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## **DOCTORAL THESIS**

Title                   MANAGING INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS:  
LEADERSHIP, PARADOX, AND POWER—Cases from  
the U.S. immigration sector

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# **MANAGING INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS: LEADERSHIP, PARADOX, AND POWER**

Cases from the U.S. immigration sector

by

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## **Abstract**

This empirical qualitative study—of four interorganizational nonprofit networks promoting immigrant rights in the U.S.—contributes to the interorganizational network management literature by focusing on the management of two inherent paradoxical tensions: unity/diversity and cooperation/confrontation. Four leadership activities—activating, facilitating, framing, and capacitating—are found to generate unity and maintain diversity. Unity and diversity, together, build the networks’ power: conceptualized as “power to” and as four power bases, namely, knowledge, financial resources, legitimacy, and access. In turn, the networks’ power together with two other leadership activities—strategizing and mobilizing—is found to be used by the immigration nonprofit networks to both cooperate and confront with powerful state actors. By using paradoxical tensions inherent to networks as its focus, this research further develops both the network leadership and network power literatures, and also aims at providing reflexive practitioners with a guiding conceptual framework.

*Para la Mama*

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My family gave me a solid base from which to start this journey and was later a source of vital comfort during deep troughs which made everything seem purposeless.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

*I think that there's power in that we're able to bring such a diverse group together. It's hard, it's really hard.*

A program officer at one of the interorganizational immigrant networks.

### **DIFFICULT TO MANAGE, POPULAR, AND UNDERSTUDIED**

Interorganizational networks are difficult to manage, as the above quote indicates. It is well known that managing interorganizational networks is an inherently difficult task and by no means an easy option (Human and Provan 2000). Scholars of business alliances estimate that more than 50% of alliances fail (Kelly, Schaan, and Jonacas 2002; Park and Ungson 2001). Failure rates are not available regarding public or nonprofit networks, but Huxham and Vangen (2000b) have identified how collaboration often succumbs to what they term as collaborative inertia. Networks are difficult to manage because they are complex. Scholars suggest that failures and the difficulty in managing interorganizational sets arise due to managerial complexity (Park and Ungson 2001), and the complex, dynamic, and ambiguous nature of collaborations (Huxham 2003).

Although they are inherently difficult to manage, networks are popular mechanisms of interorganizational governance. This popularity can be attributed to today's complex world, which demands an organizational form of individuation and dispersed power but also unification (Agranoff McGuire 2001, Mendoza 1991). Moreover, problems are nowadays "wicked" (Rittel and Webber 1973). Not only do they require complex solutions, but problems themselves are ill-defined, generating ambiguous situations (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Thoret 1976)

However, despite the rising popularity of networks and their inherent challenges, network management and leadership is an understudied field (Ebers 1997; Ebers and Jarrillo 1997; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994)—in particular, public and nonprofit network management (Isett and Provan 2006). This lack of research is even more surprising when considering that interorganizational networks fail due to poor management (Meyer 1999) and that leadership is a central factor for network success (Bardach 1998). That interorganizational network management demands more research requires little justification: interorganizational network management is in search of its paradigm (Agranoff and McGuire 2001), and until it develops one, network management will continue to have its short-comings, and hence networks will continue to fail.

### **UNPACKING THE DIFFICULTIES**

This research wants to contribute to the network management literature, and in particular to the network leadership literature. It does so by exploring the difficulties in network management. More specifically, it focuses on the inherent paradoxical nature of networks and how this affects network management. As Bouchikhi (1998) states, management research is not about negating paradoxical tensions, but asking questions about how tensions are managed. In this dissertation I look at how networks manage inherent tensions.

Networks fail and are difficult to manage because of their complexity.

The difficulties in network management are due to inherent paradoxes implied by networks, in particular the need to be simultaneously united and diverse. Based on the

claim that managing in collaborative contexts requires addressing inherent paradoxes that emerge from the complex collaborative nature itself (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Huxham 2003), this project's research topic is *the inherent paradoxes in network management*. The main research question is: *how is paradox managed in successful networks?*

The network management literature in general implicitly points towards paradox—on a duality of coexisting contradictory goals, and or processes—and suggests that the management of paradoxes has an impact on the network's success. More explicitly, Ospina and I identified, in previous research, two paradoxes: the paradoxical tension of unity and diversity regarding the internal management of the network, and the paradoxical engagement of the network with external actors with whom the networks combine confrontation and cooperation (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005).

Yet, inter-organizational network and collaboration theorists have ignored paradoxes. I believe that a focus on paradox offers great potential for developing theory and knowledge in the organizational studies field and can help scholars understand the nature of networks and their management. I also believe this research contributes directly to practitioners by providing some useful concepts that do not obviate the complexity but that serve as guiding frameworks.

I have set out to empirically explore paradox in networks to unpack network leadership. My research focuses on paradox in four interorganizational networks in the U.S.

immigration sector. More specifically it focuses on how these networks' manage contradictory goals and or processes. The networks are collective action interorganizational networks dedicated to advance the rights of immigrants. The networks are all formalized, all have a central coordinating unit, and carry out joint advocacy activities. The networks are: New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC), Coalition for Asian, African, European, Latin Immigrants of Illinois (CAAELII), National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), CAUSA – Oregon's Immigrant Rights Coalition.<sup>1</sup>

## **CONTRIBUTIONS**

This dissertation builds on and unites two strands of literature dealing with collaboration and network management that so far have walked separate lines. These are the public network management (Agranoff and McGuire 2001) and collaborative advantage theory (Huxham and Vangen 2005). By unpacking two tensions, unity/diversity and cooperation/confrontation, and by understanding how they are managed, I propose a network leadership model. The model describes how the coordinating units of the networks manage these two paradoxes.


Figure I illustrates a simplified version of the model I propose. What I have found is that the network's coordinating units sustain unity and diversity in the network by executing four leadership activities (activating, framing, facilitating, and capacitating). Having a united yet diverse network increases the overall power of the network. The coordinating

---

<sup>1</sup> Note how three out of the four networks call themselves "coalitions." Throughout the study, following Agranoff and McGuire (2001, 2003), I use the term network to refer to these interorganizational sets.

unit then uses the power of the network to execute two more leadership activities (strategizing and mobilizing), which allow the coordinating unit to manage the network's cooperation or confrontation with an external actor.

**Figure I. Simplified network management model**



By uniquely combining previously identified leadership activities with new power and leadership constructs, the study provides an explanation as to how the coordinating units manage the network. This study also finds some differences between the networks depending on their size, governmental target, culture, and geographic dispersion.

## **OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION**

Chapters 2 and 3 are theoretical chapters. In Chapter 2 I clarify my definition of interorganizational network and situate this study in relation to previous research on interorganizational networks. The last part of the chapter justifies this dissertation's topic and primary research question: *how is paradox managed in successful networks?* In Chapter 3 I review the literature on the unity/diversity and the confrontation/cooperation paradoxes. I also review the network leadership activities prescribed by collaboration theory, policy network theory, and public network management theory. Last, I construct a power framework consisting of various dimensions.



The next two chapters are methodological. For the first part of Chapter 4, I describe the research's design, including topic, claim, main question, secondary questions, propositions, units and levels of analysis, the approach, the sampling and data collection, and the data analysis. In Chapter 5 I present a historical summary of immigration in the U.S. and describe the four cases according to their mission, activities, origins, and structural characteristics.

In chapters 6, 7, and 8 I analyze my data and start building my conclusions. Chapter 6 shows how the internal paradox was present in all four networks, and in Chapter 7 I describe the leadership activities involved in managing the internal paradox of the network and why this paradox must be sustained. In Chapter 8 I show how the cooperation/confrontation paradox is present in all four networks. Then, I look at how it is managed: which activities and power resources are used to manage the cooperation and confrontation paradox and how it contributes to the network's effectiveness.

The study ends with Chapter 9 summarizing the findings and answering the general research question. I then outline the research's more general contributions and conclude discussing the research's limitations and proposing future research.

## **2. INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS: DEFINITIONS, APPROACHES, AND EARLY FINDINGS**

*En un planeta que se mundializa por momentos, la política tiende a ser cada vez más, y de forma más apasionada y consciente, local.*

Zygmunt Bauman. "Confianza y temor en la ciudad."

The first part of this chapter clarifies what I mean by interorganizational network and characterizes my object of study by mapping it with respect to an interorganizational network typology. The second part of the chapter situates this study in relation to the rest of the research on interorganizational networks. The last part summarizes the exploratory study and the empirical basis of this dissertation's topic and primary research question.

### **DEFINING THE OBJECT OF STUDY: INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS**

Prior to any study on networks, it is imperative to define specifically what is meant by the term *network*, given people's huge proclivity to use that word in all aspects of academic discourse as well as in life. Organization studies use *network* to refer to both an analytic perspective and a logic of organizing (Knight 2005; Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994; Wellman 1988).

*Network* as an analytic perspective emphasizes the relational aspects of actors, and uses the term as a metaphor for conceptualizing and understanding social reality (Dowding 1995). This use of the term is exemplified by—but not limited to—the social network analysis methodology and supports the idea that actors may be best conceptualized as

embedded in a network of social relations (Granovetter 1992). This use of the term has been applied to all kinds of actors—individuals, organizations, and groups of either.

As a logic of organizing, networks have been contrasted to traditional forms of markets and hierarchies (Powell 1990). These latter two forms have been the main conflicting images of governance modes (Williamson 1975)—the means to govern the relationships between the different organizations (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). The market governs relationships automatically; the hierarchy does so by authority.

The three governance modes—markets, hierarchies, and networks—may be roughly characterised by governance through competition, direct governance, and governance through cooperation (Hewitt 2000), or as markets, bureaucracies, and clans (Ouchi 1980). In this study, I use *network* as a concrete interorganizational governance mode.

### **Markets, hierarchies, and networks**

The market has a first stage that consists of a competitive interaction between actors (buyers and sellers, in general terms) who bargain over opportunities over exchange of resources. In the second stage, actors agree over the bargaining and exchange the agreed resources (Ebers 1997). The market governance mode relies on contracts and property rights to function, and its principal means of communication is price. The resolution mechanism of conflicts between organizations in this mode is to resort to legal courts, and the commitment between parties tends to be low. Organizations are assumed to be totally independent actors (Powell 1990).

In contrast, interorganizational relationships in hierarchical governance modes are based on employment relationships, and the main communicative means is routine. The conflict resolution mechanism used is administrative fiat (i.e. orders given by those holding authority), and the commitment among parties tends to be medium or high. With hierarchical governance modes, organizations are clearly dependent on each other (Powell 1990).

The third interorganizational mode, the network, is often thought of as a flat organizational form, which implies the idea of relations based on kin, friendship, or gender and on those of loyalty and cooperation (Frances, Levacic, Mitchell, and Thompson 1991). Using his own key features to describe hierarchies and markets, Powell (1990) describes networks as governance modes that use reciprocity and reputation as their main conflict resolution mechanism. The means of communication between organizations is relational, and the commitment between parties is medium-high. The network mode implies complementarity and mutual adjustment between organizations which are interdependent (Powell 1990). The table below summarizes the characteristics of the three governance modes.

The definitions regarding the different governance modes presented above by Powell refer to ideal-typical modes. Different governance modes do in fact simultaneously govern the relationships among a given set of organizations (Grandori and Soda 1995; Kickert and Koppenjan 1997; Marsh 1998; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Thompson et

al., 1991; Ysa 2004). Three organizations may in fact relate to each other primarily through a network governance mode such as via mutual adjustment, with high interdependencies, relational interaction as the main communication channels, and all actors having high commitment among themselves; these organizations' interrelationships also may include features characteristic of other governance modes, such as incorporating contracts into the relationships and delegating authority to one of the parties.

<b>Table I. Summarised comparison among different interorganizational governance modes</b>			
Key Features	Market	Hierarchy	Network
Normative basis	Contracts and property rights	Employment relationships	Complementarity and mutual adjustment
Means of communication	Prices	Routines	Relational
Conflict resolution mechanisms	Resort to courts	Administrative fiat	Reciprocity and reputation
Commitment among organizations	Low	Medium – high	Medium – high
Dependence between organizations	Independent	Dependent	Interdependent
Based on Powell (1990)			

### **Different network definitions**

Despite the fact that the work by Powell (1990) has been a cornerstone of the interorganizational network literature, a high variety of definitions of what a network is do exist. Not only do these differences appear among different bodies of literature, such as alliance literature, public-private partnership literature, or policy network literature, but substantial terminological differences are found within a given body of literature. However, the literature seems to share some common characteristics for defining networks. First, networks are composed of organizations with independent decision-making, in the sense that the different organizations do not have a common ownership (Bruijn and Heuvelhof 1997; Ebers 1997; Jarrillo 1993; Esman 1991; Gomes-Casseres,

1994; Grandori and Soda 1995; Kickert, Klijn and Koopenjan 1997a; Kickert and Koppenjan 1997; Marsh 1998; Mohr and Spekman 1996; Park 1996; Powell 1990;). Second, a network relies primarily on negotiation and mutual adjustment (Ebers 1997; Gomes-Casseres 1994; Grandori and Soda 1995; Jarrillo 1993; Kickert, Klijn and Koopenjan 1997a; Park 1996; Marsh 1998). Third, the interaction between network members is repetitive, where organizations hold stable and continual relationships among themselves (Ebers 1997; Kickert and Koppenjan 1997). Last, networks are composed by actors who are resource interdependent (Bruijn and Heuvelhof 1997; Kickert, Klijn and Koopenjan 1997; Kickert and Koppenjan 1997; Powell 1991).

Therefore, the definition of interorganizational network I use in this work is: *a set of interdependent organizations, with independent decision-making mechanisms, who negotiate and mutually adjust to each other, where relationships between organizations are continual.*

### **Different types of interorganizational networks**

Although we have identified some basic commonly shared attributes of interorganizational networks, there still are major differences between different network types (Agranoff 2003a; Grandori and Soda 1995). From a public and nonprofit perspective, some networks may be policy-adjusting engines (Agranoff 2003b; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997b), while others may be implementing policy. Some may try to achieve common aims, while others may not. Some may be formalized into specific structures, whereas others may be informal. While defining the type of network studied is an essential task in order to determine the generalizability of the findings, a commonly

accepted typology of interorganizational arrangements is painfully lacking in the literature<sup>2</sup>.

Networks may vary according to the function or content of the relations between actors—the building blocks of networks—and according to the form of those relations (Grandori and Soda 1995; Knoke and Kuklinski 1991)<sup>3</sup>. The content of the relations is determined by the type of interaction between actors. Actors may coordinate, cooperate, or collaborate. Coordinating organizations simply take into account other actors, cooperating organizations interact only to achieve their own mission, and collaborating organizations work together to achieve a meta-mission unreachable by acting individually (Huxham and Macdonald 1992)<sup>4</sup>.

In a parallel manner, networks may be based on informal and interpersonal relations or formal and role relations (Grandori and Soda 1995; Knoke and Kuklinski 1991; Ring and Van de Ven 1994) and may be more or less centralized (Grandori and Soda 1995)<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> From different disciplines and perspectives some authors have proposed different typologies. For example, Brinkerhoff (2002) proposes a typology based on identity and dependence, Austin (2000) on level of engagement, complexity, and interaction among others, Schopler (1994) on group origin and task structure, and Keast, Mandell, Brown, and Wookock (2004) on formality and intensity of interaction. Laumann, Galaskiewicz, Marsden (1978) distinguish between competitive, mandated cooperative, and contingent cooperative relations, and Alter and Hage (1993) between symbiotic and competitive collaboration. See Borzel (1998) for an excellent review of proposed policy network typologies. Also, see Mingus (2001) for an interesting comparison between different network research models (issue, policy, intergovernmental, public, and intergovernmental networks).

<sup>3</sup> See 6, Goodwin, Peck, and Freeman (2006) for typologies drawn along other dimensions such as function, institution, and node. However, these alternative typologies overlap with the described above.

<sup>4</sup> There are many other typologies of relational contents.


<sup>5</sup> According to Grandori and Soda (1995), social networks involve personal relations between actors, informal governance mechanisms and no common governance unit. Bureaucratic networks involve both role and personal relationships between actors and informal and formal governance mechanisms. Finally, proprietary networks, are bureaucratic networks but include a common governance unit.

Combining both aspects of form and content, Agranoff (2003b) builds on Alter and Hage's (1993) population-ecology grounded typology composed of exchange, concerted action, and joint production—or limited, moderate, and broad cooperation. Agranoff (2003b) distinguishes at one end networks that only exchange information, which he calls Informational Networks, and at the other end Action Networks, which are interagency adjustments that formally adopt collaborative courses of action. In between, his typology differentiates among those networks that deal with information exchange combined with education and member service, known as Developmental Networks, and Outreach Networks, which exchange information, sequence programming, exchange resource opportunities, and pool client contacts. The four types of networks—Informational, Developmental, Outreach, and Action—deal incrementally with exchange, capacity, strategy, and decision (Agranoff 2003b), as well as incrementally formalizing and centralizing their functioning.

As we will see, the network type this study refers to is Action Networks—see Figure II—where organizations have a formal centralized coordinating unit (or what Human and Provan [2000] call network administrative organization, NAO), and sometimes but not always adopt common collaborative courses of action, in particular regarding policy advocacy.



Figure II. Network type to which this study refers to (source: own, based on Agranoff [2003b] and Huxham and Macdonald [1992])



### SUBFIELDS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK RESEARCH

Faulkner and De Rond (2000) divide research on interorganizational networks into formation and structure, process, and management<sup>6</sup>. I suggest a fourth area of study which has recently emerged and is rapidly gaining attention: network performance (Gulati 1998; Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006). Research so far has tended to concentrate on network formation and structures (Ebers 1997; Ebers and Jarrillo 1997; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). In fact, most theories coming from the economic discipline—such as strategic management (market power) theory, transaction cost, resource-based view, agency theory, and game theory—are best suited to explain network

<sup>6</sup> Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston (2006) propose an interesting alternative contextualizing network research combining both temporal and topical research.

formation and static network configurations (Faulkner and De Rond 2000)<sup>7</sup>. Similarly, theories grounded in political science, such as resource-dependence theory, and public choice and rational choice, are more suited to explain structural configurations and strategic moves rather than process aspects of network collaboration. Theories approaching interorganizational networks rooted in organization studies are in general more behavior-friendly. In this sense, the interorganizational relations field has been one of the most relevant predecessors of present-day interorganizational network management (Benson 1975; Levine and White 1961; Whetten 1981). Organizational learning has also contributed to our understanding of network management (see for example Doz [1996]), as has the structurationist perspective, which is the basis of the renowned work of Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997c). Network theory, on the other hand, is quite dynamically oriented, but best suited to explain variance rather than process (Kenis and Oerlemans 2004).<sup>8</sup>

Given both the still growing stage in which research on network management finds itself and the complexity inherent to networks, in this study I will be drawing on several theories (Agranoff 2004). I will draw from public network management (Agranoff and McGuire 2003), inter-governmental relations (Agranoff and McGuire 1999), public private partnerships (PPPs; European Commission 2003; Vernis 2000; Ysa 2004), and

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<sup>7</sup> An exception is Zeng and Chen's (2003) social dilemma (public good game) approach to partnership management. However, even then the prescriptions are focused on enhancing collaboration between partners rather than managing the process of collaborating.


<sup>8</sup> Variance research focuses on how independent variables causally affect dependent variables through time (Van de Ven 1992), while process research looks at how, and why, the network actually evolves from 't1' to 't2' (Kenis and Oerlemans 2004).

policy networks (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997b) grounded mainly in political science—but also in economics and sociology (O’Toole 1997). From within organization studies, another source is the collaboration management literature (Gray 1985, Huxham and Vangen 2005). Also, I will draw on the classic interorganizational field (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Whetten 1981), and the business alliance (Doz 1996) and business network literature (Ebers 1997; Gulati 1998), which have drawn from resource-based view (and the closely related organizational learning), strategic management, transaction-cost economics, game theory, and social network analysis. Notwithstanding that partners in business alliances, unlike many nonprofit and public networks, do not come together to solve a common issue or problem, but rather join together to achieve their own missions (Mandell 2001); the business literature, greater in quantity to the nonprofit and public management, may prove to contribute special hindsight in this research. The figure below maps the four midrange research fields I am mainly drawing from and how these in turn are related approximately to more general theories in economics, sociology and organizations studies, and political sciences. The figure is approximate and must be interpreted as such. Theories and midrange fields below are not discrete nor impermeable, and even within them different streams exist<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> As an example, within the policy networks different approaches exist. See Marsh and Smith (2000) and the subsequent debate in Political Studies (Dowding 2001; Marsh and Smith 2001; Raab 2001).

Figure III. Theories and research subfields on which this study draws on (source: own)<sup>10</sup>



Focusing on the management of the network, my research addresses two major research priorities simultaneously (O'Toole 1997): focus on network management and empirically focusing on the network as unit of analysis. Despite my principal focus on network management, given the interrelatedness of the four different areas of study a brief review of network structure and formation, performance, and process follows.

<sup>10</sup> 6 et al (2006) interestingly divide theoretical approaches to networks into two groups: those that see systems as resources (such as Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory, Resource Dependence Theory, Exchange Theory, Behavioural Theory) and those that emphasize meaning: Institutional Theory, Organizational Culture, Reflective Practitioners, and Organizational Learning.

### **Network rationale: formation and structure**

At present, more is known regarding the factors influencing the emergence of networks than regarding the other three areas of network study (Das and Teng 2002; Ebers 1997; Oliver and Ebers 1998). Research, using many of the above theories, has sought explanations for network formation and structure at an actor level, at the level of pre-existing actor relationships, and at the institutional level (Ebers 1997). Research at the first of these levels, the actor level, has concentrated mostly on how motivations of actors lead them to network formation, while the other two levels have been more concerned with contingent factors motivating network emergence.

Actors may form or join a network to increase efficiency and effectiveness (Ariño and de la Torre 1998; Doz 1996; Ebers and Grandori 1997; Jarrillo 1993; Kanter 1994; Oliver 1990; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). Businesses—and perhaps nonprofits and public organizations in some cases—may increase their efficiency and effectiveness by binding competitors into allies, improving the use of resources, accessing complementary resources, and reducing costs due to economies of scale and scope (Ebers 1997; and Grandori and Soda 1995) or due to social sanctioning substituting for formal legal contracts (Park 1996). In the public and nonprofit sectors, problem-solving effectiveness is another catalyser of network formation. Issues and problems dealt with are often not “decomposable,” but rather “wicked problems” (O’Toole 1997; Rittel and Webber 1973; Simon 1976). Such problems may generate challenges that cross political mandates (O’Toole 1997) and surpass the quantitative capacity of single organizations, making the standard responses, such as top-down measures and information hyper-collection, too

simple and useless (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Reduction of uncertainties and risk also induces network formation (Oliver 1990; Thompson 1967), as does the need for legitimacy with regard to other stakeholders (Grandori and Soda 1995; Oliver 1990).

Contingent preconditions may also induce to network formation. At the institutional level, research has pointed out how legal, cultural, sectorial, and regional conditions, or embeddedness (Granovetter 1985), impact on the likelihood of network formation (Ebers 1997; Kanter 1994). Relational contingences such as social ties, resource dependency, and power relations have been found to induce network formation (Ebers 1997; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Grandori and Soda 1995; Gray 1996; Jarrillo 1993; Kickert and Koppenjan 1997; Oliver, 1990; Park 1996). As I argue in the next chapter, both actor motives and relational contingencies are reasons behind the formation of the networks studied: individual pro-immigrant nonprofit organizations unite into networks to better fulfil their missions (furthering immigrant rights) and thus influence powerful state actors. The Table II summarizes the main factors at each level affecting network formation.

Another popular aspect of network study is its focus on the adoption of specific structural designs, or structural characteristics. Hence this area of the literature looks at not only why networks are formed but why they are formed as they are—in line with the typological discussion mentioned in the previous section. Analytic frameworks are composed roughly of: actors (or membership in formal networks); relations, including resources and activities; and the network, which includes the governance mechanism

(such as the coordinating unit and its decision-making) and its objectives—when it has any (Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006; Saz-Carranza, Vilanova, Ysa 2006<sup>11</sup>). Although neither motives nor structural characteristics are the focus of this research, they play an important role in the management of the network. Understanding why the organizations come together, what decision-making mechanisms the networks use, and what membership requirements they apply are important issues that will come up in different network leadership activities.

Actor level: motives	Institutional level: contingencies	Relational level: contingencies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effectiveness</li> <li>• Problem-solving effectiveness</li> <li>• Efficiency</li> <li>• Increase in legitimacy</li> <li>• Decrease uncertainty and risks</li> <li>• Morally required</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional: Institutions such as chambers of commerce and universities.</li> <li>• Sectorial: Spatial clustering, specialized know-how, context uncertainty, reciprocity in goals, and structure of underlying game.</li> <li>• Legal: Regulation and legal frame.</li> <li>• Cultural: Traditionally interorganizational and inter-sectorial collaborative culture.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social ties</li> <li>• Resource interdependency (intensity and complexity)</li> <li>• Vulnerable strategic position</li> <li>• Asymmetric power relations</li> <li>• Complementary diversity</li> </ul>
Source: own, based on: Ebers 1997; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Grandori and Soda 1995; Gray 1996; Jarrillo 1993; Kanter 1994; Kickert, Klijn and Koopenjan 1997a; Oliver 1990; Park 1996.		

### **Evaluating networks: success, performance, and added value**

A disputed and developing arena on interorganizational networks is network performance (Mandell 2001), success (Mohr and Spekman 1996), evaluation (Provan and Milward 2001), and added-value (Agranoff 2003b), since operationalizing network success is a multidimensional and complex enterprise (Mohr and Spekman 1996; Provan and Milward 2001). This aspect is important to this research since, although focusing on

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<sup>11</sup> Our review was based on: Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Bruijn and Heuvelhof 1997; Doz 1996; Ebers 1997; Ebers and Grandori 1997; Gadde, Huemer, Hakansson 2003; Grandori 1997; Grandori and Soda 1995; Huxham and Vangen 2000a; McGuire 2002; Mohr and Spekman 1996; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Weiss and Visioni, 2003.

network management, a major assumption of this study is that the networks studied are successful. Moreover, as I will show, the networks behave as they do to be effective: that is to fulfil their mission. Networks may be evaluated at three different levels: member organizations, the network itself, and its larger environment or domain. Moreover, both outcome and process may be evaluated.

At the network organizational member level, the network must be internally efficient (Ebers and Grandori 1997): the payoff of the game for all actors must be superior to going it alone (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Jarrillo 1993). Another type of efficiency, not so relevant in this study, is the external efficiency (Ebers and Grandori 1997); that is, the efficiency of the network evaluated according to the well being of all the stakeholders affected by the network. External efficiency is relevant for macro/social-level studies regarding the network's contributions to society in general in terms of benefits and costs.

At the network level, the network can be assessed with respect to its effectiveness, or depending on the degree of problem resolution achieved (Gray 2000). At this network level, success and performance are often, especially in the public and nonprofit sectors, difficult to capture. Hence, networks may be assessed regarding some intermediate outcome or regarding its process.


Regarding some intermediate outcome, Gray (2000) proposes networks are often assessed according to trust generation, creation of shared-meaning, increased relational



density, and power redistribution. All of which apply at network level and are assumed to be conducive to network effectiveness. However, networks may also be evaluated regarding their process. Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and Doz (1996) identify equity as a criterion used to evaluate networks, which implies fair dealings based on reciprocity, which means neither equivalence nor equality. Network equity functions as a lower boundary for member efficiency and network effectiveness.

A network may be then evaluated at least at three different levels (Provan and Milward 2001; Saz-Carranza and Vernis 2006). While internal efficiency applies to the organization in particular, external efficiency applies to the society or sector as a whole. And network effectiveness and equity focuses on the network as a whole.

**Figure IV. Network evaluative criteria and levels of analysis (source: own, based on Saz-Carranza and Vernis 2006)**



The above figure maps the different levels at which networks are evaluated and the criteria used. This becomes important in network management, as I show, since success must be managed, and both the network power base as well as the individual organizational members' gains must be administered.

### **Network process**

Van de Ven and Poole (1995) identify four types of process theories: linear-sequential, teleological (repetitive circular), evolutionary (driven by environment), and dialectical. With regards to research in network process, it is the first two which have been most popular: the linear sequential among Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scholars (European Commission 2003; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Koppenjan 2005; Osborne 2000; Osborne and Murray 2000; Ysa 2004)<sup>12</sup>, and the teleological circular within the alliance literature (Ariño and De La Torre 1998; Doz 1996; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Saz-Carranza and Vernis, 2006).

Despite the differing terminology, linear sequential process theories are roughly composed of an emergence, evolution, and dissolution stage (using Ring and Van de Ven's [1994] terminology). In the evolution stage, actors start the "housekeeping" and "learning" as the network starts functioning, implementation takes place, and the relationship solidifies. The actors then recognize failures or changes within the network, which either produce changes to the network's agreements and functioning or may,

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<sup>12</sup> Larson (1992) and Kanter (1994) from the alliance literature, however, approach process using a linear sequential theory, while Hay (1998), using a cyclic approach, is an exception among PPP scholars.

ultimately, terminate it (European Commission, 2003; Larson 1992; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Kanter 1994).


Teleology process theories complement linear sequential process theories in that they propose cyclical micro-processes that represent the cyclical interactions and dynamism present in all the linear stages. A cyclical approach consists of reiterative sequences of negotiation and commitment—where actors bargain and agree to rules—execution, and evaluation (Ariño and De La Torre 1998; Doz 1996; Hay 1998; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). As new situations are encountered and problems arise, the actors enter again the negotiation stage and will modify only those aspects perceived as problematic while retaining the other previously reached commitments. Learning occurs throughout the cycle (Weiss and Visoni 2003).

Linear sequential theories are deterministic (De Rond and Bouchikhi 2004) and do not incorporate the variance that may occur in reality. In fact, different scholars do produce different contradictory, albeit logical, linear processes (Saz-Carranza and Vernis 2006). Another type of process theory is dialectics. With a dialectic process approach, alliances are conceived as heterogeneous and plural phenomena, where performance is a social construct (i.e. subjective, not objective), and change occurs due to unintended consequences of action. Moreover, process theories assume a descriptive, pluralist epistemology leaving aside monist expectations of order (Rond and Bouchikhi 2004). Such process theories contribute to produce an in-depth analysis of network process and

also to generate and implement change in the network (Saz-Carranza, Vilanova, and Ysa 2006). Figure V below illustrates the three main network process theories.

My research is not longitudinal and does aim at specifically developing or informing a process theory, however, as I show, concepts contributed by these process theories will be of use in my analysis. For example, dialectics is closely related to the concept of paradox I use and the continual (re)evaluation of the network proposed by the teleological theories will prove relevant in some leadership activities.

Figure V. Network process theories (source: own)



## **Network management**


Another gap in the literature on interorganizational network refers to the management of the network<sup>13</sup>. However, a set of network management dimensions may be slowly starting to emerge.

Agranoff and McGuire put forward, either as conceptual research questions (Agranoff and McGuire 2001) or as future areas of study (Agranoff and McGuire 2003), the following areas of public network management: administrative tasks, decision-making, flexibility (structure or process), accountability, trust, power, and performance. Huxham (2003) offers five conceptual themes in her (and Vangen's) collaborative advantage theory: common aims, power, membership structure, trust, and leadership; this latter theme includes activities along with leadership media, which in turn is composed of structure, processes, and actors. Both frameworks are relatively similar in that they include management activities, power, trust, and structure. Membership and objectives are implicit in Agranoff and McGuire's framework in that they are embedded, respectively, in management activities (activation), and decision-making and performance. Accountability also has a high relevance in their work, since they study primarily networks in the public sector.

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<sup>13</sup> Social network theory, for example, does have a common set of analytic dimensions such as density, centrality, multiplexity, and so on (Provan, Veazie, Staten, Teufel-Shone 2005), and network structure, as mentioned in the previous section, seems to have a shared set of dimensions. A comparable equivalent is not present for the interorganizational network management subfield.

Figure VI. Situating my research (source: own)



In this study I draw on all these six management themes but, as will become clear at the end of this chapter, with particular attention to power and leadership activities. I focus on leadership and power because my research model—which I develop in the next chapter—essentially assumes that leadership activities help manage paradox, and hence build power. Figure VI conceptually sets my research focus in the larger context of network research: I am interested in networks as a concrete governance mode and focus on network management—rather than process, formation and structure, or performance.

Prior to developing my theoretical framework—based on leadership activities, power, and paradox in networks—which I do in Chapter 3, I briefly describe the preliminary findings of an exploratory study executed by Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005) that refined my research topic and framed my research question. The findings of Ospina and Saz-Carranza’s (2005) study are the departing point of this dissertation and the study itself may be understood as a preliminary open and exploratory research cycle that together with this dissertation compose an overall research agenda into network management.

### **THE PRELIMINARY STUDY**

In their preliminary study, involving two organizations that define themselves as coalitions—the Coalition of Asian, American, European and Latin Immigrants of Illinois (CAAEII) and New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC)—and that operate in the immigration sector, Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005) set out to answer *how are successful networks managed?*

The study draws on analytical memos and transcripts from interviews carried out using appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider and Srivasta 1987). Other documentation as well as ethnography and cooperative inquiry reports were also used. Ospina and Saz-Carranza’s (2005) analytical strategy combined both inductive and deductive development of codes to analyze the existing data set.

The preliminary study identifies two paradoxes that actors of immigrant coalitions encountered as they tried to do their work, along with some of the management factors that helped them embrace two paradoxes: one paradox regarding inward work of the network, the diversity/unity paradox; and another regarding the outward work, namely the confrontation/cooperation paradox. Embracing these two paradoxes facilitated effective collaboration<sup>14</sup>. On one hand, Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005) identify three management factors that help generate the needed unity without threatening the needed diversity: nurturing and facilitating interaction, cultivating personal relationships, and promoting openness and participation. On the other, they identify three management factors that helped these coalitions embrace the confrontation/cooperation paradox so as to facilitate collaboration with influential targets. These factors are: maintaining the credibility of the coalition; continually acting at different levels, such as the local and national levels; and promoting a multiplicity of both personal relationships as well as institutional relationships. Figure VII below illustrates the preliminary findings.


These findings support and deepen the insights offered from the social work literature on the paradoxical nature of interorganizational collaboration (Bailey and Koney's 1996; Mizrahi and Rosenthal 1993). Ospina and Saz-Carranza's (2005) assertion is therefore that, at least in the context of coalition work, leaders manage paradox to facilitate collaboration.

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<sup>14</sup> As a previous reviewer of the preliminary study pointed out, both paradoxes seem to have some parallels with the two major definitions of social capital. The unity/diversity internal paradox may be equivalent to bonding (Burt 2000; Coleman and Bourdieu 1991) while the external engagement paradox with the idea of bridging (Putnam 2000). However, a link to the vast social capital literature was beyond the scope of this study.



**Figure VII. Findings of preliminary study (source: Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005)**



The two identified paradoxes in Ospina and Saz-Carranza’s (2005) study are quite different, as they emerged in two very different organizational contexts, one of inward work to maintain intra-coalition collaboration, and the other of outward work to pursue the coalition goals vis-à-vis the target. The unity and diversity paradox represents a paradox of belonging—when social units (individuals, groups, or organizations) naturally strive for both self-expression and collective affiliation (Lewis 2000). But the confrontation and cooperation paradox has to do with paradoxes of engaging, which resonate with the extensive literature that identifies tensions regarding the engagement of units as they interact with their environment, the most typical one being the tension between conflict and cooperation (de Rond and Bouchikhi 2004).

Despite the promising findings, the preliminary research has several limitations which make further research necessary. First, given the exploratory nature of the study, the research was necessarily ample and generally focused on successful factors of network management. Second, the data collected targeted neither paradox nor power, and focused on leadership in general rather than on interorganizational collaboration in particular. Given the promising findings and limitations of the research, my dissertation focuses on paradox to better understand network management and leadership. This dissertation, then, focuses on the role of paradox in network management, paying special attention to power. Within the topic of *the inherent paradoxes in network management*, my research question is: *how is paradox managed in successful networks?*



### **3. NETWORK MANAGEMENT: PARADOX, LEADERSHIP, AND POWER**

*We all knew the truth but we insisted on  
distorting things to make it seem...that first  
and foremost there are two sides to  
everything, when of course there were not;  
there was one side only, one side always:  
Just as this earth is round, the truth is  
round, not two-sided but round.*

Dave Eggers. "You shall know our velocity"

The previous chapter has laid out my topic, namely *the inherent paradoxes in network management*, and my research question: *how is paradox managed in successful networks?* This chapter first reviews findings on paradox and its related terms in organization studies in general and in interorganizational settings in particular. Next, I define paradox and focus on the unity/diversity and the confrontation/cooperation paradoxes. Thereafter, I review network leadership activities, in particular collaboration theory, policy network theory, and public network management theory. Last, I briefly review and construct a power framework consisting of two dimensions.

#### **PARADOX IN NETWORKS**

The notion of paradox has gained considerable currency in organizational studies. The construct, itself, is complicated and used differently by various scholars, as it is only emerging as a subject of theoretical and empirical study (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005). For example, at a theoretical and abstract level, the concept of paradox is used to identify contradictory yet valid and coexisting theories regarding given phenomena, which help better understand organizational life (such as the structure/agency paradox developed in the structuration theory [Giddens 1984]). But paradox may also refer to a concrete and

identifiable phenomenon in organizational life, when contradictory findings are empirically documented (Poole and Van de Ven 1989)<sup>15</sup>.

However, what is a paradox, in the context of organization studies? Lewis (2000) defines paradox as some “thing” that denotes contradictory yet interwoven elements (e.g., perspectives, feelings, messages, demands, identities, interests, or practices)—elements that seem logical in isolation but absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously.

It is conceptually worthwhile defining paradox with respect to other terms closely related to it and often used interchangeably. Dialectic and paradox are disputed terms which have been used with various meanings by different authors. For example, Plato, Fichte, Hegel, and Marx all used the term differently, and sometimes contradictorily (Evans 2001). A paradox is a duality—consisting of two parts—of opposing poles<sup>16</sup>, poles standing in contradiction, which create a tension or strained condition. Such a tension combined with an either/or linear reasoning implies a dilemma—the choice between two alternatives (poles), either of which is equally (un)favorable—since choosing one pole means not choosing the other. Regarding the term dialectic, in this study I understand dialectic as a research strategy as, for example, described in the previous chapter regarding theoretical approaches to network process.

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<sup>15</sup> These two authors point out, however, that both poles of the contradiction must occur either at an empirical or theoretical level. If one pole occurs at an empirical level and the other at the theoretical level they do not constitute a paradox: That is, an empirical finding contradicting a theoretical proposition is not a paradox.

<sup>16</sup> Poole and Van de Ven (1989) use the term horn instead of pole.

To further complicate matters, an empirically identifiable paradox may occur in a diachronic fashion, when opposing poles alternate, or it may happen synchronically, when poles occur simultaneously (Ford and Backoff 1988). Additionally, paradoxes may occur at different levels (Lewis 2000): at the micro-level of cognition, individuals, and groups (Murnighan and Conlon 1991; Smith and Berg 1987); at the macro-level of organizations and interorganizational interaction (Clarke-Hill, Li, and Davies 2003; Huxham and Beech 2003a; Mizrahi and Rosenthal 1993; Ofori-Dankwa and Julian 2004; Quinn and Cameron 1988; Tschirhartt et al. 2006); or even at the micro-macro cross-level, for example individual-organizational (Ofori-Dankwa and Julian 2004).<sup>17</sup>

The paradoxes identified by (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005) can be characterized as empirical macro-level paradoxes, “things” that occur when organizations collaborate and that generate demands which seem contradictory but must coexist. In this study of mine, I am interested in how contradictory goals and or processes are attended to in the context of work within a network of organizations. I define paradox as *a duality of coexisting contradictory goals and or processes*. While there is not much theoretical or empirical work addressing these specific interests, the organizational literature addressing paradox in general, as well as the collaboration literature addressing dynamic tensions in particular, offers insights to help frame this study and to guide it to offer relevant contributions to understanding the relationship between paradox and collaboration.

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<sup>17</sup> Ford and Backoff (1988) thus indicate that paradox may be vertical, occurring at different levels, or horizontal, when poles occur at the same level.

## **Paradox in organizational studies**

Dualities, dilemmas, and other related concepts are certainly not new in organizations studies. During the late '70s, Benson (1977) and Zeitz (1980) used a dialectics approach to organizational theory and interorganizational relations, respectively. In the '80s, Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) and Cameron (1986) were using a competing values framework to study organizational effectiveness, Eisenhardt and Westcott (1988) applied a paradox framework to Just-In-Time manufacturing, Astley and Van de Ven (1983) proposed to reconcile central debates in Organization Theory<sup>18</sup> via a dialectical perspective, and Mintzberg (1983) grounded his work on structure on the intrinsic tension of all organized human activity: coordination/division of labor. A decade later, Nutt and Backoff (1992) proposed a dialectical approach to strategy, and Handy (1994) published his “Age of Paradox.” By the turn of the century, paradox in organizations studies was gaining considerable momentum. A special issue of the Academy of Management Review was dedicated to “paradox, spirals, and ambivalence” (Eisenhardt 2000) and paradox is used as an approach in quite diverse fields, such as the resource-based view of the firm (Lado, Boyd, Wright, and Kroll 2006), strategic management (Price and Newson 2003), leadership (March and Weil 2005), and slowly in interorganizational networks (de Rond and Bouchikhi 2004) as well as in the public and nonprofit management fields (Stacey and Griffin 2006; Talbot 2005)<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> E.g.: Organizations as rational or subjective; change by internal adaptation or environmental inducement; determinism or agency; organizational or population-level action; and populations as simple aggregates or something more than the sum.

<sup>19</sup> Moreover, dialectics has also recently been applied to policy networks (Evans 2001; Marsh and Smith 2000) and institutional theory (Seo and Creed 2002).

Using an individual and interpersonal psychological perspective, Smith and Berg (1987) argue that group life is inherently paradoxical. They identify several instances where individuals pursue contradictory goals and get involved simultaneously in contradictory processes, both of which are equally relevant for engaging effectively in organizational life. Examples of such paradoxes at the micro level of social action include detaching from the group and getting involved in it; strengthening individuality and connectedness; disclosing the self and protecting the self; and pursuing independence and dependence. At the same micro level, Murnighan and Conlon's (1991) study of string quartets shows how members simultaneously combine the authority of the first violinist with a democratic structure that grants authority to all. The same authors as well as others (Tjosvold, Poon and Yu 2005) also identify the simultaneous use of conflict and compromise for effective team relations.

Moving one level up to the organizational level, scholars like Ofori-Dankwa and Julian (2004) have identified the tension between internal diversity and similarity: organizations strive for diversity to enhance creativity, but simultaneously promote similarity to enhance productivity. Clarke-Hill, Li, and Davies (2003) identify a similar tension created by the organizational need to promote collectivity and individuality simultaneously.

At the interorganizational level—of particular interest here—Bailey and Koney (1996) in the social work field discuss paradoxical management in coalitions, to address tensions such as the need for the manager to be both responsive to and assertive with the



membership. Mizrahi and Rosenthal (1993) identify dynamic tensions in coalition work, such as the demand for individuals' commitment to the coalition versus the commitment to their own organizations, and the tension between unity and diversity. Vangen and Huxham (2003) say that managing trust in collaborations is "dealing with many paradoxes inherent in collaborative activities" (23). Similarly, in the strategic alliance field, De Rond and Bouchikhi (2004), building on Das and Teng (2000), use dialectics to identify the tensions between vigilance and trust as well as between individualism and collectivism. Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995) also state that the managing strategic center of an alliance has to deal with the organizational paradox of flexibility/control and discipline/creativity. Furthermore, the strategic management literature has coined the term "coopetition" for mixed strategies of both competition and cooperation (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996).

Another dimension of paradox, apart from its level of application, is which aspect of organizational life it deals with. Lewis (2000) groups in three categories of interrelated paradoxes her extensive literature review of exemplary organization studies that have dealt with paradoxes: learning, organizing, and belonging. In learning, paradoxes arise due to the old vs. new, construction vs. destruction tensions. Paradoxes often emerge when beliefs fail to keep up with changes. Paradoxes of belonging generate tensions as individual, group, or organization units strive for both self-expression and collective affiliation. Paradoxes in organizing emerge because organizing itself requires distinctions, and in particular due to the control vs. flexibility tension. The literature also has identified tensions regarding the external engagement of units, as these interact with

their environment. Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005) propose a fourth type of paradox, that of engaging. Paradoxes of engaging involve the conflict vs. cooperation, or cooperation vs. competition tension.

<b>Table III. Paradoxes in organization studies</b>			
Paradoxes of belonging	Paradoxes of learning	Paradoxes of organizing	Paradoxes of engaging
Unity – Diversity	Construction – Destruction	Flexibility – Control	Cooperation – Confrontation
Source: own based on Lewis (2000) and Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005)			

### **The absence of paradox in network management research**

Focus on paradox as an object of network research is scant if not altogether nonexistent. The way paradox is experienced and managed, a context characterized by dynamic tensions remains a blind spot in an otherwise rich literature, which does acknowledge, at least indirectly, the presence of conceptual paradoxes, anomalies, and ambiguities of multi-collectivity behavior (Rainey and Busson 2001; Huxham and Vangen 2005). In fact, the basic idea of the network society (Castells 1996) implies the paradox of more fragmentation but also, simultaneously, more dependence (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).

While theoretical discussions have not produced a robust body of empirical research on the topic, interest in paradox is not completely absent in the literature. For example, at the most abstract level of analysis, Berry et al. (2004) call for embracing Nadel’s paradox in public network management research, which highlights the dual nature of roles, as both relational and context-specific (DiMaggio 1992). While roles represent a generic category independent of who enacts them, at the same time “each particular role is defined by local expectations and understandings that make it fundamentally incomparable to others” (p.540).

Also at a theoretical level, public network scholars have engaged the sociological “problem” of the relation between structure and action and the ongoing query of which influences which in the context of network management. Building on Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory, Klijn and Teisman (1997), from the European policy network school, and Alexander (1995, 1998), from an interorganizational coordination perspective, highlight the duality in the action-structure relation. In this view, structure is a platform where games are played. Action is determined by this, but, in turn, structure is modified and enacted in action. Not yet framed as a paradox, this duality nevertheless points to the inherent tensions of network management (and management in general) and suggests new avenues to explore how this occurs in practice.

### **Complexity and ambiguity in networks**

Insights about the factors that influence network formation, and the reasons why organizations decide to collaborate on or enter a coalition, point to the complexity of network management (Agranoff and McGuire 2003) with its intense resource consumption and inherent difficulties (Human and Provan 2000; Huxham 2003; Huxham and Beech 2003a). Together, the variety of factors associated with network formation cited in the literature suggests that the resulting networks are the repository of a diverse and often contradictory set of expectations, aspirations, and goals (Huxham 2003; and

Huxham and Beech 2003a)<sup>20</sup>. Ambiguity and complexity point towards paradox in network management, as multiple diverse goals must be advanced.

The relationship between common goals and the definition of success in a collaboration points to another source of tension: studies suggest that members of collaborations may hold diverse views about how to measure success (Provan and Milward 2001). Coalition members interviewed in Mizrahi and Rosenthal's (2001) study defined successful coalitions in multiple ways, from achieving the goal or creating lasting networks and attaining longevity, to gaining or acquiring such resources as recognition from the target, community support, new consciousness of issues, or new skills. This divergence in a context that requires convergence represents yet another source of tension.

The literature offers sufficient evidence on complexity as the source for dynamic tensions and contradictions to point to the paradoxical nature of networks and their management. For example, we know that collaborative efforts often arise to solve complex problems in dynamic social environments (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Borzel 1998; Gray 1996). Such problems involve uncertainty regarding not only the solution but also the definition of the problem itself (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004), and collaborative efforts set up to address them are usually complex themselves. We also know that complexity affects

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<sup>20</sup> Factors associated with the achievement of common goals include a sense of ownership over the goals (by the network, its members, and individual representatives), the openness of the aims (implicit, explicit, and hidden), and the means of achieving them (using the network, its members or particular individuals) (Huxham and Vangen 2000a). That achieving common goals is dependent on so many factors has practical implications too. For example, goal clarity may influence the tasks the network manager decides to undertake (McGuire 2003).

network features such as membership and size. For example, membership structure is ambiguous and dynamic, given the different linkages among actors inside and outside the partnership (Huxham 2003). Ambiguity in membership stems from the fact that the same persons may represent different organizations in different arenas, and the role a person may be representing at a given moment may be unclear. Furthermore, members may not have clarity about who is executing a given activity at the moment: the network itself, one of its member, or even an individual acting independently from the network (Saz-Carranza and Serra, 2006).

There is a lack of consensus around the effective number of organizations required for successful collaboration in a network (Huxham and Vangen 2000a; Grandori and Soda 1995; Kanter 1994; Kickert and Koppenjan 1997). Kanter (1994) suggests that as many people as possible should be involved to bridge interpersonal and interorganizational differences in structures, processes, and skills. In contrast, Huxham and Vangen (2000a) conclude that complexity must be kept low and hence membership numbers must be limited, siding with Klijn and Teisman (2000), who claim that strong trust relations may be maintained only with a limited number of actors. On the other hand Killing (1988) suggests that scope and structure complexity must balance each other out.

The contradictory findings about trust in network relations represent yet another example of the existence of paradox in networks. Kanter (1994) and Larson (1992) argue that trust develops through personal and informal relations that later become formal and role-based, an argument that follows traditional bureaucratic organization theory (Perrow,

1986). In contrast, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and Ring (1997) suggest just the opposite causal logic in network relationship formation: relationships are first based on roles, formal contracts, and agreements around network formation (fragile trust), which then turns into resilient trust as the network institutionalizes, giving way to personal relations, psychological contracts, and informal agreements and understandings that strengthen the networks over time and facilitate collaboration.

In sum, theoretical discussions (such as the agency/structure duality and the network's role generality/specificity), the relevance of complexity and tension in recurrent themes in the literature on network management—such as ambiguous membership, multiple aims and success criteria, and contradictory research findings on key themes such as membership size or relationships and trust—all highlight the potential benefits of attending to paradox to better understand and manage interorganizational collaboration. This road is promising, and some work is already underway, as demonstrated by a few studies that introduce paradox to understand coalition work. I build on Ospina and Saz-Carranza's (2005) previous findings and focus on two paradoxes to improve understanding of network management. The two paradoxes that guide my research are the unity/diversity paradox within the network and the confrontation/cooperation paradox between the network and external actors.

### **Paradoxes of belonging: unity and diversity**

Paradoxes of belonging deal essentially with the tension between the self and the collective, exemplified by strengthening individuality and connectedness (Smith and

Berg 1987), striving for diversity to enhance creativity but simultaneously promote similarity to enhance productivity (Ofori-Dankwa and Julian 2004), or promoting collectivity and individuality simultaneously (Clarke-Hill, Li, and Davies 2003). Similarly, March and Weil (2005) identify the intractable dilemma of unity and diversity in leadership, how variety and integration are necessary, or how people request autonomy (diversity) while demanding control of anything dependent on them (unity). Ybema (1996), in fact, argues that complexity of group membership, the ambiguity of rules and rituals, and the coexistence of contrasting differences and identities, are all reasons to expect both unity and division.

Studying collaborations, Huxham and Beech (2003a) argue that the potential for collaborative advantage depends on the ability of each partner to bring different resources. This needed diversity is, however, a function of differences in organizational purpose, which produces inherent tensions for collaboration (Eden and Huxham 2001). Tschirhart, Christensen, and Perry (2005) identify the paradox of branding and collaboration among public and nonprofit service delivering organizations, where collaboration requires interdependence while branding independence. Mizrahi and Rosenthal (1993) identify an organizational tension between unity and diversity. Coalitions that are too unified resemble organizations and fail to achieve the essence of the coalition. However, diversity slows progress towards goals since adjustments, such as trust and familiarity, take time to be generated.

The unity versus diversity tension may occur along different dimensions, according to Mizrahi and Rosenthal (1993). It may occur with goals either too broad, thus misleading participants and being difficult to apply, or too narrow to attract members. The expected outcome, in particular when successes are achieved and benefits must be shared, is another dimension along which the unity-diversity tension manifests itself. The tension may occur along the ideological dimension regarding goals as well as along the power dimension, where unity generates power for network but may be difficult to achieve due to power differences among members. Also occurring is a tension along the type and level of commitment dimension and the gender, sex, race, and class dimensions. Last, tensions also arise along the organizational and personal styles dimension.

The unity/diversity paradox is inherent to networks, which must be diverse to have an added value with respect to hierarchies, but must be united to allow for concerted action of any kind, unlike markets. However, unity and diversity are not antonyms: unity is defined as the state of being united or joined as a whole (Oxford University Press 1989), and diversity as the state of being diverse or heterogeneous (Oxford University Press 1989). In fact, their respective antonyms are “division” and “similarity” (Oxford University Press 1989). Since diversity is usually accompanied by division, and unity by similarity, they imply a paradox in that they entail directing attention to contradictory processes.

### **Paradox of engagement: confrontation and cooperation**

Research on teams has found the simultaneous use of conflict and compromise



(Murnighan and Conlon 1991) and cooperative conflict (Tjosvold, Poon, and Yu 2005). Scholars have found that interorganizational relationships often involve the paradox of competition and cooperation (Clarke-Hill, Li, and Davies 2003; de Rond and Bouchikhi 2004), or equal exchange and unequal exchanges (Zeitiz 1980). Using an organizational ecology perspective, Barnett and Carroll (1987) find both mutualism and competition among telephone companies, however, at different levels. There is competition between companies at the organizational level, but mutualism takes place at a population level, where different communities of companies may strengthen each other under certain circumstances.

In addition to findings in the for-profit sector, contradictory engagement modes have also been identified in the nonprofit and public sectors. Young (2000), at the inter-sector level, identifies a triad of alternating and mixed types of relations, namely supplementary, complementary, and adversarial. At the inter-organizational level, Najam (2000) identifies four types of nonprofit-government relations according to the similitude between their respective goals and strategies. These are cooperation, cooptation, complementary, and confrontation. Similarly, Hardy and Phillips (1998) identify collaboration, compliance, contention, and contestation as possible inter-agency engagement types. However, paradox as a research focus has not been used in nonprofit-public sector relations, unlike in the business sector, where scholars have identified competition and cooperation simultaneously, calling it coopetition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996), and the tension between competition and cooperation within alliances themselves (Zeng and Chen 2003).

<b>Table IV. Summary of dualities</b>			
Level	Author	Belonging	Engaging
Individual & group	Smith and Berg (1987)	Giving meaning – getting meaning; Detachment – involvement; Individuality – connectedness; Constraining via boundary-drawing – non-constraining; Disclosure – protection; Trusting – being trusted; Acceptance of self – of other; Independence – dependency	
	Murnighan and Conlon (1991)		Conflict – compromise
	Tjosvold, Poon, and Yu (2005)		Conflict – cooperation
Organizational	Ybema (1996)	Unity – division	
	March and Weil (2003)	Unity – diversity; Variety – integration; Convergence – divergence	
	Ofori-Dankwa and Julian (2004)	Diversity – similarity	
	Clarke-Hill, Li, and Davies (2003)	Collectivity – individuality	
Interorganizational	Brandenburger and Nalebluff (1996)		Competition –cooperation
	Bengtsson and Kock (2000)		Competition –cooperation
	Tschirhart et al. (2005)	Branding – collaboration	
	De Rond and Bouchicki (2004)	Unity – diversity	Competition –cooperation
	Das and Teng (2000)		Competition –cooperation
	Saz-Carranza, Vilanova, Ysa (2006)	Unity – diversity	
	Zeng and Chen (2003)		Competition –cooperation
	Vernis et al. (2006)		Competition –cooperation
	Zeitz (1980)		Equal– unequal exchange
Barnett and Carroll (1987)		Mutualism – competition	

Paradoxes, however, are usually interrelated (Huxham and Beech 2003a; Smith and Berg 1987). A paradox of belonging, such as unity/diversity, has direct links to a paradox of organizing regarding the control/flexibility paradox. For example, as the coalition is striving for unity and diversity, this will affect how they determine their goals (either broadly to be inclusive or narrowly in order to be more unitary), and this will have implications for the control/flexibility paradox. Moreover, depending on the unit of analysis, the cooperation/confrontation paradox may actually reflect the unity/diversity.

For example, if we use the organization as the unit of analysis, its engagement in conflict and cooperation with other organizations may be framed as the cooperation/confrontation paradox. If, using the same set of organizations, we take the network of interacting organizations as our unit of analysis, the same interaction may be framed as a form of the diversity/unity paradox. Hence, the relativity of both types of paradoxes. Table IV lists the studies that have found contradictory dualities regarding belonging and engaging at the individual, organizational, and inter-organizational levels.

### **Managing paradox**

Some research has been directed towards the management of paradox, dialectics, tensions, and dilemmas. One way of dealing with paradox is, simply, by favoring one pole over the other. This, however, reinforces negative cycles as pressure from the suppressed side is intensified (Surnamurthy and Lewis 2003; Johnson 1992). Another is to reach a balance between poles although this may reduce their potential. Nevertheless, Huxham and Beech (2003a), as well as Mizrahi and Rosenthal (2001), propose this approach since according to them, in most practical situations, neither extreme of the tension is likely to be operationalizable.

Another way to manage paradox is by alternating poles (Van den Ven and Poole 1988; Poole and Van den Ven 1989), furthering one pole with one subgroup and the other pole with another subgroup—as when two companies have their development departments cooperate in product design while overall they compete in product sales. Similarly, poles may be applied at alternate times according to a given situation (as in the literature on

situational leadership does [Heifetz and Sinder 1991a, 1991b; Hersey and Blanchard 1982] or Crosby and Bryson [2005] do for leadership in cross-sector collaborations specifying different types of leadership according to the stage of the policy cycle).

March and Weil (2005), on their part, call for the appreciation of leadership, where its inherent tensions are made apparent and accepted. Managing paradox entails exploring, not suppressing tensions, and involves a shift from planning and control to coping. Coping with paradox creates an edge of chaos, not settling for a bland halfway point between poles (Eisenhardt 2000). Likewise, March and Weil (2005) state that the potential for ambiguities is underestimated while rational action overvalued<sup>21</sup>. Coping with paradox, though, often requires reframing (Quinn and Cameron 1988), since specific mindsets and dispositions, in addition to competencies and skills, are necessary. Kaplan and Kaiser (2003) also call for versatile leadership, an approach that requires comprising opposite approaches (e.g., forceful with enabling leadership, or strategic and operational leadership), and which may be reached only by what F. Scott Fitzgerald termed “first-rate intelligence,” which allows you to function while holding two opposites.

In sum, considering the study of inter-organizational collaboration, networks seem to be fraught with paradoxes, and network management requires taking into account these phenomena. Paradoxes in network management may refer to different aspects of organizational life, organizing, learning, belonging, and engaging, and may take on

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<sup>21</sup> Unsurprisingly, James March was one of the authors of the garbage can decision-making model (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972).

different forms as poles apply at different organizational levels and at different times. In the context of interorganizational network management, then, what are the form and nature of the paradox? More specifically, I develop the following two research propositions and secondary research question:

***RPIa:*** *Network management requires taking into account paradoxes.*

***RPIb:*** *Paradoxes may be of different forms.*

***RQ1:*** *What are the form and the nature of the diversity/unity and confrontation/cooperation paradoxes in the context of network management?*

## **LEADERSHIP OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS**

Collaborative contexts require different type of leadership and management than traditional intra-organizational contexts, due to the boundary-crossing nature of collaborations (sector, organizational, and valorative boundaries), the lack of formal authority and hierarchy, and the blurriness of strategies (Chrislip and Larsson 1994). Leadership in collaborative contexts must be necessarily different, focusing largely on process, and has similarities to facilitative, transformative, and servant leadership: that is, to inspire commitment and action, to lead as peer problem solver, to build broad-based involvement, and to sustain hope and participation (Chrislip and Larsson 1994). A major clarification must be made at this point: my unit of analysis is the network, and the leadership I am interested in is that of the network, not that of a single organization within the network. Paraphrasing Dubin (1997), it is leadership *of* networks I am interested in rather than leadership *in* networks.

In addition to the mentioned absence of paradox in network management research, the role of leadership in generating and maintaining effective interorganizational

collaboration has also been understudied (Agranoff and McGuire 2003, 2001)—indeed, Berry et al. (2004) question, provokingly, if networks really are managed at all. However, leadership in networks seems of outmost importance. As Heifetz and Linsky (2002) point out, adaptive challenges (those that can't be solved with existing know-how) demand leadership, neither authority nor managerial expertise. In networks neither authority nor programmed routines (March and Simon 1958) are applicable due to fragmented power (Bryson and Crosby 1992) and outcome's uncertainty due to the interaction of multiple autonomous actors (Huxham 2003).

Defining leadership in general is already a disputed terrain: for example, Heifetz and Laurie (1997) state that getting people to do adaptive work is the mark of leadership, while Rainey (1991) defines leadership as the capacity of someone to direct and energize willingness of people in social units to take action and achieve goals, by drawing on legitimate authority. On my part, I follow Huxham and Vangen (2000b; Vangen and Huxham 2004) in defining leadership in more general terms as “mechanisms that make things happen in a collaboration” (Huxham, 2003). Such a definition of leadership, “mechanisms that make things happen in a collaboration,” obviously goes against authors that draw marked lines between management tasks and leadership activities, such as Alvesson (1992), who defines management as getting things done (via planning, organizing, monitoring, and control) without worrying about what people think or feel,

but who associates leadership with what people do think and feel<sup>22</sup>. However, I believe this distinction is far less useful in interorganizational networks given the shared-power setting (Bryson and Crosby 1992) and the inherently adaptive challenges (Heifetz and Laurie 1997) they imply, which strongly reduce technical tasks that may be dealt with via managerial expertise and authority.

Traditional leadership studies based on trait, style, contingencies, and transformational approaches presume the existence of a leader and a follower and specified goals (Huxham and Vangen 2000b). The latter do not usually apply to networks, since it is usually a disputed terrain (Vangen, Huxham, and Eden 1994). If intra-organizational leadership involves a leader and a follower—indeed, Heifetz (2006) argues that most interesting leadership happens without anyone experiencing being a leader and foremost no one experiencing being a follower—interorganizational leadership hardly does so (Huxham and Vangen 2000b).

Although I want to contribute to the interorganizational network management and collaboration literature, it is useful to situate my approach with respect to other leadership literatures. I am interested in looking at activities and actions that make things happen rather than at individuals, I do not draw a hard distinction between management and leadership, and see leadership as a collective phenomenon. Compared to other relational leadership streams, my approach falls under what Hunt and Dodge (2000) call systems-

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<sup>22</sup> Moreover, in individual-centered leadership approaches, another way in which management and leadership are not distinguished is when the superior-subordinate relation is confounded with the leader-follower one (Gronn 2002).

based (Wheatley 1999) and collective (Dachler and Hosking 1995) leadership and under neither social network analysis leadership (Brass and Burkhardt 1992) nor the leader-member exchange perspective (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). While all focus on a set of individuals or groups and their relationships, important differences exist. Only the leader-member perspective distinguishes between management and leadership, and both the social network analysis and leader-member approaches emphasize a leader and are not processual. Systems and collective leadership are processual and the latter does not give any individual a specific relevance. Moreover, both these approaches challenge the epistemological and ontological foundations of mainstream leadership and organizational literatures breaking away from linear conceptions. Moreover, collective leadership does challenge post-positivist stances with its social constructionist groundings. Table V summarizes these differences.

<b>Table V. Comparison of relational leadership perspectives</b>				
Characteristics	Social Network Analysis	LMX	Collectivities	Systems
Leadership vs. management	Similar	Different	Similar	Similar
Processual	No	No	Yes	Yes
Timing	Currently relevant	Currently relevant	Currently relevant	Currently relevant
Conceptual/empirical	Both	Both	Conceptual so far	Conceptual so far
Based on Hunt and Dodge (2000)				

However, I must add a major point here that applies to all four leadership approaches just mentioned: all approaches refer to organizational leadership, not interorganizational networks. Hence a major distinction between my approach and all the above is that I am situated at another level. Applied at the interorganizational level, these perspective would entail social network analysis where the nodes would be organizations, where systems



and collectivities would be made up of organizations, and where exchanges would happen among organizations. Again, I am interested in the leadership *of* networks.

### **Leadership activities**

In their renowned article reviewing the state of the art of the public network management field and the questions yet to be answered, Agranoff and McGuire (2001) identified as major questions “what are the critical functional equivalents to traditional management processes, equivalent to the POSDCORB<sup>23</sup>?” In fact, these authors have provided a suggestive grouping of network management behavior and Vangen and Huxham (2004) propose a set of leadership activities. These two pairs of authors are my core theoretical framework.

There seems to be some agreement on the type of activities—but unfortunately not on the terminology—that must be carried out to manage collaboration. The different types of activities deal with actors and resources, and with interaction and structure: including participants, ensuring that participants are committed to and advance the collaboration, putting at the participants’ disposal the necessary infrastructure, and managing the differences in influence among participants.

### **Interaction and structure**

Network management implies managing the interactions between actors, the games where actors exchange resources and co-produce activities, and the overall network

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<sup>23</sup> Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting.

(Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997c; Klijn and Teisman 1997; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; O’Toole 1997; O’Toole and Meier 2004)<sup>24</sup>. While distinct, these two levels continually feed back into each other: games are influenced by the network’s rules, membership, relations, and resources, and in turn influence the network by re-modifying the games.

*Facilitating* is aimed at interaction among participants. It refers to managing the inevitable inequalities regarding participants (Vangen and Huxham, 2004) and motivating participation by network members.<sup>25</sup>

*Framing* deals with network structuring. It is aimed at influencing institutions, including rules and values, and perceptions (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 1997b). Framing is about creating infrastructures for the collaboration—empowering according to Huxham and Vangen (2000b)—and includes influencing rules, values, and perceptions and processes (Huxham and Vangen 2000b, Kickert Klijn and Koppenjan 1997).

Two other management tasks seem relevant to network leadership. One deals with supporting actors who want to become members and with attracting those partners needed: *activating* (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; embracing, Vangen and Huxham


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<sup>24</sup> Austin (2000) draws a similar distinction between drivers (of action) and enablers (of action), the former related to interaction, the latter to structure.

<sup>25</sup> Vangen and Huxham (2004) call this activity involving, Agranoff and McGuire (2001) refer to managing interaction as synthesizing, Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997b) refer to it as game management, and O’Toole and Meier (2004) as behavioral networking.

2004). The other task deals with capturing the necessary resources and support for the network (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). This I call *mobilizing*. The use of the term differs from both Agranoff and McGuire (2001) and Vangen and Huxham (2004) in that it does not include activities focused on capturing the resources of members of the network. This is so because I have chosen to use the meaning that the networks studied give to this term and which arises as an in-vivo label from the data analysis. The following figure illustrates the four activities and how they refer to either member interaction or the network structure.

**Figure VIII.** Network leadership activities (source: own, based on Agranoff and McGuire [2001]; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan [1997c]; Vangen and Huxham [2004])



Both activating and mobilizing modify the structure of the network rather than the interaction; more interestingly, both deal with the boundaries and exterior of the network, since actors are recruited or expelled and resources are looked for from without. This

points to a second distinction which may prove useful in our study: that between network and domain.

### **IO network and IO domain**

Another management distinction that appears among the leadership tasks is whether they are focused at influencing the network itself or the network's immediate environment, or domain (Hardy and Phillips 1998; Shortell et al. 2002; Thompson 1967; Trist 1983). An interorganizational domain is the set of organizations and the issues which brings them together. In this study, the domain is the interorganizational network and the related public and private organizations that affect and are affected by immigration issues. The distinction between managing inwards and outwards has been highlighted by different scholars. Most eminently, Moore (1995), in his famous book, divides public management into managing operations, managing the political environment, and, somewhere in between managing inwards and outwards, managing the strategy and vision. Building on Moore's work, O'Toole, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2004) distinguish between managing inwards, outwards (the stakeholders and the environment), and upwards. Among municipalities, Agranoff and McGuire (1999) also distinguish between managing vertically with other level government agencies in order to acquire information or some discretionary favor, and horizontally with other actors, both public and private, with whom no hierarchical relationship exists, to better develop policies, to exchange resources, or to establish joint projects.

In all these examples, the mentioned authors, however, have as a unit of analysis an organization. This means that what they are terming as outwards management is, actually, inward network management in my analytic framework. However, it has been found that networks not only manage formal member interorganizational interaction, but also manage the network's exterior environment, or its domain (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005; Shortell et al. 2002). In fact, from the policy networks field, Marsh and Smith (2000) have also suggested that one of the three guiding dialectics in policy networks is that composed by the network and its environment. Therefore, I am adding another layer to my analytic framework by including the domain. This seems necessary when dealing with formal networks such as the ones dealt with in this study since networks are affected by the environment but process the inputs in their own way (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997a). Luhmann (1986) puts it beautifully, stating that systems maintain closure in openness.

Another reason for expanding my analytic framework beyond my unit of analysis to include the domain is not to take for granted the boundaries of the network (Berry et al. 2004), since, in practice, it is difficult to tell when an interaction arena starts and finishes (Ostrom and Ostrom, 2004). Moreover, given the broad and indivisible problems (Aldrich 1976) the networks are dealing with—immigration in this study—introducing a

layer beyond the network itself, introducing the level of the domain (Trist 1983), seems necessary (Gray 1989; Hardy and Phillips 1998)<sup>26</sup>.

In sum, network leadership activities include framing, facilitating, mobilizing, and activating. Moreover, two distinctions may be of analytic use: managing structure and interaction, and managing inwards in the network and outwards in the domain. A question that emerges, then, is how do these leadership activities help manage paradox? More concretely, the following research proposition and secondary question will guide my research:

***RP2:** Network leadership activities include: framing, facilitating, mobilizing, and activating*

***RQ2:** How do leadership activities help manage the unity/diversity and confrontation/cooperation paradoxes?*

## **POWER OF NETWORKS**

Ospina and Saz-Carranza's (2005) preliminary findings also hinted at the relevance of power: the networks united diverse members to build power. The central role of power in social change organizations is also highlighted in a meta-analysis by Ospina and Foldy (2005). They find how these organizations focus on building power and how a fundamental assumption in their work is that social inequalities arise due to power imbalances—which must be counter-balanced. However, power has long been overlooked in network and collaboration management research (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Huxham and Beech 2003b).

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<sup>26</sup> Pointing towards the need to enlarge the picture in which networks are set, albeit in a quite distinct approach, Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) use the idea of arena, which bridges the network's interaction with other networks and external actors.

## **Defining power**

Bertrand Russell defined power as “the production of intended effects” (1986, 19), Max Weber (1986) as a capacity to realize one’s will, and Dahl (1986) identifies power of A over B if A can get B to do something B would not otherwise do. Many more different definitions of power have been put forward. However, Lukes (1986) finds common to all the different definitions of and approaches to power a focus on a difference being made to the world.

In organization studies, the earliest approach to organizational power is Emerson’s (1962) exchange theory definition, where “power resides implicitly in the other’s dependence [on oneself]” (32)—power of A over B is directly proportional to B’s dependence on A (Vernis 2000). This definition is relational, situational, and potentially reciprocal (Scott 2003). Since then, other conceptualizations and definitions have been added to this one, and the approaches to and foci on different aspects of power are far more in number.

## ***Power of the network***

Building on Emerson’s idea of interdependence, network management scholars see resource dependence theory as one of their core perspectives (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker 2006): if two organizations are dependent on a more powerful third one, the two weaker ones may join to counterbalance the stronger organization (Emerson 1962).

In the immigration policy sector, to which this dissertation’s cases pertain, pro-immigration rights organizations that aim at advocating are clearly dependent on state

actors—since immigrants are highly impacted by legislation and its execution. Hence, these organizations unite into networks to build enough power to fulfill their mission (furthering immigrant rights), which unavoidably obligates them to try to influence powerful state actors.

*The sources of the power of networks*

Now the resources a network builds, captures, or coopts, can be thought of as bases or sources of its power. Since French and Raven (1959) first proposed five bases of power<sup>27</sup>—reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and expert power—many more have been put forward. Moreover, while many referred to bases (Hickson et al. 1971; Salancik and Pfeffer 1974), others haven't. Gray refers to types<sup>28</sup> of power, Agranoff and McGuire (2001) and Huxham and Beech (2003b) refer to sources, and Hardy and Philips (1998) refer to aspects of power. Similarly, what constitutes a resource also varies. While Hardy and Clegg's (1996) see resources and the capacity to use them as bases of power, Pfeffer (1992) distinguishes between power and the skills to use it. In addition, few conceptualizations regarding networks have attended the differentiation of the concept of resource (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker 2006).

<b>Table VI. A summary of sources of power</b>	
resource scarcity/ utility or control of resources	formal authority
essential skills	network centrality
control of information	the structure of a relationship
acquisition of knowledge from a partner	closeness of HRM practices
strategic importance of the relationship to one party	discursive legitimacy and discursive power
availability of alternatives or credible sanctions	
Source: Huxham and Beech (2003b)	

<sup>27</sup>Their definition of power is clearly “power over.”

<sup>28</sup> These types are: legitimacy, stakeholder capacity or power over domain, power to mobilize, to organize, to strategize, control of information, and power to authorize.



### *Power to*

Just as with leadership scholars, which have looked at leadership *in* networks rather than leadership *of* networks, scholars using “power over” and resource-dependence perspective have mostly looked at a single organization’s power *in* a network. As Pfeffer (1987) emphasizes, the resource-dependence perspective’s unit of analysis is the organization—not the inter-organizational set, or in our case the network.

While “power over” is useful to understand why organizations join a network and why the network requires to build its own power bases, “power to” conceptualizations may be also very helpful to understand the network’s power. “Power to” refers to having the capacity to do something, rather than over someone (Stone 2006). Using this concept, Agranoff and McGuire (2001) define network power as the “ability to get action by partners or organizations under circumstances where actors are under dual responsibility roles to both organizations and networks” (315). This definition resembles Hannah Arendt’s (1986) definition of her communicative power: the “human ability not just to act but to act in concert”(64). Network power understood as such also resembles Perrow’s (1987) “power with” where actors jointly increase their power, making the power game nonzero-sum. The “power to” type is closer to the etymological origins of the word “power,” to be able (Oxford University Press 1989), and in shared power settings (Bryson and Crosby 1992; Gray 1989) of ultra complexity it may characterizes situations better (Agranoff and McGuire 2001)<sup>29</sup>. Together, “power to” (as the ability to get action by

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<sup>29</sup> Perrow (1987), along a similar line of reasoning, differentiates between power in zero-sum games and power in a nonzero-sum game.

network members) and the bases of power, may be helpful in informing how networks are managed.

From the above discussion, and defining power as “power to” and power bases, two secondary questions follow: how does managing paradox contribute to the interorganizational networks’ power? And how does the power built affect the network’s effectiveness? Again, I develop the following research proposition and secondary question in more formal terms:

*RP3: Interorganizational networks aim at building their power to be effective.*

*RQ3a: How does managing the unity/diversity and cooperation/confrontation build the network’s power?*

*RQ3b: How does the power built affect the network’s effectiveness?*

## **A RESEARCH FRAMEWORK FOR INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK MANAGEMENT**

In the above sections of this chapter I have developed specific research propositions and questions. Putting all three sections together, I can construct a research framework. First, interorganizational networks are fraught with inherent paradoxes, which may be of different form and nature. Second, I showed that network leadership draws on different activities. Third, networks aim at building power to be more effective and fulfill their mission.

Now, if networks imply inherent paradoxes, then network leadership must somehow address them. Therefore, network leadership activities must manage paradox. Moreover, if networks aim at building power, then managing paradox must aim at building this

power. In other words, network leadership aims at addressing paradoxes to build network power. The following graph illustrates my research model.

**Figure IX. My research framework (source: own)**



## 4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

*Gli Stati Uniti allora e per molti anni a venire apparivano agli europei la Mecca della scienza...il 19 settembre del 1947... mi imbarcai sulla nave.*

Rita Levi Montalcini.

The first part of this chapter describes the research's design, including topic, claim, main question, secondary questions, propositions, and units and levels of analysis. Thereafter, the research methodology is explained, in particular the sampling and data collection, and the data analysis.

### RESEARCH DESIGN

#### Topic and main question

Managing in collaborative contexts requires addressing inherent paradoxes that emerge from the complex collaborative nature itself (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Huxham 2003). Hence, this project's research topic is the inherent paradoxes in network management. The main research question is: *how is paradox managed in successful networks?*

That interorganizational network management demands more research requires little justification (Agranoff and McGuire 2001)—network management and process is under-researched in general (Ebers 1997; Ebers and Jarrillo 1997; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) and in the public and nonprofit in particular (Isett and Provan 2006). It is also well known that managing interorganizational networks is an inherently difficult task and by no means an easy option (Human and Provan 2000). Scholars of business alliances estimate

that more than 50% of alliances fail (Kelly, Schaan, and Jonacas 2002; Park and Ungson 2001). Failure rates are not available regarding public or nonprofit networks, but Huxham and Vangen (2000b) have identified how collaboration often succumbs to what they term as collaborative inertia<sup>30</sup>. Scholars suggest that failures and difficulty in managing interorganizational sets arise due to managerial complexity (Park and Ungson 2001), poor management (Meyer 1999), and the complex, dynamic, and ambiguous nature of collaborations (Huxham 2003). In fact, Bardach (1998) suggests that leadership is a central factor for network success. Hence, more research regarding management and leadership in interorganizational networks is called for.

As I have tried to set out in the previous two chapters, the claim that managing in collaborative contexts requires addressing paradoxes is both normative and theoretical, as well as empirically based. It is normative and theoretical in that interorganizational network and collaboration theories point towards the existence of paradox. Chapter 3 showed how critical factors identified in the literature, such as common aims, size, formalization, and trust, point to potential contradictions managers confront. My preliminary research has identified paradoxes in the context of successful coalitions. In particular, Ospina and I identified, in previous research, two paradoxes: the paradoxical tension of unity and diversity regarding the internal management of the network, and the paradoxical engagement of the network with external governmental agencies with whom the networks combine confrontation and cooperation (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005).

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<sup>30</sup> While there isn't any empirical evidence that network failure is in fact higher than individual firm failure (6, Goodwin, Peck, and Freeman 2006), the difficulty and complexity of network management seems undisputable.

Yet, inter-organizational network and collaboration theorists have down-played paradoxes. I believe that a focus on paradox offers great potential for developing theory and knowledge in the organizational studies field and can help scholars understand the nature of networks and their management.

In this research I use paradox as a guiding framework (Lewis 2000; Quinn and Cameron 1988) and empirically as a subject of inquiry (Lewis, 2000). First, after having come upon paradox empirically in my study with Ospina (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005), I developed a theoretical framework to encompass the paradoxes of both unity and diversity within the network, and cooperation and confrontation externally. Second, I have set out to explore empirically paradox in networks in order to unpack network leadership. I instrumentally focus on paradox—to advance knowledge on collaboration. More specifically it focuses on how the network manages *both contradictory goals and or processes* of the unity/diversity and cooperation/confrontation paradox.

### **Rationale and significance**

My research aims at contributing to theoretical and practical knowledge of inter-organizational collaboration, and thus at being useful to both scholars and practitioners (its significance [Booth, Colomb and Williamson 1995; Marshall and Rossman 1995]). The rationale behind this research is to advance the knowledge of network management by focusing on paradox.

This research has a dual purpose. Focusing on paradoxical tensions and contradictions may contribute to forward the under-researched field of network management, besides breaking ground in an unexplored topic, the relationship between paradox and successful inter-organizational collaboration.<sup>31</sup> Using paradox, paradoxical tensions, and contradiction has been useful in furthering knowledge in the fields of, among others, organizational effectiveness (Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983), strategy (Nutt and Backoff 1992), and leadership (March and Weil 2005)—as explained in Chapter 3. At the same time, in terms of practice, given the practical implications of both the research question and the field in which this research is a part of, public and nonprofit management, the research is also applied, in that it aims at illuminating a societal concern: a better understanding of paradox can offer new management techniques, models, and approaches with direct relevance to the practice of non-profit managers.

Findings produced by a paradox approach may therefore be directly significant to inter-organizational managers, since preliminary research has shown the existence and importance of paradox (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005), and since in other fields, such as group behavior (Smith and Berg 1987) or change management (Cameron and Quinn 1988), it has proven to be extremely useful. A paradox approach may provide reflective practitioners (Schon 1983) with useful conceptual handles (Huxham 2003)—or guiding dimensions and reference points—and may help to avoid both extreme simplification and complexities. Table VII below summarizes the basic scheme of the dissertation.

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<sup>31</sup> Therefore, this is a “basic” research aiming at contributing to fundamental knowledge and theory (Patton 2002), as opposed to applied research or evaluation research.

<b>Table VII. Basic scheme of dissertation</b>	
Topic	The inherent paradoxes in network management.
Question	How is paradox managed in successful networks?
Rationale	Increase knowledge of network management by exploring paradoxes faced by and created by networks.
Significance	Provide reflective practitioners with useful conceptual handles for managing networks..

### **Secondary questions and propositions**

As explained, in a preliminary research Ospina and I (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005) set out to answer *how are successful networks managed?* And in so doing we identified two paradoxes, one regarding inward work of the network, the diversity/unity paradox, and another regarding the outward work, namely the confrontation/cooperation paradox. In an effort to build on previous research, the further exploration of these two paradoxes will guide the research question: *how is paradox managed in successful networks?*

To do so, my first task has been to further explore the nature of these paradoxes and to answer the secondary question: *what are the form and the nature of the diversity/unity and confrontation/cooperation paradoxes in the context of network management?* The research propositions (or guiding hypotheses [Marshall and Rossman 1994]<sup>32</sup>) that served as theoretical departing points (Yin 1994) for this secondary question were, as discussed in Chapter 3, that network management requires taking into account paradoxes and that paradoxes may be of different forms. Based on this I want to first determine the form and nature of the paradoxes I am studying. While these propositions help give direction to the

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<sup>32</sup> I use propositions rather than hypotheses, since these latter are generally required to be measurable (Whetten 1989).




research, they do so with enough flexibility to avoid constraining the inquiry in any way (Eisenhardt 1989).

Having explored the nature and form of the paradoxes, my next task was to look at a second secondary question: *how do leadership activities help manage the unity/diversity and confrontation/cooperation paradoxes?* A research proposition developed in Chapter 3 is that network leadership draws on different management tasks: framing, facilitating, mobilizing, and activating. Hence, how do these activities relate to managing the paradoxes?

Finally, with insights about the nature of the paradoxes, how they are managed, I was ready to explore the implications of managing these paradoxes. More concretely, *how does managing the diversity/unity paradox contribute to build the interorganizational networks' power? And how does the power built affect the network's effectiveness?* Interorganizational networks aim at building their power to be effective. At the core of collaboration among organizations is the expectation that doing so will enhance their capacity to achieve their mission—in the cases studied here, to reframe a reality by influencing state actors. Power then may be understood as a proxy to explore the link between the management of paradoxical tensions and successful networks. In this sense, as I show in my analysis, member organizations make explicit that a major reason to join these collaborative networks is to build power for the immigrant rights movement. Furthermore, there is a need to further look into the role of power in collaboration and network management (Agranoff and McGuire 2001, 2003; Huxham and Beech 2003b).

The proposition related to this secondary question, then, is that sustaining the internal and external paradoxes increases the network's power and effectiveness. The following figure summarizes the study's logic: from propositions and research questions to expected contributions.

Figure X. The study's logic (source: own)



### Units and levels of analysis

My unit of analysis, the network, is consistent with my propositions and research questions (Yin 1994). The interviewees involved in my research are vehicles to capture

aspects of the network properties and its management. In this sense, I transition from individual to network (micro-macro) but, in so doing, I do not assume that the network is merely the aggregation of individuals nor that network level phenomena are always predicted, perceived, or intended by individuals (Coleman 1990; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Knoppen 2006).


Throughout the research my unit of analysis is the network, as demanded by many scholars (Berry et al. 2004; O'Toole 1997), and the level of analysis is broadly inter-organizational. However, the specific level in which I am interested in varies because interaction between actors in network management may occur at different inter-organizational levels: I distinguish three. First, interaction may occur between the network coordinating unit and the organizational members. Second, interaction may occur among network members. Third, interaction may occur between the network as a whole, via the coordinating unit or a member on behalf of the network, and external actors.<sup>33</sup> As explained in Chapter 3, this third level, the domain, is relevant to my analysis. This research focuses, then, on two levels of analysis: on the interaction between the coordinating unit and the members, and on the interaction between the network as a whole and the external actors. These two levels of analysis deal respectively with the internal management of the network and with managing outwards (Shortell et al. 2002). Figure XI illustrates the different levels and the unit of analysis.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> It may be argued that a fourth level exists, that which includes interaction between individuals within the network coordinating unit. However, this level of analysis is out of my broader interorganizational level.

<sup>34</sup> In fact, the research literature has been surprisingly silent regarding the distinction between these two concepts. Although oftentimes the unit and level of analysis coincide, they may vary. Example of such non-

Figure XI. Levels and unit of analysis (source: own)



Furthermore, I have discarded looking explicitly at inter-member interaction, since covering these interactions qualitatively is not realistic given my time and resources, and the number of organizations in these coalitions (from 20 to over 150)<sup>35</sup>. I was able, nevertheless, to capture inter-member interaction by focusing on coordinating unit-member interaction as well as during my observations of network-wide events.

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coincidence is Williamson's (1981) work on Transaction Cost Economics. In this work, his unit of analysis is the transaction—which is also his independent variable while the governance structure is the dependent variable—and the dyad is the level of analysis.

<sup>35</sup> This could have been captured using social network analysis but would not have informed my questions.

## **RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY**

### **A qualitative methodology**

Given the complex, dynamic, innovative, under-researched character of my research topic and informal nature of paradoxes, a deep, rich, in-depth qualitative study is undoubtedly the most appropriate research methodology (Agranoff and Radin 1991; De Rond and Bouckchikhi 2004; Kenis and Oerlemans 2004; Marshall and Rossman 1995).

Additionally, research on paradox seems to imply a qualitative methodology. Lewis (2000) points out how one of the challenges in researching paradoxes is to identify, or bracket down, the paradox. This, according to her review, has been done using narrative techniques, psychodynamic techniques, and a multi-paradigmatic approach—for a well-known examples of this latter strategy, see Allison's (1971) essay on the Cuban Missile Crisis. In fact, Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005) came across paradox in their research by using a qualitative narrative technique. To further understand paradox and network management, I also use a qualitative narrative technique (Dodge, Ospina, and Foldy 2005; Ospina and Dodge 2005a, 2005b), since a quantitative operationalization of paradox did not seem feasible.

But, not only does paradox require the use of qualitative approaches, so does the incipient field of network management. The analytical appropriateness (Silverman 2000) of the qualitative approach chosen is justified since the network management research is process-oriented and focuses on the content of the interactions (Borzel 1998).

Furthermore, qualitative research allows to better understand the issues underlying the theory of collaboration (Ariño and de la Torre 1998). Given the limited knowledge regarding the process and interactions within a network, extensive observation and in-depth interviews are required (Agranoff and McGuire 2001).

This research's approach is explanatory, since the research is interpretative and aims at generating explanation (Miller and Crabtree 1999), and since an exploratory preliminary study already identified the two paradoxes (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005). Multiple cases are used, since evidence from such designs is often considered more compelling (Yin 1994) and is better suited for explanatory research (Marshall and Rossman 1995), in particular regarding complex managerial processes (Agranoff and Radin 1991). The research is mainly interpretivist in that it aims at explaining a causal mechanism (Lin 1998), namely the mechanism of network leadership. However, the multiple-case design allows it to see some patterns across cases, and hence also mixes into the research a more positivist approach as well.

Although this study uses cases—the networks—it is not a case-study as defined by either Eisenhardt (1989), Stake (1994), or Yin(1994). It is not a case-study in that the analysis does not go into detailed depth and historical background of each network. I do not elaborate broad contextual descriptions of each network. Also, as I show next, the primary data sources are interviews, supported by observation and documents. These latter sources, though, are secondary in importance. This study is, then, a comparative interview study of four cases of network management: a qualitative study of four cases

that uses interviews and grounded theory-type analysis (Creswell 1998; Marshall and Rossman 1995 Miles and Huberman 1995).

### **The cases**

The term case is not well defined and isn't homogeneously used in the literature (Ragin, 1992a). The cases here used primarily refer to the networks, the units of analysis, but also incorporate the domain in which the networks are embedded. This highlights the duality of the term case: the specific capital letter "Case," which refers to the unit of analysis, or the general and broader small letter "case" (Ragin 1992b), which includes both the unit of analysis and the context. The "case" in this sense has a blurry boundary which can hardly be precisely drawn (Miles and Huberman 1995).

Using a theory-driven and replication sampling strategy (Charmaz 2000; Miles and Huberman 1998; Yin, 1994), I used three criteria to select all four cases. First, all networks had to be associated to a Leadership for a Change World program (LCW) awardee<sup>36</sup>. Second, all networks had to be inter-organizational action networks (Agranoff 2003) or coalitions composed of independent organizational members working together to tackle common issues—as defined in Chapter 2. Third, networks dealt with immigration issues, a criterion included to enhance comparability among the cases since most networks in the LCW program focused on immigration. This has two direct

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<sup>36</sup> All networks were the primary organization for which the awardees were recognized. In the case of CAUSA, the awardee was primarily recognized for his work with Northwest Treeplanters and Farmworkers Union (PCUN), but CAUSA (Oregon's immigration coalition) played a decisive role in his selection. Moreover, as will be shown in the description of the case itself, CAUSA is closely related to the awardee organization, PCUN, and is perceived as very successful.

implications on the external validity of my research. It makes analytic generalization (Firestone 1993) within the policy sector more robust but also more constrained to networks dealing with immigration issues.<sup>37</sup>

The four networks here were associated with an awardee from the Leadership for a Changing World program. Awardees of this Ford Foundation funded program undergo a rigorous selection process which begins with 1000-1500 nominations per year, whittled down to the 17-20 individual or teams of awardees by national and regional selection committees.<sup>38</sup> (The research team plays no role in the selection process.) Selection criteria state that award recipients are leaders or leadership teams who are tackling and challenging critical social problems with effective, systemic solutions which, though largely unrecognized outside their field or community, would, if recognized, inspire others. In addition, LCW seeks to recognize leadership that is strategic, brings different groups of people together, is sustainable beyond any individual effort, and gets results. Given the high nominee-to-awardee ratio (at least 50:1), the rigor of the selection process, and the selection criteria, these organizations can be considered leadership exemplars (Foldy, Goldman, Ospina 2004)<sup>39</sup>. I derive a major assumption of my research

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<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, I do not assume that paradox is exclusive of network management in the immigration field.

<sup>38</sup> The process begins when individuals and teams are nominated by colleagues or supporters. A national committee selects about 250 top candidates, who move on to one of six regional selection committees. The regional committees, using newly submitted essays from each nominee, select 5 primary and 4 secondary regional finalists. The Advocacy Institute and the Ford Foundation choose 36 semi-finalists and conduct site visits. A national selection committee reviews all the materials from the semi-finalists, and by consensus recommends 24 finalists, 17 to 20 of whom will make the final cut.

<sup>39</sup> Foldy, Goldman, and Ospina (2004) note that there might be a sampling bias in the LCW program's selection process since it emphasizes tangible accomplishments, which could potentially under-select nonprofits working in particularly challenging contexts whose accomplishments are less easily captured. This however, does not seem to affect my research but may affect the external validity of the conclusions.



from this point: that all awarded networks in LCW are successful. As mentioned in Chapter 2, a network's success may mean many different things depending on the criterion used and the relative level of the evaluation. Throughout this study I understand network success as the network's degree of accomplishment of its mission. Hence I am using the network as the relative unit of evaluation and effectiveness as the criterion of evaluation. In the next chapter I describe in more detail these network's achievements and provide evidence of their effectiveness.

King, Keohane, Verba (1994) advocate for a post-positivist qualitative methodology where the dependent variable, is not constant in order to allow for causal inferences. Although I do not necessarily assume that all networks are equally successful, I do not compare networks according to their success. In this study, four "exceptional" cases (Stake 1994) are used to produce initial theory, using an interpretivist logic, and cross-case comparisons are done along dimensions other than success (e.g. size). This is not a study identifying either success in networks or successful networks but rather about identifying leadership practices of networks that have already been identified as successful. In this sense, then, all four cases are "exceptional" (Miles and Huberman 1995) since successful networks are not commonplace (Huxham 2003).

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Moreover, the Ford Foundation's ideological leanings did introduce bias into the sample. Only progressive, social justice organizations were selected as awardees. Conservative social change organizations are not included

The fact that all networks were part of a research program led by the Research Center of Leadership in Action<sup>40</sup>—of which I am part—guaranteed continued access to the cases (Marshall and Rossman 1995—see Appendix 1 for the proposal used to contact cases). The networks are<sup>41</sup>:

- New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC) – New York
- Coalition for Asian, African, European, Latin Immigrants of Illinois (CAAELII) – Illinois
- National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) – U.S.
- CAUSA – Oregon’s Immigration Coalition

The next chapter describes each in detail. For now, Table VIII summarizes their main characteristics.

Network	Budget	Members	Mission
NYIC (New York)	2005 \$2.167.560	164	To provide a forum for the immigrant community to discuss urgent issues and provide a vehicle for collective action in addressing these issues.
CAUSA (Oregon)	2006 \$195.000	16	To promote immigrant rights and well-being, and to counter the growing anti-immigrant agenda in Oregon.
CAAELII (Illinois)	2006 \$1.690.218	20	To improve the quality of life for immigrants and refugees and to ensure dignity and respect by organizing and uniting communities through education, leadership development, and direct services, and by promoting the voice of community in public policy.
NDLON (United States)	2004 \$290.000	30	To strengthen and expand the work of local day laborer organizing groups, in order to become more effective and strategic in building leadership, advancing low-wage worker and immigrant rights, and developing successful models for organizing immigrant contingent/temporary workers.

<sup>40</sup> Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University.

<sup>41</sup> Note how three out of the four networks call themselves “coalitions.” Throughout the study, following Agranoff and McGuire (2001, 2003), I use the term network to refer to these interorganizational sets.

## The research cycle

As mentioned, this research builds on the following model constructed from both the literature reviewed and the preliminary study carried out by Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005).

**Figure XII. Research model (source: own)**




Based on Marshall and Rossman (1995) and Miller and Crabtree (1999), the research cycle illustrated in Figure XIII, depicted as a spiral of the two moments in the research—the preliminary exploratory study and this second explanatory study—illustrates the circular and ongoing nature of such a qualitative study. Moreover, the first cycle of research was carried out with a “looser” design while the second cycle, the research presented here, has a “tighter” design (Miles and Huberman 1994) since it is more focused both regarding the two specific paradoxes studied and the secondary research questions. In neither cycle, however, was “inductive” purity proclaimed (Miles and Huberman 1994), since even the first exploratory study approached the data with a broad and deep knowledge of the literature in mind.

Although two networks already were part of the preliminary study (namely NYIC and CAAELLI), all four networks were involved in the same data collection process. This is so because the data collection method of the preliminary study by Ospina and Saz-

Carranza was open and appreciative, which produced data regarding general management (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005)—quite different from the one needed in this research.

**Figure XIII.** Research cycles (source: own, based on Marshall and Rossman [1995] and Miller and Crabtree [1999])




During the data collection and analysis of my dissertation—Data collection 2—I cyclically iterated between both tasks. Before reentering the field to collect more data, I analyzed some of the already collected data (Miles and Huberman 1994). Such interrelation between data collection and analysis is typical of qualitative studies (Eisenhardt 1989). In this research the flexibility allowed me to focus my data collection as the data analysis advanced (Table XII and Table XIII below show how the codes evolved during the analysis).

## Data collection

The primary data are the transcripts from in-depth interviews with members of the coordinating unit of each network, involving voice-recording. I triangulated these data collection methods with other forms of data—observation and documents—(Huxham 2002; Marshall and Rossman 1995) to shed light from different angles and visions (Fine, Weiss, Wessen, and Wong 2000), and to reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation by achieving redundancy of data using multiple perceptions (Stake 2000).

In this research, I use both source triangulation, with respect to interviewees, and method triangulation, between interviews and other data (Janesick 2000; Miller and Crabtree 1994; Richardson 2000). The sampling of data sources involves settings, events, and people (Marshall and Rossman 1995; Miles and Huberman 1994—see below for justification of source sampling). Moreover, as mentioned, multiple cases were considered, as depicted in Figure XIV.

**Figure XIV. Triangulation in the research (source: own)**



### *Interviewee sampling*

The interviewees were selected with a theoretically driven within-case sampling strategy, allowing for enough flexibility to account for the rolling quality of such within-case sampling (Miles and Huberman 1994). Initially, the design included four sets of interviews per case: one individual and three group interviews. Representatives from the network's coordinating unit (the network manager and other staff) and from member organizations were interviewed. In total, I carried out 22 interviews involving 31 interviewees: 5 managers<sup>42</sup>, 12 staff of the network's coordinating unit, and 13 organizational members were interviewed in 7 group, 11 individual, and 3 telephone interviews.

Network	Interviewees				Interviews			
	Manager	Staff	Member	Total	Group	Indiv.	Teleph.	Total
CAAELII	1	6	2	9	2	4	0	6
CAUSA	3	1	6	10	3	2	1	6
NDLON	1	1	4	6	1	2	2	5
NYIC	1	4	1	6	1	4	0	5
Total	6	12	13	31	7	12	3	22

The preliminary study that served as a basis for this one involved four group interviews with two managers, four staff, and six organizational members (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005).

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<sup>42</sup> CAUSA was undergoing a manager transition during my field visit, so I interviewed both the outgoing and incoming managers. Moreover, the incoming manager was interviewed twice, in a group interview and in an individual one.

Because these are all formalized inter-organizational networks, their well-defined coordinating units are extremely valuable research sources for my purposes<sup>43</sup>. Also, since these networks are second-level inter-organizational sets, the constituencies are dealt with by the member organizations and are, hence, less aware and involved in the management of the network. For this reason, although constituencies were included in the fieldwork's observations, they were not interviewed.

The rationale behind this sampling is to triangulate the different perspectives of actors strongly involved in the network management, but simultaneously to focus on the network manager. This actor provided most of the data related to network management, regarding the two paradoxes and around the relation between the paradoxes and management (in particular, leadership activities and power). The staff of the coordinating unit offered information that complemented and checked for the network manager's opinions and interpretations. Selected organizational members offered a limited but insightful perspective from the organizations' standpoint. The following matrix summarizes the contributions expected from each interviewee group. As I mention ahead, I did not find differences among these groups of respondents. However, I did find that the network manager offered the most informational depth, while the organizational member representatives the least. Other staff of the coordinating unit were somewhere in between.

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<sup>43</sup> While in networks with low formalization and no centralization at all, no sole actor may have an overarching sense or view of the entire network, in centralized contexts these actors are well versed and excellent informants.

<b>Table X. Actor sampling matrix</b>				
Actors	U/D	U/D & mngt	C/C	C/C & mngt
Coordinating unit (manager & staff)	***	***	***	***
Organizational members	***	**	**	**
U/D = Unity and/or Diversity; U/D & mngt = internal paradox and its effect on management; C/C = Cooperation and/or Confrontation; C/C & mngt = external paradox and its effect on management. ***very relevant, **relevant, *slightly relevant.				

### *Types of interviews*

Both group and individual interviews were used. All interviews with coordinating unit components were in-person. All other interviews were carried out during field visits and in-person, except for three telephone interviews with two NDLOM members and one CAUSA member. No systematic research has been carried out comparing telephone and in-person interviews, but it seems that the latter tend to elicit more thoughtful responses given their slower pace, to generate higher comfort due to face-to-face interaction, and to capture better, more complex issues (Shuy 2002). I used telephone interviews only with those interviewees whom I had met during a fieldwork but with whom I had not been able to set up an interview at the time. Hence, these interviews were more focused—since I had already carried out many more before them—and high degree of comfort on both sides existed, given that I had previously met the interviewees.

The group interviews used are what Frey and Fontana (1991) define as “field formal group interviews”<sup>44</sup> since they occurred in the network’s site, were loosely directive (see below for the general scheme of the interviews and Appendix 3 for the detailed protocol) and hence semi-structured. The advantages of such group interviews are, apart from their

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<sup>44</sup> As opposed to the focus group, brainstorming, nominal-delphi, or field-natural types.



obvious cost and time efficiency, that they provided insight into the relationships between interviewees, took advantage of the group dynamics as they reflect on each other's input during the interview, and made the interview more polyphonic (Frey and Fontana 1991). Group interviews' main characteristic is to make explicit interviewee-interactive insights leading to greater emphasis on the participants' points of view (Morgan 1997). However, it demands specific skills from the interviewer, who has to be capable of maintaining focus. In my group interviews, the number of interviewees was kept to a maximum of three (Fontana and Frey 2000), since size becomes an important factor increasing the difficulty for the interviewer and decreasing the time for each interviewee to intervene.

Moreover, combining both group interviews with staff, board, and non-board members, and individual interviews with the network managers allowed me to strike a trade-off between breadth in the interviewee sampling and depth and nuance in the data produced by the interviewees.

The total amount of interviews and interviewees varied per case due to logistical and operational matters on the field; the maximum amount of data was always collected, hence providing uneven data among cases. However, I believe the data covers a minimum for all four cases.

### ***Content of interviews***

The interviews had four sections (see Appendix 3 for the detailed interview questionnaire). First, the interview started with opening questions about the interviewee's work. This first part was an appreciative inquiry (Srivastava and Cooperrider 1990) and

gave the opportunity to the interviewee to explain his/her work and point out its positive aspects<sup>45</sup>. Thereafter, challenges regarding the internal management of the network were discussed. The third section included questions regarding the interaction between the network and external target state actors (e.g. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services). Fourth, the interviewees were consulted regarding the unity/diversity and cooperation/confrontation paradoxes and regarding other tensions and paradoxes in their networks. Since managers are often so embedded in their actions that they are not aware of the paradoxes they are confronted with or of the paradoxical nature of their actions, only in this last part of the interview was the concept of paradox made explicit to avoid drawing their attention to it<sup>46</sup>. Obviously, each interview had a tailored protocol.

The four parts of the interview were structured in a tree-and-branch fashion—interview divided into equal parts, and each covered by a main question—to obtain similar degrees of depth, detail, vividness, richness, and nuance (Rubin and Rubin 2005)<sup>47</sup>. The main interview questions were derived from the research questions and propositions, except for the first main question, which was broad and suggested the interviewees guide me through their role in the network and through the network itself. Follow-up questions focused on interesting ideas that arose or on unclear matters, while probes were used to

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<sup>45</sup> Stamp and Lipnack (2004) actually suggest that appreciative inquiry and network theory are intertwined in theory and practice and propose this method as a very suitable option for the latter.

<sup>46</sup> Moreover, the qualitative interviewing literature does not recommend posing the research problem directly at the interviewees: see Rubin and Rubin (2005).

<sup>47</sup> These authors identify two other types of interview structures: opening-the-locks, which is used to produce a broad view of a subject; and the river-and-channel, which is extremely open and follows the interviewee.

keep the interview focused on my level and matter of interest without constraining the interviewee (Rubin and Rubin 2005).

While not using exact wording, I followed Rubin and Rubin's (2005) advice regarding the wording of the questions. I was cautious in imposing, in any manner, my assumptions on the interviewees, questions did not encourage yes-or-no answers or abstract rationalization of the interviewees' motives, actions, and experiences (i.e. "why" questions), and I avoided academic jargon.

For each interview, I also observed nonverbal communication modes, such as the use of inter-personal space to communicate attitudes (proxemic) and body movements or postures (kinesic) (Fontana and Frey 2000). This was recorded in a post-interview log (see Appendix 4), as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994).

### ***Observation and documentation***

As another data collection method, I used observation, which complemented interviews by exploring possible differences between what people do and what they say (Huxham 2002) and by capturing both social interaction and the particular settings where these occur. The data collected through observation were recorded in an observation log (see Appendix 5) and included quotations, and researcher's commentaries and check-lists (Angrosino and Mays de Perez 1994; Huxham 2002). As soon as possible, the jottings on the log were transcribed and expanded, considering observations, interpretations, and personal comments (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995).

Alongside data collected from interviews and observation, I analyzed documentation. I collected as much documentation as possible, particularly that regarding all external activities which implied interaction with the public sector and other actors, as well as documentation regarding their internal management, such as strategy documents, mission, statutes, and minutes of assemblies or meetings. I went over more than 100 documents (see Appendix 8 for a full list) and observed over 15 major events. Rallies, strategic meetings, and annual assemblies, among other events, were observed. Appendix 7 lists the more relevant events, however, the list is only illustrative since I would spend several days uninterrupted with these organizations making it difficult to distinguish when an event started and ended. Table XI below illustrates the sampling logic of observations and documents. Observation of a major activity as well as analysis of a document contributed to illuminate the context that characterized either paradox. Observations also allowed for better understanding of the context that influences how both paradoxes are managed.

<b>Table XI. Document/observation sampling matrix</b>				
	U/D	U/D & mngt	C/C	C/C & mngt
Observation	***	**	***	**
Documents	***	*	***	*
U/D = Unity and/or Diversity; U/D & mngt = internal paradox and its effect on management; C/C = Cooperation and/or Confrontation; C/C & mngt = external paradox and its effect on management. ***very relevant, **relevant, *slightly relevant.				

### **Data analysis**

The research primarily analyzed texts—transcribed interviews and observation notes, and documents—considering some basic additional information about context such as the age of the network, the budget, and the organizational charts. Using the interview transcripts

as a window to the interviewee’s experience (Silverman 2000) and knowledge (Dodge, Ospina, and Foldy 2005), I used initially very broad codes guided by the research questions—see Table XII. However, I remained open to new “invivo” and “open” codes (Strauss and Corbin 1998) making my approach to the data mixed top-down and bottom-up (Miles and Huberman 1995).

***Codes, memos, and matrices***

Because of the focus on paradox, I phrased the codes as “statements relating to...” (rather than “statements reflecting...”) in order to include both the construct I was looking for as well as its negative. For example, the code regarding diversity captured both “willingness for diversity” as well as “unwillingness.” This then allowed me to capture the actual antonyms of diversity and unity, similarity and disunity, respectively.

<b>Table XII. Initial set of codes used</b>	
Code	Statements related to...
Diversity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• willingness to include heterogeneous organizational partners</li> <li>• real involvement of heterogeneous organizational partners</li> </ul>
Unity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• feelings of belonging to the coalition</li> <li>• commitment to the coalition</li> </ul>
Confrontation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• confrontational challenges towards external target agency</li> </ul>
Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• cooperative relations with external target agency</li> </ul>
Source	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• why one (or both) of the poles of the paradox is required or necessary</li> </ul>
Implications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• how managing the paradoxes affect the management dimensions (both positively and negatively)</li> </ul>
Awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• acknowledgement of contradictory requirements</li> </ul>
Managing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• how networks cope with the management of paradox</li> </ul>
Power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• power to mobilize, organize, strategize, control information, authorize action, and/or influence access to decision-making processes</li> </ul>

As analysis advanced, certain issues emerged and others faded. Building primarily on my analysis but also the literature reviewed, I introduced new codes, modified others, and

eliminated the ones that did not seem relevant. The final codes were grouped in four meta-codes: activities, dimensions, power, and tensions. The tensions, activities, and power codes referred respectively to paradoxes and tensions, leadership activities, and aspects of power, as reviewed in Chapter 3. The dimensions codes referred to other salient management dimensions, beyond power and activities, as reviewed in Chapter 2: trust, membership, structure, and objectives. Table XIII illustrates the final set of codes used—the evolution with respect to the initial set of codes is evident.

<b>Table XIII. Final set of codes used</b>	
Code	Statement referring to...
Activities	
MngtA-Activation	Recruiting members
MngtA-Facilitation	Managing interaction between members
MngtA-Framing	The network's structure, process, and collective meaning-making
MngtA-Mobilizing	Gathering support outside the network
MngtA-Nurturing	Nurturing the network
<i>MngtA-Strategizing*</i>	<i>Making strategy, including goals, objectives, and tactics</i>
Dimensions	
MngtD-Membership	Member characteristics, including individuals' characteristics
MngtD-Objectives/Issues	Objectives, strategies, and tactics
MngtD-St-CoordUnit	The network's coordinating unit
<i>MngtD-St-Open*</i>	<i>Openness of network's structure and process</i>
MngtD-Structure	Rules, processes, structure, including different tiers and working groups.
MngtD-Trust	Trust
Power	
PwrBaseK	Knowledge, skills, and access to information
PwrBaseL	Legitimacy and reputation
PwrBaseR	Resources in general, including access and position
<i>PwrCapacity*</i>	<i>Building capacity for members</i>
PwrDecision-making	Decision-making, both internally and externally, and including agenda-setting and non-decision-making
PwrOver	Power over someone or something
PwrTo	Power to
Tensions	
T-ConfCoop	Confrontation and/or cooperation
T-Diversity	Diversity, including division
<i>T-OtherTensions*</i>	<i>Other tensions and interaction between the unity/diversity and confrontation/cooperation</i>
T-Unity	Unity, including homogeneity
*Note: codes in <i>italics</i> are data-based, while all the others are literature-driven.	

Transcripts were analyzed continually using Atlas-Ti qualitative coding software, in order to refine the data collection process as new aspects emerged in the analysis<sup>48</sup>. Cases were first analyzed independently of each other, using matrices. A within-case concepts-ordered matrix was set up for each meta-code (Miles and Huberman 1994), see table below. These matrices consisted of a code and some of its most relevant supporting quotations. These quotations were then grouped in subconcepts or claims relating to push and pull factors (Silverman 2000) linking between concepts or sub-concepts.

<b>Table XIV. Example of conceptual within-case matrix</b>	
Subconcept	Evidence (quotation)
Code: Activation	
Network activation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We do, go, go after some groups to bring into our coalition,[...] One example is that we are weak in the Bronx and so we're trying to get groups in the Bronx to be involved [...] so a couple of times we've been trying to present our work to them. So, you know, in some cases we do court groups. 9-55</li> <li>• ...</li> </ul>
Game activation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• So depending on the issue, a different group of outside agencies will come to the table because some, you know, some issues appeal to a wide range of agencies. They come with a sense of urgency embedded, a sense of injustice. If government is proposing to cut benefits that's something that stirs people up a lot more than trying to organize people to expand benefits. 11-54</li> <li>• ...</li> </ul>
...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ...</li> </ul>

For each case, a draft narrative and causal map were spelled out in an effort to build a tentative explanatory model (Ryan and Bernard 1994). Similarities and differences were noted, and a final, cross-case comparative matrix was constructed for each meta-code (Table XV below illustrates such a matrix). A final analysis took place during the writing of the findings themselves.

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<sup>48</sup> Additionally, prior to constructing the matrix of the coded data, a preliminary co-occurrence matrix (see Appendix 9) was constructed as a guiding tool. A symmetrical code-by-code matrix summed up the number of times a code co-occurred (overlapped to some degree) with another code. This very broadly hinted at some relations between codes.

Subconcept	Evidence (quotation)			
	NDLON	CAUSA	CAAELII	NYIC
Unity & Diversity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ultimately there's a really strong focus that unites us all in focusing on worker development 30-17</li> <li>...</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sometimes different messaging or a different way of framing things. It's a predominantly immigrant-based coalition so... A lot of it has to do with geographic diversity as well, not just diversity of communities. 21-36</li> <li>...</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>I think they come together and they discuss their different efforts, their different campaigns and they get a sense of being part of a larger group or a larger effort, and I think it inspires them. 24-11</li> <li>...</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>But the ones we might not agree on, I think we agree to disagree. So it's not a perfect solution but I think we all understand that if we don't work together there's no way that we can move this forward. I think it's in the back of everybody's mind. 35-19</li> <li>...</li> </ul>
...	• ...	• ...	• ...	• ...

Throughout the research, I was involved with “memoing,” or note-taking, especially regarding codes and theory construction, but also regarding operational matters (Ryan and Bernard 1994). Highlights and interesting facts from observation notes and post-interview log forms were also developed into memos. I incorporated memos into my analysis while coding and constructing the matrices, as well as during the final write-up.

**ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Given my topic, *the inherent paradoxes in network management*, I am obligated to consider a few brief epistemological and ontological issues. The varied theoretical sources I draw on in this research situate it in what Lewis and Kelemen (2002) call multiparadigmatic research, which uses divergent paradigm lenses to contrast varied representations and explore plurality and paradox (e.g. Lewis and Grimes 1999; Ybema 1996).



This research draws from post-positivist, critical, and constructionist paradigms<sup>49</sup>. Ontologically, this research assumes a “real” reality but one which is only imperfectly apprehendable and approachable through both measurable and unmeasurable phenomena (Guba and Lincoln 1994). The focus on power situates this research also within the boundaries of critical theory (Crotty 1998), while its consideration of meaning as collectively generated brings it close to constructionism (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Schutz 1967; Searle 1995). This research, however, breaks away from post-positivism by incorporating contradictions and paradox and not considering falsification or null-hypothesis rejection (Popper 1972) as the only valid research strategy (Quinn and Cameron 1988; Teunissen 1996), and by making the assumption that social reality can be illuminated even when its elements cannot be directly “measured.”

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<sup>49</sup> Following Guba and Lincoln (1994) and Heron and Reason (1997), I refer to post-positivist, post-modernism, critical theory, constructionism, interpretivism, and constructivism as paradigms which imply a certain ontology and epistemology. Other authors refer to them either as an epistemology, a theoretical perspective, or an ontology. In fact, Crotty (1998) considers constructionism as an epistemology, but interpretivism and critical theory as theoretical perspectives grounded in constructionism.

## 5. IMMIGRATION AND NONPROFIT NETWORKS

*Ni citoyen ni étranger, ni vraiment du côté  
de Meme, ni totalement du côté de l'Autre,  
l'«immigré» se situe en ce lieu «bâtard» dont  
parle aussi Platon, la frontière de l'être et  
du non-être social.*

Pierre Bourdieu

This chapter introduces the immigration policy field in the U.S., to which all four cases pertain, and locates these cases within this field. I first present a historical summary of immigration followed by the current debate regarding immigration in the U.S. In the second part of the chapter, I briefly describe the four cases according to their mission, activities, origins, and structural characteristics. I conclude the chapter with a comparison matrix highlighting differences and similarities across the cases, which will aid my analysis in the following chapters.

### **IMMIGRATION: CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN THE U.S.**

As Spain beats its record on daily entries of undocumented immigrants (733) (Pardellas 2006), and Paris' immigrant periphery is under continual tension (Jimenez Barca 2006), the U.S. Congress is immersed in a heated confederal debate on immigration in general. Although all three situations deal in general terms with different immigrant groups—Spain with illegal entries of African migrants, Paris with second-generation immigrants of North African descent, and the U.S. with undocumented residents—the extremely high relevance of immigration as a political and social issue is evident.

According to the United Nations Population Division (2005), since 1960 the number of international migrants in the world has more than doubled, passing from an estimated 75

million to almost 191 million in 2005, constituting 3% of the world's population<sup>50</sup>. Among these only 13.5 million of world migrants are refugees (7%)<sup>51</sup>. The countries receiving these immigrants also have changed. While during the '60s 57% of all migrants lived in the less developed regions, nowadays 64% of all migrants live in the developed world—Figure XV illustrates these different trends<sup>52</sup>. Three quarters of the migrant population are found in 28 countries, led by the United States with 38.4 millions (20.2% of all migrants and 12.9% of its population)<sup>53</sup>. This phenomenon has increased relevance of the immigration policy sector in U.S. internal affairs and, hence, also exemplifies the increased challenges and opportunities faced by U.S. nonprofit networks and their increased overall importance in the American society.

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
<sup>50</sup> However about a fifth of this increase is the result of the transformation of internal migrants into international migrants—mainly due to the change in borders in the former Soviet Union.

<sup>51</sup> The definition, and hence the total number, of refugees is still under dispute. The United Nations only considers as refugees those migrants that trespass a national border and are reported by national governments. Other agencies also consider internally displaced people (IDPs) as refugees. (IDPs are forced migrants but that do not trespass a national border.) The Jesuit Refugee Service, for example, estimated the total number of forced migrants to be over 40 million people. ([www.jesuitrefugeeservice.com](http://www.jesuitrefugeeservice.com))

<sup>52</sup> The United Nations Population Division considers all of Europe plus Northern America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan as more developed regions, while the less developed regions comprise all regions of Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America, and the Caribbean, plus Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia.

<sup>53</sup> Spain is tenth with 2.8 million (2.5% of all migrants and 11.1% of its population).

**Figure XV. International migrants as a percentage of the host country population (source: United Nations Population Division 2005)**



### A brief history of immigration in the US

According to Tichenor (2002), all eras in U.S. history have had strong debates on the economic, cultural, and national security effects of immigration, as native-born mythologize their own past. However, during the early decades of the U.S. Republic, since its founding in 1776, the governmental policy was fairly laissez-faire.

The first immigration acts appeared at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, first barring prostitutes and criminals, and thereafter excluding the Chinese from entering the U.S. The

restrictions on immigration started at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century: the national quotas were introduced in the '20s. In 1940 the Immigration National Service (INS) was transferred from the Labor to the Justice Department. Later comes the first Bracero Program (1943)—a guest-worker program with Mexico, British Honduras, Barbados, and Jamaica—and the Chinese exclusion act is repealed in favor of meager quotas.

Expansive immigration policies took over during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, when the political debate was not along the conservative-liberal divide but between the rights-oriented expansionists and market-oriented expansionists (Tichenor 1994). In 1965 the Hart-Celler Act dismantled national quotas systems and established preferences criteria with emphasis on family re-unification, while pro-immigration reached its highest mark with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which opened the possibility for citizenship to more than three million undocumented immigrants. This expansion may be explained by the enfranchisement of immigrants by the late 20<sup>th</sup> Century combined with democratic elections (Tichenor 2002). However, by the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, bills restricting immigration were being passed at both the national and state levels, in particular several 1996 acts that limited immigrant access to public benefits. These bills were nevertheless counter-fought effectively and quickly by pro-immigration forces, including some of the networks here studied.


<b>Table XVI. Overview of major U.S. immigration legislation<sup>54</sup></b>	
<b>Legislation/Year</b>	<b>Major provisions</b>
Immigration Act 1875	Bars prostitutes and criminals
Chinese Exclusion Act 1882	Excludes Chinese
National Quota Law 1921	Limits immigration of each nationality to 3% of the number of foreign-born of that nationality living in the U.S. in 1910
Immigration Act 1940	INS transferred from Labor to Justice Department
Bracero Program 1943	Guestworker program with Mexico, British Honduras, Barbados, and Jamaica
Act of December 17, 1943	Repeals Chinese exclusion in favor of meager quotas
Refugee Relief Act 1953	Grants permanent residence to 214,000 European refugees
Cuban Refugee Act 1960	Begins Cuban Refugee program
Bracero Re-Authorization 1964	Terminates Bracero program
Hart-Celler Act 1965	Dismantles national quotas systems; establishes preferences criteria with emphasis on family re-unification
INA Amendments 1978	Establishes worldwide ceiling on annual immigrants (290,000)
Immigration Reform and Control Act 1986	Amnesty to 3 million undocumented; establishes weak employer sanctions; and introduces immigration anti-discrimination agency
Personal Responsibility Act 1996	Limits immigrant access to public benefits
Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act 1996	Strengthens border enforcement; expedites deportation; establishes exceptions for non-citizens
Patriot Act 2001	Confers vast and unchecked powers to the Executive branch, suspending many civil liberties and removing immigrants' constitutional protection
Homeland Security Act 2002	Transforms the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Department of Justice into the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Real ID Act 2005	Increases the necessary evidence required both to corroborate one's identity and for states to issue a driver's license.
Source: own based on Tichenor (2002).	

During this early part of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, anti-immigration forces have gained momentum, especially after 9/11, and produced restrictive bills such as the Patriot Act 2001 and the Real ID Act 2005, which, respectively, confer vast and unchecked powers to the Executive branch for suspending many civil liberties and removing immigrants' constitutional protection, and increase the necessary evidence required both to corroborate one's identity and to receive a driver's license. The Homeland Security Act

<sup>54</sup> See Appendix 10 for an extended version of this table.


of 2002, which transformed the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Department of Justice into the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) a unit of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), exemplifies the political climate now dominant. The table below summarizes major U.S. Immigration Legislation. Of particular importance to us are those bills passed during the 80's and onwards. The networks here studied were created in response to the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, the Personal Responsibility Act, or the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act of 1996. And all have been active in combating the regressive acts posterior to the year 2000.

**Figure XVI. Annual Immigration to the United States: Fiscal Years 1820-2004 (source: United States Department of Homeland Security 2006)**



Closely following the political moods and bills passed in congress, legal immigrant entries to the U.S. have been rising steadily since the 40's. Almost uninterruptedly since 1986, annual legal entries have surpassed the 800,000 figure (as Figure XVI illustrates), highlighting the significance of the work of the immigration networks here studied.

**Figure XVII. Immigration to the U.S. in terms of origin (source: United States Department of Homeland Security 2006)**





In terms of national/cultural origins, the immigrant flow to the U.S. has varied (as Figure XVII shows).<sup>55</sup> Europeans predominated during the 19<sup>th</sup> Century and reached a peak in 1910. From the mid 20<sup>th</sup> Century onwards, Asians and North Americans (mainly Mexicans) have become the main immigrant groups.

### **Immigration today in the U.S.**

Immigrants, as defined by U.S. immigration law, are “persons lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States” (United States Department of Homeland Security 2005, 4). Except for when referring to figures provided by the USCIS, the definition of immigrants I use in this research is the one used by the networks I study, which also includes foreign individuals living in the U.S. without authorization—see Table XVII for some immigration-related official definitions. Currently, aliens may become immigrants by applying from abroad, or by filing from within the U.S. an application with the USCIS for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence.

U.S. law gives preferential immigration status to persons having a close family relationship with a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, persons with needed job skills, or persons who qualify as refugees. Caps per category exist for all except refugees. Family-sponsored preferences are limited to 480,000 immigrants per year, employment-based preferences to 140,000. Moreover, there is a diversity immigration quota of 55,000, which promotes diversity immigration calculated from a formula based on immigrant

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<sup>55</sup> Prior to independence in 1776, what is known today as the U.S. were a set of European (mainly French, English, and Spanish) colonies and Native American tribes—these latter are believed to be descendents of Asian migrants that crossed the Bering Strait about 15,000 years ago (Horwitz 2006).

admissions during the preceding 5 years and the total population of a region. Per-country limits also apply and are set at 7% of the annual total (United States Department of Homeland Security 2005).

<b>Table XVII. Official definitions regarding immigration</b>	
<b>Immigrants</b>	are persons who have been granted lawful permanent residence in the United States. They are also known as legal permanent residents (LPRs) or “green card” recipients.
<b>Refugees and asylees</b>	are persons who sought residence in the United States to avoid persecution in their country of origin. Persons granted refugee status applied for admission while outside the United States. Persons granted asylum applied either at a port of entry or at some point after their entry into the United States.
<b>Nonimmigrant admissions</b>	refer to arrivals of persons who are authorized to stay in the United States for a limited period of time. Most nonimmigrants enter the United States as tourists or business travelers, but some come to work, study, or engage in cultural exchange programs.
<b>Naturalizations</b>	refer to persons ages 18 and over who become citizens of the United States. Most legal permanent residents are eligible to apply for naturalization within five years after obtaining LPR status.
<b>Enforcement actions</b>	include the apprehensions, investigations, detention, and removal of foreign nationals who are in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. These actions occur at the borders of the United States, in the interior of the country, and at designated sites outside the United States.
Source: United States Department of Homeland Security (2006)	

Among the 38.4 million immigrants presently living in the U.S., there are between 11 and 12 million undocumented. Since 2000, 850,000 unauthorized immigrants have entered the U.S. each year, raising 185% the total number of undocumented, from 3.9 million in 1992 to 11.1 million in 2006. In parallel, during the same period, the number of border patrols rose almost by the same percentage, 179%, to 11,380 officers (Passel 2006). Of the estimated 11.1 millions undocumented immigrants, 7.9 million work (constituting 4.9% of all workers—148 million) in sectors such as farming, fishing, and forestry (24%), cleaning (17%), construction (14%), food preparation (12%), manufacturing (9%), and transport (7%) (Passel 2006). The origins of unauthorized immigrants are:


Europe and Canada (6%), Latin America (78% [Mexico 56%]), Asia (13%), and Africa and other locations (3%) (Passel 2006).

Extraordinarily, U.S. immigrants concentrate in five states, which account for 60% of the nation's total immigration: California (8.9 million), New York (3.9), Texas (2.9), Florida (2.7), and Illinois (1.5). Twenty-two other states are new growth areas, among them Oregon, with 290,000 immigrants in 2000 (United States Department of Homeland Security 2005; Capps, Passel, Lopez-Perez, and Fix 2003). Most immigrants come from Latin-America, Asia (China, India, Korea, and Philippines), and the Caribbean (Dominican Republic, Haiti, and West Indies). Figure XVIII illustrates, by region of birth, immigration to the four regions related to the networks included in this research: the three metropolitan area with most immigrants (Los Angeles-Long Beach, New York City, and Chicago) and the Willamette Valley in Oregon, including Portland which ranks 28<sup>th</sup>.

Currently, the U.S. has the most diverse and the largest number of immigrants in its history (Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001a). Since the '60s there has been a continual flow of immigrants due to the post-industrial economy's voracious need of immigrants workers, along with family reunification policies, social forces such as transportation and communication, and conflicts and tensions abroad. Indeed, the third pillar of globalization, in addition to financial markets and communication systems, is immigration (Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001a). Driving this immigration, then, are both economic rationality and cultural and familiar bonds, where

the structural dependency on inexpensive labor, trans-nationalism, and international politics—as in the case of Cuba and Southeast Asia—all play an important role (Cornelius 2001; Portes 2001; Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001b).

**Figure XVIII. Immigration to metropolitan statistical areas by region of birth<sup>56</sup> for 2004 (source: United States Department of Homeland Security 2006)**



More importantly perhaps, immigrants are today blended in families and communities of undocumented immigrants, citizens, permanent residents, and legal immigrants—3 million children with U.S. citizenship are estimated to have at least one parent living in the U.S. illegally (Passel 2006). In fact, one of the networks studied here, CAAELII, has

<sup>56</sup> The USCIS (2006) include Central America and the Caribbean in “North America”

among its specific advocacy activities the reunification of divided families due to deportations.

Although the U.S. has thrived on immigration, it still causes plenty of anxiety (Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001d): according to recent public opinion poles, between 59-36% of surveyed—depending on their level of education—considered immigrants a burden, while between 56-35% considered them a strength (Kohut et al. 2006)<sup>57</sup>. According to another poll—a bipartisan poll commissioned by the National Immigration Forum—illegal immigration was ranked as the sixth most worrying issue behind the Iraq war, the economy and jobs, terrorism, moral values, and health care<sup>58</sup>. Anxiety occurs mainly among those that support the idea of an Anglo-Saxon monolithic nation, as opposed to a multicultural diverse nation which does not require homogeneity to ensure its long-term viability (Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001d). In Bourdieu's words, such anxiety arises from understanding the State as an expression of the Nation or, in other words, confounding citizenship with the cultural and linguistic (and even racial) community (Bourdieu 1991).

There are three areas of policy and scholarly dispute regarding economic effects of immigration (Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001c). First, there is the fiscal question: does immigration cost more than what it pays the system? Most

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<sup>57</sup> Similarly, in Spain immigration is considered the second most important problem, preceded, in fact, only by unemployment (El Pais 2005).

<sup>58</sup> Preliminary results are available at [http://www.tarrance.com/Immigration\\_Presentation.pdf](http://www.tarrance.com/Immigration_Presentation.pdf) (accessed June 14, 2006)

responsible economists would concur that fiscal costs of immigration are outweighed by the gains (Tichenor 1994, Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001c, International Organization for Migration 2005). The second question regards labor: does immigration depress native-workers' wages? Some scholars have highlighted the relative decline of immigrants' skills and low earnings (Borjas 2001), while others point out that low-skilled immigration increases the "intractable" black problem (poverty and social exclusion among African-Americans) by competing with African-Americans for the low-skill jobs (Tichenor 1994). To the contrary, the preponderance of evidence suggests that immigration has not affected the fortunes of native-born workers (Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001c). Last, there is the issue of the opportunity structure: how immigrants advance economically. Here, there seems to be evidence that the immigration assimilation pattern is dimorphic: some immigrants thrive, while many others struggle to survive (Portes and Zhou 2001). Furthermore, second-generation immigrants often decline on the economic and social ladder as they are unwilling to pick up jobs carried out by their parents and, hence, go on to join other excluded minorities in their fate (Gans 2001).

### **The current debate**

The debate of two bills currently occurring in conference between the two chambers of Congress has been named by the New York Times (Swarns 2006b) as "the most substantial overhaul of immigration law in 20 years." While the House passed legislation in December 2005 that offered no provision for citizenship, the Senate debated during April and May 2006 its own provision. As this happened, the pro-immigration side—of

which the networks studied are central actors as I show next—promoted and successfully carried out several rallies during March and May as the headlines of the day-after editions of major newspapers proved (Monge 2006)<sup>59</sup>: the New York Times called it “the largest effort made by immigrants to influence public policy in recent memory” (Archibold 2006).

In between, President Bush, while initially in favor of the bill in the House, seems to have now positioned himself in a middle path (Davey and Blumenthal 2006) unsatisfying many on both flanks. In fact, President Bush must walk a fine line between the House bill supported by the conservative base, which are border-focused, and the Senate bill, supported by democrats, moderate republicans, and Hispanic voters, which is in favor of providing a legalization path to the eleven million undocumented (Davey and Blumenthal 2006)—see Appendix 11 for tabulated summary of debate.<sup>60</sup>

## **FOUR CASES OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION IN THE IMMIGRATION POLICY FIELD: UNITING IMMIGRANTS<sup>61</sup>**

This chapter’s second part describes the four cases and situates them in the immigration policy context. The section proceeds thematically by describing comparatively all four

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<sup>59</sup> Even the satirical newspaper “The Onion” covered these events in its frontpage (The Onion 2006) as did the New York City’s liberal Village Voice (2006).

<sup>60</sup> The New York Times’ editorial of may 21<sup>st</sup> (New York Times 2006) pointed towards the issues that the immigration reform has to tackle if a reasonable progressive solution is to be reached, which included among others: avoid fixation with the border and not treating immigration as a pest control problem, decreasing the vulnerability of the undocumented immigrants by increasing enforcement in employees and avoiding a guest-worker program, and seriously facing the xenophobic climate prevalent in the House.

<sup>61</sup> Descriptive information here produced comes from interviews, internal documents, and the networks’ website: [www.thenyic.org](http://www.thenyic.org); [http://www.open.org/~mano/eng\\_causa.html](http://www.open.org/~mano/eng_causa.html); [www.caaelii.org](http://www.caaelii.org); and [www.ndlon.org](http://www.ndlon.org). See Appendix 8 for a list of secondary sources and documents analyzed.

cases per theme—such as mission, origin, area of work, and so on—rather than entirely reviewing each case in sequence. Nevertheless, in order to give some depth and nuance to each case, I start off—in Table XVIII—with a brief vignette (Marshall and Rossman 1995) of each network.

**Table XVIII. Vignettes of the four cases**

**New York Immigration Coalition: NYIC**

Following the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which made eligible 3 million immigrants for legal status, NYIC was founded to provide a forum for the immigrant community to discuss urgent issues and provide a vehicle for collective action in addressing these issues. The three million immigrants eligible to citizenship provoked an increase in demand for immigrant services, such as education to prepare the citizenship exam, and administrative support in registration processes. In 1987, these broad changes fuelled discussions among a small group of immigration reform advocates, who began working to create a locally based advocacy organization: the New York Immigration Coalition. Initially composed and led by large non-immigrant service providing organizations, NYIC slowly started incorporating immigrant community based organizations—as the larger organizations shared their power—to reach its current large/small immigrant/non-immigrant balanced membership.

Civic and voter participation is one of NYIC’s issue areas. The NYIC builds immigrant voting power through its nationally-known New Citizen Voter Registration Project. The largest voter registration project in New York State and the most successful initiative of its kind in the country, the project has registered more than 220,000 new citizens to vote over the past eight years. The secret of NYIC’s success in this area has been its continued outreach and presence at nearly all citizenship swearing-in ceremonies in the New York metropolitan area and a cadre of over 300 well-trained, highly-committed volunteers from all walks of life. NYIC volunteers don’t just register people to vote—they talk to them about the democratic process and the vital importance of exercising the franchise. The underlying message is a simple one: get out and vote, it’s the only way to make life better for your family and community!

**CAUSA: Oregon’s Immigrant Rights Coalition**

CAUSA—whose mission is to promote immigrant rights and well-being, and to counter the growing anti-immigrant agenda in Oregon—was formed in 1995 to challenge a bill that would deny welfare to immigrants in Arizona, a bill similar to the one that passed in California a year earlier. Different groups—including the Northwest Treeplanters and Farmworkers United and the Rural Organizing Project—joined to defeat anti-immigrant ballot measures then being prepared for circulation to Oregon voters. The measures sought to deny benefits, driving privileges, and public education to undocumented persons, and to deputize public officials, police, and educators as immigration agents. CAUSA was set up to combat this bill and ultimately contributed to its failure.

Apart from including other areas of work in their agenda, CAUSA has kept doing advocacy and lobbying. In the Oregon State legislature, during 2003 CAUSA defended the annual cost-of-living increase for Oregon’s minimum wage, immigrants’ access to a driver’s license, and together with allies as the American Civil Liberties Union preserved the Oregon statute that prohibits local police from collaborating with immigration authorities. In 2005, CAUSA worked with allies to beat back over 18 anti-immigrant/anti-worker bills in the Oregon State Legislature, again preserving immigrants’ access to a driver’s license, the annual increase to the minimum wage, and defeating anti-farmworker legislation. In addition, to break the post 9/11 inertia, CAUSA led, together with other civil rights organizations, a one-week 70-mile march involving more than 2500 people. Named the Walk for Truth, Justice & Community, the march went from Salem to Portland and called for the rights of children, the rights of immigrant workers, the rights of the poor, and in the fervent hope of ending the war in Iraq.



**Coalition of African, Asian, European, and Latino Immigrants of Illinois: CAAELII**

In 1996, in Chicago, CAAELII was formed propelled by the anti-immigrant tone of the 1996 Personal Responsibility Act. A handful of immigrant groups (such as the Arab American Action Network and Chinese Mutual Aid Association) began to meet informally to discuss ways to work together to enhance their voice in immigrant policy and politics, and coalesced around the problem of poor and slow service of the local Chicago Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)<sup>62</sup> office. Its mission is to improve the quality of life for immigrants and ensure dignity and respect by organizing and uniting communities and by promoting the voice of community in public policy. CAAELII began as an avenue for agencies to pool resources and ideas when teaching citizenship classes to immigrants and refugees seeking to apply for citizenship, recruiting and training volunteer citizenship teachers, and advocating for immigrant and refugee rights.

One of CAAELII's major areas of work is the Independent Monitoring Board (IMB). A study conducted by CAAELII in 1999 documented 1,031 cases of abuses and mistreatments of the former Chicago District INS Office. CAAELII discovered that many of the errors stemmed from basic problems, such as lost files and failure to update a simple change of address. An independent accountability council, the Independent Monitoring Board, was established thereafter to address the needs to the local community. Since its inception, the IMB has grown from a local grassroots initiative to reach national scope as it impacted change in policy with the creation of a national immigration ombudsman within the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

**National Day Labor Organizing Network: NDLON**

In July of 1999 after a football match, a group of day-laborers from different day-labor centers (both independent centers and centers organized by pro-immigrant nonprofits) initiated the formation of a network of day-labor centers. The network would develop the collective capacity to analyze and address the systematic issues of exploitation and injustice that disempower day laborers and other low-wage immigrant workers, since most of the issues that day laborers confront are not just local issues, requiring instead broader implications and broad-based strategizing, organizing, and solutions. In 2000, the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles and the Central American refugee nonprofit CASA of Maryland, among others, found NDLON "to strengthen and expand the work of local day laborer organizing groups, in order to become more effective and strategic in building leadership, advancing low-wage worker and immigrant rights, and developing successful models for organizing immigrant contingent/temporary workers." In the last seven years, by creating structures and relations of coordination and mutual support, and forming a unified national agenda, NDLON has moved day laborers from invisibility to visibility; from lack of representation to self-representation, from oblivion to hope. One of NDLON's area of work is ensuring day-laborers' civil and human rights. Because of associated with the deterioration of the neighborhoods in which they seek employment, day laborers are extremely vulnerable to violations of their constitutional rights: in particular, the criminalization of seeking employment. Many municipalities around the country have promoted ordinances that prohibit seeking employment on public property and restrict perspective employers' ability to hire day laborers from public areas. Because NDLON strongly believes that looking for work is not a crime, it has joined up with other non-member human rights organizations to initiate a campaign challenging these laws in Federal Court, particularly in those municipalities that do not offer alternatives for day laborers to earn a living. In fact, NDLON's first success, in 2000, was to repel an anti-solicitation bill passed in Los Angeles.

A century ago, urban political machines provided institutional support to new immigrants—often in unsavory ways such as offering jobs for votes—as did the religious institutions and some of the nation's most respected nonprofit organizations, for example

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<sup>62</sup>At present the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).

through settlement houses (Dodge, Ospina, and Sparrow 2004). However, these efforts were limited given the sheer numbers and the charity orientation. A couple of decades ago, recent immigrant service and advocacy organizations focused on specific immigrant groups and specific services (e.g. legal assistance involving citizenship and work permits), and worked quite independently of each other. This was as true for the country in general as for New York City, Chicago, and the Willamette Valley, Oregon.

The work of all the networks here studied—the New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC), CAUSA (in Oregon), the Coalition of African, Asian, European, and Latin Immigrants of Illinois (CAAELII), and the National Day Labor Organizing Network (NDLON)—supports members of the immigrant communities in New York City, Oregon, Chicago, and country-wide, respectively.

<b>Table XIX. Mission of networks</b>	
<b>Name</b>	<b>Mission</b>
NYIC (NY)	To provide a forum for the immigrant community to discuss urgent issues and provide a vehicle for collective action in addressing these issues.
CAUSA (OR)	To promote immigrant rights and well-being, and to counter the growing anti-immigrant agenda in Oregon.
CAAELII (IL)	To improve the quality of life for immigrants and refugees and to ensure dignity and respect by organizing and uniting communities through education, leadership development, and direct services, and by promoting the voice of community in public policy.
NDLON (USA)	To strengthen and expand the work of local day laborer organizing groups, in order to become more effective and strategic in building leadership, advancing low-wage worker and immigrant rights, and developing successful models for organizing immigrant contingent/temporary workers.

As Table XIX indicates, all four networks clearly focus on improving the conditions of immigrants; however, they all have slightly varying missions. NYIC’s highlights its mission as a discussion “forum” and a vehicle for “collective action;” CAUSA’s focus is

the counteracting of the “anti-immigrant agenda.” Both CAAELII and NDLOL highlight the organizing dimension, but the latter concentrates on the specific subgroup of immigrant temporary workers.

**Programs and areas of work**

To achieve their missions, these networks deliver different programs.

The work includes education, both civic and technical—such as English and computing literacy—advocacy of immigration rights and well-being, and leadership development and organizing. Table XX summarizes these different areas of works.

<b>Table XX. Areas of work of networks</b>			
Coalition	Community education	Advocacy	Leadership development
NYIC	Civic & Voter Ed. Community Ed.	Policy Analysis and Advocacy (in employment, education, housing, participation, and health)	Immigrant Concerns Training Inst. Immigrant Advocacy fellows
CAAELII	English & Civics Ed. Computer Technology Pr.	Independent Monitoring Board Campaigns	CIVITAS Community Organizing
CAUSA	Community awareness activities	Campaigns (National, State, and Regional)	CAPACES leadership program
NDLOL	Education	Legalization Promoting rights	Job-Center support Organizing

***Community civic and technical education***

All networks carry out some educational and awareness-raising activities directly to their member organizations’ constituents, in addition to the organizing and leadership development of their member organizations. CAUSA, for example, tries to increase civic participation and awareness of civil rights among immigrants through Town Hall meetings, where policies are debated and explained, and politicians are invited to talk.

NDLON, to develop organizing and leadership, uses education as its fundamental tool, where day-laborers from one member group's center are invited to visit another center, promoting cross-learning and multiplying it as each visiting day-laborer returns to his or her own center again.<sup>63</sup> Another issue around which constituents are trained regards legal issues and how to respond when under legal or physical attack.

NYIC helps “increase the political power” of immigrant and refugee communities through voter registration projects, with more than 100 voter education events each year, and voter mobilization efforts for elections, with more than 235,000 new citizens registered through its New Citizen Voter Registration Project. Moreover, NYIC develops educational materials (more than a million copies of dozens of brochures and fact sheets) in as many as twelve languages on important issues such as new developments in immigration law, the citizenship process, school registration, health care access, and voting rights; NYIC also works with ethnic and mainstream media outlets to disseminate important information to immigrant families.

CAAELII provides integrated English literacy and civics education to immigrant and other limited English-proficient populations to encourage community members to become active. Moreover, through its Computer Technology Project, CAAELII tries to bridge the Digital Divide for its partner agencies while providing curriculum for low literacy English students.

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<sup>63</sup> In NDLON's case in particular, distinguishing between member organizational leaders and constituents is not straightforward given its structure—explained below.

## *Advocacy*<sup>64</sup>

NYIC focuses on laws, policies, and practices that affect immigrants and the communities in which they live. Current priorities include fighting for broad legalization and comprehensive immigration reform measures; increasing the availability of integration services such as English programs, legal services, and citizenship classes; ensuring civil rights; and improving immigrants' access to quality health care, education, and safe and affordable housing.

Countering nativism and scapegoating by raising public awareness of immigrants in Oregon and responding to legislative attacks against immigrant rights and benefits are CAUSA's main lines of action regarding advocacy. These actions are done in the form of campaigns, such as the Dream Act, the Congressional Immigration Reform, the Mexican Consulate Campaign, and regional campaigns.

NDLON's advocacy work focuses on legalization for undocumented immigrants by advancing towards a new legalization program providing for undocumented day laborers legal immigration status that would alleviate many of the labor and civil rights abuses as well as many of the needs and problems of immigrant communities in the United States. NDLON is part of the existing national legalization campaigns (via its members—see below) to ensure that whatever policy is created will facilitate the integration of day

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<sup>64</sup> According to the 1979 Lobby Law and the Internal Revenue Service, the difference between advocacy and lobbying is that the latter tries to influence a specific piece of legislation while the former specifies a position on a general policy matter. While in the U.S. nonprofits are allowed to lobby, they have to limit it either to an "insubstantial" part of its activity or to a maximum of 5-20% (depending on the total amount) to keep their 501(c)3 tax-exempt status.

laborers into the larger American society<sup>65</sup>. Moreover, based on the need to defend basic human rights, particularly the right to work and/or solicit employment, NDLOM fights to enforce the existing labor laws and for new policies with better protections for workers. In NDLOM's advocacy, public awareness and media play an important role in changing public perception of day laborers.

Beyond its specific actions focused at punctual legislation, with the support of 44 endorsing organizations, CAAELII's Independent Monitoring Board serves as an independent, nongovernmental watchdog to ensure that the USCIS treats the public with fairness and in a professional and timely manner.<sup>66</sup>

One of the primary institutional targets of all networks are the public agencies addressing immigration policy at the local, state, and federal level: city councils, state legislatures, congress, and USCIS. Because all focus on issues of quality of life, they also aspire to influence other public institutions associated with education, health, and welfare, for example Department of Health, or law enforcement agencies.

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<sup>65</sup> This is an important point since in many negotiations between pro- and anti-immigrants, according to many day-laborers the first subgroup to be "sacrificed" by the pro-immigrants are the day-laborers themselves. In fact, as the New York Times' editorial of July 10<sup>th</sup> 2006 pointed out, the day-laborers have nothing to win from the current debate in the U.S. Congress, not even from the Senate's more liberal bill (Downes 2006).

<sup>66</sup> According to information provided by USCIS itself (United States Department of Homeland Security 2005), at the end of fiscal year 2003, there were 1,200,000 adjustments of status cases pending a decision; the number of persons granted lawful permanent residence in the U.S. declined 34% to 705,827 in fiscal year 2003 from 1,063,732 in fiscal year 2002, due primarily to security checks that affected application processing at USCIS.

### *Leadership development and organizing*

Through its Immigrant Concerns Training Institute, The New York Immigration Coalition offers a full calendar of workshops and seminars on topics critical for organizations, social service providers, and attorneys serving immigrant communities—the Institute also provides public education events covering immigration law and immigrant rights issues to the community at large. In addition, its Immigrant Advocacy fellows program helps immigrant leaders create “more powerful and politically relevant” organizations. CAUSA also focuses on building member leadership through its program CAPACES, its leadership development program.

Regarding leadership building, NDLOM strengthens existing, and helps create new, job centers to help protect the rights of all people involved<sup>67</sup>. Also, according to NDLOM, “in order to achieve the unity necessary to resolve problems,” organizing and leadership are necessary. Organizing, or building power in NDLOM’s own terms, also uses “cultural fusion,” such as a day-laborer band and soccer leagues: “The work isn't all about fighting,” says NDLOM’s current manager.

At CAAELII, the lead organizer works with the staff organizers from each participating agency to develop the community groups to work towards social justice for Chicago's immigrant and refugee communities. Moreover, modeled after Martin Luther King, Jr.'s

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<sup>67</sup> However, NDLOM promotes only those centers that meet certain criteria: Centers must be visible, accessible, and close to where day laborers originally congregated; they must promote real participation of the workers; and worker centers should not be run as temp agencies.

Highlander Center<sup>68</sup>, CAAELII's Citizenship and Voter Training School (CIVITAS) creates a space for reflection where community leaders can join together with others who share their concerns.

### **The networks' origins**

All four networks were fueled initially by a real concrete challenge. NYIC arose to aid the legalization process following the 1987 IRCA. CAUSA was formed in 1995 to challenge a bill that would deny welfare to immigrants in Arizona, a bill similar to the one that passed in California a year earlier. In 1996, in Chicago, CAAELII also was formed to repel anti-immigration acts. Similarly, NDLO's first action was to repel an anti-solicitation bill passed in Los Angeles.

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which made eligible 3 million undocumented workers and aliens and their families for legal status, broadened the services for immigrants and sparked collaboration among organizations. This act altered the demographic landscape of the U.S. and changed the legal status of many immigrants. Heavily oriented toward refugees and their issues prior to the IRCA, most advocates quickly changed the focus to the new immigrant-citizens (or citizens-to-be). These were quite different from previous immigrant groups and required more assistance in language skills, workforce integration, training, and other social services. In New York, these

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<sup>68</sup> The Highlander Center was founded in 1932 to serve as an adult education center for community workers involved in social and economic justice movements. The goal of Highlander was and is to provide education and support to poor and working people fighting economic injustice, poverty, prejudice, and environmental destruction. It played a vital role in the Civil Rights movement of the 60s and 70s. ([www.highlandercenter.org](http://www.highlandercenter.org))



broad changes fueled discussions among a small group of immigration reform advocates, who began working to create a locally based advocacy organization. They also wanted to respond to the downside of IRCA, which was passed to control and deter illegal immigration to the United States. In 1987, this group helped create the New York Immigration Coalition.

Ten years later, in 1995, CAUSA was founded by different groups to defeat anti-immigrant ballot measures then being prepared for circulation to Oregon voters. A year before the Personal Responsibility Act had been passed in California that limited immigrant access to public benefits. CAUSA was set up to combat this bill and ultimately contributed to its failure. The proponents of this restrictive bill did not manage to qualify it for the November 1996 ballot.

A similar development occurred in Chicago, propelled by the anti-immigrant tone of the 1996 Personal Responsibility Act. A handful of immigrant groups began to meet informally to discuss ways to work together to enhance their voice in immigrant policy and politics, and coalesced around the problem of poor and slow service of the local Chicago Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)<sup>69</sup> office. A grant issued to the group to study the problem in 1998 motivated Chicago immigrant activists to seize the moment, and CAAELII became a formal and proactive organization.

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<sup>69</sup>At present the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).

In July of 1999, after a football match between day-laborers from different day-labor centers, some day-laborer groups analyzed the strategy to create a national network to address some of the particular challenges all groups had in common in organizing day laborers. Most of the issues that day laborers confront are not just local issues, requiring instead broader implications and broad-based strategizing, organizing, and solutions that go beyond the local day-labor center. In 2000 NDLO was founded, and the first national session was held in Los Angeles in July 2001, where workers and organizers met and talked, and celebrated the overturn of an anti-day laborer ordinance in Los Angeles County.

### **Major accomplishments of coalition work**

That these coalitions have been formed within the dispersed and isolated immigration environments is an achievement in itself. As one of the founders of the NYIC says: "It is quite astonishing that there existed no immigration coalition in New York prior to 1987. Moreover, the City of New York had no organizational reflection of immigration and immigrant issues until [around 1990]." Similarly, a staff member of a CAAELII co-founder organization recalls a comparable environment in Chicago prior to CAAELII's existence: "For 14 years we didn't meet with anybody," he said, and added that until then there was no connection with other immigrant groups in the city. Similarly, in Oregon no immigration coalition existed prior to CAUSA, nor was there any unifying body for day-labor centers across states or the whole country. However, these networks have major accomplishments beyond their creation and having been awarded Ford Foundation's

Leadership for a Changing World Award—Table XXI lists some of these major accomplishments.

<b>Table XXI. Major accomplishments beyond the LCW awards</b>	
CAAELII	set up and runs the Independent Monitoring Board in Illinois.
CAUSA	has played a critical role in defeating more than 10 major anti-immigration bills in Oregon.
NDLON	has repealed several anti-solicitation ordinances, and coordinator selected as one of the 25 most influential Latinos in the U.S.
NYIC	has played a critical role in defeating more than 10 major anti-immigration bills in New York State, has registered for voting more than 60,000 people, and has helped legalize more than 200,000.

An accomplishment of these networks is their sustainability and effectiveness, and the stability they all have shown for at least a decade—two in NYIC’s case. Their reputations and credibility are also strong. For example, as mentioned in the previous chapter, their executive directors<sup>70</sup> received the Leadership for a Changing World award, which rewards leaders tackling critical social problems with effective and systemic solutions, enacting leadership that is strategic, bringing different groups of people together, and sustaining results beyond any individual effort. Given the 50:1 nominee to awardee ratio, the rigor of the selection process, and the selection criteria, we may consider these organizations highly credible exemplars of success.

In addition, each coalition can document mission-specific achievements. For example, CAAELII organized a petition campaign, with more than 19,000 signatures, for the INS reform, which resulted in the creation of an Independent Monitoring Board of 44

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<sup>70</sup> Since the receipt of the award, CAUSA and NYIC have changed executive director, although both former directors were also involved in the data collection for this study.

organizations that acts as a watchdog group and pushes immigration reform. So far, the board has sent approximately 800 documented cases to INS and to members of Congress, detailing the experiences of immigrants and refugees “caught in a seemingly endless INS backlog.” Since 1996, CAAELII has also facilitated the partnering of immigrant and refugee groups to jointly develop educational curricula, participate in teacher exchanges, and work together on common problems that affect immigrants and refugees.

Likewise, NYIC enrolled over 60,000 members of immigrant families in an immigrant voter education and mobilization campaign for the 2000 elections, which resulted in the registration of more than 200,000 new citizens. NYIC advocacy campaigns have won millions of city and state dollars in recent years to expand legal services and English classes for New York's immigrants. The coalition played a critical role in the 1997 and 1998 national campaigns to restore Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits to elderly and disabled immigrants and food stamps denied to immigrants by the 1996 Personal Responsibility Act.

CAUSA's successes date back to its inception. Founded in 1995 to defeat anti-immigrant ballot measures then being prepared for circulation to Oregon voters, CAUSA contributed to the failure of the proponents to qualify any of the initiatives for the November 1996 ballot. Two years later, in 1998, the same initiative proponents re-submitted two of the previously presented four measures, both of which were again defeated. In 1999 CAUSA defeated attempts by the Oregon legislature to pass an English Only Bill and a bill similar to Prop 209 (anti-affirmative action) in California. In May of

2000, CAUSA celebrated a major victory by putting pressure on Oregon to end a harsh time-limit on receipt of food stamps by under- and unemployed adults. In March and April of 2001, CAUSA defeated an attempt to end bilingual education in Oregon by mobilizing hundreds of people. On a national level, CAUSA has been at the forefront in leading the fight against re-introduction of the Bracero guest-worker program<sup>71</sup>. In 2003 CAUSA launched a major organizing effort to protect the immigrant community from a series of policies, measures, and laws attacking the immigrant community in the name of homeland security. CAUSA was a key partner in making the 2003 Immigrant Worker Freedom Ride a complete success. Fifty-seven CAUSA members adding up to approximately 1000 people took part in the immigrant worker Freedom Ride to New York.

In 2000, NDLON struck down an anti-solicitation ordinance in Los Angeles County. Because of this victory, over 25,000 day laborers in Los Angeles continue to solicit employment in public places. NDLON has made four additional legal challenges to similar ordinances around the country and has played a fundamental role in the creation of seven day-worker centers funded by the City of Los Angeles. The network has also worked with the University of California, Los Angeles, to develop a first-of-its-kind national survey of day laborers (Valenzuela, Theodore, Meléndez, and Gonzalez 2006). NDLON is currently working with several members of Congress to secure the passage of the National Day Laborer Fairness and Protection Act, which would ensure safe and

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<sup>71</sup> CAUSA opposes guest-worker programs because they make the employee vulnerable and create a second-class of workers.

healthy work environments for all day laborers. Also, NDLO is working with labor unions to improve relations with immigrants. Moreover, its executive director, Pablo Alvarado, was selected in 2005 by TIME Magazine as one of “The 25 Most Influential Hispanics in America” (Time 2005).

In addition to the accomplishments summarized in the above table, in the current 2006 debate on immigration reform taking place in the U.S. Congress, these organizations have spearheaded the progressive pro-immigration side. The impressive turnout in rallies promoted in part by these networks is revealing. In Los Angeles’ March 25<sup>th</sup> rally, up to 500.000 participants were counted, and the Los Angeles Times (2006) quoted representatives from NDLO’s CHIRLA and CARECEN in its coverage (Gorman, Keller, and Suarez 2006)—the same turnout was registered on the May 2<sup>nd</sup> mobilizations. Moreover, in June only, NDLO has had two New York Times editorials dedicated to it (Downes 2006; Greenhouse 2006). CAAELI-led rallies brought together 100.000 and 400.000 marchers on March 11<sup>th</sup> and May 1<sup>st</sup>, respectively, in Chicago. Its member, the Korean American Resource and Cultural Center, was cited in the Chicago Tribune on May 2<sup>nd</sup> (Chicago Tribune 2006). The CAUSA-led rally of April 9<sup>th</sup> in Salem drew 20.000 people, while NYIC’s executive director was quoted in The New York Times (Swarns 2006a) as she addressed tens of thousands during the April 10<sup>th</sup> rally.

## **Organizational and structural characteristics**

### ***Membership***

CAUSA comprises sixteen organizations and more than sixty grassroots organizations, many of which are serving the neediest parts of the Latino immigrant population in Oregon, who tend to be poor and working class, may have little or no education, and may not be literate in Spanish (due to speaking an indigenous language) or English. Its constituency is largely Latino—95% Mexican—encompassing a wide-range of experiences from pioneers who settled in the area several generations ago to recent undocumented immigrants. Member groups of CAUSA include a social service organization serving the local population, Oregon’s only farmworker union, and another organization which serves primarily immigrant day laborers (see Figure XXVII for a CAUSA’s organizational membership and regional and national affiliations). Political influences mentioned by many of the organizers and participants in CAUSA include the philosophy and work of César Chávez<sup>72</sup>; experience working in the solidarity movements which supported social movements and popular opposition organizations in Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico; and experience in farm-worker organizing. Some have engaged in community organizing and working with youth before coming to CAUSA. Participants in CAUSA articulate “immigrant rights,” “fighting racism,” “ending discrimination,” and “worker/labor rights” as some of their key points of struggle.

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<sup>72</sup> Cesar Chavez (1927-1993) was a Mexican American labor activist and leader of the United Farm Workers.

The other network based in the West, the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), is a collaborative between thirty community-based organizations that organize day laborers in different parts of the country. Constituents are principally Latin-American, but some Africans, Asians, and African-Americans are also present. To become a member of NDLON a group must, at a minimum, be community-based, have a mission of organizing day laborers, and promote the democratic participation of day laborers in the organization. Moreover, it must accept NDLON's stated principles of solidarity, service to the day-laborer, faithfulness, honesty, strong conviction of the reasons of the "fighting," (self)-criticism, gender parity, multiculturalism, pluralism, and self-determination.

CAAELII serves immigrants and refugees throughout the Chicago metropolitan area through its 20 partner agencies' sites in major ethnic communities throughout the city and suburbs. CAAELII specifically serves Arab, Bosnian, Cambodian, Chinese, Ethiopian, Indian, Korean, Laotian, Latino and Vietnamese populations with native language programs.

NYIC is an umbrella policy and advocacy organization for approximately 150 groups in New York State that work with immigrants and refugees. The NYIC's multi-ethnic, multi-racial, and multi-sector membership<sup>73</sup> includes grassroots community

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<sup>73</sup> NYIC's members fall into three different categories, organizational, governmental and individual members. Only organizational members have full voting rights.



organizations, not-for-profit health and human services organizations, religious and academic institutions, labor unions, and legal, social, and economic justice organizations.

Appendix 12 includes the list of the four networks' organizational members. It is worth noting here once again, though, that these networks have highly organizationally diverse members. CAELII members include organizations serving from a couple of thousand clients a year to up to twenty thousand. In NYIC the range is even larger with some organizations serving more than 800,000 Latinos per year. Similarly, CAUSA includes PCUN, which serves thousands of farm workers, as well as Latinos Unidos Siempre (LUS), which is made up of a couple dozen young immigrant activists. NDLO's membership is also highly diverse: it includes members who are simply an organized group of day-laborers, but also large organizations for whom organizing day-laborers is but one program.

Moreover, these four networks—NDLO, CAUSA, NYIC, and CAELII—are interlinked both via national umbrella movements as through organizational members<sup>74</sup>. For example, VOZ from Portland is both a member of CAUSA and NDLO. Similarly, different regional chapters of CARECEN are members of NYIC and NDLO (the California chapter is a member of the latter). Additionally, NYIC and CAUSA are members of the organizing committee of the Fair Immigration Reform Movement (FIRM), as are CHIRLA—one of NDLO's founding member and its current fiscal sponsor—and the Northwest Federation of Community Organizations (NWFCO), a

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
<sup>74</sup> Interestingly enough this fact did not come up as a significant issue during the analysis.

regional network covering several Northwestern states of which CAUSA is part. Also supporting FIRM are several organizational members of NYIC and NDLO.

CAUSA and CAAELII collaborate with the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (NNIRR), where NDLO's Centro Legal La Raza (San Francisco, CA) and NYIC's CAAAV Organizing Asian Communities (New York, NY) are members of the board of directors. Several other NDLO and NYIC members also support NNIRR.

Similarly, these networks interrelate again through the nation-wide New American Opportunity Campaign (NAOC) promoted by Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform's (CCIR). In CCIR's board of directors are NYIC, Pineros Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste (PCUN)—one of CAUSA's founding members—and CHIRLA. In addition, CAAELII and NDLO's Tonatierra (from Arizona), with others, have founded the national network Break The Chains, focused on labor rights. Lastly, the National Immigration Forum also interlinks all four networks, since CAAELII supports it and CAUSA's PCUN, NDLO's CHIRLA, and NYIC's Hebrew Immigration Aid Society are members of the board of directors. Lastly, CAUSA, NYIC, and NDLO all come together in different ways in the national meta-alliance We Are America Alliance (WAAA), a newly-forming nationwide alliance of immigrant, grassroots, labor, local, statewide and national organizations. Figure XIX illustrates the multiple interrelations among the networks.

Figure XIX. Interrelation between the four networks (source: own)



*Operating structure*

CAUSA’s fiscal sponsor is Mano A Mano Family Center since CAUSA is not a registered nonprofit<sup>75</sup>. CAUSA’s board membership—made up of one representative of each organizational member—is 52 percent women, about 60 percent Latino, and more than 65 percent people of color. The Board monitors the coordinator and has at present two standing committees: fundraising and internal development. At a state-level, CAUSA identifies new immigrant leaders through its four part-time regional coordinators, supporting individuals to promote, mobilize, and educate around different issues (e.g.

<sup>75</sup> A nonprofit needs to register with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under section 501(c)(3) to be tax-exempt. When this is not the case, the nonprofit needs to find a fiscal sponsor, which is then formally the legal entity.

legalization). The objective is to have a local community network in place in each of those regional areas.

NDLON's Annual Assembly is the highest decision-making body. The assembly sets the strategy and elects, via voting candidates per regions, the board of directors. Internally, NDLON has created a committee for each area of work. Each committee has a work plan that emerged from the ideas put forward and discussed at the national gathering. Regular telephone conferences and personal visits keep leaders informed. One of NDLON's current goals is to develop its internal structure with its bylaws and internal policies and procedures, and register as a tax exempt nonprofit, since at present CHIRLA is its fiscal sponsor. As for CAUSA, NDLON's staff structure comprises both regional and functional coordinators. NDLON's employs five people in total: a National Coordinator, a West Coordinator, an East Coordinator, a Development Director, and a Legal Program's Coordinator.


CAAELII has a representative of each organization on the board and is currently registering with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as a tax exempt nonprofit; meanwhile, the member Chinese Mutual Aid Association is the fiscal sponsor.<sup>76</sup> Comprising nine employees, its structure is divided into three parts: Adult Education and Policy, which includes the CIVITAS programs; Communication and Development; and the Community Organization, which includes the Immigration Monitoring Board.

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<sup>76</sup> CAAELII obtained nonprofit tax-exempt status in fall 2006, only after both the data collection and data analysis for this study were finished.

NYIC has currently 19 staff members and 22 board members, which are elected from the more than 100 organizational members. Under the executive director, the staff is divided into immigration and integration. The former is subdivided into training, legal issues, and civil rights. The integration aspect of the work is thematically divided into employment, education, housing, participation, and health.

Figure XX. Networks organigrams<sup>77</sup> (source: own)



<sup>77</sup> Working committees are included only for CAUSA. C: Committee; DD: Deputy Director; RC: Regional Coordinators

## ***Budget***

NYIC has the largest budget, totaling slightly more than 2 million USD, followed by CAAELII with 1.6 million USD. With a far smaller budget comes NDLO's 290,000 USD, while CAUSA has the smallest budget, 195,000 USD. These latter two do not accept government funds, while NYIC and CAAELII do, 25% and 63% respectively.

Coalition	Budget	Funding <sup>78</sup>	Full-time staff <sup>79</sup>	Board members	Member org.	Governing body	IRS registered
NYIC	2005 \$2,167,560	2001: PH 69.9%, GG 25.2%, OT 4.95%	19	22	164	Elected Board of directors	Y
CAAELII	2006 \$1,690,218	PH 29%, GG, 63%, OT 8%	9	20	20	Board of directors (1 per member)	N, CMAA (in process)
CAUSA	2006 \$195,000	PH 87.2%, OT 12.8%	1 & 4PT	16	16	Board of directors (1 per member)	N, MaM
NDLO	2004 \$290,000	PH 100%	5	10	30	Assembly and Board	N, CHIRLA (in process)

## **Comparison groups**

The four cases may be divided into different groups that facilitate the subsequent analysis of the collected data (Eisenhardt 1989). A first grouping of the cases puts CAUSA and NDLO in one group and NYIC and CAAELII in the other. The latter networks have a metropolitan reach, a more diverse constituency, are not based in the West, and have larger budgets (and accept governmental funding). In contrast, NDLO and CAUSA are based in the West, have a more homogeneous constituency, and their area of action is

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<sup>78</sup> PH: philanthropic institution; GG: government grants, OT: other, including membership dues, program fees, donations, and unspecified "in-kind."

<sup>79</sup> PT: varying part-time employees.

larger: state-wide for CAUSA and nation-wide for NDLO. It may be added that, while all networks draw a lot from the civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King Jr., NDLO and CAUSA draw perhaps more on the figure of Cesar Chavez for inspiration, probably due to their Hispanic culture and labor-oriented focus.

Reach	CAAELII & NYIC	Metropolitan ↔ State, National	CAUSA & NDLO
Constituency		Diverse ↔ Latino	
Headquarters		West ↔ East, Midwest	
Budget		Large ↔ Small	
Inspiration source		M.L. King ↔ C. Chavez	
Membership size	CAAELII, CAUSA & NDLO	Medium ↔ Large	NYIC
Registered		No ↔ Yes	
Focus	CAAELII, CAUSA & NYIC	General ↔ Specific	NDLO
Decision-making		Board ↔ Assembly	

Another grouping sets aside NYIC from the rest, given its registered status and large membership. Yet a third division differentiates between NDLO and the rest, since its ultimate decision-making body is the assembly, as opposed to the board, and it is focused in a specific sub-group of immigrants but over the entire country.

## **6. THE INWARD MANAGEMENT OF THE NETWORK: UNITING IN DIVERSITY**

*There is a big question about why the cultivation of singularity is so successful, given the extraordinary naivete of the thesis in a world of obviously plural affiliations*

Amartya Sen. "Identity and violence."

The next two chapters deal with the unity/diversity paradox. The first chapter addresses the first secondary question with respect to this internal paradox. It shows that the internal paradox was present in all four networks and looks at how each of the poles that constitute the paradox occurred. While all networks united around identity, vision, and the value of diversity, all are diverse regarding member size, member organizational culture, and member ideology among others.

### **THE UNITY/DIVERSITY PARADOX: INDIVIDUALITY AND COLLECTIVITY**

A mural at one of CAUSA's member organization reads beautifully: "unity in diversity." CAUSA's coordinator adds, when commenting on the unity/diversity tension: "[Coalition work] is living in a state of constant tension. Some tension is good" [21-43].<sup>80</sup>

What I have termed the unity/diversity paradox—the duality of coexisting contradictory demands, goals, or processes due to having to generate unity and maintain diversity and avoiding homogeneity and division—is present in all four networks as the quotes above show. For example, CAELII's director told me: "every day we have to face that

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<sup>80</sup> I have favored exactness over readability when transcribing quotations. Some quotations may read grammatically incorrectly but are literal transcriptions of verbal communications. Quotes from interviews are followed by an identifying number-code.



contradiction, that paradox. [...] it's stressful because then it's the same diversity and richness that gives us threat and at the same time gives us a lot of strength" [14-35].

Using as an example a specific taskforce where one important organization withdrew, a NYIC program officer illustrates how difficult it is to generate unity while maintaining diversity in positions and ideology:

*I think that's really [generate unity while maintaining diversity], really hard because I think with the task force, that one group, that crazy group that withdrew, we needed them because they're such an important, they represent such an important community. And so that really makes things really difficult in terms of bringing that unity together [9-79].*

NDLON also faces tensions which may be conceptualized using the unity/diversity paradox. A national network made up of members focusing on local specific worker-centers, NDLON has to identify which are the issues that are national and thus it will deal with as a network, and which are the local issues and are exclusive to the worker centers. The development director states: "Yes, there are tensions. Particularly in identifying what are the national things and what are the local things. Or what are the local things that have national implications. Those are kind of like the tensions" [30-7]. Again, "national things," and "local things with national implications," are dealt with by the network and require a united stance by members, while the network may be diverse regarding local-specific issues.

The paradox of unity and diversity is intrinsic to networks as an interorganizational governance mode. Interorganizational network scholars have highlighted these tensions,

either explicitly or implicitly, although not always using the same terminology. It is indeed what networks are about: they require unity among diverse actors to act collectively, in contrast to hierarchies, which favor the unity pole, and also in contrast to markets, which favor the diversity pole. Networks are an *interdependent* set of independent organizations (Gray and Wood 1991; Guo and Acar 2005; Powell 1990) that require centralized coordination of necessarily autonomous organizations (Astley and Van de Ven 1983; Blau 1963): hence the tension.

The tension arises in that neither pole can be favored over the other in the long run and both have to be maximized. Unity cannot be favored over diversity, because diversity is part of its *raison d'être*. Moreover, given that all members are autonomous independent organizations where no hierarchical authority exists (although, as shown later on, in some instances the shadow of hierarchy may show itself), they may exit the network if their own organization is not valued and protected. Similarly, as a coordinating unit staff at CAAELII points out: "[Too much diversity] can also be a detriment because sometimes it feels like there's no unified direction, that everybody's kind of doing their own thing" [24-4]. This suggests that there is a fine line between diversity and disunity.

At NYIC, diversity turned occasionally into disunity when for example, "[deciding] who gets to speak to the media" [35-31], as an NYIC project officer highlighted. Indeed, disunity regarding distribution of captured resources and benefits generated has been

identified by the alliance literature (Doz 1996; Jarrillo 1993)<sup>81</sup> and the negotiation literature (Sebenius 1992). As I show further down, diversity occasionally turned into disunity in these networks. For example, at CAUSA, the coordinator told me that exceptionally disunity arose due to "working with a lot of different people who sometimes want different things or are on their own trips for one reason or another" [21-62]. Additionally, an NDLO staff-member told me how divisions occurred due to different personal styles: "I think that the divisions have to do more with human dynamics. Like egos. Personalities" [30:33].

Huxham and Vangen (2000a) have pointed out how independent organizations come together to benefit from each other's differences, but it also may transform into plain disunity as disagreement arise from differences in organizational purpose, procedures, and structure<sup>82</sup>. Indeed, scholars have found how increase in diversity increases the network's complexity (Kadushin et al. 2005).

This seems to point at a phenomenon identified in groups and business alliances, where a diversity/performance curve seems to follow a U-shape (Goerzen and Beamish 2005). Diversity is welcomed until a certain point, after which more diversity starts reducing performance. Metaphorically, in economic terms, it is as if the marginal increase in complexity produced by the increase in diversity is superior to the marginal benefit it

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<sup>81</sup> That is why networks need to be not only efficient for the different members but also fair, as mentioned previously.

<sup>82</sup> This resembles findings regarding intra-organizational management, where the potential for conflict increases with the amount of unity on outcome preference and the variety of (diverse) professions incorporated required (Thompson 1967).

produces. Unchecked diversity may generate disunity in turn hindering unity building, and hence collective action. Weick, Sutcliffe, Obstfeld (2005) argue that whether unity is a necessary condition for all collective action is still under debate. I believe the necessary condition is that disunity does not emerge.

Answering my question *how is paradox managed in successful networks?* requires considering this tension. The next subsection looks at what are the nature and form of the unity/diversity paradox, and how each pole is manifested in these networks.

### **Diversity within the network**

These networks are all internally diverse, that is they are internally heterogeneous and incorporate differences. As mentioned in the previous chapter, organizational members in these networks vary in size: that is number of employees, number of immigrants served, and annual budget. Some NDLO members have budgets around 10,000\$, serve 300 laborers, and are made up only of volunteers, while other members have a budget of 3.5million\$ and serve 4900 laborers a year. At CAAELII, a program officer highlighted differences in capacity between "larger, more established agencies and the smaller grass-root agencies" [15-19]. CAUSA includes Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste (PCUN), which serves thousands of farm workers, as well as Latinos Unidos Siempre (LUS), which is made up of a couple dozen young immigrant activists. NYIC's director highlights the diversity in the member's organizational size and its consequences:

*I think, is having a small group with like, two staff, and then having a big group with 200 staff, and in those cases, sometimes the smaller groups get a little frustrated ... because they're just not dealing with the bureaucracy, where you come to a meeting, and you decide to join event,*

*and everybody commits to, alright, so we'll bring 20 people or whatever, and then the representative from big group goes back and it takes her two weeks before she can get to her executive director, because they have this huge bureaucracy, where this particular thing might not be the priority, so I think those kinds of differences, we just have to work into our planning [10-17].*

Diversity runs also along the member organizations' priorities, specific issues, and the constituents they serve. Although the member organizations share the same general goal, they differ in specific sub-goals. At CAUSA, for example, the organizational members differ in specific sub-goals: some focusing on worker rights (PCUN), others on women issues (Mujeres Luchadoras Progresistas, MLP), and yet others on gay, lesbian, bi-, and trans-sexual rights (Rural Organizing Project, ROP). One of CAUSA's regional coordinators points at the diversity in organizational issues:

*So one of the things that happens when you try to diversify your group, you have to be willing to look at the issues that those diverse groups bring in. For me the hardest thing is to get folks to see the connection between the issues [19:30].*

Similarly, NDLO's membership is also highly diverse: it includes members who are simply an organized group of day-laborers, but also large organizations for whom organizing day-laborers is but one program. At NYIC, some groups focus only on immigration issues (Migration Policy Institute), other on all issues affecting a specific immigrant population (Afghan Communicator), yet others are concerned with some specific issue such as community development in Brooklyn (Fifth Avenue Committee).

Geographic diversity of organizational members is high in CAUSA and NDLO. The latter is present in 11 states while CAUSA is present throughout Oregon. In contrast,

although they are also part of nation-wide advocacy movements, CAAELII and NYIC work in Chicago and New York City, respectively. Organizational geographic diversity usually implies member differences along other dimensions, for example organizational culture or capacity. As CAUSA's manager indicated: "folks from Portland have a very different mode of operating, and the folks in Eugene have a different mode of operating" [21-24]. Similarly, NDLO's geographic diversity generates diversity regarding constituents, as a CASA-Maryland staff person and NDLO board member commented: "in Washington D.C., with CASA Maryland there is a group of Haitian day-laborers...Here in the West coast almost all day-laborers—90% are Latinos from Mexico and Central America" [29-12—own translation].

Ideology represents another source of internal diversity in all four networks. Some members are more confrontational than others, and political tendencies also vary. NDLO's director said: "in our network, there are organizations that are more militant than others[, who] believe more in doing advocacy in a different way" [17:62]. Such diversity was visible during decision-making and strategizing—as I show below in this and the next chapters. A program officer at NYIC describes how such differences are palpable:

*We're supporting a bill right now on the federal level, and a couple of our organizations on that working group are totally not supporting the bill, and they're really upset at the fact that the coalition has taken a stand on this bill and is, you know, going forward [9-31].*

The above illustrates how NYIC is ideologically diverse, which in turn may block unity as those disagreeing member get "really upset."

Cultural-national diversity is also present in all networks. An experience at the Social Forum described in an interview is illustrative of such diversity at CAAELII: “we started talking about the war in Iraq [...] and it just came up that a lot of Latino communities supported the war over there. That is one of those times when the tension across culture clearly came out” [15-21]. Such a diversity is very high at CAAELII and NYIC, whose members range across different nationalities, and less so in NDLO and CAUSA, where Latinos are dominant. The internal cultural-national diversity of the networks maps that of the areas in which they operate. As we saw in the previous chapter, the immigrant population of Chicago and New York is much more diverse than that of the West Coast, which explains the higher cultural-national diversity in NYIC and CAAELII than in CAUSA and NDLO. This also points towards the fact that diversity along one dimension implies diversity along another. Geographic diversity of the network may imply cultural-national diversity, which in turn implies diversity of organizational cultures in the network, and so forth. In fact, similarly, Sauquet and Jacobs (1998) find that teams that are nationally diverse often disunite due to misunderstandings and to assumptions and rules being different.

Cultural-national diversity is highly visible in internal network communications, since different members may have "different ways of disagreeing" and different ways of saying "no," as a CAAELII organizer put it [23-12—own translation]. While national-cultural diversity is extremely high in NYIC and CAAELII—both include members serving immigrants from all over the world and speaking tens of languages—national-cultural

diversity is also relevant for NDLON, as it includes Spanish-speaking immigrants from various nationalities. The quote below is illustrative:

*Yeah, you see, that's the other thing; that before creating the relationship with [actors external to the network], we have to work internally because in a given day laborer center or corner, you have workers from Mexico, from El Salvador, Honduras, South America, and we do not always get along [17-58].*

Only in CAUSA's case this diversity seems least marked since 90% of its members' constituents are of Mexican origin. Nevertheless, many of these constituents are not Spanish-speaking and are from diverse indigenous cultures from within Mexico, making CAUSA less homogeneous than apparently expected.

In sum, all networks are internally diverse. They are highly diverse in member size, member focus, member ideology, and member constituents' national-culture. In NDLON and CAUSA's case they are also geographically diversified. The type of diversity documented in these networks mirrors "dimensions" of diversity identified by scholars (Mizrahi and Rosenthal 1993). Diversity in member goal differences has been identified by Vangen, Huxham, and Eden (1994) and national-cultural differences have also been identified by cross-national business alliance scholars (Yan and Gray 1994). In fact, as I point out below, facilitating interpersonal and interorganizational differences constitutes a main network leadership activity.

That the networks are diverse is in itself not very insightful, and may seem almost tautological. Networks are sets of different organizations linked together to some extent.



That they are diverse is not only expected, but it is at the core of the rationale behind networks. The important aspect is how are these networks internally diverse and how this compares to their unity. This shall allow me to identify some commonalities among these networks with regards to how they manage the intrinsic paradox of unity and diversity.

### **Uniting the networks**

Precisely because of the documented diversity, “collective action networks” are set up consciously and explicitly to reach a common objective shared by everyone (Agranoff 2003)—*meta*-objectives (to use Huxham and McDonald's term [1992]). Sharing a meta-goal may help generate unity, but is in itself not sufficient. As Human and Provan (2000) state, in networks “there must be a sense of collective 'networkedness,' by which member firms see themselves as part of the network and are committed to network-level goals” (329). Consider the following quote by the coordinator of NDLO member Latin American Workers Project:

*Although we are all Latin, it is not easy to integrate us all. It is difficult because we carry our borders with us ... Some come from the rural areas, others from cities. [We have] different ways of viewing the world. The way we integrate everything has been to put on top of the table [that] here you are a day-laborer [28:6-own translation].*

This quote shows how NDLO generates unity, or “collective ‘networkedness’,” around the concept of day-laborer. Similarly, CAUSA's former coordinator told me that they used the idea of the "immigration movement" to generate unity among the different organizations. NYIC also frames their unity around the immigrant concept. A program officer mentioned how:

*We've brought people from totally distinct communities together and brought them all to one table where they can hear that the problems that they see day in, day out with their constituents are really shared problems across immigrant communities ... if we choose to frame things in that way [11-21].*

At CAAELII, in an open-day event of their curriculum development program, all participants had to share their experiences as immigrants. These common experiences refer primarily to feelings of exclusion or unfairness. As a program officer at CAAELII puts it, “up to the citizenship moment there's an amazing amount of unity of what goes on that they believe is unfair at a hundred different steps up to that point” [25-21].

For all four networks a major generator of unity is then shared identity or cause. The ultimate goal, improving the immigrants' lives, unites the different organizations, and, in particular, it is the immigrant identity that catalyzes the unity—or, as in NDLO's case, the identity of the day-laborer subgroup. Although the immigration community in the U.S. is highly heterogeneous, the sense of immigrant identity is certainly strong among organizations in this policy sector. And as the above quote suggests, up to the citizenship moment, “there's an amazing amount of unity.” Identity, the idea of belonging to a certain group (Hogg and Terry 2000; Tsui, Egan, and O'Reilly 1992), is suggested to create unity within organizations in other policy and economic sectors, and Human and Provan (2000) also observed that common experiences served to unify networks in the business sector.

The value of diversity, closely related to identity and common experiences, represents another dimension of unity. In fact, consistent with the nature of paradox, I found that diversity itself may be a value around which to unite: one of the "dimensions" among which networks are united is diversity. "Well, is it really necessary that we're all on the same page anyway" [21:24]? rhetorically asked herself CAUSA's coordinator when acknowledging the general diversity in her coalition. More than just tolerance, this appreciation for diversity is true for all networks. CAAELII's director, Dale, mentions: "I keep telling the staff, that you can't have everybody, altogether, dancing, everyone out all of us dancing the Salsa. It's okay it's chaotic; it's fine to be chaotic" [14-29].

At the different events I observed, all networks showed a high sensitivity to diversity. All events were multilingual and tried to encompass linguistic and cultural diversity. NDLO's annual meeting was bilingual, Spanish and English, and included traditional artwork from several areas of Latinamerica, and rituals from both Native Americans and the U.S. CAUSA's town hall meeting was bilingual, and CAAELII's citizenship event and NYIC supporter's annual event were trilingual—English, Spanish, and Chinese. At NYIC, diversity is consciously valued. A program officer describes:

*We're knowledgeable, and I think we're really diverse and we're really thoughtful about that, you know, that we don't just work with one particular immigrant group, that we really, we're really conscious in making sure that there are people from all different communities on our board and on our working force, you know, our task force and that we really hear from all populations [9-51].*

Pablo Alvarado, NDLO's coordinator, goes a bit further and hints at how his network combines both unity and diversity and explicitly avoids seeing them in conflict:

*We don't see the diversity as being opposed to the unity part. I don't know. The diversity within our organizations doesn't really conflict with the unity part like how I think that the majority of our member organizations get it. I think that they understand why they're doing the work and we're all sort of linked in that [30:31].*

The above quote shows how these networks manage the paradox. As mentioned in Chapter 3, unity and diversity are by definition not opposites, therefore the paradox only arises when an implicit premise is made: diversity implies disunity and unity implies similarity. Pablo Alvarado's quote above shows how, by avoiding to frame unity and diversity as opposites, NDLON manages the network. I return to this in brief but, be it as it may, all above quotes show how these networks accept and enhance diversity as a value. Diversity as a value, as an organizational characteristic to be enhanced not reduced, is then a unifying factor. This resembles current trends in workforce diversity management, where the current paradigm neither assimilates nor differentiates diversity; rather it integrates diversity by valuing difference (Thomas and Ely 1996).

The above factors, then unite these networks. Agranoff and McGuire (2001) ask what is cohesive factor that bonds independent organizations together into networks? In the studied networks, the cohesion factors of experiences, the value of diversity and identity may bond independent organizations together in networks, just as the legal-rational authority does among units within single organizations.

### **Unpacking the unity/diversity paradox**

Smith and Berg's (1987: 65) ground breaking work on paradoxes in groups illustrates how diversity and unity is a paradox:

*A group often needs people who are different to fulfill its primary task. This means that differences must be brought into the group and then integrated in a way that provides unity while preserving difference. Difference alone is enough to provide a platform for conflict, but the need to unify in light of difference makes it almost inevitable that conflict will occur (Deutsch 1973). Under these circumstances, the very fact that individuals contribute differences makes it possible for the group to be effective, yet these same differences threaten the group's capacity to function.*

Although the above quote refers to groups of individuals, the rationale also applies to groups of groups (as Smith and Berg themselves state), or interorganizational networks: diversity within the network is necessary for network effectiveness; unity of the network is necessary for network effectiveness; but diversity and unity undermine each other.

This paradox of belonging (Lewis 2000; Smith and Berg 1987)—the tension between self and collective, between organization and network, between diversity and unity—is present in CAUSA, CAAELII, NDLO, and NYIC. An interesting question after documenting that the two poles of the paradox exist, is how they are present in all four networks, and how documenting them helps us to understand how these networks actually handle the tension arising from having to generate unity and maintain diversity which pull in opposing directions and generate tensions.

Breaking apart the paradox and looking at its form and nature in detail, at how each pole applies, is important because it informs us how the coordinating unit, and the rest of the network, deal with this intrinsic tension and manage the network. Knowing along which dimensions networks seek unity and along which they maintain diversity is important to

better understand network management. As Ford and Backoff (1988) state, social science paradoxes are semantic paradoxes, not logical contradictions but rather “inconsistencies in levels of thought structures” (90). Such inconsistencies arise because of the collapse of levels, time, or dimensions. The paradoxical tension is becomes destructive when unity and diversity are not differentiated along different dimensions.

It has already been stated that all four networks generated unity around purpose, identity and shared experiences, and around the value of diversity, while diversity existed around organizational size, organizational sub-purposes, organizational culture, type of constituents, and, for CAUSA and NDLO, geographical presence. All networks are diverse along the members' organizational characteristics and members' organizational culture. But not all are diverse along all dimensions. For example, NDLO is not diverse along the members' organizational sub-issue, CAUSA is not diverse along the members' constituents, and CAELII and NYIC's diversity is low along the members' geographic base. The table below summarizes these findings.

<b>Table XXIV. Dimensions of unity and diversity in the networks</b>				
	CAELII	CAUSA	NDLO	NYIC
Diversity				
Organizational characteristics	x	x	x	x
Organizational culture	x	x	x	x
Organizational sub-issues	x	x		x
Cultural-national	x		x	x
Geographic base		x	x	
Unity				
Meta-objective / vision	x	x	x	x
Identity / Experiences / Problems	x	x	x	x
Value of diversity	x	x	x	x

From the results tabulated above, in the unity/diversity paradox each pole seems to operate differently. A closer look at the paradox allows us to go beyond the basic contradiction of the three premises that define the paradox: diversity within the network is necessary for network effectiveness; unity of the network is necessary for network effectiveness; diversity and unity undermine each other. The above table shows that the unity/diversity paradox is more complex than perceived at first sight. Both poles apply at the network level—the network is united and the network is diverse—but at a closer look, the poles apply along different dimensions.

These networks seem to be managing the tension by clearly generating unity of the network around identity and experiences, meta-goals, and the value of diversity. Diversity also exists and is valued within the network around organizational characteristics and culture, and organizational sub-issues, geographic base, or culture-nationality. This seems important in managing the tension because I believe it helps us understand the way the third premise is worked out: diversity and unity undermine each other.

The above argument borrowed from Smith and Berg (1987) that diversity both is necessary for network effectiveness and also hinders network functioning has some implicit assumptions. Indeed, as Poole and Van de Ven (1989) state, social scientific paradoxes tend to be looser and poles are vague: “paradoxes in management are not, strictly speaking, logical paradoxes” (564). The third premise in the argument, “diversity and unity undermine each other,” has an implicit part to it. The full premise should read

as follows: diversity and unity *may easily* undermine each other by respectively generating disunity and similarity. Diversity per se does not necessarily need to generate disunity—the antonym of unity. In order to be effective, then, a network has to be diverse, be united, and, most importantly, avoid diversity turning into disunity.

How do these four networks manage to avoid diversity turning into disunity? These networks are diverse and united, and avoid diversity turning into disunity by requiring and building unity around the immigrant (or immigrant day-laborer) identity and common experiences, around the network’s meta-goal, and around the value of diversity. None of these networks tolerated diversity among its members around the network’s meta-goal, the network’s idea of immigrant (or immigrant day-laborer), nor regarding valuing diversity. On the other hand, they all maintained and sustained diversity among its member’s organizational culture and characteristics, and its member’s constituents, sub-issues, or geographic location. Along these dimensions, they did not look for unity. And the fact that these networks built unity along certain dimensions and sustained diversity along others is, I believe, why they successfully coped with the paradoxical tension. Using these cases as “exceptional cases” (Stake 2000), we may propose that unifying around meta-goal, identity, and value of diversity, and maintaining diversity among other members’ characteristics, is key to successfully managing this tension and, hence, to network effectiveness—at least in the context of immigration interorganizational coalitions.



Identifying the dimensions along which to generate unity and not diversity, and vice versa, avoids diversity turning into disunity: the immigrant identity unites, while national cultures strengthen diversity—Mexican versus Korean, for example. This is patent in NDLON director’s quote, “We don’t see the diversity as being opposed to the unity part,” since—although in other instances he acknowledges tensions around achieving a unified advocacy strategy among the diverse members, tensions around what issues to generate a common strategy, and tensions due to personal style—he does not take for granted the premise that diversity necessarily generates disunity.

In sum, these network successful manage the belonging paradoxical tension by valuing diversity—and hence not taking for granted the premise that diversity must turn into disunity—and by decoupling the dimensions along which unity and diversity are sought. By maintaining diversity along organizational characteristics and culture, and other dimensions, while building unity around identity and experiences, the meta-goal, and the value for diversity does not, however, resolve the paradox. The tension is still present in that the potential for diversity turning into disunity is always there: unity and diversity form a management paradox in that they imply equally necessary opposing forces that generate a tension.

### ***Building unity in diversity***

Building both on theoretical contributions and on the identified distinction between the nature of each pole, we could argue that diversity exists while unity is built. If diversity within the network is intrinsic, unity beyond a formal agreement or commitment to a

common goal must be built: unity is not intrinsically given from the outset, but is absolutely necessary for success.

Understanding the different nature of each pole in the paradox aids to understanding why unity and diversity are intertwined. To the risk of sounding redundant, paradoxes are paradoxical according to Quinn and Cameron (1988): in fact, when we refer to unity we are also referring to diversity, and vice versa. Diversity is only possible within some unity or unitary boundary. That is, without a commonality diversity has no meaning. Similarly, unity refers to two or more different parts being together but if they are not different, they cannot be united (Smith and Berg 1987). This is why when I refer to organizations having unity along the value or identity dimension, I am implicitly assuming differences among the member organizations along other dimensions. This will become apparent in the next chapter, where I describe how the coordinating units maintain diversity and build unity.

The key lesson drawn is that, although unity entails some diversity and diversity entails some unity, it is important to know along which dimension to generate unity and along which to maintain diversity. It is not the same, say, to maintain diverse ideas of what the network's meta-goal should be and unify the members' organizational culture than to maintain the diverse members' organizational culture and to unify the understanding of the network's meta-goal.

In brief, in all four networks, unity and diversity are sustained along multiple dimensions. Addressing, partially, my first secondary research question with respect to the internal paradox (*what are the form and the nature of the diversity/unity paradox in the context of network management?*), I find that in the context of immigrant networks, unity is built along the network's meta-goal, vision, identity, and shared experiences and problems, and diversity is maintained among the members' organizational characteristics, culture, and sub-issues, constituents served, or geographic base. The next chapter looks deeper at how the tension is managed, how the unity is built and how diversity is sustained along these different dimensions.

## **7. SUSTAINING THE UNITY/DIVERSITY PARADOX**

In this chapter I use the unity/diversity paradox, inherent to networks, to further my understanding of how these networks are managed. In particular, I look at the leadership activities involved in managing the internal paradox of the network. I find that four activities contribute to manage the paradox. The four activities are member selection and attraction, facilitating interaction, framing structure, and building the members' capacity. The last section explores how these networks sustain both unity and diversity to build power. Specifically, I argue that the unity/diversity paradox helps build the networks' "power to" and the power bases, by contributing to develop knowledge, expanding access to key actors, further legitimating the network, and increasing financial resources.


In successfully managing the internal paradox—the need for unity and the maintenance of diversity—I empirically identify four interrelated leadership activities which appear to play a fundamental role and that affect networks' power. All these activities are executed not solely by the network manager but mainly by the coordinating unit of the network, although other network members not pertaining to the coordinating unit also participated in them. In fact, in line with what Huxham and Vangen (2000b) find, the interviewees very rarely referred to the network manager as the "leader," although they did use the term "leadership" when referring to "building" or "developing" the "leadership" of the movement or the constituents. The leadership activities refer to what Gronn (2002) calls a pattern of group functions constituting a leadership complex, where the "group" is the network, and its core the coordinating unit.

## **Managing the network**

The following section attempts to answer my secondary research question *how is the unity/diversity paradox managed in the context of inter-organizational networks?* I find that four leadership activities play an important role in sustaining the unity/diversity paradox. Unity is built around meta-goal, identity, and the value of diversity by framing both the formal procedures, and the values and norms. In contrast, the diverse members' interaction is facilitated. Facilitation is most evident during decision-making, as the lack of authority disallows imposing decisions on autonomous actors who have the real option of abandoning the network. Indeed, the facilitated interaction that results in open decision-making aims at promoting the members' voice rather than their exit from the network (Gray 2000, Hirschmann 1970).

I find two more leadership activities in addition to facilitation and framing: activating and capacitating. While capacitating the members is clearly linked to framing common meaning-making, activating allows to maximize unity and diversity by properly selecting and attracting members to the network (or the working groups in NYIC's case). The following figure summarizes my findings.

Figure XXI. Leadership activities sustaining the unity/diversity paradox (source: own)



Some differences between networks also are apparent. First, network activation (attracting and selecting members to the network) is particularly relevant for medium-sized networks, while game activation (attracting and selecting network members to specific working groups) is more relevant in larger networks with multiple working groups. Second, consensus is the main mechanism to ratify decisions for all networks except NDLO, where a strong voting culture exists.

### **Activation: managing membership**

*I think it [successfully managing the network] all starts off when an organization applies to be part of the network, there's all the principles that we have to make sure that they believe and we see the work that they're doing, the organizing work. [30:34 & 30:35]*

The above is NDLOON coordinator's response to a question inquiring into how they managed to generate unity and maintain diversity. It suggests that selecting, attracting, and retaining the network's organizational members is an essential management task.

In NDLOON, CAUSA, and CAAELII, an essential leadership activity for managing the unity/diversity paradox is the selection and attraction of organizational members. If activation is adequately done, only those organizations which share the network's vision—a unifying factor—but are different along other certain dimensions, join the network. In managing the poles of the paradox (welcoming diversity along one dimension and unity along another), potential member selection and attraction seem important.

CAAELII's director describes his network's criteria for selecting a new member:

*They have to be community-based...and also they have to have a deep commitment and they have to do activism and organize in their community first, before...not just providing services. And that they have to be committed to leadership, intentional leadership [14-22].*

A regional coordinator at CAUSA tells us how she incorporates new members into her local chapter: "I think the groups that I have decided to work with [are] groups that I think are doing relevant work around human rights" [19:14].

Member selection allows the network coordinating unit to select and attract members who have constructive heterogeneity: making members united around identity, meta-goal,

and value for diversity, but diverse around cultural-national origins, sub-issues, organizational culture, or geographic location.<sup>83</sup>

The leadership activity of identifying and incorporating the organizations needed to achieve the network's goal has been termed activation by collaboration scholars. In a formalized network such as the ones studied here, activation deals primarily with building and attracting the network's membership. While activating has been identified by different authors (Agranoff 2003; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997c; McGuire 2003; Vangen and Huxham<sup>84</sup> 2004), the role of this leadership activity in sustaining the unity/diversity paradox has not been made explicit.

CAUSA, CAAELII, and NDLOJ similarly focus on network activation—on selecting and attracting potential network members—but NYIC contrastingly has an unmonitored and fairly free-flowing network activation policy. Although NYIC does look for a specific type of member—“strong organization background ... doing quality programs... that represent a strong constituent base” [9-57]—they have an “open-door policy,” and the acceptance of membership applicants is a “very basic process” [9-27]. Interestingly, this openness has not distorted the network's functioning, nor has it drawn undesired members. The network manager talks about self-selection and describes it as follows: “some groups just know that if they join this bigger group, there's no way they're going to convince the rest of the group to support them...so they don't bother coming to the

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<sup>83</sup> This type of entry-level selection has been observed also in informal ethnic networks and is termed parochialism (Bowles and Gintis 2004).

<sup>84</sup> “Embracing” according to Vangen and Huxham (2004, 65).



coalition...it's almost like a self selection" [10-20]. It is as if the sheer size of this network (over 150 members), compared to the other three (around 30 members), makes it much less vulnerable to cooptation by one of its members, making network activation less critical.

However, that NYIC focuses less on network activation does not mean that activation is not important. The following quote by a program officer shows that selecting and attracting groups to the table is a critical activity:

*What we do is we send out an invitation to our member groups saying we're going to form this working group...Those organizations that want to work with us on achieving that goal come and join this task force...But what we do is once we have our first meeting, we look across the table and if we see that there are major partners now missing, we sort of go out after them...we try to be strategic about it. We open it up for those that want to get involved but also we analyze it and see who really needs to be on board if we really want to, you know, get, achieve our goal or whatever the task force is. [9-18]*

The difference between NYIC and the other three networks is that NYIC attracts and selects network members to the working group. The operating structure of NYIC may be responsible for making network level activation less critical in this network than in the other three. The close monitoring of the members happens not at the network level, but at the working group or task-force level—at the game level (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997c).

NYIC functions with working groups. Borrowing from Agranoff (2003), working groups are “where the basic and detailed work gets done” (15). Here, the distinction made in

Chapter 3 between interaction and structure, or game and network (Kickert, Klijn, Koppenjan 1997; Scharpf 1997), is useful. Activating actors in the specific working groups, or game activation, becomes essential in large and diverse networks as NYIC. This is so because at NYIC—unlike NDLO, CAUSA, and CAAELII where all members generally partake in all projects and task forces—not all 150 members participate in all task forces all the time. Therefore, the selection and attraction occurs at the task force level. In order to unite around meta-goal, identity, and the value of diversity, and maintain member organizational diversity, in NYIC game activation is critical, rather much so than network activation.

Activating also may include organizations in working groups or specific collaboratives without necessarily intending to include them in the network. Confirming Huxham (2003) that the membership of a collaborative is not clear-cut and is often ambiguous, CAUSA's regional coordinators have set up local committees of groups that are not necessarily members of CAUSA. Similarly, CAAELI works with non-members in the USCIS watch-dog (the Immigration Monitoring Board), NDLO works closely with the non-member Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) and other legal groups when strategizing, and 20% of NYIC's task force participants are non-members.

### ***Factors aiding activation***

What are the key factors that help networks attract and select members? The network's legitimacy, relative to its impact, as well as to its procedural nature, helps to activate potential network members. CAUSA's former coordinator puts it this way: "the fact that

we've been able to rack up all these different victories. People want to identify with that stuff. People want to be part of it" [18:16]. NYIC's director similarly highlights the role of being perceived as a successful network in activating members: "people see us as people who can get things done, can pass laws, and can get funding, and help them do this, help them do that, and people want to join successful coalitions" [10-49]. NDLO's coordinator explains why resource-limited organizations only join networks that help them reach their goals and be successful:

*If you want to bull shit too much, it won't work. Because its meaningless, why are you going to come and waste two hours in a national conference call for nothing? Why are you going to be a member of a useless coalition that doesn't have any impact in the political life and the lives of people out there in the streets. That's the secret. The networks have to be immersed in the local political realities. Fighting along with the member organizations providing the support they need [30:37].*

In fact, success builds trust (Alter and Hage 1993; Hakansson 1990), and trust is important for collaborative processes and is closely related to power and control (Vangen and Huxham 2003). The members' continual evaluations of the network build the networks' legitimacy and the members' trust of it (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). Hence success builds "past-based trust" (Vangen and Huxham 2003) and builds the legitimacy of the network, enhancing the coordinating unit's capacity to activate important actors<sup>85</sup>.

Another factor which aids the attraction and retention of members is the network's openness and inclusiveness. NDLO's inclusive structure seems important in activating

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<sup>85</sup> This has the flavor of "increasing returns" (Waldrop 1992), where success builds more success: in the case of these networks, successful networks have an easier time activating and hence have better chances to be successful.

potential members: “One of the main things that binds us all together is that we really believe strongly in democratic principles and initiatives that include workers in the decision making processes” [16-41], mentioned its development coordinator. Having an open structure also helped NYIC include members, as its director comments: “One thing about us is that it is very open, and we reward people who work hard, and who bring their community members, involvement into our work, so I think that’s the main part of it” [10-49]. Such an inclusive and open sentiment was also present in CAUSA as its former coordinator explained: “We have some organizations that are small. Some are big...but they want to identify with this movement. Because this movement includes them” [18:31]. Being a united but diverse network also legitimizes the network internally, versus its members, as a program officer at CAAELII mentioned:

*We are asking the agencies to ...come together and work together on the issues so we are more successful together on this than alone. So...then we should also incorporate that into our structure. CAAELII should make decisions based on the whole [15-28].*

The fact that organizations want to be part of an inclusive and participatory network is coherent with the equity or fairness criterion that, in addition to the efficiency and effective criterions, is used by members in (re-)evaluating the network and their membership to it (Doz 1996, Ring Van de Ven 1994).

Another factor that aids the coordinating unit when activating potential members is the presence of existing current members. The relationships the potential members expect to build through the network help attract potential members. One of CAUSA’s regional coordinators explicates: “I also think for ... their organization ... it [is] a good place for

them to be able to sit and meet other people and also stay updated on what's going on around immigrant rights" [19:8]. In the same line of reasoning, CAAELII's director justified how meeting other organizations and sharing experiences was one of the attracting factors for potential members:

*I don't think there is only one answer...But some people might say, "Oh because I see the value of working across cultures." Or then you could go to the community leaders and they say, "Oh because I've been through these classes and I see deeply the similarities we all face." So you might not have one response...and I'm comfortable with that.*

Activating, then, plays an important role in sustaining the paradox since it allows selecting and attracting members who are diverse along specific organizational dimensions but that are united around the network's meta-goal, identity and experiences, and value for diversity. Activating happens either at the network level for smaller size networks or at the game level for larger networks, and is enhanced when the network has legitimacy in the face of potential members; legitimacy which is in turn enhanced by the network's success record and its procedural inclusiveness. The possibility to meet other organizations and share experiences also attracts potential members to the network. Last, although the networks studied are highly formalized, membership is nevertheless not a clear-cut issue.

Once groups and organizations are attracted to the network, they start interacting and the network functions. The interaction, however, must be managed, or facilitated.

## **Facilitation: managing interaction and decision-making in diversity**

Facilitating deals with interaction, in particular with decision-making. Regarding facilitation in general, the coordinating unit mediates and accompanies members and communicates with them. With respect to decision-making, the coordinating unit facilitates an open decision-making process among all members.

### ***Managing interaction***

#### *Mediating and accompanying interaction*

The analysis suggests that there are a leadership activity executed by the coordinating units aimed at easing and assisting the interaction of the different members. Mediating between members was highlighted as an important activity by NDLO's coordinator:

*The people who work in networks have to be peacemakers. I know that between [two NDLO members] there are issues... People have different ways of doing things... some of our organizers focus more on developing relationships with the local establishment, police officers, politicians ... and some may see this as "this mother-fucker is a sell out". ... So those kinds of things, yes, they happen [30-36].*

A junior leader of CAUSA member Voz Hispana Causa Chavista also pointed out as a success factor the presence in CAUSA's coordinating unit of good "mediators" that "file roughness" between members [22:20—own translation]. CAAELII's director also emphasized how confrontation easily occurs during interaction—hinting at how diversity turns into disunity if not facilitated—and how mediators are important:

*You can't have a meeting without multiple confrontations... in a day-to-day basis... I just have to hire staff that know how to manage and have lived experiences as well so that they know how to... respond and to respond with care and be mindful [14-35].*

A NYIC program officer also mentioned how she has to mediate conflicts in her daily work by focusing discussions on the goal and not on differences:

*And it's really challenging dealing, dealing with groups like that because, I mean, you have to keep reminding them that it's not about you, it's about this particular issue...It's like a therapy session [with] person-to-person phone sessions [9-53].*

In addition to mediating, these coordinating units also simply support and accompany the members and their interactions. CAUSA's manager tells us how she "nurtures" (Huxham 2003) the network's functioning: "If we have a major rally in Salem and we turn out, say, hundreds of people, and the folks from Medford come up in a van, they want recognition that they drove five hours to get here" [21:30]. At NYIC, while the board president highlights "the importance of managing the internal environment," a program officer further describes how she supported the network's action: "we play that coordinating role, supportive role, technical assistance role, but the bulk of the work, given the sheer size of the city, has to come from our kind of groups" [9-11]. Similarly, at CAELII's citizenship information day, the network's staff only opened up the speech and then transitioned between speakers. During NDLO's Annual Assembly the coordinating unit also supported and coordinated member interventions.

The above activity, mediating and supporting member action and interaction, is similar to what has been identified in the literature as "facilitation" (Agranoff and McGuire 2003;

Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997c; Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995<sup>86</sup>; Mandell 1994; Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005; Vangen and Huxham 2004<sup>87</sup>). Facilitation, then, aims to motivate member participation as well as supporting work. Facilitating involves supporting members, mediating among members, and communicating to and among members.

As Stone (2006) states, it is because of the complex power distribution and interdependencies in networks, as opposed to the more linear and straightforward hierarchical dependences within organizations, that facilitation and not domination is pervasive. Facilitation, which designates behaviors that make the process of interaction among members easier, is an essential leadership activity closely associated with the diversity pole of the internal paradox. It is precisely because diversity may easily turn into disunity during interaction that facilitating that process is essential. A monolithic entity does not need facilitation, a diverse one—if it is to be united—does.

### *Communicating among members*

*We also have a commitment to being in communication with a lot of our member organizations. And so, the primary job of the West coast and East coast coordinators is to maintain that relationship and be talking to people on either side of the country, and somewhat organizing, informing and motivating them to take action or participate in a phone call, participate in our assembly meetings [16-18].*

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<sup>86</sup> Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995) refer to “brokering.”

<sup>87</sup> “Involving,” according to Vangen and Huxham (2004).



The above quote by NDLO's development coordinator highlights the importance of support tasks by the coordinating unit but also points towards communication as an important aspect of facilitation. CAUSA's coordinator explains her focus in communication and the challenges involved:

*I've been working to do more consistent communication with folks... It's hard to know how much information to report back all the time... But people need to know, people are wanting to be informed as far as what's going on. Also, just knowing what's going on in other regions. For example, Eugene people didn't always know what was going on in Portland and stuff like that [21:10].*

A staff person at CAAELLII's coordinating unit points at how lack of communication may hinder unity: "sometimes there are problems in communication. There's a sense of not being a collective momentum [or of having] a collective goal" [24:23].

Communicating has been identified as fundamental in trust-building (Hardy, Phillips, Lawrence 1998) and sense-making (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005), and central to facilitation (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). Indeed, by promoting communication between members within the network, facilitation helps generate unity by bridging diversity. Just as Luhmann (1986) points towards the substituting of social action by communication in complex social systems, Lyytinen (1987) suggests that strategic action is replaced by communicative action (Habermas 1984) as we move from hierarchies to clans (Ouchi 1980). This is so because communication aids to generate unity within diversity.

### *Facilitating decision-making*

Managing decision-making is central to networks (Agranoff 2003, Agranoff and McGuire 2001, Huxham and Vangen 2000b). I find that decision-making is a specific instance of interaction of particular importance, which must be facilitated by the coordinating unit. By decision-making I refer to the moment a decision is made and the process preceding it. As I mention in the previous chapter, the superior decision-making body in NYIC, CAUSA, and CAAELII is the board. A secondary level of decision-making is made by the coordinating unit regarding operative, tactical, and more executive matters. NDLO functions in a similar fashion but its decision-making structure adds one more level, the general assembly. Although these differences between levels are relevant, as I show further ahead, I find that decision-making at all levels in all four networks must be facilitated.

### *An open decision-making process*

Open and inclusive decision-making—which Ospina and I (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005) have already identified in the preliminary study—seems to be a shared characteristic of all four networks. As CAUSA’s coordinator says: “it’s nice if you want them [the immigrants] to be the face of the movement, but you should also be working at...giving them decision-making power” [21:64]. At NDLO, the “legal coordinator...creates a space where the [day-]workers can be part of that legal challenge...they join the lawsuit as plaintiffs. And [the] workers see themselves in a much bigger battle that’s not just happening locally, but nationally” [16:8]. At CAAELII, the financial manager of CAAELII-member Chinese Mutual Aid Association explains

how the network comes up with its strategic issues: “The board...or director...will bring, you know, the issues...so we [the board] will pick two or three to work on” [26-22].

Openness is important for managing the network because it respects diversity while making unity possible and avoiding the diverse autonomous and independent members to abandon the network. NDLON’s coordinator states how he thinks maintaining an open process is important for network management:

*I think the purpose needs to be very clear and also that is meaningful to members, and the other thing that I think is important is you don’t enforce it. Because when you try to force it, then it won’t work. The networks have to manage in a natural manner. Like a funder all of sudden thinks that this is a fancy thing to do, and put the money in. That... doesn’t work. It’s been tried over and over again. And it doesn’t work [30-38].*

Uniting around a common vision and meta-objective, diversity is welcomed by these four networks in the process of decision-making regarding lower-level issues, strategies, and opinions. Similar to Wheatley’s (1999) self-organizing systems approach to leadership, this requires embracing diversity and not demanding unitary positions or standpoints during decision-making. As a staff person of NDLON-member IDEPSCA<sup>88</sup> commented: “I think that [the diversity] is the richness, right?...everyone has their own different perspective [so] we do open dialogues where everyone proposes their view of the issue and we land in a common point where we are all comfortable” [27:8—own translation].

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<sup>88</sup> Instituto de Educacion Popular del Sur de California

Maintaining an authentically open process—which essentially implies reducing to a minimum what Bacharach and Baratz (1962) call the non-decision-making space—and acknowledging the contrary positions within the network strengthen everyone’s backing behind the final decision adopted. Garnering support for the decision made is obviously important since a decision produces change if implemented (Pfeffer 1992) and this will happen more readily if it has sufficient support.

Now, keeping an open and participatory decision-making process seems contrary to prescriptions in the literature that call for reducing complexity in networks (Huxham and Vangen 2000a) and for maintaining stability in open systems through hierarchy (Katz and Kahn 1966; Kilduff and Dougherty 2000). However, in networks, joint decision-making may not be more efficient but may be more effective (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). The effectiveness of joint decision-making is due to the support it generates for the implementation of the decision made—especially as in networks implementation is often left to member organizations. Effectiveness of joint decision-making is also due to the fact that in networks, organizations are autonomous and the possibility of them exiting is real (Hirschmann 1970). Hence, it is better to allow for members to voice their diverse opinions—at the risk of producing a cacophony of voices (Gray 2000)—rather than having members exiting and abandoning the network.

Closely related to the idea of maintaining an open decision-making, incorporating the member organizations’ constituents—in addition to including all the organizational representatives—in the decision-making reduces the level of disagreements because, in

situations of deadlock, the constituents get to decide the position the networks take. In cases of disagreement, as in deciding whether to support the DreamAct<sup>89</sup>, facilitating consultation with the constituency base helps reach agreements since ideological subtleties present among organizational representatives fade away in favor of the constituents' real-life desires and needs. A NYIC program officer illustrates this with a real example:

*And we really thought that that [a modification introduced to the bill] really weakened and sort of really killed the authenticity of the bill ... And so we needed to really make a decision whether or not we were going to withdraw...And after long discussions and meetings and conference calls and back and forth, and obviously in consultation with a lot of the youth that we met, we felt that we needed to still support it because at the end it did provide a path to citizenship for these kids and that [it] is what most of them really wanted, and that we could see other ways in trying to get financial support [9-39].*

Similarly, NDLON includes plaintiffs in its legal challenges and does not act without the participation and support of the centers' day-laborers, and CAAELII works with what its director calls a "multi-layered cake." CAUSA, by consulting with its constituents, reduced disunion among its members with regard to the McCain-Kennedy bill<sup>90</sup> since constituents, ultimately, bring decisions to a very concrete level. CAUSA's former director explains:

*We recently had a discussion around the comprehensive immigration reform. And we had a discussion around the Kennedy-McCain Bill. There was disagreement. Some members of the coalition thought that it*

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<sup>89</sup> A proposed bill that would allow immigrant students who have grown up in the U.S., graduated from high school, and have no criminal record, to go to college and legalize their immigration status. Right now immigrant (non-U.S. citizen) students aren't eligible for government loans or scholarships to attend college.

<sup>90</sup> The McCain-Kennedy bill is the immigration proposal that comes from the Senate (as opposed to the House). It is preferred to the House bill (also known as the Sensenbrenner bill) since it allows a path for citizenship and is not as border-enforcement focused. See Chapter 5 and Appendix 11.

*was meager. It was like we weren't getting anything. But the good thing about a coalition that has a membership base, or has anchor organizations that have that base, is that the base dictates to the organization what the organization's position should be [18:19].*

Again, including more layers and individuals in the decision-making process increases the complexity of the network. However, in the long run, this inclusiveness allows the network to be better attuned with the constituents—hence maintaining legitimacy and relevance—and resolve disputes by grounding them in concrete problems experienced by the ultimate beneficiaries.

#### *Facilitating openness*

However, as the NYIC program officer's quote below shows, open processes, if left totally unguided, may disrupt the work of the network:

*So what we've had to do was set up individual aside meetings because we also find that that can be really sort of interruptive, you know, to the task force and working group. We want them to sort of open up and give their concerns but we're just so afraid that that's going to sort of sway other groups [9-32].<sup>91</sup>*

NDLON's development coordinator also point towards the dilemma of how much to interfere or manipulate these processes: "how far do we go in terms of intervention

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<sup>91</sup> This may seem to point towards the creation of coalitions of individuals as conceptualized in behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1963) in line with Murnighan and Brass' (1991) proposition that initial coalition contacts are dyadic (in this case between the program officer and the different organizational representatives). This building of individual coalition was most clearly identified at NYIC. This may be because of its size, since, as Thompson (1967) proposes, when power is widely distributed an inner circle emerges to conduct coalition business. The inner circle in this case would include the program officer and the contacted influential organizational representatives. However, the existence of such a coalition would counter the statement that decision-making in these networks is open. But this does not seem logical because if a coalition dominates the network, those left outside would "exit." Rather than pointing towards coalition-building of individuals, these informal dyadic exchanges promoted by the program officer probably indicate that the process is being spearheaded by this initial core.

whenever two organizations are going through hardship” [30:7]? CAUSA’s manager also pointed out the challenge between facilitating without enforcing: “being strategic in pushing towards the fine line between dictating what needs to be going on and having regions have a say in that” [21:25]. In a slightly different note, at NYIC, facilitating the process includes one-on-one consultations during preparation of meetings or when disagreements arise that may interrupt the process. A program officer explains: “I call them up before and I just feel them out and just see what your sort of thoughts are so I can be sort of mentally prepared for it. Because I hate being in a position where, you know, boom, and it comes down on me and I don’t even know how to respond or react” [9-44].

The above quotes show that the openness does not mean that the process is unguided or left to develop absolutely anarchically. Facilitating becomes fundamental when processes are open and inclusive. Open and inclusiveness allows to tap on diversity, generate some unity around diversity, but may turn into disunity. The open process must be facilitated—if it weren’t open it would be mandated, but, this would be unviable in a network composed of independent autonomous actors. As NDLO coordinator’s quote states, “the purpose must be very clear” but you “can’t enforce” the process. However, the tension between what constitutes facilitation and what manipulation or enforcement is present in these networks.

Facilitating the process does not give the coordinating unit the control over the outcome, but it does give oversight of the process. The outcome of the interaction in the network is

not predictable by anyone involved: it depends on all organizations involved (Huxham 2003; O'Toole 1997). Indeed, networks have all the characteristics identified by Thompson (1967) that make the relationship between cause and effects uncertain: information is insufficient, they are highly dynamic, and outcome depends on behavior of others.

Openness and participatory decision-making is important, but it can easily turn into disunity, especially during resource distribution<sup>92</sup>. While I was at CAAELII, its financial sponsor's financial manager explained how lengthy the process could become when he had to decide on the grants' re-distribution among the members: "we need meetings after meetings, among all [members and] it was very difficult for everybody to reach a decision" [26-13]. At NYIC, deciding who speaks at a rally or event may generate tensions, according to the network director, "because we can't have an event and have everybody speak" [10-47]. Another NYIC program officer describes how these power imbalances were facilitated:

*There are organizations that are better, more experienced staff, they understand the politics better, they have better connections so they themselves make sure that their side of the story's heard. One thing that we do is before every time that we meet, when we bring everybody together, we make sure that we talk individually to each one [35-20].*

A staff person of another network gave an additional example of how power imbalances, when not properly facilitated, may negatively influence the decision-making process:

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<sup>92</sup> This tension between creating value together and claiming the value created against each other is termed in negotiation analysis as the negotiator's dilemma (Sebenius 1992).



*A lot of the people who are working here, a great majority are Mexican undocumented people. And they tend to kind of overpower the voice in immigration reform efforts. And I think sometimes it seems like [their] agenda seems to take up a lot of space [in the network]. Bearing in mind that they are really that guiding force too [24-15].*

As shown above, facilitating decision-making becomes especially relevant during the distribution of benefits, since success may unite but may also divide—as Ybema (1996) states. As far as decision-making is understood as a power game as opposed to, or in addition to, a functional prerequisite (Miller, Hickson, and Wilson 1996), power among parties within the network—and in particular during decision-making—is central to the task of network facilitation (Bryson and Crosby 1992; Gray<sup>93</sup> 2000; Huxham and Vangen 2000b; Keast, Mandell, Brown, and Woodcock 2004; Tierney 1996; Vangen and Huxham 2004). Members will tend to strategically manipulate the game to their own advantage (Grandori and Soda 1995; Klijn and Teisman 1997). Indeed, Vangen and Huxham’s (2004) definition of the leadership activity “involvement” includes “managing power imbalances.”

Facilitation is necessary to maintain an open and inclusive decision-making process but, looking back, activation also may play a role in maintaining the open process. Activation allows the network to have an open decision-making process since it guarantees a minimum unity by selecting and attracting members who are diverse but also united around the meta-goal an identity. Without a proper selection, it may be that an open decision-making process is unviable since: no matter how well and how much it is

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<sup>93</sup> Actually, Gray (2000) proposes power shifts as one measure of network success.

facilitated, unity may not be achieved. On the other hand, a proper selection—together with facilitation aimed at maintaining and further building unity—allows opening up the decision-making process since a minimum of unity is already guaranteed. Killing finds (1988) that there must be a balance between scope complexity and organizational complexity (Alter and Hage 1993; Killing 1988)—an alliance can't be *both* scope *and* organizationally complex but must *either* be organizationally complex *or* have a complex scope. In these networks a similar rationale seems at work as controlling for unity around identity and meta-goal—first through activation and later through facilitation—allows for an open decision-making process among organizationally and culturally diverse members.

The facilitation of an open decision-making process hints at several points. First, while in intra-organizational settings management is about decision-making (Simon 1976; Miller, Hickson, and Wilson 1996), it may be that in a network setting management is about *facilitating* decision-making, in that decisions are made not by the coordinating unit but by others. The coordinating unit facilitates rather than decides. The idea here is not to reduce uncertainty but instead to cope with it (Thompson 1967; Kilduff and Dougherty 2000) by incorporating openness and inclusiveness as a programmed routine (March and Simon 1958). Second, the coordinating unit facilitates the process, and does not control the outcome. This does not mean that the process is left to develop freely; rather, it prescribes positive manipulation (Huxham and Vangen 2000b) and is similar to Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Thoret's (1976) support routines: routines aimed at supporting decision-making rather than decision-making itself. Facilitating the process

does not allow to closely determine the outcome of the decision-making process; this, in turn, does not allow to predetermine medium- to long-term specific objectives. This strategic *indefiniton* may then have the same effect as “strategic ambiguity” (Davenport and Leitch 2005)—when strategy is defined ambiguously—in that it may allow to promote “unified diversity” (Eisenberg and Goodall 1997). By leaving future specific objectives undefined unity is more readily reached in diversity.

### *Ratifying decisions*

Decisions must be ratified at some point. In networks decision-making is done mostly by consensus—in particular regarding major decisions—because, as explained by Agranoff and McGuire (2001), no legal mechanism exists to keep the non-agreeing independent actors together. This seems to reduce the number of options available to the network since, as in CAAELII’s case, they all come together “by choosing the issue that [they] all can work on” [26-24]. Similarly, at NYIC, on issues where consensus can not be reached, no position is taken.

Although voting happened in NYIC’s board to formalize decisions, only NDLOL seemed to use voting in actual decision-making. An organizer of NDLOL-member CHIRLA<sup>94</sup> exemplifies this: “we usually have...ways of reaching resolution of problems...and whatever we all decide is what we do. Even if it may seem too little for some or too much for others, whatever we decide in a common agreement is what gets done” [29:20—own translation]. This counters the idea that decisions taken in networks are consensual

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<sup>94</sup> Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles.

(Agranoff 2003). However, since voting happened only in NDLO, this singular exception may be because this network's superior decision-making body is the assembly. The annual assembly at NDLO uses voting to ratify decisions given the large number of people—both member representatives and constituents—present in the annual national meetings. Moreover, the day-laborers, when organizing in centers, use voting as their decision-making tool. This voting culture, then, seems to have permeated to all levels of decision-making in NDLO.

### *Summarizing facilitation*

In aggregate, an important leadership activity that emerged from my analysis was facilitating interaction, which involves communicating with, mediating among, and supporting members. This proved important since interaction of diverse organizational members must be aided if disunity is to be avoided and unity built.

Decision-making, I find, is a specific instance of interaction which must be facilitated while kept inclusive and open. Decision-making must be kept open and participatory if the diverse autonomous and independent members are not to exit and abandon the network. An inclusive and open process, though, must be facilitated in order to avoid disunity due to power imbalances and disputes arising around, for example, benefit distribution.

When ratifying decisions, consensus is the common mechanism, although voting is prevalent in NDLO as it has a culture of voting. Moreover, including constituents in decision-making seems fundamental since it ultimately reduces disagreements. The

inclusion of constituents in important and difficult decisions reduces overall disagreements since it grounds the decision in its real-life context, among the people that are most affected by it.

Facilitation, then, seems very closely linked to structure; that is, interaction—and decision-making as a type of interaction—occurs in a structure, which it in turn reifies or modifies (Giddens 1984; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997c; March and Simon 1958; Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006). As Blau and Scott noted long ago, “in the course of social interaction common notions arise as to how people should act and interact” (1978, 213). Managing the structure becomes imperative since it limits network interaction and ultimately influences the outcome.

### **Framing the structure: procedures and norms**

#### ***Procedures***

In my analysis, I identified a leadership activity carried out by the coordinating unit aimed at setting up and managing the procedures, and rules, norms, and values. All of which determine the structure. Structure is here understood as the stable patterns of behavior (March and Simon 1958) of all members of the network. Regarding the procedures, NYIC has set up a task-force multiple-tier structure to accommodate its large membership. The director explains:

*I think with the big coalition model, we just take anybody and everybody [but we don't have a] feeling like, oh, 'it's this huge coalition where everything is geared towards the lowest common denominator.' I think it's how you function, how tightly you run your coalition, and every one of our campaigns functions differently [10-32].*

NDLON and CAUSA have opted for regional coordinators, respectively at the federal and state level. In NDLON's case, its development director justifies this territorially divided structure: "it's just easier for them to communicate face-to-face and not always on the phone" [30-6]. This quote also points at how structure facilitates interaction.

In addition, all four networks studied here have set up structures that vertically span from the network's board all the way to the member organizations' constituents (as mentioned previously with regard to decision-making). NDLON incorporates day-laborers throughout its structure: in its board, in its work, and in its annual assembly. NDLON's coordinator justifies the porous vertical structure on the grounds of effectiveness: "It's about sharing leadership with the people impacted. If I were to speak on behalf of the day laborers, I will not be effective as they are when they speak on their own behalf" [17:14].

CAUSA's board is composed of organizational representatives but its working groups often incorporate constituents. As mentioned, the board incorporates immigrants in its major decisions—as in supporting or attacking the McCain-Kennedy bill. Its former coordinator justifies this verticality to ensure alignment between the network and its ultimate beneficiaries, the immigrants. This alignment in turn makes the network strong: "I think the reason why CAUSA's strong is because it's anchored in the immigrant community...historically we have seen that the movement is strong when it's led by

working class people” [18:12 & 18:13]. Similarly, CAAELII’s director identifies his network’s “multiple layer cake” structure as this network’s main strength:

*The coalition ...starts at this layer of executive directors ...but they meet only once a year, like an annual meeting. [And then] we have programs and projects together. And those project coordinators come together on a monthly basis for the specific projects... And then we go even deeper, we now take the community members of these different organizations to come together in the Leadership Program, together with some key staff, to come together. So I guess it’s a multi-layered cake, which makes it richer, but also harder to bake... I think we are successful because we have deep connections in a lot of these communities [14-9 & 14-17].*

The NYIC’s manager also argues that such an “organic” vertical structure helps avoid diversity translating into disunity. An integrated and organic structure, where the members are intertwined into the network at both the working group and board levels, may reduce disagreements between board and working groups. She puts it this way: “lot of the nitty gritty decisions get made at those working groups, but our board [organizational] members are in all of those working groups, and they participate in all of our active campaign areas” [10-7]. Such an organic or multi-tier structure increases complexity—just as an open decision-making process—but is beneficial in the long run.

Setting the formal structure, the rules, and procedures for the network is what Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997c) call framing. I propose that framing is important in generating unity within diversity. Just as diversity is facilitated, unity is framed. Framing deals primarily with unifying members.

Organizational structures, including routines and procedures, are one of the focuses of framing. The above quotes point towards the importance of managing the structure in sustaining the unity/diversity paradox. A proper structure (e.g. multiple tier for large NYIC, geographic subdivisions for dispersed CAUSA and NDLO), which is the platform for interaction, is important to ensure that interaction between diverse actors does not turn into disunity. Moreover, the organic vertical structures integrating the constituents reduces the chance for disunity by grounding disputes at a concrete level, as in the case of the DreamAct and the McCain-Kennedy bills.

The structure is then a result of the procedures and rules such as working groups, committees, and interfaces,<sup>95</sup> as well as “deep structures” (Bryson and Crosby 1992). The deep structure includes norms and values, that determine organizational culture, common frames of meaning-making, and identity—all essential components for building unity as I show below.<sup>96</sup>

### ***Rules, norms, and values***

All networks emphasized the aspect of generating common meaning-making frames of reference, values, rules, and culture. NDLO does not allow “swear words” [28:8], and CAUSA works “under a philosophy of César Chavez, [of] mutual respect; we have the

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<sup>95</sup> Huxham and Vangen (2000b) separate structure from processes; I consider structure to encompass processes, in their sense.

<sup>96</sup> Concepts such as culture, identity, values, norms, routines, and institutions are related and overlap. Even March and Olsen (2005), who contrast their neo-institutional perspective to the cultural perspective (and also to the rational-actor perspective), recognize the relation and overlap between norms and rules, with identity and culture.



right to criticize and we do so, but our movement is guided by principles” [18:13]. As an NYIC program officer states:

*I feel like you develop rules of engagement...Like you have to develop rules so like, so that, you know, we have a decision- making process, we have our board, we have our task forces, we have other partners [9-36].*

Framing such process rules and norms has to do with generating trust and safety spaces. “There’s going to always be problems, so you want to create an environment where people feel safe, that they can bring up their issues” [18:37], said CAUSA’s former manager. Similarly, a program officer at CAAELII mentioned:

*A lot of it is just having very personal dialogue and just the fact that they’re able to come together as a group of different orientations and learn about each others issues and struggles and see how they may conduct them. I think that part of space is created kind of building those relationships, those trusts [15-10].*

Indeed, Hardy, Phillips, and Lawrence (1998) suggest that trust requires predictability and goodwill: the former arises from shared meaning and the latter from participation in shared meaning-making processes.

Closely related to rules and norms, the culture of the network, made up of observable artifacts, values, and underlying assumptions (Schein 1992), helps frame unity. A value these networks seem to enhance is, as mentioned previously, that of diversity. At NYIC, a program officer stated: “we agree to disagree” [35-19]. Another program officer added:

*I think we're really diverse and we're really thoughtful about that... we're really conscious in making sure that there are people from all different communities on our board and on our working force, you know, our task force and that we really hear from all populations [9-51].*

Similarly, “CAAELII really is intentional about breaking down those barriers, exposing those cultural issues” [15-25], stated one of its program officers. Enhancing the value of diversity not only unites, as a common value, but makes differences explicit and may aid to avoid disunity by making everyone aware of the difficulties ahead. Framing unity around this value is important to make explicit the implicit premise that diversity may, but does not have to, turn into disunity.

Also related to culture, values, and norms, strong identities and vision play a fundamental role in these networks. CAAELII bases its organizing model on the pro-civil rights Highlander Training Center and its main meeting room was decorated following this reputable center. NYIC’s unifying vision is beautifully explained by its current director:

*I feel like every era really has certain sectors or certain kinds of social movements that lead change in that era, and I really think in this decade, and maybe into next decade, how immigrant rights gets defined really define basic civil rights, and what equity means in our society, just like in certain times, there was civil rights movement [10-2].*

At CAUSA, a junior leader highlighted the “César Chávez Day” [22:3] which unifies the immigrant community. At NDLON, culture, art, and sports play a significant role in meaning-making. In fact, it was after a soccer match between two day-labor teams that the idea of setting up a national network first emerged. NDLON’s coordinator explains how the network generates the unitary identity:

*When you are there [soliciting work on the street]...people see you as a nuisance, as somebody begging for day work. That’s the bottom line. Because people don’t see the Colombian, Honduran, or the Mexican. And, yes, there are differences between people, and Mexicans get along*

*better with Mexicans. And so the Colombians get along better with other Colombians. That's the reality that we face, but it has not been an obstacle for us organizing. First of all, because you don't address it like that, as a nationality issue. Look, the cops are coming. They [the cops] are taking the jobs away from you and you can't feed your children. And yes, there may be differences [between nationalities] but we address it by creating a soccer team. On one [same] side we have Mexicans and Hondurans playing [30-32].*

During my observation of network collective events, chants and symbols related to common identities and values were continually used. CAAELII finished one of its meetings with the renowned “we shall overcome” from the Civil Rights Movement, NDLOM repeated “un pueblo sin fronteras” [“a people without borders”] in its National Assembly, CAUSA shouted the “si se puede<sup>97</sup>” [“yes we can”] several times during its City Hall meeting, and NYIC chanted continually at their rallies, demanding immigrant rights.

The idea of identity, as belonging to a certain group (Hogg and Terry 2000, Tsui, Egan, and O'Reilly 1992) is relevant here. Indeed, Foldy, Goldman, and Ospina (2004) show that cognitive shifts in social change organizations not only regard the problem and the solution but also affect how the group see themselves—and how others see the group, which is part of the focus of the activity of mobilizing.<sup>98</sup> This is manifest in NDLOM's coordinator quote below:

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<sup>97</sup> Chanted by Cesar Chavez.

<sup>98</sup> Similarly, the literature on advocacy groups and social movements has distinguished between three core framing tasks (Pellow 1999): diagnostic framing, locating the origin of the problem; prognostic framing, specifying how the problem should be addressed; and articulating an identity component (Gamson 1990; Snow and Benford, 2000).

*When you develop a sense of unity based on culture among the day laborers...what you are doing is creating a sense of pride, a sense of identity and...when oppressed people gain that sense of identity and unity, then it is more difficult for unscrupulous employers and other law enforcement agencies to come and discriminate against that...because a lot of workers will stand tall [17:9].*

As Tierney (1996) points out, the idea of identity is central to leadership. However, the distinction between network identity and immigrant (or day-labor) identity was not clear in these networks. Organizational identity (in these cases, network identity) as a separate identity of the general immigrant movement was probably not as identifiable as in other types of networks or organizations because of the direct mapping of the network identity onto the broader immigration movement identity. It is as if the networks were a vehicle for experiencing the immigrant (or immigrant day-laborer) identity.

Ospina and Foldy (2005) find that social change organizations ground their strategic action on specific worldviews composed of values and assumptions. Similarly, I found in all four networks that maintaining open decision-making requires, in addition to setting the proper procedures, framing the necessary “social architecture,” such as symbols and values (Schein 1992). Such symbols and values help create sufficient unity and tolerance of diversity. More importantly, it aids common meaning-making, the cognitive “process of creating names, interpretations, and commitments” (Drath and Palus 1994, 9).<sup>99</sup>

Generating common meaning-making is a central task of leadership (Drath and Palus

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<sup>99</sup> That meaning-making, cognition, and related terms are a debated arena is well-known. Different authors use different terms but with similar meaning, as Walsh (1995) shows in his survey of different ways of referring to cognition: e.g., theories in action, cognitive maps, tacit understandings, givens, frames of reference, and screens.

1994; Feyerherm 1994; Schein 1992; Smircich and Morgan 1982), and that it is even more relevant in network fragmented settings is only expectable (Schaap and Van Twist 1997). In fact, Gray (2000) suggests that a possible perspective in assessing a network's performance is the amount of shared meaning created, and Agranoff and McGuire (2001) talk about groupware: when group development reaches mutual understanding and transcends immediate and interactive bases of coordination and communication through hierarchy. This is also similar to the concept cognitive embeddedness (i.e., structured regularities of mental processes) and cultural embeddedness (i.e., shared collective understandings) identified in informal networks (DiMaggio and Zukin 1990). The literature in public leadership has also highlighted the relevance of the organization's institutional dimension, or norms, and its congruence with processes, values, and beliefs (Terry 1995; Villoria 2001).

In fact, institutional theorists have also pointed to the importance of both formal and informal social norms, conventions, and rules (Douglas 1986; North 1990)<sup>100</sup>. In fragmented settings such as networks, institutional uncertainty (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004) is one of the difficulties that must be overcome since actors function with different rules and norms. Institutional uncertainty tends to increase in parallel to diversity, and is greatly affected by cultural and national diversity (Sauquet and Jacobs 1998). However,

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<sup>100</sup> It is important to point out that by meaning-making I refer to setting up the frames of references and the common perceptions (Termeer and Koppenjan 1997). I do not mean sense-making as the specific moment of comprehending a situation (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005) as it is often used in decision-making literature. It is rather setting up the values and procedures. It is about generating shared understanding (Dachler and Hosking 1995), being able of understanding together in general: it is not only about understanding a specific situation together.

March and Olsen (2005) also point out how difficult it is to generate common institutions and maintain diversity. They point towards this tension as being one of the sources of problems in the European Union. Indeed, we may expect this same tension occurring among these interorganizational networks: common norms must be generated in fragmented settings but these usually undermine diversity.

### *Summarizing framing*

All in all, framing is an important unifying activity. The question asked by Berry et al. (2004), “do shared core beliefs have a major impact on network stability and effectiveness?” (547), may be answered affirmatively: Partners need a shared sense of correlated fate to function (Gray 2000). First, framing is important in managing the unity/diversity paradox because it sets the platform for interaction. If adequately done, by setting the operating structure it allows for an interaction among diverse entities that does not turn into disunity, but rather unifies. Second, framing by generating identity and shared value for diversity build the unity pole. And precisely by framing not only a unifying identity but also the value for diversity, the network avoids the risk that Gray (2000) warns of: over-emphasizing one single interpretation—and hence decreasing diversity. Framing unity around identity and diversity does welcome a chorus of voices (Hirschmann 1970) as called for by Gray (2000).

Framing involves setting up the organizational structure and procedures. Generating shared meaning-making is an important part of framing, where unity emerges by setting engagement rules, common norms, and a shared identity and vision. It also maintains diversity by unifying around the value of diversity. Framing also occurs, though

indirectly, when the network builds the capacity of its member organizations—the leadership activity of capacitating.

### **Capacitating: making the members' capable**

Another leadership activity executed by the coordinating units, and relevant to the management of the unity/diversity paradox, is about making the member organizations more capable. CAAELII's Apprenticeship Program was formed to "build capacity of ... partner organizations to do community organizing within the social services framework" [15-4]. Similarly, an NYIC program officer points out the importance of capacitating members via training as they join the working group:

*It's a very intense process. We do a four-day intensive training and then monthly trainings with our groups, and then lots of other forms of convening in order to model and practice and share information and build their expertise [11-24].*

CAUSA has its leadership development program, CAPACES, and NDLO actively supports member-to-member coaching and directly trains its members. All networks invested strongly in member development. I call these activities, capacitating: making the members more capable.

Capacitating refers to the network strengthening in multiple ways the members and their staff. Referring neither to building the network's capacity (Bardach 1998), nor to the network building the capacity of someone or something external to it, capacitating refers instead to the network rendering its members more capable: building the network

members' power bases, as opposed to building the network's own power bases. It generates "power for" (Huxham and Beech 2003b) the members.

All networks spend considerable time capacitating, which occurs fundamentally in two ways: training or resource transfer. With training, via leadership and skills development programs, the member's knowledge base is increased. Capacitating member organizations also occurs by transferring resources from or via the network to the members. So, one aspect of capacitating is to support member organizations to secure staff. Another way of capacitating the members is, obviously, by financial resource transfers for executing programs. Some task forces at NYIC, for example, "subgrant several groups or members... to do sort of an increased level of work in the task force" [9-30]. CAUSA's former coordinator, similarly, explains such a resource-transfer:

*For example in Medford...the coordinator, he has his own organization but...he does part-time work for us, quarter-time [phonetic] work for CAUSA. So we're able to give them some money so that they can do that...So we're helping sustain their organization with resources. It's like strategic investments, we're making an investment in that organization because we trust that organization and we work with that organization [18:32].*

Capacitating is distinct from building the network's power, although building the member organizations' power bases indirectly strengthens the network. NDLO's development director aptly exposes the rationale behind the capacitating of organizational members:

*The power and strength of the national network is intrinsically tied to the power and the strength of each individual member, and that's why... a lot of the work that we do focuses a lot on leadership development and capacity building of member organizations [30-24].*



Capacitating helps sustain the unity/diversity paradox since it aids interaction among partners and sets common rules. Training of member organizations also increases common meaning-making (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Weik, Sutcliffe, Obstfeld 2005) and is a vehicle for the socialization of common values (Longo 2007). CAUSA, for example, explicitly deals with differences among parties via training: “Yeah, we have [differences], and I think one of the ways that we dealt with that was through the emergence of this leadership development project called CAPACES, where we have been able to bring people together” [18:38]. Similarly, the director of NDLO member Latin American Workers Project (PTLA) explains how training generates unity:

*When people from here go to Chicago, say, to a training workshop with network members, they share a process...when they say goodbye to each other...they resemble a groom and a bride [laughter] a strong spiritual bond is generated [28:7—own translation].*

Furthermore, capacitating as a skill and leadership development tool also enhances two activities linked to the management of the outward cooperation/confrontation paradox: strategizing and mobilizing—as I mention in the next chapter. Capacitating organizational members allows for improved strategizing—deciding and planning the engagement strategy, as CAUSA’s former manager says: “we have a shortage of not only being able to negotiate but also a shortage of people strategizing. People learning how to be analytical. To be able to analyze the situation. To be able to develop a strategic campaign to address that” [18:40].

Capacitating as a fundamental activity of network management has not been much touched upon in the literature, apart from Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995), who

suggest that the strategic center of a network needs to be a capability-builder. Agranoff (2003) has mentioned the importance of knowledge-sharing of networks (particularly in what he calls Development Networks), and Huxham and Beech (2003b) talk of “power for.” However, they do not explicitly refer to the network making the organizational member more capable. Even in the literature on learning alliances, it is an organizational partner learning from another organizational partner, an organization learns from another organization (Inkpen 2000; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria 1998): not from the alliance but through the alliance. This activity, however, may be specific to the immigration policy sector, where organizations are relatively weak and under-developed.

Capacitating is important in generating unity in diversity not only because it is a vehicle for framing common rules and frames of reference but also because it directly affects how the members re-evaluate their membership to the network. The idea that in networks members have to gain something from part-taking is obvious. As mentioned in my review of the network evaluation and performance literature, one of the criteria used to evaluate networks is internal efficiency (Ebers and Grandori 1997). This criterion seemed already met by the successful advocacy actions of these networks; such a shared gain seemed, nevertheless, not enough. The collective gain has to be complemented by member organization-specific gains. As NYIC board president told me, networks have to give back results, such as training and resources, to member groups. Human and Provan (2000) also found that the network not only had to deliver general gains—which indirectly benefit the individual organizations—but also organization-specific advantages. This points to an important matter: even in nonprofit networks, network

benefits must be complemented by individual organization benefits. Just as in business alliances public gains—those that can only be tapped through the alliance—must be complemented by private ones (Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria 1998), in these networks, benefits for the cause via the network had to be complemented by direct individual benefits to the organizational members.

Capacitating, as the other leadership activities, does have its perils and dilemmas, particularly with respect to resource transfers to members. While an organization-specific gain increases the members' resource base, and thus their overall power, it may co-opt members by making them dependent, and thus decreasing opposition in the working groups. One NYIC program officer, who did not use grant-making in her working groups, told a colleague, who did use grant-making in his, why she thought her group was more “troublesome” than his: “you know why? Because your groups are paid. My groups aren't paid” [9-80]. She believes grant-making and diverse opinions are negatively related. While Scharpf (1997) warns of networks cooperating under the shadow of market, hierarchy, or majority, which helps to deter opportunism, the fact that paid groups run smoother may point to the presence of cooptation.

A staff of CAAELII exposed another problem of capacitating members via resource transfer: “usually it's hard for me to get them [group members] to do things that are not related to funding or to money, if there's no financial reward for their agency” [15-11]. This seems to be the flip-side of the cooptation situation that results when resources are

given for participation: groups will not get involved in the network without individual organization-specific gains.

Summing up, I have found that organizational member capacitating is a central leadership activity in all four networks. Capacitating is also another vehicle for framing, more precisely for common meaning-making, and is thus important for uniting diversity around purpose, identity, and the value of diversity. It also builds the networks' unity by increasing the member's payoff. Capacitating, though, may have a co-opting effect on organizational members and, conversely, may make members cooperate only when specific organizational gains are involved.

### **BUILDING POWER BY UNITING DIVERSITY**

Although we have seen that the unity/diversity paradox exists in all four cases and have learned how it is sustained, it is yet unclear why the maintenance of this paradoxical tension is important for network success. My findings suggest that this paradox is crucial to build the networks' power bases as well as their capacity to get action by members, or their "power to."

The four networks sustain the paradox of unity and diversity to build power to achieve their mission: to be effective. According to NDLO's coordinator, they organize to build power. In addition, an NYIC program officer summarizes why sustaining the unity/diversity paradox generates power:

*Well, I, I think it [sustaining the unity/diversity paradox] has [generated power], because I think that to take, like to take individual groups' sort of*

*weaknesses and strengths together and sort of be able to welcome that – like one group may offer one particular piece to make this working group, you know, stronger, for example. They're great mobilizers. And then another group may be like totally legal-savvy, you know, and sort of understanding that perspective from the policy and then sort of having mobilization come together. That really makes it sort of a powerful group to have all those types of resources there and available, and so working groups, we have groups that come from all different types of backgrounds, and I think that really makes us stronger to sort of be able to work with them [9-29].*

Unity without diversity would not yield as much power, since the networks' different bases would not be as potent, or, as a CAAELII program officer says, “we could do it [with less diversity] but I don't think it would have the same power ... So I think that there's a power in that we're able to bring such a diverse group together. It's hard, it's really hard” [15-27 & 15-33]. A young board member of CAUSA-member VHCC<sup>101</sup> emphasized the idea of building power: “It is a collective work. It is the way to build more strength, more power” [22:17—own translation].

Unity in diversity builds power because isomorphism within the network decreases diversity, thus reducing non-redundant information and access to opportunities (Burt 1992). In parallel, diversity without a minimum of unity to allow the network to tap on the different power bases does not create power. Hence, while unity builds “power to” (the ability to get action by members), diversity builds the power bases.

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<sup>101</sup> Vos Hispana Causa Chavista

Power building through uniting diversity is done consciously by all four networks. The unity/diversity paradox is essential for building “power to” and the different power bases, to manage the outer cooperation/confrontation paradox via mobilizing and strategizing.

While keeping in mind the literature on power sources, power bases, and resources, I identified the following power bases in the data: knowledge, legitimacy, material and financial resources, and access. All four bases correspond to codes that emerged during the data analysis.

### **Knowledge**

Knowledge has been identified as an important power base built by networks (Agranoff 2003; Inkpen 2000). Both policy-specific technical knowledge and skills and know-how are here understood as the knowledge power base. Maintaining the unity/diversity paradox allows the network to benefit from what both unity and diversity can bring to the table. For example, the paradox is important in enhancing the network’s knowledge base as the different members bring their diverse experiences and put them in common. A junior leader of a member of CAUSA comments how diversity and unity improve the network’s decision-making: “Some people proposed one solution, others another, and a dialogue, a debate occurred. It’s what allows us to understand the reality better. Otherwise we all would have the same mindset and it would be useless” [22:18—own translation]. In the same spirit, a program coordinator at CAAELII explained why they needed diversity and unity:

*We can’t do it alone. The monster is too big, right? Therefore, the different ways in seeing the situation gives us more resources for our*

*strategy...we need many ways of understanding the same thing...the analysis is then richer...more complete [23:18—own translation].*

As an organizer of NDLOM-member IDEPSCA said: “I think that [the diversity] is the richness, right?...everyone has their own different perspective” [27:8—own translation]. Besides different members bringing in diverse knowledge and skills that, united, increase the network’s overall knowledge base, another source of building the knowledge base is the constituency themselves as providers of information. An NYIC’s program officer stated: “the one most important thing is that they’re [the members are] the ones that give us the information, they’re the ones that have access to the community, so they give us that kind of credibility when we do go to the community to talk to them about these issues” [35-17]. In addition, the constituency as a source of information also builds the network’s legitimacy.

## **Legitimacy**

Neo-institutional organizational theorists (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1983) argue that legitimacy is a driving force behind decisions, and Human and Provan (2000)<sup>102</sup> identified it as the main theme explaining network evolution and success. Legitimacy, another power base of the networks<sup>103</sup>, serves several purposes and is of many different types, depending on relative to whom the network has legitimacy. As I showed previously, legitimacy inwards—towards constituents, members, and potential

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<sup>102</sup> They distinguish between three types of network legitimacy: network as a legitimate mode of interaction (as cooperative interaction rather than competitive), network as form, and network as a specific entity. It is to the latter that I refer to.

<sup>103</sup> In the preliminary study Ospina and I performed, we identified credibility as a factor for network success (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005). In my data, just as Human and Provan (2000) found, interviewees refer often to legitimacy as “credibility.”

members—helps in activating members, and is built up by fair, open, and participatory functioning, as well as success. The legitimacy we are referring to here—legitimacy built by uniting in diversity—is that of the network with respect to external non-members. The network’s legitimacy in its domain.

Legitimacy due to the combined diversity and unity strengthens the network’s engagement, as a CAUSA regional coordinator straightforwardly states: “I think he [a congressman] needed to see that there was a support of other folks who felt that he was in the wrong place around this issue rather than me which would be in his eyes a given... because I’m a Latina” [19:25]. Similarly, CAUSA’s former director informs about how they include constituents when engaging their targets: “So say we met with a Congressman who doesn’t support immigration reform. We would get a roomful of people and tell him why” [18:25]. As NDLO director states: “If I were to speak on behalf of the day laborers, I will not be effective as they are when they speak on their own behalf” [17:14]. Additionally, uniting a diverse group of people is a mark of power that legitimizes the network. “Now, mobilization isn’t the only indication of how strong you are, but it’s one [10-25],” says an NYIC’s director.

### **Financial resources**

The unity/diversity paradox also allows the network to attract more resources because funders may prefer funding one large network rather than multiple small organizations. This is so because, as CAAELII’s financial manager told me, it lowers the “transaction costs” for the funder [26-7].



However, the unity/diversity paradox is not exempt of perils, even when it is successfully maintained. A peril may be that the network is favored by funders, over its members, and hence the overall funding available for the cause is reduced. An organizer at NDLO member CHIRLA says: “what has happened is that foundations now say, ‘why do we have to give to so many organizations when we can give to the network?’ ... but what has happened is that the funding has been reduced” [29:11]. Yan and Gray (1994) found the same problem, where a performing collaboration could eventually become a threat to the existence of member organizations, and Human and Provan (2000) found in the two networks they studied instances when organizational members felt that the network was competing against them.

### **Access**

Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence (2004) find that political access is an important resource for institutional entrepreneurs who greatly benefit from subject position, which gives them legitimacy. I have found that access is an important power base, which in turn increases other power bases. Regarding the knowledge power base, the members supply vital access to policy-specific constituent-related information. Similarly, access becomes vital in getting out the message, as NYIC’s health program coordinator states: “you want one clear message from multiple messengers getting out there again and again in order to get social change” [11-46]. CAAELI’s director shows how access is built and used through the diverse membership:

*Well we have more leaders; we have more avenues to bring information down to the community level. We have more awareness in many levels;*


leaders, students, teachers, staff. Just for example, they were going to do adult education budget cuts. In two weeks we sent to our congressional representative these 2,300 letters. They were overwhelmed [14-27].

At CAUSA, its director exemplified the increase in access gained by the network by having ROP—Rural Organizing Project, a rural Gay, Lesbian, Bi-, and Tran-sexual organization—as a member:

*ROP is strategic because like I said they're doing work in rural communities where we may not have as many numbers. So for instance in the state legislative session it's not only for like mainstream political things...Just engaging the broader progressive community, which includes ROP, GLBT folks around immigrant issues is important. Just because the immigrant community, especially in Oregon is to me it still feels like pretty invisible on the larger progressive radar screen [21:21].*

A staff person of NDLO member CASA-Maryland states how the paradox allows for increasing both the knowledge and access power bases: “unity gives us the experience of each of us. And above all, it allows to project ourselves nationally” [29:7].

**Figure XXII. Power built by sustaining the unity/diversity paradox (source: own)**



These networks sustain the unity/diversity paradox to build power as the figure above shows. Power is built precisely by sustaining the paradox and avoiding having to reduce either pole. The paradox builds power and in particular the power bases access, knowledge, legitimacy, and resources. In turn the power bases strengthen each other: e.g., position allows the network to capture knowledge, and knowledge builds legitimacy. That networks sustain the internal paradox answers the secondary question *how does managing the unity/diversity paradox build the network's power?*

## **8. THE OUTWARD MANAGEMENT OF THE NETWORK: CONFRONT AND COOPERATE**

*The hardest thing about being an advocacy organization is that you're no good to anybody if you're someone's friend all the time. But you're also no good if you're the enemy all the time. You're just as irrelevant if you're in someone's pocket, as you are if you're on the outside constantly screaming and attacking them.*

Margie McHugh, former director of the New York Immigration Coalition.

The other paradox that Ospina and I (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005) identified in previous work, and that I have analyzed in this research, deals with the outward work of the network: namely, confrontation and cooperation with external agencies. In this chapter, paralleling my secondary research questions, first I show how this paradox is present in all four networks. Then, I look at how it is managed: which leadership activities and power resources are used to manage it. Last, I explore how it contributes to the network's effectiveness, and look at the interactions between the internal and the external paradoxes.

### **COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION: THE ENGAGEMENT PARADOX**

According to Trist (1983), an organizational population becomes field-related when it engages with a set of problems which constitutes a domain of common concern. Constituting a domain in this sense is the immigration policy field, or at least the relational field between the network, fellow nonprofits, and the different governmental organizations and political bodies it interacts with and tries to influence (Carreras and

Farre 2005). All parties deal with a common set of problems, immigration-related issues, although the different actors come from and with different perspectives. The domain is uncentered (Trist 1983) since no constant referent organization exists, although the relevance of state actors in such policy domains is very high (Longo 2006). As the outgoing director of NYIC said in her farewell speech, government is such an important player for these networks' purposes that they can't afford not to play with it. Indeed, networks are also embedded in their environments (Mandel 1994; Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006)—and thus constituting between the network and the domain a dialectic of parts and wholes (Astley and Van de Ven 1983; Marsh and Smith 2000).

These networks combine both confrontation and cooperation with state actors in forwarding immigrant rights<sup>104</sup>. Whether it's a senator or a mayor, the USCIS state branch or the education board, all networks use both cooperation and confrontation, albeit always deferring to the former whenever possible. CAUSA's former coordinator puts it this way:

*It's not always about bashing. In fact, what we try to do is build incrementally...And if they, after that meeting, they continue to do that, we'll do other actions. Low-level actions that are building notoriety, press conferences, media work, getting the information out there to the community that this guy is not supporting it [18:25].*

In one of the CAUSA acts I observed, in Eugene, Oregon, they had invited the mayor, and while the different speakers engaged in dialogue in a full Town Hall meeting

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<sup>104</sup> With respect to well known typologies of influence tactics, such as Yukl and Tracey's (1992), confrontation includes "pressure" tactics, for example, while cooperation includes such tactics as "consultation." However, Yukl and Tracey refer to interpersonal influence.

regarding a Senate bill, CAUSA did not shy away from its position critiquing federal level policies and the thus-far meager local-level support. Similarly, NDLON invited governmental representatives of the U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to their Annual Assembly and, while engaging in open dialogue with them, posed their position with respect to some controversial governmental actions. In general, NDLON combines dialogue and meetings with legal litigation, marches, and boycotts. Its coordinator states:

*Before making a decision to demonstrate or to file a legal challenge against a municipality, we will always try to talk, but there's only so much you can talk. There is a moment, no matter how much you talk, still the day-laborers continue to be harassed. We come to the table... and we talk and things are going to be better and, blah, blah, blah, blah, and the next day the cops are still there harassing and ensuring that employers don't pick the workers up. So we honestly give that process a chance, but if it doesn't work, we take it to the streets...For us there's a message that is being more effective through talk than to be confrontational...So yeah, we prefer to collaborate rather than to be confrontational [30:27].*

He explains the power of cooperation vis-à-vis confrontation in humanizing the perception of the day-laborers and balancing the playing field: “When you bring the cops, when they talk to the workers directly, the relationship changes—the only interaction that there is between cops and workers is when they come and harass them ... they see each other face to face. And that is power” [30:23].<sup>105</sup> He adds:

*Sometimes we're more effective doing that [cooperating] than telling people... “You don't like immigrants because you're a racist.” The minute you do that, you start labeling people — you lose that opportunity of*

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<sup>105</sup> This observation, moreover, agrees with Foldy, Goldman, and Ospina (2004) who observed social change organizations provoking cognitive shifts in external actors with respect to how they were perceived by these external actors.

*changing hearts and minds. And sometimes you find in people who may have legitimate concerns about immigrants or about day laborers congregating in front of the property. Those are realities. So I think that we have to be open-minded about those things because at the end, the change of hearts and minds is what's going to make the neighborhoods better [17-42].*

In Chicago, CAAELII also combines engagement strategies, dialoguing with senators and legislators, with direct opposition to them. Both poles of the paradox, cooperation and confrontation, reinforce each other and make the overall strategy more effective, as its director says:

*Right, well we've been successful because we're not afraid to be confrontational. You have to be confrontational if you have to, but probably it's not our first choice. We would go first with a cooperative advocacy approach, where we would voice our concerns and that you would also listen rather than publicly shame you, saying you're not supporting us [14-46].*

NYIC, similarly, while working with several departments of the New York City Mayor's Office, such as Health or Housing, rallied at City Hall and wrote confrontational editorial letters. NYIC's staff admitted working well with government since they not only were ready to give them credit, but also because they were a thorn in their thigh. These networks' combination of cooperation and confrontation resembles Axelrod's tit-for-tat, where cooperation is the first move but if defected, networks respond with confrontation.

Such dual confrontation/cooperation behavior has been noted among environmentalist movements. "Consensus-based" environmentalist movements balance cooperation and confrontation with their opponents (Pellow 1999), and depart from Alinsky's (1989) purely confrontational activism. Similarly, scholars of social change organizations

distinguish between three different types of engagement with the state: autonomous and confrontational, cooperative, and dualistic (Dodge 2006; Monpetit, Scala, and Fortier 2004). The dualistic approach combines both the direct action (e.g. protest) with the cooperative deliberation.<sup>106</sup>

In fact, the simultaneous existence of both confrontation and cooperation supports Scott's (1992) statement that the non-confrontational notion of collaboration based on a cultural model, which believes that oppositional and confrontational behavior is an anathema to collaboration is erroneous. Confrontation, or the possibility of it, works as a regulator of cooperation (Luhmann 1995). The "shadow of confrontation" may well be necessary for cooperation.

In addition to cooperation always implying confrontation, at least hypothetically, the nonprofit-government relationship inherently includes this tension (Frumkin 2000). Page (1999), in discussing the insider/outsider distinction—an insider is a nonprofit that has frequent contacts with government and is able to influence policy—concludes that if the distinction is valid at all, it is not binary. Groups use both strategies and, more importantly, the governmental counterparts understand this duality. As Frumkin (2003), paraphrasing Fukuyama, puts it, resolving the tension between nonprofit and the public sector would mark "the end of history" in nonprofit-public relations. (However, it is

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<sup>106</sup> The confrontation and cooperation also may occur within a given network, not only within the domain. In fact, Uzzi (1997) finds that the same individual may act both selfishly and altruistically with different members of the network. My discussion here is limited to confrontation and cooperation by the network in its domain.



worth pointing out that while Frumkin is referring to sector relations, Page and I are referring to interorganizational relations.)

Several leadership activities and power resources are important in combining both poles of the cooperation/confrontation paradox, but perhaps more important is the fact that these are often enacted at different times or at different levels and points of interaction. The previous quotations have pointed how both cooperation and confrontation are applied in different moments: starting with cooperation and then moving towards confrontation if necessary. NYIC also combines different levels, as exemplified in the following statement by a NYIC program officer:

*We have like certain [governmental] staff that we are very cordial with and we talk with them and we have conversations with... Some of [them] don't have enough resources or enough support or the Mayor [is] not giving enough funding ... So in our own relations with them, sure, we're cordial and polite and, and we are more collaborative but at the same time, sometimes bash their agency or their principal, their commissioner or chancellor or whoever to get the Mayor or someone on City Council to give more resources to help them out. And I think it's kind of we're very frank. Like we'll tell a unit director, you know, 'tell us what you want, and just know that when we're bashing the agency publicly it's not about the working you're doing. You're doing good work.' [But] we want to have a public persona versus a private persona. ... You know, so there's different tones when you're talking to [9-62].*

The NYIC staff member's observations illustrates a difference between NYIC and the other three networks. Only NYIC confronts and cooperates with the same target—New York City municipality—at the same time. CAAELII cooperates with Congress and confronts the state USCIS office; NDLOM cooperates with local police in one municipality and confronts the local police of another municipality; CAUSA confronts

one senator and cooperates with another. CAAELII, CAUSA, and NDLOM all confront and cooperate with different actors, or with the same but at different moments in time. NYIC both confronts and cooperates with New York City Mayor's Office at the same time, but with different units within it. This may be so because of NYIC's size and its proximity to City Hall given its regional focus on New York City. CAUSA and NDLOM may not have such an intense interaction with any one group, and CAAELII may lack the size and capacity. NYIC, due to its size and proximity, does apply its paradoxical engagement poles of cooperation and confrontation at the same time with the same body—albeit at different units within it: e.g., cooperating with an officer in the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) but confronting its Commissioner, or vice versa.

The business literature observes a similar practice. Bengtson and Kock (2000), for example, suggest that in cooptation between companies, competition and cooperation, although interrelated, occur between different business units with different activities: e.g., confrontation with activities close to customers, and cooperation with activities far from the customer.

The discussion above regarding the form and nature of the engagement paradox addresses the first secondary question with respect to the engagement paradox (*what are the form and the nature of the cooperation/confrontation paradox in the context of network management?*) The cooperation/confrontation paradox's nature is different from the unity/diversity paradox's nature. The unity/diversity paradox's poles occur

simultaneously and at the same level (the network) but regarding different dimensions. Recall how the networks were united around immigrant identity while diverse regarding member size. In contrast, the cooperation/confrontation paradox's poles occur at different times or at different levels. The engagement paradox is diachronic or vertical in Ford and Backoff's (1988) terms. The paradox's poles either occur at different points in time or at different levels—i.e. cooperation with a public servant and confrontation with a commissioner. The paradox is perceived only by the outside observer, i.e. the analyst, because his or her thought structures automatically collapse these spatial levels and/or points in time. Collapsing time intervals or levels then generates the inconsistency (Ford and Backoff 1988), or mixed messages (Lewis 2000), of cooperation and confrontation.

### **MANAGING THE CONFRONTATION/COOPERATION PARADOX**

To manage the cooperation/confrontation paradox, two activities seem extremely relevant. First, strategizing is fundamental to know when and how to apply one pole of the paradox or the other. Second, mobilizing is important since it builds up the networks' power bases from the outside, which in turn are used to further mobilize, to strategize, or to directly engage with the external actor.

#### **Strategizing**

Thinking strategically, emphasizing future implications of present decisions (Bryson 1995), and developing and exploring strategic alternatives (Bryson 1995; Mintzberg, Ahlstand, and Lampel 1998), is done by the coordinating unit of all networks. I call this leadership activity “strategizing,” since during the analysis it came up as an “in-vivo code.” Strategizing emerged as a new construct during the analysis of the data, and in

particular with respect to the cooperation/confrontation paradox. Strategizing involves both making the decision regarding the engagement, as well as developing the engagement's plan of action.

Strategizing is of utmost importance, as was visible after the recent spring 2006 U.S.-wide demonstrations—greatly promoted and supported by the networks studied here—aimed at affecting the congressional debate on immigration (explained in Chapter 5). Underscoring the complexity of and the need for strategizing, it is yet unclear whether the at-first-sight successful massive demonstrations in favor of immigrants have had a positive impact or have generated counter-productive sentiments in the eyes of the general public (Archibold 2006).

### ***Deciding the engagement mode***

Strategizing and internal network decision-making overlap (Miller, Hickson, Wilson 1996) because deciding whether to cooperate and confront is part of strategizing. While business may to a certain extent determine whether to “bridge” with its environment or “buffer” itself from it (van den Bosch and van Riel 1998; Vernis 2000), these nonprofit networks, due to their mission obligating them to influence governmental bodies, may only decide *how* to engage with them not *if* to engage with them. Deciding whether to cooperate and confront is a difficult choice, and is part of strategizing. As an NYIC program officer puts it: “That's hard. It's an assessment that we need to do in terms of picking our battles. There's a lot of battles, but we just have to really be strategic and smart about which one we're going to choose to actually really be out there” [9-63]. CAAELII's director also describes this type of choice: “Probably after several efforts that

we have been unsuccessful getting you to hear our side, then we go to the stand where we have to be confrontational. Or that sometimes we say it's not worth destroying the bridge there" [14-47].

Similarly, at CAUSA, the current coordinator admits having picked up from the former coordinator a strategizing momentum: "I think one thing I've learned from Ramon [the former coordinator] a lot is learning to pick your fights" [21:45]. As she points out, being strategic is very important when resources are extremely limited and networks are overwhelmed by the magnitude and number of social issues that need to be tackled: "But CAUSA has stayed focused on certain issues, because that's how we can have the most impact...being strategic about who we work with and [what] issues we take on" [21:18]. NDLOM similarly finds itself having to decide what actions to carry out first. They usually prioritize anti-solicitation bills, local bills that prohibit day-workers to look for jobs, which affect workers the most.

At NDLOM, the development coordinator describes: "the leader encourages a lot to come up with strategies. ... thinking strategically and critically about issues and figuring out what will have the biggest impact in the work that we're doing" [16-28]. This quote points out the importance of strategizing in achieving these networks' missions. The contradictions between the poles of the paradox (cooperation and confrontation) are of little importance, because what these networks have very clearly defined is their mission and purpose, which is what guides their choice of engagement. Being collaborative or confrontational with the state actors is simply a strategic choice, not a value-laden issue.

The only non-negotiable is the mission for these networks; reinforcing this point, the NYIC director replied to me when asked if NYIC is a collaborative or confrontational network that that was a “silly question.” Unlike the unity/diversity paradox, which is sustained to build power, the cooperation/confrontation occurs as the networks try to be as effective as possible in fulfilling their missions.

As is true for other leadership activities, strategizing is not untouched by tension. Different tactical approaches favored by the members may result in tensions or divisions regarding “how aggressive you want to be to a certain individual or body...What's the best way to sort of get about a certain bill maybe, but, you know, tactics are huge and its tough to really get [members] on the same page” [9-40], says an NYIC program officer. The network seems to overcome tactical differences among members by focusing on issues, which eventually is a strong unifying phenomenon. A program officer at NYIC comments:

*So even though everybody might have different ideas on how to attack the issue, we all understand that language access is needed. So what we do is we just say our main objective is to ensure that language access services are being provided by HPD [New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development], and we might differ on the “how” and that’s where we have discussions and so on, but what we try to do as the coalition is to help identify kind of like the bottom lines, meaning like what are the things that we’re not willing to move on and make sure that everybody expresses that [35-19].*

As I mentioned in the previous chapter on decision-making in these networks, the above quote suggests that conflict is kept cognitive, rather than affective. The internal disagreements are focused on options (cognitive) rather than on personal (affective)

issues (Amason 1996). While cognitive conflict in teams has been found to aid performance, affective conflict undermines performance.

An organizer from NDLO- member CHIRLA<sup>107</sup> reveals the same tension among members, the tension regarding how to engage with external actors generated between the more activist members and those less activist that receive governmental funding and demand a less confrontational stance:

*Some organizations in the network receive municipal funds. ... Then they are not free anymore [since the City] requires you to be more conservative ... and [the City] pays the programs. So that is the only conflict we have had [29:16—own translation].*

In strategizing how to engage, a major issue is how to engage without further legitimizing or strengthening the opposing side. CAUSA's coordinator puts it very descriptively: "And making sure that you're not engaging in a way that further legitimizes [the system]. It's such a hard thing. Sometimes you can't always tell what's going on" [21-48]. NDLO's coordinator also agrees with the difficulty in choosing among the engagement modes:

*There is a sort of a tension between taking a more confrontational approach and really standing up for workers' rights when workers are being attacked directly. And other groups thinking that's only going to cause more waves. We want to let it be quiet, see if it blows over. And then sometimes that strategy just doesn't work in the face of actual repression and oppression of workers. So I think the most important part though is involvement of workers in the decision-making process [30-29].*

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<sup>107</sup> Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles

At CAAELII, a program officer also exemplifies such tension among members: “I think there are some parts, just like we have some agencies that are more inclined to be confrontational at first and there’s some that don’t want to be confrontational” [15-46].

Deciding between radical or incrementalist change (Price and Newson 2003) is for all networks an underlying dilemma in strategizing. NYIC’s health program coordinator spells out the dilemma:

*I think the process of selecting the vision for social change [is important]. I may have an idea around health advocacy, what we want to change in the system. My orientation may be very pragmatic, very incremental. I may be looking at the system as it exists and looking at how to change step-wise from where we are right now. Someone else might come in with a much more revolutionary perspective and say let’s just completely ignore what we have right now and try to set up universal healthcare. What we really have in mind as an ideal for our vision [is important]. They’re both very viable approaches to doing work [11-58].*

Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995), from the business literature, suggest that networks that are not guided by a strategic center—either a coordinating unit or a central firm—are unable to meet demanding challenges. These authors highlight strategizing as a critical activity of the strategic center—interestingly they use the same term as my in-vivo code.<sup>108</sup> Besides these authors, the literature on strategizing in networks is quite silent. Agranoff (2003) has pointed out planning as a main management task, and Huxham and Vangen (2000b), indirectly, point at this activity in their work on leadership, which they understand is precisely about setting and implementing the collaborative agenda. Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) have also highlighted in their later work the importance of

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<sup>108</sup> Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995) also highlight the activity of “structuring,” by which they mean building and sustaining the network.



strategic learning in networks. From the business literature, Hakansson and Ford (2002) and Gadde, Huemer, and Hakansson (2003) also refer to strategizing in networks, but they are dealing with single firms influencing the network. Using also the organization as the unit of analysis, Grandori and Soda (1995) and Klijn and Teisman (1997) note that different parties try to strategically manipulate the transactions in the network.

Strategizing is obviously also closely related to the extensive negotiation and bargaining literature. However, strategizing as I am using it in this study comprises two different levels while the negotiation literature tends to focus only on one. Strategizing is about the network's internal decision-making regarding the external engagement of the network with an external actor. Strategizing, hence, includes both the network level decision-making as the domain level engagement.<sup>109</sup>

### ***Planning engagement***

Besides the decision-making component of strategizing, all networks also placed a great emphasis on analysis, planning, and strategizing in general. Timing the engagement's implementation is a crucial component of strategizing: "We don't win unless we have a real clear plan. And it takes months, sometimes years to do it" [9-14], said a program officer at NYIC. In fact, during a strategy meeting preparing for a local pro-immigrant public event, CAUSA members decided to send out a press release as late as possible to avoid counter-action by opponents.

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<sup>109</sup> We are aware that the negotiation literature in itself comprises many streams and subfields. Crump and Zartman (2003) highlight the following: coalition theory, decision theory, game theory, leadership theory, organizational theory, and small-group theory.

CAAELII also closely plans its actions. I attended a preparatory meeting to counteract a rally by the anti-immigration Minuteman Project,<sup>110</sup> where the implementation strategy of the counter-action was developed in such a manner to have a maximum impact: “to push the...Republican congressman inside the suburbs [towards the choice of] either you’re with the Minuteman, who arranged this, or you are with us because you support diversity and you’re compassionate and that you are for immigration reform” [14-12]. In CAAELII planning and analyzing plays an important role as its director points out: “we’re ...pragmatic about the situation like this. So I think on analysis, this is very important in our work, reflection and analysis, so we do a lot of that so that we can see, okay, that didn’t work, but this time, and so we change it again” [14-55].

I also attended a strategy session at NDLO, where they had invited different allies such as American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF), and Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights (LCCR). In this meeting they discussed, among other issues, legal strategies to counteract municipal ordinances that were being passed to prohibit work solicitation in public spaces and that were hurting day-laborers. Strategies were analyzed and future effects of such strategies debated.

Strategizing as I am referring to it is about the network influencing its domain, and primarily a state actor. From my data, this is a very important leadership activity for

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<sup>110</sup> The MinuteMan Project is an anti-immigration group of civilians that have organized to patrol, armed, the U.S.-Mexico border.

managing the external paradox of combining confrontation and cooperation. Networks determine by strategizing if they are to confront and/or cooperate and how they are going to do this. Strategizing may be even of more relevance to immigration nonprofit networks trying to influence state actors since public sector organizations are usually far less capable of strategizing than private sector ones. Therefore, strategizing nonprofits have an advantage over public organizations, who are usually not as capable of responding to strategic moves (Moore 2006).

### ***Power and strategizing***

Power is also relevant in strategizing. Gray, in fact, points out the importance of the power to strategize (1989) in collaborations.<sup>111</sup> In this sense, I found that the four power bases that the sustenance of the unity/diversity builds—legitimacy, access, knowledge, and financial resources (see Chapter 7)—are used in strategizing.

### ***Internal legitimacy***

Legitimacy affects strategizing. Despite the networks openly decide on which engagement mode to adopt, the network's legitimacy in the face of its members allows for the network's advocacy expertise to be accepted by the members. Given that the networks are, among other things, the advocacy tool of the member organizations, it is the networks that have the advocacy expertise, not the member organizations. Hence, when the coordinating unit facilitates a working group and proposes an engagement mode, internal legitimacy is necessary for the network's recommendation to be taken

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<sup>111</sup> Moreover, strategizing as I have defined it resembles strongly Pfeffer's (1992) intra-organizational management through power: set goals, diagnose dependence, diagnose opposition and favor, identify own power base, set strategies for exercising power, and choose a course of action.

seriously regarding what strategy to adopt. An NYC staff member explains this: “I think most of the groups that we work with trust us in trying to balance doing the appropriate level of hostility at times when you need to, and then giving the appropriate amount of credit when they [the state actors] deserve it” [10:35]. NDLO’s coordinator supports this by explaining how the network’s credibility allows them to suggest strategies:

*We do have the credibility with our member organizations, where I can go ahead and call them and tell them, ‘Look, guys. Come on. There’s no way you’re going to get worker centers in the City of New York without creating alliances’ [17:46].*

Similarly, CAUSA also often suggests the engagement strategy to members. Its former coordinator describes an instance where a member was overusing confrontation:

*They keep banging away and so some of us have had to get together with the leadership and tell them, “Look you guys are already there, so you need to pull back the gas pedal and look at it from this way. So don’t be fighting anymore, because you’re already there, you don’t need to. You’ve got people where you want them.” So now you have to shift your strategy... And this is not easy, because once you build enough power you become the power broker, or you have to work with power. A lot of us are not trained to do that. 18:39*

### *Knowledge and skills*

The above quote also points towards the knowledge and skill base of the network. This is also of fundamental importance when strategizing. There is a clear lack of such skills in the immigration sector. CAUSA’s former coordinator explains:

*It’s all going to come down to negotiation and how you’re going to be in the best posture to come out with a victory for your community. And sometimes you need to organize campaigns around that, around positioning. So we have a shortage of not only being able to negotiate but also a shortage of people strategizing [18:40].*

NDLON's director also highlights the importance of knowledge and skills when being "clever on how to move in terms of changing hearts and minds:"

*This is really important because the minute that you have workers who understand the dynamic of power in the community, you're going to have people who are really clever on how to move in terms of changing hearts and minds, and having more support for them [17-53].*

A CAAELII program manager shows how important knowledge is to strategy by pointing at the need of having diverse perceptions of the same situation: "the different points of view on the situation are resources for our strategy" [23-18]. NYIC's director always tries "to balance the politics and the policy piece with the real ability to leverage constituent involvement" [10-26] when launching an advocacy action; the "policy piece" is the content of the advocated policy, for which knowledge is essential.

#### *Access*

Access as a power base, as the above quotes show, also is of relevance when strategizing since, for example, it helps the network acquire knowledge, skills, and information. A NYIC program officer underscored their supporters in City Hall and their allies in the media as factors for a recent success with a municipal bill: "we won because we were effective ...we were really smart...really being strategic who are our key players on the City Council, being out there mobilizing, knowing, you know, making this be an issue in every paper" [9-13]. The NDLON's strategy meeting I attended—which I mentioned previously—included allies external to the movement—MALDEF, ACLU, and LCCR—who greatly enriched the strategizing at NDLON.

This power base, access, not only allows for better strategizing but may also limit it, since some actions may jeopardize relations with key actors: “we do try to have some political sensibility about it. We don’t want to totally burn ourselves, because the result of that could be even worse as far as building long-term power” [21:56], recognizes CAUSA’s coordinator. Similarly, NYIC’s director explains:

*. . . you don’t want to antagonize them [government] so completely that they cut off communications with you on an issue that they’re working with you, but I think ... we’re viewed as a pretty credible organization, so we’ve never really given them something that they don’t deserve, so I don’t remember it ever becoming really horrible [10-37].*

#### *Financial resources*

In addition, and understandably, financial resources are also important to strategize. Financial resources are essential in an unequal battlefield such as that of the immigration field. The financial resources base, then, strengthens both leadership activities necessary to sustain the engagement paradox: strategizing and mobilizing. NDLON’s development coordinator illustrates this point:

*Well, I think NDLON is currently in a really good position. One, we were able to have a full time staff member dedicated to development and fundraising, and so I’m able to devote a lot of my time to that whole process and really thinking deeply about strategies and alternatives for future funding, which isn’t necessarily something that NDLON — that the national coordinator was able to do on his own. And that’s been helpful. [16-49]*

Generally, in managing the outwards paradox of cooperation and confrontation, strategizing is fundamental since it determines which engagement mode to effectively apply and how to combine cooperation and confrontation. Strategizing is aided by power

bases such as legitimacy, knowledge, access, and financial resources. The other leadership activity important when engaging outwards is mobilizing.

### **Mobilizing**

Mobilizing—behaviors used to develop commitment and support for network processes from external stakeholders—is about increasing the networks’ power bases that, often, are used to ultimately confront a target (Gray 1989). It is important to highlight here that I use the term mobilizing as the interviewees use it, not as Vangen and Huxham (2004) or Agranoff and McGuire (2001) do, in that it refers only to mobilizing external support to the network. Both pairs of authors above, and many others, include motivating network members as a component of mobilizing—I include member motivating in facilitating.

### ***Mobilizing allies***

According to CAUSA’s former coordinator, “building up the leverage is about power so what we do is then that we mobilize a community. Then ... we apply pressure through other ways, right” [18:26]. NDLO’s coordinator further explains this need for power:

*Sometimes it’s about balancing or creating a balance of power. What happens is that when you have Home Depot, you have the cops, and elected officials against the day laborers, the dynamics of power are always in favor of those people because they are very powerful in the community. So yeah, so from time to time, what we do is, we bring the other members of the civil rights community to balance that power; to make sure that if we negotiate — we sit down to negotiate — it’s done from people to equals and not just from one side to the other [17:49].*

CAUSA’s and NDLO’s comments point towards one of the principal objects of mobilizing: other actors. Other actors, a community or another civil rights organization,

bring in their power bases on the network's behalf and balance out the playing field, or domain—as exemplified in the above quote.

CAUSA, moreover, not only mobilizes potential allies, but also mobilizes the opposition's potential allies. Mobilizing the opposition's allies exerts pressure on the opposition. The following quote is by the former coordinator describing how and why they pressured a mushroom grower that did not respect immigrant workers by mobilizing the latter's customers (the whole foods chain store Safeway):

*At one time 1,300 Safeway stores were boycotting those mushrooms. [We managed that] through pressure. We tell them, "Look do the right thing, buy your mushrooms from this [other] company, because these people aren't treating farm workers like that. But if you don't, we're going to tell your customers." And they [Safeway] know us [18:27].*

A program officer at CAAELII stated, as one of the strengths of mobilizing via the network, the multiple relations that each network member brought: "They [the network members] have allies...strong allies on the democratic side" [23-31—own translation]. He then went on to describe in detail the different network members' personal contacts with the politicians. In the same way, NYIC's director explicates why to mobilize different actors within the administration:

*We talk to several people in the administration; somebody from the Mayor's Office, somebody from the agency, council contacts, who might have someone over there, because they all have different systems, if you end up with an incompetent commissioner or something, that should not be the reason you can't get any of your work done [10-41].*



### ***Mobilizing media***

In addition to mobilizing allies, these networks also mobilize the media and constituents.

The mobilization of media and people are a mark of the network's strength. Put bluntly by an NYIC program officer:

*[The] first thing that city council member wants to see is how many people were there and did it get press coverage. If it did not get press coverage, it didn't happen. ... So that's powerful. And we also make sure that the city council members that we're trying to lobby or push against, we have members from their own district [35-29].*

Mobilizing in general, and when dealing with the media in particular, is closely related to strategizing: balancing “the politics and the policy piece with the real ability to leverage constituent involvement” [10-26] is fundamental, says NYIC's director. Strategy regarding the mobilization's content is important, as is deciding when to mobilize, since mobilizing is highly resource-consuming. CAAELII does not think only about whether it will or will not mobilize the media; as its coordinator states, “[I had to think about how] to create a media strategy and how are we going to confront the media. And so that we were not just seen as shouting” [14-43].

Scholars studying social movements agree that successful advocacy requires getting an issue onto the media (Gamson 1975; Jacobs and Glass 2002). All four networks are extremely focused on using the media and are very skillful indeed—the spring 2006 rallies regarding the immigration debate in Congress and their media impact serve as a recent example. In fact, a nationwide strategizing meeting—which I observed—held by CAUSA and the Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CCIR) to discuss

how to support the Senate bill, concluded with participants discussing the media strategy to be used<sup>112</sup>. Similarly, at one of NYIC's rallies I attended, different media were invited and the rally was actually extended as an important TV channel was waited for.

Along the same line of reasoning, NDLO's coordinator also highlighted as a success factor their increasing ability to deal with the media: "[we've] been very effective in using media... the workers are very consistent with their message—we're not criminals; we're workers; we have families to feed, and that's why we are here. We're not here to destroy. We're here to build" [17:27]. A CAELII staff member also underscored the importance of the media and explained her work with it: "my other piece [of work] is communications where I just do internal communications to the press and try to get our name out in the press as much as possible. So I [involve] the media as much as possible, maintaining our profile, doing special events" [15-3].

### ***Mobilizing people***

In addition to mobilizing other actors and the media in support of their goals, networks mobilize the member organizations' constituents. NDLO's coordinator says: "we're usually invited to go and give testimonies about the lives of day laborers and we're invited to go and speak to churches, and schools, universities, etc., so what we do is... use Omar [a day-laborer] and we bring him and have him sing a song" [17:55]. Mobilizing member organizations' constituents to partake in activities with the general

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<sup>112</sup> Moreover, and as an indicator of these organizations' strategic ingenuity and access to information, they correctly predicted (several months in advance) that the 2006 State of the Union address by the President would focus on immigration.

public or specific targets resembles Foldy, Goldman, and Ospina's (2004) concept of cognitive shifts regarding the way in which the group is conceived by others. Going out conquering the "hearts and minds of people," in the New York Times' words (Downes 2006), is ultimately important for these networks. In particular, for NDLOM given that day-laborers are the subgroup among immigrants who are the "most hated," as a recent New York Times editorial (Greenhouse 2006) points out.<sup>113</sup>

Using constituents and people in favor of its causes, CAAELII managed to "force" a meeting with a congressional representative by having over 2000 people send him postcards: "We would force [certain congressional representative] to have a meeting with us... because we sent 2,000 postcards to him, a box of them. So that was probably our power because we have deep community connections and support" [14-51]. CAUSA also uses constituents in its work. The most prominent example was the 2005 sixty-mile week-long march which mobilized over 3000 people. Along this same line of reasoning, NYIC director grossly determines the power of one of the network's working groups according to, among other things, its ability to leverage constituents: "politics and the policy piece with the real ability to leverage constituent involvement, I think those things together define, more than anything, what we mean by the capacity of that [working] group" [10-26].

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<sup>113</sup> Moreover, the projected image of the network positively feeds back into its identity, given the interrelation between identity and various forms of organizational image (Gioia, Schultz, and Corley 2000).

## ***Mobilization, power, and strategizing***

### *Strategizing and mobilizing*

Power bases and both leadership activities, mobilization and strategizing, have a circular relationship. Power bases, together with “power to,” are needed to mobilize, and mobilization is, in part, about generating power, which in turn is needed to strategize. Strategizing and mobilizing also feed back directly into each other. NDLO’s development director explicates this: “I think NDLO is currently in a really good position. [We] have a full-time staff member dedicated to development and fundraising, and so I’m able [of] really thinking deeply about strategies and alternatives for future funding” [16:49]. As mentioned previously, CAAELII focuses on the strategic dimension of mobilizing. Similarly, CAUSA’s coordinator underscores the strategic component of mobilizing:

*When you’re doing coalition work, very especially working with a vulnerable community like the immigrant community, it’s important to identify who your strategic allies are and to not allow yourself to be wedged against them. Even in the face of some pretty intense things [21:20].*

A program officer at NYIC exemplifies the importance of strategizing with mobilizing constituents and other people for their marches:

*So each rally or press conference we do is to help us move our policy or our goal forward and we’re very smart and not just having a rally just to have a rally. Because they’re very time-consuming, takes a lot of planning, takes a lot of phone calls, it takes a lot of time to do. So we make sure that those rallies don’t occur unless they help move our policy forward [35-28].*

### *Building power*

Mobilizing is about building power. Gray (1989) has pointed this out and it is exemplified by my data. NYIC director stated: “just running programs will not build political power in your community...we think more about how do we put together enough of a critical mass” [10-27 & 10-56]. CAAELII’s director also emphasizes this:

*Probably after several efforts that we have been unsuccessful getting you to hear our side...we would find another ally, political ally, to help us. ... We’ve analyzed it, it’s not worth our time getting angry and pissing off this powerful political leader. We find another ally because our belief is power is not static, it’s dynamic; someone else will have it [14-47 & 14-48].*

Mobilizing builds power by providing the network with knowledge from the allies mobilized. CAUSA’s alliance with the GLBT (Gay, Lesbian, Bi-, and Tran-sexual) movement is an example of how CAUSA learned strategies and tactics from mobilizing allies. A CAUSA founder says: “they gave us a beautiful strategy. They helped us strategizing our plan that had an electoral component, a grass roots component, a media component, a poll room component, an electoral strategy. When using that strategy we were able to defeat those [anti-immigrant] measures twice” [18:8]. Similarly, NDLOM mobilized external organizations to help develop their overall strategy as mentioned previously, and a program officer at NYIC pointed out how this network sometimes mobilizes other “groups [that] may be like totally legal-savvy... understanding...the policy” [9-29]. A CAAELII organizer highlighted how mobilizing allies, constituents, and media increased the knowledge base: “we have more awareness in many levels; leaders, students, teachers, staff” [14-27].

Apart from building the knowledge base, mobilizing yields also another power base necessary for engagement: external legitimacy. Involving constituents, having them talk directly to the target audiences, increases the networks' external legitimacy. Recall how CAUSA "would get a roomful of people" [18:25] since the a congressman "needed to see that there was a support of other folks" [19:25]. As has been already mentioned, NDLON's coordinator highlighted the superior effectiveness of an action when day-laborers "speak on their own behalf" [17:14], and at NYIC a staff member told me: "mobilization isn't the only indication of how strong you are, but it's one" [10-25].

NYIC also builds legitimacy through mobilizing media, not only constituents. A program officer explains how they got a win, in part, because of their reputation of getting their message into the media: "We got the seven-million-dollar increase...Because I think we have the reputation—I go back to the reputation. I think we have a reputation of really getting it in the paper, especially, I think, press and mainstream press, and that we really do write up good press releases" [9-73 & 9-74].

### *Drawing on power bases*

Mobilizing not only builds power to better engage in the domain and hence increase its effectiveness, but also draws on power. The networks draw on connections and relationships, or what I have called access, to mobilize. A CAAELII organizer illustrates this: "it's a dance; many of [our] agencies are in politicians' advisory boards, in State boards...so we have capacity to mobilize" [23-35]. An important power base for

mobilizing allies is access through the relations given by the networks' position in the domain. CAAELII's director underscores this:

*Well we have more leaders; we have more avenues to bring information down to the community level. Just for example, they were going to do adult education budget cuts, adult education budget cuts. In two weeks we sent to our congressional representative these 2,300 letters, they were overwhelmed [14-27].*

NDLON and CAUSA also draw on their access to different actors to mobilize support in favor of their causes. NDLON currently uses its access to the Los Angeles municipality—something unthinkable a few years ago—while CAUSA, as already mentioned, draws on the GLBT community in Oregon (because a leading organization in this area, Rural Organizing Project [ROP], is a member of its board). A NYIC program officer also told me how they used their access to the media to mobilize support: “And I think we do a really good job on cultivating those key reporters, too. We really cultivate them and, you know, pitch to them and say, ‘Hey, did you hear about this?’ and get them more enticed to cover our story” [9-76].

Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006), referring to the business sector, show how hub firms in loosely coupled networks arise to mobilize (Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006) and McGuire (2002) hypothesizes that network managers with low level of support from stakeholders will allocate a great share of their time to mobilizing. My data seems to support this, since mobilizing is a key leadership activity of these networks' coordinating units, which are engaged in a domain which is not supportive of their aims. Mobilization, intrinsically linked with strategizing, is aimed at generating support for the network from

constituents, allies, and the media. Mobilizing both builds external legitimacy, knowledge, and access, and draws particularly on access. Mobilizing, then directly manages the cooperation/confrontation paradox by providing power bases for implementing either pole, or, for indirectly managing the paradox, by aiding strategizing. In addition, power also directly contributes to manage the cooperation/confrontation paradox.

### **Power to confront and cooperate**

Building its “power to” and power bases is essential for the networks when we look at the extremely unequal domain they are engaged in. As CAUSA’s former coordinator puts it, referring to the immigrant agricultural workers of Oregon, “to come and exert that kind of pressure on an industry that has a lot of power, has a lot of money, has a lot of influence, [with] the lowest paid workers in America, that’s...the balance... The playing field is unbalanced” [18:3]. It is this unbalanced field that partially explains why these networks are necessary, and why, by uniting diversity, they build power. CAUSA’s coordinator hints at the importance of the access, knowledge, and resource bases built by the networks:

*Especially in the immigrant community in Oregon there’s like plenty of situations you just can’t go into alone. You need allies to do that. They bring different leverage that we might not have. Different connections. Sometimes different messaging or a different way of framing things” [21:35 & 21:36].*

Along this line, the financial manager of CAAELII-member Chinese Mutual Aid Association emphasizes “power to,” the power of uniting diversity: “When we speak with one voice, we are very strong, very powerful if we are all in hand” [26-12].



### ***Legitimacy***

In engaging with target agencies, and in sustaining the cooperation/confrontation paradox, networks make use primarily of legitimacy and knowledge. These bases in addition to enhancing strategizing and mobilizing, also sustain both cooperation and confrontation directly. External legitimacy—due to the diversity of the network or its previous record of success and actions—enhances both engagement modes, confrontation and cooperation. As mentioned, a threat of confrontation or an offer of cooperation is of no use if it is not credible.

As already mentioned, one of NYIC's strength when engaging in its domain is its “reputation of really getting it in the [news]paper” [9-73 & 9-74]. Similarly, at CAAELII a program officer told me: “most of those external agencies know who CAAELII is already. So they know that when we say ‘CAAELII is here,’ CAAELII *is* here” [15-35]. NDLO's coordinator also highlights as power the increase in legitimacy of the day-labor movement (represented by the network) in the eyes of the general public:

*The work with day labor band, with the theater group, with all the things that have been done in the last ten years, at least in the metropolitan area of L.A., has made the public image of day laborers to change a little bit. And I think that's another reflection of power [17:32].*

### ***Knowledge***

Similarly, the knowledge base, including skills and education, plays a central role in managing the cooperation/confrontation paradoxical tension. All networks do demonstrably work on increasing their knowledge base, particularly in documenting cases, experiences, successes, and abuses. While a staff member at CAUSA highlights how “powerful” testimonies and documented experiences are, CAAELII's manager adds,

“[We use] powerful stories, and lots of them, to prove our point... we have used that time and time again” [14-52]. All networks use documentation of experiences, mistreatments, and immigrants’ conditions. Generating the knowledge base this way, and formalizing it, demystifies “a lot of the negative stereotypes that exist” regarding the immigrants, as NDLO’s coordinator says. It also strengthens the network’s legitimacy with respect to the State and the general public. The importance of having the necessary knowledge before engaging in either cooperation or confrontation is exemplified by the following experience narrated by a program officer at NYIC:


*We asked for a meeting with HPD [Department of Housing Preservation and Development] about a year and a half ago. [Due to] inexperience on our side we went to this meeting kind of too quickly. So we met with HPD and HPD went through the matrix and so on, but they pushed us further on our research and we were not ready. So we decided to take a step back [35-15].*

### **Managing the engagement paradox**

The figure below summarizes my findings regarding how the engagement paradox is managed, and offers an answer to my secondary question *how do leadership activities help manage the cooperation/confrontation paradox?* Power together with strategizing and mobilizing manage the paradox of engagement. As I explained, the paradox of engagement is sustained because it contributes to the networks’ effectiveness, which should help us respond to the secondary research question *how does the power built affect the network’s effectiveness?* The cooperation/confrontation occurs as the networks try to be as effective as possible in fulfilling their missions. Being true to their mission is the guiding value; being consistent in the engagement mode used with the state actors is not.

Although all networks apply both poles of the paradox similarly, a noticeable difference emerges. In the case of CAAELII, CAUSA, and NDLO, the two poles of the paradoxical tension are applied at different moments in time. In the case of NYIC, the poles are applied simultaneously but with different sub-units of the same actor, the municipal government. Such difference may be due to its narrow geographical focus, New York City, and its large size, which has allowed it to access many different levels and units of the New York City Mayor’s Office. CAAELII, despite being narrowly focused on Chicago, does not seem to have such an access—both due to its fewer human resources and the fewer contacts provided by its smaller membership.

Figure XXIII. Managing the engagement paradox (source: own)



In contrast to the unity/diversity paradox, the external paradox’s poles are applied at different points in time or at different organizational levels or units. The two paradoxes are therefore qualitatively very different. The external paradox, which deals with

attaining the mission, is clearly bounded by the policy context—in these cases, immigration—while the internal paradox is not given by the policy context but *is* inherent implied to networks.

Furthermore, the interrelation between the internal and external paradoxes emerges from the above analysis. The previous chapter concluded by hinting at power as ultimately motivating the unity/diversity paradox: “power to” get action by members, enhanced by unity, and the diverse power bases provided by the different members. This chapter, on the other hand, shows how the external paradox requires power. It is the network’s “power to” and its power bases that conceptually link both paradoxes, then, since unity/diversity generate “power to” and power bases which are necessary engage with state actors—either cooperatively or confrontationally. But, as I show next, these two paradoxes are also interrelated in other ways.

### **UNITING DIVERSITY TO POWER ENGAGEMENT**

As I showed previously, it is from the internal paradox, when unity is attained among diverse actors, that summative and multiplicative power can be generated. I have also shown how the power generated feeds the process of sustaining cooperative and confrontational engagement modes with external targets. However, other links between both paradoxes do exist. In fact, both paradoxes may reinforce each other, while in other situations they may debilitate each other.

It is well known that being under attack or in front of a common enemy may unite parties: Out-group conflict is associated with in-group cohesion (Astley and Van de Ven 1983; Coser 1956). Something similar happens between these paradoxes. The external paradox's pole of confrontation is related to the internal paradox's unity. Confrontation strengthens unity among diverse network members. A member at NDLO observes:

*As a network of immigrants in this country we have to gain the strength, the political strength. Without a network, we wouldn't be able to produce legislation nor demand improvements ...The network identifies us as one day-laborers family sharing the same problem and needs and with the same objective: generate change, to transform the negativity that exists into positivity. We also identify as the modern slaves: what exists with day-laborers is a modern slavery and our minds are at abolishing that slavery [28-5].*

More graphically, a program officer of NYIC thinks unity occurs “probably when the shit hits the fan.... I'm sure post-9/11 there was some sense of unity ... all these south Asian men deported, the INS looking for terrorists” [9-38].

Moreover, the unity/diversity paradox allows combining cooperation and confrontation in creative and unexpected ways. The already cited CAELII organizer explained how roles, as in “bad cop, good cop” (Page 1999), are divided between the members, Latino groups being more aggressive and Asian more dialogical, and how, occasionally, roles are inter-changed to improve their impact.

Also, how well the internal paradox is sustained has an impact not so much on the external paradox but on the engagement mode chosen. An NYIC program officer admits:

*The great thing about the coalition is that when our groups are behind us, we're very confrontational and we, as you probably have seen in our media events, we go out and attack and make sure that those voices are being heard... On other issues we might not have the full support so what we try to do is bring everybody to the table to have the discussions in both sides of the issue to be heard. And that's when cooperation is our main asset [35-40 & 35-42].*

### **Negative feedback**


However, the external engagement paradox may also undermine the unity/diversity paradox. More specifically, disagreement during strategy, on deciding which engagement mode to adopt, may prompt disunity. (Recall how diversity during strategizing or decision-making could turn into disunity.) An interesting example of initial diversity implying different engagement approaches generating disagreement happened at NDLO, as was mentioned previously:

*Some member organizations receive funds from the municipality... which makes them less free to act in the day-laborer's defense [And the municipality] asks you to be more conservative, less liberal, to be more cautious, and deal with problems according to their solutions ... and they [the municipality] pay the programs. I think that's the only conflict we have had [29-16—own translation].*

CAAELII and NYIC also have suffered how the confrontation/cooperation paradox, and how it is managed and combined, has affected their unity/diversity paradox. In NYIC's case, it was disagreements regarding when to confront that transformed the diversity within the network into disunity. A program officer at NYIC explains:

*I mean, they represented the South Asian population, which we need, which is lacking...and we really wanted them to sort of be a part of that. And, but we just couldn't – they were too radical. They were too militant and we just...couldn't see eye to eye because they were crazy [9-42]*

Figure XXIV. Interrelation between both paradoxes (source: own)



The above figure summarizes the link between both paradoxes. The management of the paradoxes and their ultimate characteristics influence each other. The unity/diversity paradox and the power bases generated will influence strategizing and mobilizing. These, in turn, determine how the cooperation/confrontation paradox is managed. Ultimately, the engagement paradox may influence the belonging paradox, either strengthening it or debilitating it.

## 9. CONCLUSION

I started this work by noting how networks have become a popular interorganizational governance mechanism. I also pointed out how they are difficult to manage due to their complexity, and that lack of leadership is one of the main causes for a network's demise. Research has advanced in the last two decades regarding network management, but still has a long way to go, in particular with respect to management *of* networks rather than *in* networks. This research has taken a small step in this direction, in exploring and better understanding the management of networks.

Using paradox to open up the black box of leadership activities in collaborative networks, this study of four pro-immigrant rights interorganizational networks<sup>114</sup> ends with a summary of findings that address the nature, the management, and the implications of the unity/diversity and cooperation/confrontation paradoxical tensions. I then answer my general research question and outline further contributions of the research. I conclude with a discussion of the research's limitations and propose an agenda for future research.

### **THE FORM, MANAGEMENT, AND IMPLICATIONS OF PARADOX**

This research sheds light on the secondary questions posed in the methodology chapter. In order to enhance our knowledge of network management, I proposed to focus on secondary questions regarding paradox in networks. From the analysis and findings of the previous chapters, I answer why paradoxes arise, how they are managed, and how they contribute to the networks' effectiveness.

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<sup>114</sup> The networks are: New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC), Coalition for Asian, African, European, Latin Immigrants of Illinois (CAAELII), National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), and CAUSA – Oregon's Immigrant Rights Coalition.



## **The form and nature of paradox**

My first secondary research asked: *what are the form and nature of the diversity/unity and confrontation/cooperation paradoxes in the context of network management?*

Diversity and unity of the network are both necessary for network effectiveness, but diversity often undermines unity by generating conflict and hence, disunity. These networks are simultaneously both united and diverse. The way these networks manage to avoid diversity undermining unity is by generating unity around three things: a meta-goal, identity, and the value of diversity. Maintaining diversity along organizational characteristics and culture, and other dimensions, while building unity around identity and experiences, the meta-goal, and the value for diversity, does not, however, resolve the paradox. The tension is still present in that the potential for diversity turning into disunity is always there: unity and diversity conform a management paradox in that they imply equally necessary opposing forces that generate a tension. I believe this paradox of unity/diversity partially explains the difficulties inherent in managing collaboration in networks (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Human and Provan 2000; Huxham 2003).

The nature of the cooperation/confrontation paradox—the paradox of engagement—is different from that of the unity/diversity paradox. Unity and diversity occur simultaneously and at the network level, but regarding different dimensions. In contrast, cooperation and confrontation occur at different times or at different levels. The engagement paradox is diachronic or vertical in Ford and Backoff's (1988) terms. This is that the poles of the paradox (cooperation and confrontation) either occur at different

points in time or at different levels—i.e. cooperation with a public servant and confrontation with a commissioner. CAAELII, CAUSA, and NDLOM all confront and cooperate with different actors, or with the same actor, but at different moments in time. NYIC both confronts and cooperates with the New York City Mayor’s Office at the same time, but with different units within it.

Another issue that remains to be discussed is whether the networks recognized the paradoxes. All managers recognized using both confrontation and cooperation with state actors—such as the mayor’s office, a municipal commissioner, the local police agency, or a senator—but did not see it as paradoxical. These networks cooperated with and confronted state actors to be as effective as possible in fulfilling their missions. Being true to their mission is the guiding value, being consistent in the engagement strategy used with the government is not. The networks did not define themselves in terms of how they related to state actors, nor did they aim at being consistent in their engagements with the state actors. Rather, they focused on how to be most effective in achieving their mission, so the combination of both cooperation and confrontation is not perceived as paradoxical. The paradox is perceived only by the outside observer, i.e. the analyst, because his or her thought structures automatically collapse these spatial levels and/or points in time. Collapsing time intervals or levels then generates the inconsistency (Ford and Backoff 1988), or mixed messages (Lewis 2000), of cooperation and confrontation.

However, the interviewees’ did experience a tension with respect to which engagement mode (either cooperation or confrontation) to adopt. The paradox they experienced was

that between legitimating the system, yet affecting it; by cooperating with it, on one hand, and on the other hand having less effect by choosing to confront it, which excluded the networks from the system. All network managers and coordinating unit members felt this tension between affecting the system (and legitimizing it) and not legitimizing the system (and not affecting it).

The unity/diversity paradoxical tension was recognized by all managers from all networks with the exception of NDLO's coordinator. As mentioned previously, CAUSA's coordinator commented that "[Coalition work] is living in a state of constant tension" [21-43], and CAAELII's director said: "every day we have to face that contradiction, that paradox" [14-35]. Using as an example a specific taskforce where one important organization withdrew, a NYIC program officer stated how diversity "really makes things really difficult in terms of bringing that unity together" [9-79].

NDLO coordinator, on the contrary, did not see "diversity as being opposed to the unity part." He points out that unity and diversity are not opposites and that diversity does not necessarily imply disunity. However, he does acknowledge tensions around achieving a unified advocacy strategy among the diverse members and around what issues to generate a common strategy. He actually acknowledges the tension, but simply chooses not to

frame it as a unity/diversity paradox in order to make explicit that unity and diversity are not opposites<sup>115</sup>.

### **The management of paradox**

The secondary question *how do leadership activities help manage the unity/diversity and confrontation/cooperation paradoxes?* aimed at looking at how paradox is managed and what differences may arise in leadership activities according to network and paradox type.

Activation—attracting and selecting members—plays an important role in sustaining the unity/diversity paradox since it allows selecting and attracting members that are diverse along specific dimensions, but united around others. Activating happens either at the network level—for smaller size networks—or at the game level for larger networks. Activation is easier the greater legitimacy the network has in the face of potential members. Activation is also made easier if potential members perceive the possibility of meeting other organizations via the network.

Facilitation is making peace among members, supporting member involvement, and communicating to and with members. A major component, if not the core, of facilitation is facilitating decision-making in the diverse networks, since these processes must be open and inclusive in order to avoid the “exit” of the autonomous members. Allowing

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<sup>115</sup> As Johnston and Selsky (2005) state, a paradox is an agreement among local interpreting observers that a certain duality of actual behaviors is inconsistent. NDLO's coordinator is pointing out that diversity and unity, although in tension, are not necessarily inconsistent.

voice rather than exit (Hirschmann 1970) plays a fundamental role in networks and implies *facilitating decision-making*—reducing non-decision to a minimum (Bacharach and Baratz 1962)—rather than *decision-making* per se (Simon 1976). This is so since networks are made up of autonomous organizations, who, if when dissatisfied are without an option to voice their dissatisfaction, are free to exit (or abandon) the network. That coordinating units must facilitate decision-making, rather than make decisions, in turn has an important implication: the outcome of the decision-making is not controlled by the coordinating unit. Hence, managing networks requires coping with uncertainty rather than reducing it, as is the case in intra-organizational traditional management (Thompson 1967).

Moreover, decisions are taken consensually, although in networks where the maximum authority is the general assembly and a voting culture is prevalent, voting is customary—as in the case of NDLON. Including constituents in decision-making seems fundamental since it ultimately reduces disagreements by grounding decisions in concrete problems and beneficiaries.

Framing deals with setting up the organizational procedures, and is important in managing the unity/diversity paradox because it sets the platform for interaction. Common meaning-making is an important part of framing, where unity emerges by setting engagement rules, common norms, and a shared identity and vision. All members in these four networks shared the value of diversity: coordinating units explicitly

embraced this value. Framing, then, also maintains diversity by unifying around the value of diversity.

I have found that building the organizational members's capacity (capacitating) is a central leadership task in all four networks. Capacitating—a new construct that emerged during the data analysis—is also another vehicle for framing, more precisely for common meaning-making and is thus important for uniting. Attachment to the network by members is also enhanced since it provides the organizational members with specific individual gains in addition to the gains for the general cause. It also builds the networks power bases indirectly, by building its members' capacity which, when united, increases the power available for the network. Capacitating, though, is not devoid of problems. In particular, it may have a co-opting effect on the members and, conversely, may make members engage in collective action only when specific individual payoffs are available.

Strategizing also emerged as a new construct during the data analysis, particularly with respect to the cooperation/confrontation paradox. Strategizing involves both making decisions regarding the engagement, as well as developing the plan of action.

Strategizing is aided by power bases such as legitimacy, knowledge, financial resources, and access, and has a circular relationship with mobilizing.

Intrinsically linked with strategizing, mobilization is aimed at generating support for the network from constituents, allies, and the media. Mobilizing builds external legitimacy, knowledge, and access, but also draws on access. Mobilizing then helps directly manage

the paradox of engagement by providing power bases used during cooperating or confronting, or during strategizing.

Power bases also directly contribute to sustaining the paradox of engagement. Legitimacy enhances engagement modes, since a threat of confrontation or an offer of cooperation is of no use if it is not credible. Similarly, all networks explicitly work on increasing their knowledge base, particularly in documenting cases, experiences, successes, and abuses. This strengthens their engagement mode by providing evidence and arguments.

In summary, I have identified six leadership activities that manage the networks' paradoxical tensions (activating, facilitating, framing, capacitating, strategizing, and mobilizing). Four activities were previously highlighted by network management scholars, while two are new constructs (capacitating and strategizing). These leadership activities may be categorized as dealing with the network interaction or the network structure, and as involving either only the network or the network and its immediate environment (the network's domain). Activating is aimed at the network's structure—in that it rearranges the membership—and involves the network's domain. Facilitating involves the network's interaction, while framing deals with the network's structure. Capacitating also regards the network's structure, in that it deals with network members' capacities. Mobilizing aims at building the network's structure by increasing its support in the domain. Finally, strategizing aims at managing interaction—as the decision-making during strategy development—and only involves network members. The

implementation of the engagement strategy (cooperation and/or confrontation) involves the network’s domain. The following table summarizes the categorization.

<b>Table XXV. Leadership activity categorization</b>			
		Involves actors from...	
		Network	Domain (incl. network)
Manages...	Interaction	Facilitating Strategizing	Engagement
	Structure	Framing Capacitating	Activating Mobilizing
Source: own			

### **The implications of paradox**

The final secondary questions deal with the implications of managing the paradoxes, namely: *how does managing the unity/diversity paradox build the network’s power?* and *how does the power built affect the network’s effectiveness?* Successful networks sustain the internal unity/diversity paradox to build their power and engage with state actors both through confrontation and cooperation to fulfill their mission and be effective.

These networks sustain the unity/diversity paradox to build power. The power is built precisely by sustaining the paradox and not reducing either unity or diversity. The paradox builds “power to” (the ability to get action by members) through unity, and diversity increases the network’s power bases of access, knowledge, legitimacy, and financial resources. In turn, the power bases strengthen each other: e.g. access allows the network to capture knowledge, and knowledge builds legitimacy. The differentiation of power types and power bases is in itself one of the contributions of this dissertation. In network management research, few conceptualizations have attended the differentiation of the concept of “resource” or power base (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker 2006). I



differentiate between “power to” and power bases. I further differentiate four power bases—financial resources, knowledge, access, and legitimacy.

I have also detailed how the power affects the networks’ effectiveness. The power built is used to engage with state actors and advance the networks’ mission of furthering immigrant rights. The power is both used to strategize and mobilize, as well as directly to confront and cooperate with state actors.

### **SUCCESSFUL NETWORKS: MANAGING PARADOXICAL TENSIONS**

In addressing my overall research question (*how is paradox managed in successful networks?*) the two paradoxes explored have helped to further understand network management. Sustaining the unity/diversity paradox generates power, which is used to manage the engagement paradox, cooperation/confrontation, hence increasing the network’s effectiveness.


Figure XXV summarizes my findings, and clarifies how the two paradoxes are central for the networks’ action. The coordinating units of these networks sustain the unity/diversity paradox by activating and capacitating members, facilitating interaction, and framing the structure (procedures, rules, and values). When activating, the network selects and attracts members who share certain experiences, values, and principles, but who are diverse regarding other organizational culture and characteristics. The coordinating unit facilitates interaction and open decision-making among the diverse members and unites

these members by framing common procedures, rules, and values. Capacitating is another vehicle for framing unity.

The internal paradox of unity and diversity is sustained to avoid decreasing diversity (hence reducing the value added of networks), while not letting it turn into disunity. The paradox is sustained to build the network power: unity builds the “power to” of the network—unity increases the ability of the network to get action by members—and diverse membership builds the power bases used to engage with state actors. Without unity the network cannot use its power bases. The networks use access, knowledge, legitimacy, and financial resources, together with leadership activities of mobilizing and strategizing, to manage engagement with important state actors. These state actors have a great influence on the well-being of immigrants and, hence, on these immigration nonprofit interorganizational networks’ mission. The networks use the power built by sustaining the unity/diversity paradox to achieve their mission.

Lastly, the management of the external paradox affects the sustenance of the unity/diversity paradox. Confronting an external actor may help unite the network, since outward conflict is related to internal unity. On the other hand, disagreements regarding whether to confront or cooperate may turn into disunity within the network.

Figure XXV. Model of managing paradox in networks (source: own)



The leadership findings are intended to contribute to the network leadership literature, but also may contribute to the leadership literature more generally, in particular to collective and systemic leadership which lack empirical studies (Hunt and Dodge 2000). However, an important difference with most systems and relational leadership literature is that the collective and the systems I am referring to are interorganizational. Both by situating my research at this level and by using an activities-based approach to leadership, I do not deny that individuals matter. But at the same time, the rest of the coordinating unit is extremely relevant, as are the other organizations. Moreover, two of the networks studied, CAUSA and NYIC, had changed managers a few months prior to my study, and no major shocks were detected.

## FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS AND INSIGHTS

### The internal and external power “of” networks

In addition to the above specified model, further insights may be deduced from my analysis regarding power. In particular, I have identified the relevance of another conceptualization of power not explicitly contemplated in my initial framework—which was composed of the network’s “power to” (ability to get action by members) and power bases. My findings point also to the relevance in network management of Luke’s three-dimensional conceptualization of power: decision-making; non decision-making (Bachrach and Baratz 1962); and managing meaning (Huxham and Beech 2002, 2003b)<sup>116</sup>. These three dimensions of power respectively regard how decisions are made, around what issues are decisions discussed and made, and which assumptions of what is right and wrong are prevalent.

As I showed, facilitating is about managing decision-making and non-decision-making, and framing about generating common meaning-making. The importance of facilitating decision-making in networks has been highlighted by several scholars (Huxham and

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<sup>116</sup> The first dimension is equivalent to the “pluralist” view of power in political science, while the second is similar to “elitism” (Bryson and Crosby 1992; Gray 1989; Hardy and Leiba O’Sullivan 1998). The third dimension focuses on the mechanisms that legitimate current order, on the deep structure (Bryson and Crosby, 1992) that legitimizes power through cultural and normative assumptions, on how conflict is resisted, and on how meaning is managed by those powerful in order to mask oppression and by those powerless in order to subvert it.

Extending Lukes’ (1974) three dimensions, Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) present a fourth dimension of power that conceives power as a network of relations and discourse. In this dimension, the pervasiveness of power makes it difficult to resist, since resistance tends to reinforce the current system (Hardy and Clegg, 1996). Pulling the strings of power does not necessarily produce the desired outcome, nor is responsibility clearly appointed (Lukes, 1986). Moreover, this dimension does not assume the researcher to be an independent and objective actor.

Vangen 2000; Keast, Mandell, Brown, and Woodcock 2004; and Mandell 1994). Similarly, managing common meaning-making is also known to be important in networks (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004), since in networks the members' frames of reference are quite different (Child and Faulkner 1998)—making formalized and rational decision-making rules less effective (Salancik and Pfeffer 1974).

This three-dimensional type of power, as I am using it here, still has the network as its unit of analysis—rather than using any of the organizations in the network as the unit of analysis—but deals with the network's internal power dynamics. A major issue regarding power conceptualizations based on resource-dependence theory is that they are not behavior-friendly (Faulkner and De Rond 2000), and that they are incapable of explaining processes in the network. In this sense, Lukes' (1974) three-dimensional model of power is far more helpful.

That the internal power dynamics plays a fundamental role in network management and leadership has been highlighted by several scholars (Bryson and Crosby 1992; Crosby and Bryson 2005; Gray 1989; Tierney 1996; Vangen and Huxham 2004). My contribution has been to use this conceptualization of power together with two other conceptualizations, "power to" and power bases, in explaining network management. There is, indeed, a clear potential in using multiple types of power (Brass 1984; Brass and Burkhardt 1992; Bourdieu 1986; Luhmann 1995; Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence 2004; Perrow 1986) to better capture the complexity of networks. Luhmann's distinction between organizational power and the power during interaction may be useful here


(Luhmann 1995). The way I am conceptualizing power here uses this same distinction: Luke's three-dimensional power is applicable to internal network dynamics, and "power to" and power bases are relevant to the network when engaging with external actors.<sup>117</sup>

I believe joining both conceptualizations of power may further help scholars and practitioners to understand network management. Networks aim at building power, which means building the power bases and "power to," the ability to get action by members. While the power bases are given by the network's diversity, unity allows the network to get action by members ("power to"). However, the management of the network must also take into account internal power dynamics, in particular, decision-making, non-decision-making, and meaning-making. As I have shown, these have an effect on the unity/diversity paradox and therefore ultimately affect the network's power to engage in its domain. The figure below illustrates these two types of power.

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<sup>117</sup> It also complements yet another take on power, that of Huxham and Beech (2003b), which looks at the points where power is enacted at a micro-level. They find that power is exerted at different points. For example, points of power are the processes of setting the name of the collaborative; the process for determining who may be involved; the process for appointment of management team; key individuals such as conveners; and location and timing of gathering (Huxham and Beech 2003b).

**Figure XXVI. A framework of network power (source: own)**



### **Other contributions**

Theory must aim at explaining how and why things happen (Sutton and Staw 1995). In this sense, the previous chapters that presented the findings have attempted to better understand the how's and why's of network management by building on collaborative advantage theory (Huxham 2003) and public network management (Agranoff and McGuire 2001)<sup>119</sup>. By carrying out one of the first studies to explicitly use paradox—in particular the fundamental intrinsic tension of unity/diversity—as a research focus to advance the understanding of network management, two new constructs (strategizing and capacitating) are added to previous research, increasing comprehensiveness while maintaining parsimony (Whetten 1989). I have also described relationships between concepts and, enhancing Huxham and Vangen's (2000b) work, I have specifically

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<sup>119</sup> These authors refer to this also as collaborative public management (Agranoff and McGuire 2003).

explained the concepts and links in terms of power—in itself an under-researched theme in the collaboration literature.

In addition, this work has bridged two streams of literatures, one originating in organization studies and another in political science—collaboration management and public network management—which so far have seldom spoken to each other. This study has drawn on the most salient works from both streams and has proven that they are far closer to each other than may seem at first. Moreover, I have focused on the network as unit of analysis which has been recurrently called for by other network scholars, but thus far have not been attended (Berry et al. 2004; Mandell 1994). In addition, the research has looked at decision-making and meaning making in collaborative networks, two subfields in need of attention. The decision-making component addresses a negative gap in empirical work which has principally focused on white and male-dominant contexts (Miller, Hickson, and Wilson 1996). This empirical work breaks away from this trend since it has involved mostly non-whites and as many females as males.

Lastly, this research aims at providing reflective practitioners with useful conceptual handles (Huxham 2003) for managing collaboration and collaborative networks. The model produced may help practitioners understand why network management is such a difficult task, provide them with a useful map to make sense of a complex reality, and—although the model's constructs are analytical—help them distinguish when to focus on one activity rather than another. In fact, one of the main strengths of using paradox in academic research may be its dual contribution to both practice and academic theory.



## LIMITATIONS, GENERALIZABILITY, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

### Limitations and generalizability

My research has certain limitations that arise due to methodological and design issues. The case selection was done following positive replication logic—when cases selected are all similar, positive instances of a specific phenomenon: interorganizational immigration networks in this study—and the program from which the cases were selected may have introduced some biases. In particular, the awardees of the program from which the sample was drawn—Leadership for a Changing World—were characterized by having strong strategic leadership and have an inclusive leadership style. This may undermine some aspects of the model. In particular, the facilitating and strategizing leadership activities identified may be due to the selection criteria of the program rather than a salient feature of network management. This does limit the generalizability of the findings, but not their validity. Indeed, I do not claim that this may be the only model for successful network management rather that it appears to be, logically and empirically, *a* model of effective network management.

This research is a theory-building exercise rather than a theory-testing one. Limitations to generalizability of results must be discussed. Although this research aims at analytically generalizing results to a theory (Firestone 1993), it has focused on a particular population, and this has implications. While this research has been mainly interpretivist, in that it looks at the mechanisms (Lin 1998) by which network management occurs, it does not ignore generalization altogether—as is obvious from its multiple case design.

These findings are therefore applicable to the nonprofit sector, not business alliances or intergovernmental networks; to networks dealing with immigration policy; and to formalized action networks, as opposed to, say, policy networks or social networks. Future research ought to test the findings in other network contexts. Yet, at this point it is possible to speculate on the extent to which the findings have relevance to broader contexts.

Regarding the paradox of belonging, I believe that, although entrepreneurial networks of immigrants do have their own specificities (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993), and the way in which the unity/diversity paradox is managed will vary according to the economic sector and policy field<sup>120</sup>, this paradox is relevant and applicable to all three sectors irrespective of policy field or network form. In informal business networks scholars have pointed to the peril of how over-embeddedness may diminish diversity of the network and hence reduce the availability of non-redundant information (Burt 1992) and how over-embeddedness may become overly costly (Uzzi 1997). Just as important contributions for management have come from the public sector (Kelman 2006), immigration nonprofit networks may be an excellent field to study relational leadership given their uncertain, complex, and hostile environment (Ospina and Foldy 2005). Moreover, Huxham and colleagues contribute to interorganizational collaboration literature in general by drawing on all sectors in their work. Similarly, my interest is in

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<sup>120</sup> I completely acknowledge that fundamental differences between policy fields and economic sectors exist: e.g. timeliness of outcome pressures, number of attentive stakeholder groups, and openness of decision-making (Davenport and Shirley 2005, Ring and Perry 1985, Rainey 1991).

managing interorganizational networks rather than any particular economic or policy sector.

The cooperation/confrontation paradox may seem less generalizable to other policy fields or economic sectors, since advocacy networks in the nonprofit sector in general, and in the immigration subfield in particular, tend to have engagement with other external non-member actors as the primary objective. However, the other sectors also deal with the duality of cooperation and confrontation as the literature on business competition and policy networks demonstrates (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). In addition, all networks that require engaging with its context—practically all—should be expected to have to strategize and mobilize to some degree.

Lastly, although I have used literature from non-formalized or low formalized networks and social and policy networks, this study's contribution is applicable to interorganizational networks that have an identifiable coordinating unit, strategic center (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995), or network administrative organization (Human and Provan 2000). The model proposed is about leadership activities executed by the coordinating unit. This then limits the findings, at least to a certain degree, to a specific type of interorganizational networks.

Related to the above point and as in Human and Provan's (2000) study of legitimacy-building in industrial networks, this research has primarily focused on the coordinating unit during the data collection, which has implications for the study's reliability. Such a

data collection method clearly produces a partial view of the networks, especially with regards to network-wide properties, such as the power bases: less so with regard to the leadership activities since the networks had a formalized coordinating unit and these tasks were mainly executed by it. Nevertheless, aimed at reducing such biases, the sampling of interviewees included board members and organizational members' staff, and observation and document-analysis components were also included in the research design.

### **Future directions**

The existence of paradox in immigration nonprofit networks cannot be reduced to the pair I have studied here. Indeed, network management “is living in a state of constant tension.” Moreover, tensions and paradox collapse and transform into each other, and are not independent of one another, as Huxham and Beech (2003a) have pointed out.

Several important collaboration management themes are missing from this research: individual competencies, time, and trust. Although my approach has been explicitly inter-organizational, a micro-level analysis of the coordinating unit may be an interesting complement to this research. The leadership activities I found cannot be uniquely attributed to a single individual or exclusively to the coordinating units. However, at the same time, the excellent and outstanding personal and individual qualities of all network managers studied are beyond doubt. In addition, the quality of the coordinating units, the entire team managing the networks, was also evident and continually highlighted by the network managers and the organizational members. For example, how is leadership divided within the coordinating unit among the different individuals and why? And what

type of competencies do the network manager and its team have to possess? Matching collective and individual approaches is one of the major challenges—if not *the* major challenge—of leadership studies in general, and of network leadership in particular.

Regarding time, Goodwin, Peck, and Freeman (2006) attempt to conceptually map out leadership activities along linear lifecycle models. This aspect should be given more attention. My approach here is not longitudinal so it cannot address the question of whether this model is specific to mid-age networks (ranging from 8 years [NDLON] to 20 years [NYIC]). Further research addressing the following questions is welcome: are all leadership activities always equally important? Is activation more important during formation? Are the tensions always handled in the same way or are they dealt with differently according to the networks temporality?

Another important time-related aspect is the formation of the networks. It is worth pointing out that all four networks were fueled initially by a real concrete challenge. NYIC arose to aid the legalization process following the 1987 IRCA. CAUSA was formed in 1995 to challenge a bill that would deny welfare to immigrants in Arizona, a bill similar to the one that passed in California a year earlier. In 1996, in Chicago, CAAELII also was formed to repel anti-immigration acts. Similarly, NDLON's first action was to repel an anti-solicitation bill passed in Los Angeles. How does such a foundational imprint affect posterior network management? What are important aspects of path-dependence for network management? More research on leadership *of*

interorganizational networks is still needed—and such theorizing should be carried out using all leadership theories (i.e. LMX, systemic, transformational, charismatic...).

Trust has also been missing. I have referred to it tangentially when dealing with unity, framing, and legitimacy, but due to the theoretical frame used and the silence in the data on this subject, trust has been largely absent. However, its relevance to the leadership and management of networks and collaboration is obvious and has been highlighted extensively in the literature. An obvious question would be: what role does trust play in the presented model?

Far more issues regarding network management are still waiting to be researched. Although networks will remain complex creatures, more research and, in particular, more empirical and theoretical research will help improve our understanding of them and, therefore, their management. Theory-building on management *of* interorganizational networks is still necessary, as is research aimed at developing practice-oriented conceptual tools that may increase network effectiveness. I believe this dissertation is a step in this direction.



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## **APPENDIX 1. OUTLINE OF PROPOSED RESEARCH WITH NDLON**

### **Researcher: Angel Saz-Carranza**

In further developing our model of social change leadership, and in addition to the Cooperative and Ethnography research opportunities, we are planning to interview some LCW awardees from group 3 and 4. These interviews will allow us to look across some of the organizations participating in the LCW program and expand and test some of our previous findings.

Pablo Alvarado and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) are one of the selected awardees and organizations that are invited to partake in this ulterior research process. This document briefly outlines the focus of the research and the plan we would like to propose in order to carry out this research.

### **Our research interests**

We are proposing Pablo Alvarado and NDLON to participate in furthering our research on social change leadership. In particular, we have two foci of interest, network management and Latino organizing, which we describe hereon. However, in the research process we will approach both sub-themes together

### **Network management in the immigration sector**

This stream of research aims at being useful to practitioners by contributing to fundamental knowledge and to the arena of inter-organizational network management and collaboration. We inquire into the conflicting and contradictory, external and internal demands involved in inter-organizational collaboration. Our preliminary findings suggest

that the artful management of conflicting demands is key to leverage power, both internally and externally, which in turn is necessary for inter-organizational collaboration to be successful. We are concentrating in the immigration sector networks for the time being. We have already carried out some initial research with the New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC) and the Coalition for Asian, African, European, Latin Immigrants of Illinois (CAAELII), and plan to include, in the near future, the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) and CAUSA. Moreover, this stream of research is part of a RCLA scholar's (Angel Saz-Carranza) PhD dissertation.

### **Organizing by Latino communities**

Twenty percent of the organizations and leaders selected as awardees of the LCW are working primarily with the Latino community in the USA. Most of these organizations work in advocacy and organizing, provision of services, including social and legal services, immigrant rights, training and education. These organizations play an essential role in helping Latino communities and immigrants to access services and resources and in advocating for rights related to jobs, health, environmental needs, housing and immigrant issues. At the same time, these organizations provide a great source of cultural identity, networking and kinship for the Latino community. By studying these organizations, we would like to understand how effective leadership develops among these groups. In particular, we would like to highlight the common characteristics and differences within these organizations. In addition, we would like to understand the leadership style and the impact that these organizations have in the social and cultural life of their constituencies. Among other questions, we would like to address the following: What are the main issues at stake? What are the tactics and strategies used by these

organizations? What are the primary challenges faced by these organizations? What have been the main successes? In what way has the political culture from the immigrants' native countries, influenced the leadership style of these organizations? What is the role of culture and identity in organizing and in defining leadership?

**What the research would entail & what we offer NDLO**

The research would be implemented by carrying out site visits and interviews over the next year. All interviewees will sign a consent form, which guarantees the right to confidentiality and safeguards the interviewees and their organizations.

Finally, RCLA offers the participating organizations specific by-products of the research. Should NDLO be interested in a specific topic or study, RCLA would be happy to help produce it—obviously, NDLO will receive a copy of all the research produced in which it has participated.



## APPENDIX 2. CONSENT FORM



Leadership for a Changing World  
Research and Documentation

Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service

### Consent Form for In-Depth Conversation

Thank you for agreeing to participate in an in-depth group conversation as part of the Research and Documentation component of Leadership for a Changing World (LCW). The purpose of this conversation is to develop a deeper understanding of each award recipient's work. We will be discussing your experience with this LCW award recipient and seeking your perspective on his/her/their work in a conversation of approximately 1 to 2 hours. This conversation is no way intended to be an evaluation of the award recipient's performance.

Based on our conversation and conversations with others associated with this award recipient, we will deepen our understanding of social change leadership. These conversations should offer you and the award recipient an opportunity for reflection and learning and should be of use to their work. It also should help to draw out important lessons about leadership that can be shared with others who are doing similar work. With the award recipient's permission, it will be used in a communications effort to encourage a broader conversation about leadership in this country.

By signing this letter, you show that you understand and agree to the following points:

- You understand the purpose of this in-depth conversation and are satisfied with the answers to your questions. If you have additional questions or wish to further discuss research issues individually, you may contact Sonia Ospina at 212-998-7478. If you so desire, you may also contact the University Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects at the Office of Sponsored Programs, New York University at 212-998-2121.
- Participation in the interview is voluntary. If you are a client of the award recipient's organization or one of the organizations it works with, your participation in this conversation will in no way affect the services you receive.
- There are no known risks associated with your participation in this conversation. On the other hand, it will provide you with an opportunity to reflect on your experience with the award recipient's organization and the work that they do.
- We ensure that confidentiality of any research material will be strictly maintained at the Wagner School. However, we cannot guarantee that other participants in these conversations will maintain the same confidentiality. Please note that as the individuals responsible to the university, we are required by law to report to the appropriate authorities suspicion of harm to you, to children, or to others.
- The in-depth conversations you have volunteered to be a part of will be recorded. You may review these tapes and request that all or any portion be destroyed. The material will be archived with restricted access at the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service. Any material that identifies specific individuals will be released to public audiences only with that participants' approval.
- You have been given a copy of this form to keep.

Again, thank you for your participation. If at any time you have questions about this process, please do not hesitate to contact us.

\_\_\_\_\_  
In-depth Conversation Participant      Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Core Research Team Member      Date

RCLA, 295 Lafayette St., 2<sup>nd</sup> Floor, New York, NY 10012  
Phone: 212-998-7550 Fax: 212-995-3890



### APPENDIX 3. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

- Pre-interview:
  - Get/try mini-disc.
  - Batteries (also for micro) & tapes (1/hour)
  - In-depth interview form with stamp– for all except award recipients.
  - Get forms signed by Amparo or Sonia.
  - Print protocols.
  - Ask about quiet room for interviews.
  - Ask about if everyone knows times etc...
  - Take snacks and water for between interviews.

#### **Introduction [5 min]:**

- **Thank you** for making time to work with me today.
- **Purpose** of interview:
  - Encourage a broader conversation about **social change leadership** in US (LCW)
  - Draw out important lessons for others doing similar work—in particular, **managing multiple demands in networks**
  - Give you opportunity for **reflection** and learning
- I must mention and go through with you some **bureaucratic/technical** aspects:
  - Forms: safeguard the interviewee; voluntary; confidentiality; recorded; review tapes; your approval if you are identified.

- In our conversation today, we're going to be talking about a few specific dimensions of your work that **Sonia Ospina and I identified in previous** conversation that we've had. The elements that we'll be talking about are organized around the fact that NYIC is a coalition in the immigration sector. In particular, our focus of interest is network management.
  - Our preliminary findings suggest that the artful management of **conflicting demands** is key to leverage power, both internally and externally, which in turn is necessary for inter-organizational collaboration to be successful.
  - We are concentrating in the **immigration sector networks** for the time being. We have already carried out some initial research with the New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC) and the Coalition for Asian, African, European, Latin Immigrants of Illinois (CAAELII), and plan to include, in the near future, the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) and CAUSA. Moreover, this stream of research is part of a RCLA scholar's (Angel Saz-Carranza) **PhD dissertation**.
- The interview:
  - Time permitting, our interview will have **three sections**. We'll start with some **opening questions** about you and your work. Then, we will discuss challenges regarding the **internal management** of the network. We'll finish up with some questions regarding your **interaction with your external/target/public** agency (e.g. USCIS).
  - Sound OK? Any questions?

**Part A<sup>121</sup>—opening questions [25 min.]:**

- I'd like to start by asking each of you tell me your **name and title**, and what is it about NYIC that **you most value**?
  - What's do you see as special about your role or contribution to the organization?
- Before we jump in and begin to explore issues of network management, it would be helpful to hear an **overview** of NYIC. Can you tell me how your **work is organized in general**?
  - What does the network do?
  - What are the main activities it carries out?
  - Can you describe your day-to-day work?
- Can you tell me how the network works in terms of who **decides**, who **executes**, who **overlooks**?
- What do you think are the main **strengths** of the network?
  - Can you please give me an example when the network was successful?
- What do you think are the main **challenges** to the way the network functions?
  - Can you give an example of when things did not turn out as expected?

**Part B—focusing on internal paradox [40 min.]:**

1-Nature of U/D<sup>122</sup>

- What kinds of **organizations are part** of the network? Who/what populations do they represent? [Judge the degree to which it's **diverse/similarity**.]

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<sup>121</sup> Keep in mind dual nature of workers.

<sup>122</sup> This does look at member-member interaction (i.e. level of analysis)

- How does an organization become part of this network?
    - What are the criteria (issue, region, scale, primary activity)?
  - **Why** is bringing such a group of organizations important? [Judge value added by diversity]
    - Do you think that the network promotes diverse membership? How? Can you give me an example?
  - Can you think of **problems/challenges** that arise when bringing together such different organizations?
    - Do you think there are some things that would be easier to do if there was less diversity in the network?
  - About what is there **division/disunity**? Among members on what action to take? Examples. [Actual antonym of unity.]
- Can you tell me about a time when the members of the network were particularly **united**?
  - What did they have in common? [Describe this unity]
  - How does the **unity add value** to the network's functioning?
    - How does the network promote unity among members?
- What makes it **difficult to maintain diversity** in the network and to promote commonness among members at the same time? What are the challenges? [Will inform w.r.t. perceptions]
- What is the **benefit** of having a diverse and united coalition?

## 2-U/D & dimensions

- How does maintaining unity and diversity at the same time, **affect your work**?

- ...affect **trust** among members?
- ...determine the **leadership** style in <the network>?
- ...affect your **membership**? who is invited? and who leaves?
- ...determine the way you make **decisions**?
- ...influence the way you set the **objectives** of <the network>?
- How does maintaining unity and diversity at the same time, affect [**power**], ...
  - ...decision making / non-decision making?
  - ...meaning-making?.
  - ...**power over**?
  - ...**power to**?
- How does maintaining unity and diversity provide [**power bases**]....
  - ...**resources**?
  - ...**knowledge**?
  - ...**positional** resources (centrality/boundary-spanners)?
  - ...**authority**?
  - ...**legitimacy**?

### 3-Managing U/D

- **How do you promote diversity and maintain unity** at the same time the network?
  - Do you nurture and **facilitate** member interaction? How? Could you give an example?
  - How do you cultivate personal **relationships**? Could you give an example? How much time do you dedicate to it?
  - Do you promote **openness** and participation in the coalition? How?

**Part C—focusing on external paradox [40 min.]:**

4-Nature of C/C

- In what ways does the network work/**interact** with the target/public/external agency?  
Give examples?
  - Are you by **definition** cooperative or hostile to the target agency? In what way?
- Could you give examples of how you have somehow **cooperated** with the target agency?
  - Do you cooperate at all **levels** (individual, local, state, federal) with the target agency? Examples?
  - Do you **formalize** your cooperation with the target agency? How? Give examples?
  - Do you cooperate openly and **publicly**? How? Give examples?
- If you **disagree** with the target agency, what do you do?
  - Can you give an example of how you have challenged/confronted the target agency?
  - Do you confront the target agency at all **levels** (simultaneously)? Examples
  - Do you confront the target agency **openly** and publicly? How? Give examples?
- Are there times when you **choose** a collaborative vs. a confrontation approach?
  - Also, have there been times when you were in a confrontation relationship with an individual/organization, but then you **changed** your strategy to one of cooperation? Or vice versa?

- What are the **challenges** in working with and against the target agency? [Will inform perception of tension]
- What is the **benefit** of combining both confrontation and cooperation with target agencies?

#### 5-C/C & dimensions

- How does both confronting and cooperating with the target agency **affect your work**, ...
  - ...affect **trust** among members?
  - ...determine the **leadership** style in <the network>?
  - ...affect your **membership**? who is invited? and who leaves?
  - ...determine the way you make **decisions**?
  - ...influence the way you set the **objectives** of <the network>?
- How does both confronting and cooperating with the target agency affect [**power**]...
  - ...decision making / non-decision making?
  - ...meaning-making?
  - ...**power over**?
  - ...**power to**?
- How does both confronting and cooperating with the target agency affect [power bases]...
  - ...**resources**?
  - ...**knowledge**?
  - ...**positional** resources (centrality/boundary-spanners)?
  - ...**authority**?



- ...legitimacy?

#### 6-Managing C/C

- How do you **combine** confrontation and cooperation with the target agency?
  - Is **credibility** important to better confront and/or cooperate with the target agency? Can you give an example.
  - How is acting at all **levels** important to better confront and cooperate with the target agency? Examples
  - Is cultivating multiple **relationships** with other orgs important to better confront and cooperate with the target agency?

#### **Part D—other issues [10 min.]:**

##### Other paradoxes

- Generating unity and diversity within the coalition and both confronting and cooperating with the target agency seem paradoxical, counter-intuitive, contradictory.

##### **Do you also find it paradoxical?**

- Can you think of **other contradictory aspects** of network management, of other paradoxes or other tensions?
- Do you think these tensions are specific to coalitions in the **immigration** sector?

## APPENDIX 4. POST-INTERVIEW LOG FORM

[Fill after each interview.]

Time of interview:

Date:

Place:

- How would you characterize the relation between the interviewer and the interviewees?
- How would you describe of the interview location?
- How would you describe informal talks before and after the interviews?
- Did you encounter any difficulties during the interview?
- Was there anything that could inform on the coalition's [particularly important in group interviews]:

	Inter-group communication	Nonverbal communication (kinesic, proxemics, chronemics, paralinguistics)	Rhetoric (mottos, slogans...)	Context/location
Unity				
Disunity				
Diversity				
Similarity				
Confrontation				
Cooperation				

## APPENDIX 5. OBSERVATION LOG<sup>123</sup>

[Fill after each observation and/or event.]

Time of observation:

Date:

Place:

Observer/Interviewer:

- What is the physical layout of the place?
- What is the general environment of the place?
- How would you describe the interactions of people?
- How did you feel before the observation?
- What did you do before the observation?
- Whom did you meet? What was the nature of the interaction?
- What about the experience of being there drew your attention?
- Is there anything else you would like to report that would be helpful to understand the context of the observation or to illuminate the analysis of the interview transcripts?
- Who were present/invited to activity? (all/some members, eternal actors, target agency)?
- Who spoke, facilitated, lead the activity? (all/some members, in terms of size, ideology, antiquity, language, ethnic background...)
  - Did this vary/rotate or it staid the same?
- What type of slogans, songs, rhetoric were chanted/used? In what language?

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<sup>123</sup> Adapted from LCW Research protocols for cohorts 1 & 2.

- Was there anything that could inform on the coalition's [particularly important in group interviews]:

	Inter-group communication	Nonverbal communication (kinesic, proxemics, chronemics, paralinguistics)	Rhetoric (mottos, slogans...)	Context/location
Unity				
Disunity				
Diversity				
Similarity				
Confrontation				
Cooperation				

## APPENDIX 6. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

<b>Data</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Network</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Sub-type</b>
Dale	Interview	CAAELII	.10/OCT/05	Network manager
Khem	Group interview	CAAELII	.11/OCT/05	Network staff
Diana	Group interview	CAAELII	.11/OCT/05	Network staff
Isabel	Group interview	CAAELII	.11/OCT/05	Network staff
Claudio	Interview	CAAELII	.12/DEC/05	Network staff
David	Interview	CAAELII	.12/DEC/05	Network staff
Gideon	Interview	CAAELII	.12/DEC/05	Network staff
Eugene	Group interview	CAAELII	.13/DEC/05	Network member
Seth	Group interview	CAAELII	.13/DEC/05	Network member
Guadalupe	Group interview	CAUSA	.14/NOV/05	Network staff
Aeryca	Group interview	CAUSA	.14/NOV/05	Network manager
Abel	Group interview	CAUSA	.14/NOV/05	Network member
Blanca	Group interview	CAUSA	.14/NOV/05	Network member
Lorena	Group interview	CAUSA	.15/NOV/05	Network member
Carmen	Group interview	CAUSA	.15/NOV/05	Network member
Oscar	Group interview	CAUSA	.15/NOV/05	Network member
Ramon	Interview	CAUSA	.15/NOV/05	Network manager
Aeryca	Interview	CAUSA	.15/NOV/05	Network manager
Amy	Telephone Int.	CAUSA	.26/JAN/06	Network member
John A	Group interview	NDLON	.19/DEC/05	Network staff
Pablo A	Group interview	NDLON	.19/DEC/05	Network manager
Omar L	Telephone Int.	NDLON	.10/JAN/06	Network member
Oscar P	Interview	NDLON	.10/JAN/06	Network member
Toni B	Telephone Int.	NDLON	.11/JAN/06	Network member
Carlos	Interview	NDLON	.20/JAN/06	Network member
Jose	Group interview	NYIC	.27/SEP/05	Network staff
Minerva	Group interview	NYIC	.27/SEP/05	Network staff
Chung Wa	Interview	NYIC	.02/OCT/05	Network manager
Adam	Interview	NYIC	.18/OCT/05	Network staff
Javier	Interview	NYIC	.17/JAN/06	Network staff
Marg Chin	Interview	NYIC	.23/FEB/06	Network member

Moreover, the interviewees used in the preliminary study (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005) and used again in this research, were:

<b>Data</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Network</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Sub-type</b>
Chung W	Group interview	NYIC	.04/APR/02	Network staff
Sara M	Group interview	NYIC	.04/APR/02	Network member
Margie	Group interview	NYIC	.04/APR/02	Network manager
Veronica	Group interview	NYIC	.18/APR/02	Network staff
Helen	Group interview	NYIC	.18/APR/02	Network member
Margie	Group interview	NYIC	.18/APR/02	Network manager
Dale	Group interview	CAAELII	.03/NOV/02	Network manager
Mary H	Group interview	CAAELII	.03/NOV/02	Network staff
Gideon	Group interview	CAAELII	.03/NOV/02	Network staff

Dale A	Group interview	CAAELII	.02/NOV/02	Network manager
Daisy F	Group interview	CAAELII	.02/NOV/02	Network member
Virginia C	Group interview	CAAELII	.02/NOV/02	Network member

## APPENDIX 7. LIST OF OBSERVATIONS

<b>Data</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Network</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Sub-type</b>
CIVITAS pilot-test	Observation	CAAELII	.08/OCT/05	Network-wide meeting
Apprenticeship program	Observation	CAAELII	.10/OCT/05	Constituencies training
Leadership Curriculum Development	Participation	CAAELII	.11/OCT/05	Network staff meeting
Technical Curriculum Development	Participation	CAAELII	.11/OCT/05	Network staff meeting
Citizenship Curriculum Development	Participation	CAAELII	.11/OCT/05	Network staff meeting
Town Hall Meeting prep	Observation	CAUSA	.14/NOV/05	Strategy meeting
FIRM Steering Committee Meeting	Observation	CAUSA	.15/NOV/05	Strategy meeting
Town Hall Meeting	Observation	CAUSA	.16/NOV/05	Rally
Housings w/ RR	Observation	CAUSA	.16/NOV/05	Working group
CAPACES Program	Observation	CAUSA	.16/NOV/05	Working group
National Assembly	Observation	NDLON	.27-31/JUL/05	National assembly
Press Conference	Observation	NDLON	.31/JUL/05	Press conference
NDLON strategy meeting	Observation	NDLON	.19/DEC/05	Strategy meeting
NYIC Annual PR Event	Observation	NYIC	.01/DEC/05	PR Event
Pro Immigration March	Observation	NYIC	.21/MAY/06	Rally
Housing Rights Rally	Observation	NYIC	.29/SEP/05	Rally

## APPENDIX 8. LIST OF DOCUMENTS ANALYZED<sup>124</sup>

<b>Network</b>	<b>Document</b>	<b>Date</b>
CAAELII	CIVITAS Brochure	1-Jan-05
CAAELII	Campaign for Unifying Families	1-Jan-05
CAAELII	Break the chains leaflet	12-Jan-05
CAAELII	General CIVITAS material	1-Oct-05
CAAELII	Technical Curriculum	1-Oct-05
CAAELII	Ch Tribune Article--Minutemen	15-Oct-05
CAAELII	Minutemen media summary	15-Oct-05
CAAELII	ICIRR & AAAN report	23-Nov-05
CAAELII	Office Manager Job Description	28-Nov-05
CAAELII	Fundraising material	31-Mar-06
CAAELII	Webpage	
CAAELII	Emails from multiple listserves	
CAUSA	CAUSA's report on Immigrant Labor	1-Oct-98
CAUSA	Lynn's story of PCUN	1-Sep-01
CAUSA	Nomination to LCW	1-Jan-03
CAUSA	Freedom Ride DVD	1-Jan-03
CAUSA	Horizontal analysis Interview w/ Ramon Ramirez	26-Jul-04
CAUSA	Horizontal analysis interview w/ Larry Kleinman	3-Aug-04
CAUSA	Horizontal analysis Interview w/ Ramon Ramirez #2	3-Aug-04
CAUSA	Vertical Form PCUN	1-Sep-04
CAUSA	Ethnography Lynn	20-Apr-05
CAUSA	Projected budget	1-Jul-05
CAUSA	Email Ramon Ramirez	8-Sep-05
CAUSA	Media package	1-Nov-05
CAUSA	CAPACES' description	1-Nov-05
CAUSA	Eugene Meeting Outreach Material	15-Nov-05
CAUSA	Fundraising letter AS	1-Dec-05
CAUSA	Statesman article on Mexican Consulate	4-Dec-05
CAUSA	Meta ethnography by Carol Stack	1-Jan-06
CAUSA	Fundraising letter AS	1-Apr-06
CAUSA	Various campaign material	
CAUSA	Webpage	
NDLON	Music by Day Laborers Article	1-Jan-00
NDLON	Hisotrical summary of NDLON	1-Sep-01
NDLON	Day Labor in Cleveland	4-Nov-01
NDLON	Checklist for Centers	1-Jan-02
NDLON	Centers or streets	1-Jan-02
NDLON	GAO report	1-Jan-02
NDLON	NLDON's 2002 Assembly Summary	1-Sep-02
NDLON	NDLON's 2003 Assembly Summary	1-Sep-03
NDLON	NELP report	1-Mar-04
NDLON	NDLON's 2003-04 accomplishments	1-Aug-04

<sup>124</sup> Dates are approximate since many of these internal documents did not have exact dates. Moreover, not all documents are listed individually and in some cases are grouped. Documents used in Ospina and Saz-Carranza's (2005) preliminary study were also used in this research. Lastly, Leadership for a Changing World application and selection material was also used.



NDLON	NDLON Outreach Material	1-Jan-05
NDLON	Several press releases for different events	1-Jan-05
NDLON	Violence to Day-Laborers	27-Jan-05
NDLON	Day Labor in NYC	17-Apr-05
NDLON	Call for Arizona Boycott	27-May-05
NDLON	Horizontal analysis Interview w/ John Arvizu	10-Jun-05
NDLON	Soccer tournament leaflet	13-Aug-05
NDLON	Horizontal analysis Interview w/ Pablo Alvarado	16-Sep-05
NDLON	Group 4 Awardee Portraits	12-Dec-05
NDLON	Webpage	
NDLON	NDLON ethnography concept paper	
NDLON	NDLON's principles	
NDLON	Building community document / Best practices	
NDLON	Political economy of day-laborers	
NDLON	Civil rights handout	
NDLON	Report by NDLON and U Maryland	
NDLON	Myths NDLON - Valenzuela	
NDLON	NDLON on Ordinances	
NYIC	2004 IRS form	26-Jul-05
NYIC	Housing Report	11-Oct-05
NYIC	Eduaction Issues outreach material	31-Oct-05
NYIC	Healthy Homes Report	17-Nov-05
NYIC	Healthy Homes Outreach Materials	17-Nov-05
NYIC	Bloomberg response to NYIC electoral questionnaire	28-Nov-05
NYIC	Ferrero response to NYIC electoral questionnaire	28-Nov-05
NYIC	EP response to NYIC electoral questionnaire	28-Nov-05
NYIC	Socialists response to NYIC electoral questionnaire	28-Nov-05
NYIC	Annual Meeting documentation	29-Nov-05
NYIC	NYIC Immigration Debate Outreach Material	21-Dec-05
NYIC	Webpage	
NYIC	Immigration News Newsletter	
NYIC	Immigration Housing Listserve	

## APPENDIX 9. INTERMEDIATE CO-OCCURRENCE MATRIX

Cooccurrence table: 05Dec2005

MngtA-Fac/Pla/Mob	40	MngtA-Fac/Pla/Mob	
MngtA-Facilitation	17	MngtA-Facilitation	
MngtA-Mobilizing	18	MngtA-Mobilizing	
MngtA-Nurturing	10	MngtA-Nurturing	
MngtD-Membership	50	MngtD-Membership	
MngtD-Obj/Str/Tac	46	MngtD-Obj/Str/Tac	
MngtD-St-CoordUnit	7	MngtD-St-CoordUnit	
MngtD-St-Open	26	MngtD-St-Open	
MngtD-Structure	27	MngtD-Structure	
MngtD-Trust	13	MngtD-Trust	
PwrBaseK	9	PwrBaseK	
PwrBaseL	23	PwrBaseL	
PwrBaseR	29	PwrBaseR	
PwrBases	52	PwrBases	
PwrCapacity	10	PwrCapacity	
PwrDecision-making	51	PwrDecision-making	
PwrFor	4	PwrFor	
PwrOver	31	PwrOver	
PwrTo	13	PwrTo	
PwrWith	6	PwrWith	
T-CC-Levels	12	T-CC-Levels	
T-ConfCoop	63	T-ConfCoop	
T-Diversity	71	T-Diversity	
T-OtherTensions	11	T-OtherTensions	
T-Unity	70	T-Unity	



## APPENDIX 10. MOST IMPORTANT IMMIGRATION BILLS IN U.S.' HISTORY

<b>Table XXVI. Overview of major US immigration legislation (Extendend)</b>		
Historical Period	Legislation/Year	Major provisions
Gilded age	Immigration Act 1875	Bars prostitutes and criminals
	Chinese Exclusion Act 1882	
	Immigration Act 1882	Bars “lunatics,” “idiots,” and those “likely to become a public charge”
	Contract Labor Act 1885	Prohibits contract labor admissions
	Chinese Exclusion Act 1888	Extends Chinese exclusion
	Immigration Act 1891	Creates federal immigration bureaucracy, introduces immigration head tax, and allows for deportation
Progressive Era	Immigration Act 1903	Bars polygamists and “anarchists”
	Gentleman’s agreement 1907	Limits Japanese immigration
	Immigration Act 1907	Increases head tax
	Immigration Act 1917	Imposes literacy tests and bars almost all Asians
	National Quota Law 1921	Limits immigration of each nationality to 3% of the number of foreign-born of that nationality living in the US in 1910
	Nationals Origin Act 1924	Limits immigration of each nationality to 2% of the number of that nationality living in the US, as per 1890 census
	National Quota Law 1929	Apportions quotas with respect to 2% nationality limit, as per 1920 census
New Deal and WW2	Immigration Act 1940	INS transferred from Labor to Justice Department
	Bracero Program 1943	Guestworker program with Mexico, British Honduras, Barbados, and Jamaica
	Act of December 17 1943	Repeals Chinese exclusion in favor of meager quotas
40s & 50s	War Bride Act 1945	Allows for immigration of foreign-born spouses and children of military personnel
	Displaced Persons Act 1948	Facilitates admission of European refugees
	Internal Security Act 1950	Establishes alien registry
	Immigration and Naturalization Act 1952	Reaffirms national quotas, and adds exclusion criteria based on sexuality and ideology
	Refugee Relief Act 1953	Grants permanent residence to 214.000 European refugees
	Refugee-Escapee Act 1957	Grants special status to refugees from communist regimes
60s & 70s	Cuban Refugee Act 1960	Begins Cuban Refugee program
	Refugee Assistance Act 1963	Extends support for refugees
	Bracero Re-Authorization 1964	Terminates Bracero program
	Hart-Celler Act	Dismantles national quotas systems; establishes preferences criteria with emphasis with family re-unification
	Indochina Refugee Act 1975	Begins Indochina resettlement program
	INA Amendments 1976	Sets limits per country
	Indochina Refugee Act 1977	Admits 194.000 refugees from Indochina
	INA Amendments 1978	Establishes worldwide ceiling on annual immigrants (290.000)

80s & 90s	Refugee Act 1980	Expands annual refugee admissions
	Immigration Reform and Control Act 1986	Amnesty to 3 million undocumented; establishes weak employer sanctions; and introduces immigration anti-discrimination agency
	Immigration Act 1990	Increases Annual cap to 675.000
	Personal Responsibility Act 1996	Limits immigrant access to public benefits
	Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act 1996	Strengthens border enforcement; expedites deportation; establishes exceptions for non-citizens
2000-...	Patriot Act 2001	Confers vast and unchecked powers to the Executive branch suspending many civil liberties and removing immigrants' constitutional protection
	Homeland Security Act 2002	Transforms the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Department of Justice into the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
	Real ID Act 2005	Increases the necessary evidence required both to corroborate one's identity and for states to issue a driver's license.
Source: own, based on Tichenor and USCIS		

**APPENDIX 11. SUMMARY OF CURRENT IMMIGRATION  
DEBATE IN THE U.S.**

The Debate Over Immigration Reform				
	Bill Passed in the House Bill (H.R.4437)	Hurdles to Overcome in Conference	Bill Passed by the Senate Bill (S.2611)	The President's View
Legalization of Un-documented Immigrants	No provisions for legalization, although a conservative leader in the House, Representative Mike Pence, proposed a separate bill that would allow illegal immigrants to become guest workers, but not permanent residents or citizens.	This may be the most difficult issue to resolve. A path to citizenship is one of the center-pieces of the Senate bill, while some conservative leaders in the House have repeatedly expressed opposition to any proposal that allowing illegal immigrants to qualify for residency.	Would give illegal immigrants who have lived in the United States for two years or more a path to eventual citizenship. Illegal immigrants who have been here less than two years would be required to leave the country altogether. They could apply for the guest worker program, but they would not be guaranteed acceptance in it.	While rejecting "an automatic path to citizenship," Mr. Bush has said that immigrants should be given a chance to gain citizenship after they "pay a meaningful penalty for breaking the law."
Temporary Worker Program	In December, the House defied President Bush's call for a guest worker program although the separate bill recently introduced by Mike Pence, the leader of the conservative caucus in the House, would allow illegal immigrants to become guest workers.	Although the House bill does not mention a guest worker program, some conservative House leaders have shown a willingness to compromise.	Creates a guest worker program with a path to legal permanent residence.	Has called on Congress to pass a guest worker program for more than two years. Said that "to secure our border, we must create a temporary worker program."
Number of Guest Workers to be Admitted Annually	No such provisions in the House bill.	Another issue that may be very difficult to resolve. Many House Republicans vehemently oppose the provisions in the Senate bill that would bring 200,000 foreign workers into the country each year.	Negotiations in the Senate bill have reduced the number of foreign guest workers to be admitted annually to 200,000 a year from 320,000.	Although President Bush has not supported a specific number of guest workers to be admitted annually, his strong support of a guest worker program aligns him with the Senate bill.

Worksite Enforcement	Requires employers to participate in an electronic employment eligibility verification system within three to six years.	The Senate and the House bills agree on the need for an electronic system to verify employment eligibility. Some details still need to be worked out.	The legislation would require employers to use an electronic employment verification system that would distinguish between legal and illegal workers.	Mr. Bush has also said that employers should participate in an electronic employment eligibility verification system.
Criminal Penalties for Existing Illegal Immigrants	Makes it a federal crime to live in the United States illegally. Individuals who help illegal immigrants to enter or stay in the country would also face criminal penalties.	This is another issue where the gulf between the two bills is vast. One area for compromise is that some conservative House leaders have signaled a possible willingness to remove the provision that would expose existing illegal immigrants to criminal penalties.	Mandates penalties for smuggling aliens, but offers exceptions for those who provide "humanitarian" assistance to immigrants, including medical care and housing. Also, illegal immigrants convicted of a felony or three misdemeanors would be deported.	Said that "it is neither wise nor realistic to round up millions of people, many with deep roots in the United States, and send them across the border."
Border Security: Fencing	Requires the construction of "at least two layers of reinforced fencing" as well as "physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras and sensors" along approximately 700 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border.	The bills essentially agree on the need for fencing, but differ on the length: the House calls for approximately 700 miles while the Senate calls for 350.	The bill initially called for limited "double- or triple-layered fencing" but as the debate progressed, the Senate added provisions for 350 miles of border fencing and 500 miles of vehicle barriers between the United States and Mexico.	Although he did say that "walls and patrols alone will not stop" illegal immigration, Mr. Bush later traveled to Arizona and declared that he supported fencing some but not all of America's 1,950-mile border with Mexico.
Border Security: Personnel	Hires more Border Patrol agents "as expeditiously as possible." Nearly 12,000 Border Patrol agents currently stand guard. Hires at least 250 active duty port of entry inspectors for each of the next three years.	The two bills essentially agree on the need to bolster border security, but many details need to be settled.	Increases the number of Border Patrol agents by 2,400 each year through 2011 to the current force of 11,300 agents.	Called on Congress to provide funding for large increases in manpower and technology at the border. He said that "by the end of 2008, we will increase the number of Border Patrol officers by an additional 6,000" and to help with the transition "up to 6,000 Guard members will be deployed to our southern border."
Source: <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/washington/25IMMIGRATIONBILLS_GRAPHIC.html">http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/washington/25IMMIGRATIONBILLS_GRAPHIC.html</a>				

## **APPENDIX 12. NETWORK MEMBERS**

### **Coalition for Asian, African, European, Latino Immigrants of Illinois**

Arab American Action Network  
Bosnian & Herzegovinian American Community Center  
Cambodian Association of Illinois  
Casa Aztlan  
Centro Romero  
Chinese Mutual Aid Association  
Centro Sin Fronteras  
Chinese American Service League  
Erie Neighborhood House  
Ethiopian Community Association of Chicago  
Haitian American Community Association  
Heartland Alliance/El Centro de Educación y Cultura  
Indo-American Center  
Instituto del Progreso Latino  
Korean American Community Services  
Korean American Resource & Cultural Center  
Korean American Senior Center  
Lao American Community Services  
Midwest Asian American Center  
Vietnamese Association of Illinois

### **National Day-Labor Organizing Network**

#### ***Arizona***

Tonatierra

#### ***California***

Central American Resource Center (CARECEN)

Centro Laboral de Graton

Centro Legal de La Raza (Oakland)

Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA)

Iglesia San Pedro

Instituto de Educacion Popular del Sur de California (IDEPSCA)

Malibu Community Labor Exchange

Pomona Day Laborer Center

La Raza Centro Legal - San Francisco Day Laborer Program

Day Worker Center of Mountain View

#### ***Colorado***

El Centro Humanitario de Trabajadores

#### ***Chicago***

Union Latina de Chicago

#### ***Maryland***

Casa of Maryland

#### ***New Jersey***

Casa Freehold

Viento del Espiritu

#### ***New York***

Centro de Hospitalidad



Coalicion Hispana de Ossinin  
The Hispanic Resource Center  
The Hispanic Westchester Coalition  
Neighbors' Link  
Proyecto de los Trabajadores Latinoamericanos (PTLA)  
Workplace Project

***North Carolina***

North Carolina Occupational Safety  
Health Project (NCOSH)

***Oregon***

Centro Cultural  
VOZ

***Washington***

Casa Latina

***Texas***

Gulfon Area Neighborhood Organization (GANO)  
CTIWorC (Proyecto Defensa Laboral)

**New York Immigration Coalition**

Advocates for Children of New York, Inc.  
Afghan Communicator  
Alianza Dominicana, Inc.  
American Committee on Italian Migration  
American Friends Service Committee  
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee-NY  
APICHA  
Arab-American Family Support Center  
Asian Americans for Equality  
CAIR-NY  
Casa Mary Johanna  
Catholic Charities Archdiocese of New York  
Catholic Charities Department of Immigrant & Refugee Services  
Catholic Charities Department of Social Development  
Catholic Charities Diocese of Rockville Centre  
Catholic Charities-Diocese of Brooklyn & Queens  
Catholic Family Center  
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.  
Catholic Migration  
Center for Immigrant Health  
Center for Independence of Disabled In New York, Inc.  
Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc.  
Center for Women in Government and Civil Society  
Central American Legal Assistance  
CARECEN  
Chinese-American Planning Council Inc.  
Church Alive Development Corp.  
Church Avenue Merchants Block Association  
Circulo de la Hispanidad, Inc.  
Citizens Advice Bureau  
City Bar Fund of the City of New York  
Coalition for Asian American Children & Families  
Cornell Cooperative Extension

Comprehensive Development, Inc.  
Coro  
Cornell Migrant Program  
Council of Pakistan Organization  
District Council 37-Citizenship Committee  
Doctors of the World  
The Door  
Education & Assistance Corporation  
Emerald Isle Immigration Center  
Fifth Avenue Committee  
Forest Hills Community House, Inc.  
Gay Men's Health Crisis  
Goddard Riverside Community Center  
Greater Upstate Law Project  
Harlem United Community AIDS Center  
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society  
Helping Honduras  
Hispanic Federation, Inc.  
Immigration Advocacy Services, Inc.  
Independent Press Association  
Intercommunity Centre for Justice and Peace  
Interfaith Refugee Ministry  
International Center  
International High School  
International Institute of New Jersey  
Jacob A. Riis Settlement House  
Jewish Community Center of Staten Island  
Johnson, Murphy, Hubner, McKeon, Wubbenhorst & Appelt, P.C.  
Kirkland & Ellis LLP  
Korean Community Services of Metropolitan NY, Inc.  
Latin American Integration Center  
Latino Commission on AIDS  
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights  
Learning Leaders  
Lexington Vocational Services, Inc.  
Literacy Assistance Center  
Long Island Immigrant Alliance  
Lutheran Family and Community Services  
Make the Road by Walking  
Medical & Health Research Association of NYC, Inc.  
Midwood Development Corp.  
Migration Policy Institute  
My Sisters' Place  
NALEO Educational Fund  
Nassau County Coordinating Agency for Spanish Americans  
New Immigrant Community Empowerment  
National Coalition for Haitian Rights  
New York Asian Women's Center  
New York Association for New Americans  
New York Civic Participation Project  
New York Lawyers for Public Interest  
New York Legal Assistance Group  
New York State Defenders Association, Inc.  
NYU School of Medicine Center for Immigrant Health  
New York Women's Foundation

## NYCOSH

Polish and Slavic Center  
Project Reach Youth, Inc.  
Refugee Women Council  
Riverside Language Program  
Romanian Information and Referral Center  
Sanctuary for Families  
Selfhelp Kensington  
South Asian Youth Action  
The 1199 SEIU Citizenship Program  
The Door-Legal  
UJA-Federation of Jewish Philanthropies  
Union Settlement Association  
UNITE Immigration Project  
United Neighborhood Houses  
Voices for Change: Immigrant Women & State Policy  
Young Korean American Service & Education Center, Inc.

## CAUSA

### *Eugene*

Community Alliance of Lane County  
Juventud Faceta

### *Portland*

American Friends Service Committee  
Basic Rights of Oregon  
VOZ

### *Medford*

UNETE

### *Salem*

Organización de Comunidades Indígenas Migrantes Oaxaqueños (OCIMO)  
Latinos Unidos Siempre  
Mano a Mano Family Center  
Salem/Keizer Coalition for Equality Scappoose  
Rural Organizing Project

### *Woodburn*

LUCa  
Pinos y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste (PCUN)  
Voz Hispana Causa Chapista

Figure XXVII. CAUSA's multiple linkages (source: own)

