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LEFT-WING POPULISM AND FEMINIST POLITICS

The Case of Evo Morales' Bolivia (2006-2018)

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Volveré y seré millones

(Túpac Katari)

El Estado capitalista y colonial es patriarcal;

hay que despatriarcalizar el propio Estado

(Teresa Morales)

Abstract

The relationship between populism and feminist politics is increasingly receiving more scholarly attention, largely due to the rise of populist parties both in Latin America and in Europe since the beginning of the 21st century. However, this stream of literature presents two major shortcomings. First, it has so far failed to establish a specific relationship between populism and feminist politics. Second, the literature has overwhelmingly focused on right-wing populist parties, which has introduced an imbalance in this stream of research: the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics is understudied. The present thesis contributes to filling this gap by analysing the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, focusing on the paradigmatic case of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) and Evo Morales' government in Bolivia between 2006 and 2018.

Some of the most influential works on populism and feminist politics uphold that these two political projects are essentially incompatible: according to this literature, (e.g. Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017, Shea Baird and Roth 2017, Kampwirth 2010), populist parties never promote gender equality policies or keep good relations with women's movements, regardless of whether they are left-wing or right-wing populists. I challenge this assertion by analysing three specific aspects of the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics. First, I investigate whether left-wing populist parties promote gender equality policies in some cases, against charges of a general inconsistency between populist ideology and the promotion of gender equality policies. Second, I analyse how these parties form their policy-making coalitions in the field of gender equality. Third, I investigate how much impact on policy institutionalised women's movements have when left-wing populist parties are in power. The empirical analysis carried out in this thesis is based on the qualitative content analysis of documents and semi-structured interviews with women's movements' activists, policy-makers and experts in women's movements.

The findings and conclusions of the thesis can be synthetized as follows. Regarding the promotion of gender equality policies, the analysis has revealed that Evo Morales' left-wing populist government promoted ambitious gender equality policies on violence against women in politics, gender-based domestic violence, and domestic workers' rights, among other fields. These findings show that left-wing populists can promote gender equality policies, and contradicts the literature that upholds that there is an essential incompatibility between any populist ideology and the promotion of gender equality policies. In regards to populist governments forming policy coalitions in the field of gender equality, the analysis has shown that the Bolivian government and governing party MAS experienced a contradiction between their anti-elitist discourse and their pragmatism when forming policy coalitions – they included feminist NGOs in the coalitions for the formulation of gender equality policies, even though the government had previously labelled those NGOs as elitist. As far as the relationship between left-wing populist parties and women's movements is concerned, I have focused on the case of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement. The analysis has

revealed that Morales' government kept up a close collaborative relationship with the movement. The government satisfied all the movement's symbolic demands (oriented towards improving the social image of domestic workers), but only some of its substantive demands (those that had a direct impact on the domestic workers' living and working conditions).

The findings mentioned shed light on the complex relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics. There is not an essential incompatibility between populism and feminist politics. The ideology attached to populism in each case – and not populism in itself – seems to be the key explanatory factor of the position of each populist party in relation to feminist politics. In a nutshell, the present thesis invites us to relativize the importance of the more or less populist orientation of a political party when we analyse its position on feminist politics, a conclusion that can be also useful for other streams of research on populism.

Resum

La relació entre el populisme i la política feminista està rebent cada vegada més atenció científica, principalment a causa de l'ascens que experimenten els partits populistes a l'Amèrica Llatina i a Europa des de principis del segle XXI. No obstant això, aquesta literatura presenta dues grans febleses. Primer, fins ara no ha aconseguit establir una relació específica entre populisme i política feminista. Segon, la literatura s'ha centrat de manera desproporcionada en els partits populistes d'extrema dreta, fet que ha introduït un desequilibri en aquesta línia de recerca – la relació entre populisme d'esquerra i política feminista ha estat poc estudiada. La present tesi contribueix a omplir aquest buit analitzant la relació entre populisme d'esquerra i política feminista, centrant-se en el cas paradigmàtic del Moviment al Socialisme (MAS) i el govern d'Evo Morales a Bolívia entre 2006 i 2018.

Algunes de les investigacions més influents sobre populisme i política feminista sostenen que tots dos projectes polítics són essencialment incompatibles: d'acord amb aquesta literatura, els partits populistes mai promouen polítiques en favor de la igualtat de gènere ni mantenen bones relacions amb moviments de dones, al marge que siguin populistes d'esquerra o d'extrema dreta. En aquesta tesi, qüestiono aquesta afirmació analitzant tres aspectes específics de la relació entre populisme d'esquerra i política feminista. Primer, investigo si els partits populistes d'esquerra promouen polítiques en favor de la igualtat de gènere, qüestionant la idea d'una incompatibilitat general entre la ideologia populista i la promoció de polítiques a favor de la igualtat de gènere. En segon lloc, analitzo com aquests partits formen les seves coalicions per elaborar polítiques en l'àmbit de la igualtat de gènere. En tercer lloc, investigo quant impacte tenen els moviments de dones institucionalitzats en les polítiques públiques quan els populistes d'esquerra estan en el poder. L'anàlisi empírica realitzada en aquesta tesi està basada en l'anàlisi qualitativa de contingut de documents i entrevistes semi-estructurades amb activistes de moviments de dones, responsables polítiques i expertes i experts.

Les troballes i conclusions de la tesi poden sintetitzar-se de la següent forma. En relació a la promoció de polítiques a favor de la igualtat de gènere, l'anàlisi ha mostrat que el govern populista d'esquerres d'Evo Morales va promoure ambicioses polítiques d'igualtat de gènere sobre violència política contra les dones, violència masclista en l'àmbit domèstic i drets de les treballadores de la llar, entre altres àmbits. Aquesta troballa mostra que els populistes d'esquerra poden promoure polítiques a favor de la igualtat de gènere. Això contradiu la literatura que sosté que hi ha una incompatibilitat essencial entre qualsevol ideologia populista i la promoció de polítiques a favor de la igualtat de gènere. En relació a la formació de coalicions per a l'elaboració de polítiques en l'àmbit de la igualtat de gènere, l'anàlisi ha mostrat que el govern bolivià i el partit en el poder – el MAS – van experimentar una contradicció entre el seu discurs anti-elit i el seu pragmatisme en la formació de coalicions per a l'elaboració de polítiques públiques – van incloure ONGs feministes en les coalicions per a elaborar polítiques d'igualtat, encara que prèviament el govern havia qualificat a aquestes

ONGs d'elitistes. Respecte a la relació entre partits populistes d'esquerra i moviments de dones, m'he centrat en el cas del moviment bolivià de treballadores de la llar. L'anàlisi ha mostrat que el govern de Morales va mantenir una relació pròxima i col·laborativa amb el moviment. El govern va satisfer totes les demandes simbòliques del moviment (orientades a millorar la imatge social de les treballadores de la llar) però només algunes de les seves demandes substantives (les que tenien un impacte directe en les condicions laborals i de vida de les treballadores domèstiques).

Les troballes esmentades ajuden a comprendre la complexa relació entre populisme d'esquerra i política feminista. No hi ha una incompatibilitat essencial entre populisme i política feminista. La ideologia associada al populisme en cada cas – i no el populisme en si mateix – sembla ser el factor explicatiu central de la posició de cada partit populista respecte a la política feminista. En resum, la present tesi convida a relativitzar la importància del caràcter més o menys populista d'un partit polític quan analitzem la seva posició sobre la política feminista, una conclusió que pot ser útil per a altres línies de recerca sobre populisme.

Resumen

La relación entre el populismo y la política feminista está recibiendo cada vez más atención científica, en gran parte debido al ascenso de partidos populistas en América Latina y Europa desde principios del siglo XXI. Sin embargo, esta literatura presenta dos grandes debilidades. Primero, hasta ahora no ha conseguido establecer una relación específica entre populismo y política feminista. Segundo, la literatura se ha centrado de manera desproporcionada en los partidos populistas de extrema derecha, lo que ha introducido un desequilibrio en esta línea de investigación – la relación entre populismo de izquierda y política feminista ha sido poco estudiada. La presente tesis contribuye a colmar este vacío analizando la relación entre populismo de izquierda y política feminista, centrándose en el caso paradigmático del Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) y el gobierno de Evo Morales en Bolivia entre 2006 y 2018.

Algunos de los trabajos más influyentes sobre populismo y política feminista mantienen que ambos proyectos políticos son esencialmente incompatibles: de acuerdo con esta literatura, los partidos populistas nunca promueven políticas en favor de la igualdad de género ni mantienen buenas relaciones con movimientos de mujeres, al margen de que sean populistas de izquierda o de extrema derecha. En esta tesis, cuestiono esta afirmación analizando tres aspectos específicos de la relación entre populismo de izquierda y política feminista. Primero, investigo si los partidos populistas de izquierda promueven políticas en favor de la igualdad de género en algunos casos, cuestionando la idea de una incompatibilidad general entre la ideología populista y la promoción de políticas a favor de la igualdad de género. En segundo lugar, analizo cómo estos partidos forman sus coaliciones para elaborar políticas en el ámbito de la igualdad de género. En tercer lugar, investigo cuánto impacto en las políticas públicas tienen los movimientos de mujeres institucionalizados cuando los populistas de izquierda están en el poder. El análisis empírico realizado en esta tesis está basado en el análisis cualitativo de contenido de documentos y entrevistas semi-estructuradas con activistas de movimientos de mujeres, responsables políticas y expertas y expertos.

Los hallazgos y conclusiones de la tesis pueden sintetizarse de la siguiente forma. En relación a la promoción de políticas a favor de la igualdad de género, el análisis ha mostrado que el gobierno populista de izquierdas de Evo Morales promovió ambiciosas políticas de igualdad de género sobre violencia política contra las mujeres, violencia machista en el ámbito doméstico y derechos de las trabajadoras del hogar, entre otros ámbitos. Este hallazgo muestra que los populistas de izquierda pueden promover políticas a favor de la igualdad de género, lo que contradice la literatura que mantiene que hay una incompatibilidad esencial entre cualquier ideología populista y la promoción de políticas a favor de la igualdad de género. En relación a la formación de coaliciones para la elaboración de políticas en el ámbito de la igualdad de género, el análisis ha mostrado que el gobierno boliviano y el partido en el poder – el MAS – experimentaron una contradicción entre su discurso anti-élite y su pragmatismo en la formación de coaliciones para la elaboración de políticas públicas – incluyeron ONGs

feministas en las coaliciones para elaborar políticas de igualdad, aunque previamente el gobierno había calificado a estas ONGs de elitistas. Respecto a la relación entre partidos populistas de izquierda y movimientos de mujeres, me he centrado en el caso del movimiento boliviano de trabajadoras del hogar. El análisis ha mostrado que el gobierno de Morales mantuvo una relación cercana y colaborativa con el movimiento. El gobierno satisfizo todas las demandas simbólicas del movimiento (orientadas a mejorar la imagen social de las trabajadoras del hogar) pero solo algunas de sus demandas sustantivas (las que tenían un impacto directo en las condiciones laborales y de vida de las trabajadoras domésticas).

Los hallazgos mencionados arrojan luz sobre la compleja relación entre populismo de izquierda y política feminista. No hay una incompatibilidad esencial entre populismo y política feminista. La ideología asociada al populismo en cada caso – y no el populismo en sí – parece ser el factor explicativo central de la posición de cada partido populista respecto a la política feminista. En resumen, la presente tesis invita a relativizar la importancia del carácter más o menos populista de un partido político cuando analizamos su posición sobre la política feminista, una conclusión que puede ser útil para otras líneas de investigación sobre populismo.

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No menos importante que la ayuda académica ha sido la compañía y el apoyo de mis seres queridos durante estos años. Escribir esta tesis doctoral es probablemente el trabajo más difícil que he hecho hasta ahora, tanto por el desafío intelectual que ha representado como por los periodos de angustia que he pasado, una experiencia que se ha convertido en común entre los estudiantes de doctorado. Me gustaría comenzar por Arthur Moreau, que ha sido el mejor compañero y ha mostrado una increíble paciencia durante los años más difíciles de la tesis. Sin su apoyo y sus consejos políticos e intelectuales, todo habría sido mucho más difícil. Félix Hernández, además de ser un maravilloso amigo, me ha ayudado mucho en transformar ideas caóticas en una investigación comprensible. Ana Laura Cannilla y Manuel Maroto me han animado sin descanso durante estos años, me han hecho sugerencias y comentarios enormemente valiosos y han releído todo el manuscrito de la tesis. Este trabajo les debe mucho.

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Introduction

"The capitalist and colonial state is patriarchal; we need to depatriarchalise the state itself". With this sentence, the former minister of development Teresa Morales synthetized the task that Bolivian women's movements and a group of feminist activists who had assumed positions in government had been undertaking since 2006. After five years of anti-neoliberal mass protests, former coca-growers' union leader Evo Morales was elected president in December 2005, as the candidate of the left-wing populist indigenist populist Movement for Socialism (MAS). He was the first indigenous president in the history of the Andean country, where indigenous people constitute the majority of the population but have been historically subordinated to the white and mestizo elite. Decolonisation and overcoming neoliberalism were the central axes of the MAS' political project, but Morales' arrival in power also opened a window of opportunity for Bolivian women's organisations – an extremely diverse category that includes mass women's social organisations made up of thousands of indigenous lower-class women, and small feminist NGOs dominated by white and mestizo middle-class women. In spite of Evo Morales and his vice-president Álvaro García Linera's frequently sexist comments and behaviour, and their weak initial engagement with women's rights, depatriarchalisation entered the Bolivian political agenda, and beginning in 2006, gender equality policies took an unprecedented step forward. These peculiarities make of Bolivia a very suitable case-study to analyse the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, the understudied issue addressed by this PhD thesis.

Populism is receiving increasingly more scholarly attention, due to the rise of populist radical right-wing parties in several European countries, and also in other parts of the world following the 2008 financial crisis and the austerity policies imposed by the European Union and national governments. In addition, left-wing populism was a central force in Latin American politics during the first decade and a half of the 21st century –the so-called 'pink tide' period– and some left-wing populist parties have emerged in post-2008 Europe. Among the burgeoning literature on populism, there is an incipient stream of research focused on the relationship between populism and feminist politics (e.g. Lombardo and Kantola 2019; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015; Norocel 2013). An influential group of authors considers that all kinds of populism are incompatible with feminist politics, that is to say, with the promotion of progressive policies on gender equality and the establishment of close links between governments and women's movements (e.g. Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Kampwirth 2010; Shea Baird and Roth 2017). Yet, the empirical and theoretical basis of this supposed incompatibility between populism and feminist politics is questionable, and has led me to challenge this idea. Besides, the overwhelming majority of the existent research has analysed European right-wing populist parties (e.g. Akkerman 2015; Norocel 2013), introducing a geographical and ideological bias into the literature that hampers the pursuit of general findings about the relationship between populism and feminist

politics. With the aim of countering this imbalance, I have focused on Bolivia's MAS, a Latin American left-wing populist party.

The thesis is structured around one main research question: *What is the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics?* This question is addressed through three secondary research questions (SRQ):

SRQ1: Can left-wing populist parties promote gender equality policies?

SRQ2: How do left-wing populist parties form their policy coalitions for the formulation of gender equality policies?

SRQ3: What is the impact of institutionalised women's movements on the gender equality policy agenda of left-wing populists in power?

The present thesis does not intend to establish a general causal relationship between left-wing populist ideology and feminist politics, but it does aim to improve the available knowledge about the complex relationship that exists between both political projects. Regarding the promotion of gender equality policies, this research suggests that in some cases left-wing populist parties promote this kind of policies. As far as policy-making is concerned, I uphold that populist parties are pragmatic when forming their policy coalitions for the formulation of gender equality policies: they include political and social actors in their policy-making coalitions that their parties have previously labelled as 'elitist'. In this way, left-wing populist parties experience a contradiction between their anti-elite discourse and their pragmatism in the formation of policy coalitions. This thesis also looks at the relationship between left-wing populist parties and women's movements, an issue which is closely related to the promotion of gender equality policies. Both actors often keep close relationships (a high level of movements' institutionalisation), but these good relations do not always allow movements to have a significant impact on substantive policies – those policies that have a direct impact on people's living conditions. These findings, obtained through empirical analysis of the Bolivian case, are useful to better understand how left-wing politics and feminist politics interact in other contexts.

The structure of the thesis can be summarised as follows. In Chapter 1, I address the theoretical framework of the thesis; in Chapter 2, I explain the research design, the selection of the case study and the methodology; in Chapter 3 I explain the case study. Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter, focused on how the pioneering Bolivian legislation on violence against women in politics has influenced other legislative initiatives on this issue in Latin America. Chapter 5 analyses how left-wing populist parties form their policy coalitions in the field of gender equality policies, in the context of the Bolivian case. Chapter 6, which is the third and last empirical chapter, explores the impact of institutionalised women's movements on policy when left-wing populist parties are in power, with a focus on the case of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement. The findings and conclusions of the thesis are explained in Chapter 7.

In Chapter 1, I explain the theoretical framework of the research, focusing on the concepts of left-wing populism and feminist politics. Firstly, I conceptualise left-wing populism, reviewing literature on the concept of populism, examining how populist parties form their policy coalitions, and considering discussions on the notion of left-wing populism. Secondly, I conceptualise feminist politics, a key concept that I operationalize through two dimensions: the institutionalisation of women's movements (relationships between governments and movements) and the impact of institutionalised women's movements on policy. Thirdly, I connect the two concepts that structure this thesis, and discuss how left-wing populist parties connect with feminist politics. This chapter ends with the presentation of the research questions.

In Chapter 2 I address the research design, the case study selection and the methodology, which is based on qualitative analysis of documents and semi-structured interviews. In this chapter, I also reflect on my position as a researcher and the ethical considerations that I have taken into account when carrying out my research. First, I explain the symbolic gap (Rapley 2004) that existed between me and the interviewees, and how I addressed this issue. Second, I explain the risk of cognitive extractionism (Simpson 2013). Third and last, I discuss how I consider that this research can be politically useful.

After this, the case-study is explained in Chapter 3. Insofar as this is a single-case research, a deep knowledge of the case is needed in order to understand the analysis. Thus, I have written a long, detailed chapter on the case, focusing on two elements: Evo Morales' left-wing populist and indigenous government, and the situation of women's organisations and gender equality policies in Bolivia during the period studied (2006-2018). These first three chapters precede the three analytical chapters that constitute the core of the PhD thesis. They aim to address the main research question of the thesis, but they also have a certain autonomy, reflected in their structure: the three chapters include their own sections on methodology and theoretical framework. This structure has allowed me to focus on three specific issues, applying three specific theoretical and methodological approaches, while addressing the main research question of the thesis.

Chapter 4 is entitled "Tackling Violence Against Women in Politics through Law: The International Influence of the Pioneering Bolivian Legislation". It investigates how the pioneering Bolivian legislation on violence against women in politics has influenced other legislative initiatives on the topic in Latin America. This chapter suggests that left-wing populist parties can promote ambitious and innovative gender equality policies. Besides, the chapter contributes to academic and political discussions on how to tackle violence against women in politics through law. Chapter 5 is entitled "Between Political Discourses and Pragmatic Policy-Making: Gender Equality Policies in Evo Morales' Bolivia (2006-2017)". It analyses how left-wing populist parties form their policy coalitions in the field of gender equality policies. The chapter is focused on the contradiction between Morales' populist anti-elite discourse – which Morales' government used against feminist NGOs – and its pragmatism when it came to form

policy coalitions, in which feminist NGOs were fully included. Chapter 6 is entitled "Women's Movements Institutionalisation and Impact on Policy: the Case of the Bolivian Domestic Workers' Movement"[1]. This chapter explores the influence of institutionalised women's movements on policy when left-wing populist parties are in power, by focusing on the Bolivian domestic workers' movement.

The three analytical chapters are followed by the final chapter of the thesis, where I draw conclusions on the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics. The findings on the complex relationship between both political projects reached by the thesis invite us to relativize the importance of the populist or non-populist character of a political party when it comes to analysing its position on feminist politics. In the case of feminist politics, ideology seems to be a more relevant explanatory factor than populism itself. This conclusion is relevant beyond the specific issue of feminist politics: insofar as populism is a thin-centred ideology that is always accompanied by a 'thick' ideology (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013), researchers should not concentrate all their attention on the populist dimension of parties. It is more productive to examine other features that define a political party, particularly its ideology beyond populism. In the case of feminist politics, the "left-wing" part of "left-wing populism" seems to be more important in determining the orientation of parties than the "populism" part.

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[1] A condensed version of Chapter 6 has been published in *Partecipazione i Conflitto*, vol. 12, No. 1 (2019): 168-196.

Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework: Left-Wing Populism and Feminist Politics

The present thesis investigates the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics. For the purposes of this research, "feminist politics" refers both to the establishment of close links between governments and women's movements, and the promotion of gender equality policies. The concept of gender equality policies includes all public policies that aim to improve women's social situations. The relationship between populism and feminist politics is receiving growing scholarly attention (Caravantes 2018; Kampwirth 2010; S. L. de Lange and Mügge 2015; Lombardo and Kantola 2019; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015; Norocel 2013; Shea Baird and Roth 2017), but very little research has focused on the specific relationship between *left-wing populism* and feminist politics. Most authors have focused on determining whether populist parties can promote gender equality policies and maintain good relations with women's movements.

There is an influential stream of literature that upholds that *all forms of populism*[2] (left-wing and right-wing) are incompatible with feminist politics: a stance that this thesis challenges. Advocates of the incompatibility between populism and feminist politics put forward arguments about the relationship between the two political projects, and the two dimensions analysed by this thesis: the relationship between populist governments and women's movements, and the promotion of gender equality policies by populist governments. Shea Baird and Roth (2017) refer to the "confrontational logic" that they see in the us-them rhetorical division promoted by populists. According to these authors, the populist logic implies that "the target is to destroy the enemy", a logic which they deem incompatible with the "feminization of politics" publicly advocated by left-wing populist parties such as Podemos. For her part, Kampwirth (2010) affirms that populist leaders appeal to the people as a whole, and are therefore reluctant to endorse unpopular demands, a category in which she includes feminist demands – an assertion that I challenge below. Several authors also uphold that the typically masculine and aggressive style of most populist leaders is in contradiction with feminism (Caravantes 2018; Kampwirth 2010; Meret 2015; Shea Baird and Roth 2017).

As far as government-movements relations are concerned, in the 2017 *Social Policy* special issue on the gender equality policies of the 'pink tide' Latin American governments, Blofield, Ewig and Piscopo affirm that the concentration of power in populist leaders would "block feminists' access". Regarding the promotion of gender equality policies by populist governments, Kampwirth (2010) considers that gender equality policies focus on specific issues, while populist leaders allegedly refuse to engage with specific policy demands; this leads her to affirm the incompatibility between populism and the promotion of this kind of policies. In a similar vein, Blofield,

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[2] All italics in the thesis are mine.

Ewig and Piscopo (2017, 361) uphold that the "collectivist project of populists" contradicts the "individual autonomy inherent in demands for abortion liberalization". Also regarding the promotion of gender equality policies by populist governments, Shea Baird and Roth (2017) affirm that (left-wing) populists have a restrictive view of the public sphere that leads them to invisibilize "reproductive work, gender roles or the rape culture". For the mentioned authors, populism and feminist politics are essentially incompatible political projects – according to them, populist parties *cannot* have close relations with women's movements or promote gender equality policies. The theoretical and empirical basis of the mentioned assertions on the supposed incompatibility between *all kinds of populism* and feminist politics will be challenged both in this theoretical chapter and through the analysis of the Bolivian case.

Other authors consider that some populist parties and leaders have promoted gender equality policies and maintained good relations with women's movements, implying that both political projects are compatible (e.g. Caravantes 2018; Lombardo and Kantola 2019; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015). Most of the authors who affirm that populism and feminist politics are compatible political projects have rather focused on left-wing parties (Caravantes 2018), or have conducted comparative works on right-wing and left-wing populists, both in Europe and Latin America (e.g. Lombardo and Kantola 2019; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015). It seems that ideology might be the key distinctive dimension here, with a left-wing orientation favouring the *compatibility* between populism and feminist politics. This does not imply that left-wing populist parties *always* promote gender equality policies, nor that they thoroughly implement them. It does not imply either that all left-wing populist parties maintain good relations with women's movements. Beyond the discussion of feminist politics, authors such as March (2017) have upheld that ideology is more relevant than populism per se in explaining the differences between left-wing and right-wing populists. This has led me to formulate the main research question of the thesis:

What is the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics?

I address this main research question through three secondary research questions:

SRQ1: Can left-wing populist parties promote gender equality policies?

SRQ2: How do left-wing populist parties form their policy coalitions for the formulation of gender equality policies?

SRQ3: What is the impact of institutionalised women's movements on the gender equality policy agenda of left-wing populists in power?

The present theoretical chapter of the thesis proposes a conceptual framework for the analysis of the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, proceeding in three parts. First, I investigate the concept of *left-wing populism*, drawing on three streams of literature: 1) conceptual discussions on populism, 2) literature on how populist governments form their policy coalitions, and 3) scholarship on the concept of left-wing populism. Second, the notion of *feminist politics* is

explored, focusing on two dimensions: 1) the institutionalisation of women's movements' (by which I mean the political relationship between movements and governments), and 2) the impact of institutionalised women's movements on gender policy (by which I mean the movements' capacity to promote their policy preferences). The third part of the theoretical chapter of the thesis analyses the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, which is the central theoretical issue of the thesis. I address this question in three parts: 1) I discuss whether there is a specific relationship between populism (in general) and feminist politics, 2) I analyse the inconsistency between right-wing populism and feminist politics, and 3) I analyse the complex relationship that exists between left-wing populism and feminist politics (which includes the relations that populist parties establish with women's movements and the promotion of gender policies by those parties).

1. Conceptualising left-wing populism

1.1. "Populism": a highly controversial term

"Populism" is difficult to define, both because of its theoretical complexity and also because of the intensive use that political actors make of this term with derogatory intentions, thus blurring academic discussions on the topic. Therefore, before initiating any theoretical reflection on populism I believe it will be useful to consider the preliminary warning formulated by the Argentinian philosopher Enrique Dussel (2007, 19):

> The derogatory epithet of "populism" that is used to denigrate the opponents of the Washington consensus, neoliberalism, and which refers to neo-nationalist Latin American governments […] must be ignored in social sciences.

This said, for the purposes of this thesis I consider populism to be a political construction formed by two intertwined elements: a strong and charismatic leadership (Flavia Freidenberg 2008; Laclau 2005; Moffitt and Tormey 2014), and a thin-centred ideology defined by three key features: 1) the division of the society between the elite and the people, 2) a Manichean conception in which the people is 'pure' and the elite is 'corrupt', and 3) the centrality of the popular will (Mudde 2004, 543; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 150–51). Charismatic leadership is particularly important in Latin American left-wing populism, which has led me to integrate this dimension into the conception of populism followed in the thesis. The definition of populism as a thin-centred ideology presents two advantages that make it a solid backbone for the conception of populism followed in this thesis: it allows us to conceive populist parties of different ideologies, and is useful in distinguishing populists from non-populist actors. The ideational approach proposed by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) excludes most existing parties, since they are all pluralists or elitists. According to these authors, pluralists consider that society is formed by multiple social groups – it is not sharply divided between the people and the elite –, while elitist political actors share

the people-elite divide with populists, but contrary to populists, consider that the elite is superior to the people (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 152). Thus, all political parties can be considered elitists, pluralists or populists, three mutually exclusive categories.

Before addressing the elements of the definition of populism that I propose, it is useful to briefly refer to the historical development of the concept of populism, which has received much attention from scholars for decades, both in Latin America and in Europe. A group of authors has proposed an economic definition of populism, focused on the economic policies promoted by certain Latin American populist governments. This economic stream associates populism with economic policies based on massive redistribution of wealth, with the aim of building a clientelist network between the populist leader and the people (Roberts 1995, 90), and links populism with collectivism (Mansilla 2010, 1). This economic approach to populism was challenged by the rise of populist leaders such as Alberto Fujimori in Peru or Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil in Latin America in the 1990s. They used a populist strategy to get the support they needed to implement hard-line neoliberal reforms (Panizza 2000; Weyland 2001). Indeed, the sharp contrast between the policies of import substitution, industrialization and redistribution of wealth applied by the 'classical' populist leaders that dominated Latin American politics from the 1930s to the 1960s – such as Lázaro Cárdenas (Mexico), Juan Domingo Perón (Argentina) or Getúlio Vargas (Brazil) – and the neoliberal policies implemented in the 1980s and 1990s of social cuts and opening up economies to international competition have led most contemporary authors to reject economic definitions of populism, advocating *political* conceptions instead.

Four main political conceptions of populism can be identified in the literature: populism 1) as a strategy, 2) as a style, 3) as a dimension of politics, and 4) populism as an ideology. Firstly, some authors consider that populism is a strategy (De la Torre and Peruzzotti 2008; Weyland 2001). Weyland defines populism as "a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, institutionalised support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers" (Weyland 2001, 11). Secondly, Freidenberg (2008) defines populism as a political "leadership style" in her comparative analysis of Peruvian populist leaders Álvaro Noboa and Rafael Correa. Moffitt and Tormey (2014), who also focus on leadership, consider that populism is best defined as a political style, a concept which refers to "the repertoires of performance that are used to create political relations" (Moffitt and Tormey 2014, 387). The mentioned proposals have the advantage of focusing on populist leaders, an element of populist constructions that is overlooked by ideational conceptions of populism. Charismatic leadership is a key element in many left-wing Latin American populist parties and movements such as *chavismo* in Venezuela, *peronismo* in Argentina and *evismo* in Bolivia.

A third group of authors conceive populism as a *dimension of all forms of politics*, rather than a specific political phenomenon. Within this group, Panizza (2014) considers that populism is a "political intervention", a term through which he refuses to reserve the use of the term "populism" only to certain leaders, political actors or regimes, because he believes that populism is partially present in all political contexts. This idea is closely related to Arditi's definition of populism as the "inner periphery of democracy": he affirms that populism is an inherent part of democratic politics (it is *inner* to democratic politics) but at the same time it is often seen by political actors as a challenge to the institutional norms of democracy (it belongs to the *periphery* of democratic politics) (Arditi 2011, 145–46). The most radical version of this trend towards the expansion of the concept of populism is to be found in Laclau, who affirms that politics is a synonym of populism (Laclau 2005, 195). This identification of populism and politics is far-fetched, for it limits the concept of politics too much. Fourth and lastly, a growing number of authors conceive populism as a thin-centred ideology (e.g. Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017; Mudde 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Stanley 2008); their ideational approach constitutes the backbone of the definition of populism followed in this thesis. In Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser's words, populism is "a particular set of ideas that is limited in ambition and scope" – contrary to "thick-centred" or "macro ideologies", such as socialism or conservatism, which intend to offer answers to all political issues confronted by a society (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 150).

Once I have outlined the most frequent definitions of populism, I will further develop the elements of the conception of populism followed in this thesis. As advanced above, I conceive populism as a *political project* composed of two elements: a charismatic leadership, and a thin-centred ideology defined by 1) the discursive division of the society between the elite and the people, 2) a Manichean conception in which the people are 'pure' and the elite is 'corrupt', and 3) the centrality of the popular will. The importance of leadership in populist constructions has been pointed out by Laclau (2005), who has explained how populists build up a discourse where several social demands are conceived as mutually equivalent (the "chain of equivalencies"). The failure of the established political power to fulfil those demands creates a dichotomy between the social actors that promote those demands (the people) and the power that refuses to meet them (the elite). In Laclau's conception, charismatic leadership allows populism to counter the trend of the different demands towards disaggregation (Laclau 2005, 113). Freidenberg has also underlined the importance of leadership, defining populist leadership through five features: 1) a direct and personalistic relationship between the leader and his/her followers, 2) hostility towards intermediation mechanisms, 3) emphasic put on the collective identity of individuals and their opposition to the leader's enemy, 4) an anti-parties discourse, and 5) the use of clientelism to broaden the political base (Freidenberg 2008, 2–3). For their part, Moffitt and Tormey (2014) consider that populism implies a direct appeal to 'the

people', the insistence in the existence of a crisis that needs to be quickly addressed, and bad manners. Generally, the literature defines populist leadership as strong and charismatic.

The discursive division between the elite and the people is probably the most widely accepted element when it comes to define populism. Both authors who view populism as a thin-centred ideology (e.g. Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017; Mudde 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Stanley 2008) and those who advocate other definitions (e.g. Freidenberg 2008; Laclau 2005; Moffitt and Tormey 2014; Weyland 2001) consider that all populist leaders and organisations base their discourses and their political actions on a dichotomic conception of society, which is seen as divided between the people and the elite. The people-elite opposition practiced by populist parties implies a Manichean conception of both actors: the people is presented as pure while the elite is always depicted as a corrupt entity (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 151). The people-elite division informs us about the populist character of a political actor, but it does not tell anything about the position of this actor in the Left-Right ideological spectrum. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) have highlighted, the specific ideological orientation of each populist actor is directly connected with its conception of who 'the elite' and 'the people' are.

The fourth element of the definition of populism proposed in this thesis is the centrality of the popular will, as highlighted by Mudde (2004). Echoing Rousseau, populists consider that individuals who make up a certain community are able to unify their wills. They proclaim popular sovereignty as "the only legitimate source of political power" (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 151). The centrality of the people's will in populist constructions leads many populist actors to adopt a hostile position towards check-and-balance liberal institutions such as the judiciary or the division of powers (Arditi 2011; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). Therefore, populism presents certain tensions with political pluralism, even though the importance given to the popular will by populist parties means that in some cases, populism can reinforce democratic participation and accountability (Errejón and Mouffe 2015).

1.2. How populist parties form their policy coalitions

Discussions on the definition of populism are closely connected with an incipient stream of research on policy-making when populist parties are in power, focused on cases in Europe and in Latin America – the two regions where more populist experiences have taken place, as explained by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). The main finding of this literature is that populist governments are pragmatic when forming their coalitions for policy-making: in their policy coalitions, they include social movements and other political actors that they consider to be elitist, which suggests the existence of a contradiction between the populist anti-elite discourse and populist parties' policy-making (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015; Gibson 1997; Mudde 2013;

Taggart and Kaltwasser 2016). In the present thesis, I investigate whether this pragmatic policy-making style also takes place when left-wing populists elaborategender equality policies. This is a theoretical issue placed at the intersection between literature on populist policy-making and the relationship between populism and feminist politics, which has not yet been addressed by the literature. Thus, the second secondary research question (SRQ2) of the thesis is *How do left-wing populist parties form their policy coalitions for the formulation of gender equality policies?*

Populist parties have participated in policy-making processes in two types of situation: as leaders of majority governments (mostly in Latin America), and as junior coalition partners of mainstream parties (this has been the case of most European populist radical right-wing parties that have become directly involved in policy-making). The latter situation has limited the populists' capacity to set the policy agenda (Mudde 2013, 14). In both cases, populist parties have acted "responsibly" in policy-making while keeping their radical anti-elite rhetoric. This is what Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015, 170) found in their comparative analysis of Italy's People of Freedom (PDL), Northern League (LN) and the Swiss Popular Party (SVP). In a similar vein, beginning in the 1980s, Argentinian *peronismo* and the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) promoted a U-turn in economic policy (from developmentalism with heavy state intervention to neoliberalism) while holding onto their populist rhetoric (Gibson 1997). Pragmatism has also coloured the parliamentary alliances of populist parties in Europe: populist radical right-wing forces have often reached parliamentary agreements with mainstream conservative parties – which allegedly represent the interests of the "elite" – while being responsive to the wishes of their own electoral base. This suggests that "populist parties can be discerning and sophisticated political operators, just like any other party", as Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015, 170) have expressed it.

Pragmatism is also the most frequent attitude among populists when it comes to policy coalitions: populist parties form policy-coalitions with different kinds of individuals and organisations, including political actors depicted by the populist discourse as part of the elite. In the 1980s and the 1990s, Argentinian and Mexican populist governments increasingly excluded trade unions from policy-making, replacing them with business representatives (Gibson 1997, 356–357), while left-wing Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa (2007-2017) co-opted certain sectors of the business community (Taggart and Kaltwasser 2016), even though they were supposed to belong to the abhorred elite. In other cases, populist politicians have included different kinds of actors in the same policy-coalitions: in Argentina and Mexico, both traditional politicians and newly arrived technocrats participated in the formulation of the new neoliberal policies launched beginning in the 1980s, in a sort of "marriage of convenience" (Gibson 1997, 360). Often, populist governments choose some members of their policy coalitions because of their technical expertise (Gibson 1997, 366). No research has yet analysed whether the populist pragmatism in policy-making also takes

place when it comes to elaborating gender equality policies, an issue that this thesis will address, focusing on left-wing populist parties.

1.3. Defining "left-wing populism"

Left-wing populism can be defined as a form of populism that is inclusive in its material, political and symbolic dimensions (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). This definition corresponds to the notion of "inclusionary" populism proposed by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) in their comparative work on two Latin American populist parties (the MAS and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela-PSUV) and two European ones (the French National Front and the Freedom Party of Austria). According to their typologies of inclusionary and exclusionary populism – based on Filc's (2010) analysis of the Israeli Right –, material inclusion implies that some subaltern groups are targeted to receive more state resources than the rest of the population, while material exclusion takes place when certain groups are specifically excluded from state resources (often on racist or xenophobic grounds). Regarding the political dimension, inclusion means favouring the participation and representation of traditionally discriminated groups (women and indigenous peoples, for example), while political exclusion implies that some groups are excluded from equal political participation. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser establish a distinction between inclusion and exclusion in the symbolic dimension: when populists define "the people" without referring to certain groups (discriminated ethnic minorities in the case of far-right populists, for instance), they are symbolically excluding them; by contrast, when certain groups are explicitly included in the populists' definition of "the people", this is an inclusionary construction. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013, 164-165) uses Bolivia's MAS as an example of the latter case, because the party emphasises the centrality of the traditionally discriminated against indigenous population in its conception of "the people".

The inclusionary-exclusionary distinction proposed by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) is facilitated by the ideational approach to populism adopted by these authors, and allows us to grasp the ideological difference between various populist parties, which is a valuable contribution to empirical research on populism. In this thesis I will use the terms "inclusive populism" and "left-wing populism" indistinctively, referring to the traditional Left-Right divide. While the notion of "inclusive populism" is established in the literature on populism, the "left-wing" concept allows me to connect the present thesis with literature on radical left-wing parties and the 'pink tide' that does not always adopt the theoretical framework of populism. In addition, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser themselves have used the Left-Right distinction instead of the inclusion-exclusion one in their more recent analysis of Latin American and Northern European populist parties' stances on gender (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015), which suggest that both terms are interchangeable. Generally, literature on populism

seems to be experiencing a certain 'ideological turn' – more and more authors are speaking about right-wing or left-wing populism instead of referring to populism in general.

Most research on left-wing populism focuses on Latin America (e.g. De la Torre 2003; De la Torre and Peruzzotti 2008; Dussel 2007; Flavia Freidenberg 2008; Mansilla 2010; Panizza 2008; Peruzzotti 2008; Quiroga and Pagliarone 2014), due to progressive populist parties arriving to state power in several countries in the region during the so-called 'pink tide' – a progressive political cycle that began with Hugo Chávez's first electoral victory in Venezuela in 1999 and went into its final phase in 2016, when Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff was overthrown in a doubtful impeachment process. Despite the dominance of literature on Latin American left-wing populism, the rise of left-wing populist parties in Europe after the 2008 economic crack prompted the emergence of a new stream of literature, with works focusing on European left-wing populist parties, such as Spain's Podemos (Antentas 2017; Iglesias 2015; Kioupkiolis 2016; Ramiro and Gomez 2017; Rendueles 2015; Rivero 2015), Greece's Syriza (Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis 2018; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014) and France Insoumise (Birnbaum 2017). In addition, some comparative research has been carried out on the aforementioned left-wing populist parties, together with the Italian Five Stars Movement, which revealed its right-wing orientation by making an alliance in 2018 with far-right party The League (formerly called Northern League) (e.g. Bordignon and Ceccarini 2015; Borreca 2014; Castaño 2018; Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis 2018). Literature on left-wing populism also includes theoretical research such as the works by Errejón and Mouffe (2015), and Miró Artigas (2017), who have addressed the peculiarities of left-wing populism from a Gramscian approach that is influenced by Laclau's conception of populism. Research on left-wing populism has mainly focused on the parties' discourse and communication strategies, inner organisation and electoral results, but it has not devoted much attention to the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, which is the main issue analysed in the present thesis. Before addressing the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, it is necessary to conceptualize feminist politics.

2. Feminist Politics

Feminist politics has been defined by Lombardo and Kantola (2019, 2) as "actions that aim at transforming unequal gendered power relations, norms, and practices through politicization of gender issues and empowerment of women", a definition that I follow in this thesis. For the purposes of the present research, the concept of feminist politics is operationalized through two dimensions: 1) women's movements institutionalisation (the relations between movements and governments), and 2) the impact of institutionalised women's movements on policy.

The conceptualization of feminist politics proposed by Lombardo and Kantola has two advantages that make it particularly suitable for my thesis: it is a wide definition that goes beyond gender equality policies, and it underlines the issue of "politicization", which is tightly related with women's movements – they are the most important actor in the politicization of gender issues, this is to say, the introduction of these issues in the political-institutional realm. In their work on the relationship between populism and feminist politics, Lombardo and Kantola (2019) have investigated three dimensions of feminist politics. Firstly, they have looked at descriptive and substantive representation. Descriptive representation refers to the number of women in power positions in political parties. This is a frequent issue in gender and politics literature, which has analysed the expansion of quotas as a tool to promote women's presence in institutional politics (Dahlerup 2007, 2008), and parties' resistance against this kind of mechanisms (Krook 2016). Generally, the literature has concluded that quotas are an effective way of increasing the number of women in party politics (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012), and certain research works have concluded that female legislators are more likely to defend women's rights than male ones (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017, 348). However, having more women in positions of power does not always guarantee that parties promote gender equality policies, as the literature on women's substantive representation has pointed out (Childs 2004; Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012). The promotion of gender equality policies by left-wing populist parties is one of the main issues addressed by the present thesis, whose first secondary research question (SRQ1) is *Can left-wing populist parties promote gender equality policies?* It must be specified that this thesis focuses on the agenda-setting and decision phases of the policy process, not on the implementation phase, as will be further explained. Thus, the answer to the mentioned question only refers to the formulation and promotion of policies, not to their final result.

In addition to descriptive and substantive representation, Lombardo and Kantola (2019) have investigated the parties' formal and informal gender institutions, which include internal quotas, equality plans, and the parties' institutional culture, issues that have been also addressed by other gender and politics scholars. A good example of this stream of research is Verge (2010), who has analysed how sexist informal rules within parties impact on candidate selection processes, partially hampering the efficacity of quotas. For their part, Franceschet and Piscopo (2014) have explained how informal gendered power networks can remain untouched despite the implementation of quotas. The third and last dimension of feminist politics investigated by Lombardo and Kantola (2019) are the parties' spaces that are specifically devoted to gender, such as departments dedicated to the formulation and proposal of gender equality policies, and women-only bodies within parties (Childs and Kittilson 2016; Kantola 2019).

The aim of Lombardo and Kantola (2019) was to investigate the relationship between populism (in general) and feminist politics, while mine is to analyse the specific

relationship between *left-wing* populist parties and feminist politics. That is why I propose a different operationalization of feminist politics, focusing on two dimensions: 1) *women's movements institutionalisation* (a concept that refers to the relationship between movements and governments), and 2) *the impact of institutionalised women's movements on policy*. These are the most relevant dimensions to analyse the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, for two reasons. First, literature suggests that *left-wing parties* (in general) tend to keep better relations with women's movements than right-wing ones, supporting their agenda more than right-wing populists (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Mazur 2002; McBride and Mazur 2010; Valiente 2003), which invites to investigate in detail the relations between *left-wing populist parties* and women's movements. Second, the promotion, if any, of gender equality policies is the most controversial question in existing literature on populism and feminist politics (e.g. Kampwirth 2010; Lombardo and Kantola 2017) – as I explain below – , and is tightly related with the issue of movements-parties relations. Therefore, it is key to investigate whether institutionalised women's movements impact gender equality policies when left-wing populist parties are in government, which I do through the third secondary research question (SRQ3) of the thesis: *What is the impact of institutionalised women's movements on the gender equality policy agenda of left-wing populists in power?*

2.1. The institutionalisation of women's movements

Institutionalisation has been defined as "a process of social movements traversing the official terrain of formal politics and engaging with authoritative institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, the state, and political parties to enhance their collective ability to achieve the movement's goals" (Suh 2011a, 443). This definition is followed in the present thesis, for three reasons. First, it underlines that institutionalisation is a *process*, and thus can be composed of different events or sub-processes that take place at different moments. Second, the chosen definition specifies that movements can establish relations with different "authoritative institutions" such as parliaments, not only with governments. In addition, Suh's definition conceives institutionalisation as a process that is intentionally initiated by movements *with the aim of achieving their goals*, which establishes a connection between movements' institutionalisation and movements' impact on policy that is key for this thesis – one of the analysed issues is whether institutionalised women's movements impact policy when left-wing populist parties are in government (SRQ3). Besides, it is necessary to distinguish institutionalisation from co-optation, which is the processes through which "the government (the co-opting body) embraces a movement in order to uphold its own legitimacy and authority and to avert threats to its stability" (Suh 2011b, 443). When co-optation takes place, the state accepts the participation of movements in policy-making, but the policy does not match the movements' demands (Álvarez 1990).

One of the most important questions in social movements studies are the risks and positive effects of institutionalisation for movements, an issue analysed by many authors and which is highly relevant for this thesis. Despite the usefulness of this literature, far-fetched generalizations should be avoided, because institutionalisation processes take very different forms depending on the kind of institution involved (Katzenstein 1998, 211–12), and the factors that explain institutionalisation vary greatly depending on the kind of movement, the historical moment and the socio-political environment (Suh 2011, 447). Also, Suh has pointed out in her study about Korean women's movements that the state can be at the same time an ally and a target for movements (Suh 2011, 445).

The literature has identified four major risks of institutionalisation processes for social movements. First of all, division (Horton 2015, 84): when a sector of a movement gains access to mainstream political institutions, the rest of the movement can consider that the institutionalised activists have "abandoned" them, while the former can see non-institutionalised members as "unnecessary baggage" (Meyer 2007, 131). The second risk is lack of representativeness of the movement as a whole by the "institutionalised" movement members – according to Haas, this was the case of the United States women's movement, whose members who worked for the government "were overwhelmingly upper middle class, educated, and White", while the whole movement was much more diverse (Haas 2011, 886). The third risk is that movements can lose their economic independence when they undergo a process of institutionalisation. Consequently, being set aside by formerly supportive institutions can be a hard blow for movements, as it happened to the Italian peace movement in relation to the Communist Party (Ruzza 1997, 13–14). Lastly, several authors have warned about the risk of depoliticization of the movements' demands: once an issue has been inserted in an institutional path, "the bureaucratic nature of the state regulates its treatment" (Ruzza 1997, 115). This has often implied the softening of the political or critical character of demands, as it happened in the case of the feminist struggle against rape in the US, as explained by Bush (1992, 599).

Social movements scholars have also identified four positive effects that institutionalisation processes can entail for movements. First, Ruzza upholds that institutionalisation multiplies the likeliness of organisational survival once the peak of mobilisation has passed – his study of the Italian peace movement showed that the social movement organisations[3] (SMOs) that had the tightest links with institutionalised organisations had the longest life (Ruzza 1997, 117). Second, the presence of social movement activists in state institutions allegedly allow them to seize political opportunities that are not available outside the institutional sphere, as Banaszak (2009) deduced from her interviews with American feminist activists working in government. A third possible positive effect of institutionalisation is the capacity of a

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[3] It is necessary to remind the distinction between "social movement" and "social movement organisation" (SMO) formulated by Della Porta and Diani (2009, 137), who underline that a social movement can be composed of different autonomous organisations.

small number of activists to exert significant influence on policy due to their key position in the state bureaucracy (Banaszak 2009). More generally, Suh considers that institutionalised movements have a higher capacity of obtaining "stable and influential policies that respond to movement goals" (Suh 2011, 444), which would be a fourth positive consequence of institutionalisation processes. The analysis of the impact on gender equality policies of institutionalisation women's movements when left-wing populist parties are in government performed in this thesis is tightly connected with the mentioned discussions.

In addition to investigating the negative and positive effects of institutionalisation for movements, social movement scholars have proposed typologies to describe the specific forms that institutionalisation processes take. Álvarez (1990, 9–10) has conceptualized four kinds of movement-government relations, focusing on whether the government accepts the movement's participation in policy-making, and if the policy responds to the movement's aims: 1) dual response (the movement is included in policy-making processes and the policy responds to its goals), 2) co-optation (the movement can participate in policy-making but its demands are not included in the policy), 3) pre-emption (the movement's demands are included in the policy, but the movement is not admitted in its process of formulation), and 4) no response (the movement is excluded from policy-making and its demands are not accepted). Álvarez's typology has the advantage of considering two dimensions that must be separately considered: participation in policy-making processes and impact on policy. However, Álvarez's classification is quite schematic, and it does not allow to grasp all the specific forms that institutionalisation can take.

For his part, Hanagan (1998) has proposed a typology composed of five kinds of relations between social movements and parties: 1) articulation (social movements are organised around the party program and support the party's political aims by mobilising the population, 2) permeation (movements are "loyal" to the party and they routinely exert influence within the party structures), 3) alliances (movements negotiate ad hoc alliances with parties on certain issues, but they keep their separate organisation and autonomy), 4) independence (movements are independent from parties, and they pressure them from outside), and 5) competition (in this case, social movements create political parties that compete with existing ones). Hanagan's classification provides interesting insights on how social movements and parties can relate, but it lacks from a detailed description of which forms this relationship can take.

By contrast, Meyer's (2007) classification focuses on the specific forms of institutionalisation, which has led me to follow this typology in the present thesis. Meyer considers the following forms of institutionalisation: 1) policymakers' consultation with representatives of movements; 2) offering of platforms to express the movements'; 3) creation of agencies devoted to dealing with the movements' demands; 4) funding services provided by social movements; 5) use of the rhetoric of social movements by officials; and 6) inclusion of movement actors within deliberative

processes (Meyer 2007, 126–129). An extra form of institutionalisation is included in the conceptual framework of the thesis to complement Meyer's typology: the appointment of social movement members to official positions, identified by Ruzza (1997, 113).

Regarding women's movements, it is necessary to establish a distinction between women's movements and feminist movements, as proposed by Outshoorn (2010): all *women's movements* "claim to represent women, [but] *feminist ones* also hold that there is something wrong with the status of women and challenge gender hierarchies and women's subordination". All movements explored in this thesis are women's movements but not all of them have always advocated a wholly coherent feminist agenda. Thus, for the sake of rigor, I prioritize the term "women's movements" rather than "feminist movements".

Institutionalisation of women's movements has been a frequent process in different regions of the world (Suh 2011b, 453), especially during the 1990s, when gender issues obtained growing attention from United Nations – the 1995 Beijing summit was the key event in this process. Women's organisations in the global South received abundant development funds and they increasingly oriented their action towards internationally-set gender equality targets rather than activism devoted to improve women's daily lives in their countries (Bastian Duarte 2012; Vargas 2002). Women's movements institutionalisation also implied the appointment of numerous feminist activists to state agencies created to promote gender equality. These 'femocrats' ("feminists-turned-bureaucrats") have an unstable and contradictory identity, because they find themselves in an intermediary terrain between "the rules and norms of institutional politics" and "the values and demands of movement[s]", as explained by Suh (2011, 444), who consider that femocrats tend to feel closer to the institution than to the movements.

2.2. The impact of institutionalised women's movement on policy

The second dimension of feminist politics analysed by this thesis is the impact of institutionalised women's movements on gender equality policies, an issue that has been explored in extent by literature (Banaszak 2009; Beckwith 2011; Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Haussman and Sauer 2007; Horton 2015; Suh 2011b, 2014). I follow Thoening's concept of policy: "A public policy is a programme of action specific to one or more public or governmental authorities within a sector of society or a given area" (Thoenig 1985, 6). More specifically, "gender equality policies" are conceived in the present research as all public policies that aim the improvement of women's social situation. This broad definition has the advantage of including all fields of public policies (education, health, economy, political participation, violence…), while excluding women-related policies that do not have the aim of improving women's lives or protecting their rights. It must be noted that one key achievement of 20th century feminism was the expansion of the boundaries of what is considered as the public

sphere, including in political discussion and policy-making processes previously excluded issues, such as reproductive and sexual rights and the repartition of care work between men, women and the state (Verloo and Lombardo 2007, 28).

Literature on the impact of institutionalised women's movements on policy suggests that this is a very contextual issue: impact depends "on a variety of combinations of favourable conditions that vary across policy areas, countries, and even by case" (McBride and Mazur 2010, 243). This assertion is a useful warning against the temptation of trying to identify direct and universal causal relations between specific factors and the impact of women's movements on policy. However, there is a consensus in the literature about at least two factors that often *facilitate* women's movements impact on policy: a high degree of institutionalisation (Banaszak 2009; Beckwith 2011; Suh 2011a), and a left-wing government (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Mazur 2002; McBride and Mazur 2010, 259; Valiente 2003). One of the questions investigated by the present thesis is whether left-wing populist parties can promote gender equality policies (SRQ1). Insofar as these parties have a left-wing ideology, I expect them to have a favourable position towards the promotion of gender equality policies, particularly when institutionalised women's movements pressure those parties.

Literature on social movements and women's movements outcomes is less developed than research on other related topics, such as social movements' mobilisation and development processes (Stearns and Almeida 2004, 496). One of the reasons for this imbalance is probably that the study of social movements' outcomes presents two epistemological difficulties (Amenta and Young 1999; Béland 2007; Bush 1992b; Giugni 1999; Kriesi et al. 1995; Suh 2011b, 2014; Tilly 1999). First, the problem of causality, which is "the difficulty of assessing the extent to which the movement has contributed to producing a certain effect" (Kriesi et al. 1995, 207–8). Second, the difficulty of defining and measuring social movements success, impacts or outcomes – the lack of consensus about the most convenient term to name the movements' effects is related with this epistemological problem. Kriesi et al. have convincingly argued that the terms "impact" and "outcome" are "more neutral and more encompassing that the notion of success" because they do not have the subjective component of "success" (Kriesi et al. 1995, 211). Thus, the notions of "impact" and "outcome" are indistinctly used in this thesis to denominate the effect of movements' actions on policy.

Despite the mentioned difficulties, literature on social movements' outcomes includes two key insights for this thesis: methods to identify the movements' impacts on policy, and typologies of outcomes. Several authors have proposed different methods to identify the movements' policy impacts. The so-called "collective goods criterion" proposed by Amenta and Young (1999, 25) takes into account both the proclaimed policy aims of movements and the unintended impacts of their actions. By contrast, authors such as Gamson (1975), Burstein et al. (1995) exclusively focus on the stated aims of movements: they look at their demands and investigate how many of them have been met by the government. The latter method is followed in the present thesis,

because it allows to focus on the "specific ends of collective action", as explained by Amenta and Young (1999, 26).

The second relevant input for this thesis of literature on social movements' outcomes is classifications of outcomes. Social movements can impact several dimensions of the political realm, such as public opinion and collective consciousness (Gelb and Hart 1999; Giugni 1998; Kriesi et al. 1995), the structure of political opportunities (Kitschelt 1986), social movements themselves (Kriesi et al. 1995), and policy (Gamson 1975; Giugni and Yamasaki 2009; Silva 2015). In the specific terrain of *policy* impacts, several scholars have established a distinction between direct and indirect impacts (Giugni 2004; Giugni and Yamasaki 2009; Jenkins and Klandermans 1995; Silva 2015). According to Silva's typology, social movements provoke *direct* policy impacts when policies reflect movements' "explicit demands", while he denominates *indirect* impacts the "outcomes in which they [movements] influence allies or public opinion and these then independently influence outcomes" (Silva 2015, 32–33). Giugni (2004) proposes a similar classification, which differentiates between direct-effect, indirect-effect and joint-effect of the movements' actions.

Furthermore, Kitschelt has established a distinction between "substantive" impacts ("changes of policy in response to protest") and "procedural" impacts (those which "open new channels of participation to protest actors and involve their recognition as legitimate representatives of demands"). A third kind of impact conceptualized by Kriesi et al. (1995) can be added: the "sensitizing impacts", defined as "the possibility that a movement will provoke a sensitizing of some social actor in the political arena or in the public arena". Drawing on the mentioned literature, for the purposes of my thesis I distinguish between impact on the substantive, symbolic and mixed dimensions of a public policy. I consider that the *substantive dimension* is the ensemble of governmental decisions that directly address the material demands of a women's movement. The *symbolic dimension* refers to the decisions whose aim is to improve the social image of the group represented by the women's movement (e.g. domestic workers or indigenous women). The *mixed dimension* refers to those governmental decisions where the symbolic and substantive dimensions are deeply embedded.

3. Left-wing populist parties and feminist politics

This thesis investigates the relationship between left-wing populist parties and feminist politics. I argue that both political projects are compatible in two senses. First, left-wing populist parties can promote gender equality policies. Second, they can establish good relations with women's movements. As advanced above, none of these statements necessarily imply a thoroughly *implementation* of gender equality policies. Several authors have explored the relationship between populism and feminist politics, but most works on this issue focus on right-wing populism. Research on the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics remains scarce, and this thesis contributes to fill that gap. This section proceeds in three parts. First, I address the literature that investigates the relationship between populism in general and

feminist politics. Afterwards, I explain the research that focuses on the relationship between right-wing populism and feminist politics. In the last part of the chapter, I look at the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, which is the core theoretical issue of this thesis.

3.1. Is there a specific relationship between populism and feminist politics?

One of the most frequently addressed issues on the relationship between *populism in general* and feminist politics is the populist political style. The most extensive work on this topic is Kampwirth-edited *Passionate Politics* (Kampwirth 2010), a volume that analyses the articulations between populism and gender in various Latin American countries at different moments of the 20th and 21st centuries. The book includes cases of both left-wing and right-wing populist leaders, parties and governments. Some of the analysed cases are Mexican presidents Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) and Luis Echevarría (1970-1976), Ecuador's José María Velasco Ibarra (several terms between 1934 and 1972) and Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1997), Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega (1979-1990 and current president), Brazil's Getúlio Vargas (two different periods between 1934 and 1954) and Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), Argentinian Juan Perón (several periods 1946-1974) and the left-wing peronista Montonero movement, Peru's Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), Bolivia's Evo Morales (2006-now), and Venezuela's Hugo Chávez (1999-2013). The main strength of the book is providing a detailed description of the relationship between the mentioned leaders and their political movements with several dimensions of feminist politics, namely policy, discourse and relations with women's movements. However, extremely different cases are mixed up: left-wing and right-wing leaders, dictators and democratically elected presidents, from countries all over Latin America are analysed, with a time framework of more than eight decades. These methodological limitations recommend caution towards the arguments on the relationship between populism and feminist politics proposed in *Passionate Politics*, which nonetheless are worthy reviewing.

Kampwirth (2010) affirms that there is a general contradiction between populism and feminist politics, because populist leaders deliberately project a very masculine image. This is Kampwirth's most solid finding, which is confirmed by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) for the cases of the PSUV and the MAS: according to the mentioned authors, "populism in South America is characterized by a machismo discourse" (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015, 33). For her part, Caravantes (2018) has investigated the political discourse and practices of the Spanish left-wing populist party Podemos, whose leaders have often claimed their aim to "feminize politics", a process that has been defined as moving "away from a dominant masculine party culture and the exercising of power that accentuates hierarchy, confrontation, and imposition" (Caravantes 2018, 4). However, the analysis of Podemos' leaders' discourse revealed the existence of a competitive rationale that connects with the hegemonic social views

on masculinity, which Caravantes links with the party's populist ideology. More exactly, she identified an emphasis on wining related to an aggressive strategy, hard internal confrontations, a clear hierarchy based on intellectual authority, and a charismatic masculine leadership – charismatic leadership is considered by Freidenberg (2008) and Laclau (2005) as a distinctive feature of populism, a perspective that I share.

The populist people versus elite discourse is considered contradictory with feminist politics by Shea Baird and Roth (2017): these authors consider that the very rhetorical opposition between 'us' and 'them' is contradictory with the so-called "feminization of politics" proposed by Podemos, which according to Shea Baird and Roth demands an "inclusive discourse". According to Shea Baird and Roth, left-wing populists propose a "confrontational logic where the target is to destroy the enemy". However, this contention can be challenged through Mouffe's concept of "agonism" (Errejón and Mouffe 2015). Mouffe explains how left-wing populism replaces "antagonism" with "agonism", which implies that the aim is not to *destroy* political rivals but to *democratically defeat* them.

In their comparative work on far-right The Finns and Spanish Podemos (two European populist parties), Lombardo and Kantola (2019) have found that masculine norms and practices (informal gender institutions) were hegemonic in both populist parties. In the case of Podemos, this masculine 'ethos' (Caravantes 2018) manifested in resistance from party leaders when women proposed themselves as candidates, derision of women's political ambitions, the importance of male informal networks in decision-making processes such as drawing up electoral lists, and a very aggressive and confrontational leadership style (Lombardo and Kantola 2019, 12–13). These failures have led authors such as Medina (2016) to call for the "depatriarchalisation" of Podemos, using a concept initially formulated by Bolivian feminist activists (e.g. Coordinadora de la Mujer 2012; Galindo 2013). For her part, Rodríguez Palop (2016) has affirmed that the "feminization of politics" proposed by certain Podemos' activists should imply not only a transformation in discourse and policies, but also the revalorisation of care work. At first sight, the existence of patriarchal informal institutions in both The Finns and Podemos could suggest that this feature is directly linked to populism, but literature has found these informal institutions in non-populist parties as well (Waylen 2014). According to existing literature it seems far-fetched to affirm that patriarchal informal institutions are a *distinctive* feature of populist parties. Existing research has not been able to convincingly find a specific relationship between populism (in general) and feminist politics. That is why more and more authors have focused either on right-wing or left-wing populism, as I explain in the following subsections.

3.2. Right-wing populism and feminist politics: an essential contradiction

As far as *right-wing* populism is concerned, research has found an incompatibility with feminist politics on the two dimensions of feminist politics analysed by the present thesis: women's movements' institutionalisation (the relations between movements and governments), and the impact of institutionalised women's movements on gender equality policies. Gender-related issues are receiving growing attention from European populist radical right parties such as the Norwegian Progress Party and the Dutch List Pim Fortuy, which have traditionally focused on (opposition to) immigration and cultural diversity. However, this interest in gender does not imply a feminist turn of these parties, but rather a manipulation of feminism for the sake of their anti-migrants agenda (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007). This trend has become widespread in Europe, as shown by Akkerman's comparative analysis of the positions of the six most successful populist radical right parties in Western Europe on gender equality since the 1990s (Akkerman 2015). The increasingly frequent scapegoating of migrants and minorities – particularly Muslims – in the name of women's and LGBTI rights by right-wing and far-right populist parties has been conceptualized by Farris as 'femonationalism' (Farris 2017). Some of the most frequent manifestations of this reactionary current are the attention devoted by populist radical right parties to issues such as the veil, honour killings and genital mutilation (Lange and Mügge 2015, 79), instead of focusing on the most frequent forms of gender inequality in Europe.

If we look at the proposals of populist radical right parties on gender, in general they oscillate between neoliberalism, conservatism and blatant anti-feminism (Akkerman 2015; Lange and Mügge 2015; Lombardo and Kantola 2019). According to Lange and Mudde's analysis of Dutch and Flemish populist parties' stances on gender since the 1980s, one common element of their programs is the absence of references to men or masculinity, which the authors interpret as a view where "men are the norm" (Lange and Mügge 2015). For their part, Lombardo and Kantola have found that The Finns presented a very conservative approach to gender, focused on the traditional family (Lombardo and Kantola 2019, 7). Besides, populist radical right parties have a gendered political discourse (Norocel 2013), and their electorate is mostly male (Betz 1994; Givens 2004; Harteveld et al. 2015; Norris 2005; Spierings et al. 2015).

Most right-wing populist parties are led by charismatic and strong male leaders, a feature shared with populist parties of other ideologies (Freidenberg 2008; Moffitt and Tormey 2014). There have also been important female radical right populist leaders in Europe, who have often combined features of leadership traditionally linked to masculinity – such as authoritarianism – with a motherly style (Meret 2015), in a way that reinforces patriarchal stereotypes. Some populist radical right parties have specific spaces devoted to women but they are often powerless: according to Lombardo and Kantola's research, The Finns Women (the far-right party's women's

body) is a powerless structure which does not represent any challenge to the patriarchal inner structure and policy proposals of the far-right party (Lombardo and Kantola 2019, 15–17). The relationship between populist radical right parties and feminist movements has not received much attention from literature, but it seems logical to expect a conflictual relationship between both kinds of actors, considering the hostility of most radical right parties towards gender equality policies. In a nutshell, literature suggests that right-wing populism is essentially at odds with feminist politics, a conclusion that cannot be automatically applied to left-wing populist parties. The relationship between left-wing populist parties and feminist politics is a scarcely explored issue that this thesis investigates.

3.3. The complex relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics

One of the most frequently dimensions of the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics analysed by literature is descriptive representation. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) addressed this question in their comparative research on the relationship between populism and gender in Northern Europe and South America, focused on Netherlands' Party of Freedom and Danish People's Party, on the one hand, and Venezuela's PSUV and Bolivia's MAS, on the other hand. They reached the conclusion that the PSUV and the MAS made considerable efforts to improve women's presence in politics, contrary to the analysed European populist right-wing parties. Similarly, Lombardo and Kantola (2019) have found that left-wing Podemos made substantial efforts to increase the number of women in parliament, and introduced ambitious measures to promote gender equality within the party, namely gender quotas and equality plans (Lombardo and Kantola 2019, 10).

Also regarding descriptive representation, the literature has highlighted the legislative efforts made by left-wing populist governments in Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia to promote parity in political participation in those countries (Albaine 2015a; Archenti and Albaine 2013a; Benavente, Cristina, and Valdés 2014; Cabezas Fernández 2014a; Ewig 2018; Rousseau and Ewig 2017; Sotillo 2012). As a consequence of these efforts, Bolivia has become the second country in the world with the highest percentage of women in Parliament, over 50 percent. In addition, Bolivian governments in 2010 and 2011 included 50 percent of women, a percentage that declined in the following years (Rousseau and Ewig 2017, 440). In Ecuador, the Constituent Assembly that elaborated the 2007 Constitution was elected following the rule of parity and men-women alternation in electoral lists, and the Ecuadorian constitution was the first in Latin America to establish parity in all electoral processes (Rousseau and Ewig 2017, 436). From an intersectional point of view (Crenshaw 1991; Ferree 2009; King 1988; La Barbera 2009), the Bolivian 2009 Constitution was paramount, because it jointly addressed women's and indigenous people's right to political participation (Rousseau and Ewig 2017, 437). In Venezuela, between 1999 and 2010 most of the state powers

were led by women, with the key exception of the executive power, and the number of female ministers dramatically increased beginning with Hugo Chávez's first electoral victory in 1999 (Sotillo 2012, 324). However, gender parity in electoral lists was not introduced.

Another key dimension explored by literature is the positions of left-wing populist parties on women's substantive representation, a concept that allows to investigate whether these parties promote gender equality policies, which is one of the issues addressed by this thesis (SRQ1). Literature on left-wing populist parties has shown that these organisations promote social-democratic or Keynesian policies of economic redistribution, and are progressive on social issues, but few works have investigated whether these parties promote gender equality policies (Friedman 2009; Kampwirth 2010; Lombardo and Kantola 2019; March 2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015; Shea Baird and Roth 2017; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014).

In an article on Podemos, Shea Baird and Roth (2017) affirmed that left-wing populists have a restrictive view of the public sphere, which according to these authors implies the "invisibilization of reproductive work, gender roles or the rape culture", a very general affirmation that is contradictory with the empirical analysis that I explain below. In relation to sexual and reproductive rights, Blofield, Ewig and Piscopo (2017) have affirmed that "the individual autonomy inherent in demands for abortion liberalization contradicts the collectivist project of populists". This is a good example of an inaccurate use of the notion of populism in relation to feminist politics, because it suggests a contradiction between populism and individual rights without any empirical evidence. In fact, the same authors explain that Latin American left-wing populist governments put abortion liberalization in the policy agenda for the first time (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017, 361) – even though women's sexual and reproductive rights are still severely limited in most Latin American countries, including those that had left-wing populist governments during the 'pink tide'.

For her part, Kampwirth (2010) affirms that gender equality policies focus on specific issues, while populist leaders refuse to engage with specific policy demands. Kampwirth's position can be challenged in two ways: first of all, the idea that gender equality policies are sectorial is highly questionable – many feminist reforms such as the reorganisation of care work within society or the promotion of egalitarian education have a broad impact on society that goes beyond women's specific interests. In addition, Kampwirth herself affirms that at least certain leaders analysed in *Passionate Politics* (Kampwirth 2010) promoted gender equality policies (for instance, Evo Morales and Juan Perón, who granted the right to vote to women for the first time in Argentina), which challenges the idea of a contradiction between populism and gender equality policies. Besides, Kampwirth affirms that populism and feminist politics are incompatible because populist leaders appeal the whole people, and

therefore they are reluctant to endorse unpopular demands, such as feminist ones [sic]. This contention implies that feminist demands are necessarily unpopular, which is particularly dubious now, when feminist movements are gathering mass support around the world, and specially in Latin America. The negative view of the mentioned authors on the promotion of gender equality policies by left-wing populists is confirmed in the case of Nicaragua, where Daniel Ortega's supposedly Sandinista government has firmly opposed gender equality policies (Heumann 2014).

However, research on gender equality policies during the 'pink tide' shows that in several Latin American countries left-wing legislators (many of whom belonged to populist parties) promoted progressive laws on gender equality. According to the aforementioned comparative research carried out by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) on right-wing and left-wing populist parties, PSUV government in Venezuela and the MAS government in Bolivia promoted policies that "aim to guarantee women autonomy and equality" (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015, 29). For instance, the pension law promoted by the MAS in 2010 included specific measures to palliate the gender gap in old-age pensions (Ewig 2018). Research has also highlighted 'pink tide' governments' progressive policies on LGTBI rights (Tabbush et al. 2016), women's labour rights (Guevara Duque 2014a), economic autonomy of women (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Guzmán and Montaño 2012), gender inequalities in taxation (Benavente R. and Valdés B. 2014), domestic workers' rights (Blofield 2012; Guzmán and Montaño 2012), and prevention of gender-based domestic violence (Guevara Duque 2014a; Kampwirth 2011a; Reis 2007a). In addition, indigenous women's rights "were placed on the agenda for the first time during the pink tide", according to Blofield, Ewig and Piscopo (2017, 349–50).

Regarding sexual and reproductive rights, the balance is contradictory. Several 'pink tide' governments took measures to improve sexual and reproductive health (Kulczycki 2011a), but right to abortion has been identified by literature as one of the topics in which the legal progress has been insufficient under 'pink tide' governments. There have been important changes such as the improvement of access to contraceptives in Michelle Bachelet's Chile and Rafael Correa's Ecuador (Guevara Duque 2014b; Ríos Tobar 2007), but in 2017 most abortions are still considered criminalized in most countries of Latin America (Kulczycki 2011b), and some of the 'pink tide' leaders, such as Ecuador's Rafael Correa and Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega, have firmly oppose the right to abortion (Kampwirth 2011b).

Beyond the specific issue of sexual and reproductive rights, literature has identified certain general limitations of the promotion of gender equality policies by 'pink tide' governments. The opposition of conservative parties and churches seems to be the most important obstacle to the deployment of a gender equality policy agenda. For instance, in Chile, president Michelle Bachelet intended to put gender equality at the

centre of the policy agenda, but her alliance with the Christian Democratic Party limited the scope of the reforms (Ríos Tobar, 2007, 29). In Bolivia, conservative opposition put pressure on Evo Morales' government until he dropped his proposal to partially decriminalise abortion, as I explain below. Where legislation has been passed, the insufficiency of institutional mechanisms to implement policy has been a common problem. As pointed out by Benavente et al. (2014, 118-122), lack of administrative resources for implementation and evaluation of the impacts of policies have been frequent shortcomings in several 'pink tide' countries (Benavente et al. 2014, 118–122). The relative weakness of women-related machineries has also been pointed out by Rodríguez Gustá et al. (2017).

Another limitation of the 'pink tide' policy agenda on gender equality has been the incomplete introduction of intersectionality in policies. The adoption of an intersectional perspective by policy-makers is a growing demand of women's organisations, particularly in countries with salient ethnic diversity. This is the case of Bolivia, where most of the population is indigenous, and Brazil, where almost half of the population is black. Reis investigated a sample of the policies put in place by Luiz Inácio "Lula" Da Silva's during his first term in government in Brazil, and she reached the conclusion that Da Silva's government failed to sufficiently introduce the intersectional perspective in policies on education, poverty and violence against women (Reis 2007b). The limited introduction of the intersectional approach has also been a common shortcoming of Latin American policies on violence against women in politics, as explained in Chapter 4.

In her comparative work on gender policies in Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Venezuela, Friedmand (2009) affirmed that (both populist and non-populist) left-wing governments in Latin America improved "women's status and inclusion" but "the transformation of gender and sexual power relations remains unfinished". This seems a balanced synthesis of the general situation of gender equality policies after the 'pink tide' period. Policies on gender equality promoted by the MAS are explained in detail in Chapter 3, focused on the case study.

Research on the gender equality policies promoted by European left-wing populist parties is much scarcer, but some key findings can be identified. In Greece, Syriza has consistently defended gender equality and LGBTI rights (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014, 132). According to Stravrakakis and Katsambekis' analysis, Syriza's populism implies viewing the people as a "plural, inclusive and active subject unbound by ethnic, racial, sexual, gender or other restrictions" (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014, 135). In a similar vein, France Insoumise's left-wing populist leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon was considered as "the most deeply feminist" among the main candidates to the 2017 presidential election (Lorriaux 2017), and the left-wing populist Scottish Socialist Party has been found to devote much attention to women and LGBTI people (March 2017,

294–95). A comparative work on left-wing and right-wing European populist parties based on qualitative analysis of manifestos, speeches, and published statements of party leaders reached the conclusion that Spain's Podemos presents "a clear radical left-libertarian universalistic profile advocating minority rights, gender equality and civic liberties" (Ivaldi, Lanzone, and Woods 2017, 13). One of the manifestations of Podemos' engagement with gender equality policies are its "plans of reconciliation, work and family life, and family-care leave", as explained by Lombado and Kantola (2019, 11).

In a nutshell, most of the existing literature on Latin American and European left-wing populist parties suggests that these parties can promote gender equality policies, which I will investigate in this thesis (SRQ1). I say "can" because the existent research does not suggest that left-wing populist parties *always* promote this kind of policies, but shows that many of them have done it. Therefore, according to the existing literature there is not a direct correlation between having a populist left-wing ideology and promoting gender equality policies, but both are compatible. This challenges research that upholds the existence of an incompatibility between all kinds of populist parties and feminist politics, as explained above.

In addition to the promotion of gender equality policies, there is a lack of research on the relationship of left-wing populist parties with women's movements, which this thesis contributes to fill by investigating the impact of institutionalised women's movements on policy when left-wing populist parties are in government (SRQ3). Several authors have analysed the relationship between left-wing populist parties and social movements (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013; Jenkins and Klandermans 1995; PeruCultural 2014; Quiroga and Pagliarone 2014; Tapia 2009; Webber 2011), but very little research has focused on the relationship between left-wing populist parties and women's movements. One exception is the aforementioned article by Blofield, Ewig and Piscopo (2017), which is part of a special issue on the gender equality policies of the Latin American 'pink tide'. In that article, the mentioned authors affirm that "the personalist centralization of political authority under one leader in populist left governments typically blocks feminists' access" (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017, 361). This assertion is contradictory with the empirical analysis carried out in the special issue, which shows the considerable advance in gender equality policies experienced by countries government by populist left-wing governments during the 'pink tide', as explained above – even though severe pitfalls in the promotion and implementation of policies are also identified. In addition, the affirmation about the blocking of feminist movements' access by populism only stands because Bolivia is not qualified as populist in the special issue (Rodríguez Gustá, Madera, and Caminotti 2017), a dubious epistemological choice that counters the bulk of research on the topic. Very few specific references to movement-government relations can be found in the mentioned works on left-wing populism and feminist politics: Lombardo and Kantola have found

out that Podemos had connections with "the autonomous feminist movement" (Lombardo and Kantola 2019, 10), while Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser have underlined the "influence of feminist movements" on Morales' government in Bolivia (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015, 34). The present thesis will investigate in depth the relationship between women's movements and left-wing populist parties when the latter are in government.

In conclusion, the analysis of the existent literature on *the relationship of left-wing populist parties and feminist politics* suggests that these parties share with other populist and non-populist parties a patriarchal culture – which does not seem to be a distinctive feature of these parties. In addition, research suggests that left-wing populist parties can promote gender equality policies and keep good relations with women's movements, but it does not always happen. The relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics seems to be complex, and there is a lack of research on the issue. This thesis intends to contribute to this scarce literature by improving the available knowledge about the complex relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics.

4. Research questions

Based on the theoretical framework, this thesis investigates the following main research question (MRQ): *What is the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics*

The MRQ is addressed through three secondary research questions:

SRQ1: Can left-wing populist parties promote gender equality policies?

SRQ2: How do left-wing populist parties form their policy coalitions for the formulation of gender equality policies?

SRQ3: What is the impact of institutionalised women's movements on the gender equality policy agenda of left-wing populists in power?

Chapter 2. Research Design, Case Selection and Methodology

1. Research design and case selection

The thesis adopts a single-case research design focused on Bolivia between 2006 and 2018, the first 12 years of left-wing populist and indigenist Movement for Socialism (the MAS) and president Evo Morales in power. Insofar as the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics is an understudied topic, a single-case investigation is particularly convenient, because this kind of research design provide a "idiographic insight", as explained by Lange (2012, 16). The aim of this thesis is not to establish a direct and general causal relationship between left-wing populist ideology and feminist politics, but improving our knowledge about the complex relationship that exist between both political projects, which will constitute a contribution both to literature on populism and research on feminist politics. As it will be explained throughout the thesis, Bolivia is a "paradigmatic" (Flyvbjerg 2006) case of a left-wing populist government that has promoted ambitious gender equality policies and has kept relatively good relations with women's movements. It is no coincide that Evo Morales' government is often cited both as an example of left-wing populism and as an executive that has promoted ambitious gender equality policies on several fields, such as violence against women in politics (e.g. Albaine 2017; Freidenberg and Del Valle Pérez 2017; Krook 2017), gender equality in political participation, domestic workers' rights (e.g. Blofield 2012; Peredo Beltrán 2015), and gender-based domestic violence (CEPAL 2015). In addition, the left-wing populist ideology of the MAS and Evo Morales has been undoubtedly established by literature (e.g. De la Torre 2003, 2013; De la Torre and Peruzzotti 2008; Espasandín López and Iglesias Turrión 2007; Kampwirth 2010; Linera 2006; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017).

Therefore, when I carried out the preliminary research to identify the most pertinent case(s) to investigate the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, I reached the conclusion that Evo Morales' Bolivia is the only case where a clearly left-wing populist government promoted an ambitious agenda on gender policies for a long time, as explained in detail in the following chapter of the thesis. Other Latin American left-wing populist governments such as Ecuador and Venezuela's ones also passed laws on gender equality, but their agendas were less comprehensive than the Bolivian one. In the chapter on the case study, I explain in detail the peculiarities of the MAS and Morales' populism, and the situation of women's movements and gender equality policies in Bolivia during the period studied (2006-2018). As explained above, implementation is out of the scope of this thesis, because there is not enough evidence yet to carry out a comprehensive analysis.

In addition, the case of Bolivia between 2006 and 2018 presents three particularities that makes it a very suitable case for the theoretical aims of the present thesis. First, in 2012 the Bolivian Parliament passed the 243/2012 Law on Political Violence and Harassment against Women, which is so far the only law in the world that specifically

focuses on this kind of gender-based violence, which is receiving growing attention from scholars and international organisations. The approval of such an innovative law – whose impact on other legislation is explored in Chapter 4 of the thesis – is significant to explore the relationship between left-wing populism and the promotion of gender equality policies. Second, the Bolivian landscape of women's organisations is particularly rich and diverse – mostly middle-class and white feminist NGOs coexist with women's social organisations formed by lower-class indigenous women. This peculiarity reinforces the interest of the Bolivian case for the analysis of the policy coalitions that left-wing populist parties form to elaborate gender equality policies, which I carry out in Chapter 5. Third and last, the Bolivian domestic workers' movement is a perfect case to analyse how institutionalised women's movements impact policies when left-wing populists are in government – as explained in Chapter 6, the preliminary research suggested that the domestic workers' movement was a highly institutionalised women's movements that obtained all its symbolic demands but only some of the substantive ones from Morales' government, which makes of it a very interesting object of study.

In conclusion, the case of Bolivia is paramount for the analysis of the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, because Morales' government constitutes a paradigmatic case of populism in power and has promoted the most ambitious agenda in gender equality policies among Latin American populists since the beginning of the 21st century. In addition, the case presents certain specificities that reinforces its interest to address the main research question and the secondary research questions of the present thesis.

2. Methodology

The empirical analysis carried out in thesis is based on qualitative content analysis of two sources. First, laws, regulations and other gender-related documents produced by the Bolivian government, international organisations and other Latin American national authorities. Second, semi-structured interviews with key actors in gender-related policy-making processes, including officials and activists belonging to different kinds of women's organisations, and experts. In total, 36 documents and 35 interview transcripts have been analysed in the three analytical chapters – the whole list of documents and respondents is detailed in Annex 1. The qualitative analysis of both documents and interviews has allowed me to reach an in-depth knowledge of the relations between women's movements and Evo Morales' government, as well as the process of formulation of its most important policies on gender equality and the main features of those policies. Lack of sufficient available evidence has prevented me to include the implementation of policies in the analysis, which constitutes the main limitation of the present thesis.

2.1. Documental analysis

The documents analysed in the thesis have been selected following Lindekilde's (2004) strategy of intentional sampling: I have restricted the analysis to a small sample of exemplary sources, depending on the specific issue explored in each chapter. Therefore, each analytical chapter draws on a different sample of documents, but the samples partially intersect – some documents have been analysed in more than one chapter. The sample(s) include Bolivian legislation, draft norms and legislation from other Latin American countries, regulations and declarations issued by international organisations, Bolivian policy documents, governmental communiqués, and materials published by Bolivian women's movements. For the purposes of this thesis, the terms "norms" and "legislation" include all kinds of legal dispositions (national laws, national infra-legal regulations – usually approved by governments to develop and specify the contents of a law – and international conventions). The complete list of analysed documents can be found in Annex 1.

Chapter 4 focuses on the influence of the Bolivian legislation on violence against women in politics (VAWP) on the norms and regulations on this issue drafted or passed by international organisations and in other Latin American countries. Insofar as this chapter is structured by four specific theoretical discussions identified in literature on VAWP, I have analysed the selected documents by looking for terms linked with those discussions, using NVivo. The terms are "violence" and "harassment" (related with the discussion on the definition of violence against women in politics), "electoral" (linked to the debate on the role that electoral organs should play in the prevention and tackling of VAWP), "party" and "parties" (there is also a debate on the role of political parties in the struggle against VAWP), and "intersectional", "intersectionality", "age", "ethnicity", "race", "indigenous", "LGBT", "rural", and "class" (concepts related with the introduction of the intersectional approach in legislation against VAWP, which is the fourth debate addressed in Chapter 4 of the thesis).

Chapter 5 thesis investigates the contradiction between the application of the MAS' anti-elite discourse to policy-making (which implied labelling feminist NGOs as elitists), and the party's pragmatism – feminist NGOs where included in policy-making processes on gender equality, despite being presented by the government as representatives of the elite, following a people vs. elite populist discourse. The analysis is based on Bolivian legislation on gender equality (the gender-related contents of the 2009 Constitution, Law 348 on gender-based violence and its regulation decree, Law 243 on violence against women in politics and its decree), and policy documents published by Evo Morales' government. The analysis of the documents was carried out in two steps. First, I investigated how the MAS and Morales' government applied its definition of 'elite' to feminist NGOs while praising women's social organisations as part of the 'people'. Second, I explored how both kinds of organisations were included in the policy coalitions formed by the government to elaborate and pass legislation on gender equality. Document analysis was particularly important for the first part of the analysis, while for the second one the analysis mainly drew on interviews. The

following terms were searched in the selected documents by using NVivo: "NGO", "organisation", and "civil society". Chapter 6 investigates the impact of institutionalised women's movements on gender equality policies when left-wing populist parties are in power, focusing on the case of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement during Evo Morales' government. The sample of documents is composed of a policy proposal elaborated by the National Federation of Bolivian Household Workers (Fenatrahob), and the Federation's information bulletin. In this case, no specific coding was used to carry out the qualitative content analysis. Bulletins published for over twelve years were analysed, which introduced a diachronic dimension in the analysis performed in Chapter 6.

2.2. Interviews

The second source of data of the thesis is the 36 semi-structured interviews that I carried out with activists belonging to Bolivian different kinds of women's organisations (women's social organisations mostly made up of popular-class indigenous women, middle-class feminist NGOs, and autonomous feminist groups), policy-makers (including former and current MPs, ministers and other Bolivian officials), and experts on gender equality policy. As regarding documents, each analytical chapter is based on a specific sample of respondents, but the samples partially intersect; several interviews have been used for the analysis carried out in more than one analytical chapter of the thesis. Respondents were selected through the snowball method. The number of interviews was not decided beforehand. Instead, I stopped searching for new respondents when I had obtained the needed information. Following this criterion, I made 36 interviews. Almost all interviews were carried out during two fieldwork trips in three of the biggest Bolivian cities (La Paz, El Alto and Cochabamba). The first trip took place between March and April 2016, while the second one was in August 2017, which introduces a certain diachronic dimension in the thesis. A reduced group of interviews were made virtually in June 2019. The rest of the interviews took place in women's organisations offices, public cafés and institutional buildings, according to the respondents' preferences. Interviews lasted around one hour and almost all of them were conducted in Spanish – some experts interviews were in English.

Interviewing has been chosen as one of the two methods of the thesis because it is a more economic method to obtain detailed data on social movements than methods that involve the researcher's insertion in the activities of the movement for a long time, such as ethnography or participant observation (Blee and Taylor 2002, 93). In addition, as far as my focus is rather on policy-making processes than on women's movements in themselves, the mentioned research methods were not the most convenient. I have decided to use semi-structured interviewing, which implies that the set of questions is rather a guide than a definitive list, the interviewer can follow unexpected topics that arise during the conversation, and different questions can be asked to different interviewees. This feature allowed me to modify the interview guides depending on the respondent – for instance, interviews with domestic workers

allowed me to complete the data on their working and living conditions provided by literature and documental sources, while in interviews with NGOs activists related to domestic workers' rights I rather focused on policy. Semi-structured interviews present two advantages that have led me to follow this method instead of structured interviews. First, it is easier to establish a more or less informal conversational rapport than in structured interviews (Blee and Taylor 2002, 92). Second, the flexibility of semi-structured interviews make that the initial hypothesis of the research can be modified by the interviewees' responses (Smith 1995, 22–23). The latter feature constitutes a key advantage for a PhD thesis, a long-term research work where it is recommendable to keep the research design relatively open until an advanced phase of the research process.

The specific aims of the interview analysis performed in this thesis are directly related with the objectives of each analytical chapter. In Chapter 4, focused on legislation on violence against women in politics (VAWP), interviews with Bolivian officials and activists of women's organisations, and international experts on violence against women in politics who work in international organisations allowed to obtain an accurate view of the process that led to the approval of the Bolivian legislation on VAWP. In addition, interviews allowed to understand the reasons that led activists and officials to include certain specific contents in legislation (such as giving to the electoral organ a central role in the prevention of VAWP), and to verify the influence of Bolivian legislation on norms on VAWP in other countries. In Chapter 5, which looks at the contradiction between the MAS' anti-elite discourse and its pragmatism in gender equality policy-making, interviews with officials and activists belonging to different kinds of women's organisations allowed to obtain a complete and deep view of the formulation processes of the analysed policies on gender equality. Regarding Chapter 6, which analyses the influence of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement on policy, interviews had three aims: obtaining a good understanding of the processes of formulation of policies on domestic workers' rights, completing the data provided by document analysis on the degree of fulfilment of the movement's policy demands during the analysed period, and obtaining a faithfully view on the relations between the domestic workers' movement and Morales' government. In the following section, ethical questions related with interviewing are addressed, together with the ethics of the research in general.

3. Researcher's Positioning and Ethical Considerations

"The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to *change* it". At least since Karl Marx wrote this sentence in his *Eleven Theses on Feuerbach* (1845), progressive researchers in humanities and social sciences have often reflected onthe potential impacts of their work on society, beyond their scientific impact. I do not believe that contemporary social sciences research can have a positive impact on society *by itself*, but it can indirectly contribute to the progress of political emancipatory projects, namely by enriching the reflection within social movements and other progressive political organisations about their own activities, as

I will further explain below. However, social science research can also have a *negative* impact on the analysed societies, reinforcing the class-, gender- and ethnicity-based hierarchies that any progressive researcher should rather try to challenge. To avoid this risk, it is necessary to be aware of the particularities of each case-study from an ethic-political viewpoint and the specific social position of the researcher regarding the research object.

Bolivia is the only country in Latin America where indigenous people constitute the majority of the population, but the country's politics and economy have traditionally been dominated by the white-mestizo elite, who inherited their current position of power from the times of the Spanish colonisation (1525-1835). The importance of ethnic-class hierarchies in Bolivia and the centrality of ethnicity in politics constitute a particularity of this case study that must be considered from the viewpoint of the ethics of research. In addition, the present thesis focuses on women's movements and gender equality policies. This focus creates an intersection between race, class and gender that also has ethical implications. The features of the case study mentioned must be put into relation with my social position as researcher – I am a middle-class Spanish white man, which means that a class-, ethnicity- and gender gap exists between me and the subjects of the research. This divide could have at least two problematic ethical implications: the symbolic gap between the interviewer and the respondents, and epistemic extractionism.

1. The symbolic gap between the interviewer and the respondents

As Rapley (2004, 28) has highlighted, the interviewer and the interviewees do not meet in "a historico-socio-cultural vacuum". Far from it: respondents speak as individuals who belong to specific class, gender and ethnic groups, among other social categories (Rapley 2004, 36). This also happens in the case of interviewers, which challenges the myth of the neutral researcher who is not submitted to any prejudice related to his or her social features. We must admit the possibility that the social characteristics of the researcher (namely class, race and gender, among others) have an impact on her/his attitude during interviews, which could interfere in the research. The existence of a symbolic gap between the interviewer and respondents – which is particularly wide in the case of the present research – implies the need of reflexivity: the interviewer must consider "his or her own and the interviewee's social locations and how they might affect the research relationship" (Reinharz and Chase 2011, 233).

The vast majority of the individuals interviewed for the present research were women, and many of them were popular-class indigenous women from a rural background, which created a gender-, ethnicity-, and class gap between them and me. Being a man doing research on gender equality and interviewing women can be a source of discomfort, due to the historical power imbalance between men and women. In my case, the difference was widened by the fact of me being Spanish, because Spain invaded the territory that currently constitutes the Plurinational State of Bolivia and colonised it for three centuries. In addition, large Spanish multinational companies operate in Bolivia, and some of their branches were among the foreign companies

partially nationalized by Evo Morales' government. The Bolivian and Spanish states currently have good diplomatic relations, but strong neo-colonial links exist between the former colony and the former metropolis, including the migration of hundreds of thousands of Bolivians to Spain – most of them to work in low-paid and often precarious sectors such as construction (mostly men) and domestic work (mostly women). As explained above, one of the key axes of Bolivian politics since the beginning of the 21st century has been the opposition to US imperialism and, more generally, to neo-colonialism – particularly visible in the mass appropriation by foreign companies of lucrative natural resources such as gas. The Bolivian people had benefitted little from exports of it until the partial nationalization of the sector by Morales' government. To sum up, in a context of politicization of indigenous ethnicity and explicit political and social opposition to the remains of Spanish colonialism, my nationality could potentially deepen the divide between me and some of the respondents.

The symbolic gap between the researcher and the interviewees can have various effects; these have been addressed by the literature. For instance, Padfield and Procter found in their research on the family lives of several young women that they were more willing to talk about their very personal experiences, such as abortions, to the female interviewer (Padfield) than to Procter, who is a man, as explained by Reinharz and Chase (2011). Similarly, in his research on Brazilian domestic workers, Vidal affirmed that the women that he interviewed did not speak to him about sensitive topics that they did discuss when they were in female-only groups (Vidal 2007). Another possible effect of the interviewer-respondents gender gap is that very few women accept being interviewed, something that happened to Treviño in his research about Alcoholics Anonymous. He solved this problem by "downplaying" his gender to avoid women seeing him as a threat (Reinharz and Chase 2011; Treviño 1992). In my case, the symbolic gap between me and the respondents had two effects: language differences and mistrust from some respondents.

Many of the people who I interviewed were indigenous women, whose mother tongue is not Spanish, but Aymara or Quechua, and my Spanish dialect (from the South of Spain) is very different from theirs, which is influenced by indigenous languages. Consequently, the conversations with indigenous women were slightly less fluid than with middle-class white ones, whose dialect is very similar to mine. Being aware of this difference led me to remain vigilant about the risk of unwittingly giving more importance to the statements of those respondents with whom the communication was more comfortable. The second effect of the symbolic gap between the respondents and me was a certain mistrust from a few members of indigenous women's social movements, who were slightly less willing to meet me than the (white, middle-class) feminist NGO activists. Following Acebillo-Baqué's (2018) reflections on the position of the researcher, I tried to overcome the gap with respondents by repeating as many times as needed who I was and what the aims of my research were, and paying particular attention to respecting the social norms of the environments where I conducted the interviews. Despite these efforts, I was not able to interview all

the women's social organisations activists that I had planned to, but I eventually succeed in replacing them by others who also met the needs previously identified to form the sample of respondents.

2. Cognitive extractionism

The concept of cognitive extractionism was first formulated by Leanne Simpson (2013), an intellectual who belongs to the Canadian Missiassauga Nishanaabeg indigenous people. Simpson, the Porto Rican sociologist Ramón Grosfoguel (2016) and the Aymara Bolivian sociologist Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (Rivera Cusicanqui and De Sousa Santos 2014) have drawn a parallel between the exploitation of natural resources of countries of the global South by western powers, on the one hand, and the exploitation of their intellectual resources, on the other. Grosfoguel, who speaks about *epistemic* extractionism rather than *cognitive* extractionism, has defined this process as "extracting ideas […] from indigenous communities, removing them from the context where they were produced with the aim of depoliticizing and resignifying them following Western-centred logics" (Grosfoguel 2016, 38). For her part, Rivera Cusicanqui has explained the same process in the following terms: "We [people from formerly colonised countries] produce raw materials and we get back finished goods" (Rivera Cusicanqui and De Sousa Santos 2014). For instance, she denounces that certain well-known researchers from the global North have drawn on intellectual inputs from indigenous peoples without citing them (Rivera Cusicanqui 2010).

While putting together the present thesis, I deployed two strategies to avoid epistemic extractionism. First, I purposely gave the same centrality to the testimony of all respondents, even though middle-class white feminist activists often produced more technically developed discourses about policy-making on gender equality in Bolivia, because they were more directly involved in the drafting of norms than members of women's social organisations (who are mostly popular-class indigenous women). To obtain a complete and balanced view of the processes of formulation of gender policies under Evo Morales' government, and the relationship between women's movements and the government, I needed to give equal attention to all voices, something that I tried to do. The second strategy refers to the selection of scholarly sources. I combined European and North-American research works with a wide set of Bolivian and Latin American academic sources, trying to avoid the tendency that certain academics from the global North have to collect primary data from formerly colonised countries, and then exclusively analyse them through the lenses of theory developed in Europe and the United States – something that is particularly frequent in social movements studies. This problematic epistemological attitude corresponds to Rivera Cusicanqui's accusation of the extraction of intellectual "raw materials" from the South (Rivera Cusicanqui 2010).

3. A politically useful piece of research

As advanced above, I do not believe that *by itself,* a research piece such as this thesis can constitute a significant contribution to emancipatory struggles. However, in addition to produce general knowledge about society, I am convinced that the social sciences can help progressive social movements and political parties by providing them with theoretical tools to analyse their own activity, mostly by learning from other organisations' experiences. This has been clearly explained by the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos; he has worked for decades with social movements in Latin American countries and has also researched them from an academic viewpoint. According to De Sousa Santos (2015), researchers can be useful for social movements by systematically registering and analysing their actions, which can be later used as examples (or counter-examples, we might add) by other movements. This implies admitting that social researchers do not have the responsibility or the capacity to *teach* anything to social movements, but only to transmit the examples of other movements to them. Afterwards, it is up to the movements' activists themselves to determine whether some elements of other movements' experiences might be applicable to their own struggle (regarding issues such as organisational strategy, discourse, repertoire of action, and relationship with other movements or the state). De Sousa Santos' reflections can be extended to progressive political parties, which can also learn from foreign examples, previously analysed and explained by social researchers. Indeed, mutual learning across borders has traditionally taken place among social movements and parties with or without the intermediation of academics – see the Marxist, antiracist and feminist traditions, for instance –, but scholars can potentially provide a more insightful and deeper analysis than other kinds of "mediators", such as journalists or activists themselves.

In this vein, the current thesis strives to provide in-depth analysis of the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics; this could be useful for Bolivian women's movements, other countries' movements and policy-makers in the field of gender equality. For instance, the alliances established between women's social organisations and feminist NGOs to promote the passing of gender equality policies in Evo Morales' Bolivia – as explained in Chapter 5 of the thesis – could constitute a useful example for other countries where relations among different types of women's organisations are conflictual. Regarding the relationship between movements and governments, the ambivalent experience of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement with the MAS' government, as explained in Chapter 6, illustrates some of the potentialities and limitations of women's movements' institutionalisation, one of the most frequent dilemmas of social movements. As far as policy-making is concerned, Bolivian Law 243 includes sound exemplary features that could inspire the formulation of similar regulations to tackle violence against women in politics in other countries, as detailed in Chapter 4. In a nutshell, in addition to the theoretical aims detailed in the theoretical chapter, this thesis intends to be a politically useful piece of research, with the ambition of contributing to struggles for gender equality in Bolivia and beyond, by

deeply analysing and exposing the experience of Bolivian women's movements between 2006 and 2018, a period in which they achieved unprecedent policy breakthroughs but also experienced sound disappointments. As said above, it is up to activists in each country to decide whether any of the elements of the Bolivian case analysed in this thesis are useful examples or counter-examples that could help them to reflect on their feminist political activity.

Chapter 3. The Case Study: Bolivia between 2006 and 2018

The present chapter looks at the case study of this thesis: Bolivia during the 2006-2018 period, when left-wing populist and indigenist president Evo Morales was in power. Pushed by a powerful and diverse array of women's movements, Morales' government promoted ambitious gender equality policies, although their implementation was uneven, and the personal sexist attitudes of Morales and other leading member of his cabinet raised doubts about the seriousness of their engagement for women's rights. The 2006-2018 period has been selected because it was during these twelve years when Morales and his Movement for Socialism (the MAS) promoted their most important policies on gender equality. Insofar as thesis focus on the Bolivian case, a good knowledge of Bolivian politics during the period studied is necessary to fully understand the analysis performed in the analytical chapters. The present chapter proceeds into two parts. First, a general overview of the Bolivian political context between 2006 and 2018 is presented, focusing on Evo Morales' political hegemony and explaining the antecedents of his arrival to state power, which largely prefigured the features of its government. In the second part, I describe the situation of women's movements and the most important policies on gender equality discussed and approved during the period studied.

1. Evo Morales' left-wing populist and indigenist government

Before focusing on the 2006-2018 period, it is necessary to refer to the antecedents that explain Evo Morales' and the MAS' first national electoral victory in 2005 and the establishing of a lasting political hegemony. More exactly, we need to go back to 1985, when Bolivia signed the first structural adjustment program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as many other countries of the global South did in the 1980s due to the crisis of public debt.

1.1. First antecedents: neoliberal policies and incipient popular mobilisations (1985-2000)

The signature of the agreement with the IMF – only three years after the end of the military dictatorship that had previously ruled the country – marked a long period of neoliberal economic policies in Bolivia, which had lasting social and political consequences. Under the presidency of Víctor Paz Estenssoro – who had promoted state-led economic development in a previous period of his political career –, the state privatized a large share of public companies, benefitting foreign investors, and labour rights were restricted. Decree 21060 became the symbol of "the harshest orthodox-neoliberal stabilisation programme in America since the Pinochet counterrevolution" in Chile (Webber 2011, 115). According to Webber's analysis, one of the political aims

of these measures was reducing the power of Bolivian popular classes[4], particularly dismantling the tin-mining unions (one of the major economic sectors in Bolivia) (Webber 2011, 113). Thus, privatising public mines allowed the government to simultaneously achieve two targets: reducing public deficit and weakening tin-mining unions, which were at that time the most powerful popular organisations and the ones that could have stopped the IMF-promoted economic agenda. As Arnold and Speeding (2007) have explained, miners' wives played a key role in the movement – miners' wives' leader Domitila Barrios was the only working-class woman to speak at the First Conference on Women organised by United Nations in Mexico in 1975, as she explained in her book *Si me permiten hablar* (Barrios de Chungara 1978).

During the 1980s and the 1990s, the loss of power of tin-mining unions and the mass emigration of former miners to the Chapare region to work as coca-growers meant that the coca-growers' unions became the most important organised force in the Bolivian working class. A couple of decades later, coca-growers unions would be the main promoter of the MAS, Evo Morales' party. Unions had traditionally been the main political authority in Chapare and other coca leaf-producing regions, where neoliberal governments practiced heavy repression to eradicate the production of coca, following the United States-led 'war on drugs' – even though a significant part of the production is destined for local consumption, not for the illegal production of cocaine for the international drugs market (Crabtree 2005, 34–39). As Arnold and Speeding (2007, 159) have explained, unlike miners' wives, women participate in coca-growers' unions as producers, not as wives of producers. Therefore, the traditional sexual division of labour was not reinforced but challenged by women's participation in such unions. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the left-wing political culture of miners was mixed with the coca-growers' indigenous culture, laying the ideological grounds for future social mobilisations during the 2000-2005 period. The influence of miners' unions was key for the development of coca-growers' organisations (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2008). Eventually, a coca-growers' union leader named Evo Morales would become Bolivia's first indigenous president, and other male and female former coca-growers' unionists would hold important offices in the Plurinational State of Bolivia founded by the 2009 constitution.

Policies of privatization and economic deregulation continued throughout the 1990s, mainly under Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada's first presidential period (1993-2000) – he was also president between 2002 and 2003, as explained below. During the 1993-1997 period, Sánchez de Lozada was supported by Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, who was the first

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[4] The concept of 'popular classes' refers to the ensemble of the urban and rural low-income groups. However, it also underlines the protagonist role of these social groups in Latin American progressive social and political movements, which has led me to privilege the term 'popular classes' over 'working class', most often used in European literature.

indigenous vice-president in Bolivian history. Cárdenas promoted a multicultural discourse that recognised the ethnic diversity of the country, and a constitutional reform was approved in 1994 to define Bolivia as a multi-ethnic and pluricultural state (the concept of "plurinationality" would be only included by the MAS-promoted 2009 Constitution). In addition, limited self-government was conceded to indigenous communities and a ministry for ethnic and indigenous affairs was created under Cárdenas' vice-presidency. Sánchez de Lozada's government also introduced some legal reforms to promote gender equality and co-opted some important feminist activists, as I explain in detail in the second part of this chapter. During the 1990s, a big sector of the traditional electoral base of the Left moved to NGOs, whose number skyrocketed due to the availability of abundant funds from international cooperation (Monasterios 2007; Petras 1997).

The structural adjustment program initiated in 1985 succeeded in reducing inflation, but it provoked a recession and a rise in unemployment and underemployment (Webber 2011, 118). Public-sector employment shrank while the informal sector of the economy grew, which dramatically reduced the size of workers' unions (Webber 2011, 121–22). The weakening of tin-mining unions and the inter-sectorial Bolivian Workers' Union (COB in Spanish) prevented the emergence of strong anti-neoliberal mobilisations during the 1990s. Yet, under the political surface, the rise of "social-movement unionism" was taking place (Webber 2011, 124): in large cities with indigenous majorities, such as La Paz, El Alto and Cochabamba, traditional unions established connections with organisations of informal workers and rural movements. These alliances would be key for the success of the 2000-2005 cycle of anti-neoliberal protests that preceded the MAS and Morales' arrival in power. In the countryside, the most important popular organisations were the Unified Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB in Spanish) and the indigenous federations: the National Council of Ayllus and Makas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) and the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB). CONAMAQ was founded in 1997 as the federation of the indigenous peoples of the Bolivian highlands (which broadly correspond to the west-Andean region of the country, where Aymaras are the most numerous people). For its part, the 1982-founded CIDOB is the most important organisation of Guarani- and Quechua-speaking indigenous people from the Eastern lowlands. CIDOB organised national marches for indigenous people's rights in 1990 and 1996 – the latter was joined by CSUTCB activists and by a third federation, the Bolivian Syndicalist Confederation of Colonizers (CSCB). The main immediate outcomes of the marches were the ratification of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and the recognition of self-government in certain indigenous territories. Since 1980, the CSUTCB has included a female branch called the "Bartolina Sisa" Federation of Indigenous and Peasant women, which was the most important women's social organisation during the 2006-

2018 period analysed in this thesis. The main features of the "Bartolinas" will be further addressed in the second part of the present chapter.

The 1990s also brought changes to the Bolivian party system. The neoliberal turn of formerly left-wing parties such as Víctor Paz Estenssoro's National Revolutionary Movement (MNR in Spanish) left a political void that encouraged peasant and indigenous organisations to create a new political-electoral organisation: the Political Instrument for People's Sovereignty (IPSP), which would be transformed into the Movement for Socialism (tha MAS) and ran in national elections for the first time in 1999 (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 301). Chapare coca-growers played the major role in the creation of MAS-IPSP, but the organisation was conceived as the electoral instrument of the whole peasant-indigenous Bolivian movement – its creation was supported by the CSUTCB, Bartolinas, the CSCB and CIDOB, the most important indigenous and peasant organisations in the country. After significant electoral victories in some territories in both municipal and general elections in 1995 and 1997 of the candidacies pushed by Chapare coca-growers' unions, their leader Evo Morales was elected to head the MAS (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 294). Since Morales' appointment as the MAS' leader, the party moved from a platform focused on land ownership issues to a wider discourse against US imperialism. This was the first step towards the left-wing indigenous populism that would become the MAS' ideology during the 2006-2018 period in government.

After almost two decades of weak popular response to neoliberal reforms, a strong cycle of protests took place between 2000 and 2005 (García Linera and Stefanoni 2008). Five presidents were in power during the 2000-2005 period: Hugo Bánzer (1997-2001), who had ruled Bolivia as a military dictator in the 1970s; Jorge Fernando Quiroga (2001), Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (2002-2003), Carlos Mesa (2003-2005), and Eduardo Rodríguez (2005). Most changes in government were not the consequence of elections but followed resignations due to the pressure of protests or changes in the coalitions of the traditional parties, which all supported the main elements of the neoliberal agenda. The MAS was the only major nationwide party that clearly opposed the IMF-promoted policies. In December 2005, the MAS leader Evo Morales was elected president, which put an end to the mobilisations. The 2000-2005 cycle of protests prefigured some of the features of a long-lasting MAS political hegemony, known in Bolivia as the "process of change" (*el proceso de cambio*), a term that underlines the deep yet not revolutionary character of the project of political, economic and social transformation launched by the MAS beginning in 2006. However, the process was not exempted of shortcomings and contradictions, particularly in the field of feminist politics. Before turning to this specific topic, the following pages present an analysis of the main features of the 2000-2005 protests and Morales' government between 2006 and 2018.

1.2. The 2000-2005 cycle of anti-neoliberal mobilisations

a) The 2000 "Water War" and its social and political effects

Issues related with the administration and property of gas and water – key resources for Bolivian exports – triggered the most important protests of the 2000-2005 cycle: the 2000 Cochabamba "Water War" and the 2003 "Gas War" initiated in El Alto. However, the popular opposition to privatization of supplies crystalized a very wide set of grievances, including demands of self-government in the traditional indigenous territories, defence of social and labour rights, and land property issues. Beyond the specific reasons for the mobilisations, they are related to "a [Bolivian] tradition of 'doing politics' that highlights protagonism and direct action at the margins of parliamentary procedures", as Crabtree has put it (2005, 109). Indeed, industrial and agrarian trade unions, indigenous movements and other forms of popular class social organisations have traditionally been stronger in Bolivia than in other Latin American countries, to the point that the Bolivian society has been defined as "corporatist" (Stefanoni 2016). More than 15 percent of Bolivians take part annually in some kind of protest, the highest rate in Latin America (Alberti 2016, 47). This is a central piece of data for understanding the political dynamics of the 2006-2018 period analysed in this thesis. Gutiérrez Aguilar has identified three streams of mobilisation in the 2000-2005 protests: the new autonomous urban and rural struggles, the rural and mainly Aymara-led uprisings, and the sustained electoral struggle of the Chapare coca-growers, who gradually displaced the traditional political elites in institutional positions beginning with the creation of MAS-IPSP (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2008, 344–45).

Land-related demands are key to understand the 2000-2005 cycle of protests and further developments in Bolivian politics, because they are tightly related with the political divide between the West highlands and the East lowlands of the country, a cleavage that has largely structured Evo Morales' period in government. The East lowlands are dominated by two kinds of land-owning: large commercial farming estates (*latifundios*) and small plots (*minifundios*) belonging to peasants that migrated from the West at the time of the land reform launched with the 1952 National Revolution (the founding event of the modern Bolivian state), which distributed large sections of land to peasant families. In the West there was a preponderance of *minifundios* that were becoming smaller and smaller because they are successively subdivided each generation. The consequence was a chronic lack of land, and migration from the rural areas in the highlands to cities and to the Eastern and Northern lowlands (Crabtree 2005, 77–78). This is why peasant organisations kept demanding the deepening of the land reform through further expropriation of big estates, as well as more power for traditional indigenous and trade-union authorities in the administration of land – demands that were present all over the 2000-2005 cycle of mobilisations. As in other Latin American countries, in Bolivia land-related issues are

especially important for rural women because owning land means an assurance against poverty and it is a source of political and social power within indigenous communities (Deere and Contreras Díaz 2011). This particularity partially explains the central political role in Morales' Bolivia of organisations such as "Bartolina Sisa" Federation of Peasant and Indigenous Women.

The first event of the 2000-2005 cycle of protest was the "Water War" in Cochabamba, a succession of mass mobilisations against the project of privatizing the water supply in that city, promoted by the government following the recommendations of the World Bank (Crabtree 2005, 18–21; Petras and Veltmeyer 2005, 187). According to the statement of Óscar Olivera, who was at that time leader of the Departmental Federation of Factory Workers (known as *fabriles*), collected by Crabtree (2005, 23), "the increase in water tariffs [caused by the privatization] would have absorbed about one-fifth of the income of many people in the city". The main actor of the mobilisations was the *Coordinadora por el Agua y por la Vida* ("Coordination for Water and Life"), which gathered several social movements and contested the power of the state to decide over the administration of water, reclaiming direct popular administration (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2008, 347). As a result of the participation of thousands of inhabitants in the protests convoked by the *Coordinadora*, the government accepted its demands: the water service remained under the control of a public company whose board included representatives of the *Coordinadora* (Webber 2011, 161).

The city of Cochabamba was the epicentre of the "Water War", but mobilisations soon spread to other regions of the country. The main actors involved were indigenous peasant-irrigators, coca-growers' unions from Chapare region, industrial-workers unions and, most importantly, a large network of *cabildos*, popular assemblies where thousands of people made collective decisions about the protest actions, such as roadblocks, strikes, marches and the celebration of a popular referendum about the nationalization of water supply (Webber 2011, 151–56). Even highly centralized organisations such as coca-growers' unions adopted horizontal and assemblyist methods, as highlighted by Oikonomakis and Espinoza (2014, 287). Despite their name, the "Water War" mobilisations were peaceful, which did not prevent the government from violently repressing the protestors with the army, killing at least one of them (Webber, 2011, pp. 160–161). The number of casualties would rapidly grow in following years.

The victory of popular organisations in Cochabamba was perceived as a sign that it was possible to resist the wave of privatizations (Crabtree 2005, 31). Soon, Aymara uprisings took place in Oruro and La Paz regions, organised by the indigenous federation CSUTCB. Once again, an attempt of the government to privatize water supply triggered the protests (Webber 2011, 168–169). The project of privatization constituted a direct attack against the community systems that at that time managed

two thirds of Bolivian water supply (Dwinell and Olivera 2014, 149). Indigenous leader Felipe Quispe played a major role in this mobilization, promoting what Webber calls a

> notion of communitarian socialism in the countryside [that] was the rural counterpart to the revolutionary, assemblyist forms of urban democracy experienced during the Water-War in Cochabamba through the creation of the Coordinadora and mass-meetings in the streets and plazas (Webber 2011, 177).

Other protests took place in 2000, such as the March for Survival from Oruro to Caracollo, where female and male retired workers walked 37 kilometres to demand a raise in their tiny pensions (Crabtree 2005, 72–74).

The eruption of protests beginning in 2000 was accompanied by a rapid electoral rise of the MAS. In the 2002 national elections, Evo Morales' party obtained almost 21 percent of the vote, only 1.5 points less than the winner, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. As advanced above, Morales' arrival to the MAS leadership implied the adoption by the party of an anti-imperialistic discourse that went beyond land-related issues. The defence of the coca leaf became the central symbol of a nationalist rhetoric (Almaraz et al. 2012, 116). This shift meant the triumph of what current Bolivian vice-president Álvaro García Linera calls "left-wing indigenism" (*indianismo*) over the more radical indigenism represented by the CSUTCB and the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement (MIP). MIP was led by Felipe Quispe, who had previously been one of Morales' rivals in the run for the MAS leadership. The radical indigenism proposed by Quispe and other leaders has been defined as a national-Aymara project of total *indianization* of the structures of political power (García Linera and Stefanoni, 2008), overcoming the liberal-democratic state. García Linera, who is the main theorist of the MAS' left-wing indigenism and populism, defended his political position in the following terms (García Linera and Stefanoni 2008, 390):

> [Left-wing indigenism] "is able to draw on the national-popular, Marxist and left-wing memory formed in the previous decades, what has allowed a greater urban, multisectorial and multiregional acceptance of its political call".

Indeed, the MAS included ethnic-indigenous rhetoric and demands within a peasant and anti-imperialist discourse, what allowed the party to build large and plural political alliances (Modonesi 2010, 567). The good electoral result of the MAS in the 2002 elections was not enough to attain state power, but provided the party with a more powerful position during the second part of the 2000-2005 cycle of mobilizations, which began in 2003.

b) The 2003 "Gas War" and the fall of Bolivian neoliberalism

The first important mobilization of 2003 was the March for Survival, which led 20.000 pensioners to La Paz on January 17th. As a response, the government accepted to raise the pension to 850 bolivianos (around 108 euros) per month, from the 350 bolivianos

that pensioners used to earn in 2000 (Crabtree 2005, 73). In February, the army put down a protest being made by low-paid policemen, an event that attracted the solidarity of other workers and weakened the government (Webber 2011, 179). Soon after, the executive announced a new income tax on workers, with the aim of meeting the IMF-imposed target of public deficit reduction (Webber 2011, 178). The announcement, known as the *impuestazo* (*impuesto* means 'tax' in Spanish), provoked the biggest and most spontaneous popular mobilisation in Bolivia since the 1952 National Revolution. Mass demonstrations asking for the resignation of president Sánchez de Lozada were heavily repressed by the army, resulting in the killing of 30 demonstrators in just two days (Webber 2011, 180). This uprising had the important effect of including large sectors of the urban working class of La Paz and El Alto in the cycle of mobilisations, which had been mostly peasant-led until that moment (Webber 2011, 183).

The aforementioned protests preceded the so-called "Gas War", which constituted the most important event of the 2000-2005 cycle of mobilisations. The trigger was the government's announcement of its plans to export gas (privatized in 1996) through a Chilean port, in September 2003. The plan was interpreted by many Bolivians as a double offense, for not only had the natural resource been privatized, but it was now also going to benefit Chile, a historical rival of Bolivia ever since the powerful neighbouring country had invaded the small Bolivian coastline at the end of the 19th century, making of Bolivia one of the two countries in South America without any sovereign access to the sea. The privatization of gas became the symbol of all the injustices that large sectors of the popular classes attributed to neoliberal policies, and a unifying element for the very different social movements that promoted the protests (Webber 2011, 215). Social movements demanded the nationalization of gas, the right to grow coca leaf, land reform and social rights (Webber 2011, 219–220). The demand for convoking a Constituent Assembly with the aim of building a multinational state that would reinforce the legal protection of indigenous self-government became increasingly popular. These demands were addressed to the state, but at the same time, some indigenous organisations constituted confederations of hundreds of *ayllus* (indigenous political organisational unit at the local level) and villages in the *altiplano* (highlands) during the 2003-2005 period, constituting counter-powers that for a short time challenged the monopoly of the state over political power in those territories (García Linera and Stefanoni 2008).

The shanty city of El Alto, adjacent to La Paz, was the central point of the 2003 "Gas War". The state lost control over the city, which began to be ruled by a network of more than 500 neighbourhood councils. Some of the councils were coordinated by the previously existing Federation of Neighbourhood Boards (Federación de Juntas Vecinales-FEJUVE) and the Regional Workers' Union (Central Obrera Regional-COR, which gathered unions and working-associations from various labour sectors) (Webber

2011, 201). However, many neighbourhoods were autonomously self-organised, without any control from existing social organisations (Zibechi 2010, 13). Two of the main features of the movement were the collective character of decision-making at every step and the rotation of leaders and tasks (Zibechi 2010, 43). These characteristics of mobilisations reflected traditional indigenous systems of government in villages, where the community assembly is sovereign, and the leading roles are rotational and compulsory for all inhabitants. This is a good example of how traditional indigenous politics and mainstream liberal politics intersect in Bolivia, a particularity that is also reflected in the diverse landscape of women's organisations, as I further explain below.

The interviews carried out by Dosh et. al (2010, 223) with COR leaders suggest that women's activism was critical in the success of "Gas War" protests. However, even some organisations mostly composed of women such as the federation of street vendors were controlled by a small group of men (Dosh, Kligerman, and Lerager 2010, 224), which shows the persistence of sexist attitudes and practices in popular organisations. According to the COR female leaders interviewed by Dosh et al., the main obstacles to gender equality in social organisations were the lack of support from female activists' husbands, sexist attitudes in the organisations and the difficulty of combining the exercise of executive responsibilities with a job and domestic work (Dosh, Kligerman, and Lerager 2010, 224).

The "Gas War" consisted in a 6-weeks long series of marches of peasants to El Alto and La Paz, working and hunger strikes, roadblocks in rural areas, demonstrations in several cities of the country and massive popular assemblies. There were two turning points in the development of the "Gas War": the celebration of the National Day of Protest in Defence of Gas on September 19th (which was followed by the killing of five peasants by the army), and the beginning of hunger strikes by middle-class personalities, who demanded the end of repression and the resignation of president Sánchez de Lozada, after the killing of more than 50 people by state forces in only two days (Webber 2011, 253). The support by growing sectors of the middle class to the protests "converted this explosive wave of insurgence into a revolutionary situation" (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005, 196), even though the revolution never materialized. In the section on the research design, I will explain how the MAS and president Evo Morales included progressive sectors of the middle classes in their left-wing populist indigenist political project, following the trend initiated during the "Gas War". On 17th October 2003, president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada resigned and fled the country, being replaced by his vice-president Carlos Mesa. Mesa promised to meet the two main demands of the protestors: a referendum on the administration of gas and the convocation of a Constituent Assembly (Webber 2011, 228).

According to Webber's analysis, the most radical activists considered the October crisis as a missed revolutionary opportunity, because the MAS – the de facto representative

of movements in the institutional sphere – supported the constitutional replacement of Sánchez de Lozada by Mesa instead of pushing for a revolutionary change (Webber 2011, 225–226). The MAS' decision of supporting Mesa's government with a critical attitude has been interpreted as a "strategy of maintaining parliamentary rather than mobilizational pressure on the regime" (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005, 200). Protest leaders such as the radical indigenist Felipe Quispe and the COB executive advocated the call of mass mobilisations against the new government, but the MAS justified its moderate position alluding to the risk of a right-wing coup d'état instigated by the neoliberal parties that had been expulsed from power (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005, 200).

While authors such as Petras and Veltmeyer (2005, 200–201) criticised the reformist position of the MAS, the party's main ideologist and current vice-president García Linera sees 2003 as the moment where insurgent forces discovered that they were able to paralyse the neoliberal-colonial state but they did not have an alternative proposal, and took the wise – according to García Linera – decision of allowing the replacement of Sánchez de Lozada by Mesa (García Linera and Stefanoni, 2008). In addition, the MAS did not defend the complete nationalization of gas exploitation (as most popular organisations did), but only asked for a bigger share of the royalties for the state (Webber 2011, 253). This contradiction between a radical and populist discourse and pragmatic policy-making was present in several fields of policy, including gender equality, as this thesis will analyse. The 2003 critical situation showed the tensions between the "communitarian-popular" perspective and the "national-popular" perspective that coexisted along the 2000-2005 cycle of protests (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2008, 345). This tension would reappear during Evo Morales' government, as explained below.

2004 was a relatively calm year, but street mobilisations resumed in January 2005. This time it was the Right who protested in Santa Cruz, asking for political autonomy for the departments of the *Media Luna* ("Half Moon") region – the East of the country, where the oligarchy linked to agribusiness was stronger, and has historically demanded autonomy to administer their natural resources (Eaton 2007, 74). While the movement was led by company-owners, they succeeded in co-opting many social popular-class organisations, including unions and indigenous movements in those territories (Eaton 2007, 86–89). Also in 2004, left-indigenous mobilisations resumed because of the insufficient fulfilment of the so-called "October Agenda" by president Mesa (Webber 2011, 236), according to social movements. The protests were more numerous and geographically spread than in 2003 and they evolved towards an insurrection during the months of May and June, when up to 90 per cent of Bolivian highways were blocked by protestors (Webber 2011, 240). There were divisions within the movement, mainly between the most reformist branch represented by the MAS and the most

radical actors, who wanted to close down Parliament and convoke a revolutionary constituent assembly (Webber 2011, 244).

President Mesa found himself caught between the left-wing mobilisations and the pressure of Eastern right-wing MPs who asked him to violently repress the movement, which Mesa refused to do (Webber 2011, 248). Eventually, on June 6th 2005 the biggest demonstration in the history of the country occupied La Paz and Mesa resigned (Webber 2011, 257). The Congress (the low chamber of Parliament) moved forward the general election to the end of that year. According to left-wing analysts and activists Almaraz et al. (2012, 74), the convocation of advanced elections gave breath to a liberal-representative democracy that had been to a certain extent surpassed in practice by the new institutions of popular power created during the protests. Anyhow, the MAS obtained more than 53 percent of the popular vote in the December 2005 elections, and Evo Morales acceded to the presidency in January 2006.

1.3. Evo Morales in government: an ambitious but contradictory "process of change" (2006-2018)

The arrival of Evo Morales and the MAS to government in January 2006 represented a highly symbolic historical rupture, after two decades of neoliberal policies and centuries of domination of Bolivian politics and economy by the white-mestizo minority – a neo-colonial structure inherited from the Spanish colonial domination, which lasted from the 16th to the 19th century. Even though there had been gestures towards the political inclusion of the indigenous majority of the country before – such as the appointment of the indigenous politician Víctor Hugo Cárdenas as Sánchez de Lozada's vice-president, the election of Evo Morales as president was generally perceived as a powerful symbol of the assumption by the indigenous majority of the leading role in Bolivian politics for the first time in history, as García Linera put it (2011, 83) – even though his government also experienced strong conflicts with indigenous organisations, as I explain below. Morales made his best to underline the historical resonances of his investiture as president: the official event in Parliament – where he wore traditional indigenous clothes instead of a costume – was preceded by a ritual ceremony at the pre-colonial archaeological site of Tiwanaku, attended by around 10,000 Aymara and Quechua people from Bolivia and Peru. Similar celebrations took place before his following presidential investitures, in 2010 and 2014. Indigenism had become a key dimension of the MAS' political project, and would be clearly present in Bolivian politics throughout the following 2006-2018 period, permeating the government's relation with women's organisations and its framing of gender equality policies.

a) The first term of the MAS in government (2006-2009): the struggle for consolidation

The first years of the MAS and president Evo Morales in government were defined by the approval of a new Constitution, and the fierce opposition of conservative political and social forces, which in 2008 attempted to overthrow the president through what became known as a "civic coup d'état". The MAS obtained 54 per cent of the vote in the December 2005 election, which granted the party the majority in Congress but not in the Senate, where the addition of conservative party *Podemos* and other traditional parties overcame the MAS due to their electoral dominance in the departments of the East of the country, the Half Moon region. Some of the first actions of the MAS government were the reduction of the president's and other officials' salaries, the launching of a vast campaign of alphabetization called "I do can", and the partial nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector. The method for the election of the Constituent Assembly provoked the first dispute between the MAS government and some of the progressive social movements that supported it. Before the 2005 elections, social movements and most parties agreed on the need to reserve a group of seats in the Constituent Assembly to indigenous peoples, whose quotidian political organisation is based on direct democracy, not on individual representation as in western liberal systems (Hylton, Thomson, and Gilly 2007). However, the MAS established a system based exclusively on a one-person-one-vote principle, maintaining the existing electoral districts. Also, it was decided that candidates had to run through parties or citizen's groups whose creation needed to be accepted by the state. Critical authors – including feminist anarchist activist María Galindo – consider that this governmental decision reinforced the power of political parties, which had been widely delegitimized by the 2000-2005 popular protests (Galindo 2006; Hylton, Thomson, and Gilly 2007, 139–40). The system included two important concessions to the Right: first, the winner in each district could obtain at most two of the three representatives, what eventually favoured the candidates who obtained the worst results (who belonged mostly to traditional parties); second, the Constituent Assembly included a bloc of representatives elected on a regional basis, which favoured the less densely populated and more conservative Half Moon region.

This system was interpreted by certain sectors of the Left as a concession by vice-president García Linera to traditional parties with the aim of including them in the constitutional process and, simultaneously, establishing MAS hegemony over social movements, because the numerous constituents that represented social organisations were forced to run to election through the MAS – which limited the social movements' autonomy. Indigenous organisations made proposals to change the electoral system, but the ruling party did not accept them and there were not big popular mobilisations on this topic. As a consequence

MAS would monopolize national-popular political representation in the assembly, acting as a centralizing force in relation to the movements that had brought it to power as well as regionalist opponents on the right (Hylton et al, 2007, 141).

The elections to the Constituent Assembly took place in July 2006. The MAS won 55 percent of the popular vote and more than half of the constituents, far away from the two thirds majority that was necessary to approve a completely new Constitution, so they had to reach agreements with traditional parties (Hylton, Thomson, and Gilly 2007, 147). The Assembly gathered in Sucre, the historical capital of Bolivia, and a long and conflictual constituent process began.

In September 2006 a Unity Pact was established between the MAS and the main indigenous organisations: the Unified Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), the "Bartolina Sisa" Federation of Peasant and Indigenous Women, the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB), and the National Council of Ayllus and Makas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), and some smaller indigenous organisations (Svampa 2010, 28). The Pact demanded that the new Constitution established a plurinational state that recognized indigenous self-government over their territory, the interdiction of *latifundios* (big land states, heritage of the post-colonial unequal distribution of land), recognition of the indigenous juridical system and the creation of a fourth power of the state (the so-called "social power", where social organisations would be represented), in addition to the executive, legislative and the judiciary (Svampa 2010, 30). In addition to MAS-led Unity Pact, a coalition called "Women Present in History" was formed by thousands of women belonging to feminist NGOs and women's social organisations. This unprecedented alliance played a key role during the constituent process, ensuring the introduction of a wide array of articles devoted to protect women's rights in the new supreme norm. As I further explain below, this coalition achieved most of its objectives, but failed in guaranteeing a constitutional framework that would make possible the legalisation of same-sex marriage.

The conflicts between progressive and conservative representatives blocked the functioning of the Constituent Assembly, which did not write a single draft article in nine months. The political tension led to move the Assembly to the city of Oruro, were a first version of the Constitution was drafted by MAS constituents: 164 of the 255 members of the Assembly attempted to promulgate the Constitution, but the opposition considered it as illegal. In 2008, political tension reached its peak, putting the country at the edge of civil war. From May 2008, the governments of the Eastern departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando convoked referendums to approve status of regional autonomy – considered illegal by Morales' government, the National Electoral Court and the Organisation of American States (OAS). MAS supporters boycotted the referendums, where the large majority voted for the autonomy status. As a response, in August 2008 Morales' government convoked a recall referendum to

decide on his and vice-president Álvaro García Linera's permanence in their positions, together with 8 of the 9 departmental governors. Morales and García Linera were confirmed in their offices with more than 67 percent of the popular vote. All the conservative governors were also confirmed, excepting La Paz and Cochabamba ones, who were revoked by the voters. Some days after the referendum, the governors of some Half Moon departments called to a "civic strike" with the aim of forcing the national government to transfer them the funds obtained through a tax on hydrocarbons that the government was using to finance a public pensions plan (Repoll 2010). (Later on, this tax would also be used to gender equality-related policies such as programs to prevent gender-based domestic violence, as explained below). Severe riots took place in several Eastern departments, where tens of indigenous individuals were assassinated by paramilitary groups, gas installations were attacked, and government buildings were occupied by the followers of the departments' governors, an episode known as the "civic-prefectural coup". UNASUR (the regional organisation of South American countries) supported Morales' government and the revolt was halted. The episode showed the unwillingness of the traditional political and economic elites to accept the legitimacy of Morales' government and the considerable support that these elites enjoyed in the East of the country, despite Morals and the MAS' overall electoral hegemony in the country. The Bolivian government expulsed the United States ambassador Philip Goldberg, who had met some of the heads of the "civic-prefectural coup" and was accused of having participated in its organisation (Rojas 2008). From that moment, Morales' anti-imperialist rhetoric was reinforced, and traditional political elites were accused by the MAS of collaborating with the US government's attacks against Bolivian sovereignty. Anti-imperialism rhetoric eventually became one key feature of the MAS' populism.

After the failed "civic-prefectural coup", the MAS launched negotiations with MPs belonging to opposition parties to modify the draft Constitution in the Congress. More than a hundred changes were introduced, including the reduction of the scope of the agrarian reform and the limitation of the jurisdiction of community justice, which would only be applied in traditional indigenous territories (and limited by the Constitution) (Svampa 2010, 34). The transactions were criticized by left-wing activists such as Óscar Olivera, who denounced that the final text of the Constitution had actually been decided by the party leaders, and the Congress had replaced the Constituent Assembly (Almaraz et al. 2012, 78–80). The concessions to the opposition were interpreted as part of the MAS' strategy to consolidate its government in the medium term (Hylton, Thomson, and Gilly 2007, 128). Despite some left-wing actors' criticism, the Constitution was approved in referendum in 2009, with 61 per cent of the vote. The content of the new Constitution has been analysed in very positive terms by several authors. For instance, Errejón Galván (2009, 127) stated that this is the first constitutional text that "assumes the challenge of integrating the huge Bolivian social diversity in a framework that recognises the equality within diversity", while Prada

considers that the Constitution "redefines the conception of state and the concept of citizenship, from a plurinational, multicultural and communitary logic" and he defines the state established by the supreme norm as "an intervening state, protective of the natural resources, the welfare, inclusive to the extent that it includes in an institutional way forms and practices of the original [indigenous] peoples and nations" (Prada Alcoreza 2008, 35). The Constitution established a Plurinational State that respected the autonomy of departments (regions), and has one of the widest ranges of civic, political, social and environmental rights within world constitutionalism (Pisarello 2014). Another key feature of the new constitution was the mainstreaming of the gender approach in several sections of the norm, a product of the pressure exerted during the constituent process of the so-called "Women Present in History" coalition of women's organisations (Friedman 2009).

However, certain authors criticized central aspects of the Constitution, such as the reinforcement of the executive branch of government (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011), a typical feature of populism that seems at odds with the stated aim of building a participatory democracy. For his part, Wolff (2016) defined the 2009 constitutional change as "a contradictory and partial process of rebalancing democratic principles of mechanisms", which according to him implied both the strengthening of the participatory aspects of democracy and "deviations from the mainstream liberal democratic model" (Wolff 2016, 184–85), such as the mentioned reinforcement of the executive.

b) The second term of government (2010-2014): the MAS' hegemony

Short time after the promulgation of the new Constitution, anticipated general elections were convoked. With the participation of almost 95 percent of the electorate, Evo Morales and the MAS achieved an even bigger electoral landslide, obtaining 64 percent of the popular vote. The opposition was divided, and the biggest conservative coalition (*Plan Progreso para Bolivia*) won only 27 percent of the vote. The MAS reached a large majority both in Congress and the Senate, and won in six of the nine departments of the country. The 2009 elections marked the end of the *empate catastrófico* ("catastrophic equality"), a term used to describe the 2003-2008 period, when neither the anti-neoliberal political organisations nor the traditional political actors had the needed strength to lead the country (Svampa 2008). From his second investiture as president in 2010, Evo Morales began to deploy the most important elements of his political agenda.

The approval of a new Constitution demanded the passing of "structural laws" on the Autonomies and Decentralization, the Plurinational Constitutional Court, the Judicial Organ, the Plurinational Electoral Organ and the Electoral Regime, which was one of the priorities of the new parliamentary majority. Feminist MAS MP Elizabeth Salguero was one of the leaders in elaborating the five laws, and women's organisations played

a key role in the writing of the new electoral law, which introduced full gender parity in all elections (Salguero Carrillo 2014). Regarding economic policy, in García Linera's words, the MAS' economic program implied "a revitalized role for the state as producer and industrializing force, and a central role for the indigenous majority in driving the new state", together with the fostering of "peasant community, urban artisanal and micro-business activity" (García Linera 2011, 83). In reality, the most salient feature of Morales' government economic policy was a reinforced intervention of the state in the economy – the state began to receive most of the benefits of the hydrocarbons sector, but it was not fully nationalized as the social movements demanded. This element is important, because it summarizes the contradictory relations that Morales' government kept with most progressive social movements, including women's organisations.

Besides, the application of the 1996 law on agrarian reform was accelerated and several social programs were launched, such as social bounds for elderly people, children and pregnant women. Investment in public services increased, which improved the public education system, and allowed the gender difference in access to primary education to be overcome (UNICEF Bolivia n.d.). However, the improvements in health care services were limited. Major public works were launched as well, such as the construction of roads all over the country, and a pioneering public cable car transport system in La Paz. As a consequence of the mentioned policies and the high prices fetched by commodities such as gas, the country enjoyed strong and stable economic growth during the whole period studied (despite the impact of the 2008 global crisis), inequality was reduced, and the poverty rate fell from the 60 percent of the population in 2006 to 36 percent in 2017 (La Razón 2017). As will be further explained, important laws on gender equality were also promoted from 2010. Despite the undeniable social and economic progress, the government failed in seriously reducing the country's economic dependence of natural resources.

The promulgation of the new Constitution and the overwhelming electoral victory in 2009 dramatically weakened the parliamentary opposition, placing Evo Morales in a comfortable political position throughout the 2009-2014 period. However, between 2010 and 2014 the MAS' government also experienced its first serious clashes with some of the social movements that had led it to power. The first major left-wing mobilisation against the government took place in June 2010, when the two major indigenous confederations of the country, CIDOB and CONAMAQ, organised the 7th Great March of the Indigenous People in Defence of Territory, Indigenous Autonomy and Indigenous Peoples' Rights. It is extremely significant that the March was framed as the seventh episode of a series of protests that had taken place during the 1990s and the 2000s against neoliberal governments, suggesting a certain continuity between those governments and Morales' one. The March demanded the increase of the number of seats reserved to indigenous peoples in parliament (from 7 to 18), the

reinforcement of the indigenous self-government in their traditional territories, the concession of public-owned land to indigenous peoples and the self-management of the natural resources located in their territory. The March was threatened by Chapare region coca-growers' unions, loyal to the government, and the organisers of the mobilisation, previously the MAS' allies in the Unity Pact, were accused of traitors by government and some of its followers (Mokrani 2011). Only some of their demands were fulfilled by the government.

Some months after the Indigenous March, the executive announced an increase of more than 50 per cent in the price of petrol that would have a huge impact on transport and basic goods prices, a decision known as the *gasolinazo* (*gasolina* means 'petrol' in Spanish). The protests spread all over the country, but they were particularly strong in the departments where the MAS obtained the best electoral results (Potosí, Oruro, La Paz and Cochabamba). Some social organisations backed the *gasolinazo* but they were not able to prevent their bases from joining the street protests against the price rise. After a week of mobilisations, the government announced the withdrawal of the measure (Mokrani 2011). According to some activists critical of the MAS government, the aim of the *gasolinazo* was to meet the transnational companies' demands about the price of petrol (Almaraz et al. 2012, 42). The unrest about the price increase led some sectors of the Left to express a more general criticism of the energy policy of the government, which had not nationalized the whole hydrocarbon sector as social movements demanded during the 2000-2005 cycle of mobilisations (Almaraz et al. 2012, 29–30; Mokrani 2011, 2).

A new conflict took place between March and May 2011, when nearly 50 union federations belonging to the Bolivian Workers' Union (COB) across Bolivia organised strikes, roadblocks and marches to demand the abrogation of 21060 Decree – the norm that marked the beginning of neoliberal reforms in 1985, and was still in place – and other labour and social security-related norms. The protests were launched by workers belonging to different sectors but also retired people and students joined the mobilisations. Peasant leaders showed their support to the government and their willingness to confront the workers' protests (Mokrani 2011, 3), which showed the growing division between different social organisations. After this conflict, the peasant union CSUTCB, the "Bartolina Sisa" federation of peasant women, and coca-growers' organisations consistently supported the government, while COB and indigenous organisations kept an increasingly critical stance.

The tensions between the MAS government and indigenous organisations reached its highest point in the conflict about the construction of a road through the Indigenous Territory and National Park Isidoro Sécure (TIPNIS), a region considered as indigenous territory and a natural reserve. The project – the result of an agreement between the Bolivian and the Brazilian governments – met the Brazilian geopolitical interest of connecting the Pacific Ocean with the Atlantic but it would also benefit the wood

sector and the coca growers because it would allow them to expand their activities at the expense of the indigenous peoples who live in TIPNIS (Mendizábal 2012, 7). After two indigenous marches, wide mobilisations both inside and outside Bolivia against the project, and the heavy repression practiced by the state forces against the protestors, Morales announced the suspension of the project in September 2011, but the construction of the road was resumed later. Organisations opposed to the project denounced the violation of the constitutional obligation of consulting and getting the authorization of indigenous peoples before constructing infrastructures in their territories, which is also imposed by the ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, ratified by Bolivia. In addition, the determination of the government in building a road oriented to the export of raw materials showed the continuity of the traditional Bolivian extractionist model of development despite the MAS' engagement to progress towards the principle of *buen vivir* ("Good Living"), which implies the respect of the environment. The lack of real commitment of the government with this principle has frequently been denounced by movements.

c) Between 2014 and 2018: the beginning of the end of the "process of change"?

Despite the tensions between Evo Morals' government and some of the social movements that used to support it, in 2014 MAS' electoral hegemony remained untouched: Morales and his party obtained again more than 60 percent of the vote in the 2014 election, with the participation of almost 90 percent of the electorate. The growing support of middle-class sectors who used to vote to opposition parties partially explains the MAS' impressive electoral result. This time, the first opposition party in Parliament was Democratic Unity (UN), which obtained 24 percent of the vote. The MAS used its renewed majority to pass a law to convoke a referendum on a constitutional reform that would allow Morales and García Linera to run for a third term – the 2009 Constitution established a two-terms limit for all elected authorities. Shortly after the approval of the controversial law, the biggest corruption scandal since Morals' arrival in power broke out: the General Comptroller discovered that the MAS officials such as former minister and former Bartolinas' leader Julia Ramos had diverted resources from the Indigenous Fund, a public institution created to finance development projects (Alberti 2016). This case of corruption harmed the political legitimacy of peasant organisations and the MAS, and has been said to be pivotal in the party's defeat in La Paz 2015 departmental elections (Alberti 2016, 35).

The Bolivian economy kept growing during the years that followed the 2014 election, and the social situation of the country steadily improved. However, the fall in the prices of hydrocarbons provoked a substantial reduction of the state's income. Insofar as several social bonds and services were directly funded by the tax on hydrocarbons, the reduction of the receipts had a direct impact on them – including policies against gender-based violence implemented by departmental and local governments. This

showed the limitations of funding social services with the tax on hydrocarbons, which is a consequence of the high dependence of the Bolivian economy and state on natural resources. Between 2014 and 2016, the government experienced conflicts with mining cooperatives (local companies) and with NGOs: in 2013 the government expulsed the Danish NGO IBIS from Bolivia, accusing it of "political interference" (Corz 2013), and in 2015 vice-president García Linera threatened four more NGOs with expulsing them. In this case they were Bolivian organisations, and most of them had a left-wing ideology, which suggests a growing intolerance of the government to criticism (Molina 2015).

In February 2016 the referendum took place on the constitutional reform to allow the re-election of the president and the vice-president for a third term since the approval of the Constitution in 2009 (that would be their fourth term, if we include the 2006-2009 preconstitutional period). Article 168 of the Constitution established that "the term of the president and the vice-president of the state lasts five years, and they can be re-elected continuously only once". The MAS and the social organisations that still belonged to the Unity Pact (mostly peasant organisations such as CSUTCB and Bartolinas) campaigned for the reform, while the "no" option gathered traditional parties such as National Unity (UN) and the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), together with left-of-the-centre parties critical of the MAS, such as *Soberanía y Libertad* (SOL.BO). After an intense campaign, the reform was rejected for a tight margin: 48.7 percent of the electorate voted for it and 51.3 percent opposed the constitutional change. This result suggests that a large part of the people who voted for the MAS in 2014 turned against the ruling party on this central issue two years later. It was the first electoral defeat for Evo Morales and his party in a nation-wide vote since their first election in 2005. In a context of crisis for the Latin American Left, the 2016 referendum is usually identified as the beginning of the end of the MAS' political hegemony in Bolivia.

Bolivian politics between 2016 and 2018 were dominated by the growing criticism against Evo Morales for his insistence in ruling for a third presidential mandate despite his defeat in the 2016 referendum. The MAS filed an application to the Plurinational Constitutional Court defending that the aforementioned Article 168 of the Constitution violated political rights granted by the same Constitution, and asking for its abrogation. After several protests for and against the invalidation of Article 168, in November 2017 the Court decided the elimination of the limitations to the re-election of the president, the vice-president and the rest of the elected authorities in Bolivia (BBC Mundo 2017). In 2018, the Electoral Court confirmed that Evo Morales could run for a fourth presidential mandate in the 2019 general election. Mass protests followed the ruling, with the slogan "This is Bolivia, not Venezuela" – in reference to the authoritarian turn of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, one of Morales' allies in the region. Despite the widespread discontent with Evo Morales' insistence in running again to election,

the division of the opposition makes that Morales could win the 2019 election, but the times of the MAS' political hegemony seem gone.

2. Women's organisations and gender equality policies in Bolivia (2006-2018)

2.1. Women's organisations

A wide diversity of women's organisations took part in the formulation of policies on gender equality during the 2006-2018 period, as will be further explained in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, which constitute the core of the thesis. As advanced above, women played a major role in social organisations such as coca-growers' unions, neighbours' *juntas* and urban workers' unions, particularly during the 2000-2005 cycle of mobilisations. However, this thesis focuses on female-only or women's organisations, which for analytical purposes can be broadly divided into three categories: feminist non-governmental organisations (NGOs), women's social organisations and autonomous feminist organisations. Feminist NGOs are mostly made up of middle-class white and mestizo woman and focus on individual rights, while women's social organisations gather lower-class and devote more attention to broad social issues such as land tenure. Autonomous feminist organisations are small radical but influential organisations.

a) Feminist NGOs

NGOs focused on gender rights have represented the majority of Bolivian women's organisations since the 1980s, due to the availability of funds from international cooperation agencies to implement projects of development with a gender approach (Monasterios 2007, 1), replacing previously dominant women's organisations led by left-wing politicians and activists (Arnold and Spedding 2007, 158). In general, the number of NGOs in Bolivia increased from around 100 before 1980 to more than 500 in 1992, while the IMF-imposed hard programs of structural adjustment were being implemented (Petras 1997). Some authors have accused NGOs of holding some responsibility in the deactivation of social movements since the beginning of structural adjustment plans in 1985, stating that grassroots organisations increasingly became the "beneficiaries" of NGO projects, while NGOs began to identify themselves as "'representatives' of civil society to the state and cooperation agencies" (Monasterios 2007, 2). Bolivian feminist NGOs have also been criticized for prioritizing their relations with foreign NGOs and United Nations Women conferences, instead of building their demands through dialogue with Bolivian popular-class women (Bastian Duarte 2012; Horton 2015; Monasterios 2007; Vargas 2002). According to Ewig's analysis, during the 1990s feminist NGOs implemented World Bank-funded development projects in rural areas, but they "rarely considered rural women as peers" (Ewig 2018, 443). It is worthy to remind here Lombardo, Meier and Verloo's warning about the risk that gender equality loses some of its dynamism when it is fixed in norms such as international

conventions (Lombardo, Meier, and Verloo 2009, 3–4). In addition, more radical feminist organisations have accused NGOs of exclusively focusing on the interests of middle-class white and heterosexual women (Lugones, 2008). Critics use terms such as *oenegeras* ("NGO-related"), "institutional feminist" and "gender technocracy" to denominate feminist NGOs and their members.

Even though the mentioned criticism probably applied to many Bolivian feminist NGOs between the 1980s and the 2000s – as a member of an important NGO recognised in an interview conducted for this research –, it is difficult to determine to which organisations this criticism must be applied. Also, as another feminist activist told me, it seems unjustified to use the same general arguments against all feminist NGOs than fourteen years after Evo Morales' arrival in power, when NGOs are much less powerful in Bolivia than they used to be during the neoliberal period – one member of an international NGO affirmed that "NGOs have done barbarities in this country", referring to the lack of national economic planning and the excessive power of international NGOs to set the Bolivian development priorities before the MAS' arrival in power. In addition, as will be further explained, some organisations of middle-class feminists laid during the 1990s the foundations for the progress experienced during the MAS' governments in fields such as parity in politics and policies against gender-based violence.

Most Bolivian feminist NGOs belong to the *Coordinadora de la Mujer* ("Women's Coordination") network. Some of its most important affiliated organisations – and the cities where they are based – are the Women's House (Santa Cruz, it develops projects of awareness-raising on Human Rights and domestic violence, and promotion of the political participation of women and sexual and reproductive rights), Centre of Support to Women and Children (Cochabamba), Centre of Capacitation and Research of the Peasant Women (Tarija, it fosters peasant leaders' political capacities), Centre of Capacitation and Service for the Integration of Women-CECASEM (La Paz, it promotes rural development and works on the prevention of human trafficking), Centre for the Research in Sexual and Reproductive Health-CIES (La Paz, it seeks the capacitation and empowerment of women in health issues, with the aim of helping women to better negotiate with the authorities to get better healthcare services), "Juana Azurduy" Centre (Chuquisaca, it works on sexist violence, political participation of women and labour equality, using a radio emission to spread its activities), "Gregoria Apaza" Centre for Women's Promotion (La Paz, it promotes gender equality in the economic and cultural spheres), La Paz Foundation (La Paz, it fosters women's political empowerment), Institute for the Integral Female Formation (Cochabamba, the organisation is focused on the promotion of female participation in social organisations and food sovereignty), Organisation of Kollasuyo Aymara Women (El Alto, it promotes indigenous female leaders' participation in local and traditional political institutions), Centre for the Integral Promotion of Health-SEPROSI (La Paz, it provides health services for women), Union of Women for Equity and Equality-AMUPEI

(La Paz, focused on sexual and reproductive right and the struggle against gender-based violence) and the Workshop for the History and Participation of Woman-TIPAMAHU (La Paz, it had a key role in the recovery of the historical memory of the domestic workers' movements). In addition, there are international NGOs with a focus on gender that develop an intense activity in Bolivia – like Oxfam –, while the organisation "Conexión" Emancipation Fund transmit international cooperation resources to Bolivian organisations.

b) Women's social organisations

Bolivia is considered as a "corporatist" country (Stefanoni 2016), as explained above, due to the political importance of social organisations, a concept that includes a wide range of socio-political popular-class organisations (mostly rural and urban unions, and indigenous organisations). Among them, there are certain female-only organisations, which in this thesis will be denominated "women's social organisations". For the purposes of the present research, it is important to know the main features of the "Bartolina Sisa" Federation of Peasant and Indigenous Women ("Bartolinas"), the National Federation of Paid Bolivian Household Workers (Fenatrahob), and the Association of Female Councilwomen and Majors of Bolivia (ACOBOL) – out of the scope of this thesis fall other women's social organisations such as the Union Confederation of Women from Intercultural Communities, and female indigenous federations like the Central of *Mojeñas* Indigenous Women, which did not have a relevant participation in the policy-making processes analysed in the thesis.

The "Bartolina Sisa" Federation is the biggest female social organisation of Bolivia, with more than 100,000 members all over the country (Monasterios 2007, 4). In addition, Bartolinas concentrates a big amount of power: tens of its members have been ministers or MPs under Evo Morales' government. The Federation was founded in the 1980 First Congress of Peasant Women, two years after the creation of the Unified Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB). In 1979, women played a major role in the peasant organisations' road blockades in the highlands, and these organisations recognized the need of creating female-only structures (León 1990, 139). The Federation was named after Bartolina Sisa, partner of 18th century Aymara leader Túpac Katari, who fought against Spanish colonialism (León 1990, 140). Even though most peasant women are indigenous, it is necessary to distinguish the Bartolina federation, which gathers women belonging to different indigenous peoples and from different regions of the country who share their peasant conditions, from ethnic-based indigenous organisations and federations like highlands' CONAMAQ and lowlands' CIDOB.

The creation of the Bartolinas was ambivalent from the viewpoint of the empowerment of peasant women. The political priorities established in its First Congress did not focused on women's interests, but corresponded to the general

demands of CSUTCB. However, the new organisation contributed to the reinforcement of a specific collective identity of female peasants, and gender equality demands appeared later (León 1990, 141–42). As shown by the choice of the name "Bartolina Sisa", the creation of the Federation was highly influenced by indigenism, but the incorporation of peasants from more and more regions and indigenous groups gradually reinforced the national dimension of the Federation over the ethnic one (León 1990, 143). Issues around the centrality of ethnic discourse and the autonomy from CSUTCB remained controversial during the first years of existence of Bartolinas. In the key 1983 congress, the federation re-elected as executive secretary Lucila Mejía, who defended the autonomy of the Federation from CSUTCB and rejected "the one-dimensional, ethnic discourse" (León 1990, 146).

Bartolinas is currently an autonomous federation within the structure of CSUTCB – which is in turn included in the wide framework of the Bolivian Workers' Union (COB) (García Linera and Stefanoni 2008, 213). This structure constitutes a compromise between those who defended the disappearance of the Federation and those who advocated the constitution of an independent female-only organisation that would be directly affiliated to COB (García Linera and Stefanoni 2008, 505). The growing presence of gender equality demands (even if they were not framed in that way) in the Bartolinas' agenda was evident in their 2010 Congress, where they asked for real gender equality in the spaces of power, rejecting the assignation of women to lower rang positions (Ágreda Rodríguez 2012, 71). Bartolinas' political stance evolved between 2006 and 2018 towards a clearer defence of women's rights, even though they keep rejecting the "feminist" label. Some of the most significant shifts were their support to the 2016 Law on Gender Identity and to the MAS' attempts of partially decriminalising abortion in 2017.

The "Bartolinas" Federation was one of the nine organisations that signed the Pact of Unity with the MAS in June 2006, after Morales' first electoral victory, and kept a total fidelity to the ruling party and the president throughout the period analysed in this thesis. Even though the power of the Federation is widely admitted, one of the feminist activists who were interviewed for the present research expressed her doubts about how representatives Bartolinas are of Bolivian female peasants, suggesting that they are more focused on national politics than on the daily social and political life of rural areas. In addition, the legitimacy of Bartolinas suffered a severe blow with the revelation of the Indigenous Fund scandal explained above – some Bartolinas' leaders like Julia Ramos have been accused of corruption and imprisoned for this case.

The National Federation of Bolivian Household Workers (Fenatrahob) is the social organisation of domestic workers – known in Bolivia as *trabajadoras del hogar* ("household workers"), due to the colonial and sexist load of the terms *trabajadoras domésticas* ("domestic workers") and *empleadas domésticas* ("domestic employees") in that country. Domestic workers are one of the poorest and most discriminated

groups in Bolivia, where the sector is made up of around 137,000 individuals – in a country of 11 million people (Peredo Beltrán 2015, 17). Domestic work is one of the main forms of female paid employment in Bolivia, and the large majority of domestic workers are indigenous popular-class women of rural origin who migrated to cities (CONLACTRAHO 2003; Valenzuela and Sjoberg 2012; Wanderley 2014). The first experience of domestic workers' union organisation took place in the 1920s, when the *Unión de Culinarias* ("Cooks Union") was created and first reclaimed the extension of the general framework of workers' rights to domestic workers (Peredo Beltrán 2015). The cook's experience inspired the creation of domestic workers' unions in several cities of Bolivia during the 1980s and the foundation of Fenatrahob in 1993. Along the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, Fenatrahob campaigned for the improvement of domestic workers' rights and working and living conditions. Indeed, the 1944 General Labour Act had introduced the 8-hours working day for all Bolivian workers excepting domestic workers, together with other discriminations. In 2003, in the midst of the cycle of anti-neoliberal protests that would lead Evo Morales to power two years later, the Bolivian parliament passed the 2450/2003 Law that Regulates Paid Household Work, which eliminated almost all forms of legal discrimination of domestic workers, as will be explained in detail in Chapter 6. The pressure of social movements and the MAS' parliamentary support were key to force neoliberal parties to support the 2450/2003 Law. When Evo Morales rose to power in January 2006, he engaged himself to develop and enforce the law, and appointed as minister of justice Casimira Rodríguez, former executive secretary of Fenatrahob and the Latin American and Caribbean Confederation of Household Workers (CONLACTRAHO), which raised high hopes among domestic workers. The relationship between the social movement of domestic workers and the government, and the movement's influence on policy during the 2006-2018 period are analysed in detail in Chapter 6.

The Association of Female Councilwomen and Majors of Bolivia (ACOBOL) is the most unique women's organisation of those that are included in the present thesis, because no other Latin American country has such a big organisation focused on challenging violence against women in politics (VAWP), a specific form of gender-based violence that has the aim of expulsing women from politics (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016c). ACOBOL was founded in 1999, with the aim of promoting gender equality in institutional politics. Since its creation, ACOBOL has focused on two kinds of activities: research on VAWP and campaigning for the approval of norms and the implementation of policies against this specific form of gender-based violence. ACOBOL has received hundreds of complaints of VAWP, which has allowed the Association to carry out studies that constitute the most complete quantitative source on VAWP in Bolivia, as it is shown by the frequent references to them both in Bolivian and foreigner literature on VAWP (e.g. Albaine, 2015; Archenti and Albaine, 2013; Cabezas Fernández, 2014; Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016b, 2016c; Machicao Barbery, 2004; ONU Mujeres, n.d.;

Piscopo, 2016; Rojas Valverde, 2010, 2012). Between 2000 and 2009, ACOBOL gathered 249 reports from elected women who had suffered VAWP (ACOBOL 2010).

In addition to collecting complaints, ACOBOL analysed the Bolivian law and the international women's rights legislation in order to look for ways of challenging VAWP through law (Rojas Valverde 2012, 99). In 2001 they reached the conclusion that the existing legal framework was insufficient and ACOBOL sent to parliament a draft for the development of a specific law against VAWP (Rojas Valverde 2012, 74). However, the draft law was first discussed in 2006, soon after the MAS' arrival in power. As it will further explained in Chapter 4, ACOBOL played a pivotal role in the drafting of the 243/2012 Law on Political Violence and Harassment against Women and its 2935/2016 Supreme Decree, in addition to campaigning for their approval.

c) Autonomous feminist organisations

Latin American autonomous feminism – a concept widely used in Latin American militant and scholarly discussions – represents the most radical positions of Latin American and Caribbean feminism. Autonomous feminism was born as a response to the so-called institutional feminism, in two senses. First, during the 1970s and the 1980s, lesbians, Caribbean and afro Latin women, and women belonging to popular classes rejected the prioritization by mainstream feminists of the interests of middle-class, white and heterosexual woman (Lugones 2008, 95), a criticism which was enriched in the 1990s by the post-structuralist idea of deconstructing identities. Second, autonomous feminism asserted the independence of feminist groups, in a context of growing institutionalisation of many feminist organisations in Latin America (Grupo de Mujeres Ixchell, 2011). As advanced above, some of the features of this institutionalisation process are the focus on the preparation of United Nations conferences and the co-optation of organisations' leaders by states (as previously said, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada's neoliberal government successfully attracted certain feminist activists, who were appointed to positions in the national administration). In Bolivia, the autonomous feminist movement is represented by two relatively small yet quite influential organisations: *Mujeres Creando* ("Women Creating") and the *Asamblea Feminista Comunitaria* ("Communitarian Feminist Assembly"). Both have been included in this section due to their strong ideological influence over other women's organisations and, in the case of communitarian feminists, on the framing of the MAS' policies on gender equality during the 2006-2018 period.

Mujeres Creando is probably the Bolivian feminist organisation that is best known abroad. The strategy of *Mujeres Creando* is "based on deconstructing symbols and languages of patriarchal domination in a context of internal colonialism. Its weapons range from graffiti, television shows and the press to silent theatre, poetry and workshops" (Monasterios 2007, 3). In addition, the organisation supported two important mobilisations protagonised by women in the 1990s: the 1995 march of

female coca-growers and the 1999 mobilisation of microcredit women debtors (Monasterios 2007, 3). However, *Mujeres Creando* main leaders María Galindo and Julieta Paredes (who eventually abandoned the organisation) have been accused of holding a "rigid" interpretation of feminism (Arnold and Spedding 2005, 34). *Mujeres Creando* and particularly her leader Galindo kept an extremely critical rhetoric towards the MAS and president Morales during the 2006-2018 period – even though she also addressed proposals to Parliament and government on certain topics. In 2006 Galindo published an article entitled "Evo Morales and the phallic decolonisation of the Bolivian state" (Galindo 2006), where she criticized the system of individual representation established by the MAS to elect the members of the Assembly, and the MAS' supposed celebration of the indigenous identity as "pure", affirming that the decolonisation of the state is impossible without a process of depatriarchalisation. Later on, in 2014, Galindo kept a tense but interesting meeting with vice-president García Linera, where she accused him of not having done enough to force the resignation of a MAS MP who had made a homophobic statement, the lack of sexual education in schools, and the criminalisation of abortion, among other topics (Galindo and García Linera 2014).

At the beginning of the 2000s, a split took place in *Mujeres Creando*. Julieta Paredes, one of the founders of the organisation with Galindo, criticised the lack of direct involvement of *Mujeres Creando* in the 2000 "Water War" and their participation in an avant-garde contemporary art exhibition in Madrid, which was seen by Paredes as the evidence of the growing detachment of the feminist organisations from the day-to-day reality and struggles of Bolivian women (Paredes 2008). Consequently, Paredes founded the organisation *Mujeres Creando Comunidad* ('Women Creating Community'), which would later become the Communitarian Feminist Assembly. These two organisations put more emphasis on the concept of "community", which Paredes tries to connect with feminism. The communitarian feminists' repertoire of action is similar to *Mujeres Creando*'s: they have done theatrical performances like *Hilando fino desde el feminismo comunitario* , but they also directly took part to social struggles such as the 2003 "Gas War" against Sánchez de Lozada's government. Paredes does not only defend the need of establishing alliances between different feminist groups but also underlines the importance of feminist activists engaging with other social struggles, also with the aim of challenging the sexist attitudes that exist in indigenist and left-wing organisations, instead of only criticizing these behaviours "from the pulpit" (Paredes 2008). The communitarian feminists support the so-called "process of change" led by the MAS and Evo Morales, which constitutes the major difference with *Mujeres Creando*. One of the clearest manifestations of this support to the MAS' government was Paredes' development of the conceptual framework of the 2010 governmental Equality Plan (Viceministerio de Género y Asuntos Generacionales-Ministerio de Justicia 2008), which will be one of the analysed documents in Chapter 5 of the thesis.

2.2. Gender equality policies

Major policies on different fields related with gender equality were approved by the Bolivian government and parliament during the 2006-2018 period. In this thesis, I will only analyse the most relevant policies to investigate the relationship between feminist politics and left-wing populism through the Bolivian case. However, these policies must be investigated within their context – an overview of the most important legislation on gender equality approved in Bolivia during the period studied is needed. As advanced above, the focus of the thesis is placed on the agenda-setting, formulation and decisions phases of the policy-making process, not on the implementation. In the following pages, I present a synthesis of the most important policies on gender equality in political participation, violence against women in politics, gender-based violence in general, sexual and reproductive rights, women's access to land, human trafficking and domestic workers' rights. LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersexual) rights are out of the scope of the present thesis, but a synthesis of the most important policies promoted by the MAS on this topic has been included due to the tight conceptual connection between gender equality and sexual and gender diversity.

a) Gender equality in political participation

Promoting the equal participation of women in institutional politics was one of the priorities of feminist NGOs and other middle-class feminist organisations before the MAS' arrival in power in 2006, including the Women's Political Forum and the Association of Congresswomen, which gathered female politicians from several parties in the 1990s. As Monasterios (2007, 3) pointed out, these groups "reproduced the ethnic and class divisions of traditional political parties": they were overwhelmingly composed of white middle- or upper-class female politicians. Despite this limitation, the organisations of female politicians achieved certain important legal reforms, such as the 1999 quotas law, which established that electoral lists to Congress had to contain at least 30 per cent of women. This was the first step towards the alternation principle that was introduced in the law that convoked the elections for the 2006 Constituent Assembly promoted by the MAS: each man must be followed by a woman in each electoral list, never by another man. Due to the application of this rule, 34.50 percent of the constituents were women, which made of the Constituent Assembly the space of political decision with the highest percentage of women in the history of Bolivia until then. The president of the Assembly was Silvia Lazarte, a woman appointed by the MAS. In addition, many of the constituents were popular-class indigenous women of rural origin, which constituted a novelty in Bolivian politics (Ágreda Rodríguez 2012, 63). The 2009 Constitution introduced in all elections the principles of parity and alternation, which were developed by the 26/2010 Law on the Electoral Regime. The Bolivian constitution stands out among other Constitutions

promoted by left-wing populist governments in Venezuela (1999) and Ecuador (2008) – only in the Bolivian case, equality between men and women in the political participation is enshrined as a basic principle of the state. The mentioned norms have made of Bolivia the second country in the world with the highest percentage of women in parliament, after Rwanda: in 2015, 53.8 percent of the members of the Bolivian Congress were women (NODAL 2018), and the percentage has never been much lower than 50 percent since.

b) Violence against women in politics

The objective of reaching gender equality in political participation is hampered by violence against women in politics (VAWP) (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016a). This is a particularly serious problem in Bolivia, where ACOBOL gathered 249 cases between 2000 and 2009 (ACOBOL 2010), a figure that probably underestimates the magnitude of the phenomena, for most cases are never reported. As it has been advanced above, the main components of the Bolivian legal framework against VAWP are the 243/2012 Law on Political Violence and Harassment against Women and the 2935/2016 Supreme Decree, which developed Law 243. In addition, some articles of the 1096/2018 Law on Political Organisations focus on VAWP. The 243/2012 Law, which was the first in the world that focused specifically on the struggle against VAWP, intends to prevent VAWP, protect the victims and sanction the authors, with the aim of "guaranteeing the full exercise of their political rights" by women (Article 2 of the law). The importance of the example of the Bolivian legislation for the struggle against VAWP in other parts of the world has been underlined by authors such as Krook and Restrepo Sanín (2016b, 127), and will be explored in detail in Chapter 4. Law 243 has been partially implemented, but ACOBOL activists interviewed for this research demanded more public funds for the training of civil servants and politicians in gender equality, a task that is mostly developed by ACOBOL.

c) Gender-based domestic violence

Gender-based domestic violence is widespread in Bolivia, where 53 percent of women have suffered physical violence from her partner at some point of their relationship, according to data provided by the ministry of justice (Ministerio de Justicia de Bolivia 2016). Thus, the passing of specific legislation to tackle this form of sexist violence has been a priority for Bolivian feminists since the 1990s. The first step in this direction was the approval in 1995 of the 1674 Law against Violence in the Family or Domestic Violence, commonly known as "Law against Intra-Familiar Violence". While this norm criminalized violence against women committed by their relatives, it did not have a specific gender perspective (masculine gender-based violence against women was considered as any other form of domestic violence within the family). The situation has evolved since the MAS' arrival in power in 2006. The 2009 Constitution stated that "all

individuals, *particularly women*, have the right not to suffer any physical, sexual or psychological violence, nor in their families neither in the society" (art. 15.II), underlining the gendered character of domestic violence against women. In the following paragraph, the Constitution states that "The State will adopt the necessary measures to prevent, eliminate and sanction gender-based violence" (*violencia de género*) (art. 15.III). This approach has been qualified as "a more feminist perspective" by Friedman (2009) in her comparative work on the extent of change on women's rights in Latin America under 'pink tide' governments.

The constitutional mandate on gender-based domestic violence was met by the 348/2013 Comprehensive Law to Guarantee Women a Life Free of Violence, which established a wide array of measures for the prevention and sanction of violence against women both in the domestic sphere and out of it.   The 348/2013 Comprehensive Law to Guarantee Women a Life Free of Violence was one of the first comprehensive laws (*integrales*, in Spanish) on gender-based violence approved in Latin America. This trend has grown in following years — due to a great extent to the passing in 1994 of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, known as the "Belém do Pará Convention" —, and today more than 10 Latin American countries have comprehensive laws on gender-based violence. Law 348 stands out in two major points, as suggested by the comparative analysis of Latin American comprehensive laws carried out by the CEPAL Gender Equality Observatory (CEPAL 2015). First, the Bolivian law is one of the norms that takes into account the largest number of specific forms of violence, including economic violence, workplace bullying and violence against women in politics — while other laws, such as the Colombian and Guatemalan ones, define "violence" in more vague terms. Second, the Bolivian 348/2013 Law created civil and criminal norms to tackle violence, while other laws did not change any criminal disposition (namely the Argentinian, Costa Rican and Mexican laws). To sum up, the 348/2013 Law is one of the most advanced norms on gender-based domestic violence in Latin America. As it will be further explained in Chapter 5, the contents of Law 348 were developed by the 2145/2014 Supreme Decree. Even though the implementation of policy is out of the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to briefly point out that the enforcement of Law 348and its regulation decree has been difficult, and limited by the following factors: the fact that the specialized courts to tackle domestic violence are simultaneously anti-corruption court, the resistance of certain civil servants and sectors of the police and the judiciary to the effective implementation of this legislation, and the lack of sufficient funds – particularly from some departmental governments –, as explained by several feminist activist who were interviewed for this thesis.

d) Sexual and reproductive rights

Article 66 of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution affirmed that "The exercise of their sexual and reproductive rights is guaranteed to men and women". This constitutional mandate was partially developed by the 475/2013 Law on Integral Health Services, which guarantees the provision of contraception services to women between 15 to 49 years old. In addition, both the 348/2013 Law against gender-based violence and the Code of Children and Teenagers established mechanisms to prevent sexual violence. However, one major obstacle has prevented Bolivian women from exerting their sexual and reproductive rights for many years after Morals' arrival in power: the criminalisation of abortion.

Abortion was banned in 1973, with two exceptions: risk for the mother's life or rape. According to a survey, 13 percent of Bolivian women have had an induced abortion, and the World Health Organisation (WHO) has estimated that 9.1 percent of mothers' deaths in Bolivia are provoked by illegal abortions (Aliaga Bruch et al. 2011). The Constitutional Assembly was the scene of harsh clashes between feminist activists and conservative evangelic constituents such as the president of the Assembly, Silvia Lazarte (appointed by the MAS), who wanted to specify that human life begins from the moment of conception – with the aim of avoiding a future decriminalisation of abortion. The feminist activists eventually succeeded in eliminating this disposition, and the door kept open for the legalisation or decriminalisation of abortion.

After years of discussions within the MAS and with its allied social movements, in 2017 the government promoted a legal reform that would partially decriminalise abortion, despite the fierce opposition of the catholic church, the Bolivian College of Physicians and wide sectors of the parliamentary opposition. The feminist organisation Catholics for the Right to Decide was one of the major supporters of decriminalisation. Social organisations such as "Bartolinas" changed their previous position on the issue, and ended up supporting decriminalisation too. The draft reform of the Criminal Code introduced new exemptions to the crime of abortion: when decided by women who are students, or need to take care of children, elderly adults or individuals with a handicap. In addition, the proposed reform established that public health centres would have the obligation of carrying out the abortions that respect the law. However, the mass conservative protests in the streets against the decriminalisation of abortion and other changes included in the draft law led Evo Morales to pull back, renouncing to pass the reform. The proposed partial decriminalisation did not equate with the legalisation of abortion, but the failed reform would have put Bolivia among the most permissive countries on this issue in Latin America (abortion is only legal in Cuba, Guyana and Uruguay). This failure was one of the most important shortcomings in the MAS' legislative agenda on gender equality since 2006.

e) Women's access to land

The unequal distribution of land inherited from the colonial period has traditionally been a key political question in Bolivia, where agriculture and the food industry are major economic sectors. As advanced above, women's access to land is particularly relevant in Latin America, for it constitutes an assurance against poverty and a source of political and social power within indigenous communities (Deere and Contreras Díaz 2011). In addition, possessing land can be a protective factor against domestic violence, because women who own land enjoy greater economic autonomy – and thus are less dependent from their husbands. A land reform was launched after the 1952 National Revolution, but it was incomplete: decades later, very small plots were still frequent in the highlands, while agribusiness occupied large territories in the Half Moon lowlands. In 1996, the Law of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA) was approved, but its application was limited until Evo Morales' arrival in power in 2006, which accelerated the process.

The INRA Law for the first time recognised women's right to equal access to land property, but it did not include enough mechanisms to guarantee gender equality in the land distribution. Women have played a central role in the Indigenous Marches for Land and the Territory and the Bolivian *Movimiento Sin Tierra* (MST) – inspired by the well-known sister movement in Brazil. Besides, NGOs such as the International Land Coalition, Fundación Tierra and the Women's Coordination have struggled for women's access to land, in addition to "Bartolinas" Federation and female coca-growers. Between 2006 and 2012, 80 percent of the land remediation processes carried out by INRA benefited couples, which constituted a major change, for land titles used to be given only to men. Until 2014, almost half of the individual beneficiaries were women, which also constituted a relatively positive step towards greater gender equality in the distribution of land property (International Land Coalition 2015, 182). However, the International Land Coalition has demanded a greater visibility of the productive role of rural women, which is increasingly important in Bolivia (International Land Coalition 2015, 195). In short, gender inequalities in land distribution have now been addressed for the first time, but the imbalance is still wide.

f) Human trafficking

Bolivia, together with Venezuela, is one of the countries that suffer the highest prevalence of human trafficking, according to the US Department of State (Página Siete 2018) – even though the Bolivian government has contested the conclusions of the American report (El Deber 2018). Between 2015 and 2017, the Bolivian government registered more than 550 cases of human trafficking per year (Ministerio de Justicia de Bolivia 2017). In South America, 74 percent of the victims are women, which justifies the adoption of the gender approach to address the problem (UNODC 2016). The interdiction of human trafficking was explicitly introduced in Article 15.V of the 2009

Bolivian Constitution, which shows the seriousness of the problem in the Andean country.

The main MAS-promoted policy against human trafficking was the 263/2012 Comprehensive Law against Human Trafficking and Smuggling, which created several institutions to challenge this crime and established that media must contribute to raise social awareness about the issue. In a similar way to Law 348 against gender-based violence, the 263 Law created a comprehensive legislative framework to prevent and repress human trafficking, and protect the victims. In addition, the Law reinforced the international cooperation to challenge this crime. Most victims are kidnapped and transported to Argentina and Brazil, and the situation is particularly serious in the Bolivian-Argentinian border, where Morales' government launched a specific program funded by United Nations (Corsi n.d.)

g) Domestic workers' rights

Domestic workers have traditionally been one of the most discriminated and socially vulnerable sectors in Bolivia. As explained above, the 2450/2003 Law ended up with the secular legal discrimination suffered by domestic workers. Since then, Bolivian domestic workers are entitled to the same limits of daily working time (with an exception for workers who live in their employers' homes), the same annual holidays and minimum salary, among other rights. However, the new norm did not have a sound immediate impact on domestic workers' situation. Some of its articles needed to be developed through executive decrees to be effective, and the implementation of the law was a difficult task. As it will be explained in Chapter 6, several norms were approved between 2006 and 2018 to enforce the 2450/2003 Law and improve the working and living conditions of domestic workers.

h) LGBTI rights

The right to abortion and equal marriage were the most controversial issues for feminist and LGBTI activists in the 2006-2009 Constituent Assembly. While feminists obtained a partial victory regarding abortion, as detailed above, the conservative sectors of the Assembly (including certain MAS constituents) succeeded in introducing in the Constitution an article that restricted marriage and civil unions to "one woman and one man" (Art. 63) – as explained by a former member of the LGBTI activist group *Familia Galán* who was interviewed for the present thesis. Although in principle this disposition forbad same-sex marriage, the Bolivian Ombudsman presented in 2011 a proposal to legalise it, with the support of the MAS' MPs, but it did not succeed. The advocates of equal marriage argue that Article 63 of the Constitution is contrary to Article 14.II, which explicitly forbids any discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Evo Morales has shown his personal opposition to equal marriage, and has

also affirmed that the Bolivian people should decide on this issue through a referendum (Mendoza 2015).

The greatest advancements on LGBTI rights since the MAS' arrival in power were the 45/2010 Law against Racism and All Forms of Discrimination – which explicitly forbad discriminations on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity – and the 807/2016 Law on Gender Identity, which allowed the change of the legal gender. The 807 Law raised fierce opposition from the catholic church, evangelic churches and part of the parliamentary opposition, focused on the alleged risk that homosexual individuals would change their legal gender to marry their same-sex partners. A group of conservative senators brought an action against the Law to the Constitutional Court, which ruled in 2017 that the citizens who change their legal gender cannot get married or adopt children. Important MAS leaders such as former Congress president Gabriela Montaño showed their opposition to the judicial decision (Correo del Sur 2017). The surprising ruling of the Constitutional Court constituted a hard blow for LGBTI movements and for the government's legislative agenda on LGBTI rights.

Conclusions

In 2006, Evo Morales and his left-wing populist party the MAS acceded to state power for the first time in Bolivian history. During the following years, the Andean country experienced a process of deep but contradictory progressive political transformation. Neoliberalism was overcame and social inequalities where reduced, and the indigenous majority of the country acquired a relevant position in Bolivian politics. The so-called 'process of change' has also shown failures, such as major corruption cases, the continuation of the extractionist economic model and the hostility of the MAS' government towards certain aspects of liberal democracy. Regarding gender equality policies, the 2006-2018 period has been one of major legislative progress, although implementation of certain policies is weak. The promotion of an ambitious agenda on gender equality by left-wing populist the MAS makes Bolivia a very suitable case to analyse the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, which I do in the following chapters, focusing on three aspects: the international influence of the Bolivian legislation on violence against women in politics, the formulation of gender policies in Morales' Bolivia, and the influence on women's movements on policy when populist parties are in government (focusing on the case of the domestic workers' movement).

Chapter 4. Tackling Violence Against Women in Politics through Law: The International Influence of the Pioneer Bolivian Legislation

In 2012, Bolivian councilwoman Juana Quispe was murdered after months of sexist harassment and aggressions. This crime triggered the approval of Law 243 on Political Violence and Harassment against Women, the first and so far the only law in the world that specifically focuses on this kind of violence. Violence against women in politics (VAWP) has been defined as the ensemble of "behaviors that specifically target women *as women* to leave politics by pressuring them to step down as candidates or resign a particular political office" (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016a, 218). This specific form of gender-based violence is receiving growing attention from academics, policy-makers and international organisations such as UN Women, because it threatens the efforts made during the last two decades to promote women's equal political participation through quotas and parity measures (Krook 2017a). Feminist attitudes have provoked a growing awareness of the problem of violence against women, particularly in Latin America. Some scholars have begun to assess measures to combat VAWP (Krook 2018), but there is still little research on how legislation against VAWP is designed, because few international and national norms on this topic have been approved.

This chapter contributes to scholarly discussions on legislative efforts to tackle VAWP, which have been so far the most frequent mean to stop this form of violence (Restrepo Sanín 2018). The present research analyses how the Bolivian legislation has influenced norms on VAWP drafted and passed in other countries and also by international organisations. Literature has suggested that Bolivian legislation inspired draft legislation on VAWP in Ecuador, Peru, Mexico and Costa Rica (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016a, 218), in addition to the model law elaborated by the Inter-American Commission on Women (Restrepo Sanín 2018, 676). Yet, no research has focused yet on how specific features of the Bolivian norms on VAWP have influenced norms in other contexts. I argue that four specific features of the Bolivian legislation have had a major influence on other norms on VAWP: (i) a wide and detailed definition of VAWP; (ii) the attribution to the electoral organ of competences to prevent VAWP; (iii) the establishment of political parties' responsibilities; and (iv) the (incomplete) adoption of an intersectional perspective.

The present Chapter analyses the influence of the Bolivian legislation on other legislation on VAWP through the concept of 'influential features', which I define as the specific elements of the analysed Bolivian legislation that have influenced norms on VAWP developed in other countries or by international organisations. This 'influential features' approach that I propose constitutes a version of the 'best practices' approach in policy-making, which has been defined as follows: "the practice of good practices aims to produce shared knowledge as a tool for effective and comparable policy-

making across different contexts" (Vettoretto 2009). I also draw on literature on policy diffusion, which has been particularly relevant to understand the diffusion of quota laws through international norms (Krook 2006). The focus of this chapter is exclusively placed on legislation content. The analysed norms are only drafts, and the ones that have been approved are very recent and have not been thoroughly implemented yet, which prevents from performing a rigorous analysis of implementation.

This chapter draws on literature on violence against women in politics (VAWP), an incipient field in political science which is tightly related with discussions on gender equality in political participation, on the one hand, and literature on political violence, on the other hand. VAWP presents two specificities: it targets women *because they are women*, and it has the aim of expelling them from politics. As (Ballington 2017) has pointed out, the term VAWP underlines the gendered character of this kind of violence, while the concept of political violence against women focuses on its political character. The notion of VAWP is used in the present research insofar as I adopt a gender and politics theoretical approach which conceives VAWP as the most serious manifestation of the patriarchal beliefs and behaviours that structure the political sphere. The research adopts moreover an intersectional approach, looking at how VAWP affect different groups of women and how legislation on VAWP should adopt an intersectional perspective (Crenshaw 1991; Ferree 2009; King 1988; La Barbera 2009) – the intersectional approach is particularly relevant in Latin America, because class differences among women are stark and there is an important degree of ethnic diversity in several countries in the region, including Bolivia.

The chapter is based on the analysis of the Bolivian legislation on VAWP and other national and international norms and draft norms on VAWP in Latin America – I focus on Latin America because it is the only region in the world in which specific and comprehensive legislative efforts to tackle VAWP have been deployed so far. The insights obtained through the analysis of legislation and draft legislation are complemented by semi-structured interviews with women's movements activists and former government officials and MPs. The chapter proceeds in five sections. Section 1 explains the theoretical framework of the research, identifies four key debates in literature on VAWP and how to tackle it through legislation. In section 2, I explain the methods of the chapter. Section 3 explains the process that led to the approval of the 243/2012 Law. Section 4 looks at the Bolivian legislation on VAWP in order to determine how that legislation answers to the theoretical debates identified in Section 1, focused on the definition of VAWP, the role of electoral organs and political parties, and intersectionality. The analysis is completed in Section 5, where I investigate how these features of Bolivian legislation have influenced subsequent norms on VAWP promoted by other Latin American states and international organisations.

1. Scholarly discussions on violence against women in politics (VAWP)

Research on VAWP constitutes an emergent field within gender and politics. It is tightly related with discussions on gender equality in political participation, which has been a priority for the United Nations and its member states since the 1995 Beijing United

Nations Conference on Women (UN Women 1995). As a consequence of women's under-representation in politics, tens of countries have introduced quotas to guarantee the balanced presence of women in Parliaments and other spaces of political participation during the last two decades (Celis 2009; Celis and Lovenduski 2018). However, there is still a major gender gap in political participation around the world, for at least two reasons. First, there exists still a sexist political culture in parties that limit real opportunities of participation for women (Brennan 2017; Restrepo Sanín 2017; Santamaría 2017; Verge and De la Fuente 2014). Second, violence against women who are involved in politics is a persisting reality in all regions of the world (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2016). While some authors suggest that the apparent increase in cases might reflect an increase in awareness (Alanís Figueroa 2017; Ballington 2017; Krook 2017b), several other consider that violence against women in politics is growing *as a reaction to* the increase in the number of women in the public sphere (Alvarez Minte 2015; Bardall 2013; OAS 2015).

Literature on VAWP can be classified into four groups. First are studies that look at the prevalence and features of VAWP in countries such as India, Nepal and Pakistan (Kumari et al. 2014), Peru (Quintanilla Zapata 2012), Brazil (Biroli, 2018), Mexico (Cerva 2014), and Bolivia (ACOBOL, 2013; Machicao Barbery, 2004; ONU Mujeres, n.d.; Rojas Valverde, 2012). Secondly, there are studies that look at the nature of VAWP. These take the form of works that focus on specific topics such as the conceptualization of VAWP (Bardall, Bjarnegård, and Piscopo 2017a, 2017b; Krook 2017a; Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016a, 2016c; Piscopo 2016b), how communication technologies are used to exert VAWP (Bardall 2013), the impact of VAWP on the political performance of its victims (Rojas Valverde 2011), the conception of VAWP as a sexist 'backlash' against the increase in the number of women in politics (Alvarez Minte 2015; Bardall 2013), gender-based violence during electoral processes (Bjarnegård 2016), the gendered character of parliaments (Erikson and Josefsson 2018), and the intersectional character of VAWP (Kuperberg 2018). Thirdly, there are a number of methodological research works, which have focused on issues such as how to measure VAWP (Ballington 2018), the use of qualitative methods to conduct research in this field (Kuperberg 2016) and strategies for data collection on sexist election violence (Bjarnegård 2018).

Literature on VAWP also includes a fourth and last group of studies that look at existent efforts to challenge this form of violence against women (Krook 2018), the stream of research to which the present chapter contributes. While some authors have investigated the role of the judicial system in the struggle against VAWP (Bou Valverde 2012), most of them have focused on law. Hernández (Hernández 2017) has highlighted the importance of passing specific legislation to tackle this kind of gender-based violence, while Krook and Restrepo Sanín have pointed out that "legislation can be valuable even if there is little implementation, as a law establishes that the behavior in question is wrong — validating violence against women in politics as a "problem" and empowering victims in their efforts to gain some measure of justice, however imperfect" (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016c, 463–64). Indeed, passing

specific legislation has been so far the most usual strategy to challenge VAWP from the state (Restrepo Sanín 2018).

Research on how to tackle VAWP through law includes Albaine's (2017) comparative research on existing laws and draft laws on VAWP in Latin America, Restrepo Sanín's (2018) investigation on the limitations of the definitions of VAWP followed by some laws, and the analysis of the debates that preceded the approval of Law 243 in Bolivia carried out by Cabezas Fernández (2014). For their part, Freidenberg and Del Valle Pérez (2017) edited a volume that reviews existing legislation on VAWP in Latin America, with a focus on the Mexican case. The literature has suggested that Bolivian legislation has influenced other countries' legislative initiatives on VAWP (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016a) and international norms (Restrepo Sanín, 2018), but no research has investigated yet which specific features of the Bolivian legislation influenced other countries and how, which is the question addressed by the present chapter. In the following paragraphs I identify four key debates in the literature on how to design legislation against VAWP: the definition of VAWP, the role of electoral organs in the prevention of VAWP, the responsibilities of political parties, and intersectionality.

1.1. The definition of 'violence against women in politics'

Discussions on the concept of VAWP stand out for their theoretical relevance and their practical importance for the design of legislation. Research has revealed that female politicians suffer not only physical and sexual aggressions, but also symbolic, psychological and economic forms of violence. Bardall (2011) established that female politicians report intimidation and psychological abuse more often than male politicians, while data produced by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2016) shows that 25 per cent of female MPs have suffered physical violence, more than 20 per cent have been subjected to some form of sexual violence, more than 80 per cent have suffered psychological violence, and 30 per cent have experienced economic violence. Economic violence includes denying the reimbursement of electoral expenses to female politicians or even not paying them their wages (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016a, 142–43).

Some of the most intense theoretical discussions on the definition of VAWP have focused on which kinds of behaviours must be included within the concept of VAWP. The diversity of forms of VAWP identified through empirical research has led several authors to consider that the notion of 'violence' should be problematized with the aim of including *economic* and *symbolic* forms of violence in the definition of VAWP (Biroli 2016; Krook 2017b, 2017a; Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016a, 2016c; Machicao Barbery 2004; Restrepo Sanín 2017). Biroli defends this position in the following terms: "I am aware that the lack of clear borders to the concept of political violence against women might be an issue, but it could as well be an advantage as it exposes the connections between suppressing women's voices, gender debate and agenda, and acting violently against women" (Biroli 2016, 583). There has been a debate on the convenience of

including symbolic violence within the concept of VAWP between the aforementioned authors and Piscopo (2016). Krook and Restrepo Sanín (2016a) consider that symbolic violence should be considered as a specific form of VAWP (together with physical, psychologic and economic violence), while Piscopo advocates a neat distinction "between criminal acts of physical and psychological violence, and sexist practices of economic and symbolic violence" (Piscopo 2016b, 445–46). Accordingly, only the first should be included in legal definitions of VAWP as a crime. Other authors do not explicitly advocate either position, even as they include economic and symbolic forms of violence in their research (Quintanilla Zapata 2012; Rojas Valverde 2011), while other scholars have rather focused on physical and symbolic forms violence (Bjarnegård 2016; Hoyos 2014). In sum, there is an open discussion in the literature on the boundaries of the concept of VAWP, focused on which specific forms of violence should be included within the notion of VAWP.

1.2. The role of electoral courts in preventing and addressing VAWP

The debate on the definition of VAWP relates to discussions about which state institutions should tackle this sort of gender-based violence. This focuses on electoral courts, which are the organs responsible for the organisation and supervision of electoral processes, and have a particular juridical and political salience in Latin America. Some authors consider that attributing electoral courts a certain role in the struggle against VAWP is "efficient" from a political viewpoint, for electoral courts are stronger and more active than other institutions in defending gender equality (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016c, 476–78). However, Krook and Restrepo Sanín recognize that electoral courts present limitations, as generally they cannot sanction VAWP, a point in which they agree with Piscopo (2016). For her part, Piscopo rejects the framing of VAWP as an "electoral problem" and argues that electoral courts are not the best institutions to address political gender-based violence, beacause "they cannot investigate, prosecute and imprison individual offenders" (Piscopo, 2016, p. 448). Rather, she proposes to address VAWP as a manifestation of the general impunity enjoyed by "those who violate others' rights to bodily integrity, irrespective of the means or motives of abuse". Indeed, Piscopo considers that the struggle against VAWP must not be based on specific legal tools but "must be embedded within broader efforts to construct just, fair, and effective democratic institutions" (Piscopo 2016b, 455), particularly in Latin America, where – she argues – judicial and democratic institutions are weak. For her part, Albaine (2017, 138) considers that electoral organs should have the capacity to monitor the respect by parties of the duties that some laws impose to them in order to prevent and sanction VAWP. Therefore, there is an open debate on the role that electoral courts should have in the struggle against VAWP.

1.3. The responsibilities of political parties in the struggle against VAWP

Research suggests that VAWP is tightly intertwined with the marginalization of women within parties. Several authors have pointed out that the sexist political culture of

parties hampers the attempts to guarantee the equal participation of women, even when formal rules such as quotas are implemented (Brennan 2017; Restrepo Sanín 2017; Santamaría 2017; Verge and De la Fuente 2014). Violence is indeed one of the "resistance strategies" that attempt to stop women's representation gains in parties and candidacies, together with "bad implementation" of gender-related rules, "delegitimization" and "trumping" (Celis and Lovenduski 2018, 158), particularly at the local level (Piscopo 2016b). Members of other parties or the victim's party are some of the most frequent authors of VAWP (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016a, 139). The link between parties' resistance to parity and violence against female politicians is so strong that some authors jointly address both issues, conceiving VAWP primarily as a limiting factor of the effectivity of parity rules (Archenti and Albaine 2013b; Restrepo Sanín 2017).

Insofar as political parties are the space where much of VAWP takes place and perpetrators are often party members, certain authors (e.g. Albaine 2017) and institutions have called for engaging parties in the struggle against VAWP. The US National Democratic Institute included this approach in its campaign #NotTheCost against VAWP, assisting political parties in how to challenge this violence (Krook 2018). The Mexican National Council on Preventing and Eliminating Discrimination prompted parties to get involved in the struggle against sexist violence among their ranks (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016a, 132). The role of political parties in the struggle against VAWP is therefore an incipient discussion in scholarly and grey literature on how to tackle VAWP through law.

1.4. Intersectionality in legislation on VAWP

The intersectional perspective has underlined that gender can interact with other forms of domination (such as class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability and age), creating new specific and complex forms of domination (King, 1988; Crenshaw, 1991) – different structures of domination do not simply addition to each other, but 'intersect'. The intersectional perspective is increasingly present in the literature on gender and politics (Ferree 2009; Kantola and Lombardo 2017; La Barbera 2009). La Barbera explains that understanding gender as intersectional does not refer to an "additive process" (patriarchy is added to other structures of domination), but to a "constitutive process", where "any form of gender discrimination is originated and interconnected with other factors in inextricable ways" (La Barbera 2009, 1). This conception of intersectionality in relation to gender is close to Ferree's concept of 'interactive intersectionality', which is particularly useful to explore the intersectional perspective in legislation on VAWP. Taking the example of 'race' and 'gender', Ferree defines the intersections between both categories as "a process through which 'race' takes on multiple 'gendered' meanings for particular women and men" in different fields such as "sexuality, reproduction, political authority, employment or housing" (Ferree 2009, 87).

A growing number of authors has introduced intersectionality in discussions on VAWP and how to tackle it. Tolley (2017) has explored whether patterns of representations of women are applicable to racial minorities, focusing on the case of candidate recruitment in Canadian political parties, Reingold (2017) has looked at legislative leadership and intersections of gender and ethnicity, and Dhrodia (2018) found out that female MPs of colour suffered 30 per cent more abuse than white female MPs during the 2017 general election campaign in the UK. In addition, the data produced by the Inter-Parliamentary Union shows that young female MPs experience more abuse than older ones (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016). For her part, Kuperberg (2018) has highlighted the fact that specific structures of domination that are relevant to VAWP can take different forms and levels of salience in different contexts. Kuperberg (2018) suggests that asking local activists is the best criterion to determine which specific structures of domination are the most relevant in each context is to ask local activists. Her position partially matches the proposal by Townsend-Bell (2011), who considers that the relevance of each structure of domination in specific contexts can be identified through two criteria: analytical importance and activist's opinions. This discussion is key for the analysis of how to introduce the intersectional approach in legislation on VAWP.

Summing up, the key debates in the literature on VAWP refer to 1) the boundaries of the concept of VAWP, 2) the role of electoral courts in the struggle against VAWP, 3) The responsibilities of political parties in the struggle against VAWP, and 4) Intersectionality in legislation on VAWP. These will be the theoretical issues addressed in this chapter through the analysis of the Bolivian legislation on VAWP (Section 4) and the influence of this legislation on other Latin American countries and international organisations (Section 5).

2. Methodology

Research in the present research is based on two methods: qualitative content analysis of legislation on VAWP and semi-structured interviews with key actors. The content analysis has been carried out by looking for key concepts that synthetize the four theoretical discussions previously identified: the definition of violence against women in politics (I have looked for "violence" and "harassment" in the analysed documents), the role of electoral courts in preventing and addressing VAWP (I have looked for the word "electoral"), the attribution of responsibilities to political parties in the struggle against VAWP (I have searched the terms has been "parties" and "party"), and intersectionality in legislation against VAWP (I have looked for the words "intersectionality", "intersectional", "age", "ethnicity", "race", "indigenous", "LGBT", "rural", and "class").

The selection of the sample of norms and draft norms has been done following Lindekilde's (2014) method of intentional sampling strategy, which implies selecting the most relevant documents for the theoretical purposes of the research. The sample is composed of Bolivian legislation, international legislation and other national

legislation in Latin America on VAWP (19 documents). The sub-sample of Bolivian legislation includes the 2009 Constitution – which set the legal basis for further specific legislation on VAWP –, the 243/2012 Law on Political Violence and Harassment against Women, the 2935/2016 Supreme Decree that regulates the implementation of Law 243, and the 1096/2018 Law on Political Organisations, which does not exclusively focus on VAWP but includes relevant regulations to tackle this kind of violence. The 2935/2016 Decree and the 1096/2018 Law did not influence many of the norms on VAWP promoted out of Bolivia, because the latter were elaborated *after* the mentioned Bolivian norms, but these have been included in the analysis to obtain a complete picture of the whole Bolivian legal body on VAWP.

Table 1: Bolivian legislation on VAWP

Document title	Kind of document	Institution and date
Bolivian Constitution	Constitution	Bolivian Constituent Assembly, 2006-2009
243/2012 Law against Violence and Political Harassment on Women	Law	Parliament of Bolivia
2935/2016 Supreme Decree	Supreme Decree	Government of Bolivia
1096/2018 Law on Political Organisations	Law	Parliament of Bolivia

Source: prepared by the author

The second sub-sample of norms is formed by the most important international norms that refer on VAWP: the Santo Domingo Consensus (CEPAL 2013) approved by the state members of the Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (CEPAL), the Frame Norm to Consolidate *Paritarian* Democracy approved by UN Women and the Latin American and Caribbean Parliament (UN Women and Parlatino 2015), the Declaration on Political Violence and Harassment Against Women of the Organisation of American States (OAS 2015b), and the Inter-American Model Law for the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Political Violence against Women, which intends to inspire future legislation on the topic in the Americas (OAS 2017). Some of these norms were elaborated before the 243/2012 Law, and thus this Law did not influence them, but they have been included in the analysis to get a complete view of the international legal efforts to tackle VAWP.

Table 2: Latin American international legislation on VAWP

Document title	Kind of document	Institution and date
Quito Consensus	International statement	Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean, 2007
Santo Domingo Consensus	International statement	Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean, 2013
Frame Norm to Consolidate *Paritarian* Democracy	Non-binding international instrument	Un Women and the Latin American and Caribbean Parliament, 2015

| Declaration on Political Violence and Harassment Against Women | International statement | Organisation of American States, 2015 |
| Inter-American Model Law for the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Political Violence against Women | Non-binding international instrument | Organisation of American States, 2017 |

Source: prepared by the author

The third subsample of legislative documents is composed of the existing national and sub-national draft norms on VAWP in Latin America. In Mexico, only the non-binding 2016 Protocol to Address Political Violence against Women has been approved, while the Constitution of Mexico City has included the possibility of reversing an election if women candidates have suffered violence. Both norms are analysed in the present chapter. In Ecuador, a first draft law on VAWP was rejected in 2012 and a new project was presented in 2016, which is currently under discussion. In Costa Rica and Honduras, draft laws on this issue are currently being discussed. In addition, several Latin American countries have included references to VAWP in general legislation on gender-based violence: the 5777/2016 Law in Paraguay, the 520/2011 Special Comprehensive Law for a Life Free of Violence for Women in El Salvador, and the 26485/2009 Law on Comprehensive Protection for Women in Argentina. The mentioned legislation is included in the sample.

Table 3: national legislations on VAWP in Latin America

Document title	Kind of document	Institution and date
Argentina's 26485/2009 Law	Law	Parliament of Argentina, 2009
El Salvador's 520/2011 Law	Law	Parliament of El Salvador, 2011
Peruvian draft law on VAWP (num 1903)	Draft law	Peru MPs, 2012
Costa Rican draft law on VAWP (num. 18719)	Draft law	Costa Rica MPs, 2013
Honduran draft decree-law on VAWP	Draft decree-law	Honduras MPs, 2015
Ecuadorian draft law on VAWP (num. 560-BCG-A)	Draft law	Ecuador MPs, 2016
Mexican Protocol to Address Political Violence against Women	Non-binding legal protocol	Federal Electoral Court of Mexico, 2016
Paraguay's 5777/2016 Law	Law	Parliament of Paraguay, 2016
Constitution of Mexico City	Local constitution	Mexico City Constituent Assembly, 2017

Source: prepared by the author

The second component of the research design is interviews: the sample is 16 members of women's organisations, former government officials and experts on VAWP (as

detailed in Appendix 1). The respondents were selected purposively with the aim of obtaining a precise view of the process of politicization of VAWP and the formulation of legislation against VAWP in Bolivia, which led me to include in the sample former ministers, MPs and officials, members of ACOBOL and other women's organisations that were directly involved in the drafting of Law 243 and its decree, and international experts involved in the drafting on international legislation on VAWP or who have analysed the policy diffusion of the Bolivian legislation. Respondents were identified and contacted through the snow-ball method, and the search of new interviewees was stopped when I had obtained enough information. The interviews were carried out during two fieldwork trips in March-April 2016 and April 2017, excepting a small group of interviews that were carried out virtually on June 2019.

The research is focused on the case of Bolivia. This case is paramount for the analysis of legislation on VAWP, because it was the first country that passed a specific law on this form of gender-based violence. The focus of this chapter is not the Bolivian legislation in itself, but how certain features of the 243/2012 Bolivian Law influenced norms elaborated by international organisations and other countries' parliaments and governments – the process of policy diffusion of legislation on VAWP in Latin America. However, a good knowledge of the political process that led to the passing of the 243/2012 Law is needed to understand the key features of the Bolivian legislation on VAWP that I address in Section 4.

3. The long way to Law 243

The passing of the first law on VAWP in the world in Bolivia can be explained through three factors: the high prevalence of this form of gender-based violence in the Andean country, the role of the Association of Female Bolivian Councilwomen and Mayors (ACOBOL), and the favourable political context made up of the parliamentary majority of left-wing indigenist and populist party Movement Towards Socialism (the MAS) from 2006, and the alliance between feminist NGOs and women's social organisations, as explained by several activists who were interviewed for this research. There is no exact data on the number of cases of VAWP in Bolivia, but existing sources suggest a high prevalence of this kind of aggressions. During the 2000-2009 period, ACOBOL gathered information about 249 cases of VAWP, with 34 cases between 2010 and 2011 (María Eugenia Rojas Valverde 2012, 77). ACOBOL (2010) gathered 249 cases between 2000 and 2009. This figure probably underestimates the magnitude of the phenomena, for, as a member of ACOBOL in Cochabamba stated to me, most cases are not reported.

The second factor that explains the approval of Law 243 is the role played by ACOBOL. In the words of a Bolivian feminist activist who was interviewed for the present research, "ACOBOL led the process [of formulation] of the law on harassment and political violence", an analysis that is shared by other feminist activists and former government officials. ACOBOL is a federation composed of the nine regional Associations of Councilwomen, whose stated aim is to guarantee "the political and institutional representation of councilwomen and female majors regarding their rights

and emerging interests" (ACOBOL 2016). ACOBOL was created in 1999, with the aim of promoting the equal participation of women in politics. At that time, gender quotas were at the centre of the Bolivian political debate – quotas were introduced in local elections just one year after the foundation of ACOBOL (Cabezas Fernández 2014a, 31).

In addition to collecting plaints of VAWP, since its foundation ACOBOL has analysed the Bolivian law and the international women's rights law in order to look for ways of legally tackling VAWP (Rojas Valverde, 2012, 99). Another component of ACOBOL's work on legislation was the analysis of all the Constitutional Court rulings between 2004 and 2005, with the aim of finding out if any case of VAWP had made its way until the Constitutional Court. No case of VAWP was found, which meant that no plaint of VAWP had been reviewed by the Constitutional justice system between 2004 and 2005 (Rojas Valverde, 2012, 89). In 2001 ACOBOL activists reached the conclusion that the existing legal framework was insufficient to effectively tackle VAWP, and the Association proposed to the Parliament the promulgation of a law on the topic (Rojas Valverde 2012, 74). The first draft law on VAWP was addressed to Parliament in 2001, but it was first discussed in 2006, soon after the electoral landslide that gave the MAS party a large parliamentary majority.

The MAS and president Evo Morales' arrival to state power allowed the discussion of the draft law – which was defended by Elizabeth Salguero, a middle-class feminist MAS MP – but it was not enough for its immediate approval. As Cabezas Fernández (2014) has analysed in length, during the first term of Morales in government (2006-2010), the law was unanimously supported by the opposition MPs but the MAS parliamentary group was divided. The indigenous-peasant MAS female MPs who spoke in the session where the draft was discussed manifested their opposition to it, using a motherhood frame: they considered that the Law against VAWP would sanction "their sons, husbands and brothers", as MP Julia Ramos put it (Cabezas Fernández, 2014, 33). The general orientations of the future Law were eventually approved during the 2006-2010 term, but further discussion on its content was needed before its approval. The following parliamentary debate on the topic was scheduled for September 2007. Activists belonging to ACOBOL and other organisations of the Committee for the Promotion of Women's Political Rights gathered in front of the Parliament to support the Law, but a group of indigenous-peasant MAS female MPs pressured the ruling body of the Parliament and they succeeded in excluding the discussion of the draft from the day's agenda (Cabezas Fernández, 2014, 33). The draft law was not discussed again until the following legislative term.

The situation was gradually deblocked with the beginning of the constituent process. As several activists and former ministers told me, the process of beginning to develop a new constitution in 2006 promoted the formation of an alliance between feminist NGOs (mostly made up of middle-class white women) and women's social organisations (organisations of indigenous and peasant women), which eventually allowed the passing of Law 243 and other laws on gender equality during the second

term of the MAS in power (2010-2014). The MAS MP who defended in Parliament the draft law on VAWP explained the process to me in the following terms:

> During my first term [as MP], it was extremely hard, we could not even pass the law on gender-based harassment and political violence, on which we had been working for four years […]. It took many years of work to install certain issues; later on, indigenous women [who were MAS MPs] understood that these were also *their* issues.

The rapprochement of positions between feminist NGOs and their allies in parliament, on the one hand, and women's social organisations and their MPs, on the other, worked also in the other direction: middle-class feminists became increasingly aware of the demands and priorities of women belonging to popular classes, as one feminist activist explained to me.

The law was eventually passed in 2012, shortly after the murder of councilwoman Juana Quispe, which provoked a national shock. In an interview conducted for this research, an activist belonging to ACOBOL said that this crime raised the awareness of the public and the MAS about the seriousness of VAWP, and accelerated the passing of the law. Several feminist activists and former MAS officials interviewed noted that the engagement of a group of ministers and the MAS MPs was key for the law being passed. Four years later, the ministry of justice approved Supreme Decree 2935/2016 to implement the norm. A member of ACOBOL explained that the contents of the decree are based to a great extent on the proposals of ACOBOL; a contention confirmed by a senior official in gender equality policies who was also interviewed for this research. In 2018, the Law on Political Organisations was approved, completing the Bolivian legislation against VAWP.

In addition to the campaign for the passing of a law on VAWP, ACOBOL conducted important research work on VAWP in Bolivia. The studies carried out by ACOBOL constitute the most complete quantitative source on VAWP in Bolivia, as it is shown by the frequent references to them both in the Bolivian and the foreign academic literature on the topic, and in documents produced by international organisations (Albaine, 2015b; Archenti and Albaine, 2013; Cabezas Fernández, 2014; Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016a, 2016b; Machicao Barbery, 2004; Piscopo, 2016; Rojas Valverde, 2012, 2010). During the 2000-2009 period, ACOBOL gathered information about 249 cases of VAWP, and 34 cases where collected between 2010 and 2011 (Rojas Valverde, 2012). According to the Bolivian Observatory of Gender[5], by 2012 ACOBOL had gathered around 4000 plaints from elected women who had suffered VAWP (Coordinadora de la Mujer 2012a). ACOBOL did not only gather the complaints, but it also included the victims' demographic and educational data, the actions that were taken to tackle the aggression, a detailed description of the case, and the reasons for

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[5] The Gender Observatory (*Observatorio de Género*) is a platform for the production of knowledge on gender issues, created by the Bolivian Women's Coordination (*Coordinadora de la Mujer*), the most important alliance of Bolivian feminist organisations.

the aggression. This detailed data allowed ACOBOL to propose a typology of political harassment and violence against women (María Eugenia Rojas Valverde 2012, 99), which was included in the draft law presented in 2001 and Law 243 passed in 2012.

4. Key features of the Bolivian legislation on VAWP

The analysis of the literature on how to tackle VAWP has allowed to identify discussions on four issues: the legal definition of VAWP, the attribution to the electoral organ of competences to prevent VAWP, the establishment of political parties' responsibilities in the struggle against VAWP, and the introduction of the intersectional perspective in legislation on VAWP. In the following paragraphs I analyse the Bolivian legislation in the light of the mentioned questions.

4.1. A wide and detailed definition of 'violence against women in politics'

The definition of violence against women in politics of the Bolivian legislation includes economic and symbolic forms of violence, which reinforces Krook and Restrepo Sanín's (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016c) position in their debate with Piscopo (2016). The 243/2012 Bolivian Law establishes a distinction between harassment (defined in Article 7.a as "acts of pressure, persecution, molestation or threats") and violence (defined in Article 7.b as "actions, behaviours and/or physical, psychological or sexual aggressions"). According to the Law, harassment and political violence have two major commonalities: their victims and their aim, as specified in Article 7:

> [Acts of harassment or political violence are] "committed by an individual or a group of individuals, directly or through third parties, against women who are candidates, elected, designed or in exercise of the political-public function, or against their families, with the aim of shortening, suspending, restricting or preventing the exercise of the functions that are inherent to her post, in order to induce her or force her to carry out — against her will — an action or an omission, exerting her functions or her rights" (Articles 7.a and 7.b).

This definition includes the two elements identified by Krook and Restrepo Sanín (2016a, 218) to distinguish VAWP from other kinds of political violence: it targets women *because they are women*, and it intends to expulse them from politics.

The specific behaviours and actions that fall into the definitions of harassment and political violence in the Bolivian legislation are detailed in Article 8 of Law 243 and Article 2 of Decree 2935. Article 8 of the Law establishes a very detailed list of 17 actions that constitute harassment or political violence, such as imposing, due to gender stereotypes, tasks unrelated to the job itself; restricting a woman's ability to speak in sessions; divulging personal and private information to force women to resign; spreading false information with the objective of discrediting a woman's leadership; applying illegal economic sanctions or withholding women's salaries. The latter is a form of economic violence, while the other mentioned behaviours can be considered as symbolic forms of violence. Article 2 of Decree 2935 develops and specifies the distinction between harassment and political violence established in the

law: the decree specifies the three forms that harassment can take (pressure, persecution and molestation), and the four forms of political violence (threat, physical aggression, psychological aggression and sexual aggression). As noted above, the Bolivian legal definition of VAWP includes both economic violence and symbolic violence

The most important features of the conceptualization of VAWP in the Bolivian legislation are its high degree of detail, and the wide range of behaviours that are included within the concepts of harassment and violence against women in politics. The high precision of the definitions provided by Law 243 and its decree seems to be a consequence of the fact that the law was based on the cases of VAWP collected by ACOBOL since its creation in 1999 (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016b, 129; ONU Mujeres n.d., 133). For example, pressures to make councilwomen resign — which is one of the behaviours included in Article 8 of the Law — were identified as the most common form of VAWP by ACOBOL in its research on the 2000-2005 period (ONU Mujeres n.d., 134): 36 per cent of the 117 victims of VAWP whose cases were analysed by ACOBOL reported having suffered pressures to make them resign (Rojas Valverde 2010, 529).

Both a former feminist minister and the responsible for gender in a NGO based in La Paz who were interviewed for this research underlined the importance of a precise and detailed definition of VAWP in Law, taking into account the conservative and patriarchal political orientation of most judges in Bolivia — which is a common feature with other countries. According to the mentioned interviewees, the prevalence of strong patriarchal beliefs among the Bolivian judiciary has constituted an obstacle for the implementation of gender-related norms such as the 348/2013 Comprehensive Law to Guarantee Women a Life Free of Violence, Law 243 and its Decree. In the same vein, another Bolivian feminist activist said that the functioning of the Bolivian judicial system was "an outrage" while another activist denounced its "patriarchal" orientation. This analysis is shared by Machicao Barbery, who reminded in her 2004 report on VAWP that at that point there had never been a criminal conviction for a case of gender-based political violence in Bolivia, even though aggressions were already penalized before the approval Law 243 (Machicao Barbery 2004, 55). In conclusion, the definition of VAWP in the Bolivian legislation is broad and highly detailed.

4.2. A powerful electoral organ

The analysis of the Bolivian legislation on VAWP and the context in which it was approved suggests that the attribution of competences on VAWP to electoral organs can be useful, particularly in countries where the institutions that hold the most important competences in this field (namely the regular judicial system and the ministry of justice) do not have enough resources or political will to deploy the needed efforts to prevent and stop VAWP.

The Bolivian 243 Law attributes important competences to the plurinational electoral organ in the struggle against VAWP, even though the ministry of justice is the main responsible for the implementation of Law 243 — the institution that is officially charged of gender policy in Bolivia is the vice ministry for the equality of opportunities, which belongs to the ministry of justice. Article 10.II of Law 243 allocates to the electoral organ the responsibility for "defining policies and intercultural strategies for the democratic education with gender equity, with the aim of guaranteeing the enjoyment of the political rights of persons — particularly women — and the equality of opportunities between men and women". This disposition is developed by two articles of Decree 2935. Article 3.e establishes that the ministry of justice must promote "actions of prevention, education, awareness-rising and analysis of the problem of harassment and political violence against women, *in coordination with the Plurinational Electoral Organ*". Article 10 of the decree attributes the competency of implementing "communication strategies to promote women's political rights and prevention of political harassment and violence, in spoken and written media, social media and others" to the ministry of justice, the ministry of communication, the subnational administrations and *the electoral organ*. Lastly, Decree 2935 establishes that a representative of the electoral organ will be one of the members of the mechanism for the prevention and immediate attention to victims of VAWP.

The Bolivian plurinational electoral organ was created by articles 205 to 208 of the 2009 Constitution and is regulated by Law 18/2010 of the Plurinational Electoral Organ. Feminist activist and former minister Salguero Carrillo (Salguero Carrillo 2014, 295) has highlighted that feminist activists and women's organisations played a major role in the formulation of the 18/2010 Law. As a consequence, the Law includes the principles of gender equality, parity, and several articles that focus on guaranteeing the effective exercise of political rights by women. Both feminist activists and feminist MAS officials who were interviewed for this research expressed their deep mistrust in the commitment of the vice ministry for the equality of opportunities regarding gender equality. A former minister (who was one of the main promoters of the Bolivian legislative gender agenda during Evo Morales' government) told me the following:

> The vice ministry for the equality of opportunities has never been an effective vice ministry, it has never had any power, it has never promoted any serious initiative.

According to another feminist activist and former minister, one of the reasons for the lack of engagement of the vice ministry for the equality of opportunities with gender issues is the excessive wideness of its competences: the vice ministry is responsible for the policies on age-based discrimination against children, teenagers and older individuals; discrimination against persons with handicap and all other kinds of discrimination, in addition to gender equality policy. The so-called 'general direction for the prevention on gender- and age-based violence' is the only section of the vice

ministry that focuses on gender, and it has only three employees and an annual budget of 8000 US dollars[6].

Interviews with Bolivian activists and officials also revealed that the MAS and Evo Morales' government's legislative agenda on gender equality was promoted by an ad-hoc alliance of ministers and MAS MPs that included the feminist activist who presided the plurinational electoral organ between 2015 and 2018. These feminist officials promoted the most important laws on gender equality approved from 2006 onwards, such as Law 243, the 263/2012 Law against Human Trafficking, and the 348/2013 Comprehensive Law to Guarantee Women a Life Free of Violence. Two members of this group of ministers and MPs confirmed to me that the attribution to the electoral organ of competences that could correspond to the ministry of justice was a strategic move of the promoters of Law 243. The attribution of competences to an electoral organ presided by a feminist activist allowed the development of policies for the prevention of VAWP even if the ministry of justice does not deploy enough efforts to tackle this sort of violence. As Piscopo has pointed out[7], good relations between feminist activists and electoral courts officials are usual in several Latin American countries, due to their past collaboration in the formulation of legislation on quotas – this is also the case in Bolivia. In a nutshell, the Bolivian legislation on VAWP attributes to the electoral organ a key role in preventing this form of violence.

4.3. Political parties, key actors to tackle VAWP

The Bolivian legislation on VAWP attributes a major responsibility to parties in preventing an addressing VAWP, and more generally in promoting the equal participation of women. Thus, Bolivian norms reflect the fact that the struggle against VAWP and the wider efforts to promote women's equal political participation are tightly entangled, as highlighted by literature (Archenti and Albaine 2013b; Celis and Lovenduski 2018; Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016b; Piscopo 2016b; Restrepo Sanín 2017). The Bolivian 243/2012 Law refers to the role of political parties in the struggle against gender-based political violence, in four specific ways. First of all, Article 80 sanctions the fact of providing the plurinational electoral organ with false information regarding the sex of the candidates to elections — according to the account of one activist of the Bolivian Women's Coordination, this provision intends to tackle the frequent practice of 'feminizing' the name of some candidates in order to skip the rules on gender parity, when parties send their lists to the electoral court. Secondly, the 2935/2016 Supreme Decree created a process to monitor the resignation of women elected to office, with the aim of verifying that the resignation is not a consequence of pressures. Thirdly, the sanctions against VAWP established by the law are harder when the author holds a position of responsibility within a political party (Article 17.II.4). Fourthly, the Forth Transitory disposition of Law 243 attributes to

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[6] Interview with the former head of the general direction.
[7] Personal communication, 2017.

parties the responsibility of including in their inner regulations provisions to prevent and sanction VAWP, and offer assistance to the victims.

Bolivian legislative and institutional efforts to engage political parties in the struggle against VAWP continued after the approval of Decree 2935 in 2016. The most important initiatives in this field were the creation of the Observatory of Democratic Parity in 2017, and the formulation of the 1096/2018 Law on Political Organisations. Both initiatives were promoted by the plurinational electoral organ, which confirms the salience of this institution in the struggle against VAWP in Bolivia. The Observatory of Democratic Parity is defined as follows in its foundational document (OEP 2017, 3):

> A specialized technical-political service whose core activity is the permanent observation of electoral processes, the political system and the political organisations, for the generation of information oriented to [...] the strengthening of electoral and political participation of women, from the perspective of the Intercultural and *Paritarian* Democracy.

One of the specific aims of the Observatory is the production and dissemination of knowledge on VAWP in Bolivia, in order to increase the visibility of this kind of violence and promote its effective "institutional and juridical" processing (OEP 2017, 3).

For its part, the 1096 Law on Political Organisations includes gender parity in the governing bodies of parties (parity in electoral lists has already been compulsory in Bolivia since 2009) and develops the legal requirement to include provisions on VAWP in the inner regulations of parties. As noted above, the link between the struggle against VAWP and the promotion of gender equality in political participation is expressed in Bolivia through the concept of '*paritarian* democracy' ('*democracia paritaria*' in Spanish), a notion which is being increasingly used by the electoral organ and the Bolivian office of UN Women (OEP and UN Women 2016). Recent Bolivian legislative and institutional initiatives framed within the concept of '*paritarian* democracy' propose to consider the struggle against VAWP as part of the wider effort to promote gender equality in political participation, through specific measures such as the introduction of parity regulations in the inner organisation of political parties. In conclusion, Bolivian legislation on VAWP clearly attempts to involve political parties in the struggle against VAWP, largely through the concept of *paritarian* democracy.

4.4. An intersectional legislation?

The intersectional perspective implies taking into account how different structures of domination interact, creating new specific forms of domination (Crenshaw 1991; King 1988), as explained above. A way of introducing the intersectional perspective in legislation against VAWP is establishing heavier sanctions when violence is committed against a woman who is simultaneously subjected to other structure(s) of domination, beyond gender. The identification of the relevant structures of domination in each context is one of the main challenges for the introduction of the intersectional perspective in activism, an issue addressed by Townsend-Bell (2011). She proposes to

determine which are the most relevant categories in each specific context through two criteria: the analytical importance of each category and activists' views. This proposal can be applied to the design of legislation on VAWP.

In the Bolivian context, the importance of ethnicity in politics suggests that this is one key structure of domination for female politicians (in addition to gender). The majority of the Bolivian population is indigenous, and racism against the indigenous majority has been a structural feature of the Bolivian society since the beginning of the Spanish colonisation in the 16th century. Therefore, many female politicians are indigenous and thus exposed to racism. Moreover, Law 243 was promoted in Parliament by the Movement to Socialism (the MAS, in Spanish), the left-wing populist and indigenist party that ruled Bolivia from 2006 to 2019. The relevance (Townsend-Bell 2011) of ethnicity in relation to VAWP in Bolivia seems to be confirmed by research. In her analysis of the 117 testimonies of VAWP gathered by ACOBOL between 2000 and 2005, Rojas Valverde highlighted that "Female council members were discriminated against not only for being women, but also because of colour/race and for other reasons" (Rojas Valverde 2010, 529–31). Of course, many other structures of domination can intersect with gender and race, but if we follow Townsend-Bell's (2011) approach, ethnicity seems to be a very relevant category in Bolivia. In addition, high rates of violence against LGBTI people in several Latin American countries (particularly against trans people) suggests that sexual orientation and gender identity could be two extra relevant categories in legislation on VAWP. Therefore, introducing the intersectional approach in the Bolivian legislation on VAWP would imply at least the imposition of more severe sanctions when violence is exerted against female politicians who belong to a subordinated ethnic group (indigenous or black women) or/and have a non-normative gender identity or sexual orientation.

The analysis has shown that Bolivian 243 Law establishes more severe punishments when acts of harassment or violence are committed against a pregnant woman (Article 17.II.1), a woman who is older than 60 (Article 17.II.2), a woman who has limited basic education (Article 17.II.3) or a woman who has a disability (Article 17.II.5). The inclusion of these aggravating circumstances means that the legislator considers that the fact of being older, being pregnant, having a disability or a low level or formal education interacts with gender in ways that increase the vulnerability of these groups of women to VAWP. Following Ferree's concept of interactive intersectionality (Ferree 2009), gender interacts with pregnancy, disability, older age or low education level in the field of political violence, increasing the vulnerability of these groups of women to VAWP. Therefore, the legislator has considered that these acts deserve a more severe response from the state than other cases of violence. Surprisingly, ethnicity, gender identity and sexual orientation are not included among the categories considered relevant by the legislator, which constitutes a pitfall of the adoption of the intersectional approach in the Bolivian legislation.

In addition to the lack of relevant categories of oppression in Law 243, it is not clear whether the inclusion of a list of aggravating circumstances is enough to consider that

intersectionality has been fully integrated in legislation – the very specificity of this approach is considering how different structures of oppression interact, which the Bolivian legislation does not do. For instance, the penalty is the same when the act of violence is committed against a woman who is older than 60 *and* has a disability that in the case where the woman is older than 60 and does not have any disability. This failure is particularly serious if we keep in mind the strength of sexist beliefs among the Bolivian judiciary – it seems unlikely that judges will apply the intersectional approach if the law does not clearly force them to do so. In conclusion, intersectionality is partially present in the Bolivian legislation on VAWP, because the possibility of gender interacting with other structures of oppression is considered, but two pitfalls have been identified by the analysis: 1) some relevant categories are absent of the regulation, and 2) the possibilities of interactions between gender and several other structures of domination are not considered.

5. How the Bolivian legislation influenced subsequent norms on VAWP

The literature has suggested that the Bolivian legislation on VAWP strongly influenced subsequent norms on VAWP in Latin America (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016, 218; Restrepo Sanín, 2018, 676), but no research has focused yet on this case of international policy diffusion. International policy diffusion (or "policy transfer") has been identified by literature on other fields of legislation, namely on quotas: Krook (2006) found that international sharing had been the most determinant factor on the rapid diffusion of quotas laws around the world since the end of the 1990s. I argue that international policy diffusion has also been key in the case of legislation on VAWP, based on three empirical elements: 1) the dates of approval of the analysed norms, 2) the similarity of contents of Bolivian legislation and further legal initiatives on VAWP, and 3) the accounts of international experts on legislation on VAWP. The following table explains the chronological relationship among the diverse legal initiatives against VAWP in Latin America.

Table 4: Legal initiatives against VAWP in Latin America

Dates	Legal initiatives	
2001	First draft law on VAWP submitted to the Bolivian Parliament by ACOBOL	
2006	First discussion of the draft law on VAWP in the Bolivian Parliament	
2007	CEPAL Quito Consensus	
2009	Argentina's 26485 Law on Comprehensive Protection for Women	New Bolivian Constitution

2011	El Salvador's 520 Special Comprehensive Law for a Life Free of Violence for Women		
2012	Bolivia's 243 Law on on Political Violence and Harassment against Women	Peru's draft law on VAWP (num. 1903)	
2013	Costa Rican draft law on VAWP (num. 18719)	CEPAL Santo Domingo Consensus	

2015	OAS Declaration on Political Violence and Harassment Against Women	OAS Frame Norm to Consolidate *Paritarian* Democracy	Honduran draft decree-law on violence against women in politics	
2016	Bolivia's 2935 Supreme Decree on VAWP	Ecuadorian draft law on VAWP (num. 560-BCG-A)	Mexican Protocol to Address Political Violence against Women	Paraguay's 5777 Law of Comprehensive Protection for Women

2017	Constitution of Mexico City	OAS Inter-American Model Law for the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Political Violence against Women
2018	Bolivia's 1096 Law on Political Organisations (Bolivia)	

Source: prepared by the author.

Table 4 shows that ACOBOL's draft law on VAWP was the first legal initiative on this issue in Latin America. In addition, the number of draft laws and international norms on VAWP dramatically increased from the moment Bolivian Law 243 was passed in 2012. Until that year, only three legal initiatives on VAWP had been launched out of Bolivia, while eleven of them has been identified from 2012 onwards. This sharp difference suggests that the Bolivian legislation exerted a considerable influence in the proliferation of legal initiatives on VAPW in the region. The 2007 CEPAL Quito Consensus, the 26485/2009 Argentinian Law and El Salvador's 520/2011 Law (which include explicit references to VAWP) were approved before the Bolivian 243/2012. However, several experts who were interviewed for this research revealed that previous discussions in Bolivia about the need to pass legislation on VAWP were key for the introduction of references to this kind of gender-based violence in the mentioned norms, even though they were approved before the 243/2012 Bolivian law. In conclusion, the chronological relationship between legal initiatives on VAWP in Latin

America suggests that the Bolivian 243 Law favoured the approval of similar norms and legal instruments on the issue throughout the region.

This finding is confirmed by the similarity of contents among the Bolivian Law and subsequent norms of VAWP, and by experts' accounts, as I explain the following paragraphs. The analysis is structured around the key features of the Bolivian legislation explained in Section 3: a wide definition of VAWP, the attribution of a central role in the struggle against VAWP to electoral organs and political parties, and an incomplete integration of the intersectional approach.

5.1. Wide definitions of VAWP

The Bolivian 243 Law defines VAWP in very wide terms, including many specific forms of physical, psychological, symbolic and economic forms of violence. The wideness of the definition has heavily influenced subsequent legislation on VAWP: both international and national norms refer to a wide array of forms of violence that include not only physical and psychological violence but also symbolic and economic violence. The 2015 Declaration on Violence and Political Harassment against Women passed by OAS is paramount in this sense, because it provides one of the widest definitions of VAWP, conceived as:

> Any action or omission […] which has the aim of damage, conceal, prevent, obstruct or prevent [women's] political rights […] in equal conditions to men.

The OAS Model Law on VAWP, which intends to work as a guide for future national legislation on the issue, also was directly inspired by Law 243, as confirmed to be by an international expert who took part in the drafting of the Model Law. This respondent affirmed that the specification of a wide array of behaviours that are considered as harassment and violence – a peculiarity of Law 243 – "is very useful, so we copied that structure". The OAS experts followed the same reasoning as the Bolivian policy-makers: VAPW "is an issue that provokes resistance [among judges and other judicial actors], therefore the more you specify [the sanctionable behaviours], the better".

At the national level, the same international expert confirmed that the Mexican Protocol to Address Political Violence Against Women followed the same logic. Psychological violence is included in the Ecuadorian, Costa Rican and Honduran draft laws, and sexual violence is explicitly mentioned in several norms (such as the Mexican Protocol). According to Albaine's analysis of norms on VAWP, the concept of harassment is often used to denominate "indirect" forms of violence, while 'violence' denominates "direct" forms of violence (Albaine 2017, 127). The detailed characterization of VAWP in Law 243 has also influenced draft norms in Costa Rica (it refers to acts committed through "omission, pressure, persecution, harassment and threats") and Honduras ("pressure, persecution, harassment and threats"). Economic violence is included in the Costa Rican draft law, under the label "patrimonial damage". As highlighted by an UN Women expert, several draft norms in the region refer to Law 243 in their statements of purpose. The Bolivian discussion on VAWP has

also influenced general laws on violence against women, such as Argentina's 26485/2009 Law. El Salvador's 520/2011 Law, and Paraguay's 577/2016. The mentioned UN Women expert explains this as follows:

> "The Bolivian legislation has helped the holding on debates on [...] legislation on violence against women that includes the characterization of violence against women in the political context".

In a nutshell, the wide definition of VAWP in the Bolivian 243 Law has inspired most subsequent norms on VAWP in Latin America.

5.2. The role of electoral organs

The role that electoral organs must play in the legal against VAWP has been object of much scholarly discussion (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016c; Piscopo 2016b). The Bolivian legislation attributed an important role to the plurinational electoral organ in preventing VAWP, a decision that has inspired other legislation on VAWP in Latin America. An UN Women expert who was interviewed for the present research expressed in the following terms the importance attributed to electoral organs in the struggle against VAWP in the region:

> "Electoral mechanisms have been key. Two examples are Bolivia and Mexico – the role that electoral organs had in enforcing legislation on parity shows the role that they can have in mainstreaming gender in electoral managment, which includes violence [against women in politics]".

This expert also highlighted the importance of the Bolivian electoral organ in international exchange of experiences on how to address VAWP. The 2015 OAS Declaration on VAWP is paramount regarding this issue, as it affirmed the need to

> Promote that electoral institutions and other public entities, as applicable, incorporate the issue of political harassment and/or violence against women in the framework of their functions related to the organisation of elections.

This provision is reproduced in the OAS Model Law, which includes 12 references to the role of electoral organ. An expert who participated in the drafting of the Model Law revealed that this discussion came up when the document was being written. A Mexican expert affirmed that the electoral organs needed to play a key role in the struggle against VAWP because they were the first institutions that received the information about cases of political violence. That is why the Model Law attributes to electoral organs competences such as providing immediate protection to victims of VAWP (section 9 of the statement of purpose). The Frame Norm to Consolidate *Paritarian* Democracy approved by UN Women and Parlatino also refers to the role of the "electoral power" in promoting parity, which this norm links with the struggle against VAWP.

A similar position on the role of electoral organs can be found in legislation on VAWP in Peru and Mexico. The Peruvian draft law specified that the electoral organ must take part in the prevention of VAWP by disseminating the contents of the law in

society. The Mexican Protocol, approved in 2016, went a step forward, attributing to "local public electoral organs" the capacity to sanction party members that have committed acts of political violence against women. While in the Bolivian legislation the electoral organ only has a preventive role, in Mexico local electoral organs can respond to acts of violence with sanctions. An expert who was interviewed for this research confirmed the Bolivian influence on the Mexican Protocol: "There has been a learning from the role of the Bolivian organ in implementing the [243] Law". In short, the attribution of a central role to the electoral organ in the struggle against VAWP by the Bolivian legislation has influenced subsequent norms on VAWP in the region, and at least the OAS Model Law and the Mexican Protocol have gone beyond by enlarging the competences of electoral organs.

5.3. The growing presence of political parties in legislation

The Frame Norm to Consolidate *Paritarian* Democracy defines political parties as "key spaces for the political empowerment of women", and devotes a whole section to the role of parties in promoting parity and tackling VAWP. For its part, The OAS Model Law explicitly refers to the role of political parties in the struggle against VAWP, in the following terms:

> Political parties and organisations of political representation are also key actors in democracy and they play an essential role in the protection of women's political rights and to contribute to the eradication of political violence against them.

Insofar as political parties are relevant actors in contemporary democracies, Article 17 of the Model Law establishes that parties must include in their statutes measures to "prevent, sanction and eradicate political violence against women", "promote the paritarian political participation in equal conditions", and "devote part of the public funding to the strengthening of women's political leadership", among other provisions. The 2015 OAS Declaration on Political Violence and Harassment Against Women also mentions political parties, recommending that they "create their own internal instruments and mechanisms to prevent, punish and eradicate political violence" (p. 10), a provision that was already included in the 243/2012 Bolivian Law. Parties are also mentioned in the Santo Domingo Consensus, even though this norm does not focus on VAWP, but on gender equality in general.

According to an OAS expert who was interviewed for the present research, the references to political parties included in the Bolivian legislation "doubtlessly have influenced other laws" in the region. Honduras Decree-Law against Harassment and Political Violence on Women includes a provision which seems directly inspired in Article 80 of the Bolivian 243 Law, which sanctions parties that give electoral authorities false information regarding the sex of the candidates to elections, a strategy that has been used in Bolivia to dodge parity regulations. The importance of this issue in international discussions on VAWP has been confirmed by the mentioned OAS expert. The 2016 Mexican Protocol to Address Political Violence also establishes

the parties' duty to develop inner protocols to prevent, address and sanction VAWP. The Honduran norm also attributes to parties the duty to monitor the accomplishment of the legislation, while the Costa Rican and Ecuadorian draft norms on VAWP do not include any references to political parties. In a nutshell, the importance given by the Bolivian legislation to the role of political parties in the struggle against VAWP has influenced key international instruments and several nation-wide draft norms on VAWP in Latin America.

5.4. An incipient intersectional approach

The intersectional perspective is particularly important in Latin America, due to the broad class divisions in the region and its ethnic diversity, and several experts who were interviewed for this research affirmed that this issue is increasingly present in discussions about VAWP in the region. However, the introduction of the intersectional perspective in Latin American legislation on VAWP has been limited so far. In the analysed international norms, the intersectional approach is present but it is not directly applied to policies against VAWP. The 2013 CEPAL Santo Domingo Consensus refers to the specific needs of groups such as "young women, rural women, women with disabilities, indigenous women, Afro-descendent women, displaced women, migrant women, other women who live in particularly vulnerable or marginalized circumstances and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, transgender, transvestite and intersex (LGBTTI) persons". However, no direct link is established between these multiple categories and VAWP. In the case of the 2015 OAS Declaration on Political Violence and Harassment Against Women, the intersectional approach is completely absent. For its part, the OAS Model Law only refers to indigenous peoples to specify that traditional uses and customs cannot be used to oppose gender equality in political participation or to justify VAWP (OAS 2017) – a reference does not equate to introducing the intersectional perspective, because it does not take into account the higher vulnerability of indigenous women to VAWP, which was highlighted by a researcher in VAWP who was interviewed for this research. The Frame Norm to Promote *Paritarian* Democracy does not mention intersectionality.

In national draft laws on VAWP, the intersectional approach can be identified in the articles that introduce aggravating circumstances to the crime of political violence against women. In the draft law on VAWP presented in 2011 to the Ecuadorian Parliament, the disability or pregnancy of the victim were considered as aggravating circumstances (Article 6). In a similar way, the Costa Rica draft law imposes more severe penalties to acts of political violence committed against women who suffer a disability, are pregnant or are older than 65, among other circumstances (Article 16). Lastly, the Mexican Protocol to Address Political Violence against Women explicitly refers to the need to adopt an intersectional perspective to effectively tackle VAWP. To sum up, intersectionality is increasingly present in discussions and legislation on VAWP, but, similarly to the Bolivian case, the adoption of this approach is uneven, and existent regulations do not consider the possibility that several structures of

oppression simultaneously impact victims of VAWP. As an expert who I interviewed underlined, this is a particularly complex issue when it comes to drafting legislation.

Conclusions

Violence against women in politics (VAWP) is a particularly serious form of gender-based violence, because it challenges women's right to equal political participation, a core democratic right, and could in turn jeopardize the legislative efforts deployed during the last two decades to promote women's equal political participation around the world, mostly through quotas. Bolivia approved in 2012 the first law in the world that specifically focuses on tackling VAWP, inspiring legal action by other Latin American countries and international organisations. The present chapter has analysed in which specific forms the Bolivian legislation on VAWP has influenced subsequent norms on VAWP in Latin America, the only region in the world where major attempts to tackle VAWP through law have taken place. The focus of the chapter is placed on legislation, not on its implementation.

A scarcity of academic analysis of legislation on VAWP makes this research timely, contributing to filling that gap by analysing the Bolivian legislation on gender-based political violence, together with national laws and draft laws, and international regulations. The analysis has shown that the Bolivian legal framework on VAWP has influenced subsequent norms in four specific ways. First, most norms have adopted a broad and detailed definition of VAWP, following the example of the 243/2012 Bolivian law. Second, the attribution to the electoral organ of a role in the prevention of VAWP in Law 243has been replicated in other norms, and in one case (the Mexican Protocol on VAWP) electoral authorities have also been attributed competences to sanction authors of violence. Third, several norms and draft norms inspired by law 243 have established dispositions in order to engage political parties in the struggle against VAWP, following the path open by the Bolivian legislator, although in this field the Bolivian influence is stronger on international norms than in national ones.

Regarding the intersectional approach, the relationship between the Bolivian regulation and subsequent legislation in other countries is more complex. Law 243 partially adopted the intersectional approach, establishing aggravating circumstances when VAWP is committed against specific groups of vulnerable women. Yet, the law did not include key categories such as ethnicity, sexual orientation and gender identity, and failed in considering how several structures of oppression can intersect in the field of VAWP (e.g. gender, ethnicity and age). This incomplete adoption of intersectionality is also present in other norms of VAWP: references to the need of taking into account the intersection of gender with other categories are frequent in Latin American norms and draft norms on VAWP, but none of them has coherently and fully adopted intersectionality so far.

The mentioned findings allow to obtain a complete and deep view of the current situation of legal efforts to tackle VAWP in Latin America. In addition, the present chapter allows to understand better how the 243/2012 Bolivian law on VAWP, the first

of its kind in the world, has influenced subsequent norms on the issue. Legislation is not enough to effectively tackle violence against women in politics, because this form of violence is legitimized by patriarchal beliefs that are deeply rooted in all societies. In addition, the implementation of legislation has been limited so far. However, legislation is a necessary first step towards the elimination of all forms of gender-based violence, and it has the immediate effect of delegitimizing violence against women, as illustrated by the Bolivian legislative efforts against VAWP. A good knowledge of the existing legislation is the first step towards a correct design of legal instruments to tackle this form of violence, which is greatly important to achieve the aim of having democratic societies free of violence against women. The present chapter intends to constitute a step in that direction.

In this chapter, I have explained how the Bolivian 243 Law on violence against women in politics (VAWP) became has become a model for other legislative initiatives on the issue in the Americas, both at the national level and for international organisations such as the Organisations of American States (OAS) and UN Women, which suggests that left-wing populist parties can promote ambitious and progressive policies on gender equality. In Chapter 5, I focus on how populist parties form their policy coalitions for the formulation of gender equality policies.

Chapter 5. Between Political Discourses and Pragmatic Policy-Making: Gender Equality Policies in Evo Morales' Bolivia (2006-2017)

Political science is devoting growing attention to articulations between populism and gender (e.g. Akkerman 2015; Caravantes 2018; Köttig, Bitzan, and Pető 2017; Spierings et al. 2015) and the performance of populist parties in government (e.g. Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015; Taggart and Kaltwasser 2016), both in Europe and Latin America. However, almost no research works have looked at the *gender equality policies formulation processes under populism* – one exception is the article by Rodríguez Gustá, Madera and Caminotti (2017). The present chapter contributes to fill that gap through an in-depth analysis of the paradigmatic case of Bolivia, by testing the following twofold hypothesis. Populist parties apply their conceptions of the 'people' and the 'elite' to the women's organisations that intervene in policy-making processes in the field of gender equality: some women's organisations are accused of being part of 'the elite' while others are praised by populists in power, who include them in the category of 'the people'. However, populist parties include in policy-making processes actors that they presented as part of the elite, because of their technical expertise. If this twofold hypothesis was confirmed, it would imply a contradiction between the populist parties' discourse and policy-making.

Insofar as this chapter is focused on a single case, the findings cannot be generalized to all populist governments, but the present analysis provides a better understanding of the complex relations between discourse and policy-making when populist parties are in power, a perspective that could also enrich further research on gender and populism. The present chapter focuses on the case of the MAS (Movement for Socialism) and Evo Morales' left-wing populist government in Bolivia, which during the 2006-2017 period promoted the most ambitious agenda in gender equality policies among Latin American populists since the beginning of the 21st century. The Bolivian government introduced sound gender equality-related contents in the Constitution and promoted highly innovative laws such as the 348/2013 Law to Guarantee Women a Life Free of Violence and the 243/2012 Law against Violence and Political Harassment on Women. Two kinds of women's organisations were included by the government in the formulation processes of the laws: feminist NGOs (characterized by the over-representation of middle-class white and mestizo urban women), and women's social organisations (mostly composed of lower-class indigenous and rural women). This particularly diverse landscape of women's organisations reinforces the suitability of the Bolivian case to test the hypothesis presented above.

The chapter is based on the content analysis of the mentioned laws and its supreme decrees (executive regulations), documents produced by the Bolivian government and semi-structured interviews with key actors in the analysed policy-making processes, including officials, activists belonging to women's social organisations and members of feminist NGOs. Insofar as many of the involved women's organisations do not explain their participation in policy-making processes in documents, interviews have been the preferred mean to obtain the organisations' view on these processes, rather than documental analysis. The present chapter proceeds in three parts. The first is the theoretical section, where I review research on the influence of women's organisations on policy-making and literature on populists in government, and I formulate the hypothesis of the chapter. The second section explains the case selection, the methods and the research design. The third part is the empirical section, where I test my hypothesis by analysing the processes of formulation of gender equality policies in Bolivia between 2006 and 2017.

1. Theoretical Framework: the Influence of Women's Movements on Policy-Making and Populists in Government

The issue of the *formulation processes of gender equality policies promoted by populist governments* is placed at the crossing of two streams of research: literature on the women's movements' influence on policy-making and research on the performance of populists in governments. Only one article refers to both issues, according to my literature review (Rodríguez Gustá, Madera and Caminotti 2017), but its focus on policy machineries (instead of policy actors) and a dubious use of the concept of 'populism' (Evo Morales' government is not considered as populist by these authors) lessen the relevance of the article for my research. Thus, the theoretical framework of the present chapter is based on research works on the two aforementioned streams of literature. In addition, my research adopts an intersectional perspective (Crenshaw 1991), a theoretical approach that puts special emphasis on the interactions between gender, class and ethnicity.

The present research follows the definition of populism as a 'thin-centred' ideology formulated by Mudde (2004, 543): it considers society to be divided into two groups, the people and the elite; it is a Manichaean, people-centred and anti-elite ideology that stresses the centrality of people's sovereignty. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015, 17) have highlighted, populism never appears in a pure form but "in combination with other sets of ideas". I have decided to follow this definition because conceiving populism as a 'thin-centred' ideology allows to consider political actors that combine populism with other ideologies (such as feminism).

1.1. The Role of Women's Organisations in Gender Equality-Related Policy-Making

Women's organisations often play a key role in the formulation processes of gender equality policies, an issue that has been extensively explored by literature (e.g. Banaszak 2009; Beckwith 2011; Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Haussman and Sauer 2007; Horton 2015; Suh 2011, 2014). The role of women's organisations in the formulation of gender equality policies is often analysed through the concept of 'institutionalisation', which has been defined as "a process of social movements traversing the official terrain of formal politics and engaging with authoritative institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, the state, and political parties to enhance their collective ability to achieve the movement's goals" (Suh 2011, 443).

The issue of institutionalisation has been addressed by several gender and politics scholars, most of whom consider that institutionalised movements have more chances to influence gender policies (Banaszak 2009; Haussman and Sauer 2007; McBride and Mazur 2010; Suh 2011). The degree of institutionalisation of movements largely depends on to what extent and in which forms the government establishes connections with movements, as highlighted by Meyer (2007). For instance, a government can offer platforms for the expression of movements' demands, or carry out consultations with movements' activists for the formulation of policies. How populist governments include different kinds of women's organisations in policy-making processes is one key issue for the present research.

When analysing the influence of women's organisations on gender policy, it is key to underline the diversity among women's organisations. In particular, it must be noted that not all of them can be considered as feminist, as explained by Outshoorn (2010): all women's organisations "express explicit identity with women as a group, use gendered discourse, and claim to represent women, [but] feminist ones also hold that there is something wrong with the status of women and challenge gender hierarchies and women's subordination". The feminist or non-feminist character of different women's organisations determine their policy priorities. Other dimensions that allow to establish a distinction between some women's organisations and other ones are their structure and their social composition (Horton 2015), a distinction that is key in the Bolivian case.

1.2. Populists in Government

Insofar as populism is based on the discursive opposition between the 'people' and the 'elite', at first sight it could be expected that populist governments only include in policy-making processes actors that they consider to be part of the 'people', excluding allegedly 'elitist' actors. However, existing literature on European and Latin American populist parties suggests that populist parties are rather pragmatic when it comes to

policy-making: they include in policy-making processes political actors that they label as elitists.

Most European PRR parties that have reached power have done so as junior coalition partners of mainstream (and more experienced) conservative parties, which has limited their capacity of shaping the policy agenda (Mudde 2013, 14). By contrast, the Latin American populist movements analysed by literature on populists in government (such as Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional-PRI and Argentinian Peronism) enjoyed large parliamentary majorities – a similar situation to Bolivia's MAS during the period studied (2006-2017). Both among European and Latin American populists, pragmatism in the formation of policy-making coalitions has been the rule.

Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015, 170) found in their comparative analysis of Popolo della Libertà (PDL), Lega Nord (LN) and Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) that populist parties in power are able to act "responsibly" in policy-making while keeping a radical anti-elite rhetoric. A similar phenomenon has been identified in the case of Argentinian Peronismo and Mexican PRI: both promoted a U-turn in economic policy (from developmentalism with heavy state intervention to neoliberalism) while keeping their populist rhetoric (Gibson 1997). Besides, European PRR parties have often governed with mainstream conservative parties – which allegedly represent the interests of the "elite" – while being responsive to the wishes of their own electoral base, which suggests that "populist parties can be discerning and sophisticated political operators" (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015, 170). Research also suggests that populists are able to change the composition of their policy coalitions: in the 1980s and the 1990s, Argentinian and Mexican populist governments increasingly excluded trade unions from policy-making, replacing them by business representatives (Gibson 1997, 356–57), and left-wing Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa (2007-2017) was able to co-opt sectors of the business community who were supposed to belong to the abhorred 'elite' (Taggart and Kaltwasser 2016). In addition, very different kinds of actors can coexist in the same policy coalitions – in Argentina and Mexico, both traditional politicians and newly arrived technocrats were included by government in the formulation of the new neoliberal policies. Often, populist governments choose some members of their policy coalitions because of their technical expertise (Gibson 1997, 366).

The mentioned research on populists in government, together with literature the role of women's organisations in policy-making, allows to formulate the twofold hypothesis that structures the present research. Populist parties apply their definitions of the 'people' and the 'elite' to the women's organisations that intervene in policy-making processes in the field of gender equality: some women's organisations are accused of being part of 'the elite' while others are praised by populists in power, who include them in the category of 'the people'. Simultaneously, populist parties include in policy-

making processes actors that they presented as part of the elite, because of their technical expertise.

2. Case Selection, Research Design and Methods

The case of Bolivia is key for the analysis of the articulations between populism and the formulation of gender equality policies, for two reasons. First, Evo Morales and the MAS' populist government has promoted the *richest and most innovative gender equality policy agenda* among Latin American populist governments since the beginning of the 21st century. Thus, Morales' government is a *paradigmatic case* of a clearly populist government that has promoted progressive gender equality policies. Second, the Bolivian landscape of women's organisations is particularly diverse, which allows to analyse how Morales' populist government related with different kinds of women's organisations. Insofar as this is a single-case analysis, the particularities of the MAS' populism and the gender equality policies promoted by Evo Morales' government are explained in detail in the following sub-sections, before addressing the research design and the methodology of this chapter.

2.1. The MAS and Evo Morales' Populism

As explained in the theoretical section, different populist parties defend different definitions of the people and the elite. In the case of Bolivia's MAS, its conception of the people is tightly related with the 2000-2005 cycle of anti-neoliberal social mobilizations that preceded the party's first national electoral victory, in 2005. Between 2000 and 2005, a wide range of social movements (unions of peasants and urban workers, indigenous organisations, women's social organisations, etc.) protested the privatizations of gas production, water supply and other public sectors promoted by neoliberal governments that followed the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 2000-2005 social movements also reclaimed the refoundation of the Bolivian political system through a constituent assembly, with the aim of building a multinational state that would protect social and environmental rights and respect indigenous self-government in their traditional territories. Peasant and indigenous social movements led the protests, but a wide alliance with middle-class sectors (mostly mestizo and white) was established (Webber 2011). Neoliberal politicians were identified as the common enemy of a wide and diverse coalition of social movements and large sectors of the Bolivian society, whose demands were put together in a way that reminds Laclau's (2005) concept of 'chain of equivalences'. A Manichean division between the 'people' of the 'elite' was installed in Bolivian politics even before Morales' arrival to state power in January 2006.

The alliance between indigenous popular classes and white-mestizo middle classes formed during the 2000-2005 cycle of mobilizations was key in the election in 2005 of former coca-grower union leader Evo Morales as president, with more than 50 percent

of the vote. Even though the support of progressive sectors of the middle-class was key for the MAS' political dominance during the period studied, the party's conception of the 'people' corresponds to the indigenous popular classes, which constitute the majority of the population. The importance of ethnicity in the MAS' populist construction and in Bolivian politics in general makes it necessary to adopt an intersectional approach, as explained in the theoretical section of this chapter.

Regarding the notion of 'elite', the MAS has built its political hegemony over the opposition to foreign multinational companies, the US government and the pre-2005 Bolivian political elite, whose political parties governed the country from the approval of the first structural adjustment plan in 1985 to 2005. The links of those politicians (most of whom supported neoliberal reforms) with foreign multinationals, together with the supposed involvement of the US government in the failed attempt of coup d'état against Morales' government in 2008, allowed the MAS to adopt a successful anti-imperialist and anti-elite discourse. Bolivian oligarchs (who are overwhelmingly white or mestizo) and traditional parties are depicted in the MAS' Manichean discourse as defenders of the interests of foreign companies and the US government, which are allegedly opposed to the interests of the Bolivian people. By contrast, indigenous president Evo Morales presents himself as the legitimate representative of the Bolivian people, whose majority indigenous ethnicity is highlighted by the governmental discourse. The 'pure' people who defeated imperialist neoliberalism in the streets is opposed to the abhorred elite in Morales' discourse. This is why this is a paradigmatic case of a populist government.

2.2. The MAS and Evo Morales' Gender Equality Policies

The present research is focused on three *processes of formulation* of gender equality policies during the 2006-2017 period (rather than the context of the policies): 1) the introduction of gender content in the 2009 Constitution through the Constituent Assembly, and the processes of formulation of 2) the 348/2013 Comprehensive Law to Guarantee Women a Life Free of Violence and its regulation decree, and 3) the 243/2012 Law against Violence and Political Harassment on Women and its regulation decree.

One of the most significant elements of the MAS' gender equality policy agenda was the inclusion in the 2009 Constitution of a wide array of women's rights in fields such as education, health, political participation, access to land, labor, and sexual and reproductive rights, paying particular attention to working-class and indigenous women's needs (Rousseau 2011). The richness of the gender contents of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution stands out among the most recent and progressive constitutions approved in Latin America, which were promoted by left-wing populist governments in Venezuela (1999) and Ecuador (2008). The MAS legislative agenda is also outstanding in relation to gender-based domestic violence. Law 348 was one of the first

'comprehensive' laws (*integrales*, in Spanish) on gender-based domestic violence approved in Latin America. This trend has grown in following years, and today more than 10 countries in the region have comprehensive laws on gender-based violence. Comparative analysis (CEPAL 2015) has shown that Law 348 stands out in two major points. Firstly, it considers a particularly large number of forms of violence, including economic violence, workplace bullying and violence against women in politics — while other laws, such as the Colombian and Guatemalan ones, define 'violence' in more vague terms. Secondly, the Bolivian Law created civil and criminal norms to tackle violence, while other laws in the region did not change any criminal disposition (Argentina, Costa Rica and Mexico). In a nutshell, the 348/2013 Law is one of the most advanced laws on gender-based domestic violence in Latin America.

The third key element of the MAS' legislative agenda on women's movements is the 243/2012 Law, the first law approved in the world with the specific objective of tackling violence against women in politics (VAWP), which I have analysed in length in the previous chapter. As explained above, the aim of Law 243 is threefold: preventing harassment and political violence against women, addressing the needs of the victims, and sanctioning the authors — with the general aim of "guaranteeing the full exercise of their political rights" by women (Article 2). The importance of the Bolivian example for the worldwide struggle against VAWP has been highlighted by Krook and Restrepo Sanín (2016, 127):

> The Bolivian case, where a long grassroots campaign culminated in legal reform in 2012, was seminal in three respects: giving a name to this phenomenon, highlighting psychological alongside physical forms of abuse, and developing legislation to criminalize these behaviors.

2.3. Research Design and Methods

As explained in length in Chapter 2, the present research is a single-case study, which according to Lange (2012, 16) present a more "idiographic insight" than comparative ones, which is particularly useful for obtaining a deep understanding of a phenomena, generating theoretical tools that can be applied to other casesA . The single-case research design is thus particularly adequate for the aim of this thesis explained above: improving our knowledge about the complex relationship that exists between left-wing populism and feminist politics. The empirical research is based on Braun and Clarke's (2006) qualitative method of thematic content analysis, which has been applied to three sources: semi-structured interviews with key actors of policy-making processes in the field of gender, documents on gender equality policy produced by the Bolivian government, and the selected laws. Semi-structured interviews with women's activists and officials were carried out in La Paz, El Alto and Cochabamba (three of the four biggest cities in Bolivia) during two fieldwork trips, in March-April 2016, and August 2017. Actors opposed to gender equality policies have not been included in the sample

of interviews because they did not participate in the formulation of the selected policies, which is the focus of the present research. The sample is made up of 6 members of women's social organisations, 6 NGOs activists, 6 former government and MAS officials specialized in gender equality policy, and 3 members of autonomous and communitarian feminist organisations – a number that has been proven sufficient to meet the aims of the research.

The composition of the sample of interviewees has been oriented by two targets: obtaining the most accurate account of the formulation of the selected policies and getting a faithful picture of the different positions of feminist NGOs and women's social organisations on the analysed policy-making processes. Therefore, the first criteria to select the interviewees was their degree of knowledge of these processes, not their position within their organisation – the focus of the research is the formulation of gender equality policies, not women's organisations as such. The stance of activists on the MAS' government has been considered as well: I have included in the sample activists who fully support the government, critical supporters and opponents. Besides, the intersectional approach has been applied to the composition of the sample: I have chosen respondents that reflect the different social composition of feminist NGOs and women's social organisations regarding gender, ethnicity and the rural-urban cleavage. Thus, all the feminist NGOs activists respondents were urban, white or mestizo and middle-class, while the women's social organisations activists were lower-class indigenous of rural origin.

The selection of the analysed documents has been based on an intentional sampling strategy, a selection method that implies restricting the analysis to a small sample of exemplary texts (Lindekilde 2014). The sample is composed of the most relevant documents on gender equality policy produced by the government, the gender contents of the 2009 Constitution, the two analysed laws and the two decrees that regulate them. First of all, I have looked at the Equality Plan of the government approved through the 29850/2008 Supreme Decree (Viceministerio de Género y Asuntos Generacionales-Ministerio de Justicia 2008). The second document is the written by the Ministry of Justice in 2014 for UN Women (Ministerio de Justicia de Bolivia 2014), a document that reviews the main progress made by the MAS in gender legislation since its arrival in power in 2006. Thirdly, the gender contents of the 2009 Constitution have been analysed. Lastly, I have carried out a content analysis of the 348/2013 Law to Guarantee Women a Life Free of Violence, the 2145/2014 Supreme Decree that develops Law 348, the 243/2012 Law against Violence and Political Harassment on Women, and the 2935/2016 Supreme Decree that develops Law 243. I have decided to focus on the introduction of gender equality contents in the 2009 Constitution and the formulation processes of Law 348, Law 243 and their respective decrees for two reasons. First, there are the three most important and innovative gender equality policies approved during the period studied. Second, they were

particularly long and complex processes, in which both women's social organisations and feminist NGOs intervened.

3. Empirical Section: the Making of Gender Equality Policies in Populist Bolivia

The present section will test in the Bolivian case the following twofold hypothesis. Populist parties apply their conceptions of the 'people' and the 'elite' to the women's organisations that intervene in policy-making processes in the field of gender equality: some women's organisations are accused of being part of 'the elite' while others are praised by populists in power, who include them in the category of 'the people'. However, populist parties include in policy-making processes actors that they presented as part of the elite, because of their technical expertise. The analysis is carried out in three parts. First, I explain the Bolivian complex landscape of women's organisations. Second, I analyse the discourse of Evo Morales' government on the main policy-making actors in the field of gender equality policies (feminist NGOs and women's social organisations) with the aim of determining whether and how the government applied its conceptions of the 'elite' and the 'people' to women's organisations. Third, I investigate whether and how these organisations were included by the government in the selected policy-making processes.

3.1. Bolivian Women's Organisations: Feminist NGOs and Women's Social Organisations

Understanding the diversity of the Bolivian women's organisations is key for the analysis that will be carried out below. References to this diversity can be found in Ewig (2018), Cabezas Fernández (2013), Monasterios (2007), literature on Bolivian social movements (García Linera and Stefanoni 2008), research on Latin American women's movements (Bastian Duarte 2012; Horton 2015; Lugones 2016) and works focused on the Bartolina Sisa Federation of Peasant and Indigenous Women (León 1990) and the National Federation of Bolivian Household Workers (Peredo Beltrán 2015). As advanced in the theoretical section, women's organisations can be differentiated through their feminist or non-feminist character (Outshoorn 2010). This determines their policy priorities, their structure and their social composition (Horton 2015). As explained in Chapter 3, if we apply these two dimensions to Bolivia, three broad categories of organisations can be identified: feminist NGOs, women's social organisations, and autonomous feminists. However, in this chapter I focus on the first two categories, because they played the most important role in the policy-making processes analysed.

In Bolivia, feminist NGOs are overwhelmingly made up of middle-class white or mestizo urban women, while most members of women's social organisations are lower-class indigenous and rural women, as several activists explained to me. Thus, the distinction between feminist NGOs and women's social organisations has a clear class-

and ethnic- character, as advanced in Chapter 3 on the case-study of the thesis. Interviews with members of feminist NGOs also revealed that these organisations deal with the same policy issues as organisations of the same kind in Europe and North America (such as quotas, sexual and reproductive rights and domestic violence); for their part, women's social organisations devote more attention to class-related demands, such as land distribution and social rights. Regarding structure, most Bolivian feminist NGOs are small organisations with several experts in gender, while women's social organisations have thousands of members, most of whom are not specialized in gender issues.

a) Feminist NGOs. During the 1990s, the number of women's rights NGOs multiplied both in Bolivia and in Latin America generally, due the availability of abundant funds from international cooperation agencies (Monasterios 2007). Latin American feminist NGOs achieved outcomes such as the introduction of women's rights in national constitutions, the creation of official bodies responsible for the implementation of gender equality policies and, in some countries, the introduction of gender quotas (Eckstein 2001). However, 'autonomous' feminists denounced the growing focus of so-called 'institutional' feminists on their links with foreign NGOs and states, together with the participation to United Nations Women conferences, to the detriment of street activism and attending to the demands of popular women (Bastian Duarte 2012; Horton 2015), a criticism expressed by members of two autonomous feminist organisations who were interviewed for this research. 'Institutional' feminists have also been accused of exclusively focusing on the interests of white heterosexual middle-class women (Grupo de Mujeres Ixchel 2011; Lugones 2016). This bad image of feminist NGOs shared by wide sectors of the Bolivian Left explains why they were presented as part of the elite by Morales' government, as will be analysed below.

b) *Women's social organisations.* In the Bolivian context, the concept of 'social organisations' includes a wide range of organisations made up of popular-class individuals, mostly unions and indigenous organisations. The present research *focuses* on women-only social organisations, such as *Bartolina* Sisa National *Confederation* of Peasant, Indigenous, and Native Women of Bolivia (broadly known as 'Bartolinas'), the National Federation of Paid Bolivian Household Workers (FENATRAHOB) and the National Confederation of Indigenous Women of Bolivia. Social organisations have traditionally been particularly strong in Bolivia and constitute a major support for the MAS' government, as expressed by members of Bartolinas and other peasant social organisations who were interviewed for the present research. For a long time, women's social organisations such as 'Bartolinas' could be considered non-feminist, following Outshoorn (2010) – for instance, they used to oppose the right to abortion. However, they have evolved towards a more clearly feminist stance, as the analysis will show. The Association of Female Councilwomen and Majors of Bolivia (ACOBOL) is a slightly different kind of women's social organisation, because some middle-class experts in

gender play an important role. However, ACOBOL is a big organisation that includes councilwomen from all over the country, most of whom are indigenous, which clearly distinguishes it from feminist NGOs.

The following table shows the feminist NGOs and women's social organisation that played the most important role in the policy-making processes analysed in the present chapter.

Table 5: Bolivian women's organisations

Feminist NGOs	Women's social organisations	Coalitions
Women's Coordination	Association of Female Councilwomen and Majors of Bolivia (ACOBOL)	Women Present in History: coalition where both kinds of women's organisations gathered to influence the formulation of the 2009 Constitution
"Gregoria Apaza" Foundation	Bartolina Sisa Federation of Peasant and Indigenous Women ('Bartolinas')	
La Paz Foundation		
SEPROSI		
AMUPEI		
"Juana Azurduy" Centre for Women's Promotion		

Source: prepared by the author.

3.2. 'Popular' Women's Social Organisations versus 'Elitist' Feminist NGOs: the MAS' Populist Discourse on Women's Organisations

The 2008 Equality Plan is the most important document of the analysed sample, as it was the only comprehensive national plan on gender equality approved by Morales' government, and it established both the policy priorities and the theoretical framework of its gender equality agenda. Its complete title is National Plan for the Equality of Opportunities 'Women Building the New Bolivia to Live Well' (2008). The most relevant section of the plan for the purposes of the present research is the 16-pages conceptual framework, written by the communitarian feminist activist Julieta Paredes. The conceptual framework devotes a whole section to criticize the so-called "neoliberal" gender equality policies that were applied before the MAS arrived in power. The document recognizes that women's rights experienced some progress during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, but it underlines that "some women benefited more than others" from legal reforms such as quotas, referring to white middle-class women as the main beneficiaries of pre-MAS gender equality policies (p. 8). The class- and ethnic-based divisions that exist among women are underlined by the document, taking the example of domestic work:

> Middle- and higher-class women still benefit from the manual and domestic work
> performed by indigenous poor women […]. Also between women, there are

relations of power and exploitation, relations constituted by ethnic- and class-belonging (p. 8).

The criticism to feminist NGOs is explicit: the document affirms that women's NGOs advocate "gender *equity*, a concept that intends to create the idea that it is possible to equalize the roles attributed by patriarchy to women and men" (p. 9), while the aim of the feminist struggle should be to "overcome the gender system, as a historic and cultural product" (p. 9). The Plan underlines the supposed alliance of feminist NGOs with pre-MAS neoliberal governments, establishing a direct link between feminist NGOs and the MAS' concept of 'the elite'. The Plan also criticizes the mobilization strategies of feminist NGOs, their supposed pretension to represent all women, and their link with international cooperation (the tight connections of the Bolivian elite with foreign governments and companies is one of the key elements of the MAS' definition of 'the elite'):

> The distortion of the concept [of gender] during the neoliberal period led women's organisations (mostly gathered in NGOs supported by international cooperation) to follow strategies that were far away from mobilizing in the streets and putting pressure on the state. They translated the demands and negotiations to the lobbies of the meeting venues and conventions of politicians, getting partial concessions which had a minor relevance for the real situation of popular-class women and indigenous women. [The indigenous women] did not feel represented by those organisations, which assumed a role of representative [of all women] and mediators with the state and the international cooperation" [...]. Indigenous and popular women [...] saw how *these same [middle-class] women were part of the powers that they [the indigenous and popular women] held responsible for their situation of impoverishment* (p. 10).

In addition, the conceptual framework of the Plan underlines that the "gender equity public policies [promoted by feminist NGOs] ended up becoming actions to neutralize the unrest and popular frustration – particularly women's –, with a minimal outcome if compared with the [negative] effects of the structural adjustment policies" (p. 10). This fragment implies accusing feminist NGOs of being accomplices of the neoliberal policies promoted by Bolivian governments in the 1990s.

The MAS' populist rhetoric reflected in the Equality Plan devotes a very different treatment to social organisations of peasant and indigenous women: they are presented as representatives of 'the people' in the field of gender policy. The preface of the Plan (written by Evelyn Ágreda Rodríguez, who was at that time vice minister of gender and generational affairs) affirms that the Equality Plan is "the product of a long dialogue process between the national government and the women's social organisations from all around the country" (p. viii). This statement establishes the following parallel: the direct relationship that the populist leader (Evo Morales) is supposed to have with the Bolivian people (Á. García Linera 2006) is similar to the tight relationship existing between the gender-related authorities of the government and

women's social organisations (whose indigenous and popular-class social composition corresponds to the MAS' idea of the 'people'). Therefore, the populist scheme is applied to women's social organisations, which are attributed the position of 'the people', while there is no reference to feminist NGOs in the preface of the Plan. In conclusion, the 2008 Equality Plan establishes a link between feminist NGOs and the neoliberal political elite that the populist discourse of the MAS considers as its political rival, and conceals the role of these organisations in the formulation of gender equality policies in Bolivia. By contrast, the positive role of women's social organisations in this field is emphasized, and they are presented as the incarnation of the MAS' notion of the 'people' in this terrain of policy-making.

The second gender equality-related document included in the analysis is the report developed by the Bolivian ministry of justice for UN Women in 2014. The ministry did not begin to draft the report until three months before the deadline imposed by the Beijing Agenda, because ministry officials considered that Bolivia did not need to report back to an international organisation — as one gender consultant who worked for the ministry at that moment explained to me. The hostility towards any form of foreign intervention in Bolivian governance is related with a populist view in which the national elite is directly connected with multinational companies and the US government. At the end of the day, the report was written and sent to UN Women, but the ministry manifested its discontent by including the following paragraph:

> The report does not necessarily meet the demands and incomplete international indexes [sic]. By contrast, it intends to show that the new development policy [of Bolivia] has allowed to achieve substantial progress […] The achievements made so far have gone further than the [targets of the] indexes proposed by international platforms (p. 1).

The report places the gender equality policies of the MAS government within the wider framework of its populist left-indigenist political project, recalling the important role that women's social organisations played in the 2000-2005 anti-neoliberal mobilizations that preceded Evo Morales' first national electoral victory (pp. 1-2). Hereafter, the report highlights the role played by women belonging to indigenous and peasant social organisations in the Constituent Assembly (2006-2009), establishing a symbolic identification between these organisations and MAS' concept of 'the people', where the indigenous hold the central role:

> 88 women [participated in the Constituent Assembly], mostly indigenous; those women had only primary education but they were in the first ranks of the mobilisations and the resistance to neoliberalism, they became members of the Assembly following the mandate of their *ayllu* [traditional indigenous form of political organisation at the local level], their community and their organisations […] women [were] nourished by new capacities of deliberation and proposal, showing their coloured dresses, their ponchos, blankets and braids, showing their identity and their dignity of peoples that flourish in the heat of the debate (p. 2).

The major role supposedly played by women's social organisations in the MAS-led political project (usually known as the 'process of change') is also emphasized in the following fragment of the ministerial report:

> Social organisations […] are an active actor in the process of change, and in the formulation, implementation and socialization of laws and policies (p. 17).

There is only one reference to feminist NGOs in the report, and it is a highly critical one:

> The Plurinational State of Bolivia has advanced much more than what is demanded in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action thanks to 'depatriarchalisation' — a process to which the [feminist] NGOs and the churches have contributed little (p. 17).

Not only does the report conceal the role that feminist NGOs actually played in the formulation of gender equality policies, but they are placed at the same level of Bolivian churches, which are often presented by Morales' government as allies of the neoliberal elite and have been fierce opponents to legislative progress on women's rights in Bolivia. In conclusion, the report sent by the ministry of justice to UN Women in 2014 strongly highlighted the role played by women's social organisations in the formulation of gender equality policy, linking it to the wider struggle of Bolivian popular classes against neoliberalism — a rhetorical move that presents women's social organisations as the incarnation of the MAS' conception of the 'people' in the field of gender equality policies. By contrast, NGOs are mentioned only once, and they are said of having "contributed little" to the efforts deployed by Evo Morales' government to tackle gender inequality; their real role in the formulation of gender equality laws and regulations is completely ignored in the report.

In addition to governmental documents on gender equality policies, I have analysed the gender contents of the 2009 Constitution, Law 348, Law 243, and their respective regulation decrees. Social organisations are present all through the text of the 2009 Constitution (articles 199.II, 209, 210.I, 210.III, 298.II.14, 300.I.12, 374.II, in addition to there being several mentions of indigenous economic organisations), while NGOs are mentioned only twice (articles 298.II.15 and 300.I.13). In addition, the article 'Indigenous Rights in the New Political Constitution of the State, in the Avant-Garde of Human Rights', which was published together with the official version of the Constitution, highlights that the Constitution was the product of the work of social organisations, including women's groups. There is no reference to NGOs in the mentioned article. In this case, the populist influence is manifested through the celebration of the political role of social organisations (most of whom support the MAS) and the concealment of feminist NGOs' roles.

Regarding Law 348, the general stance of this law on social organisations and feminist NGOs is set out in Article 15:

> *Social organisations* and *organisations of civil society women* will exert participation and social control within the framework of the corresponding law, participating in the design, evaluation and management of the policies of prevention, attention and protection to women.

Insofar as 'organisations of civil society women' is an alternative way to denominate feminist NGOs, Law 348 is the only gender-related official document analysed in the present research that recognizes the positive role played by feminist NGOs in the formulation of gender equality policies. Other articles of the Law refer to "women's organisations and institutions" (art. 26.I.4), "organised women" (art. 30) and "women's organisations" (art. 50.II.8), terms that seem to include both feminist NGOs and women's social organisations. In the same vein, Article 11 of Supreme Decree 2145 that developed Law 348 uses the formulation "social organisations and organisations of civil society women", including both kinds of organisations. Thus, the legislation on gender-based domestic violence is an exception to the generalized concealment or stigmatization of feminist NGOs in official documents on gender. This exception can be explained for three reasons. First, most of Law 348 and its decree was written by NGOs. Second, legal norms are written in a juridical style that makes it difficult to introduce strong ideological affirmations, something that is easier to do in governmental documents that are not norms as such (for example, plans). Lastly, the state needs the collaboration of feminist NGOs for the implementation of the highly complex legislation on domestic gender-based violence, which explains the frequent positive references to NGOs in Law 348 and its regulation decree. As argued by Gibson (1997), technical expertise is one of the reasons that leads populist governments to include supposedly 'elitist' organisations in their policy-making coalitions.

Regarding legislation on violence against women in politics (VAWP), Law 243 and its 2935 Supreme Decree include several positive mentions of "organised civil society" which in this context refers to the women's social organisation ACOBOL (articles 6.e and 6.f), as advanced in Chapter 4. This is related to the fact that the mentioned norms attribute a certain competence to ACOBOL in preventing VAWP (ACOBOL and its regional branches are included in the Mechanism for the Prevention and Immediate Attention created by the decree, Article 5.III.b). The importance of social organisations in the struggle against VAWP in Bolivia is also reflected in the Fourth Transitory Disposition of Law 243, which establishes that the internal regulations of all "political and social organisations" must introduce dispositions oriented towards the prevention and sanctioning of violence against women within the organisation. There is no reference to NGOs in the aforementioned norms of VAWP, even though they played a major role in their development, as I explain below.

Table 6: Main references to women's organisations in policy documents and norms

Policy document/ Norm	References to feminist NGOs	References to women's social organisations
2008 Equality Plan	NGOs advocate "gender *equity*, a concept that intends to create the idea that it is possible to equalize the roles attributed by patriarchy to women and men" (p. 9). "The distortion of the concept [of gender] during the neoliberal period led women's organisations (mostly NGOs supported by international cooperation) to follow strategies that were far away from mobilizing in the streets and putting pressure on the state." (p. 10). "Indigenous and popular-class women […] saw how these same [middle-class] women were part of the powers that they [the indigenous and popular-class women] held responsible for their situation of impoverishment" (p. 10). "gender equity public policies [promoted by feminist NGOs] ended up becoming actions to neutralize unrest and popular frustration – particularly women's –, with a minimal outcome if compared with the [negative] effects of the structural adjustment policies" (p. 10).	The Equality Plan is "the product of a long dialogue process between the national government and the women's social organisations from all around the country" (p. viii).
2014 ministry of justice report for UN Women	"The Plurinational State of Bolivia has advanced much more than what is demanded in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action thanks to 'depatriarchalisation' — a process to which the [feminist] NGOs and the churches have contributed little" (p. 17).	"Social organisations […] are an active actor in the process of change, and in the formulation, implementation and socialization of laws and policies" (p. 17).
2009 Constitution	References in articles 298.II.15 and 300.I.13.	References in articles 199.II, 209, 210.I, 210.III, 298.II.14, 300.I.12, 374.II.
348/2013 Law	"Social organisations and organisations	"Social organisations and organisations

	of civil society women [NGOs] will exert participation and social control within the framework of the corresponding law" (Article 15).	of civil society women [NGOs] will exert participation and social control within the framework of the corresponding law" (Article 15).
2145/2014 Supreme Decree	"Social organisations and organisations of civil society women" (Article 11).	"Social organisations and organisations of civil society women" (Article 11).
243/2012 Law	No reference	References to the "organized civil society" (articles 6.e and 6.f). Reference to "political and social organisation" (Fourth Transitory Disposition).
2935/2016 Supreme Decree	No reference	Inclusion of ACOBOL in the Mechanism for the Prevention and Immediate Attention (Article 5.III.b)

Source: prepared by the author.

In short, except for legislation on domestic violence, the analysed documents, produced by the government and legislation on gender equality, concealed the role of feminist NGOs in policy-making processes and they even accused these organisations of being allied with the neoliberal elites that the MAS' government consider as its major political rival. By contrast, the participation of women's social organisations in gender equality policy-making is highlighted and amplified by the governmental discourse expressed in the analysed documents.

3.3. The (Real) Role of Feminist NGOs and Women's Social Organisations in Policy-Making Processes in Bolivia

The anti-NGOs discourse identified in Bolivian governmental documents and legal texts is in sharp contrast with the key role that these organisations played in the policy-making processes analysed by the present research.

The MAS-promoted 2009 Constitution includes a wide range of dispositions related to women's rights and the improvement of women's condition, with a focus on indigenous and working-class women. The activists and former government officials who were interviewed for this research present a similar version of the process of formulation of these gender-related contents. One former MAS MP explained to me that the relations between middle-class feminist NGOs and women's social organisations were conflictual during the first term of Evo Morales in government (2006-2010), because women belonging to social organisations considered that the demands promoted by feminist MPs and activists were "middle-class Western issues". However, the relations between both sectors gradually improved in the context of the

Constituent Assembly (2006-2009), as both women's social organisations and feminist NGOs collaborated to promote the introduction of progressive gender contents in the new Constitution. To this end, feminist NGOs and women's social organisations established an ad hoc alliance denominated 'Women Present in History' – which reminds Gibson's notion of "marriage of convenience" between different policy actors (Gibson 1997, 360). An activist who had a major role in that process said:

> ['Women Present in History'] was composed of more than 500 organisations, it was as collective of more than 80000 women who took actively part in the construction of proposals for the Constitution.

As explained by Ewig (2018), the empowerment of indigenous women starting with Morales' first national electoral victory in 2005 forced middle-class feminist activists to closely work with them. The rapprochement between feminist NGOs and women's social organisations initiated during the constitutional process continued when the MAS' government included both kinds of women's organisations in policy-coalitions for the formulation of gender equality-related laws, as further explained below. Even though women's social organisations are formally autonomous from the government, Bartolinas (the most important one) keeps tight links with the MAS and Morales' government – many *bartolinas* have been MAS MPs or have held ministries and other high offices since Morales' arrival in power –. According to autonomous feminist activist María Galindo, *bartolinas* have been "co-opted" by the MAS (Ewig 2018, 444), following a typically populist dynamic. Thus, the growing proximity between feminist NGOs *and Bartolinas* in the constituent process implied also a closer relationship between feminist NGOs *and the government*, due to the tight connection between Bartolinas and Morales' executive.

Regarding Law 348/2013 to Guarantee Women a Life Free of Violence, most interviewees pointed out that it was the joint work of feminist NGOs and women's social organisations which allowed the approval of the law, but NGOs played the leading role in the process. One activist of the Women's Coordination told me that the former leader of Bartolinas was initially opposed to Law 348 because, according to her, that law would "allow to put in prison our sons, our brothers, our comrades". However, the female MAS MPs belonging to Bartolinas eventually supported the Law following president Morales' orders. For her part, an activist belonging to another feminist NGO based in La Paz told me the following regarding Bartolinas:

> [They] did not want to have much to do with the laws that we [feminist NGOs] made. They thought that they must do it [elaborate the laws] themselves, but as they didn't do it, we did.

However, this activist recognized that some *bartolinas* attended the meetings where feminist activists worked on the draft of Law 348, and both the Bartolinas Federation

and other female social organisations made "some contributions" to the draft law. Most respondents affirmed that the formulation and approval of Law 348 was the consequence of a joint work of feminist NGOs and women's social organisations, even though NGOs activists were responsible for the drafting of the norm. An autonomous feminist explained this apparent contradiction as follows:

> We are fundamentally an oral culture. […] The comrades of the social organisations have not written the law as such […] The government convoked NGOs, technicians, specialists, lawyers.

Three interviewees belonging to feminist NGOs explained that the first draft of Law 348 was written between 2011 and 2013 by a group composed of feminist NGOs such as "Gregoria Apaza" Foundation, La Paz Foundation, SEPROSI, AMUPEI and the "Juana Azurduy" Centre — the coalition of feminist NGOs Women's Coordination got involved in the final stage of the process. The role of women's social organisations in the formulation of Law 348 was highlighted by respondents such as one Bartolinas member, who told me that her organisation played "a major role" in it. For her part, one former minister who was pivotal in the approval of the law explained to me that women's social organisations took part in the meetings organized by the Women's Coordination all over Bolivia to discuss the contents of the norm. One feminist activist who knows well the process that led to the approval of Law 348 manifested her satisfaction with the fact that women belonging to social organisations viewed the norm as their own, regardless of their effective involvement in the technical task of drafting it.

In regards of the 243/2012 Law against Violence and Political Harassment on Women, all respondents inquired about its formulation stated that the women's social organisation ACOBOL was the key actor both in the drafting of the law and the campaign for its approval. Specialized literature (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016) and international organisations (ONU Mujeres n.d.) have also highlighted the role of ACOBOL in the drafting of Law 243, while a former minister who was interviewed for the present research pointed out that the NGO Women's Coordination also lobbied for the passing of the norm. ACOBOL elaborateda first draft law on VAWP in 2001, and it submitted it to the Bolivian Parliament, but the draft was discussed in Parliament for the first time in 2006, when the MAS won the parliamentary majority. According to the account provided by one Women's Coordination activist, ACOBOL led a Committee for the Law on Political Violence, in which councilwomen and MPs took part. Therefore, Law 243 was mostly a consequence of the campaigning of the social organisation ACOBOL, but it was supported by several feminist NGOs. The symbiotic relationship between both kinds of actors – which had traditionally kept rather conflictual relations – was described in the following terms by one gender consultant who used to work for the viceministry of equality of opportunities:

The NGOs contributed to the formulation of gender equality policies with money, the social organisations contributed with political legitimacy.

Table 7: Participation of feminist NGOs and women's social organisations in policy-making processes

	Feminist NGOs	Women's social organisations
2009 Constitution	Participation in the alliance 'Women Present in History' to elaborate proposals on gender equality for the Constitution (interview, feminist activist and former MP).	Participation in the alliance 'Women Present in History' to elaborate proposals on gender equality for the Constitution (interview, feminist activist and former MP).
Law 348/2013 and Supreme Decree 2145/2014	-Gregoria Apaza" Foundation, La Paz Foundation, SEPROSI, AMUPEI and the "Juana Azurduy" Centre wrote the first draft between 2011 and 2013 (interviews, 3 feminist activists). -Feminist NGOs elaborated the draft law and decree, and pushed for their approval (interviews, 3 feminist activists).	-Bartolinas MPs supported the Law in Parliament. -Some members of women's social organisations attended the meetings organised by feminists to elaborate and promote Law 348 (interview, Bartolinas' member). -Bartolinas and other female social organisations made "some contributions" to the draft law (interview, feminist activist).
Law 243/2013 and Supreme Decree 2935/2016	-The Women's Coordination pushed to pass the law (interview, former minister).	-ACOBOL was the key actor in the formulation of the law and the campaign for its approval (several interviews with feminist NGOs activists and ACOBOL members). -ACOBOL led a Committee for the Law on Political Violence, in which councilwomen

		and MPs took part (interview, Women's Coordination activist).

Source: prepared by the author

In conclusion, both feminist NGOs and women's social organisations played an important role in the formulation of the gender equality contents of the 2009 constitution, Law 348, Law 243 and their respective supreme decrees, because both kinds of organisations were included by Evo Morales' government in policy-making coalitions.

4. Findings and Discussion

The analysis has allowed us to confirm the twofold hypothesis of the present chapter. Firstly, the left-wing populist MAS and Evo Morales' government applied their conception of the 'people' and the 'elite' to the women's organisations that participated in the three analysed processes of policy-making in the field of gender equality during the 2006-2017 period: the gender-related contents of the 2009 Constitution, Law 348 on domestic gender-based violence and its supreme decree, and Law 243 on violence against women in politics and its supreme decree. In the three policy-making processes, the MAS' discourse suggested that feminist NGOs belong to the neoliberal 'elite' against which the populist political project of the MAS has been built, while social organisations were exalted as the incarnation of the 'people' in the field of gender equality policy. Secondly, both kinds of women's social organisations were allowed to participate in the formulation of legislation on gender equality. The political support of women's social organisations was key for the approval of the gender equality contents of the 2009 Constitution, Law 348, Law 243 and their respective regulation decrees, but feminist NGOs played the major role in the drafting of the mentioned norms. Thus, the MAS kept up an anti-elite rhetoric while allowing the participation of feminist NGOs (presented by the MAS' discourse as part of the elite) in the policy-making processes in the field of gender equality.

The Bolivia case-study seems to confirm the findings of previous research on populist in government that was not focused on gender equality policies. Indeed, the MAS government's inclusion of feminist NGOs in policy coalitions reminds us of the ability of European populist radical right parties to keep up an anti-elite rhetoric while acting "responsibly" in policy-making (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015, 15), of the integration of neoliberal technocrats in the policy coalitions built by Peronists and PRI populists in Argentina and Mexico, or of Correa's co-optation of certain sectors of the business community (Gibson 1997, 356–57; Taggart and Kaltwasser 2016). The contradiction between the populist anti-elite rhetoric and the pragmatic policy-making strategies of populist parties seems to be a particularity of populism.

Populist leaders promise their electoral bases (potentially, the whole 'people') that they will govern in defence of the people's interests, which populist parties define as opposed to those of the 'elite'. However, this simplistic scheme is difficult to apply to the complex terrain of policy-making, where a great diversity of actors comes into play. When it comes to policy-making, populist leaders find out that the policies that they intend to carry out to respond to the people's demands (or at least to what the populists consider to be the people's demands) can hardly ever be designed and implemented without involving a diversity of actors. And it is very unlikely that all those actors respond to the populist parties' notion of 'the people', which is usually a deeply ideological definition. Non-populist parties do not encounter this problem, because they do not exclude any policy actors *a priori*. Populists assume that the 'people' and the organisations that supposedly represent it have the knowledge needed to design and implement the policies that would meet the people's demands, but this is not always the case. This forces populist parties to turn to policy actors that the populists themselves have previously defined as 'elitists'.

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The current chapter has looked at the contradictions between discourse and policy-making regarding the formulation of gender equality policies by populist governments, an issue that had not yet been addressed by political science. Previous research on the performance of populist in governments in Europe and Latin America had suggested that populist parties are reflexive political actors, able to include a wide range of actors in their policy coalitions while keeping a populist anti-elite rhetoric; this is a hypothesis that has been tested in the case of the formulation of gender equality policies by the MAS and Evo Morales' populist government in Bolivia during the 2006-2017 period. This is a paradigmatic case of a populist government that has promoted ambitious gender equality policies in a particularly diverse landscape of women's organisations, which included mostly middle-class and white feminist NGOs and women's social organisations that were overwhelmingly made up of lower-class indigenous women.

A twofold finding has been reached through empirical analysis. First, I have found that Evo Morales' government applied its specific populist definitions of 'people' and 'elite' to each kind of organisation, stigmatizing feminist NGOs as representatives of 'the elite' and concealing their actual role in policy-making, while praising women's social organisations as representatives of 'the people' and exaggerating their participation in the processes of formulation of gender policies. Second, the analysis has revealed that both kinds of women's organisations were fully included in policy-making coalitions, and alliances were established between feminist NGOs and women's social organisations.

The findings reached in this chapter suggest that populist governments experience a contradiction between discourse and policy-making, which confirms the conclusions of

previous research works on other fields of policy-making. This contradiction seems to be a peculiarity of populism, a thin-centred ideology that affirms its intention to defend the people's demands, and suggests that popular actors have the knowledge needed to elaborate and implemented the necessary policies to meet those demands, which is not always the case. Non-populist parties do not encounter this contradiction, because they do not exclude any group of policy actors in principle. This finding constitutes a contribution both to research on the performance of populist parties in power and literature on the relationship between gender and populism. In the following chapter, I explore the extent of the influence exerted by institutionalised women's movements when left-wing populist parties are in power, an understudied issue that I investigate by focusing on the case of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement.

Chapter 6. Women's Movements Institutionalisation and Impact on Policy: the Case of the Bolivian Domestic Workers' Movement

Alliances between social movements, parties and governments have been frequently analysed by social movement studies and women's movements scholars through the concept of institutionalisation, both in relation to Latin America and other regions. However, the literature has paid little attention to the *differentiated impact* of institutionalised movements on the *substantive* and *symbolic* dimensions of policies. The present research intends to contribute to filling that gap by investigating how institutionalised women's movements impact different dimensions of the same policy.

This theoretical issue is addressed through a single-case research design focused on the Bolivian domestic workers' movements. This case has been selected because preliminary analysis of the literature and the Bolivian political context suggested that this is a paradigmatic case of 1) an institutionalised women's movement which 2) achieved a sound impact *on the symbolic dimension* of the Bolivian policy on domestic workers' rights but 3) had a limited impact *on the substantive dimension*. The chapter focuses on the 2006-2017 period, during which left-wing indigenist and populist party MAS (Movement for Socialism) and president Evo Morales were in power. The indigenist orientation of the government favoured a close relationship with the domestic workers' movement, as shown by the appointment of the movement's leader as minister of justice in 2006. The empirical analysis is based on qualitative content analysis of two sources: documents produced by the movement and the government, and semi-structured interviews with key actors (movement activists and government officials). The analysis is exclusively focused on the agenda-setting and decision phases of the policy process, for there is not enough available material to carry out a rigorous analysis of the implementation phase. The Bolivian domestic workers' movement is conceptualized in the present research as a women's movement rather than a labour movement, because in the Bolivian case domestic workers' struggles are more directly connected to other women's fights for their rights than to other labour-related struggles, as shown by the fact that for a long time the movement has kept tighter links with women's organisations than with unions. In addition, there is a tight historical relationship between the gendered character of domestic work and the discrimination suffered by domestic workers, which is reflected in the rhetoric used by the Bolivian movement.

The present chapter suggests that the institutionalisation of women's movements facilitates the achievement of *symbolic* policy outcomes, but it does not necessarily allow the achievement of *substantive* policy outcomes. Regarding specific forms of institutionalisation, in the light of the present research, the inclusion of movements in deliberative processes that imply the joint formulation of policy seems to be the *form of institutionalisation* that allows the strongest impact on the substantive dimension of

policy, while the appointment of movement members to official positions is less effective. In addition, a form of 'soft' institutionalisation that was not included in existent typologies has been identified: the recognition of the importance of a movement by the government. The chapter proceeds in three parts. In the first section, I conceptualize the institutionalisation of women's movements and their impact on policy. The second section explains the case selection and methods of the research. The third part is the empirical section, where I analyse the institutionalisation of the movement and its impact on policy.

1. Conceptualization of women's movements institutionalisation and movements impact on policy

Institutionalisation has been defined as "a process of social movements traversing the official terrain of formal politics and engaging with authoritative institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, the state, and political parties to enhance their collective ability to achieve the movement's goals" (Suh 2011, 443). Institutionalisation takes very different forms depending on the kind of institution involved (Katzenstein 1998, 211–212), and the factors that determine this process greatly vary depending on the kind of movement, the historical moment and its socio-political environment (Suh 2011, 447).

Institutionalisation needs to be differentiated from co-optation, which according to Álvarez (1990) happens when the state accepts the participation of movements in policy-making, but the policy does not match the movements' demands. Suh (2011) provides an alternative definition of co-optation, which underlines the manipulative intention of the government: co-optation takes place when "the government (the co-opting body) embraces a movement in order to uphold its own legitimacy and authority and to avert threats to its stability" (Suh 2011, 443). For their part, Coy and Hedeen (2005) have pointed out that co-opted movements often drop some of its most ambitious demands. Not all forms of movement-government relations can be labelled as co-optation, as highlighted by Hellman (1992). If we want to obtain an accurate view of movement-government relations, it is necessary to use a restricted notion of co-optation, including the elements pointed out by Álvarez, Suh and Coy and Hedeen. Thus, for the purposes of the present research I consider that co-optation takes place when 1) the government allows the participation of a movement in policy-making, 2) the government unilaterally launches this process to uphold its own legitimacy, 3) the movement drops at least some of its most ambitious demands, and 4) the final policy does not reflect the movement's demands.

The issue of institutionalisation has been frequently treated by the literature on women's movements and social movements in general, both in relation to Latin America and other geographical contexts. One priority of researchers has been

identifying positive and negative consequences of institutionalisation processes. Some alleged positive consequences are the possibility of seizing more political opportunities (Beckwith 2011, 1064), the capacity of a small number of activist to exert significant influence on policy due to their position in the state bureaucracy (Banaszak 2009), a higher likeliness of organisational survival (Ruzza 1997, 117), and, more generally, the higher capacity of obtaining "stable and influential policies that respond to movement goals" (Suh 2011, 444). Some of the negative consequences of movement institutionalisation identified by the literature are the risk of depoliticization of demands by their bureaucratic treatment (Bush 1992, 599, Horton 2015, 84, Meyer 2007, 174, Ruzza 1997, 115), the risk of divisions in movements (Horton 2015, 84, Meyer 2007, 131), and economic dependence (Ruzza 1997, 13–14).

Despite the richness of research on movements' institutionalisation, the literature has paid little attention to how women's movements impact *different dimensions* of policies, an issue that needs to be analysed if we want to know how important institutionalisation is for obtaining *substantive* policy changes that can really improve the living conditions of the people that social movements intend to defend. Marion and Oliver (2010) uphold that all political acts are to some extent symbolic, a contribution that somehow introduces the symbolic dimension in policy analysis, but they do not establish an explicit distinction between substantive and symbolic policies. For their part, Haussman and Sauer (2007), and McBride and Mazur (2010) have investigated in detail the relationship between women's movements and women's policy agencies, but none of their respective analysis introduce the symbolic-substantive distinction either.

For the purposes of the present chapter, I propose an analytical framework for the analysis of women's movements institutionalisation which is based on the typology proposed by Meyer (2007), a series of forms of institutionalisation which I use to identify in which specific forms the Bolivian domestic workers' movement was institutionalised during the period studied: 1) policymakers' consultation with representatives of movements; 2) offering of platforms to express the movements' claims; 3) creation of agencies devoted to dealing with the claims of movements; 4) funding services provided by social movements; 5) use of the rhetoric of social movements by officials; and 6) inclusion of movement actors within deliberative processes (Meyer 2007, 126–129). The concept of 'deliberative process' implies a tighter relationship between social movements and the state than mere 'negotiations', because the inclusion of movements in deliberative processes implies the joint formulation of policies, as will be further explained in the analysis section. In the present research, Meyer's typology is complemented with one extra form of institutionalisation: the appointing of social movement members to official positions, identified by Ruzza (1997, 113).

The notion of 'women's movements institutionalisation' is put into relation in the present chapter with the concept of 'social movements policy impacts' (or outcomes). Research on movements impacts has focused on topics such as impacts on the structure of political opportunities (Kitschelt 1986), on the movement itself (Kriesi et al. 1995), on public opinion (Giugni 1998, Kriesi et al. 1995), on policy (Gamson 1975; Giugni and Yamasaki 2009, Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, Kriesi et al. 1995, Silva 2015), on implementation of policies (Silva 2015), and methods to identify the policy outcomes of movements (Amenta and Young 1999, Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995). In the present chapter, movements outcomes on policy are assessed by analysing how much of their program is achieved, following the method proposed by Burstein et al. (1995), which allows to focus on the stated demands of the movement.

The analytical framework for the assessment of movements' impact on policy proposed in the present chapter is based on the distinction between the substantive, symbolic and mixed dimensions of policies. Before explaining the classification developed for this research, it is necessary to specify Thoenig's concept of public policy, which I follow: "A public policy is a programme of action specific to one or more public or governmental authorities within a sector of society or a given area" (Thoenig 1985, 6). Thus, a policy includes several decisions of the incumbent authority on the same area. My threefold typology of social movements' impacts on policy is inspired by the work of Kitschelt (1986) and Kriesi et al. (1995) on the typologies of social movement outcomes. Kitschelt has distinguished between "procedural" impacts (which "open new channels of participation to protest actors and involve their recognition as legitimate representatives of demands") and "substantive" impacts (which are defined as "changes of policy in response to protest") (Kitschelt 1986, 67). For their part, Kriesi et al. (1995) introduce a third kind of external outcome: the "sensitizing impacts", which they define as "the possibility that a movement will provoke a sensitizing of some social actor in the political arena or in the public arena".

For the purposes of this research, the symbolic dimension of a policy is *the ensemble of governmental decisions whose main aim is to improve the social image of domestic workers and domestic work*, while the substantive dimension refers to *the decisions that directly address the material demands of the domestic workers' movement regarding social rights*. Symbolic and substantive dimensions are often conflated in the same policy, but certain policies focus rather on one dimension than the other, which justifies the distinction. The 'mixed dimension' has been included to denominate those decisions where the symbolic and substantive dimensions are so deeply embedded that it is impossible to determine which one predominates. The present research exclusively focuses on the agenda-setting and decision phases of the policy-making process, for the implementation of the Bolivian legislation of domestic workers' rights is still so limited that there is not enough material to conduct an insightful analysis of that phase.

The symbolic-substantive dichotomy explained above reminds the recognition-redistribution debate on social justice launched in 1995 by Fraser, who affirmed that "cultural recognition [was displacing] socioeconomic redistribution as the remedy for injustice and the goal of political struggle" (Fraser 1995). For the purposes of the present research I have chosen to use the terms 'symbolic' and 'substantive' because they are more directly connected to the concepts proposed by social movement scholars mentioned above. This terminological choice attempts to emphasise the adscription of this chapter to the field of social movements and women's movements studies.

The present research also draws on literature on domestic workers' mobilisations, which has often referred to the links between movements, on the one hand, and parties, governments and international organisations, on the other hand (e.g. Ally 2005; Blofield 2009, 2012; Cabezas Fernández 2013; Chien 2018; CONLACTRAHO 2003; Goldsmith 2007; ILO International Training Centre 2014; Peredo Beltrán 2015; Schwenken 2011, 2013). This chapter does not discuss in-depth literature on domestic workers' movements because the theoretical focus of the research is placed on women's movements in general. However, three inputs of the mentioned literature are particularly relevant for the present chapter. First, Ally's (2005) conceptualization of the most frequent organisational models of domestic workers' movements: union-based and NGO-based movements. Second, Chien's (2018) research on the formulation of policies on care workers' rights in Taiwan, where she underlines the importance of taking the local context into account when investigating domestic workers' movements and policies on domestic workers' rights. Lastly, Peredo Beltrán (2015) has highlighted certain symbolic impacts of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement – such as the adoption by government of the movements' rhetoric – and has pointed out the weakness of the substantive policies on domestic workers' rights in Bolivia. Peredo Beltrán has not carried out a systematic analysis of the movements' demands and their degree of satisfaction as the one performed in the present chapter, but her work suggests that the Bolivian domestic workers' movement obtained more symbolic than substantive outcomes during the period studied, which is one of the reasons that led me to choose this case study, as further explained below.

2. Case selection and methods

2.1. Case selection

This chapter investigates the case of the Bolivian social movement of domestic workers between 2006 and 2017, the first years of Evo Morales and left-wing indigenist and populist party MAS in government. The choice of a quite long time framework allows to avoid the bias derived from restricting the analysis to the peak period of a movement, a methodological risk in social movement studies pointed out by Ruzza

(1997, 95). As advanced above, the preliminary examination of existing research on the movement (Peredo Beltrán 2015) suggested that the Bolivian domestic workers' movement achieved a major impact on the symbolic dimension of policy but not on the substantive dimension. In addition, the appointment of former domestic workers' movement's leader Casimira Rodríguez as minister of justice in 2006 by president Morales suggests that there was a tight relationship between the movement and the government, which will be further explained below. The mentioned particularities make of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement a very sutiable case to perform a differentiated analysis of the impact of specific forms of institutionalisation on different dimensions of policy.

Domestic work has traditionally been the main form of female paid employment in Latin America (Kuznesof 1989, 31). In Bolivia, there are around 137,000 domestic workers, which is a considerable figure if a country with a total population of around 11 million (Peredo Beltrán 2015, 17). 97 per cent of Bolivian domestic workers are women (André 2016), and most of them are indigenous individuals who have migrated from rural areas to cities, come from the lowest social classes and have a lower level of formal education than the national average. Domestic workers' working and living conditions have traditionally been extremely deficient, even for the standards of Bolivia, one of the poorest countries in Latin America (CONLACTRAHO 2003; Valenzuela and Sjoberg 2012; Wanderley 2014). Despite their subaltern position in the Bolivian society – directly related with the fact that most of them are indigenous women –, domestic workers succeeded in creating their first unions in the eighties, and the union-based National Federation of Bolivian Paid Household Workers (Fenatrahob)[8] was founded in 1993.

At the beginning of the 1990s Fenatrahob presented to Bolivian Parliament a draft law on domestic workers' rights that intended to overcome the legal discrimination they suffered at that time (for instance, their daily working time was much longer than for the rest of the Bolivian workforce), but the draft was rejected. All throughout the 1990s, Fenatrahob combined the struggle for legal reform with actions that aimed the immediate improvement of its members' living conditions, such as specialization courses to increase the workers' wages (Peredo Beltrán 2015, 84). In 1997, a Committee to Promote the Law was created, with the participation of feminist NGOs such as the Women's Network for Economic Transformation (REMTE), some unions and other progressive organisations[9]. The Bolivian organisational model corresponds to the "union" category conceptualized by Ally (2005) – NGOs provide support to Feantrahob

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8 Domestic workers are usually called "household workers" in Bolivia, because the former term has a colonial-racist load.
9 Author's interviews with the coordinator of one of the NGOs that support Fenatrahob (La Paz, August 17th 2017).

for the drafting of legal proposals but the political decisions of the movement are taken within the union structure[10]. However, the support of Bolivian inter-branch unions such as the Bolivian Workers' Organisation (COB) was uneven. The domestic workers' movement's repertoire of action included signature collections, petitions to authorities, and street protests such as sittings (Cabezas Fernández 2012).

Despite the mentioned actions, the movements' demands remained unsatisfied for a long period. Throughout the 1990s, neoliberal politics were hegemonic in Bolivia, where the International Monetary Fund imposed hard structural adjustment plans that included restrictions of social rights and a growing deregulation of the labour market. The political context has experienced a U-turn since 2000, when a massive cycle of anti-neoliberal mobilisations began in Bolivia and Fenatrahob's demands entered the political agenda (Peredo Beltrán 2015, Webber 2011). The pressure of peasant-indigenous and working-class social movements led the Parliament to approve in 2003 Law 2450 that Regulates Paid Household Work, which attributed to domestic workers similar rights to those of the rest of Bolivian workforce, including the legal minimum salary, yearly holidays, weekly free time from work, access to education, and health insurance coverage. Evo Morales' MAS, which was the main opposition party at that time, was the main parliamentary supporter of the law. Law 2450/2003 constituted a major achievement for the movement, but it did not immediately improve the situation of domestic workers, for some of its most important dispositions – such as the articles that guaranteed their right to health insurance and pensions – needed to be developed by supreme decrees (infra-legal regulations issued by the president).

In December 2005, after five years of anti-neoliberal mobilisations, former coca-growers' union leader and MAS candidate Evo Morales won the national election and was invested as president, which raised high hopes among domestic workers. He was the first indigenous president in Bolivia's history and kept tight links with the peasant, working-class and indigenous social movements that had provoked the resignation of neoliberal presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 and Carlos Mesa in 2005. One of Morales' first decisions as president was the appointment as minister of justice of Casimira Rodríguez, former executive secretary of Fenatrahob and the Latin American and Caribbean Confederation of Household Workers (CONLACTRAHO). This significant gesture was the first of the several forms of institutionalisation experienced by the Bolivian domestic workers' movement between 2006 and 2017, as further explained below.

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10 The distinction between 'social movement' and 'social movement organisation-SMO' proposed by Della Porta and Diani (2009, p. 137) is applied to the present research in the following way: the ensemble formed by Fenatrahob and the organisations that support it is considered as 'the Bolivian domestic workers' movement', while Fenatrahob is the main organisation of the movement (a social movement organisation).

2.1. Methods

As advanced in Chapter 2, the research performed in this chapter follows a qualitative approach based on two methods: 1) qualitative thematic analysis of documents produced by the Bolivian social movement of domestic workers and the government, and 2) semi-structured interviews with activists and government officials. Documental analysis has been used by researchers who focus on domestic workers' movements, such as Chien (2018), while interviews have been the main source of data for Peredo Beltrán (2015) and Blofield (2009, 2012). The documents have been selected by intentional sampling (Lindekilde, 2014). Regarding Fenatrahob, two kinds of documents have been selected: 1) the policy proposal *Depatriarchalisation and Decolonisation from the Perspective of Waged Household Workers* (Fenatrahob, 2014a) – a document in which Fenatrahob performed a diagnosis of the working and living conditions of Bolivian domestic workers and exposed its main policy demands –, and 2) all the *Equidad y Justicia* ('Equity and Justice') informative bulletins published by the Federation between 2005 and 2017 (the sample is composed of 23 bulletins, as they are usually published two or three times per year). Insofar as Fenatrahob is the main organisation of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement, its documents set the policy priorities of the whole movement. The present research does not have the specific aim of analysing the chronological evolution of the movements' institutionalisation and impact on policy, but the analysis of bulletins published over twelve years introduces a certain diachronic dimension in the analysis. Regarding the government, I have analysed communiqués of the ministry of labour on domestic workers' rights, and the laws and regulations approved or promoted by the government on this topic.

In addition, semi-structured interviews have been carried out with a sample of 14 individuals belonging to the following categories: Fenatrahob leaders (including two of its former executive secretaries and two leaders of local unions), activists belonging to women's organisations that support Fenatrahob, and government and MAS representatives (including a former minister, a former senator and a former official of the ministry of labour). The interviews had two central aims: completing the data provided by document analysis on the degree of achievement of policy demands, and obtaining a faithfully view of the relations between the movement and the government. In the case of Fenatrahob members, their biography was also addressed, in order to complete the contextual information provided by literature on the working and living conditions of domestic workers. By contrast, interviews with members of the NGOs that support Fenatrahob were rather expert interviews, focused on the processes of policy formulation. Interviewing both activists and government officials allowed to obtain a balanced and comprehensive picture of the analysed issues. The interviews were carried out in La Paz, El Alto and Cochabamba (three of the four biggest cities in Bolivia) during two fieldwork trips that took place in March and April 2016 and August 2017. Conducting interviews in two different years instead of

concentrating all of them in the same moment also reinforced the diachronic dimension of the research.

3. The institutionalisation of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement and its impacts on the policy on domestic workers' rights

The empirical analysis of the case study proceeds in three parts. First, I analyse to what extent and in which forms the domestic workers' movement was institutionalised during the 2006-2017 period. Second, I explore how the movement impacted the substantive, symbolic and mixed dimensions of the policy on domestic workers' rights. In the third subsection, I investigate the connection between the specific forms of movement's institutionalisation and its policy impacts.

3.1. The institutionalisation of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement

The analysis of the movement's institutionalisation is based on Meyer's (2007) typology, which has been complemented with an input by Ruzza (1997) – the appointment of social movement members to official positions – and an extra form of institutionalisation that I have deduced from empirical analysis: the symbolic recognition of the importance of the social movement by the government.

The following table explains the forms of institutionalisation that the Bolivian domestic workers' movement experienced between 2006 and 2017 and when they took place. The different forms of institutionalisation are organized following a criterion of graduation — the less intense forms are presented in the first part of the table, while the more intense ones are at the end of the table.

Table 8: Forms of institutionalisation of the domestic workers' movement (2006-2017)

Form of institutionalisation	Description	Date
Symbolic recognition of the importance of the social movement (conceptualized by the author)	Celebration of a ceremony at the ministry of labour to recognise the work of Fenatrahob during its 20 years of existence (Ministerio de Trabajo 2013)	2013
Use of the rhetoric of social movements by officials (Meyer 2007)	Use of the rhetoric of Fenatrahob in the 28655/2006 Decree that created the National Day of Household Workers. The decree states: "The work of household workers, often rendered invisible by everyday life, must be recognised. […] Their struggle against discrimination is the same struggle to get a	2006

	country with more justice". By contrast, this kind of rhetoric is completely absent from Law 2450, approved before left-wing indigenist and populist Morales' arrival to state power in 2006.	
Offering of platforms to express movements' claims (Meyer 2007)	Participation of Fenatrahob to the Constituent Assembly (Fenatrahob 2006)	2006-2009
Appointment of social movement members to official positions (Ruzza 1997)	Appointment of Casimira Rodríguez as minister of justice	2006
	Appointment of several Fenatrahob activists to subnational official parliamentary and executive positions[11]	2006-2017
Inclusion of movement actors within deliberative processes that imply joint formulation of policy (Meyer 2007)	Participation of Fenatrahob in the drafting of a supreme decree on health insurance for domestic workers (Fenatrahob 2017, 2014b, 2010, 2009, 2007)	2007-2017
	Participation of Fenatrahob in the formulation of a programme for the access of domestic workers to secondary education (Fenatrahob 2014b)	2014
	Participation of Fenatrahob in the drafting of a ministerial resolution on written contracts and 'salaries books' (Fenatrahob 2014c)	2014

Source: prepared by the author

As shown in Table 8, the analysis has allowed to identify several specific events of institutionalisation that match five categories: symbolic recognition of the importance of the social movement, use of the rhetoric of social movements, offering of platforms to express movements' claims, appointment of social movement members to official positions, and inclusion of movement actors within deliberative processes. One of the 'soft' forms of institutionalisation that took place during the period studied was the holding of an official ceremony in the ministry of labour to commemorate the 20th anniversary of Fenatrahob. This event has been conceptualized as *symbolic recognition of the importance of the social movement*, a form of 'soft institutionalisation' that is not included in existing typologies. In addition, the rhetoric of the social movement was used by the government in the 28655/2006 Decree that created the National Day of Household Workers, and the movement participated in the Constituent Assembly.

11 Author's interview with a former MAS senator and one former executive secretary of Fenatrahob.

These two institutionalisation events took place in 2006, together with the appointment of Casimira Rodríguez as minister.

By contrast, movement's participation in policy-making processes (the most intense form of institutionalisation identified in this case) was more frequent during the second half of the analysed period. Representatives of Fenatrahob and the NGOs that support the Federation co-elaborated a programme for the access of workers to secondary education, participated in meetings with officials of the ministry of health and proposed draft norms to guarantee the workers' right to health insurance, and also took part in the drafting of the ministerial resolution on written contracts and 'salaries books' – the three issues will be further explored below. The inclusion of movement's representatives in the mentioned processes was a form of directly integrating domestic workers in policy-making procedures from which lower-class indigenous women are usually excluded.

There seems to be a trend towards the intensification of the movement-government relationship throughout the analysed period, which suggests that 'soft' forms of institutionalisation can be the first step towards more intense ones. For instance, when a government has publicly praised a movement and has adopted its rhetoric (as Morales' government did), it seems difficult to avoid the inclusion of the movement on subsequent policy-making processes. However, there are also exceptions to this trend in the analysed case: for instance, the ceremony held at the ministry of labour to commemorate the anniversary of Fenatrahob (a soft form of institutionalisation) took place in 2013, while the first government-movement meetings to jointly elaborate a decree of health insurance took place in 2007. Thus, it would be far-fetched to conclude that soft forms of institutionalisation *generally* precede more intense institutionalisation forms such as movements' participation in policy-making. Rather, the analysis suggests that different kinds of institutionalisation can take place simultaneously, and 'soft' forms of institutionalisation are important, because at least in some cases they can pave the way for stronger government-movement ties.

3.2. The impact of the movement on the symbolic, mixed and substantive dimensions of the policy on domestic workers' rights

The institutionalisation of the movement allowed it to obtain all its symbolic demands during the 2006-2017 period and most of its mixed demands, but only a few of its substantive demands. As explained above, I assess the impact of the movement by analysing how many of its stated demands were met, as suggested by Burstein et al. (1995).

a) Impacts on the symbolic dimension of policy

Two symbolic demands were promoted by the movement between 2006 and 2017: the creation of a National Day of Household Workers, and the constitutional recognition of the economic value of domestic work. Both demands were met by the government.

Table 9: Fenatrahob's demands of symbolic policies

Fenatrahob's demands
Creation of the National Day of Household Workers[12]
Official recognition of the economic value of domestic work (Fenatrahob 2009a, 2014d)

Source: prepared by the author

Fenatrahob called in 2006 for the creation of a National Day of Household Workers on March 30th, to commemorate the anniversary of the foundation of the Latin American and Caribbean Confederation of Household Workers (CONLACTRAHO) in 1988 and the struggle of domestic workers for their rights. The demand was met in 2006, when Casimira Rodríguez was Evo Morales' minister of justice. The decision was confirmed through Law 181/2011. In Bolivia, all occupational sectors have an annual national day. Thus, creating the domestic workers' one was a way of recognising their work as equal to the rest, which had the intention to improve the social image of domestic workers. That is why the creation of the National Day must be considered as a symbolic measure.

The second symbolic demand of Fenatrahob (2009b) was the constitutional recognition of the economic value of domestic work, a claim that was satisfied through Article 338 of the new Constitution approved in 2009. This achievement was highlighted by one former secretary general of Fenatrahob in the following terms:

> There is this issue in the Constitution, the recognition that household work must be valued. […] Article 338 recognises that household work is the contribution of household workers to the country.

Again, the aim of improving the social image of domestic workers through constitutional recognition confirms that this was a symbolic policy.

b) Impacts on the mixed dimension of policy

The balance is slightly less positive regarding *mixed* policy demands. The movement formulated two demands of this kind: the ratification of Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, approved by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in

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[12] Author's interview with a former executive secretary of the movement.

2011; and the inclusion of domestic workers' rights in the General Labour Act, which establishes the general framework of labour relations in Bolivia (Fenatrahob 2010b, Wanderley 2014). The first demand was met, and the government engaged itself to meet the second one when the general reform of the labour legislation takes place.

Table 10: Fenatrahob's demands of mixed policies

Fenatrahob's demands
Ratification of the 189 ILO Convention on Decent Work for Domestic Workers[13]
Inclusion of domestic workers in the new General Labour Act (Fenatrahob 2010a)

Source: prepared by the author

Convention 189 is the first international treaty that explicitly recognises basic rights to domestic workers, such as freedom of association and the right to collective bargain, and requires equating of domestic workers' rights with those of other workers, with some exceptions. When I asked one former secretary general of Fenatrahob which had been the main achievements of the Federation since 2006, she underlined the importance of Convention 189 and the participation of Fenatrahob in the negotiations that led to the approval of the treaty (Fenatrahob 2011, 2010c):

> We participated in the drafting of Convention 189 in Geneva. This has been a very important achievement for household workers at the international level, and also in Bolivia, for it allows us to actualise the legislation on domestic work, it allows us to be considered as equal to other workers.

The symbolic importance of Convention 189 for the Bolivian domestic workers' movement was also highlighted by a former official of the ministry of labour who was interviewed for this research:

> Convention 189 gave them [Bolivian domestic workers] an international legal framework. It was also their need to feel identified and recognised as household workers. There is a very strong identity issue here.

Indeed, the ratification was a key priority for Fenatrahob for symbolic reasons (it reinforced the legitimacy of the domestic workers' demands) and legal reasons (the convention only became compulsory in Bolivia when it was ratified by Parliament and the government, reinforcing the workers' legal protection). Fenatrahob and its supporting organisations wanted Bolivia to be the first state in the world in ratifying the convention. However, the decision was retarded to 2012 due to civil servants' reluctance, as an activist of the movement told me:

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[13] Author's interviews with a former official of the ministry of labour and movement activists

It was very difficult to convince civil servants [of the ministry of labour] of the need of ratifying the convention.

Convention 189 was eventually ratified by Bolivia through Law 309/2012. It did not create any new right for Bolivian domestic workers, insofar as Law 2450/2003 was more advanced that the convention, but the ratification favoured the approval of Ministerial Resolution 218/2014 on the written contracts and the 'salary book', whose contents will be explained below. As May 2014 *Equity and Justice* bulletin reminded, Convention 189 establishes that "all states must carry out the necessary measures to make sure that its workers are adequately informed about their working conditions through *written contracts*" (Fenatrahob 2014d). In addition, several interviewees affirmed that the ratification reinforced the movement's position in further negotiations. ILO conventions include a reporting mechanism that allows unions addressing demands for implementation of labour rights to ILO, a tool that improved Fenatrahob's correlation of forces vis-à-vis the Bolivian state. That is why the ratification of Convention 189 was a mixed (symbolic-substantive) measure.

The second mixed policy demand promoted by Fenatrahob was the inclusion of domestic workers' rights in the General Labour Act – they are currently recognised by Law 2450/2003, a specific norm. The government committed itself to include domestic workers' rights in the future General Labour Act[14], but the accomplishment of the promise will not be sure until the approval of the general reform of labour legislation. If the government honours its commitment and the Parliament validates the decision, the inclusion of domestic workers' rights in the General Labour Act will improve their legal situation (substantive dimension) and will reinforce the idea that domestic workers deserve the same rights than the rest of the workforce, improving their social image (symbolic dimension).

c) Impacts on the substantive dimension of policy

The analysis of the *Equity and Justice* bulletins and the *Decolonisation and Depatriarchalisation* policy proposal published by Fenatrahob allows to identify several *substantive* policy demands on five issues: 1) minimum wage and working time limits, 2) health coverage, 3) pensions, 4) education, and 5) protection against violence. All the demands analysed here are related with domestic workers' social rights and working and living conditions, which has led me to classify them as substantive demands. In the following paragraphs, the five mentioned categories of demands are analysed by exploring three dimensions: the legislation that existed before 2006 (Law 2450/2003), the demands formulated by the movement, and the new legislation that was approved following the movement's demands.

Table 11: Fenatrahob's demands of substantive policies

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14 Author's interview with a former MAS senator.

	Fenatrahob's demands
Minimum wage and working time limits	1. Necessary administrative regulation to allow the labour inspection to supervise the working conditions of household workers (Fenatrahob 2014d) 2. Publication of a guide that explains the workers how to legally claim their rights (Fenatrahob 2014d) 3. A Ministerial Resolution that makes compulsory the written contract and the 'salary book' for all domestic workers, where the wages perceived by workers and the effective time of work are registered (Fenatrahob 2014a)
Health coverage	A Supreme Decree that implements article 24 of Law 2450/2003 (include domestic workers in the National Health Insurance system) (Fenatrahob 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009b, 2010b, 2010a, 2015, 2016)
Pensions	1. Effective pension coverage (Fenatrahob 2014c, 2014d)
Education	1. The Ministry of Education must "generate the conditions for the access of household workers -particularly girls- to the education system, considering their special situation" (Fenatrahob 2014d) 2. The government must create courses of alphabetisation for those who could not attend school when they were girls, courses for the professional specialisation of workers and scholarships (Fenatrahob 2014d)
Protection against violence	1. "Massive campaigns of communication with […] transformative criteria on the culture of discrimination, oriented towards employers, workers and authorities" (Fenatrahob 2014d)

Source: prepared by the author

Regarding minimum wage and working time limits, Law 2450/2003 established domestic workers' right to earn the legal minimum wage and a general limit of eight hours of work per day. There was an exception for live-in domestic workers (those who live in the house where they work), whose daily working time was set in ten hours. This difference was justified during the debate of Law 2450/2003 by the need to pay back the employers for giving shelter to the worker. As these rights were often violated by employers, in 2014 Fenatrahob demanded the creation of an administrative regulation to allow the labour inspection to supervise domestic workers' working conditions, the publication of a guide that explains the workers how to legally claim their rights, and a ministerial resolution that makes compulsory for all domestic workers the written contract and a 'salary book' – a document where the wages perceived by workers and the effective time of work are registered (Fenatrahob 2014a, 2014b). That same year, the ministry of labour passed Resolution 218/2014, which established the compulsory character of written contracts and 'salaries books'.

As far as health coverage is concerned, Law 2450/2003 established domestic workers' right to affiliation to the National Health Insurance but the implementation of this right was conditioned to the approval of a supreme decree. The passing of this decree was a frequent demand in *Equity and Justice* bulletins throughout the analysed period (Fenatrahob 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2010a, 2010b, 2015, 2016). In addition, the executive secretaries of two local unions of domestic workers (in La Paz and Cochabamba) interviewed for this research stated that the passing of a decree on health coverage was "the main priority" of the movement. However, the decree was not approved during the period studied, which led some members of the movement to express their exasperation. For instance, one leader of Fenatrahob said:

> I told the people in the Social Security: 'Frankly, comrade, we have been waiting for the health insurance for fourteen years. […] What 'Good Living'[15] are they talking about? It is not enough to write it on paper, one needs to enjoy it'.

Regarding pensions, Law 2450/2003 established domestic workers' rights to "compensation for years of work", and Fenatrahob repeatedly called for an effective pension coverage for domestic workers (Fenatrahob 2014d, 2014a), which was not achieved during the analysed period. As an activist of the women's organisation Colectivo Rebeldía claimed:

> No household worker has the right to a pension! And the state has not lifted a finger to guarantee this right. It is not [even] their money, they won't need to use the money of the state but the money of employers.

The mentioned testimony suggests that the government's fear of a conflict with employers might have deterred it from meeting the domestic workers' demand on pensions.

Another important category of Fenatrahob's substantive policy demands is education, an issue on which Law 2450/2003 does not contain any specific disposition. However, in 2014 Fenatrahob asked the government for measures to facilitate domestic workers' access to formal education (Fenatrahob 2014a). The demand was met by the ministry of education two years later through the creation of a secondary education program that allows domestic workers to attend classes on a part-time basis (Ministerio de Educación 2016).

The movement also formulated policy demands regarding protection against violence. This is not exactly a social right, but it is a demand that intends to directly improve domestic workers' living conditions, which justifies its inclusion among substantive demands. In addition, living and working without suffering any violence is a necessary condition to enjoy the social rights demanded by domestic workers. Law 2450/2003 established the specific duty of the Police and the Public Prosecutor to receive the

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15 She refers to the concept of *buen vivir* ('Good Living'), an indigenous principle which is supposed to inspire MAS policies.

claims from domestic workers on harassment and violence committed by their employers or their employers' relatives, and initiate the corresponding investigations. Due to the seriousness of this problem, Fenatrahob called in 2014 for "Massive campaigns of communication with […] transformative criteria on the culture of discrimination, oriented towards employers, workers and authorities" (Fenatrahob 2014a). Scholars such as Rivera Cusicanqui (2015) have highlighted that violence against domestic workers is often legitimized by the racist and sexist discrimination that they suffer. However, the government did not meet this demand during the period studied.

The analysis has shown that only two of the seven *substantive* policy demands expressed by the movement were satisfied by the Bolivian government between 2006 and 2017: the 218/2014 Ministerial Resolution that established a compulsory contract and a 'salaries book' for domestic workers, and the program elaborated by the ministry of education to promote domestic workers' access to formal education. By contrast, the movement was highly successful in impacting the symbolic and mixed dimensions of the policy on domestic workers' rights. Overall, the government conceded the demands that needed less public spending and a did not imply a direct conflict with employers. This, combined with the fact that substantive demands were less successful than symbolic ones, could suggest that the movement was co-opted by the government, but it would be an inaccurate definition of the movement-government relations in this case.

As explained above, co-optation takes place when the government allows the movement's participation in policy-making with the aim of upholding the government's legitimacy, but the policy does not meet the movement's demands, and the movement drops some of its demands (Álvarez 1990, Coy and Hedeen 2005, Suh 2011). The Bolivian domestic workers' movement was included in policy-making processes, its demands were partially met, and it would be inaccurate to affirm that the process was unilaterally initiated by the government – Fenatrahob and its allies took the decision of establishing a close relationship with Morales' government in order to promote its policy demands. In addition, the analysis has shown that the Bolivian domestic workers' movement did not renounce to any of its more ambitious demands (including health and pensions coverage) during the period studied. As Peredo Beltrán (2016, 26) has put it, Bolivian domestic workers "were able to keep their own agenda". Thus, despite the incomplete satisfaction of the movement's demands during the period studied, it would be inaccurate to label the relationship between Morales' government and the Bolivian domestic workers' movement as co-optation.

3.3. The relationship between the institutionalisation of the movement and its impacts on policy

Table 12 presents the impacts achieved by the movement, in connection with the forms of institutionalisation that are directly related with those impacts.

Table 12: Forms of institutionalisation of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement and impact on the policy on domestic workers' rights (2006-2017)

Specific case of institutionalisation and date	Form of institutionalisation	Related policy decision and date	Dimension of the policy
Appointment of Casimira Rodríguez as minister of justice (2006)	Appointment of social movement members to official positions (Ruzza 1997)	28655/2006 Supreme Decree that establishes the National Day of Household Workers on March 30th and Law 181/2011 that confirms it (2006 and 2011)	Symbolic
Participation of Fenatrahob to the Constituent Assembly and creation of a Commission on the Constituent Assembly within the inner structure of the Federation (2006-2009)	Offering of platforms to express movements' claims (Meyer 2007)	Constitutional recognition of the economic value of domestic work (2009)	Symbolic
General close movement-government relationship (2006-2012)	Several forms of institutionalisation	Ratification of Convention 189 (2012)	Mixed
Participation of Fenatrahob in the formulation of a programme for the access of domestic workers to secondary education (2014)	Inclusion of movement actors within deliberative processes (Meyer 2007)	Creation of a specific program of secondary education for household workers (2016)	**Substantive**
Participation of Fenatrahob in the drafting of a ministerial resolution on written contracts and 'salaries books' (2014)	Inclusion of movement actors within deliberative processes (Meyer 2007)	218/2014 Resolution of the ministry of labour establishing the compulsory character of written contracts and 'salaries books' for all domestic workers (2014)	**Substantive**

Source: prepared by the author

Table 12 shows three major findings. First, specific forms of institutionalisation are directly related with specific impacts on policy, as I will further explain. Second, the two impacts that the movement had on the substantive dimension of policy were directly related with *the same form of institutionalisation*: the inclusion of movement actors within deliberative processes (Meyer 2007). The third finding is that the appointment of former Fenatrahob leader Casimira Rodríguez as minister of justice did not allow the achievement of any substantive policy impact, only a symbolic impact. The latter finding challenges the idea that a small number of social movement activists can have a major influence on policy because of their position in the state bureaucracy, formulated by women's movements scholars such as Banaszak (2009). In the same vein, the appointment of other activists of the domestic workers movement to subnational official positions previously identified in Table 8 did not seem to allow any specific policy impact.

The lack of impact of Rodríguez's appointment on the substantive dimension of policy seems to be related to the permanence of a racist and sexist habitus within the ministry of justice, together with Rodríguez's difficulties in making her way in the bureaucratic structures of the ministry, as explained by an experienced former minister who was interviewed for the present research:

> When she [Casimira Rodríguez] went to meetings, her advisors spoke in her name [...] She was 'invaded' by the bureaucratic logic. We were all 'invaded' [by that logic] when we arrived to government, no minister had any knowledge in public administration. If this was difficult for ministers who were professionals, it was even harder for a woman who was semi-illiterate.

Racism and sexism in the ministry was also denounced by Rodríguez herself in her memoirs (Rodríguez Romero 2015). Despite these major obstacles, Rodríguez's appointment as minister allowed the creation of the National Day of Household Workers, a symbolic impact. The direct link between the appointment of the domestic workers' leader as minister and the creation of the National Day was confirmed by a former secretary general of Fenatrahob:

> We presented this proposal, Casimira Rodríguez presented the proposal to make that March 30th becomes the National Day of Household Workers. The Bolivian state accepted our proposal through a supreme decree. Now, household workers enjoy a day of rest to recognise our work. Because a supreme decree can change if the government changes, we promoted that the decree becomes a law. Therefore, the 25th October 2011 the decree was turned into a law.

Regarding the economic recognition of the value of domestic work in the 2009 Constitution, the presence of Fenatrahob in the Constituent Assembly was key. An activist and scholar explained to me that the general political situation of the country was very tense during the formulation of the new constitution: "There was an extreme social polarization in Bolivia. There was a situation of almost civil war". In that strained

context, the presence of movement's representatives in the Assembly allowed the approval of Article 338 on the economic value of domestic work.

Lastly, there is a direct connection between the movement's participation in policy-making processes and the achievement of two substantive impacts: a specific program of secondary education for household workers and the 218/2014 Ministerial Resolution on written contracts and 'salaries books'. The direct participation of movement's representatives in the drafting of the mentioned norm and policy program allowed a direct influence on the final outcome. By contrast, the ratification of Convention 189 was not directly linked to a specific form of institutionalisation, but seems to be related to the generally tight relations that the movement and the government kept during the 2006-2017 period.

Conclusions

The present chapter has explored *how institutionalised women's movements impact different dimensions of the same policy*, focusing on the substantive, mixed and symbolic dimensions. To address this theoretical issue, I have investigated the case of the Bolivian social movement of domestic workers between 2006 and 2017, a period during which left-wing indigenist and populist party MAS and president Evo Morales were in power. Insofar as Bolivian domestic workers are overwhelmingly indigenous lower-class women and the MAS had supported their movement prior to its arrival in power, Morales' election raised hopes of legal and material progress among domestic workers, who suffered a lasting situation of discrimination and poor working conditions.

In the first part of the analysis, five forms of movement institutionalisation have been identified: symbolic recognition of the importance of the social movement by the government, use of the rhetoric of the movement by officials, offering of platforms to express the movement's claims, appointment of social movement members to official positions, and inclusion of the movement within deliberative policy-making processes. Thus, the analysis has shown that the movement was highly institutionalised throughout the period studied (2006-2017), and several kinds of institutionalisation took place simultaneously. The following step has been investigating the impact of the movement on different dimensions of the Bolivian policy on domestic workers' rights. I have found that the movement was highly successful in obtaining *symbolic* and *mixed* policy demands, but it only obtained two of the seven *substantive* policy demands that it formulated: a ministerial resolution that established the compulsory character of written contracts and a registry of salaries ('salary books') for domestic workers, and a specific program to promote domestic workers' access to secondary education. Key policy demands such as health coverage, right to pensions and effective protection against violence remained unmet. Therefore, the movement had a much greater impact on the symbolic and mixed dimensions of policy than it had on the substantive dimension. Even though the movement did not obtain all its demands, I have reached the conclusion that this is not a case of co-optation, because the institutionalisation

process was actively initiated by the movement, the movement did not drop any of its most ambitious demands, and it obtained many of its policy aims.

In the last part of the analysis I have investigated the relationship between the previously identified forms of institutionalisation and the movement's impacts on policy. The analysis has shown that the two substantive policy impacts achieved by the movement between 2006 and 2017 were facilitated by the same form of institutionalisation: *the inclusion of the movement within deliberative processes* that implied the joint development of policy. By contrast, the appointment of former leader of the movement Casimira Rodríguez as minister of justice only allowed the achievement of symbolic policy (the creation of the National Day of Household Workers); her appointment did not grant any substantive policy impact.

The mentioned empirical findings allow to formulate three arguments that can enrich research on social movements institutionalisation. First, the case study suggests that institutionalisation of women's movements facilitates the achievement of symbolic policy demands but does not necessarily allow the achievement of substantive policy demands. Second, if we look at specific forms of institutionalisation, inclusion of social movements in deliberative processes seems to be the form of institutionalisation that allows the strongest impact on the substantive dimension of policy, for it implies the joint development of policies by the government and the movement. By contrast, the appointment of social movement activists to official positions in the state seems to be less effective, which challenges existing assumptions in women's movements literature about the influence of institutionalised activists. The third finding consists in the conceptualization of a form of institutionalisation that is not included in existent typologies: symbolic recognition of the importance of the social movement. This form of 'soft institutionalisation' does not seem sufficient by itself to achieve policy impact, but could facilitate the establishing of stronger forms of institutionalisation. Therefore, this form of institutionalisation should be added to existing classifications with the aim of performing more accurate analysis of movements institutionalisation.

Final Discussion and Conclusions

In 2006, Evo Morales roseto state power in Bolivia after an electoral landslide, with the support of social movements and the promise to overcome neoliberalism and neocolonialism. Between 2006 and 2018, social and economic reforms reduced inequalities and palliated the traditional imbalance of power between the mestizo and white elites and the indigenous majority of the country. Yet, high dependence on natural resources, corruption, and a growing concentration of power in Morales' hands were also defining features of Bolivian politics during the period studied. Morales' arrival in power in 2006 was a consequence of two decades of growing social unrest provoked by the neoliberal regime put in place in Bolivia by international financial institutions with the collaboration of national economic and political elites. The growing popular opposition to neoliberalism throughout the 1990s exploded in the 2000-2005 cycle of mobilisations, a wave of protests of unprecedented intensity that united a wide range of peasant, indigenous and working-class organisations with progressive sectors of the middle class. Women played a major role in the mobilisations, particularly through peasant women's organisations, neighbourhood councils and coca-growers unions.

The strength of women's movements had an impact on Evo Morales' government and the MAS, which from 2006 promoted innovative and ambitious policies in several gender equality-related fields. This singularity makes Morales' Bolivia a particularly suitable case for investigating the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics. The literature had rarely addressed the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, and therefore we lack a comprehensive and deep understanding of the complex relationship between both political projects. This thesis is a relevant academic development that seeks to fill this gap. Considering the recent surge of populist movements around the world, and the rise of a feminist fourth wave, political scientists are compelled to examine the practical relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, a question which this thesis answers in a timely fashion.

In Latin America, the progressive political cycle known as the 'pink tide' has come to an end. The political and economic crisis in Venezuela, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's electoral defeat in 2015 in Argentina, and the destitution of Brazil's Dilma Roussef through a judicial coup d'état in 2016 marked the beginning of the end of the 'pink tide'. With the exception of Bolivia, former 'pink tide' countries have either turned to the right or their governments have acquired increasingly authoritarian features, such as in the cases of Venezuela and Nicaragua. In Bolivia, Morales won the October 2019 election, but with much lower support than on previous occasions, and amidst accusations of fraud that are still to be proven. Soon after, a military coup ejected Morales from power and forced him to flee the country, putting an end to 14 years of the so-called 'process of change'. At the time of writing this conclusion, Bolivia was sinking into a new period of authoritarianism and political regression. The time has

come to assess the impact of the last decade and a half of left-wing governments in the region, in particular with regards to women's struggles for rights and equality. In the years that followed Hugo Chávez's first electoral victory in Venezuela in 1999, left-wing parties have reached state power through electoral victories in Nicaragua, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia. In many of these countries, the new ruling parties were populist (the clearest cases are Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina and Bolivia) at least in the definition used throughout this thesis. For a decade and a half, 'pink tide' governments promoted more participatory constitutions, effectively tackled poverty and social inequalities (the starkest in the world) and reinforced the autonomy of Latin America in international relations. However, these governments also presented major failures, such as the incapacity to deeply transform the extractionist economic structure of most countries in the region and the entrenched corruption in most of them. Much has been written on the aforementioned topics (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Mendizábal 2012; Panizza 2008; Pisarello 2014; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010), but little research has focused on the gender policies promoted by the 'pink tide' governments (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Friedman 2009; Rodríguez Gustá, Madera, and Caminotti 2017), including those 'pink tide' parties that can be considered as populist (Archenti and Albaine 2013b; Cabezas Fernández 2014b; Dosh, Kligerman, and Lerager 2010; Ewig 2018; Heumann 2014; Kampwirth 2010; Monasterios 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015). The available research suggests that in several Latin American countries, the 'pink tide' governments promoted progressive laws on gender equality, and the presence of women (including indigenous ones) in politics increased under left-wing governments.

In Europe, the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent economic and social depression prompted the rise of a group of left-wing populist parties and leaders in countries such as Spain, Greece, France, and the United Kingdom – a phenomenon that is somewhat a parallel to the more pronounced rise of radical right-wing populist parties. Of the left-wing ones, only Greece's Syriza has reached state power so far, but Spain's Podemos, France Insoumise and the Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Party in Britain have deeply transformed their countries' political systems. However, research about these parties is scarce (Antentas 2017; Birnbaum 2017; Bolton and Pitts 2018; Borreca 2014b; Casero-Ripollés, Sintes-Olivella, and Franch 2017; Castaño 2018; Franzé 2017; Gann 2019; Gerbaudo and Screti 2017; Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis 2018; Meyenberg 2017; Otalora 2017; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014) and, more specifically, research into their gender equality policies is almost non-existent (Caravantes 2018; Lombardo and Kantola 2019; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015). The available literature on both Latin American and European cases does not provide a satisfactory answer to the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics. For this reason, in this thesis I have examined whether left-wing populist parties can promote gender equality policies and how exactly they relate to women's movements. In doing so, I have shed light on how these parties often promote progressive gender equality policies and keep collaborative relations with women's movements.

The interest in the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics coincides with its theoretical relevance. As I explained in the theoretical chapter, there is a growing stream of research on the link between populism (in general) and feminist politics that claims that the relationship is necessarily contradictory both in left-wing and right-wing populism, because of the tension between the typically masculine and aggressive style of most populist leaders, and feminist theory and practice, (Caravantes 2018; Kampwirth 2010; Meret 2015; Shea Baird and Roth 2017). Beyond this finding, the literature on populism and feminist politics has failed to establish a general relationship between populism and the two dimensions of feminist politics that I explore in this thesis: 1) the institutionalisation of women's movements (the relations between movements and governments), and 2) populist governments' promotion of gender equality policies. This pitfall is largely due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of works on populism and feminist politics focus on European radical right-wing parties, an imbalance that this thesis contributes to palliate through a single-case investigation on Bolivia's Movement for Socialism (the MAS), a Latin American left-wing populist party.

This final chapter of the thesis does not repeat the findings and conclusions of the three analytical chapters that compose the core of the thesis, but chooses rather to articulate them around the research questions that structure the thesis. Therefore, here I will only refer to the findings and conclusions of the three chapters that are directly related with those questions. I have investigated the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics (the main research question) through three secondary research questions, which I address in the following sub-sections:

SRQ1: Can left-wing populist parties promote gender equality policies?

SRQ2: How do left-wing populist parties form their policy coalitions for the formulation of gender equality policies?

SRQ3: What is the impact of institutionalsed women's movements on the gender equality policy agenda of left-wing populists in power?

One of the key discussions in the literature on the relationship between left-wing populist parties and feminist politics is whether these parties can promote gender equality policies. As I explained in the first chapter of the thesis, empirical research suggests that several left-wing populist parties in Europe and Latin America have advocated and promoted policies aiming to foster gender equality (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Lombardo and Kantola 2019; March 2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). Yet, there are also examples of left-wing populists that have opposed gender equality or have not strongly promoted it (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Heumann 2014; Kampwirth 2010). The ambiguous findings of this literature suggest that it is not possible to establish a general causal relationship between having a left-wing populist ideology and promoting gender equality policies. That is why I have decided to investigate whether these parties *can* promote gender equality policies, with the aim of challenging the positions that affirm

the existence of a *general incompatibility* between populism and the promotion of gender equality policies (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Kampwirth 2010). My aim has not been to establish any general causal relationship between left-wing populism and the promotion of gender equality policies, as I agree with the mentioned literature. Instead, my aim has been to explain that left wing populists can and indeed often do promote a feminist agenda, going against the charges that this is inconsistent or impossible by definition.

The analysis of the Bolivian case provides solid findings for my claim. Between 2006 and 2018, the MAS and Evo Morales' government promoted the most ambitious agenda regarding gender policies of all Latin American left-wing populist governments. The analysis has exclusively focused on the agenda-setting and decision phases of the policy processes, because implementation has not yet been completed in any of the fields examined. From the moment of its arrival to state power in 2006, the MAS pushed for the passing of a new Constitution, which was finally approved in 2009 and whose gender-related contents stand out among the most progressive constitutions in Latin America. In 2012, the Bolivian Parliament approved the Law on Political Violence and Harassment against Women, the first and only law in the world that focuses on tackling this specific form of gender-based violence. In 2013, Comprehensive Law 348 to Guarantee Women a Life Free of Violence was approved. It is one of the most complete laws on domestic and other gender-based forms of violence in Latin America. Besides, throughout the period analysed, important policies were approved to improve the social image and working and living conditions of domestic workers, one of the most discriminated groups in Bolivia.

With this in the background, in Chapter 4 I have explained how Law 243 has become a model for other legislative initiatives on violence against women in politics (VAWP) in the Americas, both at the national level and for international organisations such as the Organisations of American States (OAS) and UN Women. In Chapter 5, there is an analysis of the gender-related contents of the 2009 Constitution, Law 348 on gender-based violence and its regulation executive decree, reaching the conclusion that both constitute major improvements in the legal framework for the promotion and protection of women's rights in Bolivia. In addition, the 2009 Constitution introduced an intersectional perspective, jointly addressing gender-based discrimination and racism against indigenous people, who constitute the majority of the Bolivian population. The balance is less optimistic regarding the policy on domestic workers' rights. Evo Morales made important gestures towards this historically discriminated group, such as the appointment of the movement's former leader Casimira Rodríguez as minister of justice, and he met all the movement's symbolic demands. However, the analysis carried out in Chapter 6 has revealed that the Bolivian government only met two of the substantive demands formulated by the movement between 2006 and 2017.

The general assessment of the gender policies promoted by the MAS and Morales' government is relatively positive: ambitious and innovative laws were approved, but

not all the demands of the domestic workers' movement were met, as I explain in detail in Chapter 6. The extent and intensity of the policy improvements was uneven between different sectors of policy. In conclusion, the analysis carried out in this thesis shows that left-wing populist parties can indeed promote gender equality policies. This claim challenges the literature that upholds the existence of a general incompatibility between a populist ideology and the promotion of gender equality through law. Therefore, other factors beyond the left-wing populist ideology must be explored to understand why some populist parties are more prone to having these policies than others, as I explain in the last paragraphs of this chapter.

The second central discussion on left-wing populism to which this thesis contributes is the debate on how these parties form their policy coalitions to elaborate gender equality policies. As explained in the theoretical framework, no research had so far focused on populists' policy coalitions to elaborate gender equality policies, which is the issue addressed by Chapter 5, focusing on the case of Bolivia. Existent research on how (right-wing and left-wing) populist parties form their policy coalitions, both in Europe and Latin America, suggests that they are pragmatic political actors, capable of including different kinds of social movements, individuals and organisations in policy-making coalitions, often thanks to their technical expertise. I have tested this finding in the field of gender equality policy-making by analysing the formulation of the gender contents of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution, Law 243, Law 348 and their respective regulation executive decrees.

The analysis carried out in Chapter 5 confirmed in the case of the formulation of gender policies in Bolivia what previous research had found regarding other policy fields and other cases: the MAS experienced a contradiction between its anti-elite populist discourse and its pragmatic policy-making strategy. Evo Morales' party and government applied their dichotomous populist discourse to women's organisations: white, middle-class feminist NGOs were presented as agents of the abhorred elite, while women's social organisations (mostly composed of indigenous lower-class women) were portrayed by the MAS and the government as representatives of the people. However, both kinds of women's organisations were equally included in the policy-making coalitions formed by the government, largely because Morales' executive needed the feminist NGOs' technical expertise to design the policies effectively. The contradiction between discourse and policy-making found by previous research and confirmed in this thesis seems to be a particularity of populism, an ideology that promises to meet people's demands with the only support of 'popular' social and political actors ('governing with the people for the people'). However, the technical expertise of allegedly 'elitist' organisations is often called upon to design policies to meet the popular demands effectively. This contradiction between discourse and policy-making seems to affect both right-wing and left-wing populist parties, and also takes place in the field of gender equality policy-making, as the analysis performed in Chapter 5 has shown.

Research on left-wing populism also presents a gap regarding the relationship between left-wing populist parties and women's movements. There is plenty of scholarship on political parties-women's movements relations in general – an issue that social movement scholars often address through the concept of 'institutionalisation' –, and there are some works on the relationship between left-wing populist parties and social movements. However, the intersection between both streams of literature is underdeveloped: there is almost no research on the relations between left-wing populist parties and women's movements. In Chapter 6, I have explored this question by focusing on how institutionalised women's movements impact gender equality policies when left-wing populists are in power. Chapter 6 investigates the case of the Bolivian domestic workers' movement, which according to previous literature seemed to be a paradigmatic case of a highly institutionalised movement that had a greater impact on the symbolic dimension of policy than on the substantive dimension.

The analysis carried out in Chapter 6 has shown that the domestic workers' movement experienced various forms of institutionalisation during the 2006-2017 period. I have also found that Evo Morales' government met all the movements' symbolic demands and most of its mixed demands, but it only satisfied two of the seven substantive demands sought by the movement – those that could have a direct and tangible influence on domestic workers' living and working conditions. These findings suggest that, when a left-wing populist party is in power, a tight movement-government relationship (a high level of institutionalisation of the movement) is useful for achieving some impact on the symbolic dimension of policy, but does not guarantee a major impact on the substantive dimension of policy.

Certain experts on populism, who give a disproportionate explanatory power to the concept of populism, might disagree with the conclusions of this thesis. A growing number of academics, politicians and commentators, both ardent opponents and advocates of populism, have tried to explain the features and behaviours of populist parties and leaders through their populist ideology. However, a closer empirical analysis such as the one carried out in this thesis shows the limits of this approach, at least in the field of feminist politics. Populism is a useful concept for political science, because it allows us to understand certain peculiarities of a group of parties and leaders that have been key in Latin American politics for the last decade and a half and are becoming increasingly important in European politics. But there are many aspects of populist parties that cannot be explained by their populist character – for instance, the kind of policies that they promote, and the social movements with whom they establish the closest relations. This is what I have found in the case of the MAS and Evo Morales' government in Bolivia.

The analysis carried out in this thesis has shown that Morales' government, a paradigmatic case of left-wing populism, promoted ambitious and innovative gender equality policies in several fields, but it did not meet all the demands of the women's movements on which I have done the deepest analysis. This finding, confirming the

hypothesis that left-wing populism and feminist politics are compatible political projects, shows that left-wing populists often promote gender equality policies and often establish close links with women's movements. Considering that research has found that right-wing populists are usually hostile to feminist policy proposals, the key factor here seems to be ideology: left-wing ideology facilitates a favourable position towards gender equality policies, a finding of previous gender and politics research that did not focus on populism. Therefore, I have shown that there is no specific connection between populism and a party's position towards feminist politics. As advanced in my previous caveat, implementation has not been analysed by the present thesis. However, eventual pitfalls in implementation would not fundamentally alter the aforementioned finding about the relationship between populism and the support (or lack of) of gender equality policies: the implementation of policies can be more or less comprehensive, but the analysis has shown that left-wing populist parties can have a favourable position towards the promotion of these policies.

Regarding the relationship between left-wing populist parties and women's movements, I have not found any specificity related with the populist character of the MAS in the case-study. The analysis of the impact of the (highly institutionalised) domestic workers' movement on the Bolivian policy on domestic workers' rights has allowed me to arrive at some findings about the differentiated impact of institutionalised movements on different dimensions of policy – the impact is easier for the symbolic dimension of policy than it is for the substantive dimension –, but I have not found any specific connection between these findings and the populist character of the government in question. The generally close relationship between the MAS and the domestic workers' movement (overwhelmingly made up of indigenous women) seems to be related to the MAS and Morales' left-wing and indigenist ideology, not with any populist character. Thus, the analysis carried out in this thesis suggests that populism does not have any explanatory power regarding relations between governments and women's movements – the 'thick' ideology alongside the populism is much more important in explaining these relations, as explained above regarding the promotion of gender equality policies.

A different conclusion has been reached regarding the formation of policy-making coalitions by left-wing populists for the formulation of policies on gender equality. As far as this dimension is concerned, populism is important. The analysis of the case-study has confirmed the findings of previous research: the populist character of left-wing populist parties leads them to a contradiction between their anti-elite discourse and their pragmatism when it comes to forming policy-making coalitions, also in the field of gender equality. Left-wing populists often include in their policy-making coalitions actors that they have previously defined as elitists, because the government needs these actors' technical expertise. This pragmatism in forming policy-making coalitions is in contradiction with the anti-elitist discourse promoted by populist parties and governments. Here, the populist thin-centred ideology shared by left-wing and right-wing populists is a relevant factor, and causes populist parties with different orientations and in different policy sectors to experience the same contradiction.

The findings invite us to relativize the importance of the populist or non-populist character of a political party when we analyse its position on feminist politics. This is a conclusion that can also be useful for other streams of research on populist parties and leaders. Instead of presuming that populism is a key explanatory factor for different issues related with populist parties – such as their policy positions on certain topics, their relations with other parties or social movements, or their strategies –, it seems more productive to consider populism as only one of several other possible explanatory factors, and to be open to relativize its importance.

In addition to the aforementioned theoretical contributions on the relationship between left-wing populism and feminist politics, and the contributions to other streams of political research explained in the analytical chapters of the thesis, this research has allowed us to improve the understanding of feminist politics in Bolivia during the MAS and Evo Morales' first twelve years in government. The so-called 'process of change' initiated when Morales was first elected in December 2005, after five years of mobilisations against neoliberalism, has been a promising emancipatory political project, and has been observed attentively by progressive analysts from around the world. Despite its pitfalls and recent decadence – including Morales' perpetuation in power through a dubious constitutional reform –, the 'process of change' has implied a political, social and economic upheaval for Bolivia. For the first time in centuries, the indigenous majority of the country has been widely represented in the political realm – even though there have also been conflicts between the government and major indigenous organisations –, social inequalities and poverty have fallen dramatically, and gender equality has been placed at the centre of the political agenda – even though the strong patriarchal structures of the country are still in place. An assessment of the MAS' action on gender policies had so far been lacking, and I hope that this thesis has contributed to filling that gap. In addition to general theoretical contributions on the relationship between feminist politics and left-wing populism, this PhD thesis has intended to enrich the available knowledge on the fascinating Bolivian experience, critically analysing the available literature and carrying out original empirical research on Morales' Bolivia. Following Boaventura de Sousa Santos' reflection on the political usefulness of social sciences, I hope that this research will be useful for feminist and left-wing activists from other countries, by allowing them to learn from the accomplishments and shortcomings of the Bolivian 'process of change' in relation to feminist politics, and to apply those learnings to their political practice in other countries.

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Annex 1: Documents and interviews

Analysed documents

Document	Kind of document	Author and date
National Plan for the Equality of Opportunities 'Women Building the New Bolivia to Live Well'	Governmental document approved through the 29850/2008 Supreme Decree	Julieta Paredes and viceministry for gender and generational affairs (ministry of justice), 2008
Ministry of justice report for Un Women	Ministerial report	Anonymous gender consultant and ministry of justice, 2014
Law 348/2013 to Guarantee Women a Life Free of Violence	Law	Parliament of Bolivia, 2013
Supreme Decree 2145/2014	Supreme Decree	Government of Bolivia, 2014
Law 243/2012 against Violence and Political Harassment on Women	Law	Parliament of Bolivia
Supreme Decree 2935/2016	Supreme Decree	Government of Bolivia
Law 1096/2018 on Political Organisations	Law	Parliament of Bolivia
Bolivian Constitution	Constitution	Constituent Assembly, 2006-2009
14 trabajadoras asalariadas del hogar logran titularse como Bachilleres ("14 household workers obtain their secondary school degree")	Official communiqué	Bolivian ministry of education, 2016
Ministerio de Trabajo condecora 20 años de fundación de la Fenatrahob ("The ministry of labor commemorates the 20th anniversary of Fenatrahob's foundation")	Official communiqué	Bolivian ministry of labor, 2013
Descolonización y despatriarcalización desde la perspectiva de las trabajadoras de las trabajadoras asalariadas del hogar: una propuesta de política pública ("Depatriarchalisation and Decolonisation from the Perspective of Waged Household Workers")	Public policy proposal	Fenatrahob, 2014
Boletín "Equidad y Justicia" marzo 2016	Information bulletin	Fenatrahob, 2016

Boletín "Equidad y Justicia" marzo 2015	Information bulletin	Fenatrahob, 2015
Boletín "Equidad y Justicia" mayo 2014	Information bulletin	Fenatrahob, 2014
Boletín "Equidad y Justicia" marzo 2014	Information bulletin	Fenatrahob, 2014
Boletín "Equidad y Justicia" julio 2010	Information bulletin	Fenatrahob, 2010
Boletín "Equidad y Justicia" julio 2010	Information bulletin	Fenatrahob, 2010
Boletín "Equidad y Justicia" agosto 2009	Information bulletin	Fenatrahob, 2009
Boletín "Equidad y Justicia" mayo 2008	Information bulletin	Fenatrahob, 2008
Boletín "Equidad y Justicia" octubre 2008	Information bulletin	Fenatrahob, 2008
Boletín "Equidad y Justicia" diciembre 2007	Information bulletin	Fenatrahob, 2007
Boletín "Equidad y Justicia" septiembre 2006	Information bulletin	Fenatrahob, 2006
Quito Consensus	International statement	Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean, 2007
Santo Domingo Consensus	International statement	Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean, 2013
Frame Norm to Consolidate *Paritarian* Democracy	Non-binding international instrument	Un Women and the Latin American and Caribbean Parliament, 2015
Declaration on Political Violence and Harassment Against Women	International statement	Organisation of American States, 2015
Inter-American Model Law for the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Political Violence against Women	Non-binding international instrument	Organisation of American States, 2017
Mexican Protocol to Address Political Violence against Women	Non-binding legal protocol	Federal Electoral Court of Mexico, 2016
Constitution of Mexico City	Local constitution	Mexico City Constituent Assembly, 2017
Peruvian draft law on (num 1903)	Draft law	Peru MPs, 2012
Ecuadorian draft law on violence against women in politics (num. 560-BCG-A)	Draft law	Ecuador MPs, 2016
Costa Rican draft law on violence against women in politics (num. 18719)	Draft law	Costa Rica MPs, 2013
Honduran draft decree-law	Draft decree-law	Honduras MPs, 2015

on violence against women in politics			
Paraguay's 5777/2016 Law	Law		Parliament of Paraguay, 2016
El Salvador's 520/2011 Law	Law		Parliament of El Salvador, 2009
Argentina's 26485/2009 Law	Law		Parliament of Argentina, 2009

Interviewees

Name	Organisation	Position	Place and date of the interview
Teresa Morales	Government of Bolivia	Minister of productive development (2011-2015)	La Paz, 2016
Anonymous	Government of Bolivia	Former general director for the prevention and elimination of all forms of gender- and generational-based violence	La Paz, 2016 and 2017
Elizabeth Salguero	Government and parliament of Bolivia	Minister of culture (2011-2012) and MAS MP (2006-2010)	La Paz, 2016
Margarita Tiñini	Parliament of Bolivia and 'Bartolinas'	MAS MP (2016)	La Paz, 2016
Rosa Álvarez Choquetupa	Parliament of Bolivia and CONAMAQ	MAS MP (2016)	La Paz, 2016
Patricia Costas	Vice-presidency of Bolivia	Policy advisor (2016)	La Paz, 2016
Casimira Rodríguez	CONLACTRAHO, Fenatrahob, government of Bolivia and departmental government of Cochabamba	Executive secretary of CONLACTRAHO (2001-2005), Fenatrahob (1996-2005), minister of justice (2006), Cochabamba departmental secretary for equal opportunities (2017)	Cochabamba, 2017
Celima Torrico	Government of Bolivia, Cochabamba local government and 'Bartolinas', ACOBOL	Secretary of relations of the departmental federation of 'Bartolinas' (1999-2001), minister of justice (2007-2010), member of Cochabamba local	Cochabamba, 2017

		government and member of ACOBOL (2017)	
Claudia Peña	Government of Bolivia and Friedrich Ebert foundation	Minister of autonomies (2011-2015) and vice-minister of departmental and municipal autonomies (2010-2011), projects coordinator at Friedrich Ebert foundation (2017)	La Paz, 2017
Yuri Callisaya	Ministry of labour	Responsible for the eradication of child labour (2014-2017)	La Paz, 2017
Anonymous	Ministry of justice	Gender consultant (2016)	La Paz, 2016
Prima Ocsa	Fenatrahob	Secretary of relations (2016)	La Paz, 2016
Eliana Mariaca	La Paz "Max Paredes" Union of Household Workers	Executive secretary (2016)	La Paz, 2016
Gregoria Gabriel	Fenatrahob	Executive secretary (2016-2017)	La Paz, 2017
Juana Durán	Cochabamba Union of Household Workers	Executive secretary (2017)	Cochabamba, 2017
Alicia Carrillo	San Pedro (La Paz) Union of Household Workers	Executive secretary (2017)	La Paz, 2017
María del Carmen Cáceres	ASOMUC	Spokesperson (2016)	La Paz, 2016
Sandra Silva	ACOBOL	Legal advisor (2017)	La Paz, 2017
Anonymous	ADECO (ACOBOL-Cochabamba)	Advisor (2017)	Cochabamba, 2017
América Maceda	Communitarian feminism assembly	Member (2016)	La Paz, 2016
Julieta Paredes	Communitarian feminist assembly	Member (2017)	La Paz, 2017
Julieta Ojeda	*Mujeres Creando*	Member (2016)	La Paz, 2016
Lourdes Montero	Oxfam Bolivia	Coordinator of the program for economic justice (2016)	La Paz, 2016
Cecilia Enríquez	"Gregoria Apaza" Centre for Women's Promotion and UMSA Centre for Research and Development	Director of the "Gregoria Apaza" Foundation (2009-2014) and researcher at UMSA (2016)	La Paz, 2016
Tania Sánchez	"Gregoria Apaza" Centre for Women's	Director (2015-2017)	La Paz, 2017

	Pormotion		
Diana Urioste	"Conexión" Development Fund	Director (2016-2017)	La Paz, 2016 and 2017
David Aruquipa	*Familia Galán* (LGBTI activist group)	Member	La Paz, 2016
Graciela López	REMTE	Coordinator (2017)	La Paz, 2017
Guadalupe Pérez	*Colectivo Rebeldía*	Spokesperson (2017)	El Alto, 2017
Maritza Jiménez	ACOBOL and La Paz Foundation	Vice-president of ACOBOL (2000-2005) and director of La Paz Foundation (2017)	La Paz, 2017
Mónica Novillo	Women's Coordination	Director (2013-2017)	La Paz, 2017
Marta Martínez	Inter-American Commission of Women (Organisation of American States)	Expert in women's political rights (2011-…)	Virtual interview, 2019
Marta Val	UN Women	Expert in women's political participation (2012-…)	Virtual interview, 2019
Brigitte Fillon	Inter-Parliamentary Union	Consultant at the Gender Partnership Program (2009-…)	Virtual interview, 2019
Anonymous	University of Buenos Aires	Reseacher in women's political participation	Virtual interview, 2019

Annex 2: Acronyms

Acronyms mentioned in the thesis

Acronym	Meaning in the original language	English translation
ACOBOL	Asociación de Concejalas y Alcaldesas de Bolivia	Association of Female Councilwomen and Majors of Bolivia
ADECO	Asociación de Concejalas y Alcaldesas de Cochabamba	Association of Female Councilwomen and Majors of Cochabamba
AMUPEI	Articulación de Mujeres por la Equidad y la Igualdad	Union of Women for Equity and Equality
ASOMUC	Asociación de Mujeres Constructoras	Association of Female Builders
CECASEM	Centro de Capacitación y Servicio para la Mujer	Centre of Capacitation and Service for the Integration of Women
CEPAL	Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
CIDOB	Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia	Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia
CIES	Centro de Investigación en Salud Sexual y Reproductiva	Centre for the Research in Sexual and Reproductive Health
COB	Central Obrera Bolivia	Bolivian Workers' Union
CONAMAQ	Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Makas del Qullasuyu	National Council of Ayllus and Makas of Qullasuyu
CONLACTRAHO	Confederación Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Trabajadoras del Hogar	Latin American and Caribbean Confederation of Household Workers
COR	Central Obrera Regional	Regional Workers' Union
CSCB	Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia	Bolivian Syndicalist Confederation of Colonizers
CSUTCB	Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia	Unified Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia
FEJUVE	Federación de Juntas Vecinales	Federation of Neighbourhood Boards
FENATRAHOB	Federación Nacional de Trabajadoras Asalariadas del Hogar de Bolivia	National Federation of Paid Bolivian Household
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Freedom Party of Austria
IDH	Impuesto directo a los hidrocarburos	Direct tax on hydrocarbons
ILO	-	International Labour Organisation

IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
INRA	Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria	National Institute for Agrarian Reform
IPSP	Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos	Political Instrument for People's Sovereignty
LGTBI	Lesbianas, gays, transexuales, bisexuales e intersexuales	Lesbians, gays, transsexuals, bisexuals and intersexuals
LN	Lega Nord	Northern League
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo	Movement for Socialism
MIP	Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti	Indigenous Pachakuti Movement
MNR	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario	Revolutionary Nationalist Movement
MP	-	Member of Parliament
MST	Movimiento Sin Tierra	Landless Movement
NGO	-	Non-governmental organisation
OAS	-	Organisation of American States
PDL	Popolo della Libertà	People of Freedom
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional	Institutional Revolutionary Party
PRR	-	Populist radical right
PSUV	Partido Socialista Unificado de Venezuela	United Socialist Party of Venezuela
REMTE	Red de Mujeres Transformando la Economía	Women's Network for Economic Transformation
SEPROSI	Centro de Promoción y Salud Integral	Centre for the Integral Promotion of Health
SOL.BO	Soberanía y Libertad	Sovereignty and Freedom
SMOs	-	Social movement organisations
SVP	Schweizerische Volkspartei	Swiss People's Party
TIPAMAHU	Taller de Historia y Participación de la Mujer	Workshop for the History and Participation of the Woman
TIPNIS	Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro-Sécure	Indigenous Territory and National Park Isiboro-Sécure
UMSA	Universidad Mayor de San Andrés	Higher University of San Andrés
UN	Unidad Demócrata	Democratic Unity
UN	-	United Nations
UNASUR	Unión de Naciones Suramericanas	Union of South American Nations
US	-	United States
VAWP	-	Violence against women in politics
WHO	-	World Health Organisation