esta persona es importante estar a cargo de los demás y decirles lo que deben hacer. Esta persona quiere que la gente haga lo que el dice.											
9. Para esta persona es importante ser rico. Quiere tener mucho dinero y lujos.											
10. Tener mucho éxito es importante para esta persona. Le gusta impresionar a otras personas.											
11. Para esta persona es muy importante mostrar sus habilidades. Quiere que la gente admire lo que hace.											

16. Aquí describimos brevemente el perfil de ~~a~~ algunas personas. Por favor lea cada descripción cuidadosamente y piense su nivel de coincidencia con ~~en~~ los modelos de persona que le ofrecemos a continuación marcando en el cuadro de la respuesta que mejor describe su sentimiento personal. (1) significa No es como yo en absoluto y (10) significa es como yo totalmente.

	¿Cuánto se parece a ti esta persona?									
	No es como yo en absoluto.									Es como yo totalmente
		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Para esta persona es importante tomar sus propias decisiones acerca de lo que hace. Le gusta tener libertad para planificar y elegir sus actividades por sí mismo.										
2. Busca aventuras y le gusta correr riesgos. Quiere tener una vida emocionante.										
3. Para esta persona es muy importante ayudar a las personas que lo rodean. Quiere cuidar de otras personas.										
4. Cree que es importante que todas las personas del mundo sean tratadas por igual. Quiere justicia para todos, incluso para las personas que no conoce.										
5. Esta persona busca cada oportunidad que pueda para divertirse. Quiere hacer cosas que le den placer.										

Muchas Gracias

12.3 Questionnaire (Arabic version)

١. هل لديك حساب على موقع التواصل الاجتماعي فيسبوك؟

١. نعم

٢. لا (إذا كانت الإجابة لا، يرجى انهاء الاستبيان. شكرًا جزيلاً لمشاركتك).

٢.برجاء تحديد العمر:

١. ١٨- ٢٤ سنه

٢. ٢٥- ٢٩ سنه

٣. ٣٠- ٣٤ سنه

٤. ٣٥ سنه

٣. برجاء تحديد النوع

١. ذكر

٢. انثي

٣. اخر (برجاء تحديد) ٠٠٠٠٠٠٠٠٠٠٠٠٠٠

٤. برجاء تحديد المستوي التعليمي

١. غير متعلم

٢. حاصل على التعليم الأساسي

٣ .طالب جامعي

٤ .حاصل على بكالوريوس

٥ حاصل على درجة الماجستير

٦ . حاصل على درجة الدكتوراه

٧. أخرى (يرجى ذكر) ----------

٥. برجاء تحديد ميولك/اتجاهك السياسي علي مقياس من ١ الي ١٠، بحيث ان (١) تعني يساري جدا و (١٠) تعني يميني جدا

يساري جدا **يميني جدا**

١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠

٦. علي مقياس من ١ إلى ١٠، برجاء تحديد الي أي مدي تجد منشورات إخبارية أثناء تصفحك صفحتك الرئيسية (نيوز فيد) على فيسبوك؟ (١) تعني لا أجد ابداً و (١٠) تعني دائماً ما أجد

لا أجد ابداً **دائماً ما أجد**

١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠

٧. علي مقياس من ١ الي ١٠، برجاء تحديد الى أي مدى تقرأ المنشورات الإخبارية بشكل مختصر (مثل قراءة العناوين الإخبارية) والتي تجدها اثناء تصفحك صفحتك الرئيسية (نيوز فيد) على فيسبوك؟ (١) تعني لا أقرأ ابداً و (١٠) تعني دائماً ما أقرأ

لا أقرأ ابداً دائماً ما أقرأ

١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠

٨. علي مقياس من ١ الي ١٠، برجاء تحديد الى أي مدى تقرأ تفاصيل المنشورات الإخبارية التي تجدها اثناء تصفحك صفحتك الرئيسية (نيوز فيد) على فيسبوك؟ (١) تعني لا أقرأ ابداً و (١٠) تعني دائماً ما أقرأ

لا أقرأ ابداً دائماً ما أقرأ

١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠

٩. تقريبًا، كم عدد المنشورات الإخبارية التي تصادفها على فيسبوك وتكون من المنشورات الإخبارية التي ينشرها اصدقائك او أقاربك او أشخاص آخرين تتابعهم عبر صفحاتهم؟ (١) تعني عدد قليل جداً و (١٠) تعني عدد كبير جداً

عدد قليل جداً عدد كبير جداً

١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠

١٠. هل تتابع أيًا من صفحات الأخبار على فيسبوك (مثل: الصحف اليومية، شبكات التلفزيون الإخبارية الوطنية او العالمية، التلفزيون الاخباري المحلي، وكالات الانباء، الصحفيين، المحررين، الخ..) لمتابعة ومعرفة الأحداث الجارية؟

١. نعم

٢. لا

١١. برجاء وضع علامة (√) على مصادر الأخبار التي تتابعها على فيسبوك لمعرفة ومتابعة الأحداث الجارية. (يمكنك اختيار أكثر من إجابة)

١. شبكة بي بي سي (بي بي سي نيوز / بي بي سي TV/ بي بي سي نيوز بالعربية) BBC network

٢. جلوبال نيوز Global News

٣. سي ان ان / سي ان ان انترناشونال CNN / CNN International

٤. شبكة قنوات الجزيرة (قناة الجزيرة / الجزيرة بالإنجليزية / الجزيرة بالعربية) Aljazeera network

٥. يورو نيوز (إنجليزي /عربي) Euro news (English/Arabic)

٦. ام اس ان بي سي MSNBC

٧. روسيا اليوم / روسيا اليوم بالعربي Russia Today

٨. واشنطن بوستWashington Post

٩. ذا جارديان The Guardian

١٠. فايننشال تايمز Financial times

١١. لوس انجلوس تايمز Los Angeles Times

١٢. ذا ديلي تليجراف The Daily Telegraph

١٣. وول ستريت جورنال The Wall Street Journal

١٤. نيويورك تايمز New York Times

١٥. هاف بوست HuffPost

١٦. يو اس اليوم US Today

١٧. بلوم برج Bloomberg

١٦. سكاي نيوز (عربي- انجليزي) Sky news

١٩. فوكس نيوز Fox news

٢٠. إلبايس ElPaís

٢١. إلموندو Elmundo

٢٢. ماركا Marca

٢٣. ا بي سي ABC

٢٤. لا فانغارديا La Vanguardia

٢٥. إل كوريو El Correo

٢٦. إلبيريوديكو Elperiodico

٢٧. اليوم السابع

٢٨. المصري اليوم

٢٩. اكسترا نيوز Extra news

٣٠. مصراوي

٣١. وكالة أنباء الشرق الأوسط - MENA

٣٢. الصفحة الرسمية للرئيس عبد الفتاح السيسي

٣٣. الصفحة الرسمية لمجلس الوزراء المصري

٣٤. الصفحة الرسمية لصندوق تحيا مصر

٣٥. شبكة رصد

٣٦. أخرى (يرجى ذكر) .....

١٢. علي مقياس من ١ الي ١٠، برجاء تحديد مدي قراءة الأخبار من خلال متابعة كلاً من هذه المصادر الإخبارية المؤثرة على فيسبوك والآتي ذكرها. (١) تعني لا اتابع أبدًا و (١٠) تعني اتابع دائمًا

لا اتابع أبدًا **اتابع دائمًا**

صفحات مصادر الأخبار	١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠
١. صحفي (فرد)										
٢. محلل أو صانع رأي (مثل: مفكر سياسي، كاتب سياسي، محلل سياسي، إلخ)										
٣. سياسي (فرد)										
٤. حزب سياسي (منظمة)										
٥. عضو في الحكومة او أحد المسئولين (مثل: رئيس الجمهورية، رئيس وزراء، وزير، محافظ، إلخ).										
٦. ناشط سياسي (مواطن، حركة اجتماعية، حركة احتجاجية، إلخ).										
٧. صحيفة (مطبوعة أو الكترونية)										
٨. قناة إخبارية تلفزيونية (وطنية / عالمية)										
٩. وكالة أنباء										
١٠. محطة إذاعية										

١٣. علي مقياس من ١ الي ١٠، برجاء تحديد مدي شعورك بالأمان نحو الحياة المعيشية في بلدك.

(١) تعني غير آمن للغاية و (١٠) تعني آمن للغاية

غير آمن للغاية **آمن للغاية**

١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠

١٤. علي مقياس من ١ الي ١٠، حدد موقفك تجاه كلاً من العبارات التالية عن طريق وضع علامة (√) في المربع الذي يصف شعورك تجاه كلاً من تلك العبارات. (١) تعني غير موافق بشدة و (١٠) تعني موافق بشدة

غير موافق بشدة **موافق بشدة**

العبارة	١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	٧	٨	٩	١٠
١. اشعر بالخوف من القنابل والمتفجرات التي قد اتعرض لها في أي وقت.										
٢. أشعر بالتهديد من الأداء الاقتصادي للبلد.										

٣. اشعر بالخوف على امن وسلامة اسرتي.										
٤. أشعر بالتهديد من عدم وجود حرية تعبير عن الرأي والحقوق الديمقراطية.										
٥. أعتقد أن انتشار الأمراض هو تهديد وشيك.										
٦. أعتقد أن جائحة كورونا (COVID-19) تهدد حياتي.										
٧. أعتقد أن معظم الأخبار المتداولة على فيسبوك حول كوفيد١٩ (COVID-19) هي أخبار ملفقة، مزيفة، ومضللة.										
٨. أعتقد أن نشر المزيد من الأخبار المتعلقة بكوفيد١٩ (COVID-19) على فيسبوك قد نشر الخوف والذعر بين الناس.										
٩. أعتقد أنه لا بد من وجود معايير وسياسات محددة لتنقية المحتوي الإخباري على فيسبوك أثناء فترات الأزمات الإنسانية مثل انتشار كوفيد١٩ (COVID-19).										

١٥. علي مقياس من ١ الي ١٠، حدد موقفك تجاه كلاً من العبارات التالية عن طريق وضع علامة (√) في المربع الذي يصف شعورك تجاه كلاً من تلك العبارات. (١) تعني غير موافق بشدة و (١٠) تعني موافق بشدة

غير موافق بشدة **موافق بشدة**

العبارة	**١**	**٢**	**٣**	**٤**	**٥**	**٦**	**٧**	**٨**	**٩**	**١٠**
١. على الرغم من أنه قد يبدو في الأخبار المتداولة على فيسبوك أن الأمور تزداد خطورة وفوضى باستمرار، إلا أنها في الحقيقة ليست كذلك.										
٢. عندما اقرا الأخبار على فيسبوك أشعر أنه سوف تعم الفوضى في أي وقت.										

١٦. هنا نقوم بوصف بعض الأشخاص. برجاء قراءة كل وصف بدقة وتحديد إلى أي درجة يشبهك أو لا يشبهك هذا الشخص. ضع علامة (√) في المربع الذي يوضح إلى أي مدي يشبهك الشخص الموصوف على مقياس من ١ الي ١٠.

(١) تعني لا يشبهني اطلاقا و (١٠) تعني يشبهني جدا

لا يشبهني اطلاقا **يشبهني جدا**

العبارة	**الي أي مدي يشبهك هذا الشخص؟**									
	١	**٢**	**٣**	**٤**	**٥**	**٦**	**٧**	**٨**	**٩**	**١٠**
١. من المهم بالنسبة له أن يعيش في محيط آمن. فهو يتجنب كل ما قد يعرضه للخطر.										
٢. من المهم جدا بالنسبة له أن يكون بلده آمن من التهديدات الداخلية والخارجية. فهو مهتم بحماية النظام الاجتماعي.										
٣. من المقبول بالنسبة له أن يتنازل عن بعض الحقوق المدنية من أجل الحفاظ على الأمن القومي.										
٤. هو يعتقد أنه يجب على الناس القيام بما يقال لهم. فهو يعتقد أنه على الناس اتباع القواعد في كل الأوقات، حتى في غياب رقيب عليهم.										

٥. من المهم بالنسبة له أن يتصرف دائما على نحو لائق. فهو يريد تجنب القيام بأي شيء قد يقول الناس عنه أنه خطأ.										
٦. هو يعتقد أنه من المهم عدم طلب أكثر مما هو معك. فهو يعتقد أن الناس يجب أن يكونوا راضين عما يملكون.										
٧. الاعتقاد الديني مهم بالنسبة له. فهو يحاول جاهدا أن يفعل ما يطلبه دينه.										
٨. من المهم بالنسبة له أن يكون المسؤول وأن يملي على الأخرين ما يجب عليهم فعله. فهو يريد الناس أن يفعلوا ما يقول.										
٩. من المهم بالنسبة له أن يكون ثريًا. فهو يريد أن يمتلك الكثير من المال والأشياء باهظة الثمن.										
١٠. أن يكون شخصاً ناجحًا جداً أمر مهم بالنسبة له. هو يحب أن يثير إعجاب الآخرين.										
١١. من المهم جدًا بالنسبة له إظهار قدراته. فهو يريد أن يعجب الناس بما يفعله.										

١٧. هنا نقوم بوصف بعض الأشخاص. برجاء قراءة كل وصف بدقة وتحديد إلى أي درجة يشبهك أو لا يشبهك هذا الشخص. ضع علامة (√) في المربع الذي يوضح إلى أي مدي يشبهك الشخص الموصوف على مقياس من ١ الي ١٠.

(١) تعني لا يشبهني اطلاقا و (١٠) تعني يشبهني جدا

لا يشبهني اطلاقا **يشبهني جدا**

العبارة	**الي أي مدي يشبهك هذا الشخص؟**									
	١	**٢**	**٣**	**٤**	**٥**	**٦**	**٧**	**٨**	**٩**	**١٠**
١. من المهم بالنسبة له أن يتخذ قراراته بنفسه حول ما يقوم به. فهو يحب أن يكون حرا في تخطيط واختيار نشاطاته لنفسه.										
٢. هو يبحث عن المغامرات ويحب المخاطرة. هو يريد أن يعيش حياة مثيرة.										
٣. من المهم جدا بالنسبة له مساعدة الأشخاص من حوله. فهو يريد الاعتناء بالأخرين.										
٤.هو يعتقد أنه من المهم أن يعامل كل شخص في العالم بمساواة. فهو يريد العدالة للجميع حتى للأشخاص الذين لا يعرفهم.										
٥. هو يبحث عن كل فرصة ممكنة للاستمتاع. من المهم بالنسبة له أن يفعل أشياء تسعده.										

شكرا على تعاونكم