THE POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM OF IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS IN BARCELONA

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Abstract

This thesis addresses two fundamental questions in the transnational migration research field: whether or not all immigrants engage in political transnationalism? And which are the main determinants of their transnational political activism? To answer the first research question, I specifically compare different degrees of transnational political engagement of various national/ethnic origin immigrant associations in Barcelona. To answer the second research question, I focus on *meso-* and *macro-* levels determinants. The thesis demonstrates that transnational political engagement is not generalised among all immigrant associations in Barcelona, presents a relatively low level of regularity, and is generally nationally based. It also demonstrates the importance of studying the effect of the exit context and, in particular, of the political opportunity structure in home country on the political transnationalism of immigrant associations. *Meso-* level determinants like social networks and sources of funds also seem to explain the variance in immigrant associations' transnational political engagement.

Resum

Aquesta tesis vol respondre a dos preguntes fonamentals en l'àrea de recerca de la migració transnacional: S'impliquen els immigrants en el transnacionalisme polític? I, quins són els factors determinants del seu activisme polític transnacional ? Per respondre a la primera qüestió, comparo el nivell d'activisme polític transnacional d'una mostra d'associacions de diferents orígens immigrants a Barcelona. Per contestar a la segona, centro l'atenció en possibles factors determinants a dos nivells, meso i macro. La tesis demostra que l'activisme polític transnacional no està generalitzat entre totes les associacions a Barcelona, que presenta un nivell relativament baix de regularitat, i que generalment es desenvolupa al nivell nacional. També demostra que la necessitat d'examinar l'efecte del context de sortida i, més en concret, l'estructura d'oportunitats polítiques del país d'origen sobre el transnacionalisme polític de les associacions d'immigrants. Altres determinants a nivell meso, com les xarxes socials o les fonts de finançament semblen explicar la variació en l'activisme polític transnacional de les associacions d'immigrants.

Introduction

The subject of this thesis is the analytical and empirical analysis of the political activities and practices realised by contemporary immigrant associations in their countries of origin. It is a comparative research study that examines and contrasts the political transnationalism of different national/ethnic origin immigrant associations in Barcelona. The forms, scope, relative intensity, and social determinants of immigrant associations' political transnationalism are the main aspects to be investigated. With respect to the level of analysis, the thesis integrates meso and macro levels, more precisely, organisational and contextual explanations. The investigation is qualitative, relying largely on data coming from semi-structured interviews with 24 immigrant associations in Barcelona. It also employs a quantitative analysis in order to corroborate or enhance the findings of the qualitative research study (the triangulation approach). More accurate aspects of the research strategy, sample, data and data sources appear in Chapter 3.

The idea of this research goes back in time to 2004 when I defended my Master thesis in Sociology of Law at the International Institute for Sociology of Law, Oñati, Spain. While wondering if I could further on develop the research subject of my Masters degree for the PhD degree, one of my colleagues, who was translating at that time to Spanish an article of Alejandro Portes and some of his collaborators on assimilation and transnationalism (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003), ask me why I do not try to investigate this new phenomenon

that came to be so popular in the United States. After the readings I have done on this research subject, I have become more and more interested in how migrants develop new forms of accommodation to a more global world. I have thought that it would be interesting to explore whether the findings of that piece of research could be relevant in the European context.

Choosing the subject was not an easy task but the most difficult research aspects were still to come. The research approach and design, or the level and unit of analysis have been decided in time after many hours of readings, large discussions with professors and colleges and some failed attempts of research proposals. From the two research approaches to the comparative study of immigrant transnationalism, that are studying one immigrant group in different national/local contexts and studying various immigrant groups in the same national/local context, I decided to go for the second one that was scarcely employed in the European-based research. As such, my research perspective was to study the transnational political practices and activities of different national/ethnic origin immigrant associations in Barcelona.

Although the research was conducted in a fairly localised setting that is the organisational immigrant life of Barcelona, it has implications for the wider debate about new forms of self-identification and affiliations of immigrants that go beyond state borders and that might come to challenge in long run the traditional nation-state model. This research will allow us to validate the

existence of a stable and significant transnational field of political action connecting immigrants with their countries of origin. The transnational social field is significant for both home and destination countries since it not only enhances the development prospects of home countries and communities but affects also the way immigrants incorporate themselves and alter conventional expectations of assimilation (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003). Nevertheless, this study focuses more on the causes than on the effects of immigrant political transnationalism.

This research line also allows us to question conventional analyses that focus exclusively on immigrant assimilation to the destination society neglecting thus migrants' ties or ongoing relations with their countries of origin that lead to new forms of immigrant accommodation, to a more global context. Having a multiple identity, in some cases with two or more passports, participating actively in the politics of two or more countries, fighting discrimination and marginalisation in various polities by appealing to international human rights instruments and organisms, etc., are just some of these new forms of immigrants' transnational political participation.

As previously seen in Chapter 1, immigrant transnationalism represents a relatively new phenomenon and concept in the political and social sciences. Although some form of transnationalism have always existed like returned migrants, immigrants who travel periodically back home, 'commercial diasporas' or forced political

diasporas, these did not achieve the regularity, routine and critical nature of present forms of transnationalism (Cohen, 1997; Portes *et al.*, 2003).

The novel and important character of contemporary immigrant trasnationalism resides also in the increasing number of people involved, the high intensity of interchanges due to the technological advances, the new forms of transaction and the multiplicity of activities that cross state borders and require this kind of geographical movement for their fulfilment, its high degree of institutionalisation and the various forms this might take (Itzigshon *et al.*, 1999; Itzigshon, 2000; *Portes et al.*, 2003). These conceptual differences between newer transnational practices and older migration networks represent an important contribution of the transnational approach to the theoretical development of migration studies (Vertovec, 2004).

Transnationalism as a new concept in social and political sciences has appeared in the 1990s and has been examined in several disciplines like social anthropology, cultural studies, sociology, history and political science. Although the concept was first developed from a top down perspective (transnationalism from above) directing the research interests to cross-border activities of governments and multinational corporations, later on, social science scholars have started to analyse grass-roots initiatives of civil society actors like nongovernmental organisations, social movements, and immigrants across state borders (transnationalism

from below) and to examine their critical nature (Basch *et al.*, 1994; Guarnizo, 1998; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Appadurai, 1990; Bhabha, 1990; Clifford, 1992; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003; Portes, 1999; Portes *et al*., 2003, 2007; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003).

Social anthropologists have first suggested that transnationalism represents a generalised phenomenon among contemporary migrant communities that has developed as an alternative to traditional ways of assimilation. Transnational migration is been defined as a form of migration through which persons, even if they move across international borders and establish relations in new societies through information and 'cultural capital' or informal networks, maintain ongoing social connexions with home country *polity* (Basch *et al.*, 1994; Guarnizo, 1998; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999). Cultural studies scholars have given the concept a curios cultural orientation and a particular normative, post-modern connotation as "counter-narratives of the nation" that question the viability of the state and indicate the emergence of "post-national" societies (Appadurai, 1990; Bhabha, 1990; Clifford, 1992; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003).

Sociologists, who have performed comparative work on migrant transnationalism, have defined the phenomenon as economic, political or socio-cultural activities initiated and sustained by non-institutional actors across state borders. They have also suggested that this social phenomenon is far from being so widespread among

immigrant communities and its perspective for transforming power asymmetries within and across countries has so far to be determined (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Portes *et al.,* 2002, 2003, 2007). Nevertheless, through the networks established across political borders and given the nearly instantaneous character of communication in time and space, an increasing number of people have homes in two countries and pursue economic, political and socio-cultural interests in both of them, in a quite institutionalised manner and many times on a regular basis (see Itzigshon *et al.*, 1999, 2002; Landolt, 2001, 2008; Landolt *et al.*, 1999; Portes *et al.*, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2007; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; etc.).

Later on, political theorists like Kymlicka (2003a, 2003b) and Bauböck (2003a) have interpreted immigrant transnationalism in terms of a possible challenge to the traditional model of national citizenship. In order to define migrant transnationalism, these scholars have first tried to delimit and differentiate the scope of transnationalism from other international, multinational or supranational phenomena that also entail cross-border interactions but conducted by more institutionalised and considerably more powerful actors. Immigrant political transnationalism is been defined in terms of dual or overlapping membership between two different and independent political communities. Transnational migrants were mainly seen as diasporas or dual citizens.

According with Kymlicka (2003a, 2003b), immigrant transnationalism, apart from questioning the nation-state in the name of another nation or minority group, it also queries the idea that citizenship should be circumscribed within the territorial boundaries of a national community. Hence, his vision of transnationalism includes not only a form of transnational activism (immigrant transnationalism or transnational advocacy networks) but also of transnational governance (transnational legislative/parliamentary bodies). Bauböck (2003a) defines it in a less abstract manner as political institutions and practices that transcend the borders of independent states by involving simultaneous overlapping affiliations of person to geographically separate polities. Accordingly, migrant political transnationalism includes not only a narrow set of activities (like external voting rights and dual citizenship) through which migrants become involved in the politics of their country of origin, but also the way in which these activities affect the collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native population in both home and destination countries.

Although both theoretical perspectives are extremely informative as they attempt to define new forms of political relations and communities, their high level of abstraction is of little use when trying to find clear indicators for measuring who is and who is not a transnational political migrant. More empirical approaches come from sociologists like Portes and his collaborators (Portes *et al.*, 1999, 2003, 2007; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003) who define migrant

political transnationalism as *regular* cross-border political activities (electoral and non-electoral) connecting immigrants with their countries of origin.

Eva Östergaard-Nielsen (2001b, 2003a), though she gives the concept a broader meaning, develops an operational definition of immigramt political transnationalism as various forms of direct and indirect (via the institutions of the host country or international organisations) cross-border participation of both migrants and refugees in the politics of their country of origin. She accordingly identifies various types of transnational political practices and activities such as homeland politics, diaspora politics, immigrant politics, and trans-local politics.

I employ an operational definition of immigrant political transnationalism that integrates arguments from both sociology and political science (more precisely, political theory and political participation literature). Hence, migrant transnational political participation is defined as voluntary electoral and non-electoral cross-border political activities and practices (homeland politics, immigrant politics and trans-local politics) through which migrants attempt to or exert pressure on at least two political communities (home and destination countries), on a relatively regular basis. This participation can be direct like voting, membership in a political party, etc. and/or indirect via the political institutions of the home country (government, embassy/consulate) or international organisations.

Most studies on transnational migration have come from economic sociology (see Sassen, 1988; Portes, 1996) and those coming from others fields like social anthropology or cultural studies (see Ong, 1999; Ong and Nonini, 1997) have not made politics the central focus of their analysis of transnational practices. Moreover, a political science research perspective on immigrant transnationalism has not been very common in the scholarly literature. At the same time, social movement theories or studies on transnational networks, and also political participation literature have been scantily employed in transnational migration research studies. This thesis adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the study of immigrant political transnationalism by drawing on theoretical and empirical studies in sociology and political science (more precisely, political theory, political participation and social movements literature).

Research on immigrant transnationalism has been quite abundant though two different research perspectives can be distinguished on both sides of the Atlantic. First, European-based research, unlike the United States-based research, has focused less on immigrant political transnationalism and scarcely from a comparative perspective. Second, the main research design in European-based studies has been studying one immigrant group in several countries, the destination context being the main explicative variable. While European researchers have mainly focus on national ideologies and policies, the United States studies have closely looked at local-to-

local bottom up political practices of immigrants. Collective immigrant organisations/associations in Western Europe as main transnational actors though in a less institutionalised manner have not been given much attention, neither the initiatives undertaken by home states to motivate and channel the political participation of their expatriates (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001b, 2003a).

This overview of the relevant academic and research areas to the subject of immigrant transnationalism provides evidence of the importance of investigating this phenomenon in the European context. Accordingly, this thesis consists of a comparative research study of the transnational political practices and activities of different national/ethnic immigrant associations in Barcelona. More detailed explanations on the concept of immigrant political transnationalism and on the main lines of empirical research on this subject appear in Chapter 1.

In this thesis, I attempt to test the validity of various hypotheses that are significant in the transnational migration literature, some of them having not been yet examined. The main descriptive hypothesis of this study is that immigrant associations in Barcelona engage at different degrees in political transnationalism. In other words, the main assumption is that not all immigrant associations in Barcelona participate directly and/or indirectly in the politics of their country of origin, and on a relatively regular basis. To contrast this hypothesis, I compare the political practices and activities of

different national/ethnic origin immigrant associations and identify those immigrant associations that are (or not) politically transnational. I then describe the forms, scope and intensity of their political transnationalism.

The causal hypotheses of this study focus on the effects of contextual factors like the political opportunity structure in home country, the level of socio-economic development of home country or the national/ethnic origin of the immigrant group, and of organisational factors like type of immigrant association, social networks, year of foundation, sources of funds, etc., on immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism.

Several scholars have suggested that instable or transitional political situation in home country may open up more opportunities for immigrants' engagement in the politics of their country of origin (see Portes *et al.*, 2007). The vulnerable geopolitical position of many peripheral exit states, increasing poverty in the wake of structural adjustment policies, and the racial barriers migrants encounter explain recent trends toward extending the boundaries of citizenship in these countries (see Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994; Portes *et al.*, 2003; Itzigshon, 2000).

The instability of political alliances in pluralistic political systems might release new political opportunities for collective action. In less democratic countries, the lack of routinely competence converts whatever sign of instability in a chance for collective action. At the

same time, conflicts among elites might encourage the emergence of collective action by motivating groups with low resources (like economic immigrants) to assume the risks of collective action or/and by animating the elite that has been excluded from power (like diasporas) to adopt the role of "people's voice" (see Tarrow, 2004: 118-120).

New access opportunities in home countries (double citizenship, external voting rights or other state-led policies toward emigrants living abroad) can lead to increasing transnational political action of immigrant associations. As narrower participation access is (for example, in a less democratic country), as much likely that new openness (new political rights or new state-led policies and programmes) produces new opportunities for collective action (see Eisinger, 1973: 15; Tarrow, 2004: 117-118). More emigration countries have lately widen the spectrum of political rights (double citizenship and/or external voting rights) and have adopted various state-led policies and programmes as a way of biding their emigrants to the home country and getting, in turn, benefits like remittances, technology transfer, political allegiance and cultural maintenance.

States become involved in the transnational social space as this becomes more prominent, in other words, when states perceive the economic and political potential of their expatriate communities (Portes, 1999). State-led trasnationalism refers to "institutionalised national policies and programs that attempt to expand the scope of a

national state's political, economic, social, and moral regulation to include emigrants and their descendents outside the national territory" (Goldring 2002: 64). Three broad categories of migrant-sending states have been identified in the scholarly literature (see Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004): 1) transnational nation-states that treat their emigrants as long-term, long-distance members and grant them dual citizenship or nationality; 2) strategically selective states that encourage some forms of long-distance economic and political nationalism but want to selectively and strategically manage what emigrants can and cannot do; and 3) disinterested and denouncing states which treat migrants as if they no longer belong to their homeland.

In this sense, my *main causal hypothesis* is that higher political opportunity structure in home country increases the engagement of immigrant associations in transnational political activities and practices. The concept of political opportunity structure in home country for nationals living abroad includes the following dimensions: 1) the level of freedom in home country; 2) formal political rights for nationals living abroad (dual citizenship, external voting rights); and 3) state-led policies directed at emigrants living abroad. More accurate aspects on the operationalisation of this concept appear in Chapter 2. My ambition and purpose in the present work essentially consists in trying to demonstrate that immigrant associations whose country of origin is more free (democratic), providing their emigrants more political rights and

more state services, are more likely to engage in political transnationalism.

Persons migrating from poor regions to the developed Western Europe have come to constitute an indispensable source of survival for their countries and communities of origin. The level of remittances sent by immigrants in the advanced countries to their respective nation states (families) easily exceeds the foreign aid that these nations receive and even match their hard currency earnings from exports (Portes *et al.*, 2007: 243-244; Sandell *et al.*, 2007: 14-15). Migrants to developed countries have also started to implement a whole array of philanthropic and civic projects in home communities and countries (see Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002; Portes *et al.*, 2003b).

Empirical data show that immigrants' and home country counterparts' initiatives might possess the counter-hegemonic potential to the contemporary processes of global neoliberal capitalism. While the latter leads to increasing inequalities among and within nations and remains largely indifferent to the causes behind the massive movements of people from the Global South to the North, the activities of hometown committees and other immigrant organisations/associations strongly seek to alleviate this situation. Nevertheless, the ways by which people driven from their countries by poverty, violence and lack of resources and opportunities then turn around and seek to overturn these conditions

by using the resources acquired abroad needs to be further on investigated (Portes *et al.*, 2007).

In this sense, *the second causal hypothesis* is that the level of socio economic development of home country influences immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism. In other words, as lower the socio-economic level of development of home country, as higher immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism (in particular, in trans-local politics). The level of socio-economic development of home country is measured in this study through the Human Development Index.

Empirical studies show that transnational organisations and activism vary among different national origin immigrant groups, in part, because of the entrance of home country governments in the transnational field and the policies that they have so far implemented (Portes *et al.*, 2007). Programmes and policies initiated by home country governments toward nationals living abroad play a significant role in the transnational social field, especially if they go beyond symbolic appeals and provide help for their emigrants. In these cases, official directives can considerably influence the direction and goals adopted by grassroots transnational activities (Smith 2003b). *The third causal hypothesis* is that immigrant associations' transnational political activism varies among different national/ethnic origin immigrant groups.

In the absence of large economic resources, immigrants carry out long-distance projects depending on the maintenance of strong networks of social contacts. The larger or more difficult the proposed transnational project is, the stronger the social networks required to uphold it. The prediction is that, regardless of immigrant associations' motivations for engaging in political transnationalism, the latter will be conditioned by the size (the absolute number of an association's ties) and spatial scope (the ratio of out-of-town association's contacts, including those abroad, to those in the city of residence) of immigrant associations' networks. The larger and more spatially diversified these are, the greater the chances for engaging in political initiatives across state borders (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1218, 1224). Hence, *the fourth causal hypothesis* of this thesis is that as more extended and spatially diversified social networks as higher immigrant associations' engagement in transnational political practices and activities.

Recent empirical studies of immigrant communities in the United States reveal that the predominant type of immigrant organisations involved in transnational activities are the civic entities that pursue an agenda of national scope, based on several projects in their home country. Second in importance are hometown committees whose scope of action is primarily local. Next are social agencies that provide health, educational, and other services to immigrants, but which are also engaged in their home country. The latter are commonly better-financed organizations since their budget includes funds for social services provided by destination municipal, county,

and state governments. Trasnational political organisations are rather a minority and they are represented among particular immigrant groups (Portes *et al.*, 2007). Accordingly, *the fifth causal hypothesis* of this study is that civic entities would engage more in transnational political activism than social, cultural or hometown associations.

Other organisational variables that will be also tested in this thesis are year of foundation, number of members, sources of funds, etc. More accurate aspects on the hypotheses, dependent and independent variables appear in Chapter 2.

As mentioned previously, this research subject came to me in a rather unexpected manner. However, at the time of choosing this PhD research subject, I was ending up my PhD Programme in political and social sciences. After I received my second university degree in Sociology (the first one was in mathematics) I completed my postgraduate studies with courses at Lund University, Sweden and then with a Master programme in Sociology of Law at the International Institute for Sociology of Law, Oñati, Spain. I wrote my first Masters dissertation on Swedish immigration policy, and the second one about the integration process of newcomer Arab immigrants in the city of Malmö, Sweden. This contributed considerably to my socio-legal formation as a researcher in areas like migration and human rights. The subject of immigrant political transnationalism was just an opportunity for integrating my main formation in Sociology with the postgraduate studies in Political

and Social Sciences. My background in Mathematics and Sociology allowed me to design a study that incorporates not only qualitative data and methods but also a quantitative analysis in order to enhance the results of this qualitative investigation.

This research was conducted in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona. The big urban conglomerates are the zones where more immigrants arrive ultimately, principally because of increasing work opportunities. Barcelona is the second metropolitan area in Spain, after Madrid, and one of the main areas of immigrant concentration. The big cities of the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (MAB) gather the majority of immigrants independently of their country of origin, thing that increases the cultural diversity of the area. Barcelona is the most important city in the urban system hierarchy, many economic, social and territorial dynamics varying in their importance in function of their proximity to Barcelona. Accordingly, most European, American and Asian immigrant populations are concentrated in Barcelona, and only the African origin population is distributed between the city of Barcelona and other cities of the MAB like Terrassa, Mataró, Granollers or Martorell (Cladera and Elordui-Zapaterietxe, 2004).

Historically, Barcelona has been a city of immigration. In the XIXth century, there was an internal migration to Barcelona from other Catalan provinces. At the beginning of the XXth century, migrants came to Barcelona from various neighbouring regions due to a major improvement in infrastructure. During the 60s, the

phenomenon of migration acquired a significant dimension and expanded to other Spanish regions like Murcia, Andalucia and Galicia. With the 80s and 90s, immigrants started to come to Barcelona from outside the Spanish borders (see Solé, 2000). In 2006, Catalonia registered the highest number of foreign population (22% of the total foreign population) from the 17 Spanish autonomous communities and the two autonomous cities (Melilla and Ceuta) that compose the Spanish State. Among the Catalan Autonomous Community, Barcelona represented the province with the highest number of foreign population (71% of the total foreign population), far more than Girona (13%), Tarragona (11%) or Lleida (6%).

Between 2000 and 2006, the absolute value of registered persons with other nationality than Spanish (how an immigrant is usually defined by official statistics that analyse the international migration) has significantly increased in the city of Barcelona. While in 2000 the foreign nationals living in Barcelona represented 4.9 per cent of the total population, in 2006 they represented around 16.5 per cent. This increase of 11.6 percentage points, in only six years, indicates a real migratory boom. The foreign population in Barcelona come mainly from Latin American, African, European and Asian countries. The Latin Americans (Central and South America) represented in 2006 by far the largest immigrant group in the province of Barcelona (41.3% of the total foreign population), followed by the Africans (23.4%), the Europeans (21.2%) and the Asians (11.8%). The research location of this study has been chosen

not only because of the presented data, but also of an important theoretical assumption that is that city polities are in many ways more open to transnational affiliations than nation-states (see Bauböck, 2003b).

The principal aims of this research study are the following: to explore if immigrant associations in Barcelona engage in transnational political practices and activities; to analyse the forms, scope, and intensity of immigrant associations' participation in the politics of their country of origin; to examine the main determinants of this kind of political activism like the political opportunity structure in home country, the level of socio-economic development of the country of origin, the social networks, the type of immigrant associations, etc.; and to investigate if there are any patterned differences across different national origin immigrant associations in the incidence and forms adopted by this phenomenon.

The structure of the thesis

To give a brief outline of the thesis, in Chapter 1, I first examine the larger concept of migrant transnationalism and the main theoretical perspectives developed on it. I then define the concept of immigrant political transnationalism, as one particular form of migrant transnationalism, and explore its relationship with the traditional conception of national citizenship. Immigrant political transnationalism refers here to various forms of direct and indirect (via the political institutions of the destination country or

international organisations) cross-border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both immigrants and refugees, and on a relatively regular basis. This chapter also highlights the main lines of empirical research on immigrant transnationalism.

In Chapter 2, I explain the research questions motivating this dissertation and emphasise the socio-political and theoretical relevance of studying immigrant political transnationalism. The research questions are concerned with the identification of those immigrant associations in Barcelona that engage in political transnationalism and of the main determinants of this kind of political activism. This chapter also presents the proposed theoretical model, more specifically, the main hypotheses, the dependent and independent variables, and the unit and level of analysis.

Chapter 3 begins with a presentation of the empirical strategy adopted that is a qualitative analysis of immigrant political transnationalism, more specifically, a comparison of the cross border participation of different national/ethnic origin immigrant associations in Barcelona in the politics of their country of origin. I also describe the research design, the sample construction, type of data and methods used to produce my empirical evidence.

Chapter 4 offers a conventional descriptive analysis of the transnational political practices and activities of 24 immigrant associations in Barcelona. The empirical analysis is systematically

carried out for each group of national/ethnic origin immigrant associations and focus on the origins, types and structure of the selected immigrant associations and also on the forms, scope and intensity of their political transnationalism. The main findings are then discussed, stressing the differences observed across various forms of political transnationalism, and the national/ethnic origin of immigrant associations. In the last section of this chapter, I present an initial profile of the sample of transnational immigrant associations.

Chapter 5 provides a conventional explicative analysis of the structural and organisational determinants of the transnational political activism of 24 immigrant associations in Barcelona. The theoretical arguments and hypotheses are divided according to two groups of factors that are emphasised in the literature on immigrant transnationalism and on organisational political behaviour: contextual determinants like the exit context and organisational factors like type of immigrant associations, social networks, number of members, sources of funds, etc. The main findings are discussed according to these two types of determinants, *macro* and *meso*.

Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the main points of the theoretical framework and results of the descriptive and explicative analyses presented in this thesis and discusses the implications of these findings for the future. This chapter also includes suggestions for future research on some particular issues and findings addressed in this thesis. More specifically, it proposes that the theoretical

framework developed here – the transnational political engagement of immigrant associations– has further explanatory potential with additional data from surveys to embassies/consulates on state-led policies toward emigrants living abroad or from the effects of this political activism on both exit and destination countries, and new individual data on members' implication or participation in the politics of their country of origin. As the reader will notice, the findings of the thesis suggest that organisational and contextual factors matter to different extents depending on the kind of transnational political activity under consideration. An important lesson in the study of political behaviour follows from this that is the need to differentiate between different types of transnational political action.

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1. IMMIGRANT POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM

1.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the concept of immigrant political transnationalism, as one particular form of migrant transnationalism. I examine first the larger concept of migrant transnationalism and the main theoretical perspectives developed on it. Then, I analyse the main theoretical contributions on immigrant political transnationalism and explores its relationship with the traditional conception of national citizenship. Finally, I highlight the main lines of empirical research on this phenomenon.

1.2 Immigrant Transnationalism: Concept and Analytical Perspectives

A) Establishing and delimitating the phenomenon

In order to define the concept of immigrant transnationalism, we first have to situate the incidence of the phenomenon within the migration research field. In other words, we have to examine the scale (immigrant transnationalism has to involve a significant number of immigrants), continuousness (transnational activities have to be constant and flexible over time) and distinctness (transnational activities have to be different and not included in the already existent concepts) of this 'new' phenomenon in the migration studies (Portes *et al.*, 2003).

The phenomenon of immigrant transnationalism, although not entirely new, has reached at the end of the 20th century a particular intensity at the global scale and has become a subject of interest for many researchers from the migration field. More and more people live today a double life: they speak two languages, they have houses in two countries and their everyday life implies a continuous and regular interaction across state borders. Helped moreover by the modern technology that makes easier to travel and communicate with their homelands, many immigrants today maintain themselves active in the economic, social and political spheres of their country of origin. Transnational activities vary from informal businesses of import and export of goods, to the emergence of a new 'class' of bi-national professionals or immigrants who participate currently in the politics of their home country (Portes 1997, 2001, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 2003; Castles, 2002).

The increasing involvement of immigrants in diverse activities across state borders has opened many controversial academic debates. Some scholars consider that the phenomenon of transnationalism is new and rising, while others believe that it has always existed jointly with migration. Some picture transnational businessmen as a new and particular group of people, while others affirm that all immigrants are part of a transnational community. Finally, there are scholars who describe these activities as deriving from the globalisation of capital, while some others see them as a popular reaction to the adverse effects of this same process (Portes *et al.*, 2003).

American anthropological studies suggest that transnationalism represents a generalised phenomenon among contemporary migrant communities that has developed as an alternative to the traditional way of assimilation. As such, transnational migration is defined as a form of migration through which persons, even if they move across international borders and establish relations in new societies through information and 'cultural capital' or informal networks, maintain ongoing social connexions with home country *polity*. In transnational migration, people actually live their lives across international borders and are defined as 'trasmigrants' (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999).

This anthropological approach, by assuming that all immigrants are transnational, does not create explicit criteria for differentiating who is and who is not a 'transmigrant'. If the simple act of sending remittances to families or travelling home occasionally are considered as transnational activities, this puts in question marks the existence of the entire field since immigrants have always been engaged in this kind of activities. Hence, this high reliance on case studies in the transnational field has created a methodological problem, that of selecting on the dependent variable. Only those involved in transnational activities have constituted the unit of analysis. Consequently, the phenomenon of transnationalism has been overestimated in its general spread, and its possible absence in the everyday life of many immigrants has been thus overlooked

(Levitt, 2001b; Kyle, 2001; Portes, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 2003; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003).

Comparative studies on immigrant transnationalism show that regular or occasional participation in transnational activities is not a universal practice. Not all migrants develop transnational practices, and many do so only in one sphere of their lives (see Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Faist, 2000a; Landolt, 2001; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003). Although immigrant remittances, occasional contacts, trips to and activities in homeland communities might be considered as certain forms of transnationalism that contribute to the strengthening of the transnational field, these cannot justify *per se* the development of a new concept. Moreover, immigrants have engaged for a long time in this kind of activities (Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004).

Precursors of present transnationalism have always existed like returned migrants, immigrants who travel periodically back home, economic diasporas or forced political diasporas and their continuous contacts with their homelands (Cohen, 1997; Portes *et al.*, 2003). Some examples of forced political diasporas are the Russian Jews escaping from the tsarist persecution in the XXth century (see Howe, 1976), the Armenians escaping form the Turkish oppression (see Noiriel, 1995) or the significant Spanish diaspora after the instauration of fascism in Spain (see Solé, 1995).

Examples of previous economic transnationalism are the 'commercial diasporas', meaning merchant communities established in foreign jurisdictions with the aim of commercialising

products, that maintained their networks across borders and travelled from one side to another in search of commercial opportunities (see Curtin, 1984; Portes *et al.*, 2003). Venetians and Genovese merchants in medieval Europe are one early example of economic transnationalism or transnational entrepreneurs (see Pirenne, 1970). During the successive phases of the European colonization of Africa and America, many Portuguese, Danish and English established commercial enclaves of agents involved in various forms of transnational commerce (see Dobb, 1963; Hardoy, 1969; Arrighi, 1994). More recent, the Chinese started to represent an archetypical example of a transnational commercial community (see Lim, 1983; Granovetter, 1995).

But the first examples of economic transnationalism were elitist, including commercials and resource commercial agents who maintained a strong affiliation with their representative firm/house and communities of origin and depended on large distance networks for their economic survival. With the labour migration in the XIXth century, the more popular precursors of contemporary transnational activities started to appear. In this new era of a relatively advanced industrial capitalism, the expansion of commercial industry and agriculture required the over-crossing of barriers or frontiers that limited the local labour force. Transnational enterprises were established, whose workers had few roots abroad, maintained their networks with homeland through trips and inversions and worked on a regular base abroad (see Galarza, 1977; Cohen, 1988; Noiriel, 1995; Portes *et al.*, 2003).

Examples of a more recent economic transnationalism are the massive European labour migration to the United States in the XIXth century, the massive recruitment of Polish workers in the hard industry and mining in Germany, of Algerian and Moroccans workers in the French industry before the World War II or the massive migration of Mexican workers to the southeast of the United States that increased with the Braceros programme, a labour immigration treaty between Mexico and the United States (see Weber, 1906 [1958]; Samora, 1971; Barrera, 1980; Portes and Bach, 1985; Portes *et al.*, 2003).

Early political transnationalism is less common but that, that did exist, had transcendental consequences. We could mention for instance the efforts of some leaders and activists abroad to free up their land from foreign control or to support the creation of a nation-state. Some common examples are those people who emigrated from nations without states in the XIXth century or the beginning of the XXth century like the Lithuanians or Czechs in the United States. At the same time, the Polish immigrants to the United States contributed with money to the cause of the Polish liberation at the beginning of the XIXth century, while the Cuban expatriates in the United States helped in the foundation of the Cuban Republic (see Glazer, 1954; Thomas, 1971; Rosenblum, 1973; Portes *et al.*, 2003).

All these examples of previous transnational immigrant activities reinforced the links between their respective communities but did not achieve the regularity, routine and critical nature of present

forms of transnationalism. Very few immigrants really lived in two countries in terms of their everyday activities. Although many past immigrants dreamt with returning someday back home, this aim was postponed by daily worries and necessities of their new lives and for many of them, these dreams just disappeared. Contemporary transnationalism corresponds to a global economy and to new strategies of popular actors who find themselves in a subordinate position in respect to the system, but who come to accede to new technological advances in order to overcome this position (see Thomas and Znaniecki, 1984; Handlin, 1973; Portes *et al.*, 2003).

The novel and important character of contemporary immigrant trasnationalism resides in the high intensity of interchanges, the new forms of transaction and the multiplicity of activities that cross state borders and require this kind of geographical movement for their fulfilment, its high degree of institutionalisation and the various forms this phenomenon might take (Itzigshon *et al.*, 1999; Itzigshon, 2000; Portes *et al.*, 2003). Present transnational communities possess a distinct character that give good reason for the emergence of a new research field: 1) an increasing number of people involved; 2) the nearly instantaneous character of communications across space due to the technological advances; and 3) the cumulative character of the process that makes participation *normative* within certain immigrant groups (Portes 1997, 2001, 2003).

Transnational activities and occupations require regular and stable social contacts across sate borders for their accomplishment (for example, the monthly trips of a Pakistanis businessman to deliver correspondence and supplies to his co-nationals' parents in Pakistan or the community development projects undergone once a year by an Ecuadorian hometown association in some deprived home community). Occasional gifts in money or goods that immigrants send to their parents or friends (that is not an occupation) or buying a house in home country (that is not a regular activity) do not constitute a transnational activity (Portes *et al.*, 2003; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003). Long-distance connections maintained by migrants one hundred years ago were not exactly transnational in the contemporary meaning of regular, sustained and, especially, 'real time' social contacts. Such earlier links were rather just border crossing migrant networks, sporadically maintained by migrants as best as they could at that time (Portes *et al.*, 1999). These conceptual differences between newer transnational practices and older migration networks represent an important contribution of the transnational approach to the theoretical development of migration studies (Vertovec, 2003).

B) The Concept

In the post-War period, socio-political analysts were mainly concerned with the problem of immigrant assimilation into an ethnically homogeneous society. By the 1980s, they shifted to the 'softer' notion of integration and developed a new policy

perspective, that of multiculturalism. Later on, by the 1990s, socio-political scientists started to focus on new forms of citizenship and inter-group relations in the city, while with the 21st century they moved their interest towards transnationalism (Castles, 2002: 2).

Transnationalism, as a new concept in social and political sciences, was first developed from a top-down perspective (transnationalism from above) directing the research interests to the cross-border activities of governments or multinational corporations. More recent sociological literature has started to look at the initiatives of common people in establishing solid economic, political and socio-cultural networks across national borders (transnationalism from below) (see Portes, 1999; Portes *et al*., 2003, 2007; Guarnizo *et al*., 2003). The term *transnationalism* has come to be used when referring to both human activities and social institutions that expand across national borders. States have been seen as delimited political entities whose borders are crossed by flows of people, money or information and are expanded by social networks, organisations or fields (Bauböck, 2003a). As we will see in Chapter 2, this study focuses on the "transnationalism from below", more exactly, on the political transnationalism of immigrant associations.

Immigrant transnationalism was first analysed by a group of social anthropologists who related it with transmigration and defined it as "multi-stranded" social relations and activities shaped and sustained by immigrants across state borders. Immigrants were seen as building social fields that over-cross geographic, cultural, and

political borders. One of the essential elements of this process was the multiplicity of social, political and economic involvements that migrants sustain in both, home and destination societies. These scholars suggested the term *transmigrants* for these people who live their lives across borders and develop social, familial, political, economic and religious networks that incorporate them into two or more states (Basch *et al*., 1994; Guarnizo, 1998; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999).

On the other side, cultural studies scholars gave the concept a curios cultural orientation and a particular normative, post-modern connotation as "counter-narratives of the nation" that question the viability of the state and indicate the emergence of "post-national" societies (Appadurai, 1990; Bhabha, 1990; Clifford, 1992; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003). Nevertheless, both theoretical views have come to converge when defining transnationalism as a form of popular resistance "from below" rather than global activities "from above" performed by large economic enterprises or states (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998).

Sociologists who realise comparative empirical work on transnationalism (see Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 2007) also distinguish between "transnationalism from above" - those trasnational activities initiated and developed by institutional actors such as multinational corporations or states, and "transnationalism from below" - those activities that result from grass-root initiatives of immigrants and their counterparts in the country of origin. Transnational activities from above are well known and have been

examined from different conceptual frameworks like economic globalisation, international relations or cultural diffusion (Sassen, 1996; Meyer *et al.*, 1997). Researchers tend now to focus more on transnational initiatives from below, particularly the civic projects developed by hometown immigrant associations in their communities of origin (see Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 2007).

"Transnationalism from below" refers to grassroots activities carried out across state borders by civil society actors such as immigrants (see Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc, 1992, 1995; Portes, 1996, 1997, 2003; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003b), social movements (see Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, 1997; Tarrow 1998, 2001, 2005; della Porta *et al.*, 1999) and nongovernmental organisations (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Boli and Thomas, 1999), independent of and sometimes in opposition to official political systems. These empirical findings show that through the networks established across political borders, an increasing number of people frequently have homes in two countries and pursue economic, political and cultural interests in both of them.

Nevertheless, the emancipating nature of transnationalism is still questioned, capital accumulation rather than power-contesting practices being the main explanatory variable when studying diasporas (see Mitchell, 1997; Ong, 1999). Some scholars do not differentiate between "transnationalism from above" and

"transnationalism from below" and define the phenomenon generically as "a set of sustained, border-crossing connections" among various groups of geographically dispersed social actors, such as immigrants, global corporations and business partnerships, media and communications networks, social movements, criminal groups and terrorist organisations (see Vertovec, 2003: 972).

According to Guarnizo and Smith (1998: 6), a guiding principle for determining the *counter-hegemonic* nature of transnationalism could be "to discern how this process affects power relations, cultural constructions, economic interactions, and, more generally, social organization at the level of the locality". The 'dominated' (or subordinate) forces could gain control or become counter-hegemonic through political and economic contest or through cultural and ideological struggle. By studying the transnational practices and activities of non-institutional actors and also their networks of alliances of interest with the civil society, in general, a researcher could identify the counter-hegemonic nature of their transnational activism.[1]

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[1] Hegemony could be defined as the means and practices of the dominant group in a society in order to maintain its dominance by securing the natural consent of the subordinate groups (including the immigrants - author's note). This consent is assured through the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus that incorporates both dominant and dominated groups (Gramsci, 1971).

C) Main theoretical perspectives on transnationalism: Kymlicka, Bauböck and Portes

Most social and political science theorists interested in transnationalism try first to delimit and differentiate the scope of transnationalism from other international, multinational or supranational phenomena that also entail cross-border interactions but conducted by more institutionalised and considerably more powerful actors. Consequently, they distinguish between different types of transnationalism.

Will Kymlicka (2003a: 13-16), for example, perceives minority nationalism and transnationalism as two possible challenges to the traditional model of national citizenship. Although minority nationalism asks for forms of ethnic minority accommodation like self-government and collective minority rights, it does not seem to challenge the very idea of nationhood but rather that of statehood like state's sovereignty and its mutually exclusive jurisdiction.[2] States are incapable of recognising substate national groups and give them the possibility to democratic cultural expressiveness. Thus, minority nationalism "replicates" rather than "challenges" the model of liberal-democratic national citizenship within present political communities. Immigrant transnationalism, instead, apart from questioning the nation-state in the name of another nation or minority group, it also queries the idea that citizenship should be

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[2] Kymlicka (2003a: 13) defines *minority nationalism* as "mono-national political communities,…, which mobilise to maintain or regain their historic rights of self-government, with their own public institutions, operating in their own language.

circumscribed within the territorial boundaries of a national community. In other words, this phenomenon challenges the very idea of national citizenship.

In order to assess this, Kymlicka (2003a,b) examines five forms of political activity that have been described as examples of "transnational citizenship": (1) immigrant transnationalism; (2) transnational advocacy networks; (3) international legal authority; (4) transnational legislative/parliamentary bodies; and (5) intergovernmental regulatory authorities (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1: Forms of "transnational citizenship"

1. Immigrant transnationalism	2.Transnational advocacy networks	3. International legal authority	4. Transnational legislative/ Parliamentary bodies	5. Intergovernmental regulatory authorities
Immigrant participation in homelands politics	NGOs that pressure on one's own government	International law (HR law); intergovernmental regulatory bodies (WTO); international legislatures (EU Parliament).	EU's European Parliament or a possible common North American Parliament	"…delegated powers by states to exercise in accordance with the interests of these states"

(Personal elaboration; Source: Kymlicka, 2003a)

Kymlicka (2003a: 16) defines *immigrant trasnationalism* as immigrant participation in homelands politics. But he refers only to one form of immigrant trasnationalism that is the political transnationalism, which he merely sees in terms of dual nationality acceptance and external voting rights. In his opinion, these rights do not actually challenge the normative assumption that "politics

should be organised through territorially-bounded national political communities".

Transnational advocacy networks consist of recruiting supporters from other countries, usually NGOs, to help pressure on one's own government.[3] But this sort of transnational activism represents a "weak" transnational political agency since it assumes that "the ultimate locus of decision-making is territorially-bounded national legislatures" (Kymlicka, 2003a: 16-19).

Apart from the transnational activism, some sort of transnational decision-making or governance could also replace or contest the nation-state power, and challenge the liberal/national models of citizenship. Kymlicka (2003a: 19-22) analyses three forms of *transnational or international legal authority*: (a) international law, such as human rights law; (b) intergovernmental regulatory bodies like the World Trade Organisation (WTO); and (c) international legislatures like the European Union Parliament. He nevertheless concludes that international legal authority does not actually challenge liberal/national models but rather universalises and exports them, though it does impose limits on state sovereignty.

Kymlicka (2003a: 22-24) considers that a *democratic transnational parliament* at the global scale is rather utopian in a world in which

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[3] Kymlicka (2003: 18) gives the examples of indigenous people in Canada and their appeal to international allies in local policy issues: the development taken up in James Bay by the Quebec Government, environmental groups trying to put pressure on Canada to stop the seal hunt, or Canadian environmental NGOs pressuring the Government of Brazil to change its policies in the Amazon.

many countries do not have democratic elections for their own governments.[4] Even common citizens are "unenthusiastic" about a *transnational democracy* as this might imply a return to the "pre-national phase", in which "the masses will be governed by elites who do not share their own language and culture, and in which politics is conducted in a language and in a media that is 'foreign' to the masses". People's perceptions about the appropriate boundaries of a political community have less to do with size but more with "a feeling of belonging together, of being a *nation*, *people* or *community of fate*".

If the idea of *transnational democracy* does not seem to be realistic at least for the foreseeable future, the level of democracy in our transnational institutions can still be supervised through *intergovernmental regulatory authorities* that are "…delegated powers by states to exercise in accordance with the interests of these states". But these institutions could serve, in the end, the interests of their own agents and not of the people who elected them. Democratic accountability at a transnational level might not only be difficult to put in practice but also more limited than that at a domestic level (Kymlicka, 2003a: 24-26).

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[4] Kymlicka (2003: 22-24) gives the example of the Bank of Canada - a democratically elected national legislature that supervises national regulatory institutions like the WTO. Regional democratic elected bodies like the EU Parliament or a possible common North American Parliament to make decisions regarding North American Free Trade Agreement - based institutions seem more feasible, even though there is little public support or quite indifference to the idea of transnational democracy.

Kymlicka (2003a: 26-27) finally concludes that none of these five forms of transnationalism really erodes the model of democratic citizenship and its political legitimacy that remains tied down to national political communities. The so-called "postnationalism", being this minority nationalism or migrant transnationalism, should be best understood as "latest adaptations of nationalist impulses" rather than "a new postnational political order". Kymlicka's idea of transnationalism requires not only a form of transnational activism (migrant transnationalism or transnational advocacy networks) but also of transnational governance (transnational legislative/parliamentary bodies), thing that does not seem to be feasible in the nearby future.

Rainer Bauböck (2003a: 704), another political science theorist, takes as a starting point in defining transnationalism the dual meaning of the term *national*: (1) as "an attribute of a territorially bounded state"; and, as well as, (2) "of communities that aspire for, or exercise, comprehensive self-government". He thus distinguishes four basic types of political relations: international, multinational, supranational and transnational (see Table 1.2).

Table 1.2: Types of political relations

International	Multinational	Supranational	Transnational
When state and polity coincide - external relations between independent states, and organisations in which these states are represented by their governments (United Nations, free trade zones or military alliances)	When several political communities can be nested within a larger state - multinational states, such as Canada, Spain, Belgium or the UK, and the internal relations between their historic and relatively autonomous minority groups	When several states can be nested within a larger political community - the European Union	When several political communities can overlap between separate states - political institutions and practices that involve simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities

(Personal elaboration; Source: Bauböck, 2003a)

The label *international* is used when state and polity coincides and refers to external relations between independent states and organisations in which these states are represented by their governments (for example, the United Nations, free trade zones or military alliances). When several political communities can be nested within a larger state, the right term is *multinational* that denotes multinational states (for example, Canada, Spain, Belgium or the UK and the internal relations between their historic minority groups) that enjoy substantial political autonomy (Bauböck, 2003a: 704-705).

When several states can be nested within a larger political community, Bauböck (2003a: 704-705) uses the term *supranational* relations between independent states that have concerted their

sovereignty by forming a larger federal polity (for example, the European Union).[5] Finally, the term *transnational* is used when several political communities can overlap between separate states and refers to those political institutions and practices that transcend the borders of independent states by involving simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities.

According with Bauböck's perspective (2003a: 717), migrant transnationalism is not seen anymore as a one-side process, meaning its relation with the home society, but rather as a two-side process that involves both home and destination countries. This transnational perspective that centres on overlapping membership helps us to understand how "patterns of integration into the receiving polity" and "unfinished projects of nation building in the homeland" form migrants' attitudes towards their country of origin. Migrant transnationalism is not only about a narrow set of activities (external voting rights or dual citizenship) through which migrants become involved in the politics of their homeland (see Kymlicka, 2003a,b), but also about how these activities affect in turn the "collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native population in both receiving and sending societies" (see Bauböck, 2003a: 716). This study focuses on immigrants' participation in the politics of their country of origin. A subsequent investigation would be needed in order to examine the effects of

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[5] In Bauböck's opinion (2003a: 4), free trade zones or military alliances are considered international organisations rather than supranational ones.

these transnational political activities on both, exit and destination countries.

Bauböck's and Kymlicka's theoretical perspectives on transnationalism are quite different but united in scope as they both define new forms of political relations and communities. Since these two perspectives are quite distinct and abstract, they do not allow us to construct very clear measures on the phenomenon of immigrant transnationalism. In order to encounter more junction points between them and to delimit more exactly the nature, forms, dimensions and possible indicators of this phenomenon, we bring into the discussion Alejandro Portes' perspective.

Sociologists like Alejandro Portes and his collaborators (Portes *et al.*, 1999, 2003, 2007; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003) base their analytical perspective on previous social anthropology contributions on migrant transnationalism. They distinguish between different types of activities like transnational, international and multinational according to different types of actors involved: international activities are conducted by states or nationally-based institutions; multinational activities are carried out by formal institutions whose aims and interests transcend a single nation-state; transnational activities are initiated and sustained by non-institutional actors across state borders.

Table 1.3: Cross-border activities of different types of actors

Activities	Areas		
	Political	*Economic*	*Socio-Cultural*
International	Establishment of embassies and organisation of diplomatic missions abroad by national governments	Export drives by farming, ranch, and fishing organisations from a particular country	Travel and exchange programs organised by universities based on a specific country
Multinational	United Nations and other international agencies charged with monitoring and improving specialised areas of global life	Production and marketing activities of global corporations with profits dependent on multiple national markets	Schools and missions sponsored by the Catholic Church and other global religions in multiple countries
Transnational	a) Non-governmental associations established to monitor human rights globally	a) Boycotts organised by grassroots activists in First World countries to compel multinationals to improve their Third World labour practices	a) Grassroots charities promoting the protection and care of children in poorer nations
	b) Hometown civic associations established by immigrants to improve their sending communities	b) Enterprises established by immigrants to export/import goods to and from their home countries	b) Election of beauty queens and selection of performing groups in immigrant communities to take part in annual hometown festivals

(Source: Portes 2001 ; Portes *et al.*, 2007)

According to Portes and his collaborators (Portes *et al*., 1999: 465), two theoretical premises are necessary when performing empirical work on transnationalism: (1) the concept has to refer mainly to

cross-border activities (economic, socio-cultural and political) of private actors, including immigrants; and (2) transnational activities of private actors, including immigrants ("transnationalism from below") are different from the activities realised by big bureaucracies and other global institutions ("transnationalism from above").

"Transnationalism from below" refers to grassroots activities carried out across state borders by non-institutional actors such as non-governmental organisations, human rights activists, humanitarian agents and agencies, hometown civic associations or other immigrant groups. Immigrant transnationalism is one particular form of the "transnationalism from below" and includes those activities carried out across territorial borders by hometown civic associations (or committees) and other immigrant groups in order to improve the political and socio-economic conditions in their home countries/communities or to protect and preserve their own cultural heritage and identity (Portes *et al*., 2007).

Portes and his collaborators (Portes 2001; Portes *et al*., 2007) identify three types of immigrant transnational activities: 1) economic initiatives of transnational entrepreneurs who mobilise their contacts across borders in searching for capital and markets; 2) the political activities of members of political parties, governmental functionaries or community leaders whose main purpose is to achieve political power and influence in the exit country and the expatriate communities; 3) socio-cultural enterprises oriented

toward national identity reinforcement abroad or collective cultural divertissement (see Table 1.3).

In sum, Kymlicka (2003a,b) has a forward-looking approach to transnationalism as a post-national form of membership and conceives different outsets of post-national political communities that require both institutional and non-institutional actors. Bauböck (2003a) identifies as transnational all those political institutions and practices that involve simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons (non-institutional actors) to geographically separate polities. Finally, Portes and his collaborators (1999, 2003a, 2003b, 2007) have a more empirical view and define transnationalism as those activities and practices (political, economic and socio-cultural) that entail the active engagement of non-institutional actors (including the immigrants) across territorial borders.

The three analytical perspectives do not come to agree upon different types of political relations and practices. Portes defines the United Nations as a multinational organisation, while Kymlicka and Bauböck describe it as international. Yet, international NGOs are seen as transnational by all three authors. Usually both types of organisations are considered to be international. Bauböck defines European Union as a supranational organisation, while for Portes and Kymlicka this organism is international. But all three authors coincide when defining immigrant transnationalism as a form of "transnationalism from below", meaning practices and activities conducted by non-institutional actors across national borders,

independent of and sometimes in opposition to official political systems. Immigrants are just one group within the vast array of civil society actors that might get involved in transnational practices and activities from below.

d) Ways of conceptualising immigrant transnationalism

A large number of studies have examined different forms of transnational connections, activities and practices, identities and organisations between immigrants and their country of origin (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992; Basch, Glick Schiller and Blanc-Szanton, 1994; Mahler, 1995, 1999, 2000; Portes, 1996; Goldring, 1996; Guarnizo, 1997, 1998; Smith, 1998; ; Kyle, 1999; Popkin, 1999; Guarnizo, Sanchez and Roach, 1999; Roberts, Frank and Lozano-Asencio, 1999; Itzigsohn *et al.*, 1999; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Itzigsohn, 2000; Portes *et al.*, 2003, 2007; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003).

Due to the new nature of this phenomenon, theoretical and methodological confusions have accompanied the development of the transnational migration research field. Different scholars have emphasised different forms of transnationalism, have conducted their studies at different levels of analysis, and have used a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches. Nevertheless, transnational connections and activities have proved to be quite often heterogeneous and variable in their popularity and character across immigrant communities (see Guarnizo *et al*., 2003). Thus,

more conceptual and empirical work is needed to identify forms, particularities and differences in migrant transnationalism.

Vertovec (1999: 449-456) summarises the present state of development of the studies on transnationalism. He consequently divides the field of transnationalism into six different areas of conceptualisation: 1) transnationalism as a social morphology, *i.e.*, the rise of networks and institutions that create new transnational forms of social relations and action; 2) a type of consciousness; 3) a mode of cultural production (or socio-cultural transnationalism); 4) an avenue of capital (or economic transnationalism); 5) a site of political engagement (or political transnationalism); and 6) the (re)construction of place and locality. These six areas of study are not mutually exclusive and many studies of transnationalism have simultaneously addressed more than one of them.

Subsequently, Vertovec (2003: 975) maps out the different types and levels of migrant transnationalism emphasised by various studies. This last differentiation help us to find out channels and factors (infrastructures) that facilitate transnational activities such as family and kinship organisation, transportation or people smuggling routes, communication and media networks, financial arrangements and remittance facilities, legislative frameworks regarding movement and status, and economic interdependencies linking local economies.

Table 1.4 Types and levels of immigrant transnationalism

A. Smith and Guarnizo 1998	*Transnationalism from above*		*Transnationalism from below*	
	Flows of global capital, media, and political institutions		Local and grassroots activity across borders	
B. Itzigsohn et al. 1999	*Narrow*		*Broad*	
	Related to institutionalised and continuous activities among immigrants		Referring to more occasional practices linking migrants and places of origins	
C. Faist 2000	*Transnational kinship groups*	*Transnational circuits*	*Transnational communities*	
	Based on reciprocity within families	Based on exchanges of goods, people and in formation within global networks	Characterised by feelings of solidarity within ethnic diasporas	
G. Levitt 2001a,b	*Core*		*Expanded*	
	With reference to patterned and predictable practices within one sphere of social life		Bringing in occasional practices in a wider set of spheres	
D. Gardner 2002	*Great*		*Little*	
	Pertaining to the level of state and economy		Regarding the intimate level of family and household	
E. Itzigsohn and Saucido 2002	*Linear*	*Resource-based*	*Reactive*	
	Grounded in plans to return to place of origin	Linked with labour market position and mobility	Especially based on experiences of discrimination	
A. Portes 2003	*Broad*		*Strict*	
	Including both regular and occasional activities		In connection only to regular participation	

(Personal elaboration; Source: Vertovec, 2003)

Finally, Vertovec (2003: 973-975) underlines three ways of categorising transnational migrant activity: a) through a better refinement of the different types and levels of transnational activity among migrants that vary among different groups of people depending on many factors, such as the geographical proximity of

exit and destination contexts, the histories of cooperation and interdependence between nation-states and localities, the patterns of migration and processes of settlement; b) through distinguishing between migrants themselves like those whose quests for work or "mobile livelihoods" involve them in transnational migration circuits or patterns of circular migration (for example, unskilled labour migrants, undocumented migrants, return migrants, retirement migrants, forced migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, religious specialists servicing migrants, highly skilled workers, generally and specifically information technology workers employed through global labour market and trained occupational specialists drawn back from diasporas to contribute to the development of their homelands); c) through identifying various degrees of mobility in regard to migrants' transnational practices and orientations (for example, people who travel regularly between specific localities; people who mainly stay in one place of immigration but engage people and resources in a place of origin; and people who have never moved but whose locality is significantly affected by the activities of others abroad).

The diversity of approaches underlined by Vertovec (1999, 2003) reflects certainly the new and developing nature of the transnational migration research field. Nevertheless, in order to conduct comparative studies on migrant transnationalism, researchers have to try to systematise different findings and organise the way in which this phenomenon is conceptualised in order to avoid conceptual and methodological fussiness and confusion (Itzigsohn,

2000). This thesis attempts to offer an operational definition of immigrant transnationalism as a form of transnationalism from below (see Smith and Guarnizo, 1998) that refers to practices and activities undertaken by immigrants in their country of origin, on a more regular or occasional basis (see Portes, 2003).

1.3 Immigrant Political Transnationalism or the Political Activism of Immigrants across State Borders

The globalisation processes have brought about various changes in the way groups develop their political identities and mobilise for political goals. There has been a change in the way groups formulate recognition and rights claims and a transformation in the spatiality of political practices (Landolt, 2008: 53). Accordingly, the scholarship world has underlined three shifts in civil society politics: 1) an expansion in the territorial orientation of politics to include allies and agendas situated across different nation-states (Itzigsohn *et al.*, 2002); 2) a greater ability to build networks that overpass distance and shift territorial location and levels of governance within which groups make political demands (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001a, 2003a); and 3) extension of citizenship rights beyond the boundaries of the nation-state and into the transnational (Bauböck, 1994) and supranational sphere (Soysal, 1994).

New forms of political action and citizenship that transcend the territorial and political boundaries of states are currently emerging. Systematic forms of immigrant engagement in their country of origin are increasing. Recent research literature has depicted migrants as active political participants (see Glick Schiller *et al.*, 1992; M.P. Smith, 1994; Graham, 1997; Itzigsohn *et al.*, 1999; Itzigsohn, 2000; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003). Several immigrant communities continue to be part of their country's electorate due to the fact that political parties from these countries have opened up offices in immigrant settlements and political candidates regularly campaign among expatriates to gain their political and monetary support (see Graham, 1997; Itzigsohn *et al.*, 1999).[6] Even people who have lived for decades abroad seem to maintain their involvement with their homelands either in support of or in opposition to the government in practice (see Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991; M.P. Smith, 1994; Kearney, 1995; Kyle, 2001).

The economic and political potential of immigrants have determined an increasing number of home states to introduce constitutional reforms to provide dual citizenship rights and formal political representation to their nationals living abroad (see Lessinger, 1992; Mahler, 1998; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). These

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[6] Nevertheless, these new opportunities for political participation might explain only partially immigrants' engagement in political transnationalism. Another important aspect that should be taken into consideration when analysing this phenomenon might be the socio-economic status of immigrants in destination countries. Many researchers include socio-demographic variables like gender, education, years of residence and occupational mobility upon immigration when doing research in immigration (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991, 1996; Jones-Correa 1998; Mahler 1999; Mahler and Pessar 2001; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003;).

new rights have changed the way in which migrants incorporate themselves into the destination societies. These incentives provided by home states are aimed to maintain the loyalty of their expatriates and attract their remittances, investments, and political contributions. On the other hand, such incentives give migrants a new and stronger 'voice' in the politics of their home countries or communities (see Roberts, Frank, and Lozano-Asencio, 1999).[7]

A growing literature in international relations, political science and political sociology tries to conceptualise political transnationalism (see Itzigsohn, 2000:1128-1131). Some scholars address the disjunction between "ones' legal identity as citizen of a territorial state and one's political identity as an actor in the public sphere" (Mandaville, 1999: 657). Others emphasise the emergence of rights that are guaranteed across national borders and affirm that the convergence between nation and state is being challenged and that new forms of politics are emerging that transcend and do not depend on the territorial boundaries of the state (see Agnew, 1999; Brock, 1999; Laguerre, 1999; Mandaville, 1999; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001b, 2003a; Kymlicka, 2003a, 2003b; Bauböck, 2003a; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003). Other authors focus on the institutional structures of immigrant political transnationalism (on the one hand,

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[7] Political transnationalism is not exclusively immigrant linked (Itzigsohn, 2000). Other groups might also get involved in transnational political action: indigenous movements that create alliances with other movements across national boundaries or with core countries' nongovernmental organisations in order to strengthen the support and give international resound to their demands (Van Cott, 1994; Brysk, 1996; Yashar, 1998); transnational advocacy networks that work globally to defend causes like human rights, the environment, labour rights or women's rights (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Evans, 2000).

immigrants and their social and political organisations and, on the other hand, the political institutions and the state apparatus of the country of origin) in order to assess whether and how the state is expanding and in which new areas political rights are created (see Itzigsohn, 2000).

As mentioned before, political science theorists tend to define immigrant transnationalism in terms of a dual or overlapping membership between two different and independent political communities. Transnational migrants are seen rather as diasporas or dual citizens than transmigrants. Kymlicka (2003a: 16), for example, defines immigrant political transnationalism as the political participation of immigrants in homeland politics via external voting rights and dual citizenship. Bauböck (2003a: 716) has a more complex analytical view on political transnationalism, not only as a narrow set of activities (external voting rights or dual citizenship) through which migrants become involved in the politics of their homeland, but also about how these activities affect collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native populations in exit and destination societies. Political transnationalism differs from international, multinational and supranational political relations because it generates overlapping forms of membership between two territorially separated and independent polities.

In order to defend this overlapping form of membership, Bauböck (2003a: 716) offers some normative insights into the concept of migrant political transnationalism. First, he considers that

transnational migrants should not be seen as threatening the national integrity of the destination country. External voting rights or dual citizenship do not necessarily lead to or give good reasons for discourses or projects of extra-territorial nation building. On the contrary, they should be considered only as "legitimate means for involving those immigrants who have strong social and political stakes in their political community of origin".

Second, Bauböck (2003a: 717) somehow defends the meaning of democracy in transnational relations. According to him, overlapping membership of migrants creates different kinds of claims and rights towards both countries involved. Migrants' rights in the destination country are derived from residence and are territorially-based, while migrants' affiliations to the country of origin give them the right to be reaccepted to their country's territory, but does not give the exit state the right to make any claim to the territory of the host state. Political theory has to cautiously distinguish between the challenge of multinational and international conflicts that refer to the delineation of territorial jurisdictions and the distribution of political powers between self-governing polities and, the challenge of transnational migration that is about the permeability of international borders for geographic mobility and the types of overlapping membership, rights and identities linking both exit and destination polities.[8]

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[8] Bauböck (2003a) refers here to the difference between the transnational migration and the colonialism and irredentist nationalism.

According to Bauböck (2003b: 716), the boundaries of polities are for the political transnational action not only "demarcations of territorial jurisdiction", but also "contested sites for determining political identities". The etymological and historical origins of citizenship are in the city:

"Citizenship was born in the Mediterranean city-states of Athens and Rome, it was reinvented in the liberties of Renaissance city republics and its modern national form arose in the urban revolutions that swept across Europe from 1789 to 1848." (2003b: 17)

It is therefore extremely important to conceive the city as a political space inside the territorial nation-state and to redefine a more attractive concept of urban citizenship in the new cosmopolitan democracies.[9] Studies on immigrant transnationalism, therefore, cannot be anymore confined only to relations between independent states, but have to be also extended to regional and local levels of government. City polities are in many ways more open to

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[9] Models of cosmopolitan democracy have extended federal principles from domestic to global arena (Held, 1995, Bauböck, 2003b). Bauböck's arguments (2003b: 18) for a model of cosmopolitan democracy and urban citizenship are: (1) an urban citizenship would not only provide an alternative basis to territorial federations, but it would also transform national identities and nationalist ideologies from below and from within; (2) the model would strengthen the autonomy of cities vis-à-vis the state and would erode the claims of internal and external sovereignty attached to national government; (3) it would provide an alternative model of membership that could eventually help to overcome some of the exclusionary features of national citizenship - cities would provide a space not only for transnational cultural diversity, but also for cosmopolitanism within the nation-state.

transnational affiliations than nation-states, thus research on immigrant transnationalism should be circumscribed to the local and regional level of government. The research location of this study that is the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona has been chosen also in function of this theoretical assumption. Though I do not focus on the effect of the destination context, I consider that the cosmopolitan nature of the city of Barcelona offers immigrants more opportunities for maintaining their connections with home countries or communities.

Although all these theoretical perspectives on migrant political transnationalism contribute to the development of the transnational migration research field, there is a need for more empirical research in order to examine the nature, forms, extent and main determinants of this social phenomenon and thus redefine the concept in mire operational terms.

Sociologists like Portes and his collaborators (Portes *et al.* 1999, 2001, 2003, 2007; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003) define political transnationalism as one particular form of "transnationalism from below" that consist of cross-border political relationships initiated and maintained by contemporary immigrants (immigrant hometown associations/committees and other immigrant groups) in order to improve social conditions in their home countries or communities. They examine the nature, forms and extent of this social phenomenon and also the link between immigrant transnationalism and immigrants' socio-demographic characteristics or immigrants' integration in the detination country. They furthermore distinguish

between 'broad' (occasional and regular) and 'strict' (only regular) immigrant transnational activities as a clearer criterion for delimiting this phenomenon.

Eva Östergaard-Nielsen (2001b: 4-5; 2003a: 762), another social science scholar interested in transnationalism, uses a much broader definition of transnational ties. She focuses her research interests on migrants' transnational political practices and activities and develops a clear conceptual category. First, she defines migrants' transnational political practices and activities as "various forms of direct cross border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees (such as voting and other support to political parties, participating in debates in the press), as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country (or international organisations)".

Indirect participation refers to the way in which political participation in one country, such as voting patterns or lobbying, is influenced by particular political events in another. Östergaard-Nielsen (2003a: 762) departs from Itzigsohn's distinction (Itzigsohn *et al.*, 1999) between 'broad' (less institutionalised) and 'narrow' (more institutionalised) transnational practices when divides transnational political practices and activities in "(occasional) participation in meetings or events" and "actual membership of parties or hometown associations". Indirect participation constitutes a major part of the political activity of migrants and refugees since the actual mobility of the migrants involved is not a main parameter

for the degree of 'transnationalness' of the political practices. Contrary to economic and social practices, regular cross-border contact, but not necessarily actual travel, is a constitutive part of political transnational practices (Itzigsohn *et al.*, 1999: 329).

Transnational migration scholars advocate that immigrant practices and normative frameworks are territorially oriented. Transnational practices and activities may be oriented toward people and institutions in places of origin (a transnational orientation), toward the place of settlement (an assimilationist orientation) or toward a multisited, more decentred, and potentially diasporic orientation. All these orientations are not mutually exclusive but rather overlap and intermingle (Joppke and Morawska, 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Landolt, 2008).

Accordingly, Östergaard-Nielsen (2001b: 5-6; 2003: 762-763) distinguishes among four types of immigrant transnational political practices and activities that are not pure but rather "overlap and blend into each other" depending on the particular combination of converging/diverging interests of the main actors involved: a) *homeland politics* - political activities of immigrants that belong to domestic or foreign policy of sending country; b) *diaspora politics* - for some, a subset of that type of transnational practices confined to those groups that are taken away the possibility to participate directly in the political life of their country of origin; for others, it has a more extensive connotation and refers to the politics of sensitive issues like national sovereignty and security political

disputes, overlapping thus with the previous category of homeland politics; c) *immigrant politics* – political activities that immigrants undertake to better their socio-economic situation in receiving country, and that are supported by sending country; and d) *trans-local politics* – initiatives from abroad to better the situation in local community where one originates.

But Östergaard-Nielsen focuses more on immigrants' networks and activities that engage them in the politics oriented towards their country of origin and less on how this migrant activism affects the destination country, as Bauböck would propose. Nevertheless, her definition and typology provides more valid and clear criteria for measuring who is and who is not a transnational political activist and, thus, it will be used in this investigation. I will also look at the regularity of transnational political practices and activities. The effect of immigrant transnational political activism on exit and destination societies might become a subject of interest for a subsequent research study.

1.4 Does immigrant transnationalism really challenge the traditional conception of national citizenship?

Human societies under the influence of complex phenomena like migratory movements, economic, social and political development, international cooperation, have evolved throughout the history from tribes to communities of people, from states and nation- states to

federations and confederations of states. With the construction of the modern liberal nation-state the main marker of belonging or identity has been the national citizenship. Modern politics and citizenship have been organised around the correspondence between citizenship rights and state boundaries.

Ongoing social processes like globalisation, descentralisation and devolution (regionalisation and federalisation) or international mass migration affect the conventional nation-state model and raise issues like social exclusion or limited public participation. The formal matters of belonging to a nation-state are now extended to more substantive ones of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights and duties. The limits of classical analyses like T.H. Marshall's distinction (1949) between civil, political and social forms of citizenship are being exposed by other theories on citizenship. New rights such as economic rights in the workplace, cultural or collective minority rights of recognition and the corresponding duties and obligations are advanced in the present debate on citizenship (Santos, 1995; Stavenhagen, 1995; Kymlicka, 1995). The national conception of citizenship or the compatibility between individual liberal values and group rights is being now questioned and argued (Rogers and Tillie, 2001).

Some authors have underlined the effects of economic globalisation on the nation-state (see Sassen, 1996; Castells, 1996). Others have embraced a new concept of citizenship, that of *cosmopolitan citizenship* and described how various inter-state, intra-state and

ultra-state practices challenge the viability of the conventional model of nation-state and the international system constructed around it (see Held, 1995; Beck, 2002; Bauböck, 1994). Others have underlined the impact of mass migration and migrant transnationalism alongside globalisation on the nation-state and the construction and re-construction of national identities (see Soysal, 1994; Bauböck, 1994; Portes 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003; Joppke, 1998, 1999; Castles, 2002; Kymlicka, 2003a, 2003b; Vertovec, 2003).

Migration movements have always questioned the territorially based form of organisation of citizenship. On the one hand, there is the problem of immigrants' inclusion within the imagined national community of the destination state and its legal and political order. On the other hand, immigrants create new socio-cultural, economic and political linkages with their country of origin and establish institutions that transcend the political boundaries of exit and destination countries (Itzigshon, 2000).

The intensification of migration within Europe in the last decades has led to many changes in the rules of national citizenship. In many countries there has been a shift from *ius sanguinis* (citizenship through descent that tends to exclude immigrants and their descendents), to more inclusive forms of citizenship like *ius soli* (citizenship through birth in the territory) and *ius domicilii* (citizenship on the basis of residence). More immigration countries give now the right to dual citizenship as a way of improving the

social integration of minorities and preventing thus ethnic conflict and racism (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2001; Castles, 2002).

Transnationalism represents one by-product of the globalisation processes and of the increase in international migratory movements. In the academic area, it is often debated in terms of a possible 'post-nationalist' outset of political community (Bauböck, 1994 2003; Soysal, 1994; Joppke, 1998; Kis, 2001; Castles, 2002; Kymlicka, 2003a, 2003b;), thing that rises a contradictory understanding of the term: "post-" or "trans-" nationalist conception of political community? Accordingly, some scholars (Kis, 2001) suggest that new forms of self-government might be developed within the European Union or under the frame of human rights organisations, which will enable ethnic minorities, who currently live across national borders, to act collectively. These new forms of self-government do not actually aim at making the nation and the state coincide, but somewhat create overlapping forms of membership that will cut across the existing state boundaries and will be sheltered by larger frameworks like the European Union or international human rights organisations[10].

Other scholars (Soysal, 1994; Joppke, 1998; Joppke and Morawska, 2003) examine the "postnational" forms of political membership among immigrants in Europe and emphasise the increasing

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[10] Janos Kiss (2001) gives the example of ethnic Hungarians who live abroad and of the Irish republican minority, which through the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland can exercise a degree of collective action with their kin in the Republic of Ireland.

immigrant appeal to international human rights instruments and organisations. Non-citizen residents of a state can claim civil, social and even some limited political rights, based on discourses of universal personhood since national identity is no longer linked to the right to make claims on the (national) polity.

Although there seem to be an important shift in the European Union citizenship politics, the congruence between identity and citizenship is far from being universally accepted. Citizenship, in many cases around the world, continues to depend on essentialised national identities that legitimate rights claims. This kind of 'traditional' identity seems to be especially strong among *diasporas* and transnational migrants (Tölölyan, 1996; Das Gupta, 1997). Migrants' claims of citizenship on their communities of origin are likely to be framed within particular discourses of this strong sense of national identity and origin rather than on appeals to universal rights (Fitzgerald, 2000: 3).

Accordingly, scholars like Will Kymlicka (2003a: 12-18) do not see the European Union or other international organisations to nurture the formation of a post-nationalist form of citizenship, but rather accommodate nationalist identities and aims. Migrant transnationalism, rather than a form of postnational citizenship that challenges the idea of nation-state, is seen as a form of dual membership or the latest adaptation of nationalist goals. Transnationalism as a broader suprastate political community might challenge "the scope of citizenship" or the primacy of the nation-

state as "the locus of citizenship", but it does not represent a real threat to "the values or principles of liberal-democracy *per se*". Transnational immigrants are literally "dual nationals", not "postnationals", and the empirical data suggest that they are as devoted as anyone else to the idea that politics should remain organised through bounded national political communities in both exit and destination countries (Kymlicka, 2003a: 12-18).

Rainer Bauböck (2003a: 705) believes that migration becomes transnational "only when it creates overlapping membership, rights and practices, which reflect a simultaneous belonging of migrants to two different political communities", without necessarily questioning the nation-state *per se*. Accordingly, comparative empirical studies (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1211) have shown that immigrants' transnational political engagement is far from being as widespread, socially unrestrained, 'deterritorialised' and liberator as to really challenge the nation-state system itself. Transnational political action is regularly undertaken by a small minority, is socially restrained across national borders, takes place in quite specific territorial jurisdictions, and appears to reproduce pre-existing power asymmetries. The potential of transnationalism for transforming asymmetries within and across countries has so far to be determined and proved.

In spite of all this, understanding migration from a transnational social field perspective entails at least revisiting the meaning of nation-state membership (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Delgado and

Stefanicic, 2003).[11] While states grant membership through laws that compatibilise legal citizenship and nationality, people also make demands on states regardless of their legal status. Even persons without full citizenship may act as substantive or social citizens, claiming rights or assuming privileges that are, in principle, given to citizens (for example, immigrants without citizenship who fight and die as members of a host country's military, protest in the streets about public policies, and access various social programmes and services without being citizens) (see Flores and Benmayor, 2000). Individuals connected through social networks to a transnational social field make claims, take actions, and may even see themselves as members of a country in which they have not lived.

Substantive citizenship as exercised within the transnational social field differs from the findings of proponents of post-national citizenship (see Soysal, 1994). Post-national citizenship scholars put aside the domain of nation-states and look to global rights regimes to protect and represent individuals living outside their homelands. Persons in the transnational social field who are refugees or religious or racial minorities may draw on plural legal systems in their quest for rights, but the international rights regimes is still very much dependent on individual states for enforcement (see Foblets, 2002; Woodman, 2002).

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[11] Transnational social fields refer to "a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices and resources are unequally exchanged, organised and transformed" (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004: 1005).

Persons living within the transnational social field may not make claims on states as legal or substantive citizens until a particular event or crisis occurs. They may engage in lobbying, demonstrating, organising or campaigns of public information to influence the destination country government, their homeland government, or some other state to which they are connected. By focusing simply on legal rights and formal membership, post-national citizenship scholar overlook this broader set of people who, to varying degrees, act like members of a society while not formally belonging to it. These people influence and are influenced by the state. They are named "transborder citizens" or "transmigrants" that is those people who may or may not be citizens of both their home and destination polities but who express some level of social citizenship (partial citizenship) in one or both (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2001).

Partial membership in two *polities* challenges core aspects of governance in at least two ways. First, dual belongings call into question the very notion of governance because it is not readily obvious which state is ultimately responsible for which aspects of transnational migrants' lives: where they should get health care, pay taxes, or serve in the army? which state should protect and represent them? what happens when migrants are sentenced to the death penalty in their host country while death sentence is prohibited in their country of origin? Second, the multiple experiences of governmentality and political socialisation of transborder citizens do not occur in isolation from one another. Persons in the

transnational social field enter the political domain with a broader repertoire of rights and responsibilities than citizens who live only within a state. The fact that migrants may also have direct experience with international rights regimes provides them with useful knowledge to reconceptualise their relationship to the state (Pessar, 2001; Levitt and Wagner, 2003).

Migrants also bring with them ideas about governance that transform destination country politics. They reformulate their ideas and practices in response to their experiences with the destination state, and they transmit these social remittances back to those in their homelands or to the members of their networks settled in other states (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2001). Shared experiences of democratic incorporation in the destination state may feed back into transnational activities that lead to more transparent politics at home (Shain, 1999).

In sum, there is little academic support for the idea that transnationalism represents a real challenge to the nation-state system itself. In this sense, there are generally three trends of conceptualising *immigrant transnationalism* in the scholarly world. *The first group* of scholars suggests that transnational communities threaten the feeling of national identity and lead to a disintegration of social cohesion in the country of residence. *The second group* argues that transnational communities may constitute, on the contrary, a new form of immigrant adaptation to the mainstream society. Finally, *the third group* considers that there is nothing new

about transnational communities and that they have existed since long time ago in the form of *diasporas*. These academic debates have lead to a growing number of empirical researches on this phenomenon (Castles, 2002: 2).

I believe that transnational migration have come to question the *locus* of membership formation, thing that requires at least a re-consideration of the nation-state membership and citizenship (see Kymlicka, 2003a, 2003b). As migrants develop social projects in their home countries and communities, they claim forms of citizenship that allow them to cross the boundaries of nation-states without losing all their rights in their places of origin (Fitzgerald, 2000). They usually request legal rights of citizenship, such as voting from abroad and a kind of moral citizenship or 'extra-territorial' citizenship in the community of origin.[12] Lately, more emigration countries give the right of citizenship to their emigrants as a way of biding them to the home country and getting in turn benefits like remittances, technology transfer, political allegiance and cultural maintenance (Fitzgerald, 2000; Castles, 2002; Kymlicka, 2003a, 2003b). Moreover, transnationalism is an emerging phenomenon whose nature, forms, scale, intensity and implications still have to be studied but which might influence considerably in long run the traditional model of national citizenship.

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[12] Fitzgerald (2000: 4) defines extra-territorial citizenship as citizenship in a territorially bounded political community without residence in the community. It does not necessarily mean legal citizenship, as citizenship has a moral dimension that is not always congruent with the juridical status.

1.5 Lines of Empirical Research on Immigrant Transnationalism

a) Foundational approaches to transnational migration

Empirical studies on immigrant transnationalism are highly fragmented because of a lack of analytical rigor and a well-defined theoretical framework. The existent studies often use different units of analysis (individuals, groups, organizations, local states) and mix diverse levels of conceptualisation. This tendency threatens the viability of this emerging research field (Portes *et al.*, 2003: 16).

Social researchers have usually explored transnational identity formation together with the economic, political, religious and socio-cultural practices that propel migrant incorporation and transnational connection. A transnational social field approach to the study of social life is needed in order to distinguish between the existence of transnational social networks and the consciousness of being embedded in them. Social anthropologists like Glick Schiller and Levitt (2004: 1004-1006) ingeniously sum up the foundational research approaches to transnational migration.

They first distinguish the researchers who have proposed typologies to capture variations in the dimensions of transnational migration (Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991; Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Mahler, 1998; Laguerre,

1998; Itzigsohn *et al.*, 1999; Morgan, 1999; Portes *et al.*, 1999; Schiffauer, 1999; Duany, 2000; Itsigsohn, 2000; Faist, 2000a, 2000b; Kyle, 2001; Levitt, 2001a,b; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2001; Landolt, 2001; Kivisto, 2001; Koopmans and Statham, 2001; Riccio, 2001; Van der Veer, 2001; Abelman, 2002; Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2002; Eckstein and Barberia, 2002; Gold, 2002; Goldring, 2002; Smith, 2003b; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Fitzgerald, 2003; Vertovec, 2003; Morawska, 2003b).

They subsequently mention the researchers who have explored the extent to which transnational migration is a new phenomenon or whether it shares similarities with its precursors (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Weber, 1999; Foner, 2000; Smith, 2002; Morawska, 2003b). Other studies have examined the scope of transnational practices among particular immigrant populations (Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002; Portes *et al.*, 2002; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003), while an emerging body of research has tried to explain variations in transnational practices across groups (Levitt, 2002; Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002; Portes *et al.*, 2002; Portes *et al.*, 2003).

Four distinct traditions have been developed among scholars of transnational migration (see Glick Schiller and Levitt, 2004):

1) The research done by sociologists and anthropologists in the United States: some developed a critique of the unilinear assimilationist paradigm of classical migration research (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994; Glick

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Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc, 1995; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999); other focused on the kinds of networks that stretch between a home community and its migrants (Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991; Rouse, 1992; Smith, 1998; Kyle, 2001; Levitt, 2001a); other determined the conditions under which migrants maintain homeland ties and identities and how commonplace transnational practices include the migrant population as a whole (Basch, Glick and Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994; Morawska, 2003b; Levitt, 2003b); other studies revealed that a small but nonetheless significant number of migrants engage in regular economic and political transnational practices (Portes *et al.*, 2002; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003) and that many more individuals engage in occasional transnational activities; some studies explored the relationship between migration and development, categorising transnational migration as a result of late capitalism which renders small, nonindustrialised countries incapable of economic autonomy and makes them dependent on migrant-generated remittances (M.P. Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Itzigsohn, 2000; Portes, 2003); other studies focused on the ways in which exit and destination states continue to play a critical role in migrants' lives (Smith, 1998; Goldring, 2002; Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003); more recent research on the second generation follows the debate on assimilation, proponents of the classical approach arguing that transnational migration is an ephemeral first-generation phenomenon while some

transnationalists speak of new forms of transnational connection or replace the term second generation with transnational generation to include youth in the homeland and the new land (Levitt and Waters, 2002; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2002);

2) Studies realised by the Transnational Community Programme based at Oxford University that use a much more broader definition of transnational ties, transnational connections forged by business, the media, politics, or religion being all examined under the rubric of community (Castles, 1998; Morgan, 1999; Schiffauer, 1999; Faist, 2000a; Koopmans and Statham, 2001; Riccio, 2001; Van der Veer, 2001; Abelman, 2002;). This work demonstrates that migrants are embedded in networks stretching across multiple states and that migrants' identities and cultural production reflect their multiple locations. Some studies highlighted the need to distinguish between patterns of connection on the ground and the conditions that produce ideologies of connection and community (Gomez and Benton, 2002; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2003);

3) A literature on transnational families (kinship) developed in the United States and Oxford to document that family networks constituted across borders are marked by gendered differences in power and status (Ballard, 2002; Chamberlain, 2002; Bryceson and Vuorela, 2002);

4) Scholars who use a transnational approach to migration to challenge social theory in an effort to reformulate notions of space and social structure (Guarnizo, 1997; Faist 2000a, 2000b; Landolt, 2001; Morawska 2001, 2003a).

B) Potential determinants of immigrant transnationalism

The potential explanatory variables for immigrant transnationalism (at an individual level) have usually come from three different theoretical lines: 1) the classical theories on the role of the individual characteristics in immigrant assimilation; 2) the contemporary theories of the contextual roots as a determinant factor in immigrant incorporation in the host society; and 3) the theory of social networks (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1215).

The classical theories of assimilation consider that persons who emigrate will get 'absorbed' by the economic and socio-cultural system of the destination society losing, therefore, their 'old' cultural practices and political allegiances (Alba, 1985; Alba and Nee, 1997). The main hypothesis is that, as longer immigrants reside and get socialised in the manner of the destination country, as higher the possibilities to be completely 'absorbed' by it. In terms of political transnationalism, the hypothesis would be that as longer periods of residence in the destination, as higher the separation from the allegiances in the home country. Besides, immigrants are expected to have a single national identity and political

representation in one political community. Thus, another hypothesis is that naturalised immigrants would get involved to a lesser extent in the politics of their home countries (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1215-1216).

In line with these theories, educational background, to the extent to which it favours a rapid integration and mobility in the destination country, might also lead to a breakdown of the networks in the home country (Borjas, 1987, 1990). Educated immigrants would tend to shift their allegiances and transfer their interests toward the destination country (Pickus, 1998). However, an extensive literature questions this assumption by considering that education increases the overall political participation in both countries. In that case, higher education would lead to an increase in migrant transnationalism (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1215-1216)

Empirical data on the relationship between gender and immigration show that men and women have different views towards their exit and destination countries. Studies on Latin American immigrants in the United States reveal that men normally experience occupational descent mobility upon immigration and a loss of status. Migrant women tend to experience something in the opposite direction, meaning that by immigrating to USA many of them come to work for the first time in their life. Accordingly, Latin American immigrant men have a stronger political perspective and are more likely, therefore, to get involved in transnational political activities than migrant women. This comes mainly as a compensation for the

loss of status in the destination country (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1216-1217).

A second theoretical line analyses how exit and destination contexts influence migrants' propensity towards participation in transnational activities. The hypothesis here is that as bigger the socio-cultural differences between the recently arrived persons and the destination society, as more difficult the process of their incorporation. Migrants that come from remote rural areas to metropolitan areas of distinct countries would have lesser possibilities to adapt and, therefore, would tend to preserve the connections with their home countries (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1217-1218).

United States studies show that immigrants from urban areas who emigrated from a generalised context of violence in their home country tend to look for a quick integration in the destination society and to avoid whatever form of active participation back home (for example, the Colombians in the United States) (see Guarnizo *et al.*, 1999). In contrast, immigrants that come from small towns or rural areas and whose country is peaceful are more likely to get involved in transnational civic and political activities in order to help their native communities (for example, the Salvadorians in the United States) (see Landolt *et al.*, 1999; Menjivar, 2000).

Another explicative variable could be the "socially expected durations" (SED- developed by Merton in 1984), meaning the expectations held by relatives and friends about the proper duration of the staying abroad. The main hypothesis is that temporary SEDs (normative expectations of return), to the extent to which they will help preserve the home networks and commitments, might increase migrant transnationalism. The context of reception might also influence the political and economic incorporation of immigrants. A more negative context of arrival characterised by an occupational descendent mobility might lead to the perpetuation of the networks and commitments with the home country. Transnational activism could thus function as a compensatory mechanism for the loss of status in the destination society (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1217-1218).

The third theoretical line describes migration as a process that builds up networks that influence, in turn, the exit and settlement of newcomers when the original economic incentives have disappeared (see Tilly, 1990; Massey, Goldring, and Durand, 1994). Early departures, for example, facilitate the following ones by reducing the costs and risks of the initial journey (Massey and Espinoza, 1997). The main hypothesis is that as larger and more spatially diversified the social networks, as higher immigrants' opportunities to get involved in political activities and initiatives across national borders (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1218).

C) Empirical link between immigrant incorporation into the destination society and transnational communities

Many empirical studies have shown that there is a link between immigrant incorporation in the destination society and transnational communities. Castles (2002: 7-8) develops this idea by analysing three main approaches to immigrant incorporation into the destination society: *assimilation* (classical immigration countries like the United States, Canada and Australia and some European immigration countries); *differential exclusion* ("guestworker system" in European countries like Germany up to the 1970's or "overseas contract workers" in Gulf oil countries and Asian tiger economies today); and *multiculturalism*.

Castles (2002: 7-8) considers that transnational communities have much in common with the cultural diversity accepted by multiculturalism with regard to "cultural maintenance and community formation". Yet, transnational communities are different from multiculturalism because "they maintain strong cross-border affiliations, possible over generations" and "their primary loyalty is not to one nation-state or one territory", how multiculturalism does assess. By maintaining allegiances with two or more nation-states, transnational communities might constitute a challenge to the nation-states.

Empirical studies show that immigrants engage in some sort of transnational activities as opposing 'assimilation' or different forms

of discrimination and exclusion in the destination society. These studies suggest that the process of immigrant incorporation into the destination society influences immigrant propensity to participate in transnational activities. Those immigrants that get dispersed and almost lost in the new context, by seeking to protect themselves from discrimination, are less likely to participate in political activism (for example, the experience of the Haitians, Dominicans and Mexicans in the United States and of the Hindu and Pakistanis in Great Britain) (see Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Itzigson *et al.*, 1999; Roberts *et al.*, 1999).

Transnational activities, moreover, grow up in communities that are highly concentrated and have experienced a hostile receiving procedure from local authorities and the native population. These highly concentrated zones create multiple opportunities for transnational activities. The increased external discrimination makes immigrant communities to look in within and augments, therefore, the strong contacts with the communities of origins. Transnational cultural activities and civic associations offer an important tool of defence against the external hostility and may protect the personal dignity of the threaten ones (see Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Itzigsohn *et al.*, 1999; Roberts *et al.*, 1999).

Other studies, on the contrary, suggest that transnational activities create an alternative way of socio-economic and political adaptation of immigrants to the destination society and do not come, therefore, against the process of immigrant 'assimilation' or integration.

Typically, those immigrants who are better established or integrated into the destination society, having therefore a higher security, are more likely to get involved in transnational activities.[13]

1.6 Why Study Immigrant Political Transnationalism in the European Context?

Most of the literature on transnational migration has come from economic sociology. These studies have focused on the macroeconomic driving forces of global migration or the microeconomic practices of immigrant entrepreneurs that turn into transnational communities and resist the hegemonic logic of global capitalism (see Portes, 1996; Sassen, 1988). Anthropologists and cultural studies scholars have focused instead on the cultural meaning of transnational networks and practices and how these in turn foster enduring transnational ties (see Ong and Nonini, 1997; Ong, 1999). The emphasis in all these studies have been on economic and cultural forces explaining transmigration and the emergence of transnational migrants.

Just few transnational scholars have made politics the central focus of their analysis of transnational practices. Some of them have acknowledged that transnational practices are unavoidable

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[13] Guarnizo and his collaborators (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1233), in their analysis on Latin American groups in the United States have found that political transnationalism is strongly associated with national origin and a product of greater human capital, greater stability and experience in destination society, plus strong social connections and enduring moral ties with home communities.

determined by while also transcending the institutional and geographical boundaries of a state (Shain, 1989; Kearney, 1995). Others have offered evidence of the role of the state in reincorporating transnational immigrants or drawing on their investments and social capital in an effort to construct a "deterriorialised" nationhood (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994). Despite some more recent research on transnational political practices (Itzigsohn, 2000; Radcliffe, 2001; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001a, 2001b, 2003a; M.P.Smith, 2003; Margheritis, 2007), political transnationalism of immigrants is still a largely underdeveloped studying area within the transnational migration field.

European comparative research on migrant transnational political activities and how these, in turn, foster or inhibit immigrant incorporation into the polity of the destination country has been more or less absent from the political and social science research agenda. Some scholars, however, like Soysal (1994) or Joppke (1998, 2001) have tried to investigate "postnational" forms of political membership in European countries as a result of an increasing immigrant appeal to postnational norms of human rights, independently of immigrants' period of living or level of integration in the destination society.

Studies on migrants' transnational political practices and activities have mainly come from the United States and the research perspective has been quite different from that adopted in Europe

(Rogers, 2000). Some important research aspects of migrant transnationalism have not been yet investigated by European-based studies. First, there is much less attention to and research available on political transnationalism in Europe than on the other side of the Atlantic and this has less to do with phenomenon's incidence than to "the extent to which it is observed and the political context in which it is observed" (Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001b: 6-8).

Second, European-based research has tended to focus on immigrants' political participation in destination country, meaning immigrants' efforts to better their situation in the destination country like obtaining more political, social and economic rights, fighting marginalisation and discrimination and so on (see Soysal, 1994; Bauböck, 1994; Joppke, 1998, 1999). Hence, transnational ties or networks have been included more as a cause in the analysis of political integration than as a phenomenon in its own right. United States-based studies, instead, have mainly focused on the mobilising role of the home country like particular politics and initiatives towards citizens and former-citizens abroad to attract more economic and political resources, or the local initiatives from abroad and cooperation with local organisations and associations at home (see Mahler, 1998, 2000; Landolt *et al.*, 1999; Guarnizo *et al.*, 1999; Itzigsohn, 2000; Menjivar, 2000; Levitt, 2001a; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003; Smith, 2003b Rosenblum, 2004;). There are fewer studies that emphasise the relationship between immigrant transnationalism and destination states (see

Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Itzigsohn *et al.*, 1999; Roberts *et al.*, 1999; Portes *et al.*, 2002; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003).

Third, there is a difference in the level of analysis (Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001b: 8). There is more local-to-local bottom up research of political practices in the United States than in Europe where researchers are more interested in those practices that are more directly related to national ideologies and policies (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Levitt, 2001). There are next to no studies of hometown associations among immigrant groups in Western Europe although these might be situated at the centre of economic, political and socio-cultural trans-local activities even if in a less institutionalised shape. Researchers continue to focus their interest on the main ethnic, religious or party political organisations.

United States-based anthropological studies have suggested that transnationalism represents a generalised phenomenon among contemporary migrant communities that has been developed as an alternative to traditional ways of assimilation. Transnationalism was described as a permanent back and forth movement in which immigrants live concurrently in two or more societies and cultures. This leads to the emergence of "deterritorialised" communities (Basch *et al.*, 1994). This approach, by focusing on transnational entrepreneurs or political activists and excluding other immigrants not involved in these actions, has created a methodological problem that of selecting on the dependent variable. All immigrants were seen as "transmigrants" and transnationalism was overestimated in

its purpose, as an alternative to assimilation, and in its general spread. Its possible absence in everyday life of many immigrants was thus overlooked (Levitt, 2001; Kyle, 2001; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Portes, 2003).

Subsequent comparative quantitative and qualitative studies have shown that regular or occasional participation in transnational activities is not a universal practice (Portes *et al.*, 1999; Portes *et al.*, 2002; Orozco, 2002; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 2007). Although immigrant remittances or visits back home might be considered as particular forms of transnationalism, they cannot justify *per se* the development of a new concept. There are scholars who consider that immigrants have always been involved in these types of activities with their countries or communities of origin (Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004).

Migrant transnationalism as a new phenomenon and concept in the migration field is based on the regular activities across national borders of only a minority of the members of the general migrant population (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Landolt, 2001; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003). It nevertheless provides us a new theoretical lens for seeing and studying what might have always been there but could not be seen before (R.C. Smith, 2003b). However, more comparative qualitative and quantitative studies on transnationalism are needed in order to formulate different causal mechanisms, to test subsidiary ideas and hypotheses and determine its actual forms and extent, determinant factors and consequences (surveys and

aggregate official statistics) or its generational transmissibility (longitudinal information) (Portes *et al.*, 1999; Portes *et al.*, 2007).

This thesis adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the study of immigrant political transnationalism by drawing on theoretical and empirical studies in sociology and political science. It is a comparative research study of the transnational political practices and activities of different national/ethnic immigrant associations in Barcelona. Chapter 2 presents the proposed theoretical model that will guide the investigation.

2. THE POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM OF IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS. PROPOSED THEORETICAL MODEL[14]

2.1 Introduction

In general terms, whatever scientific research study should respect at least two conditions in order to be valued by the scholarly community: 1) it should introduce a relevant or 'important' question from a political, social or economic point of view; and 2) it should make a real contribution to what has been written or researched in the academic world, so the collective capacity to give scientific explanations of some aspect of social reality can increase (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 15).

The first condition leads the researcher to the real world of political and social phenomena and to the present and past record of the events and problems that influence people's lives. In other words, in order to determine if a research question fulfils this condition a researcher has to evaluate its social and political significance. The second condition directs a researcher's attention to the academic

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[14] In this chapter, the term 'theory' is used as an explanation of observed regularities. I do not refer here to *grand theories* that operate at a more abstract and general level but rather to *middle range theories* (Merton, 1967). According to Merton, grand theories are of limited use in connection with social research as they offer few indications to researchers as to how these might guide or influence the collection of empirical data. Middle-range theories, unlike grand theories, operate in a limited domain and are much more likely to be the focus of empirical enquiry.

literature in social and political sciences, that is, to those intellectual paradoxes not yet formulated or that still have to be solved, and to the scientific theories and methods offered to resolve them (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 15).

In this chapter, I first formulate the research questions and examine the socio-political and theoretical relevance of this research subject. Then, I present the alternative theoretical model (descriptive and causal hypotheses; dependent, and independent variables; unit and level of analysis). The descriptive hypothesis is that immigrant associations have different degrees of engagement in political transnationalism (some might engage in political transnationalism and at different levels of intensity, and some others no). The causal hypotheses take into consideration structural determinants like the political opportunity structure in home country and the socio-economic level of development of home country, and also organisational characteristics like the social networks, the type of immigrant association, year of foundation, sources of funds, etc. I end the chapter with a summary of the proposed theoretical model.

2.2   Research Questions

This is a comparative research study on the political transnationalism of different national/ethnic origin immigrant associations in Barcelona. The main objective of this investigation is to analyse the transnational political practices and activities of immigrant associations in Barcelona, more exactly, the various

forms of direct and indirect (via the political institutions of the destination country or international organisations) cross-border political participation of Barcelona's immigrant associations. I seek to establish what forms, scope and intensity characterise the political activism of immigrant associations across national borders and to determine the organisational and structural factors that shape this kind of transnational political participation.

The research questions of this investigation are the following:

- Are there any politically transnational immigrant associations?

- Which are these associations and what forms, scope and intensity characterise their political transnationalism?

- What are the main determinants of this kind of political activism?

Are there any patterned differences across different national origin immigrant associations in the incidence and forms adopted by this phenomenon?

2.3 Socio-political relevance of the research subject

Social science scholars generally portray immigrant transnationalism as a growing phenomenon. Although numerically limited, this phenomenon involves an increasing number of people and has an important impact on both immigrant adaptation in destination countries and the development prospects of exit countries and communities. The rise of different forms of grass-roots transnationalism (transnationalism from below) offers new life options to people either in their own countries or in those to which they migrate. There are scholars who believe that grass-roots transnationalism has the potential of undermining in time one of the fundamental premises of capitalist globalisation that is, labour stays local while capital becomes global (Portes *et al.*, 1999; Portes, 2001).

The possible implications of grass-roots transnationalism have been summarised on the basis of the existent empirical evidence, in three substantive propositions: 1) the emergence of transnationalism from below is driven by the very logic of global capitalism; 2) transnational communities, though they follow well-established principles of social network development, represent a phenomenon at variance with conventional expectations of immigrant assimilation; 3) grass-roots transnationalism, as being driven by the dynamics of capitalism, has greater potential as a form of individual and group resistance to dominant structures or as way of

development of exit countries than alternative strategies (see Portes *et al.*, 1999: 227-230; Portes, 2001: 186-191).

The first proposition relies on the evidence that the increasing demand for immigrant labour in the advanced countries provides the appropriate conditions for the rise of transnational enterprise. At the same time, a significant number of immigrants and their home country counterparts mobilise themselves for political action or transform the character of local religious and cultural forms of life through their continuous cross-border exchanges (see Portes *et al.*, 1999: 228; Portes, 2001: 187-188).

Today immigrants are less likely to get good jobs in the industry sector but rather low-paid jobs in agriculture, cleaning and domestic services with few possibilities for advancement (see Sassen, 1998; Roberts, 1995). These precarious and discriminatory conditions stimulate them to look for better strategies of survival and resistance among which knowledge and access to goods and services across state borders represent an important one. Technological advances in transport and communication facilitate these cross border connections and exchanges. As such, a new class of transnational entrepreneurs, cross-border political activists, socio-cultural reformers or hometown associations emerges to fulfil the distinct but complementary needs of migrants and home country populations (Portes *et al.*, 1999: 228).

The second proposition questions the well-established assumption in migration literature that, by time, immigrants tend to assimilate in the host society (see Alba, 1985; Alba and Nee, 1997). Today's empirical evidence demonstrates the existence of back-and-forth migrant movements and regular exchanges of goods and information between origin and destination countries or communities. This transnational field, created by contemporary migrants, amount to an alternative way of immigrant adaptation in the advanced world. Rapid acculturation is not anymore a precondition to economic success and social status, immigrants being able to develop their life expectations through the social networks established across state borders (see Goldring, 1996; Guarnizo, 1997).

The process of integration to the destination country of both first- and second- generation immigrants can be altered in various ways by transnational activism. One possibility is that successful transnational entrepreneurs finally return home, taking their families along, and invest in land and 'retirement houses' in their communities of origin. Another more interesting possibility is that transnational activities like economic and political initiatives based on strong social networks with the country of origin may actually go together with and support successful adaptation to the destination country where practices of labour market exploitation and discrimination continue to exist. Empirical evidence demonstrates that immigrant transnationalism is associated with a

more secure economic and legal status in the destination country (Portes, 2001; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003).

Though there is still no clear evidence that economic or political transnationalism is transmitted inter-generationally (see Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Smith, 2001; Fitzgerald, 2000), this involvement may have durable effects on second generation both through its influence on the socio-economic integration of parents and through their efforts to create bridges between their children and the culture and communities left behind (Portes, 2001: 189-190). Parents may try to pass on to their offspring both their transnational skills and assets, perpetuating this social field across generations. All these alternatives may transform the assimilation assumption in migration literature, with major consequences for both exit and destination countries (Portes *et al.*, 1999: 229).

The third proposition relies on the emergence of transnational networks in defence of labour rights and standards in poor countries that become an increasing threat to the international expansion of capitalism (see Piore, 1990; Fields, 1990). More and more people start to confront the new capitalist world economy through resistance or through designing their own economic alternatives (see Sassen, 1988; Guarnizo, 1992; Portes and Dore, 1994). Aggregate immigrant remittances often exceed the value of the exit country's national exports or the development aids received from rich countries. Domestic industries like residential construction can become severely dependent on migrants' acquisitive power and

demand. As such, small transnational enterprises are created to cover the needs of both migrant and homeland populations. At the same time, more and more returned immigrants start businesses with capital and knowledge accumulated abroad (see Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Levitt, 2001a; Roberts *et al.*, 1999).

On the other hand, governments of exit countries intensify their contacts with their nationals living abroad and involve them in national life through dual citizenship and dual nationality laws, rights to vote in national elections or even representation in national legislatures, emigrant target agencies and programmes seeking to provide them various services. National parties and political movements in exit countries establish offices in cities with major migrant concentration and conduct regular fundraising and campaigning. Migrants become increasingly important for home governments not only as sources of remittances, investments, and political contributions and support, but also as potential 'ambassadors' or lobbyists in defence of national interests abroad (see Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Landolt, 2001; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001a; Smith, 1999; Itzigsohn *et al.*, 1999; Levitt, 2001a).

Transnationalism is important not only for national development but also for local development. Empirical data demonstrate that towns and rural communities in exit countries that are supported by civic hometown associations or committees abroad are better off in terms of physical infrastructure (from church repairs to paved roads, health centres and water and irrigation devices) (see Landolt, 2001).

Local economies and traditional authoritarian politics might be revitalised, respectively changed, by the growing economic power of migrants' hometown associations and their democratising influence (see Fitzgerald, 2000; Levitt, 2001a).

2.4 Theoretical relevance of the research subject

As mentioned in Chapter 1, most studies on transnational migration have come from economic sociology and those coming from others fields like social anthropology or cultural studies have not made politics the central focus of their analysis of transnational practices. Moreover, a political science perspective on immigrant transnationalism has been more or less absent in the scholarly literature. At the same time, social movement theories or studies on transnational networks have been scantily employed in transnational migration literature.

Empirical studies in transnationalism have relied almost exclusively on case studies, This has led to an extensive list of qualitative and ethnographically–based literature (Mahler, 1995, 1999; Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991; Portes and Guarnizo, 1991; Levitt, 2001a; Guarnizo, 1998; R. Smith, 1998; Goldring, 1996; Glick-Schiller *et al.*, 1995; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999, 2001; Basch *et al.*, 1994, Wolf, 1997; Mitchell, 1997; J. Lin, 1998; Ong, 1999, etc.). While undoubtedly valuable, these studies invariably sampled on the dependent variable, pointing out those who take part in

transnational activities, to the exclusion of those who do not participate. Intermittent activities like occasional trips home or sporadic financial contributions to a home country political party help strengthen the transnational field but do not justify *per se* the emergence of the new concept. A new class of immigrants has to be identify, the so-called *transmigrants*, like economic entrepreneurs or political activists who undertake cross-border activities on a *regular* basis in order to legitimate a new field of investigation (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Portes *et al.* 2003).

On the other side, most comparative research on migrant transnationalism has come from the United States, European-based comparative studies on this issue being quite scarce and poorly developed. The extent to which this phenomenon has been observed in Europe and the political context in which it has been investigated has been fairly limited. For example, the exit context has not been systematically analysed as an important determinant of transnational political practices, the focus of interest being instead on the destination context as one important variable in immigrant integration (Rogers, 2000, Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001b, 2003a).

European-based research have mainly focused on the effects of migrants' transnational political practices or ties on improving their situation in destination country like obtaining more political, social and economic rights, fighting discrimination and so on. In turn, United States-based studies have shown the significant role of the exit context as a mobilising factor (Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001b,

2003a). These studies have focused on the political transnationalism of migrants or refugees from Central and Latin America residing in the United States and emphasised the activating role of a deprived human development context or of a poor level of democratisation in exit country (see Portes *et al.*, 2007; Itzighson, 2000; Landolt *et al.*, 1999).

In Europe, maybe because of the important role given to issues of policies of reception and integration, studying one immigrant group in several countries has been the main research approach to migrant transnationalism. Particular politics or initiatives of home country governments toward their nationals or citizens living abroad that attempt to enhance countries' economic and political resources can also play a significant role, especially if they move behind symbolic appeals and provide real help for their migrants abroad. In these cases, the direction and objectives adopted by immigrant transnational activities can be significantly influenced by official home state politics (Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001b, 2003a; Smith, 2003b).

Various United States-based studies have shown that differences in transnational political participation depend on the exit context of different immigrant groups: those coming from rural areas, whether immigrants or refugees, tend to form non-political hometown civic committees in support of their original local communities; immigrants coming from more urban areas commonly become involved in the political and cultural life of their countries as a

whole, especially if political parties, religious and cultural institutions there seek to maintain an active influence on their expatriates (see Itzigsohn, 2000; Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002; Mahler, 2002; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Escobar, 2003; Smith, 2003b; Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003).

There is also a difference in the level of analysis between the European- based and the United States-based research. While European studies on migrant political transnationalism have mainly focus on national ideologies and policies, the United States studies have closely looked at local-to-local bottom up political practices of immigrants. Hometown associations in Western Europe as main transnational actors though in a less institutionalised manner have not been given much attention, the main ethnic, religious or political party organisations representing instead the focus of interest of European researchers (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001b, 2003a).

Table 2.1 Research approaches to the study of immigrant transnationalism

General panorama of research studies on immigrant transnationalism	
Most studies from economic sociology, social anthropology or cultural studies	Fewer studies from sociology, political science, social movements or interdisciplinary studies
More accent on economic transnationalism	Less studies on political transnationalism
Mainly case-studies	Less comparative studies
European-based research	**United States-based research**
Less research on immigrant transnationalism	Various studies on immigrant transnationalism
More accent on the destination country as one important variable in immigrant integration	More emphasis on the exit context
Focus on national ideologies and policies	Focus on local-to-local bottom up practices and activities like those undergone by hometown associations or committees

(Personal elaboration)

In this investigation, I attempt to test the validity of various hypotheses that are significant in the transnational migration literature. The first one is a descriptive hypothesis according to which immigrant associations engage in political transnationalism at different degrees. To contrast this hypothesis I compare the political practices and activities of different immigrant associations and identify those immigrant associations that are (or not) politically transnational. I then describe the forms, scope and intensity of their political transnationalism. Some causal hypotheses focus on the effect of structural characteristics like the political opportunity structure in home country or the level of socio-economic development of home country on immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism. Other causal hypotheses focus on the effect of different organisational factors like type of

immigrant association, social networks, number of members, sources of funds, etc. on immigrant associations' involvement in political transnationalism.

2.5   Theoretical model

What are the descriptive and causal claims I am interested in, and what is the simplest model I can propose? As I mentioned before, this systematic comparative study looks at the forms, scope, intensity, and the main determinants of the political transnationalism of immigrant associations. It therefore compares the transnational political activism of different ethnic/national origin immigrant associations in Barcelona. The unit of analysis is different national/ethnic origin immigrant associations and the level of analysis is local-to-local/regional/national/international bottom up political practices of immigrant associations.

A) Descriptive hypothesis and dependent variable

The main hypothesis of this study is that immigrant associations in Barcelona engage at different degrees in political transnationalism. I depart from the assumption that not all immigrant associations in Barcelona participate directly and/or indirectly in the politics of their country of origin, and on a relatively regular basis. In order to assess this hypothesis, I define in this subchapter the dependent variable that is the political transnationalism of immigrant

associations, and then I specify its dimensions and indicators. In Chapter 4, I will test its validity.

I depart from the previously discussed theoretical perspectives on immigrant (political) transnationalism, bringing in also contributions from social movement and political participation literature. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Portes and his collaborators (1999) divide transnational activities into three categories: economic, political and socio-cultural. Such distinctions are very useful but they can ignore the interaction between different kinds of practices.[15] I acknowledge the interdependence among various domains of transnational activism (political, economic, socio-cultural, and religious) at the level of states, individuals or associations that might blur empirical boundaries. However, in this section, I attempt to construct valid and explicit measures on the political transnationalism of immigrant associations.

A significant number of scholars have argued that contemporary migrants maintain their loyalty and commitment to their homelands. These migrants turn up to be an alternative political force that not only transforms local traditional structures but also opens up new opportunities for home country communities. Transmigrants might become agents of change who support and promote local

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[15] For example, a simple immigration policy measure like family reunification restrictions might be seen as a way of impeding the development of transnational social ties in a more politicised debate on immigration. The (re)formulation of the political agendas of different immigrant communities or states into issues of culture and religion also reveals this interconnectedness (Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001b: 3).

development initiatives and programmes through hometown associations (see Goldring, 1996; R.C. Smith, 1998; González Gutierrez, 1995), as well as active political participants in homeland politics (Glick Schiller *et al.*, 1992; M.P. Smith, 1994; Graham, 1997; Itzigsohn *et al.*, 1999; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001b, 2003a; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003) or direct international investors in home countries (Portes and Guarnizo, 1991; Massey and Parrado, 1994; Baires, 1997; Kyle, 1999, 2001).

Many immigrant communities continue to be an important part of the electorate of their countries of origin. Political parties from these countries open up offices in major immigrant settlements, while political candidates regularly campaign among expatriates to gain their political and financial support (see Graham, 1997; Itzigsohn *et al.*, 1999: Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001a, 2003a). Migrants contribute also financially to the annual fundraising revenues of home country parties (see Graham, 1997; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003). Even those people who have lived abroad for several decades are accounted to maintain their engagement with their homelands either in support of or in opposition to the government in office (see Kearney, 1995; Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991; M.P. Smith, 1994; Kyle, 2001).

Following this trend of migrants' transnational engagement, many home states have introduced bureaucratic and constitutional reforms to attract and maintain the loyalty, remittances, investments and political contributions of their nationals living abroad. Dual

citizenship and formal political representation for nationals living abroad have been lately introduced in many countries (see Lessinger, 1992; Mahler, 1998; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003). Home country governments have also established agencies and programmes targeting their expatriates and seeking to provide them various state services (see Levitt and Wagner, 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004). All these home-state government incentives give immigrants a stronger *voice* in the politics of their home countries and communities (see Roberts *et al.*, 1999). The main question is how and to what extent immigrants decide to take advantage of these new opportunities for homeland political action (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003).

I depart from the assumption that political involvement, in general, gives immigrants an opportunity to communicate information to government officials (political communities) from both home and destination countries about their concerns and preferences in regard to different political aspects and to put pressures on them to respond.

Immigrants who wish to take part in transnational politics have a range of options: they may express their opinions through various forms of direct cross border participation in the politics of their country of origin or through indirect participation (voting patterns or lobbying in destination country as a result of particular events in home country) via the political institutions of the destination country or international organisations; they may give time, effort or

money contributions to home country parties; they may work alone or in concert with other (local, national, international or transnational) organisations; they may engage not only in homeland politics but also in immigrant politics or translocal politics. Since different forms of transnational political participation express information to or exert pressure differentially on the governments of home and destination countries, it is important to know if immigrants take part in this, how and to what extent, and which are the main determinants of this kind of involvement.

Electoral and non-electoral (voluntary) political participation

Political participation is normally measured through indicators related to electoral activity, voting, electoral campaign work (working for one of the parties or candidates; persuading people; displaying preferences - campaign button, sticker or sign; meetings - political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners), money contribution to parties, candidates or any other groups that support or oppose a candidate (Brady, 1999: 745). But there are also forms of non-electoral political involvement like different forms of protest or participation in local development projects that can influence elected politicians' action (see Verba *et al.*, 1978; Parry *et al.*, 1992; Verba *et al.*, 1995).

This perspective on political action's multidimensionality has been lately extended to the analysis of collective actors' political behaviour like, for example, the political participation of

associations (see Knoke, 1990; Lelieveldt and Caiani, 2006). The study of associations and their impact on the democratic political life has been quite scarce in political science agenda. Some political scientists consider that associations have a poor institutional role and a smaller relevance in comparison with political parties. Others consider that associations are less important in comparison to social movements due to their reduced capacity of mobilisation and low level of response. Robert Putnam's famous work on democracy and social capital (1993, 2000) reconsidered the role of associations in the democratic political life. In this study, the researcher refers to a specific segment of the associational sphere that is immigrant associations and how these act politically at the transnational level.

Beside the classical forms of electoral participation, immigrant associations might participate in the decision-making processes through other political channels: forms of protest like petitions, lawful demonstrations, boycotts, lobbying, etc.; or local community development projects, monetary contribution to philanthropic projects, and so on. Non-electoral activities are political as they influence national, regional and local governments by determining, for example, which public projects get financial support from immigrant associations, and force authorities to take into account the desires and priorities of immigrants. By financing local development projects or contributing to philanthropic projects, immigrants can maintain a high social status and political influence in home localities (see Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1223-1226).

Migrants abroad cannot force their governments to become more accountable, but they can create incentives for greater government accountability through their ability to channel or restrict resources to public projects. Migrants are only likely to carry out successful projects in their communities of origin when there are mechanisms in place that create public trust in both the associations and the home state (Fitzgerald 2000: 27). Accordingly, political transnational participation ought to include both electoral and non-electoral transnational activities and practices that are meant to influence the conditions in both home and destination countries (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Bauböck, 2003a).

Political participation is also understood as *voluntary* activity and practice. Verba and his collaborators (1995: 38-39) define voluntary activity as "participation that is not obligatory – no one is forced to volunteer – and that receives no pay or only token financial compensation".[16] I take into consideration both *activities* (doing politics) and *practices* (being attentive to politics) when analysing immigrant political transnationalism. Beside particular transnational political activities, I also include transnational political practices like reading about home politics in newspapers or watching homeland political news on TV within the association, discussing home politics (local community politics and affairs) among association's members, collective letters to editors or calls to radio talk shows (those who have called in to express their views on a

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[16] This definition is been elaborated from Max Weber's distinction between those for whom politics is an avocation (occasional politicians) and those for whom it is a vocation (they make politics their major vocation) (see Verba *et al.*, 1995: 38).

radio talk show) in relation to particular homeland politics, organising or participating in public conferences or reunions on important aspects of home politics, websites and Internet radio programmes focusing on homeland politics.

Dimensions and indicators of immigrant political transnationalism

As we could see in Chapter 1, there is a growing literature in international relations, political science and political sociology that refers to migrant political transnationalism in terms of a possible challenge to the normative convergence nation and state. Political theorists like Kymlicka (2003a, 2003b) and Bauböck (2003a) define immigrant political transnationalism in terms of dual or overlapping membership between two different and independent political communities. Transnational migrants are mainly seen as diasporas or dual citizens, though Bauböck emphasises the importance of studying the effects of this form of participation on the institutions and the conceptions of membership of both destination and homeland polities.

Sociologists like Portes and his collaborators (Portes *et al.*, 1999, 2003, 2007; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003) define migrant political transnationalism as *regular* cross-border political activities (electoral and non-electoral) connecting immigrants with their countries of origin. Eva Östergaard-Nielsen (2001b, 2003a) gives this definition a broader meaning. Migrant transnational political practices and activities are defined as various forms of direct and

indirect (via the institutions of the host country or international organisations) cross-border participation of both migrants and refugees in the politics of their country of origin. She consequently distinguishes between four types of transnational political practices and activities: a) homeland politics; b) diaspora politics; c) immigrant politics; d) trans-local politics.[17]

In this study, I follow mainly Östergaard-Nielsen's definition and typology on political transnationalism that I subsequently enhance with contributions from political science literature on political participation. Migrant transnational political participation is defined here as voluntary electoral and non-electoral cross-border political activities and practices (homeland politics, immigrant politics and trans-local politics) through which immigrant associations attempt to or exert pressure on at least two political communities (home and destination countries), on a relatively regular basis. This participation can be direct like voting, membership in a political party, etc. and/or indirect via the political institutions of the home country (government, embassy/consulate) or international organisations.

Homeland politics includes those political activities and practices of immigrant associations that belong to domestic or foreign policy of the home country/community such as opposition (or support) for existing homeland political regime and its foreign policy goals:

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[17] Östergaard-Nielsen's typology on transnational political practices and activities is analysed in Chapter 1.

voting; participation in electoral campaigns; monetary contribution to parties or candidates; forms of protest like lobbying the government of destination country to reject or approve a certain national or foreign policy in home country, petitions, demonstrations, boycotts for specific national sovereignty and security political disputes in the case of particular national minorities (for example, Berbers or Western Sub-Saharans in Morocco, ethnic groups in Guinea Bissau or Equatorial Guinea, etc.); human rights defence or protest actions (denouncement of human rights violations in exit country like petitions, demonstrations, letters, etc.); informative action on homeland political issues (reunions, conferences, website forums, web logs, etc.).[18]

Immigrant politics includes those political activities and practices that immigrant associations undertake to better co-nationals' legal and socio-economic situation in destination country, and that are supported by the country of origin, like obtaining more political, social and economic rights: voting or support for particular destination country political party that favours immigrant rights; forms of protest in defence of immigrant rights (petitions, lawful demonstrations, boycotts, lobbying, etc.); informative action on immigrant rights (reunions, conferences, website forums, web logs, etc.).

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[18] Immigration to Spain is mainly socio-economic, so we include *diaspora politics* in the category of *homeland politics*.

Trans-local politics includes those activities and practices from abroad to better the situation in local community where one originates: membership in a civic hometown association or committee in destination country to support home communities and advance local or regional development projects; monetary contributions to community projects in home country (community); contributions to charity organisations active in home country (community); informative action on local community's socio-economic and political affairs (reunions, conferences, website forums, web logs, etc.).

Intensity of immigrant political transnationalism

Portes and his collaborators (Guranizo *et al.*, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 2007) found out that transnational activities are quite often sporadic, heterogeneous and vary across immigrant communities, both in their popularity and character. Though a significant proportion of immigrants engage in the transnational field, core or regular transnational activism is much less expanded than the occasional one. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between two levels of intensity in order to evaluate the importance of studying this phenomenon from a transnational perspective: 1) *broad*, *i.e.* both regular and occasional transnational activities; and 2) *strict*, *i.e.* only regular participation.[19]

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[19] Portes and his collaborators (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1226) measure the dependent variable - the number of transnational political activities - on a specific scale. They also codify with (1) regular participation or involvement, and occasional or no-participation with (0).

Other scholars like Itzigsohn (Itzigsohn *et al.*, 1999) and Östergaard-Nielsen (2003a) differentiate between *narrow* and *broad* migrant transnational political participation as opposite ends of a continuum of different practices. The more a transnational political practice or activity is institutionalised and has migrants involved and the more they move around to realise it, the narrower it is understood to be. Thus, *narrow* refers to more institutionalised and regular (political) activities and practices like the actual membership of parties or hometown associations and *broad* refers to (occasional) participation in (political) activities, meetings or events linking immigrants and places of origins. In this study, I use Itzigsohn's and Östergaard-Nielsen's distinction between "narrow" and "broad" migrant transnational political practices and activities.

B) Causal hypotheses and independent variables

Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (2003: 23-24) identify two necessary conditions for transnational activities that do not depend so much on the empirical evidence (as the identification of main determinants and practical implications does) rather than on the logical comparison with anterior migration periods, when these same activities were not so evident. The first one refers to later technological innovations (rapid flights, diary telephone contact, fax and e-mail communication, etc.) that permit governments and big corporations to accelerate the process of "transnationalism from above". Common people also beneficiate from this by establishing

their own forms of activities across borders. The resulting hypothesis is that as higher the access of immigrant groups to new technologies, as higher the frequency and scale of transnational activities. Immigrant communities with higher economic resources and human capital (education and professional preparation) would register higher levels of transnationalism by having a major access to the infrastructure that makes possible these activities.

The second necessary condition refers to social networks across state borders. The common assumption is that as higher the distance between communities of origin and destination, as lower the number of transnational enterprises. Big distances imply higher costs and generally more difficulties for a regular contact, thing that would reduce the proportion of immigrants that get involved in transnational activities. A small distance with high possibilities of communication would incentive this kind of activities. But distance barrier diminishes gradually with the replacement of traditional personal contact by new forms of electronic communication. Accordingly, whatever exception to or variation in the above hypotheses would have to be tested empirically through fieldworks in both home and destination countries (Portes *et al.*, 2003: 24-25).

Apart from these two necessary conditions - technological innovations and the establishment of new social networks through new forms of electronic communication - there are other possible factors that might explain the transnational political engagement of immigrant associations.

As such, my main causal hypothesis is that *higher political opportunity structure in home country* increases the engagement of immigrant associations in transnational political activities and practices.

The concept of political opportunity structure was first introduced by social movement scholars like Eisinger (1973), and elaborated later on by Tarrow (1989) in order to systematically analyse the political context that mediates structural conflicts given as latent political potentials. More recent social movement literature (Kriesi, 1995; Kriesi *et al.*, 1992; McAdam *et al.*, 1996; Koopmans, 1999; Tarrow, 2004, 2005) points out that collective action proliferates when people achieve access to necessary resources for escaping from their habitual submissiveness and find the opportunity to use them. Collective action also increases when people feel threaten by costs that cannot bear or that came against their sense of justice.

The political opportunity structure (POS) (or the external resources perceived by the group) is been defined as a conjuncture of factors or opportunities that enhances collective action. These opportunities operate as options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them that depend on factors outside the mobilising group. People choose those options for collective action that are available and expected to result in a favourable outcome. Not all the variation in levels and forms of collective action is due to strategic intelligence, courage, imagination, or plain luck of different actors

involved in conflict situations. An important part of it is shaped by structural characteristics of the political context in which these actors, willingly or unwillingly, have to act (Koopmans, 1999: 97, 100). According to Tarrow (2004: 122), these (favourable) opportunities for collective action might be: (1) increased access to new actors' participation; (2) instable political alliances in the government; (3) the emergence of influential allies; (4) the emergence of lines of divisions among elites; (5) a decrease in a state's capacity and will to repress the dissidence.

Institutionalist literature on collective action explains the variations in immigrant politics as an outcome of the interaction between a group's resources (human, social and cultural capital) and the institutional opportunity structure (IOS). The IOS usually employ the character of state elites, governmental bureaucrats, and the party system to explain the rules of interaction between political allies and competitors (Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005: 828; Landolt, 2008: 55). Immigrant organisations, in particular, may prosper or vanish depending on the combination, number, and authorization of institutional actors (Bloemraad 2005; Landolt, 2008: 55).

Departing from the discussed concepts of political/institutional opportunity structure and also from the available literature on transnationalism, I develop the definition of the political opportunity structure in home country for emigrants living abroad. Some initial dimensions of the concept political opportunity

structure can be adapted to the new definition while some not.[20] Accordingly, this study's concept of political opportunity structure in home country for nationals living abroad would include the following dimensions: 1) the level of freedom in home country; 2) formal political rights for nationals living abroad (dual citizenship, external voting rights); 3) state-led policies directed at emigrants living abroad. Each dimension is explicitly defined as follows.

1) *The level of freedom in home country* refers to how free (democratic) a country is in terms of political rights and civil liberties and thus opened to attract emigrants' engagement and sense of loyalty. This dimension consists of a combined average index of political rights and civil liberties ratings in exit country that takes the following values: 1 – "Not Free"; 2 – "Partly Free"; 3 – "Free".[21]

Several scholars have shown that instable or transitional political situation in home country may open up more opportunities for immigrants' engagement in the politics of their country of origin

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20 In this research study, immigrant associations' networks, although it might be seen, according to Tarrow's definition (2004), as another possible dimension of the variable political opportunity structure, is treated as a separate independent variable since the researcher considers that in the case of immigrant political transnationalism this variable has a particular causal effect that has to be studied separately. On the other side, the institutionalist approach fails to consider the more horizontal relations between immigrant organisations and other sectors of civil society (like other migrant and non-migrant organisations in home and destination countries) on the formation and nature of immigrant organising, focusing instead only on vertical contacts with the state and political parties (Landolt, 2008). All these horizontal contacts would be examined as indicators of the variable immigrant associations' social networks.

[21] For a detailed definition of this index, see Chapter 3.

(see Portes *et al.*, 2007). The vulnerable geopolitical position of many peripheral exit states, increasing poverty in the wake of structural adjustment policies, and the racial barriers migrants encounter explain recent trends toward extending the boundaries of citizenship in these countries (see Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994; Itzigshon, 2000; Portes *et al.*, 2003).

The instability of political alliances in pluralistic political systems might release new political opportunities for collective action. In less democratic countries, the lack of routinely competence converts whatever sign of instability in a chance for collective action. At the same time, conflicts among elites might encourage the emergence of collective action by motivating groups with low resources (like economic immigrants) to assume the risks of collective action or/and by animating the elite that has been excluded from power (like diasporas) to adopt the role of "people's voice" (see Tarrow, 2004: 118-120).

Well-established democratic governments have become aware of the utility of having access to populations settled elsewhere. Countries like Ireland, Greece, Italy and Portugal have recently developed policies and rhetoric that embrace their communities abroad (see Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004: 1018). These states have different instrumental grounds for regarding their emigrants as a resource, such as "an interest in upgrading human capital", "in attracting remittances", or "in using immigrant communities to promote economic and foreign policy goals" (Bauböck, 2003a: 17).

Democratic governments have started to devise special laws and policies to maintain links with their nationals abroad even when these take the citizenship of destination country (see Castles, 2002; Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004).

2) *Formal political rights for nationals living abroad* like dual citizenship or external-voting rights might also increase emigrants' access to homeland politics.

States become involved in the transnational social space as this becomes more prominent, in other words, when states perceive the economic and political potential of their expatriate communities (Portes, 1999). State-led trasnationalism refers to "institutionalised national policies and programs that attempt to expand the scope of a national state's political, economic, social, and moral regulation to include emigrants and their descendents outside the national territory" (Goldring 2002: 64).

The reasons and forms of state involvement might vary, though there is an emphasis in the literature on states' economic and political motivations to adopt transnational policies. These motivations might be: the economic potential of emigrant remittances, investments and entrepreneurial activities; emigrant communities as a potential market for home companies; the political representation abroad that can advance home-state's economic and foreign policy interests; the human capital emigrants represent for home country; the reinforcement of nationhood bonds

by retaining the loyalty of expatriates) (see Mahler, 2000; Levitt, 2001a; Naim, 2002; Saxenian, 2002; Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2003b; Margueritis, 2007).

Three state positions have been identified in response to emigrants living abroad (Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004: 1019-1024):

1) States that vary with respect to law or the degree to which they extend political rights. Some states distinguish between two categories of membership: citizenship and nationality.[22] Accordingly, home states employ a range of legal distinctions to demarcate categories of citizenship and nationality: a) denial of dual citizenship or any form of dual access to rights (for example, countries such as Haiti and Germany do not allow dual sets of rights);[23] b) dual nationality with the granting of some legal privileges to emigrants and their descendants but not full dual citizenship (for example, Mexico and India); c) dual citizenship in which emigrants and their descendants are given full rights, when they return to the homeland, even if they also hold the passport of another country (for example, France, Ireland, Greece, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Italy, and

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[22] Citizenship delineates the character of a member's rights and duties within the national polity while nationality legally demarcates a category of belonging without granting full citizenship rights (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004: 1019).

[23] Germany allows dual citizenship only for *Ausiedler*, Jews, and persons whose countries do not allow the repudiation of citizenship. Haiti, without altering citizenship laws, considers its diaspora as a part of the Haitian nation (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004: 1019).

Portugal); d) dual citizenship with rights while abroad (for example, the Colombians living abroad who have the right to elect representatives to the home-country legislature).[24]

2) States that vary with respect to rhetoric or the kind of ideology of nationhood that is promulgated (for example, China, Ireland, Portugal, and Haiti propose a national self-concept based on blood ties linking residents around the world to their respective homelands). Long-distance nationalism encompasses various ideas about belonging that link together people living in various geographic locations, and motivate or justify their taking action in relation to an ancestral territory and its government (see Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2001a).

3) States that vary with respect to public policy or the kinds of programmes and policies that they pursue in response to transnational migration (for example, Latin American governments implement different programmes and policies toward emigrants such as reforming ministerial and consular services to be more responsive to emigrant needs; investment policies designed to attract and channel economic remittances; granting dual citizenship or nationality, the right to vote from abroad, or the right to run

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[24] In 2000, ten Latin American countries allowed some form of dual nationality or citizenship while only four countries had such provisions prior to 1991. Other countries recognise dual membership selectively, with specific signatories (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004: 1019-1020).

for public office; extending state protections or services to nationals living abroad that go beyond consular services; implementing symbolic policies designed to reinforce emigrants' sense of enduring membership) (see Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003).

These state positions or answers toward emigrants with regard to law, rhetoric, and public policy might be translated in three broad categories of migrant-sending states (see Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004: 1021-1024):

1) Transnational nation-states that treat their emigrants as long-term, long-distance members and grant them dual citizenship or nationality. The transnational migrants' contribution (remittances, etc.) and participation become an integral part of the national policy and the consular officials and other government representatives are seen as partially responsible for emigrants' protection and representation (for example, countries like El Salvador, Mexico, Portugal, the Dominican Republic, Brazil);

2) Strategically selective states that encourage some forms of long-distance economic and political nationalism but want to selectively and strategically manage what emigrants can and cannot do. These states offer partial and changing packages of tax privileges and services to emigrants, encourage long-distance membership, but never grant the legal rights of

citizenship or nationality or the franchise (for example, countries like India, Barbados, Ireland, the Philippines, Haiti, and Turkey);

3) Disinterested and denouncing states which treat migrants as if they no longer belong to their homeland. Migrants are treated as suspects because are seen as having abandoned the homeland or even as traitors to its cause; this stance was more common prior to the current period of globalisation (for example, Cuba's relationship to Cubans in the United States; Slovakia, following the Cold War, did not allow any representation for its emigrants within the new political system).

More emigration countries have lately widen the spectrum of political rights (double citizenship and/or external voting rights) as a way of biding their emigrants to the home country and getting, in turn, benefits like remittances, technology transfer, political allegiance and cultural maintenance.[25] However, the electoral institutions of those countries whose expatriates retain, for example, the right to vote are many times criticised on the basis that long-term (permanent) residency in a democratic state is what should entitle people to full political rights, regardless of their ethnicity and national origin. Countries like Canada and Australia that

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[25] Blais, Massicotte and Yoshinaka (2001: 56-57) in their study of the constitutions and the election laws of 63 democratic countries reveal that a majority of countries (40) give citizens residing abroad the right to vote and that "stronger" democracies are less inclined to disfranchise their expatriates.

disenfranchise their citizens after five and six years of residence in a foreign country are seen as offering a more desirable and democratic model for voting.

New access opportunities in home countries (for instance, double citizenship or external voting rights) can lead to increasing transnational political action of immigrant associations. As narrower participation access is (for example, in a less democratic country), as much likely that new openness (new political rights) produces new opportunities for collective action. The expansion of dual nationality (or citizenship) and the extension of external voting rights mean that even persons who are not active participants in transnational politics have access to those membership rights if they want to claim them. As an identity strategy, an investment strategy, or even an exit strategy, multiple memberships provide the individual with several potential positions with respect to the state (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004: 1020). Nevertheless, neither total access nor total lack of access determines the maximum level of collective action. It is rather a mix of opened and closed factors that influence collective action (see Eisinger, 1973: 15; Tarrow, 2004: 117-118).

The indicator, external-voting rights, was constructed based on the available information on national election systems and laws and takes the following values: 1 - "no external voting rights"; 2 – "external voting rights with some restrictions"; 3 – "external voting rights". The indicator, double citizenship rights, was constructed

using the available information on citizenship, dual citizenship and multiple citizenship from a survey on world citizenship laws and takes the following values: 1 - "no right to dual citizenship"; 2 - "having the right to dual citizenship with some exceptions"; 3 – "having the right to dual citizenship".[26]

State-led policies directed at emigrants living abroad

Various empirical studies have shown that institutions such as social service agencies, state consular offices, ethnic and religious organisations determine the territorial orientation of immigrant practices. They can motivate immigrants to re-enforce ties with their home country, to engage in local affairs or other multilocal and more decentred diasporic relations, to renounce at any kind of politics, or a combination of these different orientations (see Menjivar, 1999; Kurien, 2001; Gold, 2002; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2003a; Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003; Levitt *et al.*, 2004; Landolt, 2008).

Individuals' transnational activities have been commonly initiated as a direct reaction to governmental policies and global capitalism's effects in poor countries. Immigrants and their families have been trying to evade the enduring poverty resulted from this situation (Portes and Guarnizo, 1991; Roberts *et al.*, 1999). State-motivated transnationalism has come in subsequently with the recognition by national governments of the importance of their expatriate

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[26] For more information on all these indicators, see Chapter 3.

communities. From that moment, governments have been trying to gather and manage the initiatives of their communities living abroad.

Nevertheless, states' engagement in the transnational social field as well as the variety of home countries' responses to emigration in particular have been less studied by the migration scholarship. States' involvement has been commonly interpreted as a response to migrants' demands and increasing capacity to organise and lobby, and most likely to happen in cases of massive migrations with a significant political impact (for example, the Mexicans in the United States). Nevertheless, some home states, though with a less significant or organised emigrant population, have started to implement measures targeting their communities abroad.[27]

Motivations behind home state policies have to do less with the size and organisational level of emigrant community but rather with specific political projects (rebuilding political representational ties, broadening support and recapturing human capital), specific domestic agents and processes (the presidency rather than political parties, political instability, human rights issues or economic crises), and bilateral and multilateral agreements more or less institutionalised (Margheritis, 2007: 88). These state initiatives contribute substantially to the development of a transnational

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[27] The Argentinean emigration, for example, though increasingly significant, does not imply large numbers, is not primarily motivated by poverty and unemployment, and does not have a high level of organisation. However, the Argentine government recently implemented a number of specific initiatives targeting the Argentinean communities abroad (Margheritis, 2007: 87).

migrant space in general, and to the development of transnational migrant organisations or associations (see Guarnizo, 1998; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Portes, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 1999; Vertovec, 1999; Waldinger and Fitzerald, 2003; Margheritis, 2007).

Home states adopt different policy packages to incorporate or attract the participation of their nationals living abroad. The most common ones are: a) "homeland politics" to encourage state contact with temporary migrants and facilitate their return; and b) "global national policies" through which states maintain links with permanent settles abroad not to facilitate their return but to encourage emigrants' continued sense of membership and loyalty to the home state (see Smith, 1998; Goldring, 2002; Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003). These home state policies might create enhanced opportunities for immigrants to engage in political transnationalism.

There is generally more convergence on the type of home state policies toward nationals living abroad (see Guarnizo, 1998; Itzigshon, 2000) and more divergence on how far states are willing to guarantee an enduring long-distance membership of migrants (see Smith, 1998; Goldring, 1998, 2002). Some factors such as the structural imperatives facing poor countries, the economic potential of emigrant communities, and the emergent international norms might lead to convergence among states' transnational policies while some others, more nationally based, such as the size and organization of the emigrant community vis-à-vis its homeland, the capacity of state institutions to make and implement credible

policies, or the unique role of political parties might account for divergence (see Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003). Other factors like particular emigration trajectories, type and stability of political regime, economic situation, position in the world economy, and bilateral and multilateral relations with destination countries might also explain the variations in state-led policies toward emigrants (see Östergaard-Nielsen, 2003b; Margheritis, 2007).

In this study, the dimension *state-led policies directed at emigrants living abroad* comprises the following indicators:

a) Ministerial or consular reforms (bureaucratic reforms): census or studies of emigrant communities abroad; units of assistance, support programmes or 'mobile consulates' for emigrant communities abroad; cabinet-level offices that function primarily as governments' voice on emigration-related issues; Ministry for emigrants living abroad, etc.;

b) Investment policies that seek to attract or channel migrant remittances: investment funds with higher interest rates; matching funds for investment in public works by hometown and home-state organisations; remittance sending agencies; measures to draw on the human capital abroad (database of the technical skills of emigrants living abroad; conferences etc.); creating home-provinces organisations in destination countries;

c) Extending state protection or services to nationals living abroad that go beyond traditional consular services: service delivery by home states to their emigrant communities abroad (programmes providing literacy training and primary and secondary schooling for adults through its consulates; sending books and advisers to train educators in the destination state, making it possible to obtain home state's high school equivalency from abroad; equivalence student programmes, health insurance packages to cover emigrants' families in home countries; business networks in order to promote small business development in emigrant communities); public condemn by consulates and other state officials of human rights abuses committed against undocumented workers in destination countries; measures to promote emigrants' continued participation in home-country's life than to ease their lives in destination country (customs policies such that return migrants can import their belongings, including one car per household, without paying taxes; housing units built and partially funded by the government specifically for returnees);

d) Symbolic policies designed to reinforce emigrants' sense of continuing membership and loyalty to the home state: sponsoring creative-writing contests among second-generation immigrants; allocating funds to establish cultural houses in areas with sizable immigrant population; promoting hometown organisations and encouraging

remittances seeking thus the promotion of a sense of political membership (Levitt, 2001a; Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003).

The second causal hypothesis contemplated in this study is that the level of socio- economic development of home country influences positively immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism. In other words, as lower the socio-economic level of development of home country, as higher immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism (in particular, in trans-local politics).

Persons migrating from poor regions to the developed Western Europe have come to constitute an indispensable source of survival for their countries and communities of origin. The level of remittances sent by immigrants in the advanced countries to their respective nation states (families) easily exceeds the foreign aid that these nations receive and even match their hard currency earnings from exports (Portes *et al.*, 2007: 243-244; Sandell *et al.*, 2007: 14-15). According with World Bank estimations, in 2005, the remittances achieved a level of 167.000 millions of dollars, with 7 millions more than in 2004. Oriental Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean were the first two remittance receiving regions followed by South Asia, Middle East and north of Africa, Europe (the developing countries), Central Asia and, ultimately, sub-Saharan Africa.

Migrants to developed countries have also started to implement a whole array of philanthropic and civic projects in home communities and countries. Empirical studies show that immigrants or refugees coming from rural areas tend to form non-political hometown civic committees in support of the localities left behind, while those from more urban origins commonly become involve in the politics and the cultural life of their countries as a whole, especially if political parties, churches, and cultural institutions there seek to maintain an active presence among their expatriates (see Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 2007).

Many immigrant associations abroad whose members maintain strong emotional ties with their hometowns support the respective communities and advance local development projects, with considerable political implications, through collective (socio-economic and political) strategies. Transnational activities among immigrant organizations possess sufficient weight to affect the development prospects of localities and regions and to attract the attention of home country governments (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 2007).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the study of immigrant transnationalism is still incipient (more case studies and less systematic quantitative or qualitative work), yet the existing data show that immigrants' and home country counterparts' initiatives might possess the counter-hegemonic potential to the contemporary processes of

global neoliberal capitalism. While the latter leads to increasing inequalities among and within nations and remains largely indifferent to the causes behind the pogroms of people from the Global South to the North, the activities of hometown committees and other immigrant organisations strongly seek to alleviate this situation. Nevertheless, the ways by which people driven from their countries by poverty, violence, and lack of resources and opportunities then turn around and seek to overturn these conditions by using the resources acquired abroad needs to be further on investigated (Portes *et al.*, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 2007).

The main indicator used here for measuring the variable level of socio-economic development of home country is the Human Development Index (HDI) with its three values: 1- "low"; 2 – "medium"; 3 – "high".[28]

The third causal hypothesis is that immigrant associations' transnational political activism varies among different national/ethnic origin immigrant groups.

Empirical data show that transnational organisations and activism vary among different national origin immigrant groups, in part, because of the entrance of home country governments in the transnational field and the policies that they have so far implemented (Portes *et al.*, 2007). Programmes and policies initiated by home country governments toward nationals living

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[28] For a detailed discussion on the election of this indicator, see Chapter 3.

abroad play a significant role in the transnational social field, especially if they go beyond symbolic appeals and provide help for their emigrants. In these cases, official directives can considerably influence the direction and goals adopted by grassroots transnational activities (R.C. Smith, 2003b).

The fourth causal hypothesis is that as more extended and spatially diversified social networks as higher immigrant associations' engagement in transnational political practices and activities.[29]

Sociologists have pictured migration as a self-constructing network-building process, facilitating the departure and settlement of newcomers and sustaining the movement when the original economic incentives have disappeared (Tilly, 1990; Massey *et al.*, 1994). Cumulative causation appears when networks of migration perpetuate by themselves, early departures paving the way for subsequent ones and lowering the costs and risks of the initial journey (Portes and Bach, 1985; Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003).

Moreover, immigrant social networks present two different characteristics in comparison to those of the natives: 1) they are simultaneously dense and extended over long physical distances; 2)

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[29] Here might come in a possible selection bias. The social networks of immigrant organisations could be also strengthened by the political activism of immigrants across national borders. I, however, assume that the primary causal mechanism runs in the direction of social contacts leading to immigrant political activism across national borders: "socially isolated immigrants are unlikely to take first steps toward transnational political participation" (see Guarnizo *et. al.*, 2003: 1232).

they tend to generate solidarity by virtue of generalised uncertainty. Accordingly, "exchange under conditions of uncertainty" generates "stronger bonds among participants" than that which is characterised by "full information and impartially enforced rules" (Portes, 1997: 8).

Departing from these theoretical assumptions, I consider that transnational activities will follow the same network-building migration logic and that social networks of transnational immigrants would be as durable and cohesive as immigrant social networks.

Many immigrants soon become aware that living in the advanced world is not going to improve too much their social and economic status. To overcome the situations of discrimination and social exclusion that destination society reserves them, they must activate their networks of social relationships. At the same time, increasing immigrant access and appeal to international human rights instruments might expand the political channels of immigrant associations and thus facilitate their possibilities to combine external and internal status and affiliations. On the other side, the proliferation of principles of human rights and democratisation in foreign policy agenda of home and destination states might lead to the creation of particular governmental and non-governmental organisations working on human rights. These new organisations monitoring and defending human rights may enlarge the social networks of immigrant associations by assisting them in their transnational political activism.

In the absence of large economic resources, carrying out long-distance projects must depend on the maintenance of strong networks of social contacts. The larger or more difficult the proposed transnational project is, the stronger the social networks required to uphold it. The prediction is that, regardless of immigrant associations' motivations for engaging in political transnationalism, the latter will be conditioned by the size and spatial scope of immigrant associations' networks. The absolute number of an association's ties represents the network size while the network spatial scope is measured by the ratio of out-of-town association's contacts, including those abroad, to those in the city of residence. The larger and more spatially diversified these are, the greater the chances for engaging in political initiatives across state borders (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003: 1218-1224).

The fifth causal hypothesis is that the type of immigrant association (civic, hometown committee, social or cultural) might influence immigrant associations' engagement in transnational political activities and practices. The theoretical expectations are that particular types of immigrant associations (for example, civic associations) tend to perform more transnational political activism.

Recent empirical studies of immigrant communities in the United States suggest that the predominant type of immigrant organisations involved in transnational activities are the civic entities that pursue an agenda of national scope, based on several projects in their home

country. Second in importance are hometown committees whose scope of action is primarily local. Next are social agencies that provide health, educational, and other services to immigrants, but which are also engaged in their home country. The latter are commonly better-financed organizations since their budget includes funds for social services provided by destination municipal, county, and state governments. Transnational political organisations are rather a minority and they are represented among particular immigrant groups (Portes *et al.*, 2007).

2.6   Unit of analysis

Immigrant transnationalism involves individuals, their social networks, their communities and institutional structures like local and national governments. The existent research literature tends to mix these different units of analysis, referring sometimes to the achievements of individual migrants, other times to the transformation of local communities in home countries or to the initiatives of home countries' governments to attract the loyalty and resources of their respective expatriates. This leads to an increasing confusion on the concept and its meaning (Portes *et al.*, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 1999).

Although scholars like Castles (2002: 2) argue that more and more immigrants recognize themselves "as members of transnational communities based on a common identity with their co-ethnics in

the ancestral homeland and other migration destinations",[30] Portes and his collaborators (2003: 19-20) consider that, for methodological reasons, the appropriate unit of analysis in studying "transnationalism from below" is the individual and his/her social networks. Other units of analysis like communities, economic enterprises, political parties, etc., can also come into analysis but in subsequent and more complex phases of research. In order to understand the structure of transnationalism and its effects in a more efficient way, it is important to study the history and activities of the individuals. These data would help us to define the networks and thus identify the counterparts of transnational entrepreneurs and activists in the country of origin, and to recollect information for establishing the aggregate effects of these activities.

Less well-studied is the wide range of collective organisations/associations among immigrants developing a number of projects in their respective countries and communities of origin, as well as the initiatives undertaken by these communities and even nation states to motivate and channel the material and human capital

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[30] Although community boundaries are ambiguous and subject to negotiation by members, Stephen Castles (2002: 5-6) suggests the term *transnational communities* for "groups based in two or more countries, which engage in recurrent, enduring and significant cross-border activities, which may be economic, political, social or cultural". Only those groups whose "consciousness and regular activities transcend national borders" make up transnational communities. Consequently, he identifies four types of transnational communities: (1) transnational business communities and multinational corporations; (2) transnational political communities; (3) transnational cultural communities; and (4) transnational social communities. As we can see, Castles does not distinguish between "transnationalism from above" and "transnationalism from below".

contributions of their expatriates.[31] This study aims to bring in more and new information on the transnational activities of immigrant groups through a systematic analysis of immigrant associations' transnational political action. The data gathered allows us to gain better understanding of the forces creating and sustaining these associations and to test preliminary hypotheses about the effects of exit contexts, social networks and types of associations on the character of immigrant political transnationalism.

Immigrant associations

The arena of political decision-making and policy formation in representative democracies is filled by various interest groups, intermediary organisations and civic associations, social movements, voluntary associations, all of them exerting influence through lobbying or by participating in consultative bodies. The array of these forms of social organisation is basically endless varying from political parties, trade unions, business and professional organisations, welfare and charity organisations to service clubs, community associations, churches, sports, social and leisure clubs, scientific, educational, youth, health and cultural organisations (van Deth, 1997: 1).

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[31] Portes, Escobar and Walton Radford (2007) undertake a systematic survey of immigrant organizations between three Latin American–origin immigrant groups in the East Coast of the United States. The principal focus of their study is on the implications of the phenomenon for local and national development in sending countries.

Robert Putnam (1993, 2002, 2003), in his work on social capital, emphasises the significant role of the associational life in representative democracies. Participation in associations is seen as a structural indicator of the existence (or absence) of social capital. Other political scientists like Hirst (1992, 1994) or Cohen and Rogers (1992, 1995) underline the democratic function of associations, regarding them as real schools of democracy. The associational life, apart from its consequences on the normative and attitudinal structure of citizens, might also influence the behaviour of its members. As such, associational engagement increases political debate and participation (Almond and Verba, 1963; Olsen, 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; van Deth, 1997). Associations might also have a distributive role, contributing to the increase or descent of social inequalities (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995).

Sociologists have traditionally seen participation in associations as an indicator of social and political integration (Parsons, 1969). Scholars in sociological and historical institutionalism regard associations as important sources of influence (power) rather than mere channels for individual participation (Skocpol, 2002). Associations' function could be purely political if these can turn into real sources of power and public influence. Accordingly, associations could shape public opinion and develop public agenda issues, exert pressure in order to include certain subjects in the political agenda, or participate in the processes of public

deliberation by representing the excluded or marginalised voices (Warren, 2001).

Economic and political restructuring in developed Western societies has produced an array of new modes of exclusion, including unequal access to public resources and policy making. This situation particularly affects the members of immigrant and ethnic minority groups (Vertovec, 1999). New forums, types of representation and modes of immigrant participation have emerged to bring about more democratic developments surrounding a range of public policies in destination countries (including education, housing, health and social care) or social development programmes in home countries/communities. Immigrant association is just another form of social organisation attempting to influence and adjust the political decision-making and policy formation in representative democracies in accordance to the interests of immigrant groups.

Immigrants' role and social position, their forms of exclusion and possibilities of inclusion have recently stimulated much rethinking on concepts like citizenship and pluralism, as well as on basic ideas concerning the nature of democratic civic society (Dahrendorf, 1994; Van Gunsteren, 1994; Habermas, 1994). New concepts of citizenship, such as "transnational citizenship" (Bauböck, 1994; Castles, 2005), "multicultural citizenship" (Kymlicka, 1995), "differentiated citizenship" (Young 1989, 1990), "neo-republican citizenship" (Van Gunsteren, 1994), "cultural citizenship" (Turner,

1994), "postnational citizenship" (Soysal, 1994) or "cosmopolitan citizenship" (Held, 1995), are proposed as a way of resolving the questions posed by contemporary forms of pluralism and the modes of exclusion that have arisen with them.

Most of these new forms of citizenship seek to extend T.H. Marshall's (1949) classic notion of "social citizenship" and to explore new meanings of membership and participation. Citizenship comes to refer to an array of rights, duties and activities of individuals and groups that reflect their own interests with regard to public sphere decisions affecting life opportunities, quality of life, and/or representation in society (Vertovec, 2003).

Several scholars like Brubaker (1992, 1995), Layton-Henry (1992, 2004), Bauböck (1994), Kymlicka (1995), Vertovec (1999, 2001, 2003) have focused primarily on the politics of immigration, citizenship and minority rights in Europe. As a result, many academics, policy institutions and politicians have lately emphasised the need for policy reassessment and formulation in terms of issues like enhancing the modes of immigrant/ethnic minority participation. For some of them, re-defining citizenship means dismantling certain forms of representation in favour of more participatory frameworks and mechanisms fostering greater group involvement (Vertovec, 2003).

Migrant associational sphere fulfils an important role in the process of immigrant labour integration in the destination country and, in

particular, in the course of immigrant adaptation to a new social context. Immigrant associations provide immigrants useful information about the destination country and the existing opportunities there, assist them in their basic needs and in the integration process. By being networks of immigrants funded on cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious, etc., resemblance, and by perfectly combining the relational forms imported from homeland tradition or culture with the modern modes of internal organization adapted to the destination country, these associations become active bridges of dialog between the destination society and the immigrants.

Immigrant associations are many times more prone to engage in political activism that the general population associations. The former might actuate with higher frequency as intermediation vehicles between foreign citizens and the political arena.[32] At the same time, more and more immigrant associations like for example hometown and civic/cultural immigrant associations build up trans-local connections and engage in transnational practices and activities (Orozco 2000a, 2000b, 2002; Sorenson 2004; Portes *et al.*, 2007; Caglar 2006). As such, immigrant associations might turn into rights demanding associations in respect to both home and destination countries, they may ask for social rights and legal

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[32] An empirical study on the political integration of immigrant associations in Madrid demonstrate that immigrant associations are more likely to participate in political activities than the general population associations (González and Morales, 2006).

recognition to improve immigrants' situation in destination country or they may participate in homeland politics.

The unit of analysis of this research study is immigrant associations of different national/ethnic origins whose members reside in the metropolitan area of Barcelona. This category includes civic, hometown committee, social and cultural associations. I analyse if certain types of immigrant associations in Barcelona could be regarded as transnational political collective actors.

An entity, in order to be transnational, must have social and political bases outside its target state or society (Tarrow 2001: 11). Transnational associations are those whose aims and activities are partially or totally located in countries others than where their members reside (Portes *et al.*, 2007: 12-13). Accordingly, a transnational immigrant association must have social and political bases outside the country/community of origin (its target state or society), so in the destination country/community, and conduct political activities and practices in the country/community of origin. By transnational political immigrant associations I refer here to those immigrant associations established in one foreign country/community that get involved with regularity in various forms of direct and indirect participation in the politics of their country of origin.

2.7 Level of analysis

In methodological terms, this research study is structured in function of two different levels of analysis: (1) the contextual or macro (home-state oriented – the political opportunity structure and the level of socio-economic development in home country); and (2) the organisational or *meso* (migrant association oriented – characteristics and organisational networks).

2.8 Summary of the proposed theoretical model

Table 2.2 Theoretical model

Transnational Political Practices and Activities of Immigrant Associations		
Unit of analysis	Immigrant associations (civic, hometown committee, social agency, cultural, political, professional, religious, educational, sportive, economic, etc.)	
Level of analysis	Multilevel (bottom up)	
Dependent variable: Immigrant associations' transnational political practices and activities	Electoral: - voting; - participation in electoral campaign; - money contributions to political parties, candidates or any other groups that support or oppose a candidate	Non-Electoral: - forms of protest like petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, appeals to international human rights organisations etc.; - informative and debating activities; - local community development projects; - monetary contribution to philanthropic projects, etc.

	Homeland politics - political activities and practices of immigrant associations, which belong to domestic or foreign policy of the exit country: - opposition (or support) for existing homeland political regime and its foreign policy goals	Immigrant politics -political activities and practices that immigrant associations undertake to better co-nationals' legal and socio-economic situation in the destination country, and that are supported by the country of origin: - obtaining more political, social and economic rights; - fighting discrimination and marginalisation	Trans-local politics - activities and practices from abroad to better the situation in local community where one originates: - hometown associations or committee created in destination countries to support the respective communities and advance local development projects; - contributions to or participation in local philanthropic projects; etc.
Intensity	Broad: occasional and non-institutionalised forms of participation (regular and occasional activities and practices like meetings or events linking immigrants and places of origins)		Narrow: continuous and institutionalised forms of participation (only regular activities and practices like association's continous involvement in home country national elections or in diverse civic projects)
Independent variables	The political opportunity structure in home country: a) level of freedom; b) new political rights for emigrants (dual citizenship; external voting rights); c) other state policies directed at emigrants living abroad.		
	The socio-economic level of development in home country: the human development index (HDI)		
	The social networks available to immigrant associations: a) size (absolute number of an association's ties); b) spatial scope (local and non-local).		
	The type of immigrant association: civic, hometown committee, social agency, cultural, political, professional, religious, educational, sports, economic, etc.		

(Personal elaboration)

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3. RESEARCH DESIGN, SAMPLE, DATA AND DATA SOURCES

3.1 Introduction

This thesis consists of a qualitative research study of immigrant associations' political transnationalism. The study evaluates both descriptive and causal hypotheses in order to analyse this kind of political activism. In this chapter, I specify the research design, the sample construction, the methods, and the data and data sources.

From an epistemological point of view, there are basically two approaches in social sciences on the query whether or not to embrace natural sciences' research model (methods): a) *the positivism* underlines the importance of using natural sciences methods, and focuses on explanation; b) *the interpretativism* focuses on comprehension and interpretation, and rejects the use of natural sciences methods. There are also two positions in social sciences when considering if, from an ontological point of view, the social reality is something objective, external to the individual or something constructed: a) *the objectivism* regards social phenomena as external to the individual, independent of his/her existence; b) for *the constructivism*, social phenomena are a result of social interaction (all social reality is a constructed reality). These approaches have led to two distinct methodological perspectives and traditions in social sciences, the quantitative and the qualitative,

which have influenced the design of the vast majority of research studies.

Although quantitative and qualitative researches have been usually regarded and situated on the opposite sides of the methodological field, authors like King, Keohane and Verba (1994), Bryman (1988) and even Corbetta (2007) consider that both types of research are legitimate and utile. The two methodological lines seem to be very different at a first view and there are many researchers who try to confront them like, for example, the 'pure' quantitativists or, in our terms, the *quanti* (positivist epistemological assumption; the objective is to explain and make causal inferences with a high number of cases, to generalise and find empirical regularities) versus the 'pure' qualitativists or, in our terms, the *quali I* (interpretativist epistemological assumption; the objective is to observe and understand).

For King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 3-7; 7-9), both styles of research (quantitative and qualitative) could be systematic and scientific if they are guided by the same inferential logic. Their book "Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research" shows how to design qualitative (small-n) studies so that they satisfy the rules of scientific inference.[33] A qualitative,

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[33] The researcher is aware about the possible critiques to King, Keohane and Verba's book (and methodological approach) that were reunited in a review symposium published in *The American Political Science Review*, 89(2), 1995: the crucial role of conceptual framework formulation in social inquiry; many researchers in the area-studies tradition do not seek generality of explanation because they hold that outcomes are highly determined by the "context" in which

quantitative or methodologically mixed research study could be regarded as scientific if this fulfils four basic requisites:

1. The research objective is to formulate descriptive (What? Who? How?) or explicative inferences (Why?) based on the empirical information that we have on the world;
2. In order to generalise and analyse the data, the methods have to be explicit, codified and public thus they can be evaluated;
3. The conclusions are uncertain so, a certain degree of doubt is inherent to science;
4. The methods are at the core of science.

Bryman (1988: 109) too considers that the differences between the two types of research are not epistemological but rather technical. As such, the best research studies tend to combine the characteristics of both methodological traditions, even though this is not always a necessary requirement. Corbetta (2007: 60-61), in turn, although he recognises the legitimacy of both research styles, believes that these are different not only from a technical point of view but also epistemological. For him, the two research styles represent the direct and logical expression of two distinct epistemological perspectives, two different paradigms that imply

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politics get played, this itself no subject to variable analysis; the selection criteria may be different when theory is strong as opposed to when theory is weak; better theory (and not increasing the number of observations) might permit inferences from fewer cases, allow restrictions on the independent variable, and may even profit from judicious selection on the dependent variable; the importance of combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, etc.

different ways of understanding the social reality, the research objectives, the role of the researcher and the technical instruments.

However, all these authors would agree that in the same research study we could find data that we can analyse statistically and other relevant data that we cannot analyse with quantitative methods. In order to understand a social world in a continuous change, we have to work with information that is easy to quantify and other that is not. We cannot afford the risk to renounce at none of this type of information. It is not only possible but also sometime necessary to combine both types of research and use quantitative as well as qualitative methods and data to interpret and explain the social reality.

3.2 The research design

In comparative transnational research literature, we usually find two basic ways of studying immigrant transnationalism: one is studying the transnational activities of the same immigrant group in different local/national contexts (see Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001a; Landolt *et al.*, 1999; Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002; Landolt, 2008); and the other is studying the transnational activities of different immigrant groups in the same national/local context (Portes *et al.*, 2002; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 2007; Waldinger, 2008).

This comparative research study attempts to identify the common and specific elements of the transnational political activities and

practices of various immigrant associations in Barcelona. Thus, it focuses on cross-border political activities of different ethnic/national origin immigrant associations in Barcelona.

3.3 Sampling

A) Population sample

The ethnographic evidence analysed in this study is based on fieldwork conducted between 2006 and 2008 in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona.[34] The big urban conglomerates are the zones where more immigrants arrive ultimately, principally because of increasing work opportunities. Barcelona is the second metropolitan area in Spain, after Madrid, and one of the main areas of immigrant concentration. The year of reference for the sample selection was 2005.

After the II World War, Europe has been a land of immigration, national policies being fairly liberal during the 1950s and 1960s, before becoming more restrictive from the 1970s onward. From early-1950s to 1973, emergent industrialised countries like Germany, France, and the UK started to run short of labour and recruited workers from less industrialised countries like Italy,

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[34] The General Territorial Plan of Catalonia defines the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (MAB) as an area of 3.236 km2 that comprises a total population of 4.392.393 inhabitants distributed in 164 municipals that are structured in 7 *comarcas* (Barcellonès, Garraf, Alt Penedès, Baix Llobregat, Vallès Occidental, Vallès Oriental y Maresme) (see Roca and Fullaondo, 2004).

Portugal, and Spain, and also from their former colonies like North Africa, the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent or, in the case of Germany, from adjacent countries like the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. Over this period, net immigration to Western Europe reached around 10 million (compared to 4 million between 1914 and 1949) (Stalker 1994, 2002; Solé *et al.*, 2000; Appleyard, 2001).

Between 1974 and mid-1980s, Western Europe closed its doors to further labour immigration because of the economic recession, and expected guest workers to leave. These workers had, however, established themselves and preferred to stay. Migrants started to choose other destinations like Italy and other countries of Southern Europe. The economic incentives of joining the European Community made Greece, Portugal and Spain more attractive to immigrants. Between mid-1980s and 2001, the political upheaval in Eastern Europe brought on to Western Europe thousands of people fleeing conflict and seeking asylum. Other people from other regions were also drawn on by the asylum hope. From 1989 to 1998, more than 4 million people applied for asylum in Europe, from which 35 per cent were from Asia, and 19 per cent from Africa (Salt *et al.*, 2000). The pressure grew and Western Europe started to tighten up its borders but more people tried to enter illegally, either travelling on their own initiative or with the help of smugglers (see Solé *et al.*, 2000; Appleyard, 2001; Stalker, 2002).

The most significant factors behind this increase in migratory movements beginning with the 80s have been the economic

resurgence of the continent and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. On the other side, the economic depression or the destruction of traditional modes of life jointly with the natural disasters and armed and political conflicts determined many people from North Africa, Latin America and Asia to flee to Western European countries in search for enhanced economic and social opportunities. Mediterranean countries like Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece have changed from countries of emigration to countries of immigration. Since the 80s, Spain, has converted itself in a destination country, registering a significant immigrant increase beginning with the 1990. In 2003 and 2004, Spain become one of the main European Union immigration countries alongside Portugal, Italy and the UK (Solé *et al.*, 2000; Lorca-Susino, 2006).

According with Eurostat, in 2004 the stock of foreigners (i.e., not nationals of their country of residence) in the European Union reached almost 25 millions, around 5.5 per cent of the total population.[35] Though immigrant trends in the European Union have been changing over time, present statistics show that immigrants come primarily from the Maghreb countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya), West Africa, Turkey, and South America, and to a lesser extent from India, and Eastern Europe. These immigrants tend to settle primarily in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands (Lorca-Susino, 2006).

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[35] The European Union is formed by 25 countries with an approximate total population of about 450 million people. Source: EUROSTAT, "Statistics in Focus: Population and Social Conditions 8/2006". http://epp.eurostats.cec.eu.int.

The total foreign population (persons with other nationality than Spanish) registered in 2006 more than four millions, around 10 per cent of the total population, the vast majority coming from European (communitarian and non-communitarian) (38.8%), countries, followed by American (36.9%) , African (18.9%) and Asian (5.3%) countries. Immigrant men and women almost came to equalise their proportions, thing that has determined many scholars to talk about a process of feminisation of the contemporary migration (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Foreign population by sex and region of nationality. Spain 2006

Nationality	Total	% Total	Men	Women
EUROPE	1.609.856	38.8	842.163	767.693
UE (25)	918.886	22.2	481.640	437.246
Non-EU countries	690.970	16.6	360.523	330.447
AFRICA	785.279	18.9	533.780	251.499
AMERICA	1.528.077	36.9	700.571	827.506
Central America	126.966	3.1	52.154	74.812
North America	51.149	1.2	24.065	27.084
South America	1.349.962	32.6	624.352	725.610
ASIA	217.918	5.3	137.236	80.682
OCEANIA	2.363	0.1	1.276	1.087
STATELESS	673	0.005	443	230
Total	4.144.166	100.0	2.215.469	1.928.697

(Personal elaboration; Source: the National Statistics Institute, INE, municipal registration).

From the 17 Spanish autonomous communities and the two autonomous cities (Melilla and Ceuta) that compose the Spanish State, Catalonia registered the highest number of foreign population in 2006 (22% of the total foreign population) (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Foreign population by sex and autonomous communities. Spain 2006

Autonomous Communities	Total	% Total	Men	Women
Andalucia	488.928	11.8	266.149	222.779
Aragon	105.361	2.5	58.648	46.713
Asturias (Principado De)	30.258	0.7	13.963	16.322
Balears (Illes)	167.751	4.0	86.433	81.318
Canarias	233.447	5.6	120.811	112.636
Cantabria	23.834	0.6	11.826	12.008
Castilla y Leon	106.159	2.6	54.409	51.750
Castilla-La Mancha	132.725	3.2	74.100	58.625
Catalunya	913.757	22.0	504.858	408.899
Comunidad Valenciana	668.075	16.1	360.384	307.691
Extremadura	24.467	0.6	15.146	12.321
Galicia	73.756	1.8	35.531	38.225
Madrid (Comunidad De)	800.512	19.3	402.294	398.218
Murcia (Region De)	189.053	4.6	113.888	75.165
Navarra (C. Foral De)	55.444	1.3	29.971	25.473
Pais Vasco	85.542	2.1	43.494	42.048
Rioja (La)	35.037	0.8	20.171	14.866
Ceuta	3.078	0.1	1.521	1.557
Melilla	3.982	0.1	1.899	2.083
Total	4.144.166	100.0	2.215.469	1.928.697

(Personal elaboration; Source: the National Statistics Institute, INE, municipal registration)

Among the Catalan Autonomous Community, Barcelona represented in 2006 the province with the highest number of foreign population (71% of the total foreign population), far more than Girona (13%), Tarragona (11%) or Lleida (6%) (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3: Foreign population by sex and provinces. Catalonia 2006

CATALUNYA	Total	% Total	Men	Women
Barcelona	645.737	71	351.517	294.220
Girona	116.284	13	65.249	51.035
Lleida	52.633	6	31.813	20.820
Tarragona	99.103	11	56.279	42.824
Total	913.757	100	504.858	408.899

(Personal elaboration; Source: the National Statistics Institute, INE, municipal registration)

The foreign population came mainly from Latin American, African, European and Asian countries. The Latin Americans (Central and South America) represented in 2006 by far the largest immigrant group in the province of Barcelona (41.3% of the total foreign population), followed by the Africans (23.4%), the Europeans (21.2%) and the Asians (11.8%) (see Table 3.4).

Table 3.4: Foreign population by sex and nationality. Barcelona Province 2006

BARCELONA	Total	% Total	Men	Women
EUROPE	137.263	21.2	73.168	64.095
UE (25)	87.430	13.5	47.818	39.612
Non-European countries	49.833	7.7	25.350	24.483
AFRICA	151.202	23.4	99.043	52.159
AMERICA	280.303	43.4	127.811	152.492
Central America	25.183	3.9	10.186	14.997
North America	13.746	2.1	6.513	7.233
South America	241.374	37.4	111.112	130.262
ASIA	76.450	11.8	51.208	25.242
OCEANIA	481	0.007	262	219
STATELESS	38	0.005	25	13
Total	645.737	100.0	351.517	294.220

(Personal elaboration; Source: the National Statistics Institute, INE, municipal registration).

Each Spanish municipal registration office establishes continuous statistics on the foreign population with the main residence in that municipality. The data are revised periodically in function of the number of arrivals and departures. According to the Immigration Law 4/2000, immigrants, once registered, have the right to public health and education, so they have a personal interest in declaring officially their residence.[36] In spite of a possible overvaluation problem because of persons leaving without a notice to a third country, this form of immigrant registration seems to be less biased and more real than other foreign population statistics. Moreover,

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[36] Home Office (http://www.mir.es/SGACAVT/derecho/lo/lo04-2000.html).

starting with 2003, a new law was introduced so that immigrants without a permanent residence permit have to re-register their residence every two years. This measure permits a better control of the influx and outfluxes of migrants within a municipality.

The big cities of the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (MAB) gather the majority of immigrants independently of their country of origin, thing that increases the cultural diversity of the area. Barcelona is the most important city in the urban system hierarchy, many economic, social and territorial dynamics varying in their importance in function of their proximity to Barcelona. Accordingly, most European, American and Asian immigrant populations are concentrated in Barcelona, and only the African origin population is distributed between the city of Barcelona and other cities of the MAB like Terrassa, Mataró, Granollers or Martorell (Roca and Fullaondo, 2004).

Historically, Barcelona has been a city of immigration. In the XIXth century, there was an internal migration to Barcelona from other Catalan provinces. At the beginning of the XXth century, migrants came to Barcelona from various neighbouring regions due to a major improvement in infrastructure. During the 60s, the phenomenon of migration acquired a significant dimension and expanded to other Spanish regions like Murcia, Andalucia and Galicia. With the 80s and 90s, immigrants started to come to Barcelona from outside the Spanish borders (see Solé, 2000).

Between 2000 and 2006, the absolute value of registered persons with other nationality than Spanish (how an immigrant is usually defined by official statistics that analyse the international migration) has significantly increased in the city of Barcelona. While in 2000 the foreign nationals living in Barcelona represented 4.9 per cent of the total population, in 2006 they represented around 16.5 per cent. This increase of 11.6 percentage points, in only six years, is extremely significant (see Table 3.5).

Table 3.5: Evolution of the municipally registered persons with foreign and Spanish nationality. City of Barcelona 2000-2006

Year	Total population	Foreign nationality	% Foreign population	Spanish nationality	% Spanish population
December 2000	1.512.971	74.081	4.9	1.438.890	95.1
December 2001	1.503.884	95.356	6.3	1.408.528	93.7
January 2002	1.527. 190	112.773	7.4	1.414.417	92.6
January 2003	1.582.738	167.223	10.6	1.415.515	89.4
June 2004	1.586.604	206.495	13.0	1.380.109	87.0
June 2005	1.612.237	248.091	15.4	1.364.146	84.6
June 2006	1.629.537	269.595	16.5	1.359.942	83.5

(Personal elaboration; Source: the Department of Statistics, Barcelona City Hall and the National Statistics Institute, INE, continuous municipal registration)

Figure 3.1: Evolution of the municipally registered persons with foreign and Spanish nationality. City of Barcelona 2000-2006

(Personal elaboration; Source: the Department of Statistics, Barcelona City Hall and the National Statistics Institute, INE, continuous municipal registration)

In 2005, the total population of the city of Barcelona was of more than one million and six thousands persons (1.612.237). Around 84.6 per cent of Barcelona's total population had a Spanish nationality. The next region of nationality was America (7.8% of the total population), with a clear predominance of Latin American nationalities, followed by Europe (communitarian and non-communitarian) (3.6% of the total population), Asia (2.6% of the total population) and, ultimately Africa (1.4% of the total population). The number of women with European and American nationalities was higher than the number of men with the same nationality (see Table 3.6).

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Table 3.6: Population by sex and region of nationality. City of Barcelona 2005

Region of nationality	Total	% Total	Men	Women
Europe	1.421.981	88.2	665.650	756.331
Africa	21.862	1.4	14.651	7.211
America	126.011	7.8	57.376	68.635
Asia	41.984	2.6	28.909	13.075
Oceania	371	0.023	200	171
Stateless	28	0.002	24	4
Total	1.612.237	100.0	766.810	845.427

(Personal elaboration; Source: the Department of Statistics, Barcelona City Hall, municipal registration)

In 2005, the five most important immigrant groups in Barcelona, from a numerical point of view, were: 1) the Ecuadorians (31.707); 2) the Peruvians (15.589); 3) the Moroccans (15.180); 4) the Pakistanis (14.741); and 5) the Colombians (14.268).[37]

B) Sampling frame

The informants of this research study were selected to represent a broad spectrum of the migrant communities in Barcelona. I first listed all the units in the population from which the sample was selected, meaning all immigrant associations in Barcelona, by country of origin. Since I was interested in analysing the effect of the exit context on the political transnationalism of immigrant associations in Barcelona, I looked for maximum variation in this

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[37] For a more detailed statistics on Barcelona's population by sex and nationality, see Appendix A.

key explanatory variable and controlled for the destination context (or the mode of incorporation in the destination country). European Union immigrant groups were excluded from the population sample, as their exit context (external voting rights and double citizenship rights, the level of socio-economic development) was quite similar. Accordingly, I chose only non-European Union immigrants as reference sampling groups.

I included all the existent immigrant associations that were then grouped in civic, hometown committee, social and cultural immigrant associations, according with Portes's typology of immigrant associations (Portes *et al.*, 2007). Immigrants from 46 countries (without those members of the European Union) were organised in 2005 in associations in Barcelona. In 2005, the total number of different national/ethnic origin immigrant associations that were recompiled from official sources was of 103.[38]

C) Non-probability sample

The sample was not selected using a random selection method. Thus, some units in the population were more likely to be selected than others. Since it was an "intentional" design, the observations

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[38] Sources: Secretaria per a la immigració, Generalitat de Catalunya (www.gencat.net), person of contact: Saoka Kingolo, Responsable de Participació, Secretaria per a la immigració; Ajuntament de Barcelona, Serveis socials – Imigrants, Extrangers i Refugiats (www.bcn.es); Diputació Barcelona, Servei de Polítiques de Diversitat i Ciutadania (www.diba.es/diversitat/); Torre Jussana Serveis Associatius, Ajuntament de Barcelona (http://www.bcn.es/tjussana/), person of contact: Victoria Civit (vcivit@mail.bcn.es).

for inclusion in the study were selected to ensure variation in the key explanatory variable, in this case, a composite index called the political opportunity structure in exit/home country (and any control variables like, for example, the level of socio-economic development of home country) without regard to the values of the dependent variable. Selecting observations according to the categories of the key causal explanatory variable or of a control variable (if it is causally prior to the key causal variable, as all control variables should be) creates no inference problems (Verba *et al.*, 1994: 137-140).

The first objective was to create a typology of countries depending on the key explanatory variable, the political opportunity structure in home country and the control variable, the level of socio-economic development of home country. Different typologies might be useful for different research objectives. Accordingly, the elaborated classification strategy has to be related with the final research objective.[39] The final research objective of this study was to analyse the effect of the exit context on the nature and forms of immigrant associations' transnational activism. Thus, I analysed the transnational political practices and activities of different national/ethnic origin immigrant associations established in the same local community, Barcelona.

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[39] The typology was created in function of three formal criteria that are indispesable for whatever classificatory concept: a) no subcategory of classification (Mi or Si) could remain empty: Mi ± 0; Si ± 0; b) the classification has to be exhaustive: no element of (M) or (S) can remain outside; and c) the classification has to be exclusive: the members of (M) and of (S) can not belong to more than one subcategory (Domenech, 2001).

The key explanatory variable, deduced from the hypotheses of this research study, was the political opportunity structure in home country. The target population was selected based on the variability of this variable. The level of socio-economic development of the country of origin was another significant explanatory factor for immigrant associations' engagement in local community development projects or in other transnational activities and practices. Thus, the level of socio-economic development of home country was a variable to control for in the selection of the sample.

Indicators like external voting rights, double citizenship or level of freedom reflect various political aspects of exit contexts and were used to construct a composite index, the political opportunity structure in home country. The other composite index, the level of socio-economic development of home country, could cause bias if not controlled for because it might be correlated with both, the key explanatory variable and the dependent variable and it might constitute a key omitted explanatory variable (Verba *et al.*, 1994: 199-206).

Selection criteria of relevant observations (ethnic/national origin of immigrants): Establishing a country typology in function of the key explanatory variable and the control variable:

1. The level of socio-economic development of home country

The human development index (HDI) was chosen for measuring the level of socio-economic development of home country. Its dimensions reflect social and economic achievements of a country. The HDI includes three dimensions of human development – longetivity, educational attainment and command over resources needed for a decent living - though it leaves out other certainly important aspects. From a human development perspective – that is a people-centred analytical framework - the HDI has clear limitations related to the complexity of distinct or interrelated factors such as political, economic, social, legal, epidemiological, and other that could be also included in order to explain our well being and freedom. However, including more factors into this numerical index is not feasible because this would reduce the importance of each of the other variables (already included), oversimplifying thus the reality to be evaluated (Fukuda-Parr and Kumar, 2004).

Economic freedom and political empowerment are usually seen as two sides of the same coin. Yet, there are situations where it is possible to have one without the other (for example, China that does well on the HDI as a medium human development country, but its record on human rights and political freedom remains poor). Thus basic needs like literacy or life expectancy could be quite high in a totalitarian regime, while political rights and civil liberties could be completely absent (Fukuda-Parr and Kumar, 2004). Nevertheless, the level of socio-economic development of home country might determine people's motivation to emigrate in the first

place or to engage in transnational activities and practices and, thus, it might give us additional insights into the particularities of migrant transnational activism.

How we have mentioned before, the Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars. While the concept of human development is much broader than any single composite index can measure, the HDI offers a powerful alternative to income as a summary measure of human well-being. The country ratings go from 0 to 1 and are ordered in three categories or ranks: 1 – "low HD" (0.0-0.499); 2 – "medium HD" (0.5- 0.799); 3 – "high HD" (0.8-1.0).[40]

2. The political opportunity structure in home country

This variable is a constructed composite scale-index that goes from 1 to 3, where: "1" is "low political opportunity structure"; "2" is "moderate political opportunity structure"; and "3" is "high political

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[40] Human Development Report 2005, published for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The HDI-values included here correspond to the year 2003. The Human Development Report team establishes the country ratings and cutting points. Internet source: http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/countries.

opportunity structure". It was created using three political indicators in accordance to its definition that appears in Chapter II of this research study:

a) Level of freedom in exit country;

This indicator is a combined average index of political rights and civil liberties ratings where: 1) the political rights ratings reflect to what extent the system offers voters the opportunity to choose freely from among candidates (electoral process) and to what extent the candidates are chosen independently of the state (political pluralism and participation), the levels of accountability, openness and transparency between elections (functioning of government); 2) the civil liberties ratings refer to constitutional guarantees of human rights like freedom of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, personal autonomy and individual rights and, the actual practices of fulfilling these rights or the rule of law. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of: 1 – "Not Free" (5.5-7.0); 2 – "Partly Free" (3.0-5.0); 3 – "Free" (1.0-2.5).[41]

a) External voting rights;

This indicator was constructed using the available information on national election systems and laws. The country ratings reflect an

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[41] Freedom House Organisation, *Freedom in the World 2006*. Selected Data from the Freedom House Annual Global Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. The freedom ratings and cutting points are officially established by the *Freedom in the World 2006* team. The freedom ratings reflect an overall judgement based on survey results. The ratings reflect global events from December 1, 2004 through November 30, 2005. Internet source: www.freedomhouse.org.

overall evaluation of specific voting laws for citizens residing outside their country (all citizens including students, diplomatic staff, armed forces and those on vacations), voting facilities abroad (voter lists, specific pooling stations), and types of elections (Presidential, Senate and Parliament). The ranking goes from 1 to 3 and was adapted in accordance with the research objectives of this study, meaning immigrants with or without external voting rights: "1" - "no external voting rights" (prohibited for all citizens residing abroad or accepted only for the diplomatic staff and armed forces); "2" – "external voting rights with some restrictions" (voting by proxy; no specified physical place; the need to return home in order to cast ballots; only in Presidential elections); "3" – "external voting rights" (voting laws for all citizens residing abroad; voting lists and pooling stations abroad like embassies, consulates and other special places; Presidential, Senate and Parliament elections).[42]

b) Double citizenship rights;

This indicator was constructed using the available information on citizenship, dual citizenship and multiple citizenship based on a survey on world citizenship laws. The country ratings reflect an overall judgement based on national legislation particularities on the right to dual citizenship for co-nationals or citizens residing outside the country. The ranking goes from 1 to 3 and was adapted to the

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[42] Election Process Information Collection Project (EPIC), 2004, Comparative and country-by-country data on election systems, laws, management and administration, a joint endeavour of International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and IFES, an international non-profit organisation that supports the building of democratic societies (http://epicproject.org/); Interparliamentary Union's internet website (www.ipu.org).

research objectives of this study, meaning immigrants with or without the right to dual citizenship in their country of origin: 1 - "no right to dual citizenship" (in any case or only until 18 or 21 years old); 2 - "having the right to dual citizenship with some exceptions" (restrictions imposed by the law of the destination country; special petition to or permission by the government of the home country; second citizenship is not formally recognised until giving up the original national citizenship; only for citizens by descendent or natural citizens; only for women who marry foreign nationals and must take the nationality of their husbands; citizens who marry a foreign national and acquire the citizenship of their spouse remain unofficial dual citizens; recognising dual citizenship but original citizenship takes legal precedence over the other; limited status of sojourn for oversee nationals; preserving nationality by birth when adopting a foreign nationality; only children of nationals born abroad; only for nationals who acquire foreign citizenship by marriage); 3 – "having the right to dual citizenship" (full right to dual citizenship or special treaty or agreement with Spain).[43]

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[43] UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, Research/Evaluation, RefLeg–National legislation. Internet source: www.unhcr.org; Government report, *Citizenship Laws of the World*, a non-commercial collection of information about citizenship, dual citizenship and multiple citizenship based on an extensive and well-produced survey of world citizenship laws that was produced by the Office of Personnel Management of the US government in 2000/2001, as a resource for dealing with multiple citizenship issues. Internet source: www.multiplecitizenship.com.

c) State-led policies directed at emigrants living abroad;

This indicator was constructed in function of various forms of state involvement in migrants' transnational social space, such as home government bureaucratic reforms in response to emigrants' heightened importance to policymakers, different investment policies to attract or channel migrant remittances, political rights for emigrants living abroad, state services abroad or service delivery to emigrant communities to symbolic politics aimed at reinforcing emigrants' sense of loyalty and long-term membership. Because of a low rate of responses from embassies/consulates, this indicator could not be properly measured and thus included in the construction of the composite index, the political opportunity structure in the home country. Nonetheless, the information received was used to complete the information available on this independent variable.

Using the above constructed indexes, the level of socio-economic development (HDI) and the political opportunity structure (POS) in the country of origin, I developed a specific country typology as a previous step to the sample selection. The typology was constructed using three cutting points (the distance value) in recoding the values of both scales, socio-economic level of development and political opportunity structure. I obtained nine possible categories: 1) high-high; 2) high-moderate; 3) high-low; 4) moderate-high; 5) moderate-moderate; 6) moderate-low; 7) low-high; 8) low-

moderate; 9) low-low. The case summary by typology is the following:

Table 3.7 Country typology

Typology	Countries	Total
High HD and High POS	Argentina, USA, Australia	3
High HD and Medium POS	Israel, South Korea (Rep. Of Korea), Chile, Uruguay, Mexico	5
High HD and Low POS	Rep. of Panama	1
Medium HD and High POS	Romania, Ghana, Philippines, Peru, Colombia, Honduras	6
Medium HD and Medium POS	Ukraine, Morocco, Tunisia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia	8
Medium HD and Low POS	Russian Federation, Republic of Congo, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, India, Bangladesh, Lebanon, China, Syrian Arab Republic, Pakistan, Occup. Palestinian Territories, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nicaragua	14
Low HD and High POS	Senegal	1
Low HD and Medium POS	Nigeria, Mauritania, Cote d'Ivoire	3
Low HD and Low POS	Guinea Bissau, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Cameroon, Angola North Korea (Dem. Rep. of Korea)	5
Total		46

(Personal elaboration)

I controlled for the variable socio-economic level of development of home country in order to assure unit homogeneity. Countries were classified in three main groups in function of the three values of this variable. Thus, from the first group of countries with high socio-economic level, I selected countries with high, moderate and low

political opportunity structure. From the subsequent group of countries with moderate socio-economic level, I selected countries with high, moderate and low political opportunity structure. From the last group of countries with low socio-economic level, I selected countries with high, moderate and low political opportunity structure. The minimum number of countries that could have been chosen was nine.

The variation in the values of another possible explanatory variable that is the type of immigrant associations (civic, hometown committees, social agency and cultural) – another potential explanatory variable – was also taken into consideration in constructing the sample. Thus, I included in the sample population those countries from each group of the above constructed country typology that had the maximum variation in the type of immigrant associations. The selected countries were: Argentina, Uruguay, Panama, Peru, Morocco, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan, Senegal, Nigeria, and Cameroon.

D) Profile of the selected immigrant groups

Since 2000, the Spanish population has increased significantly due mainly to an augmented life expectancy rate (79, 5 years, 2, 5 more than the medium of the UE-25) and a raise in immigration (from 0, 9 million in 2000 to approximately 4 million in 2006). The vast majority of immigrants have come from poor regions like Latin America, Africa, the Non-EU region and Asia. Despite of this rapid

immigration increase in the last years, Spain is situated in the pro-medium of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. The migratory flows are distributed heterogeneously in the Spanish territory, the proportion of immigrants being the highest in the Baleares Islands (15, 9%), followed closely by Madrid (13, 1%), Valencia (12, 4%), Murcia (12, 3%), Catalonia (11, 4%) and La Rioja (11, 3%). In the rest of the autonomous communities, the immigration rate is lower than the Spanish medium of 8, 7 per cent.[44]

Overall, immigration has had a positive economic impact explaining not only over 50 per cent of the Spanish GDP increase of the last five years but also an increase in the income per capita (in more than 600 euros) due to a more elevated immigrant employment rate (almost with 6 points) in comparison to that of the natives. Other notable economic indirect effects are a positive impact on the activity rate of the natives (1/3 of the increase in women's activity rate due to the immigrant work in the domestic sector) and a more flexible labour market (a two points decrease in the structural unemployment rate due to the immigrant work in less desirable sectors, their higher geographical mobility, and their downward pressure on the increase in real income). At present, immigrants are net contributors to the Spanish welfare state and

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[44] "Inmigración y Economía Española: 1996-2006", Miguel Sebastián, Director of the Economic Office of the President of Government, 15 of November 2006, Madrid.

supply with approximately 0, 5 per cent of the GDP the public surplus.45

The Latin Americans: Argentineans, Uruguayans, Pennames, Peruvians and Ecuadorians

Over the last decade, migration from Latin American countries to Europe, especially to southern European countries like Spain and Italy, has grown significantly. These countries have quickly changed from being countries of immigration during the nineteenth and twentieth century (especially Argentina, and to a lesser extent Brazil, Uruguay, Cuba, Mexico and Chile) to countries of emigration starting from the 80s and 90s. Between 1995 and 2003, the number of Latin American immigrants with a residence permit in Spain has increased from 92.642 to 514.485, a figure that achieved the level of 986.178 at the end of 2005.46 The main reasons behind this increased flow of people from these regions to Europe have been the increasing poverty and the economic recession, together with more strict immigration controls and visa regimes in the United States after 11 September 2001 (see Solimano, 2003; Pellegrino, 2004).

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45 Ibid.

46 These figures are likely to be much higher if dual nationals and immigrants in an irregular situation are also counted. With the 2005 regularization process and the family reunification policy the number of Latin American immigrants has raised to 1,215,351 at the end of 2007 (Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, número 15, enero 2008; http://extranjeros.mtas.es).

The demographic profile of Latin American migrants in Spain illustrates a young population, highly feminised (women constitute over half of all Latin American migrants), with high rates of labour force participation, relatively high levels of education and elevated levels of remittances. Over one billion US$ are sent annually from Spain to Latin American countries (and one billion from the rest of Europe). These figures are expected to grow further on with an improving in the remittance services and an increase in the Latin American diaspora. Overall, the cultural and linguistic affinities between EU (Spain) and Latin American countries seem to facilitate the integration of immigrants coming from these regions. However, with the growing migratory flows, the proportion of Latin American migrants in irregular situation has also increased and the human trafficking (in children and women for sexual exploitation) between these regions and Europe has become a severe problem. There is also an increasing preoccupation over brain drain from these regions as Europe seeks to recruit mainly highly skilled migrants (see Pellegrino, 2004).

Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present a summary of the main characteristics of the Latin American immigrant groups and of their country of origin. The cultural similarities between these groups and the systematic structural differences between their countries of origin provide a suitable background for analyzing the forms and nature of their political transnationalism, and to predict the potential impact of this phenomenon in home countries and communities (see Portes *et al.*, 2007).

Table 3.8: Country of origin of Latin American immigrant groups

Cont/ Nat (1)	LA	ARG	URG	PER	ECU	PAN	SPN
Pop. (2)	-	38,75	3,46	27,97	13,23	3,1*	43,06
Urban pop. (3A)		90.1	92.5	73.9	61.8	57.2	76.5
HDI (3B)	-	0,863	0,84	0,762	O,759	0,804	0,928
HDI Rank (3C)	-	34	46	79	82	56	21
Pop. below pov. line (3D)	-	14.3	3.9	37.7	40.8	17.6	10.1*
Level of freedom (4)	-	Free (2)	Free (1)	Free (2.5)	Partly free (3)	Free (1.5)	Free (1)

(Personal elaboration)

(1) Continent and nationality: LA: Latin American; ARG: Argentina; URG: Uruguay; Per: Peru; ECU: Ecuador; PAN: Panama; SPN: Spain.
(2) Population (in millions in 2005): "El estado del mundo 2006. Anuario económico geopolítico mundial", Ediciones Akal, S.A., 2005. The population figure for the Republic of Panama corresponds to 2003 (UNDP).
(3) "Human Development Report 2005." United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
   (A) Urban population (% of total). 2003. Data are based on national definitions of what constitutes a city or metropolitan area. Data refer to medium-variant projections;
   (B) Human Development Index. 2003. It focuses on three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life (life expectancy at birth);
   (C) HDI Ranking. 2003.
   (D) Population below poverty line (% $2 a day). 1990-2003. Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified. In Spain the value refer to those living below 50% of median income. 1999-2000.
(4) Level of freedom (combined average of political rights and civil liberties). The freedom ratings reflect global events from December 1, 2004 through November 30, 2005. Freedom House Organisation, Freedom in the World 2006.

Table 3.9 Profile of Latin American immigrant groups in Spain

Cont/ Nat (1)	LA	ARG	URG	PER	ECU	PAN	SPN
Total imm.	986.178	82.412	24.272	82.533	357.065	760	-
Gen. reg. Res. (2)	826.695	49.950	16.369	73.676	348.052	382	-
Com. res. (3)	159.483	32.462	7.903	8.857	9.013	378	-
% Women	54,34	49,17	48,15	52,28	51,21	59,42	-
Av. Age (4)	32	36	36	35	30	36	-
Empl. (5A)	69,5	-	-	-	-	-	49,11*
Sec. edu. (5B)	54,7	-	-	-	-	-	
Tec. Prof.edu. (5C)	7	-	-	-	-	-	
Univ. (5D)	15,4	-	-	-	-	-	
Arrived between 2000-2002 (5E)	55	-	-	-	-	-	-
Res. in BCN (6)	159.022	13.811	5.229	22.417	54.586	131	-
Remit. (7)	-	117	15	189	795	3	-

(Personal elaboration)

(1) Continent and nationality: LA: Latin American; ARG: Argentina; URG: Uruguay; Per: Peru; ECU: Ecuador*;* PAN: Panama; SPN: Spain.
(2) General regiome of residence
(3) Communitarian residence
(4) Average Age
(5) Encuesta de migraciones 2003. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE). A possible overestimation of these indicators for Asia as INE estimates this indicator together for Asia, Oceania and stateless people.
     (A) Employment rate (% ages 16 and above).
     (B) Secondary education (% ages 16 and above).
     (b) Technical-professional education (% ages 16 and above).
     (c) University degree (% ages 16 and above).
     (d) Time of residence in Spain (% between 1 and 3 years).
(6) Anuario Estadístico de Inmigración 31.12.2005. Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración.
(7) Bilateral remittance estimates using migrant stocks (millions of US$). Ratha and Shaw (2006) "South-South Migration and Remittances," Development Prospect Group. World Bank (www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremmitances).

The Africans and the Asians: Moroccans, Equatorial Guineas, Senegalese, Nigerians, Cameroonians, and Pakistanis

Though African and Magreb (Morocco, Argelia and Tunisia) immigration to Spain has decreased from 2000 to 2005 (from 60% of the total migration population in 2000 to 35% in 2005), while the Latin American immigration has considerably increased in this period (from 20% in 2000 to 60% in 2005), African and Magreb immigration to Spain continue to be an important issue for the Spanish migration policy. Since the 90s and the beginning of the XXI century, Spain in cooperation with other European Union countries has progressively enforced its borders with Africa to stop the illegal immigration coming from Magreb and Sub-Saharan Africa (Sandell, 2006).

In spite of this law enforcement, the African immigration to Spain has substantially increased between 1999 and 2005, from 174.400 immigrants to more than 700.000, though to a lower pace than the Latin American immigration. The Asian immigration has also registered a significant increase during the same period, from 47.300 in 1999 to 186.200 immigrants in 2005. With an increase of about 22 per cent between 2004 and 2005, the Asian and African immigration, and also the non-EU immigration augmented more rapidly than the total immigration to Spain. The data seem to show us that tougher state border security measures cannot stop the illegal immigration from African and Asian countries (Sandell, 2006).

The "push-pull factor" migration theory explains this massive movement of people from poor to rich countries in terms of increasing labour market competencies due to a growing urbanisation, a rising active population and a labour shortage in the country of origin (push factors), and also in terms of better economic opportunities like a higher GDP per capita in the destination country (pull factors). Other macro-incentives to emigrate might be the migration legislation in the destination country that can be more or less permeable. There are also more individual factors that certainly influence a person's decision to emigrate like personal education and wealth, or family and friendship networks in the destination country (Sandell, 2006).

Empirical data demonstrate that there is a positive correlation between, on the one side, an increasing active population leading to higher labour market competences and the increase in migratory flows and, on the other side, a growing urbanisation leading to higher labour market competences and the increase in migratory flows. At the same time, a decrease in the PIB per capita in poor countries (or, as a pull factor, an increase in the PIB per capita in rich countries) relates positively with the increase in migratory flows from these countries (Sandell, 2006). I consider that the determinant aspect that pushes a person to leave his/her country (a decision with high costs) is for certain an impoverished socio-economic situation in her/his home country.

The African and Asian immigration does not seem is going to stop, on the contrary, the prediction is that it is going to grow in the nearby future due mainly to the push factors in destination countries. One way to ease the African and Asian migratory pressure on the European borders is to employ more absorption mechanisms of legal migration rather than control mechanism of illegal migration from these regions. This paradigm change in migratory policies relies on the fact that legal migration is not only a way of improving immigrant situation in the destination country but also of improving the life of those left behind through immigrant remittances or through socio-economic cooperation and solidarity action between poor and rich countries.

The demographic profile of the African and Asian migrants in Spain illustrates a young population, less feminised (except in the case of Equatorial Guinea, where the percentage of migrant women is relatively high) and with lower rates of labour force participation and lower levels of education than the Latin American immigrants. The level of remittance is in general lower than in the case of the Latin Americans, except for the Moroccan immigrants whose level of remittance is the highest by difference among all immigrant groups. The cultural and linguistic differences between Spain and African and Asian countries do not seem to facilitate the integration of these immigrants though we can talk about an older immigration (like the Moroccan immigration) that that from Latin America. On the other side, with the growing migratory flows, the proportion of African and Asian migrants in an irregular situation has increased

and the human trafficking (clandestine cross-border encouraging extortion and sexual exploitation) between these regions and Europe adds to the gravity of this problem.

Table 3.10: Country of origin of African and Asian immigrant groups

Cont/ Nat (1)	AFR	Eq.G	MOR	CAM	SEN	NIG	AS	PAK	SPN
Pop. (2)	-	0,50	31,48	15,7	11,66	131,53	-	157.94	43,06
Urban pop. (3A)	-	48.0	57.4	59.9	57.9	55.5	-	34.1	
HDI (3B)	-	0,655	0,631	0,500	0,458	0,453	-	0,527	0,928
HDI Rank (3C)	-	121	124	148	157	158	-	135	21
Pop. below pov. line (3D)	-	-	14.3	50.6	67.8	90.8		65.6	10.1 *
Level of freedom (4)	-	Not free (6.5)	Partly free (4.5)	Not free (6)	Free (2.5)	Partly free (4)	-	Not free (5.5)	Free (1)

(Personal elaboration)

(1) Continent and nationality: AFR: Africa; Eq.G: Eq. Guinea; MOR: Morocco: CAM: Cameroon; SEN: Senegal; NIG: Nigeria; AS: Asia; PAK: Pakistan; SPN: Spain.
(2) Population (in millions in 2005): "El estado del mundo 2006. Anuario económico geopolítico mundial", Ediciones Akal, S.A., 2005. The population figure for the Republic of Panama corresponds to 2003 (UNDP).
(3) "Human Development Report 2005." United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
    (A) Urban population (% of total). 2003.
    (A) Human Development Index. 2003.
    (C) HDI Ranking. 2003.
    (D) Population below poverty line (% $2 a day). 1990-2003. Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified. In Spain the value refer to those living below 50% of median income. 1999-2000.

(4) Level of freedom (combined average of political rights and civil liberties). The freedom ratings reflect global events from December 1, 2004 through November 30, 2005. Freedom in the World 2006. Freedom House Organisation.

Table 3.11: Profile of African and Asian immigrant groups in Spain

Cont/ Nat (1)	AFR	Eq.G	MOR	CAM	SEN	NIG	AS	PAK	SPN
Gen. reg. Res. (2)	618.843	5.815	473.463	1.983	26.744	15.096	166.374	27.769	-
Com. res. (3)	30.408	1.801	19.651	375	934	2.242	11.049	938	-
% Women	32,43	65,97	34,59	34,97	18,01	37,22	39,5	13,34	-
Av. Age (4)	28	30	28	28	32	29	31	31	-
Empl. (5A)	61,8	-	53,6	-	-	-	70,6*	-	49,11*
Sec. edu. (5B)	32,7	-	29,1	-	-	-	27,9*	-	
Tec. Prof.edu. (5C)	4	-	1,9	-	-	-	2,7*	-	
Univ. (5D)	12,1	-	3,1	-	-	-	19,7*	-	
Arrived between 2000-2002 (5E)	42,2	-	29,9	-	-	-	27,7	-	-
Res. in BCN (6)	120.282	819	99.196	306	4.732	1.652	56.031	15.768	-
Remit. (7)	-	-	1.202	0	28	54	-	30	-

(Personal elaboration)

(1) Continent and nationality: AFR: Africa; Eq.G: Eq. Guinea; MOR: Morocco: CAM: Cameroon; SEN: Senegal; NIG: Nigeria; AS: Asia; PAK: Pakistan; SPN: Spain.
(2) General regiome of residence
(3) Communitarian residence
(4) Average Age
(5) Encuesta de migraciones 2003. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE). A possible overestimation of these indicators for Asia as INE estimates this indicator together for Asia, Oceania and stateless people.

(A) Employment rate (% ages 16 and above).
(B) Secondary education (% ages 16 and above).
(e) Technical-professional education (% ages 16 and above).
(f) University degree (% ages 16 and above).
(g) Time of residence in Spain (% between 1 and 3 years).
(6) Anuario Estadístico de Inmigración 31.12.2005. Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración.
(7) Bilateral remittance estimates using migrant stocks (millions of US$). Ratha and Shaw (2006) "South-South Migration and Remittances," Development Prospect Group. World Bank (www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremmitances).

Tables 3.10 and 3.11 present a summary of the characteristics of the African and Asian immigrant groups in Barcelona and of their country of origin. The cultural similarities within each of these two groups and systematic structural differences between their countries of origin provide a suitable background for analyzing the forms that transnational political activities and practices can take and predict their potential impact on home countries and communities (see Portes *et al.*, 2007).

E) Selection of immigrant associations

To assess how well immigrant activist associations represent the transnational citizenry, a representative sample of the public is essential. However, ordinary representative samples may contain very few of the most interesting transnational activist associations - those who engage in relatively rare but important activities such as giving large donations to home country associations or organizations, serving on local homeland governing boards, or taking part in protests, denouncing human rights violations that relate to homeland, etc. (see Verba *et al*., 1995: 6).

Accordingly, I took into consideration those cases of activist associations corresponding to politically relevant racial and ethnic minorities in Barcelona. Hence, the groups introduced in the sample were the Argentineans, the Uruguayans and the Cameroonians, many of them emigrating from their countries in the 70s or 80s on political reasons. I also introduced in the sample those associations corresponding to the numerically most significant immigrant groups in Barcelona, in the year of the sample selection. In 2005, the first four immigrant groups were the following: 1) the Ecuadorians; 2) the Peruvians; 3) the Moroccans; and 4) the Pakistanis.[47]

The final sample of Barcelona's immigrant associative public was the following:

a. Countries with a high level of socio-economic development and a high, medium, and low political opportunity structure: i) Argentina; ii) Uruguay; iii) Republic of Panama.

Immigrant associations to be interviewed:

1. Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina
2. Casal Argentí a Barcelona
3. Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona
4. Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos
5. Unión de Argentinos en Cataluña

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[47] See "Ranking de nacionalitats": http://www.bcn.es.

6. Asociación de Uruguayos en Cataluña (AUC)
7. Casa de Uruguay
8. Casa Charrua Uruguay
9. Asociación Panamá Cataluña

b. Countries with a medium level of socio-economic development and a high, medium and low political opportunity structure: i) Peru; ii) Ecuador; iii) Morocco; iv) Equatorial Guinea; v) Pakistan.

Immigrant associations to be interviewed:

10. Asociación Solidaria con las Mujeres Peruanas en el Extranjero (ASOMIPEX)
11. Associació Cultural Alma Peruana
12. Federación de Peruanos sin Fronteras
13. Centro Peruano de Barcelona (CPB)
14. Perú Alternativa
15. Associació Catalano-Equatoriana per a la Integració i el Desenvolupament
16. Associació d'Equatorians a Catalunya
17. Asociación Catalana Ecuatoriana de Mujeres - Intercambio Cultural
18. Asociación Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos Solidaridad y Cooperación - Ecuador Llactacaru
19. Associació Amical d'Emigrants Marroquins a Catalunya

20. Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Cataluña (ATIME Catalunya)
21. Associació NAHDA
22. Associació Cultural Dar El Farah
23. Asociación de Amigos del Pueblo Marroquí-Itran
24. Associació d'Estudiants Marroquins
25. Associació Unió Marroquina-Catalana d'Educació i Cultura
26. Associació Socio-Cultural Riebapua
27. Associació d'Estudiants i Joves de Guinea Equatorial
28. Asociación de Mujeres E'Waiso Ipola
29. Asociación Cultural Viyil
30. Associació Cultural Rhombe
31. Associació de Treballadors Pakistanesos
32. Associació Cultural Idara Minhaj Al Quran Pakistaní
33. Federació Associacions Pakistaneses Catalunya (FAPC)
34. Associació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa Dones Pakistaneses (ACESOP)

c. Countries with a low socio-economic level of development and a high, medium and low political opportunity structure: i) Senegal; ii) Nigeria; iii) Cameron.

Immigrant associations to be interviewed:

35. Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos
36. Associació Diakha Mandina - Inmigrants Senegalesos
37. Associació de Residents Senegalesos del Vallès Occidental

38. Associació Nigeriana de Catalunya – Nigeria Community

39. Comunidad Igbo de Nigerianos en Cataluña

40. Associació Cultural Adna Bassa (Camerún)

41. Agrupació Camerunés Residents a Barcelona (RACAMERS)

Though the sample list comprised initially a relatively significant number of immigrant associations (41), institutional reasons like the fact that immigrant associations are not obliged to deregister when they decide to end their activity, or other field research reasons like association's refusal to be interviewed or the impossibility of getting in contact with the association (wrong or no direction, telephone number, e-mail), the number of immigrant associations interviewed was in the end of 24. This is an acceptable level of response given that most of the sampled associations that did not response were inexistent at the time of the interviewing.[48] A response rate of 59 per cent, which is more than half of the sampled associations, represented in the end more than three thirds of those that really existed and functioned at that time.[49] At the same time, I maintained the representativeness of the sample as I managed to have cases for all the categories of the selection variables.

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[48] Other research studies emphasise the problem of associations' registration/deregistration (see Montero *et al.*, 2006: 4).

[49] For the sample of immigrant associations with the detailed information on their level of response, see Appendix D. How we can note from the Appendix D, around 11 associations did not function at the time of the interviewing.

a. Countries with a high level of socio-economic development and a high, medium, and low political opportunity structure: i) Argentina; ii) Uruguay; iii) Republic of Panama.

1. Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina
2. Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona
3. Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos
4. Asociación de Uruguayos en Cataluña (AUC)
2. Casa de Uruguay
3. Casa Charrua
4. Asociación Panamá Cataluña

b. Countries with a medium level of socio-economic development and a high, medium and low political opportunity structure: i) Peru; ii) Ecuador; iii) Morocco; iv) Equatorial Guinea; v) Pakistan.

5. Asociacion Cultural Alma Peruana
6. Federación de Peruanos sin Fronteras
7. Centro Peruano de Barcelona (CPB)
11. Associació Catalano-Equatoriana per a la Integració i el Desenvolupament
12. Associació d'Equatorians a Catalunya
13. Asociación Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos Solidaridad y Cooperación - Ecuador Llactacaru
14. Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Cataluña (ATIME)
15. Asociación de Amigos del Pueblo Marroquí-Itran

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16. Associació Cultural Rhombe
17. Associació de Treballadors Pakistanesos
18. Associació Cultural Idara Minhaj Al Quran Pakistaní
19. Federació Associacions Pakistaneses Catalunya (FAPC)
20. Associació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa Dones Pakistaneses (ACESOP)

c. Countries with a low socio-economic level of development and a high, medium and low political opportunity structure: i) Senegal; ii) Nigeria; iii) Cameron.

21. Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos
22. Associació Nigeriana de Catalunya – Nigeria Community
23. Associació Cultural Adna Bassa (Camerún)
24. Agrupació Camerunés Residents a Barcelona (RACAMERS)

3.4 Data and data sources

This research study includes both qualitative and quantitative data gathered between fall 2005 and spring 2008. Most of the data come from semi-structured interviews in Spanish and English with the main representatives of immigrant associations in Barcelona. Some data come also from many informal conversations with members of immigrant associations and from their reunions and assemblies. Official documents, programmes, and other data on the investigating issues were also included into the analysis. Most

interviews were tape-recorded and then transcribed, while some few were recorded with extensive notes.

Other data come from a questionnaire on state policies toward nationals living abroad that were applied to those embassies/consulates whose nationals were represented in the sample of immigrant associations. The embassies (consulates) corresponded to the selected eleven countries of origins: Panama, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, Morocco, Cameron, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan and Senegal.

A) The semi-structured interview

Through the qualitative interviewing we can normally identify the personal perspective of an interviewee on the investigated subjects. Qualitative interviewing has to be realised to a considerable numbers of previously selected subjects to assure a possible generalisation of the findings to the whole population. The semi-structured interview is commonly used in researches like this one when the issues to be investigated are quite new or when these are so complex that the answers are completely unforeseeable. In this case, the interviewer departs from a guide of themes/topics established in function of his/her research objectives and that have to be discuss as the interview goes on (Corbetta, 2007: 350-357).

The main interviewing topics or themes for analysing the political transnationalism of immigrant associations in Barcelona were the following:

I.   Origins, types and structure of immigrant associations that engage in transnational practices and activities;

II. Types of political activities and practices of immigrant associations that are partially or totally located in countries other than where their members reside (homeland politics; immigrants politics; trans-local politics);

III. Intensity of the transnational political practices and activities of immigrant associations (broad; narrow).[50]

B) The questionnaire

A questionnaire, in comparison to an interview, is highly standardized. The main objective of a questionnaire is to frame the mental categories of an interviewee within a sequence of pre-established questions (answering to closed questions) (Corbetta, 2007: 349). The questions and the order of them are the same for each interviewee and most of them are closed. I used just few open questions for covering the possible lack of complete information on the investigated issues.

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[50] For a complete interview guide, see Appendix B.

The questionnaire comprised question items about different types of state policies toward nationals living abroad and was applied to all embassies/consulates whose nationals were represented in the population sample of immigrant associations. The questionnaire was sent by post, e-mail and fax, but only around 30 per cent of these embassies/consulates finally answered it. Because of a low rate of responses, the variable "state policies toward nationals living abroad" was not used in the end as another possible selection variable. Nevertheless, the information received was used in order to improve the general quality of the data analysis. The main question items were the followings: [51]

I. Bureaucratic reforms in response to emigrants' heightened importance to policymakers;

II. Investment policies to attract or channel migrant remittances;

III. Political rights: dual citizenship and the vote abroad;

IV. State services abroad or service delivery to emigrant communities;

V. Symbolic politics aimed at reinforcing emigrants' sense of long-term membership.

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[51] The detailed description of the variable "state policies toward nationals living abroad" appears in Chapter 2. For a complete questionnaire, see Appendix C.

4. THE POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM OF IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS IN BARCELONA

4.1 Introduction

This qualitative research study uses both descriptive and causal inferences in order to analyse the political transnationalism of immigrant associations in Barcelona. The present chapter describes the political practices and activities that immigrant associations in Barcelona realise across state borders. In the following, I first describe the origins, types and structure of the selected immigrant associations and analyse the forms, scope and intensity of their political transnationalism. I then realise a general profile of the sample of transnational immigrant associations (type of association, national/ethnic origin of association's members, year of foundation, number of members, scope of projects and focus of activity in country of origin, frequency of involvement in home country civic projects and national elections, sources of funds, forms of transnationalism employed, etc.).

4.2 Origins, types, and structure of immigrant associations. Forms, scope and intensity of their political transnationalism

A) Argentinean immigrant associations

Red Solidaria was initially founded in Argentina in 1995 by a group of people from the San Gabriel College of Buenos Aires who sought to connect deprived people with persons or institutions that could solve out their necessities. The association registers today in Argentina more than 3.000 volunteers and has been recognised by the United Nations Organization for its work and good practices. *Red Solidaria Barcelona* was established in Spain at the beginning of 2003 as a formal non-profit association that focuses on the basic needs of newcomers (mainly from Argentina) and on their integration process into the Catalan society. Its main objective is to guide and inform immigrants and to create a shared culture as a method of integration. The association is part of *Fedelatina*, the Federation of Latin American Entities in Catalonia, that reunites more than 100 immigrant associations from Latin America and that was created to provide immigrants or returned immigrants (and to their corresponding entities) services, assistance and coordination in light of a common interest.[52]

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[52] See http://www.fedelatina.org.

Association's services (immigrant assistance and legal information) are free of charge and realised by a group of volunteers and professionals (four persons) that assist and support approximately 400 persons per month. The association does not have any registered member (no annual quotas), and functions mainly through networks and contacts such as: governmental institutions like the Catalan Local Government and Barcelona's City Hall, the Spanish syndicate *Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras* (CCOO), non-governmental organisations like the Catalan Association of Solidarity with the Refugees (ACSAR), *Caritas* (the Official Confederation of Social and Charity Entities of the Spanish Catholic Church), and Argentinean associations like *Red Solidaria Argentina*. The last subvention they received from the local public administration permitted them to contract a full-time secretary.

Red Solidaria Barcelona engages in *homeland politics* like informative action on homeland national elections and electoral campaigns or on the voting process of the nationals living abroad (special radio programmes;[53] distributing various Latin American newspapers in line with the association's objectives;[54] a TV satellite situated at the association's venue; reunions with political candidates who want to inform potential voters abroad about their electoral programme). The association occasionally defends

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[53] *Red Solidaria Argentina* has two radio programmes within the Radio Gladys Palmera 96.6 FM and the Radio Gracia. The first one is called "New Citizens" and the other one is called "The Latin Community", and they both aim to inform and unite culturally immigrant communities with their communities of origin.

[54] Those newspapers published in Spain can be consulted directly at the association's venue and those published abroad via the website of the association.

homeland human rights (for instance, mothers' rights to find out what happened with their disappeared sons and daughters during the dictatorship in Argentina- *Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo*) via press conferences and lawful demonstrations.

The association engages in *immigrant politics* like informative and protest action on immigrants' rights (immigrants' right to vote; human rights violation like for example, helping an Uruguayan young woman exploited sexually by a prostitution network to return home and the identification of this network in collaboration with the Argentinean and Uruguayan consulates and embassies). In terms of translocal politics, the association participates occasionally in international cooperation projects (for instance, building a health centre in some deprived community of Argentina) together with non-governmental organisations like Caritas.

The association *Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos* was founded in 2001 as a supporting group from abroad to the largest and most popular syndicate in Argentina, the *Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina* (CTA). The latter came into existence in 1992 as a new model of syndicate based on direct elections and affiliation, and autonomy from whatever economic group, government or political party. *Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos* registers around 8-10 members who collaborate voluntarily in diverse activities related to home country's economic and socio-political situation or immigrants' situation in Catalonia. The main sources of finance are the member

quotas, the public subventions from the Catalan Local Government or other solidarity money from the CTA or the Spanish and Catalan syndicates.

The association engages in *homeland politics* like informative action on the external voting process, and informative and protest action on homeland politics and human rights (for example, organised discussions with syndicate leaders from Argentina on homeland politics; manifestations against the impunity law in Argentina; bilateral reunions with political parties from Argentina and Catalonia, etc.). All these activities are organised in collaboration with the CTA but also with other syndicates from Spain and Catalonia like the CCOO, the *Union General de Trabajadores* (UGT), the *Unió Sindical Obrera de Catalunya* (USOC), or with the Argentinean Consulate or Embassy.

In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association involves in informative and protest action on immigrant rights (for instance, when two Argentinean young men were accused of beating a civil guardian, the association asked for support from the CTA and the ombudsman in Argentina to defend them; the right to vote for immigrants; residence permits and the regularisation process) but with no support from home country government (consulate/embassy). In all these activities, the association collaborates with the CTA and other supporting groups of CTA established in Spain (Galicia, Madrid, Tenerife, Murcia) or in other countries (Sweden, Finland, France, Italy), and diverse immigrant

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associations members of the *Casa de la Solidaridad* (an entity that joins up 14 immigrant associations of different national origins in Barcelona, especially from Latin America and Africa) like *Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina*, *Plataforma contra la Impunidad,* or *Union de Argentinos en Cataluña*. It also maintains strong links with Catalan left-wing political parties like the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC) or the Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV).

The association also engages in trans-local politics like diverse civic and humanitarian projects in home country: for instance, gathering and sending clothes, medicine or computers to children living in a poor neighbourhood in Argentina via a solidarity brigade of Catalans professors involved in developing work there; constructing a school for these Argentinean children together with the Catalan syndicate, USOC.

The sense of dual/trans (political) implication or participation in both destination and home countries is quite strong within this association:

"We see what happens here because we live here…We are not blind, we live all the injustices here because we are part of the Catalan society and we participate in it. And if something happens here we ask for help there. But we are also Argentineans and we have very strong links with our country. It would be a big injustice not to participate in our country, at least in the memory of all those

people who died for democratising Argentina. This is the main reason for joining up this association."[55] (President of the association)

The association *Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina* was founded in 1983 with the objective of supporting the Argentinean immigrants in Catalonia and also the marginalised people in Argentina. The association registers around 50 members from whom approximately 10 are real active, organising all association's activities. The association' venue is *Casa de la Solidaridad*, the establishment that reunites various immigrant associations. The main sources of finance are the local public subvention (the local Catalan Government, Barcelona's City Hall) and association's own cultural activities (cultural festivals like folkloric or cinema festival, the book's day, or communal meals). The association is divided in working groups, some dedicated to immigrant issues and other to solidarity action with Argentina.

The association engages in *immigrant politics* like informative action on immigrant issues (residence permit, regularisation process, family reunification, municipal registration) and also protest action against immigrant discrimination and marginalisation (discrimination at the working place, education and health systems; or defending the illegal immigration and the right to free international mobility) but with no support from home country government. In these protest actions, the association collaborates

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[55] For more details on the interviews, see Appendix D.

with other nongovernmental associations like *SOS Racisme Catalunya* and immigrant associations like *Papers and Drets per Tothom* (Documents and Rights for Everybody) and other immigrant associations registered in the *Casa de la Solidaridad*.

In terms of *homeland politics*, the association engages in protest action against particular homeland politics and in home country human rights defence (for example, the disappeared persons during the military dictatorship - *las madres de la Plaza de Mayo*; protest action against the Avellaneda Massacre in front of the Argentinean Embassy; organised discussions in the universities on the Movement of Unemployed Working People in Argentina; etc.) together with other Argentinean associations like Plataforma Contra la Impunidad and el *Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos*.

The association engages also in trans-local politics by giving political and material support to the Movement of Unemployed Working People (*Movimiento de los Trabajadores Desocupados o los piqueteros*-MTD) founded in the second half of the 90s in Argentina as a result of the big economic recession (desindustrialisation and the decrease in the Argentinean exports). The association particularly supports the *Popular Front Darío Santillán* (FPDS), a social and political movement founded as a reaction to the assassination of the social militant Darío Santillán and his compatriot Maximiliano Kosteki by the police in the Avellaneda Massacre (for instance, it sends money, or material

objects like clothes, computers, notebooks, pencils, technical equipment, etc.).

B) Uruguayan immigrant associations

The *Associación de Uruguayos en Cataluña* (AUC) was founded in 2003 as a formal non-profit association and its main source of finance has been the member quotas (there are more than 400 members who pay monthly quotas). In the last year, AUC has applied for various state subventions and has started to organise diverse activities like collective meals, cultural festivals or other celebrations in order to increase its annual revenues. The main objective of the association is to improve the life of all the Uruguayans worldwide (as a moral obligation), by prioritising the socio-cultural action. Its activities are oriented mainly toward promoting civic participation and legal and informal counselling to the Uruguayans living in Catalonia, and to channel their socio-cultural initiatives and protect their human rights. The association sends periodical Internet newsletters to its members, with detailed information about all its activities.

AUC identifies mainly with the working class, thus it maintains strong links with the Spanish syndicate CCOO and other syndicates from Uruguay. It also integrates and participates actively in the Federation of Associations and Houses of Uruguayans in Spain (FAYCUE), the Coordinator of the Catalan Immigrant Entities

(CEICAT), the Ibo-American Coordinator of the XXI Century's Migrations (CIBAMI XXI), *Fedelatina*, the Promoter Network of Social Consensus over Migrations, and the Working Groups of the Immigration Cabinet of Barcelona's City Hall. It also maintains strong contacts with other Uruguayan associations from Spain, Argentine, and the United States.

In its activities and projects, the association collaborates with the Barcelona's City Hall, the Catalan Local Government, the Spanish syndicate CCOO, the Catalan Foundation for Peace and Solidarity (Fundació Pau i Solidaritat), the Catalan socio-cultural Foundation Pere Ardiaca, the Catalan civic association *Lliga per la laïcitat* (the Laic League), the Association of Immigrant Families and Friends *Ida & Vueltas*, private enterprises like *Uruimport* and *Uruguay in Europe* that import products from Uruguay, and with insurance companies in Spain and Latin America like MAPFRE.

AUC engages in *homeland politics* like informative and protest action on home country politics, and homeland human rights defence (disseminating political news via its website; fighting for external voting rights by pressuring home country government to change the constitution in this respect; militating for the derogation of the impunity law established during the dictatorship, etc.). AUC participates also in *immigrant politics* like informative and protest action on immigrant rights (for example, providing the adequate information that might facilitate immigrant accommodation in the destination country; defending immigrant rights in case of

discrimination and racism; supporting, together with other immigrant associations, immigrants' right to vote, by pressuring the Spanish and Catalan political parties to modify the electoral law; fighting for the reinstatement of the 1870's Peace and Friendship Treaty between Uruguay and Argentina that permits Uruguayans citizens to live and work legally in Spain, and this in cooperation with the left-wing Uruguayan government and its elected president Tabaré Vázquez).

Since 2005, AUC has been working in different social development projects in home country together with the Association *Ida & Vueltas*. As such, both associations have participated in diverse civic projects in areas like education/schools, health, and also in the organisation of various cultural festivals in Uruguay (traditional dances like *murgas* or tango). *Trans-local politics* seems to be an important aspect of AUC's activities and practices as a way of strengthening the links between Uruguayans immigrants and their co-nationals at home. Protecting and preserving the Uruguayan identity abroad is a strong objective of this association:

"You never lose your identity but rather reinforce it abroad. You never can transnationalise emotionally an individual, only physically as a migrant who moves from one place to another. A migrant can establish himself/herself in one place but he/she will never renounce to belong to his/her country of origin…She/he will always have the heart in Uruguay and the body in Spain." (President of the association)

The association *Casa de Uruguay* was founded in 1978 as an opposition political force against the military dictatorship in Uruguay. At that time, the association defended homeland human rights and militated for democratic institutions and liberties in Uruguay. In this regard, the association collaborated with the United Nations Refugees Agency (UNHCR), the humanitarian organization Red Cross Catalonia and other left-wing sectors of the Catalan society. Most founders came as political refugees though now the association registers an increasing numbers of economic immigrants. However, political activism remains a significant characteristic of this association:

"Most of the association's founders came as political refugees. Later on, the association has been integrating other people…though I do not like to differentiate between political refugees and economic refugees. Economic refugees are the result of bad politics in home country, so we could say that, in reality, they are also political refugees." (President of the association)

Since 1985 and with the political change in the Uruguayan government, the number of association's members has decreased to approximately 75 as many refugees returned home while more associations of Uruguayans have started to appear in Spain. The main sources of finance are the membership quota (around 3 euros per month), the money gathered from various cultural activities like collective meals and folklore festivals, and the subventions from

local public administrations (for instance, the Gavà's City Hall). The association is a member of the Federation of Latin American Entities in Catalonia, *Fedelatina*.

Lately, there has been a shift in the association's objectives toward *trans-local politics*. The association engages in many civic projects in Uruguay like a communitarian public house in Santa Catalina, a deprived neighbourhood in Montevideo, sometimes in collaboration with other Uruguayans associations like *Casa Charrua*, or in cultural festivals. In terms of homeland politics, the association involves in human rights defence (for example, in the case of the disappeared children or sexually abused women during the dictatorship), organises discussions with Uruguayans politicians on various subjects of national interest (for instance, the role of Uruguay within the commercial block the Southern Common Market – *el Mercado Comun del Sur, Mercosur*; the education reform in Uruguay) and provides regular information on homeland politics via the weekly Uruguayan newspaper *Brecha*, etc.

In terms of immigrant politics, the association engages in informative and protest action on immigrant rights (for example, cases of discrimination and racism; reunions with left-wing Catalan political parties like the Socialist Party of Catalonia - PSC, United and Alternative Left - EUia, Initiative for Catalonia Greens - ICV, Republican Left of Catalonia - IRC to defend immigrants' right to vote; sending official protest letters like in the case of the sub-Saharan immigrants dying at the border with Spain, etc.), though

with no support from home country government. *Casa Uruguay* maintains occasional contacts and develops occasional cooperation projects with other immigrant associations like the Federation of Associations and Houses of Uruguayans in Spain (FAYCUE), *Casa de Estocolmo* in Sweden, or other immigrant associations in France.

The association *Casa Charrua* was founded in 1992 with the objective of preserving and disseminating the Uruguayan culture across state borders, and developing various civic projects in home country, though there was initially a debate on a possible political character of the association. Today the association register around 8-10 members and finances itself via subventions from the local public administration (the City Hall of Castelldefels), regional agencies for cooperation and development (*Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament*), and its own cultural activities like collective meals and cultural festivals. Lately, the association has started a campaign of co-opting more members and establishing a member quota.

The association participates mainly in trans-local politics like diverse civic projects in Uruguay (for instance, reforming or building a hospital in a deprived neighbourhood of Montevideo; financing small organic farms, a quarter of their profits going to orphanages) with the intermediation of homeland non-governmental organisations or associations (like *Fuente al Sur*). Association's members regard this kind of trans-local civic action as a moral duty of Western societies for the colonisation period.

"There is only economic globalisation and no social globalisation. The poor Africans or Latin Americans come here not because they want to, but because in their countries they are dying of hunger. This terrible situation you cannot resolve it with more militarised borders but rather by supporting the socio-economic development of poor countries. Rich countries, after stealing the resources of poor countries for so long, have now the moral duty to compensate them." (President of the association)

The association also engages in *homeland politics* like informative and protest action on home country politics, and homeland human rights defence (organised discussions with politicians from home country; the defence of external voting rights; homeland human rights defence). In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association involves in informative and protest action on immigrant rights (for instance, immigrants' right to vote; the 1870's *Peace and Friendship Treaty* between Uruguay and Argentine; other immigrant integration or discrimination aspects in collaboration with non-governmental associations like the *Asociación Solidaria América* 2002 (from Castelldefels) that gives immigrants legal advice or *S.O.S Racisme Catalunya*), generally with the support of home country government and consulate.

C) Panamanian immigrant associations

The *Asociación de Panama en Cataluña* was founded in 1997 with the objective of supporting the integration of Panamanian immigrants into the Catalan society, preserving and disseminating the Panamanian culture, with the support of the Spanish and Catalan institutions. It is a cultural association that registers around 50 members. Its main sources of finance are the annual member quotas and the voluntarily member contributions to specific cultural events organised by the association. The association maintains strong links with the Catalan Institute for International Cooperation (ICCI), the Foundation Catalonia-America, and it is also a member of the Federation of American Associations in Catalonia (FASAMCAT).

The association engages only indirectly in *immigrant politics* like the participation in informative acts organised by the Federation of American Associations in Catalonia on immigrants' right to vote or immigrants' rights within the Catalan autonomous political regime. It does not have however any clear position in all these aspects. The relationship with the home country government or the Panama's Consulate in Barcelona is almost inexistent. The association does not engage in any form of *homeland politics* since it does not have sufficient strength and resources for doing this. At the same time, homeland politics is not one of the main objectives of the Panamanian community in Catalonia. It does not participate in any form of *trans-local politics* as the voice and representation of Panamanians living abroad is very limited.

In terms of a possible transnational identification, the president of the association recognises that for the Panamanian immigrant group this is rather something emotional because of the idiosyncrasy of this people that move for different reasons and, frequently, just temporarily:

"I define myself as a Panamanian who loves very much his country of origin and who has been adopted by a country that he learns to love. We are living in two worlds that are ours. They both adopted us and for that we have to love them both and identify ourselves with both them. I am a Spanish Panamanian and a Panamanian Spanish who loves his country of origin but also the country that received him." (President of the association)

D) Peruvian immigrant associations

The non-profit immigrant association *Federación de Peruanos sin Fronteras* was founded in 1998, in a moment when the Peruvian immigrants felt somehow abandoned by the Peruvian Embassy in Madrid in terms of legal counselling, immigrants in irregular situation or the preservation of the Peruvian culture. The association registers around 150 members who give money voluntarily for diverse civic projects in Peru. The annual funds of the association rise also with the money gathered from organised cultural activities like collective meals and cultural festivals. The association is a

member of the Federation of Latin American Entities in Catalonia, *Fedelatina*.

Association's main activities are basically resumed to a radio programme called *La voz del Inmigrante* that started in 2001 on a radio channel from Peru called *Radio Libertad Trujillo*. A Spanish immigrant from Extremadura founded this radio channel 50 years ago in the Trujillo town. The radio programme is transmitted on the Internet each week on Saturday at one o'clock in the afternoon, the Peruvian hour or at eight o'clock, the summer Spanish hour, and it has a length of half an hour. The programme is about immigrant situation in Spain (for example, rights and how they are treated by the Spanish society) or other political and socio-economic aspects of Spain or Catalonia (for example, how people live in Spain, what do they eat and how much do they earn; how secure is life in Spain in comparison with Peru and how does the police act; the associational life in Spain in comparison to that from Peru; the Spanish authorities; the autonomy regime in Catalonia; the Spanish public transportation system; the Spanish politicians and their wages, etc.). All this information helps immigrants' families in Peru to come in contact with the Spanish social and political reality.

The association engages in *homeland politics* like informative action on national elections and electoral campaigns (for instance, for the 2006 national elections, the association did not support the candidature of Alan García Pérez though it maintained contacts with his party *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*, APRA)

or homeland human rights defence (for instance, in the case of a presumed political repression of some APRA members who denounced the right-wing orientation of Alain Garcia and his implication in the forced disappearance of many persons and the human rights violations perpetrated during the 1983-1996 internal conflict) via non-governmental or governmental organisations like International Amnesty or the European Parliament.

In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association involves in informative and protest action on immigrant rights (for instance, counselling work in aspects like nationalization or family reunification; fighting discrimination practices via non-governmental organisations like International Amnesty, and governmental ones like the European Parliament, or via other immigrant associations from countries like the United States). It maintains strong contacts with the Socialist Catalan Party (PSC) in terms of immigrants' right to vote, but receives no support from home country government in immigrant issues.

Through the radio programme, the association engages also in some form of *trans-local politics* (for example, contest awards of 25 euros on the Father's or Mother's Day; a *Cumbayá fiesta*, that brought to the association around 500 dollars that were used for diverse presents for 60 poor children from Peru; a dancing festival, with the traditional dance called *La Marinera*, organised in collaboration with *El Club Libertad de Trujillo*, an organisation from Peru, in the Trujillo town, a winning couple from Spain being

sent to participate in the festival). The association has tried to support civic projects in poor villages or towns from various regions of Peru *like Sierra del Perú, Sierra de la Libertad* in areas like education (for example, building a school or buying education materials) or health (for example, building a hospital), but failed to achieve any agreement with the corresponding city hall mayors who asked for exorbitant amounts of money. In 1991, Barcelona signed up a cooperation agreement with the Trujillo town but this did not come to terms because of a bad management from the part of the public administration in Trujillo.

The association *Centro Peruano de Barcelona*, one of the oldest Latin-American immigrant associations in Barcelona, was founded in 1963 as an association of academics from Peru. In the 80s, the association acquired its present name and established as its main objective the dissemination and preservation of the Peruvian culture abroad. It organises debates and conferences on diverse socio-cultural aspects and events from Peru (for example, archaeology, literature, education, Peru's independence anniversary day, etc.) and other cultural activities (for example, poetry festivals, sport contests, cinema festivals, photography exhibitions, etc.) together with other Peruvian immigrant associations.

The association registers around 40 members and its main sources of finance are the public subventions (Barcelona's City Hall) and association's own cultural activities (for instance, collective meals organised every month or cultural festivals that take place usually in

July). The association is part of the Federation of American Associations in Catalonia (FASAMCAT) that was created in 2001 as an encountering platform to channel, assist and coordinate the efforts of Latin American associations in their areas of interests, and to intermediate between these and the public and private Catalan institutions.[56]

The association engages in homeland politics by organising pre-electoral discussions during the Peru's national elections time-period (for example, for the 2006 Peruvian elections, the association invited representatives of the two main political parties that competed against each other, the *Partido Aprista Peruano* and the *Union por el Peru*, to present their electoral programmes to the nationals living abroad) or participating in the organisation of the external voting process together with the Peruvian Consulate in Barcelona in 2006. The association also engages in homeland human rights defence by sending official protest letters to international organisms or participating in lawful manifestations.

In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association engages in informative action on immigrant rights (for example, roundtables on immigration; free legal counselling to immigrants on aspects like the regularisation process or the residence permits, etc.). The association maintains strong links with various Spanish entrepreneurs, offering immigrants significant information about the

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[56] See http://www.fasamcat.org.

situation of the Spanish labour market. It also engages in protest action on immigrant rights (for example, the study homologation of Latin American midwifes in collaboration with the Association of Latin American Midwifes; the preservation of Latin TV programmes on the digital television as main sources of immigrant information; immigrants' right to vote in collaboration with the main Catalan parties, People's Party of Catalonia - PPC and the Socialist Catalan Party - PSC). In these immigrant issues, the association does not receive any support from home country government (consulate/embassy).

In terms on *trans-local politics*, one of the association's future objectives is to increase its participation in civic projects in home country. In this regard, the association has already started to participate with another Peruvian immigrant association in a project of sending medicine and medical technology to necessitated hospitals in Peru. The strong feeling of dual belonging is the real reason behind association's involvement in transnational (political) activities and practices:

"I think nobody renounces to belong to his/her homeland…I grown up and lived in Lima, I have many friends there, my high school. I have everything there. I go there and my immense satisfaction is to step on the soil of my country. It feels as if I would have never gone away… If I can do something for my country, if I can decide at least a little bit on its destiny, I feel more linked to it…I normally vote in all national elections in Peru and not because it is obligatory

but because I really believe in this vote…I also vote here in Spain in all the elections, because I believe that here this is the only way we can make our voice heard." (President of the association; she has dual citizenship)

She continues:

"I sincerely and honestly feel I belong to both countries. I have never felt as a stranger here, probably because when I came, Spain was particularly hospitable with Latin-American academics…By disgrace, today immigrants are not received with opened arms…I define myself as a global citizen or, more precisely, I feel as both Catalan and Peruvian, I feel as if I belong to both parts. This is why I do this voluntary work within this association. I want to continue being in touch with my country and my people, and contribute with whatever I can… It is a feeling of amplitude as if all borders are open. In fact, I have never understood why do state borders exist in the first place?"

The *Alma Peruana* was founded in 1991 when Peru was coming out of a cholera epidemic. A small group of Peruvians living in Barcelona, who were working with the political party "United Left" in Peru and also with a Catalan support committee of Peruvian people, thought of creating this association. At that time, the association started to organise cultural activities like dancing festivals and gastronomic exhibitions in order to collect money and medicine for Peru. After this, the association has continued as a

cultural association, its main objective being the preservation and dissemination of the Peruvian folklore and culture abroad. At present, the association registers around 16 active members and finances itself through an annual member quota, and the money gathered from its own cultural activities (mainly, dancing festivals).

The association participates sporadically in *homeland politics* (for example, the organisation of the electoral process of the 2006 Peruvian elections together with other Peruvian immigrant associations and in coordination with the Peruvian Consulate in Barcelona). In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association provides little information to Peruvian immigrants trying to derivate them to a Peruvian lawyer. In case of immigrant rights violation, the association joins up other Peruvian immigrant associations and sends collective official protest letters to different human rights organisations. In these immigrant aspects, the association does not receive any support from home country government (consulate/embasy).

The association engages in *trans-local politics* indirectly via other immigrant associations. As such, it organises cultural festivals, for example, together with a sport association called *Peña Alianza Lima en Barcelona* and the collected money go to particular civic projects in the education area (for example, a football school for children in Peru) that are run out by other Peruvian immigrant associations.

In terms of transnational immigrant participation, things do not seem to be too easy for particular immigrant groups who cannot travel freely around the world, and if they succeed to do so, they find themselves trapped in precarious work situations for a long time. Acquiring the Spanish citizenship is still the most adequate option for a free mobility and particular immigrant groups like those coming from the European Union and certain Latin-American countries (for example, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, etc.) that have special treaties with Spain can obtain it earlier than most of the non-European immigrants. Acquiring the Spanish citizenship, beside the liberty of movement, gives immigrants the feeling of belonging to two places, the feeling of being a transnational citizen:

"When I had only the Peruvian passport, I could not travel freely to almost any place. With the Spanish passport I have more liberty…the borders are more open for me now. I do not think state borders should exist in the first place…We all should have the liberty to move from one place to another. If the economic situation of my country is not as good as it should be, we should have the liberty to change this by moving to other places with better economic opportunities… When I first came to Barcelona, 18 years ago, I first lived in an 'illegal' situation for three years then, with the new migration law, I could obtain a residence permit and, after a while, the Spanish citizenship. I first worked as a housekeeper and taking care of old people. Then, I worked in a factory for seven years until it closed down and finally in a hotel reception. In all these years, I have improved my educational and professional

situation. I have all my family here but I feel myself as a transnational citizen: I have my heart in Peru, I am a Peruvian because I love my culture and I try to disseminate it, but I also feel very much from here, from Barcelona. Economically, I live better here and this changes a lot of things." (President of the association)

E) Ecuadorian immigrant associations

The *Asociación Catalana-Equatoriana para la integración y el bienestar* was founded in 2003 at the initiative of a former member of the *Associació d'Equatorians a Catalunya*, discontent with this association, and of other Ecuadorian immigrants. The main objective of the association was to provide useful information, legal counselling and support to newly arrived Ecuadorian immigrants. At present, the association registers only two active members in Catalonia though around 5.000 Ecuadorians have at least once required support from it. Its main sources of finance are the voluntarily contributions from the association's members and from other non-governmental organisations (for instance, the Spanish broadcasting COPE).[57]

The association engages in homeland politics like informative action on the external voting process in collaboration with the Ecuadorian Consulate or on home country politics in general (for example, organised discussions on homeland politics; distributing

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[57] COPE or *Cadena de Ondas Populares Españolas* is one of the main national broadcastings financed almost entirely by the Spanish Catholic church.

free newspapers like *Mi Ecuador*, directed to Ecuadorian immigrants). The association participates in *immigrant politics* like informative or protest action on immigrant rights (for instance, the residence permits; the regularisation process; labour market discrimination or insertion in collaboration with supermarkets like *Mercadona* or *Corte Inglés*; the mistreat of Ecuadorian immigrants by the Ecuadorian Consulate and the denouncement of the latter to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.) but with no support from home country government.

In terms of *trans-local politics* the association engages in various civic projects in home country, especially in the area of health care. The association recollects each year off-load medicine from friends and sends it to hospitals and health centres in Ecuador (for example, in 2005, the association sent medicine in a value of 50.000 euros to three provinces from Ecuador). At the same time, the association intermediates the contact between those Ecuadorians who suffer of diseases that cannot be cured in Ecuador, and specialised health centres from Catalonia (for example, in 2005, the association brought seven persons from Ecuador to be cured in Catalonia). In this humanitarian action, the association receives support from the Health Department of the Catalan Government that pays for the whole treatment.

Apart from these transnational political activities, the association also tries to disseminate the Ecuadorian culture through cultural exhibitions (the president of the association is a painter herself) and

festivals. In this regard, it maintains strong links with the Cultural House in Ecuador. The association organises each year, in collaboration with the Spanish broadcasting COPE, the celebration of the *Reyes Magos* (the Magic Kings) for those Ecuadorian children living in Catalonia (Barcelona).

The *Associació d'Equatorians a Catalunya* was founded in 1993 at the initiative of a group of Ecuadorian students. Since 2000, the association has enlarged its area of activities toward more socio-economic aspects of Ecuadorian immigrants' integration into the city of Barcelona. Between 2001 and 2003, the association registered a high increase in the number of its members (around 5.800 members), becoming at that time one of the most representative Ecuadorian immigrant associations. Today, though the association registers around 7.200 members in Catalonia, only around 70-80 of them are real active.

The main sources of finance are an annual member quota of around 15 euros, the money gathered from organised cultural activities, and the public subventions from Barcelona's City Hall, the Catalan local government, or from financial institution like the bank *la Caixa*. The association maintains strong links with other immigrant associations like the Federation of Ecuadorian Associations in Madrid, the Ecuadorian association from Vic, the immigrant association *Ecuador Llactacaru*, two Ecuadorian immigrant associations from the United States that promoted the external voting rights in the first place, and non-governmental organisations

like *S.O.S Racisme Catalunya,* Spanish charitable religious entities like *Caritas*, the Catalan civic association *Lliga per la laïcitat* (the Laic League), and the Spanish syndicates CCOO and UGT. The association is a member of *Fedelatina* and of the Federation of American Associations in Catalonia (FASAMCAT).

The association engages in homeland politics like informative action on home-country national elections and the external voting process (for example, organising reunions and roundtable discussions with political candidates from Ecuador; informing about the external voting rights to be exerted for the first time in September 2006), and home country politics in general (for example, distributing newspapers directed to Ecuadorian immigrants; organised discussions on diverse issues of home politics).

In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association involves in informative and protest action on immigrant rights (for instance, legal counselling on immigrant regularisation process, resident permits, family reunification and corpse repatriation; job market counselling; lawful manifestations like that from 2001 against the train accident in Lorca that ended up with the life of 21 Ecuadorian immigrants in an irregular situation, who were travelling all in a van, or the 2002 manifestation against the assassination of an Ecuadorian immigrant in the discotheque *Mare Magnum*; immigrants' right to vote, etc.), but with no support from home country government and quite a cold relationship with the

Ecuadorian Consulate in Barcelona. Beside this, the association also organises diverse cultural activities like particular national celebrations (the Mother's Day, the Father's Day, the National Day, and the Christmas Day), cultural and sport festivals.

The association does not engage in any form of *trans-local politics*, the main focus of its interest being, for the moment, the migratory process in Spain. Each Ecuadorian, on an individual basis, inverts in properties in Ecuador (land or houses) or sends family remittances. The president of the association acknowledges that, at a collective level, it is very difficult to develop civic projects in home country because of the corruption of Ecuadorian functionaries working at the border control and of the public administration in general (for instance, the association tried to send some bread furnaces to Ecuador that were all confiscated by Ecuadorian border control functionaries).

The *Asociación de Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos en Cataluña para la Solidaridad y la Cooperación - Ecuador Llactacaru* was founded in 2001 as a support group for those immigrants in an irregular situation who self-confined themselves in a church in order to defend their human rights. At that time, the association provided information and legal counselling in aspects like the regularisation process, residence permits, voluntary home return, etc., in response to the tough migration policy implemented by the, then in power, Spanish Popular Party (PP). The association started with a non-hierarchical structure, with no member quotas and a communitarian

functioning, registering in short time more than 1.000 members. It has entered, after a while, in a crisis period (its members have descended to 20 persons) and has extended its activities to other issues like immigrant integration, cultural preservation and solidarity with Peru.

Most of association's activities are self-financed through organised cultural events (collective meals, cultural festivals, sport contests, etc.) while some other projects receive financial support from local public administrations (Barcelona's City Hall) or international organisations (the European Union). Since it has been founded, the association has developed four big projects, the most important ones being the following: *El Mundo de Colores* (the World of Colours) that focused on the integration of Ecuadorian immigrants in the socio-cultural life of a neighbourhood from Barcelona; the financing and building of an Internet centre in Ecuador; and the organisation of a general reunion in Barcelona with all Ecuadorian immigrant associations from Spain.

The association engages in *homeland politics* like informative action on the external voting right and on home country politics in general (for example, organised discussions with politicians from Ecuador; planning the vigilance of the first electoral process abroad – electoral campaign and voting – together with the Spanish non-governmental organisation *Associación Libre de Ciudadanos por la*

Democracia, ALCD).[58] It maintains strong contacts with particular political parties from Ecuador like *El Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti and El Movimiento Popular Democratico* (MPD).

In terms of immigrant politics, the association involves in immigrant rights defence via non-governmental associations like *S.O.S. Racisme Catalunya*, and collaborates mainly with Catalan left-wing parties (Iniciativa per Catalunya, Esquerra Republicana) in aspects like social and labour integration of immigrants or immigrants' right to vote. It does not receive any support from home-country government (or consulate), but maintains strong links with international networks like the *Taller Nacional de Migración* (TNM) and Ecuadorian associations from other countries that defend migrants' rights (immigrants, refugees, displaced people).

The association engages also in *trans-local* politics through its returned members who collaborate with the association in diverse civic projects. These projects are developed mainly in the southern and northern parts of the Quito province/canton (Pichincha) and focus on education and schools for children or on improving the life conditions of poor families living there (for example, the association is still in a process of finding a Spanish bank that could finance with low interest rates the housing of poor Ecuadorians who do not have family members abroad).

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[58] At the time of the interviewing, the external voting rights were still in a process of legalisation that was supposed to end in October 2006.

When asked about a possible transnational identification, the president of the association considered this aspect as something personal. The nation had little importance for him, accentuating instead his ideological orientation:

"I do not consider myself a transnational citizen but rather an a-national. I do not have any national identity…I have a passport because this is compulsory in today's world, but I do not have an identity from a country in particular and this because of my ideological orientation. I am an anarchist and nations do not tell me anything. For me, the state and the nation are just oppressing systems." (President of the association)

F) Moroccan immigrant associations

The *Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Catalunya* is a branch office of the *Asociación de Trabajadores y Inmigrantes Marroquíes en España* (ATIME) that has its central venue in Madrid. The Catalan association has started its activities in 1993 and has an independent status from that in Madrid though it often collaborates with this. At the time of its foundation, the association tried to establish a political party in Morocco, called the "Left-Wing Democratic Movement" but failed to achieve it. The association directs its activities to the Moroccan immigrant working class in Catalonia. It registers around 600 members in Catalonia (300 in Barcelona) and develops various activities directed primarily at the integration of the Moroccan immigrants into the

Catalan society. It has five employees and its main sources of finance, beside the members' quotas, are the public subventions from Barcelona's City Hall and the Catalan local government.

The association involves in *homeland politics* like homeland human rights defence (foe example, women and children rights; the democratisation of the home country) or informative and protest action on homeland politics (reunions, roundtables, monthly newsletters to its members; denouncing the Moroccan Consulate in Barcelona for corruption and immigrant mistreating, etc.). The association, together with other Moroccan immigrant associations from France, Holland and Belgium, performs lobbying action on the Moroccan government in order to designate representatives from emigrant communities living abroad in the Moroccan Parliament. In this regard, it plans to organise, at the European level, an informing campaign on homeland politics and the external voting rights for nationals living abroad.

The association also engages in *immigrant politics* like informative action on immigrant rights (for example, legal and labour market counselling) and other socio-cultural integration aspects, and immigrant rights defence (for example, a centre for Moroccan immigrants under 18 years old in an irregular situation; cases of immigrant discrimination in the labour market). In some of these activities, the association receives support from diverse home-country non-governmental associations or some opposition political parties but not from home-country government

(consulate/embassy). In the last four years, the association has been organising an informative activity in Morocco called *No más muertes en el estrecho* (No more deaths on the seashore) about the tragic experience of those persons who are forced to flee their countries.

In terms of *trans-local politics*, the association has a department of cooperation and development that coordinates civic projects in home country in areas like education/schools, old people/children, local development, etc. In these projects, the association collaborates in these projects with the Barcelona's City Hall and the Catalan Local Government, and also with Moroccan non-governmental associations (particularly, the branch office ATIME Rabat Morocco). It also organises every two years, together with the branch office ATIME-Madrid and other regional branch offices, a conference called "Between Two Cultures" whose objective is to bring together Moroccan and Spanish cultures. Academics, non-governmental associations, representatives of the Ministry of Culture and Education, and also politicians from both countries participate in this conference. The association acts as intermediary between various political parties, or between political parties and non-governmental associations in home and destination countries.

In terms of a transnational (political) identification, the president of the association does not feel identify with any political community though he has a Moroccan nationality and a residence permit in Spain:

"I belong to Morocco but I do not belong to any political community. It is more a cultural and religious belonging: I belong to the Arab culture, but I do not belong to the Moroccan political community. They do not allow me and I also do not want to belong to it. And this is not only my case. I can speak in the name of many members of the ATIME. Here in Spain or in Catalonia I belong to a community that is called ATIME. I have been working for a long time in this association and I plan to continue doing this. I belong to this association and up to now I am not prepared to belong to any political community." (President of the association)

The homeland civic association *Asociación Amigos Pueblo Marroqui - Itran*[59] was founded in 1998 with the objective of supporting deprived Moroccan towns like Errachidia, the administrative capital of the Meknès-Tafilalet region situated in north-central Morocco, bordering Algeria. The association registers around 20 members who pay a monthly quota of around 6 euros. Other sources of finance are the voluntarily contributions from Moroccan Muslim immigrants (the yearly humanitarian debt Muslims have within the Islamic religion) and the public subventions from the Barcelona's City Hall, the Catalan local government, or Spanish and Catalan banks. Association's reunions are organised in an establishment donated by a Catholic parish from Barcelona.

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[59] *Itran* signifies in the Arab language, star that represents the emblem of the Moroccan national scud. In this way the association emphasises its strong connection with Morocco.

The association does not engage directly in *homeland politics* but rather indirectly via contacts maintained with various home country political parties in terms of voting rights for nationals living abroad or the political representation of nationals living abroad in the Moroccan parliament. Though at the time of the interviewing the external voting right was still in a stage of law project, various Moroccan political parties (for instance, the Islamic moderate and radical political parties, the Moroccan Feminist party) have contacted with the association to explore to what extent this could engage in the organisation of electoral campaigns among the Moroccan immigrants living in Spain.

In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association's activities are rather punctual (when somebody asks for help), and include informative and protest action on immigrant rights (for instance, informative stands and roundtables; legal derivation in terms of residence permits; manifestations and official protest letters; opinion newspaper articles against immigrant mistreating at state border controls or immigrant discrimination in the education system). In all these activities, the association collaborates with other (local or regional) immigrant associations like *Ibn Batuta*, Latin American immigrant associations (from Uruguay, Ecuador, Argentina), or with Spanish syndicates like UGT and CCOO.

The association engages mainly in *trans-local politics* like various local civic projects in areas like education (for example, supporting

the educational programme of various schools from Errachidia; buying school materials like notebooks, pencils, computers, etc; financing public school transportation and/or the residence for students living in remote towns or villages), women and children rights (for example, providing women access to Internet; promoting equal education for girls and women) or health (for example, providing medicine and medical instruments to various health care centres from Errachidia). All these projects are realised in collaboration with associations of teachers and other non-governmental associations from Errachidia, and universities and hospitals from Catalonia.

G) Guineans Equatorial immigrant associations

The *Asociación Cultural Rhombe - Comunidad Ndowe* was founded in 1983 at the initiative of Guineans students of Ndowe ethnic origin, who came to study in Spain (Catalonia), and wanted to preserve and disseminate their culture. The association registers today around 200 members of the Ndowe community.[60] The main objective of the association is the intercultural exchange between the Catalan and Ndowe ethnic communities (for example, organising Spanish language and African dance courses in collaboration with Barcelona's City Hall and the Catalan local government). The association finances itself through a member quota, public subventions from Barcelona's City Hall and the

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[60] The Ndowe is one of the four tribes that co-exist in Guinea Equatorial along the Fang, Bubis, Anabonese, and Bujeba, and that lives on the coast.

Catalan local government, and voluntarily contributions from Catalan non-governmental organisations and churches.

The association engages in *immigrant politics* like informative and protest action on immigrant rights (for example, legal counselling on the regularisation process; labour market formation and insertion; immigrant women discrimination) but with no support from home country government. In terms of *homeland politics*, there is a group inside of the association that dedicates itself to homeland human rights defence and that maintains strong contacts with opposition political parties in home country. The association involves also in *trans-local politics* like financial help to young people from the Ndowe community who want to come and study in Spain or monetary contributions to civic projects directed to Ndowe infants in the nursing period that are coordinated by a Spanish non-governmental association.

When asked about a possible transnational identification, the interviewer underlines her Guinean identity though she is aware of the strong Spanish influence from the time of the Spanish colonisation:

"I am a Guinean though I many times joke at my workplace that I am an exotic Spanish woman. I feel Guinean but I am a Spanish citizen. Many of my co-nationals in Guinea feel Spanish. My mother speaks perfect Spanish." (Founder member of the association)

H) Pakistanis immigrant associations

The *Federació d'Associacions Pakistanesos a Catalunya* (FAPC) was founded in 2004 on 14th of August, the Pakistani Independence Day. The federation includes around 28 Pakistani associations, the majority from Catalonia, and registers around 190 members who pay a voluntarily monthly quota. Other sources of finance are the public subventions from the Barcelona's City Hall and the Catalan bank *la Caixa*, the voluntarily contributions from Pakistani businessmen who reside in Catalonia and the money gathered from organised cultural events or activities.

The association maintains strong links with the Pakistani Embassy in Madrid (for example, negotiating for establishing a Pakistani Consulate in Barcelona), the Pakistan International Airlines (for example, negotiating for a direct flight from Islamabad to Barcelona), governmental institutions and organisations like the Catalan local government, the Catalan Institute for International Cooperation (ICCI), and non-governmental organisations like *Fons Catalans*, the Muslim Society, the Pakistani Cultural Centre, *Casa Asia*, the Pakistani socio-cultural association *Arman*[61] and the *Associació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa de Dones Pakistaneses* (ACESOP).

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[61] The president of the Pakistani Federation is also member of the socio-cultural association *Arman*.

The association engages in *homeland politics* like informative action on home country politics (for instance, organised discussions with Pakistani politicians; the dissemination of three newspapers in Urdu with news from home country). It also involves indirectly in homeland politics through its members, many of them belonging to the *Liga Musulmana*, a political party that is part of the Pakistani government. On the other side, immigrants' families back-home decide their vote in national elections based on the opinion of their family members living abroad:

"We are sending money to our families back home, so we are somehow seen by them as somebody who can decide upon their lives." (President of the association)

In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association involves in informative and protest action on immigrant rights (for example, the regularisation process; the residence permits; the family reunification; discrimination in the labour market and education system; women discrimination; homeland legal documents like the national identification card and passport, etc.), often with the support of the Pakistani Embassy. The association maintains strong contacts with the Socialist Spanish and Catalan parties (PSOE and PSC) in issues like the Catalan autonomous regime or immigrants' right to vote.

The association does not involve in any form of *trans-local politics* though it is aware that all its members contribute, on an individual

basis, to the socio-economic development of their country of origin not only through family remittances, but also through financial support to diverse civic projects. The association plans to participate in development and cooperation projects in Pakistan, but at the moment, its possibilities to do so are quite low. The association has already started to organise regular conferences to motivate people to invest in Pakistan.

In terms of a possible transnational identification, the president of the association recognises that the Pakistani culture is very connected with the Islamic religion and this does not help too much the integration of Pakistani immigrants into the Spanish/Catalan society. The Pakistani immigrants should first try to understand and integrate into the destination society and then think in terms of dual or transnational belonging. From here comes also his reticence in regard to external voting rights for nationals living abroad.

The Pakistani cultural association *Idara Minhach Al Quoran* (e.g., the road to peace) was founded in 1996 at the initiative of a group of Pakistani immigrants who have been living for some time in Barcelona and wanted to know better the Catalan culture, while preserving and transmitting their own culture. The association registers around 870 members in Catalonia (though the majority of them reside in Barcelona) and does not belong to the Federation of Pakistani Associations in Catalonia (FPAC). It has two full-time and three partial-time employees, and around three-four volunteers.

The main sources of finance are the voluntary member quota and the voluntarily contributions from private sympathisers.

The association engages in *homeland politics* like informative and protest action on home country politics (for example, organised discussions with politicians from home country; distribution of newspapers from home country; defence of external voting rights). It also maintains strong contacts with and supports certain political parties from home country (many members of the association belong to political parties in home country).

The association also involves in *immigrant politics* like informative and protest action on immigrant rights (for instance, legal counselling on residence permits and the regularisation process; labour market counselling and insertion; situations of cultural/religious discrimination), but with no support from home country government. In immigrant issues, the association collaborates with governmental organisations like the Catalan Parliament of Religions and other groups of inter-religious dialogue like Barcelona's Inter-religions Centre and the religious charity entity *Caritas*, non-governmental organisations like Red Cross Catalonia and the Jaume Bofill Foundation, the Maghreb socio-cultural association *Ibn Batuta*, the Civic Centres of neighbourhoods like *Raval* and *Ciutat Vella*, the Catalan syndicate USOC, etc.

In terms of *trans-local politics* the association finances various civic projects in areas like health and education that are realised by non-governmental organisations from home country. It also sends humanitarian help in cases of natural disasters like, for example, the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. When asked about a possible transnational political identification, the president of the association was quite sceptical about this:

"We do not have full political rights so it is impossible that we belong to two political communities. Our community is socio-cultural and religious. I define myself as a Catalan citizen of Pakistani origin because I have got the Spanish citizenship but I live in Catalonia that is an autonomous Spanish community. Well, in fact, I would rather say that I am a Catalan Muslim." (President of the association)

The *Associació de Treballadors Pakistanesos a Catalunya* (ATPC) was founded in the 90s with the objective of supporting the integration of Pakistani immigrants into the Catalan society. It registers around 300 members in Catalonia (200 in Barcelona), only men (the Pakistani women have a separate association), and has an employed secretary. The main sources of finance are the voluntarily member quotas and the public subventions from Barcelona's City Hall and the Catalan local government. The association is not a member of the Federation of Pakistani Associations in Catalonia (FAPC) but belongs instead to the *Lliga per la laïcitat* (The laic league), a Catalan civic association promoted by diverse civic

entities like syndicates and laic foundations, and in convention with the Catalan local government. The association sends periodical Internet newsletters to its members, with detailed information about all its activities.

The association engages mainly in *immigrant politics* like informative/formative and protest action on immigrant rights (for instance, the residence permits and the regularisation process; the family reunification; labour market specialisation and insertion; Catalan courses; legal counselling via the Catalan Information Centre for Immigrant workers, CITE; immigrant discrimination and human rights violation like life insecurity of Pakistani immigrants in the construction sector, cases of racism, or immigrants' right to vote- the symbolic vote as a form of protest) with no support from home country government.

In all these activities, the association collaborates with Spanish and Catalan syndicates (CCOO, UGT, USOC), with governmental organisations like the Secretary of Linguistic Policy of the Catalan Government and the Consortium for Linguistic Normalisation, the civic entity *Òmnium Cultural* that promotes the Catalan language and identity, the non-governmental association *SOS Racisme Catalunya*, the Catalan socio-cultural Foundation Pere Ardiaca, Spanish left-wing parties like the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and the United Left (IU), Catalan left-wing parties like the United and Alternative Left (EUia) and immigrant associations like

the Association of Uruguayans in Catalonia, the Association of Ecuadorians in Catalonia, etc.

The association involves to a lesser extent in *homeland politics* like informative and protest action on homeland politics (for example, weekly discussions on home country politics; roundtables on political and human rights issues with academics or representatives from Pakistani syndicates or other associations like the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan-RAWA; signing up campaigns and manifestations on aspects like family reunification and bureaucratic consular barriers, the necessity of establishing a Pakistani Consulate in Barcelona, or the military dictatorship in Pakistan). The president of the association writes opinion newspaper articles as a form of protest against the military dictatorship in Pakistan. Two newspapers in Urdu (mainly with news from Pakistan) are distributed periodically to the association's members. Many Pakistani Muslim immigrants, members of the association, send money, on an individual basis, to different political parties in Pakistan via the mosques.

In terms of *trans-national politics*, the association does not engage in homeland civic projects, the Pakistani immigrants being accustomed to help individually their own families back home. However, in the case of the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir-administered Pakistan, the association mobilised in order to send humanitarian help to necessitated people. A transnational identification seems quite odd and unrealistic for a group that

encounters normally many legal barriers in terms of rights and participation in home country, and even movement between home and destination countries. At the same time, political activism is something unknown (or prohibited) for most Pakistani immigrants, the majority coming from the Pakistani province Punjab that is very much dominated by the Pakistani state armed forces.

The *Associació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa Dones Pakistaneses (ACESOP)* was founded in 2005 by a Pakistani woman with the objective of defending the rights of the Pakistani women living in Barcelona and to support their integration into the Catalan society. The association registers around 100 members, the majority Pakistani women. It has applied for various public subventions but did not receive any financial help, as it does not focus on the Catalan language and culture but rather on counseling Pakistani women in various aspects like education, health, women rights, etc. The President of the association organizes all activities with personal funds. The association maintains strong links with the *Federació d'Associacions Pakistanesos a Catalunya* (FAPC), though it is not part of it, and with various nongovernmental organizations from Barcelona like *Casal dels Infants del Raval*, *Tot Raval*, *Gavina*, etc.

The association does not engage in any form of *homeland politics* because it does not approve the form of government in Pakistan. In terms of *immigrant politics*, the association engages in informative action on women rights and women discrimination but with no

support from home country government (embassy/consulate). The association involves also in *trans-local politics* like humanitarian help (for example, gathering and sending funds in case of natural disasters like the earthquake in Pakistan). A transnational identification or participation results impossible for a group that feels marginalized and discriminated not only in its own country, but also in the destination country.

I) Senegalese immigrant associations

The *Asociación Catalana de Residentes Senegaleses* was founded in 1988 in support to newcomer Senegalese (reception, counselling and orientation). The association started also to assist its members, in body repatriations to Senegal or immigrant family bury in Senegal. This humanitarian orientation has increased the number of its members and its annual revenues. Development and cooperation in Senegal have become a central line of action within the association. The association's next prospect is to establish a federation of Senegalese immigrants from different countries with the objective of improving the socio-economic conditions of Senegalese immigrants worldwide and of their families and peoples back home. At present, the association finances itself through member quotas and public subventions from governmental institutions like Barcelona's City Hall, the Catalan local government or the Catalan Agency for International Cooperation.

The association engages in *homeland politics* like informative action on the external voting process and homeland electoral campaigns. It also involves in *immigrant politics* like informative action on immigrant issues (for instance, temporary labour migration, the association acting as an intermediary between the Senegalese and Catalan authorities; syndicates' position in terms of immigrant rights). Immigrant rights defence is another important area of action of this association (for instance, the 2006 events from Ceuta and Melilla when tons of people tried to climb up barbed wire fences over three meters high, using rudimentary stairs made by themselves; or Barcelona's law on civic coexistence), in which it collaborates with non-governmental organisations like S.O.S. Racisme, Catalan and Spanish syndicates, African immigrant associations from Murcia and Alicante or from Belgium, France, and the USA, and other national origin immigrant associations in Catalonia or Barcelona like the *Association de Mujeres Amazigas*, *Casal Argentí*, immigrant associations from Uruguay, Guinea Equatorial and Magreb.

In terms of *trans-local politics*, the association participates in various civic projects in home country in areas like education, health, local development, etc. The association is aware that a country's development is something structural and that political change is needed in order to perform all these socio-economic improvements. The association defines itself as something broader than a purely immigrant counselling association:

"Our association is not something isolated, only solving out immigrant legal documents. We are something more than this. We are part of the citizenship from both countries. Our association's legal status permits us a higher civic implication and participation that allows us to be attentive to everything is happening here and there…"(Secretary of the association)

In personal terms, the secretary of the association defines himself as a citizen of the world:

"I am from Senegal, I migrated to South Africa, then to France and now I am here, but maybe tomorrow I go to Canada, USA or back to Senegal. The world in principle should not have any barriers: if goods can circulate freely, why persons cannot do the same? Moreover, the right to free movement is a basic human right though it is not respected in practice. I also define myself as a Catalan citizen because I live here, I pay my taxes here and I have all my life here. I identify myself totally with Catalonia but I have my own cultural identity…I am a culturally diverse person and this means in fact that I am a rich person." (Secretary of the association)

J) Nigerian immigrant associations

The *Asociación de Nigerianos de Cataluña* was founded in 1980 at the initiative of Nigerian students who came to study in Spain (Catalonia). Today, the association defends and supports the rights and interests of all Nigerians living in Catalonia. The association

registers around 320 members and functions as a federation of Nigerian associations in Catalonia. It maintains links with the Federation of Nigerian Immigrant Associations in Spain (Madrid) and finances itself through voluntarily member quotas and public subventions from Barcelona's City Hall or the Catalan local government. It has one employed person that is the secretary of the association.

The association engages in *immigrant politics* like informative and protest action on immigrant rights (for example, immigrants' right to vote; immigrant discrimination or human rights violation in the labour market or the education system), or on whatever other social, economic, and political aspect of immigrant integration into the Catalan society. In these immigrant integration aspects, it collaborates with the Nigerian Embassy in Madrid with which it also organises each year the celebration of the Nigerian Independence Day. In terms of *homeland politics*, the association defends and militates for the external voting rights, while it does not engage in any from of *trans-local politics*.

K) Cameroonian immigrant associations

The association *Agrupació de Camerunesos i Cameruneses Residents a Barcelona* was founded in 1985 by a group of Cameroonian political refugees. Since then, the association's members have descended from 50 to 15. At the beginning, the association involved in a series of activities like human/immigrant

rights defence and protest action against homeland political regime and the imprisonment of political dissidents. Today, the association's main objectives are the integration of Cameroonian immigrants in Barcelona while preserving and disseminating their own African culture, and the development of a dynamic of solidarity between the African immigrants. Its main sources of finance are a member quota of around 30 euros per month and public subventions from Barcelona's City Hall.

The association engages in *immigrant politics* like protest action on immigrant rights in collaboration with non-governmental associations like *S.O.S Racisme*, Red Cross Catalonia, and immigrant associations from Cameroon, Philippine, Senegal, Congo, Morocco, etc., but with no support from home country government. It also maintains strong contacts with and supports the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC). In terms of *homeland politics*, the association, though it is aware of the authoritarian regime in Cameroon, does not take almost any action against it (except a slight protest in defence of homeland human rights) because of a feeling of impotence:

"Fro here we can not do anything against this. We could write an article in a newspaper but it would not serve of anything. We do not have the power to do anything. We would like to do more. For example, I am a member of a Cameroon organisation fighting for democracy, but this is an opposition party that fights from abroad. The party does not have any legal validity, so it cannot do anything

in Cameroon…Many members of the association belong to this party but there is always a danger to affirm this directly, especially if you plan to visit or return to Cameroon. I have not been home since I came, that is 25 years ago." (President of the association)

The association does not involves in any form of *trans-local politics* mainly because of a lack of resources. Whatever the association can gather up goes to the Cameroonian immigrants living in Barcelona.

The *Associació Cultural Adna Bassa* was founded in 1996 as a cultural association in solidarity with the *Bassa* ethnic group. It registers around 50 members who pay their monthly member quota and collect additional funds from organised cultural events. The association focuses mainly on the socio-cultural integration of the Bassa ethnic group in Barcelona. It organises each year and together with other African associations a cultural festival in order to disseminate the African (Bassa) culture.

The association engages in *immigrant politics* like informative action on immigrant rights (for example, legal documents and residence permits; the integration in the labour market, etc.) but with no support from home country government. In terms of *homeland politics*, the association does not perform any activity, as it does not agree with the political regime in Cameroon:

"We do not carry out any activity in our country because we do not agree with the political situation in Cameroon. In fact, we do not

approve any political system in Africa." (President of the association)

4.2 General profile of the sample of immigrant associations that engage in political transnationalism

The association does not engage in any form of *translocal politics* though it plans to do so in the nearby future. As such, it plans to participate in various development and cooperation projects in collaboration with the Catalan non-governmental organisation acting in Cameron, the *Agermanament Sense Fronteres*.

The immigrant associations sampled were formal non-profit associations registered officially in various databases of the Catalan local government or the Barcelona's City Hall. All these immigrant associations were located in the metropolitan area of Barcelona. From the 41 immigrant associations initially sampled, I finally could interview 24. However, how I have mentioned in Chapter 3, this is an acceptable level of response taking into consideration the impediment of knowing from the beginning which association is still active or not.

From a total of 24 immigrant associations interviewed, 22 of them (91.7%) engage in some form of political transnationalism (homeland politics, immigrant politics and/or trans-local politics).

Only two of them (8.3%), in particular, the Panama Association in Catalonia and the Cameroonian cultural association *Adna Bassa* do not involve in any form of political transnationalism.

Table 4.1 Politically transnational immigrant associations

	Frequency	%
No	2	8.3
Yes	22	91.7
Total	24	100

(Personal elaboration)

Twenty-one immigrant associations (87.5%) engage in homeland politics, eighteen of them (75.0%) in trans-local politics and six (25.0%) in immigrant politics (see Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).

Table 4.2 Homeland politics

	Frequency	%
No	3	12.5
Yes	21	87.5
Total	24	100

(Personal elaboration)

Table 4.3 Immigrant politics

	Frequency	%
No	18	75
Yes	6	25
Total	24	100

(Personal elaboration)

Table 4.4 Trans-local politics

	Frequency	%
No	6	25
Yes	18	75
Total	24	100

(Personal elaboration)

Table 4.5 presents the immigrant associations by forms of political transnationalism these employ. Only four immigrant associations, in particular, Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona, Asociación de Uruguayos en Cataluña, Casa Charrua and Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos, engage in all three forms of political transnationalism (homeland politics, immigrant politics and trans-local politics). The vast majority employ at least one form of political transnationalism.

Table 4.5 Forms of political transnationalism by immigrant association

Immigrant associations	HP (1)	IP (2)	TLP (3)	Pol. Trans. (4)
Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina	yes	no	yes	yes
Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona	yes	yes	yes	yes
Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos	yes	no	yes	yes
Asociacion de Uruguayos en Cataluña	yes	yes	yes	yes
Casa de Uruguay	yes	no	yes	yes
Casa Charrua	yes	yes	yes	yes
Asociación Panamá Cataluña	no	no	no	no
Asociacion Cultural Alma Peruana	yes	no	yes	yes
Federacion de Peruanos sin Fronteras	yes	no	yes	yes
Centro Peruano de Barcelona	yes	no	yes	yes
Associació Catalana-Equatorian per a la integració i el desenvolpament	yes	no	yes	yes
Associació d'Equatorians a Catalunya	yes	no	no	yes
Asociación Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos Solidaridad y Cooperación -Ecuador Llactacaru	yes	no	yes	yes
Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Catalunya	yes	no	yes	yes
Asociación de Amigos del Pueblo Marroqui - Itran	yes	no	yes	yes
Asociación Cultural Rhombe	yes	no	yes	yes
Associació de Treballadors Pakistanesos a Catalunya	yes	no	yes	yes
Associació Cultural Idara Minhach Al Quoran	yes	no	yes	yes
Federació d'Associacions Pakistanesos a Catalunya	yes	yes	no	yes
Associ ació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa Dones Pakistaneses (ACESOP)	no	yes	yes	yes
Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos	yes	yes	yes	yes
Associació Nigeriana de Catalunya	yes	yes	no	yes
Agrupació Cultural Adna Bassa	no	no	no	no
Agrupació Camerunes Residents a Catalunya	yes	no	no	yes

(Personal elaboration)

Note: (1) Homeland politics; (2) Immigrant politics; (3) Trans-local politics; (4) Political Transnationalism.

Table 4.6 presents an initial profile of the sample of immigrant associations that engage in some form of political transnationalism.

Each of the previously selected country is represented by at least one immigrant association. Though I looked for maximum variation in the variable type of immigrant association, I could not interview all the recorded immigrant associations. A low variation in this variable does not allow us to make any generalised assumption though, at a first glance, the predominant type are the "social agencies" (12 of the total 22) that provide legal, labour, educational and health counselling, and other services to immigrants in Catalonia (Barcelona), but which are also engaged in projects, mainly at a national level, in their home country. These are commonly better-funded associations since municipal and regional governments usually finance their budget. Examples appear in Table 4.7 that includes such immigrant associations like the *Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona, Asociación de Uruguayos en Cataluña, Associació d'Equatorians a Catalunya, Asociació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Catalunya, Associació de Treballadors Pakistanesos a Catalunya, Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos*, etc.

Table 4.6 Profile of immigrant associations that engage in political transnationalism

Variable	Values	Freq.	%
National origin	Argentine	3	13.6
	Uruguay	3	13.6
	Peru	3	13.6
	Ecuador	3	13.6
	Morocco	2	9.1
	Equatorial Guinea	1	4.5
	Pakistan	4	18.2
	Senegal	1	4.5
	Nigeria	1	4.5
	Cameroon	1	4.5
Total		22	100
Association type	Social agency	12	54.5
	Civic	5	22.7
	Cultural	4	18.2
	Hometown committee	1	4.5
Total		22	100
Scope of projects (1)	Local	1	4.5
	Regional	1	4.5
	National	13	59.1
Focus of activity (2)	Education/schools	10	45.5
	Health	9	40.9
	Old people/children	5	22.7
	Human rights	2	9.1
	Local development	6	27.3
Involvement in home country national elections	Never	13	59.1
	Occasionally	3	13.6
	Each national election	6	27.3
Total		22	100
Involvement in diverse civic	Never	6	27.3
	Occasionally	13	59.1
	Yearly	3	13.6
Total		22	100
Sources of funds(3)	Members' quotas	17	77.3
	Governmental entities	17	77.3
	Non-governmental entities	5	22.7
	Private companies	5	22.7
	Churches	3	13.6
	Cultural activities	10	45.5

(Personal elaboration)

Note:
(1) Percentages do not add up to 100 because immigrant association may be engaged in projects at various levels or might not be engaged in any type of project in home country;
(2) Percentages do not add up to 100 because immigrant association may be engaged in multiple projects in country of origin;
(3) Percentages do not add up to 100 because immigrant association may receive multiple sources of funds.

Second in importance are the "civic" entities (5 of the total 22) that pursue an agenda of national scope, based on several projects in their home country. Examples appear in Table 4.7 such *as Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina, Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos, Casa de Uruguay, Casa Charrua, Federación de Peruanos sin Fronteras*. Next are the cultural associations that attempt primarily to preserve and disseminate their home culture in the destination country, and which are lesser engaged in their home country. Table 4.7 provides examples such as the *Asociación Cultural Alma Peruana, Asociación Cultural Rhombe, Associació Cultural Idara Munhach Al Quoran*, etc.

Hometown committees represent a small minority of the sample (1 of the total 22) and their scope of action is primarily local. The only example that appears in Table 4.7 is the *Asociación de Amigos del Pueblo Marroqui Itran*. This fact does not surprise us as this type of association could hardly be highly represented in a country that has started to experience massive migration only in the last decades. The low variation in the variable type of immigrant association is partly due to this.

Table 4.7 Examples of politically transnational immigrant associations

Type	Name	Year found.	No. memb.	Salaried empl.
civic	Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina	1983	50	0
social	Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona	2003	4	1
civic	Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos	2001	10	0
social	Asociacion de Uruguayos en Cataluña	2003	400	0
civic	Casa de Uruguay	1978	75	0
civic	Casa Charrua	1992	10	0
cultural	Asociacion Cultural Alma Peruana	1991	16	0
civic	Federacion de Peruanos sin Fronteras	1998	150	0
cultural	Centro Peruano de Barcelona	1963	40	0
social	Associació Catalana-Equatorian per a la integració i el desenvolpament	2003	5.000	0
social	Associació d'Equatorians a Catalunya	1993	7.200	0
social	Asociación Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos Solidaridad y Cooperación -Ecuador Llactacaru	2001	20	0
social	Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Catalunya	1993	600	5
hometown committee	Asociación de Amigos del Pueblo Marroqui - Itran	1998	20	0
cultural	Asociación Cultural Rhombe	1983	200	0
social	Associació de Treballadors Pakistanesos a Catalunya	1990	300	1
cultural	Associació Cultural Idara Minhach Al Quran	1996	870	5
social	Federació d'Associacions Pakistanesos a Catalunya	2004	190	0
social	Associació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa de Dones Pakistaneses (ACESOP)	2005	100	0
social	Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos	1988	99	0
social	Associació Nigeriana de Catalunya	1980	320	1
social	Agrupació Camerunes Residents a Catalunya	1985	15	0

(Personal elaboration)

Table 4.6 also shows that the prime philanthropic concerns of the majority of these associations in their home communities or countries is education and health care. Then come local development initiatives (agriculture, water, electricity, employment and housing), childcare and old people care (orphanages and retirement houses), and human rights defense. The majority of these associations are funded through members' quotas and/or through governmental funds (for example, Barcelona's City Hall, the Catalan Local Government, *Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament*, etc.) or their own cultural activities (collective meals, folklore or dancing festivals, etc.).

The level of regularity of immigrant associations' involvement in this kind of civic and/or philanthropic projects is quite low which, according to Portes and his collaborators (2007), would impede us to draw generalized conclusions about this type of political participation. Table 4.6 shows that only six immigrant associations (27.3%) involve with regularity in home country national elections (40.9% both regularly and occasionally), while only three immigrant associations participate each year in diverse civic projects in home country (72.7% both regularly and occasionally).

Fifteen immigrant associations (68.2%) that engage both regularly and occasionally in political transnationalism were founded beginning with the 90s, in a moment when economic migration to Spain has started to increase considerably. Only seven of them (31.8%) were founded before 1990, mostly by immigrants coming

on study reasons like *Centro Peruano de Barcelona, Associació Nigeriana de Catalunya*, and *Asociación Cultural Rhombe de Guinea Equatorial*, or as political refugees like *Casa de Uruguay* and *Agrupació de Camerunesos i Cameruneses Residents a Barcelona* (see Tables 4.7 and 4.8).

Table 4.8 Year of foundation of transnational immigrant associations

	Frequency	%
Betwen 1960-1989	7	31.8
Between 1990-2006	15	68.2
Total	22	100

(Personal elaboration)

The data on membership (both, regular and occasional) indicate wide dispersal, with associations ranging from a handful of committed activists (for example, 4 members) to hundreds and even mils of members (for example, 7.200 members). As such, ten immigrant associations (47.6%) register a relatively small number of members (around 100), nine of them (42.9%) register between 101 and 1.000 members, and only two of them (9.5%), in particular, two Ecuadorian associations, register more than 1.001 members (see Table 4.9).

Table 4.9 Number of members (regular and occasional) of transnational immigrant associations[62]

	Frequency	%
Between 1-100	10	47.6
Between 101-1000	9	42.9
Between 1001-8000	2	9.5
Total	21	100

(Personal elaboration)

Only five immigrant associations (22.7%) that engage (both, regularly and occasionally) in political transnationalism such as *Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona*, *Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Catalunya*, *Associació de Treballadors Pakistanesos a Catalunya*, *Associació Cultural Idara Minhach Al Quran* and *Associació Nigeriana de Catalunya* have at least one salaried employee. The seventeen left (77.3%) do not have paid staff because of a low monthly budget (see Tables 4.7 and 4.10).

Table 4.10 Salaried employees

	Frequency	%
Without salaried employees	17	77.3
With salareied employees	5	22.7
Total	22	100

(Personal elaboration)

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[62] One immigrant association did not provide us any information on the number of its members.

In sum, the descriptive hypothesis that immigrant associations engage at varying degrees in political transnationalism has been validated by the results of this research study. Although from the 24 immigrant associations interviewed, a majority of them (91%) develop some form of political transnationalism, mainly homeland politics and trans-local politics, only few of them do this on a regular basis. More social associations tend to engage in political transnationalism, their focus of interest being both immigrant issues and home country politics, most of these were founded after 1990, are better-funded associations (mainly with governmental funds), and tend to pursue an agenda of national scope, based on several projects in their home country, particularly in areas like education and health.

5. THE MAIN DETERMINANTS OF THE POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM OF IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS IN BARCELONA

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I integrate both meso and macro explanations of the transnational political participation of immigrant associations in Barcelona and examine in depth the effects of these two groups of factors. The results of the qualitative analysis from Chapter 4 are going to be crosschecked against the results of a more quantitative analysis presented in this chapter. I use a triangulation approach that will permit me to corroborate or enhance the findings of this qualitative research study by using a quantitative analysis (see Bryman 2001: 447). Nevertheless, this research is primarily qualitative. Hence, the result of this quantitative analysis has to be cautiously interpreted, as the low number of cases does not permit us to make generalised conclusions.

In order to analyse the impact of several determinants on immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism, I focus on two levels of analyses. First, I take into account organisational factors at the meso-level, like the type of immigrant association, number of members, year of foundation, sources of funds and the social network in order to explore their relations with immigrant associations' involvement in transnational political practices and

activities. Second, I consider the effects of several contextual factors at the macro-level, like the political opportunity structure and the level of socio-economic development of home country in order to explain immigrant association's engagement in political transnationalism. Finally, I will summarise the effects of the main factors through a multivariate empirical model for immigrant association's engagement in political transnationalism.

In this chapter, I employ several statistical techniques to measure the degree of association between the dependent variable (immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism) with its different ways of being operationalised, and the meso- and macro-level explanatory variables. The specific types of techniques applied will depend on the nature of both the explanatory variables (categorical or of continuous -though bounded-nature) and the dependent variable, sometimes treated as dummy variable for each of the categories (immigrant politics, homeland politics and trans-local politics) and, in other cases, as an ordinal variable that includes all categories.

The following quantitative examination of the data of this study consists of both bivariate and multivariate analyses. First, in the bivariate empirical analyses, I will use cross-tabulations, comparison of means and correlations. In this case, this type of analyses is relatively important having so few observations (N = 24). Second, in the multivariate analyses, as the dependent variable is measured as a continuous variable, I will apply an ordinary least-

squares (OLS) regression. Nevertheless, it is worth nothing that the sample of immigrant associations is very small and I am dealing with several independent variables. This implies that there is a danger of rejecting hypotheses due to the lack of statistical efficiency, when these hypotheses in reality could hold something of truth. Therefore, caution is needed when interpreting the results of the multivariate analyses.

5.2 *Meso*-level determinants of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism

In this section, bivariate analyses of the *meso*-level determinants of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism are presented. The following variables are introduced into the analyses: type of immigrant association, number of members, year of foundation, sources of funds and the social networks. Before discussing the results of the bivariate analyses, I will explain how I measured the dependent variable.

As mentioned before, the operationalisation of the variables determines the selection of the statistical techniques of analysis. In this study, I use two forms of measurements of the dependent variable. On the one hand, I measure the dependent variable on an ordinal scale that goes from 0 to 3. The values of the dependent variable, level of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism, are obtained by summing up the number of

transnational political activities and practices that an association might perform. There are three possible types of transnational political practices and activities (immigrant politics, homeland politics and trans-local politics) so, the values of this variable range from 0 to 3, where "0" represents the minimum value and "3", the maximum value.

On the other hand, in order to observe the relations between specific types of transnational political practices and activities (immigrant politics, homeland politics, trans-local politics) and certain independent variables, I create dummy variables for each type of organisational political transnationalism, where "1" represents the existence of a certain type of political transnationalism and "0", the absence of this form of political transnationalism.

One of the main hypotheses of this thesis is that the type of immigrant association (civic, hometown committee, social or cultural) might influence immigrant associations' engagement in transnational political practices and activities. The theoretical expectations are that particular types of immigrant associations tend to perform more transnational political activity.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, recent empirical studies of immigrant communities in the United States suggest that the predominant type of immigrant organisations involved in transnational activities are the civic entities that pursue an agenda of national scope, based on several projects in their home country. Second in importance are

hometown committees whose scope of action is primarily local and next are the so-called social agencies that provide health, educational, and other services to immigrants, but which are also engaged in their home country. Transnational political organisations are rather a minority and they are represented among particular immigrant groups (see Portes *et al.*, 2007).

In order to explore the relation between different types of immigrant associations and their transnational political activism, I use the analysis of variance Anova that compares the means of the transnational political activity scale among the four types of associations (civic, social, cultural and hometown committee). This analysis allows me to measure if one particular type of immigrant association engages more than the others in political transnationalism.

The null hypothesis is that there are no differences in the level of engagement in political transnationalism between the four types of immigrant associations (H_0: $\mu_1 = \mu_2 = \mu_3 = \mu_4$). The alternative hypothesis is that there are some differences between the means. The results are presented in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Political Transnationalism by type of immigrant association

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Social	2	0,74	12
Hometown Committee	2	,	1
Cultural	1,33	1,03	6
Civic	2,2	0,45	5
Total	1,88	0,8	24
F	1,39 n.s		

(Personal elaboration)
Note: ** significant at the level of 95%; *significant at the level of 90%; n.s = not significant

As we can see in Table 5.1, the mean differences between the four groups of immigrant associations are very small and are not statistically significant.[63] Hence, there do not seem to exist any relation between the type of immigrant association and the level of its engagement in political transnationalism.

Though the descriptive analysis presented in Chapter 4 points out to a predominance of social entities that provide various social services to immigrants in the destination country but which are also involved in civic projects in home country, the bivariate quantitative analysis does not indicate any relation between the type of immigrant association and immigrant associations' level of engagement in political transnationalism. These results contradict the findings of previous studies on immigrant organizations' engagement in transnationalism (Portes *et al.*, 2007). From a

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[63] Complete statistical analyses are available to the interested reader.

theoretical point of view, the lack of a causal mechanism that could explain the relation between the two variables decreases the strength of this hypothesis. Future investigations are needed in order to test and maybe reformulate this hypothesis.

Moreover, an alternative bivariate analysis through contingency tables also corroborates that there is no relation between the type of immigrant association and immigrant associations' engagement in various forms of political transnationalism. In this case, I took into consideration the dependent variable with its three dimensions (immigrant politics, homeland politics, trans-local politics) that were recoded into three dummy variables. The four dimensions of the independent variable type of immigrant association (social, civic, hometown committee and cultural) were also recoded into four dummy variables. Nevertheless, we have to be cautious when affirming that there is no relation between these two variables. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, there is little variation in the variable type of immigrant association, hometown committee being the lowest represented one in the sample.[64]

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[64]Due to the fact that immigration to Spain is still a relatively new phenomenon, it is hardly possible to expect a high variation in the type of immigrant associations. Moreover, a significant number of hometown committees, which are associations completely oriented toward the country of origin, is less probable to exist in a relatively 'young' immigration country. If we exclude hometown committees (due to the low number of cases) from the variable type of immigrant associations and perform again an analysis of variance, the results do not change. The variable type of immigrant association does not seem to influence immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism.

Next, I have run a bivariate analysis (in this case, correlation analysis) between other organisational variables like the number of members, the year of association's foundation, or the number of salaried employees, and the dependent variable, the level of immigrant association's engagement in political transnationalism. As we can see in Table 5.2, none of these relations are statistically significant. Neither the number of members, nor the year of foundation, nor the number of salaried employees seem to influence the engagement of immigrant associations in political transnationalism.[65]

Table 5.2 Correlations between the index of political transnationalism and several explanatory variables

	Index of political transnationalism
Number of members	-0,146 n.s (0,507)
Year of association's foundation	-0,116 n.s (0,588)
Number of salaried employees	0,118 n.s (0,583)

(personal elaboration)
Note: ** Significant at the level of 99% * significant at the level of 95% and + significant at the level of 90%.

Another meso-level determinant is the sources of funds. This is a nominal variable that takes six values: members' quotas, governmental entities, non-governmental entities, private companies, churches, and associations' own cultural activities. In

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[65] A good appreciation of the relationship between immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism and the number of salaried employees is very much impeded by a low variation in the values of this last variable. Very few associations dispose of sufficient funds to employ additional personnel.

order to run an analysis of variance Anova, I have recoded the six dimensions of the independent variable into six dummy variables, while the values of the dependent variable vary from 0 to 3. In this case, there seems to be a positive relation between those associations that receive governmental funds and the level of their engagement in political transnationalism (see Table 5.3). In other words, it seems that those associations that receive governmental funds are more prone to engage in some form of political transnationalism.

Table 5.3 Political transnationalism by sources of funds

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
No governmental funds	1,29	0,95	7
Governmental funds	2,12	0,6	17
Total	1,88	0,8	24
F	6,74**		

(Personal elaboration)
Note: ** Significant at the level of 95%, *Significant at the level of 90%, n.s= not significant

In order to examine if this relation is been given for all types of political transnationalism or only for some specific ones, I realised a more precise analysis through contingency tables. I introduced in this analysis the three forms of transnationalism recoded into dummy variables and the six dimensions of the independent variable, also recoded into dummy variables. The results suggest that those associations that receive governmental funds tend to engage particularly in homeland politics and immigrant politics (see

Table 5.4 and Table 5.5). Trans-local politics does not seem to be an immigrant association activity financed through public funds. These findings were quite foreseeable, since governmental entities or agencies would particularly finance those events or activities that have to do more with immigrants' situation in the destination country.

Table 5.4 Homeland politics by governmental funds

			Sources of funds (governmental local/regional entities)		
			no	yes	Total
Homeland Politics	no	Count	3	0	3
		Row percentages	42,9%**	0%**	12,5%
		Adjusted Residual	2,9	-2,9	
	yes	Count	4	17	21
		Row percentages	57,1%**	100%**	87,5%
		Adjusted Residual	-2,9	2,9	
Total count			7	17	24
Pearson Chi-Square	8,327**				
Cramer's V	0,589**				

(Personal elaboration)
Note: ** Significant at the level of 95%, *Significant at the level of 90%, n.s= not significant

Table 5.5 Immigrant politics by governmental funds

			Sources of funds (governmental local/regional entities)		
			no	yes	Total
Immigrant Politics	no	Count	7	11	18
		Row percentages	100%	64,7%	75%
		Adjusted Residual	1,8	-1,8	
	yes	Count	0	6	6
		Row percentages	0%	35,3%	25%
		Adjusted Residual	-1,8	1,8	
Total count			7	17	24
Pearson Chi-Square	3,29*				
Cramer's V	0,37*				

(Personal elaboration)

Note: ** Significant at the level of 95%, * Significant at the level of 90%, n.s.= not significant

Another important explicative variable of this research study is immigrant associations' social networks. As mentioned in Chapter 2, many immigrants soon become aware that living in the advanced world is not going to improve too much their social and economic status. To overcome the situations of discrimination and social exclusion that destination society reserves them, they must activate their networks of social relationships. Here, I depart from the

theoretical assumption that transnational activities will follow the same network-building migration logic and that social networks of transnational immigrants would be as durable and cohesive as immigrant social networks. The larger or more difficult the proposed transnational project is, the stronger the social networks required to uphold it (Portes and Bach, 1985; Massey *et al.*, 1997; Portes, 1997; Guarnizo *et al*., 2003)

The prediction is that, regardless of immigrant associations' motivations for engaging in political transnationalism, the latter will be conditioned by the size and spatial scope of immigrant associations' networks. As more extended and spatially diversified social networks are, as higher immigrant associations' engagement in transnational political practices and activities. The absolute number of an association's ties represents the network size, while the spatial scope is measured by the ratio of out-of-town association's contacts, including those abroad, to those in the city of residence (see Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003).

The null hypothesis here is that there is no lineal association between the level of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism and the size and/or scope of their social networks. The alternative hypothesis is that larger (size) and more spatially diversified (scope) social networks increase immigrant associations' chances for engaging in political action across state borders.

I run out a correlation between the variables size and scope of immigrant associations' social networks, and their engagement in political transnationalism. The value of the correlation coefficient (0,41) indicates us some kind of positive relation, statistically significant at a significance level of 0.05, between the size of immigrant associations' social network and their engagement in political transnationalism. Larger social networks seem to increase immigrant associations' chances for engaging in political transnationalism.[66]

Table 5.6 Immigrant associations' political transnationalism by size and spatial scope of their social networks

	Index of Political Transnationalism
The spatial scope of immigrant association's social networks	0,02 n.s. (0,931)
The size of immigrant association's social networks	0,411** (0,046)
N	24

(Personal elaboration)
Note: ** Significant at the level of 95%, *Significant at the level of 90%, n.s= not significant

However, as we can see in Table 5.6, the scope or the spatial diversification of immigrant associations' social networks does not seem to influence their engagement in political transnationalism. The fact that these networks might be more local or more out of

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[66] The values of the variable immigrant associations' political transnationalism range from 0 to 3.

town do not seem to have any effect on the political activism of immigrant associations across state borders.

In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I dealt with another important research question that is: are there any patterned differences across different national origin immigrant associations in the incidence and forms adopted by immigrant political transnationalism? As mentioned in Chapter 2, recent empirical data suggest that transnational organisations and activism vary among different national origin immigrant groups, in part, because of the entrance of home country governments in the transnational field and the policies that they have so far implemented (Portes *et al.*, 2007).

The sample of this study presents a high variation in the national/ethnic origin of immigrant associations, so I grouped immigrant associations on the continent of origin (Latin Americans, Africans and Asians) in order to test if there is some relation between the national/ethnic origin of immigrant associations and their engagement in political transnationalism. An analysis of variance between the independent variable immigrant associations' continent of origin and the dependent variable, level of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism shows us that, although the Latin American immigrant associations seem to present a higher level of transnationalism, there is no statistically significant association between these two variables (see Table

5.7).[67] The higher engagement of Latin American immigrant associations in political transnationalism seem to be explained more by the higher level of political opportunity structure in these countries, in particular, more state-led policies and programmes toward emigrants living abroad.

Table 5.7 Political transnationalism and the political opportunity structure in home country by continent of origin

	Political Transnationalism		The political opportunity structure in home country		
	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Latin Americans	2	0,82	2,38	0,65	13
Africans	1,71	0,95	1,71	0,76	7
Asians	1,75	0,5	1	0	4
Total	1,88	0,8	1,96	0,81	24
F	0,33 n.s		7,97**		

(Personal elaboration)
Note: ** Significant at the level of 95%, *Significant at the level of 90%, n.s= not significant

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Latin American governments have adopted a wide range of programmes and policies toward emigrants living abroad such as: reforming ministerial and consular services to be more responsive to emigrant needs; investment policies designed to attract and channel economic remittances; granting dual citizenship or nationality, the right to vote from abroad, or the right

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[67] A more precise analysis through contingency tables between the three forms of transnationalism recoded into dummy variables, and the variable "continent" disclosed in its three dimensions and these recoded into dummy variables also shows that there is no relationship statistically significant. The results are available to the interested reader.

to run for public office; extending state protections or services to nationals living abroad that go beyond consular services; implementing symbolic policies designed to reinforce emigrants' sense of enduring membership) (see Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003). In the next section, I will analyse the macro-level determinants of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism.

5.3 Macro-*level determinants of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism*

The main causal hypothesis of this thesis is that as higher the level of political opportunity structure in home country, as higher immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism. As mentioned in Chapter 2, collective action proliferates when people achieve access to necessary resources for escaping from their habitual submissiveness and find the opportunity to use them. Collective action also increases when people feel threaten by costs that cannot bear or that came against their sense of justice (Kriesi, 1995; Kriesi *et al.*, 1992; Koopmans, 1992; McAdam *et al.*, 1996; Tarrow, 2004).

The concept of political opportunity structure (POS) has been defined in social movement literature as a conjuncture of factors or opportunities, many of them related with the political context in which actors have to act, that enhances collective action

(Koopmans, 1999: 97, 100). Institutionalist literature has explained the variations in immigrant politics as an outcome of the interaction between a group's resources (human, social and cultural capital) and the institutional opportunity structure (IOS) that has to do with the character of state elites, governmental bureaucrats, and the party system (Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005). As previously mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, the composite scale-index of political opportunity structure has been constructed departing from the three dimensions of the concept of political opportunity structure in home country for emigrants living abroad: 1) the level of freedom in home country; 2) formal political rights for nationals living abroad (dual citizenship, external voting rights); 3) state-led policies directed at emigrants living abroad. The values of this index goes from 1 to 3, where: "1" is "low political opportunity structure"; "2" is "moderate political opportunity structure"; and "3" is "high political opportunity structure".[68]

Bivariate analyses between various forms of immigrant associations' political transnationalism (homeland politics, immigrant politics and trans-local politics) and the level of political opportunity structure in home country give us the following results.[69] First, there seems to be a statistically significant positive

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[68] For more accurate aspects on the operationalisation of this variable and the construction of the index of political opportunity structure, see Chapters 2 and 3.
[69] Again, the three dimensions of the variable immigrant associations' political transnationalism (immigrant politics, homeland politics, trans-local politics) are recoded into dummy variables, while the variable level of political opportunity structure in home country is ordinal and takes three values: 1 for low, 2 for medium and 3 for high.

relation between those immigrant associations that engage in homeland politics and the level of political opportunity structure in the country of origin. In other words, as higher the level of political opportunity structure in home country, as higher immigrant associations' implication in homeland politics. Nevertheless, at a confidence level of 95%, we can confirm that only those immigrant associations whose members come from countries with a low level of political opportunity structure have a higher probability for not engaging in homeland politics (see Table 5.8).

Table 5.8 Homeland politics by level of political opportunity structure in home country

| | | | The political opportunity structure in home country | | | |
			low	medium	high	Total
Homeland Politics	no	Count	3	0	0	3
		Row percentages	37,5%**	0%	0%	12,5%
		Std. Residual	2	-1,1	-0,9	
	yes	Count	5	9	7	21
		Row percentages	62,5%	100%	100%	87,5%
		Std. Residual	-0,8	0,4	0,4	
Total count			8	9	7	24
Pearson Chi-Square	6,86**					
Cramer's V	0,54**					

Note: ** Significant at the level of 95%, *Significant at the level of 90%, n.s= not significant

Second, there is no statistically significant relation between immigrant associations' engagement in immigrant politics and the level of political opportunity structure in home country. Instead, there seems to be a statistically significant and positive relation between those associations that perform trans-local politics and the level of political opportunity structure in the country of origin. Moreover, as higher the level of political opportunity structure in home country, as higher the implication of immigrant associations in trans-local politics (see Table 5.9).

Table 5.9 Trans-local politics by level of political opportunity structure in home country

| | | | The political opportunity structure in home country | | | |
			low	medium	high	Total
Trans-local Politics	no	Count	4	2	0	6
		Row percentages	50%	22,2%	0%	25%
		Std. Residual	1,4	-,2	-1,3	
	yes	Count	4	7	7	18
		Row percentages	50%	77,8%	100%	75%
		Std. Residual	-,8	,1	,8	
Total count			8	9	7	24
Pearson Chi-Square		5,04*				
Cramer's V		0,46*				

Note: ** Significant at the level of 95%, *Significant at the level of 90%, n.s= not significant

Another important hypothesis of this thesis is that the level of socio-economic development of home country influences positively immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism. In other words, as lower the socio-economic level of development of home country, as higher immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism (in particular, in trans-local politics). As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, the level of socio-economic development of home country is measured through the Human Development Index (HDI).

Empirical evidence suggests that immigrants' and home country counterparts' initiatives might possess the counter-hegemonic potential to the contemporary processes of global neoliberal capitalism. While the latter leads to increasing inequalities among and within nations and remains largely indifferent to the causes behind the massive movements of people from the Global South to the North, the activities of hometown committees and other immigrant organisations/associations strongly seek to alleviate this situation (see Portes *et al.*, 2007). Many immigrant associations abroad whose members maintain strong emotional ties with their hometowns support the respective communities and advance local development projects, with considerable political implications, through collective (socio-economic and political) strategies. Transnational activities among immigrant organizations possess sufficient weight to affect the development prospects of localities

and regions and to attract the attention of home country governments (see Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 2007).

The results of the bivariate analyses between the level of socio-economic development of home country and the three forms of political transnationalism (homeland politics, immigrant politics and trans-local politics) suggest the following.[70] First, there is no association between the level of socio-economic development of home country and immigrant associations' engagement in immigrant politics or homeland politics.

Second, there seems to exist a statistically significant positive relation between those immigrant associations that perform trans-local politics and the level of socio-economic development of their country of origin. Nevertheless, at a confidence level of 95%, we can confirm that only those immigrant associations whose members come from countries with a low level of socio-economic development have a higher probability for not engaging in trans-local politics (see Table 5.10). The initial hypothesis does not seem to be validated by the results of this analysis, a contrary hypothesis being instead partially confirmed that is: as higher the level of socio–economic development in home country, as higher immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism.

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[70] The three dimensions of the variable immigrant political transnationalism (immigrant politics, homeland politics, trans-local politics) are recoded into dummy variables, while the variable level of socio-economic development in home country is ordinal and takes the following values: 1 for low, 3 for medium and 3 for high.

Table 5.10 Trans-local politics by level of socio-economic development

			The level of socio-economic development in home country			
			low	medium	high	Total
Trans-local politics	no	Count	3	2	1	6
		Row percentages	75%	15,4%	14,3%	25%
		Std. Residual	2,0	-,7	-,6	
	yes	Count	1	11	6	18
		Row percentages	25%	84,6%	85,7%	75%
		Std. Residual	-1,2	,4	,3	
Total count			4	13	7	24
Pearson Chi-Square	6,4**					
Cramer's V	0,51**					

(Personal elaboration)
Note: ** Significant at the level of 95%, *Significant at the level of 90%, n.s= not significant

In sum, the level of political opportunity structure in home country and also the level of socio-economic development of home country seem to affect positively immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism, though this influence is much clear in the case of a lack of these two contextual factors. In other words, those immigrant associations whose members come from poor countries and with low levels of political opportunity structure are less prone to engage in political transnationalism. Hence, the data analysis

seem to indicate that both factors, particularly the level of political opportunity structure in home country, are necessary conditions but not sufficient for immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism.

5.4 Multivariate analysis of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism

I turn now to discuss the results of the multivariate analysis. However, before presenting the results, it is important to remark that this analysis suffers from a numerical empirical limitation that has to do with statistical efficiency. My objective here is to test whether immigrant association's engagement in political transnationalism vary according to some *meso-* and *macro-*level determinants. Since I have only 24 observations and 3 independent variables plus the constant, we can talk about a typical case of few degrees of freedom. Accordingly, the estimations presented in this section may be relatively inefficient.

Keeping all these caveats in mind, the inferences that can be drawn from these results have to be cautiously interpreted, but they are nevertheless interesting enough to be worth commenting. The objective is to compare how the *meso-* and *macro-*level factors relate with the dependent variable. Table 5.11 provides the results of the multivariate analyses based on an ordinary least square estimation. I excluded those variables that in the bivariate analysis displayed less. Hence, the independent variables considered in the

model are the following: the size of immigrant associations' social networks (organisational or *meso*-level variable), the political opportunity structure in home country (contextual or *macro*-level variable) and the level of socio-economic development of home country (contextual or *macro*-level variable). The dependent variable, the level of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism, is measured on an ordinal scale that goes from 0 to 3.

Table 5.11 Predicting immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism by *meso*- and *macro*-level determinants. OLS regression.

	Political transnationalism
Size of immigrant association's social networks	,048* (,024)
Political opportunity structure in home county	,451** (,175)
Level of socio-economic development in home country	,069 n.s. (,213)
Constant	,32 (,515)
F	4,81 (Prob > F=,011)
R-squared	,42
Adjusted R-squared	,33
S.E.E.	,65
N	24

(Personal elaboration)
Note: ** Significant at the level of 95%, *Significant at the level of 90%, n.s= not significant

First of all, we can notice that the value of R-Square (that is the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that can be

predicted from the independent variables) is of 0,42, meaning that approximately 42% of the variability of the level of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism is accounted for by the variables in the model (see Table 5.11). The adjusted R-Square indicates that about 33% of the variability of the level of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism is accounted for by the model, even after taking into account the number of predictor variables in the model.[71]

With a p-value of 0,011 (99,9% level of confidence), the model is statistically significant. Accordingly, the group of variables - size of immigrant associations' social networks, level of political opportunity structure in home country and level of socio-economic development of home country - could be used to reliably predict the level of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism

For the variable size of immigrant associations' social networks, the coefficient (β=0,048) is statistically significant at the level of 90%, whereas for the variable level of political opportunity structure in home country the coefficient (β=0,451) is significant at the level of

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[71] The standard error of estimate shows us how much the value of the dependent variable can fluctuate in-between the minimum and the maximum. In other words it gives us an indication of how the observations are distributed along the regression line, or a prediction of the accuracy of the model. If the standard error of estimate is lower than half of the mean of the dependent variable, this indicates a fairly good model. In this case, the mean of the dependent variable is approximately 1,88, so half of it would be 0,94. Hence, the standard error of estimate is approximately 0,65, which is lower than 0,94.

99%. Hence, these two independent variables are significant being the latter, the political opportunity structure in home country, the most important predictor. The coefficient for the level of socio-economic development of home country ($\beta=0,069$) is not significant.

From the coefficients' table (Table 5.11), we can also notice which are the values for the regression equation in order to predict the dependent variable from the independent variables. The regression equation expressed in terms of the variables used in this model is the following:

Immigrant associations' level of engagement in political transnationalism Predicted = 0,32 + 0,048*size of immigrant associations' social networks + 0,45*level of political opportunity structure in home country + 0,069*level of socio-economic development of home country

These estimates inform us about the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. In other words, these estimates reveal the amount of increase in the level of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism that would be predicted by 1-unit increase in the predictor.

The coefficient (parameter estimate) for the size of immigrant associations' social networks is: 0,048. Hence, for every unit increase in the size of immigrant associations' social networks, a

0,048-unit increase in the level of immigrant associations'
engagement in political transnationalism is predicted. In other
words, for every increase of one percentage point of the level of
immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism,
the size of immigrant associations' social networks is predicted to
be higher by 0,048.

The coefficient (parameter estimate) for the level of political
opportunity structure in home country is: 0,45. Hence, for every
unit increase in the level of political opportunity structure in home
country, the level of immigrant associations' engagement in
political transnationalism is predicted to be 0,45-units higher. This
is significantly different from 0. The coefficient (parameter
estimate) for the level of socio-economic development of home
country is: 0,069. Hence, for every unit increase in the level of
socio-economic development of home country, the level of
immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism is
predicted to be 0,069-units higher.

In conclusion, from the estimates above, we can conclude that from
the three independent variables, the one which influences more the
dependent variable (level of immigrant associations' engagement in
political transnationalism) is the variable level of political
opportunity structure in home country.

Summing up, the above quantitative analysis, although it has been
realised with a relatively small number of cases, has helped us to

enhance and corroborate the results of this qualitative research study. First, among all *meso*-level variables introduced in the analyses, the only one that seems to influence immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism is the size of their social networks. Larger social networks seem to increase immigrant associations' chances for engaging in political transnationalism. However, the type of immigrant association, a variable that appeared to be significant in the descriptive analysis, does not seem to influence the political transnationalism of immigrant associations. There is also a positive relation between governmental funds and immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism. Those associations that receive governmental funds tend to engage particularly in homeland politics and immigrant politics. Trans-local politics does not seem to be an immigrant association activity financed through public funds, an aspect that comes to indicate a low implication of the destination country in socio-economic and political aspects of immigrants' country of origin.

Second, the two *macro*-level factors, the level of political opportunity structure in home country and the level of socio-economic development of home country, seem to influence positively immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism. Nevertheless, this empirical evidence is much clear when these two variables take the lowest value. In other words, those immigrant associations whose members come from poor countries and with low levels of political opportunity structure

seem to be less prone to engage in political transnationalism. Both factors, particularly the level of political opportunity structure in home country, act as necessary conditions but not sufficient for immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism.

Third, from the three independent variables tested in the multivariate analysis (the size of social networks, the level of political opportunity structure in home country and the level of socio-economic development of home country), the one that seem to influence more the dependent variable (the level of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism) is the level of political opportunity structure in home country. These results come to reinforce the main hypothesis of this thesis that is as higher the level of political opportunity structure in home country, as higher immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has addressed two fundamental questions in the transnational migration research field: whether or not all immigrant associations in Barcelona engage in political transnationalism? And which are the main determinants of immigrant associations' transnational political activism? The first research question has focused specifically on the comparison of different degrees of transnational political engagement among various immigrant associations in Barcelona. First, I have explored if immigrant associations in Barcelona engage in transnational political practices and activities. Then, I have examined the forms, scope and intensity of immigrant associations' transnational political activism.

As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 3, European-based studies have primarily focused on studying one immigrant group in different national/local contexts and explored mainly contextual factors (the destination context) like national ideologies and policies. The political participation of immigrant associations in their countries of origin have not been given much attention and neither the exit context like formal political rights in home country or state-led policies and programmes that home states adopt to attract the participation and contribution of their emigrants living abroad. In contrast, this thesis has focused on comparing the political

transnationalism of various national/ethnic origin immigrant associations in one locality that is Barcelona.

To answer the second research question, I have focused on *meso* and macro levels of analysis. On the one hand, I have examined how organisational factors like, for example, type of immigrant association, social networks, number of members, year of foundation, sources of funds influence immigrant associations' political transnationalism. On the other hand, I have also analysed if contextual factors like, for example, the political opportunity structure in home country or the level of socio economic development of country of origin determine the engagement of immigrant associations in political transnationalism. This multilevel approach constitutes the second main contribution of the present thesis. The framework established here and this contribution to research opens up the way for further analysis using data recently made available.

In what follows, I will briefly summarise the findings and arguments, and discuss their implications in the light of the theoretical questions posed in this thesis. I shall also make suggestions concerning future research on some of the topics and findings addressed here that have emerged as particularly promising.

I have started this research by offering a detailed synthesis of the main theoretical contributions on immigrant transnationalism, and

particularly, on immigrant political transnationalism. The main objective of this analytical work has been not only to establish the relevant academic and research areas to the subject of this study, but also to encounter clear indicators for measuring the phenomenon of interest that is immigrant political transnationalism.

As previously seen in Chapters 1 and 2, there are few operational definitions of immigrant political transnationalism and few research studies have focused on immigrant associations of different national/ethnic origin as the main unit of analysis. One of the main contributions of this thesis is to develop a more operational definition of political transnationalism and to examine if immigrant associations in Barcelona engage in this kind of political activism, how and why they do this. Although, I depart from Portes's (Guarnizo *et al*., 2003) and Ostergaard-Nielsen's (2001b, 2003a) definitions of immigrant transnational political practices and activities, I include additional indicators from political participation literature.

Are there any politically transnational immigrant associations? Which are these associations and what forms, scope and intensity characterise their political transnationalism? The findings suggest that immigrant associations engage at varying degrees in political transnationalism. From the 24 immigrant associations interviewed, a majority of them (91%) develop some form of political transnationalism, mainly homeland politics and trans-local politics. Only two immigrant associations, in particular, the Panama

Association in Catalonia and the Cameroonian cultural association *Adna Bassa* do not involve in any form of political transnationalism. However, these transnational political activities and practices are more occasional than regular. Only six immigrant associations (27.3%) involve with regularity in home country national elections (40.9% both regularly and occasionally), and three immigrant associations participate each year in diverse civic projects in home country (72.7% both regularly and occasionally). More social associations tend to engage in political transnationalism, their focus of interest being both immigrant issues and home country politics. Most of these associations were founded after 1990, are better-funded associations (mainly with governmental funds), and tend to pursue an agenda of national scope, based on several projects in their home country, particularly in areas like education and health.

In the following table I summarise the forms, scope and magnitude of political transnationalism among immigrant associations in Barcelona:

Table 6.1 Immigrant associations' political transnationalism: forms, scope and intensity

Variable	Values	Frequency	%
Engagement in political transnationalism	Yes	22	91.7
	No	2	8.3
Total		24	100
Forms of political transnationalism[72]	Immigrant politics	6	25.0
	Homeland politics	21	87.5
	Trans-local politics	18	75.0
Total		24	100
Scope of civic projects in country of origin[73]	Local	1	4.5
	Regional	1	4.5
	National	13	59.1
Focus of activity in country of origin[74]	Education/schools	10	45.5
	Health	9	40.9
	Old people/children	5	22.7
	Human rights	2	9.1
	Local development	6	27.3
Frequency of involvement in home country national elections	Never	13	59.1
	Occasionally	3	13.6
	Each national election	6	27.3
Total		22	100
Frequency of involvement in diverse civic projects in home country	Never	6	27.3
	Occasionally	13	59.1
	Yearly	3	13.6
Total		22	100

(Personal elaboration)

As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 5, the causal hypotheses of this study focus on the effects of two types of factors: organisational and contextual. The most important contextual determinants of

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[72] Percentages do not add up to 100 because immigrant association may engage in various forms of political transnationalism.

[73] Percentages do not add up to 100 because immigrant association may be engaged in projects at various levels or might not be engaged in any type of project in home country.

[74] Percentages do not add up to 100 because immigrant association may be engaged in multiple projects in country of origin.

immigrant associations' political transnationalism that have been tested in this thesis are the political opportunity structure in home country and the level of socio-economic development of home country. In order to define and operationalise the concept of political opportunity structure I have integrated social movement literature. In this respect, this thesis offers not only a novel definition of the political opportunity structure in transnational migration research field but also tests an hypothesis that has not been yet examined: as higher the political opportunity structure in home country, the higher the engagement of immigrant associations in political transnationalism. Other studies on immigrant transnationalism focused only on the socio-political context of exit and in the character of involvement of home country governments (policies and programmes initiated by home country governments toward emigrants living abroad) as potential explicative variables for immigrant transnationalism (see R.C. Smith, 2003b; Portes *et al.*, 2007).

What are the main conclusions that can be drawn from testing this hypothesis? The results of the bivariate analysis suggest that there seems to be a statistically significant and positive association between those immigrant associations that engage in homeland politics and the level of political opportunity structure in home country: as higher the political opportunity structure in home country as higher immigrant associations' engagement in homeland politics. Nevertheless, this relationship is not very clear as, at a confidence level of 95%, we can only confirm that those immigrant

associations whose members come from countries with a low level of political opportunity structure have a higher probability for not engaging in homeland politics. There also seems to be a statistically significant and positive association between those associations that perform trans-local politics and the level of political opportunity structure in home country, though at a higher level of significance. However, these results can hardly be generalised because of a small-N sample. More research studies with a higher number of cases would be needed in order to validate these results.

The level of socio-economic development of home country measured through the Human Development Index has not been used as a possible explicative variable in the transnational migration research field. Other variables like urban/rural places of origin have been employed when measuring the variation in immigrant political transnationalism (see Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002; Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 2007). In this sense, my hypothesis is as lower the level of socio-economic development of home country, as higher immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism.

The results of the bivariate analysis show us that there is no association between the level of socio-economic development of home country and immigrant associations' engagement in immigrant politics or homeland politics. Nevertheless, there seem to be a statistically significant and positive association between those immigrant associations that engage in trans-local politics and the

level of socio-economic development of the country of origin. However, at a confidence level of 95%, we can only confirm that those immigrant associations whose members come from countries with a low level of socio-economic development have a higher probability for not engaging in trans-local politics. Accordingly, my initial hypothesis does not seem to be validated by the results, a contrary hypothesis being instead partially confirmed that is as higher the level of socio–economic development in home country, as higher immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism.

In sum, both explicative variables, the level of political opportunity structure in home country and the level of socio-economic development of home country, seem to influence positively immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism. Nevertheless, this influence is much clear when these two variables take the lowest values. In other words, those immigrant associations whose members come from poor countries and with low levels of political opportunity structure are less prone to engage in political transnationalism. Hence, the data analysis seem to indicate that both factors, particularly the level of political opportunity structure in home country, are necessary conditions but not sufficient for immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism. Again, these results have to be cautiously interpreted because of a small-N sample.

The sample of this study presents a high variation in the variable national/ethnic origin of immigrant associations, thing that has determined us to group the countries by continent. When trying to find if there are any patterned differences across different continents of origin in the incidence and forms adopted by immigrant political transnationalism, the findings suggest that there is a spurious relationship between these two variables due to the incidence of the variable political opportunity structure in home country. In other words, the fact that Latin American immigrant associations seem to present a higher level of transnationalism, though the relationship is not statistically significant, has to do more with a higher level of political opportunity structure for emigrants living abroad in these countries. When we have controlled the effect of this independent variable for other factors like the political opportunity structure and the social networks, the effect of this variable remains statistically insignificant.

The results of the bivariate analyses between organisational factors like type of immigrant associations, sources of funds, number of members, year of foundation etc, reveal that the sources of funds seem to be the only factor that explains some variation in the level of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism. In other words, it seems that those associations that receive governmental funds are more prone to engage in political transnationalism. In addition, a more precise analysis of contingency shows us that those associations that receive governmental funds tend to engage particularly in homeland politics

and immigrant politics. Trans-local politics does not seem to be an activity financed through public funds. None of the other organisational factors seem to have an impact on immigrant associations' level of transnational political activism. Nevertheless, these results have to be cautiously interpreted as many of these explicative variables like the type of immigrant associations present very little variation. Subsequent studies with a higher N are needed in order to obtain the maximum variation in all these potentially explicative variables.

What is the effect of social networks on immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism? The results of the bivariate analysis between these two variables suggest that larger social networks seem to increase immigrant associations' chances for engaging in political transnationalism. The scope or the spatial diversification of the immigrant associations' networks does not seem to influence associations' engagement in political transnationalism. Nevertheless, in today's network societies (see Castells, 1996, 2001; Cairncross, 2001) the spatial orientation of social networks does not seem to be so important when the communication in time and space is extremely fluid due to the impact of new communication and information technologies (e-mail, chats, blogs, websites, mobile phones, low cost air flights, etc.). An interesting line of future research might be to examine the effect of these new technologies on immigrant transnationalism.

The results of a multivariate analysis that takes into consideration the most important independent or predictor variables that are, the size of immigrant associations' social networks (organisational), the political opportunity structure in home country (contextual) and the level of socio-economic development of home country (contextual), suggest that the level of political opportunity structure in home country is the variable that accounts more for the variation in the level of immigrant associations' engagement in political transnationalism.

In sum, one of the main findings of this qualitative research study is that immigrant associations in Barcelona do engage in transnational political activism. Accordingly, this study presents more empirical evidence in favour of the existence of a relatively stable and significant transnational field of political action that connects immigrants with their polities of origin a transnational immigrant field. Nevertheless, this transnational political engagement is not generalised among all immigrant associations, presents a relatively low level of regularity, and is generally nationally based.

Another important contribution of this investigation is to emphasise the significant role of the exit context in immigrant associations' engagement in transnational political action. This study demonstrates that we cannot offer a complete explanation of immigrant political transnationalism without taking into account this dimension. The main indicator of the exit context that has been tested in this study is the political opportunity structure in home

country. In this sense, this thesis suggests that concepts that function in other areas of political science, in this case in social movements, to explain the political participation, can contribute to a more complete explanation of immigrants' transnational political engagement. An interesting line of future research might be to construct more holistic explicative models that include variables related with both exit and destination contexts.

Beside the *macro* level of analysis, the *meso* level suggests that two variables, more precisely, the social networks and the sources of funds (governmental funds) are significant when trying to explain the variance in immigrant associations' transnational political engagement. Being politically very well connected (and funded) at the local/national level in destination country seems to increase immigrant associations' probability to undertake transnational political action.

My plan is to replicate the analysis incorporating more cases and new data in order to increase the number of observations. In this sense, beside the *macro* and *meso* levels of analysis, I could also include an individual level (carrying out a survey with the associations' members) in this multilevel approach. At the same time, in order to test the effects of the social networks, I plan to integrate more indicators related with the new communication and information technologies.

I believe that the big challenge in the transnational migration research field is to construct an explicative model that would integrate the three levels of analysis, *individual*, *meso* and *macro* and include also variables related with both exit and destination contexts. On the other side, it would be also necessary to examine the effects of this form of political participation on the institutions and the conceptions of membership in both destination and homeland polities. Only in this way we could confirm the critical or counter-hegemonic nature of immigrant transnationalism.

Appendix A. Population by sex and nationality. City of Barcelona 2005

Nationality by country	Total	Men	Women
Total	1.612.237	766.810	845.427
EUROPE	1.421.981	665.650	756.331
Spain	1.364.146	635.035	729.111
Italy	12.933	7.481	5.452
France	8.274	4.066	4.208
Germany	5.064	2.581	2.483
Romania	4.733	2.436	2.297
The U.K.	4.378	2.549	1.829
Russia	3.390	1.250	2.140
Ukraine	2.492	1.335	1.157
Portugal	2.137	1.170	967
Holland	1.691	990	701
Bulgaria	1.644	936	708
Armenia	1.339	796	543
Georgia	1.146	797	349
Poland	1.026	497	529
Belgium	986	525	461
Sweden	971	442	529
Switzerland	699	352	347
Ireland	574	344	230
Austria	487	241	246
Moldavia	406	203	203
Denmark	383	197	186
Greece	368	191	177
Serbia and Montenegro	362	178	184
Byelorussia	265	116	149
Finland	261	97	164
Andorra	245	123	122
Czech Republic	233	80	153
Norway	221	104	117
Hungary	190	71	119
Albania	177	108	69
Slovakia	143	51	92
Croatia	125	64	61
Lithuania	116	65	51
Island	96	41	55
Bosnia and Herzegovina	72	32	40
Leetonia	56	22	34
Slovenia	46	20	26

Estonia	37	19	18
Macedonia	28	24	4
Luxemburg	19	10	9
Chipre	13	6	7
Malta	5	3	2
San Marino	2	1	1
Liechtenstein	1	1	0
Monaco	1	0	1
AFRICA	21.862	14.651	7.211
Morroco	15.180	9.913	5.267
Algeria	1.945	1.507	438
Nigeria	957	623	334
Guinea	753	364	389
Senegal	613	512	101
Ghana	547	472	75
Camerun	247	137	110
Egipt	223	184	39
Equatorial Guinea	217	64	153
Tunisia	176	145	31
Mali	162	140	22
Gambia	98	85	13
Mauritania	67	49	18
Sierra Leone	65	57	8
Republic of South Africa	65	35	30
Cote d'Ivoire	65	45	20
Angola	59	29	30
Guinea Bissau	49	44	5
Congo	49	34	15
Mozambique	31	18	13
Burkina Faso	31	28	3
Kenia	30	10	20
Cabo Verde	28	12	16
Liberia	26	22	4
Sudan	25	18	7
Libia	20	16	4
Togo	17	9	8
Benin	16	10	6
Tanzania	15	9	6
Ethiopia	13	8	5
Zaire	10	5	5
Niger	10	9	1
Mauricia	7	4	3
Chad	6	4	2
Zimbabwe	5	5	0
Madagascar	5	1	4
Sao Tome and	4	4	0

Principe			
Gabon	4	3	1
Uganda	3	2	1
Ruwanda	3	2	1
Central African Republic	3	2	1
Burundi	3	3	0
Zambia	2	1	1
Somalia	2	2	0
Malawi	2	2	0
Eritrea	2	2	0
Seychelles	1	0	1
Botswana	1	1	0
AMERICA	126.011	57.376	68.635
Ecuador	31.707	14.406	17.301
Peru	15.589	6.915	8.674
Colombia	14.268	6.589	7.679
Argentina	13.043	6.762	6.281
Bolivia	9.928	3.893	6.035
Dominican Republic	7.313	2.782	4.531
Chile	5.616	2.918	2.698
Brasil	5.512	2.378	3.134
Mexico	5.486	2.610	2.876
Venezuela	3.660	1.674	1.986
Uruguay	3.621	1.879	1.742
United States of America	3.158	1.577	1.581
Cuba	2.502	1.193	1.309
Paraguay	1.422	500	922
Honduras	1.236	445	791
El Salvador	750	294	456
Canada	373	176	197
Guatemala	210	99	111
Panama	205	102	103
Costa Rica	178	84	94
Nicaragua	158	59	99
Haiti	28	12	16
Dominica	26	21	5
Jamaica	7	2	5
Trinidad and Tobago	6	1	5
Guyana	3	1	2
Bahamas	2	2	0
Belize	2	2	0
Barbados	1	0	1
Surinam	1	0	1

ASIA	41.984	28.909	13.075
Pakistan	14.741	13.337	1.404
China	10.915	5.886	5.029
Filiphines	6.590	2.933	3.657
India	3.492	2.901	591
Japon	1.693	782	911
Bangladesh	1.551	1.317	234
Israel	476	272	204
Republic of Correa	409	189	220
Syria	329	219	110
Iran	270	164	106
Liban	233	148	85
Turkey	232	131	101
Nepal	212	171	41
Iraq	148	103	45
Jordan	148	114	34
Taiwan	82	31	51
Thailand	78	23	55
Kazakhstan	50	24	26
Azerbaijan	46	18	28
Uzbekistan	43	16	27
Singapore	40	18	22
Indonesia	38	18	20
Malaysia	38	18	20
Vietnam	26	15	11
Afghanistan	18	18	0
Popular Democratic Republic of Correa	16	8	8
Kyrgyz Republic	14	6	8
Saudi Arabia	13	11	2
Mongolia	12	2	10
Sri Lanka	12	7	5
Cambodia	5	2	3
Tajikistan	4	2	2
Turkmenistan	4	1	3
Bahrain	2	2	0
Myanmar	2	2	0
Laos	1	0	1
Maldives	1	0	1
OCEANIA	371	200	171
Australia	311	162	149
New Zeeland	60	38	22
STATELESS	28	24	4

Source: Municipal registration of inhabitants, 30.06.2005. Department of Statistics. Barcelona City Hal.

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Appendix B. Interview guide

I.   Origins, types and structure of immigrant associations.

1. Origins of the association, its members and leaders (national/ethnic origin).

2. Number of members (and occasional members).

3. Types of immigrant associations: civic; hometown committee; social; cultural; etc.

4. Scope of projects in country of origin: local; regional; national.

5. Focus of activity in country of origin: education/schools; health; children/old people (orphanages, retiring houses); human rights; local development (employment/ agriculture/water/electricity/housing/communitarian centre), etc.

6. Frequency of association's involvement in home country national elections (organisation of the external voting process; information on electoral campaigns): never; each national election; occasionally.

6. Frequency of civic events sponsored by the association: never; occasionally; yearly.

8. Monetary funds (per year).

9. Monthly expenses: no expenses; less than 1.000 euros; less than 5.000 euros; 5.000 euros or more.

10. Salaried employees: none; less than 5; less than 10.

11. Sources of funds: members' quotas; governmental institutions; foundations and non-governmental institutions; private companies; churches; association's own cultural activities; etc.

10. Social networks: a) size: b) spatial scope.

II.   Types of transnational political activities and practices of immigrant associations:

1. Homeland politics - political activities and practices of immigrant associations, which belong to domestic, or foreign policy of home country like opposition or support for homeland political regime and its foreign policy goals.

- Voting: Does the association engage in the electoral and voting process in home country? If yes, in which way? (for instance, informative action on the external voting process and electoral campaigns in home country like reunions, conferences, roundtable discussions, website forums or web logs, organisation of the voting process together with the consulate, etc.)

- Contacts with home country political parties or monetary contribution to their electoral campaigns: Does the association maintain contacts with certain political parties in home country? Does it send money to different political parties (periodically or in the campaign period)?

- Informative action on homeland politics (for example, reunions, conferences, roundtable discussions, website forums or bulletins, web logs, etc.): Does the association organise informative or debating activities on national and foreign policy issues of home country? Does the association organise conferences or roundtable discussions with social

and political leaders in home country in order to inform the emigrants living abroad about homeland politics?

- Forms of protest (petitions, lawful demonstrations, boycotts, lobbying, etc.) on particular home country politics such as form of government, certain national or foreign policy measures, etc.: Does the association involve in protest action like lobbying the government of destination country to take a stand against certain political issues in home country? Does it involve in lawful demonstrations in order to prove its disagreement with certain national or foreign policy measures of home country?

- Homeland human rights defence: Does the association take active action (for example, official letters or petitions to international organisations of human rights; lawful demonstrations; disseminating information through leaflets and reunions; etc.) in cases of human rights violations in home country? Does it engage in the defence of external voting rights?

2. Immigrant politics – political activities and practices that immigrant associations undertake to better the socio-economic situation of their national group in destination country and that are supported by home country (home government or diplomatic services in destination country).

- Support for (contact with) particular destination country political party that favours immigrant rights, and this in line

with the politics of home government: Does the association support or maintain contacts with certain political parties from destination country? Is there a general political orientation among association's members?

- Forms of protest in defence of immigrant/human rights (for example, press conferences, petitions, lawful demonstrations, boycotts, lobbying, etc.) with the support of homeland government or consular services abroad: Does the association engage in protest action like lawful demonstrations or lobbying the government of the destination country (with the support of home government/consulate or embassy) in defence of immigrant rights?

- Informative action on immigrant rights (for example, reunions, conferences, roundtable discussions, website forums or web logs) with the support of homeland government or consular services abroad: Does the association organise informative activities like reunions, conferences, etc. in relation to different immigrant issues?

3. Trans-local politics – initiatives from abroad to better the situation in the local community where one originates:

- Giving money (or skill support) to civic projects in home country: Does the association participate in diverse civic projects in home country, and in what areas?

- Humanitarian support in case of natural disasters or situations of extreme poverty/economic necessity: Does the association send money or other supplies in cases of natural disaster in home country?

III.   Intensity of transnational political practices and activities of immigrant associations - the more a transnational political practice is institutionalised and has migrants involved and the more they move around to realise it, the narrower it is understood to be.

1. Broad: more occasional practices linking migrants and places of origins like (occasional) participation in meetings or events (Itzigsohn et al. 1999); includes both regular and occasional activities (Portes, 2003).

2. Narrow (or strict): institutionalised and continuous activities among immigrants like actual membership of parties or hometown associations (Itzigsohn et al. 1999); includes only regular participation (Portes 2003).

Appendix C. Questionnaire on State-led policies toward emigrants living abroad

This is a questionnaire by which we want to recollect information about the political measures that states adopt, many times through their diplomatic services abroad, in order to attract and maintain the loyalty of their citizens living abroad. Please mark the answer with an "X" in the appropriate space or, if you have a different answer, write it down where in the category "others". We guarantee you the total confidentiality of the answers. The time estimated for filling in the questionnaire is of approximately 15 minutes. Thank you very much for your collaboration.

1. Country: ………………………………………………………….

2. Diplomatic service:

   a) Embassy [   ]
   b) Consulate   [   ]

3. Did your government adopt some of these political/institutional reforms to support its emigrants living abroad?

   a) Assistance units in order to deal with emergency situations.
   Yes [   ] NO [   ] DNK/NA [   ]

b) 'Mobile consulates' designed to bring consular services 'to the people' (periodical office hours at churches or other convenient venues).

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

c) Agencies fostering links and mutual understanding between nationals on both sides of the border.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

d) Agencies in charge of state involvement with hometown organisations and with implementing the services that states offer to emigrants.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

e) Extending the tasks of the embassies and consulates: sections in charge of extending protection and legal advice to emigrants; staff persons linked to the agencies in charge of state involvement with hometown organisations, etc.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

f) Cabinet-level office functioning primarily as the government's voice on emigration-related issues.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

g) National Council for National Communities Abroad, located normally under the Secretariat of Foreign Relations.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

h) Office of Diasporic Affairs.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

i) Ministry for Nationals Living Abroad.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

j) Census of the estimated nationals abroad.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

k) Others …………………………………………………

4. Does your government implement some of these measures to motivate the economic potential of its nationals living abroad?

a) Measures to foster the development of hometown and home-state organisations that raise funds for public projects in home country.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

b) Offices for Service to Nationals Abroad within state governments, which handle the matching-fund programmes whereby state officials match remittances sent by emigrants to support public work projects.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

c) Publishing regular reports comparing the exchange and service rates of different agencies and offering higher interest rates for money deposited.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

d) Directing remittances into productive investments while involving local and state governments. Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

e) Mutual Funds for Investment in Emerging Enterprises intended to offer support and investment advice to Nationals abroad who hope to open business at home.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

f) Database of the technical skills of Nationals Abroad.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

g) Conferences organised by consulates or embassies in order to discuss work options in a country for national students in various areas (science and technology).

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

h) Efforts to foster investment in home country by supporting the creation of home-province organisations (supporting fundraising and resource-gathering efforts; offsetting some of the shipping costs).

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

i) Others ……………………………………………….....

5. What type of nationality (or double citizenship) and external voting rights offer your government to its national living in Spain?

    a. Double nationality/citizenship.

       Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

    b. Full dual citizenship.

       Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

    c. Selective, with specific signatories.

       Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

    d. Extension of dual nationality rather than dual citizenship.

       Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

    e. Permitting the vote of emigrants (including those who are naturalised in the receiving country) for state officials as well as run as candidates for

proportional representation seats in the state legislature (mayoral offices in the state or candidate lists for federal deputy).

<div align="center">Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]</div>

f. Emigrants allowed voting from abroad (by mail or through consulates/embassies).

<div align="center">Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]</div>

g. Emigrants having to return to the home country in order to vote.

<div align="center">Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]</div>

h. Others ………………………………………………….

6. Does your government (through its diplomatic services) support some collective action to promote dual citizenship?

a) Conferences organised by emigrant activists or other agencies to promote constitutional reforms allowing dual citizenship.

<div align="center">Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]</div>

b) Pro-Vote Movements for Emigrants Living Abroad (demand of emigrant activists or from other agencies).

<div align="center">Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]</div>

c) Others ……………………………………………………….

7. Does your government (through its diplomatic services) realise some of these state services to promote the education of its nationals living abroad?

a) Programmes that provide literacy training and primary and secondary schooling for adults through its consulates.

Yes [　]　NO [　]　DNK/NA　[　]

b) Sending books and advisers to train educators in receiving countries, in order to obtain high school degrees equivalence from abroad.

Yes [　]　NO [　]　DNK/NA　[　]

c) The Document for Transference of the Emigrant Bi-national Student designed to facilitate a student's passage from one country to the other without having to repeat grades.

Yes [　]　NO [　]　DNK/NA　[　]

d) Pilot programmes offering a condensed version of the high-school equivalence course, so that emigrants could earn a high school degree from abroad.

Yes [　]　NO [　]　DNK/NA　[　]

e) Distributing books to bilingual education programmes in the region.

Yes [　]　NO [　]　DNK/NA　[　]

f) Others ……………………………………………………….

8. Does your government (through its diplomatic services) offers some of these other state services to its emigrates living abroad?

a) Supporting business networks or non-governmental pilot projects designed to promote small business development in the emigrant community.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

b) Revising custom policies such that return migrants can import their belongings, including one car per household, without paying taxes (customs officers at each consulate to help migrants complete the required paperwork before they leave the receiving country).

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

c) Government programmes for return migrants that allow them to buy housing units built and partially financed by the government specifically for returnees (prospective buyers take out mortgages with designated receiving country banks).

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

d) Others …………………………………………………….

9. What type of cultural/symbolic policies does your government adopt to strengthen the feeling of belonging or the cultural identity of its nationals living abroad?

a) Contests to promote an understanding of homeland among second generation (creative-writing contests among second-generation immigrants to begin compiling a literature of the diaspora).

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

b) Cultural festivals.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

c) Sporting events in communities overseas.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

d) Allocating funds to establish cultural houses in areas with sizeable emigrant populations.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

e) Promotion of hometown organizations and efforts to encourage remittances.

Yes [ ] NO [ ] DNK/NA [ ]

f) Others …………………………………………………….

Contact person and telephone number:

Appendix D. Sample of immigrant associations

A. Countries with high level of socio-economic development and high, medium and low political opportunity structures: a) Argentina; b) Uruguay; c) Republic of Panama.

1. *Casa Retruco Solidaridad con Argentina* – interviewed

Address: C/Vistalegre 15, 08001 Barcelona
E-mail: mtdveronbarcelona@yahoo.es
Website: no
Focus of interest: immigration and ethnic minorities
Contact person: member of the association
Interview: 20.05.2008. Casa de la Solidaridad.

2. *Casal Argentí a Barcelona* – not interviewed

Address: C/Àusias Marc 161, Bajos/Izquierda, 08013 Barcelona
E-mail: info@casalargentino.org; presidente@casalargentino.org
Website: www.casalargentino.org
Contact person: president of the association

Note: We contacted various times with the president of the association who asked for an interviewing offer by e-mail. In the end, he accepted to be interviewed but only for a payment of 25 euros. As the participation in the research is voluntarily for

everybody, we did not accept his request because a material incentive could biased the results.

3. *Red Solidaria Argentina en Barcelona* – interviewed

Address: C/Nou de Sant Francesc 15, 08002 Barcelona
E-mail: redsolidariabcn@yahoo.es
Website: www.redsolidariabarcelona.org
Contact person: president of the association
Interview: 17.06.2006, association's venue.

4. *Grupo de Apoyo a la Central de Trabajadores Argentinos* – interviewed

Address: C/Vistalegre 15, 08001 Barcelona
E-mail: ctabarcelona@argentina.com
Website: no
Contact person: president of the association
Interview: 20.06.2006, president's home place.

5. *Unión de Argentinos en Cataluña* – not interviewed

Address: C/Sant Salvador 96, Baixos, 08024 Barcelona
E-mail: unarca@yahoo.com.ar
Website: www.uniondeargentinosencatalunya.com

Note: We could not establish any contact with it. The telephone number and the e-mail do not function and the association does not figure at the indicated direction. Various neighbors could not tell us anything about this association.

6. *Asociación de Uruguayos en Cataluña* (AUC) – interviewed

Address: C/Olzinelles 30, Baixos, 08014 Barcelona
E-mail: auc@uruguayosencatalunya.com
Website: www.uruguayosencatalunya.com
Chat: aurucat@hotmail.com
Contact person: president of the association
Interview: 07.06.2006, association's venue.

7. *Casa/Amigos de Uruguay* – interviewed

Address: C/Major 93, Baix 3º, 08860 Castelldefels, Barcelona
Contact person: president of the association
E-mail: no
Website: no
Interview: 19.06.2006, a bar-terrace.

8. *Casa Charrua Uruguay* – interviewed

Address: Av. 301, No.24, A 3º-2º, 08860 Castelldefels, Barcelona
E-mail: info@casacharrua.org
Website: www.casacharrua.org

Contact person: president of the association

Interview: 08.06.2006, president's workplace

9. *Asociación Panama Cataluña* – interviewed

Address: C/ Concilio de Trento 13, 8e 3a. Esc.5, 08018 Barcelona

E-mail: nieves.martos@coac.net

Website: no

Contact person: president of the association

Interview: 22.06.2006, president's workplace.

B. Countries with moderate socio-economic development and high, medium and low political opportunity structures: a) Peru; (Colombia) b) Ecuador; Morocco; c) Equatorial Guinea; Pakistan.

10. *Asociación Solidaria con las Mujeres Peruanas en el Extranjero* (ASOMIPEX) – not interviewed

Address: C/ Casp 38, pral., 08018 Barcelona

E-mail: no

Website: no

Note: No contact data, except the address. The association used to gather at the venue of the association Ca la Dona, but after a while it did not show up anymore.

11. *Associació Cultural Alma Peruana* – interviewed

Address: C/ Olzinelles 30, Baixos, 08014 Barcelona

E-mail: alma_peruana@hotmail.com

Blog: http://asocfolc.iespana.es/peru.htm.

Website: no

Contact person: president of the association

Interview: 13.06.2006, association's venue.

12. *Asociación Peruanos sin Fronteras* – interviewed

Address: C/ Viladomat 51, 4º, E-3, 08015 Barcelona

E-mail: no

Website: www.radiolibertadmundo.com (Internet direction of the radio programme La Voz del Inmigrante)

Contact person: president of the association

Interview: 17.06.2006, a café-bar closed to the president's workplace

13. *Centro Peruano de Barcelona* (CPB) – interviewed

Address: Av. Diagonal 441, 5E, 08036 Barcelona

E-mail: centroperuanobcn@gmail.com

Website: www.terra.es/personal/cperubcn

Contact person: president of the association

Interview: 7.06.2006, association's venue.

14. *Peru Alternativa* – not interviewed

Address: C/Vistalegre 15, 08001 Barcelona
E-mail: no
Website: no

Note: We could not establish any contact with the association. The other Peruvian associations interviewed told us that this association does not exist anymore. The same answer we received from the coordinator of the association Casa de la Solidaridad where this immigrant association figures as a member.

15. *Associació Catalano-Equatoriana per a la Integració i el Desenvolupament* - interviewed

Address: Av. Meridiana 129, 1r 2a, 08026 Barcelona
E-mail: no
Website: no
Contact person: president of the association
Interview: 14.06.2006, president's home place.

16. *Associació d'Equatorians a Catalunya* – interviewed

Address: C/Antonio Machado 24, Barcelona
E-mail: oso_em_cota_bcn@hotmail.com (delivery failure)
Website: no
Contact person: president of the association

Interview: 29.06. 2006, association's venue.

17. *Asociación Catalana Ecuatoriana de Mujeres Intercambio Cultural* – not interviewed

Address: C/Reina Cristina 8, 3r 1a, 08003 Barcelona
E-mail: no
Website: no

Note: The official presentation letter was returned and the telephone numbers do not function. Other Ecuadorian associations told us that this association does not exist anymore.

18. *Asociacion Immigrantes Ecuatorianos Solidaridad y Cooperación Ecuador Llactacaru* - interviewed

Address: C/Vistalegre 15, 08001 Barcelona
E-mail: llactacaru@llacta.org / ecuador-llactacaru@llacta.org
Website: www.llacta.org/organiz/llactacaru
Contact person: president of the association
Interview: 16.06.2006, association's venue.

19. *Associació Amical d'Emigrants Marroquins a Catalunya* – not interviewed

Address: C/Jerosalem 32, 1°-2°; C/Tallers 55, 08001 Barcelona
E-mail: no

Website: no

Contact person: former member of the association

Note: The official presentation letter was returned. We spoke with a former member of the association who did not know if the association still exist or not.

20. *Associació de Treballadors i Immigrants Marroquins a Cataluña* (ATIME-Catalunya) – interviewed

Address: C/Blasco de Garay, 26, local 1, 08004 Barcelona
E-mail: atimecat@atime.es
Website: www.atime.es / http://webs.ono.com/egviel/index.htm
Contact person: president of the association
Interview: 17.05.2006, association's venue.

21. *Associació sociocultural NAHDA del Colectivo Marroquí en Catalunya* – not interviewed

Address: C/Basses de Sant Pere 1, 08003 Barcelona
E-mail: no
Website: no
Note: We could not establish any contact with it. The telephone number does not function and the association does not figure at the indicated direction.

22. *Associació Cultural Dar El Farah* – not interviewed

Address: C/Mestre Serrano 15, BX, 08906 L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, Barcelona
E-mail: jeanbosco.botsho@campus.uab.es
Website: no
Focus of interest: no
Contact person: member of the association

Note: After various failed attempts, we could get in contact with the former president who told us that this association does not exist anymore.

23. *Asociación de Amigos del Pueblo Marroquí Itran* – interviewed

Address: C/De Casanova, 175 baixos, 08036 Barcelona
E-mail: itran_marruecos@yahoo.com
Website: no
Contact person: secretary of the association and president of the association
Interview: 23.06.2006, a café-bar.

24. *Associació d'Estudiants Marroquins* – not interviewed

Address: C/Nonell 8, 2n 3a, 08290 Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelona

E-mail: fati-fleur1@caramail.com

Website: no

Contact person: former president of the association

Note: We contacted with the former president who told us that the association does not function since two years ago.

25. *Associació Unió Marroquina-Catalana d'Educació i Cultura* – not interviewed

Address: C/Santa Coloma 82, 08913 Badalona, Barcelona

E-mail: assocuniomarroquina@badalona.lamalla.net

Website: no

Note: We could not establish any contact with them. The telephone number and the e-mail do not function.

26. *Associació Socio-Cultural Riebapua Comunidad Bubi de Guinea Equatorial* – not interviewed

Address: C/Pere Verges 1, 08020 Barcelona

E-mail: riebapua@eresmas.com

Website: www.terra.es/personal8/icparras

Focus of interest: culture and art; immigration and ethnic minorities

Contact person: president of the association

Note: We phoned the president several times but he refused to accept the interview.

27. *Associació d'Estudiants i Joves de Guinea Equatorial* – not interviewed

Address: C/Assaonadors 26, Baixos, 08003 Barcelona
E-mail: aejgecat@aejge.org / info@aejge.org / aejgecat@terra.es
Website: http://www.aejge.or
Contact person: coordinator of the association

Note: We could not establish any contact with it. The telephone number does not function and they do not respond at any e-mail. A neighbour told us that this association does not exist anymore.

28. *Asociación de Mujeres E'Waiso Ipola* (Guinea Ecuatorial) – not interviewed

Address: C/Casp 38, pral., 08010 Barcelona
E-mail: caladona@pangea.org
Website: no
Contact person: president of the association

Note: We contacted various times with the president of the association but she refused categorically to be interviewed.

29. *Asociación Cultural Viyil* (Guinea Ecuatorial) – not interviewed

Address: C/Sant Climent 5, 4rt 2a, 08001 Barcelona

E-mail: no

Website: no

Contact person: member of the association

Note: We could not establish any contact with it. The telephone number does not function. A neighbour told us that this association does not exist anymore.

30. *Associació Cultural Rhombe* (Comunidad Ndowe de Guinea Ecuatorial) – interviewed

Address: C/Comte d'Urgell 251, 6è 1a, 08036 Barcelona

E-mail: no

Website: no

Contact person: member of the association

Interview: 15.06.2006, member's home place.

31. *Associació de Treballadors Pakistanesos a Catalunya* (ATPC) – interviewed

Address: C/Robadors 11, 08002 Barcelona

E-mail: atp20042@hotmail.com

Website: no

Person of contact: president of the association and secretary of the association

Interview: 26.05.2006, association's venue.

32. *Associació Cultural Idara Minhach Al Quoran* (Pakistan) – interviewed

Address: C/Arc del Teatre 19, Baixos, 08001 Barcelona
E-mail: no
Website: no
Contact person: president of the association
Interview: 06.06.2006, a café-bar close to the association's venue

33. *Federació Associacions Pakistaneses Catalunya* (FAPC) – interviewed

Address: C/Tiradors 9, Bajos, Barcelona
E-mail: alshi@hotmail.com
Website: no
Contact person: president of the association
Interview: 20.06.2006, association's venue.

34. *Associació Cultural Educativa i Social Operativa Dones Pakistaneses* (ACESOP) – interviewed

Address: C/Rambla 116, Prl./1ª , Barcelona
E-mail: acesop786@yahoo.es
Website: no
Contact person: president of the association

Interview: 31.05.2006, a café-bar close to the president's workplace.

C. Countries with low socio-economic development and high, medium and low political opportunity structures: a) Senegal; b) Nigeria; c) Cameroon.

35. *Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos* (ACRS) – interviewed

Address: C/Comerç 42, Baixos, 08003 Barcelona
E-mail: associaciosenegal@yahoo.es   /
associaciosenegalesos@yahoo.es
Website: no
Contact person: secretary of the association
Interview: 01.02.2006, a Senegalese restaurant.

36. *Associació Diakha Mandina* (Senegal) – not interviewed

Address: C/Argimon 8, 08032 Barcelona
E-mail: no
Website: no
Contact person: member of the association
Note: We could not establish any contact with it. The association does not figure at the indicated direction.

37. *Associació de Residents Senegalesos del Vallès Occidental* – not interviewed

Address: C/Comerc 42, Baixos, 08003 Barcelona
E-mail: abocarsam@yahoo.es
Website: no
Contact person: member of the association

Note: This association is a branch of the Associació Catalana de Residents Senegalesos, It does not function separately.

38. *Associacio Nigeriana de Catalunya* – interviewed

Address: C/Ginebra 32-36, Baixos, 08003 Barcelona
E-mail: interbizarrakis@hotmail.com
Website: no
Contact person: interim president
Interview: 27.06.2006, association's venue.

39. *Comunidad Igbo de Nigerianos en Catalunya* – not interviewed

Address: C/Mallorca 425-433, 5 e, 08014 Barcelona
E-mail: iyiama@yahoo.com
Website: no

Note: We could not establish any contact with it. The e-mail direction does not function. A neighbour told us that this association does not exist anymore.

40. *Associació Cultural Adna Bassa* (Camerún) – interviewed

Address: C/Apartat de Correus 451, 08080 Barcelona
E-mail: yamakouba@yahoo.es; kodog5@celoma.net
Website: no
Contact person: president of the association
Interview: 5.02.2008, president's home place.

41. *Agrupació Camerunés Residents a Barcelona* – interviewed

Address: C/Rambla Catalunya 11, 2n 2a, 08007 Barcelona
E-mail: no
Website: no
Contact person: president of the association
Interview: 30.05.2006, a café- bar terrace in front of the president's home place.

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