






Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

ADVERTIMENT. L'accés als continguts d'aquesta tesi queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons:  http://cat.creativecommons.org/?page_id=184

ADVERTENCIA. El acceso a los contenidos de esta tesis queda condicionado a la aceptación de las condiciones de uso establecidas por la siguiente licencia Creative Commons:  <http://es.creativecommons.org/blog/licencias/>

WARNING. The access to the contents of this doctoral thesis it is limited to the acceptance of the use conditions set by the following Creative Commons license:  <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/?lang=en>

Mediatization: Examining Newspaper Coverage of the 2015 and 2019 Nigerian Presidential Election Campaigns

By Chiogo Constance Ikokwu

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Journalism and Communication Sciences, Faculty of Communication Sciences, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), Spain, in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD in Journalism and Communications, 2022.

Under the supervision of Prof. Laura Cervi and Prof. Santiago Tejedor

Copyright by Chiogo Constance Ikokwu 2022 – chiogoikokwu@gmail.com

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	7
Dedication.....	9
Acknowledgement.....	10
CHAPTER ONE.....	13
1:1 Introduction	13
1:2 Organization of Chapters.....	13
1:3 History and Overview of Nigeria	14
1:4 British Rule.....	15
1:5 Economy.....	19
1:6 Education.....	24
1:7 Politics	25
1:8 Historical Perspectives on Nigerian Media (Press).....	27
CHAPTER TWO.....	34
2:1 Theoretical Background Mediatization and Political Communication	34
2:2 Mediatization.....	34
2:3 Media Interventionism.....	35
2:4 Mediatization of Politics.....	36
2:5 Mediatization of Politics as a Four-Dimensional Process.....	37
2:6 Mediatization: Media Logic and Political Logic.....	39
2:7 Differentiating Between Media Logic and Political Logic	41
2:8 Indicators for Measuring Media Logic/Mediatization	44
2:9 Media Interventionism and Measurement.....	44
2:10 Understanding the Framing of Politics as Strategic Game/Horse race	47
2:11 Understanding Mediatization in the Context of Media Systems.....	48
2:12 The Relationship between Media Institutions and Political Institutions in Nigeria	53
2:13 Laws Governing the Nigerian Media	53
2:14 Structure, Ownership and Control of the Nigerian Media	56
2:15 Structure and Ownership in Nigeria: Modern Day.....	58
2:16 Political Actors and Media Ownership in Nigeria	60
2:17 Media and Politics in Nigeria: Media Logic vs. Political Logic	61
CHAPTER THREE	64
3:1 Background of the Study.....	64
3:2 Problem Statement.....	64
3:3 Conceptualizing Mediatization.....	65
3:4 Nigerian Political News Journalism	66

3:5 The Media and the Nigerian General Elections (2015 and 2019)	68
3:6 Mediatization of Politics in Nigeria	71
3:7 Purpose of the Study	74
3:7 Objectives of the Study (General and Specific)	75
3:8 Research Questions	75
3:9 Cases and Hypotheses	75
3:10 Significance of the Study	77
3:11 Newspapers Under Study	77
3:12 Profile of Newspapers	77
3:14 Operational Definition of Terms	93
CHAPTER FOUR	94
4:1 Introduction	94
4:2 Quantitative Content Analysis: Research Design	94
4:3 Process	97
4:4 Selection of Cases (Newspapers)	97
4:5 Sampling	98
4:6 Unit of Analysis	98
4:7 Research Indicators	99
4:8 Hypothesis and Research Questions	100
4:9 Content analysis Options for the Measurements of Degree of Mediatization	102
4:10 Indicators Explained in Detail	103
4:11 Coding of Data	105
4:12 The Story Analysis Form	105
4:13 Validity and Reliability	106
4:14 Inter-Coder Reliability Analysis	106
4:15 Theme (main topic)	110
4:16 Categories and Definition	111
4:17 Coding Manual	112
4:18 Coding on a Present-absent Basis	113
4:19 Data Analysis	114
4:20 Summary	115
CHAPTER FIVE	116
5:1 Introduction	116
5:2 2015 Election Coverage	117
5:3 2019 Election Coverage	118
5:4 Coverage of all Article Category by Newspapers in 2015 and 2019 Elections	119

5:5 Cross Data of Article Categories Distribution in Newspapers Both years.....	121
5:6 Election Coverage Mediatization	123
5:7 Election Coverage Mediatization (Strategic Game/Horse Race)	123
5.7 Election Coverage Mediatization (Journalistic Style)	124
5:8 Media Logic Representation by Newspaper Coverage	126
5:9 Degree of Mediatization (Strategic Game/Horse Race) Between North and South.....	128
5:10 Degree of Mediatization (Strategic Game) in the North/South 2019.....	129
5:11 Degree of Mediatization (Journalistic Style) in the North/South in 2015.....	132
5:12 Degree of Mediatization (Journalistic Style) in the North/South in 2015 and 2019	132
5:13 Strategic Game/Horse Race Coverage Difference Between 2015 and 2019	135
5:14 Journalistic Style Election Coverage Comparison 2015 and 2019	137
5:15 Percentage Distribution of Articles in 2015 Talking about the Indicators	137
5:16 Percentage Distribution of Articles in 2019 Talking about the Indicators	139
5:17 Hypotheses Testing 1	140
5:18 Hypothesis 2	142
5:19 Hypothesis 3	143
CHAPTER SIX.....	145
6:1 Discussion, Conclusion and Areas for Further Research	145
6:2 Mediatization of the 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections (Presentation of the stories as strategic game/horse race) and journalistic style	146
6:3 Media Commercialization and the Role of the Nigerian State in the Media System	151
6:4 Degree of Mediatization (Between Northern and Southern Newspapers)	153
6:5 Conclusion.....	156
6:6 Limitations of Study.....	162
6:7 Areas for Further Research.....	162
References	164

List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of Africa.....	14
Figure 2: Map of Nigeria.....	17
Figure 3: World Development Indicators.....	20
Figure 4: World Development Indicators.....	20
Figure 5: Sector Development.....	21
Figure 6: Potential Opportunities on the Basis of Sector Fitness.....	22
Figure 7: THISDAY Newspapers 1.....	78
Figure 8: THISDAY Newspapers 2.....	81
Figure 9: Vanguard Newspapers 1.....	83
Figure 10: Vanguard Newspapers 2.....	85
Figure 11: Daily Trust Newspapers 1.....	87
Figure 12: Daily Trust Newspapers 2.....	89
Figure 13: Blueprint Newspapers 1.....	90
Figure 14: Blueprint Newspapers 2.....	91

List of Tables

Table 1: Leading Nigerian National Newspapers.....	60
Table 2: Brief on Newspapers Researched.....	98
Table 3: Inter-coder reliability.....	108
Table 4: Indicator 1:0 Theme 1.....	109
Table 5: Indicator 2.0: Theme 2.....	110
Table 6: Election Coverage 2015.....	117
Table 7: Election Coverage 2019.....	118
Table 8: Coverage of all Article Category by Newspapers in 2015 and 2019 Elections.....	120
Table 9: Distribution of Article Categories across the Selected Newspapers.....	122
Table 10: Election Coverage Mediatization (Strategic Game/Horse Race).....	123
Table 11: Election Coverage Mediatization (Journalistic Style).....	125
Table 12: Media Logic Representation by Newspaper Coverage.....	127
Table 13: Mediatization North/South in 2015/2019.....	128
Table 14: Strategic Game/Horse Race in Northern Region in 2015.....	129
Table 15: Strategic Game in Northern Region in 2019.....	130
Table 16: Strategic Game in Southern Region in 2015.....	130
Table 17: Strategic Game in Southern Region in 2019.....	131
Table 18: Journalistic Style in Northern Region in 2015.....	133
Table 19: Journalistic Style in Southern Region in 2015.....	133
Table 20: Journalistic Style in Northern Region in 2019.....	134
Table 21: Journalistic Style South 2019.....	135
Table 22: Percentage Distribution of Articles in 2015 Covering the Indicators.....	138
Table 23: Percentage Distribution of Articles in 2019 Covering the Indicators.....	139
Table 24: Hypothesis 1 Descriptive Statistics.....	141
Table 25: Hypothesis 1 Anova.....	141

List of Charts

Chart 1: Election Coverage 2015.....	118
Chart 2: Election Coverage 2019.....	119
Chart 3: Article Coverage 2015.....	120

Chart 4: Article Coverage 2019.....	121
Chart 5: Articles According to Categories	122
Chart 6: Mediatization of Election Coverage 2015	124
Chart 7: Mediatization of Election Coverage 2019	124
Chart 8: Showing Strategic Game/Horse Race Election Coverage.....	125
Chart 9: Showing Journalistic Style Being Engaged in Election Coverage	126
Chart 10: Media Logic Representation.....	127
Chart 11: Strategic Game North 2015	129
Chart 12: Strategic Game North 2019	130
Chart 13: Strategic Game South 2015	131
Chart 14: Strategic Game South 2019	132
Chart 15: Journalistic Style North 2015	133
Chart 16: Journalistic Style South 2015	134
Chart 17: Journalistic Style North 2019	134
Chart 18: Journalistic Style North 2019	135
Chart 19: Showing Strategic Game/Horse Race Coverage Difference Between 2015 and 2019	136
Chart 20: Showing Journalistic Style Election Coverage Comparison 2015 and 2019	136
Chart 21: Showing use of Journalistic Style in the 2019 Elections.....	137
Chart 22: Distribution of Articles 2015	138
Chart 23: Distribution of Articles 2019.....	140
Chart 24: Descriptive Statistics	141

Abstract

Mediatization helps to explain the relationship between media and politics. Although, it is more of a concept rather than a theory, it is employed more and more by scholars to unpack the influence that the media has on politics and vice-versa. The concept also expounds on increasing media influence in all spheres of society. Simply put, the main focus of mediatization research is to investigate the extent to which the media has become an indispensable channel in terms of communication.

Scholarly research on mediatization in Western developed countries is well established. However, empirical research on the same phenomenon in developing countries, especially in the context of election campaigns, is scarce. Against this background, this study investigates mediatization in Nigeria, West Africa.

Empirically, the study draws on a quantitative content analysis of how newspapers covered the 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections in Nigeria. The main thrust is (a) to examine if and how far political news journalism is mediatized; (b) if journalistic style of reportage was mainly descriptive or interpretive; (c) the differences or similarities of coverage in the North and South of the country; and (d) the differences or similarities in the two election cycles. In other words, to what extent was the election coverage driven by media logic rather than political logic? The study achieves this objective by specifically studying how news content was presented in the elections in four selected newspapers namely THISDAY, Vanguard, Daily Trust and Blueprint.

Mediatization was probed using quantitative content analysis research design, drawing from a library research to mine data from the four Nigerian daily newspapers, comprising of back copy issues of the selected newspapers two weeks prior to the commencement of the elections. The unit of analysis was the full thematic news stories, the most widely used methodology and approach on news content. The selection criteria were that news stories must make reference to the candidates, political parties and party leaders. The papers sampled covered two weeks prior to the 2015 Presidential Election (14th to 27th March 2015 and the 2019 Presidential Election

(9th to 16th February).

Findings reveal that mediatization as a phenomenon exists in Nigerian elections. Political news was mediatized, as it was guided by media logic rather than political logic. The results further indicate clear evidence in support of Stromback's Third Phase of Mediatization, given that there was a move towards mediatization indicators such as game-oriented news presentation, and personalization at the expense of political logic.

The study confirms the situational nature of mediatization as the political news coverage shows different levels of descriptive style of reporting as opposed to interpretive style in the two election cycles. Findings from this study challenge the conventional wisdom that political news journalism is mainly interpretive. Data analyzed indicates that news coverage was more descriptive than interpretive in the case study.

Furthermore, analysis of news during the elections suggests that there were no major and important differences between the elections of 2015 and 2019 and newspaper coverage in the Northern and Southern parts of the country.

Based on data of collected and analyzed through content analysis, this study has developed the mediatization concept in contemporary Nigeria, by exploring the degree of mediatization.

In conclusion, empirical findings from this study suggest that mediatization of politics exists in Nigeria in varying degrees; it occurs in newspapers in all parts of the country in the North and South; and there are similarities in mediatization in the two election cycles of 2015 and 2019.

Index Words: Mediatization, Media Interventionism, Media Logic, Political Logic, Journalistic Style, Nigeria, Political News Journalism, Nigerian Elections, Nigerian Media

Dedication

Dedicated to my late loving father Elder Jason Sunday Izuchukwu Ikokwu, my dependable mum Mrs. Alice Nwakaego Ikokwu, and late Uncle Major Aaron Madubuko. Your unconditional support gave me the backbone to stand tall in life. I am eternally grateful for the stability you provided at all times.

Acknowledgement

I have always been intellectually minded. This was inherited from my late father Elder Jason Sunday Izuchukwu Ikokwu and the larger Ikokwu family. This deep interest in intellectual pursuit gained momentum when I met late Prof. Abubakar Momoh and Dr. Said Adejumobi, both lecturers in my undergraduate days at Lagos State University (LASU), Nigeria. I was fired up and mesmerized attending their classes. They were cerebral, passionate, and unconventional in their teaching methods. Prof. Momoh later became my dissertation supervisor. He greatly inspired me that I stayed in touch after graduation. I had then expressed interest in empirical research. I fancied being a university professor, which in my mind would afford me the chance to positively impact younger people, as Prof. Momoh did to me. But life happened. I took the path of journalism. Over the years, he constantly reminded me that it was necessary to undertake doctoral studies. In 2016 or thereabout, after many years of working, I was ready for a change. Returning to school seemed a logical step. Prof. Momoh was readily available to give me hope, assurance, and guidance as I began this journey. He suggested schools to me, and read and edited my research proposal. Sadly, he passed away a couple of years later. I am grateful for his contributions to my life.

Credit go to brothers late Prof. Chuma Osakwe and late Ambassador Chiedu Osakwe who were like fathers to me. Prof. Chuma was instrumental in my taking that step in 2016 to finally scout for schools to commence this doctoral study. He was relentless in nudging me to take a break from journalism. Arming myself with a doctorate will up the ante professionally, he insisted. His pressure worked.

To his brother Ambassador Chiedu, who was a pillar in my life. He freely and happily offered advice and direction on all things, including my studies. Both brothers were acute problem solvers. They had a solution for everything. I am forever indebted to them.

Mention must be made of my colleague Chido Onumah who pointed me in the direction of Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB). I had bumped into Chido at

the Shehu Musa Yar'Adua Center library in Abuja, Nigeria, after a long time. We exchanged pleasantries and I informed him of my search for potential supervisors for my PhD. By what I consider to be fate and not mere coincidence, Chido was already at UAB working on his doctorate. He, it was, who encouraged me to send my proposal to the school. The rest, as they say, is history. Without Chido, Spain as a study destination would never have occurred to me. I am happy because my time in Barcelona opened up another vista. It has greatly enriched my knowledge about this part of the world, learning about the more than 30 million afro-descendants in Latin America and forging friendships with some of them. It's been life-changing. Thank you!

Credit also goes to Prof. Jose Manuel Tornero, the first lecturer at UAB that gave me an audience upon arriving there. I was out of my depth. I neither spoke the language nor knew anyone. It was overwhelming. Prof. Tornero was kind-hearted, fatherly, and welcoming. His reassuring smile calmed me down. He was also on hand to make sure that I settled into the department. Thank you for being there.

To my supervisors Prof. Laura Cervi and Prof. Santiago Tejedor who constantly told me that I could finish what I started. This is probably one of the most difficult projects I have ever embarked upon in my life. Many times, I asked myself "what the hell I'm I doing here? Who forced me to do a PhD? Sometimes, I felt like pulling out my hair because it was difficult and laborious. Plus, I was alone most times given the nature of the degree. Doing a doctorate is a one-man squad and a lonely journey. But their guidance saw me through.

I am immensely grateful to Felix Okoro who made the data gathering part of my investigation less painful. Anyone who grew up in Nigeria knows how difficult it is to gather accurate data for any type of research within the country. My study required digging into 112 newspapers and over 1,700 articles during the period under review. Felix sacrificially placed his resources at my disposal. Thank you so much!

To my former colleague Dr. Supo Olusi who provided me with materials needed to round off my research. Supo promptly replied to text messages, offered explanations over the phone, and did his best to place required statistics, figures, and the like at my

doorstep. Your professionalism is appreciated.

I would like to thank Galaga Jamthi and his coworkers at the Nigeria Press Council (NPC), Abuja. Galaga welcomed me warmly on my first visit there, answered my questions, helped to arrange some interviews, and worked with the librarian to provide available materials in their library for this research. He was also consistent in responding to my barrage of follow-up queries.

Finally, to my Caribbean, Afro-Latina, and African sisters and brothers Rachel, Juliet, Cecilia, Vera, Chanti, Nathalie, Elizabeth, Angel, Brenda and Jean-claude, you made my time in Barcelona worth it. The sisterhood/brotherhood with you made my studies bearable. Thanks for your overflowing love and warmth. I couldn't have done it without you. Love you all!

CHAPTER ONE

1:1 Introduction

It is impossible to appreciate the socio-political dynamics in Nigeria without a grasp of its history. Although, this research focuses on political communication, the role of the media in elections, mediatization, media logic and political logic, basic knowledge of the country is crucial to deepen an understanding of the media system and how it interfaces with the political system.

This chapter traces the country's history from colonialism to its current democratic experiment. It examines the politics, geopolitical differences, religious dichotomy, economy, and education system.

All these factors in more ways than one impinge on the media system. The media does not operate in a vacuum. It is a subset of the society and is often assumed to play a key role. As an organ of mass communication, the media interacts with different sectors in profound ways. A background on Nigeria provides impetus and direction by linking the necessary threads that explain issues of great importance for the research theme.

1:2 Organization of Chapters

The dissertation begins in Chapter 1 by introducing a historical context of Nigeria. It looks at different aspects such as colonial history, education, economy, politics, and the media system. The theoretical framework and literature review are developed in Chapters 2 and 3, with a view to conceptualizing Mediatization and Media Interventionism and understanding political news journalism. Chapter 4 presents the methodology of the study while the results of the investigation are interpreted and analyzed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the final discussion, conclusion, limitations of study and areas for further research.

1:3 History and Overview of Nigeria

Nigeria, a country of about 193 million people as at 2016, is situated in the West African region. Often referred to as the giant of Africa, it has the largest population in Africa. The country also has a young population with majority between the ages of 0-14. It is estimated that the country's population could reach 410 million by 2050. Nigeria borders Benin in the West, Cameroon in the East and The Republic of Niger in the North. It's coast lies in the Southern part of the country on the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic Ocean. (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2018).

Figure 1: Map of Africa



Nigeria is a richly endowed country that when managed properly is in a position to provide tremendous opportunities for its citizens. Its population presents a huge market base for its products and inventions, likewise the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) region and the entire African continent, especially following the set up of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AFCFTA). The country has more than 40 mineral deposits, a huge agricultural potential (82 million hectares

of arable land), a highly entrepreneurial population, copious water resources that include rainfall, huge bodies of surface water and three of the eight key river systems in Africa. In 2018, 5.3 million people entered the labour force, a number that is set to grow in the coming years. Agribusiness, manufacturing, mining, digital information and communication technology are all sectors that if effectively tapped will unleash the potentials of the country. (International Finance Corporation (IFC), 2020).

Nigeria is a diverse country with more than 250 ethnic groups, the major ones being Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. There are other fairly sizeable ethnic groups such as Tiv, Ibibio, Ijaw, Kanuri, Nupe, Gwari, Igala, Jukun, Idoma, Edo, Urhobo and Ijaw. The official language is English and other main languages are Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. Christianity and Islam are roughly shared equally with a minority population practicing traditional African religion. The Northern part of the country is majority Muslims while the South is mainly Christian. (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2020).

Nigeria practices a democratic system of government with a three-tier structure of Federal Government, 36 State Governments and 774 Local Government Areas. The country is divided into six geopolitical zones – North-west, North-east, North-central, South-west, South-east and South-south. It has a multi-party Presidential Democratic System with several small parties but two main ones namely the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) and the opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and elections organized every four years. (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2020)

1:4 British Rule

Nigeria is a complex society owing to its history and origins. Many scholars have written about its colonial past. Ekeh 1983, Ihonvbere 1994, Ochonu 2014, Ogunbado 2012, Smith 2007, Yakubu 2005, Cookey 2001 have studied the impact on the country in terms of religion, economy, education, law, freedom and the issue of sub-colonialism.

Before British rule in the 19th and 20th centuries, the various ethnic groups in Nigeria lived separately as different kingdoms, empires and communities. European powers

plotted dominance over the African continent at the 1885 Berlin Conference, with Britain staking a claim to what is today called Nigeria. Prior to that, in the 1880s, the trade in palm oil, palm kernel, cocoa and peanuts in what is today Southern Nigeria was established and it made the area a profitable commercial concern for ambitious world powers. The British needed to explore the River Niger area, which was an entrance to the hinterland and the rich resources therein. (Falola, 2009, p.1).

Colonisation made conquest of the area possible. It was achieved through force and/or threat of war often leading to surrender or subjugation and annihilation. Studies suggest the consequences of resistance to British rule were dire. For instance, King Jaja of Opobo was squashed and banished in 1887 for fighting British advance inland; Oba Ovonramwen of Benin lost his throne and Kingdom in 1897; King Nana Olomu of Itshekiri on the Benin River was removed from his base in Ebrohimi in 1894; King Ibanichuka of Okrika was dethroned and banished in 1898; the Ijebu were attacked and vanquished in 1892; the Nupe of Ilorin were conquered in 1897; Ologbosere attempted to regain the Benin Kingdom but was overpowered and finished in 1899. (Falola, 2009, p.1).


The dethronement of a king usually meant absorption of the people into the British Empire by force. The aforementioned events except Ilorin occurred in the Southern part of the country, later known as Southern Protectorate in 1900. After Lagos Colony was added in 1906, it changed to Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. In 1849, the British appointed John Beecroft Consul for Lagos (in the South) and other parts of West African coastline, in preparation for further expansion in political and economic interests following the abolition of the slave trade. The British imposed or signed anti-slavery treaties with locals such as in Bonny and Calabar, that validated the use of military might if treaty was infringed upon. This also came with interference with local politics whereby chiefs that cooperated were made kings. (Falola, 2009, p. 2-3).

In 1851, the British shelled the coastal city of Lagos and annexed it in 1861. It used manipulation as a key tactic among opposing indigenous groups as well as exploiting enmities between Lagos chiefs to gain a foothold and ensure success of its commercial and political interests. Initially, it established control over Lagos, Niger

Delta and Lokojo. Simultaneously, other colonial powers such as Germany and France, were making incursions into Africa, prompting the British to sign a treaty with chiefs of Niger Delta in 1884 and declaring a protectorate over central and eastern coast of Nigeria 1885. (Falola, 2009, p. 3-4).

This step was taken to establish and claim a domain as a prelude to the Berlin Conference of 1885 where Western powers divided up Africa, essentially stamping their authority. It was a calculated move, given that the African region was increasingly a scene of ferocious struggle for supremacy among the British, Germans and French. The British continued to penetrate the hinterland into the Igbo, Ibibio areas, subduing various groups by force or threat of violence. The trade in palm oil and palm produce for British industries flourished. The trade was labour intensive, requiring many hands to produce and crack the kernels as well as transport the product from the hinterland to Lagos and the Delta states. The conquest moved North where wars were waged on the armies of Ilorin and Nupe. (Falola, 2009, p. 7).

Figure 2: Map of Nigeria



In the core Northern part of the country consisting the Hausa and Fulani, an Islamic area later known as the Sokoto caliphate existed, owing to years of trade and interaction with Arab traders.

British presence in what is present day Northern Nigeria dates back to 1824, when the Sultan of Sokoto Muhammad Bello received Captain Hugh Clappaton. Other visitors followed. William Baikie would establish a settlement at the Niger and Benue Rivers in the 1860s. Baikie made contact with the Emir of Bida and went to Kano in 1862. (Umar, 2006, p. 19).

There, the viability of direct trade with the Sokoto Caliphate was made, thereby eliminating the Brass merchants who profited as middlemen between the emirates and European trading posts on the Atlantic Ocean. (Baikie, 1862, p. 92-109).

The British ramped up aggression in the North as Bida fell to their hands in 1897 and Ilorin a month later. The incursion changed from individual travelers to voyagers, merchants and then military captors. The West African Frontier Force comprising military formations across West Africa was formed and the Commander of WAFF Frederick Lugard proclaimed the establishment of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria on January 1, 1900 and himself as High Commissioner.

The conquest was not total at first as different colonial powers fought for control. The Protectorate included areas in the Sokoto Caliphate while a vast part of Adamawa Emirate in the Southeast fell to the Germans. The French grabbed the northern part of Katsina Emirate and other territories in northwest Sokoto. Borno was apportioned with the British gaining control over the west of Lake Chad and the French the east of Lake Chad. Non-Muslim communities in the Niger-Benue region were absorbed to the Protectorate. The conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate was completed when the Sultan of Sokoto Muhammadu Addahiru was killed by the British in 1903. (Umar, 2006, p. 21).

The British although having superior military power were outnumbered. They lacked the men to administer vast areas and therefore, in most cases retained local authorities that were loyal. Facing defeat, some of the authorities were willing to work with the

colonialists in exchange for remaining in office, hence the indirect rule system in the North.

For example, after Bida fell, the RNC appointed the next claimant to the throne Muhammadu Makum. In Ilorin, defeated chiefs were kept in power as opposed to radical claimants. In other parts of the North, emirs that were overpowered but willing to work with the British were allowed to stay in office while the hardliners were dethroned and replaced. (Umar, 2006, p. 24).

Southern and Northern Protectorates were merged by the British in 1914 to form a single colony called Nigeria. Studies indicate that the merger was prompted by economic reasons as the colonialists sought to counterbalance the budget shortfall in the North with excesses from the South. The country gained independence from British rule in 1960.

1:5 Economy

Nigeria depends heavily on oil and gas discovered in 1956, exploited and produced in commercial quantities in the Niger Delta region in the South-south, some parts of the South-east, and off-shore on the continental shelf and in the deep-sea of the territorial waters. While oil contributes substantially to government revenue, it only accounts for 14% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). From the 1950s, oil export rose from 3 percent to 43 percent in 1969, and exceeded 90 percent by 1974. Between the 1970s and 2012, the sector held over 80 percent of total revenue earnings. The volatility of oil in the international market affects the country's economy largely. For instance, By 2015 and 2016, a sharp fall in the price of oil caused a revenue fall to 63 percent of government receipts. (World Bank, 2019).

This uncertainty propelled the government to make attempts at diversifying the economy.

Figure 3: World Development Indicators





Figure 4: World Development Indicators



In 2014, Nigeria rebased its economy, becoming the largest in Africa ahead of South Africa with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 500 billion dollars and 26th largest in the world. The results of the rebasing showed a more diverse setting than previously thought. It was found that the agricultural sector contribution declined from 33 per cent to 22 per cent, and services increasing from 26 per cent to 51 per cent; oil & gas 15.9 per cent, manufacturing 6.7 per cent, Telecoms 8.7 per cent, entertainment 1.2 per cent. Between 2005 and 2014, the country grew at an average rate of 7 percent, driven by a bust of activities in non-oil sectors such as telecommunications, services, entertainment, etc. (Nigerian Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning, 2020).

Figure 5: Sector Development




Figure 6: Potential Opportunities on the Basis of Sector Fitness

Sector	Large base (opportunities with large export volumes)	Other fast growing (other competitive exports that are growing above the global average)	Green shoots (goods and services that are not yet exported competitively, but that are growing quickly)
Agribusiness (including animal products and forestry)	Plants for pharmaceutical and insecticides use Animal products (tanned lamb skins) Tropical wood in the rough	Soups/broths, cocoa paste	Bovine leather
Mining/extractives	Aluminum, lead, petroleum gas	Tungsten ores, zirconium ores, and metal ash	Aluminum waste, iron/steel masts, lead ores
Manufacturing		Synthetic wigs/beards	Machinery and transportation equipment (motorcycles, motor vehicles, parts for gas turbines, hand working tools, and electric generating sets) Chemicals (polypropylene and polyethylene in primary forms); toothpaste
Services	Transport, finance		
<i>Source: World Bank Group staff analysis.</i>			

The return to civilian rule in 1999 has seen tremendous growth in three sectors namely telecommunications, financial services and cement. Following the deregulation policy of the government, telephone lines grew from 400,000 in 2001 to over 140,000,000 to date. These changes led to job creation with more than one million direct and indirect jobs created. Success in telecommunications, especially in regard to mobile phones, birthed ancillary sectors such as entertainment (Nollywood) and e-commerce. In the financial services sector, the liberalisation policy that started in 1990 was continued in 2005, resulting in mergers and acquisitions that saw banks shrinking from 89 to 24. The banks emerged from the exercise bigger and better with stronger financial base. Another policy in the cement sector called backward integration policy saw the country move from a net importer to a net exporter of the product. (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2020).

The liberalization of the telecommunications sector led to huge investments from the private sector with over \$18 billion since 2001, with over 70 percent mobile phone penetration. As a result, the country is home to Africa's largest mobile market. Private investments from both local and foreign companies such as MTN, Globacom, Airtel, Etisalat saw a boom in the sector. This was made possible by changes in the law that allowed the government to take major steps including privatization of up to 60 percent share of the government-owned Nigeria Telecommunications Ltd, injecting foreign participation and opening up to private companies to compete. (World Bank, 2019).

Nigeria's technology sector has also seen some advances. Innovation hubs increased from 23 to 55 between 2016 and 2018, while the software development sector grew from \$6.4 billion in 2012 to \$10.5 billion in 2017. As at 2018, it was estimated that business process outsourcing could generate 5 million direct and indirect jobs in the following five years. In addition, online trading and e-commerce have been on a steady upward trajectory. Worth \$13 billion as at 2018, it is expected to rise to \$50 billion over a period of 10 years. Agriculture,/agribusiness, mining, manufacturing, ICT, quarrying are all potentially viable sectors in Nigeria, according to the World Bank. (Ernest & Young, 2020).

With plentiful rain, surface water, underground water resources and moderate climatic extremes, which allow for production of food and cash crops, agriculture has huge

potentials. The common food crops are cassava, maize, rice, yams, various beans and legumes, soya, sorghum, ginger, onions, tomatoes, melons and vegetable. The main cash crops are cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, oil palm and rubber. The Northern part of the country is much known for agriculture. Nigeria is also blessed with significant non-oil mineral deposits such as coal, iron ore, gypsum, kaolin, phosphates, lime - stone, marble, columbine, baryte and gold. (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2020).

1:6 Education

The state government is responsible for primary and secondary education, while tertiary education is the preserve of the Federal Government. Education in Nigeria has its challenges. There are cultural, social, geographical and other factors that impinge on children getting the basic education required at childhood.

According to the United Nations Fund for Children (UNICEF 2017) Nigeria Report on Education, Nigeria has 10.5 million out of school children aged 5 to 14. Similarly, only 61% of 6 to 11 year olds attend primary school regularly while 35.6% of 36 to 59 months obtain early childhood education. That report further reveals that the Northern part of the country has a net attendance rate of 53%. Specifically in the Northwest and Northeast, female primary attendance rates stand at 47.3% and 47.7%, which indicates that more than half of girls fail to get formal education.

Religion plays a vital role in what type of education parents or society see as necessary. For instance, 29% and 35% of Muslim children in the Northeast and Northwest attend Quranic education where rudimentary skills such as literacy and numeracy are not included in the curriculum. Following the insurgency caused by Boko Haram terrorist group, the situation is dire. The Northeast, the base of Boko Haram is worst hit, with the group consistently attacking and destroying schools. Boko Haram in English means ‘Western Education is Sin’. The conflict prone areas of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe have 2.8 million children in need of education. At least, 802 schools have been shut down due to insurgency while 497 classrooms have been destroyed and another 1, 392 damaged but can be repaired. (UNICEF, 2017).

With regard to literacy among young women, 37% of women aged 15-24 cannot read a sentence. The figure improves slightly among women aged 15-19 to 73% and 58% for women in the 20-24 ages bracket. These numbers are disproportionately wide among wealthy and poor households. Young women from the wealthiest 20% of households have better prospects and four times more likely to be literate than young women from the poorest 20% of households. Overall, literacy rate among young women stands at 63%. (UNICEF, 2017).

By geopolitical zone, the disparities are evident between the North and South. The range of population lacking in education in the South is between 5 and 8 percent while the gap widens in the North to between 32 and 69 percent. The rate of out-of-school children is also higher among girls in the North compared to boys – 32 to 28 percent. (World Bank, 2015).

1:7 Politics

The Royal Niger Company ruled much of the country from 1886 to 1899. In 1900, The Southern Nigeria Protectorate and the Northern Nigeria Protectorate were amalgamated as the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria by the British colonialists. The amalgamation of different ethnic and religious groups created tension, which is still alive today.

The British had created a distorted system to serve its interests. A former colonial officer Harold Smith described in an interview granted in 2005 how the British rigged the 1956 and 1959 elections to give an upper hand to a particular part of the country – the North (Boateng, 2008, p. 21).

“The British loved the North and had arranged for 50% of the votes to be controlled by the Northern People’s Congress, which was largely a creation of the British administration....The Northerners never really wanted the British to leave. They feared the Southerners more than the British. The British and Northern elite worked so closely together that differences of policy could hardly exist” (Boateng, 2008, p. 24).

By the time Independence from British rule came in 1960, the stage was ripe for conflict among the various groups that make up the country. The colonialists laid the foundation for ethnic tension and rigging of elections. (Momoh, 2015, p. 45).

In January 1966, some military officers led by Major Kaduna Chukwuma Nzeogwu and Emmanuel Ifeajuna from former Eastern region and other parts of the country led a coup, with the voiced objective of sanitizing the country and ridding it of corruption. The top casualties were: Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa from North-east; Sarduna of Sokoto Ahmadu Bello from North-east; Premier of the Western Region Samuel Akintola and Finance Minister Festus Ekotie-Eboh of the then Eastern region.

Prior instability and political violence resulting from several crises led to the coup. There was the Action Congress (AG) party crisis of 1962/63, the population census crisis of 1962/63, Tiv revolts of 1960 and 1964, the federal election crisis of 1964/1965 and the Western region election crisis of 1965. But the coup was viewed by some as ethnically motivated. (Akinboye and Anifowoshe, 1999, p. 244).

This resulted in a counter coup by Northern officers in July 1966. Several events led to the massacre and pogrom of Igbos living in the North, eventually culminating in a civil war from 1963 to 1966.

Ferocious, intense struggle for power and control would lead to several other coups. First, Military President Yakubu Gowon from North Central (NC) who prosecuted the war was ousted in a palace coup in July 1975 bringing Brigadier Murtala Muhammed from the North West into power; in 1976, Lieutenant Buka Suka Dimka from North Central plotted a coup, that led to the assassination of Murtala Muhammed, after which Olusegun Obasanjo from the South West was persuaded to take over as Military President.

President Obasanjo organized elections and handed over power to the winner Alhaji Shehu Shagari from the North West. In December 1983, some officers including Majors Ibrahim Babangida (NC) and Muhammadu Buhari (NW), Brigadiers Sani

Abacha (NE), Tunde Idiagbon (NC) and Ibrahim Bako (NW) overthrew the Shehu Shagari government in a coup, bringing Muhammadu Buhari (NW) into power as Military President.

By 1985, Chief of Army Staff Ibrahim Babangida (NC) overthrew Buhari in a palace coup. There was an alleged coup by Major General Mamman Vatsa (NC) in December 1985, followed by another alleged coup by Major Gideon Okar (NC) in 1990. Several officers were indicted and executed on both occasions including the alleged principal actors.

Following internal and worldwide pressures to jettison military rule, Babangida resigned and handed over power to an interim President Chief Ernest Shonekan (SW) in August 1993. This would only last temporarily as General Sani Abacha (NW) took over power through a palace coup three months later.

Pressure continued to mount on the government. Unrest, strikes, demonstrations, was rife. Abacha died suddenly in 1998. General Abdulsalami Abubakar (NC) took over, paving the way for elections and return to democracy in 1999.

Fear and rivalry persists in Nigerian politics. The fault lines of religion, ethnicity are manipulated by politicians for their gain. However, these are not the only factors affecting politics. There are powerful economic forces within and outside the country that shape and influence things. There are class issues. Other variables such as resource control, federal character, quota system and geo-political zones also dominate the discourse (Momoh, 2015, 45).

1:8 Historical Perspectives on Nigerian Media (Press)

According to Shaw (2009), African journalism cannot be understood only within the context of Western model of liberal democracy, which is often accepted as being universal. This in his view automatically hinders an analysis of the different models of journalism practice that evolved across the continent even before colonial times.

What could be described as African journalism model, he argued, was “grounded in oral discourse, creativity, humanity and agency.” A study of its origins, practices and transformation would therefore, be incomplete without examining the pre-colonial period, before the colonial and post-colonial. Shaw debunked the widely held view that there is no journalism practice on the continent shaped by African values. His study was further anchored on the premise that African journalism took the form of “oral tradition and folk culture with communal story-tellers (griots), musicians, poets and dancers performing the role of modern day journalists.” (Shaw, 2009, p. 2-5).

Eribo and Jong-Ebot (1997) speak in the same vein noting there are other forms of communication that have existed in Africa for centuries such as dance, art, word of mouth, traditional music, oral literature, and which are relied upon by rural populations. Not much scholarly studies have been devoted specifically to pre-colonial media in Nigeria. There are however, records of press activities during colonial and post-colonial periods.

Tador (1996) classified Nigerian press history into the Early Press (1800-1920), the Nationalist Press (1929-1960), the Modern Nigerian Press (1960-date).

In summary, these various phases could be referred to as the: Colonial Press, Military Press and Civilian Press. The reason being that what could be described as Western press today initially occurred under colonial rule, leading to independence. Few years after independence, the military took over government and would rule for more than 30 years relinquishing power in 1998. The civilian press was ushered in, in 1999, after peaceful democratic elections.

During colonial rule, the media was dominated by missionaries, politicians, political parties and other groups. The press provided sustained public debate, criticisms against the colonial administrators and political consciousness that gave birth to the nationalist struggle.

The first printing press was established in Calabar, Cross River State in then Eastern Nigeria by the Presbyterian Mission in 1846. Another printing press was set up in Abeokuta Ogun State in the South-west part of the country in 1854 by Reverend

Henry Townsend. Reverend Townsend followed up with the establishment of the first newspaper *Iwe Irohin fun Awon Ara Egba ati Yoruba*, at Abeokuta. The name translated means Newspaper for the Egba-Speaking People and the Yorubas.” (Tador, 1996, p. 40, Oduntan, 2005, p. 298).

From indications, the paper was tilted towards religious reporting to fulfill the mission of the churches. However, they performed the customary role of newspapers, which is informing and educating. (Oduntan, 2005, p. 299-301)

In 1855, the Presbyterian Mission also known as the Presbyterian Church of Scotland Mission led by Rev Hope Waddell started publishing the newspaper *Uwana Efik* in Calabar and *Obupong Efik* in 1886. As with *Iwe Irohin*, the objective of the *Uwana Efik* was to advance the conversion of natives from African traditional religion or what was referred to as heathens to Christianity. Hence, pamphlets, booklets and other religious materials were printed to this effect. (Duyile, 2009, p. 41).

Within three years, the Bible was translated into Efik; almanacs and catechism booklets were printed for the public. Other missionary agents followed suit with similar objectives: the United Free Church of Scotland set up post in Calabar; the CMS Niger Mission opened schools in Onitsha, Lokoja and Akassa; the Westleyans and CMS established boarding schools in Badagry, Lagos, etc. (Duyile, 2009, p. 42)

The year 1863 saw the establishment of the Anglo-African newspaper, in English language. Viewed as favorable to the colonial government, it was aimed at promoting the interests of Lagos people in the South-west. The paper was short lived though, folding up in 1865.

An explosion of papers occurred in the following years from the Lagos Times set up by Andrew Thomas in 1880 to others such as Lagos Observer (1882), the Eagle and Lagos Critic (1883), the Mirror (1887), the Lagos Weekly Record (1891), and the Chronicle (1908). Some survived and others died. But that did not stop new ones from emerging (Tador, 1996, p. 41).

From the 1900s, other papers emerged: the Pioneer (1914-1936) and the Nigerian Daily Times (1926-date). From 1917, religious newspapers sprang up mainly with the aim of spreading Christianity and preventing citizens from challenging the colonial government. In this category were In Leisure Hours and The African Church Gleaner. (Tador, 1996: p. 42).

These did not stop the emergence of papers by nationalists largely used as an advocacy tool to fight for independence. For instance, Lagos Daily News established by Herbert Macaulay arrived in 1925. Not surprisingly, it advanced the causes of the National Democratic Party (NDP) founded by Macaulay.

The tough environment occasioned by promulgation of unfavorable operating laws by the colonial government only strengthened the resolve of private newspapers. (Omu, 1978, p. 87)

Although, most of the papers went out of print as the years went by, it opened the door for new ones. The Service and the Comet were set up in 1933. The Service was a political party mouthpiece of the Lagos Youth Movement. The year 1931 saw the arrival of the African Sunday Digest and the West African Nationhood both of which went out of circulation by the mid 30s.

From then onward, there were attempts to expand newspapers to other regions of the country. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe launched the West African Pilot in 1937 in Lagos. Azikiwe, a graduate of Political Science from the United States of America was formerly an editor of the African Morning Post in Accra Gold Coast now Ghana. (Tador, 1996, p. 43-44).

He went on to establish other papers known as Zik Group of Papers or the Associated Newspapers of Nigeria. First, the Eastern Nigerian Guardians was set up in Port Harcourt in 1940, being the first daily newspaper in Eastern Nigeria. This was followed by the Nigerian Spokesman at Onitsha in 1943; and Southern Nigeria Defender in Warri.

Azikiwe acquired the Comet and converted it into a daily newspaper, which was transferred to Kano in 1949 to become the first daily newspaper in Northern Nigeria. He also set up the Northern Advocate in Jos. (Tador, 1996, p. 44).

The 40s and 50s saw the publication of several other provincial newspapers in English and local languages that were short lived. Some of them are: The Eastern States Express published in Aba by Dr. E.U Udoma and The People by Mr. G.C. Nonyelu in the Port Harcourt Area, Eastern Nigeria; the Egbaland Echo in Lagos, Ijebu National Voice in Lagos and Western Leader in Ibadan in the South-west; Jakadiya and Mwanger U Tiv by the Gaskiya Corporation in the North, Northern Advocate published in Jos by Mr. B. E Ogbuagu, etc. (Duyile, 2009, p. 82-83).

When the country gained independence by 1960, the major papers were owned by political parties and were used as organs of the parties. For instance, in the North, the Nigerian Citizen was the official organ for the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). The National Council for Nigerian and the Cameroons (NCNC) had papers owned by Azikiwe which, projected the party's interests in Eastern Nigeria.

The Nigerian Tribune held sway in the South-west. Tribune was founded by South-west politician Chief Obafemi Awolowo. It was used to advance the causes of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) founded by Awolowo. (Dada, 1979, p. 3, Olawoyin, 1979, p.13).

The regions also had their papers. The Eastern region government converted the Weekly Eastern Outlook to a daily newspaper renamed Nigerian Outlook. By 1964, the Western Nigerian government established the Daily Sketch in Lagos; the New Nigerian was launched in Kaduna in 1966 by the Northern Nigerian government. This set the stage for a media that was highly regional and used to propagate the interests of the various regions. (Tador, 1996, p. 47-48).

Given the situation, the Federal Government attempted to go into newspaper business to promote national interests. It incorporated the Nigerian National Press Limited who published the Morning Post and the Sunday Post in 1961.

It was obvious that while the papers were mostly employed in the fight against the foreign governments during colonial rule, they reverted to working along regional and ethnic lines after independence. This created problems for national unity, and persists up till today.

An important observation to be made from the history of the press in Nigeria is that newspapers were largely politically focused, especially during the independence struggle and post independence years. The interests of the actors dictated the direction of the press.

Macaulay, Azikiwe and others were interested in a sovereign Nigeria free of any foreign rule. The political parties they were affiliated to harbored the same ideas. They therefore, were used to further those objectives. The stage was already set for an active interface between the political elite, politicians, the media and the state. The media played a crucial role in electoral politics.

After independence, the media was active in political communication. Public debate on Issues such as ‘revenue allocation’, ‘state creation’, ‘green revolution’, ‘operation feed the nation’, ‘the national census’, ‘war against indiscipline’, ‘national reconstruction’, ‘International Monetary Fund (IMF) debate,’ was provoked and kept alive by the media. (Olayiwola, 1991, p. 35).

According to Ujo (2014, p. 492), the media rallied public opinion against the government when the presidential election won by late Chief M.K.O Abiola in 1994 was annulled by the military government of Gen. Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, forcing the latter to step down from power.

But that came at a cost. Prior to the annulment, Concord Newspaper owned by Abiola promoted the political interests of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the Second Republic. It would later publish vernacular editions Udoka, Amana and Isokan, used to reach the grassroots in preparation for Abiola’s political involvement. (Agbaje 1990: 211-213). It was very critical of the Babangida government. Following the annulment, Concord was closed in 1994 and finally went out of print in 2000. (Olukotun, 2005, p. 64-65).

The National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), an organization formed in 1994 to fight against military rule was given massive coverage by the media. Ujo argued that NADECO was held up as a “formidable democratic body against the military government, yet it existed essentially on the pages of newspapers.” The tremendous coverage that NADECO received allowed it to make an impact on the struggle against the military.

Varying accounts lend credence to the claim that the media, newspapers specifically, have been active in electoral politics in Nigeria. Graham Mitton (1983) cited in Galadima and Ehighe 2001 explained that when it was certain the British would give Nigeria independence just before 1960, more newspapers emerged. Why? Publishing a newspaper had become synonymous with successful politicking.

Njamnjoh (2005) noted that the “media assumed a partisan, highly politicized, militant role in Africa.” Gerbner et al. (1982), Ali A. (2015), McCombs and Mauro (1977) all agree that the media are proxies of political communication as well as propaganda.

CHAPTER TWO

2:1 Theoretical Background Mediatization and Political Communication

Available literature acknowledges the symbiotic relationship between media and politics, particularly the notion that media actors rely on politicians for news while political actors rest on the media to reach the public (Bennett and Entman 2001; Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; Brants et al. 2010; cited in Strömbäck, 2011). Drawing on literature from mediatization and media interventionism, this study examines the degree (if any) of mediatization of politics in Nigeria. Specifically, the study investigates the extent to which the 2015 and 2019 elections in Nigeria were mediatized. This chapter therefore presents an in-depth review of relevant literature on mediatization and political communication.

2:2 Mediatization

Mediatization is an analytical concept or perspective whose main thrust is that the mainstream media has a strong influence on politics. It is also “a political system that is highly influenced by and adjusted to the demands of the mass media in their coverage of politics” (Asp, 1986, p. 359). Shulz (2004) also defines mediatization as “changes associated with communication media and their development. The processes of social change in which the media plays a key role may be defined as extension, substitution, amalgamation and accommodation.” (p. 88). Other scholars who have been cited widely include (Kiplinger, 2002) who refers to mediatization as “the adaption of politics to the needs of the mass media” (p. 973).

Furthermore, different scholars have attempted to explain mediatization in a variety of ways. According to Hjarvard (2008), “mediatization implies a process through which core elements of a social or cultural activity (like work, leisure, play etc.) assume media form,” while Schrott (2009) says “the processes of mediatization involve media effects of a special type, namely supra-individual effects that cannot be traced back to individual media content but are caused by the existence and the meaning of the media. The main assertion is that the media increasingly has influence on the political system. Specifically, therefore, mediatization of politics is described by the

independence of the media and the way they cover and present political information. According to Strömbäck and Esser (2014):

“The more important the mass media became as source of information and as a channel of communication between political actors and the public, and the more independent the news media as an institution has become, the more decisive has news media logic become for both what the media cover and how they cover it. (p.384). Thus, the political implication is that the media employ the media logic rather than political logic. While politicians assert power and control over the society, the independence of the media means they still have to adapt to the media environment. Falasca (2014) says one sign of increasing news mediatization is “political news journalism characterized by media interventionism that entails news shaped by journalists.” (p.585)

2:3 Media Interventionism

Closely related to Mediatization is the research on Media interventionism. Media Interventionism is described as “the extent to which the media are capable of playing a formative role in shaping the agenda of election campaigns, and with the forces that enable them to play such a role or limit their performance of it” (Semetko et al. 1991, p. 3). In other words, Media Interventionism has to do with the discretionary role the media have to shape the content of the news. (Falasca, 2014). This therefore refers to the leeway that journalists have to intervene and decide the content of political news. Thus journalists are considered critical to shaping the agenda during election campaigns.

Mediatization of political news journalism can be indicated through media interventionism, where journalists are in charge and practically rule in the news production process. (Esser 2008; Strömbäck and Dimitrova 2011; Zeh and Hopmann 2013 – in Falasca 2014, pp. 586)

Indeed, political communication researchers have utilized the concept of media interventionism to study the impact of the media on politics. It therefore, provides a

model for expounding how news content may be mediatized. While empirical research on the degree of political mediatization is limited, particularly in developing countries, media interventionism is a useful additional concept for studying the degree of mediatization in any given context. Esser (2008) argued that “the journalistic attitude toward intervention in election campaigns is high when journalists report the campaign in their own words, scenarios, assessments and when they grant politicians only limited opportunities to present themselves” (p. 403). Consequently, the extent to which news coverage is shaped by the intervention of journalists – media logic, as opposed to political logic can be used as an indicator of the degree of mediatized content and media interventionism.

2:4 Mediatization of Politics

Although, researchers have more recently increasingly sought to define the relationship between the media and politics as mediatization, the concept is not entirely new. Lippmann’s *Public Opinion* (1997, 1992) argued that people’s views are shaped mainly by perception rather than actuality. This perception is based on information put out by the media or what he termed the “pseudo-environment” that is created (Strömbäck, 2011). (Asp 1986; Nimmo and Combs 1983; Bennet and Entman 2001), emphasize that knowledge is primarily derived from the mass media (cited in Strömbäck, 2011). In essence, politics can be regarded as mediated whenever it is being experienced through communication by the mass media. In recent times, it is common to consider modern politics as mediatized. (Livingston 2009; Krotz 2007; Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Meyer 2002) suggest and agree that politics is increasingly being affected by contact or exchanges with the media (cited in Strömbäck, 2011).

In addition, Hjarvard, 2008, Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999, and Meyer, 2002 also contend that mediatization assumes that people are becoming more dependent on the media as opposed to political and other institutions. The consequence of this is decreasing political influence as explained by Schrott as follows:

“The core of mediatization consists in the mechanism of the institutionalization of media logic in other societal subsystems. In these subsystems, media logic competes with established guidelines and influences the actions of individuals.” (cited in Strömbäck, 2011).

2:5 Mediatization of Politics as a Four-Dimensional Process

Strömbäck (2008) proposed a four-dimensional way of understanding the process of mediatization in politics. The notion of the first dimension is centered on the degree to which the media serves as a very important source of information in a society. The implication is that the media become an important channel of communication for political actors and institutions on one hand and the public on the other hand. Strömbäck (2008) further explained that this dimension could only be effective in situations where the audiences are heavy consumers of media, such as radio, television or newspapers. On the other hand, the impact of the media may not be as effective if the audience depend on more interpersonal channels of communication. For developing countries like Nigeria, where opinion leaders play an important role in shaping the opinions of people; the degree of mediatization through this first dimension may vary. It is also important to emphasize that depending on the type of media in question, the degree of impact will differ. For instance, more people may have access to radio information in the rural areas because of the low cost of procuring one, as opposed to television or newspapers, which tend to be elitist and pricier.

The second dimension in the process of mediatization refers to the extent of independence of the media in relation to other social and political institutions. Strömbäck and Esser (2014) explained that under this dimension, the media are not only independent; they influence political institutions and actors. The media are rather influenced “by the media’s own interests, needs and standards of newsworthiness, rather than subordinated to the interests and the needs of political institutions and actors.” (p. 377-378)

The third dimension, refers to the degree to which the content and coverage of politics by the media is guided by media logic, rather than political logic. This means that political actors and institutions use and depend on the media to communicate with, and share information with their audience, without influencing the media content and the information dissemination process. This dimension, like the second, depicts the media as being so independent that they perform an agenda-setting role by framing the news and setting the tone and direction of the national discourse. Strömbäck (2008) describes this in the following way:

“The importance of the media in the third phase thus goes beyond single interactions with political actors attempting to influence the news. It also goes beyond agenda setting or framing effects on individuals. What is instead significant is that the media have become so important that their formats, content, grammar, and rhythm—the media logic—have become so pervasive that basically, no social actors requiring interaction with the public or influence on public opinion can ignore the media or afford not to adapt to the media logic.” (p.238)

The fourth and last dimension in the process of mediatization is focused on the degree to which political actors and institutions are governed by media logic and not political logic. Essentially, therefore, the three dimensions above make up the fourth. As independent entities with their own needs and values, the media are not influenced by political institutions in society; rather they shape and influence the nature of information being disseminated by political actors and institutions. In this dimension, the media are not only powerful and influential, political actors and institutions acknowledge this fact and understand that the power of the media cannot be ignored. When put together, these dimensions explain the extent to which politics can be described as being mediatized.

Based on the above, what is relevant to this study is the degree of mediatization with respect to the third dimensions, i.e. the degree to which media coverage of the 2015 and 2019 elections in Nigeria is guided by media logic, rather than political logic. In order to provide a context for this study therefore, the next section presents a contextual analysis of the differences between media logic and political logic.

2:6 Mediatization: Media Logic and Political Logic

Media logic consists of a form of communication; the process through which media present and transmit information. Elements of this form include the various media and the formats used by these media. Format consists, in part, of how material is organized, the style in which it is presented, the focus or emphasis on particular characteristics of behavior, and the grammar of media communication. Format becomes a framework or a perspective that is used to present as well as interpret phenomena (Altheide and Snow, 1979, p.10).

In the above definition, media logic refers to the way in which the media dominate and influence the society through presentation of news, how they tell their stories and the strategies they employ to capture the attention of the audience. Media logic also explains the way the media cover political stories, the way they interpret the events, how the news is presented as well as how political stories are told (Altheide, 2013). Therefore, basic premise of media logic is the idea that journalists are often guided by news values when they make decisions to select and present political news.

Furthermore, media logic is shaped and influenced by *Professionalism, Commercialization and Media Technology*, Hallin, et al cited in Esser (2014). These three elements affect the news production process in media organisations and institutions as a whole. Professionalism has to do with news production in line with journalistic standards, practices and rules while commercialization refers to news production according to economic considerations. In other words, most media organizations are commercially driven with far reaching implications for news production. Finally, media technology deals with the changes that occur as journalists employ different technological format in news production. In essence therefore, technology shapes news in an attempt to fit the formats required be it television, radio, print or the Internet.

Political logic on the other hand is influenced by the institutional framework of politics. Strömbäck and Esser argued that political logic is shaped by three dimensions namely polity, policy and politics. Polity in this instance refers to a structure that guides and regulates the political processes of any given society. This includes the political system, electoral system, systems governing political institutions, the party system and the judicial system as a whole. When it comes to policy in political logic, this is linked to identifying problems, identifying policies for addressing them and implementing such. Politics on the other hand has to do with efforts made by parties and political actors to gain support, promote one's candidacy and the political programs of a party and to win elections. (Strömbäck and Esser, 2014).

While Strömbäck, Esser, Dimitrova, etc, are Western classic authors of mediatization, there are specific African perspectives that are relevant to the subject matter.

The study by Mutsvaira et al (2018) on the interplay between media and politics in Africa is a great empirical contribution covering different countries such as Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa, Cote d'ivoire, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. The chapters provided an insight into how the forces of politicians constantly attempt to control and undermine the media.

An important point raised by the study is that the linguistic, cultural, religious, social and political diversity that exists on the continent is crucial to understanding political communication from an African perspective. Scholars have argued that this lack of homogeneity may be part of the reasons impeding the advancement of theories and methodologies specific to the continent. Consequently, more comparative work has to be done in order to generate theories and methodologies that are truly African.

Isike et al (2017) notes the tendency of media organizations in Africa to focus on negative news to the detriment of their countries. They argue that lack of ability to balance news coverage undercut democracy and development on the continent.

Similarly, Sally Osei-Appiah (2020) posits that controversy, conflict and the power elite are determinant factors in news content that is eventually published, as in other

parts of the world. His conclusion is drawn from his study of news production in radio stations in Ghana, West Africa.

In the first republic between 1960-1966 in Nigeria, the effect of ownership on newspapers controlled by government, party, regions and private concerns was obvious in the coverage of national issues such as elections campaigns, ethnic and group interest, regional crises. Papers exhibited “over-zealous, irresponsible partisanship and recklessness.” (Olayiwola, 1991, p. 36).

Issa (2016) agrees with this negativity perspective and inability of the media to balance news content. He summed up the role the Nigerian media in election coverage, in reference to the 2015 elections, in the following way:

“Personal interests and political sympathies of many of owners were mainstreamed into professional content of publications and broadcasting to demonize, advocate or manipulate public opinion. Even media organizations that claimed non-partisanship were easily betrayed by the contents on their pages or airwaves. Under the guise of performing their constitutional, structural and psychological responsibilities, many media professionals deliberately confused facts with feelings, masqueraded objective critical analyses with subjective political biases and, in many cases, engaged in defamatory contents that appeared as ordinary news, though were actually planted stories.” (p.13)

2:7 Differentiating Between Media Logic and Political Logic

Haßler, Maurer & Oschatz (2014) identified five ways that media logic differs from political logic. The first is the absence of policy issues, where the media seem to focus more on politics rather than discuss policy issues. Strömbäck (2008) described this as horse race coverage as media stories focus more on competition between parties, their candidates and opinion polls.

Another form of media logic is personalization of coverage. Personalized coverage is defined as ‘a heightened focus on individual politicians and a diminished focus on

parties, organizations, and institutions' in the media.” (Rahat and Sheaffer, 2007, p. 67). In this context, political coverage is focused on people themselves (political actors) rather than more serious issues. An example is when the coverage centers on both the public and private lives of politicians.

The third way media and political logic differ is negativity. This goes with the notion that negativity sells. During election campaigns, negative stories tend to outnumber positive stories. While most of the negativity is driven by politicians, the media tend to focus more on the negative events as a way of attracting readership (audience). (Brants and van Praag 2006; Lengauer, Esser and Berganza, 2012).

The fourth dimension of media logic is topicality. Haßler, Maurer & Oschatz point out that the media tend to focus on short-term events rather than long term issues. This is contrary to political parties whose goal is to solve long-term problems. Finally, there is the absence of ambiguity in media logic; for the news media, being ambiguous is important for determining newsworthy events. This is different from politicians whose political strategy is largely driven by ambiguity.

It is pertinent to note that when it comes to political communication, political logic is about power and control. There is no doubt that political actors and institutions have the power to control and shape public narrative. Politicians wield immense power; however, media independence and its importance as an effective communication channel means that members of the public are more dependent on the media and their logic. Therefore, when it comes to politics, Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) argue that media logic “competes with and, hypothetically, becomes more important than political logic.” (p.32)

Several factors might account for why that is so. The first is commercialism, which is often cited as one of the main factors driving the mediatization of politics (Esser 2008; Patterson, 1993; Strömbäck, 2008). This is a crucial point because it presupposes that the media is independent from political institutions and thus, the state. At the same time, the commercial media are as a result more dependent on market mechanisms. Consequently, different levels of mediatization can be explained from the differences in commercial media and the role of the system in the media. For

instance, the coverage of elections is increasingly moving way from political logic to media logic due to the commercialization of the media (Echeverría and Gonzalez, 2018). This means rather than reporting on policy or content related to politics, the media largely focus more on human-interest stories, conflict and scandals.

Echeverría and Gonzalez 2018 argued that from decreased readership for the print media, the internet has led to high competition of readership; which means the print media will have to find ways of appealing to a less politicized audience. In a longitudinal content analysis of the last four Mexican elections (1994, 2000, 2006, 2012), Gonzalez found that while there was no decrease in election coverage due to commercialization of the media, the coverage lacked substantive information for the voters. According to him, “political content of the Mexican elections coverage mainly focuses on electoral process, as well as legal, operative and logistic issues. To a lesser degree, it reports on the candidate’s leadership, political problems and how to solve them” (p.11). The implication is that commercialization played a role in shaping the political discourse. In this regard, Esser (2012) listed the effects of media commercialization on political communication as:

“Playing up sensational or uncommon features of political events, focusing on conflict rather than compromise, scandal rather than investigation, relying on emotionalization, visualization, polarization, and stereotyping for storytelling; adopting 'game schema' and 'horse race frames' in election coverage and ...attributing political activity to individuals as opposed to parties and institutions; constructing political news around persons with their own temperaments, charisma, looks, idiosyncrasies, ideas.” (p.171-172)

Another reason why media logic has become more important than political logic is the reconfiguration of media audiences: the shrinking newspaper readership, the migration of both media and the audience to the internet means that the audience have the ability to choose what to consume. Therefore, in a bid to attract the attention of the audience, the news media try to reduce the seriousness of political news and focus more on stories that can emotionally connect with the audience (Echeverría and Gonzalez, 2018).

2:8 Indicators for Measuring Media Logic/Mediatization

As earlier mentioned, there is limited empirical research that examines the degree of mediatization and how this can be operationalized. However, Kepplinger (2002) attempted to do that but his study was limited to the fourth dimension of mediatization, which is the degree to which the activities of political actors are guided by political logic rather than media logic. His article studied the activities of members of the German Parliament.

To operationalise and measure media logic, Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) identified at least six indicators of Media Interventionism and thereby, the degree of mediatization of Politics.

2:9 Media Interventionism and Measurement

Media Interventionism refers to journalistic interventions in political news journalism and these indicators include: (a) framing of politics as a strategic game or horse race (b) journalistic visibility (c) journalistic style (d) length of politicians' sound bites (e) lip flaps (f) wrap up.

I. Framing of Politics as a Strategic Game or Horse Race

Studies indicate that journalists lean heavily towards framing, talking about the strategies and tactics, which are mainly driven by the media rather than politicians. Although there are differences across countries, (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; De Vreese and Semetko 2002; Esser and Hemmer 2008; Kerbel et al. 2000; Lawrence 2000; Patterson 1993; Scammell and Semetko 2008; Sheafer et al. 2008), there is no doubt that the media have control over content and as a result independence from political actors. Therefore, the degree to which politics is framed as a strategic game or horse race could be an indicator of the degree to which media content is mediatized.

II. Journalistic Visibility

This refers to the level of visibility of journalists in reports (Farnsworth and Lichter, 2006; Grabe and Bucy, 2009; Patterson, 1993). In news reports, journalists often insert themselves in between viewers, whether in interviews

as anchors or live reporting. The more visible they are could be an indicator of the degree of mediatization of politics.

III. Journalistic Style

The media could decide to use an interpretive or descriptive style of reporting. While the descriptive style focuses on the basic questions of whom, what, when and where, the interpretive style goes a step further to question what has happened, why and what it portends. In this case, the journalist is able to shape the agenda by analyzing the story, thereby providing context. The “interpretive style empowers journalists by giving them more control over the message. Whereas descriptive reporting is driven by the facts, the interpretive form is driven by the theme around which the story is built” Patterson (2000, p. 250).

Other researchers such as Cardoso (2008) speak of journalistic genres, dealing with the types and features of written expression. These genres differ according to the desires or aims of the writer, he argues. Other authors like Martinez Albertos, Gomis, Núñez Ladevéze explain genres in terms of the functions and purposes intended in the text.

Serrano (1982) delves into the types of the journalistic genres and the functions that it aims to fulfill, classifying them as informative, interpretive and opinion-based. The informative genre is relating to pure reporting of events or occurrences, such as in news stories. Martini (2000) describes news as the narration of factual events. In essence, the informative genre or news is not given to conjectures.

Researchers explain that the opinion text expresses the viewpoint of the writer, while the interpretive genre on the other hand is related to information that not only relays an event or occurrence but also expresses the opinion of the writer, makes projections and discusses consequences.

In his work, Marques de Melo (2016) proposed five genres consisting the informative genre - news, report, interview and notes; the opinion genre - commentary, review, editorial, letter, column, caricature, and chronicle; the

Interpretive genre – profile, chronology, analysis, survey and dossier; the diversional genre consisting history and human-interest stories; and the utilitarian genre categorized as quote, script and service.

What is important is that the discourse on journalistic genres and style by most authors fall within informative, opinion and interpretive definitions. This broadly falls within the spectrum of Strömbäck and Kaid, (2008) journalistic style of either descriptive or interpretive nature. It could thus be deduced that the degree to which the journalist uses the interpretive style could be an indicator of the degree to which content is mediatized.

IV. Length of Politicians' Sound Bites

Journalists get to decide the speaking time apportioned to politicians on television for instance, as well as what portion of their quotes, statements or words can be expressively used in a news story. This length of time given to political actors or that journalist's assign to themselves can be an indicator of the degree to which news content is mediatized (Esser, 2008; Farnsworth and Lichter, 2006, 2008; Grabe and Bucy 2009).

V. Lip Flaps

This deals with “the overlay of a reporter narration on corresponding video of a candidate who appears to be mouthing the words of a speech or a spoken comment” (Grabe and Bucy 2009, p. 202). Again, journalists could decide to undertake analysis over a video of a politician speaking, thereby silencing them. This could be an indicator of the degree to which content is mediatized.

VI. Wrap Up

Journalists more often than not, have the last say in an interview, for instance. This has its benefits as it “leaves the strongest, most favorable impression,” (Grabe and Bucy, 2009, p. 202). The level to which journalists are given the wrap-up could be an indicator of the degree of mediatized content.

Finally, it is clear that all the above six indicators deal with the degree of media interventionism and how journalists are able to shape the news through production, picking their content based on their own standards, values and needs.

2:10 Understanding the Framing of Politics as Strategic Game/Horse Race

Generally, scholars utilize framing theory to study and understand happenings in society. For instance, Cervi and Tejedor (2020) unpacked how the Roma people in Italy were successfully cast as the “enemy” by the leader of the Lega party Matteo Salvini. Analyzing eight electoral campaigns, the authors uncovered populist sentiments that were used to effectively create “us” versus “them” feelings among the populace.

Strategic game or horse race specifically is a major area of research especially with regard to election and campaigns. Election coverage that is framed as a strategic game is typified by heavy emphasis on the performance of politicians, their campaign strategies and tactics, and who is winning or losing the race. Distinctions are made between game frame and policy frame, in which case the former focuses on personality, game, tactics while the latter concentrates on substance of political problems, issues and how to solve them. Previous studies emphasize the tendency for media to lean towards framing politics as a game rather than focusing on issues

Within the framing literature, scholars have carried out studies on different types of frames. Semetko and Valkenberg (2000) and Matthes (2009) stress the difference between generic frames also known as game or strategy frame (referring to the structure of news applied to different topics) and issue-specific frame (dealing with certain issues). This study concerns itself with the game frame otherwise known as strategic game frame.

Anderson and Thorson (1989) argue that commercialism, the rise of television news and technology are some of the factors that gave rise to journalists covering politics using strategic game frames. In addition, highlighting the drama side of news, digging

in the background and lives of politicians drew in large audiences for news organizations. (Iyenger et al., 2004).

Besides, the focus by journalists on the strategies and tactics of politicians rather than their speeches gives reporters a certain level of independence on deciding their news content. (Zaller 2001: 248). Also, changes that have occurred in the political campaign system have seen the game become more complex in terms of practices and strategies used. The news business changed to accommodate these new developments with journalists focusing on how to expose or lay bare these schemes employed by political parties. (Patterson 1993) and (Fallows 1997).

Some of the benefits of the strategic game for journalists are that it lends itself to the concept of deadlines in the newsroom, because it is quick to produce and does not require too much resource that may be involved in researching deep policy issues. (Fallows, 1997). There's also the point that strategic game coverage fits into the newsworthiness need of journalists in terms of the relentless need for negativity, drama, and conflict. (Van Aelst et al., 2012). It can be deduced therefore, that the framing of politics as a strategic game is one of the major ways that journalists employ to be in control of the news.

2:11 Understanding Mediatization in the Context of Media Systems

The media system that exists in a society is important for understanding Mediatization and degrees of it, in addition to the relationship between the two domains of politics and media. A good example is the groundbreaking research by Hallin and Mancini (2004) establishes that a country's political system and culture impacts on its media system. Ongoing news coverage in the United States of America (USA) show a media (Bennet & Livingston, 2003) that is influenced by politics and at the same time contributes to shaping political power.

In dissecting the relationship between politicians and journalists and the part that they play, Cohen (2008) argues that politicians endeavor to be featured in news given their trust in the influence of the media. This strong confidence in the power of the media,

he says, generates deliberate and active desire to be in the news, thereby leading to greater media importance.

Investigating the same topic, Castells (2007), maintained that politicians exercise considerable power too, as the 24-hour news cycle increases their visibility and standing. Since the main channel of communication between them and the people is the mass media, politicians are dependent on the media in the battle for the minds of people. This link between media and politics reveals the nature of the political system, the culture and the interplay of forces between journalists and politicians.

Furthermore, research by Berinsky et al (2006) shows that the masses rely on the media to understand complex political information. Thus, media framing of issue in a particular way affects their opinion and response to politicians and the government in turn.

Indeed, Bennet et al (2001) devoted their research to examining exchange of information between the media and the public and how people make political decisions based on this. It asserted that changes have occurred in communication whereby interactions are now increasingly mediated. This means that the establishment of personal opinion is affected by the many different uses of the media.

Attempts to develop different types of media systems dates back to the publication of the Four theories of the Press in 1956 by Fred S. Sibert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, which proposed the Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Media Systems. The Authoritarian theory derived from the absolute nature of states prevailing in Europe at the inception of the printing press, where the state wielded much control. The Libertarian theory set in Britain and the United States of America was based on liberal philosophy to the effect that citizens should have the freedom to exchange ideas. It promoted the market place of ideas. The Social Responsibility theory derived from a critique of the Libertarian theory, stressing the possibility of unequal access to the media and a circumstance where hype overcomes reason. It advocated necessary changes to the weaknesses found in the Libertarian theory by supporting professionalism, self-regulation and limited state intervention. (Hallin, 2016, p. 1-3). As for the Soviet Communist theory,

the media is driven by the state rather than left to private individuals. The state however, uses the media as a means for social transformation as opposed to mainly preventing disorder. (Hallin, 2016, p. 3)

Researchers have since then studied media systems around the world, putting forward different models and variations. The Four Theories of the Press expectedly faced heavy criticisms because of its limited applicability and the fact that it was developed based on limited empirical analysis in Britain, the Soviet Union and the USA

Altschull (1984) and Picard (1985) attempted to revise or propose alternative typologies. Similarly, Curran (1999) proposed a typology of European media systems based on the way market-based and collectivist approaches were combined. A marked difference was however drawn between regulated media markets for instance in Sweden, mandated markets in Netherlands, regulated markets in Britain and other mixed markets that merged civic, public and market sectors under consideration in Eastern Europe at the dawn of the transition from Communism.

Based on the dissimilarities between politics and media, Hallin and Mancini's major study in 2004, *Comparing Media Systems*, proposed three models of media system defined by four variables namely (1) The development of media markets (2) The degree of forms of political parallelism (the extent to which the structure of the media system parallels the divisions of the political party and interest group system) (3) Journalistic professionalism (4) The role of the state, following an analysis of 18 liberal democracies in Western Europe and North America.

Based on these dimensions, they developed a pattern in Western media, the North Atlantic or Liberal Model, the North Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model and the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model.

The commercial media is dominant in the Liberal model, with little state participation and high level of professionalism. The Democratic Corporatist is characterized by commercial and party newspapers as well as media associated with organized social groups. There's an existence of professionalism, some state role and mass circulation of newspapers. The Polarized model is a system with less professionalism, a press

more tangled with the political world than the market, a press directed more to the political elite as opposed to the general populace and moderate meddling by the state (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 11).

These models are viewed not as homogenous but as tools for comparative analysis and could be mixed in some countries. For example, the UK is seen as sharing a combination of traits of the Liberal and Democratic Corporatist. France on the other hand is viewed as both a Polarized Pluralist and Democratic Corporatist.

Research has also expanded to cover other systems outside of Western Europe and North America. Some scholars have attempted to evaluate the Hallin and Mancini models in other parts of the world including Africa, with the purpose of validating them, proposing additional variables or new models.

Obviously, the results are interesting given the different circumstances and cultures in developing and emerging democracies. This is in view of the fact that there have been limited attempts by scholars to theorize on African Media Systems, emphasizing the significant role of the state and a “journalism of association, affiliation and belonging” in a prejudiced media allied with ethnic groups and political parties (Hadland 2012, Shaw 2009, p. 498, Hallin, 2016, p. 11).

Adrian Hadland (2016) noted the systematic diversity of the African continent, emphasizing that it's a formidable undertaking to extend the Hallin-Mancini models to the myriad of new and growing democracies in the developing world. He did however appraise the South African Media system against the Hallin-Mancini models. His conclusion: “the fit is not a comfortable one with South Africa exhibiting features of all three of the Hallin-Mancini models, in particular the Polarized Pluralist model but also elements of the Democratic Corporatist and Liberal ones”. (Hadland 2016, p. 97 cited in Hallin, 2016)

In their study, Nisbet and Moeller 2005 proposed five typologies that distinguishes different media systems on the African continent: open democratic, liberalized democratic, liberalized autocratic, closed autocratic and repressive autocratic systems (Hallin 2016). Also, there have been other efforts to apply the liberal democracy

models to Africa: (Obang-Quaid 1985; James 1990; Ansah 1991; Uche 1991; Okoye 1994; Magee 1995; Running 1994, 1995).

Shaw 2009 pursued a similar argument to Hadland, emphasizing the “manifest inapplicability of the Western model” to different countries in Africa. He called for a media theory that takes into cognizance the local peculiarities of different societies outside of the West. (Shaw 2009, p. 29).

In light of the above, the Nigerian Media and political system, like much of the rest of Africa has gone through various phases of colonialism, military rule and then democratic government of recent. The circumstances are different and therefore, not typical of Europe. Nevertheless, there are elements of the Hallin and Mancini models (2004) – Liberal, Democratic Corporatist and Polarized Pluralists, found in the country.

In Nigeria, the mass media is the most important channel of information of news on politics (first dimension of mediatization of politics). Newspapers in contemporary times are mostly commercialized, market-oriented and privately owned organisations, indicating elements of a Liberal Model. They are largely independent of political actors in their daily business to an extent and less differentiated from the markets (second dimension of mediatization of politics). However, given that ownership is often not very transparent and sometimes are tied to political figures, some may not be purely described as running on market mechanisms.

The bulk of the electronic media (radio and television) is akin to the Polarized Pluralist with strong state role, and weak commercial media. The public radio and television space are dominated by government ownership and funding both at the state and federal level. They’re thus, less independent and less commercially inclined. The obligation to pursue purely commercial news is not there. While they are not *prima facie* integrated into party politics, the fact that funding emanates from government obligates them to dance to the tune of the government/political party in power to an extent.

The Democratic Pluralist where commercial media and those tied to political groups existed in the early media history of the country especially during and just after colonial rule. As discussed in Chapter 1, media ownership then was tied to high profile political figures that utilized their media platforms to advance political, social and other causes. Today, it is not a common feature, although it still exists.

Below, this study further expounds on the nature of the media and politics in Nigeria.

2:12 The Relationship between Media Institutions and Political Institutions in Nigeria

Nigeria gained independence from Britain in October 1960 and was for the greater part of her history controlled by military dictatorship with unsuccessful attempts at democratic governance in 1960-1966 and 1979-1983. The country became a democracy in 1999 and has in the past 22 years, recorded an unbroken record of civilian rule, the longest in the nation's history. This is important because the history of the press and media freedom in Nigeria can be traced to pre-colonial times up to the early 1960s. However, during the years of military rule, there was basically no freedom for the Nigerian media (Katu-Ogundimu, 2016). For instance, in the 1980s, the then military government in Nigeria issued Decree No 4 of 1984 (protection against false accusation), which made it an offense to “publish or transmit any message, rumor, report or statement, which is false that any public officer has in any manner corruptly enriched himself.” (Ismail, 2011, p.20). Under this decree, the Federal Military Government had the power to shut down newspaper organizations, revoke licenses or simply detain journalists who were deemed to have broken the law. Although a democratic government took over in 1999, media freedom in Nigeria remains a myth. This is because the government still maintains a high level of control over media content through the National Broadcasting Commission and the National Press Council (Katu-Ogundimu, 2016).

2:13 Laws Governing the Nigerian Media

Chapter IV Section 39 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution states that: “Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to

receive and impart ideas and information without interference.” With the foregoing, it could be submitted that the freedom to expressly engage in publication of opinion as well as inform others is guaranteed under this section. However, Subsection (3) of section 39 suggests there may be limits to that freedom:

“Nothing in this section shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society: (a) for the purpose of disclosure of information received in confidence, maintaining the authority and independence of courts or regulating telephony, wireless broadcasting, television or the exhibition of cinematographic films; or (b) imposing restrictions upon persons holding office under the Government of the Federation or of a State, members of the armed forces of the Federation or members of the Nigerian Police Force or other Government security services or agencies established by law.”

Media laws in Nigeria have often been controversial following attempts by government to inhibit press freedom. One of the earliest of such laws was the 1917 Newspaper Ordinance promulgated by Sir Frederick Lugard. The law imposed 250 pounds pre-publication fee for newspapers, which was a hefty sum in those days. (Momoh, 1998). Some of the laws (from 1960) clearly reveal the objectives: Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publication) Act 1961; Defamation Act 1961; Emergency Powers Act 1961; Obscene Publications Act 1961.

Others between 1966 and 1979 are The Defamatory and Offensive Publications Decree No 44 1966; Newspaper Prohibition of Circulation Decree No 17, 1967; Newspaper (Prohibition of Circulation) (Validation) Decree No 12 1978; Public Officers (Protection against False Accusation) Decree No 12, 1978. From 1979 to date, there were: Constitution (Suspension and Modification Decree) No 1, 1984; National Broadcasting Commission Decree No 38, 1992; Offensive Publication (Proscription) Decree No 35, 1993; Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree No 29, 1993. (Momoh, 1998).

Most of the laws have been used to justify the persecution of journalists while there have been many cases of detention of journalists, assassination, confiscation and proscription of newspapers and constant harassment. Under Public Officers (Protection against False Accusation) Decree No 4, 1984; two journalists Tunde

Thompson and Nduka Irabor were jailed for daring to publish the list of ambassadorial nominees before it was officially released to the press by the government (Okoye, 2003; Abayomi, 2003, p. 113-117).

Also, under Decree 6 of 1987, (Proscription and Prohibition from Circulation), the Newswatch Magazine was forcefully shut down by the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida for six months, after the assassination of its Editor-in-Chief Dele Giwa, through a parcel bomb (Peretei, 2004,). Many other decrees that were regarded as repugnant. These include the Offensive Publications (Proscription) Decree No 35 of 1993, which, was used as justification to proscribe *Tell* and *The News* Magazines in 1993 (Oloyode, 2004).

Consequently, the hostile environment forced journalists to adopt guerilla style journalism, operating from hideouts, changing locations constantly and publishing against all odds. The media also became quite radical with very strong views. *Tell*, *Tempo* and *The News* exemplified such publications in the 1990s (Ibelema, 2003; Olukotun, 2002). In 2017, Committee to Protect Journalists ranked Nigeria 11th out of 12th, of the countries where journalists are killed with impunity. The annual Global Impunity Index indicated that journalists covering war, politics and human rights were often targets (Premium Times 2017).

As recent as January 6, 2019, the Nigerian Army invaded and shut down the offices of Daily Trust Newspapers in Maiduguri, Borno State and Abuja, Federal Capital Territory. The regional correspondent Uthman Abubakar and reporter Ibrahim Sawab were arrested. The action was tied to a story the newspaper wrote about the on-going fight against terrorism waged by the terrorist group Boko Haram. (Vanguard Newspapers online: Jan 6). According to the military:

“We would like to state that soldiers of the Nigerian Army along with elements of Nigeria Police Force and other Security Agencies were indeed at Abuja and Maiduguri offices of the publishing company to invite the staff of the company over its lead story on Sunday Trust publication, which divulged classified military information, thus undermining national security. In it, the newspaper made disclosed details of planned military operations against the Boko Haram terrorists. The disclosure of classified security information

amounts to a breach of national security and run contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of the Official Secrets Act.” (Vanguard Newspaper online Jan 7, 2019).

Despite these challenges, the media have been active in political communication. Public debate on issues such as ‘*Revenue Allocation*’, ‘*States Creation*’, ‘*Green Revolution*’, ‘*Operation Feed the Nation*’, ‘*the national census*’, ‘*War against Indiscipline*’, ‘*National Reconstruction*’ and the ‘*International Monetary Fund (IMF) Debate*,’ among others, were provoked and kept alive by the media. (Olayiwola, 1991, p. 35).

2:14 Structure, Ownership and Control of the Nigerian Media

Despite the challenges faced by the Nigerian media, internet access has become a game changer for Nigerians. Internet Users and Telecommunication, reports 92,699,924 internet users as of June 2015, representing about 51.1 percent of Internet penetrations in the country. Also, access to smart phones has allowed more people to have access to different sources of information. An important part of this discourse is the fact that the current media system in Nigeria is structured in a way that allows both the government and the political elite to influence the media and set the public and media agenda. Several studies conducted in Nigeria have shown that the pattern of media ownership has ensured that while the media basically set the cultural agenda, the government and elite, particularly the political class serves as news sources that set the political agenda for the country (Nwozor, 2014; Katu-Ogundimu, 2016; Olayiwola, 1991).

As discussed in the previous section, the ownership structure of the Nigerian media is both public (government) and private. This implies that there is a correlation between ownership structure and media content. Newspaper ownership in Nigeria is equated to power as owners are known to exercise some influence in the political and other spheres.

In the first republic from 1960-1966, the effect of ownership on newspapers controlled by government, party, regions and private concerns was obvious in the

coverage of national issues such as elections campaigns, ethnic and group interest, regional crises. Newspapers exhibited “over-zealous, irresponsible partisanship and recklessness” (Olayiwola, 1991, p. 36). It would seem that the earlier incursion of missionaries in the South with their publishing businesses inadvertently resulted in more printing enterprises in that part of the country.

When the country gained independence in 1960, the major newspapers were owned by political parties and were used as organs of the parties. For instance, in the North, *The Nigerian Citizen Newspaper* was the official paper for the Northern People’s Congress (NPC). The National Council for Nigerian and the Cameroons (NCNC) had papers owned by Azikiwe which projected the party’s interests in Eastern Nigeria. *The Nigerian Tribune* held sway in the South-west. *The Tribune* was founded by South-west politician Chief Obafemi Awolowo. It was used to advance the causes of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) founded by Awolowo (Dada, 1979; Olawoyin, 1979).

The regional governments also had their newspapers. For instance, the Eastern Region government converted the *Eastern Outlook* to a daily newspaper and renamed it as *Nigerian Outlook*. By 1964, the Western Nigerian government established the *Daily Sketch* in Ibadan while *the New Nigerian Newspaper* was launched in Kaduna in 1966 by the Northern Nigerian government. This set the stage for a media environment that was highly regional and used to propagate the interests of the various regions in Nigeria (Tador, 1996).

Given the above scenario, the Federal Government of Nigeria attempted to go into newspaper business aimed at promoting national interests. It incorporated the Nigerian National Press Limited, who published the Morning Post and the Sunday Post in 1961. It was obvious that while the newspapers were mostly employed in the fight against the foreign governments during colonial rule, they reverted to working along regional and ethnic lines after independence. This has affected national unity, and persists up till today. An important observation to be made from the history of the press in Nigeria is that newspapers were largely politically focused, especially during the independence struggle and post-independence years. The interests of the actors dictated the direction of the press. For example, Macaulay, Azikiwe and others were

interested in a sovereign Nigeria free of any foreign rule. The political parties they were affiliated with harbored the same ideas. They therefore, were used to further those objectives. The stage was already set for an active interface between the political elite, politicians, the Nigerian media and the state. Consequently, the media played a crucial role in electoral politics.

This gradually led to an expansion of the business with more people investing in the industry. During this period, the Northern parts of the country especially the North-west and North-east had little of such developments in their regions. In the South, newspapers owned by the private sector thrived as opposed to government both because of interest and investment from individuals and groups. However, in the North, the newspapers that emerged early on were mostly government owned.

2:15 Structure and Ownership in Nigeria: Modern Day

The structure and ownership of modern-day media in Nigeria changed with the deregulation of broadcast media by the military Government of Ibrahim Babangida in 1992. (Akeem, Oyeyinka, Qasim, Lateef, Omolago, Onyinyechi, 2013). This saw the springing up of privately-owned radio stations, while in the Northern parts of the country, the gap in newspaper ownership persisted.

As a result of the deregulation, the government started awarding private licenses for radio frequencies, leading to proliferation of media outlets. Further liberalization in broadcasting continued in 1999 after the return to civil rule. The growth was exponential - from 53 stations in the year 2000 to 100 in 2004. Governments at the federal and state levels still enjoyed monopoly over the broadcast media, though. For example, only 17 of the 100 stations were private. The remaining were owned by the government (National Broadcasting Corporation, 2004). The expansion of privately-owned newspapers continued, in spite of the fact that the policies that influence operations are dictated by government.

The monopoly enjoyed by earlier owners of newspapers such as Azikiwe, Awolowo, Macaulay, etc., gave way to multiple players from all regions of the country

(Oyovbaire, 2000). As Okoye (2003) notes, the 1970s and 80s saw newspapers employing educated, intelligent and multipurpose driven individuals both as editors and reporters into their editorial boards. In other words, the ownership structure became relatively diverse, with several newspaper owners falling into the category that could be described as the Nigerian elite. Newspapers like, THISDAY, Vanguard, Punch, Daily Trust, The Guardian fall into this category.

For instance, the owner of THISDAY Nduka Obaigbena used to be a media cartoonist. It's on record that he began the paper as a small venture, which rapidly grew in its early days following impressive editorial quality, breaking news and an incisive content manned by an array of top professionals poached from other media houses.

The Vanguard newspaper was established by renowned journalist and a former editor of Sunday Times and first Managing Director of the Punch Sam Amuka Pemu. Following in the footsteps of vigorous, incisive reporting, the newspaper established in 1984, grew to become a household name in the country.

While the Vanguard describes itself as “family-oriented general interest newspaper which also appeals to the upwardly mobile executives and captains of industry,” the Guardian on the other hand, was established by the wealthy Ibru family from the oil-rich Delta State. The family runs a multi-billion-dollar business with interests in shipping, oil and gas, agriculture, banking and aviation. Late entrant into the market, The Daily Trust was set up in 1998 by a group of entrepreneurs and journalists mainly from the North.

The Punch was set up by Chief Olu Aboderin, although he was known to be close to Awolowo of the UPN. As Olayiwola (1991) pointed out, the so-called independent newspapers “were not so independent. They subjected their readers to all kinds of publicity, ideology and culture of their owners or those who were close to them (p.39).”

2:16 Political Actors and Media Ownership in Nigeria

The liberalization of the broadcast and print media also opened up the space for politicians in the country to own and fund the media. Some examples include the former Governor of Lagos State and leading member of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) Ahmed Bola Tinubu, who is believed to own *The Nation* Newspaper and a TV station - Television Continental (TVC). But publicly, the Nation is listed as owned by Vintage Press Limited and TVC owned by TVC Communications Ltd. The Nation gives extensive coverage to the APC, a party jointly founded and funded by Tinubu and others. Similarly, former Governor of Delta State who served a jail time in the United Kingdom (UK) for money laundering owns the Daily Independent. Another politician Raymond Dopkesi owns the Africa Independent Television (AIT) and Raypower FM radio station, while a Presidential aspirant in the 2015 elections Sam Nda-Isaiah, owns Leadership Newspaper. Prior to 2015, he was simply known as a businessman but soon joined the political fray. Former governor of Abia State between 1999 and 2007, Chief Orji Uzor Kalu owns The Sun newspaper, although he is reputed to be more of a businessman, thereby allowing professionals considerable editorial independence. Table 1 below presents a snapshot of national newspapers in Nigeria by region and ownership.

Table 1: Leading Nigerian National Newspapers

Newspaper	Ownership	Name of Owner	Region of Owner
THISDAY	Private	Nduka Obaigbena	South-south
Guardian	Private	Ibru Family	South South
Vanguard	Private	Sam Amuka Pemu	South-South
Sun	Private	Orji Uzor Kalu	South-East
New Telegraph	Private	Orji Uzor Kalu	South-East
Leadership	Private	Sam Ndah Isaiah	North-Central
Daily Trust	Private	Kabiru Yusuf/others	North-West

Nation	Private	Bola Ahmed Tinubu	South-West
Punch	Private	Founded by Olu Aboderin	South-West

The history of the Nigerian media as highlighted above also reveals certain elements of mediatized politics, although the extent and impact of this has not been widely measured scientifically. The various roles embarked upon in the three phases: Early Press (1800-1920); the Nationalist Press (1929-1960); and the Modern Nigerian Press (1960-date) reveal a media that has struggled to dictate the political agenda as well as influence decisions of politicians. Clearly, journalists have been actively involved in the political system through their professional practice. That symbiotic relationship between political actors and media actors is evident in the Nigerian system on the face value. This sets the stage for an empirical measurement of mediatization in the 2015 and 2019 general elections.

2:17 Media and Politics in Nigeria: Media Logic vs. Political Logic

There is no doubt that the discourse on media logic presents a framework for understanding the symbiotic relationship between the press and politics. For an emerging democracy like Nigeria, several factors shape the nature of these interactions. Most theorizing on mediatization of politics has been on the experiences of Western democracies (Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011; Takens, van Atteveldt, van Hoof and Kleinnijenhuis, 2013). The key findings from these studies present media logic as being prevalent in societies where the media are highly independent and differentiated from politics and politicians (Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011). There is however a difference in the level of mediatization across countries due to factors such as media commercialization, professionalism, technology, deregulation and convergence among other factors.

A review of the Nigerian media system presented above, shows that issues like ownership structure might play a critical role in shaping the level of mediatization. With some media ownership in the hands of government and the political elite, the media in Nigeria are more or less a megaphone of those in control of power. According to Apuke (2016), “instead of performing the function of surveying the

environment, correlating parts of that environment and transmitting culture; or providing entertainment, the media are turned into indispensable tools for relating power by those controlling them.” (p,14). The implication for media logic therefore provides a justification for this research.

To respond to these issues, this study adopts Strömbäck (2008) phases of mediatization and Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) measurement to understand mediatization of election coverage of the 2015 and 2019 elections. Nigeria was chosen as a developing country whose media has emerged from different phases in the history of the country. The structure of media ownership will also provide an interesting basis for analysis. Also, the 2015 and 2019 general elections generated a lot of interest in the country. This change in the political landscape was characterized by massive interaction and engagement by the citizens through the mainstream media and also on social media.

The study focuses only on the third phase of mediatization, which is the degree to which the content and coverage of politics by the media is guided by media logic, rather than political logic. For this reason, the study is driven by three key objectives as follows:

The first objective of this study is to measure the extent to which the 2015 and 2019 general elections in Nigeria were mediatized. A sub objective is to examine the degree to which the elections were covered using media logic rather than political logic. To achieve these objectives, the measurement of mediatization proposed by Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) was replicated. Additionally, Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) identified six indicators in a study they conducted to measure mediatization and media interventionism in the United States and Sweden. These include: (a) framing of politics as a strategic game or horse race (b) journalistic visibility (c) journalistic style (d) length of politicians’ sound bites (e) lip flaps (f) wrap up.

While Strömbäck and Dimitrova’s indicators have been welcomed in research, I believe that two out of the six indicators will fit into this research. These are *the framing of politics as a strategic game* and *interpretative journalistic style*, which allows journalists to have more control of media content and message.

This research will not apply the other four indicators including journalistic visibility, length of politicians' sound bites, lip flaps and wrap up because they are considered more suited to television news coverage whereas casting politics as a horse race or strategic game frame and journalistic style is applicable to print the media, which is the focus of this work.

The second objective of this study is to examine the extent to which newspapers from the North and South regions of Nigeria differed in their degree of mediatization. It is important to note that regional, religious and ethnic divide in Nigeria, make a comparative analysis of newspapers from Northern and Southern Nigeria crucial. This is because religion and ethnicity have been intertwined with Nigerian politics to an extent that the narratives and discourse in the two general elections were largely shaped by these sentiments.

Thirdly and finally, there is a comparative analysis of the level of mediatization between two major election cycles in Nigeria (2015, 2019).

CHAPTER THREE

Problem Statement and Overview of Nigerian Political News Journalism

3:1 Background of the Study

Recent political happenings in Nigeria (the 2015 and 2019 general elections) brought to the fore, the strategic role the media played in shaping the electoral process. With a history of military rule where media freedom was limited and a fairly developed media system in recent times, this study is important for understanding if and to what extent the media has shaped the current political environment in the country. As the biggest country in Africa, with a developing democracy and vibrant media, this research is timely because it throws a searchlight on media phenomena in Africa vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

Against this background, this study engages the concept of mediatization as a social science research tool to explain and comprehend the relationship between the media and politics and how that affects society, particularly with regard to elections.

3:2 Problem Statement

Although the concept of mediatization in politics has mostly been applied by scholars to investigate the impact of the media in very developed countries, like Sweden and the United States (Falasca, 2014; Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011), there is almost no studies or very limited studies that focus on developing countries that have unique political and media systems. Since mediatization is contextual, investigating different dimensions and the extent of mediatization in developing countries is important for understanding the theory. This background provides justification for this study. This dissertation/thesis therefore attempts to make sense of mediatization of politics in a developing country like Nigeria.

This is necessary because as mentioned earlier, the 2015 and 2019 general elections highlighted the considered role the media played in shaping the electoral process. With a history of dictatorship whereby the media space was muzzled and a

continuously growing democratic system with more media freedom today, the study of mediatization is important for understanding if and to what extent, the media has shaped and continues to shape political discourse in the country.

3:3 Conceptualizing Mediatization

The concept of mediatization has gained currency in recent times. Mediatization, according to Mazzoleni and Schulz's (1999) refers to "the extension of the influence of the media (considered both as a cultural technology and as an organization) into all spheres of society and social life" (p.250). This definition implies that the media have both direct and indirect influence on contemporary societies, with the influence extending to every sphere of human endeavor.

Perhaps, more than any other sphere, mediatization of politics has become very popular in research. In recent times, there has been a focus on investigating mediatization, particularly in relation to political communication. Mediatization in politics is a process in which politics has "lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central functions as mass media, and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media" (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999, p.250). With this definition, when it comes to mediatized politics, the media are very important and necessary channels of communication. It also means that mediatization to a large extent, influences, shapes and transforms the behavior of political actors. Simply put, mediatization influences politics. Falasca (2014), explained that the concept of mediatization of politics is particularly drawing attention on how the "news media constitutes the most important source of information and communication channel concerning politics in contemporary society." (p.584). This means there is a heavy dependence on the media for political information; the implication is that political news is shaped more by journalists rather than politicians.

Mediatization of politics is a multidimensional process. Strömbäck (2008) identified four dimensions through which the mediatization of politics can be conceptualized. The first deals with the extent to which the media are important sources of communication in a society; the second concerns itself with the level of independence

that the media has; the third is the level to which what the media produces is governed by media logic, rather than political logic; the fourth dimension focuses on political actors in a society and the level to which they are governed by media, rather than political logic.

A review of these dimensions reveals three fundamental issues relevant to this study. One, it is evident that while mediatization of politics is complex, it is also multi-dimensional. Two, each of these four dimensions can be isolated and studied to understand the process of mediatization of politics. Three, the extent to which media is mediatized can vary across countries (Strömbäck and Esser, 2014).

3:4 Nigerian Political News Journalism

From a media perspective, the media system in Nigeria can be described as both democratic and regulated in line with the classification of global systems proposed by Curran and Park (2000). The structure provides a deeper understanding of the relation between the media, the power structure in Nigeria and the society as a whole. Although the government is democratic and the media environment is liberalized, the government still regulates the broadcast sector through the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), the print sector through the Nigerian Press Council (NPC) and the telecommunication industry through the National Communication Commission (NCC). For example, while, the NBC controls license procedures for the broadcast media, issuance of broadcast licenses is done by the president as required under section 39 of the 1999 constitution (Media Sustainability Index, Africa, 2007).

During colonial rule, the media was dominated by missionaries, politicians, political parties and other groups. The press provided sustained public debate, criticisms against the colonial administrators and political consciousness that gave birth to the nationalist struggle.

Since then, the Nigerian press has evolved from publication of religious materials by the missionary to win converts at the onset of colonial rule, to politically inclined and anti-government news promoted by nationalists during the colonial struggle for

freedom to news projecting the interests of different regions and political parties in the post independence era. The transition followed the circumstances of the different periods under examination.

The media in Nigeria has gone through different stages of transition. The first stage, which Price, Rozumilowicz and Verrhulst (2000) described as the pre-transition stage, can be traced to the late 1980s and early 1990s. At this stage, media reform takes place before a political transition period as it also puts in place what Price et al call refer to as the foundation for the continuation of the reform process. Liberalization of the broadcast industry in Nigeria came in to effect with the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) Decree No. 38 of 1992.

In 1999, Nigeria moved to the second transition stage, which Price et al, describe as the primary stage; this emerges out of what she calls, “Internally-pacted transition” and comes to effect as a result of democratic process such as holding of elections. The 1999 elections in Nigeria saw a voluntary hand-over of power from the military to the civilians with the emergence of President Olusegun Obasanjo as President. This stage focuses on reforming legislative media models and also allows reformers to address issues of ownership and pave way for the emergence of a free and independent media. The period after 1999 has seen the development of democratic institutions and practices; it has witnessed the rapid growth of civil society and an increase in press freedom, especially in the broadcast media (Blankson and Murphy, 2007). The dynamics of this relationship displays how the media in Nigeria relates to the power structure.

This relationship was reflected in Nigeria, particularly during the 2015 and 2019 elections, which has witnessed the country transiting to the secondary stage. This stage according to Price at al., aims at fine-tuning the media and legislative framework with emphasis on the “rule of law mode”. The mantra of the government is respect for the rule of law. The period between 2007 to date has seen an effort by reformers to pass into law, The Freedom of Information Bill, which is expected to allow for easy access to information by the press. The passage of this bill was finally achieved.

Questions of ownership and control in the Nigeria media system, has been described as “ownership in diversity” by the World Information Access report of 2010. This is because there is a very diverse media climate with a mixture of both state and privately owned news and media organizations. For newspapers, there is a divide between the North and South in terms of ownership of newspapers. This began in the colonial era and intensified after independence with concentration of papers in what is termed the ‘Lagos-Ibadan’ Axis in the South-west. Apart from Lagos, papers thrived in other parts of the South in Calabar, Enugu, Ibadan, Onitsha, Warri, Abeokuta, etc.

With this unique media system, political journalism in Nigeria cannot be said to be guided by the principles of objectivity and impartiality. Having such an ownership structure means that news coverage of politics and elections may be independent of political and government institutions in the state but not completely. The ownership structure of newspapers also implies that individuals, particularly the elite play an important role in shaping the political discourse. When it comes to election coverage, the media pay more attention to political news, political parties, institutions and political actors as a whole. The media dynamics thus, provides an interesting framework for understanding mediatization of politics in the Nigeria.

3:5 The Media and the Nigerian General Elections (2015 and 2019)

Nigeria, a country of over 160 million people is located in the western region of Africa, with a landmass of 923,966 sq km. It is the largest country in Africa and the 10th most populous country in the world. Nigeria has a huge population with over 250 ethnic nationalities. The country is predominantly rural with more than two-third of its population living in rural areas. Recognized as one of the oil producing countries in Africa, Nigeria is endowed with many agricultural, mineral, and natural resources. (Globe Scope Inc., 2004).

Nigeria gained independence in 1960 and was for the greater part of her history controlled by military dictatorship with unsuccessful attempts at democratic governance in 1960-1966 and 1979-1983. The country returned to democracy in 1999 and has since then, recorded an unbroken record of civilian rule, the first in the

nation's history. Nigeria practices a democratic system of government with a three-tier structure of Federal Government, 36 State Governments and 774 Local Government Areas. The country politically is divided into six geopolitical zones – North West, North East, North Central, South West, South East and South-South.

Nigeria has multi-party Presidential Democratic System with several small parties but two main ones namely the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) and the opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and elections organized every four years.

During the 2015 Presidential election, the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) both Northern parties, merged with the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) from the South-west and a tiny portion of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) from the South-east to form the APC, which went on to beat the PDP candidate President Goodluck Jonathan from the South-South region, bringing General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd) from the North-west to power. The merger gave the APC a national spread, which the various parties previously lacked.

What stands out in both elections is the role the media played. The media played an important role in the electoral process, during the electioneering campaigns and elections by serving as major sources of information.

Specifically, the 2015 elections according to Isa (2016):

....also witnessed unprecedented mass media coverage ever in the history of elections in Nigeria. The mass media were inundated with not just political advertisements but also news analysis, news features, news stories, editorials, opinion articles, predictions among other media genre to the extent that on daily basis before the election on March 28th 2015, the mass media (print and electronic) became the mass educator that they are. This is because the mass media became not just the rallying point of garnering people's views but also the barometer with which political parties gauge their popularity (p.10).

Prior to the 2015 elections, the media played a crucial role in the election of Former President Goodluck Jonathan by promoting his candidacy, selling his grass-to-grace

story as a person with a humble beginning. Olowojolu (2016) argued that the media performed an agenda setting role in the 2015 elections in the way they covered activities of Jonathan's administration. The tone of these news stories directly or indirectly created a perception of both the incumbent President and his challenger, Muhammadu Buhari.

Examples of such coverage included the reporting of the "Occupy Nigeria" movement, which painted the Jonathan administration as being anti-people in their policies. Others are, the Boko Haram insurgency and the celebrated adoption of over 250 secondary school girls in Chibok (April 14, 2014). Media coverage of the kidnap and subsequent social media campaign #Bringbackourgirls, led to a backlash, which many believe contributed to President Goodluck Jonathan losing the election.

Another negative coverage was media framing of the administration as corrupt. In June 2014, some newspapers presented the President as being anti-media (Olowojolu, 2016). The media also played a similar role during the electioneering campaign. On the opposite side, news documentaries sponsored by the Jonathan campaign presented damaging information about the then APC candidate, Muhammadu Buhari. The documentaries were aired on television stations like the African Independent Television (AIT) and Silverbird Television (STV). Similar information was published in some online newspapers (Sahara Reporters, January 19, 2015).

Seventy-three political parties participated in the 2019 General elections in Nigeria, although there were only two major parties APC and PDP. The incumbent President, Muhammadu Buhari of the APC, won the elections. He beat Alhaji Abubakar Atiku, a former Vice President and candidate of the PDP to win the elections.

Like 2015, the media played a major role in the framing the issues during the 2019 elections in Nigeria. There was very high activity on social media platforms. Leading television stations in the country used hashtags and live coverage to engage viewers online. Online news platforms and other newspapers dominated the social media sphere. Although as part of the election coverage, the Nigerian Media Code of Election Coverage prepared by the International Press Center provided a framework that guided election coverage for journalists (both local and international); the media

played a critical role in framing narratives about the major presidential candidates and political parties.

Issa (2016) sums up the role the Nigerian media in election coverage in the following way:

“Personal interests and political sympathies of many of owners were mainstreamed into professional content of publications and broadcasting to demonize, advocate or manipulate public opinion. Even media organizations that claimed non-partisanship were easily betrayed by the contents on their pages or airwaves. Under the guise of performing their constitutional, structural and psychological responsibilities, many media professionals deliberately confused facts with feelings, masqueraded objective critical analyses with subjective political biases and, in many cases, engaged in defamatory contents that appeared as ordinary news, though were actually planted stories.” (p.13).

3:6 Mediatization of Politics in Nigeria

This study responds to three major gaps identified in literature on mediatization and politics. First, while several studies have over time examined the concept of mediatization in politics in advanced post-industrial democracies, studies that focus on developing countries are scarce. In relatively contemporary concepts such as mediatization and media interventionism, much of the literature is based on advanced, post-industrial societies in Europe and America. Few if any have applied these concepts and perspectives in the developing world.

This study attempts to bridge that gap by investigating mediatization in the 2015 and 2019 general elections in Nigeria. As African countries continue to build democratic systems, as well as develop their media and political spheres, it will be important to understand happenings in society by testing established concepts or creating new ones. This is more so because the upcoming democratic systems in Africa follow the footprint of democracy in the Western world. These Western type democratic experiments/systems are usually imported from abroad and encouraged by the West

through various means. It will therefore, be interesting to see how this plays out in Africa.

Two, Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) acknowledged that the degree of mediatization varies across countries. This is even more important for developing countries, like Nigeria with different and evolving political structures and media systems. The unique political and media systems in the country therefore provide justification for this study. The third point is that studies on mediatization have overtime focused mainly on the broadcast media, particularly, television (Nie, Kee, Ahmad and Korff, 2015). This study responds to this gap by conducting a study that will examine if there was a mediatization of election coverage by newspapers in Nigeria.

In order to investigate the degree of mediatization in the political process in Nigeria, this study will first of all look at the four dimensions of mediatization of politics proposed by Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011).

As mentioned earlier, Strömbäck (2008) defined a four-dimensional way of understanding the process of mediatization in politics. The first dimension addresses the degree to which the media serves as a very important source of information. Based on this, the media is a vital outlet of communication for political actors and institutions and the public.

The second dimension deals with the level of independence of the media relative to other social and political institutions. Strömbäck and Esser (2014) explained that under this dimension, the media in addition to being independent, influences political institutions and actors. The media are influenced “by the media’s own interests, needs and standards of newsworthiness, rather than subordinated to the interests and the needs of political institutions and actors” (p. 377-378).

The third dimension concerns the degree to which the content and coverage of politics by the media is guided by media logic, rather than political logic. Here political actors and institutions use and depend on the media to communicate with, and share information with the public, without swaying the media content and the information distribution process. What this means is that the media is seen as so independent that

they perform an agenda-setting role by casting the news using their own standards and setting the tone and direction of national discourse. Strömbäck (2008) explains it thus:

“The importance of the media in the third phase thus goes beyond single interactions with political actors attempting to influence the news. It also goes beyond agenda setting or framing effects on individuals. What is instead significant is that the media have become so important that their formats, content, grammar, and rhythm—the media logic—have become so pervasive that basically, no social actors requiring interaction with the public or influence on public opinion can ignore the media or afford not to adapt to the media logic.” (p.238).

The fourth dimension has to do with the degree to which political actors and institutions are governed by media logic and not political logic. As an independent institution with its own needs and values, the media is not totally influenced by political actors, instead it shapes the nature of information being disseminated by political actors and institutions. Under this last dimension, the media is not only powerful and influential, but is acknowledged and recognized as being so by political actors and institutions. The above four dimensions explain the magnitude or level to which politics can be described as being mediatized.

What is relevant to this study is the degree of mediatization with respect to the third dimension: the degree to which media coverage of the 2015 and 2019 elections in Nigeria is guided by media logic, rather than political logic. In order to provide a context for this study, the next section provides a contextual analysis of the differences between media logic and political logic.

When we say that the third dimension is the notion that election coverage by the media is governed by media logic, rather than political logic, it means that the news media “play an active and independent role in shaping election news content and coverage” (Falasca, 2014, p.586). The concept of media logic also implies that the media frame election campaign and politics as a whole as more of a strategic game. Falasca (2014) explained that strategic framing of politics means that journalists focus more on news stories that dwell on the performance of politicians, the political institutions and the strategies that political parties are employing to win. According to

her, “journalists try to be in control of news stories by framing politics and the political game as strategic (game frame) rather than reporting on the political issues and events (issue frame) promoted by political actors.” (p.568).

How is media logic measured? As indicated in Chapter 2, to operationalise and measure media logic, Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) identified at least six indicators of Media Interventionism and thereby, the degree of mediatization of Politics. These indicators include: (a) framing of politics as a strategic game or horse race (b) journalistic visibility (c) journalistic style (d) length of politicians’ sound bites (e) lip flaps (f) wrap up.

This study will therefore measure media logic and the degree of mediatization of elections in Nigeria guided by two indicators - how and the extent to which journalists might have framed politics as a strategic game or horse race and the journalistic style. The other four indicators are more operational for television news while the chosen two is more suited to print.

Falasca (2014) explained that descriptive journalism allows or requires of journalists to simply report what they see. Interpretative journalism on the other hand enables them to analyze events. According to Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011). When journalists are descriptive in their reports, their voice is “mainly passive and neutral and focuses on facts or known entities.” But when the journalist engages in interpretative journalism, it is “a kind of journalism that attempts to go beyond the obvious and provide analysis or context” (p.36). Consequently, the degree to which the journalistic style of newspapers in Nigeria is interpretative determines the level of mediatization.

3:7 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine if and to what degree there was a mediatization of election coverage by selected Nigerian newspapers. To achieve this goal, the study will be guided by three key objectives.

3:7 Objectives of the Study (General and Specific)

The general objective of this study is to investigate the role that the media played in the 2015 and 2019 general elections by examining the coverage of the elections; to understand if and how the Nigerian media influences discourse and to trace mediatization. Specifically, the study aims to do the following:

1. To measure the degree of mediatization in the coverage of the 2015 and 2019 elections. (Sub Question A) To examine the extent to which news content was guided by media logic rather than political logic. (Sub Question B) To examine the journalistic style of reporting and if it was interpretive or descriptive
2. To compare the level of mediatization between newspapers in North and South
3. To compare the level of mediatization between 2015 and 2019

3:8 Research Questions

To address the objectives above, this study will be guided by the following research questions:

1. Generally, was the 2015 and 2019 election coverage mediatized? (1A) To what extent was news content cast as a strategic game or horse race? (1B) To what extent was the journalistic style interpretative or descriptive?
2. In which way and to what extent did newspapers from the North and South regions differ in their degree of mediatization?
3. Did the 2015 and 2019 elections differ in their degrees of mediatization?

3:9 Cases and Hypotheses

Hallin and Mancini's 2004 research classified three models of media and politics based on Western post-industrial societies. The Liberal model distinguished by a dominance of the market mechanisms and commercialism; the Democratic

Corporatist characterized by low limited state role, some form of commercial media and ties to political and social groups; the Polarised Pluralist typified by strong state role, integration into party politics and feeble commercial media. (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p.11).

The level of mediatization will defer depending on the model in existence in a society, the role of the state and the level of commercialization. Commercialization is an important factor as it is viewed as crucial to mediatization and media interventionism. If the media is commercially inclined, it is less dependent on politics but more tied to market mechanisms. All of these variables help explain levels of mediatization of politics.

The Nigerian media system mimics the Liberal Model and Democratic Corporatist in contemporary times, while there were elements of the Polarised Pluralist historically. The country has seen different phases of a media and political system: the Early Press (1800-1920) which was during colonial rule; the Nationalist Press (1929-1960) at the dawn of independence which started in 1960; and the Modern Nigerian Press (1960-date) whereby the country went through eras of military rule and now democracy.

Within the context of the Liberal Model today in Nigeria, the media has a dominance of private organisations ruled by market mechanisms and commercialization; and elements of Democratic Corporatist whereby the state has limited role, and a co-existence of commercial media and those tied to politicians not necessarily political groups.

In the country, the mass media could be said to be the most important source of information for politics (the first dimension of mediatization of politics). The print media is especially independent of political institutions in the day-to-day running of their business (the second dimension of mediatization of politics). The public broadcast media (television and radio) are however, more dependent because they are funded by government. It is therefore, expected that the print media will display a high degree of media interventionism and mediatization in 2015 and, then 2019 elections. **Consequently, the following Hypothesis will guide this study:**

1. The 2015 and 2019 elections will be mediatized and therefore shaped by media logic rather than political logic. (1A) Political news coverage will be commonly cast as strategic game or horse race. (1B) Journalistic style will be more interpretive than descriptive
2. There will not be much difference in coverage between the North and South
3. There will not be much difference in the 2015 and 2019 elections

3:10 Significance of the Study

This study is significant for both theory and practice. For theory, this research inevitably adds to scholarship on media, elections and political communication in West Africa and Africa as a whole. The study is justified in that scientific research on the operationalisation of mediatization is limited in the world in general, particularly with respect to developing countries. It is crucial to scientifically measure what influence the media has in political discourse in order to understand the impact on the society in question.

The study is also significant because it adds to existing knowledge on the critical role the media play in election coverage in Nigeria. Findings of the study show how the Nigerian media influences the country's political discourse, by measuring mediatization in the election campaigns. This advances development of overall studies in the field of media, mediatization, media logic, political logic, elections and political communication.

3:11 Newspapers Under Study

The four newspapers chosen are national, which means they are circulated in most parts of the country. Four of them THISDAY, Vanguard, Daily Trust and Blueprint

3:12 Profile of Newspapers

THISDAY

THISDAY is a national private daily newspaper founded in 1995 and published by Leaders & Company Ltd. With headquarters in Apapa area of Lagos, Nigeria, a bureau in the Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory, the organization delivers news from offices in the 36 states of the country. (THISDAY, 2021)

Figure 7: THISDAY Newspapers 1

FG Directs Oil Firms to Cut Offshore Workforce

● **NNPC, DPR differ over Nigeria's petrol stock**

Emmanuel A. Adedeji, Director of COVID-19 pandemic in the country, said in a circular in Abuja that only staff on essential duties should be nominated and permitted to travel to offshore and other remote locations. The circular was issued just as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the DPR at the weekend disagreed over the country's total stock of petrol, as fears continue to grow over the sustainability of the current nationwide supply of the product. "All travels to and from offshore/remote locations shall strictly be in line with the guidelines and procedure for travel to offshore/suamp location and obtainment of offshore safety Permit 2019," it stated, adding: "Non-essential" Continued on page 9

ASUU Demands N1.1tn for Universities Revitalisation.

Page 8

Monday 30 March, 2020
Vol 25, No 9121. Price: N250

THIS DAY



www.thisdaylive.com

ARISE TV Panelists Laud Nigeria's Handling of Pandemic

● **Warn of tougher days ahead**

Our Correspondents Channel, the broadcast arm of THISDAY Newspapers, yesterday lauded Nigeria's management of COVID-19 but warned the federal government not to rest on its oars. The panelists, comprising health practitioners around the world, among others, alerted the federal government that tougher days were ahead and how it would handle the next few weeks would determine whether or not Nigeria would be able to flatten the curve and halt the spread of the virus. Among the contributors Continued on page 11

Buhari Locks Down Lagos, Ogun, Abuja as COVID-19 Cases Rise to 111

● **Suspends fight operations** ● **Promises stipend for vulnerable people, gives three-month moratorium on development bank loans** ● **I feel well, says Kyari, moves to Lagos for further tests** ● **Anambra, Ekiti, Benue, Ogun, Yobe, Abia close borders** ● **Dangote, Sanusi, Bello test negative** ● **Stallion group pledges rice and fish supply to govt hospitals** ● **Air Peace evacuates 274 Israelis to Tel-Aviv**

Our Correspondents full restriction of movements within the three areas for 14 days. With effect from 11:00 p.m. today, Lagos State, the epicentre of COVID-19 in Nigeria; the neighbouring Ogun State, and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) would be locked down, President Muhammadu Buhari directed yesterday. The president, in a nationwide broadcast in which he outlined efforts by his administration to contain the virus, which as at yesterday had infected 111 people, with one death, directed the Federal Ministry of Health and the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) to ensure

Fourteen fresh cases were recorded yesterday to bring the tally to 111 with nine new infections recorded in Lagos and five in FCT, according to data from NCDC Twitter account. The presidential broadcast came on the same day Buhari's Chief of Staff, Mallam Abba Kyari, in a statement signed by him and posted on the official twitter handle of the presidency @NGRPresident, broke his silence on his COVID-19 status, saying on Continued on page 10



Celebrating 68, Tinubu Donates N200m to Fight COVID-19... Page 9

MR. PRESIDENT ON COVID-19...

President Muhammadu Buhari during his nationwide broadcast on COVID-19 in Abuja... yesterday

win more with just **₦5,000**
Simply Dial *901*5# to open a DiamondXtra account today

Diamond Xtra 12
access

Source: THISDAY Newspapers

THISDAY describes itself as “Nigeria’s most authoritative media,” catering to the business class, professionals, the diplomatic community and the middle class. THISDAY motto also explains its mission as “a public trust dedicated to the pursuit of truth and reason covering a range of issues from breaking news to politics,

business, the markets, the arts, sports and community to the crossroads of people and society.” (www.thisdaylive.com)

The paper claims a circulation of 100,000 copies on a daily basis with two printing presses in Lagos and Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria. It has a staff of over 1,000 in its editorial and non-editorial departments.

The owner of THISDAY Nduka Obaigbena used to be media cartoonist. It's on record that he began the paper as a small venture, which rapidly grew in its early days following impressive editorial quality, breaking news and an incisive content manned by an array of top professionals poached from other media houses.

THISDAY has also been involved in various other projects such as organizing town hall meetings, international conferences and music events that have involved the likes of former President Bill Clinton, Beyonce, former Prime Minister of Britain Tony Blair, Former United States Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Jay-z, Naomi Campbell, Alek Wek, Oluchi Onweagba, Diana Ross, Lionel Richie, Rihanna, John Legend, etc.

In 2012, THISDAY's Abuja and Kaduna offices, along with a few other newspapers, was attacked by the dreaded Boko Haram terrorist group based in the Northern part of the country. (France 24, 2012)

The paper is known for its hard hitting back page columns featuring house-hold names such as Olusegun Adeniyi, Okey Ikechukwu, Chidi Amuta, Dele Momodu, Reuben Abati, Kayode Komolafe, etc. (THISDAY, 2021).

VANGUARD

Vanguard was established by renowned Journalist and a former Editor of Sunday Times and first Managing Director of the Punch Sam Amuka Pemu in 1984. It's one of the widely read national newspapers in the country published by Vanguard Media, with headquarters in Lagos and offices in different parts of Nigeria. Following in the footsteps of vigorous, incisive reporting, the paper has grown steadily becoming a force to be reckoned with in the Nigerian media industry. (Vanguard, 2021)

Figure 9: Vanguard Newspapers 1

Vanguard

...towards a better life for the people

ONLINE | www.vanguardngr.com

VOL. 28 | NO. 52318

TUESDAY, MAY 5, 2015

N150

Enugu lawmakers serve Gov Chime impeachment notice >> 6

FG, marketers fail to agree on oil subsidy debt >> 49

We're not responsible for your loss, PDP tells GEJ

- Says party was not carried along during campaigns
- Blames PDP's failure on hate campaign against Buhari
- Threatens to publish beneficiaries of party funds
- **BUHARI'S CABINET: APC govts submit ministerial list** >> 9



RESCUED—Migrants from Nigeria queue up to receive food at a building sited by the Nigerian Red Crescent in the southeastern port of Zaria, near the border with Libya, yesterday, a few weeks after they were rescued off the sea from Libya to Europe. AFP/PHOTO

Sweetcrude

Oil crisis, heading toward Brexit, Nigeria's 2015 budget



Mr & Mrs

...THE WIFE OF THE ...



NIGER DELTA VOICE

Rivers' monarch speaks from hideout

COLUMNIST

Uche Anuehodi - *Real*

Pregnancy rights victory for women

Oil price down to \$66 per barrel >> 9

Source: Vanguard Newspapers

Vanguard is one of the print organisations in the country with a strong and vibrant online presence. It claims to have a print run of 130,000 copies daily. The paper describes itself as “family-oriented general interest newspaper which also appeals to the upwardly mobile executive and captains of industry,” with a stable of a daily newspaper, as well as Saturday and Sunday editions. (www.vanguard.ngr.com)

The paper covers many areas including politics, business, education, sports, health, tourism, etc. It also has a few specialized editions including Allure, Hitech, Financial Vanguard, Sweet crude, Cyber life and Sports Vanguard.

Figure 10: Vanguard Newspapers 2

Vanguard

...towards a better life for the people

ONLINE | www.vanguardngr.com

VOL. 25 NO. 82405 FRIDAY, MAY 15, 2015 N150

Oil marketers holding Nigerians to ransom—CONCERNED CITIZENS

How we defeated Jonathan — TINUBU

- Says they applied Common Sense Revolution
- Soyinka lauds Tinubu, Amaechi as change agents
- Soyinka is the only person I have carried his bag—Amaechi

By Dapo Akintola & Chris Okotha

LAGOS—ALL Progressive Congress, APC, leader Akinwale Adesina Tinubu, yesterday attributed the defeat of President Goodluck Jonathan to the best presidential election in a century—a common-sense revolution inspired in a rebellion against the excesses of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).

The speech at a book launch in Lagos where he also lauded Prof. Ayo

Continued on Page 2

Over 60 killed in Maiduguri attack

50

Mr & Mrs

THE MARRIAGE IS THE...
...THE MARRIAGE IS THE...
...THE MARRIAGE IS THE...



BOOK PRESENTATION—The book Dynamics of Change: The Amaechi Years was launched yesterday at the Chidi Centre, Mbarika Island, Lagos. From left, Akinwale Adesina Tinubu, National Leader, APC; Justice Adesiphos Kambi Whyte, Chairman of the book; Mr. Tonye Cole, book presenter; Dr. Kayode Fayomi, former Governor of Ekiti State; Dr. Chidi Amadi, co-editor of the book; Akinwale Adesina Tinubu, Governor of Zamfara State and Mr. Akinwale Adesina, Governor of Rivers State during the book presentation. Photo: Labial Saragana. More photos on Page 16.

WOMEN'S VOICE
CABINET FORMATION: South West govts in quandary?

COLUMNISTS:
Damil Lakemba
Fighting fire with water P.29

Obasanjo hands over report on devt plan to Buhari

Source: Vanguard Newspapers

It also boasts of an array of outstanding and well known columnists such as Ochereome Nnanna, Helen Ovbiagele, Obi Nwakanma, Bunmi Sofola, Treena Kwenta, Dele Sobowale, Pini Jason among others.

Apart from publishing, the newspaper has organized public lectures focusing on the economy and socio-political issues, attracting highly placed personalities within and outside the country.

Its mission is to “be the best media group with the widest reach through innovation backed by excellent service delivery, highly motivated human capital and latest technology.

With regard to vision, the newspaper emphasis it’s focus on impacting its readers/clients and society “by providing highly quality, reliable and affordable media products for promoting knowledge, political stability and economic prosperity.” (Vanguard, 2021)

DAILY TRUST

Daily Trust is one of few influential newspapers from the Northern part of Nigeria. Officially owned and run by Media Trust Limited, the company also engages in consultancy, and commercial printing and publishing. (Daily Trust, 2021)

The newspaper came into the Nigerian market in 2001, set up by a group of entrepreneurs and journalists mainly from the North. Headquartered in Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria, with offices in other parts of the country, the paper has an English and Hausa version. On its stable are Daily Trust, Weekly Trust and Hausa Aminiya. The Weekly Trust started publication in 1998 before the Daily Trust set up shop in 2001.

Figure 11: Daily Trust Newspapers 1



335 DAYS
since over 200 schoolgirls were kidnapped from GGSS Chibok, Borno State, by gunmen

NEWS

6 Killed in Abuja-Kaduna Road Auto Crash

>>>Page 9

SUNDAY TRUST



Sunday, March 15, 2015
Jumadil Ula 25, 1436 A H

THE NEWSPAPER YOU CAN TRUST

www.dailytrust.com.ng sunday
Vol. 9 No. 42 N260

80
years

EURASIA REVERSES EARLIER PREDICTION, SAYS:

BUHARI 'LL WIN 2015 PRESIDENCY

By Abideen Olaniji, with agency report

World largest political risk consultancy, Eurasia Group, Friday said it expects to see the 2015 presidential election due in two weeks, predicting victory for the candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC), General Muhammad Buhari. Eurasia Group said a Buhari win would be made possible

by the intensity of support for his candidate. Buhari also enjoys the backing of the PDP and the erstwhile incumbent, President Goodluck Jonathan. The Electoral Commission (EC) said the APC candidate would record a 60% victory against his rival. President-elect Jonathan, who is seeking re-election.

- **Dame Patience: We'll Complete 8 Years in Aso Rock** Page 4
- **Jonathan May Reshuffle Cabinet This Week** Page 9

Continued on Page 4

North Has Not Been The Same Again Since 1966 Coup - Justice Akanbi

Page 4





Why PDP is Afraid of APC Presidency - Oyegun

Pages 5, 6, 7

● Says: Attacks on Buhari, Tinubu Won't Help Jonathan

Source: Daily Trust Newspapers

According to Daily Trust, it's vision is a "world class media company that can earn public trust," while it's mission is stated as the dissemination of "credible information for the good of all stakeholders." The company also stresses its core values to include ethical conduct, editorial integrity, product excellence, professionalism, constant innovation, etc. (www.dailytrust.com)

It also sees its workers as one of its most treasured possession. "The company believes that its workers are the most valuable and dependable asset, to meet the challenges of its objectives," said the company, adding that "while the company will strive to create a congenial and harmonious working environment, offer equal opportunity for advancement and reward workers as appropriate, it will also demand dedication to service and loyalty from employees." (Daily Trust, 2021)

Figure 12: Daily Trust Newspapers 2

PAGE 3 COMMENT

'Marshal Plan' for the North East

For once the Federal Government and Defence Headquarters seem to be fulfilling their promise to Nigerians with the ending of battle. It is successes being recorded in the north of North East states in the last few months. Since the latest offensive was launched by the Nigerian military with the active help of our neighbours Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin Republics most of the areas previously held by the terrorist Boko Haram have been liberated. Adamawa State has now been entirely cleared of Boko Haram. Most of Yobe State has been cleared while in Borno State only the two major towns of Damboa and Gwoza are yet to be liberated.

We congratulate all Nigerians on these good tidings. Yet, it is time to remind ourselves and the international community that clearing the North East states of Boko Haram insurgents is only the first step in the long, hard work of resettling and rehabilitating its inhabitants and restoring the region's crippled infrastructure and social services. The thousands of lives that have been lost in the tragedy in the region and beyond cannot be restored but there are hundreds or thousands of orphans and widows that need food, shelter and medical aid that are a matter of urgent help.

Apart from the dead, there are tens of thousands of people who have been wounded in Boko Haram attacks and bomb blasts in many towns and villages and are in dire need of ongoing medical care and rehabilitation. Hundreds of thousands of people have also been traumatised by Boko Haram attacks and will need long-term social, legal and rehabilitation. Many have witnessed the slaughtering of their husbands and parents, the rape and abduction of their children and the burning of their homes and communities, episodes that will haunt them forever. In addition there are the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) said to number in the millions. There are another less than a million such IDPs in the Borno State capital, Maiduguri alone with hundreds of thousands more in Yobe, Damboa, Gwoza, Bauchi and Abuja.

For now, the respective state governments through their emergency management agencies, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the National Commission for Refugees are tried their best to assist and feed these IDPs and provide medical supplies and temporary educational facilities for their children. Many public health agencies and religious groups have also helped, as have some international agencies. Apart from the IDPs there are thousands of Nigerians who fled to

Cameroon and Niger Republic. There were reports at the weekend of Borno State Governor Kashim Shettima saying that thousands of Niger Republic IDPs to which thousands of people from Borno's Mobbar, Mbederi, Mengera and Bakura local governments had fled.

As soon as the military succeeds in eradicating the insurgents from all their enclaves and occupied areas, the first task will be to facilitate the refugees' return to their homes. This is easier said than done. While refugees are naturally eager to return to their liberated homes and try to pick up the pieces from their shattered lives, they cannot return to their

homes for people to return to their homes. Roads of terrorists could still ruin the countryside. Mines and other booby traps placed by the retreating insurgents must also be cleared not only on the roads but in homes, farms, schools and places of worship. Then there are the corpses that must be cleared: thousands of insurgents as well as some innocent civilians would have been killed in these operations and their remains must be properly cleared and buried and the whole area must be thoroughly fumigated. There are many disturbing reports that the insurgents dumped bodies in wells and ponds, making them unusable as sources of drinking water.

Then there is the wholesale destruction of public buildings and other infrastructure by the numerous insurgents. In every town they occupied schools, hospitals, public buildings, courts, palaces, libraries, churches and mosques as well as the homes of wealthy citizens were singled out for destruction. Markets, shops and banks too were destroyed as recent pictures from Maiduguri and Gwoza showed. Insurgents also blew up many bridges in order to slow the army's advance into occupied areas. Therefore, a lot of rehabilitation and reconstruction work must be done before these areas could become fit to live once again.

How can Nigeria be expected to cope with this setback and how to take the North East region and Nigeria as a whole back several decades? Even before Boko Haram the North East region was one of the poorest regions in the country. In fact, it is said to have been the poorest, providing a large pool of displaced persons to which the insurgents recruited fighters. As if the state and local governments in the region will be saddled with the main task of relief, resettlement and rehabilitation Borno State Government has already made a start by establishing a Task Force on Evaluation, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Insurgency Victims. This is a welcome start but states cannot cope alone so the federal Government must walk in to a very big way. This is a key task that will keep the government to be inaugurated on May 29.

Unfortunately governments at all levels in Nigeria are faced with dwindling revenues due to the steep fall in international oil prices. It is therefore time to launch an effort to mobilise international support for the rehabilitation of our war-ravaged North East. In short, we need a program that is the American-sponsored Marshall Plan that restores America to its feet after the Second World War. The time to start is now.



Air Marshal Alex Badeh

Unfortunately governments at all levels in Nigeria are faced with dwindling revenues due to the steep fall in international oil prices. It is therefore time to launch an effort to mobilise international support for the rehabilitation of our war-ravaged North East

homes immediately. There were some rumours last week as some politicians advocated a quick return of refugees to their homes in time to vote in the elections which are now just a few days away. This is not possible, return to the land of things.

Even after the military successes in occupying and liberating the occupied towns and villages, it might take weeks for it to give the green light

TODAY IN HISTORY



March 15, 1911
Ruzuzo, East North Dakota and Minnesota.

In 1911 people in Ruzuzo, East North Dakota and Minnesota were trapped in their cars when it came suddenly. Two thousand people attending a basketball game in Mankato, Minnesota were stranded overnight when it was wisely decided that it was too dangerous to travel.

HAPPENING TOMORROW



March 16, 2015 is the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Goodwill Treaty between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The treaty was signed in Beijing on February 11, 1950. It is a landmark in the history of Sino-Soviet relations. The treaty provided for the establishment of a joint Sino-Soviet Commission for the Far East, which was to be inaugurated on May 29.

NEWS



IDP K.C.s: Our Boku Haram Stories

SUNDAY TRUST

- KABIRU A. YUSUF Chairman/Chief Executive Officer
- MR ABHAY DESAI Chief Operating Officer
- MANNIR DAN ALI Executive Director/Editor-in-Chief
- MAHMUD JEGA Associate Director (Editorial)
- ALIU M. AKOSHILE Associate Director (Business)
- THEOPHILUS ABBAM Editor, Sunday Trust
- SHEHU O. MOHAMMED General Manager, Management Services
- GARBA ALIYU ABUBAKAR Deputy General Manager (IT)
- AKEEM MUSTAPHA Account Manager

Our COMMENT&DEBATE pages begin on page 21

BLUEPRINT

Compared to previously mentioned newspapers, Blue Print is a relatively new print organization in Nigeria.

Figure 13: Blueprint Newspapers 1

Blueprint
For Truth and Justice

Like us on:
facebook: blueprint.ng
twitter: @blueprintng
instagram: @blueprintNigeria

No. 1,951 THURSDAY February 14, 2019 jIMADAI AkHIR 9, 1440 AH N200 www.blueprint.ng

AGF writes iNEC over Zamfara elections PAGE 7

Arrest Onnoghen, CCT orders iGP, DSS
By kehinde Osasona Abuja
The Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT) Wednesday issued a bench warrant for the arrest of suspended Chief Justice of Nigeria Walter Onnoghen following his absence in court.
NJC sets up 5-man c'ttee to probe Onnoghen, acting CJN of State Services (DSS) to arrest and produce Onnoghen unflinching Friday
At the last sitting, the tribunal ordered Onnoghen to appear before it at the next adjourned date. Consequently, the tribunal said the Inspector General of Police and Director-General of the Department

Man arrested for raping 6-year-old girl PAGE 8

iNEC faults APC, PDP over alleged bias PAGE 6

AT FRESH PEACE ACCORD:
Buhari says Nigeria greater than any party
My ambition not worth any Nigerian's blood – Atiku **SEE PAGE 6**

Chairman National Peace Committee (NPC) General Abdulsalami Abubakar (2nd left); APC presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari (middle), PDP presidential candidate Atiku Abubakar (2nd right), NPC Vice Chairman retired Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe (right) and other presidential candidates, during the 2nd signing of the 2019 National Peace Accord, in Abuja Wednesday

President Muhammadu Buhari in a handshake with former Vice President Abubakar at the event
Photos: Tidzalla Zacchaeus

WHO WILL YOU VOTE FOR?

A MODEST, FRUGAL FULANI MAN WHO HAS PLACED THE COUNTRY ON THE PATH OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND PROGRESS THROUGH MASSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT, SOUND ECONOMIC POLICIES AND VIGOROUS FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION?

OR

A FLAMBOYANT FULANI MAN EXPANDING HIS BUSINESS EMPIRE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE POOR; WHO WANTS TO BE PRESIDENT TO SELL NNPC AND OTHER NATIONAL ASSETS, AND SOLELY TO ENRICH HIS FRIENDS AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATES?

Source: Blueprint Newspapers

Established in 2011, the newspaper was floated by a group of people in Northern Nigeria namely Mohammed Idris, Salisu Umar, Zainab Suleiman Okino and Ibrahim Sheme. It took off as a weekly publication in May 2011 before going daily in September 2011. (Blueprint 2021)

Figure 14: Blueprint Newspapers 2

The image shows the masthead of the Blueprint newspaper. At the top, it includes social media links for Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, the word 'BLUEPRINT' in all caps, and the date 'Thursday, February 14, 2019'. The masthead features the 'Blueprint' logo in a large, bold, blue font. Below the logo, there is contact information for the newspaper, including its address in Abuja, Nigeria, and email addresses. A 'MISSION STATEMENT' is provided in a red box, stating the newspaper's commitment to democracy and the restoration of hope. Below the mission statement, the names and titles of the newspaper's leadership are listed: Chairman/CEO (Mohammed Idris, FNPR), Chief Operating Officer (Salisu Umar), General Manager (Ajibola Oyetubo, Finance), Deputy General Manager (Thomas I. Joseph, Administration), Editor-in-Chief (Zainab Suleiman Okino), Managing Editor (Clement Oluwole), Editor (Abdulrahman A. Abdulrauf), and General Editor (Chamba Simeh).

EDITORIAL

The torching of INEC offices

The spate of arson on the facilities of the electoral umpire, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), in parts of the country few days to the 2019 general elections, is a new trend in Nigeria's chequered political history. Without a doubt, the dastardly act is not only criminal and reprehensible but it is also condemnable as it is targeted at truncating the nation's evolving democracy.

It is unfortunate that barely four days to the Presidential and National Assembly elections, fire on Tuesday gutted two containers housing smart card readers for the conduct of elections at INEC headquarters in Awka, Anambra state.

Confirming the fire, the Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC) in Anambra state, Dr Nkwachukwu Orji, said he was yet to ascertain the extent of damage. He said the sensitive materials affected were smart card readers meant for the general elections.

"I don't have the details of how the fire started. All I know is that there was a fire incident involving the containers that house some of our sensitive materials. We have to do an assessment before we can ascertain the extent of damage, we have been storing equipment in that facility since 2011," he said.

The Anambra fire is coming on the heels of two separate fire incidents at Isiala Ngwa, Abia state and Qua'an Pan, Plateau state. INEC offices were penultimate week gutted by fire by unidentified persons in Isiala Ngwa South local government, Abia state while the incident at Qua'an Pan local government area of Plateau state occurred last Saturday.

"Some of the items destroyed in Isiala Ngwa South local government include 2979 Permanent Voters' Cards (PVCs) and other materials. At the Qua'an Pan office, items destroyed include 5987 uncollected Permanent Voters' Cards (PVCs), 380 Voting Cubicles, 755 ballot boxes, 14 generators, election forms and official stamps," Festus Okoye, Chairman, Information and Voter Education Committee of INEC, said late on Sunday.

Okoye said the commission has raised the matter with the police chief, Mohammed Adamu, of the emerging trend of the burning of the local government offices of the commission close to the conduct of the elections and at a period when the commission is engaged in the massive movement of election-related materials nationwide.

Okoye said in view of these developments, the commission has taken the following steps:

1. Notified the inspector general of police of this new trend and requested that additional security measures be provided to enhance security around INEC offices and other critical structures of the commission.
2. Directed the resident electoral commissioner for Plateau state to

open a register for all those in the affected local government area who approach the commission to collect their PVCs within the specified period. The commission will print the PVCs and make them available for collection in good time before the elections.

3. Reprinted and delivered the permanent voters' cards of the affected registered voters in Isiala Ngwa South in Abia state.

4. Made temporary arrangements for the relocation of the burnt offices of the commission. The said offices will be ready for the conduct of the February 16 and March 2, 2019 elections.

5. The commission will proceed as planned in the affected local government areas and all the burnt materials will be replaced in good time and as such will not affect the conduct of the elections.

All relevant security agencies have been requested to arrest and bring to justice, persons or groups involved in the attacks on the offices of the commission. The two fire incidents did not affect the smart card readers that are presently being configured in the respective state offices of the commission.

The commission wishes to assure all Nigerians that it will not succumb to the antics of arsonists whose motive might be to create fear in the minds of voters and sabotage the conduct of the 2019 general elections.

Following INEC's request, the police chief on Sunday ordered water-tight security around offices of INEC across the country ahead of Saturday's election. He also ordered 24-hour security to safeguard all the materials to be used for the election from all forms of crimes and mischief, before, during and after the polls.

Regrettably, in spite of the swift response of the police hierarchy to INEC's distress call by the deployment of security personnel to the commission's offices nationwide, barely 48 hours after, the arsonists still had a field day, torching INEC's facilities in Awka. How sadistic and unpatriotic anyone could be!

It is, however, heart-warming that INEC has remained undeterred in its resolve to not only conduct free, fair, credible, and acceptable elections but also to stick to its time table, declining the prompting to postpone any of the elections scheduled for this Saturday and February 2, 2019.

This commendable gesture will most assuredly go a long way to deepen the nation's democratic culture and instill confidence in Nigerians as well as command the respect of the international community. While urging INEC to remain steadfast in its determination to deliver hitch-free elections to Nigerians, we call on the police chief to ensure that the arsonists are apprehended and expeditiously prosecuted in order to nip this dangerous dimension in our politics in the bud.

Source: Blueprint Newspapers

Blue Print is one of the few known newspapers from the North of Nigeria with a fairly good coverage of news on business, politics, entertainment, health, security and human interest stories.

It has offices Lagos, Kaduna, Kano and a head office in Abuja. On its stable are the daily newspaper, a weekend edition and a Hausa version. (www.bluprint.ng)

Blue print fiercely states its mission to be a commitment to “the tenets of democracy and the task of restoring hope to our lives as a nation.” It continued: “We will eagerly take our pens and fight those that threaten Nigeria’s wellbeing, unity and progress through corruption, misplacement of priorities, as well as nepotism and prejudice. At the same time, we will celebrate Nigeria achievers at home and overseers, tasking others to emulate them. (Blueprint, 2021)

3:13 Justification for selecting the newspapers

Nigeria is a country of over 160 million people with more than 250 ethnic groups dispersed across various regions of the country. The diversity and religious differences have often been sources of tension particularly following a colonial past that solidified an unbalanced political structure. As a result, attempts are often made to take into cognizance this diversity in a way that supports the aspirations and voices of different groups. These colorations sometimes reflect in the views and slant of media coverage.

Against this background, the study selected two newspapers THISDAY and Vanguard, representing the Southern part of the county and two Daily Trust and Blue Print from the North. Normally, more widely read newspapers are published from the Southern part of the country.

These newspapers are regarded as leading papers published by owners from the Southern region. They’re national in nature as well. There are fewer papers published by Northern interests. Daily Trust and Blue Print are among them.

Furthermore, research on mediatization has largely focused on television news. This study attempts to strike a different path by exploring newspapers. Finally, the print

media in Nigeria is viewed as agenda setters when compared to television and radio. They're politically focused in their coverage of news, and thus sought after by the political class and government because of an assumed power and effect on society.

3:14 Operational Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this study, the below is the operational definition of terms used in the study:

- **Mediatization:** Refers to a social change process in which the media is very influential in the society. It is also a process where the media is deeply integrated in the society
- **Media Interventionism:** Media interventionism refers to the discretionary power of the media as they play a formative role in shaping news content “(Falasca, 2014, p.587). Media interventionism can be identified when journalists act independently by setting the agenda for society.
- **Media Logic:** In the context of this study, media logic is described as the process through which the media present and transmit information. It also deals with media independence, particularly the unique way they interpret and present information.
- **Political Logic:** Unlike media logic, political logic is framed by overall institutional framework of politics. Media is less independent in this instance and heavily relies on political actors and institutions and official sources and perspectives (Bennett, Lawrence and Livingstone, 2007; Falasca, 2014).

CHAPTER FOUR

Methodology

4:1 Introduction

The purpose of this study is to examine the degree to which the news coverage of the 2015 and 2019 general elections in Nigeria were mediatized. To this end, this study will employ a quantitative content analysis research design, using a library research to mine data from four Nigerian daily newspapers, comprising of back copy issues of the selected newspapers two weeks prior to the commencement of the elections. The selected newspapers are THISDAY, Vanguard, Daily Trust and Blueprint. They are considered some of the most important, widely read newspapers in the country, cutting across the North and South geopolitical divide. The unit of analysis is full thematic news stories, the most widely used methodology and approach on news content. The selection criteria were that news stories must make reference to the candidates, political parties and party leaders. Collected data was analyzed using the SPSS Version 25 software to run appropriate statistical tools to count, classify and explain the observed degree of mediatization of the elections with regard to each of the research questions. This conforms to Barbie's position that "... The overarching aim of a quantitative research study is to classify features, count them ...in an attempt to explain what is observed." (p. 1).

It's also important to emphasize that this research utilizes the diagnostic approach in the sense that it is heavily descriptive, analytical and exploratory.

4:2 Quantitative Content Analysis: Research Design

Content analysis is a scientific "method of analyzing written, verbal or visual communication messages" (Cole, 1988). It essentially includes the study of communication, contexts, meaning, sub-texts, and intentions that are contained in the messages. It also involves analyzing the content of recorded human communication including books, videos, text messages, tweets, newspapers, magazines and social media posts, etc.

Extrapolations can be made from using content analysis as a research tool. These extrapolations or interpretations may be aimed at understanding the effect of a message, the senders of the message and the message in itself. (Weber, 1984). Content analysis was first used in magazines, newspaper, hymns, political speeches and advertisements in the 19th century (Harwood and Gary, 2003). In the past couple of decades, the usage has expanded to many areas including business, sociology, communication, psychology and journalism. (Neundorf, 2002).

Krippendoff (2013, p. 24) describes content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use.”

A number of scholars have investigated mediatization using quantitative content analysis design. De Vreese and Semetko (2002, p. 623) examined the coverage of the 2000 Danish referendum on euro and coded stories to determine performance, style, language of war, winning and losing, competition and games usually associated with media logic in mediatization.

Sheafer et al. (2008, p. 45) coded campaign stories to analyse issue and game frames associated with mediatization, on a present-absent basis. Stromback and Dimitrova (2011) investigated differences in mediatization between the USA and Sweden by coding according to variables related to strategies for winning elections, politicians winning, and polls and politicians standing in the polls. Patterson (1993, p. 73-74) studied mediatization in New York Times front-page stories, identifying game frame that rose from less than 50% in 1960 to more than 80% in 1992.

Using a mixed method that combined quantitative and qualitative, computer assisted and human content analysis, Cervi, Tejedor and Gracia (2021) analyzed the news content of top newspapers in Spain and Italy - El Mundo and left-leaning El País for Spain and Il Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica for Italy, to see how Muslims and Islam were represented in the media. The article uncovered the constant linkage of Muslims with terrorism through framing and the negativity that sort of representation produces among people in those countries.

Kerbel et al (2000, p. 17) studied the use of horse race/strategy in US television news and Aalberg and Brekken (2007, p. 188) examined how games frame changes occur during election campaign from three weeks to one week before the vote.

Cervi, Simelio and Tejedor (2021) investigated journalism and communication curriculum in eight top ranked Europeans universities using quantitate and qualitative methodologies. The study evaluated how the universities were far from making crucial structural changes in communication to reflect the changing tide.

Researchers have equally used other methods to analyze news items. Tejedor, Cervi, Tusa, Portalés, & Zabolina (2021), carried out a comparative study of the Covid-19 pandemic newspaper coverage of eight countries. The work reviewed the front pages of 16 newspapers using descriptive approach of hemerographic analysis.

But when investigating mediatization, quantitative content analysis enables the researcher to separate the variables and the different phases of mediatization to study for the existence and frequency of concepts. It provides the analytical capabilities needed to test the accuracy of the concept by determining of the independent variable causes an effect on the dependent variable. (Campbell and Stanley, 1963).

For the purpose of this study, a quantitative content analysis method was chosen based on that fact that it is considered an appropriate, systematic and rigorous design that is suitable to achieve the objectives of the thesis. This researcher chose it because it will engender a robust, accurate measurement and evaluation of the existence of mediatization phenomena or none of it in Nigeria through experimental and/or descriptive means.

Quantitative content analysis, which, combines both the *directed* and *summative* content analysis approaches were adopted. To this end, in order to lay the foundations for primary codes guided by the theoretical framework and the research questions, coding schemes were derived (directly) from the text data that were collected from each of the four selected Nigerian newspapers. This was subsequently followed by

counting and comparisons of the key words (or codes). Finally, descriptive statistical analysis was conducted to summarize the data for interpretation.

According to Delost and Nadder (2014), quantitative research designs “may be experimental where there is an intervention, or non-experimental if no intervention is included in the design. Causation can only be established with experimental research. Popular types of non-experimental research include descriptive and survey research....” (p.1). Since no intervention is included in this research, this content analysis method is essentially non-experimental. However, careful attention will be paid to show how data-driven evidence supports the research findings (Rose et al., 2015), in line with the extant literature, the research questions and mediatization theory

4:3 Process

The content analyzed focused on the existence and frequency of concepts (codes) in the newspaper coverage on the 2015 and 2019 general elections in Nigeria. To this end, the process consisted of the following steps, which was performed sequentially:

1. List the research questions (as identified above)
2. Conduct systematic sample selection (the newspapers)
3. Skim through the sampled materials and make a list of the main themes to be analyzed
4. Generate the coding scheme based on the identified themes and
5. Develop a coding manual made up of categories, names of political parties, candidates, etc.
6. Carry out the coding (i.e. put the information – based on developed themes - into a quantifiable form).

4:4 Selection of Cases (Newspapers)

Four Nigerian newspapers were sampled for the purpose of data collection. Each publication was drawn to reflect the geographical point of origination in Nigeria. The

newspaper samples selected from Southern Nigeria are THISDAY and Vanguard while Daily Trust and Blueprint were selected from Northern Nigeria.

The content analysis exercise was carried out at the National Library Abuja, Nigeria, and the libraries of the various newspapers, using back copies of the selected publications two weeks before the 2015 and 2019 general elections in Nigeria.

Table 2: Brief on Newspapers Researched

Newspaper	Ownership	Name of Owners	Region
THISDAY	Private	Nduka Obaigbena	South
Vanguard	Private	Sam Amuka-Pemu	South
Blueprint	Private	Mohammed Idris/others	North
Daily Trust	Private	Kabiru Yusuf/others	North

4:5 Sampling

The papers sampled covered the two weeks prior to the 2015 Presidential Election (14th to 27th March 2015 and the 2019 Presidential Election (9th to 16th February) in selected newspapers. A total number of 112 newspapers (14 days X 2 X 4 newspapers) constitute the total sample for this study. But a total of 106 were eventually sampled due to the availability of old copies.

4:6 Unit of Analysis

The cases of political and election news coverage of the newspapers selected for this study focused on the Nigerian national elections of 2015 and 2019 respectively. Every back copy of the selected newspapers (Sundays to Mondays) was content-analyzed during the period under study. The unit of analysis comprised of the full

thematic news stories in each of the selected newspapers. This means that the news stories that were included and analyzed were those that made reference to (a) the political candidates of the major political parties in Nigeria (2015 and 2019 election), (b) the political parties themselves and (c) the party leaders.

4:7 Research Indicators

The degree of mediatization in the news coverage of the 2015 and 2019 general elections in Nigeria was measured using two basic indicators of media interventionism, also conceptualized as the degree of mediatization of political news. There were six indicators in a study proposed by Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) on media Interventionism and thereby, the degree of mediatization of politics. Media Interventionism refers to journalistic interventions in political news journalism and these indicators include: (a) framing of politics as a strategic game or horse race (b) journalistic visibility (c) journalistic style (d) length of politicians' sound bites (e) lip flaps (f) wrap up.

As explained in Chapter 2, the study shall measure *if and to what degree* news content and coverage of the 2015 and 2019 elections in Nigeria, using two out of these six aforementioned indicators of media interventionism and mediatization of politics proposed by Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011).

While most of these indicators have been widely used, this researcher proposes to use only two namely (a) framing of politics as a strategic game or horse race (b) journalistic style, for the following reasons: (1) Most of the indicators such as journalistic visibility, length of politicians' sound bites, lip flap, and wrap up are more suited to measuring mediatization in television news. Again, most of the studies by other scholars were tailored for television news. (2) This study explores print media, hence the two indicators – strategic game or horse race and journalistic style work for this purposes.

These indicators are:

1. The notion that the coverage of elections is governed by media logic, rather than political logic. In other words, the news media “play an

active and independent role in shaping election news content and coverage” (Strömbäck and Kaid, 2008; Falasca, 2014, p.586). This also implies that there is journalistic independence in news coverage with less influence by politicians. This indicator further suggests that journalists control the news process by reporting politics as more of a strategic game or horse race.

2. The second indicator suggests that the degree to which news is mediatized is related to the journalistic style. Some studies have shown that journalistic interpretation is very common in the coverage and reporting of elections (Strömbäck and Kaid, 2008). When journalistic style is interpretative, the journalist moves away from describing events to an in-depth reporting of and analysis of issues (According to Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011). Thus, the degree to which the journalistic style is interpretative is another indicator of the degree of mediatization.

This study adopted these indicators and categories based on the fact that they fit for analyzing mediatization in the Nigerian context. Collected data will be scoured for existence of strategic game or horse race and journalistic style employed by journalists in the election coverage.

4:8 Hypothesis and Research Questions

The research questions and hypothesis that guided this study are couched in the postulations of mediatization and media interventionism. Drawing on literature from these, the study investigates the degree of mediatization of politics in Nigeria along the third dimension.

It is important to note that there are little empirical studies that have operationalized mediatization as a theory. The foremost study that has done that is Kepplinger’s (2002) article, which focused on activities of members of parliament of Germany, dealing with the fourth dimension of mediatization (political logic) rather than the third (media logic).

Media logic consists of the way in which media present and transmit information, the way they cover political stories, and the way they interpret the events. (Altheide, 2013). The main argument is the idea that journalists are often guided by news values, professionalism, commercialization and media technology when they make decisions on political news.

On the other hand, political logic is shaped by institutional framework namely polity, policy and politics. These include the political system, electoral system, identifying problems, identifying policies for addressing them and implementing such as well as efforts made by parties and political actors to win elections.

Other research related to media interventionism and political news journalism has been advanced by scholars to investigate mediatization and the impact of media on politics. Mediatization refers “to adaption of politics to the needs of the mass media.”(Kiplinger 2002, p. 973) while Media Interventionism has to do with the discretionary role the media have to shape the content of the news. (Falasca, 2014). Mediatization of political news journalism can be indicated through media interventionism, where journalists are in charge and practically rule in the news production process. (Esser 2008; Stromback and Dimitrova 2011; Zeh and Hopmann 2013).

Esser (2008) argued that “the journalistic attitude toward intervention in election campaigns is high when journalists report the campaign in their own words, scenarios, assessments and when they grant politicians only limited opportunities to present themselves”(p. 403). Consequently, signs that news coverage is shaped by the intervention of journalists – media logic, as opposed to political logic can be used as an indicator of the degree of mediatized content and media interventionism.

As mentioned earlier, to operationalise and measure media logic, Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) identified six indicators of media interventionism and thereby, the degree of mediatization of politics namely: (a) framing of politics as a strategic game or horse race (b) journalistic visibility (c) journalistic style (d) length of politicians’ sound bites (e) lip flaps (f) wrap up. The indicators all deal with the degree of media

interventionism and how journalists are able to shape the news through production, picking their content based on their own standards, values and needs.

Having established the relation between mediatization of politics and media interventionism, this study examines the issues, guided by two out of the six indicators, namely the framing of politics as a strategic game or horse race and journalistic visibility.

The following research questions and hypothesis are based on the studies above.

- R.Q. 1 - Generally, was the 2015 and 2019 election coverage mediatized? R.Q. 1a - To what extent was news content cast as a strategic game or horse race? R.Q. 1b - To what extent was the journalistic style of the news coverage interpretative or descriptive?
- R.Q. 2 - In which way and to what extent did newspapers from the North and South regions differ in their degree of mediatization?.
- R.Q. 3 - Did the 2015 and 2019 elections differ in their degrees of mediatization?
- H1 - The 2015 and 2019 elections will be mediatized and therefore shaped by media logic rather than political logic. H1a - Political news coverage will be commonly cast as strategic game or horse race. H1b - Journalistic style will be more interpretive than descriptive.
- H2 - There will not be much difference in coverage between the Northern and Southern regions.
- H3 - There will not be much difference in coverage between 2015 and 2019.

4:9 Content analysis Options for the Measurements of Degree of Mediatization

To answer the above research questions, the indicators presented above served as the measures to be employed in the content analysis. As a result of the comparative nature of the study (that is the 2015 and 2019 elections), indicator-driven data collected

focused on political news stories, such as campaigns, election news coverage, editorials and news features. To measure the first indicator (that coverage of elections is governed by media logic, rather than political logic and therefore cast as a strategic game), the measurements proposed by Falasca (2014, p.590) in a study on political news journalism and mediatization was applied. Since contemporary Nigerian media and political system somewhat mimics the Liberal and Democratic Corporatist Western systems as earlier discussed in Chapter 2, in addition to the print media being highly commercialized, these indicators can appropriately be applied.

News stories were coded as strategic game when they focused on:

- The strategy and/ or tactics of politics
- The winning or losing of elections
- The battle for voters by the candidates and political parties
- The politicians as (individual) persons rather than their policies (individualization)

4:10 Indicators Explained in Detail

The above indicators are closely related and speak to similar issues. The main point is that they're less issue-oriented, and speak to the horse trade journalism style or strategic game. In strategic game, election coverage by journalists depicts politicians as performers in a game and the electorates as the audience or viewers. In this instance, the position of journalists as explicators and predictors of happenings and events during election is dramatically increased. For the purposes of this research, these indicators: strategy and tactics of politics; winning and losing, battle for voters and politicians as individual selves, are viewed as manifestations of the same trend – strategic game/horse trade.

The researcher scanned the newspapers for stories that reflected horse trade in the Nigerian context such as controversies, war language, provocative statements from party officials, candidates, party members, party leaders, campaign organisation officials, electioneering activities, debates, polls, accusations and counter accusations, activities to attract voters, securing endorsement from king makers, and other things

that were less issue oriented. Also, stories that highlighted candidates and parties often accusing each of other of being religious and tribal fanatics, of planning to undermine the elections generally, rigging the polls, corrupting electoral officers, buying off voters, disrupting the electoral process, desperation to take over power, sabotaging voters, etc. These type of stories fall under horse race/strategic game political journalism.

The first category, the strategy and/or tactics of politics patterns to articles that center on the intentions and aims of the candidates, the methods or plans they are employing to win, their media strategy, the political calculations, their maneuvers or schemes, and how they are campaigning in order to take power. In this case, the researcher looked out for how the stories covered the PDP and APC (parties in contest) political strategies, their aims, the design of their campaign, what they did to win, etc. There's absolutely an absence of a focus on policy issues or stories geared towards solving problems.

Winning and losing of elections is classified as articles that depict politics as a game and war that pits winners against losers. That game focuses on who is ahead or behind in the election, the opinion of the public on candidates, the polls that show the performance of candidates, debates that are happening and what these show, support of different groups, endorsements, alliances, and election outcomes. The research therefore examined articles on politics in general on APC, PDP, their candidates Muhammadu Buhari, Goodluck Jonathan, Atiku Abubakar, and political leaders, short term events such as performance of the candidates in the campaign, dissecting how candidates stand, portraying election as a war, endorsements This is also when they use opinion polls and choose to portray the election as who is winning and losing.

Battle for voters speaks to articles on the ways in which they're trying to get voters, competition between APC and PDP, campaign rallies/events by candidates, overall electioneering activities, parties, party leaders, and campaign council members.

Finally, the politicians as (individual) persons refer to articles that are building stories around the individuals resulting in a laser focus on their person instead of institutions or issues. So, the articles that focused on Muhammadu Buhari and Goodluck Jonathan

in 2015 and Muhammadu Buhari and Atiku Abubakar in 2019; their record, personal profile, and statements.

The second indicator/assumption (*the degree to which the general elections are mediatized is related to the journalistic style*), the study will examine whether or not the journalistic styles of the newspapers are interpretative (Stromback and Dimitrova, 2011, p.36). Specifically, when;

- Journalists did not just describe the *who, what, where, and when* of an event/incident
- But they rather focused on the *why and what*: Why an incident/event happened, what it means and the larger implication of the event.

Journalists decide whether to use descriptive or interpretive style when reporting political and other news. While the descriptive style primarily touches on the basic questions of whom, what, when and where, the interpretive style goes a step further to question what has happened, why and what it portends. By using the interpretive style of reporting, journalists are in a position to shape the election campaign by interpreting news, happenings and events. The “interpretive style empowers journalists by giving them more control over the message. Whereas descriptive reporting is driven by the facts, the interpretive form is driven by the theme around which the story is built” Patterson (2000, p. 250). The researcher therefore, searched through all categories of relevant stories - news, feature, interview, editorial and opinion to identify the style of presentation.

4:11 Coding of Data

According to Weber (1990) it is important to develop a coding manual, which usually contains names of categories, definitions, rules for assigning codes, etc. This is to ensure that there is consistency of coding, especially if multiple coders are to be employed. To this end, a standardized story analysis form designed by the Readership Institute (2002) was utilized for the content analysis.

4:12 The Story Analysis Form

The story analysis form contains several items that focus on the indicators and the research questions, guided by the research problem as well as the theoretical framework (mediatization). Thus, research questions were addressed in this study using the Story Analysis Form (Readership Institute, 2002) for content analysis. Data was collected from four Nigerian national dailies.

4:13 Validity and Reliability

Data was collected adopting an existing research instrument – Story Analysis Form, designed by the Readership Institute (2002). The validity and reliability of a data collection instrument is of paramount factor in quantitative studies. While validity could be defined as the extent to which a concept is accurately measured in a quantitative study, reliability has to do with the accuracy of data collection instrument: it is the extent to which a research instrument shall consistently give the same results if it is repeated used in the same situation on different occasions Haele and Twycross (2015). Highlighting the importance of reliability and validity in quantitative inquiries, Boller et al. (2011) posit that it is necessary that researchers provide appropriate types of reliability and construct validity evidence for each measure in a study. This goes a long way in enabling the readers to determine the adequacy of the research evidence generated. Suffice it to say that validity and reliability are two sides of the same coin.

4:14 Inter-Coder Reliability Analysis

Reliability has to do with the accuracy of the data collection instrument – it is the extent to which a research instrument shall consistently give the same results if it is repeatedly used in the same situation on different occasions (Black, 2005). Expressing this in a different manner, Boller et al. (2010) emphasized the need for reliability evidence for scales or test scores with regard to its internal consistency and test-retest reliability.

Reliability in content analysis is interpreted as inter-coder reliability. Inter-coder reliability is defined as the extent to which a number of independent coders agree on a

coding scheme. According to Lavrakas (2008), “Intercoder reliability is a critical component in the content analysis of open-ended survey responses, without which the interpretation of the content cannot be considered objective and valid (p.344). Conducting inter-coder reliability tests will ensure research quality. Lavrakas says low level of intercoder reliability may suggest weakness in coding methods of even coding categories.

One of the important ways to measure reliability in content analysis is the ability of the researcher to develop and define categories that will be clear and also allow all the coders to agree on the coding decisions (Kassarjian, 1977). In line with this, the principal researcher (myself) created a coding scheme whose characteristics were drawn from the indicators and variables that measured the degree of mediatization of election coverage in Nigeria. This ensured that it was clear what to look for when coding. A few samples of the relevant newspaper articles to be content-analyzed were randomly selected and coded.

Based on articles randomly selected outside the sample size, the study tested for reliability. Inter-coder reliability was conducted by this researcher and another coder familiar with the country. A total sample of 183 articles were selected for analysis in this study, which is 10% of the total number of articles.

The selected variables in the articles were coded with two researchers and the results of their coding were used for the inter-coder reliability. The two coders coded all the selected articles separately to ensure higher degree of reliability. The ReCal2 reliability package was used to determine the agreement indices using Scott’s Pi and inter-coder reliability.

Table 3: Inter-coder reliability

S/ N	Variables	Total agreement (N)	Total disagreement (N)	Percentage Agreement	Scott's Pi	Cohen's Kappa
1	Amount of articles	185	0	100	1.000	1.000
2	News	185	0	100	1.000	1.000
3	Feature	185	0	100	1.000	1.000
4	Column/O pinion	185	0	100	1.000	1.000
5	Editorial	185	0	100	1.000	1.000
6	Interview	185	0	100	1.000	1.000
7	Readers/Le tters	185	0	100	1.000	1.000

Source: Inter-coder analysis

Table 3 above shows the categories of articles news, feature, column/opinion, editorial, interview, readers/letters that were coded by the two researchers. Results indicate 100% agreement in the data that was worked on.

Table 4 below shows the analysis of themes for strategy, tactics, winning, losing, battles and politician. The result reveals that the average percent agreement for this theme is 57.19. The Scott's Pi for those with strategy and/or tactics of politics is 0.104 and those without strategy and/or tactics of politics is 0.082. The winning or losing of elections shows a Scott's Pi of 0.041 and 0.058 for those who had winning or losing and who did not have.

Table 4: Indicator 1:0 Theme 1

S/N	Variables	Total agreement (N)	Total disagreement (N)	Percentage Agreement	Scott's Pi	Cohen's Kappa
1	Strategy and/ or tactics of politics – Yes	109	74	59.60	0.104	0.116
2	Strategy and/ or tactics of politics – No	108	75	59	0.082	0.093
3	The winning or losing of elections –Yes	105	78	57.40	0.041	0.049
4	The winning or losing of elections – No	108	75	59	0.058	0.063
5	The battle for voters by the candidates and political parties – Yes	105	78	57.40	0.033	0.041
6	The battle for voters by the candidates and political parties – No	107	76	58.50	0.041	0.047
7	The politicians as (individual) persons rather than their policies – Yes	98	85	53.60	0.06	0.083
8	The politicians as (individual) persons rather than their policies – No	97	86	53	0.042	0.068

Source: Inter-coder analysis

The table 5 below shows the inter-coder reliability for who, what, where and when of an event/incident. The result reveals that this theme has an overall percent agreement of 68.3. The Scott's Pi for those with focus on why and what is 0.216 while those without focus on why and what is 0.22.

Table 5: Indicator 2.0: Theme 2

S/N	Variables	Total agreement (N)	Total disagreement (N)	Percentage Agreement	Scott's Pi	Cohen's Kappa
1	Describes who, what, where, and when of an event/incident – Yes	120	63	65.60	0.168	0.175
2	Describes who, what, where, and when of an event/incident – No	124	59	67.80	0.183	0.186
3	Focused on why and what - Yes	129	54	70.50	0.216	0.216
4	Focused on why and what - No	127	56	69.40	0.22	0.22

Source: Inter-coder analysis

4:15 Theme (main topic)

This study analyses media coverage of the 2015 and 2019 presidential elections in Nigeria, to determine the degree to which it was mediatized. This study used the Story Analysis Form model to suit the purposes of designing a theme. In line with the Story Analysis form, before coding, it's important to "be clear on objectives." "What are you hoping to learn? Do you have any areas of coverage that you want to focus on?" (Lynch and Peer, 2002).

It follows therefore, that the theme of the research will be around stories that tell us something about the subject matter. Questions such as what are the stories about and what are the main points were utilized to generate a theme. Themes are the general idea or message in an article. As such, the theme for the research was: Politics, Elections, Campaign, Political Parties, Politicians and Government. For the purposes of data collection, all stories that made reference to the aforementioned theme were

considered and coded. The study therefore, considered whether the articles focused on the following:

- Politics: The researcher considered whether the stories were generally speaking to politics, which is usually associated to issues of governance, tussle for power, issues and debate between parties, etc.
- Elections: This included articles that discussed the polls, winning elections, the two main parties PDP and APC in the 2019 elections as well as in the 2015 elections.
- Campaign: This variable included all stories that covered the campaign activities of both parties during the two election periods under study and articles on the voting process, battle for public opinion, etc.
- Political Parties: This category considered the two main political parties that contested the elections in both years the PDP and the APC
- Politicians: This considered the personalities that were mentioned on in the stories published. In this case, the two main candidates in 2015 Muhammadu Buhari and Goodluck Jonathan and the main candidates in 2019 Muhammadu Buhari and Atiku Abubakar. It also included the party leaders/players in APC 2015: Lai Mohammed, Bola Tinubu, John Odigie-Oyegun, Nasir El-rufai, Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, Abubakar Saraki, Rotimi Amaechi, Murtala Nyako, Abdulfatah Ahmed, Murtala Nyako, Aliyu Wamakko, etc. The party leaders/players in APC 2019 Adams Oshiomole, Bola Tinubu, Lai Mohammed, Yemi Osinbajo, Nasir El-rufai, Festus Keyamo, etc. The party leaders in PDP 2015: Femi Fani-kayode, Olisa Metuh, Bamangar Tukur, Adamu Muazu, etc. the party leaders/players in PDP 2019: Uche Secondus, Abubakar Saraki, Peter Obi, Buba Galadima, Kola Ologbondiyan, etc. In addition, all other party members and leaders from PDP and APC that are not mentioned above
- Government: The researcher considered articles that focused on statements, press releases, from the government relating to the elections, the parties and political personalities.

4:16 Categories and Definition

Story Types: This refers to the writing style adopted by journalists in their presentation of journalistic content. The Story Analysis Form was used and modified to suit the purposes for this research. The Form is a guide to analyzing newspaper content and/or coverage and was developed by the Readership Institute. The manner in which a story is published should not be muddled with the subject of the story. (Lynch and Peer, 2002). The treatment below was considered based on the fact that they're editorial content where articles on the theme or main topic could be generally found in a newspaper:

1. General News: Indicated whether the stories mostly highlighted facts rather than opinion of an event.
2. Feature: The researcher considered where the articles were longer and focused on telling a story as opposed to merely stating the facts as they happened.
3. Opinion/Column: The researcher considered the view points by either a staff of newspaper with the title of columnist or a contribution from the outside as a guest column
4. Editorial: This study considered stories representing or stating the perspective of the newspaper on a particular issue. They bear no bylines and are unsigned.
5. Interview: An interaction with an interviewee conducted by a staff of the newspaper and published word-for-word
6. Letters by readers: Opinion piece sent in to the editor and specifically identified as coming from readers
7. Other (any other story that makes reference to the theme but does not fall into the above category).
8. Bylines: This study considered the authors of the various news reports such as staff, wire services, party spokesmen or a combination
9. Sources: Sources refer to the informant or the people quoted in the article. The researcher considered government officials, party members, or combined.
10. Unknown: When the source or byline of the story is not stated

4:17 Coding Manual

The following coding manual guided the coder on what to observe during the process:

1. All News stories on front page, inside page and back page of newspapers that make reference to the theme of the research were recorded.
2. Specific sections to look out were Feature stories not limited to: “Politics Page”, “Feature Page”, “Special Report”, “Cover Story”, “Encounter,” “Business,” “Law Page,” “Education”, “Saturday Magazine,” “Sunday Magazine,” “Entertainment”. Some entertainment pages with feature pictures and stories of the political players without exactly talking about politics were considered.
3. The law, education and business pages with analysis of policies of politicians, making reference to the theme were considered.
4. Opinion articles offered by journalists of the newspapers including columnists that regularly write for them.
5. Opinion/letters sent in by readers.
6. All editorial articles by the newspapers including those published on the “Editorial Page” of the newspapers and those contributed by outsiders.
7. Interviews with officials or politicians from both parties and other politicians specifically in the two parties that have not been named but make reference to the theme.
8. Stories that may not necessarily be advertisements but are written by interested political parties, such as communication officials and information managers of the parties or politicians.

4:18 Coding on a Present-absent Basis

Drawing from literature, this study investigated mediatization the 2015 and 2019 Nigerian elections on a present-absent basis. Essentially, this way of coding distinguishes between several variables based on their presence or absence in the articles being studied. Emphasis was therefore, laid on presence of variables that indicated strategic game.

In their study of the Danish referendum on euro in 2000, De Vreese and Semetko (2002, p. 623-624) coded “strategic news coverage” on a present-absent basis. This means that articles that emphasized the following: performance of candidates, style,

strategies, the language of war, games and competition were recorded on the basis of their being present in the news. In his own study, De Vreese (2003, p. 81-81) defined “strategic news” as those dwelling on “winning and losing, emphasis on language of war and games, focus on politicians and citizens as ‘performers, critics and audiences,’ and focus on candidates’ style and perceptions.”

Also, Kerbel et al (2000, p. 13-15) coded his research on a present-absent basis. His study distinguished between the “political game” and “issues and substance.” He also categorized two frames namely “horse race/strategy frame” and the “public opinion,” frame and recorded if they were absent or present in the news stories.

Additionally, Stromback and Dimitrova (2011) coded “strategic game” on a present-absent basis using three variables: with (1). Politicians or parties winning or losing elections, legislative debates, governing negotiations, or winning or losing in politics generally (2) politicians or parties strategies for winning elections, negotiations or issues debates, (3) polls and politicians or parties standing in polls.

Based on the above, this study investigated the casting of the 2015 and 2019 Nigerian election as strategic game using four variables coded on a present-absent basis, conceptualized as the indicators of mediatization and media interventionism, according to Stromback and Dimitrova 2011. The study asked if the news stories deals with: the strategy and/ or tactics of politics, the winning or losing of elections, the battle for voters by the candidates and political parties, the politicians as individual persons rather than their policies (individualization). Finally, it asked if stories were descriptive or interpretive conceptualized as types of journalistic style, which can be applied to measure the level of mediatization.

4:19 Data Analysis

The data was analysed using SPSS version 25. Descriptive statistics, tables, pie charts and bar charts, are used to present the research findings. Appropriate statistical analyses and tests were conducted based on the nature of the research questions. Some of this range from simple descriptive statistics – frequencies, means, standard

deviation to independent sample T-tests. According to Miles and Banyard (2007), descriptive statistical analysis serves the purpose of describing data in order to help the researcher “explain to *other people* what is happening” in the data (p. 12). In addition to generally explaining to other people what the data is saying, the statistical analyses of research questions will go a step further by performing independent samples T-tests to compare the degree of mediatization between the 2015 and 2019 general elections in Nigeria (Field, 2009; Miles 2006). This is because the T-test makes it possible to compare the means from two independent groups (Field, 2009; Miles, 2006; and Johnson, 2013).

4:20 Summary

This study is aimed at examining the degree to which the 2015 and 2019 general elections in Nigeria were mediatized. To this end, the study employed a quantitative content analysis research design, which combines both the directed and summative content analysis approaches. Primary codes, guided by the theoretical framework and the research questions, were generated and coding schemes derived (directly) from the text data collected from each of the four selected Nigerian Newspapers. This was subsequently followed by counting and comparisons of the key words (or codes). Finally, descriptive statistical analysis was conducted to summarize the data for interpretation. Statistical tools of data analysis that were used include descriptive statistics - frequency, means, standard deviation and T-tests. The results are presented in chapter five.

CHAPTER FIVE

Analysis, Presentation, and Interpretation of Result

5:1 Introduction

This study examined the degree of Mediatization in the 2015 and 2019 elections in Nigeria based on the concept of Mediatization and Media Interventionism. Four newspapers THISDAY, Vanguard, Daily Trust and Blueprint were analyzed two weeks before the elections in 2015 and 2019, being a period of 14 days each. Based on the availability of back copies in the archive, a total number of 106 copies of newspaper were considered for 2015 and 2019. A total of 1,792 articles combining general news, feature, editorial, interviews, reader/letters and opinion were coded and analyzed. The selection criteria were that news stories must make reference to the candidates, political parties and party leaders. The content analyzed focused on the existence and frequency of concepts (codes) in the newspaper coverage.

This section presents the analysis of the secondary data gathered in the course of the study, with descriptive analysis making use of frequency distribution, percentages, measures of central tendency, and graphical representations employed to provide a sound description of events. Inferential analysis making use of statistical techniques such as independent sample t-test, correlation analysis, as well as regression analysis performed to provide inferences useful to the course of the study. Four newspaper publications namely THISDAY, Vanguard, Daily Trust, and Blueprint, with THISDAY and Vanguard representing the Southern region of the country, while Daily Trust and Blueprint newspapers representing the Northern region of the country.

There are five sections in this chapter of the study. The first section presents the univariate analysis of data pertaining to the election coverage in the 2015 and 2019 general elections. The second section provides information on the mediatization of the election coverage with charts used to provide a pictorial representation of the figures. The third section of this chapter reveals the difference in the degree of mediatization between newspapers in Northern and Southern regions and the difference in

mediatization between 2015 and 2019. The fourth section of the chapter describes the percentage distribution of articles in newspapers in both 2015 and 2019 election years related to the indicators of election mediatization. Lastly, section five of the study presents the hypotheses testing which was done using statistical techniques such as t-test, correlation analysis, and regression analysis.

Election Coverage

This section shows the summary statistics of the distribution of election coverage relative to the four newspapers chosen for the study in both election years.

5:2 2015 Election Coverage


Table 6 describes the election coverage by the newspapers in the 2015 general election. It was revealed that Daily Trust newspaper had the highest election coverage in 2015 with 35.1%, Vanguard had the second highest with 30%, THISDAY newspaper had the third highest with 18%, while Blueprint newspaper had the least coverage with 16.9%.

Table 6: Election Coverage 2015

Newspaper	Frequency	Percentage
THISDAY	158	18.0
Vanguard	264	30.0
Daily Trust	309	35.1
Blueprint	149	16.9
TOTAL	880	100.0

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 1: Election Coverage 2015



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5:3 2019 Election Coverage


Table 7 describes the election coverage by the newspapers in the 2019 general election. It was revealed that Vanguard newspaper had the highest election coverage in 2019 with 29.5%, Blueprint had the second highest with 27.2%, THISDAY newspaper had the third highest with 23.5%, while Daily Trust newspaper had the least coverage with 19.8%.

Table 7: Election Coverage 2019

Newspaper	Frequency	Percentage
THISDAY	214	23.5
Vanguard	271	29.5
Daily Trust	182	19.8
Blueprint	248	27.2
TOTAL	915	100.0

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 2: Election Coverage 2019



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5:4 Coverage of all Article Category by Newspapers in 2015 and 2019 Elections

Table 8 below describes the various categories of articles as represented in the selected newspapers in the 2015 and 2019 general elections. In the 2015 general elections, general news had the most coverage (62.8%), followed by readers/letters with coverage of 13.6%. Columnist opinion had 11.5% coverage percentage, interview ranked fourth with coverage of 5.8%, features ranked fifth with coverage of 5.0%, while editorial ranked sixth with coverage of 1.3%.


The 2019 election coverage revealed that general news had the most coverage with 63.5%, followed by readers/letters with coverage of 17.0%. Feature had 8.9% coverage percentage, Columnist opinion ranked fourth with coverage of 7.1%, Interview ranked fifth with coverage of 2.0%, while editorial ranked sixth with coverage of 1.5%.

Table 8: Coverage of all Article Category by Newspapers in 2015 and 2019 Elections

Article Category	2015 Election		2019 Election	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Columnist/opinion	101	11.5	65	7.1
Editorial	11	1.3	14	1.5
Feature	44	5.0	81	8.9
General news	553	62.8	579	63.5
Interview	51	5.8	18	2.0
Readers/Letters	120	13.6	155	17.0
TOTAL	880	100.0	912	100.0


Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 3: Article Coverage 2015



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 4: Article Coverage 2019



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5:5 Cross Data of Article Categories Distribution in Newspapers Both years


Table 9 below describes the percentage distribution of article categories in the selected newspapers. The results revealed that THISDAY newspaper had 20.1% columnist opinion articles, Vanguard had 30.5% of columnist opinion articles, Daily Trust had 31.1% columnist opinion articles, while Blueprint had 18.3% columnist opinion articles. It was also revealed that THISDAY newspaper had 28.0% editorial articles, Vanguard had 24.0% of editorial articles, Daily Trust had 28.0% editorial articles, while Blueprint had 20.0% editorial articles. Also, THISDAY newspaper had 32.0% feature articles, Vanguard had 29.6% of feature articles, Daily Trust had 22.4% feature articles, while Blueprint had 16.0% feature articles. The results also showed that THISDAY newspaper had 18.9% general news, Vanguard had 26.9% of general news, Daily Trust had 29.2% general news, while Blueprint had 25.0% general news. Also, THISDAY newspaper had 13.0% interviews, Vanguard had 46.4% interviews, Daily Trust had 24.6% interviews, while Blueprint had 16.0% interviews. It was also revealed that THISDAY newspaper had 24.7% readers/letters, Vanguard had 37.1% readers/letters, Daily Trust had 21.1% readers/letters, while Blueprint had 17.1% readers/letters.

Table 9: Distribution of Article Categories across the Selected Newspapers

Newspaper	Article Categories					
	Columnis t Opinion	Editorial	Feature	General news	Interview	Readers/ Letters
THISDAY	33 (20.1)	7 (28.0)	40 (32.0)	214 (18.9)	9 (13.0)	68 (24.7)
Vanguard	50 (30.5)	6 (24.0)	37 (29.6)	305 (26.9)	32 (46.4)	102 (37.1)
Daily Trust	51 (31.1)	7 (28.0)	28 (22.4)	331 (29.2)	17 (24.6)	58 (21.1)
Blueprint	30 (18.3)	5 (20.0)	20 (16.0)	284 (25.0)	11 (16.0)	47 (17.1)
TOTAL	164 (100.0)	25 (100.0)	125 (100.0)	1134 (100.0)	69 (100.0)	275 (100.0)

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 5: Articles According to Categories



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5:6 Election Coverage Mediatization

This section describes the mediatization of the election coverage in the 2015 and 2019 general elections.

5:7 Election Coverage Mediatization (Strategic Game/Horse Race)

RQ1 asked if there was mediatization in the 2015 and 2019 elections in Nigeria and the degree of it. **RQ 1a** asked if news content was cast more as strategic game or horse race. The results as hypothesized show that indeed, there was mediatization and more stories were dominated by horse race coverage in 2015 and 2019 by focusing on the strategy/tactics of politics, the winning and losing of elections, the battle for voters by the candidates and political parties and the politicians as individual persons rather than policies.


Table 10 below reveals the election coverage mediatization in the 2015 and 2019 general elections. The data revealed horse race dominance in the following order beginning with the year 2015: 25.8% covered strategy/tactics, 29.7% of newspaper coverage featured winning/losing stories, 25.6% battle for voters, while 22.9% covered politicians as individual persons. The 2019 election coverage revealed that 26.0% of newspaper covered strategy/tactics, 26.5% covered winning or losing of election, 26.3% of newspaper covered battle for voters, while 21.2% covered politicians as individual persons, indicating high levels of mediatization.

Table 10: Election Coverage Mediatization (Strategic Game/Horse Race)

Year	Strategic Game				TOTAL
	Strategy/ Tactics	Winning or Losing	Battle for Voters	Individualization	
2015	763 (25.8)	761 (29.7)	755 (25.6)	677 (22.9)	2956 (100.0)
2019	717 (26.0)	730 (26.5)	727 (26.3)	586 (21.2)	2760 (100.0)


Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 6: Mediatization of Election Coverage 2015



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 7: Mediatization of Election Coverage 2019



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5.7 Election Coverage Mediatization (Journalistic Style)

R.Q. 1b asked if journalistic style was more interpretive or descriptive. Results showed overall that the campaign coverage was more descriptive rather than interpretive. The stories that described who, what, where and when of an

incident/event (descriptive) outnumbered those focusing on the why and what happened and the larger implications (interpretive)


Table 11 below reveals the election coverage mediatization in the 2015 and 2019 general elections with emphasis on the Journalistic style. The data revealed that election coverage in the 2015 election specifically was more descriptive than interpretive. Also, the 2019 election coverage revealed that the election coverage was more descriptive than interpretive as well, indicating that mediatization was less with regard to journalistic style.

Table 11: Election Coverage Mediatization (Journalistic Style)

Year	Journalistic Style		TOTAL
	Descriptive	Interpretive	
2015	612 (64.1)	343 (35.9)	955 (100.0)
2019	632 (61.2)	401 (38.8)	1033 (100.0)

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)


Chart 8: Showing Strategic Game/Horse Race Election Coverage



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

The chart above shows strategic game/ horse race election coverage in the 2015 and 2019 general elections. The high level of strategic game in the election years is an indication that the media coverage in both election years is driven by media logic and not political logic, thereby showing high level of mediatization.

Chart 9: Showing Journalistic Style Being Engaged in Election Coverage



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

The chart above shows the use of journalistic style as election coverage in the 2015 and 2019 general elections. It revealed that the election coverage in both election years are more descriptive than interpretive, indicating low level of mediatization.

5:8 Media Logic Representation by Newspaper Coverage

Table 12 describes the media logic representation by newspaper coverage. The results showed that Vanguard newspaper had the highest media logic representation (35.3%), Daily Trust had the second highest media logic representation (24.9%), Blueprint newspaper had the third highest media logic representation (20.1%), while THISDAY newspaper had the least media logic representation (19.7%). This can be explained by the fact that Vanguard has the highest number of news stories, followed by other newspapers, which allowed it to feature more stories dominated by horse race coverage, hence higher level of mediatization. But as will be seen later in comparison


of election coverage between the North and South and 2015 and 2019, these differences in media logic between the newspapers are insignificant.

Table 12: Media Logic Representation by Newspaper Coverage

Newspaper	Media Logic Representation	Percentage (%)
THISDAY	98	19.7
Vanguard	175	35.3
Daily Trust	124	24.9
Blueprint	100	20.1
TOTAL	497	100.0

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 10: Media Logic Representation



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5:9 Degree of Mediatization (Strategic Game/Horse Race) Between North and South

R.Q. 2 asked in which way and to what extent did newspapers from the North and South regions differ in their degree of mediatization. Data shows there was no much difference between both regions. Strategic game was more in use both election years, with strategic game having the higher representation in newspapers in the Northern region in 2015 while the 2019 elections showed that it was more in use in the Southern region.

Table 13: Mediatization North/South in 2015/2019

Regions	2015	2019
	Strategic Game	Strategic Game
North	204	165
South	166	360
TOTAL	370 (60.8)	525 (67.0)

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

For further breakdown according to each indicators according to percentages:

Degree of Mediatization North/South in 2015

Table 14 below reveals the degree of mediatization through horse race coverage in the 2015 election in Northern region. The result showed that battle for voters (25.7%) was most prominent of the strategic game indicators in the 2015 election, followed by strategy/tactics (25.5%), winning or losing of election (25.5%) and individualization (23.3%), while in the Southern region in Table 5.4.3, the results showed that Strategy/Tactics (26.2%) was most prominent of the strategic game indicators in the 2015 election in the Southern region, followed by winning or losing (26.1%), and battle for voters (25.3%), with individualization (22.4%) having the least coverage.

5:10 Degree of Mediatization (Strategic Game) in the North/South 2019


Table 15 below reveals the degree of mediatization through the use of strategic game in the 2019 election in the Northern region. The result showed that Strategy/Tactics (26.5%) was most prominent of the strategic game indicators in the 2019 election in the Northern region, followed by winning or losing (25.5%), and battle for voters (25.5%), with individualization (21.3%) having the least coverage, while Table 5.4.4 below reveals the degree of mediatization through the use of strategic game in the 2019 election in the Southern region. The result showed that winning or losing of election (26.8%) was most prominent of the strategic game indicators in the 2019 election in the Southern region, followed by battle for voters (26.6%), and strategy or tactics (25.4%), with individualization (21.2%) having the least coverage.

Table 14: Strategic Game/Horse Race in Northern Region in 2015

Strategic Game 2015	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Strategy/Tactics	416	25.5
Winning or Losing of Election	415	25.5
Battle for Voters	419	25.7
Individualization	380	23.3
TOTAL	1630	100.0

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 11: Strategic Game North 2015



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Table 15: Strategic Game in Northern Region in 2019

Strategic Game 2019	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Strategy/Tactics	351	26.5
Winning or Losing of Election	345	26.1
Battle for Voters	345	26.1
Individualization	281	21.3
TOTAL	1322	100.0

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 12: Strategic Game North 2019




Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Table 16: Strategic Game in Southern Region in 2015

Strategic Game 2015	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Strategy/Tactics	347	26.2
Winning or Losing of Election	346	26.1
Battle for Voters	336	25.3
Individualization	297	22.4
TOTAL	1326	100.0

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 13: Strategic Game South 2015




Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Table 17: Strategic Game in Southern Region in 2019

Strategic Game 2019	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Strategy/Tactics	366	25.4
Winning or Losing of Election	385	26.8
Battle for Voters	382	26.6
Individualization	305	21.2
TOTAL	1438	100.0

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 14: Strategic Game South 2019



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5:11 Degree of Mediatization (Journalistic Style) in the North/South in 2015

Patterning journalistic style indicators, both regions showed similar coverage as reports were more descriptive rather than interpretive. Table 18 below showed that the journalistic style in Northern region in the 2015 election is more descriptive (67.9%) than interpretive (32.1%) while Table 5.4.7 below showed that the journalistic style in Southern region in the 2015 election is more descriptive (60.5%) than interpretive (39.5%).

5:12 Degree of Mediatization (Journalistic Style) in the North/South in 2015 and 2019

Table 19 below showed that the journalistic style in Northern region in the 2019 election is more descriptive (70.9%) than interpretive (29.1%) while Table 5.4.8 below showed that the journalistic style in Southern region in the 2019 election is


more descriptive (54.3%) than interpretive (45.7%). The pattern of descriptive rather than interpretive remains constant in both years and in both regions, showing a trend.

Table 18: Journalistic Style in Northern Region in 2015

Journalistic Style 2015	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Descriptive	317	67.9
Interpretive	150	32.1
TOTAL	467	100.0

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 15: Journalistic Style North 2015



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Table 19: Journalistic Style in Southern Region in 2015


Journalistic Style 2015	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Descriptive	295	60.5
Interpretive	193	39.5
TOTAL	488	100.0

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 16: Journalistic Style South 2015

N

Journalistic style for Southern region 2015




Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Table 20: Journalistic Style in Northern Region in 2019

Journalistic Style 2019	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Descriptive	304	70.9
Interpretive	125	29.1
TOTAL	429	100.0

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 17: Journalistic Style North 2019




Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Table 21: Journalistic Style South 2019

Journalistic Style 2019	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Descriptive	328	54.3
Interpretive	276	45.7
TOTAL	604	100.0

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 18: Journalistic Style North 2019




Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5:13 Strategic Game/Horse Race Coverage Difference Between 2015 and 2019

R.Q. 3 asked if the 2015 and 2019 elections differ in their degrees of mediatization? The findings did not suggest significant differences between 2015 and 2019. If anything, it shows a trend based on the fact that the results were quite close in both years. This shows that mediatization is indeed a phenomenon in Nigeria, having been empirically confirmed in two consecutive election years.


The descriptive indicators were more than the interpretive in both years. The differences between 2015 and 2019 was also not significant as can be seen in the **charts below**

Chart 19: Showing Strategic Game/Horse Race Coverage Difference Between 2015 and 2019




Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 20: Showing Journalistic Style Election Coverage Comparison 2015 and 2019



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 21: Showing use of Journalistic Style in the 2019 Elections



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5:14 Journalistic Style Election Coverage Comparison 2015 and 2019

The figure above describes the use of journalistic style in the 2015 and 2019 general elections. It revealed that journalistic style in both general elections was more descriptive than interpretive, and there isn't much difference between both years.

5:15 Percentage Distribution of Articles in 2015 Talking about the Indicators

Table 5.5.1 describes the mediatization indicators relative to newspaper coverage in the four newspapers selected for the study in the 2015 election. The result showed that THISDAY newspaper coverage had Strategy/Tactics of Election as the mediatization indicator with the highest representation, Vanguard newspaper coverage had Winning or Losing of Election as the mediatization indicator with the highest representation, Daily Trust newspaper coverage had Strategy/Tactics of Election as the mediatization


indicator with the highest representation, while Blueprint newspaper coverage had Battle for voters as the mediatization indicator with the highest representation.

Table 22: Percentage Distribution of Articles in 2015 Covering the Indicators

Newspapers	Strategy /Tactics of Election (%)	Winning/ Losing of Election (%)	Battle for Voters (%)	Politicians as Persons (%)	Descriptive (%)	Interpretive (%)
THISDAY (N=158)	138 (87.3)	134 (84.8)	132 (83.5)	119 (75.3)	86 (54.4)	71 (44.9)
Vanguard (N=264)	209 (79.2)	212 (80.3)	204 (77.3)	178 (67.4)	209 (79.2)	122 (46.2)
Daily Trust (N=309)	285 (92.2)	282 (91.3)	283 (91.6)	259 (83.8)	210 (67.9)	102 (33.0)
Blueprint (N=149)	131 (87.9)	133 (89.3)	136 (91.3)	121 (81.2)	107 (71.8)	48 (32.2)

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 22: Distribution of Articles 2015



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5:16 Percentage Distribution of Articles in 2019 Talking about the Indicators


Table 23 describes the mediatization indicators relative to newspaper coverage in the four newspapers selected for the study in the 2019 election. The result showed that THISDAY newspaper coverage had Battle for Voters as the mediatization indicator with the highest representation, Vanguard newspaper coverage had Winning or Losing of Election as the mediatization indicator with the highest representation, Daily Trust newspaper coverage had Strategy/Tactics of Election as the mediatization indicator with the highest representation, while Blueprint newspaper coverage also had Strategy/Tactics of Election as the mediatization indicator with the highest representation.

Table 23: Percentage Distribution of Articles in 2019 Covering the Indicators

Newspapers	Strategy/ Tactics of Election (%)	Winning/ Losing of Election (%)	Battle for Voters (%)	Politicians as Persons (%)	Descriptive (%)	Interpretive (%)
THISDAY (N=214)	170 (79.4)	176 (82.2)	179 (83.6)	137 (64.0)	151 (70.6)	84 (39.3)
Vanguard (N=269)	196 (72.9)	209 (77.7)	203 (75.5)	168 (62.5)	177 (65.8)	192 (71.4)
Daily Trust (N=181)	137 (75.7)	136 (75.1)	136 (75.1)	119 (65.7)	124 (68.5)	59 (32.6)
Blueprint (N=248)	214 (86.3)	209 (84.3)	209 (84.3)	162 (65.3)	180 (72.6)	66 (26.6)

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Chart 23: Distribution of Articles 2019



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5:17 Hypotheses Testing 1

H₀: Political news coverage will be more interpretive than descriptive

H₁: Political news coverage will be commonly cast as strategic game or horse race

The tables below describe whether the political news coverage will be commonly cast as strategic game or horse race. The descriptive analysis revealed that mean value of coverage is 224.38 ± 57.88 , mean value of strategy is 185.00 ± 52.36 , mean value of descriptive is 155.50 ± 46.43 , while the mean value of interpretive is 93.00 ± 46.59 .


The second table shows the output of the ANOVA analysis and whether there is a statistically significant difference between our group means. The table shows that the significance value is 0.00 (i.e., $p = .000$), which is below 0.05, and therefore there is a statistically significant difference in the mean of coverage as strategic game or horse race, and coverage as interpretive or descriptive, which implies that news coverage will be commonly cast as strategic game or horse race.

Conclusion: Based on the outcome of the analysis carried out, the null hypothesis which states that ‘Political news coverage will be more interpretive than descriptive’ is rejected, and the alternate hypothesis which states that ‘Political news coverage will be commonly cast as strategic game or horse race’ is accepted

Table 24: Hypothesis 1 Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive Statistics			
	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Coverage	224.38	57.884	8
Strategy	185.00	52.361	8
Descriptive	155.50	46.430	8
Interpretive	93.00	46.596	8

Chart 24: Descriptive Statistics



Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Table 25: Hypothesis 1 Anova

ANOVA^a					
Model	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	23205.795	3	7735.265	124.722	.000 ^b
Residual	248.080	4	62.020		
Total	23453.875	7			

a. Dependent Variable: Coverage

b. Predictors: (Constant), Interpretive, Strategy, Descriptive

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5:18 Hypothesis 2

H₀: There won't be difference in coverage between the North and South

H₁: There will be little difference in coverage between the North and South

The tables below describe whether there will be little difference in coverage between the North and South. The descriptive analysis revealed that mean value of coverage in Northern region is 222.00 ± 71.12 , while the mean value of coverage in Southern region is 226.75 ± 52.39 .

The second table shows the output of the t-test analysis and whether there is a statistically significant difference between our group means. The table shows that the significance value "Sig. (2-tailed)" is 0.918, which is higher than 0.05, and therefore there is no significant difference in the mean of coverage in the Northern region and the Southern region. This indicates that there won't be difference in coverage between the North and South.

Conclusion: Based on the outcome of the analysis carried out, the null hypothesis which states that 'That there won't be difference in coverage between the North and South' is accepted, and the alternate hypothesis which states that 'That there will be little difference in coverage between the North and South' is rejected.

Table 26: Hypothesis 2 Group Statistics

Group Statistics					
	Region	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Coverage	North	4	222.00	71.120	35.560
	South	4	226.75	52.392	26.196

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Table 27: Hypothesis 2 Descriptive Statistics

Independent Samples Test									
	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
	F	Sig.	T	Df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
								Lower	Upper
Equal variances assumed	0.745	0.421	-0.108	6	0.918	-4.750	44.167	-112.823	103.323
Equal variances not assumed			-0.108	5.515	0.918	-4.750	44.167	-115.167	105.667

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

5:19 Hypothesis 3

H₀: There won't be difference in coverage between 2015 and 2019

H₁: There will be little difference in coverage between 2015 and 2019

The tables below describe whether there will be little difference in coverage between 2015 and 2019. The descriptive analysis revealed that mean value of coverage in 2015 is 220.00±79.04, while the mean value of coverage in 2019 is 228.75±38.98.

The second table shows the output of the t-test analysis and whether there is a statistically significant difference between our group means (2015 and 2019). The table shows that the significance value “Sig. (2-tailed)” is 0.849, which is higher than 0.05, and therefore there is no significant difference in the mean of coverage in the 2015 and 2019 general elections. This indicates that there won't be difference in coverage between the 2015 and 2019 general elections.

Conclusion: Based on the outcome of the analysis carried out, the null hypothesis which states that ‘That there won't be difference in coverage between the 2015 and 2019 general elections’ is accepted, and the alternate hypothesis which states that ‘That there will be little difference in coverage between the 2015 and 2019 general elections’ is rejected.

Table 28: Hypothesis 3 Group Statistics

Group Statistics					
	Year	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Coverage	2015	4	220.00	79.040	39.520
	2019	4	228.75	38.982	19.491

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

Table 29: Hypothesis 3 Descriptive Statistics

	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
	F	Sig.	T	Df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
								Lower	Upper
Equal variances assumed	8.383	0.028	-.199	6	0.849	-8.750	44.065	-116.573	99.073
Equal variances not assumed			-.199	4.378	0.851	-8.750	44.065	-127.040	109.540

Source: Own Elaboration (2021)

CHAPTER SIX

6:1 Discussion, Conclusion and Areas for Further Research

This study set out to measure mediatization of politics in the 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections in Nigeria. In other words, the goal of the study is to examine the extent to which the Nigerian media, particularly newspapers influenced the electoral processes and the political environment in general.

Drawing from literature on *mediatization*, *media interventionism* and *political news journalism*, the study focused on investigating the degree of mediatization of politics in the Nigerian elections using four newspapers as case study namely; THISDAY, Vanguard, Daily Trust and Blueprint.

To understand the degree of mediatization in the two election cycles, the study relied on two out of the six indicators of media interventionism as proposed by (Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2010). The two indicators are (1); the notion that election coverage is governed by media logic, rather than by political logic. By implication, the media is independent and therefore shapes how political news is covered and disseminated. This indicator suggests that in this scenario, journalists cast or frame election coverage and political news as a strategic game/horse race, and (2); the journalistic styles of news reports. In this instance, the degree to which journalistic style is interpretative, rather than descriptive is another indicator of the degree of mediatization. Both indicators also measure media logic; the extent to which the content of political news is shaped by the interventions of journalists (Falasca, 2014).

To this end, the study examined the extent to which the news coverage of 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections in Nigeria was mediatized; the extent to which the news content and coverage of the elections were cast as a strategic game/horse race, and the degree to which the journalistic style of the news coverage was either descriptive or interpretative. This study also examined the differences (if any) in the extent of mediatization of political news in the two Presidential elections under reference to see

if there are differences in the ways the Northern and Southern-based newspapers covered to two election cycles.

The study which utilized the content analysis methodology, examined newspaper stories published two weeks prior to the 2015 general elections (14th to 27th March 2015) and also two weeks prior to the 2019 elections (9th to 22nd February 2019). In all, a total of 112 newspapers (14 days X 2 X 4 newspapers) constituted the sample for this study. However, given the difficulty in sourcing back copies from the archives, a total of 106 newspapers were selected and analyzed. The units of analysis for this study were back copies of the papers from Sunday to Monday general news, editorials, feature stories, interviews, letters and opinion reports.

6:2 Mediatization of the 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections (Presentation of the stories as strategic game/horse race) and journalistic style

Overall, the study found that during the 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections in Nigeria, the degree of mediatization varied on each of the indicators measured. Based on the first indicator, the results indicated a high level of mediatization of news coverage and reportage of both the 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections. The newspapers cast the elections as a strategic game or horse race. Specifically, the results showed that most of the newspaper coverage of the elections focused more on (a) the strategy/tactics of politics, (b) the winning and losing of elections, (c) the battle for voters by the candidates and political parties and (d) the politicians as individual persons rather than policies.

The outcome from the second indicator however showed a lower degree of mediatization in response to questions that measured the journalistic styles of news stories in the period under review. The study found that overall, the coverage of the electioneering campaigns and the general election was more descriptive than interpretative. Using a more descriptive approach, the stories in the four newspapers (THISDAY, Vanguard, Daily Trust and Blueprint) focused more on answering questions such as *who*, *what*, *where* and *when* of an incident/event much more than

being interpretative (focusing on the why and what happened and the larger implications). This happened across the four newspapers in 2015 and 2019.

For instance, the study found that general news stories outnumbered other category of stories such as feature, editorial, column/opinion, interview and readers. The newspapers had more pages dedicated to news. Normally, general news articles are assumed to focus more on the who, where and when questions. The other categories of stories such as feature, editorial, opinion and letters focus on the why and what questions and the deeper implications. These were less in number as seen here: In the 2015 general elections, general news had the most coverage (62.8%), followed by readers/letters with a coverage of 13.6%. Columnist opinion had 11.5% coverage percentage, interview ranked fourth with a coverage of 5.8%, features ranked fifth with coverage of 5.0%, while editorial ranked sixth with coverage of 1.3%. In 2019, general news also had the most coverage with 63.5%, followed by readers/letters with coverage of 17.0%. Feature had 8.9% coverage percentage, *Columnist opinion* ranked fourth with coverage of 7.1%, Interviews ranked fifth with coverage of 2.0%, while editorial ranked sixth with coverage of 1.5%.

The high number of general news stories does not mean that they focused only on facts, though. Some of the news articles attempted deeper analysis on the implication of happenings ahead of the elections. Nevertheless, this does not make up for the fact that news dominated the media space. Unlike the first indicator, this outcome suggests a lower degree of mediatization as according to Esser (2008, p.403), “the journalistic attitude toward intervention in election campaigns is high when journalists report the campaign in their own words, scenarios, assessments—and when they grant politicians only limited opportunities to present themselves”.

In response to the third question, the study also found that there was statistically very little difference in the degree of mediatization between news coverage of elections by the newspapers based in the North compared to the Southern part of Nigeria. Also, there were similarities in the degree of mediatization of politics in the 2015 elections and the 2019 elections as represented in the newspapers under study.

It is instructive that the findings of this study suggest both a high level of mediatization of the 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections (with regards to the way the newspapers covered and presented the stories as strategic game/horse race) and low level of mediatization in terms of journalistic style of presenting stories, (which were more descriptive than interpretative). While these outcomes may seem to be contradictory, the findings can be examined within the context of the different dimensions of mediatization of politics, as it concerns Nigeria (Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011).

As reflected in the literature review, these dimensions are: (a) the extent to which the media constitute the most important source and channel of communication; (b) the media's independence from other social institutions and political institutions; (c) the media content and the degree it is governed by media logic or political logic; and (d) the political actors and degree to which they are governed by media logic or political logic. Thus, the four dimensions, the degree of mediatization of politics can be expected to vary across countries.

An analysis of the dimensions of mediatization of politics in Nigeria could provide a context for understanding the outcome of the study, which indicates varying degrees of mediatization in election coverage of Nigerian newspapers (the casting of political news as strategic game/horse race) and the descriptive, rather than interpretative journalistic news style of the THISDAY, Vanguard, Daily Trust and Blueprint newspapers. These dimensions as they affect Nigeria are discussed below:

- 1. The extent to which the media constitute the most important source and channel of communication**

Before now, the conventional media (television, radio, newspapers, etc.) was the most important source and channel of communication in Nigeria. From 1960 when Nigeria gained independence from Britain till the early 1990s, the media (mostly broadcast and some print) were under state control. The structure ensured that the media was owned strictly by the Federal and State Governments. The liberalization of the broadcast market came into effect with the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) Decree No. 38 of 1992, promulgated under military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida (Ariye, 2010).

The opening of the media market allowed for the operation of private newspapers, magazines, radio and television. These platforms allowed the media to champion the struggle for return to civil rule in the country, thus, making them the most important source and channel of communication.

Nevertheless, it's imperative to point out that the emergence of social media has impacted this dynamic. The internet revolution is redefining the way that the public access and consume news and how journalists disseminate information too. (Onumah, 2018).

This development needs to be studied further but it is true that through social media, politicians are able to access their supporters, examine their political relevance and mobilize their voters (Mamman, 2019) nowadays. With the increased penetration of the internet and mobile phone technology, Nigerian electorates are now more than ever before equipped to engage in and participate in politics. As a result, Nigerian politicians are leveraging on especially social media platforms to reach the electorate (Alakali, Akpan, and Tarnongo, 2013).

Similarly, Njoku (2018) argues that access and participation of the citizenry has seen an increase owing to the convergence between cell phones, social media and radio.

According to Ekwueme and Folarin (2017), politicians in Nigeria have (virtually) boycotted mainstream media (print, newspapers) and the electronic media (television and radio) and are using new media during electioneering to achieve their political goals. With this, while newspapers can be said to still be an important source and channel of information, indications are that the digital revolution is going to shape the future.

2. The media's independence from other social institutions and political institutions.

The Nigerian media cannot necessarily be described as an institution that is completely independent from other social and political institutions in the country. The media system in the country can be described as both *democratic* and *regulated* in

line with the media system by Parks & Curran (2000). There is a diverse media climate consisting of federal, state and privately-owned broadcast media and newspaper organizations in the country.

Although the press and broadcast media environment is highly liberalized, the Federal Government still exerts a level of control by regulating the sector through the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission (NBC) (Ismail, 2011). For instance, the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission implements a section of Decree No 38 that allows it to ban broadcasts it deems as inimical to the national interest (Onwumehili, 2007). Similarly, the Nigeria Press Council through Decree No.85 of 1992 and the Nigeria Council (amendment decree no. 60 of 1999) is empowered to regulate the Nigerian press (Ismail, 2011). Media ownership by politicians and the elite class in the country also puts paid to the question of total media independence in Nigeria.

3. The media content and the degree it is governed by media logic or political logic; and (4) political actors and degree to which they are governed by media logic or political logic

In Nigeria, like other countries, the media logic plays an important role in determining the admission of political discourse and actors in the public sphere (Nygren, Gunnar & Niemikari, Risto, 2019). The study also found that election coverage is governed by media logic rather than political logic. To an extent, it could be said that the media logic is influencing political logic and is increasingly deciding the political process and discourse in the country. The Nigerian public relies on the media to provide information about the ideologies of political parties as well as assess the competence of political candidates (Egbuna, 2012). The citizenry are often times, influenced to vote for political candidates based on the kind of information promoted by journalists. According to Oboh (2016, p.4), “Some Nigerian newspapers usually do not provide the public with balanced and objective accounts of the integrity and competence of candidates, which would otherwise enable the voters to cast their votes intelligently for deserving party members”. Since politicians and political parties need the attention of the internal logics of the media as conditions for their operations, it could therefore be deduced that there is a high degree of mediatization of politics in Nigeria. There however exists a symbiotic relationship between the media and the political

institutions in Nigeria as there is a mutual benefiting relationship between these two institutions. While media logic sets the tone and shapes the political narratives, “political logic is working on another level than media logics in news production, and that political actors use media to achieve political goals” and thus achieve “political instrumentalization of media” (Nygren, Gunnar & Niemikari, Risto, 2019, p.198).

Strömbäck and Esser (2014a) argued that to achieve an ideal mediatized system there must be maximum degree of mediatization in all the four dimensions. On another hand, Nygren, Gunnar & Niemikari, Risto (2019, p.200) described a non-mediatized system as “one in which the media is not the most important source of information about politics (Dimension 1); the media are mainly dependent on political institutions (Dimension 2); media content is guided mainly by political logic (Dimension 3); and political actors are mainly operating according to political logic (Dimension 4).” As this research findings have shown, there was no *maximum degree* of mediatization in the election coverage of the 2015 and 2019 elections. Similar outcome is reflected in the four dimensions discussed above in different degrees.

There are other factors that could further explain reasons for the varying degrees of mediatization of politics and election coverage of the 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections in Nigeria. Hallin and Mancini, (2004) identified three models of the media and politics that influence the media system characteristics in way that determines the strength and character of the newspaper industry in countries - the degree of professionalism in the media, self-regulation and the role of the state. In Nigeria, deregulation of the media environment, news commercialization and the roles of the Nigerian State play an integral role in shaping of the media system.

6:3 Media Commercialization and the Role of the Nigerian State in the Media System

The drastic slump in international oil prices in the 1980s and factors like corruption led to series of economic problems for Nigeria. In response, the then Military President, General Ibrahim Babangida adopted the Structural Adjustment Program—SAP from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) package. (Bwala, 2014). A greater part of the demand by the IMF was commercialization and deregulation,

where through Decree No. 25 of 1988, the Nigerian government listed a total of 35 public enterprises for commercialization, (24 were for partial commercialization and 11 eleven for full commercialization). Commercialization meant that the enterprises operated fully as profit-making ventures, those that were partly owned by the government were partly sub-vented by government (TCPC Final Report, 1993). The radio, television and the press in Nigeria thus became some of the enterprises that were commercialized. Njoku (2018) contends that liberalization and commercialization were by the IMF as one of the ways to reduce government expenditure.

Some literature on mediatization studies identified media commercialism as a key factor that influences media interventionism and mediatization of politics (Esser 2008; Strömbäck 2008a). These studies have suggested that media commercialism has led the media to become more independent to an extent that they are isolated from politics of the state. In such scenario, the media is almost free from regulations and control from the instruments of the state. In the case of Nigeria, the media environment is not entirely free from regulation and government interference. On another hand, the de-regulated media environment opened the space to allow for private ownership of the media. Currently, the Nigerian government at the State and Federal levels own and control radio and television stations. Similarly, several (not all) of the media organizations are owned by politicians, such as the Daily Sun Newspaper, AIT, Ray power, The Nation newspaper, the National Mirror, Leadership Newspaper, among many others.

Whether government or privately-owned most media organizations in Nigeria are commercially driven, which has implications for their news production process and policy. For one, the newspapers under study are commercial concerns, and largely outside the purview of total government control.

To appreciate the role of the state in this process, Hallin and Mancini (2004) argued that the media models of countries are largely shaped by the nature of their model of democracy. These models are the North Atlantic or Liberal Model; the North Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model; and the Mediterranean or Polarized, Pluralist Model. The commercial media, which is dominant in the Liberal model, has

little state participation and a high level of professionalism. The United States of America, which operates a liberal model, has a highly commercialized independent media, with a very high degree of mediatization (Patterson, 2000).

Although Nigeria is a democracy, the polarized pluralism model proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) fits more as a better description of the country's media model. A polarized media system has a lower level of professionalism, compared to countries like the United States, and it is fairly regulated and experiences intermittent interferences by the state. While the Nigerian media is an important source and channel of communication, politicians are somewhat able to get their views across by being ubiquitous sources of information for reporters. This is because journalists derive a number of their sources from politicians, government officials and party members for news stories, interviews and feature. Politicians also utilize the media to reach the masses through paid political advertising, which are a source of revenue for the newspapers. This therefore demonstrates that the media and political institutions have influence on each other. The degree of that influence however varies from time to time and across different types of media and political systems. Unlike countries with liberal and democratic corporatist models where the media are fully commercialized and independent from social and political institutions, given the nature of the media ownership, the lines are blurred in Nigeria, thus raising questions about the media logic having more influence over the political logic or vice versa.

6:4 Degree of Mediatization (Between Northern and Southern Newspapers)

In response to the second and third questions about the difference in the degree of mediatization represented in the 2015 and 2019 presidential election coverage by newspapers in Northern and Southern Nigeria, the findings show that there was no much difference in the degree of mediatization between both regions. Strategic game was more in use in both election years, with strategic game having the higher representation in newspapers in the Northern region in 2015 while the 2019 elections showed that it was more in use in the Southern region.

The casting of the 2015 elections by Northern-based newspapers (the Daily Trust and Blueprint) as a strategic game or horse race, slightly more than the Southern-based newspapers (THISDAY and Vanguard) could be explained by the fact that the dynamics of the 2015 presidential elections differed significantly from that of 2019 with regards to the Presidential candidates of the two major political parties. Unlike the 2019 elections, which featured two Northern Muslims, (Alhaji Atiku Abubakar of the PDP and General Muhammadu Buhari of the APC) on the Presidential ticket, the candidates of the 2015 elections were Goodluck Jonathan (Christian) of the PDP and Muhammadu Buhari (Muslim) of the APC. This is in view of the fact that Nigeria is a multi-religious society with three major dominant religious faiths, namely Christianity, Islam, and African traditional religions.

The framing of political parties and candidates in Nigeria is equally influenced by factors such as ethnicity, and religion (Jim, 2019). Ethno-regional identities to a large degree also play a critical role in influencing politics in Nigeria. According to Olayode (2015, p.3), “political parties and candidates are easily perceived as representatives of a particular ethnic or religious group and voting pattern in Nigeria largely mirrors the various cleavages in the country.” There is no doubt that there is a definite relationship between religion and politics in Nigeria (Adebanwi, 2010; Marshall, 2009; Onapajo, 2012; Jim, 2019). Religion influences how the voters support candidates with people mostly voting according to their faith, regardless of the competences of candidates. Religion also plays a critical role in determining how the political parties choose their flag bearers (Jim, 2019).

Apart from religion, there has been a dichotomy between the North and the South as regards to power tussle in Nigeria. Simbine (2002, p.34) explained that the zoning formula is important for Nigeria as it serves to balance the conflicting demands for political power between the North and South. He argued that, the “zoning formula seems to fit into the heterogeneous and federal nature of the Nigerian state, helping to accommodate all groups as much as possible and therefore reducing complaints of domination and or marginalization”. Thus, political parties in Nigeria have adopted zoning arrangements, where party positions and electoral candidates are selected based on their geographical locations.

As expected, the media provide the space through which these political dialogues happen as well as the vehicle for political parties and their candidates to promote their party manifestos and mobilize the electorates. The 2015 general elections in Nigeria therefore witnessed heavy media coverage, especially of the presidential candidates, with more attention paid to the APC and PDP - the two most popular political parties. The battle was a tight race between the two top candidates, the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP and General Muhammadu Buhari (Retired) of the APC (Ezea, 2015).

A European Union report observed that Nigerian media outlets were biased in the 2015 elections campaigns. For example, the report indicated that the Northern-based Daily Trust, offered 47 percent coverage to APC, 41.5 percent to PDP, while THISDAY gave PDP 53 percent in its parties' coverage compared to 34 percent for the APC. Similarly, the newspaper offered the PDP candidate, Jonathan 63.9% of coverage and the APC candidate, Buhari received only 35.9 percent (EU EOM Report, 2015). Since the two candidates in the 2015 elections were from different religious and ethnic leanings, the newspaper coverage focused more on the candidates and less about the issues (Ogirisi, 2020). The bias of the Daily Trust newspaper in the 2015 elections towards the Northern Muslim Presidential Candidate of the APC does, in a way reflect a finding of the study on the higher degree of mediatization by Northern-based newspapers in the 2015 elections.

As for the 2019 elections, the results show there was a higher mediatization from the Southern-based newspapers (THISDAY and Vanguard). What might cause a shift could also be a different dynamic when it came to the Presidential candidates. Unlike in 2015 where the candidates for the two major political parties were Christian Goodluck Jonathan of PDP and Muslim Muhammadu Buhari of the APC, the scenario in the 2019 Presidential elections did not provide the ethnic/religious divide that could have created the stiff competition between the North and South, as both candidates were Muslims.

Finally, did the 2015 and 2019 elections differ in their degree of mediatization? Findings of the study did not clearly indicate such. This is because the outcomes in terms of casting both election cycles as a strategic game/horse race and the descriptive

journalistic news styles of the newspapers were similar. On the whole, this study does suggest that there was mediatization and media intervention in the 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections in Nigeria. The findings also suggest that there are differences in the degrees of mediatization in the two indicators that guided this study.

A significant contribution of this study is the theoretical implication of mediatization of politics, particularly in non-Western countries, which are mostly underrepresented in literature. As the dominant literature has suggested, the theory of mediatization has largely been shaped by studies conducted in Western democracies whose media systems are largely liberal, with highly commercialized independent media system. However, as findings in this study have suggested, the degrees of mediatization, as shown by indicators and dimensions could vary not only across countries but also in different situations. This can be said to be the situation in Nigeria.

6:5 Conclusion

This study makes a novel contribution, testing and discussing the degree of mediatization of politics in the 2015 and 2019 Presidential elections in Nigeria. It tested indicators of media interventionism, which is also theorized as the degree to which news content is mediatized, according to Falasca (2014, p.590). The degree to which news content is mediatized is the third dimension of mediatization of politics as argued by Stromback and Dimitrova (2010). In this way, it provides an understanding of the symbiotic relationship between media and politics in a developing country such as Nigeria.

The main aim was to explore whether mediatization existed in the country; whether news content during the period under study was shaped by media logic or political logic; and whether news content was descriptive or interpretive in the journalistic approach. The research also compared differences in the coverage between the North and South, and in addition, between the two election cycles (2015 and 2019) under examination.

Using a quantitative content analysis research design, the researcher mined library data on four Nigerian daily newspapers, and examined back copy issues of the papers two weeks prior to the commencement of the elections. The designated newspapers from the Northern and Southern parts of the country - THISDAY, Vanguard, Daily Trust and Blueprint are well known and widely read. The unit of analysis is full thematic news stories, being the most widely used methodology and approach on news content. The selection criteria were that news stories must make reference to the candidates, political parties and party leaders. Data was assembled and analyzed using the SPSS Version 25 software to run appropriate statistical tools to count, classify and explain the observed degree of mediatization of the elections with regard to each of the research questions. In addition, the research employed the diagnostic approach in that it is analytical, exploratory and descriptive.

The empirical results emerging from this study are clear. Some of the findings were predicted as theorized but not all. Three of the study's research questions and hypothesis are supported by findings from the quantitative analyses conducted. One of the hypotheses in regard to journalistic approach was not supported. First, the results indicate that there was mediatization in the election campaign coverage and news content was shaped by media logic. Statistically, strategic game coverage was dominant in both years under study. This suggests a high level of mediatization. Secondly, findings reflected similarities in coverage between the North and the South, and in the 2015 and 2019 elections. Thirdly, in terms of journalistic approach, the coverage was statistically more descriptive rather than interpretive. Hence, the results suggest the following:

1. Mediatization featured prominently in the 2015 elections.
2. Mediatization featured prominently in the 2019 elections.
3. While there was some reportage showing political logic in the 2015, stories cast from the viewpoint of strategic game or horse race, indicating media logic dominated the election.
4. While there was some reportage showing political logic in the 2019, articles cast from the angle of strategic game or horse race, indicating media logic dominated the election.

5. The format of general news stories dominated the election coverage. As a result, more stories were statistically descriptive than interpretive.
6. There were similarities in mediatization levels in the North and South
7. There were similarities in the degree of mediatization in 2015 and 2019.

This study draws the following conclusions:

First, the media exercises a certain level of independence in determining what stories are covered during election campaigns and how they are cast, thereby revealing mediatization and media logic. The fact that all the newspapers under review had similarities in their coverage across the two election cycles points to the factor of commercialization and its attendant effects, as expounded by Hallin and Mancini (2004).

Commercialisation refers to news production according to economic considerations. In essence, some media organizations are commercially driven, which has implications for their news production process. For one, the newspapers studied are commercial concerns, and largely outside the purview of total government control.

According to Stromback and Van Aelst (2010), the degree of commercialism is the most important factor in the framing of politics as a strategic game or horse race and thereby, a measure of mediatization. While countries have different political and media structures and systems, the USA for instance, is seen as one where commercial news is dominant and therefore a high degree of casting of politics as a strategic game or prominence of media logic (Patterson, 2000). Notably, issues frames and, political logic are dominant in systems where the news market is regulated by the state (Binderkrantz and Green-Pedersen, 2009)

In Nigeria, the mass media is the most important channel of information of news on politics (first dimension of mediatization of politics), although this is slowly changing with the emergence of new media. Newspapers in contemporary times are mostly commercialized, market-oriented and privately owned organisations, indicating elements of a Liberal Model. They're independent of political actors in their daily business to an extent and less differentiated from the markets (second dimension of

mediatization of politics). This obviously, explains the similarity of results across the four newspapers.

Nevertheless, politicians are somewhat able to get their views to the public by being pervasive sources of information for reporters. From this study, journalists derive a number of their sources from politicians, government officials and party members for news stories, interviews and feature.

In this case, politicians are sometimes able to drive through their agenda. When journalists focus on strategic game or horserace that has the capability to trivialize electioneering campaign, making it somewhat of a spectacle or show, politicians take advantage of that political environment. In her study, Cervi (2020) illustrates how exclusionary populism and Islamophobia takes hold in Europe, specifically in Italy and Spain. In this instance, politicians successfully sell the message of “us” versus “them” during election discourse through the media, thereby driving a wedge between people. This is clearly a by-product of mediatization recognized the world over.

She explained how politicians depict their target in election speeches thus:

“Muslims are, in fact, portrayed as an external threat for the sake of political mobilization and to debilitate competitors, framed as unaware or careless of the invasion. On the other side, they are also depicted as internal enemies, subject to cultural racism to capitalize on irrational fears and, again, to delegitimize the élite, especially feminists, who allegedly “tolerate” Muslims’ “uncivilized practices”, leaving an open door to “moderate” Muslims for redeeming themselves accepting “civilized” Western—in this case, Italian-values.”

Likewise, politicians utilize the media to reach the masses through advertising. In Nigeria, this is a big source of revenue for commercial and privately owned newspapers. This study therefore, demonstrates that the media and political arms have influence on each other. The degree of that influence varies from time to time and across different types of media and political systems.

Also, the research shows that the format of stories published determine the degree of mediatization. Whereas different categories of stories exist, most newspapers have more news stories on a daily basis. The limiting nature of news stories means that journalists have less leeway to express opinion, views or dwell on the bigger implications of events. This was evident in the results of the questions on whether an article was descriptive or interpretive. The ability to explain the why and what of an event is a huge factor in determining that a story is interpretive, and therefore the degree of mediatization. In this aspect, newspapers were constrained. However, some of the news stories were strictly not based on facts. Some were interpretive in their coverage. THISDAY, Vanguard, Daily Trust and Blueprint published many stories during the election campaigns both in 2015 and 2019. While the number of stories was different for each newspaper, they all focused on the same subject and devoted space to more news articles.

According to Njoku (2018), the media is crucial in any society. Whether it is the traditional forms - radio, television, newspapers and magazines, or social media, the impact that the media has on the lives of the public cannot be underestimated. Similarly, Onumah (2018) highlights the “indispensability” of journalists, journalism and media in building a society. Likewise, Tayie (2019) posits that in the epoch of information technology, democratization of news, and the commotion that come with it, there’s even more at stake in information and communication. This especially so with regard to how new challenges are managed with journalists and the citizenry. She further explains it in the following way:

“Nowadays, like never before, we are witnessing an era mainly characterized by polarization and information chaos. Despite the perception that technology is progress, when applying this to the status of information and democracies, it becomes closer to regress. With politicians and capitalists striving to control the public opinion, with more citizens empowered by the ability to create and disseminate content to thousands, the ecosystem of the media has massively transformed. With this change comes challenges to all the actors involved; journalists – the resource rich original gate keepers of information, and citizens – the resource poor content creators/disseminators.”

All these point to the importance of media and how it impacts lives everyday.

The study's objectives therefore, have larger implications for political news journalism, the political system, the media system and political engagement. This project contributes not only to the burgeoning literature on mediatization, media interventionism, media studies, political reporting and election campaigns in the world, but in developing countries particularly in Africa. It is significant that the investigation is based on recent election campaigns in the biggest country on the African continent, Nigeria, with a thriving media, and a challenging and complex political system. Whereas the classic mediatization literature had focused entirely on a different geography - mostly on the developed world such as Europe and the USA, this research has succeeded in analyzing and proving the existence of mediatization on varying levels and degrees in an African country.

This research provides a valid and vigorous measure and establishes the existence of mediatization in print media and the way that the media presents news during elections. It demonstrates the influence that the media has on politics. As the Nigerian situation shows, the concept of media logic and political logic are not only intertwined, other logics such as commercialization, regulation, media ownership, ethno-religious identity, etc., interact with and shape the media system in different ways. As the political logic works to find expression in the media environment, the media logic, driven by content and the journalistic approach to election coverage, is increasingly providing an outlet for journalists to work towards the public interest.

Finally, mediatization of elections is an emerging trend that has to be watched and further studied in Nigeria, and indeed in other African countries. It can be inferred from previous studies that mediatization is a trend in democracies around the world. What the results of this study suggests is that in so far as African countries practice Western style democracy, mimicking other institutions that are important in a democracy such as the media, this tendency is likely to be found, albeit in different levels and dimensions. In other words, this research on mediatization of the presidential elections in Nigeria can be replicated in other African countries and emerging democracies around the world.

6:6 Limitations of Study

While this study offers new knowledge on the mediatization of politics and media interventionism in Nigeria and Africa by extension, it has some limitations. The thesis concentrated only on one dimension of mediatization (the third dimension). As Strömbäck (2008) noted, mediatization is a multi-dimensional process and can be studied using four different dimensions. According to Strömbäck and Esser (2014), each of these dimensions can also be examined in isolation. It means that all four dimensions can also be studied.

This study focused strictly on articles published two weeks before the 2015 and 2019 elections in Nigeria. These periods are in the thick of the electioneering campaigns. However, it is to be noted that this is usually not the beginning of publications on political parties and candidates. Election messages find their way into publications a few months before. They may not be direct messages. But the slant and focus, albeit subtle, point to campaign materials.

6:7 Areas for Further Research

While this study throws up highly informative results, it opens up areas for further research. Future studies could consider studying all four dimensions of mediatization in Nigeria. That would advance the knowledge base for political communication in the country.

Two, it would be interesting to extend research of mediatization and media interventionism to social media use in the country. This is because Nigerians are very active on the social media – Facebook, Twitter and Instagram and YouTube. Government officials and politicians now own and manage social media accounts as well as release information and press releases through these mediums. Analyzing activities online would establish the level of impact they have on society too.

Three, to operationalise and measure media logic, Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) identified detected six indicators of Media Interventionism and thereby, the degree of mediatization of Politics. These indicators include: (a) framing of politics as a

strategic game or horse race (b) journalistic visibility (c) journalistic style (d) length of politicians' sound bites (e) lip flaps (f) wrap up. Given that this study looked at two out of these six indicators of media logic related to newspapers specifically, the remaining four indicators could be operationalized in studies on other forms of media.

Four, seeing that this study centered only on newspapers, it will be insightful to study mediatization on television and radio. Although, traditional media is facing an onslaught worldwide with the emergence of new media, and television and radio are entertainment-driven in Nigeria, it will be a worthwhile scholarly exercise to investigate mediatization and media interventionism to ascertain the level of influence in these mediums.

References

- Aalberg, T. and Brekken, T. (2007). Når spill og enkeltepisoder blir viktigst [When games and single episodes become most important]. In: Jenssen AT and Aalberg T (eds) Den medialiserte politikken [The mediatized politics]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 177–196.
- Adebanwi, W. (2010). The clergy, culture and political conflicts in Nigeria. *African Studies Review*, 53 (3), 121-142.
- Adigun, A. (1990). Freedom of the press and party politics in Nigeria: Precepts, retrospect and prospects. *African Affairs*, 89(355), p. 205-226.
- Africa Media Development Initiative. (2008). Nigeria. *Country Report Context* Retrieved from <http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservicetrust>
- Akeem, A.R., Oyeyinka, T.O., Qasim, O.A., Lateef, O., Omolayo, J., and Onyinyechi, N. (2013). Deregulation of broadcast media in Nigeria: An appraisal. Kuwait Chapter of Arabian *Journal of Business and Management Review*, 3(3), 6-13.
- Alakali T.T, Akpan, C. S., & Tarnongo, M. O. (2013). An assessment of the utilisation of social media mobilisation of Nigerian youths in 2011 general elections. A Case Study of Youths in Benue State. *Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences*, 6(5), 32-44.
- Altheide, D.L. (2013). Media logic, social control, and fear. *Communication Theory* 23,223–238.
- Altheide, D. L., and Robert, P. S. (1979). *Media Logic*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Andersen, K, Thorson, SJ (1989) Public discourse or strategic game? Changes in our conception of elections. *Studies in American Political Development*, 3, 262–278.

Apuke, D.O. (2016). Exploring the issues of media ownership and control in Nigeria. *New Media and Mass Communication*, 56, 13-16.

Ariye, E.C. (2010). The impact of public broadcasting in Nigeria. *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences*, 7(6), 415-423.

Asp, K. (1986). *Democracy and the marketplace of ideas: Communication and government in Sweden and the United State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Akinboye, S. and Anifowose, R. (1999). Nigerian Government and Politics. In R. Anifowose and F. Enemu (Eds). *Element of Politics*. Lagos: Malthouse Press.

Baike, W.B. (1862). Note of Journey from Bida in Nupe to Kano in Hausa, Performed in 1862, *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 33, 1867. (92-109) in Umar M.S. 2006. *Islam and Colonialism: Intellectual Responses of Muslims of Northern Nigeria to British Colonial Rule*. Brill, Leidon, Boston

Bennett, W. L. and Livingston, S. (2003). Editors' introduction: A semi-independent press: Government control and journalistic autonomy in the political construction of news. *Political Communication*, 20: 359–362.

Bennett, and R. M. Entman. (Eds. 2001), *Mediated politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy* (pp. 1-2). Cambridge, CA: Cambridge University Press.

Bennett, W.L., Lawrence, R.G., and Livingstone, S. (2007). *When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina*. Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.

Berinsky, A. J., and Kinder, D. R. (2006). Making sense of issues through media frames: Understanding the Kosovo crisis. *The Journal of Politics*, 68(3), 640-656

Binderkrantz, A. S, & Green-Pedersen, C (2009) Policy or processes in focus? The *International Journal of Press/Politics* 14(2),166–185.

- Blankson, I. A., & Murphy, P. D. (2007). *Negotiating Democracy Media Transformations in Emerging Democracies*. Press, Albany: State University of New York.
- Blueprint Newspapers. (2021). Retrieved from <https://www.blueprint.ng/>
- Boateng, O. (2008). A squalid end to empire. *New African, Issue 478*, November 2008.
- Brants, K., and van Praag, P. (2006). Signs of media logic half a century of political communication in the Netherlands. *Javnost-The Public*, 13(1), 24-40.
- Bwala, M.H. (2014). Structural adjustment programme. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, 4(7), 2225
- Campbell, D.T. & Stanley, J.C. (1963). *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Cappella, J. and Jamieson, K. H. (1997). *Spiral of cynicism: The press and the public good*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cardoso, H. (2008). *Investigación y creación periodística*. La Habana: Editorial Pablo de la Torriente
- Castells, M. (2007). Communication, power and counter-power in the network society. *International Journal of Communication*, 1, 238-266.
- Cervi, L. and Tejedor, S. (2020). Framing The Gypsy Problem: Populist Electoral Use of Romaphobia in Italy (2014–2019). *Social Sciences* 9, no. 6: 105. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci9060105>
- Cervi, L., Tejedor, S., and Gracia, M. (2021). What Kind of Islamophobia? Representation of Muslims and Islam in Italian and Spanish Media" *Religions* 12, no. 6: 427. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12060427>

Cervi, L., Simelio, N., and Tejedor, S. (2021). Analysis of Journalism and Communication Studies in Europe's Top Ranked Universities: Competencies, Aims and Courses, *Journalism Practice*, 15:7,1033-1053, DOI:

Cervi, L. (2020). Exclusionary Populism and Islamophobia: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Spain. *Religions* 2020, 11, 516. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11100516>

Ciaglia, A. (2013). Politics in the media and the media in the politics: A comparative Study of the relationship between the media and the political systems in three European countries. *European Journal of Communication*, 28(5): 541-555.

Cohen, J. (2008). The influence of presumed media influence on politics: Do politicians' perceptions of media power matter? *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 72(2), 331-344.

Curran, J., & Park, M. J. (2000). *De-Westernizing Media Studies*. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Cookey, S.J.S. (2001). Colonialism and the Process of Underdevelopment in Nigeria. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. Leiden Tomo 14, No 1 (Jan 1,1979): 19

Daily Trust Newspapers. (2021). Retrieved from <https://www.dailytrust.com>

De Vreese, CH and Semetko, HA. (2002). Cynical and engaged: Strategic campaign coverage, public opinion and mobilization in a referendum. *Communication Research* 29(6): 615–641. Entman RM (1993) Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Jour*

De Vreese, CH. (2003). *Framing Europe. Television News and European Integration*. Amsterdam: Aksant

De Vreese H. and Semetko H. (2002). Strategic campaign coverage, public opinion, And mobilization in a referendum. *Communication Research*, 29,615

Echeverría, M., and González, R.A. (2018). Media logic and journalistic commercialisation. A longitudinal analysis of frames in campaign coverage. *Communication & Society*, 31(1), 57-71.

Egbuna, B. (2012). *Covering elections: The broadcaster's responsibility*. Commonwealth Broadcasting Association Conference on Innovating for Quality Broadcasting, Commonwealth Broadcasting Association, London, England. Retrieved from [http://www.cba.org.uk/conferences_and_events/Covering Elections the Broadcaster's Responsibilities](http://www.cba.org.uk/conferences_and_events/Covering_Elections_the_Broadcaster's_Responsibilities).

Ekeh, P. (1983). *Colonialism and Social Structure*. University of Ibadan Press, Nigeria

Ekwueme, M. & Folarin, S. (2017). Role of social media in electioneering: The case of the Nigerian 2015 presidential election. *Covenant University Conference on e-Governance in Nigeria*, 299- 311.

Esser, F. (2008). Dimensions of political news cultures: Sound Bite and image Bite News in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. *International Journal of Press Politics*, 14,401–28.

Esser, F. and Hemmer, K. (2008). Characteristics and dynamics of election news coverage in Germany. In *Handbook of Elections News Coverage around the World* (Ed.) Jesper Strömbäck and Lynda Lee Kaid. New York: Rutledge.

Esser, F. and Strömbäck, J. (Eds.) (2014). *Mediatization of politics: Understanding the transformation of western democracies*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Eribo, F. and Jong-Ebot, W. (Eds.). (1997). *Press freedom and communication in Africa*. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press

Ernest & Young, (2018) In International Finance Corporation IFC. (2020). A Country Private Sector Diagnostic. Creating Markets in Nigeria, Crowding in the Private Sector: Nigeria's Path to Faster Job Creation and Structural Transformation

Ezea, S. (2015). Between Jonathan, Buhari, Others: Election like never before. *The Guardian*, 27th March. Retrieved from Falola, T. (2009). Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria. Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, USA, 1-7.

Falasca, K. (2014). Political news journalism: Mediatization across three news reporting contexts. *European Journal of Communication*, 29(5), 583– 597. DOI: 10.1177/0267323114538853

Fallows, J (1997) *Breaking the News*. New York: Vintage.

Farnsworth, S, and Lichter, S. (2006). Trends in television network news coverage of U.S. elections. In J. Strömbäck and L.L. Kaid (Eds.). *Handbook of Elections News Coverage Around the World*, pp.1-20. New York: Routledge.

Federal Republic of Nigeria Factsheet. (2020) Retrieved from <http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/index.php/2016-04-06-08-38-30/economy>

Field, A. (2009). *Discovering statistics using SPSS*. (3rd Ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Fraser, C. and Estrada, S. R. (2001). *Community radio handbook*. Paris: UNESCO.

Gomis, L. (2008). *Teoría de los géneros periodísticos*. Barcelona: UOC.

France, 24. (2012). Daily Blasts Hit Newspaper Offices in Abuja, Kaduna. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/20120426-deadly-blasts-hit-nigerian-newspaper-offices-abuja-kaduna-thisday-suicide-bombings>

Frederick, J.D. Lugard (2006). Collected Annual Reports for Northern Nigerian 1900-11 in Umar, M.S. (2006). *Islam and Colonialism Intellectual Responses of Muslims of Northern Nigeria to British Colonial Rule*. Brill, Leiden, Boston, 157

Globe scope Inc. (2004). *Nigeria*. Retrieved from <http://www.nigeria.embassyusa.org/>

Grabe, M. and Bucy, E. (2009). *Image bite politics: News and the visual framing of elections*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hallin C and Mancini P (2004). *Comparing media systems: Three models of media and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Haßler, J., Maurer, M., & Oschatz, C. (2014). Media logic and political logic online and offline. *Journalism Practice*, 8(3), 326-341, DOI:10.1080/17512786.2014.889451

Harwood, T.G. and Garry, T. (2003). An overview of content analysis. *The Marketing Review* 3, 479– 498

Heale, R. and Twycross, A. (2015). Validity and reliability in quantitative research, *Evidence-Based Nursing* 18(3): 66-67.

Ihonvbere, J. (1994). *The State and Underdevelopment in Nigeria*. Transaction Publishers New Brunswick New Jersey, USA.

Internet Usage and Telecommunications Reports, Nigeria. (2018). Internet usage statistics. Retrieved from <https://www.internetworldstats.com/af/ng.htm>

Ismail, A.O. (2011). The Nigerian press: The journey so far. *Continental Journal of Sustainable Development*, 2, 8-19.

Issa, A.A. (2016). Assessment of the role of media in the 2015 Nigerian general election. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309155502_Assessment_of_the_Role_of_Media_in_the_2015_Nigerian_General_Election/download

Iyengar, S, Norpoth, H, Hahn, KS (2004) Consumer demand for election news: The horserace sells. *Journal of Politics* 66(1),157–175.

Jim, A. J. (2019). Religion as a determinant of voter behavior: An analysis of the relation between religious inclination and voting pattern in Cross River State, Nigeria. *Journal of Social Science Research*. 14, 3252-3267

Johnson, D. E. (2013). Descriptive statistics. Retrieved from http://www.danielezrajohnson.com/johnson_2013.pdf

Just, M., Crigler, A., and Buhr, T. (1999). Voice, substance, and cynicism in presidential campaign media. *Political Communication*, 16, 25–44.

Katu-Ogundimu, N. (2016). The media, conflict audiences and dynamics of information dissemination: Is the tail wagging the dog? Doctoral Dissertation, Published online at OhioLink ETD:
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/pg_10?0::NO:10:P10_ETD_SUBID:112939

Kerbel, M., Apee, S., and Ross, M. (2000). PBS ain't so different: Public broadcasting, election frames, and democratic empowerment. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 5(4), 8–32.

Kiplinger H (2002). Mediatization of politics: Theory and data. *Journal of Communication*, 52 (4), 972 – 986.

Krippendorff, K. (2013). Content Analysis: An introduction to its Methodology. London: Sage.

Lawrence, R. (2000). Game-framing the issues: Tracking the strategy frame in public policy news. *Political Communication*, 17(93), 114.

Lengauer, G., Esser, F. and Berganza, R. (2012). Negativity in political news: A review of concepts, operationalisation and key findings. *Journalism*, 13(2), 179–202.

Mamman, Y. (2019). The influence of social media on political culture in Nigeria: A political perception of state assembly members from 2015 elections to date. *Journal of Arts and Sciences*, 12(1), 66-70.

Magnus, J. and Gunnar, N. (2019 Eds.) *Close and distant: Political executive–media relations in four countries*, pp. 197-220. Göteborg: Nordicom.

Marshall, R. (2009). *Political spiritualists: The pentecostal revolution in Nigeria*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Mazzoleni, G. and Schulz, W. (1999). Mediatization of politics: A challenge for democracy? *Political Communication*, 16,247–61.

Maliere, P. (1998). The rules of the journalistic field: Pierre Bourdieu’s contribution to the sociology of the media. *European Journal of Communication*, 13(2), 219-234.

Matthes, J. (2009). What’s in a frame? A content analysis of media framing studies in the world’s leading communication journals, 1990–2005. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 86: 349–367.

Martini, S. (2000). Periodismo, noticia y noticiabilidad (Vol. 4). Editorial norma
Martínez Albertos, José Luis. *Curso general de redacción periodística*. Madrid: Paraninfo, 1983.

Marques De Melo, J. (1994). *A opinião no jornalismo brasileiro*. 2. ed. Petrópolis: Vozes.

Mazzoleni G and Schulz W. (1999). Mediatization of politics: A challenge for democracy? *Political Communication*, 16, 250-261.

Miles, J. & Banyard, P. (2007). *Understanding and using statistics in psychology: A practical introduction*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Momoh, A. (2015). *The thorny march towards democracy: Some introspection and prognosis in democracy and socio-economic issues*. Published by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Media Sustainability Index, Africa. (2008). *Nigeria*. Retrieved from http://www.irex.org/programs/msi_africa/2008.asp

Miles, J. and Banyard, P. (2007). *Understanding and using statistics in psychology: A practical introduction*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Nigerian Media Code of Election Coverage. (2008). Retrieved from <http://www.ipcng.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/The-Nigerian-Media-Code-of-Election-Coverage-2018.pdf>

Neundorf, K. (2002). *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. Sage Publications Inc., Thousand Oaks, CA.

Nigerian Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning Factsheet. (2020). Retrieved from <http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/index.php/2016-04-06-08-40-29/executive/149-federal-ministry-of-finance>

Nigerian Bureau of Statistics. (2018). Retrieved from <http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/>

Nie, S.K., Kee, P.C., Ahmad, L.A., and Korff, R. (2015). Mediatization of politics in developing nation: An analysis of Youtube political reporting in Malaysia. *Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 10(2), 274-285.

Nuneze L. (1995). *Introducción al periodismo escrito* Barcelona: Ariel Comunicación, 1995.

Nigerian Burea of Statistics (2018). Retrieved from: <file:///Users/constanceikokwu/Downloads/Demographic%20Statistics%20Bulletin%202017.pdf>

Njoku, G. (2018). *The Political Economy of Deregulation and Commercialization of Radio Broadcasting in Nigeria, 1992-2017: An Assessment of Access, Participation, Content and Peacebuilding*. PhD. Thesis Project Submitted to the Faculty of Communication Sciences, Department of Journalism and Communication Sciences, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) Spain, in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Retrieved from: <https://ddd.uab.cat/record/204208?ln=en>

Nwozoe, A. (2014). Redefining political terrorism: Nigerian media and the crisis of democratization. *African Research Review*, 8 (2), 96-117. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/afrev.v8i2.7>

Nygren, G. and Niemikari, R. (2019). Media logics as parts of the political toolkit: A critical discussion on theories of Mediatization of Politics in: *Close and Distant: Political Executive–Media Relations in Four Countries* / [ed] Johansson, Karl Magnus, & Gunnar Nygren, Gothenburg: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg, 2019, 197-220.

Oboh, G. E. (2014). *Mediatization of Nigerian elections: Issues and perspectives for African democracy*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Stirling- Horden.

Ochonu, M. (2014). *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria*. Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis.

Ogirisi, U. I. (2020). Religious influences on politics in Nigeria: Implications for national development. *Journal of African Studies*, 15(2), 139-157.

Olayode, K. O. (2015). Ethno-Regional cleavages and voting behavior in the 2015 General elections: Issues and challenges for democratization and nation building. Being a Paper presented at the Two-Day national conference in Abuja, organized by the Electoral Institute (TEI), Nigeria. Retrieved from www.inecnigeria.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/conference-paper-by-kehindeolayode.pdf.

Onapajo, H. (2012). Politics for God: Religion, politics and conflict in democratic Nigeria. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 4(9), 42-66.

Onumah, C. (2018). Digital Migration: A Comparative Study of the Digital Transition of the Print Media and Nigeria and South Africa. PhD. Thesis Project Submitted to the Faculty of Communication Sciences, Department of Journalism and Communication Sciences, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) Spain, in fulfillment of the requirements of for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Retrieved from: <https://ddd.uab.cat/record/217186?ln=en>

Onwumechili, C. (2007). Nigeria: Equivocating while opening the broadcast liberalization gates. In I.A. Blankson, & D. Murphy (Eds.). *Negotiating Democracy: Media Transformations in Emerging Democracies*, 123-42. New York, NY: Suny Press.

Ogunbado, A. F. (2012). Impacts of Colonialism on Religions: An Experience of Southwestern Nigeria. *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol 5, Issue 6, 51-57.

Ojo, E. (2013). Mass media and ethnic politics in Nigeria: An overview. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*.13 (1), 429-438.

Olayiwola, R.O. (1991). Press and politics in Nigeria's second republic. *Africa Media Review*, 5(2).

Olutokun, A. (2004). Repressive state and resurgent media under Nigeria's military dictatorship, 1988-98. *Nordiska Afrikainstitutet*, 126. Retrieved from <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:240609/FULLTEXT02.pdf>

Omenugha, K.A. (2004). Nigerian press and the politics of difference: An analysis of The newspaper report of the Yoruba/Hausa ethnic clash of February 2002. In J. Hands and E. Siopera (Eds.), *At interface: Continuity and transformation in culture and politics*, 61 – 79. O'Neil, P.H. (Ed). 1998). *Communicating democracy: The media and political transitions*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner

Owolojuwu, O. (2016). Role of media in 2015 presidential election in Nigeria. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, 7(1), 3-13. Park, M.J. & Curran, J. (Eds.). (2001). *De-westernizing media studies*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Patterson, T.E (2000). *The United States: News in a free-market society*. In: Gunther, Mughan, R. A. (Ed.) *Democracy and the Media. A Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 241–265.

Patterson, T. (1993). *Out of Order*. New York: Vintage.

Price, M. E., Rozumilowicz, B., & Verrhulst, S. G. (2002). *Media Reform Democratizing the media, democratizing the state*. London and New York: Rutledge, Taylors & Francis Group.

Rahat, G. and Sheaffer, T. (2007). The personalization(s) of politics: Israel 1949–2003. *Political Communication*, 24(1), 65–80.

Scammell, M. and Semetko, H. (2008). Election news coverage in the U.K. in *The Handbook of Election News Coverage Around the World*, 17. 1st Edition, Routledge

Semetko, HA, Valkenburg, PM. (2000) Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news. *Journal of Communication*, 50(2): 93–109.

Semetko, H., Blumler, J., Gurevitch, M., and Weaver, D. (1991). The formation of campaign agendas: A comparative analysis of party and media roles in recent American and British elections. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 3.

Servaes, J. (Ed.) 2008). *Communication for development and social change*. London: Sage.

Serrano, M. Piñuel, JL. (1982). *Teoría de la comunicación: epistemología y análisis de la referencia*. Cuadernos de la comunicación, Madrid-España.

Shaw, I. S. (2009). Towards an African Journalism Model: A critical Historical Perspective. *International Communication Gazette*, 71, 6, 491-590.

Sheafer, T., Weinmann, G., and Tsfati, Y. (2008). Campaigns in the holy land: The content and effects of election news coverage in Israel. In J. Strömbäck and L. L. Kaid Handbook (Eds.). *Handbook of Election News Coverage around the World*. Routledge.

Shulz, W. (2004). Reconstructing Mediatization as an analytical concept. *European Journal of Communication* 19(1), 87-101.

Simbane, A. (2002). *Minority and Power Sharing in Nigeria*, Ibadan: NISER Monograph Research.

Smith, S. (2007). Colonialism in Economic Theory: the Experience of Nigeria. *The Journal of Development Studies*, Volume 15, 1979, Issue 3: Trade and Poor Economies, 38-59.

Strömbäck, J. (2008a). Four phases of Mediatization: An analysis of the mediatization of politics. *Press/Politics*, 13(3), 228-244.

Strömbäck, J. and Esser, F. (2014). *Mediatization of Politics: Transforming Democracies and Reshaping Politics*. In Lundby, K. *Mediatization of Communication*. Berlin: De GruyterMouton, 375-403.

Strömbäck, J. and Dimitrova, D.V. (2010): Exploring semi-structural differences in Television News Between the United States and Sweden. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254093252_Exploring_semi-structural_differences_in_television_news_between_the_United_States_and_Sweden

Strömbäck, J. & Dimitrova, D.V. (2006). Political and media systems matter: A comparison of election news coverage in Sweden and the United States. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 11(4),131–47.

Strömbäck and L. Kaid Handbook (Eds.). *Handbook of Elections News Coverage around the World*. New York: Rutledge.

Strömbäck, J and Dimitrova, DV. (2011) Mediatisation and media interventionism: A comparative analysis of Sweden and the United States. *International Journal of Press/Politics* 16, 30–49.

Strömbäck, J, Van Aelst, P. (2010). Exploring some antecedents of the media's framing of election news: A comparison of Swedish and Belgian election news. *International Journal of Press/Politics*, 15(1), 41–59.

Strömbäck J. (2008) - Four Phases of Mediatization: An Analysis of the Mediatization of Politics. *Press/Politics*, 13(3), 228-244.

Strömbäck, J. (2011). Mediatization and perceptions of the media's political influence. *Journalism Studies*. 12(4), 423–439

Takens, J., van Atteveldt, W., van Hoof, A., and Kleinnijenhuis, J. (2013). Media logic in election campaign coverage. *European Journal of Communication*, 28(3), 277–293. doi: 10.1177/0267323113478522.

Tayie, S. (2019). News Literacy for a Responsible Online News Experience Against Harmful Messages: Implications for Political Engagement of Egyptian and Spanish Youth. PhD. Thesis Project Submitted to the Faculty of Communication Sciences, Department of Journalism and Communication Sciences, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) Spain, in fulfillment of the requirements of for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Retrieved from: <https://ddd.uab.cat/record/217853?ln=en>

TCPC. (1993). The Presidency: Technical committee on privatization and commercialization final report, I. (Main Report).

Tejedor, S., Cervi, L., Tusa, F., Portalés, M., Zabolina, M. (2021). La información de la pandemia COVID-19 en las portadas de los diarios. Estudio comparativo de Italia, Reino Unido, España, Francia, Portugal, Estados Unidos, Rusia y Alemania. *Revista*

Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 66(242), 251-291. <http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2021.242.77439>

THISDAY Newspapers. (2021). Retrieved from <https://www.thisdaylive.com>

Uche, L. (1989). *Mass media, people and politics in Nigeria*. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company.

Umar, M.S. (2006). *Islam and Colonialism Intellectual Responses of Muslims of Northern Nigeria to British Colonial Rule*. Brill, Leiden, Boston, 19-24

UNICEF Nigeria Report on Education 2017: <https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/education>

UNDP Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NGA.pdf

World Bank: Nigeria Biannual Economic Update: Connecting to Complete. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/769551524576691390/pdf/WP-NigeriaBiannualEconomicUpdateAprilFinalVersion-PUBLIC.pdf>

World Bank Nigeria Systematic Country Diagnostic: (2019). *Moving Toward a Middle-Class Society, Nigeria on the Move: A Journey to Inclusive Growth*

Yakubu, J. (2005). Colonialism, Customary Law and the post-colonial State in Africa: The Case of Nigeria. *African Journals Online*, Africa Development Vol 30, No 4. 201-220. (Impact of colonialism on customary law)

Zaller, J. (1998). The rule of product substitution in presidential campaign news. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 560, 111-128. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1048980>

Van Aelst., P, Sheafer., T, Stanyer., J. (2012). Personalization of politics in the news. *Journalism*,13(2).

Zaller, J.R (2001). The rule of product substitution in presidential campaign news. In: Katz, E, Warshel, Y (Eds) (2001). Election studies. What's their use? Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 247–270.

Vanguard Newspapers. (2021). Retrieved from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/>