Measuring the Content of National Identities and Political Mobilization through Identity Saliency

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Abstract

This thesis is a contribution to the empirical research on national identities, nationalism, and political participation, from an individual level perspective of analysis and using survey data. First, this thesis presents a conceptualization and a new measurement model of the content of national identities that applies in seventeen European countries. Secondly, it also shows a procedure to create survey items to improve the measurement of the content of national identities in multinational states such as Spain. Thirdly, this thesis makes a contribution to the analysis of protest participation by proposing and testing a model that relates the saliency of national identities with political protest in Catalonia.

Resum

Aquesta tesi és una contribució a la recerca empírica sobre identitats nacionals, nacionalisme i participació política, adoptant una perspectiva d'anàlisi a nivell individual i utilitzant dades d'enquesta. Primerament, a la tesi es presenta una conceptualització i un nou model de mesura del contingut de les identitats nacionals, aplicable a disset països europeus. En segon lloc, la tesi també mostra un procediment per a crear ítems d'enquesta que permeten millorar la mesura del contingut de la identitat nacional en països plurinacionals com Espanya. Finalment, aquesta tesi fa una contribució a l'anàlisi de la protesta política com a forma de participació, proposant i contrastant empíricament en el cas de Catalunya un model que relaciona la saliency de les identitats nacionals i la protesta política.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

In 10 December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stating that "Everyone has the right to a nationality" and that "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality" (Article 15). The nature, scope, and consequences of the two World Wars preceded and provoked the appearance of both the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The two statements make all human beings holders of the right to a nationality and the right to change it, while states are made the main duty bearers implied by these rights. Through its citizenship policies, states regulate the conditions for access to nationality, conditions for any person to become a member of the nation. These elements: states, citizenship policies, national membership are the cornerstones of the international landscape where every individual has –at least- a nationality or is member of a nation. This thesis is about the third one of those elements: national membership, and specifically on the subjective aspects of national identities.

The scholar Walker Connor looked for a definition of national communities to address the subjective aspects of national identities, to go beyond purely territorial or institutional definitions of national communities. His 1989 conference titled 'When is a nation?' attracted a great deal of attention and opened scholarly discussion about the origin of nations. In a strong statement made later on, he declared that the topic of his conference was not important because national "[…] identity does not draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions; […] whatever historians may say, in popular perceptions nations are eternal" (Özkirimli 2005, 199).

The intertwining of states, nations, and citizens can be traced back to the French Revolution, when for the first time state-building processes in Europe were funded on a combination of individuals' feelings, identities and national consciousness (Linz 2008 557). The French triad of freedom, equality, and fraternity became the core of claims linked to the creation of nations and the programmes to enhance already existing ones; and so they have remained until our

days (Schnapper 2001). Nowadays, most individuals in the world are citizens within the scope of state institutional machinery; in this sense one might say they are shaped by nations and nation-states. Even in a globalizing world, it is difficult to exaggerate the relevance of national communities, movements, and states; in fact, the international organization of world affairs is so embedded in people's perception that it is frequently transparent to themselves (Calhoun 1997). Most individuals frame the events, thoughts and relations within such a world. Escaping from it or adopting a reflective view requires departing from our *natural* way of being and perceiving, not only because of existing regulations to grant nationality to every person but also because having a given nationality implies enjoying certain citizenship rights (and duties) and, not the least, because of the emotional ties individuals develop towards conational peers and towards national communities themselves. The nature of those ties may condition the attitudes towards acceptance of some type of rules and policies to regulate one's own community, and also to regulate the relation with aliens (Deutsch 1966). In fact, concerns about these issues, especially during the World War II, encouraged Hans Kohn to elaborate *The Idea of Nationalism* (1948) to distinguish between political and cultural nationalisms. He conceived political nationalisms as those where membership to the nation is sustained on rational decisions made by individuals, or reasons based on their will; while cultural nations would be those where membership is based on already existing and shared traits among members of the nation. National policies, and citizens' attitudes and behavior, Kohn would say, are determined by the type of the nation they come from.

Individuals, their thoughts, feelings, and behavior, play a key role in the development and reproduction of nations or nationalism. Nevertheless, as we will see in this introduction, it has only been recently that empirical research on nations and nationalisms have shifted the object of study from the aggregates, the nations, to the individuals. This thesis intends to contribute to this body of research by focusing on two aspects of national identities: first, what has been called in the literature the content of national identity or

representations of national identity made by individuals; secondly, to the role of saliency of national identities in promoting citizens political participation. The contributions of this thesis are both substantive and methodological, and will be summarized in this introduction. The cases of study embrace different European territories: Chapter 2 will analyze the content of national identity in seventeen European countries; Chapter 3 will cover also the topic of the content of national identities in multinational countries, specifically the content of national identity of the titular nation or the center nation-builder, using Spain as the case of study. Chapter 4 will analyze the role of identity saliency as a factor of mobilization for political participation, specifically of protest participation, in territories where the center-periphery cleavage is relevant. The case of study will be Catalonia, where two main national identities articulate the center-periphery dynamics among Catalans.

1. Literature review on nations and nationalism in Europe

In the 1980s a few scholarly contributions reopened the interest in nations and nationalisms as objects of study. The fundamental works of Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983) and Smith (1986) aimed at explaining the socio-economic conditions and time of appearance of nations and nationalism, and the relation between the two. As in the classic works conducted by early sociologists, they analyzed the emergence of nationalism as a phenomenon concurrent with modernity, under the macro-processes of transition from traditional to modern societies. The strategy used in those studies focused mostly on the analysis of elites' discourses and policies to identify the necessary socio-economic conditions of success for nationalist movements. Other scholars argued from a Marxist perspective that there are not objective and generalizable conditions either to identify nations (Hobsbawm 1990) or to define nationhood (Calhoun 1997). In reference and clear opposition to the discussion opened by Connor

(1990), Marxists would point to the instrumental use of nationalism by the bourgeoisie, manipulating memories through the invention of tradition, as Hobsbawm famously put it.

In parallel a great deal of attention was devoted to analyse the characteristics and typologies of existing nations and nationalisms, mostly constructed on the basis of elite discourses and nation-building policies taken from historiographical sources (Smith 1991; Brubaker 1992; Kymlicka 1995). One of the most popular typologies from this period was the one that distinguishes Primordialists from Modernists: the former would claim that nations are based on a pre-existing ethnic substrate, which nationalist movements or elites develop, while modernists would claim that nationalisms created nations during the modernization process occurred since late XVIII and XIX Centuries. Smith (1991) would ascribe to a third type, the Ethnosymbolist, which combines aspects from both and stressed the constructivist core of national discourses which legitimate the existence and programmes of nations.

This period finalized when Billig (1995) shifted the focus on the everyday mechanisms that explain state-nationalisms reproduction, especially from the point of view of citizens perceptions. The creation of a we-feeling opposed to them would be the result of nationalizing agents and institutions such as the intellectuals, politicians, and specific arrangements of symbols and rituals present in everyday life, like flags waving in official buildings, the anthem played in sports events or the arrangement of teams according to their national origin in international sports competitions, or the world framing through national maps shown in weather forecast television programmes, to name a few. This publication widened the areas of interest besides state-seeking nationalisms, unveiling the existence and pervasiveness of nationalism beyond its violent expressions. In fact, Billig's work had also a bigger impact in the field of nationalism studies as it paved the way for the adoption of plainly constructivist approaches to the study of nationalism. Nowadays, for example, it is quite common

conceiving nationalism as a discursive form (Calhoun 1997; Özkirimli 2005), and focusing on the analysis of how nationalism structures individuals' perception, thought and experience, discourse and political action (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Brubaker 1996).

The constructivist turn generated an increased interest to conduct analysis at the individual level, to conduct empirical tests of existing untested hypothesis, and scholars started studying citizens' views, opinions, and attitudes related to the nation (Billiet, Maddens, and Beerten 2003; Bollen and Díez Medrano 1998; Shulman 2002). The lack of objective conditions to classify nations and nationalisms, having commonly shared conceptual tools to describe, has not been an obstacle for the production of comparative empirical research on the subject. The explanation lies in the fact that scholars made use of a conceptual framework designed several decades earlier: the distinction between ethnic and civic nations; between nationalistic and patriotic attitudes towards the nation; cultural and political conceptions of the nation; restrictive and open criteria of membership to the nation.

This trend of scholars who started analyzing the subject at the individual level and using survey data, distinguished between civic/liberal nations and ethnic/illiberal ones. Building upon the early Meincke's (1970) distinction between political and cultural nations, Hans Kohn (1948) elaborated a dichotomy on the historical grounds of the nationalization processes in Western and Eastern European countries. In Western countries the nationalization process was simultaneous or posterior to the existence of the state. This means, the argument goes, that there was relatively high cultural homogeneity at the moment when states set their institutional machinery in motion to unify and nationalize the population. Moreover as that moment coincided with the Enlightenment debates, nationalization was inspired by ideas such as liberty and equality of the individual members of the nation. On the contrary Eastern European states were cultural or ethnic mosaics and nationalist

political demands were sustained on the necessity to match states with ethnic boundaries. In order to build a base level of social unity the notion of equality implied by the idea of citizenship was not at play. Instead the idea of ascendance, heritage or *volk* was the reference point. Nowadays this dual conceptualization has been taken beyond Kohn's historical account, and as exemplified in the work of Brubaker (1996) it focuses on the criteria of membership in the nation. Membership in civic nations would depend on decisions or on status attributes of the individual that depended on the will of the individual herself; while membership in ethnic nations would depend on inherited features. The same criteria would then be used to characterize peoples' representation of their own and others' nations, what we will call in this thesis *the content of the nation*. To summarize, an association is generally made between the civic conceptions of the nation and Ernest Renan statement that nations exist as long as their members share a feeling of common membership; and between the ethnic conception and the emphasis in German romanticism on inherited culture.

Theoretical criticisms of the ethnic-civic distinction point to the actual fluidity of the criteria used to distinguish both categories; the set of civic features -whatever they may be- or the set of ethnic ones –whatever they are- are not embodied in any existing nation. And the same might be said of national identities: there is no such thing as a civic national identity or an ethnic one, but they appear to be mixed in reality, and so the issue is to know how they are mixed. We can find in the literature different expressions of this basic objection: first, we can say that all nations have an ethnic component since all nationalist narratives emphasize the uniqueness of the nation in history and its singularity related to concrete boundaries (Spencer and Wollman 2002). Secondly, if one interprets the ethnic conception in a narrow sense, i.e. the emphasis being made on ancestry or descent, the result would be that there would be no ethnic nations and hence all nations should be conceived as civic. If on the contrary civic nations are defined narrowly, i.e. the definition excludes any

reference to cultural traits; all nations should be conceived as ethnic. As Özkirimli (2005, 22-28) states, the large majority of citizens in "civic" nations have no choice as they acquire citizenship by birth and not by an act of will, while entry to another "civic" nation may be as restrictive as entry to an "ethnic" one. Brubaker (1999) expressed these ambiguities showing the difficulties in accommodating cultural traits into the dichotomy. Eventually there is a growing consensus recognizing that actual nations consist of a mixture of ethno-cultural and political traits (Brubaker 1998). A common response scholars give to the criticisms mentioned above would be that the ethnic and civic categories should be considered Weberian ideal types that can help guide research (Ignatieff 1994). But while one can acknowledge the analytical or inspirational utility of the distinction in such terms, empirical analysis should take into account that the content of nations is made of combinations of both elements, is this is not certainly the case as we will see in detail in this thesis.

Research on the relation between national identities and political participation has mainly dealt with electoral participation, with few exceptions found in the literature of social movements, especially within the framing approach (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994). This body of research has been mostly theorized under the analysis of the European modernization process in the configuration of political parties and party systems developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Initially the authors suggested capturing the political dynamics of nationalisms in multinational countries as expressions of conflicts between developed centers and relatively underdeveloped peripheries. This approach would fail in the case of Spain because minority nationalisms appeared in more economically developed peripheries rather than the center, namely Catalonia and the Basque Country. In fact this was one of the underlying causes behind peripheral nationalist mobilization. Later on, Rokkan and Urwin (Rokkan and Urwin 1982) would generalize the mechanisms by which center-periphery cleavages explain the political dynamics of

conflict: peripheral issues would arise from the incongruence among cultural, political, and economic roles between relevant or numerous actors in the center and the periphery. Within this framework, most empirical studies focus on the relation between national identities in peripheral areas and party choice, and national identity is taken as a given and its measurement is not problematized but assumed (with nationalism scales, origin, language), or the well-known Linz question (Linz 1986) is the main tool chosen (Winter and Türsan 1998; Winter, Gómez-Reino, and Lynch 2006; Pérez-Nievas and Fraile 2000; Montero and Font 1991; Shabad 1986). An attempt to elaborate on the electoral mobilization of peripheral nationalist parties in Europe can be found in Pérez-Nievas and Bonet (Pérez-Nievas and Bonet 2006). In fact, what most of these studies assume is that there is a relation between individuals' national self-categorization and vote or party choice. A complementary line aiming also at explaining the relation between national identities and electoral behavior, was opened by the developmental perspective (Leifer 1981). As in the cleavage approach, the development perspective also consists of a theoretical framework built within a wider framework to explain macro-processes. Scholars proposing developmental models sustain that ethnic or national mobilization is actually based on class or status dynamics because economic categories and ethnic or national categories overlap. This model presents nationalist mobilization articulated around a set of absolute grievances claims. This, as happened with earlier proposals of the center-periphery cleavage approach, would not work for nationalisms based in better-off regions. Later variations of these models would focus on claims based on relative grievances; or they would pay more attention to occupational structure in majority versus minority nations; these approaches have been tested to explain nationalist vote choice, producing sometimes contradictory results (Hechter y Okamoto, 2001; Díez Medrano 1994).

2. Overview of the Research

a. Analytical Approach

The lack of a shared knowledge on the definition of nations and national identities has produced a myriad of concepts, definitions and studies that pose serious challenges to advance research and cumulative knowledge on the subject. Certainly this is something quite usual in social sciences, but the pervasiveness of the national discourses has taken things to a point where sometimes it has been difficult to distinguish nationalist claims from nationalism analysis; between categories of practice and categories of analysis in the field of nationalism (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Quoting George Orwell, Brubaker and Cooper suggested that "[…] the worst thing one can do with words is to surrender to them. If language is to be an instrument for expressing and not for concealing or preventing thought, one must let the meaning choose the word, and not the other way about" (2000, 1).

The clarification of categories of analysis is a fundamental step in this area to make any progress, because alternatively the use of categories of practice to refer to nations or national identities leads very easily to the reification of the subject (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004) or to a methodological nationalism whereby the object of study is circumscribed to the spaces or territories that coincide with the nationalist discourses (nations or state-nations territories) which have affected social theory and research since XIX century (Chernilo 2007; Smelser 1997).

Another caveat to conduct studies on nations and nationalisms, raised by Brubaker (2004) as well, is related to the naturalization of social categories and to what he called groupism: the attribution of some characteristics to all the members of a group that leads to explanations national or ethnic conflicts are built in terms of conflicts between national or identity groups. Groupism is the "tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous and

externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis (Brubaker 2009, 28).

In order to clarify the analytical framework and prevent some of the analytical problems highlighted, I will set the conceptual framework and assumptions used in this thesis. I will define *nation* as a social category a certain number of individuals claim to belong to, in the sense of an imagined community (Anderson 1991) that has certain traits: it is made of equal members normally territorially concentrated, who have shared cultural elements, rituals, and symbols representing itself (Smith 1991). The nation is better understood as the result of dynamic process influenced by the institutional setting, intentional policies (nation-building), and the political environment; hence I consider the nation an endogenous product of the political sphere. Nationalist discourses are articulated around the existence of the nation through three sets of interrelated claims: identity claims, by which most individuals are categorized as belonging to one nation or another; temporal claims, pointing towards a story of the nation and a project; and territorial claims, whereby the nation and its members are linked to a delimited land (Özkirimli 2005, 208-209).

This thesis is built on the four cognitive dimensions that characterize individuals' national identification, summarized by Hierro (2012): self-categorization, content, saliency and intensity. *Self-categorization* is the process by which individuals ascribe themselves as members of a social category (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981) a nation (or more) in our case. The *content* of national identification refers to the cognitive meaning assigned or the ways that individuals represent the characteristics of the nation (Huddy 2001). From a collective point of view, the content has two components: the meaning and the degree of contestation of that meaning among the individuals who ascribe to the nation (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2006). *Saliency* is the importance

that a particular identification with a nation has for the individuals. Saliency has been proven to have a positive relation with individuals' opinions and behavior (Abrams 1992; Deaux 1992). And finally, Intensity, which refers to the strength of identification with a given category.

In Chapter 2, the content of national identity in seventeen European countries will be dependent variable, while in chapter 3 the dependent variable will be Spanish national identity. Chapter 4 will turn center the attention to saliency of national identification in Catalonia to understand what is the relation between saliency and political protest participation.

b. **The Chapters**

The next chapter (2) builds on the conceptualization of collective identities proposed by Abdelal et al. (2006), to present and test a measurement model of the content of national identities based on Mokken scaling procedure. This approach provides an explanation to a finding stressed though unattended by scholars who analyzed the content of national identities using survey data: most citizens conceive their nation in inclusive/civic terms, while few others conceive it simultaneously in both inclusive/civic and exclusive/ethnic ones. The unidimensional cumulative Mokken model proposed also addresses the main criticism to the ethnic-civic dichotomy of national identities, namely that all existing nations are combinations of civic and ethnic elements. Using survey data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2003 survey, the model is applied and validated in sixteen out of seventeen European countries under a demanding –albeit unrealistic- restriction. If lifted such restriction, results improve and the model is validated for all the countries. The result is a parsimonious characterization of national identities at both collective and individual levels, which shows a common pattern of combination of ethnic and civic components across countries while simultaneously retains the information required to portray national singularities.

In the Chapter 3, the Mokken model developed and tested is used to test the validity and reliability of two sets of survey items aiming at measuring the content of national in Spain. The studies that have analyzed the content of national identities under the ethnic-civic dichotomy, using survey data, have focused on the study of national identities in nation-states, this chapter focuses on the measurement of the more complex state-nations identities, states with more than one national group. Here we present an application of the Q-methodology to create survey items to measure national identities, and apply it to a state-nation. We use the case of Spain to analyse the quality of Q-

methodology survey items from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) survey CIS-2667, conducted in 2007, to measure Spanish state-nation identity, and we compare them with the well-known civic-ethnic items from ISSP-2003. The comparison is based on the comparison of unidimensional cumulative Mokken scales with items from both surveys. External validation of the scales is produced to account for territorial and ideological cleavages in the conception of Spanish identity. The results show that the Q-methodology items outperform the ethnic-civic ones in terms of internal and external validity, and reliability.

Empirical studies on the relation between national identification and political participation in general, and also in Catalonia, have focused mostly on electoral participation. This is understandable given the relevance of the center-periphery cleavage in electoral politics. Chapter 4 focuses on two neglected sides of national identification and political participation: saliency of national identification and political protest. The political conflict in Catalonia is articulated not only around the category of national identification chosen by Catalans: Spanish or Catalan or a combination of the two, but also around how salient is that identification for them. Building on literature of social-psychology, this chapter argues that irrespective of the category of national identification, saliency of identification increases the chances that individuals become politically engaged or motivated, and through this they become involved in political protest activities. This hypothesis is contrasted empirically with survey data from the CIS-2450 study, using Structural Equations Modeling.

Chapter 2. A Unidimensional Measurement Model of National Identities in Europe

Eduard Bonet

1. Introduction

The interest in the study of nationalism and national identities grew since the appearance of the fundamental contributions by Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983) and Smith (1986). The three authors would propose wide-range theories on the origins of nations and their relation with nationalism. The increased volume of empirical research on national identities and nationalisms they spurred was generally centered in the analysis of the roles of elites, their discourses, and the policies implemented by nationalist governments or nation-building programmes. Perspectives adopted were predominantly historical, using long temporal scales in analysis that would allow to test the validity of classifications and typologies of nations and nationalisms suggested in the literature. Most of the scholarly debate has been devoted to the validation and refinement of two typologies of nations and nationalisms: one typology categorizes approaches in the conception of the origins and nature of nations and nationalisms as Primordialists, Modernists, and Ethnosymbolists. The second typology directly classifies nations, national policies or programmes according to their meaning or content in terms of the dichotomy of Civic and Ethnic nations, politically and culturally based nations.

In the last decade a line of empirical research has consolidated the use of surveys to explore the dichotomy of Civic and Ethnic nations. The analysis of the content of national identities has moved from elites to citizens, from historical to public opinion studies. The use of survey data has been a key instrument to this process, and an opportunity to study the linkage between national policies and elite discourses with public opinion. Although scholars have made extensive use of survey data to analyze the content of national identities under the dichotomy of Civic and Ethnic, results have been ambiguous, as we will see. Some scholars have stressed that we yet "actually know very little about how the "nation" defines itself"

(Díez Medrano and Koenig 2005, 86), referring to the inconclusive results attained (Hjerm 1998).

This growing body of empirical research with survey data that built around the two concepts of the dichotomy civic-ethnic: the political dimension and the cultural one, has expanded in several areas of research. One of these areas focuses on the comparability of the civic-ethnic dichotomy among countries, seeking to uncover structural characteristics in the survey items associated with the dichotomy (Davidov 2009; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010); a different area of research explores the relation between national and European identities (Bruter 2003; Carey 2002; Ruiz Jiménez, Górniak, Kandulla, Kiss, et al. 2004); and yet others explore the dimensionality of survey items used to measure the dichotomy to establish country classifications as (more) ethnic or (more) civic, and analyze their classifications with policy preferences or attitudes (Heath and Tilley 2005; Janmaat 2006; Jones and Smith 2001a, 2001b; Shulman 2002). Scholars usually echo the most common objections raised against the dichotomy, objections tapping its usefulness and accuracy, and cautionary messages sent to note the risk of reifying national identities and social groups; some also have noted the difficulties of classifying any particular national identity with either the civic or the ethnic categories throughout time (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004; Özkirimli 2005). Yet empirical studies, and particularly those building on survey data, continue making extensive use of the dichotomy while keeping unaltered the conceptual and research strategies (Jayet 2012). Hence empirical research has not adopted strategies to overcome ambiguities and take on board criticisms of the conceptual framework used; as a result we still lack of an adequate measurement model of national identities that would allow a certain accumulation and sophistication of knowledge on national identities.

The main challenge faced in the empirical research that uses survey data to study the content of national identities is the need to provide

a way to articulate the civic and the ethnic elements of national identities at the individual level. A clarification on the nature of the dichotomy is required, on what are the patterns expected or how individuals may respond to them. And the discussion on the conceptualization should also lead to adequate measurement models to better capture the proposed concept. Some questions should be answered in this process: can we apply the same civic-ethnic dichotomy to the analysis of the content of national identities from a collective and from an individual point of view? Is the content of national identity a bipolar concept with ethnic elements at one pole and civic ones at the other, so countries should be classifiable as civic or ethnic, the same as individuals should? Is the content of national identity an N-dimensional concept -with ethnic and civic being each one of the dimensions-, which can combine each other producing alternative dimensions? Can the content of national identity be a mixture of both ethnic and civic elements that follows certain regular patterns of combination of the elements? If national identities are combinations of both kinds of elements, as some literature has suggested, is it possible to use the civic-ethnic dichotomy to measure consistently collective and individual levels of national identity, while accounting for that combination of elements?

This chapter builds on Abdelal et al. (2006) to propose a new and parsimonious measurement model of the content of national identities for European countries, using survey data and building on the dichotomy of ethnic and civic components of identity. The model used to measure the content of national identities is built upon realistic assumptions on the type of data used, and allows us to describe national identities at both collective and individual levels. Here we will provide answers to the above questions proposing a unidimensional conception of the content of national identities in Europe, and using Mokken scaling procedures to test it. The result obtained reduces complexity by capturing the regularity of the way that civic and ethnic elements are combined. Results inform on the content of national identities at the collective and individual levels.

Eventually, and noticeably, this model produces a single continuous variable which measures individuals' national identity. Results will show that from a collective point of view, pure ethnic and civic nations do not exist; at the individual level, results indicate that the content of national identity is civic for the majority of individuals; albeit for some of them national identity also includes ethnic elements.

The following section provides a brief review of the empirical literature on the content of national identities in Europe, based on the civic-ethnic dichotomy, in order to highlight conceptual and empirical flaws. Section 3 contains the conceptualization of national identities and describes how the regularities expected can be accounted for by it. Section 4 introduces the measurement model, and Section 5 presents the results of its application to the seventeen European countries included in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2003). Here the model is also validated against opinions regarding immigrants and immigration. The last section, Section 6, discusses and summarizes the findings, notes several caveats, and suggests areas for further research.

2. The content of national identities in European countries

Empirical research conducted to analyze the content of national identities of individuals in European countries has mostly been elaborated with data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) surveys. Two analytical strategies have been adopted by scholars: in the first one, researchers would build on more or less explicit theoretical considerations to associate a set of survey items with ethnic conceptions of national identities and a set of survey items with civic conceptions (for example Shulman 2002; Díez Medrano 2005). They would then use techniques to test their assumptions, either confirmatory factor analysis or more complex

models using structural equations, and they would also explore the relation between different types of national identity and attitudes towards immigration, tolerance, or more general attitudes of openness. The second strategy seeks to understand the situation a posteriori, exploring what are the patterns that emerge from data as a matter of fact, and hence here authors would use exploratory factor analysis techniques. Results are then interpreted as if every resulting dimension would correspond to any of the two available latent variables: ethnic or civic (Heath and Tilley 2005; Jones and Smith 2001a, 2001b). In either strategy, a discussion about the context dependency of the items' meanings is normally absent (Díez Medrano 2005), certainly because this would increase complexity of comparative analysis when it comes the moment to explain why certain items seem to behave (cluster) differently in different countries. Some scholars noted that, especially in the second strategy, it can be difficult to accommodate items such as the *language* and the *territorial* ones under the civic-ethnic conceptions. Their findings show that in some countries the same item is associated with one category of the dichotomy while in other countries it matches the alternative category. Some authors have taken this further and have tried to show that one cannot do cross-country comparisons between these kind of survey items because they are interpreted differently across countries (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010). Janmaat (2006) has already stressed the incongruence between the theoretical constructs informing what items measure the civic dimension and what items measure the ethnic one, and the results normally obtained in empirical analysis; his own research concludes with 'partial' confirmation of a structure that corresponds with the civic-ethnic dimensions.

Scholars in any of the two analytical strategies generally have the expectation that the survey items will somehow reflect the civic-ethnic dichotomy, with items clustering in what might be interpreted as a civic type and others in an ethnic one. Technically speaking the result that is most commonly obtained is a bidimensional factor

structure with a first set of items loading on a civic factor, which would explain the largest part of the variance, and another set of items loading on a second factor –with some items loading in both factors. Additionally all studies show that the two factors are highly and positively correlated, although the reason behind this correlation is neglected. So while scholars use survey data to find out clusters of traits that they tend to interpret as reflecting the opposite civic and ethnic dimensions, it turns out that the two dimensions are highly correlated. In fact, the relation between the two dimensions appears already troubling in more basic stages of the analysis: ISSP survey items that are traditionally conceived as civic (for example, respecting the law) are in all countries the ones that most people consider important elements of the content of national identity, while ethnic items (for example, having national ancestors) tend to be considered important by smaller shares of the population. If scholars treat (implicitly or explicitly) civic and ethnic as two mutually exclusive terms, then they should explain why survey data shows that for some individuals the content of national identity has only civic traits, while for some others (fewer) it has both civic and ethnic traits. A thorough review of this and other related discrepancies among the conceptualization of the content of national identities, the measurement models used, and results obtained, can be found in Jayet (2012).

In general, there seems to be a need to clarify the conceptualization of the dichotomy and to provide an adequate measurement model with survey data. If one thinks that ethnic and civic characteristics are mutually exclusive, then this should be reflected in the measurement models chosen; for example, when using a confirmatory factor analysis by defining no correlation between factors. In order to be more precise, if we understand the civic-ethnic dichotomy as a bipolar concept that ranges from the civic pole to the ethnic one, meaning that if a person has an ethnic understanding then he/she is certainly not civic and vice versa, then it would be more appropriate to model it empirically as an unfolding scaling model

(Van Schuur and Kiers 1994). There are different available alternatives, here we propose a unidimensional conceptualization of the content of national identity, and we will specify the pattern by which different traits are organized to constitute the content of national. Such a pattern follows a particular cumulative model by which civic traits are generally part of the content of national identities, and ethnic traits are only part of the content of national identities for more reduced groups of individuals.

3. How is the nation? The content of national identities in European countries

It is likely that the problems stressed above derive from the dichotomy civic-ethnic itself, but also from the application of the dichotomy to the individual level analysis while it was created to operate at the collective or macro level. Scholars have not provided an explanation of the linkage between the macro and the micro levels that might justify applying the dichotomy to both levels. In this section we present a definition of national identities and discuss the basic traits that national identities may have in Europe, aiming at clarifying concepts and paving the way to propose an adequate measurement model.

We use here the analytical framework that Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott (2006) proposed to study collective identities. This framework aims to facilitate the operationalization and comparable research of social identities in general by defining social identities as categories that vary across two dimensions. The first dimension is the meaning or the content of a collective identity, which may be of four types: constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models. Here we explore the first type: the constitutive norms of national identities, the rules or features that define group membership. At the end of the chapter we will show how specific understandings of the constitutive norms of national identities shape cognitive models regarding immigration. The second dimension of social identities is the degree of contestation over the meaning of some rules or features among group members. Here we focus on the measurement of the content of national identity, although it will also be noticed that the measurement model proposed can also be easily used to indicate the degree of contestation.

We have seen that empirical studies rule out the expectation that ethnic and civic traits are mutually exclusive. It is therefore reasonable to expect that a mixture of ethnic and civic traits will be found. In this case, for this to be theoretically relevant there should be a non-random pattern of combinations of ethnic and civic traits which can also be generalized in different countries. Analyzing how individuals conceive their nations entails looking at the specific features they associate with them. The focus is set on what traits individuals think, irrespective of its content of truth (whether or not it is objectively right or accurate to associate a certain trait with the nation is irrelevant here), are constitutive of their nation. We are thinking here of typical ethnic or civic tokens: blood or ascendancy, birth place, civic attitudes or behavior, mother tongue, etc., can be combined in different ways to portray different nations, or the same nation at different times. Citizens from the same country can conceive their nation in many different ways, some of which might be similar, others complementary, others opposing and others even incompatible. Hence looking for a pattern behind the possible combinations of traits must not preclude those ways of conceiving the nation. To be sure, if there is any such thing as a pattern of combination of traits to represent the nation it should provide room for differences among citizens. This is what is implied by acknowledging that some of the representations of the nation will be contested (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2006).

An empirically driven typology of individuals according to the content of national identities has been proposed: *postnationalists* are individuals whose meaning of the nation is based on civic, open or inclusive criteria; while *credentialists*, are those whose meaning is made with a mix of civic and ethnic criteria (Díez Medrano 2005). This typology focuses on Spanish data, captures the fact that for most of the ISSP survey respondents the content of their nation consists of inclusive or civic criteria, while for a smaller share the content consists of exclusive or ethnic criteria simultaneously. The ethnic criteria are considered relevant national identity criteria by much less

respondents than the civic ones. Here I will propose a measurement model of the content of national identities that accounts for the regularity stressed by this typology. The measurement model will show that the typology applies to all European countries: most European citizens have a postnationalist conception of their nation, while a smaller number have a credentialist conception. Importantly, credentialists regard civic and ethnic criteria as constituents of the content of the nation, so there is not an *ethnicist-only* type of citizens. I will show also that differences exist in the way specific criteria align to portray the content of the nation at an aggregate level, i.e. in each country there is a particular way of ranking the civic and ethnic criteria.

Why for most European citizens the content of their respective nations consists of civic criteria? Why would the civic criteria be the least contested, or most widely accepted, among the population in Europe? Why there is not an ethnicist-only type of citizen? The way citizens represent their country is conditioned by the discourses of the elite, the structure of political conflict (or cleavages), institutions, policies, or to put it in Brubaker's (2011) terms, it is the effect of nationalizing projects and processes. Nationalizing agencies target the population in the national territory but they operate within a broader context, where some macro processes affect all countries and condition some aspects of nationalizing projects and processes. European countries are under the influence of the European Union (EU), either because they are already members of the club, they are aiming to access it, or just because their agreements with the EU are conditioned by the club requirements. The 1993 Copenhagen European Council established the political criteria for any country's access to the EU, which can be broadly summarized as: having the democracy guaranteed by stable institutions, rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. These criteria have been one of the forces pushing towards more liberal convergence in citizenship policies among European countries

(Howard 2009).[1] And the increasing pressure trend would be reinforced by the saliency gained by individual rights as human rights in the post-national citizenship era (Soysal 1994). Obviously these factors also condition the countries in other directions, for example in the way European countries can accommodate multicultural and even multinational diversity relying on mechanisms that aim to stabilize democratic regimes on liberal bases (Linz and Stepan 1996; Stepan 1998). These forces condition the nationalizing projects and processes that political elites can put in place. An eloquent and blunt example of this is the EU reaction, in Winter 2000, to the far-right wing Freedom Party forming a governing coalition in Austria: the remaining fourteen member countries pledged to boycott relations with Austrian Government, while the holder of the EU's rotating presidency, the Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres said: "The problem is not Jörg Haider but what his party represents".[2] The direction nationalizing projects can take under such an environment requires fostering inclusive criteria of the nation that can accommodate individuals' and social groups' diversity. One can see "shared inclusive civic criteria" of the nation as an equivalent of the Rawlsian overlapping consensus in liberal societies around democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This would in fact be a functional argumentation; a certain degree of coincidence regarding the way citizens conceive their nation is necessary for the stability of the community and solidarity bonds. And certainly, complex modern societies require some levels of consonance between polities and citizenship; the community and solidarity bonds (Calhoun 1997); a ground to legitimate tax systems and welfare services. A functional argument like this does not necessarily imply that national identities are immutable or that this outcome is ineluctable. It is an outcome

[1] Howard argues that in those countries where the opening up of citizenship policies has not occurred, this can be explained by the role of extreme right wing parties in the public discourse. Nevertheless other authors have shown that even those parties are adapting their discourse and communicative practices, and the ones that succeed tend to adapt their discourses to better capture the liberal and civic characteristics of national identities (Halikiopoulou, Mock, and Vasilopoulou 2013).

[2] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/mar/01/austria.ianblack

that might be explained for example through mechanisms such as those that regulate citizens' symbolic representation of their nations (Billig 1995) in liberal regimes, letting them internalize the constitutive norms of the nation as "rules that are lived rather than conspicuously applied", in the Wittgensteinian terms used by Abdelal et al. (2006, 697).[3]

4. How can the nation be measured?

We propose to measure the content of national identities in European countries with the unidimensional cumulative non-parametric Mokken model. We contend here that the Mokken model (Mokken 1997) is a strong candidate measurement model because it matches the features we described for the pattern of combinations of nationhood traits. First, it is a one-dimensional scaling model that can capture the mixing of elements. Secondly, the cumulativity of this scaling model fits adequately the two requirements of nationhood as we conceive it: it allows us to capture commonalities and discrepancies in nationhood traits among the population. A cumulative scaling procedure will uncover, if our conception of nationhood holds among the population, the set of shared traits by the majority of the population and also those traits that are most contested, i.e. the traits that are not shared by all the population. Thirdly, this model is appropriate for the measurement level of the ISSP 2003 items: under this model one is not assuming that the item responses are equal for all items or even that they resemble a normal distribution (see the graphs in the Annex). Quite the contrary: a cumulative model should be built upon variables that would have a certain pattern of differing distributions. The Mokken model is

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[3] Functionalism of this kind of explanation might be discussed, as such an explanation can avoid the three classical problematic postulates of functionalism: functional unity of society, universal functionalism, and indispensability (Merton 1967, 79–91).

designed for categorical variables and applicable to even a small number of them: originally with dummy variables and later on extended to ordinal ones (Molenaar 1997).

It is a relatively simple model –at least in terms of the assumptions made on the data- that retains as much substantively interesting information conveyed by the items as possible. Mokken Scale Analysis is *a combination of a measurement model and a procedure that is commonly used to assess people's abilities or attitudes […] [*It is a*] nonparametric probabilistic version of Guttman scaling […] used similarly to other techniques for data reduction that allow for the unidimensional measurement of latent variables* (Van Schuur 2003, 139).[4] Eventually, when the procedure has been applied to a set of items, the researcher knows which items form a cumulative scale, and then she can create an additive scale with those items by simply adding them up and hence providing a score for each case or individual.

The Guttman scalogram procedure (Guttman 1944) is at the origin of the Mokken model, though the latter adds room for measurement error in the model. There are two major Mokken models: the Monotone Homogeneity model and the Double Monotonicity model, which is a more demanding extension of the former. It is said that a set of items that conform to the Double Monotonicity model measure one unidimensional latent variable. In this case both the items and the respondents have scores of the latent variable, and they can be located along a latent continuum. It is a critical assumption of the model that the items that form a scale –or the items that are used to measure a latent trait[5]- can be ordered along the latent continuum according to their degree of difficulty (or according to how demanding it is to give a positive answer to each item). Respondents can also be ordered

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[4] For a complete overview of the model for dichotomous items see Mokken (1997) and Molenaar (1997) for its extension to ordinal items. Van Schuur (2003) gives a short but complete overview of the model with some examples.
[5] In Guttman's terms, the attributes used to measure a concept.

along the same latent continuum according to their ability (or propensity) to give positive answers to certain items.

Figure 1 shows the hypothetical ordering of dichotomous items and persons along a latent continuum where A is the most difficult item and D is the easiest one; person 1 is the person with the lowest scale score and person 4 is the one with the highest. The fact that the items form such a Mokken scale implies that the number of respondents that answered item A positively will be lower than the number of respondents answering item B positively, and this will be lower than the number of positive responses to item C, until we reach the easiest item D, which is the most popular in the sense that it has the highest number of positive responses.

Figure 1. Persons and Items along the Latent Variable continuum of difficulty levels

In order to keep this brief explanation as simple as possible, we shall continue to hypothesize that we are working with dichotomous items. In this case items' degrees of difficulty are determined by the frequency of positive responses that they have. This means that the easiest item will be the one that is most popular (the item to which a larger share of respondents gave positive answers) and the most difficult item will be the least popular one. This treatment of the items points to one nice feature of these scales: once a Mokken scale has been formed, one can interpret the meaning of the items that form the

scale simply by looking at their level of difficulty. This indeed is possible because of the cumulative nature of the items that form the scale. Let's take the example in Table 1 where a fictitious set of eight dichotomous items has been ordered according to their difficulty, i.e. the frequencies of positive answers given to each item. In this example the easiest item is Item8 and the most difficult is Item1.

Table 1. Hypothetical Example: Ordering of Items per Difficulty Levels

ITEM	Frequency of Positive Responses
Item1	120
Item2	200
Item3	340
Item4	380
Item5	541
Item6	706
Item7	726
Item8	893

The ordering of the items by frequency of positive responses is a first stage in the process of checking whether the items may form a cumulative scale. If we move to the individual level, then the cumulativity should be reflected as shown in Table 2. Here the items are ordered by the difficulty levels shown in Table 1, from the most difficult or least popular on the left (column titled "Item1") to the easiest on the right. In fact this is what a perfect Guttman scale of eight dichotomous items should look like since a perfect Guttman scale implies that any individual answering a specific item positively, would also answer the less difficult items positively. In Table 2, answering Item1 positively would imply answering all the remaining items positively (this corresponds to pattern 9 in the table). If we take for example response pattern 5, this would imply that the individuals

who answered positively Item5 also did so for the easier ones: Item6, Item7, and Item8. In the hypothetical data used in the table, 15 per cent of the sample responded according to pattern 9 and 10 per cent according pattern 5 (see last column).

Table 2. Hypothetical Example: Response patterns of 8 dichotomous items to a perfect Guttman scale

Response Patterns	Item1	Item2	Item3	Item4	Item5	Item6	Item7	Item8	Percentage respondents*
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	20
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	5
4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	15
5	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	10
6	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	5
7	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
8	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	15
							Total Percentage Respondents		100

0: negative response to the item; **1**: positive response to the item.
* The figures are fictitious.

The Mokken model transfers all these features into a probabilistic domain to account for measurement error, assuming that there will be response patterns which will not correspond to a perfect Guttman scale. There might be, for example, individuals that having responded positively to Item5, Item7 and Item8, have also responded negatively to item6, thus violating the pattern of a perfect Guttman scale. The Mokken procedure tests whether the number of violations is sufficiently high or the violations sufficiently grave to contradict the pattern of answers of the Guttman scale.

Once we identify a set of items that form a Mokken scale, we can create an additive scale with those items which will be the score of the latent variable. The relation of items and persons in this scale

based upon their score of the latent variable can be expressed in probabilistic terms as follows:

$$P(X_{k-1} = 1 \mid \theta_u) > P(X_k = 1 \mid \theta_u)$$

Given the score (value) of the latent variable for an individual, θ_u, the probability that the individual responds positively to an item X_k is higher than the probability she responds positively to the item X_{k-1} with a lower score. For example, given the individuals' and items' scores in Figure 1, the probability that person i_2 would respond positively to Item C will be higher than the probability of responding positively to Item B. For a brief presentation of the Mokkel model in contrast to Item Response Theory see Van Schuur (2003), and for a more detailed account see Sijtsma and Molenaar (2002).

5. Empirical Test and Validation

Here we use the ISSP survey data to test whether the content of identity can be measured as a Mokken scale in European countries, and whether inclusive items are the most popular ones of the scale and the exclusive items the least popular (or the most contested according to the conceptualization of national identity that we use). In 1995 the ISSP conducted the first cross-national survey module on national identity, and the set of questions and the items used to measure representations of the nation and attitudes towards the nation have become popular. In 2003 the set of items used to tackle the civic-ethnic features was replicated and a new item was added to capture the presumably most exclusive element of an ethnic conception: the role of ascendancy. We use the 2003 survey as it contains a more complete set of items, and we select data from all seventeen European countries included in the survey: Germany (joining East and West datasets), Great Britain, Austria, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Sweden,

Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Spain, Slovakia, France, Portugal, Denmark, Switzerland and Finland.

The variables we work with correspond to the following question: *Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is…?*

1. *to have been born in [country]* **Birth**
2. *to have [country nationality]* **Citizenship**
3. *to have lived in [country] for most of one's life* **Lived In**
4. *to be able to speak [country language]* **Language**
5. *to be a [country religion]* **Religion**
6. *to respect [country] political institutions and laws* **Respect Law**
7. *to feel [country nationality]* **Feel**
8. *to have [country nationality] ancestry* **Ancestry**

The response categories for each of the eight items were: 1-Not important at all; 2-Not very important; 3-Fairly important; 4-Very important; 8-Can't choose; 9-No answer. It is very difficult to allocate each item either to civic/inclusive or ethnic/exclusive features because their interpretation is context dependent, as we have seen. Nevertheless it is quite common in the literature to count Citizenship, Respect Law, Feel and Language as civic/inclusive items, while Birth, Lived In, Religion and Ancestry would be considered ethnic/exclusive items. There is little doubt that the ISSP question was designed to capture the ideas behind the civic-ethnic dichotomy and to provide data for cross-country comparisons (Svallfors 2000).

First we explore whether there are any clues pointing to the cumulativity of the items as seen above. In order to simplify this step and economize space, we explore this in the pooled dataset for the seventeen countries, using dichotomized variables (collapsing categories *3-Fairly important* and *4-Very important* as positive answers, and *1-Not important at all* and *2-Not very important* as negative answers; the remaining ones are considered missing). Secondly, we show the results obtained using the four-category ordinal variables for each of the seventeen countries.

Table 3 shows that in the pooled dataset for the seventeen European countries, Language, Respect Law, Feel, and Citizenship are the most common constituents of national identity while Religion, Ancestry, Birth, and Lived In, are the least common. Hence this opens the door to consider this items' ordering for a perfect Guttman scaling looking at the individual response patterns to each of the items. In Table 4 these response patterns are indicated by ordering the items from the most difficult to the easiest, from Religion to Language. The percentage of respondents that conform to a perfect Guttman scale is approximately 60 percent. Considering that the set of possible different response patterns in the dataset is 256, it is worth noting that 3.6 percent of the response patterns (9 from the perfect Guttman scale out of 256) concentrate 60 percent of the respondents. Although 43 percent respond positively to all the items, it is worth noting that here items are dichotomized and response variability is hence reduced. In any case this is taken into account in the country-by-country test.

Table 3. ISSP 2003 Ordering of Dichotomized Items per Difficulty Levels (pooled dataset for European Countries)

ITEM	Positive Responses (fairly or very important)	
	Percent	Number
Religion	39	7,702
Ancestry	61	12,203
Birth	71	14,337
Lived In	74	14,884
Citizenship	85	17,250
Feel	87	17,468
Respect Law	88	17,841
Language	90	18,270

Table 4. Response patterns of a perfect Guttman scale of ISSP 2003 dichotomized items (pooled dataset for European Countries)

Response Patterns	Religion	Ancestry	Birth	Lived In	Citizenship	Feel	Respect Law	Language	Percentage respondents*
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.69
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.34
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1.23
4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1.65
5	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	4.19
6	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	4.46
7	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6.19
8	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	15.48
9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	25.64
							Total Percentage Respondents		59.87

0: negative response to the item; 1: positive response to the item.
*Total number of respondents: 18,636.

Once we saw that there were grounds to think that a cumulative scale might be formed with the ISSP 2003 survey items, we tested the Mokken scalability of the eight items in every European country

included in the ISSP 2003. This avoids results being affected by likely varying interpretations of the items in different countries and allows us to capture differences in contents of national identities between countries. The items are taken in their original form as four-category ordinal variables but recodified as 0-Not important at all; 1-Not very important; 2-Fairly important; 3-Very important; and the remaining declared missing. Hence for this test items have not been dichotomized as in the previous section. The analysis has been done using STATA packages *msp* and *loevh* prepared by Jean-Benoit Hardouin.[6]

The test of cumulative unidimensionality for each country has consisted of three steps. The first checked the scalability of the items using a bottom-up hierarchical clustering process. Testing the scalability of the items is a bottom-up procedure where the two items with the highest Loevinger H coefficient are selected[7]; then the item with the highest coefficient is added, and so on, until the overall H coefficient is below the threshold 0.3, or until all the items have been included in the scale. The second checked for Monotone Homogeneity requirements, which means testing whether the scale allows ranking the survey respondents according to their scores of the latent trait, i.e., testing whether the Item Response Functions are monotonically non-decreasing. When this is the case, the probability that an individual agrees with a difficult item will be higher than or equal to the probability that she agrees with all the items easier than that. In this step the usual CRIT value of 80 has been used as a threshold to identify items potentially problematic and discard them. The third step checked the Double Monotonicity of the items forming the scale; whether the items can be ranked consistently according to their level of difficulty –this is the implication of the Double Monotonicity model. There are several procedures to test this; I have

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[6] Available from http://www.anaqol.org/ (accessed April 3, 2013).

[7] The Loevinger homogeneity coefficient H is the weighted relation between the number of perfect Guttman model violations and the number of expected violations under the assumption of statistical independence.

used the P-Matrices of joint occurrence of pairs of items. Here the CRIT value of 80 has also been used as a threshold to identify and discard potentially problematic items.

It is very important to note that the whole test for Mokken scalability has been conducted for each country using only data from individuals who did not respond the same in all questions. This poses the most demanding conditions for the test because it excludes cases that are clearly constitutive of a Mokken scale (in the case of dichotomous items the excluded cases would be the ones corresponding to patterns 1 and 9 in Table 4). The set of ISSP 2003 items measured with equal positively formulated scales might be subject to the kind of acquiescence bias analyzed by Schuman and Presser (1981), and this would artificially inflate the Mokken scalability of the item. In order to avoid capitalizing on chances, we have excluded the respondents that answered the same for all items, even though some or many of them might truly have the same opinion for all items. The exclusion of cases has been applied to any number of items that passed the first step -scalability- of the analysis.

Results (Table 5) show that Mokken scales can be formed in all the countries but Portugal, as shown by the highlighted grey cells (the items that do not form a Mokken scale in a given country have blank cells). The quality of the scales is usually assessed with the Homogeneity Index H shown in the last column; H values between 0.40 and 0.50 indicate the scales are moderately good. Exceptions to this are Germany, France, Czech Republic, France, and Denmark, with 0.39; and one of the Hungarian scales is H=0.36 and the other one H=0.51. Three items are conceived are constitutive elements of national identities in every country: Citizenship, Lived In, and Birth. Ancestry and Language are important in most of the countries, while Feel and especially Religion are only elements of national identity in half of the countries.

A second aspect worth looking at is the level of difficulty of the items: the most difficult item in every country is highlighted with number 1 in Table 5 cells, and the number increases as item difficulty diminishes. The scales obtained show that exclusive/ethnic items are the most difficult and inclusive/civic ones are the easiest. The results indicate that in Great Britain, for example, the content of national identity is formed by seven items; from the mostly agreed upon to the most contested ones, these seven items for British citizens are competence in the English language, having British nationality, feeling British, having been born in Britain, having lived in Britain for most of one's life, having British ancestors, and being Christian. Certainly there is an ordering of components in this portrayal of British national identity with inclusive/civic elements being the shared components of British identity and the most exclusive/ethnic ones the most contested. The Mokken procedure allows us to say that whenever a British respondent considers that being Christian (the most difficult item) is a constitutive norm of British national identity, there is a high probability that the same respondent will also consider all the remaining items as constitutive elements. Conversely, understanding that mastery of the English language is a constitutive norm of British national identity does not imply that other elements are conceived as constitutive parts of this identity. This means that national identity is formed by both types of components: inclusive/civic and exclusive/ethnic. And it is also the case that the inclusive/civic components are the ones that all citizens share in common, while the exclusive/ethnic components are the most contested. This interpretation is valid for all the countries analyzed (with the exception of Portugal), irrespective of the number of items that form the Mokken scale in each. The exception is Spain where Language is among the most contested, and is even less popular than Birth. There seems to be a very plausible explanation based on the role that the Spanish language played as a symbolic marker for the acceptance of a more open conception of the nation in relation to national minorities within the country (Bonet and Muñoz 2013). Language is here considered a civic element because the item refers

to linguistic competence, which can be acquired, and not to maternal language or any organic conception of it (for this distinction see Björklund 2006).

Table 5. Mokken Scaling of ISSP Items in 17 European Countries

	Religion	Ancestry	Birth	Lived in	Citizenship	Feeling	Respect Law	Language	Homogeneity Index H
Germany		1	2	3	5	4		6	0.39
Great Britain	1	2	4	3	6	5		7	0.40
Austria	1	2	3	4	6	5		7	0.43
Hungary	1	1	2	3	3			2	0.51/0.36
Ireland			2	1	3				0.41
Norway	1	2	3	4	6	5		7	0.41
Sweden	1	2	3	4	5			6	0.50
Czech Rep.		1	2	3	4			5	0.39
Slovenia	1	2	3	4	5			6	0.40
Poland		2	3	1	4	6		5	0.42
Spain		1	3	6	5	4		2	0.39
Slovakia		1	2	3	4	5		6	0.47
France	1	2	3	4	5				0.39
Portugal	*No items scale*								--
Denmark		1	2	3	4			5	0.39
Switzerland	1	2	3	4	6	5			0.42
Finland	1	2	4	3	5				0.48

Grey cells indicate the item is part of the scale, otherwise the cell is blank.
Numbers reflect the relative level of difficulty of each item in the scale, 1 being the most difficult item.
Germany: Language accepted with H=0.29 instead of 0.30 because tests for Monotone Homogeneity and Double Monotonicity are correct.

A more detailed country-contextual analysis should account for the most plausible interpretations of each item and the variations observed in every country for us to confirm that this interpretation is correct. It would also allow us to understand why certain items do not

form a Mokken scale in some countries, or for example why Portuguese national identity cannot be captured with a Mokken scale and why in Hungary two scales are formed (though highly correlated at 0.38). Here it is important to stress that if we were to lift the demanding condition under which we conducted this analysis and use all the cases, including those who responded the same in all the items, results would be quite different. In Portugal a scale is formed with all eight items and H=0.5; the particularity of this scale is that difficulty levels among the items are very similar except for Religion, the most difficult item, meaning that most Portuguese are overwhelmingly credentialists. In Hungary a single scale with five items is formed (in decreasing level of difficulty: Birth, Lived In, Citizenship, Ancestry, and Language) and H=0.42.[8] Even in Ireland, instead of a three-item scale we would obtain a seven-item scale, only excluding Respect Law, with H=0.43. In all countries, were we to use all the cases to test for Mokken, the quality of the scales would improve further and most of the items would have been included.

Going back to the results obtained under the most demanding conditions, Table 5 also shows that there is not a single country where the Respect Law item is included in the scale. This is an unexpected result because in principle respecting political institutions and laws in the country is one of the clearest civic items, and the frequency of positive answers shown in the Appendix would avail the expectation of Respect Law functioning as a consensual component of national identity. Nevertheless the results indicate that it does not relate to other items with the logic of a cumulative scale. There are several plausible explanations for this, which here we cannot explore, but we would like to suggest two directions in which inquiry might go. First, citizens with civic conceptions of their nations, postnationalists, might well adopt a critical perspective of their institutions and legislations in the sense indicated by Norris (1999), and hence

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[8] A six-item scale including Religion is formed in Hungary which passes the tests of scalability and Monotone Homogeneity, but has a CRIT=101 for Double Monotonicity.

respecting institutions and legislation would not necessarily be constitutive of being a national. On the other hand, from the point of view of a credentialist or someone having an exclusive view of the nation, respect for institutions and the law would not be enough to make someone a national. The empirical study conducted by Reeskens and Hooghe (2010) found a strong correlation between ethnic traits and the Respect Law item, which they interpret in the way suggested.

a. Validation of results

We have seen there is regularity in European countries whereby national identities are formed by inclusive/civic and exclusive/ethnic elements. This can be captured in a cumulative scale that at the individual level shows that most European citizens have inclusive/civic conceptions of their nation, while fewer have simultaneously inclusive/civic and exclusive/ethnic conceptions. The way we operationalize the measurement of national identity therefore is creating an additive scale with the items that form a Mokken scale in every country. So for example for Great Britain we measure the content of national identity for each individual by creating a continuous variable that results from adding up Religion, Ancestry, Lived In, Birth, Feel, Citizenship, and Language. As each item was recoded to take values from 0 to 3, the scale will range from 0 to 21; lower values in the scale will indicate that the individual is more likely to be a postnationalist (conceives the nation only in inclusive/civic terms) while higher values will indicate that she is more likely to be a credentialist (the nation is conceived in both inclusive/civic and exclusive/ethnic terms). We will use these scales to validate our conception and measurement of national identity as a cumulative scale with inclusive/civic as the easiest components and exclusive/ethnic as the difficult ones.

We followed Abdelal et al. (2006) to conceptualize national identity in order to propose a measurement model of the constitutive norms of the nation. According to those authors, constitutive norms inform the worldviews, opinions and interests of the group members, so we shall build on this to validate our scales focusing on the relation between the scales and attitudes towards immigrants. Social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Turner 1975) has shown that there is a relationship between group membership and in-group favoritism even in minimal group settings. Whenever group membership is defined in more restrictive terms, one can expect that the chances of rejecting out-group members will be higher. From this we can extract our hypothesis to validate our scales: if our Mokken scales measure the content of national identity as a cumulative scale ranging from inclusive/civic to exclusive/ethnic, then the scales should be related to opinions or policy preferences towards prototypical members of the out-group such as immigrants. We use six questions from the ISSP 2003 on attitudes and perceptions towards immigrants or immigration. *There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [country]. (By 'immigrants' we mean people who come to settle in [country]). Please tick one box to show how much you agree or disagree with each of these statements*. The statements are the following: *Immigrants increase crime rates; Immigrants are generally good for [country's] economy; Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [country]; Immigrants improve [country] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures;* with response categories*:* 1-Agree strongly; 2-Agree; 3-Neither agree nor disagree; 4-Disagree; 5-Disagree strongly; 8-Can't choose. Category 8 has been excluded from the analysis, and the categories have been recoded to run from 1: Disagree strongly to 5-Agree strongly. The sixth question we use is: *Do you think the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays should be… 1-Increased a lot; 2-Increased a little; 3-Remain the same as it is; 4-Reduced a little; 5-Reduced a lot; 8-Can't choose.* This has also been recoded to run from 1-Reduced a lot to 5-Increased a lot, with category 8 discarded.

Table 6. Validation of national identity measurement: Pearson correlations between additive scales (adding Mokken scale items) and attitudes towards immigrants/immigration

	Immigrants increase crime rates	Immigrants are generally good for [Country's] economy	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [Country]	Immigrants improve [Country Nationality] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures	Government spends too much money assisting immigrants	Number of immigrants coming to country
Expected sign of correlations	+	-	+	-	+	-
Germany	0.35	-0.16	0.37	-0.24	0.30	-0.29
Great Britain	0.36	-0.23	0.34	-0.32	0.35	-0.30
Austria	0.49	-0.29	0.39	-0.34	0.48	-0.41
Hungary (scale 1)	0.24	-0.08	0.23	-0.13	0.24	-0.19
Hungary (scale 2)	0.20	-0.16	0.19	-0.13	0.21	-0.20
Ireland	0.14	-0.17	0.20	-0.15	0.19	-0.18
Norway	0.38	-0.32	0.44	-0.41	0.43	-0.39
Sweden	0.45	-0.39	0.46	-0.44	0.49	-0.46
Czech Republic	0.19		0.11		0.12	-0.09
Slovenia	0.38	-0.09	0.41	-0.17	0.36	-0.29
Poland	0.16		0.19	-0.08	0.11	-0.14
Spain	0.27	-0.09	0.20	-0.08	0.15	-0.19

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	Immigrants increase crime rates	Immigrants are generally good for [Country's] economy	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [Country]	Immigrants improve [Country Nationality] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures	Government spends too much money assisting immigrants	Number of immigrants coming to country
Expected sign of correlations	+	-	+	-	+	-
Slovakia	0.18		0.24		0.22	-0.11
France	0.55	-0.43	0.55	-0.44	0.51	-0.41
Denmark	0.39	-0.28	0.35	-0.42	0.45	-0.49
Switzerland	0.43	-0.23	0.36	-0.26	0.39	-0.35
Finland	0.42	-0.33	0.44	-0.38	0.45	-0.47

Cells indicate Pearson correlation values, significant at 0.05 or below. Blank cells have no significant correlation.

The correlations between the scales of national identity and the attitudes towards immigration are shown in the first row of Table 6 (the expected sign of the correlations is in the second row). The results confirm overwhelmingly the expected directions of the correlations: in all countries, the higher the values of the national identity scale (i.e. the higher the chances that exclusive/ethnic components enter one's own nation conception), the more individuals think that immigrants increase crime rates, take jobs from other fellow nationals, and that government spends too much in assisting immigrants; and the lower the values of the scale, the less individuals agree with the views that immigrants are good for the economy, that they improve society with new ideas and culture, and that the number of immigrants in the country should be increased. In Czech Republic and Slovakia there is no correlation between the national identity scale and the two opinions on immigrants; and in Poland there is no correlation with one of the immigration opinion variables. Nevertheless, in all three countries the significant correlations found in the remaining variables have the expected sign.

6. Conclusion

The conceptual framework used to measure the content of national identity (according to Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2006) proposes two dimensions, as mentioned above. Here we have given priority to the first one: the content of national identity to show that in every European country national identities can be portrayed with a sequence of inclusive/civic and exclusive/ethnic elements. This characterization of collective national identities tells us that countries differ as to what are the specific elements and how they are specifically sorted to portray national identity. Nevertheless we have shown that there is regularity in the way those elements align: in every country national identities are composed by inclusive/civic elements, around which there is a majority consensus among the citizens, and by exclusive/ethnic elements which are contested in the sense that smaller groups of citizens conceive their nation in exclusive terms.

The measurement model proposed reduced complexity and ambiguity in the area of empirical studies on national identities using individual level information. Reduction is done by providing an alternative measurement of the content of national identities, which is able to capture the relevant information and summarize it in a single continuous variable. Such variable is the additive scale created with the items that form a Mokken scale, a continuum of values ranging from low values, capturing what we called postnationalist citizens (inclusive/civic only conceptions of the nation), to high values, capturing credentialist citizens (conceptions of the nation simultaneously inclusive/civic and exclusive/ethnic). It is worth noting that the proposed measurement of the content of national identities also provides a parsimonious way of measuring the second dimension proposed by Abdelal et al. (2006): the degree of contestation of the content of identity. Due to economy of space, we cannot extend on this here but we would like to stress the fact that by means of this continuous variable (additive scale), produced to

measure national identities at the individual level, we can also very easily estimate the degree of contestation using measures of central tendency and variability of continuous variables. It is as simple as, for example, using standard deviations, or to compare contestation levels across social groups or even countries using standardized variables, which can help improving our understanding of key aspects of national identities and their mobilization such as the relation between identity fragmentation and political conflict.

The fact that most of the citizens are postnationalists and fewer are credentialists was already found by other authors in single country analysis (Díez Medrano 2005; Heath and Tilley 2005): their analysis with ISSP 2003 Spanish and British data showed that there are not citizens with only exclusive/ethnic conceptions. Whenever citizens conceive their nation in those terms they do also simultaneously conceive it in the inclusive/civic ones. Moreover, postnationalists form the largest group of citizens (and a third group with less than 10 percent of what they call neither civic nor ethnic). Interestingly this same pattern was also found in USA by Wright, Citrin and Wand (2012) with a different dataset, which would seem to confirm that the interpretation offered in this chapter might also be adequate there.

The scale analysis has been conducted under a highly restrictive setting because the cases with invariant responses have been excluded in order to avoid capitalizing on chance. As we mentioned above, results would improve markedly in all countries if invariant response cases are not excluded. Clarifying the reasons behind relatively high numbers of invariant responses obtained in some countries is a pending task left to further research. In any case we have shown that the Mokken model allows us to reduce the complex articulation of elements in the content of national identities in Europe, and to account for it in a simple and practical fashion at both collective and individual levels, and even estimating the degree of contestation in the content of national identities.

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
7. Appendix

Figure 2. Frequency Distribution of the ISSP 2003 Items in Each Country
(row percentages, 0-100%)

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(row percentages, 0-100%)

| Very important | Fairly important | Not very important | Not important at all | Cannot choose | NA |

55

Figure 2. Frequency Distribution of the ISSP 2003 Items in Each Country
(row percentages, 0-100%)

Chapter 3. A Grounded Method to Measure the Content of National Identity in State-Nations. The Case of Spain

Eduard Bonet

and

Jordi Muñoz

1. Introduction

The previous chapter centered on one of the aspects that have drawn attention of many scholars: the analysis of the content of national identity; and proposed a unidimensional measurement model to measure the content of national identities in European countries. The cases selected to study the content of national identities are usually not qualified as nation-states or multinational states (or state-nations). It has been assumed that every country is equivalent to a nation-state, and hence multinational countries have not been given appropriate treatment. This has also been the case of the approach taken in the previous chapter, and this is something we will address here in this one.

Analyzing national identities in nationally homogeneous states is certainly much simpler than in states where culturally diverse, territorially based, and politically organized groups have claims on differentiated national allegiances. The content of national identities in nation-states such as France, Germany or the United States may be complex as one takes into account the historical legacies, culture, and political dynamics of competition among political parties. Nevertheless all those factors are also present when the focus is set on multinational countries or in what Linz and Stepan called *state-nations* (Linz 1997; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2010), in countries such as Canada, Belgium, India, or Spain. What is the content of Canadian national identity according to Quebecois Canadians? What are the conceptions of Spain that Basques and Catalans hold, and how do they compare to those of other Spaniards? The way citizens in multinational countries represent the content of the state-nation identity will provide information on the cohesiveness of the different national groups in the country, and on the prospects for stability, potential for conflicts, and nature of political cleavages since it can inform political elites on what are the sensible areas for nation-building policies and their potential impact on the stability of the polity.

This chapter intends to facilitate the study of state-nation identities using survey data by proposing a method to design new survey items that can capture the complexities of identity in multinational societies. Building on a concept of national identity based on Abdelal et al. (2006) definition of collective identities, and using ISSP 2003 survey items, the previous chapter of this thesis showed that the content of national identities in European countries is unidimensional and cumulative. This means that civic and ethnic components must be combined to understand the content of national identities, and they are generally combined following cumulative patterns whereby civic components are relevant to most of the citizens in every country, while ethnic components are relevant to smaller parts of the population who also consider important the civic components. The question now is whether the same conceptual approach is valid, and the same survey tools (from ISSP 2003) are valid to capture the complexities of state-nation identities. Understanding state-nation identities as collective identities does seem an adequate conceptual approach. But survey tools that were thought of for a one nation country might not be good tools to capture the content of state-nation identities of individuals from minority nations within multinational countries. In another words, it is unclear that survey items designed to capture civic–ethnic features of nation-states will be appropriate to capture the core and the nuances of state-nations identities: because different meanings can be attributed to the same survey items by members of different national groups within the country.

In this chapter we will make the case for country specific survey items to measure complex national identities of state-nations. Specifically we will show that it is possible to use a relatively low cost procedure to identify a core set of traits and survey items to measure the content of state-nations by means of the Q-methodology (QM). We will compare the quality of the measurement obtained with those items and the ones from ISSP 2003 used in the previous chapter. The quality comparison will be done in terms of the validity and reliability of the unidimensional cumulative scales created. In the

next section (second one) we review the concept of state-nations and explain the key characteristics of Spanish state-nation identity.[9] The third section will define the conceptual approach and describe the available survey items to measure national identities, focusing on the ones created with the QM. In the fourth section we will build Mokken scales of national identity in Spain using ISSP 2003 and QM items, and compare their quality, strengths and weaknesses. A first part of the section will use the scale building process itself to obtain information on the construct validity of the scales. The second part will explore the external validity of the scales. Finally we will summarize and discuss the results in the last section.

2. Spain as a State-Nation

Recently Linz, Stepan and Yadav (Linz and Stepan 1996; Linz 1997; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2010) proposed and developed a classification of democratic states according to the number of national groups and the political articulation or accommodation given to them under the same state. All democratic states embrace culturally diverse populations; where diversity is at its lowest, we can talk about culturally homogeneous states; in the case of national diversity, the lowest level of diversity would correspond to the case of a single nation in the state. This is the pattern of nation-states such as France, Portugal, or Japan where one sociocultural identity rivals with no other collective identity. In other states, there is a significant cultural diversity that might not be articulated politically or might not be territorially circumscribed, with organized groups acting on behalf of the cultural groups or the nations; such is the case of the United States and Switzerland, which can also be considered nation-states. Eventually there is a third type of states: those which are culturally

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[9] Whenever we will talk about the content of Spanish state-nation identity we will refer to the content of the titular nation of Spain, Spanish nation. Depending on the specific content of this Spanish nation, it might include or not the minority national identities such as Basque or Catalan.

diverse, and have territorially based and politically organized groups with claims on differentiated national allegiances. The cases of Canada, Belgium, Spain, or India are tokens of multinational societies; they cannot be considered nation-states because more than one national group is exists within the state territory. There may be certain allegiances and bonds linking the citizens from all national groups with the state institutions, some sort of identification that provide legitimacy to the state, in a similar vein as it happens in nation-states. Nevertheless, in these states citizens can simultaneously identify with different nations within the state, or only with minority ones. These are the state-nations.

Political elites belonging to the dominant or titular nation in state-nations face constitutional limitations to the nationalization processes they can promote to homogenize the population. This grants certain level of respect to members of the minority nations, some degree of recognition of their collective rights. Political stability in those countries is ultimately sustained on the basis of a diffuse support of all citizens to the state polity and certain levels of affective identification with the polity, even among those citizens who might identify with different nations of the country. Asymmetric federal systems are suggested by the proponents of the state-nation concept as the adequate organization to accommodate national differences in the same state territory, systems that care about the allocation of rights and obligations among the culturally distinct and territorially concentrated groups. *Bargains and compromises on these issues, which might be necessary for peace and voluntary membership in the political community, are negotiable in an asymmetrical system, but are normally unacceptable in a symmetrical system* (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2010, 56).

State-nation building policies aim at creating a sense of we-feeling that encompasses all national groups, seeking to promote citizens' attachment to common symbols and to some form of patriotism. Ultimately, state-nations aim at developing multiple and complementary identities among the citizens, integrating diverse

national groups in a stable manner in the polity. For example, as long as state-nation building policies are not built around symbols and myths that belong exclusively to one of the nations, there will be chances to integrate diverse national groups and attain a content of the state-nation identity shared by citizens from all constitutive nations.

Spain can be considered a state-nation and therefore an ideal case to test the measurement of the content of state-nation identities. It is also a good case to test the operationalization of the content of national identities because it has an old and yet on-going internal public debate that has made it well-known issue for most Spaniards, from whom we are going to measure the content of identity. The salience of national issues since the early XVIII Century has made Spain a very fertile ground of cases to study nationalism, especially the peripheral nationalisms in the Basque Country and Catalonia. But it has only been recently that Spanish nationalism has appeared as an object of analysis at the population level (for a review see Muñoz 2009). Here we will provide a summary account of the ways the content of Spanish identity has been articulated through discourses and policies, and the institutional shifts that have most likely affected the current mass conceptions of nationhood. This schematic characterization will be the reference framework that we will use to interpret and identify the core traits of Spanish nationhood, and to interpret and validate the measurement of Spanish identity.

At the beginning of the XIX Century, in a time where many European states where engaged in nation-building processes that would lead to the configuration of nation-states, Spain did not have an accepted historiographical discourse to legitimate the new political community for the modern state. Most common available accounts referred to old times of the Visigoths period and to the Catholic Kings. Spanish intellectuals would not seriously undertake the revision of the national discourse until the second half of the century (Álvarez Junco and Fuente Monge 2013, chap. 13). All along the XIX Century, the context would not favor such endeavor since Spain faced political

instability, economic depression, and by 1898 it had lost the remaining colonies of the old empire (Álvarez Junco 2001). The only foreign threat Spain faced at the beginning of the Century, the Napoleon invasion, ended with the War of Independence, which generated the first attempts to provide a description of the content of the Spanish nation: the liberal and the conservative-traditionalist versions appeared and structured the debate for decades on what should be the institutional settings, the place of Catholicism, the role of Castilian language, and the territorial organization of the state (Muro and Quiroga 2005). Normally liberals would emphasize civic over ethnic components of the nation, though they would split internally between centralists and federalists regarding the territorial organization of the state; while conservative-traditionalist versions would emphasize ethnic and organic components over civic ones, disagreeing internally also regarding the territorial organization of the state. In the early formulation of both liberal and conservative-traditionalist versions, Castilian language would only play an important role only in the liberal concept of the Spanish nation.

The Spanish elite had failed to nationalize Spaniards during the XIX century (Linz 1973; Riquer 1993) and since then peripheral nationalisms, especially in the Basque Country and Catalonia, have conditioned the development and prevented the culmination of the Spanish nationalization process. The loss of the colonies Cuba and Philippines, including the humiliating defeat against the USA -a new and not even European power- initiated a debate on the content of the nation, initially framed in essentialist terms (Álvarez Junco and Fuente Monge 2013, chap. 15). Eventually, prominent intellectuals proposed a modern civic conception of the nation, as a European democracy, with ethnic components funded in German romanticism, social Darwinism, and geographical determinism. Peripheral nationalisms would be qualified as selfish and backward looking localisms (Muro and Quiroga 2005, 16).

The 1923 military coup implied a revision of the conservative-traditionalist version, giving more emphasis to the ethnic elements and interpreting the whole set in organicist terms: Catholicism and Castilian language would be presented as essential to Spanishness; authoritarianism and anti-liberalism would be considered instrumental to realize the full potential of the nation; and centralism would be conceived as the best form of territorial organization. The short period of the Republic, 1931-1936, brought an overtly civic version of the nation, conceived as a liberal and democratic political community, with a decentralized state granting power to peripheral nationalists, albeit with an idea of the nation built in linguistic, cultural and historic terms. The General Francisco Franco's victory against the Spanish Republic brought the conservative-traditionalist version to a new practical dimension; in fact it opened the most serious nation-building project in XX Century Spain to implement the version proposed in 1923 (Saz 2003). Moreover, Spanish Republicans would be perceived as an anti-Spain coalition, formed mainly by communists and Catalans and Basques separatists (Núñez Seixas 2007a). The winner would also impose the new version of the nation, together with the anthem and the flag symbols (Núñez Seixas 2007b).

During Franco's dictatorship, two versions of the nation contended: the Falangist version and the National-catholic one (Saz 2003). Both versions had a fascist basis rooted in 1923 proposal, with an organicist and essentialist conception of the nation, although one had a forward looking project (Falangist) and the other would be more traditionalist and strongly Catholic (National-catholic). The Falangist version was an adaptation of the fascist ideology to the Spanish context while the successful national-catholicism implied an identification of the nation with the Catholic confession, the Roman Church, and the idea of Spain as the chosen people. The places of collective memory selected to extract the myths and create the narrative were the Visigotic period, the Reconquista and the Catholic Kings' unification; indeed the mission of the Francoist regime would be to re-establish the unity created by the Catholic Kings. The

struggle for preserving the territorial unity, especially before minority nationalisms, and the opposition to liberalism or multiparty democracy were at the core of the national-catholic discourse (Arbós, Fuster, and Puigsec 1980; Saz and Campos 2003). Unity was understood not only in a political sense but also a linguistic and cultural one, as indicates the retrieval of the assimilation project aiming to build a monocultural society (Benet 1978).

In the early 1970s, the socioeconomic situation of the country and the death of the dictator created an opportunity for the regime reformists. Since Francoism had monopolized patriotism and moulded an ethnic ideal of the nation, the regime reformists found it hard to redefine a new nationalist discourse because by one side, they would not openly reject the Francoist prevailing version, and by the other side the left-wing elites and peripheral nationalists felt compelled to accept some of its components as part of the trade-offs to draft the Constitution leading to democracy (Núñez Seixas 2001): conspicuously the regime's flag and anthem, and a privileged institutional setting of state relations with the Catholic Church. As a long term consequence, the public presence and people attachment to national symbols like the flag and the anthem would be less common than in other democratic countries (Muñoz 2009, 61–63). Conflict avoidance prevailed during the period of transition to democracy, and hence a shared interpretation of the past was not discussed. Peripheral nationalisms were framed under the conceptual distinction between cultural and political nation; peripheral nations would be understood as cultural nations ("nationalities" in the Constitutional language) while the titular or dominant nation, Spain, would be the political one (the "nation"). Demands of linguistics recognition from peripheral nationalists were addressed granting some Constitutional protection to minority languages in their peripheral regions, and Castilian was declared the common language of all Spaniards, who would have the duty to know it (Bastida Freixedo 2007). Anti-Francoist opposition united left-wing and peripheral nationalists' claims for democracy and openness which were intertwined with decentralization. Support to peripheral nationalisms demands for autonomy were addressed

through the territorial articulation of the *Estado de las Autonomías*, opening a gradual process of administrative and political decentralization.

This succinct account of the content of the Spanish nation in the last two centuries, and especially the paths opened with the democratic transition and consolidation, provides some relevant hints to test an empirical measurement of the content of Spain national identity. Such an analysis should tap the relevant issues around which different versions of the nation articulated: Catholicism, territorial organization of the state and accommodation of peripheral national minorities, historical essentialism, and the role of Castilian language, symbols and myths. A measurement tool of the content of Spanish national identity should be able to detect commonalities and diversity in the versions held of the Spanish nation. The commitment from all parties to the new democratic regime should for example be reflected in a shared liberal democratic version of the nation by all parties. The contested meanings of nationhood should be apparent across the different territories of Spain, especially in those where competing nationalisms are being sustained; such as Catalonia and the Basque Country.[10] Secondly, the measurement tool used should also mirror the varying perceptions on Spanish nationhood of individuals with opposed political ideologies, especially along the left-right dimension: with right-wing individuals being more leaned to accept ethnic conceptions of the nation, and the left wing and peripheral nationalists more leaned towards the refusal of ethnic components.[11]

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[10] Bollen and Díez Medrano (1998) showed that these territories are indeed the ones with the lowest levels of attachment to Spain.

[11] This expectation on peripheral nationalists refers only to the version they would hold on the Spanish nation: in this sense, ethnic and traditional elements originated in the early years of national-catholicism, a version of Spanish nationalism that would also seek cultural assimilation. Obviously this expectation has no implications on the civic and ethnic components of peripheral nationalisms, as they might probably be defined with any kind of combination of elements from both components. But this is beyond of the scope of this chapter.

3. How Can We Identify the Core Traits of Spanish Identity?

In this section we present the two sets of survey items we are going to test. The first one is the battery of eight civic-ethnic items from the ISSP-2003 survey used in the previous chapter. These questions were designed to conduct comparative analysis across countries. They were inspired in the seminal literature on nationalisms (Kohn 1948; Meincke 1970), and specifically in the distinction between the two types of nations and nationalisms. The civic ones are inclusive; based on political or social features that can be acquired. The ethnic ones are exclusionary, based on historically or culturally rooted features that are mostly inherited. The dichotomy between ethnic and civic itself has already been challenged on conceptual, normative, and empirical grounds (Özkirimli 2005; Smith 1991; Yack 1996). Other studies have shown that empirically it is difficult to find a correspondence between the dichotomy and the way people conceive their nations: civic and ethnic items are combined in particular ways to provide representations of the nation (see the previous chapter of this thesis). Some authors have already shown that items have different meanings in different countries (Reeskens, Hooghe, and Meuleman 2008; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010), which poses particular concerns on whether the same items would have the same meaning among members of different nations in state-nations.

Spaniards consider the entire set of items fairly or very important (see Figure 1). As we saw in the previous chapter, civic items like RespectLaw and Citizenship are the ones considered most important. There are two particularities worth considering here: in Spain it is the relevance granted to the Spanish language, something we already highlighted and commented in the previous chapter. The second one is that Catholicism is not an important component of Spanish national identity to more than half of Spaniards.

Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of Civic-ethnic items, ISSP, Spain, 2003

0: Not important at all; 1: Not very important; 2: Fairly important; 3: Very important; 8: Can't choose

The alternative set of items we will test to measure the content of Spanish state-nation identity was designed purposefully. In order to create the survey items, we conducted a Q-Methodology (QM) study[12], a technique already used to measure complex concepts such as nationhood in different settings (Davis 1999; Haesly 2005a, 2005b). Using QM we identified a set of relevant traits to characterize the Spanish state-nation identity, which later on have been adapted and included in a survey questionnaire and implemented by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) in 2007. In other words, we used QM to select a series of items to tap the relevant traits of nationhood in Spain. Here we will explain the process and the results obtained from this technique.

QM was proposed firstly by William Stephenson in 1935 through a letter to *Nature*, which pointed that in most measurement tools the researchers are the ones attributing meanings to the stimuli, while it is assumed that the people participating in research studies are supposed to share those meanings. By acknowledging that subjectivity is something real that can be measured and analysed systematically (Brown 1980), the QM is an excellent tool and approach to measure complex concepts. In fact, *QM is a composite of philosophy, concepts, data-gathering procedures, and statistical methods that provides perhaps the most thoroughly elaborated basis for the systematic examination of human subjectivity* (Given 2008, 699).[13]

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[12] The Q methodology study was designed and conducted by Eduard Bonet, Jordi Muñoz, Santiago Pérez-Nievas, and Iván Llamazares in the second half of 2006 thanks to a grant of the CIS. The selection of the Q methodology items that eventually were implemented in the survey questionnaire of the Study 2667, was done by all the members of the team. Mónica Méndez and Joan Font, from the research management board of the CIS, contributed with valuable suggestions. The survey has a sample size of 3,192 cases, representative of the Spanish population, obtained through a multistage stratified sampling, with a confidence level of 95.5% and a margin of error ±1.77. Oversamples from Autonomous Communities of Madrid, Catalonia, Basque Country and Valencia were obtained with the same study.

[13] An overview of the technique can be found in Van Exel and Graaf (2005)

The QM consists of four stages. First of all, the researcher identifies a number of stimuli, normally statements, which cover the whole spectrum of existing opinions on the object of study. It is crucial that the statements selected are representative of the existing universe of opinions, what is known as the *concourse*. Second, the researcher selects a sample of approximately 50 to 80 individuals. This set of individuals will not be a representative sample; instead, the persons selected must be diverse regarding certain variables of interest that theoretically the researcher considers might be related to the object of study. This is one of the main challenges the researcher faces when using this technique, as it is the case of any qualitative technique: a small number of individuals provide the information obtained, so if they are not balanced in terms of key characteristics the results we obtain might be biased. In the third stage, each individual is interviewed and requested to sort the statements following a given rule, for example from those which he/she most agree with to those which he/she most disagree. The generation of data from QM occurs in this step, and it is very important to note that interviewees are guided by the interviewer to sort the statements and are invited to review it after completion. Fourth and final, the researcher analyses the data to find out different profiles of individuals according to the way they sort the statements.

In our study we sampled the concourse of opinions about Spanish identity by exploring newspaper's editorial letters, newspapers opinion articles, and newspapers forums, internet blogs and other websites, previously existing survey questions, and qualitative research. In order to embrace the main dimensions in the universe of views on Spanish identity we collected initially 200 statements tapping nine topics: territorial organization of the state, languages, immigration, religion, history, symbols, Europe, civic attitudes, and way of life. Those statements were eventually reduced to 47 and worded as closely as possible to their original way. In the second stage of our QM study, we selected the individuals to participate in the study covering quotas according to our variables of interest: Autonomous Community (Catalonia, Basque Country, Madrid, and

Castilla and León), sex, age, education, and ideology. 58 individuals were interviewed, found either through direct or indirect contacts, covering this way the quotas for the variables of interest.

The interviews were conducted in the third stage of our study. Each individual was asked to fist read the 47 statements, each one printed in a card, and afterwards sorting them according to their level of agreement or disagreement, placing each card (i.e. each statement) in a panel like the one in the Figure 2. The vertical position of the cards carries no meaning at all; it is only the horizontal position that conveys information on the level of agreement or disagreement with the statements; the more to the right in the panel a statement is placed, the higher the agreement with it, and viceversa. Although it is not necessary to use a bell shaped template, it helps identifying the most relevant statements because interviewees are forced to choose only a few statements for the two poles of the scale. Once all the statements have been distributed on the template, the interviewees are asked to double check their sorting and redistribute the statements if they wish. This process allows the interviewee to assess her own judgement: for example, some statements can be relocated based on the relative position (level of agreement) assigned to others. Hence the level of agreement with any statement will be a function of the interviewee's views, the meaning attributed to the statement, and also to the level of agreement with other statements. This sorting process provides the researchers with a systematic way to understand the meaning attributed to the statements, identifying the most critical ones, and in particular detecting ambiguous or ambivalent statements.

Once each of the interviewed individuals had ranked the 47 statements we analyzed the results. First we produced a correlation matrix using individuals as the variables instead of the usual

Figure 2. Q-Sorting Template

| -5 | -4 | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 |

Strongly Disagree   Neither Agree/Nor Disagree   Strongly Agree

correlation matrix of statements: the matrix of raw data contains statements in the rows and individuals in the columns. In fact QM owes its name to the way factor analysis is used; typically, in *R based methodology*, we would use the statements as variables while in Q methodology we use individuals as variables. This way, using principal components factor analysis with orthogonal rotation, we identified three types of individuals according to the way they sorted the statements. The first type, we called it *Non-Spanish,* and is characterized by acceptance of statements of alienation towards Spanish identity, a strong rejection of traditional features of Spanish identity like identification with Catholicism, unitarist or historicist and organic aspects of Spain, the symbols, and the acceptance of the positive inclusive role of the 1978 Constitution and multinational aspects of Spain. The second type is *Civic-Spanish*, with individuals who are against both: alienation towards Spanish identity and the traditional features of the nation, and at the same time show a strong agreement with the integrative role played by the Constitution; the acceptance of national symbols like the anthem and the flag is not a common trait among them. The third type formed by individuals with *Traditional-Spanish* conceptions, accepting traditional and organic features of Spanish identity, strongly rejecting assertions on the multinational character of Spain, although also accepting the integrative role played by the Constitution. More details on the QM study and the resulting groups of individuals obtained can be found in Bonet et al. (2008).

Eventually we used the factor scores to identify the statements that best represented each type of individual. Out of the original 47 statements we selected 12, which were slightly reworded to fit in the questionnaire of the study number 2667, conducted by the CIS in 2007,[14] and they were placed in two separated batteries of six-item each. Some statements are formulated in positive sense, and some others in negative one. Each item had five answer options: 0-Totally

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[14] The reformulation consisted basically in shortening the wording to fit the requirements of a survey questionnaire while keeping as much as possible the original meaning of the statement.

agree; 1-Agree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Somewhat disagree; 4-Totally disagree; 8-Don't know.[15] The twelve used in the final questionnaire are shown in the Table 1.

The frequency distributions of the responses to these items are shown in Figure 2. In order to facilitate interpretation of results, the order of the answer options of some items was reverted to make highest values correspond to the strongest agreement with each item; 0 corresponds to the minimum value, "Totally Disagree", and 4 to the maximum value, "Totally Agree". In order to keep the same interpretation of the scales for all item, the scales of three items that were formulated in negative terms (*State*, *Documents*, *Flag*) were not reverted; the item *Sports* was neither reverted to facilitate its interpretation alongside the remaining items. Looking at frequency distributions in Figure 3, we see that about 80 percent of Spaniards disagree with the item *Documents* ("Even if my official documents are Spanish, I don't consider myself a Spaniard"), which has the lowest proportion of Spaniards agreeing with. Listening to the Spanish *Anthem*, around 45 percent have positive feelings about their belonging to the Spanish political community, almost 30 percent reject those feelings, and about 15 percent are indifferent. The *Sport* statement is formulated as a soft version of peripheral nationalists claim for national sports teams. Almost 45 percent of Spaniards agree with the statement, about 38 percent disagree with it, and 13 percent do not answer. The percentage of those who do not answer is even higher on the *State* statement: about 20 percent. This seems to be a difficult statement because it requires a distinction between the concepts of state and nation; so it seems risky to make interpretations of the results (later on, in the analysis, this item will be discarded because it does not fit the measurement model).

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[15] The answer option codes in the questionnaire ranged from 1 to 5, plus 8 for "Don't know". We changed them to range 0-4 due to requirements of the analysis we will conduct in the coming sections.

Table 1. Survey Items obtained from the Q methodology study

		Original wording	**English translation**
1	State	España es un Estado y no una nación	*Spain is a state and not a nation*
2	Language	El idioma español es un elemento básico de nuestra identidad	*The Spanish language is a basic component of our identity*
3	Documents	Aunque mis documentos oficiales son españoles, yo no me considero español	*Even if my official documents are Spanish, I do not consider myself a spaniard*
4	Soul	Los países tienen un carácter propio que se manifiesta en episodios de su historia: para España podrían ser el Cid, los Reyes Católicos, el descubrimiento de América, entre otros	*Countries do have their own character that is made evident in episodes of their history. For Spain they could be the Cid, the Catholic Kings, the discovery of America, among others*
5	Anthem	Cuando escucho el himno nacional de España, siento que formo parte de una comunidad de la que me enorgullezco	*When I hear to the Spanish national anthem, I feel that I am part of a community which I am proud of*
6	Other languages	Quizás el castellano sea la lengua de la mayoría, pero el gallego, el catalán o el euskera también son lenguas españolas	*Maybe castillian is the majority's language, but galician, catalan and basque are also Spanish languages*
7	United	España debe mantenerse unida para garantizar la igualdad entre todos los ciudadanos y la solidaridad entre las distintas CA.	*Spain has to remain united in order to guarantee the equality among all citizens and the solidarity among autonomous communities*
8	Flag	La bandera de España no despierta ninguna emoción en mí	*The Spain's flag does not create any emotion in me*
9	Catholicism	El catolicismo es muy importante como parte de la identidad española	*Catholicism is very important as a part of the Spanish identity*
10	Constitution	Valoro positivamente la Constitución, porque ha sido un instrumento muy útil para mantener unido el país	*I value in a positive way the Constitution because it has been a very important tool for keeping the country united*
11	Sports	Cataluña, el País Vaso y Galicia deberían poder tener selecciones deportivas propias, si así lo desean sus ciudadanos	*Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia should be able to have their own sport national teams if that's what their citizens desire.*
12	History	La historia que compartimos, con sus cosas buenas y malas, es la que nos hace a todos españoles	*The history we share, with its good and bad things, is what makes us all spaniards*

Figure 3. Frequency Distribution of Q-Methodology Items, CIS-2007, Spain

The statement most Spaniards agree with is the consideration of Spanish *Language* as a basic component of national identity: about 85 percent agree with it. Between 70 and 80 percent of Spaniards agree with the integrative views on the *Constitution* and the shared *History*, and with the argument of solidarity and equality among Autonomous Communities to keep Spain *United*. Apart from *Language*, these three statements are the ones most Spaniards agree with. About 68 percent think that *Other Languages* (Galician, Catalan, and Basque) are also Spanish languages. A similar percentage of Spaniards agree with the *Soul* item, a traditionalist interpretation of Spanish history where the nation's character can be found in the Catholic Kings and the Discovery of America. Although about 12 percent do not answer in this survey item, less than 25 percent disagree with it. Eventually, 40 percent think that Catholicism is a very important feature of Spanish identity. Nevertheless, another 40 percent of Spaniards oppose that view, and 15 percent are indifferent.

The item that implies a clear rejection of Spanish identification (*Documents*) is the one most Spaniards disagree with. *Catholicism* is fairly contested, with equal shares of the population agreeing and disagreeing with its relevance. In the opposite pole, civic interpretations of history and institutions (Constitution, History, United) are the ones that generate more consensus, only behind the agreement raised by Spanish Language understood as a basic identity component. The remaining items are more or less contested, in different degrees.

4. Measuring the Content of Spanish state-nation identity: the Test

In this section we are going to test how well the civic-ethnic set of items from ISSP-2003, and the QM items from CIS-2007 surveys capture the Spanish state-nation identity. National identities are collective identities defined with two dimensions: the meaning of identity and the degree of contestation of that meaning (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2006). This definition, explained previously in the second chapter of this thesis, means that some features of the national identity in a given polity are widely shared by its citizens, are barely contested among them; and some other features are contested or divisive among the population. The previous chapter of this thesis showed empirically, with the use of ISSP survey data, that unidimensional and cumulative Mokken scaling is a good operationalization of European national identities as defined by Abdelal et al. (2006). Results showed that there is a wide consensus among citizens of European countries in the representation of their nations in civic or open terms. Contestation appears regarding the use of ethnic or exclusionary features to represent the nation because, although there is a consensus around the civic characterization of the nation, some citizens do conceive their nation in both civic and ethnic terms.

Assuming that the meaning and contestation of state-nation identities can also be measured with unidimensional cumulative scales, we are going to create a Mokken scale with each of the two sets of survey items described above and compare the quality of both scales in terms of validity and reliability. Mokken scale analysis is a combination of a measurement model and a procedure to create scales to measure latent traits (Van Schuur 2003), through a nonparametric probabilistic version of Guttman scaling. A detailed explanation on this technique and its application to measure national identities can be found in the previous chapter.

a. Scalability of the Items

This first step will help us answer whether we can use Civic-ethnic and QM items to measure a single latent trait, in our case Spanish national identity. Here we use Mokken analysis as an exploratory tool: we are going to check whether the ISSP and CIS-2007 items are homogeneous enough to consider each set forms a separate unidimensional scale. The procedure starts selecting the two most homogeneous items and then adding the most homogeneous one among the remaining items, and so on. This step iterates until there are no items left out, or until homogeneity does not reach a minimal threshold normally established at 0.30 (Hemker, Sijtsma, and Molenaar 1995).[16]

Out of 1,193 respondents that responded to the six civic-ethnic items from the ISSP-2003 survey that form a scale, 566 respondents (46.7 per cent) responded the same answer to all the items, hence they are excluded in order to conduct the full test of the scale. The response codes were reverted, so the higher values correspond to stronger agreement with each item, with 0 as the minimum value for "Not important at all" to 3 for "Very important". Results shown in Table 2 indicate that six out of the eight civic-ethnic items form a Mokken scale: *Ancestry*, *Language*, *Birth*, *Feeling*, *Citizenship*, *Livedin*. The scale Loevinger Homogeneity coefficient is 0.39, which qualifies for an acceptable scale (higher than 0.30), and Homogeneity for the items range from 0.30 for *Language* to 0.45 for *Citizenship*. The ordering of the items from the easiest (or most popular, i.e. with the highest frequency of respondents saying it is important to be truly Spanish) to the most difficult, from *Livedin* to *Ancestry*, shows that

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[16] The survey respondents who give exactly the same answer to all the items will suit in a perfect Guttman scale and hence would inflate the degree of homogeneity in a Mokken scale. This entails no problem at all if their views are truly expressed by giving the same answer to all items. But it can well happen that they acquiesce or repeat the same answers to the items due to fatigue or any other reason not related to their true views. In order to avoid this potential problem we will exclude from the analysis those respondents, although this will pose a more demanding test to the scalability of the items. This avoids a situation whereby scale quality would be overestimated due to number of invariant respondents that had not been excluded. The Chapter 2 provided a more detailed explanation on this issue.

the civic elements are the base for a common understanding of identity while the ethnic features are more contested among the population. Language (Spanish) is understood from an ethnocultural perspective because it is positioned between Ancestry and Birth; nevertheless as we will see later this is not the common view of all citizens, especially those from regions with other languages such as Euskera and Catalan. Such diversity of views is already reflected in the fact that *Language* is the item with the weakest homogeneity index (0.30).

Table 2. Scalability of *Civic-ethnic Items Set*

Item	Relative difficulty	Loevinger H coeff
Livedin	6	0.43787
Citizenship	5	0.45114
Feeling	4	0.37793
Birth	3	0.41272
Language	2	0.29657
Ancestry	1	0.37183
Scale homogeneity		0.39058
Scale reliability		0.76

Data: ISSP-2003 (N=627)

The items *Religion* (Catholicism) and *RespectLaw* are excluded from the scale. Modernization, democratization and probably immigration brought religious diversity and secularization to Spain. Since the establishment of democracy, religiosity is becoming less relevant to conceive and even to attach emotionally to the nation (Muñoz 2009). Montero (1993) showed the progressive weakening of the religious cleavage in Spain and Montero and Calvo (2000) confirmed that religiosity is not associated with party voting in Spain, suggesting that conservative and socialist religious voters might have different conceptions of religiosity: the former would

understand religion in the traditional sense, as integrated with the Spanish national character, while the later would have a more private approach to religion. Nevertheless, this interpretation should be quarantined and more data gathered to understand this issue in detail since religious voting reappeared in the 2008 General Elections (Calvo and Martínez 2010). In any case, this cross-cutting presence of religion in Spain would explain its exclusion from a unidimensional scale of national identity. The item *Respectlaw*, has been excluded from the scale because it did not pass the second DM test. This item was also excluded from scales measuring the content of national identities in other European countries, as we saw and discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis. The item is one of the most popular items, so its rejection from the Mokken scale might be due to the fact that it simply does not follow the cumulative pattern. A possible explanation is that from a strongly ethnicist view of the nation, Respectlaw would entail accepting aliens as members of the endogroup only because they respect law and institutions; this would imply that some of those holding ethnicist views of the nation would reject an item that is the most popular (easiest) one, which would break the cumulativity of a scale that ranges from civic (easiest) items to ethnic (most difficult) items. In other words: if the item would be constitutive of a cumulative scale, then someone accepting the most difficult items (ethnic ones) should also accept the easiest one, in this case *RespectLaw*.

Nine out of the twelve QM items from the CIS-2007 survey form a Mokken scale. Out of the 2,314 respondents with non-missing answers to all nine items, 115 responded the same (5 per cent) and therefore are excluded from the test. The ordering of the items from the easiest ones: History, Constitution, and Language, to the most difficult ones: Sports, Flag, and Anthem, indicates that there is a consensual representation of the Spanish identity built around the role of history and the Constitution as integration factors, but also with Spanish language as a key factor (albeit not excluding explicitly the minority languages in the country). Identification with symbols like the anthem and the flag, controversial since its adoption in the democratic period as we saw above, is the most contested element together with the acceptance of granting regional sports teams for Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia. This means that only a

part of the respondents have an emotional attachment to the Spanish anthem and flag, reflecting what was already mentioned in the second section of this chapter. The rejection of the possibility of not considering oneself Spaniard although being legally one (*Documents*) is quite common, as it is surprisingly the organic conception of the nation in traditional historic accounts (*Soul*). Both Documents and Soul are less contested as elements of Spanish identity than the egalitarian and solidary instrumental conception of the unity of the nation.

Table 3 shows that the nine items forming the scale are quite homogeneous: the scale Loevinger Homogeneity coefficient, 0.50, indicates that this is a mid-level strength scale, and stronger than the ISSP one. The item homogeneities range from 0.36 for *Soul* to 0.57 for *United*. This indicates that overall homogeneity of the QM scale is better than the civic-ethnic scale. Moreover, the reliability coefficient for the Civic-ethnic scale is 0.76 while for the QM one is better as well: 0.87. The three items excluded from the scale are *State*, *Otherlanguages* and *Catholicism*. The item *State* required distinguishing between state and nation, two concepts rather complex, and this probably posed problem to respondents, as it suggests the fact that 20 percent did not provide valid answers. The exclusion of *Otherlanguages* might be due to the fact that the question had admittedly ambivalent meanings for those holding more traditional views of the Spanish identity, those holding more integrative visions, and even for the members of minority nations. The reasons behind the exclusion of *Catholicism* from the Civic-ethnic scale are also valid to explain its exclusion from the QM one.

Table 3. Scalability of *Q-Methodology Items Set*

Item	Relative difficulty	Loevinger H coeff
History	9	0.4859
Constitution	8	0.4859
Language	7	0.5532
Documents	6	0.5445
Soul	5	0.3596
United	4	0.5737
Anthem	3	0.5474
Flag	2	0.5147
Sports	1	0.4451
Scale Homogeneity		0.5018
Scale Reliability		0.87

Data: CIS-2007 (N=2,199)

b. Monotone Homogeneity and Double Monotonicity tests

The previous interpretation of the scalability check went a bit further than would have been possible because the Loevinger coefficient of homogeneity is not sufficient to claim that a Mokken scale can be formed by the items. We have gone a bit further than we should to ease the interpretation of the Mokken analysis. There are two additional requirements to be satisfied in order to form a Mokken scale: the first one implies that the Items Response Functions must be monotonically non decreasing, which means that the probability that an individual agrees with a difficult item should be higher or equal than the probability that she agrees with all the items easier than that. Correspondingly, the probability that she agrees with an item that is more difficult than that should be lower or equal. The scale is Monotone Homogeneous when such requirements

are satisfied. The second requirement that can be imposed to a Mokken scale is Double Monotonicity: the ordering of the items must be the same for all the individuals. If one scale satisfies this requirement then we can assume that individuals perceive the items in the same rank order of difficulty.

Results of the Monotone Homogeneity test are positive for the civic-ethnic scale, as it is shown in Table 4. Crit index is a measure capturing the gravity and number of deviations from the Guttman scale for each item; Crit index with values higher than 80 tend to be problematic. The test of Double Monotonicity can be conducted in different complementary ways: here we will use the conventional P+ matrix and also the External Groups comparison, using the Autonomous Communities as the groups. Three items out of the six violate the assumptions of this test under the External Groups modality: *Feeling*, *Language*, and *Citizenship*. This result implies that the three items are not equally understood among Spaniards from the different regions.

Table 4. Monotone Homogeneity and Double Monotonicity Tests for *Civic-ethnic* Items (Entries are CRIT values)

Items	Monotone Homogeneity Test	Double Monotonicity Test	
		With P+ Matrix	With External Groups (Autonomous communities)
Livedin	7	-7	69
Citizenship	7	70	86*
Feeling	-4	75	116*
Birth	51	34	63
Language	65	30	96*
Ancestry	10	-4	22

CRIT > 80 should be considered inclusion of the item in the scale. See detailed output tables in the Appendix

Monotone Homogeneity is also satisfied by the items in the QM scale (Table 5). Nevertheless two items slightly violate the Double Monotonicity test conducted under the External Groups comparison: Soul and Sports, with Crit values 88 and 81 respectively. In this case it also makes some sense that these two items generate problems. Sports item is the most difficult one in the scale as we saw in Table 3, but several respondents from Catalonia and the Basque Country may find this item less difficult (i.e. the item is more widely accepted) than appears to be in the scale, because it is in those Autonomous Communities where there have been some parts of the civil society and political parties claiming for official sports selection. The same agents and regions would also tend to reject the organic conception of Spanish history (*Soul* item) and hence for them this item would be more difficult than it is in the overall scale. In any case, the absolute and relative number of QM items that violate the test is lower than those of the Civic-ethnic items. Moreover, the violations are also stronger in the later set of items.

Table 5. Monotone Homogeneity and Double Monotonicity Tests for *Q-Methodology* Items (Entries are CRIT values)

Items	Monotone Homogeneity Test	Double Monotonicity Test	
		With P+ Matrix	With External Groups (Autonomous Communities)
History	2	-9	39
Constitution	-9	-9	29
Language	-13	56	56
Documents	-12	56	41
Soul	9	71	88*
United	-14	40	63
Anthem	-12	61	53
Flag	-11	51	63
Sports	21	79	81*

CRIT > 80 should be considered inclusion of the item in the scale. See detailed output tables in the Appendix

c. External Validity of the Scales

Now that we have seen that Civic-ethnic and QM form a unidimensional Mokken scale, albeit with some differences in the ranking of the items among Autonomous Communities, we will test the external validity of the scales constructed. Mokken scaling is a procedure to test whether a set of items do form a unidimensional cumulative scale to measure a latent trait; in our case the content of Spanish state-nation identity. Once a set of items have been tested and they can form a more or less stronger Mokken scale, the best estimation of the true latent trait is the creation of an additive scale with all the items (Van Schuur 2003). In order to conduct an external validity test we are going to create one scale adding up the values of the six Civic-ethnic items, and another scale adding up the values of the nine QM items. Each respondent will have a value in that scale, a score of the latent trait, which is directly interpretable against the way items are ranked in each scale. Adding up the items to obtain a score for a cumulative scale synthesizes the information of the items in a single number. In order to interpret this number we should look at the item ordering of each scale (as included in Tables 2 and 3). So, for example, an individual scoring (having) the lowest values of the civic-ethnic scale is someone who at most agrees with the civic items of Spanish identity, and another individual scoring the highest values of the scale is someone who, apart from adhering the political conception she has also an ethnicist conception of nationhood. For the Q methodology nine items scale, an individual scoring the lowest values is someone who at most conceives that history, the Constitution, and the role of Castilian are constitutive elements of nationhood. And an individual scoring the highest values of the scale agrees that history, the Constitution, and the role of Castilian are constituents of nationhood but also has an emotional attachment to the flag and the anthem, and disagrees granting an official selection sports to the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia.

The validity of the scales will be tested against the two assumptions presented at the end of section 2: a measurement tool of the content of Spanish identity should capture the divergent versions on the nation of left-wing and right-wing Spaniards, and of peripheral nationalists: political ideology and territory of residence of individuals are two variables that should allow us to reflect those differences. One expects that an operationalization of the content of Spanish identity as a state-nation will reflect the different conceptions of nationhood between those living in different territories of Spain, especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country; and also that it will reflect the diversity of identity conceptions depending on political ideologies.

In order to enhance the comparability of the scales for the assessment of their external validity, we have rescaled the Q methodology scales to the same range as the civic-ethnic one.[17] In both cases we created the scales using data from all the respondents, and also for those who might have not answered one of the items. Figures 4 and 5 show the mean values and 95% confidence intervals of the two scales for all the seventeen Autonomous Communities in Spain. The Civic-ethnic scale does not allow distinguishing among regions substantively although one might expect that Communities with alternative nationalisms should have lower scale values because adherence to ethnicist traits of Spain would be lower, and adherence would mostly be with the civic traits. The results show that this scale does not capture this distinction: for example, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia have higher values than La Rioja or Extremadura.

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[17] The Civic-ethnic scale score is created adding up the value of the six items for every respondent. With item values ranging from 0 to 3, the theoretical minimum value is 0 and the maximum is 18. The QM scale contains nine items with five categories, from 0 to 4, which means that the theoretical minimum is 0 and the maximum 36. For the sake of comparability the QM scale is rescaled to range from 0 to 18.

Figure 5. External Validity test of OM scale: Autonomous


Figure 4. External Validity test of Civic-ethnic scale: Autonomous
Communities

In order to conduct the external validity test with political ideology, we used party choice in the last General Election, held in 2000 for the Civic-ethnic scale (ISSP-2003 survey) and in 2004 for the QM scale (CIS 2007). Here we will see the mean values of the scales for the electorate of the two main Spanish parties, PSOE and PP, the post-communist IU/ICV, and Regional-Nationalist (RN) parties, category that includes regional and peripheral nationalist parties. We expect that right-wing PP voters will have more traditional or ethnicist views than the left-wing socialist PSOE voters, and much more compared to the IU/ICV ones; eventually RN should have the lowest values in the scales as they would share some common views on the content of the nation with the leftist voters, such as multinational aspects, and some of RN voters would go beyond and would not even identify with Spain. The values of the QM scale should replicate the same ordering of scoring per electorate. We show also the results for the QM scale with 7 items, i.e. excluding the *Soul* and *Sports* items. In Figure 6 we can see that both scales differentiate among party voters as expected, although QM one discriminates much clearly the identity profiles of party voters.

Figure 6. External Validity test of Civic-ethnic scale: political ideology

5. Conclusion

In this chapter we analyzed how well we can measure the content of state-nation identities with survey data, using Spain as our case of study. We have compared two sets of survey items: from ISSP-2003 and from CIS-2007 surveys, designed using different methodologies. The first set of items was designed to reflect the dichotomy civic-ethnic appeared in the literature on nations and nationalisms and has been widely used in comparative studies to measure national identities. The second set of items was designed purposely to measure Spanish identity, and hence it was created using the Q Methodology, a technique that would allow capturing the nuances of national identity in state-nations. The interest of this exercise lays in the fact that in multinational, the use of generic items like those from ISSP-2003, might not capture adequately the content of state-nation (the central one) because items thought of to measure the content of state-nation identity might be interpreted differently by those who identify with minority nations. The Spanish case has an added particularity that makes this test even more interesting, and challenging: the content of Spanish identity has been problematized since at least XIX Century and the variety of versions proposed from different ideological positions provide a complex picture.

Using Mokken analysis to build unidimensional cumulative scales, we have tested how well the two sets of items can measure Spanish state-nation identities. The ISSP-2003 scale depicts an identity built upon the consensus around civic representations of the nation, with ethnic traits being the contested elements of the content of identity. Contestation here must be understood in the sense given to term by Abdelal et al. (2006); those elements eliciting least consensus among the Spaniards. Similarly, the CIS-2007 items also portray an identity sustained on political and open elements like the common understanding of the integrative role of history and the 1978 Constitution, and Castilian as a relevant marker of Spanish identity. Besides the trait that expresses a direct self-exclusion from the Spanish nation, adopted by a minority of the Spaniards, the aspects that generate relatively least consensus are one of the main symbols of the

country, the anthem, and the granting of official sports selections to the three territories with historic nationalist movements: Catalonia, Basque Country, and Galicia. Eventually, the detailed comparison of both sets of items has shown that a QM scale of Spanish identity outperforms the Civic-ethnic one in terms of internal validity, external validity, and reliability.

It is worth mentioning here that using a unidimensional model of measurement implies that even complex national identities such as those from state-nations can be measured as a single latent variable. Here, as in the previous chapter, the cumulativity of the scales tested with the Mokken analysis, contributes clarifying how the different components of national identity relate to each other, and in the end it helps simplifying the information by creating an additive scale. This aspect has not been discussed in depth because it was presented in detail in the second chapter of this thesis.

One relevant aspect that is often omitted in the empirical analysis of survey data and here it is worth mentioning is the location of the questions in the questionnaire. It is a well-known thing that the placing of a question can affect the response pattern obtained. In this sense the eight items of the civic-ethnic approach that appear in the ISSP-2003 questionnaire are all placed in a single battery. This may have generated more consistent patterns of response than with the alternative items, as it can be seen by the high percentage of respondents who provided the same option to all items. Regarding the CIS-2007 questionnaire we should remark that the twelve original items were divided into two groups of six items each, each one being in different positions of the questionnaire. Additionally the wording of the questions would alternate positive and negative statements. An effect of this might be the lower number of respondents who gave the same answers to all the items. Nevertheless, we have to note that the percentage of missing cases is in general higher with CIS-2007 items, and particularly with two of them. However, this has not altered the validity and interpretation of the scale because the additive scale used for external validity tests has included respondents who had missing cases in any item. Table 6 summarizes the results of the comparison between both scales.

Table 6. Summary of the Comparison between both approaches

	Q Methodology Items set	Civic-ethnic Items set
Missing values	-	+
Number of respondents evaluated	+	-
Scalability	0.50	0.39
Reliability	0.87	0.76
Test MH	+	+
Test DMH	+	+ / -
External validity	+ /+	+ / -

We have shown that the items created with the QM presented in this chapter improve our understanding of Spanish state-nation identity. This method can be applied to measure other state-nation or nation-state identities because it allows the researchers creating contextualized survey items through a bottom-up process. The measurement of complex concepts may be better supported with the selection of survey items adjusted to the context, to each country in the case of national identities. This approach will be at the cost of increasing the difficulty to conduct comparative research. Nevertheless, it may help improving our understanding of the different cases and, in the long term, it may help designing better survey items for comparative research. Or alternatively, one can also consider the trade-off between comparability of the items and reliability.

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Chapter 4. Saliency of National Identification as a Mobilization Factor of Political Protest in Catalonia

Eduard Bonet

1. Introduction

Since more than two centuries, it has been widely accepted the claim for congruence between the polity and the cultural or national boundaries was expected for most countries. Every nation should have its own state and every state would embrace its own nation. This view was reinforced at the end of the First World War with President Wilson's programme aiming at creating new states matching every nation. Nevertheless, although the number of states increased continuously since the Second World War, the destabilizing potential of the idea of congruence between the nation and the state has led to its refusal. Instead, nowadays emphasis is placed in individuals' membership to the state, which is tied to citizenship status, recognition of minority groups, including national ones; this implies an acceptance of the fact that different nations may reside within the same state boundaries, and hence that citizens in such states may identify with different nations. This is specially the case of multinational countries like the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium or Spain, where citizens may identify with different national groups territorially linked to the state territory. Coping and accommodation mechanisms of this diversity have been devised, and as we saw in the previous chapter, there have also been efforts to distinguish analytically those states that apply such mechanisms: state-nations accommodate multiple national identities mainly through territorial decentralization of the state, and intend to make compatible the coexistence of multiple national identities, identities of minority and majority (or titular) national groups.

The state-nations model for nationally heterogeneous countries intends to secure stability in democratic regimes by accommodating minority national groups in countries that have a majority or titular national group. In the particular case of Spain, this ongoing process of accommodation has articulated the political game along a center-periphery cleavage with Spanish political elites, in one side, and Basque and Catalan ones, in the other. From an individual level perspective, Spanish citizens in the Basque Country and in Catalonia have a repertoire of national categories they can ascribe to so, which implies that the country-wide national heterogeneity

is also reflected in the peripheries, as citizens in both territories may also identify with different national groups. Most Spanish citizens in the Basque Country and in Catalonia have two main national categories available to identify with: Spanish and Basque in the Basque Country; Spanish and Catalan in Catalonia. Hence the variety of national groups we find in a state-nation like Spain, is also found in the peripheral areas. This fact sets the context for this article: taking Catalonia as the case of study, we will show that despite different socio-economic and attitudinal background conditions of citizens identifying nationally with Spain, by one side, and with Catalonia, by the other, saliency of their national identification plays the same role at the individual level by enhancing the motivational aspects that mobilize individuals to participate in protest politics.

Scholars who conducted the classic studies in political participation defined political participation as any action by private citizens aiming at influencing the selection of government personnel or the action they take (Verba and Nie 1972, 2). This definition excludes activities that are quite common nowadays, for example those aiming at raising the awareness of the public. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 4) proposed a wider definition of political participation to embrace all those activities aiming at influencing the definition and distribution of social goods and values. Combining both contributions, here I will define political participation as *any activity by private citizens aiming to influence the definition and distribution of social goods and values*. This definition embraces electoral and non-electoral participation, conventional and non-conventional, legal and illegal.

In democratic regimes voting has been the most extended channel that citizens use to express their political preferences. Elections are critical because they offer a mechanism to aggregate citizens' preferences that facilitates the selection of legislative and executive powers. Nevertheless, elections are a rather imperfect way to hold governments accountable because they provide small amounts of information on citizens' preferences regarding specific issues. During a term governments and

legislative powers produce a varied set of policies and legislation, and it is very likely that not all of them will receive approval from the citizens. Moreover, candidates from political parties and party manifestos frequently make ambiguous and even unachievable promises, thus making voting a complex way to choose candidates using rational criteria.

Non-electoral forms of participation provide citizens with alternative channels of expression of their political preferences on specific policy issues, either reacting to government or legislative action or by proactively proposing new issues or alternative approaches to manage or solve old issues. As Morales puts it, non-electoral political participation has a "crucial impact on democratic governance shaping political decisions through […] communication of citizens' preferences over specific issues; setting the political agenda; and contributing clarifying politicians' policy positions and making the decision-making process more transparent" (Morales 2009, 3).

Protest politics is a form of non-electoral political participation that has increasingly been accepted by institutions and the public. It is a channel of participation available in the repertoire of political action. Inequalities in political participation in general, and in protest politics in particular, convey information on the extent of inequalities of any political system and its bias favouring the preferences and interests of some citizens while ignoring those of other citizens. The study of the relation between protest politics and national identities in Catalonia has been an infrequent subject of study among scholars. Montero, Font and Torcal (2006) used survey data describe and analyse citizen engagement and political participation, including protest politics, in Spain at the beginning of the XXI Century. In their analysis of Catalonia they confirmed national identification as a relevant explanatory factor of political participation; specifically those Catalans who identify with Catalonia tend to be politically more active than those who identify with Spain. The individual level mechanism or the reasons behind the linkage of national identification with protest participation are not explained, but it is assumed that higher status and

richer civic life with social and political organizations among those identifying with Catalonia may explain participation differentials.

In this chapter we will propose an individual level explanation of the way national identities contribute mobilizing citizens' protest participation in Catalonia. The hypothesis tested holds that, irrespective of the particular national identity group, saliency of national identities interacts with individuals' motivation bringing citizens to act in protest politics. We will not deal with any particular object of the protest activities but with the degree of citizens' involvement in any kind of protest activities. The hypothesis that will be developed and tested empirically with the case of Catalonia states that there is a linkage between the saliency of a highly politicized issue and political engagement or motivation. This in turn leads to increasing the chances that citizens become mobilized and participate in the most demanding form of political participation: political protest. In principle this hypothesis might be extended to explain the relation between national identities and protest participation in territories where there is a national identity cleavage, but here we will focus only in Catalonia.

The next section (2) will provide an overview of the context of Catalonia, providing brief historical account of the relevant characteristics of the two main national identity groups and the lack of studies linking national identities and protest participation. Section 3 will introduce the explanatory model of protest participation that will be used, and Section 4 will develop the conceptual framework that links saliency of national identities and protest participation. The next section (5) will present the operationalization of identity saliency and the rest of variables used to test the hypothesis. The empirical model will be designed and used to conduct the test. The final section will conclude summarizing the results and suggesting two lines for further research..

2. The Context of Catalonia

During the world financial crisis initiated in 2008, Spain faced also a deep economic crisis and an erosion of legitimacy of its core political institutions. In Catalonia, this situation coupled in June 2010 with the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court against some articles of the "Estatut d'Autonomia", the main Catalan law for self-government ranking just below the Spanish Constitution. A governmentally driven massive demonstration in Barcelona took place several days later. In 2012, while Spain was in the middle of the financial and economic crisis, some organizations of the Catalan civil society led and organized an even more massive demonstration under the slogan: "Catalonia, Next State of Europe". Political leaders from the governing Catalan nationalist party Convergència i Unió (CiU) joined the band wagon when all signs indicated that the demonstration would be a success. Since then, the governing party managed to mark the agenda of the political debate by claiming for the "right of Catalans to decide", an ambiguous "catch-all" formulation that could match with different political claims: from self-rule on specific issues to the right to call for an independence referendum. Since 2006, independence support has gone through an increasing path, accelerated since 2010, and in 2013 all the polls indicate that about one half of Catalans would vote for independence. Despite this hegemonic trend in Catalonia, there have been attempts to mobilize population opposing this trend, attempts to mobilize those Catalans holding a Spanish national identity. Their claim is sustained with liberal arguments pointing at the rights of individuals being granted by the Spanish state and at the wide existence of dual national identification among Catalans, confronting directly the claims of Catalans holding a Catalan national identity by denying the existence of a Catalan nation or, in general terms, the illusion of collective rights. While those holding Catalan national identity mobilized through civil society and demonstrations claiming for independence, those with a Spanish national identity mobilized claiming for Spanish unity in front of pro-independentists. This brief account of the past years presents the two groups being mobilized around the identity issue from different positions and opposed claims. From an individual level point of view, this situation

shows a symmetry for individuals in the two groups: they both can be mobilized based on identity claims, and hence identity saliency might be well expected to have a similar role in the mobilization of individuals from the two groups. Nevertheless, this has not been the case in the past three decades; the group of those holding a Spanish national identity in Catalonia have only recently been mobilized; identity mobilization in Catalonia has mainly been directed towards those holding Catalan national identities. Availability of data will restrict the analysis of this chapter to the year 2003, when those holding Catalan national identities were mobilized by political parties and organizations and Catalan national claims were sustained, while the others remained comfortably in the status quo. This will add additional value to the hypothesis tested in this chapter, as the role of saliency of national identities is expected to be the same for both individuals with different national identification, those holding Catalan national identities and also those with Spanish national identities, despite attempts to mobilize the later were not widespread. Here we will contend that, although there are contextual factors explaining the much higher mobilization of those who hold a Catalan national identity, individuals with high identity saliency are more prone to be mobilized for political protest irrespective of the national group they identify with.

In the era of nation-building in European countries, the Spanish state and institutions were facing a crisis of legitimacy inherited from the civil wars, the divisions between liberals and absolutists, and different positions within each of the two groups. "One of the main objectives we must pursue is making the Spanish Nation a nation, which is not and has not yet been", declared in the Parliament the liberal Antonio Alcalá Galiano in 1835. Three quarters of a Century later, the philosopher Ortega y Gasset would declare that "given that Spain does not exist as a nation, the duty of intellectuals is to build Spain" (Riquer 2000a, 86). We cannot know whether those opinions represented the average Spaniard views, but they clearly mark a discomfort among the political elite towards the Spanish nation-building programme or its inexistence.

Implicit to the above concerns there is the idea that every state must embrace a single nation. The construction of the Spanish state was initiated by the Reino de Castilla much earlier in the XV Century with the annexation of the Reino de Navarra, Reino de Portugal, and Corona de Aragón. During the centralization process in the absolutist period, opposition rose from those territories, conspicuously from Catalans under the Corona de Aragón in XVII and XVIII Centuries. The root of those problems had to be found, according to Elliott, in the fact that each acquired territory by the Reino de Castilla in the medieval ages would maintain its laws and privileges, uniting crowns but not the peoples (1984, Introduction). Political claims by some of the prominent elites would be grounded on the existence of those peoples, demanding a major role in the future plans of the socio-political and economic development of the country. Similar claims lasted until the XXI Century, reframed in the language of national identity politics. This helps understanding why many scholars do not conceive Spain as a nation-state, even though it is one of the oldest European states. Linz summarized this in a famous sentence saying that Spain is "nowadays a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large proportion of the population, and only a state though not a nation for important minorities" (Linz 2008, 65). The same author suggested that Spain should not be conceived as a failed nation-state but as a successful state-nation, the model of those multinational countries that kept unity and political stability through the accommodation of different national groups (Linz and Stepan 1996; Linz 1997), as we saw in the previous chapter.

The national identity dynamics in Spain is more complex than suggested because Catalan population is itself heterogeneous in terms of national identities. The territorial concentration of the Catalan population and the sustained claims held by Catalan political elites leans frequently towards a simplification of the situation. Nowadays, in fact, a large part of Catalans have their origins in other Spanish regions, Spanish language is the mother tongue for about half Catalans, and besides any ethnic or linguistic consideration, their national identification is heterogeneous; some hold Catalan identities, some others hold Spanish identities, and even others claim dual identities. A brief historical overview will help stressing the

main structural factors contributing to the reproduction of such varied configuration of the national identification landscape in Catalonia.

Catalonia was in XIX Century the Spanish region where industrial revolution first took place and for decades it remained the only industrialized region (Nadal 1975). This differential in development stages marked the relations between the Catalan bourgeoisie and the Spanish elite and governments, ending up with the appearance of nationalism as the result of a long and complex process led by the Catalan bourgeoisie (Riquer 2000b). Most of the Catalan nationalist projects have been built within the context of Spain, seeking to increase Catalan power within the Spanish institutional framework. This was the approach adopted by the Catalan elites even before Catalan nationalism would be politically articulated: during the Spanish liberal period and afterwards, from 1808 to 1868, the majority of Spanish liberal revolutionary projects would appear in Catalonia (Fontana 1990). Nevertheless, the incapacity of those Catalan elites, bourgeoisie representatives, to influence the Spanish governments to rule according to their interests during the liberalization of the state in XIX Century, and the incapacity of the Spanish governments to modernize the state accommodating the socio-economic requirements of the industrialized Catalonia, set the stage of a favouring environment for the emergence of Catalan nationalism (Vives 1960). In this sense, the distance between the Spanish and the Catalan political elites can be summarized in the light of Catalan elites participation in Spanish Governments: from 1814 to 1900, Spain had 115 ministerial cabinets formed by more than 800 ministers: 22 out of those 800 where born in Catalonia (Riquer 2000: 109). Grievances claims were articulated around economic, cultural, but also in political terms.

Nationalist discourses are built around the exploitation of existing particularisms in a given territory and their politicization (Smith 1991). Since its early stages Catalan nationalism implied diverse political and ideological assumptions, positions and projects; a varied articulation of Catalan particularisms. This variety of Catalan nationalist discourses (Álvarez Junco and Fuente Monge 2013) had as their common

denominator the reference to the Catalan differential factuality,[18] with the Catalan language as one of the core differential traits (Balcells 1995). The claim for an appropriate accommodation within the Spanish state and governance structure would persist among Catalan nationalists. In 1965 the Catalan historian Ramon d'Abadal wrote to Américo Castro, a renowned Spanish historian: "Knowing since when we are Catalans is not a big problem for us but knowing since when we are Spaniards and what kind of Spaniards are we". D'Abadal's statement pointed to the problematic issue of an inclusive Spanish nation towards Catalan identity traits.

Nowadays there are two main national categories that Catalan citizens identify with: Spanish and Catalan. Early studies (Linz and Montero 1986) revealed that around 40 percent of the citizens have inclusive identities; they identify with both Spanish and Catalan entities. This has been and still is the case in XXI Century Catalonia, although there is an on-going process whereby citizens increasingly identify with the Catalan category (Hierro 2012). It has been shown that national identification in Catalonia is related to the origin of individuals and their maternal language, something that is partially explained by the huge immigration movements into Catalonia from the rest of Spain especially in the second half of the XX Century. The demographer Anna Cabré estimated that if the migratory process into Catalonia would have not occurred along the XX Century, the six million Catalans in 1981 would have been 2,360,000 and Catalan population would be six percent of Spanish population, instead of the present 16.5 percent (1991). From 1940 to 1981 the Catalan population doubled with the immigration flow, especially intense in the 1960s. The majority settled in the surroundings of Barcelona (see Figure 1), facing harsh living conditions due to unplanned urbanization (Capel 1974).

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[18] Differential factuality is a translation of the Catalan "fet diferencial" and the Spanish "hecho diferencial", a common term in the Spanish public debate that refers to relatively different linguistic and socio-economic features.

Figure 1. Population and Density in Catalonia and Barcelona in the XX Century

Source: BBVA Cuaderno n5, 2006

111

These flows modified the social structure in Catalonia, and specially the relation between classes and national identification; the relative status of native population lifted, while political elites would remain mostly local and would only change at a slow pace (Linz 1973). Interaction with the Catalan culture, even with its language, was difficult for most immigrants given their concentration in the outskirts of main industrial cities, and given the fact that public expressions of Catalan culture and language were forbidden during the Francoism (Candel 1964). Integration of second generation immigrants was reasonably achieved for many (Virós Canals i Pallares, 1991), although the overlapping between origin and national identification has lasted in the first generation (Hierro 2012, chap. 1–2).

Serrano (1998) identified different typologies of nationalist discourses among Catalans linked to political parties and social status. Remarkably she extends the focus beyond the Catalan nationalist discourses to cover also the Spanish nationalist discourses in Catalonia, tapping therefore into discourses of what other authors have labelled as exclusive identities (either Spanish or Catalan) or dual identities among Catalans. This documents and describes the existence of different identities problematized in Catalonia, and their linkages with different political parties as potential mobilizing actors. Some scholars have explored the nature of Catalan national identity, and predominantly have considered it mostly civic (Linz 1973; Díez Medrano 1999; Serrano 1998), although some others have claimed its ethnocultural nature sustained mainly in the role of Catalan Government's' linguistic policies (Miley 2007). In this chapter we will not enter into the discussion on the content of Catalan identity because we lack of the data to explore this subject as we did in the previous chapters. Instead we will focus on the role of saliency of national identity in Catalonia, either Spanish or Catalan identity, as an individual level factor of political mobilization, specifically of political protest.

3. Explaining Political Participation

Research has been conducted to understand how national identification and origin, language, and social class, relate to electoral behaviour (to name a few: Montero and Font 1991; Pérez-Nievas and Bonet 2006; Pérez-Nievas and Fraile 2000; Riba 2000). Behind those studies there is normally the implicit assumption that national identities per se do not politically mobilize individuals, but it is origin, language, social class, or any other factor that would actually do because they would overlap with categories of national identification. None of the studies explored the relation between saliency of identification and political participation.

Modern forms of protest like demonstrations or strikes Catalonia spread during the industrialization period in XIX Century. In the early XX Century they adopted violent forms of protest in the wave of an anarchist movement in Barcelona and the surroundings, with local and immigrant active actors. This wave of protest might be understood under the deprivation approach (Gurr 1970), where discontent with the socio-economic situation would be politicized. Under the Francoist dictatorship political and civil rights were not granted to Spaniards and hence free and open political participation was not allowed. Clandestine movements led with time to a subculture of mobilization and by the end of the period, just after the death of the dictator, the left opposition to the regime had assumed the nationalist claims for self-government and respect to cultural expressions, mainly the Catalan language and symbols (Johnston 1991). And the Catalan population and Catalan nationalist elites were engaged into the consecution and afterwards consolidation of democracy. With the consolidation of democracy in Spain during the 1980s, the nature of protest shifted to what was common in Western democracies: students, consumers, environmentalists, human rights activists, among others, took the public protest stage, constituted and backed by affluent social bases, undertaking planned and organized action to mobilize and influence public opinion and policy makers (Dalton 2002, 62–64).

Since survey data was initially used in the second half of XX Century to gather evidence on the determinants of political participation in Western democracies, it has regularly been confirmed that individual level resources and political attitudes or motivation, are crucial factors to understand who participates. Education, income, a sense of efficacy and psychological engagement with politics or public affairs are positively related to all kinds of political participation (Barnes, Kaase, and Allerbeck 1979; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). In Spain this has also been confirmed by different studies such as those by Torcal (1995), Caínzos (2004), Montero, Font and Torcal (2006). And this is also the case with activism through political organizations (Morales 2009) and political protest (Ferrer-Fons 2005). In order to provide a better account of the underlying mechanisms of political participation, the so called socio-economic status model was overcome with the *Civic Voluntarism Model* (CVM) proposed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995). This model suggests that citizens' participation in politics depends on three factors: first, the level of individual resources like education, free time, money, enables some citizens to participate because they allow them to overcome the costs (especially opportunity costs) of participation, while prevents others doing so because they have more important priorities to satisfy. Secondly, motivation or political engagement, which makes citizens aware and interested in politics, hence more informed and ready to form opinions and become involved in political action. Eventually, a third factor would be the opportunities to participate open with recruitment processes, which contribute to overcoming the costs of participation by increasing the perceived benefits of political action.

In this second model, the CVM, social institutions have a major role determining the chances that citizens get involved in political action: schools, civic organizations, churches, endow the citizens with resources, motivation, and opportunities required to overcome the costs of participation. The three elements would favor different modes of political participation: for example, education provides skills that facilitate gathering and processing the information to understand issues and make an opinion; money would favor the contribution to political campaigns and

donations. Highly educated people tend to generate more income, and they are able to use that income to buy time (outsourcing domestic chores, child care, etc.) they can use to participate; the skills acquired through education –though not only- also help improving time and money management to make more efficient use of both. And time can also be used to collaborate actively with civic or political associations, which in its turn contribute developing skills to participate and generate opportunities for mobilization.

An important contribution on the explanatory mechanisms of political participation came from Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), focusing on the profile of those who participate and the timing to do it. Building on earlier models than the CVM, they sought to overcome the paradox of political participation: why should a rational citizen participate if the costs would usually seem to be higher than the expected benefits? Their answer consisted of highlighting the motivational role played by interests, preferences, identification with issues, and beliefs, which make some citizens benefit from participation more than others, and from strategic mobilization by political entrepreneurs targeting motivated audiencies. In order to maximize the benefit of their efforts, political entrepreneurs mobilize the highest number of citizens given the effort and resources they can invest in. They hence identify a target population with characteristics like having high level of resources or motivation because they those are people who tend to be well connected and are influential; political entrepreneurs expect that they will trigger a mobilization cascade effect making their effort more efficient. Connectedness of this target population, argue Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 23ff), is also due to the fact that social networks create solidary compensations for individuals, benefiting those who act for the common interest. These kinds of benefits imply increasing self-esteem, neighborhood and friendship bonds sustained in obligations, reciprocity, and trust among peers. The role of social networks and social capital as generators of activists and engaged citizens has been explored by other authors (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). The opportunities to participate in this revised CVM

model expand the scope beyond individual level factors, opening the door to social networks.

Institutional characteristics are an additional element favoring political participation. Institutions and political processes shape the incentives structure to participate depending on their degree of openness of political systems towards different kinds of political participation, the degree of fragmentation of the political elites, or the porosity of bureaucratic decision-making system (Morales 2009). Institutional level factors are relevant in comparative studies to help understand variations in levels and patterns of political participation. We are not going to observe these elements in this chapter because the analysis here focuses only on the case of Catalonia, so institutional elements are invariant for all individuals. Nevertheless there is one institutional level mechanism that might be worth mentioning as it may have a role in political mobilization in Catalonia. The distribution of subsidies and funds to public and private organizations tends to reflect political priorities of governing parties which choose promoting certain policies, values, and interests instead of others. This mechanisms can help those political entrepreneurs, who share the values or interests promoted by public institutions, mobilizing citizens; while other political entrepreneurs will face relative disadvantage to do so. In the Catalan context, for example, where all governing parties have been either Catalan nationalist parties or at least they were publicly sensitive to the protection and promotion of Catalan cultural distinctive traits, one might expect that public subsidies and funding would have enhanced, through the mentioned mechanism, the opportunities of participation of those holding Catalan identities.

4. Saliency of National Identification and Political Participation

This section will explain the relation between national identities and political protest, and specifically how saliency of national identities can play a role as a political mobilizing factor. The question here is how, from an individual level perspective, can national identity promote political participation, and specifically of protest participation, in those territories where national identities are highly politicized. Wherever there is a national identity cleavage articulated around a limited repertoire of identity options, can we expect a particular individual level mechanism that link national identities to political participation? Direct and indirect political mobilization by political parties is certainly an important factor implied in the answer, but the question remains: is there any characteristic of national identities per se that might make some individuals more prone to engage in political action than others, or such linkage is more related to the content of specific national identities, for example those favoring civic or participatory values? In this section I will argue that in a territory with a national identity cleavage, the more salient are national identities to individuals, irrespective of the content of national identity, the more likely they will become engaged in politics, and hence the easier will be that they are mobilized to participate.

There is nothing a priori that allows us to establish a generic mechanism to link the content of national identities, whether they consist mostly of civic components or they include also ethnic aspects, with protest participation. As we saw in the previous chapters, the content of Spanish national identity ranges from purely civic attributes to a combination of civic and ethnic, similarly as in other European countries. Although we don't have information to test it, we may assume that the content of Catalan national identity will show a similar pattern. In order to explore the linkage between national identities and political participation, one might be tempted to argue on the relation between civic conceptions of the nation and political participation. But it seems difficult to establish such a linkage in general terms because there is not an intrinsic characteristic of a civic or

ethnic content of national identities that favors individuals' political protest participation. Content-wise, the linkage appears if we add into the equation other factors like, for example, the mobilization by political entrepreneurs targeting population having one kind or another of national identity; or adding some other individual level characteristics which might overlap with holders of any kind of identity. Establishing that link would be easier if we would consider protest participation with specific objectives: think of somebody holding an ethnic Spanish or Catalan national identity; the chances that this person will hold negative attitudes towards immigrants are higher compared to a person holding a civic conception of the nation, as it was shown in the chapter 2 of this thesis, and hence the chances he/she might engage in protest activities against open immigration policies are higher than for those with more civic identities. Likewise, chances that the later will engage in protest activities in defense of the rights of immigrants are arguably higher than for those with ethnic identities. So none of the types of identities, civic or ethnic, imply per se a generic relation on how this might promote political participation. Here I contend that we have to look at another dimension of national identities in order to establish such a generic linkage. This dimension is identity saliency, according to the distinction of national identification dimensions proposed discussed in the Introduction of this thesis.

In what follows we will develop the argument that links the saliency of individuals' national identification and political participation in general. We will build on social psychologists work and the main concepts of the Social Identity and the Self-Categorization theories (Turner 1975; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981). It is not the objective of this article to explain the two theories (for a critical review see Huddy 2001, 2002; Oakes 2002) but only reviewing the relevant parts required to develop our hypothesis. Human beings tend to structure the social environment assigning social categories to others and themselves. Awareness of our belonging to certain categories or social groups, together with the emotional and evaluative components associated to those categories, form our social identity. Hence social identity is a concept applied to individuals as members of any social group; social identity is then a mosaic of the social groups individuals belong to. Group belonging is the result of a

categorization (or classification) process by which external markers and stimuli are processed in a way that exacerbates differences between categories and reduces differences within categories (Abrams 1992, 58). Behind such a categorization process there are practical and adaptive reasons: this helps individuals reducing complexity of the surrounding world and develop the ability to act in it. The between and within categories biases are explained by the need individuals have to regard themselves in positive terms to grant psychological stability: positive evaluations of the groups one belongs to, either in absolute or in relative terms, and negative evaluations of alternative groups serve this function. In order to keep a psychological balance with such biased performance, individuals emphasize selectively those intergroup differences that foster positive perceptions of the endogroups and negative perceptions of the exogroups. The self-categorization process, hence, has a motivational component related to the promotion of self-esteem.

Tajfel and Turner (1979) established another linkage between self-categorization and the social structure and the relative power positions of social groups in that structure. Individuals who self-categorize themselves as members of least powerful social groups, have also psychological tools to achieve and maintain a positive social identity, tools that depend on their beliefs structure regarding permeability of social groups and possibility of social change. The options are somehow restricted by objective characteristics, but selective selection of available characteristics open a wide range of alternatives. Social Identity Theory is built on the process of (self-)categorization by which individuals consider themselves to belong to certain social categories or groups, and the consequences of this (self-)categorization process. As social categories, national groups are available categories of identification for individuals which are subject to the same psychosocial processes: perception biases, attribution biases, and hence they have capacity to influence perceptions, evaluations, and behavior. In all the process, intergroup comparisons help defining perceived and attributed characteristics of the endogroup compared to those of the exogroup, and this is a critical step by which individuals establish their

social identities by identifying with certain social categories (Turner 1991, Chap.2; Abrams 1992, 58ff).

On the basis of the perceived characteristics of social categories and of context-dependent characteristics, individuals assign different degrees of relevance to the social groups (categories) they identify with. And the more salient a social category is for an individual, the higher will be its capacity to model his/her perception and influence his behavior. A social category that ranks high in the relative importance of categories or that is salient will be more accessible to cognitive processes and hence will have greater conditioning power over perceptions, evaluations, and behavior (Deaux 1992, 26).

Ros, Cano and Huici (1987) applied the Social Identity Theory to the analysis of territorially based identities. They analyzed attitudinal and behavioral correlates of the self-categorization process in territories with a center-periphery cleavage. They used the Spanish and specifically they focused on the relation between the saliency of identification with either the center (Spain) and the periphery (Autonomous Communities), and some perceptions and behavior. The analysis was articulated around the concept of Comparative Identities: a concept that measures the saliency of territorial identities by comparing the relative levels of identification with different territorial identities. In order to capture the effects of saliency of identification with either the center or the periphery of the country, the authors suggested that what counts is the difference between levels of identification with each politically nested territory; for example the level of identification with Spain compared to the level of identification with an Autonomous Community. That difference captures the saliency of identification and hence determines the degree to which they condition individuals' perceptions and behavior in relevant matters of the context that relate to the respective social categories (Huici et al. 1997).

We are now in a position to formulate a general hypothesis on the linkage between identification with national groups in Catalonia, and political participation. In a context like Catalonia where national identification is

problematized and politicized, i.e. where there is a center-periphery cleavage, one expects that saliency of identification will have an impact on political attitudes and behavior. Irrespective of whether Catalans identify with Spain or with Catalonia, the more salient their identification is, the more they will be exposed to political information and the more engaged they will be to the relevant national debate and, in general, to political issues. It is important to note that this hypothesis rests upon an individual level mechanism: in a context where national identities and debates articulate the political dynamics and debates, when national identification is high, political engagement will also tend to be high also, irrespective the specific category of identification (be it Spanish or Catalan) that is salient. Political entrepreneurs will then mobilize those citizens who are more prone to react to their mobilization campaigns, i.e. citizens who politically engaged and share the preferences or interest of political entrepreneurs. This will make these citizens more likely to become involved in political participation.

5. Empirical Test

In this section we are going to test empirically the hypothesis that saliency of national identification favors political participation via the promotion of political engagement or motivation, and this will happen irrespective of the specific national group individuals identify with. This hypothesis applies equally to any national group; what counts here is the saliency of identification.

I will use survey data from the Study 2,450 "Ciudadanía, participación y democracia" conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas in 2002,[19] because it contains a large enough representative number of cases of Catalan population (1,135 cases), obtained through a multistage stratified sampling, with a confidence level of 95.5% and a margin of error ± 2.97, and it contains the most complete set of variables to model political participation and to measure saliency of national identification.[20] Unfortunately due to the lack of other surveys providing suitable data and large enough sample sizes, the test cannot be conducted in different moments to assess the test the validity of the hypothesis in of varying conditions in the political context. Nevertheless, it is worth a mention that using 2002 data poses a challenge to the hypothesis to be tested because, although the hypothesis scope embraces saliency of national identity of both Catalan and Spanish national identities, in 2002 Spanish national identity was not widely mobilized in Catalonia while the contrary happened with Catalan national identity.

The hypothesis formulated here contains an apparently challenging implication in the Catalan context. The apparently challenging implication arises from the fact that the hypothesis states that salient national identification mobilizes individuals even if their category of national

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[19] The project was funded by the grant no. SEC 2000-0758-C02, from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and directed by Professors José Ramón Montero (UAM) and Joan Font (UAB).

[20] More technical details, the questions included in the survey questionnaire, and the frequency distribution obtained can be found in http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/-Archivos/Marginales/2440_2459/2450/e245001.html

identification is Spain. Socioeconomic profiles of individuals identifying with Catalonia tend to be higher than those of individuals identifying with Spain, so as we saw above, this might partially explain why individuals identifying with Catalonia are more participative than those identifying with Spain (or than those with any kind of dual identity). The fact that the two thirds Catalans born in Catalonia occupied higher status (educational and occupational) positions than the one-third of immigrants who arrived from the rest of Spain in the 1950s-1960s, and that Catalonia born population were better integrated in the civil society, would explain their higher levels of participation given the fact that they had resources and were well connected to social networks. Although identity change of immigrants is an ongoing process in Catalonia by which immigrants change their identification with Spain to a dual identification or less frequently to an exclusive identification with Catalonia, it is yet autochthonous individuals the ones who more frequently identify nationally with Catalonia only (Hierro 2012). Moreover, the nationalist Convergència i Unió party occupied the regional government during six terms, until 2003; this created favorable conditions to mobilize individuals on the basis of their Catalan national identification, which would add to the fact that those individuals are the ones with higher resources and social networks, increasing also the chances they would take part in political action. This is why the hypothesis formulated might seem at first glance challenging, more so if one takes into account that since the conservative Partido Popular won the Spanish 2000 General Election by majority, and supported CiU minority to form government in Catalonia, Catalan nationalist bases mobilized and in the 2003 regional election the left pro-Catalan independence party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) achieved its best result ever with more than half a million votes, doubling results from the previous election (Molins and Pardos-Prado 2006). In any case, we need to stress here that the hypothesis formulated does not intend to explain national identity groups differential in aggregates of political protest; it targets individual level role of national identity saliency irrespective of the specific national group of identification. Besides, a relative success has been achieved when political entrepreneurs also intended to mobilize those individuals identifying with Spain (attempts

occurred in different occasions since the establishment of democracy, mainly by intellectuals through Spain-wide mass media regarding the Catalan language policies, with a relative success in the 2006 Catalan election, as shown in Lago, Montero, and Torcal 2007).

In the next part we are going to present an operationalization of saliency of national identification in Catalonia, and afterwards we are going to discuss the model to conduct the empirical test.

a. Operationalizing Saliency of National Identification

Ros et al. (2000: 81-82) defined the concept of Comparative Identity as the "comparison between the degree of identification with two [national] categories", which as we saw informs about the saliency of such identification. They also proposed an operationalization of this concept to measure saliency adopting the well-known Linz question used in many survey questionnaires.[21] As the difference of identification with Spain compared to Catalonia is higher, or conversely as the degree of identification with Catalonia compared to Spain is higher, the saliency of identification will also be higher. The following Table shows the saliency levels corresponding to each option of the Linz question.

Table 1. Use of Linz Question to Measure Saliency of National Identification

Linz question categories	Saliency levels
Only Spanish	High
More Spanish than Catalan	Medium
As Spanish as Catalan	Low
More Catalan than Spanish	Medium
Only Catalan	High

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[21] The Linz question asks survey respondents to choose the option they feel more identified with among the following ones: *I feel only Catalan; I feel more Catalan than Spanish; I feel as Spanish as Catalan; I feel more Spanish than Catalan, I feel only Spanish.*

Although this question has been used by some social psychologists to measure saliency of identification, it was not designed and it has some problems to serve this purpose. The first version of the Linz question appeared in a questionnaire of a survey conducted by the company DATA S.A., funded by Juan J. Linz, in 1979[22], and it was designed to analyze the level of conflict and potential demands of autonomy, or even independence, by the peripheral national parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Analyses were used to describe the profiles of center and periphery identifiers, and also to highlight the limitation of demands for those parties given the existence of large parts of the population in both Autonomous Communities identifying simultaneously with Spain and the region. This last point was lately used by Linz and Stepan to develop an analytical framework to understand and address multinational countries where notable parts of the population in the peripheries have multiple identities; such a framework would be articulated around the concept of state-nations (Linz and Stepan 1996; Linz 1997).

The use of the Linz question was soon extended to the remaining Autonomous Communities in Spain, and hence it had to be used as the operationalization of different concepts to capture different contexts. For example, Giner and Moreno (1990) use the Linz question to measure "double nationalities", "primitive identification of nationality", "regional identity", or "national – state identifying traits", depending on the Autonomous Community it is applied to. Eventually, the Linz question also became a common tool to analyze center-periphery conflicts in other multinational countries like Canada, United Kingdom, Belgium (Keating 1996, 1999; Moreno 1999; Bromley, Curtice, McCrone, and Park 2006), or it has even been adopted in the Eurobarometer series to explore the extent of citizens' multiple identification with countries and the EU, and also with adaptations to suit particular cases (McMannus, Miller,

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[22] In the publication that first appeared making use of the question, the authors acknowledge the support received from the company in the design of the questionnaire (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986, Appendix 4). Three years later, in 1982, the question was also used to conduct another survey and results were analyzed in Linz and Montero (1986).

Markowski, and Wasilewski 2003). The validity of the adapted Linz question to analyze country-EU identifications has been analyzed by Ruiz-Jiménez (Ruiz-Jiménez 2007).

Operationalizing saliency as a *comparative identity* requires two steps: first gathering information on the degree of identification with each of the two territories; and second, comparing the differences in the degrees of identification. The Linz question is a bipolar scale that captures in one step the differences of identification between two territories, and this makes this question unsuitable to measure saliency because it generates validity problems. Reducing a two-step process into one implies a loss of information that generates ambiguities. If we try to distribute the five answer options of the Linz question in a bidimensional plot where one axis refers to the degree of identification with Spain, and another axis to the degree of identification with Catalonia, we will obtain what is shown in Figure 1. The answer options with high levels of saliency (see Table 1 above) are the only ones that do not generate any ambiguity: they are represented in cells 1 and 4 of Figure 1. Nevertheless the remaining answer options are ambiguous. Take for example the option "More Spanish than Catalan": an individual can choose this option and be in three different situations; first, having a high degree of attachment to Spain and a low degree of attachment to Catalonia (cell 1 in Figure 1); second, having a high degree of attachment to both territories, though higher for Spain (cell 2); and third, having a low degree of attachment to both territories, though higher for Spain (cell 3). This means that the differences in the degree of attachment will be higher for individuals in the first option, and hence the

Figure 1. Linz Question as Measurement of Saliency: Combination of Degree of
Identification with Two Territories

saliency of their identification should also be higher, but the Linz question will not let us distinguish among them. Equivalent situations are found, mutatis mutandi, with the answer option "More Catalan than Spanish". Regarding the answer option capturing the lowest saliency level, "As much Spanish as Catalan", ambivalence is found because it captures two different cases: by one side, individuals with the same and high degree of identification with Spain and Catalonia; and by the other side, individuals with a low though also the same degree of identification with both territories. The two situations capture different degrees of saliency of identification: the first one, in a context with a center-periphery cleavage, where national identification is a pivotal issue structuring political parties and positions alignment, holding a positive and equal identification with bot h center and the peripheral territories reflects a low saliency level. This might be understood as a conciliatory position and it is difficult (though possible) that it implies identification is salient for the individual; considering this position as salient would equate to assume that moderates in the center-periphery cleavage are so to say intensely moderate.[23] By the other side, an individual who rejects identification with the two territories around which the cleavage center-periphery is articulated implies a refusal of taking part in an important public debate, signalling that the stance taken is highly salient. The position of these individuals might be probably understood within the literature of social movements, under the framing processes leading towards of a counter-culture identity (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994). It is therefore important to distinguish between the two

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[23] Actually, when the relevance of the center-periphery cleavage increased progressively since the beginning of the elaboration of a new Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia in 2004, internal tensions arouse within the Catalan socialist party PSC. This had always been a party with an electorate characterized by such conciliatory position (Molas and Bartomeus 1998; Linz and Montero 1999) in the center-periphery cleavage. When this cleavage became highly salient with the political debate articulated around the independence of Catalonia, since summer 2010, the party faced serious internal tensions to define a clear position while keeping its electoral support. Besides, Hierro (2012) has shown that individuals change in the answer options of the Linz question is rationalized by events or experiences that end up making more relevant (salient) some aspects of any of the two categories of identification (Spain and Catalonia), changes that are usually driven by the debates among political elites.

situations highlighted, especially with regards to the analysis of the relation between saliency of identification and protest political participation.

An alternative to measure saliency and overcome the Linz question problems is required. Luckily some survey questionnaires include a question that can be used to measure saliency following the two steps mentioned above. This question asks the respondents about their degree of attachment or identification with different territories, normally starting by the village/town/city of residence, and following with the region, country, Europe, and the world. The measurement level of this question is either a scale from 0 to 10, or an ordinal variable with four levels of attachment/identification. Here I am going to use scale from the survey CIS 2450 (year 2002).[24] Table 2 shows the marginal frequencies of the Linz question in Catalonia: with a large majority having pure dual identities (40 percent), similar proportion of Catalans feeling only Spanish or only Catalan (11 and 12 percent, respectively), and a four times higher share of Catalans feeling more Catalan than Spanish compared to the reverse option. Attachment levels to different territorial entities in Catalonia are shown in Table 3: results indicate that the highest level of attachment is addressed towards Catalonia and the second lowest to Spain, just above Europe. The highest variability in these levels of attachment is towards Spain (2.71 standard deviation) while the lowest is towards Catalonia (1.89).

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[24] There are other surveys including the attachment/identification question, but they do not include other variables required to specify the model of political protest participation. Nevertheless, we are going to use the CIS 2667 (year 2007) survey to validate the operationalization of saliency proposed in this article.

Table 2. Linz Question, CIS-2450, Catalonia 2002

	Percentage	Number
I feel only Spanish	11.0	(125)
I feel more Spanish than Catalan	6.4	(73)
I feel as Spanish as Catalan	40.2	(456)
I feel more Catalan than Spanish	24.9	(283)
I feel only Catalan	12.1	(137)
Don't know	1.9	(21)
Don't answer	3.5	(40)
TOTAL	100.0	(1135)

Survey Question: "Which one of the following statements best reflects how you feel?

Table 3. Levels of attachment to different entities, CIS-2450, Catalonia 2002

	Mean	Standard Deviation	(N)
The neighbourhood you live in	7.59	2.26	(1126)
The village/town you live in	7.94	2.14	(1129)
The Autonomous Community	8.33	1.89	(1129)
Spain	7.17	2.71	(1124)
Europe	6.83	2.36	(1070)
The Humankind	7.73	2.24	(1083)

I would like to ask some questions about the attachment you feel towards the place you live in; for example, your neighbourhood, your village/town or your country. In this scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "None" and 10 "Much", how attached you feel to…?

The operationalization of saliency requires two steps as we saw above. The first one is already completed with the information on the degrees of attachment to Catalonia and Spain shown in Table 3. The second step requires comparing those degrees of attachment. In order to simplify the task, we will consider that values in the attachment scale from 0 to 5 indicate weak attachment, and values from 6 to 10 indicate strong attachment. With this in mind, we have compared the attachment levels and obtained the results that appear in Table 4. About 42 percent Catalans have a low saliency of national identification; 10 percent have medium levels of saliency of their Spanish identification; and 4 percent have high levels of saliency. Among those identifying with Catalonia, 18 percent have medium saliency levels and 22 percent have high saliency. These results are quite different from the Linz question regarding the categories with high saliency, with less Catalans having salient Spanish identification and much more having a highly salient Catalan identification.

The two Medium (Spanish) options have been merged into a single category, and the two Medium (Catalan) options have also been merged into a single one, given the very small number of cases in the weak identification options. This clarifies the situation depicted in Figure 1 above, leaving the cell number 3 with only one category: those with high saliency because they refuse both categories of identification (around 4 percent). The result can be compared with the one obtained with the Linz question, albeit this one has no ambiguities in the categories. This new operationalization correlate with other variables in the same way than the Linz question does: the relation of the new operationalization with individuals' preferences of territorial organization of the state, and with nationalism scales are equivalent to those obtained with the Linz question (see the results in the Appendix Figures A1-A4).

Table 4. New Operationalization of Saliency of National Identification in Catalonia, CIS-2450.

Saliency levels	Comparison of degree of attachment to Spain and Catalonia	Cell (from Figure 1)	Percentage	(N)
High (Refuses both categories)	Spain: Weak Catalonia: Weak & **Spain = Catalonia**	3	3.7	41
High (Spanish)	Spain: Strong Catalonia: Weak & **Spain > Catalonia**	1	4.3	48
Medium (Spanish)	Spain: Strong Catalonia: Strong & **Spain > Catalonia**	2	9.9	111
Medium (Spanish)	Spain: Weak Catalonia: Weak & **Spain > Catalonia**	3	0.4	4
Low	Spain: Strong Catalonia: Strong & **Spain = Catalonia**	2	41.6	467
Medium (Catalan)	Spain: Weak Catalonia: Weak & **Spain < Catalonia**	3	1.0	11
Medium (Catalan)	Spain: Strong Catalonia: Strong & **Spain < Catalonia**	2	17.2	193
High (Catalan)	Spain: Weak Catalonia: Strong & **Spain < Catalonia**	4	22.0	247

Table 5. New Operationalization of Saliency, CIS-2450

Saliency levels	Percentage	Number
High Spanish	4.3	(48)
Medium Spanish	10.3	(115)
Low	41.6	(467)
Medium Catalan	18.2	(204)
High Catalan	22.0	(247)
Refuse both	3.7	(41)
TOTAL	100.0	(1122)

b. Empirical Test: The Role of Saliency of Identification in Protest Politics

In a territory with a center-periphery cleavage, implying the mobilization of different national identities (either inclusive or exclusive), individuals' saliency of national identification is expected to increase their political engagement or motivation, and ultimately to influence the chances they become active in protest politics. In order to test empirically this hypothesis in the case of Catalonia, we are going to describe the empirical model and operationalization.

According to the main studies on political participation, there are three main individual level factors influencing political participation: resources, motivation, and group resources. The three factors are going to be included in our model, together with four control variables: size of location of residence, ideology, age, and gender. Nonetheless, our focus will be on the interaction effect of saliency of identification and motivation over political protest action.

The empirical test will be done using Structural Equations Modeling (SEM) because this technique allows capturing the complex relations between the factors that intervene in the explanation of protest behavior. The available individual resources of citizens are expected to favor their implication in protest activities, as we mentioned above. But as we have also seen there is, according to previous empirical studies, a positive relation between individual resources and motivation, by one side, and between individual resources and group resources, by another side. These kinds of relations have a mediating effect on political participation, and these are the kind of complex relations that can be modeled and captured by SEM. Certainly there are other techniques, for example two-stages least squares multiple regression, that allow to model those relations. The comparative advantage of SEM is that it also captures the relation between unexplained variances of variables (the error terms), improving the accuracy of the estimated parameters, providing additional information and increasing overall power of the models estimated. Moreover SEM results seem to be less affected by non-normal error distribution (Bollen 1998).

The strategy chosen to test the hypothesis has been the following. Given that we expect that saliency of identification will increase political engagement or motivation, which in its turn has an impact on protest participation, we will compare the effect of motivation over protest participation for each saliency level. This means that the sample is divided and the above model is estimated for each saliency level; then the estimated effect of motivation over protest participation is compared across the samples. The model to be estimated, as we will see below, requires the use of eight variables and the estimation of more than twenty parameters (this is variable, depending on what is the best model fit), which implies that reasonable sample sizes are required to obtain reliable estimates. Given that the number of cases within each saliency level is small (see Table 5), especially for the Spanish identification categories, I have merged the saliency levels of Spanish identification into the category named "Saliency Spanish Identification", and the saliency levels of Catalan identification into the category "Saliency Catalan Identification". So the hypothesis will

be tested empirically against three subsamples: one subsample includes the cases with low saliency in national identification; the other two include cases with higher saliency of national identification -either Spanish or Catalan. The expectation is that the effect of individuals' motivation on protest participation will be higher for the higher saliency groups of cases, either Spanish or Catalan, than for the low saliency group (see Table 6).

Table 6. New Operationalization of Saliency, Merged Categories for SEM Test

Saliency levels	Percentage	Hypothesis
Saliency Spanish Identification *(High Spanish + Medium Spanish)*	14.6	Positive effect of motivation
Low saliency	41.6	Small or null effect of motivation
Saliency Spanish Identification *(High Catalan + Medium Catalan)*	40.2	Positive effect of motivation
Refuse both	3.7	[Too small sample size to conduct the test]
TOTAL	100.0	

In order to keep parsimony in a model with eight observed variables and facilitating the interpretation of its results against the hypothesis, I have created composite scores of the main variables. This allows to create a structural (path) model only because there is not a measurement component in the form of latent variables. Composite scores are estimates of latent variables created as a sum of the weighted average of observed variables. Following Saris and Gallhofer (2007, chap. 7), each of the composite scores is an estimate of the latent variables created using at least three indicators. Efficiency of the composite scores can be improved by accounting for the quality of each of the constitutive indicators; in the case

of scores for individuals, I have used regression weights because according to Saris and Gallhofer (Saris and Gallhofer 2007, chap. 14) it is the best option available for scores of individual level latent variables. Regression weights are obtained through a confirmatory Factor Analysis.[25] Quality of the coefficients is reflected in the diagonal of the correlation matrices provided as input data to estimate the SEM models (see in Table 7 below the quality coefficients of all the model variables).

The model variables and indicators used to build the composite scores are described below, details are provided in the Appendix.

Dependent variable. *Protest Participation*. This is a composite score created with the combination of the dichotomous variables (yes/no) capturing whether the survey respondents participated in the previous 12 months to the interview in any of the following activities: signing petitions, wearing badges or stickers, participating in a public demonstration, joining a strike, and participating in illegal protest activities. The selection of activities is based on the empirically tested typology of participation modes in Catalonia by Torcal, Montero, Teorell (2006).

Independent variables.[26] The main explanatory variables in the model are individual resources, motivation, and group resources.

Resources: the CIS-2450 survey provides information on income of individuals at the household level and education level completed. Unfortunately, the income variable contains 35 percent of missing cases, and given the fact that individual resources is a relevant factor in the model and three variables are needed to create a composite score, I preferred not to use income –even if imputed.[27] Instead I decided to use only education,

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[25] Details of the calculations are shown in the Appendix.

[26] In the SEM models that will be estimated one would refer to endogenous and exogenous variables. Nevertheless, the only purely exogenous variable in the models is participation in protest politics, and this would not help the reader follow the design of the model for the empirical test in line with the theoretical framework and the hypothesis.

[27] Multiple imputation regression models attempted had extremely low explanatory power (as per the R^2).

which has only one missing case, and its categories are: None, Primary, Secondary, and Higher levels.

Motivation: A composite score has been created using three indicators, each one capturing one dimension of political motivation: cognitive, affective, and behavioral, following the operationalization used in the CID Project by Morales, Mota and Pérez-Nievas (2006). The cognitive dimension consists of an additive scale of four variables: frequency of reading of newspapers, frequency of following TV or radio programmes on politics other than the news bulletins, knowledge about the European Union, and knowledge about the country. The affective dimension is also an additive scale formed by four variables: importance of politics, feelings inspired by politics (positive feelings like enthusiasm and compromise ranking the highest and negative feelings like irritation and distrust ranking the lowest), internal efficacy, and interest in politics. The third dimension, behavior, is an additive scale adding up two variables: frequency of political discussion and frequency of trying to persuade others about own opinions.

Group Resources. This variable is operationalized as a composite score created with four indicators: total number of associations the individual voluntarily belongs to; associational engagement (with three values: not engaged, passively engaged –only belongs to or makes donations- and actively engaged) as operationalized in the CID Project by Morales and Mota (2006); social trust; and belonging to informal networks (dichotomous variable).

Table 7. Quality Coefficients of Variables in the Model, CIS-2450

Variable	Quality Coefficient	Source
Protest	0.66	Own elaboration (see Appendix)
Group Resources	0.77	Own elaboration (see Appendix)
Motivation	0.78	Own elaboration (see Appendix)
Individual Resources (education)	0.90	Alwin (2007, Appendix)
Ideology	0.54	Alwin (2007, Appendix)
Size residence location	1	Alwin (2007, Appendix)
Gender	1	Alwin (2007, Appendix)
Age	1	Alwin (2007, Appendix)

Control Variables. There are four control variables in the model: the age of the respondent measured in years, gender, size of habitat, and ideology (left-right scale). Ideology is a variable with 23 percent missing; in order to keep it in the model I have imputed the missing cases using nine variables (mass attendance, the Linz question, frequency of political discussion, importance of politics, importance of being a god citizen, tolerance of minorities, contacting a politician or attending a demonstration in the past 12 months, and education). The average values of 300 replications have been taken as the estimates of the missing cases.

The SEM model that has been estimated separately for each saliency group is shown in the Figure 2, the total effects or variables of interest has been obtained, en eventually compared to test the hypothesis.[28] In fact, three options have been tried to model the relation between Motivation and Group Resources (options *a*, *b*, and *c* in the Figure 2). In option *a* Motivation and Group Resources have a reciprocal influence. Option *b* is

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[28] The first strategy was to estimate a Multiple Group Comparison holding parameters constant across saliency groups. Nevertheless the model could not even be estimated due to the fact, as we will see below, that the structural models differ across saliency groups.

a model in which Motivation increases the available Group Resources, but not the other way around, while option *c* is the opposite case. The selection of the best model for each group has been made according to global fit measures: RMSEA, P-Value, AIC, and NFI (Jöreskog and Sorbom 2006). The consideration to free additional parameters in the model has been guided by the indices provided by JRule package (Saris, Satorra, and van der Veld 2009).

Figure 2. Model of Protest Participation
(excluding control variables)

The overall results with total effects of Individual Resources, Motivation, and Group Resources on Political protest are depicted in the Figure 3 below.[29] It is worth noting that all three key independent variables have a positive impact on political protest activities, confirming what is known from all empirical studies on political participation. Looking at our variables of interest, the total effects of Motivation on Political protest are higher in the Spanish and the Catalan saliency groups compared to the low saliency one. The 95 percent confidence intervals drawn in the graph are

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[29] Details of the models in their path form and results for each saliency group are shown in the Appendix.

quite large, reflecting at least the relatively small sample sizes used; nevertheless the ranges they depict do not overlap, hence the hypothesis formulated should not be rejected. The second point worth noting refers to the models of relation between Motivation and Group Resources: as it can be seen in the path models for each saliency group (see Appendix), in the Spanish and the Catalan saliency groups, individuals' Motivation has a positive effect on Group Resources (model *b* in Figure 2) while for the low saliency individuals the relation between Motivation and Group Resources is reciprocal (model *a*). This means that, although the total effect of Motivation on political protest is mostly due to a direct effect, there is also a small portion that is accounted for indirectly through the impact that Motivation has on Group Resources. These results seem reasonable, since they imply that individuals with salient national identifications are mobilized persons and probably they are influential in the mobilization process, so their mobilization reinforces group resources role as a favoring factor of political participation. A deeper understanding of this pattern might be provided by information on the type of voluntary associations individuals are involved with, since it has been shown that political associations are the more efficient ones in bridging from associational involvement to political action (Morales 2009).

Figure 3. Individual Level Factors on Protest
(SEM Total Effects)

These results also highlight the role of individual resources. It is relevant the fact that only among the group of individuals with a salient Spanish identification, individual resources have no significant effects on political protest. The direct effect of individual resources is negative (see path diagram in Figure A.5. in the Appendix), but the indirect effect through Motivation is clearly positive (0.42). Mobilization of Spanish identifiers through Motivation might be a compensatory route to nurture and maintain active in political protest. The characteristics of the immediate environment, defining the structure of political opportunities for participation as we saw previously, might be one underlying explanation. With a social group mobilized for the Catalan cause, the closest institutions being responsive to their demands, and political elites having a pool of engaged citizens to mobilize. Another explanation could be found in the object of the political motivation: the results of the estimated models show (see Appendix, Figures A.5-A.7) that age has a twice as big effect on Motivation for Spanish salient identifiers (0.20) than for the other two groups. Life-cycle and political socialization condition individuals political preferences in general, and in Catalonia too regarding identity issues (Hierro 2012); it should be analyzed whether differences in issues of interest among age groups, overlapping with identity self-categorizations, are better channeled through different participation modes. In any case, further research should confirm these results, especially if available data would allow for a more refined operationalization of Individual Resources.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has covered a gap in the area of political participation studies: the exploration of the role of national identities as an individual level factor of political participation protest activities. Empirical studies on the relation between national identification and political participation in Catalonia have focused mostly on electoral participation. This is understandable given the relevance of the center-periphery cleavage in electoral politics. The social movements' literature has mostly dealt with collective identities associated to specific roles or issues. This article has focused on a neglected aspect in studies on national identification and political participation at the individual level: the relation between saliency of national identification and political protest. In territories with an active cleavage center-periphery, national identification plays a significant role in political and public life. Using the case study of Catalonia, I argued that political conflict is reflected at the individual level by the national identification chosen by Catalans: Spanish or Catalan, or a combination of the two. Building on literature of social-psychology, I argued and tested empirically that irrespective of the category of national identification, saliency of identification increases the chances that individuals become politically engaged or motivated, and through this they become involved in political protest activities.

This article has not intended to explain the reasons behind the different levels of protest behavior among citizens with different national identification. It is already known that those identifying with Catalonia are more involved in politics than those identifying with Spain. This is probably due to the higher social profile of Catalonia identifiers that grants them higher skills and influential positions to become engaged and mobilized, to their better social connectedness through associational involvement, and to the partial overlapping of political interests with governing parties regarding identity politics. This article instead intended to show that in places like Catalonia where there is an active national identity cleavage, identity saliency is a relevant mobilizing factor for protest activities, irrespective of the national identity group citizens

identify with. This means that, even though Spain identifiers have a much weaker tradition of identity mobilization in Catalonia, those who become active in protest politics do so because they have a salient national identification that induces political motivation and, eventually, participation.

Further analysis replicating the same model in different time points, with varying contextual factors, will help understanding the role of saliency of identity in protest politics. The focus here is has been individual level explanatory factors of political protest, and specifically on the role of saliency of national identification via the promotion of political engagement or motivation. In principle, testing this hypothesis in a different time, with different contexts, should not refute the results of this test but only probably show changes in the strength of the relation. Conducting qualitative studies rich with information on the specific objectives of protest activities will also contribute refining the results obtained here. Hopefully this article will ease conducting further research by making the case for the need or survey data that includes information to measure identity saliency and political participation.

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8. Appendix

Figure A.1. Linz Question and Nationalism Scales in Catalonia, CIS-2667

Figure A.2. New Operationalization of Saliency and Nationalism
Scales in Catalonia, CIS-2667

Figure A.3. Linz Question and Preferences of Territorial Organization
of the State, CIS-2667

Figure A.4. New Operationalization of Saliency and Preferences of
Territorial Organization of the State, CIS-2667

Figure A.5. SEM for Salient Spanish Identification, CIS-2450

Figure A.6. SEM for Low Saliency of National Identification, CIS-2450

Chi-Square=6.02, df=14, P-value=0.96586, RMSEA=0.000

Chi-Square=2.94, df=13, P-value=0.99815, RMSEA=0.000

Figure A.7. SEM for Salient Catalan
Identification, CIS-2450

Chi-Square=3.49, df=13, P-value=0.99930, RMSEA=0.000

Table A.1. Operationalization of Variables in the Model

PROTEST (Dependent Variables)	Badge	Sign	Demonstration	Strike
Weights from factor scores	0.13	0.21	0.18	0.04
Weights from factor scores scaled to sum 1	23%	38%	32%	7%
Loadings (stdzed.)	0.52	0.65	0.64	0.4

MOTIVATION (variables)	Cognitive	Affect	Behavioral
Weights from factor scores	0.19	0.32	0.28
Weights from factor scores scaled to sum 1	24%	41%	35%
Loadings (stdzed.)	0.66	0.77	0.75

GROUP RESOURCES (variables)	Associational Involvement	Number of Associational memberships	Social Trust	Informal Networks
Weights from factor scores	0.36	0.38	0.05	0.03
Weights from factor scores scaled to sum 1 (Regression weights)	44%	46%	6%	4%
Factor loadings	0.78	0.79	0.26	0.17

Chapter 5. Conclusion

This thesis addressed substantive and methodological topics relevant to the study of national identities and in the explanation of political protest at the individual level. First, it has shown that the a priori complex content of national identities in European countries can be measured if we propose a unidimensional cumulative conceptualization and an appropriate measurement model; the Mokken scaling procedure. Results indicate that civic and ethnic elements are combined in unidimensional scales in each European country without exception. Secondly, this thesis has shown that difficulties to measure the content of state(-wide) national identities in multinational states, such as the selected case of study: Spain, can be overcome with adequately designed survey items. This confirms that conceptualizing the content of national identity as a unidimensional cumulative concept is adequate, and opens the way to simplified research on national identities for scholar. Thirdly, this thesis proved that saliency of national identification is a critical factor to mobilize individuals for political protest in democratic societies that have a national cleavage, such as Catalonia.

The second chapter of the thesis addressed the ubiquitous discussion in the empirical literature on the nature of the content of nations, around the dichotomy civic-ethnic initially created to classify nationalisms. Using a Mokken scale, the article has proven that unidimensional cumulative scales can be built in the seventeen European countries analyzed; the implication of this result is that the content of national identities is neither pure civic nor ethnic but a specific combination of both elements. This thesis has shown that there is regularity in the way those elements align: in every European country, national identities are composed by inclusive/civic elements, around which there is a majority consensus

among the citizens, and by exclusive/ethnic elements which are contested in the sense that smaller groups of citizens conceive their nation in exclusive terms. At the individual level, the additive scale created to capture unidimensional cumulativity implies the existence of a continuum of values ranging from low values, capturing what we called postnationalist citizens (inclusive/civic only conceptions of the nation), to high values, capturing credentialist citizens (conceptions of the nation simultaneously inclusive/civic and exclusive/ethnic). Such a measurement model reduces complexity and ambiguity in the area of empirical studies on national identities using individual level information.

The third chapter addresses the problem of the measurement of state-wide national identities in multinational countries. "A Grounded Method to Measure the Content of National Identity in State-Nations" introduced the Q-methodology, a mixed-method technique that combines aspects from qualitative and quantitative techniques, and uses it to create survey items to measure national identities. Using the case of Spain, the quality in terms of validity and reliability of Q-methodology survey items and from the comparative-study ISSP-2003 survey is tested to measure the content of Spanish national identity. External validation of the scales is produced to account for territorial and ideological cleavages in the conception of Spanish identity. The results show that the Q-methodology items outperform the ethnic-civic ones in terms of internal and external validity, and reliability. The same Mokken scaling procedure tested in the previous chapter to measure the content of national identities has been used. From an aggregate perspective, the ISSP-2003 scale shows an identity built upon the consensus around civic representations of the nation, with ethnic traits being the contested elements of the content of identity. The CIS-2007

items, created with the Q-Methodology, also portray an identity sustained on political and open elements like the common understanding of the integrative role of history and the 1978 Constitution, and Castilian as a relevant marker of Spanish identity. The aspects that generate relatively least consensus are one of the main symbols of the country, the anthem, and the granting of official sports selections to the three main peripheral nationalist territories, namely Catalonia, Basque Country, and Galicia.

The results indicate that the survey items created with the QM presented in this chapter improve our understanding of Spanish state-nation identity. This method can be applied to measure other state-nation or nation-state identities because it allows the researchers creating contextualized survey items through a bottom-up process. The measurement of complex concepts may be better supported with the selection of survey items adjusted to the context, i.e. to each country in the case of national identities, although this will probably increase the challenges to conduct comparative analysis.

It is worth mentioning here that using a unidimensional model of measurement implies that even complex national identities such as those from state-nations can be measured as a single latent variable. Here, as in the previous chapter, the cumulatively of the scales tested with the Mokken analysis, contributes clarifying how the different components of national identity relate to each other, and in the end it helps simplifying the information by creating an additive scale. This aspect has not been discussed in depth because it was presented in detail in the second chapter of this thesis. The scale analyses have been conducted under a highly restrictive setting because the cases with invariant responses have been excluded in order to avoid capitalizing on chance. As we mentioned above,

results would improve markedly in all countries if invariant response cases are not excluded. Clarifying the reasons behind relatively high numbers of invariant responses obtained in some countries is a pending task left to further research. In any case we have shown that the Mokken model allows us to reduce the complex articulation of elements in the content of national identities in Europe, and to account for it in a simple and practical fashion at both collective and individual levels, and even estimating the degree of contestation in the content of national identities.

The implication of this finding is that researchers of any discipline who use survey data and are interested in the content of national identities, from now on they will have available a simple operationalization of the concept: an additive scale that captures in a unique variable the position of each individual, with relative positions being interpretable in terms of the specific way the items are sorted in the scale in terms of difficulty. This may facilitate the evaluation of the role of the content of national identities in the political support to specific polities, either at sub-state, state, or European levels; in determining policy positions of individuals; party choice; and attitudes towards immigration or minorities, for example. It may also contribute assessing the relative role and even the mutual interaction of different dimensions of national identifies.

In Chapter 4 of the thesis, "Saliency of National Identification as a Mobilization Factor of Political Protest in Catalonia", the focus is another dimension of national identities: the saliency, which here has been used as an independent variable to model protest behavior in areas with a center-periphery cleavage. With Catalonia as the case of study, the article fills the gap of a neglected area in existing studies: the individual level relation

between saliency of national identification and political participation mode of protest. The political conflict in Catalonia is articulated not only around the category of national identification chosen by Catalans: Spanish or Catalan or a combination of the two, but also around how salient is that identification for them. Building on literature of social-psychology, this chapter presents an operationalization of saliency of identification, and builds on the Civic Voluntarism Model to analyze the role of saliency in promoting protest participation. I showed that irrespective of the category of national identification, saliency of identification increases the chances that individuals who are politically engaged or motivated become involved in political protest activities. The empirical test has confirmed the hypothesis using Structural Equations Modeling: saliency of national identification is a relevant individual level determinant of political protest because it turns political motivation more efficiently translated into political action. This is true even when other facilitating factors and determinants of political protest are relatively absent, as it is the case with Catalans who identify nationally with Spain. Among this social group, saliency of national identification helps translating political motivation into political protest activities in two ways: directly and indirectly, because motivation increases access to group resources, which in its turn facilitate engagement into political activity. Further research in this topic is required to validate the results in other territories with national cleavages, and also to explore the effect of context characteristics in this individual level relation between saliency of national identities and political protest. In this regard, it will be crucial to expand survey questionnaires used to measure political participation to supply items to measure national identities, and especially the saliency of national identities.