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THE ROLE OF TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION IN THE
SHAPING OF A READER'S VIEW OF WORLD EVENTS
- THE PRESS AND THE FALKLANDS WAR

VOLUME I: TEXT

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1. INTRODUCTION

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1.1. Translation and Interpretation

'Thatcher: I fight to win' ('The Guardian' 22 November 1990).

'Thatcher reitera que luchará "para vencer"' ('El País' 22 November 1990)¹.

These words, attributed to Mrs. Thatcher before the second round of voting for the leadership of the Conservative party in 1990, appeared in newspaper headlines printed on the same day in two different countries - one in England, the other in Spain.

In the first text, Mrs. Thatcher states, as a matter of fact and using the present simple tense in English, that whenever she fights, she fights to win. The implication of this statement is that once she has made up her mind to fight, Mrs. Thatcher does not contemplate the possibility of failure². She is shown to be both confident and determined.

¹ Refer to Appendix 1.

² 'Do you remember what Queen Victoria once said? "Failure? The possibilities do not exist...we must go out calmly, quietly to succeed". (Margaret Thatcher, 'The Times' 6 April 1982).

In the second text, however, modifications are introduced that effectively change the meaning of Mrs. Thatcher's words. Mrs. Thatcher 'reitera' (she repeats/insists - this implies that her audience is either not listening to her, or does not believe her) 'que luchará "para vencer"' ('that she will fight "to win"').

By placing "para vencer" between inverted commas, the reporter highlights this particular aspect of Mrs. Thatcher's words, and in so doing converts her statement into a declaration of intent, one in which her declared aim in fighting is 'to win'. Having to insist on the fact that 'Thatcher reitera', however, indicates a certain amount of scepticism on the part of her audience as to the viability of her project.

This disassociation of the audience from Mrs. Thatcher's declared intentions is further emphasised by the fact that winning is seen to be an end in itself for her - 'luchará "para vencer"'. Since the logical corollary to this is 'The end justifies the means' Mrs. Thatcher will presumably stop at nothing to achieve her aim. By attributing these words directly to Mrs. Thatcher through the use of direct speech ('reitera que luchará "para vencer"') the reporter effectively disassociates himself from the possible moral implications of these words.

It is clear that, although the same voice and the same words are accessed by both 'The Guardian' and 'El País', the way in which they are presented to the public varies. As a result, the significance of Mrs. Thatcher's words is altered and readers' understanding of the event reported differs.

How and why does this happen?

As mediators between reality and the reader, reporters play a key role in this process. It is their telling and treatment³ of events that leads readers to understand those events in one way or another.

In the example above, 'The Guardian' reporter **reflects** reality by quoting Mrs. Thatcher's words verbatim. The reporter in 'El País', on the other hand, **represents** her words.

This representation of Mrs. Thatcher's words is a highly **personal representation**. A comparison of the words reflected in 'The Guardian' and those represented in 'El País' evidences the introduction of modifications to the original⁴ which can only

³ Hartley, 1989, pp. 42-47.

⁴ Indirect speech is used, the verb 'reitera' is introduced, the future tense 'luchará' rather than the present simple 'fight' is used, and "para vencer" is placed between inverted commas.

have been made by the reporter himself on transferring Mrs. Thatcher's words into Spanish.

Each of these modifications is the product of linguistic choice. As such, each encodes values and beliefs of significance to the author. Readers are, therefore, not provided with a factual, unbiased report of Mrs. Thatcher's words, but with the reporter's personal interpretation of those words.

This interpretation, however, would have meaning only for the reporter if it were not for the fact that, being a member of the society for which the text is written, the beliefs and values permeating his text are shared by his readers. It is identification with the underlying ideology of a text that makes communication effective.

Both the selection of information (in this case, what Margaret Thatcher has to say) and its transformation (the way it is represented to readers) are guided by reference, generally unconscious, to socially held ideas and beliefs.

Given that meaning is socially constructed, the significance of linguistic structures transferred, or **trans-lated**, from one society to another must, therefore, vary since the social and

historical context in which the original words are produced differs from that in which they are reproduced.

The meaning of Margaret Thatcher's words changes from 'The Guardian' to 'El País' as much as the result of the way in which Mrs. Thatcher's words are represented to readers (the 'telling') as a result of the significance conferred upon them by two peoples whose social and historical realities differ.

Whereas 'The Guardian' accepts Mrs. Thatcher's statement at face value, 'El País' is sceptical both of the possibility of Mrs. Thatcher's attaining the objective she has set for herself and of the methods she might use in her attempt to attain it.

Two completely different attitudes towards women in society are being appealed to. In Spain, a traditionally male-dominated society where few women work and fewer hold public office, the underlying belief is that the chances of a woman winning out in a man's world (in this case, politics) are limited. In Britain, however, where women have long been emancipated and enjoy equal opportunities in the workplace, there is no reason to query Mrs. Thatcher's confidence and determination in fighting for the leadership of her party.

Luis Foix's reference to the unstated abstract propositions implicit in the use of the word 'Malvinas' as opposed to 'Falklands' shows how aspects of linguistic structure encode beliefs and values which confer ideological significance:

Si se habla de Malvinas se está a favor de Argentina y si se elige Falklands ya se sabe que se está al lado de su Majestad británica. Pero, como en principio, la Administración Reagan es aliada y amiga de Londres y Buenos Aires han surgido dificultades semánticas. Solución: el Departamento del Estado se refiere al archipiélago del Atlántico Sur con el genérico nombre de 'Las Islas'. No es una anécdota insignificante este matiz de lenguaje ('La Vanguardia' 4 April 1982).

The United States, given its good relations with both Argentina and Britain, and wishing to maintain strict neutrality in the dispute, is forced to choose its words with great care when referring to 'Las Islas' in order not to antagonise or to show favouritism to either side involved in the conflict.

If we consider that Alexander Haig's attempts to find a peaceful solution to the Falklands crisis could have been jeopardized by doubt being cast on his role as 'honest broker'

just by the words he used to refer to the Islands, his choice of words was clearly of vital importance.

Awareness of this 'matiz de lenguaje' is necessary to understand the significance of the following report of a telephone conversation between President Reagan and General Galtieri: 'el primer magistrado norteamericano llegó incluso a hablar de las Malvinas y no de los Falklands'⁵.

To anyone accepting the discourse as 'normal' the significance of the fact that President Reagan speaks of 'las Malvinas' and not 'the Falklands' is lost.

The social and historical context in which the incident is reported, however, determines the significance of his use of words which may be found in the fact that the President's sympathies are understood to lie with Argentina, and not with the United States' traditional ally, the United Kingdom.

Inherent to the question of cross-cultural transfer, therefore, is the problem of the loss, or acquisition, of ideological significance in words, depending upon the different social,

⁵ 'La Vanguardia' 3 April 1982. Photocopies of all the reports relevant to the Falklands Crisis, that appeared in the four newspapers analysed during the month of April 1982, are included in the Appendices in Volume II.

historical and cultural contexts in which they are used.

1.2. Methodology of the Case Study

The comparison of Spanish and British press coverage of the Falklands War - the basis of this study - provides a unique opportunity of determining the role of translation (cross-cultural transfer) and interpretation (the 'telling' of events) in the shaping of a reader's perception of international events.

Assuming as a working principle that language is not neutral, but is rather a highly constructive mediator; that the language used in newspapers is both shaped by and shapes ideas and beliefs; and that language and linguistic structures contribute to the construction of ideas, given that each form of linguistic expression used has its reason and as such carries ideological significance, a study was made of press coverage of the Falklands War in Spain and the United Kingdom.

Based on the working hypothesis that the press shapes a reader's view of world events, that this view varies between newspapers, and that the role of translation and, in particular, interpretation, is instrumental in shaping this view, the reporting of the Falklands crisis in four quality

newspapers was analysed - two British newspapers ('The Times' and 'The Guardian') and two Spanish newspapers ('La Vanguardia' and 'El País').

As an introduction to the case study on which this thesis is based, a brief outline is given of the social and historical context of the conflict and of the linguistic framework within which the analysis of newspaper discourse is carried out.

Since it is not the author's purpose to deal in depth with the theory of discourse analysis or the different aspects of the Falklands War itself, an extensive bibliography on both these subjects is included for reference purposes at the end of this study.

As a first step towards determining the beliefs and values encoded in each newspaper's reporting of the Falklands crisis, a study was made of the headlines of reports included in the four newspapers examined, during the month of April 1982.

Subsequently, each newspaper's reporting was analysed as a 'text', assuming that, in the context of newspaper reporting, a 'text' may be an individual article, a series of articles on the same subject on the same page on the same day, a series of articles on the same subject on different pages on the same

day, or, in an on-going event such as the Falklands crisis, a series of articles on the same subject over a period of time.

The purpose of this exercise was to determine the discursive end established by each newspaper and to determine whether or not this was maintained through a day's, a week's, or a more extended period of time's reporting.

An analysis was made of a day's reporting in each of the newspapers under study (3 April 1982, the day after the Argentine invasion of the Falklands), followed by an analysis of a week's reporting (2-7 April 1982). A comparison of the results obtained in each case was then made to determine whether or not there were differences between the discursive ends established in each paper in order to confirm the hypothesis that newspapers shaped a reader's view of world events and that this view varied from one newspaper to another.

A study of individual and 'overall' texts (whole pages or sections of newspapers) was undertaken to determine the process of selection and transformation of information at work when establishing the discursive end - at the level of individual texts (through the use of vocabulary and syntax) and at the level of overall texts through the kind of reports selected, their length, position and distribution in the newspaper. A

comparative study of the reporting of the same incident in all four newspapers was used to determine the presence of bias through omission.

The purpose of this study was to determine the role of interpretation (the selection and transformation of information) in establishing each newspaper's discursive end.

In one of the four newspapers under study, it was determined that instances arose in which reality was neither reflected, nor represented, but constructed. Hence, a study was made of the techniques used to present this constructed reality as plausible and comparative study was made of reporting in all four newspapers during a period of two weeks (April 8-25) - when theoretically no news was available on developments in the crisis - to establish instances of news stories unique to this constructed reality.

Finally, a study was made of the linguistic structures transferred from one language to the other in order to determine the role played by translation in shaping a reader's view of events.

2. DISCOURSE AND THE NEWS

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2.1 News

News is a discourse generated by a general sign-system in relation to a social structure. News develops in an active, even a creative way. It does not simply reflect its linguistic, social, historical determinants, it works on them. It transforms its raw material into a recognizable product we accept as familiar (Hartley, 1989).

News is described here as a product of what, to all intents and purposes, is a manufacturing process ('works on'... 'transforms' ...'raw material'...'product'). To attribute to 'news' itself, however, the role of active agent in this process (it works on ... it transforms) is to imply that news exists as an autonomous, self-perpetuating phenomenon⁶ dependent upon social, historical determinants for its

⁶ Only at a much later stage in an established discourse can it be said that this process becomes autonomous and self-perpetuating. An interesting example is the juxtaposition 'Oficial muerto y júbilo popular' in the headlines, 'La Vanguardia' 3 April 1982, when referring to events during the invasion of the Falklands. Implied in this headline is the fact that Argentinians were jubilant at the fact that a member of the armed forces had been killed. This would seem to be totally inconsistent with the patriotic fervour shown by the Argentinians on hearing the news of the invasion - they would be much more likely to lament, rather than celebrate, this loss. Catalan readers of 'La Vanguardia', however, would find nothing strange about this affirmation since members of the armed forces under General Franco's dictatorship were 'persons non grata' in Catalonia.

existence. It is to deny the predominant role played by reporters and editors alike in the process of manufacturing news⁷.

To centre our attention on the predominant role of reporters and editors in the manufacture of news is to centre our attention on their role as mediators between events and the news reader, i.e., upon their representation of reality in the press, and the way in which it is made meaningful to readers.

2.2. Maps of meaning⁸

To report on events occurring in our immediate environment or in others more distant is to create maps of meaning pertaining to each and every one of these events - maps which are abstractions but which are nevertheless representations of the reality they describe and which are recognizable as such. Each map is the reporter's attempt to order experience into meaning and to represent that meaning to his/her audience.

The reporter's representation of events is the end-product of

⁷ The whole subject of discourse analysis is a new and complex field of theoretical linguistic research. The present study is limited to a specific case study within a deliberately limited context. An extensive bibliography of relevant works on discourse analysis is included in the general bibliography.

⁸ Hartley, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

a process of selection (which information should be included; which should be left out; which should be highlighted; which should not) and transformation of information (how the information selected should be presented, what form it should take) which is made meaningful to the audience through the sign-system used.

Each of these processes involves decision-making procedures that require the exercise of personal choice. No matter how impartial or objective a reporter wishes to be the process of selection and transformation of information that takes place prior to writing about an event ensures that the decision-making processes involved confer a highly personal interpretation on events, and, as a result, on their representation in the press.

This personal representation of events, however, though initially meaningful only to the reporter him/herself, can be made meaningful to others by providing them with the means to identify elements common to a shared experience - an experience that may be shared at the level of individuals, groups, cultures, societies, etc. This shared experience may be what is termed as **common sense** - knowledge acquired through personal experience - or **common knowledge** - knowledge acquired through sources other than personal experience (text books, authority,

the press).

Maps of meaning are therefore dependent upon the use of socially recognizable signs and sign systems if they are to be understood. Events in themselves have no meaning. Their meaning results from the way in which they are reported, the features of the sign systems used to generate maps of meaning, and the context within which these are uttered and received.

2.3. Signs and sign-systems

Signs⁹, the elements that are combined in a sign-system to create a map of meaning, are characterised by the arbitrariness of their nature: the signifier is arbitrary in relation to the signified and the signified in relation to the conceptual field¹⁰. Signs therefore have no intrinsic meaning/value - they have only meaning-potential¹¹ and this potential is actualised in use. Their capacity for meaning is dependent upon their use in relation to other signs within a system: 'Instead of pre-existing ideas then, we find...values emanating from the system' (Saussure, 1974, p.117), and on their usage and general

⁹ Saussure, 1974.

¹⁰ Culler, 1976, pp. 19-20.


¹¹ A quality that Valentin Volosinov (1973) terms as 'multi-accentuality'.

acceptance by the community: 'the arbitrary nature of the sign explains in turn why the social fact alone can create a linguistic system. The community is necessary if values that owe their existence solely to usage and general acceptance are to be set up' (ibid., p. 113).

When combining signs in a system, the sequence of signs used may be pragmatic or syntagmatic¹². Usage and general acceptance (codes/conventions) determine the selection of certain signs within a given system.

However, choosing and combining these signs in a system is not a purely linguistic choice. It is also an ideological one. This is because, as a result of the process of selection of signs and their transformation into a sign-system, the meaning-potential of the signs within a system is increasingly limited or closed and, as a whole, the system tends towards a particular kind of meaning depending upon the context within which it is uttered, and upon the speaker.

¹² See Hartley, op. cit., pp. 20-21. The sequence of signs that makes up any act of communication involves relations in two dimensions - the 'vertical' paradigmatic axis, and the horizontal syntagmatic axis, e.g.



Thus, while the news reporter chooses certain signs to represent his/her version of events, and endows them with meaning by placing them together with other signs from the same conceptual field, s/he is at the same time orientating the reader's understanding of events by limiting the meaning-potential of those signs.

Understanding the meaning of the sign-system created depends upon the degree of interaction between writer/reporter and reader. Interaction depends upon the reader's ability to recognize the signs used within the system, and this ability, as we have already mentioned, is socially determined.

Independent of the significance that signs may have within a specific system/discourse as a result of individual choice or opinion, the signification of signs may be multiplied up into a second order of signification through connotation and myth¹³.

Thus, independent of the significance that signs may have within a specific system, they also possess socially-oriented signification¹⁴.

¹³ Barthes, 1968, 1973.

¹⁴ Hartley, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-29.

3. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE STUDY

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3.1. Claims to sovereignty

The Argentine flag was first raised in the Falklands on 6 November 1820 when the United Provinces of the River Plate, having declared themselves independent of Spain in 1816, sent a ship to proclaim their sovereignty over the Islands as successor to the former colonial power¹⁶. In January 1833 the flag was lowered by the crew of a British warship and replaced by the British flag. It was not raised again for another 149 years when the Argentine forces occupied the Islands on 2 April 1982. On April 7, General Mario Benjamín Menéndez took up his post as third Argentine Governor of the Islas Malvinas.

Until 2 April 1982, Britain had ruled the Falklands without interruption since HMS Clio had appeared in Puerto Soledad to reassert British sovereignty after protesting the appointment of Louis Vernet as the first Argentine governor of the Islands in 1829¹⁷.

¹⁵ See Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 1991.

¹⁶ 'The Times' 6 April 1982.

¹⁷ See 'The Guardian' 8 April 1982: 'When a sloop saved the day'.

Britain had established a fort at Port Egmont, West Falkland, the century before and Spain's expulsion of British settlers there in 1770 had brought the two countries to the brink of war.

Spain returned Port Egmont to Britain in 1771 although Britain withdrew from the settlement a few years later. It maintained its claim to sovereignty, however, leaving a plaque which declared that the Falkland Islands were the 'sole right and property' of King George III¹⁸.

The Islands were formally established as a Crown Colony in 1840 and the first British Governor left Britain to take up his post in 1841. A small agricultural community was developed and Britain remained in effective occupation until 2 April 1982¹⁹.

Thus was established what was to become a permanent presence on the Islands and the basis for the assertion of sovereignty²⁰. In the process a sense of grievance was created in the then

¹⁸ 'The Times' 6 April 1982; 'El Pais' 3 April 1982.

¹⁹ The population in the 1980 census was 1,849 and slowly declining. In 1982 the island economy was largely dependent upon sheep farming and the export of wool. Inshore fishing which started in 1977, and the alginate industry were still awaiting full development. See 'The Guardian' 3 April 1982.

²⁰ 'The Times' 4 April 1982.



fledgling Argentine state that thereafter became part of the national consciousness²¹.

3.2. Bi-lateral talks

As a result of repeated claims by the Argentine government to its territorial rights on the Falklands, in 1964, the UN Decolonisation Committee included the Falkland Islands in its list of territories that ought to be decolonised. It also accepted the inclusion of the Argentine designation 'Malvinas' following the 'Falkland Islands' in the official denomination of the Islands.

The following year, a resolution (Resolution 206) was passed by the General Assembly recognising the existence of a dispute over the question of sovereignty over the Islands and invited the governments of Britain and Argentina to proceed 'without delay' with negotiations 'to find a peaceful solution to the problem...bearing in mind...the interests²² of the population

²¹ 'The Times' 4 April 1982: 'The raising of a national dream'.

²² In the semantics of the dispute the use of the word 'interests' rather than 'wishes' was to be of vital importance, since the Islanders' interests might have brought them closer to Argentina (they were dependent upon a number of services being provided from the mainland) but their wishes were to remain British.

of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),²³.

In 1966, bi-lateral talks began between the two governments under these terms.

Effective lobbying by the Falkland Islands Committee²⁴ in the House of Parliament in 1968, however, brought about changes in Britain's negotiating position. The 'wishes' as opposed to the 'interests' of the Islanders were to be critical²⁵.

In 1973, Resolution 3160 once more called upon the two claimants to 'arrive at a peaceful solution of the problem of sovereignty'. Given the Islanders' insistence on the fact that their wishes (to remain British) should be given paramount importance in any such solution, the negotiation of a leaseback arrangement seemed to be the only approach possible for the British government. According to this arrangement Argentina would receive titular sovereignty but allow British

²³ 'The Guardian' 19 June 1982: 'The Give-away years'.

²⁴ The Falkland Island Emergency Committee was established during the course of a visit of four members of the Islands' Executive Council to London in 1968.

²⁵ 'El País', 3 April 1982: 'Las negociaciones formales sobre la soberanía de las Malvinas comenzaron sólo en 1977, manteniendo siempre los británicos que la solución estaría guiada por los deseos de los isleños'. 'La Vanguardia' does not make this point clear to its readers.

administration to continue on the Islands²⁶.

When this was proposed to Parliament and the Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy Committee in December 1980 it was met with fierce opposition. In a formidable show of strength, the Falklands lobby obliged the Government to add their representatives to all future delegations discussing the Islands with the Argentinians and to freeze the sovereignty issue²⁷. In January 1981, the Falkland Islands Joint Council proposed that the British delegation at future talks with Argentina should seek an agreement to freeze the dispute over sovereignty for a specified period of time.

3.3. The new Junta²⁸

Such was the situation when, on 8 December 1981, a new military Junta came to power in Argentina under the Presidency of General Leopoldo Galtieri. General Galtieri appointed as his

²⁶ Concessions had already been made designed to integrate the Islands with the continent. In 1969 the first steps were taken to open a line of communications with the Islands. The Communications Agreement of 1971 provided for the introduction of a weekly air service with the mainland. Domestic gas and petrol services were provided by Argentina. See 'The Guardian' 3 April 1982.

²⁷ Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1991): 'The Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was reformed in 1973 as the UK Falkland Islands Committee with the objective: To assist the people of the Falkland Islands to decide their own future for themselves without being subject to direct or indirect pressure from any quarter'.

²⁸ See Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, op.cit., pp. 3-13.

Foreign Minister Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez who had long experience with the Falklands issue having been closely involved in early Anglo-Argentine talks from 1966-68. During that time he had felt that great progress had taken place towards the transfer of sovereignty only to be thwarted by the emergence of a strong Falklands lobby.

General Galtieri, aware of the fact that January 1983 was to mark the 150th anniversary of the visit of HMS Clio and the British occupation of the Islands, had made the recovery of the Malvinas, by the magic month of January 1983, a high priority.

Thus, Costa Méndez decided to reactivate the sovereignty talks with Britain. The immediate objective was to return to the original negotiating framework of 1965-67, i.e., a return to a concern with the 'interests' of the islanders rather than their 'wishes'.

Talks were scheduled for February 1982 in New York after a communiqué had been sent to the British government calling for new negotiations towards the transfer of sovereignty to be concluded within a reasonable period of time and without procrastination. There should be 'no more delays and dilatory

arguments'²⁹.

Within the diplomatic time-scale established by Costa Méndez, and assuming, as he did, that little progress would be made at the New York talks, the plan was to denounce Britain's procrastination in negotiating a solution to the problem of sovereignty over the Falklands in the UN Decolonisation Committee in August, where a sympathetic hearing could be expected, before taking the case on to the meeting of the General Assembly in November. Argentina would thus be able to obtain international support for her case before 3 January 1983, the 150th anniversary of the occupation³⁰.

Britain did not formally accept Argentine proposals at the February meeting and gave no indication of when it expected to do so³¹. Argentina then issued a unilateral statement whereby

²⁹ Reports in 'The Times' 4 April 1982: 'Why the last outpost had to fall', and 6 April 1982: 'Why Argentina took tough line after talks' make reference to a series of articles by Iglesias Rouco published in 'La Prensa', one of Argentina's main newspapers, towards the end of January. Rouco, political columnist of 'La Prensa', anticipated the fact that: 'Argentina would present Britain with a virtual ultimatum. It would demand a firm time-table for handing over the islands, failing which, negotiations would be broken off and the use of military action considered' ('The Times' 6 April 1982). See also Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *op.cit.*, p. 25.

³⁰ Costa Méndez: 'La situación al 2 de abril de 1982' in Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

³¹ Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *op.cit.*, p.28: 'The meeting took place in a cordial and positive spirit. The two sides reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for procedures to make better progress in this sense. They agreed to inform their Governments accordingly.'

it stressed that Britain should accept a new system for negotiations proposed by Argentina 'as an effective step for the early solution of the dispute'. However, should this not occur, Argentina reserves the right to terminate the working of this mechanism and to choose freely the procedure which best accords with her interests'³².

Argentina's attitude had clearly hardened in an attempt to force a solution. Britain's ability to provide that solution, however, was limited so long as the wishes of the Islanders remained paramount.

3.4. South Georgia

The crisis was precipitated by the illegal landing on St. Peter's Island in South Georgia, a dependency of the

³² After the events of 3 April 1982 (the invasion of the Falklands), the irony of the report in 'The Guardian' 2 April 1982, entitled, '"Islands dispute" near solution', becomes clear: 'Argentina's dispute with Britain about territorial rights in the South Atlantic could be resolved one way or another by this week-end, Argentine officials believe.'

See also Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, op.cit., p. 98: 'The South Atlantic War of 1982 took place because the Argentine Junta had been planning a military action. If the plans had not been well advanced in March 1982, the intervention could not have taken place'; and p.12: 'On 5 January 1982 the Junta resolved to reactivate to the fullest extent all negotiations for the sovereignty of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands' and at the same time 'prepare a contingency plan for the employment of military power should the first alternative fail'. This contingency plan was known as Operación Rosario.

Falkland Islands, of a group of Argentine scrap merchants on 19 March 1982³³.

The men, who had been contracted by Constantine Davidoff to dismantle a disused whaling station, had landed in South Georgia without the necessary immigration clearance. When asked to leave or seek landing permission they did neither. On 24 March 1982, the ice-patrol ship *Endurance* was diverted to South Georgia to evict the men while Argentina rejected a British offer of immigration facilities for the scrap merchants.

Instead of withdrawing their men from the islands as requested by Britain, Argentina instead sent marines to defend them³⁴. When the Press got hold of the story and described the landing in terms of an Argentine invasion³⁵, both governments were put under pressure not to give in to the other³⁶.

While the British government insisted on settling the problem of the Argentine scrap merchants who had landed on St. Peter's

³³ Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-83; 'The Times' 4 April 1982; 'The Guardian', 5 April 1982.

³⁴ There was also a scheme to take advantage of the Davidoff venture to establish a base covertly. This was known as Project Alpha. See Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *op.cit.*, pp. 40-46.

³⁵ 'Evening Standard' 23 March 1982: 'Argentine invasion of the South Georgia Islands' in Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

³⁶ 'The Times' 3 April 1982; 'El País' 3 April 1982.

Island without permission, Argentina was determined that the South Georgia incident could not be separated from the overall sovereignty issue in which Argentina claimed as hers both the Falklands and its dependencies³⁷.

3.5. Resolution 502

On 1 April 1982, Britain's ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Anthony Parsons, called for a meeting of the Security Council in view of the British Government's belief that there was 'an imminent threat of armed action and that an Argentine invasion force was already on its way by sea' (to the Falkland Islands)³⁸. Sr. Perez de Cuéllar, the UN Secretary General, had earlier intervened in the dispute when he had summoned both the British and Argentine ambassadors and expressed his concern at the rising tension in the area³⁹ and made an appeal for

³⁷ 'The Guardian' 2 April 1982, makes reference to Constantino Davidoff's proposal to recognise the presence of a British settlement at Grytviken 'without recognising British sovereignty', and to the fact that the Foreign Office acknowledged that 'Argentina is illegally occupying another piece of British territory in the South Atlantic' - 'a scientific research station' in Southern Thule, South Sandwich Islands.

³⁸ 'The Times' 2 April 1982.

³⁹ Argentina had suggested that press reports of a British task force travelling to the South Atlantic constituted the 'beginning of aggression'. These reports are referred to in 'La Vanguardia'/'El País', 1 April 1982. 'El País' quotes the BBC and the British press as sources. Britain, meanwhile, spoke of press reports of an Argentinian invasion force sailing towards the Falklands - apparently from Argentine newspaper sources ('The Times' 4 April 1982).

both sides to use maximum restraint⁴⁰.

At the Security Council meeting the President of the Council made a statement calling on both governments to 'exercise the utmost restraint at this time and in particular to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force in the region'. Britain's ambassador, Sir Anthony Parsons, gave an undertaking that Britain would heed the appeal but the Argentine representative did not⁴¹.

On 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falklands in defiance of exhortations made by the UN Secretary General and the President of the Security Council for restraint⁴².

On 3 April 1982, a draft resolution tabled by Britain at an emergency meeting of the Security Council was passed by ten

⁴⁰ 'The Times' 2, 3 April 1982. 'The Times' 2 April 1982: '(He) renewed his call to both sides to exercise maximum restraint. He had earlier called in Sir Anthony (Parsons) and Señor Eduardo Roca, the Argentine representative, to make a personal appeal for the two governments to rely on diplomatic rather than military means to settle the dispute'.

⁴¹ 'The Times' 3 April 1982: 'In an appeal issued late on Thursday night the Security Council had called upon both Argentina and Britain to refrain from the use or threat of force and urged the two countries to seek a diplomatic solution to their dispute. Sir Anthony Parsons, who had asked the United Nations to intervene when it became clear that Argentina was planning an invasion said that Britain would take heed of the appeal but the Argentine representative would give no such commitment'.

⁴² 'El País' 3 April 1982; 'The Times' 3 April 1982.

one⁴³.

Resolution 502 stated that:

The Security Council, recalling the statement made by its President at the 234th meeting of the Security Council on 1 April 1982 calling on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

Deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion on 2 April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina,

Determining that there exists a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

1. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities;
2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine force from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);

⁴³ 'The Times' 4 April 1982.

3. Calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations⁴⁴.

As far as Britain was concerned this resolution was a clear statement of opposition to the Argentine action. It linked Argentina with a breach of the peace. Only Argentina was asked to withdraw its forces. If it failed to do so Britain could claim that it was justified in resorting to force in self-defence, permitted by the Charter. In the event, British rationales for the use of force on this basis were generally accepted⁴⁵.

Hence Britain's insistence that the Argentine withdrawal from the Islands was a necessary pre-requisite before negotiations could begin. Any action carried out against Argentine troops on the Islands was, therefore, in legitimate self-defence.

⁴⁴ 'The Times' 15 April 1982.

⁴⁵ See 'The Times' 7 April 1982: 'International law would favour the British argument'. Argentina had violated the United Nations Charter on two counts: Articles 2(3) and 2(4) require countries to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the use or threat of force. Article 2(4) specifically prohibits the use of force against a territory of any state. Britain could therefore exercise her right to self-defence in accordance with Article 51. See also 'The Guardian' 5 April 1982.

Argentina, however, argued that, if the resolution was to form the basis of future negotiations, it had to be taken as a whole and not clause by clause.

This was based on an ingenious interpretation which noted that the resolution did not accuse Argentina of actual aggression; that the first demand, for the cessation of hostilities, had been met and that any renewal of hostilities would be Britain's responsibility; that the second demand, for the withdrawal of Argentine forces, did not mention the date of execution (although rather awkwardly for this interpretation, it did say 'immediate'); and that the third clause calling on all parties to negotiate precisely reflected Argentinian objectives.

Thus, the return of the British task force to home base was required for the cessation of hostilities (clause one) which would then be coupled with the Argentine troop withdrawal (clause two) and the beginning of negotiations (clause three).

Argentina insisted on the fact that it had simply taken back land that had been seized illegally in 1833, that the military preparations made by Britain in the region explained and justified the actions that 'the Argentine Government has been forced to take in the defence of its rights', and since the Islands were now being administered by Argentina, that

sovereignty was non-negotiable⁴⁶.

Such was the position of the two powers involved in the conflict when Alexander Haig began his mediation in an attempt to find a negotiated solution to the conflict.

3.6. The international context

It is clear that the different interests that would normally have divided the vote in the UN (anti-colonialist feeling amongst Third World and non-aligned countries; Pan-American solidarity, etc.) were united in condemning Argentine action in the Falklands. The passing of Resolution 502 by such an overwhelming majority was a clear indictment of Argentina's use of force in establishing its claim to sovereignty over the islands.

As far as the major powers were concerned, by invading the Falklands in support of her claim to sovereignty, Argentina was setting a dangerous precedent. Not only had it contravened the United Nations Charter on two counts, through the threat and use of force against another territory's possessions, but it

⁴⁶ Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *op.cit.*, p. 134. This was made clear in Eduardo Roca's defence of Argentina's position at the emergency meeting of the Security Council, 3 April 1982.

had also challenged the policy of orderly decolonisation of territories based on the principle of self-determination⁴⁷. Other smaller groups felt themselves to be potentially under threat from the expansionist tendencies of their neighbours⁴⁸.

The Falklands crisis, in fact, occurred at a time when a series of conflicts around the world had made countries particularly sensitive to the question of the use or threat of force against another country's territory⁴⁹. In the Middle East, attempts were being made to negotiate a solution to the conflict between the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Israel over the West Bank and the Gaza strip; Iran and Iraq were at war in the Gulf area; American hostages at the Embassy in Teheran had just been released; Russia had invaded Afganistan and had imposed martial law in Poland; East-West relations were marked by the United States' desire to reduce nuclear armament, and its attempts to stem the influence of Communism in Central and South America. Argentina was a close collaborator to this end. Territorial

⁴⁷ Reports in the right-wing Spanish 'El Alcázar' suggest that the same action should be taken by Spain over Gibraltar ('The Guardian' 5 April 1982). Similar action might therefore be used to solve territorial disputes over other British (Belize, Guyana), French or Spanish colonies (Ceuta, Melilla, Spanish Sahara, Ifni).

⁴⁸ 'The Times' 15 April 1982: 'The eyes of the world are now focused upon the Falkland Islands. Others are anxiously watching to see whether brute force or the rule of law will triumph. Wherever naked aggression occurs it must be overcome. The cost now, however high, must be set against the cost we would have to pay if this principle went by default'.

⁴⁹ 'La Vanguardia' 3 April 1982: 'en el área internacional cunde la preocupación por el nuevo foco de conflicto'.

disputes on the continent included Argentina's dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel and the Islands of Lennox, Picton and Nueva in 1980; Guatamala over Belize, and Venezuela over the Essequibo region in British Guyana. In Europe, NATO and Britain were reshaping their strategic arms forces to incorporate Pershing and Trident missiles as deterrents against Russia. Spain was negotiating entry into the EEC and NATO, having just emerged from forty years of dictatorship, and having recently quashed a revolt of military generals (23 February 1981). Talks were about to begin with Britain on Spain's claim to sovereignty over Gibraltar.

4. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

4. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

As a working principle in discourse analysis or critical linguistics, we assume that the ostensible subject of representation in discourse is not what it is 'really about': in semiotic terms, the signified is in turn the signifier of another, implicit but culturally recognizable meaning (Fowler, 1991, p.170).

4.1. Headlines

In a first attempt to arrive at a more precise understanding of the deep meaning of the discourse in newspaper reports on the Falklands crisis, the headlines in reports appearing on the front pages and in the International sections of 'La Vanguardia' and 'El País', 'The Times' and 'The Guardian' during the month of April were analysed.

Since headlines usually constitute a synthesis of the contents of the article that follows, the noun phrases used to refer to the subject under discussion were studied⁵⁰.

Syntactically speaking noun phrases have a number of possible

⁵⁰ Fowler, 1991, pp. 171-175.

different structures. They may be simple: 'el conflicto de las Malvinas' or complex 'el conflicto reavivado del Gibraltar argentino', 'preocupación y actividad diplomática entorno a las Malvinas'.

The noun which refers to the 'it' being talked about is called the 'head'. The other parts of the noun phrase which attend the 'head' are known as the 'modifiers': they qualify the 'head' semantically, restricting its reference to, say, a particular category/aspect of conflict.

Modifiers may follow as well as precede the head noun: 'el grave conflicto'. Determiners used might be definite or indefinite articles 'el', 'la'/'un', 'una' or demonstratives such as 'este', 'esta' / 'ese', 'esa' / 'aquel', 'aquella'. The use of the definite expression 'el conflicto de las Malvinas' presupposes an agreement between the writer and the reader that they are both familiar with the matter being discussed.

4.1.1. 'La Vanguardia'

In 'La Vanguardia', the Falklands crisis was referred to as:

- (1) 'el conflicto de las Malvinas', 'la crisis de las Malvinas', 'el enfrentamiento anglo-argentino', 'una

crisis que amenaza la paz';

- (2) 'la grave crisis de las Malvinas', 'la inesperada ocupación militar de las Malvinas';

in a more general way:

- (3) 'intensa actividad diplomática en la crisis de las Malvinas', 'temores y esperanzas en la crisis de las Malvinas', 'tensa espera en el conflicto de las Malvinas', 'punto muerto en la crisis de las Malvinas', 'semana de tensión entorno a las Malvinas', 'una semana decisiva para las Malvinas';

or telegraphically as :

- (4) 'Malvinas: Gran Bretaña y Argentina al borde de la guerra', 'Malvinas: se acerca la hora decisiva'.

Following the same method of critical analysis as described by Fowler, the noun phrases found to occur most frequently were: definite article + head + modifier (1), followed by the more complex deployment of the same syntactical and lexical components (3). Both (2) and (4) occurred much less frequently, although their impact on the reader was more dramatic.

The structures shown in (1), (2), (3) constitute fixed formulaic structures that repeatedly occur throughout the corpus with variations in the lexical terms plugged into the slots provided by the syntactic frame⁵¹.

If we make this 'frame and formula' principle visible using a tabular presentation:

<u>determiner</u>	<u>head</u>	<u>modifier</u>
la	crisis	de las Malvinas
el	conflicto	reavivado del 'Gibraltar argentino'
el	enfrentamiento	anglo-argentino
la	crisis	militar entre Argentina y Gran Bretaña
el	problema	de las Malvinas
la	crisis	de las Malvinas
el	conflicto	de las Malvinas

we find that the objective phenomenon of the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands, which might have been

⁵¹ Fowler, 1990, pp. 173-175: 'The importance of formulaic patterns in a connected body of discourse is threefold. First, formulaic patterning is cohesive in effect: recurrent patterns provide a set of stylistic templates homogenising the discourse. The existence of formulae in the conflict discourse and their widespread dispersal through the language of the newspapers provides a 'cue' to readers to recognise all of this as a same discourse. Second, formulaic phrase patterns are generative. They are an important mechanism in facilitating the generation of new instances of 'it' in the discourse. Third, they have a levelling or equating effect causing different matters to be perceived as instances of the same thing'.

expected to be the logical dominant head of the noun phrases in the headlines, is not found in the 'head' position. Instead, we find this position given over to the abstractions and subjective states resulting from the invasion, i.e., 'el crisis', 'el conflicto', 'el enfrentamiento', 'el problema'. These 'heads' would seem to be freely interchangeable, although 'el conflicto' y 'la crisis' were those most frequently used⁵².

The real subject of the discourse would therefore appear to be, not an objective phenomenon, but the abstractions and subjective states attendant upon that phenomenon. This would seem to be reinforced by the fact that the modifier 'reavivado del Gibraltar argentino' is used early on in reports to qualify 'la crisis' or 'el conflicto' in the Falklands.

Through the use of allusion, culturally implicit paradigms and stereotypes are brought into play and the general public assumes a ready-made point of view and predictable emotional reactions consonant with the frustration experienced by

⁵² It should be noticed that common usage of the three terms distinguishes between:

- 'crisis' - crisis de gobierno; crisis económico
- 'conflicto' - conflicto de competencias; conflicto de jurisdicción; conflicto de leyes; conflicto nacional; conflicto internacional.
- 'enfrentamiento' - enfrentamiento con los enemigos (Enciclopedia Larousse, 1960).

Spaniards in their unsuccessful attempts to reclaim sovereignty over Gibraltar.

An implicit pact is established between newspaper and reader, so that it is thereafter sufficient to refer to 'la crisis/el conflicto/problema de las Malvinas'/'anglo-argentino' for readers to identify with the matter being discussed and to react accordingly.

In example (3), abstractions and subjective states continue to occupy the 'head' position although, increasingly, emphasis is placed on the latter as time runs out and the prospect of war becomes more real.

(3)	<u>head</u>	<u>modifier</u>
	evolución militar y política	del problema de las Malvinas
	intensa actividad diplomática	en la crisis de las Malvinas
	temores y esperanza	en la crisis de las Malvinas
	tensa espera	en el conflicto de las Malvinas
	preocupación y actividad diplomática	entorno a las Malvinas
	intenso compás de espera	entorno a las Malvinas
	la incertidumbre	sobre las Malvinas
	punto muerto	en la crisis de las Malvinas
	una semana decisiva	para las Malvinas

4.1.2. 'El País'

A similar study of the headlines introducing reports on the Falklands in 'El País' over the same period of time shows important differences. The noun phrases that designated the subject being discussed were:

(5) 'la invasión argentina de las Malvinas'; 'la ocupación argentina de las Malvinas'; 'la invasión argentina del archipiélago';

(6) 'la crisis de las Malvinas'; 'el conflicto de las Malvinas'; 'el conflicto anglo-argentino'; 'la crisis anglo-argentina';

or in a more general way:

(7) 'tensión y confusión en la crisis de las Malvinas'; 'máxima tensión diplomática en la crisis de las Malvinas'; 'creciente tensión en torno a las Malvinas'.

By applying the 'frame and formula' principle once more, we find:

(5) <u>determiner</u>	<u>head</u>	<u>modifier</u>
la	invasión	argentina (de las Malvinas)
la	invasión	argentina (del archipiélago)
la	ocupación	argentina (de las Malvinas)
la	recuperación	del archipiélago de las Malvinas

The objective phenomenon of the taking of the Falklands - 'invasión'/'ocupación' - occupies the dominant head position of the noun phrases in the above headlines, and the fact that Argentina was responsible for this action is emphasised in the modifier position.

Clearly, this fact is of particular importance to 'El País' (in contrast to 'La Vanguardia' that prefers to overlook the question of Argentine action in the Falklands to concentrate on more abstract, emotional concepts).

It is only later on in the reporting of events, coincident with Alexander Haig's attempts to mediate in the conflict to obtain a negotiated solution, that abstractions and subjective states appear in the dominant head position in both simple structures:

(6)	<u>determiner</u>	<u>head</u>	<u>modifier</u>
	la	crisis	de las Malvinas/ anglo-argentino
	el	conflicto	de las Malvinas/ anglo-argentino

and more complex structures:

(7)	<u>head</u>	<u>modifier</u>
	tensión y confusión	en la crisis de las Malvinas
	máxima tensión diplomática	en la crisis de las Malvinas
	creciente tensión	entorno a las Malvinas

It is interesting to note that far fewer noun phrases are used in the headlines in 'El País' than in 'La Vanguardia'. Instead, many more headlines using the subject + verb combination are used, thereby describing actions and decisions taken and attributing responsibility for these to specific agents - a much more dynamic, objective form of reporting.

In the noun phrases studied, the number of variations used in 'head' or 'modifier' positions in 'El País' is minimal. The situation in the Falklands is referred to only as 'la crisis'

or 'el conflicto' ('La Vanguardia' refers to 'la crisis'/'el conflicto'/'el enfrentamiento'/'el problema') and the only subjective state referred to is 'tensión' ('La Vanguardia' refers to 'temores'/'esperanzas'/'tensa espera'/'preocupación'/'incertidumbre').

The linear progression from the phenomenon of the invasion to the inevitable consequences in terms of international diplomacy, with the attendant increase in tension as a negotiated solution is sought within the space of a fortnight when the British fleet is due to arrive in the Falklands area, clearly reflects the development of events throughout the month of April.

This progression is not apparent in 'La Vanguardia' where, to begin with, no reference is made to Argentine action in the Falklands, the detonator of the crisis, and the use of formulaic phrase patterns levels and equates all references to the subject, causing them to be perceived as instances of the same thing which, through the use of allusion, is defined as 'el conflicto reavivado del Gibraltar argentino'.

Our study of the headings used would therefore indicate different approaches towards the reporting of events - 'La Vanguardia' with a more culturally-biased, emotionally-involved

approach than 'El País', which would appear to be more concerned with the active process of finding a negotiated solution to the crisis, based on international consensus.

4.1.3. 'The Times' and 'The Guardian'

It is interesting to note that headlines used in 'The Times' and 'The Guardian' only use noun phrases referring to the 'Falklands crisis', the 'Falklands dispute' when referring to the situation in the South Atlantic prior to the invasion of the Islands on April 3. Of the modifier + head type (8), they occupy the syntactic object position in the clause where they are affected by the actions or agents occupying the subject position ('impenetrable silence on the Falklands crisis'; 'UN intervenes in Falklands dispute')⁵³, or the subject position in a nominalized passive construction ('"Islands dispute" nears solution')⁵⁴.

Once the invasion of the Islands has taken place these noun phrases disappear from the headlines and are instead used to head whole sections of the newspapers within which different reports on the Falklands are grouped. These section headings

⁵³ 'The Times' 4 April 1982.

⁵⁴ 'The Guardian' 1 April 1982.

may be event-specific, revealing newspaper attitudes through the analysis of the noun phrase heads ('The Falklands Debacle'⁵⁵; 'War in the Falklands'⁵⁶), or they may constitute a regular section in the daily newspaper, as is the case in 'The Falklands Crisis' ('The Guardian'); 'Falklands Crisis' ('The Times'). An analysis of these noun phrases as section headings reveals significant differences in their use.

'The Times', by using the noun phrase 'Falklands Crisis' as the heading to a section given over to news items of interest concerning the Falkland Islands - equivalent in use to the headings 'Overseas News' or 'Home News' in sections reporting news items of interest concerning domestic or foreign affairs - effectively empties the head 'crisis' of all its subjective/emotive content as it is leveled and equated with the word 'news' within the formulaic structure pattern characteristic of section headings as a whole.

Within this structure - modifier + head - the readers' attention focuses on the modifier as the distinguishing characteristic of the pattern - 'Home News', 'Overseas News', 'Financial News' etc.- and creates, by analogy, an equivalent

⁵⁵ 'The Times' 4 April 1982.

⁵⁶ 'The Sunday Times' 4, 11, 18, 25 April 1982.

form 'Falklands (News) in lieu of 'Falklands Crisis'.

Interest in this section is centred, therefore, on 'Falklands', the geographical unit, not the 'crisis' ('British fleet ready for Falklands', 'Retaking the Falklands', 'Emergency Privy Council at Windsor as fleet arms for Falklands operation', 'Flag flying on Falklands is seen as key obstacle')⁵⁷.

'The Guardian', on the other hand, by including the article 'the' as denominator in 'The Falklands Crisis' effectively alters the significance of the use of the noun phrase as a section heading from one in which items of news of interest concerning the Falklands are reported to one in which the items reported have to do with 'the...crisis' (the one which we all know about) and, more particularly, 'the crisis in the Falklands - 'the Falklands crisis'.

Readers are, thus, given to understand the development of events as described in news reports in the section to be a

⁵⁷ Fowler, op. cit., p. 80: Nominalization is a radical syntactic transformation of a clause which has extensive structural consequences and offers substantial ideological opportunities. Compare 'retaking' with the fully spelt out proposition 'X is going to retake A which Y took from X'. Deleted from the nominal form are the participants, indications of time - because there are no verbs to be tensed - and any indication of modality - the writer's views as to the truth or desirability of the proposition. It permits habits of concealment in areas of power relations and the writer's attitudes.

continuum of the crisis declared two weeks prior to the Argentine invasion of the Falklands (the landing of scrap merchants on South Georgia), although attention in the headlines of the articles included in the section refer only to 'Falklands: 'Argentine action in Falklands stuns Cabinet'; 'Britain to blockade Falkland Islands'; 'Galtieri will offer to share rule of Falklands'.

While 'The Times' section heading would, therefore, indicate a more factual approach to news about events occurring at a specific location, 'The Guardian' section heading would indicate a much more politically sensitive approach to those same events.

4.2. Texts

4.2.1. Individual articles as texts

Events, we have said, are put together with signs that indicate how they should be understood - what they 'mean'. The process of selection of signs to create the map of meaning desired is determined by the orientation given to the subject by the

reporter, mindful of the public s/he is addressing⁵⁸. An analysis of the sign-system (discourse) used will, therefore, disclose the preferred meaning of a text (the terms in which the reporter wishes the reader to make sense of events).

An instance of how this preferred meaning is arrived at is shown in the following analysis of two articles published in 'La Vanguardia', one on 4 April 1982 and the other on 6 April 1982.

Both texts apparently deal with the same topic in similar terms -the consequences of the political storm caused by the Falklands invasion and the possible resignation of those responsible for the government's lack of preparation for the crisis. In the first, reference is made to the posts of Defence and Foreign Secretary, in the second, to that of Prime Minister. Both share common lexical and syntactical forms which serve as cues, first, to remind readers of information previously made available and, subsequently, as the basis upon which to develop their significance.

(1) A pesar de todos los esfuerzos presentes del

⁵⁸ Hartley, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-24: 'Signs have a multiaccentual potential for meaning, but as reporters write, the capacity these signs have for connotation and myth are gradually filled until the signs are closed, apparently unaccentual'.

Gobierno, parece enormemente difícil que pueda paliar los efectos negativos -psicológicos y políticos- de la invasión. Si en las próximas semanas no logra algún éxito militar o diplomático le caerá encima todo el peso de haber subvalorado las amenazas argentinas que precedieron la invasión...la tempestad política resulta prácticamente inevitable...La tempestad que se cierne sobre el Gobierno...se puede desembocar, como mínimo en 'la muerte política' del Ministro de Defensa y del titular del Foreign Office ('La Vanguardia' 4 April 1982).

That is to say, unless the British Government obtains some form of diplomatic or military victory over Argentina, it will be held responsible for having misjudged the situation in the Falklands and this could well mean the end, metaphorically, ('muerte político') of the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary⁵⁹.

After the Foreign Secretary has in fact resigned, we read two days later⁶⁰:

⁵⁹ 'The Times' 4 April 1982: 'The fate of John Nott, the Defence Secretary, and Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, hung in the balance yesterday'.

⁶⁰ These were effectively successive articles since 'La Vanguardia' did not appear on Mondays.

- (2) Aunque esta dimisión tiende a descargar, de momento, las responsabilidades del Gabinete sobre el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, el futuro político de la primer ministro parece destinado también a la muerte repentina si no logra en las próximas semanas algún éxito militar o diplomático capaz de levantar otra vez el malherido orgullo británico. Que la primer ministro sigue en peligro y su futuro depende de los acontecimientos de los próximos días quedó subrayado ayer... la primera responsable de lo sucedido con las Malvinas era la Señora Thatcher. Hay que temer, en efecto, que un Gobierno que lucha por su supervivencia caiga en alguna exageración.

(‘La Vanguardia’ 6 April 1982).

Leading the reader along the path he wishes him/her to follow, the reporter deliberately evokes the first article in the reader’s mind by using similar words and phrases and then proceeds to give them a completely different meaning, given that the context within which they are uttered has changed.

Thus, we find:

- (1) (a) ‘si en las próximas semanas no logra algún éxito militar o diplomático’

- (2) (a) 'sí no logra en las próximas semanas algún éxito militar o diplomático'
- (1) (b) ' muerte política'
- (2) (b) 'el futuro político de la primer ministro/la muerte repentina'
- (2) (c) 'la primer ministro...en peligro...su futuro depende'

The similarity of the lexical and semantic structures used, however, belies the radical shift in meaning that occurs between one article and the other.

An analysis of the use of the conditionals 1(a) and 2(a) shows that in the first article, 1(a) constitutes a conditional whereby, unless the Government scores some sort of military or diplomatic victory over the Argentines, they will have to face the political consequences of the invasion taking place:

Si en las próximas semanas no logra algún éxito militar o diplomático le caerá encima todo el peso de haber subvalorado las amenazas argentinas que precedieron la invasión.

Common knowledge has it that in such cases this would imply the resignation ('muerte político') of those responsible for

protecting British interests abroad.

In the second article, the condition as expressed in 1(a) no longer holds, since a member of the government (Lord Carrington) has in fact resigned, presumably because no diplomatic success was forthcoming to mitigate public outrage.

Nevertheless, the formula 2(a) is repeated. It is repeated in conjunction with other words also reminiscent of the first article. Recalling the political consequences to be derived from the crisis ('muerte político') and which have already affected one member of the Cabinet, the author uses the same phrase in a new guise to describe the political consequences the crisis will have for Mrs. Thatcher. Having split the phrase in two parts ('muerte', 'político') further connotations are added to each ('el futuro político', 'la muerte repentina') and identification between the political consequences for the Government and Mrs. Thatcher made explicit by the use of 'también' and the same formula 1(a)/ 2(a):

Aunque esta dimisión tiende a descargar, de momento, las responsabilidades del Gabinete sobre el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, el futuro político de la primer ministro parece destinado también a la muerte repentina si no logra en las próximas semanas algún

éxito militar o diplomático.

A closer look at the text shows that the identification is false. The condition 1(a), as understood in the first article, is no longer valid - the Minister has resigned. The modification of the phrase 'muerte política' has moved readers' attention away from those responsible for the disaster being called to resign to focus attention on the Prime Minister's political future. The formula 2(a), therefore, assumes a totally new dimension in the second article as readers come to understand events occurring in the aftermath of the invasion in terms of Margaret Thatcher's political future depending upon her obtaining a diplomatic or military victory over the Argentinians. Unless she fulfils this condition, her political career will come to an abrupt end.

It is clear, then, that while both the Government and Mrs. Thatcher's actions in the aftermath of the invasion are conditioned, according to the reporter, by the same need to obtain some form of diplomatic or military victory over the Argentinians - 'si no logra en las próximas semanas algún éxito militar o diplomático' - a close look at the 'construction' of the text shows a clear differentiation in the motivation behind these actions. Government action is motivated by the desire to stem public outrage at the invasion whilst

Mrs. Thatcher's is to ensure her own political survival.

By subsequently confirming that 'la primer ministro sigue en peligro y su futuro depende de los acontecimientos de los próximos días', the reporter clearly differentiates between Margaret Thatcher and her political career, emphasising that it is Margaret Thatcher herself who is in danger. Mrs. Thatcher's reactions are not just motivated by a fight for political survival, but by a fight for personal survival in life-threatening circumstances. Popular wisdom on which the saying 'A drowning man clutches at a straw' is based has it that in such circumstances one may be led, in desperation, to resort to any course of action in order to save oneself.

Thus, warns the reporter: 'Hay que temer, en efecto, que un Gobierno que lucha por su supervivencia caiga en alguna exageración' - anything can happen.

It is interesting to note that the Government and Mrs. Thatcher, for the reporter's purposes, are one and the same. By identifying the Government with Mrs. Thatcher - 'la primera responsable de lo sucedido con las Malvinas era la Señora Thatcher' - he has effectively personalized the decision-making process in Britain, and what's more, given it female attributes.

A wealth of common sense knowledge about women, their actions and reactions, can be tapped to understand the course of events as dictated by the Government/Mrs. Thatcher's decisions⁶¹.

The reporter's preferred reading of the development of events in Britain after the invasion of the Falklands is to be understood in terms of the personal and/or female characteristics of Mrs. Thatcher which provide the stereotypes that will be exploited to render government actions meaningful. As we will see, the Government's/Mrs. Thatcher's actions will always be presented in terms of these stereotypes. Indeed they will never be selected as newsworthy unless they fit the stereotype.

So it is that 'la dama de hierro'⁶² decides to carry on with 'su anunciado proyecto de recuperar militarmente las islas' (also termed 'la invasión británica'); 'la Señora Thatcher envía una potente flota para liberar las Malvinas'.

Mrs. Thatcher's decision to send a naval task force to the Falklands is, however, deemed to be both madness ('económica-

⁶¹ Fowler, op. cit., pp. 93-105, on discrimination in discourse and the female paradigm.

⁶² 'The Iron Lady' - reference to the sobriquet given to Mrs. Thatcher as a result of her tough economic and foreign policies. See Section 7.

mente es una locura enzarzarse en una guerra') and crass stupidity ('luchar a 13.000 kilómetros de distancia sin ningún apoyo logístico cercano parece una insensatez a los expertos').

Held personally responsible for the decision to send the task force to the Falklands, her judgement in so doing is called into question. On the one hand, she is shown to lack good judgement and not to be at all sensible ('una insensatez'), on the other, to have taken leave of her senses, to be insane ('una locura').

A female stereotype of irrationality and hysteria is being appealed to here in order to make sense of Mrs. Thatcher's actions. It should be noticed that her decisions provoke 'desasosiego', 'consternación', 'vertigo' in the rational, well-documented male-dominated world of experts and international institutions (NATO, EEC).

As far as 'La Vanguardia' is concerned⁶³, there would seem to be no rational support for her decision - sending a task force would cost a fortune at a time when NATO countries are trying to cut down on the cost of keeping their ships at sea; even if Britain did win a victory over the Argentinians, she could not

⁶³ 'La Vanguardia' 4 April 1982: 'La OTAN alarmada'.

afford to keep her troops on the islands; the islands are of no strategic importance for the NATO alliance since there are no Soviet ships in the area and besides there is a greater need for them in the Mediterranean; fighting 13,000 kms from home makes no sense when neither Uruguay or Brasil will provide logistic support; the time taken to reach the Falklands will mean that the islands will be even more strongly defended by the Argentinians against attack; the Argentinian fleet is more than capable of taking on the Navy, etc.

The only possible explanation, as readers might well expect in the light of their previous knowledge of British government action: 'La Thatcher está marcando un "bluff"',⁶⁴. The reporter's lack of respect for Mrs. Thatcher is evident as he uses the disrespectful form 'la Thatcher' instead of 'Margaret Thatcher' or 'Señora Thatcher'.

4.2.2 Newspapers as texts

As stated in the Section 1.2., an analysis was made of each newspaper's reporting of events in order to determine the

⁶⁴ 'The Times' 1 April 1982. Reference is made to the occasion on which James Callaghan's government had obtained a diplomatic solution to an earlier incident in the Falklands by assembling ships from the Caribbean, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean and stationing them 400 miles off the Falklands.

discursive end established. It was assumed that this discursive end would be established at the outset of the crisis and that it would remain constant throughout its duration. This assumption was based on the belief that newspaper reporting, despite the variety of apparently different texts on the same subject over an undetermined period of time, effectively constitute a 'whole' - a single 'text' - in which the orientation of reporters' presentation of a particular event does not vary⁶⁵.

Just as reporters in each of their texts practice a policy of selection and transformation of information (signs) in order to create a map of meaning (sign-system) to help readers make sense of events (orientation towards the reader), newspaper editors, too, create sign-systems (maps of meaning) through a similar policy of selection and transformation based on their decisions as to which articles should be published on a specific subject, how many should be published, how much space they should occupy, their position on the page and their position in relation to other articles on the same page.

Each of these factors plays an important part in multiplying up the significance of articles published on an event and

⁶⁵ Hartley, *op.cit.*, pp. 87-88.

effectively contributes to establishing the newspaper's preferred meaning of events (as opposed to the reporter's), i.e., the newspaper's 'line' on events⁶⁶.

In an on-going event such as the Falklands crisis, readers are provided at the outset with a series of clues as to how to understand, or to make sense of, events. These clues may have their origin in the dictates of common sense (common sense knowledge) or in knowledge acquired from other sources, such as the press (common knowledge) and, through repetition and reinforcement, constitute the framework within which events as they develop will acquire meaning.

Each successive day's reporting builds on that of the previous day as these same clues are used to level and equate the myriad different aspects of the saga as it develops. No new development is ever understood in itself, only in the light of what has gone before, of how it fits into the scheme of things. It is in this way, by encouraging readers to understand events from a pre-determined point of view, and by mediating reality at different levels and in different ways, that reporters and

⁶⁶ Just as the map of meaning of an individual text is determined by the orientation given to the subject by the reporter, mindful of the public s/he is addressing, so the newspaper's 'line' is determined by commercial considerations, i.e., the audience the paper serves. To sell papers, editors must cater for the interests of the sector of the public that reads the newspaper.

editors alike effectively contribute to the shaping of readers' view of world events. This would explain why events appear to assume a degree of predictability as readers are able to 'foresee' developments which later appear to be confirmed.

This process of selection, however, can lead to bias in reporting:

One of the most effective and easy ways of implanting bias is one the public could never be aware of. We have no way of knowing what news stories the editors decide not to print (Cirino, 1971, p. 43).

Bias, or for our purposes, the preferred meaning given to news stories by reporters and editors, is not readily apparent to the wo/man in the street, who generally accepts that newspapers are impartial and keep him/her well informed of events. Moreover, newspaper readers tend to buy only one newspaper - the one whose ideology the reader most closely identifies with.

Thus, only by establishing the preferred meaning given to events by different papers, and comparing them, will differences in interpretation/ bias become apparent.

An in-depth analysis of the reporting of the Falklands crisis

in 'La Vanguardia' (2-7 April 1982) was carried out in order to determine the 'preferred meaning' given to events by the newspaper and the way in which this was established in individual articles and confirmed and reinforced through a day's (3 April 1982) and a week's (1-7 April 1982) reporting.

A similar analysis was then made of reporting over the same period in the other three newspapers under study to determine if the preferred meaning varied in any way.

4.2.2.1. 'La Vanguardia'

On 2 April 1982, one article appeared on page 16; on April 3, ten articles appeared on pages 1, 3, 4, 15, 16; on April 4, seven appeared on pages 3, 6, 15, 16, 17; on April 6, five appeared on pages 1, 3, 4, 15, 16; and on April 7, five on pages 3, 4, 15, 16.

Given that 'La Vanguardia' has a fixed International section (pages 1-18, or 1-21, depending on the day), it is clear that the invasion of the Falklands (2 a.m. Spanish time, 3 April 1982) was a particularly newsworthy event⁶⁷ that, as well as

⁶⁷ Galtung and Ruge, 1973, established a series of news values which determined whether or not an event was 'news-worthy'. These apply to news-selection all over the world.

occupying a prominent position in the International section itself (the first pages), warranted front page coverage in the newspaper on four of the days under study and on two, made the headlines on page 1. The number of articles on the subject peaked on the first two days after the invasion.

Although one would expect equal representation of both the British and Argentine points of view on the subject of the Falklands⁶⁸, there is, in fact, a preponderance of articles representing and making sense of events from the Argentine point of view: 1 out of 1 on April 2; 7 out of 8 on April 3; 5 out of 7 on April 4; 4 out of 5 on April 6; 6 out of 7 on April 7. The amount of space taken up by these articles was 82.1% of the total space given over to the subject of the Falklands.

The articles published in 'La Vanguardia' between 2 April 1982 and 7 April 1982 strongly represent the Argentine point of view in the Falklands crisis and are consonant with a newspaper 'line' sympathetic to Argentine ambitions in the Falklands.

⁶⁸ Fowler, op. cit., p. 1: 'Andrew Neil, the editor of the 'Sunday Times', introducing a book on the 1984-85 miners' strike written by the paper's journalists, asserts that though a newspaper may have a clear editorial position on some topic reported, that is reserved for the leader column, while the news reporting itself, on the other pages, is factual and unbiased.'

The cumulative effect of the large number of articles published at the time of the invasion representing the Argentine, as opposed to the British, point of view familiarizes readers to such an extent with this point of view that it effectively becomes their point of view.

Once this occurs, the newspaper's line and the reporting of events acquire greater credibility since their understanding of events is seen to coincide with that of the reader (common knowledge).

The stage is then set for newspaper, reporter and reader alike to make sense of events in like fashion, within the framework established. The newspaper effectively identifies with the reader and the reader identifies with the newspaper.

Establishing the newspaper line

The newspaper's line is established at the outset by the paper itself. Since few readers have any experience or prior knowledge of the situation in the Falklands, it is the newspaper that provides the specific knowledge which, together with other common sense knowledge, will be used by readers to make sense of events as they develop.

On 2 April 1982, just before the Argentine invasion of the Falklands and following on from the news that the Falklands crisis was coming to a head ('Malvinas: Horas decisivas'), José Guerrero Martín provides readers with information on the historical background to the crisis.

He refers to it, however, in terms of 'un litigio de larga historia'. As readers know only too well, litigation is the bringing of complaints before a judge who, after hearing both sides in the dispute, passes judgement in favour of one or the other.

What would seem to be a set of facts (history) of events leading up to the present crisis is in fact a series of events interpreted within the context of a process of litigation in which Guerrero Martín himself assumes the role of judge.

After solomonically presenting the opinions of both sides as to why the present crisis has arisen - 'Pueden tener razón en Londres cuando dicen que la actual crisis se debe al deseo del gobierno argentino de distraer la atención de su pueblo. Pero están en lo cierto en Buenos Aires cuando afirman que Gran Bretaña lleva practicando el colonialismo en las Malvinas desde hace siglo y medio' - he explicitly supports the Argentine point of view - 'están en lo cierto' - and goes on to pass

judgement on Britain when he notes that in 1833 'se produjo la usurpación de las Malvinas por Inglaterra'⁶⁹.

As far as he is concerned Britain is guilty of having committed a criminal offence, of having wrongfully seized the Falkland Islands through the use of violence or intimidation. Implicit in this affirmation is the fact that Britain forcefully seized the Islands from another power, Argentina, in which case Argentina has every legal right to reclaim its sovereignty over the Islands.

Since the information provided by Guerrero Martín is presented as a history of events, a set of facts, it is taken on authority by readers. Taken on authority, too, is his understanding/interpretation of events, presented as they are in legal terms. Britain is the wrongdoer, the criminal; Argentina, the victim. Argentina is in the right, Britain in the wrong, and hence Argentina should (moral obligation) be supported by international opinion.

How the significance of this article is multiplied up by the articles included in the day's reporting on 3 April 1982 will

⁶⁹ 'usurpación': a criminal offence whereby an individual seizes or assumes (throne, office, power, property, etc.) wrongfully, through violence or intimidation. Britain is, therefore, implicitly understood to be the perpetrator of a criminal offence.

be shown, first, in terms of the content of the articles that appear, second, in terms of the position each article is accorded in relation to other articles on the same page and, ultimately, in terms of the position accorded overall, within the section given over to the Falklands crisis.

Multiplying up significance in a day's reporting - the position and distribution of articles.

On 3 April 1982, the day after the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, the caption to a photograph on the front page of 'La Vanguardia' refers to the conflict in terms of 'el Gibraltar argentino'.

Guerrero Martín's explanation of the Falklands crisis as a 'litigio de larga historia' is compounded with its identification with 'Gibraltar'⁷⁰. Synonymous, for Spanish

⁷⁰ Gibraltar: '...1462, fue definitivamente conquistada por el Duque de Medinaceli e incorporado a la corona de Castilla por los Reyes Católicos en 1502 por su valor estratégico-militar. Tras iniciarse la Guerra de Sucesión de España, Gibraltar fue ocupado por las tropas del almirante inglés Roque (1704) en nombre del archiduque Carlos. El tratado de Utrecht (1713) reconocía la soberanía británica sobre Gibraltar. Los esfuerzos de España para recuperar la plaza fueron en vano. Las peticiones de devolución de Gibraltar por parte del gobierno español comenzaron ya en 1940 pero la ofensiva diplomática española se acentuó a partir de 1956: el problema fue planteado ante la Asamblea general de las Naciones Unidas y llevado al Comité de Descolonización de dicha organización. Desde 1962 el problema está prácticamente estancado y las posiciones de ambos bandos son inamovibles, las negociaciones han fracasado una y otra vez. Gran Bretaña considera que su soberanía es absoluta y sin límite temporal; España acusa a Gibraltar de ser el último vestigio del colonialismo en Europa.' (Enciclopedia Larousse, 1976).

readers, with an equally long battle waged to obtain recognition of Spain's claims to sovereignty over the island, now a British colony, 'Gibraltar' not only makes sense of the conflict in terms familiar to readers but also projects onto it all the connotations the word has acquired for Spanish people over the years of frustrated negotiation for the devolution of what has always been considered to be part of Spain, animosity towards Britain as a colonial power, the conviction that Spain's claim to the Island was justified, etc.

In this light, and mindful of the 'fact' that Britain had wrongfully seized the Falklands in the first place, it is perfectly understandable that the article on page 3, giving details of the invasion, should be prefaced by three references to the 'recuperación' of the Islands and the insistence, by Nicanor Costa Méndez, Argentina's Foreign Minister, on the fact that Argentina 'no invadió las Malvinas y que el término correcto es recuperación de la irredente tierra argentina'. In the same article ample reference is also made to the people's reactions to the news - 'Júbilo en Buenos Aires ante la "recuperación"'.

General Galtieri's speech to the nation (p. 1) reiterates the legitimacy of Argentine claims to the Islands: 'Hemos recuperado...las islas australes que integran por legítimo

derecho el patrimonio nacional', and justifies the Junta's decision to invade in terms of having given expression to 'el más profundo sentir del pueblo' by putting an end to the 'interminable sucesión de evasivas y dilaciones instrumentadas por Gran Bretaña para perpetuar su dominio sobre las islas'.

The full text of the Spanish government's statement on the crisis (p.16) places the conflict within the context of a process of decolonization and gives its support to Argentina's claim to the Islands in dispute: 'su descolonización debe hacerse asegurando el restablecimiento de la integridad territorial argentina.' It also attributes the possible cause of the crisis to excessively long-drawn-out negotiations: 'La prolongación sin solución real de estas soluciones coloniales, en contra de la integridad territorial de los países, es causa de tensiones que pueden llevar incluso a conflictos como el actual'.

This point is picked up and dealt with at length in Guerrero Martín's article on the same page - 'Una larga guerra política y diplomática' (p. 16) - which confirms General Galtieri's claim that the occupation of the Falklands was undertaken to 'acabar ya con evasiones y dilaciones sin fin' (p. 1).

Each of these articles contributes to increase and confirm the

information contained in the others until, little by little, the overall picture becomes clear. Readers come to understand events (in this case, the invasion of the Falklands) as the justified result of Argentine impatience at the delaying tactics used by the British to put off returning the colony which was rightfully theirs and wrongfully seized in 1833.

Two other articles that appear on April 3 deal with international reaction to the news of the invasion - the first with that of the USSR and the USA, and the second with that of NATO and the EEC.

While the United States is acknowledged to be on good terms with Argentina and is presented in the role of mediator from the very beginning of the invasion, the reactions of powers and institutions alike are presented as being polarised between two clearly defined camps - pro-Argentina or pro-Britain.

The United States, for the purposes of 'La Vanguardia', is aligned with the United Kingdom - 'los lazos con Gran Bretaña son más fuertes'⁷¹; the Soviet Union with Argentina - 'La

⁷¹ 'La Vanguardia' 3 April, p. 15: 'Horas después de que Estados Unidos expresara su apoyo implícito a Gran Bretaña..' - represents the reporter's interpretation of a situation which was not a fact until well into the month of April - the USA did its utmost to remain even-handed in the dispute so as not to compromise its role as mediator between both powers.

posición del Kremlin se debe, en primer lugar a militar en el campo contrario al de Estados Unidos'; the EEC with Britain - 'sus amigos'- and the rest of the world with Argentina - 'se da por descontado aquí (Brussels) que el bloque comunista - Moscú y Pekín reunidos - así como Latinoamérica, Africa y el mundo árabe se inclinarán a favor de Argentina'.

While this polarization intensifies the fear of war as powers are seen to take up positions in explicit opposition to one another, it also simplifies for the reader the intricacies of political and diplomatic manoeuvring characteristic of this kind of situation and serves the purposes of the newspaper by facilitating the continued assessment of events, actions and reactions, in terms of what is right and what is wrong.

The amount of international support that 'La Vanguardia' expects to be given to Argentina seems to confirm the fact that the invasion of the Falklands was justified.

Argentina's case is once again argued as the first of these articles ends with the Argentine ambassador to the UN's statement on the Falklands: 'mi Gobierno ha declarado la recuperación de la soberanía nacional sobre las islas Malvinas acto que corresponde a una justa reivindicación argentina', and the second makes reference to Belize - 'otra posesión española

arrebatada en su día por la 'pérfida albión'.

Britain's description as 'la pérfida albión'⁷² not only refers to the treacherous nature of the British, but also to the fact that historically, as far as Spaniards are concerned, Britons have always been characterised by this type of behaviour. From the time of Francis Drake and his pirates who terrorised their shipping routes from the Indies down to the present day: 'refiriéndose a los británicos, se oían estribillos mencionando a los "piratas"'⁷³.

If Britons were not to be trusted in the past, they certainly do not seem to be any more trustworthy at present. How can one trust a government that wilfully conceals information from its citizens 'tras tenerse noticia que la capital de las Malvinas había caído el Gobierno Británico tardó aún siete horas en admitir oficialmente la invasión' and refuses to give information about troop movements which are known to exist? The explanation given for the government's reluctance to

⁷² Albión: name used by the Greeks to refer to Britain, presumably inspired by the white appearance of the cliffs of Dover.

⁷³ It should be noted that, dating from the time of Francis Drake, an insult commonly preferred by Spaniards even today to describe people behaving in this way is: 'hijo de la Gran Bretaña'. It is curious to note that in reports in 'La Vanguardia' the United Kingdom is always referred to as 'Gran Bretaña'. In 'El País', it is referred to as 'el Reino Unido', the correct term.

provide information: 'si el Gobierno británico se niega a proporcionar detalles sobre sus próximos pasos en el terreno militar es en aras de mantener sus cartas tapadas el máximo tiempo posible', card-player-like strategies designed to outwit one's opponents and score points⁷⁴.

The acknowledgement of the possibility of a credibility gap between the information that the British government possesses and the information it chooses, or does not choose, to provide (like the card-player) successfully ensures that nothing the British government says will ever be taken at face value since it is understood that whatever it says will form part of a plan or strategy designed to outmanoeuvre, or gain some sort of advantage over, its adversary⁷⁵.

The significance of the clues presented as a means to understanding events is multiplied up by the position and juxtaposition of the articles appearing on the same page, as

⁷⁴ 'Muchos piensan aquí que la Thatcher se está marcando un "bluff" para forzar a Buenos Aires a negociar'. Playing one's cards close to one's chest, bluffing, and calling one's opponent's bluff are all part and parcel of a cardplayer's strategies to beat one's opponent. Inveterate card-players and gamblers, Spanish readers would be more than familiar with the situation alluded to here, since Poker (said to have first developed from a Spanish game, Primero) and Mus are two of the most popular card games in the country, based precisely on these strategies.

⁷⁵ This preconceived idea of the motivations behind the British Government actions did in fact prove damaging to the Government's credibility during Alexander Haig's attempts at mediation in the conflict.

well as their distribution throughout the section given over to the Falklands.

Thus we find:

- P.1. Top left-hand position: photograph and caption referring to the crisis as 'el Gibraltar argentino'.
- p.3. Parallel articles from correspondents in Buenos Aires and London on the bottom right-hand half of the page, continued over onto the left-hand half of page 4, with the article from Buenos Aires positioned below the article from London.
- p.15. Articles describing international reaction occupying the whole page. At the top of the page, from left to right: Washington and Moscow; NATO and the EEC. At the bottom of the page, from left to right: General Galtieri's address to the nation; map and general information about the Islands.
- p.16 Two articles occupying virtually the whole of the page, one of which publishes the official Spanish government statement on the crisis (top left-hand side) and the other details the long-drawn-out

process of negotiation between Argentina and Great Britain over the Falkland Islands (centre of page).

The position of the articles as they appear on different pages also contributes to the discursive end in mind. Depending upon which position they hold, greater relevance is given to one aspect or another of the crisis (priority position), or to aspects of the crisis particularly relevant to the discourse (carry-over position).

Reading as one does from left to right, top to bottom, articles on the top left-hand position enjoy priority position as they are the first to be noticed or read while those on the bottom right are those that are 'carried over' - either physically, as they are continued on the next page, or mentally, as they leave in the reader's mind the discursive end the reporter or newspaper has intended.

On page 3, the two parallel articles appearing at the bottom of the page - both equal in length, one from London, the other from Buenos Aires - would appear to provide a balanced (in terms of physical representation) report of events. By virtue of the positioning of the article from London in the bottom right-hand position, however, readers' attention is ultimately centred on London's reactions to the invasion and this is

carried over on to the next page, 4, where the article assumes priority position on the top left-hand side.

Subsequent articles on page 1 give priority to the American/Soviet reaction to the crisis (top left-hand position on the page) before readers' attention is finally focused on General Galtieri and the Falkland Islands themselves (bottom right-hand position) which provides the link, over the page, with the Spanish government statement on the Falklands (top left-hand position) and, in the centre of the page, Guerrero Martín's article on 'la larga guerra política y diplomática'.

Priority position is, therefore, accorded to reactions to the invasion in London and Buenos Aires, Washington and Moscow, and in Spain.

Carry-over position, however, when the discursive end the reporter or newspaper has in mind is held over in the reader, is reserved for the articles describing reaction to the invasion in Buenos Aires and London (p. 3); General Galtieri's address to the nation; and a map and general information about the Islands (p. 15).

Of these articles, only one focuses on the United Kingdom while three focus on Argentina and the Falklands. The fact that the

second half of the article on the reaction to the news of the invasion in Buenos Aires, General Galtieri's address to the nation and the information on the Falklands come after the article from London means that these remain fresher in the reader's mind and, by sheer force of numbers, carry greater weight.

The Junta's account of the invasion, the people's reaction to the news and General Galtieri's explanation of the Argentine position on the Falklands - quoted verbatim in 15 lines - are given much wider coverage and accessed through many more voices. London's reaction to the invasion of the Falklands is expressed in only 16 lines, by Lord Carrington, and at no time is the voice of Margaret Thatcher accessed.

This again is consonant with 'line' adopted by 'La Vanguardia' that is not only sympathetic to Argentine aspirations but actively supports Argentina's view on the crisis, to the exclusion of others.

Just as the articles selected for inclusion in the newspaper strongly represent the Argentine point of view on the Falklands, so the position of the articles within the paper keeps this view in the forefront of the readers' minds. The distribution of the articles in the newspaper is designed to

convince readers that this view is their own.

Beginning with the contextualization of the crisis in terms of 'el reavivado Gibraltar argentino' - synonymous with Spain's lengthy negotiations with Britain over the sovereignty of Gibraltar - and ending with a centre-of-the-page article on Argentina's lengthy negotiations with Britain over the sovereignty of the Falklands, the distribution of the articles in the day's paper bring the readers full circle from being encouraged to identify with the Argentine position on the Falklands to actually doing so.

The relevance of the article, 'Una larga guerra política y diplomática' (p. 16) lies not so much in the prominent position it holds in the centre of the page, nor in its length (both of which are, of course, important factors in themselves) but in its contribution to attaining the discursive end established at the outset - identification with the Argentine point of view on the Falklands.

This it does as the last of a series of articles which, individually and as a whole, contribute to the same end. It draws together the various strands woven by the previous articles and completes readers' understanding of the circumstances surrounding the Falklands crisis. With

understanding comes recognition, and with recognition, identification. Readers recognize Argentina as a fellow traveller on the long, hard road to recovering national territory, and Britain as a common enemy.

It is at this point that both readers' and the newspaper's views coincide. From now on, as readers' identification with Argentine ambitions begins to shape their view of events, the newspaper itself will ensure, from one day to the next, one week to the next, that that view will continue to be shaped, reinforced and confirmed through a continuous process of selection, transformation, positioning and distribution of information such as that we have just described.

Like a series of ever-widening circles which share a common point of departure, a day's, a week's, a month's reporting of an event, even though it covers many different aspects of the same event, is continually shaped/conditioned by the discursive end established at the outset. It is this discursive end which provides the framework within which events are to be understood and into which they must fit, thereby confirming and reinforcing this same end. How this happens can be seen in the reporting of events in 'La Vanguardia' 4-7 April 1982.

Multiplying up significance - a week's reporting

In 'La Vanguardia', the discursive end (preferred meaning) established by reports on 2 April and 3 April 1982 was that Argentina, victim of British aggression in 1833 when the Falklands were colonized, and of British machinations to delay the decolonisation of the Islands, was justified in recovering the Falklands which were rightfully hers. Reports on the Falklands 4-7 April 1982 repeatedly confirm and reinforce that end.

The fact that the Falklands crisis is made sense of from the outset in terms of a process of litigation implies the existence of a consensual model of society, a set of propositions - in this case right and wrong - assumed to be generally agreed upon, embodied in the legal code and enforced by law.

At international level these propositions are embodied in international law and enforced through international institutions. Numerous references are made to the countries and the institutions forming this consensus and safeguarding these propositions: the United Nations, NATO, EEC, OEA, TIAR, etc.

Hall et al. (1978) see this 'background assumption' of

consensus as crucial, going far beyond the recognition of shared language and knowledge:

Because we occupy the same society and belong to roughly the same 'culture', it is assumed that there is, basically, only one perspective on events: that provided by what is sometimes called the culture, or ... the 'central value system'... this view denies any major cultural discrepancies between different groups, or between the very different maps of meaning in society. (Hall et al., op.cit., p. 55)

In the consensual model, everybody has access to the expression and resolution of their grievances within the framework of established social institutions. Not to accept this order is to incur in what is termed as deviant behaviour as one places oneself beyond the boundaries of what is socially acceptable behaviour. In the diagramme used by Hall et al. this type of behaviour is listed alongside more traditional crime⁷⁶. Deviant behaviour is always associated with violent actions or actions leading to violence⁷⁷.

⁷⁶ Hall et al., op.cit., p. 226.

⁷⁷ This is, according to Hall, the most salient, operational 'news value' in the domain of political news, because he argues 'at the level of 'deep structure' political violence is unusual - though it regularly happens - because it signifies the world of politics as it ought not to be. It shows conflict in the system at its most extreme point. And this 'breaches

According to 'La Vanguardia', Britain's behaviour in rejecting the possibility of solving the problem of the decolonisation of the Falklands through the normal channels (Britain continually procrastinated over solving the dispute over sovereignty despite several UN resolutions to the effect) and determining to resolve the dispute outside these channels (sending a task force to the Falklands) is by definition, deviant. It contains the 'threat of violence' and the threat of violence is 'anti-social' in the profoundest sense. It is identifiable with criminal behaviour.

Thus, having found Britain guilty of wrongfully taking the Falklands in the first place in 1833, and considering the taking of the Islands as the justified recovery 'de facto' of Argentine national territory, Britain's dispatching of the fleet - 'más de 30 buques de guerra'/'en formación de guerra'- in response to Argentina's occupation of the Falklands can only be interpreted by 'La Vanguardia' readers as yet another act of aggression similar to that which occurred ten years earlier - 'una auténtica expedición colonial en pleno siglo XX' (4 April 1982).

expectations' precisely because our society is supposed to be regulated, and politics is exactly 'the continuation of social conflict without resort to violence': a society, that is, where the legitimacy of the social order rests on the absolute inviolability of the 'rule of law' (p.184).

To all intents and purposes Britain has once more assumed its historical role of aggressor leaving Argentina no other alternative but to defend itself in legitimate self-defence:

'Si la Escuadra británica ataca nuestras posiciones en las Malvinas sabremos y deberemos defendernos' (6 April 1982).

The British press's clamour for 'una decidida acción de fuerza' (4 April 1982), the Defense Minister's confirmation that 'Gran Bretaña está dispuesta a hundir barcos argentinos y tomar por asalto las Malvinas' (6 April 1982) and the results of public opinion polls - 'un 70% de los preguntados se ha mostrado de acuerdo en que la Royal Navy mande a pique los buques de la Armada argentina si esto es necesario para recuperar las Malvinas' (7 April 1982) - all go to confirm the criminal tendencies of the British government's actions.

The difference between the positions of Britain and Argentina over the Falklands is likened, in 'La Vanguardia', to the difference between 'rapia' (robbery with violence) and 'rescate' (recovery) with Britain's position clearly warranting universal condemnation - 'la fuerza moral está nacional y internacionalmente de parte de Argentina' (4 April 1982).

This being the case, it is inconceivable that anyone should even contemplate the possibility of Argentina giving up the

islands - 'nadie espera que este país vaya a abandonar ya aquellas islas que son suyas a bien suyas' (4 April 1982).

However, since Britain has systematically shown itself to be contrary to this opinion: 'se confía en que Inglaterra no aumente su mala fama internacional en materia de colonialismo haciendo víctimas entre los actuales ocupantes de las islas a quienes les atiende un derecho moral y material ampliamente reconocido por todos' (4 April 1982).

At this point it is clear that reference is being made to a second form of consensus in society which, as distinct from that which imposes law and order through social institutions, regulates society through the exercise of moral conscience.

This form of consensus - based on moral values, derived from religious beliefs - differs between groups. Cultural differences and therefore differences in 'maps of meaning' in society are closely linked to differences in these beliefs and values.

Clearly, two traditionally Roman Catholic, Spanish-speaking nations such as Argentina and Spain share the same cultural background, beliefs and moral values that Britain - traditionally Protestant and Anglo-Saxon - does not.

Based on this shared consensus, and parallel to the discourse condemning Britain's actions in legal terms, a second discourse is developed passing judgement on Britain's actions in terms of Church law⁷⁸.

As far as practicing Catholics are concerned, Britain is guilty of a multitude of sins which, according to Church law, make

⁷⁸ According to the practice of the Roman Catholic Church the Sacrament of Holy Communion is preceded by an Examination of Conscience, Act of Contrition and Confession. Churchgoers are guided in their Examination of Conscience by reference to the kind of behaviour that is considered to be sinful in specific texts for the purpose included in the Sunday Missal. In the Spanish Missal these are divided into sins against the Commandments, against the Church, 'faltas' and 'pecados capitales'. The sins relevant to the discourse in question are those listed as follows in the 'Santa Misal V.S.J.'.

En el SEPTIMO Y DECIMO MANDAMIENTOS que prohíben 'el hurto y la codicia de los bienes ajenos', se puede pecar: por tomar o desear tomar sin el consentimiento de su dueño, los bienes ajenos; por haber retenido lo que era del prójimo, contra su voluntad; por haber hecho daño al prójimo en sus bienes; y por no pagar las deudas. (According to 'La Vanguardia' 6 April 1982, Britain had taken the Falklands, rightfully belonging to Argentina, and, despite Argentina's insistence on having them returned, continued to maintain British sovereignty over the Islands).

En el OCTAVO MANDAMIENTO, que prohíbe 'levantar falsos testimonios y mentir', se puede pecar por mentir; por juzgar temerariamente; por hablar mal del prójimo; por calumniarle; por levantar falsos testimonios, y por no guardar sus secretos. ('La Vanguardia's report, 7 April 1982, of members of the Government's explanation of exactly when they were told of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands indicated that they were not telling the truth. General Galtieri's remarks, reported 11 April 1982, indicate that Britain had offended Argentina in word and deed).

PECADOS CAPITALES.- Pecados de ORGULLO: obrar por orgullo; gastar con exceso; despreciar a los demás; complacerse en pensamientos de vanidad; ser susceptible. (According to 'La Vanguardia' 11 April 1982, Mrs. Thatcher and her Government were spurred to take action against Argentina as a result of their wounded pride. Moreover, the flagship of the naval task force had already been sold to Australia as a result of the insolvency of the British Government).

her actions equally wrongful⁷⁹. Britain, having wrongly seized the islands from Argentina in 1833 and having unduly prolonged their return to their rightful owner, had in fact broken the seventh and tenth commandments: 'por tomar...los bienes ajenos' and 'por haber retenido lo que era del prójimo, contra su voluntad' (6 April 1982).

Faced with the responsibility of explaining to the British public the shortcomings of government action in preventing an invasion from taking place, serious doubts are cast upon the truthfulness of members of the government in admitting to the date upon which they were notified of the impending invasion:

A agravar las cosas contribuye la disparidad de las fechas en que los miembros del Gobierno afirman haber tenido noticias de los planes de la invasión argentina. Mientras que el ex-titular del Foreign Office, Lord Carrington (dimitido ayer) asegura haber sido informado el pasado día 29 de marzo (cuatro días antes) la primer ministro insistió ayer en los Comunes en que el Gobierno fue advertido el 31 de

⁷⁹ The significance of this shared consensus lies not only in the Catholic religion itself, but in the fact that the possibility of papal mediation in the Falklands crisis had been mentioned in 'La Vanguardia', 1 April 1982. The Pope had already intervened in the Argentine-Chilean dispute over the Beagle Channel. See 'El País' 3 April 1982.

marzo (dos días antes). El 'Times' y el 'Telegraph' afirman, como ya se ha dicho, que eso sucedió el 26 de marzo (siete días antes). Preguntada al respecto, Margaret Thatcher calificó ayer de 'confusas' tales informaciones periodísticas (7 April 1982).

Clearly, the dates on which members of the government say that they were told of the impending invasion cannot possibly 'agravar las cosas' or make things worse than they already are. What 'La Vanguardia' really means is that someone is clearly lying and that is 'grave' since members of the British government are breaking the eighth commandment: 'que prohibe levantar falsos testimonios y mentir'.⁵⁰

Not only guilty of breaking the commandments, Britons as a nation and their leaders are also guilty of the mortal sin of pride - 'obrar por orgullo'⁵⁰.

Thus, 'El orgullo nacional británico no aguanta la humillación de este "hecho consumado"', a European diplomat is quoted as saying, on 4 April 1982; doubts are expressed as to whether it

⁵⁰ It should be noted that there is a very important difference between the concept of 'pride', 'honour' and 'humiliation' as used in 'La Vanguardia' and as used in the British press of the time. The difference derives precisely from the differences in culture and 'maps of meaning' in the two communities. This particular aspect of reporting international events will be dealt with in Section 7.

will be sufficient for Britain to break off diplomatic relations with Argentina after the invasion without some other action being necessary 'para satisfacer...el orgullo nacional herido' (4 April 1982); Michael Foot, 'con algunos problemas de conciencia pero el orgullo nacional por encima de todo' (4 April 1982), decides to support the Conservative government's decision to refer the problem to the United Nations rather than propose a vote of censure against the government for its ineptitude; Margaret Thatcher is guilty of attempting to 'levantar otra vez el malherido orgullo británico' (6 April 1982) by sending the fleet to the Falklands to recover the islands after the invasion; the crisis itself is referred to as 'la guerra del orgullo' (7 April 1982).

Pride being one of the cardinal sins, it is not surprising that much should be made of the 'sentimiento de humillación nacional' attributed to Britain after the Argentinian invasion of the islands. After all, Britain has obtained its just rewards - the giant has been brought low.

Spending in excess is yet another of the sins of pride. Only in terms of moral theology can one explain the curious description of Britain's decision to use the 'Invincible' as the flagship of the naval task force to be dispatched to the Falklands - 'De este modo, Gran Bretaña se aprestaría a hacer frente a una

humillación en las colonias con un portaviones ya vendido por falta de fondos' (3 April 1982).

The fact that readers are forcefully reminded of the fact the following day 'Hay que recordar que la venta del flamante portaviones HMS Invencible fue concertada hace tres semanas para reducir los gastos de defensa' (4 April 1982) would certainly seem to indicate that this point is considered to be of singular importance⁸¹.

According to 'La Vanguardia', and within the context of the consensual models of society described, Argentina is sure to find support for her position in international fora: son conscientes de los argumentos y razones morales que les acompañan y están seguros de la mella que éstos produzcan en el campo internacional' (4 April 1982).

Thus, in the emergency debate in the United Nations, 'no parecía factible una resolución en su (Great Britain's) favor', and, moreover, 'se da por descontado aquí que al bloque comunista Moscú y Pekín reunidos así como Latinoamérica, Africa y el mundo árabe se inclinarán a favor de Argentina' (3 April 1982).

⁸¹ In June 1981, the Government published the Defence White Paper announcing cuts in the defence budget.

It is interesting to note that when this condemnation is not forthcoming, the concept of consensus is redefined and modified. Consensus is henceforth constituted by a set of propositions common, not to the social institutions of the nation or the international community, but to public opinion in Argentina and Spain, as defined by 'La Vanguardia':

El recuento de los amigos que están a su lado resulta abrumadoramente ingrato para este país...Cierto es que en muchos países la opinión pública no coincide con la oficial. Pero homologados las Malvinas con Gibraltar se esperaba otra actitud oficial⁸². Sin embargo la transcripción de los comentarios periodísticos españoles compensa la actitud oficial porque revelan simpatía y adhesión por parte de la opinión de la península (6 April 1982).

Once more the correspondence is established between the Argentine nation's struggle over the Falklands and the Spanish nation's problems over Gibraltar.

⁸² 'La Vanguardia' 4 April 1982: 'por diez votos contra uno el citado Consejo pidió la retirada argentina de las islas'. Contrary to 'La Vanguardia' expectations, the Spanish Government abstained from voting on Resolution 502 demanding (the resolution was mandatory) the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falklands. See Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *op.cit.*, pp. 134-141.

This identification between two peoples gives rise to the 'simpatía' and 'adhesión' attributed to readers mindful of the extensive coverage given by 'La Vanguardia' to General Galtieri's speeches justifying the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in terms of, 'el profundo sentir del pueblo argentino'/'pensado en nombre de todas y cada uno de los argentinos'/'causa de todo el pueblo argentino'/'la expulsión de los usurpadores se encuentra plenamente justificado hoy en el marco de la lucha contra los últimos reductos del colonialismo' (3 April 1982).

Consensus, as established by 'La Vanguardia' in terms of a common set of propositions shared by 'la opinión pública de la península' and the people of Argentina, implies, by definition, that the propositions of national or international institutions fall outside the boundaries of this limited consensus and are, therefore, seen to be deviant.

Thus, the Spanish government is disqualified - 'la opinión pública no coincide con la oficial' - as are the Common Market countries (for siding with Britain) 'CEE condenan la intervención armada de general argentino en las Malvinas y le exigen que retire sus fuerzas inmediatamente y se adhiera al llamamiento del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU a fin de evitar el uso de fuerza... Con esta declaración conjunta los 10 han

cumplido su deber de solidaridad con su asociado británico' (4 April 1982), and the UN who is unfair: 'Las propias Naciones Unidas habían reconocido el estado colonial de las Malvinas y habían recomendado a Inglaterra y a Argentina que entablasen negociaciones...que fueron burladas una y otra vez por Inglaterra', and hypocritical: 'La votación fue acusatoria para Argentina...el efecto es muy relativo pues se recuerdan condenaciones y recomendaciones anteriores...que fueron desoídas y no pasó nada' (6 April 1982). In the circumstances, therefore, it is only natural that these institutions should command little respect from Argentina: 'Al inculpado no le dió frío ni calor la excomunión' (6 April 1982).

Although Argentina, by taking the Falklands by force, effectively stands outside the accepted bounds of legitimacy as defined by international law - international condemnation reinforces the fact - the way in which the reporters and the editor of 'La Vanguardia' have wanted readers to understand events has meant that reality is perceived in a totally different light from the way it is perceived by the majority.

Having limited consensus to the opinions of the Spanish and Argentine peoples, by definition, therefore, national and international institutions are all potentially threatening and Argentina is not only seen to be the victim of aggression on

the part of Great Britain, but also of the international community at large.

This discursive end is, as will be shown, maintained to the end of the news story when Britain re-takes the Falklands.

4.2.2.2. 'El País'

An analysis of the reporting of the Falklands invasion and the British reaction to the occupation of the islands in 'El País' during the same period of time as was analysed in 'La Vanguardia' (April 1-7) shows that the preferred meaning accorded to events is completely different.

As distinct from 'La Vanguardia', 'El País' published no article on the Falklands on April 2, and on April 3, the day after the invasion, the front-page news was headlined, 'La Junta Argentina se apodera por la fuerza de las Islas Malvinas', and in slightly smaller print above, 'Londres tardó horas en confirmar la ocupación de la colonia y traslada el conflicto ante las estancias internacionales' (p.1).

London is clearly seen to be working within the legitimate means of pursuing its interests by seeking to solve the conflict through the channels established for the purpose,

while Argentina has circumvented these channels and has resorted to direct action to obtain its objectives ('invasión', 'ocupación').

The taking of the islands is referred to as 'esta arriesgada intervención' since, although the paper quotes General Galtieri's justification of the invasion in terms of territorial integrity and the need to put an end to 'la interminable sucesión de maniobras dilatorias utilizadas por el Reino Unido para perpetuar su dominio sobre las islas' (p.1), it is clear the discursive end in mind is not the justification of the Argentine point of view but the condemnation of Argentina's use of force.

The issue in 'El País' is one of form rather than of content. Thus, the Spanish government's reaction to the invasion is placed in the carry-over position and has the last word. While recognizing the need to reestablish territorial integrity, 'se pronuncia en contra del uso de la fuerza y considera necesario resolver el conflicto por vías pacíficas' (p.4).

This rejection of direct action to solve conflicting interests is seconded at various levels throughout the international community: the EEC, NATO, the United States. Not only did the invasion constitute a challenge to the concept of consensus

politics but it was both unwarranted and unjustifiable: 'Todo indica que el Gobierno británico estaba ayer intentando evitar una confrontación militar con Argentina, pero ahora se halla en un grave aprieto'; 'Atkins insistió en la necesidad de una solución diplomática que había rechazado el gobierno Argentino' (p.3).

Arguing from Britain's point of view, Argentina's claims to the islands are unacceptable and the landing of the scrap merchants on San Pedro Island (South Georgia) illegal.

The fact that the conflict arising out of the landing of a group of Argentinian scrap metal merchants on the islands, raising the national flag and singing the national anthem, could not be solved through the normal channels, is necessarily attributed to something outside the system - 'el acerbado nacionalismo característico de los argentinos'. This would explain why 'El País' describes reactions to the whole incident as reaching a 'gran dimensión propagandística' (p.3).

Consensus politics being the means of managing dissent, two subsequent articles (p. 3) centre readers' attention on the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Argentina and the expulsion of Argentine diplomats from Britain, 'trás verse arrebatada por la fuerza la colonia de las Malvinas'. These

measures, taken by Lord Carrington, were only to be expected. By ostracizing and segregating deviant groups and defining them as a threat, the act of labelling prepares the way for controlling the action.

Argentina's behaviour is seen to be deviant and she is seen to be operating outside the limits of international consensus as Lord Carrington deplores the fact that 'los argentinos habían actuado en contra las recomendaciones formuladas en la víspera por el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas y el Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad'⁸³. Britain 'no sabe muy bien cómo reaccionar' because, the implication is, this is not normal behaviour.

The Lord Privy Seal, however, assures Parliament that Britain will continue to operate within these limits of consensus so that, 'Estamos tomando las medidas apropiadas para defender nuestros derechos', while continuing to insist on the need for 'una solución diplomática'⁸⁴.

The responsibility for the failure of this option so far is

⁸³ See 'The Times' 2 and 3 April 1982; 'The Guardian' and 'La Vanguardia' 3 April 1982.

⁸⁴ While 'The Times', 'The Guardian' and 'El País' 3 April 1982 refer to Britain taking appropriate measures to defend its rights, this specific point is not mentioned in 'La Vanguardia'.



squarely laid at Argentina's door - 'una solución diplomática que había rechazado Argentina' (p.3). Not only has Argentina rejected the option of a negotiated solution but she is seen to have contributed to the failure of any possible negotiated settlement by reacting adversely at the slow progress made in negotiations, causing bi-lateral talks to be called off when veiled threats were made of action being taken outside diplomatic channels: 'las negociaciones se empantanaron siendo suspendidas en febrero de este año cuando Argentina amenazó con "buscar otros medios para resolver la disputa"' (p.3).

It is within the context of the numerous disputes over territorial claims that Argentina has with other countries, in particular with Chile over the Beagle Channel, that 'El País' wishes readers to understand the problem of the Falklands: 'el tema del Beagle, como en otros órdenes, el de las islas Malvinas, o el complejo hidroeléctrico argentino-paraguayo de Yacireta es uno de los grandes temas de América Latina' (p.5).

The description of the Beagle Channel dispute in 'El País' has many points in common with that of the Falklands - it is a dispute over the sovereignty of a group of islands to the South of South America, lasting for over 100 years, for which Argentina is willing to go to war, and in which both sides

refuse to recognize the other's claim to sovereignty⁸⁵.

In both cases, however, Argentina is disputing sovereignty already exercised by another power: Chile in the case of the Beagle Channel and Britain in the case of the Falklands.

Having established the similitude between both cases, 'El País' goes on to describe the difficulties experienced in reaching a negotiated solution to the Beagle Channel dispute and attributes these to the intransigence of Argentina in her demands, and her reluctance in accepting the results of negotiations or arbitration when these are not in its best interests.

Argentina is held responsible for 'closing the door' to a negotiated solution to the conflict by going back on the agreement reached with Chile in 1972 to refer the dispute between the two countries to the Hague for arbitration, insisting instead on a renegotiation of frontiers more in keeping with her own aspirations: 'si bien considera que la

⁸⁵ 'Por tres islotes, perdidos en el extremo sur del continente americano, Argentina y Chile estuvieron a punto de ir a la guerra en 1978...el espinoso contencioso que los dos países vecinos mantienen desde hace más de un siglo por la soberanía de las islas Nueva, Pincón, y Lenox, en la zona del canal de Beagle, subsiste, terco, enquistado, porque, en definitivo, ninguna de las dos partes en litigio quiere dar su brazo a torcer'.

decisión de denunciar el acuerdo "cierra un camino" para la solución del litigio del Beagle, desea remplazar el tratado con otro más moderno, que sirva para resolver de un modo más preciso en el diferendo limítrofe', and turning a deaf ear to the Pope's attempts at mediation after bringing both countries to the brink of war in 1978: 'la ausencia de respuesta argentina, hasta ahora, a las iniciativas pontificias, coloca la situación en una conyuntura que los observadores políticos y diplomáticos califican de peligrosa'.

Not only has Argentina made it difficult for a negotiated solution to be found to the conflict, but she has also aggravated the situation by repeatedly challenging Chilean sovereignty in the area either by claiming the right of passage through the Beagle Channel⁸⁶; provoking international incidents such as the Deceit Island incident⁸⁷; or violating air and sea space in the Beagle Channel⁸⁸.

⁸⁶ 'El País' 3 April 1982: 'las naves argentinas no tienen derecho a navegar libremente por aguas del canal de Beagle, que son de jurisdicción chilena' afirmación rechazada de plano por el Gobierno argentino.

⁸⁷ 'El País' 3 April 1982: 'un incidente naval ocurrido en las cercanías de la isla Deceit que protagonizó el barco argentino Gurruchaga, el cual fue conminado a abandonar la zona por naves de Chile, intimidación que no acató el buque patrullero'.

⁸⁸ 'El País' 3 April 1982: 'portavoces oficiales de Chile denunciaron más tarde alrededor de 250 violaciones de los espacios marítimos y aéreos de la región en disputa'.

The responsibility for the possible failure of the Pope's attempts at mediation is placed fairly and squarely at Argentina's door - 'la mediación pontificia, dificultada en los últimos tiempos por las dilaciones y cabildeos por parte de Argentina' (p.5).

Argentina's credibility at the negotiating table is called into question as she is seen to repeatedly defy the dictates of international law and diplomatic convention: 'Argentina, que ve seriamente comprometida su imagen, la cual se degradaría si, después de haber rechazado el laudo de la corona británica, que designó cinco jueces del Tribunal Internacional de la Haya para arbitrar el conflicto, no aceptase ahora tampoco el fallo de la máxima autoridad de la Iglesia católica' (p.5).

Throughout the following week, reports confirm widespread rejection of Argentine actions, taken outside the limits of consensus. The British Parliament condemns Argentine aggression and unites in its support of Mrs. Thatcher's declared aim to recover the Islands: 'todo el parlamento está de acuerdo en presentar una postura unitaria' (4 April 1982); the United Nations, by an overwhelming majority 'votaron contra Argentina' (6 April 1982); and on the Falkland Islands, three Islanders interviewed on Argentine television voiced their objections to the invasion: 'Somos británicos por nuestros orígenes, nuestros

antepasados y nuestras tradiciones, y no queremos cambiar de vida' (6 April 1982).

4.2.2.3. 'The Times'

The preferred meaning of 'The Times' newspaper is established on 2 April 1982 when two reports published on that day inform readers of the intense diplomatic activity taking place in the United Nations as tension increases in the Falklands area and Britain faces the threat of an imminent invasion of the Islands.

The significance of the headlines 'UN meets on Falklands invasion fear' and 'UN intervenes in Falklands dispute' (p.1) lies in the fact that particular emphasis is laid on the role of the international community in redirecting a dispute which would appear to be escalating out of control.

It is this international community, through the institution that guarantees the enforcement of the principles of international law laid down by the United Nations Charter and to which each member nation ascribes, that calls upon two of its fellow members to refrain from the threat or use of force and to seek a diplomatic solution to their dispute.

As far as 'The Times' is concerned, the dispute between Britain and Argentina over the Falklands is not a dispute between individual nations⁸⁹, nor is it one which either of the two is empowered to solve unilaterally, but diplomatically through international fora⁹⁰.

It is one in which, as members of the international community, both countries are bound to express and resolve their grievances through the channels made available to them within the framework, and according to the dictates, of international consensus. Condemnation is consequent upon actions taken outside the limits of what is agreed to be acceptable behaviour⁹¹, as are punitive measures designed to correct deviant behaviour⁹².

Reports on events in the Falklands on 3 April 1982, the day after the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, both confirm and

⁸⁹ 'La Vanguardia' 3 April 1982, however, quotes Eduardo Roca, Argentina's ambassador to the UN as saying: 'el conflicto...como pretende la Gran Bretaña no se ha planteado entre los Malvinos y los Argentinos sino entre Londres y Buenos Aires'.

⁹⁰ Sir Humphrey Atkins: 'We have responded in the appropriate way, by taking the matter to the United Nations'. The Spanish Government's statement published in 'La Vanguardia' and 'El País' 3 April 1982 supports this.

⁹¹ UN Resolution 502 demands the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falklands as a first step to negotiating a peaceful solution to the dispute.

⁹² Diplomatic relations were cut off with Argentina, assets in Britain were frozen, credits stopped, an arms embargo and a ban on imports to Europe were imposed.

reinforce the significance of the role assigned to diplomacy and the principles of international law and order in the search for a peaceful solution to the dispute.

The day's reporting begins and ends with information on how the British Government is taking, and has taken, the necessary military and diplomatic moves to deal with the situation, through the proper channels and in accordance with internationally accepted codes of conduct⁹³.

On confirmation of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, therefore, priority position is given to the news, on page 1, that 'Carrington expels Argentine envoys' and 'British fleet ready for Falklands'. These measures are both appropriate and necessary within the context of a consensual model, the first, condemning behaviour that is deemed to be unacceptable, the second, supporting the principle of legitimate self-defence in the face of wanton aggression.

Britain's willingness to act in accordance with generally agreed codes of conduct contrasts with Argentina's rejection of diplomatic channels to solve the dispute between the two countries. Thus, President Reagan is reported to have had an

⁹³ See 'British fleet ready for Falklands' (p.1) and 'Necessary military and diplomatic moves are being made' (p.3).

hour-long conversation with General Galtieri before news of the invasion is confirmed, urging the exercise of restraint - but to no avail⁹⁴. Similarly, as a result of Britain's request for United Nations intervention in the dispute the night before the invasion, the Security Council calls upon both Argentina and Britain to refrain from the threat or use of force, urging both parties to seek a diplomatic solution to their dispute. However, while Britain agrees to do so, the Argentine representative gives no such commitment⁹⁵.

Indeed, the juxtaposition of 'Britain would take heed of the appeal but the Argentine representative would give no such commitment' and 'A few hours later the Argentine media began reporting the Argentinian landing' (p.1) emphasises the fact that Argentina deliberately and knowingly rejects the options open to her to find a diplomatic solution to the dispute.

Any thought that Argentinians might have any misgivings over the way in which the Malvinas have been recovered are rapidly dispelled as wholehearted support is pledged to the government by Carlos Contín, leader of the Radical Party in Argentina,

⁹⁴ 'La Vanguardia' 3 April 1982 quotes President Reagan as saying at midday 2 April 1982: 'hice todo lo que era posible pero creo que es demasiado tarde porque me dicen que ya han desembarcado'.

⁹⁵ Fns. 40 and 41.

'beyond any discrepancies we may have over the measures taken'⁹⁶.

Argentina's actions, because they do not come within what is generally agreed to be acceptable behaviour, are considered to be deviant - not only in the present crisis but throughout the 10-year dispute with Britain over the Falkland Islands and its dependencies.

A long history of aggressivity, 'Bellicose gestures over 150 years' (p.3) and expansionist tendencies, 'Argentina's other claims' (p.3) is attributed to Argentina, when bellicose statements and threats to take the Islands by force have been used 'more than once'.

It is in the last news item concerning the Falklands on 3 April 1982, 'Parliament April 2 1982 - Necessary military and diplomatic moves are being made' (p.3), that statements made by Sir Humphrey Atkins, Lord Privy Seal and principal spokesman for the Foreign Office in the Commons, both confirm and reinforce what effectively constitutes the discursive end established by 'The Times', i.e., that Britain is going to take

⁹⁶ Contin would here appear to be spokesman for politicians and trade unions alike who unanimously acclaimed the recovery of the islands for Argentina.

the necessary steps to defend her territories, as is her right according to international law.

The significance of his statements is multiplied up, not only by the fact that they contain information which is already familiar to readers through their reading of earlier newspaper reports⁹⁷, but also because they are made by a person of authority - full details of the political office held by Mr. Atkins enhance the importance of his position - to members of Parliament, in the House. This confers particular significance upon them since parliamentary tradition has it that Ministers are expected to tell the truth - to mislead the House is motive for resignation⁹⁸. The position of the article, as last in a series published on the same day and in the carry-over position (when the discursive end is carried over in the mind of the

⁹⁷ No differentiation is made in the reader's mind between reports that have been read 'earlier on' in real time (April 2) and 'earlier on' (referring to position - at the beginning of the day's paper). Thus, the information that readers bring to mind on reading Mr. Atkin's statements is from reports appearing in 'The Times' on April 2 - such as the account of Sir Anthony Parson's appeal to the Security Council to discuss the worsening situation in the Falklands area, or the appeals made by the United Nations Secretary General and the President of the Security Council to both Governments to find a diplomatic solution to their dispute - or from reports appearing on page 1, April 3 - President Reagan's appeal to General Galtieri and yet another reference to Sir Anthony's appeal to the Security Council. In terms of real time, Mr. Atkin's words cannot possibly refer to the conversation between President Reagan and General Galtieri because the event took place 24 hours later, although in a time-less context this event, the same as the others, is yet one more instance of the absence of Argentine response to appeals for restraint.

⁹⁸ 'The Sunday Times' 4 April 1982: "I very much regret that I inadvertently misled the House". There were some cries of 'resign' at the end of his short statement".

reader - in this case from one day to the next) ensures that this information is effectively carried forward to make sense of events in the future.

Mr. Atkins states that: 'the Government was taking appropriate military and diplomatic measures to sustain United Kingdom rights under international law and in accordance with the United Nations Charter;

that: 'Britain had sought an emergency meeting of the Security Council and had immediately associated itself with a request from the President of the Security Council that both countries should exercise restraint and refrain from the use or threat of force, but continue the search for a diplomatic solution. There had been no Argentine response nor had the Argentine President responded to the many appeals made to him to draw back from the use of force';

that: 'we (the Government) have responded in the appropriate way, by taking the matter to the United Nations where we have support';

and that: 'the ambassador has been in negotiation with the Argentine Government during the last few weeks but they have rejected every suggestion we have put forward for solving this

matter or taking it forward by diplomatic means'.

The appropriateness of Britain's recourse to the United Nations and of her attempts to find a solution to the dispute within the framework of international law and the United Nations Charter, as well as her willingness to pursue the peaceful solution of the dispute, are, thus, emphasized and contrasted with the repeated refusals of Argentina to respond either to appeals against the use of force or to suggestions for solving the dispute through diplomatic channels.

Reporting through the rest of the week substantiates this discursive end. It begins with reports in 'The Sunday Times', of the United Nations vote (10-1) in support of Britain's resolution demanding immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands, and of Mrs. Thatcher's speech during the emergency sitting of the House of Commons when she assured MPs of commitment to the Islands and the principle of self-determination⁹⁹ in the face of the 'unprovoked aggression by the government of Argentina against British territory. It has not a shred of justification and not a scrap of legality' ('The

⁹⁹ 'It is the government's objective to see that the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment' since the people of the Falkland Islands 'have a right to live in peace and to determine their own allegiance'.

Sunday Times' 4 April 1982).

Since Argentina continues to reject any peaceful solution to the dispute¹⁰⁰, military moves such as the dispatch of the naval task force, the possible sinking of ships and the storming of the islands are seen to be justified and necessary if the government's obligation to defend the rights of the islanders is to be fulfilled: 'We have to recover those islands. We have to what is necessary to recover those islands' ('The Times' 6 April 1982)¹⁰¹.

'What is necessary'¹⁰², of course, refers not just to military but also to diplomatic moves to find a solution to the situation, and repeated reference is made to Britain's desire to negotiate a peaceful solution despite the fact that 'the chances of success are small' (5 April 1982); there is 'little hope' (6 April 1982) or 'hopes were not high' (7 April 1982).

¹⁰⁰ 'The Times' 5 April 1982: 'If the Argentine people are attacked by air, sea or land the nation in arms will go to battle... We will not withdraw from Argentinian territory. Argentina will maintain its freedom to protect the nation's interest and honour, it will not be negotiated'.

¹⁰¹ The justification of Britain's actions in terms of the Government's obligation to defend its citizens contrasts with the interpretation made by 'La Vanguardia' 6 April 1982 in which they are seen to be measures taken in desperation by a government fighting for political survival.

¹⁰² The word 'necessary' brings to mind the headlines of the report on the debate in Parliament 2 April 1982: 'Necessary military and diplomatic moves are being made' ('The Times', 3 April 1982).

Despite this lack of optimism, the article, 'International law would favour the British argument' (7 April 1982), serves to reinforce the legitimacy of Britain's position in readers' minds.

4.2.2.4. 'The Guardian'

The preferred meaning given to events by 'The Guardian' differs from that of the other three newspapers in that it focuses on the Government's handling of the Falklands crisis from a national, rather than an international, point of view, appraising the appropriateness or otherwise of Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence policies in dealing with the dispute with Argentina over sovereignty in the Falklands.

On 2 April 1982, after reporting Argentine officials' veiled threats on the possibility of solving the dispute with Britain 'in one way or another by this weekend', and the Argentine Foreign Minister's warnings that reported British naval movements had "worsened" the situation', the Foreign Office's handling of affairs with Argentina is implicitly queried. First, it is reported to have refused to connect events in South Georgia with the illegal occupation of Southern Thule - where 'fifty members of the Argentina armed forces are

operating what they describe as "a scientific station"¹⁰³; and, second, as the Director of the Falklands Office in London claims 'the Government does not yet seem to realize the urgency of the issue (the dispute over sovereignty over the Falkland Islands) and the risk of invasion by Argentina is still seen to be strong'.

When the news breaks, on April 3, of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, the news is not included in the section dealing with 'Overseas News', where we might expect it to be, but in the 'Home News' section.

Front-page coverage is given, not to details of the invasion, but to the effects of the invasion on London (seat of the British Government), the Cabinet, and members of Parliament. Lord Carrington, Foreign Secretary, and John Nott, Secretary for Defence, are individually mentioned as the Ministers accountable to the nation for the events that have occurred.

The Government is in disarray - 'London left in confusion - the Cabinet is incapable of reacting - 'Argentine action stuns Cabinet' - while the Ministers responsible are called to answer

¹⁰³ The South Sandwich Islands were discovered by Captain Cook in 1775. The Argentinians landed on Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands in 1976. Britain protested the occupation at the time.

for the frustration felt by representatives of the nation at having to stand by helplessly watching the Islands being taken from under their noses - 'Carrington and Nott face humiliation and fury' (p.1).

Criticism is leveled at the Government's defence policy¹⁰⁴, Government intelligence¹⁰⁵, and Government indecision¹⁰⁶, that are all seen to have contributed to 'the irony of a government elected to strengthen its defence posture finding itself in this position' (p.1).

This essentially negative view of Government activities is

¹⁰⁴ The Government had given priority to the Trident programme (the development of Britain's own nuclear strike force) to the detriment of the Navy's need for surface ships, many of which were to be scrapped within a Government programme of cuts in defence expenditure (Defence White Paper in June 1981). Within this programme, the Government included the imminent withdrawal of HMS Endurance, the ice-patrol ship stationed in the Falklands area (planned for April 1982). The decision to withdraw the Endurance, it was believed, gave Argentina the wrong impression over the strength of Britain's commitment to the Islands. See Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, op.cit., p. 10.

¹⁰⁵ According to 'The Guardian' this was evidenced by the belated confirmation of the invasion 'which had apparently eluded ministers - though not the world's media, American intelligence, or radio hams'. For the reasons why the Government was caught unprepared, see Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, op. cit., pp. 86-90.

¹⁰⁶ In answer to a suggestion that the discrete stationing of a naval force in the area might have led Argentina to back down as in a previous incident in 1977 (see also 'El País' April 3 1982), Mr. Nott said that the arrival of the scrap merchants - '12 people with a valid salvage licence' - on South Georgia was not sufficient reason in itself for sending a task force. (This should be contrasted with complaints over the Government's interpretation of the situation in 'The Guardian' 2 April). Lord Carrington also insisted that military manoeuvres might have produced the very excuse for military action that the Argentinians wanted (see Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, op.cit. p.93).

further reinforced by the headline, also on the front page: 'Britain fails to get UN action'. In fact this headline misrepresents the contents of the news item as 'action' is later qualified in the report as 'swift' action, not 'no' action which is implied. Furthermore, contrary to what one would expect, the article does not deal with UN action but rather with America's position in the conflict. These elements support the negative discourse established, while more positive reports of support for the British Government's position are not given prominence of position on the page (the US formally appeals to Argentina to withdraw its troops from the Islands, and the EEC condemns Argentina's armed seizure of the islands). These are, therefore, further indications of a newspaper line characterised by a negative attitude towards Government policy.

Repeated reference is made to the negative aspects of the Government's decision to prepare a naval task force to be sent to the Falklands despite the fact that there was much support for the decision and to the problems involved in recovering control of the Islands: 'this is nothing to the military problem of recovering control from an invasion force said to comprise several thousand Argentinian troops and a powerful squadron of supporting warships'; 'any makeshift pre-emptive squadron, designed primarily to show the flag and deter, is totally different from the full-scale task force with air and

logistic support which would be needed to take on the Argentinians now that they are established and with the advantage of being only hundreds, rather than thousands of miles from their air and naval bases'(3 April 1982)¹⁰⁷. 'The Ministry of Defence may well', it is suggested, 'advise Mrs. Thatcher that a confrontation cannot be contemplated with any confidence' (p.1).

Repeated insistence, too, is laid on the economic cost of such a venture. On 3 April 1982, the last news item on the Falklands, 'Islands' assets', in the carry-over position, draws attention to the fact that not only is the Islands' contribution to Britain's balance of payments modest, but large sums of money are required to complete development programmes begun there, while services such as domestic gas, petrol and airline services are provided by Argentina. Implicit is the question of whether or not the returns expected warrant the expense of sending a task force to the islands and keeping it there. The article 'Foreign Office has no heart for fight over "relic"' (5 April 1982) provides the answer. According to 'The Guardian': 'the Foreign Office is desperate to settle for once and for all disputes over outposts linked to Britain's colonial

¹⁰⁷ See 'Argentina prepares to reinforce its island troops'(6 April 1982); 'Argentina considers islands impregnable'(7 April 1982).

past'¹⁰⁸.

As self-appointed spokesman for the British people, 'The Guardian' underlines the fact that: 'The hope of the British, desperately anxious to avoid the risks and costs of military action...is that naval action, and certainly any attempt at a landing on the islands may be unnecessary if even the beginning of guidelines for a diplomatic solution can be agreed' (5 April 1982).

Coinciding with the news of the resignation of Lord Carrington and John Nott and increased American involvement in diplomatic activities aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the dispute, the negative attitude shown by 'The Guardian' towards the British Government's decision to use force to recover the islands is balanced by a positive attitude to American mediation in the dispute in an attempt to reach a compromise, 'to be achieved through a combination of British military threat and American political pressure' (6 April 1982).

The preferred reading of events in 'The Guardian', 2-7 April

¹⁰⁸ Other articles through the rest of the week highlight the effects of the crisis on the economy, the cost of defending the Falklands, and the potential value of Island oil fields: '2.6 bn off shares as pound slumps'; 'Cost of sending Navy could reach 50 million'; 'Doubt remains over oil reserves' (6 April 1982); 'Shares are hit by crisis nerves' (7 April 1982).

1982, is, therefore, one characterised by a persistently negative attitude toward British Government policy. This attitude does not change, despite intense activity by the Government to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis - the express desire of 'The Guardian'. This is because any possible diplomatic solution is viewed as the probable outcome of a compromise between British military threat (negative) and American political pressure (positive).

4.3. Meaning

4.3.1. Changes in meaning as a result of omission

Meaning in discourse is not only determined by what is present but also by what is absent, not selected. Usually, what is discursively repressed in an article is never seen by the public. The process of selection/omission, it should be remembered, is determined by the orientation given to the subject by the reporter, the public s/he is catering for, and editors' inclusion criteria as papers go to press (space, etc.).

4.3.1.1. Anglo-Argentine relations over 150 years

A comparison of the history of negotiations between the United Kingdom and Argentina prior to the taking of the Falklands on

2 April 1982, as published in 'The Times' ('Bellicose gestures over 150 years') and 'La Vanguardia' ('Una larga guerra política y diplomática') shows how the absence of certain information affects the meaning of a text.

The articles in question appeared in 'The Times' and 'La Vanguardia' on Saturday, 3 April 1982. Both begin their account of the run-up to the events of 2 April 1982 in September 1964 and both end in February 1982. Of all the dates mentioned in the two articles (a total of 17), only five are common to both - September 1964; September 1966; January 1976; February 1977; and February 1982. Nine dates considered relevant by 'La Vanguardia' were excluded in 'The Times', three of those cited by 'The Times' were not included in 'La Vanguardia'.

The information excluded from 'La Vanguardia' referred to the crashlanding of a pilot and two journalists near Port Stanley; Argentina's lifting of a ban on direct communications with the Falklands; the signing of a communications agreement in 1971 and trade and fuel supply pacts in 1974; and a propaganda campaign for the invasion of the Falklands in a local newspaper in 1974.

The information excluded from 'The Times' referred to the UN resolution (1971) requiring Great Britain and Argentina to find

a solution to the problem of the Falklands; the UN resolution (1973) requiring the British government to 'proceder sin demora a poner fin a una situación colonial'; Britain's calling off of talks in 1975, reaffirming its sovereignty over the Falklands and its rights to the exploitation of oil fields in the area; Argentina's insistence at the Interparliamentary Congress (1975) on its rights over the Islands, referring to British presence on the Islands as 'un acto de piratería' (September 1975); bilateral conversations between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1965, 1968, 1978 and 1979; the rejection of British government proposals for a solution to the problem of the Falklands (rejected by the Islanders themselves); and the postponing of talks scheduled for December 1981.

To determine the effect of the absence of certain information on the meaning of a text, the information found in the 'The Times' article was added to that in the article published in 'La Vanguardia'. There was in fact no change in the meaning of the Spanish text. This is because 'La Vanguardia' makes sense of the events of 2 April 1982 in the light of the prolonged 'war of diplomacy' waged by the two countries over the Falklands.

It repeatedly refers to 'conversaciones', 'negociaciones', 'reuniones bilaterales', 'contactos bilaterales', 'consejos',

'contactos', 'avances'; the insistence of international bodies for a rapid solution to be found to the problem; and the British government's reluctance to do so. The whole run-up to the crisis is understood in terms of 'el carácter bilateral de las negociaciones de acuerdo con lo resuelto por la Asamblea General de la ONU' with the Argentine government pursuing its claim to sovereignty over the Falklands through the official channels open to it, from within the bounds of legitimacy. None of the additional information in any way affects this understanding of the situation.

If, on the other hand, the information found in 'La Vanguardia' is incorporated into 'The Times' article, the whole meaning of the article is changed. This is because 'The Times' makes sense of the run-up to 2 April 1982 in terms of repeated 'bellicose gestures'. Prefaced by an account of the Shackleton incident in February 1976, terms of violence and conflict abound as the Argentine government, Argentine subjects, authorities and nationalists alike, are seen to be repeatedly operating from outside the boundaries of legitimate authority.

Only brief mention is made of the government's willingness to lift the ban on direct communications with the Falkland Islands, the signing of the communications agreement and trade and fuel pacts. Otherwise the country (personalised), and

its people, are referred to as agents of violent actions - 'threatened', 'take by force', 'shadowing', 'fired shots', 'attacked', 'smashed', 'damaged', 'hijacked', 'crashed', 'angered', 'protested'- which, because they violate the established tenets of social order inevitably legitimate a coercive reaction by the community.

The inclusion of the information provided by 'La Vanguardia', which presents the Argentinians as a people working within the boundaries of legitimacy, would confuse matters to such an extent that the reader would no longer be able to make sense of events. Were the Argentinians working inside or outside the boundaries of legitimacy? They could not do both.

The exclusion of the information made available to Spanish readers ensures that the orientation 'The Times' wishes to give events is clear - readers should understand the April 2 crisis in terms of recurrent deviant behaviour on the part of the Argentinians thus legitimating a coercive reaction on the part of the international community to what constitutes the latest in a series of transgressions of the established order.

4.3.1.2. Recovery of the Islands

A further interesting example of the effect on meaning of the

filtering out of information is the accessing of voices out of context. By suppressing information on the context in which voices are accessed, these are effectively emptied of their original meaning. Using them again in any other context endows them with a completely different meaning from the original.

During the emergency sitting of Parliament to discuss the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence, said 'that he would not hesitate to order the sinking of Argentine ships or the storming of the islands' ('The Times' 5 April 1982). Within the context of the Government's commitment to the Islanders, to doing everything it could to restore British sovereignty to the Falklands after the Argentine invasion, to freeing the islanders and upholding their right to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance, these words were testimony to the lengths to which the Government was prepared to go to fulfil the commitment it had undertaken to defend the rights of its people against the invaders¹⁰⁹.

'La Vanguardia' 6 April 1982 quotes the same words: 'Gran Bretaña está dispuesta a hundir buques argentinos y tomar por asalto las Malvinas'. However, instead of quoting them within

¹⁰⁹ See also 'The Guardian' 5 April 1982.

their original context 'the Government...repeated its promise to free them (the Islanders) from Argentine occupation', they come at the end of a discussion of the political consequences for the Conservative government of the invasion, the first of which is the resignation of Lord Carrington.

Vehement criticism of the Government and calls for the resignation of those responsible for allowing the invasion to occur leads the reporter to suggest that this bodes ill, warns that the Government may do something rash to ensure its political survival and, to prove his point, takes as an example John Nott's words:

Hay que temer...un gobierno que lucha por su supervivencia. Como botón de muestra, ahí están las manifestaciones efectuadas por el atribulado Ministro de Defensa, Nott, en el sentido de que Gran Bretaña está dispuesta a hundir buques argentinos y tomar por asalto las Malvinas ('La Vanguardia' 6 April 1982).

By suppressing the context within which John Nott originally said his words, they no longer constitute the recognition of Britain's responsibility towards its citizens and a pledge to honour its commitment, come what may, but instead are indicative of rash, irresponsible behaviour on the part of the

indicative of rash, irresponsible behaviour on the part of the Minister in response to criticism.

4.3.1.3. The Islanders' wishes

It is the reporting of the emergency debate, 3 April 1982, considered to be historic because it was the first sitting to be held on a Saturday since the Suez crisis, that provides the most interesting example of the effects of omission on the meaning of a text and one of particular significance in the development of this thesis. Omission can be seen not only to affect the meaning of a text, but if a sufficiently large part of the text is omitted, a completely different reality may be represented.

A study of the reporting of the debate, held two days after the Argentine invasion of the Falklands and called both to inform members of the House of events and to account for the unpreparedness of the Government for the attack, shows that both 'The Times' and 'The Guardian' coincide in reporting virtually all points included in Mrs. Thatcher's speech although, inevitably, some points are given slightly more relevance than others, depending upon their significance within the discourse established by each newspaper.

One point highlighted in 'The Times' (mentioned twice) which does not appear in 'The Guardian' is Mrs. Thatcher's invitation to the House to totally condemn 'this unprovoked aggression by the Government of Argentina against British territory. It has not a shred of justification and not a scrap of legality' ('The Times' 4 April 1982).

This omission must to be understood in terms of the fact that, while this particular statement is of significance to the preferred meaning established by 'The Times' (Argentina's actions are illegal), it is not of particular significance to that of 'The Guardian'. The omission in no way alters the significance of the discourse of the debate.

Both newspapers coincide in quoting from Mrs. Thatcher's speech:

The Falkland Islands and their dependencies remain British territory. No aggression and no invasion can change that simple fact. It is the Government's objective to see that the islanders are freed from occupation and returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment ('The Sunday Times' 4 April, p.2; 'The Guardian' 5 April 1982, p.3).

and in reporting her references both to the Islanders' desire to remain British and the Government's commitment to defend their right to determine their allegiance:

We have no doubt about our sovereignty which has been continuous since 1833. Nor have we any doubt about the unequivocal wishes of the Falkland Islanders, who are British in stock and tradition and wish to remain British in their allegiance'. Britain had assured the islanders that there would be no change of sovereignty without their consent ('The Guardian' 5 April 1982 p. 3).

Their way of life is British, their allegiance is to the Crown. The people are few in number but have the right to live in peace, and to determine their own allegiance. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of the government to do everything we can to preserve that right ('The Sunday Times' 4 April 1982 p.2).

They also coincide, in the same report, on quoting the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Michael Foot:

So far they have been betrayed and the responsibility

for that betrayal lies with the government...they are faced with an action of naked aggression carried out in the most shameful and disreputable circumstances. Any guarantee from the invading force ('these occupying forces' - 'The Guardian') is utterly worthless, as worthless as any guarantee by this same Argentine Junta to its own people.

Mr. Enoch Powell:

In the next week or two the house, the nation, and the prime minister herself would learn of what mettle she was (made). (making reference to the Prime Minister's sobriquet as the Iron Lady).

and Mr. Fisher - who suggested that Argentina should be withdrawn from the FIFA World Cup competition to be played at Wembley.

Reports of the debate in 'El País', headlined 'Thatcher reafirma la soberanía británica sobre las islas' (p.3), coincide with 'The Times' and 'The Guardian' in the way the debate is presented.

Quoting Mrs. Thatcher's words reported in 'The Times'

describing the day of the invasion as one of 'rumores y contrarumores', it goes on to report her insistence on the fact that the Falklands 'siguen siendo territorio británico. No hay duda sobre su soberanía' (p.3).

It coincides in quoting Mr. Michael Foot's intervention: 'tras condenar el acto de agresión y el poco respeto de los derechos humanos por parte del gobierno argentino afirmó rotundamente que los habitantes de las Malvinas han sido traicionados. La responsabilidad de esa traición recae en el Gobierno'; Mr. Enoch Powell's: 'tocó el corazón de muchos de los presentes al señalar que "en los próximos días, esta Cámara, el país , y la propia dama(Thatcher) sabrá de que metal está hecha"'; and Mr. Fisher's: 'entre otras propuestas menos serias, como la de excluir a Argentina de la Copa Mundial de Fútbol'.

It also makes reference to Mrs. Thatcher's announcement of the freezing of Argentine assets in Britain in addition to the earlier ban on trade credits, to her telephone conversation with the Governor of the Falkland Islands in Uruguay and to her telephone conversation with President Reagan.

Clearly, there is an attempt by 'El País' to report the debate as fully and as accurately as possible, bearing in mind the interests of the different reading publics.

It is, therefore, noticeable that 'El País' omits any reference to the points in the debate relevant to the question of self-determination. While emphasis is laid by Mrs. Thatcher on the fact that the Islanders wish to be British and that they have every right to have that wish respected, this point is overlooked, as is the fact that Britain is determined to defend this inalienable right to self-determination.

This part of the discourse of the debate, of vital importance in the understanding of Britain's position when attempting to negotiate a solution to the conflict at a later stage, and her determination to resort to a military solution, if this were necessary, is, therefore, completely lost.

The significance of the debate is thus limited for 'El País' readers to a reiteration of Britain's claim to sovereignty, when it is, in fact, a statement of intent made by the British Government not only to defend British territory but also to defend the principle of self-determination in any dispute over sovereignty¹¹⁰.

¹¹⁰ It is curious that the same reporter, however, had a report published the day before, in carry-over position, entitled 'Londres no cederá las islas sin que lo consienta la población'. In the report, information is given on bi-lateral talks between Britain and Argentina and the point is made that any solution adopted will be 'guiado por los deseos de los isleños'. The point is, however, lost as the report concludes that the pressure on the British Government not to give up sovereignty comes from the political parties, not the Islanders. This in fact was not so. The link is not established between self-determination and sovereignty. This may well

'La Vanguardia's reporting of the debate, however, shows how omission can not only change the meaning/significance of a text but, if enough of a text is omitted, it can lead to the construction of a reality, as opposed to the representation of reality, which depends for its significance upon the context provided by the newspaper itself.

In 'La Vanguardia', the April 4 debate is reported in two articles, one front-page article entitled 'Londres: Más de treinta buques de guerra zarparán mañana rumbo a las Malvinas' and in smaller print 'Duros ataques en los Comunes contra el Gobierno, no sólo desde la oposición, sino de los propios diputados conservadores'; and the other, on page 16 of the same edition: 'La Thatcher trata de justificar la falta de previsión de su Gobierno'.

After first informing of the announcement of the preparation of a naval task force to be sent to the Falklands, the first report centres attention on overwhelming criticism of the Government for having failed to prevent the invasion: 'un alud de críticas al Gobierno por su ineficacia', 'la pasividad británica ante la creciente tensión en las Malvinas', 'haber subvalorado las amenazas argentinas', 'culpable de negligencia

be of interest to 'El País' given that the problem of Gibraltar is similar in that Spain claims sovereignty while the people wish to remain British.

en un tema tan sensible como la defensa de las colonias' - hypothesizing about the possibility of calling General Elections. It then goes on to speak of the task force in more detail and again hypothesizes over the possible strategies to be put into effect by the Navy to solve the difficult logistics of attempting to recover the Islands. Brief mention is made of the freezing of Argentine assets in the United Kingdom and of Britain's appeal to the United Nations, for which, 'La Vanguardia' believes, little support will be found.

The second article summarises the debate in the following terms: 'presidido por la impotencia ante la "insolencia" argentina...arropado con una terminología digna de una gran potencia, desprendió por los cuatro costados el anacronismo de una nación relativamente pequeña y aquejada de crisis económica, obligada a defender unas islas situadas a más de once mil kilómetros de distancia. Fue, en suma, un debate de honor malherido, pero - eso sí - un debate digno y a la altura de las magníficas tradiciones democráticas de este país'.

Reference is made once more to the announcement of the preparation of the task force, and details are given of Mrs. Thatcher's justification of the Government's unpreparedness for the invasion, of Mr. Foot's intervention, and that of Mr. Enoch Powell.

At no time is mention made in either of Mrs. Thatcher's commitment to the Falklands or her determination to defend the islanders' rights to self-determination. Neither is any mention made of her reference to the illegality of Argentine action or to Britain's territorial rights over the Islands.

The omission of the basis upon which Britain undertakes her actions (the context), changes the original significance of the announcement of the dispatch of the naval task force (to defend territorial rights and the principle of self-determination in accordance with the dictates of international law embodied in the United Nations Charter). A new significance is acquired - the dispatch of the naval task force takes on shades of 'the beginnings of aggression'.

Indeed, from now on, none of Britain's actions can have the same significance for British readers as 'La Vanguardia' readers. Since the original context (circumstances) within which they were undertaken has gone, it is for 'La Vanguardia' to provide a context within which they will have meaning/significance. This will be determined by the discursive end established by the newspaper at the outset of events.

5. THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (The case of 'La Vanguardia')

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5.1. Constructed and represented reality

Journalists generally resist suggestions that there is any underlying pattern to news production. As already stated, they prefer instead to subscribe to the opinion that their task is 'to give our readers an impartial and well-informed picture of what was really happening'¹¹¹.

If, as the preceding analysis suggests, events in an on-going news-story such as the Falklands crisis are never understood in themselves but rather in terms of what has gone before, and the discursive end established at the outset provides the framework within which these events are to be interpreted, the question arises: can the picture we are being given in the news really be totally 'impartial' and 'well-informed'?

To what extent, in those cases in which events are made sense of in terms of readers' prior knowledge of a subject, and that knowledge has been made available through the reading of press reports (mediated, of course, by reporters and editors) do readers not, in fact, become accomplices to a 'constructed'

¹¹¹ Wilsher et al, 1986, p.xii.

reality in which, at the same time as events are perceived, interpreted and understood in the terms proposed by the press, that same press ensures that news items are provided that will satisfy readers' expectations?

As distinct from the mediation of reality (reporters' representation of reality in terms that are readily understood by readers), the 'construction' of reality involves, on the one hand, the presentation of hypothesis, opinion or rumour in terms akin to those representing reality and, on the other, the conscious shaping of the perspective on events to fit a pre-established framework.

In the first instance, constructed reality coexists naturally alongside represented reality. The verosimilitude of reporters' proposals and their presentation is such that these proposals are accepted as fact. In the second, the acceptance of these proposals is dependent upon their degree of 'fit' with preestablished ideas. Again, verosimilitude and presentation are the key to success since in those cases in which the degree of 'fit' is not good, credibility is strained.

The period of time that lapsed between the departure of the naval task force from Portsmouth, England, and its arrival in the South Atlantic (5-25 April 1982) provides us with a unique

opportunity of seeing how reality is constructed in the news and made acceptable to readers by fulfilling established criteria of meaningfulness, consonance and predictability¹¹².

Characterised, on the one hand, by attempts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Falklands before the task force arrived in the area in dispute and, on the other, by the build-up of forces on the Argentine mainland and on the Falklands in case of an eventual attack, little information was officially made available during this period about what was 'really happening', for reasons of security or confidentiality.

Since hopes for a peaceful settlement of the dispute depended upon the success of Alexander Haig's diplomatic mission during this period, public attention increasingly focused on the possible terms of a negotiated solution to the conflict as a result of mediation by the American government.

Yet, by definition, in this task, 'confidentiality is critical; one of the few weapons available to the mediator is that only he has the full picture of the state of negotiations and he can

¹¹² Galtung and Ruge, op. cit., pp. 62-73.

be selective in his disclosures¹¹³.

Reporters were, therefore, faced with the challenge of providing information on a daily basis about developments in the Falklands crisis when access to hard (objective and impartial) information that would keep readers well-informed about what was really happening was severely restricted¹¹⁴.

Alternative sources of news production were therefore sought after in order to retain public interest in the Falklands until events were finally precipitated. For three long weeks (the time it took for the task force to reach the islands) reporters satisfied the public's desire for information about what was happening in the area, reporting developments in negotiations often on the basis of their interpretation of 'signs' and 'signals', and, of course, 'semantics' - the basis of diplomacy.

¹¹³ Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, op.cit., p. 165; 'La Vanguardia' 9-10 April 1982: (Haig) 'se negó a hacer declaraciones y tampoco había declaración conjunta'; 'La Vanguardia' 13 April 1982: 'manifestó que "aún quedan muchas dificultades sustanciales" pero se negó a entrar en detalles'; 'The Times' 13 April 1982: 'American officials were uncharacteristically silent about the proposals which Mr. Haig was understood to have taken from Buenos Aires to London fearing that leaks to the press at this stage would jeopardize his delicate mission'.

¹¹⁴ Information sources both on the Argentine mainland and on the Islands were controlled by the Junta; Britain's plans for the task force were secret; and Mr. Haig's negotiations were confidential.

The authority with which these interpretations were communicated had much to do with their telling and treatment. Discourse, opinion, rumour or hearsay thus formed the basis of this constructed reality which, moulded and shaped to 'fit' pre-established ideas and concepts, appeared to readers as the continuum of reality as it had hitherto been represented.

5.2. Sources used by 'La Vanguardia'

If news is to be objective and impartial it must be based on hard fact - what is known to be so.

Given the considerations of secrecy and confidentiality mentioned above that were attendant upon the situation in the Falklands before and after the invasion, instead of finding alternative sources of 'hard' news, 'La Vanguardia' resorts to the reporting of 'soft' news based on rumour, leaks, unofficial sources of information:

- (i) Hay rumores en Londres no confirmados de una posible oferta de mediación de los Estados Unidos...A última hora de la tarde, se difundió en esta capital la noticia - no confirmada oficialmente - de que Estados Unidos se ha ofrecido para mediar en la disputa ('La Vanguardia' 1 April 1982).

This 'news' was subsequently confirmed:

El presidente Reagan ha despachado Alexander Haig a Londres y Buenos Aires con la misión de mediar en la crisis de las Malvinas ('La Vanguardia' 8 April 1982).

- (ii) La tirantez entre Gran Bretaña y Argentina subió ayer de temperatura al anunciarse oficialmente que se está preparando una fuerza naval en varias bases de la Royal Navy para dirigirse hacia aquella colonia en el Atlántico Sur...todas las noticias sobre el envío de buques de la Royal Navy al archipiélago no son confirmados ni desmentidos por el Ministerio de Defensa. Se trata de meras filtraciones ('La Vanguardia' 1 April 1982).

This 'news' was confirmed:

Anunciaba la preparación de una importante fuerza naval para acudir a la zona ('La Vanguardia' 3 April 1982).

- (iii) El Gobierno celebró ayer dos reuniones de emergencia antes de que...Lord Carrington anunciara oficialmente poco después de las cinco de la tarde - siete horas después de la rendición de las Malvinas que el

archipiélago había sido invadido. Cuando se registró este anuncio hacia ya rato que los londinenses podían leer las noticias en la prensa de la tarde ('La Vanguardia' 3 April 1982).

That press reports, based on such sources, should have subsequently turned out to be true would seem to validate them over and above official sources which are, by contrast, shown to be unreliable:

(iv) El Foreign Office insiste en que Gran Bretaña quiere una solución pacífica del conflicto. Es más, todas las noticias sobre el envío de buques de la Royal Navy al archipiélago no son confirmados ni desmentidos por el Ministerio de Defensa. Se trata de meras filtraciones. Por este método se tiende a mantener oficialmente una actitud no beligerante ('La Vanguardia' 1 April 1982).

(v) Si el gobierno británico se niega a proporcionar detalles sobre sus próximos pasos en el terreno militar es en aras de mantener sus cartas tapadas el máximo tiempo posible. Sin embargo, anoche la televisión independiente británica mostró imágenes de aviones de transporte de la RAF despegando de

aeropuertos británicos con rumbo no precisado ('La Vanguardia' 3 April 1982).

Whatever the government says, or does not say, is viewed with suspicion and scepticism since, in examples (iii), (iv) and (v) above, inconsistencies are brought to light between reality as the outsider perceives it, and reality as officialdom knows it to be. Moreover, officialdom not only appears to condone but to actively encourage the use of unofficial sources of information for its own purposes - examples (iv), (v).

Once unofficial sources of information - news leaks, hearsay, rumour - have been accorded validity over and above official sources, the road is left wide open for the 'construction' of reality on the basis of 'valid' hypotheses, i.e., hypotheses based on unconfirmed information from diverse unofficial sources that are presented as if they were fact. Each time these hypotheses are confirmed, the validity/truth of unconfirmed extra-official sources, i.e., constructed reality, is reinforced. Should they not be confirmed, they merely drop from public view and disappear from collective memory. The characteristics of news production (a 24-hour cycle and the need for repetition to keep information at the forefront of

readers' minds) facilitate this process¹¹⁵.

There is, therefore, no end to the possibilities afforded by 'leaks', hearsay, rumour, conjecture to validating propositions once official sources, normally understood to represent objective reality, are invalidated. The status of 'objective', 'impartial' reality (the truth?) is accorded to that which the reporter wishes to pass on. Readers are, therefore, one step closer to moving into the world of constructed reality.

5.3. Recall

Given that the role of the press is to 'construct' a cohesive whole out of the fragmented information at its disposal, explaining events in terms of the common knowledge that readers share, while at the same time reminding them of the knowledge upon which the explanations are based, the pre-established ideas and concepts that provide the framework into which constructed reality 'fits' are those same ideas and concepts that determine the discursive end established at the outset of a news-story (the 'preferred reading'). By dint of recall and repetition, they are kept at the forefront of the readers'

¹¹⁵ 'La Vanguardia' 8 April 1982 affirms that 'una de las opciones que Alexander Haig piensa proponer...es convocar una cumbre en Camp David entre la primer ministro Margaret Thatcher y el presidente Galtieri'. This 'opción' is never mentioned again and therefore drops from the public view.

minds.

In 'La Vanguardia' the widespread use of brackets, imperatives, and, ultimately, formulae serves this purpose admirably.

5.3.1. Brackets

Brackets are traditionally used to provide readers of a text with additional information on a subject, thereby contributing to increase their knowledge:

- (i) 'el Ministro de Defensa (Francis Pym) y de Defensa (John Nott)';
- (ii) 'el Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca (Tratado de Río)'.

The following examples from 'La Vanguardia' would appear to serve the same purpose:

- (iii) Los 36 buques de la Royal Navy (incluidos 2 portaviones, destructores, fragatas, submarinos y varios petroleros de apoyo) (8 April, p. 3).

(iv) Las Malvinas (a 11.300 kilómetros de distancia o si se prefiere a más de 15 días de navegación) (8 April, p.3).

Within the context of an on-going news story such as the Falklands crisis this is, in fact, not so. The information included between brackets is not additional information, nor does it contribute to increasing readers' knowledge. It does, in fact, make reference to information that readers already possess, that has been acquired through their reading of earlier news reports, and which reporters wish them to recall, for a purpose.

This purpose is two-fold: by recalling information obtained at a particular point in the past ('prior knowledge'), readers bring to mind not only the information acquired (which in itself means nothing) but also the context within which it was originally produced, and the interpretation it was given (this confers meaning on information).

The more often this same information is referred to in different contexts, the more connotations the signs incorporated acquire. In examples (iii) and (iv), the cumulative build-up of significance through recall, therefore, confers particular significance on the elements placed between brackets.

Thus, '2 portaviones' not only brings to mind the names of the two aircraft carriers referred to ('Invincible' and 'Hermes'), the fact that the 'Invincible' is heading the task force and the 'Hermes' is the largest aircraft carrier in the Navy, etc., but also the newspaper's negation of Britain's ability to continue 'ruling the waves'¹¹⁶: 'Cuando en 1978 la Armada británica dió de baja su último gran portaviones el Ark Royal... firmó su abdicación de gran potencia naval'¹¹⁷ and its reference to her moral and economic bankruptcy: 'De este modo, Gran Bretaña se aprestaría a hacer frente a una humillación en las colonias con un portaviones ya vendido por falta de fondos'¹¹⁸; 'Hay que recordar que la venta del flamante portaviones HMS 'Invincible' a Australia fue concertada hace 3 semanas para reducir los gastos de defensa'¹¹⁹.

'Submarinos' is immediately associated with HMS 'Superb' - 'un submarino a propulsión nuclear' - and the threat and fear of nuclear warfare; the magic figure of '11.300 kilómetros' with the logistic problems inherent in defending the Falklands from

¹¹⁶ 'La Vanguardia' 4 April 1982: 'Britannia rules the waves?'

¹¹⁷ 'La Vanguardia' 4 April 1982.

¹¹⁸ 'La Vanguardia' 3 April 1982.

¹¹⁹ 'La Vanguardia' 4 April 1982.

a distance: 'la principal dificultad para una acción militar en el archipiélago de las Malvinas reside en la lejanía de cualquier base naval británica (la más cercana se halla en la isla de Ascensión)',¹²⁰.

It should not, however, be forgotten that the 'prior knowledge' brought to mind and used by readers to interpret the significance of these signs is not the product of personal experience (common sense knowledge). It is a product of the process of selection and transformation of information used by the press to develop a 'preferred reading' of events (common knowledge - knowledge that is shared by the press and its readers).

By dint of cumulative reinforcement this 'prior knowledge' becomes so familiar to readers that it eventually assumes the category of common sense knowledge, and is used by readers to make their own interpretations of events. When this occurs, readers have effectively moved into the realm of constructed reality - a press-constructed reality which is made to appear credible by appealing to the common knowledge shared by both press and reader.

¹²⁰ 'La Vanguardia' 4 April 1982.

Examples (v) and (vi) show how personal opinion and/or rumour are made credible by appealing to this form of common knowledge. By placing such knowledge between brackets, thereby conferring upon it the condition of additional information, whatever appears immediately before the bracket automatically assumes the category of fact.

(v) Londres estaría dispuesta a suspender la contundente amenaza {una escuadra de 29 buques de la Royal Navy} (13 April, p. 3);

(vi) un rígido bloqueo de los accesos al puerto de Buenos Aires. Es ésta la posibilidad que apuntan con insistencia los expertos británicos en materia militar (los departamentos gubernamentales guardan, como resulta obvio, un escrupuloso silencio al respecto) (8 April, p. 3).

In (v), the Royal Navy task force on its way to the Falklands was certainly a fact. A threat, by definition, is not. Feeling threatened is a subjective state, and exists only in the mind of the beholder. By referring to Britain's 'contundente amenaza' and supplementing information on that 'threat' in terms of 'una escuadra de 29 buques de la Royal Navy' readers equate one with the other and the threat becomes as real as

the task force itself.

In (vi), the fact that secrecy and confidentiality characterized government action during the period of time the task force was heading towards the islands, was a fact. The hypothesis that the task force was to blockade the port of Buenos Aires was certainly not. However, 'prior knowledge' of British actions in the South Atlantic, past and present, based on historical fact¹²¹ and newspaper interpretations¹²², makes this possibility as real as any which, despite lack of official confirmation, eventually turned out to be true¹²³.

The use of brackets in reporting in 'La Vanguardia', therefore, constitutes a highly effective means of leading the reader into

¹²¹ Britain attacked Buenos Aires in 1806 and 1807. 'La Vanguardia' 16 April 1982: 'Fueron las batallas contra Inglaterra en las que Buenos Aires, siendo todavía una colonia española, se levantó en armas para rechazar al invasor'.

¹²² 'La Vanguardia' 2 April 1982: 'durante el gobierno del general Balcarce se produjo la usurpación de las islas Malvinas por Inglaterra...se apoderó del archipiélago...creando una situación de hecho que todavía dura'.

¹²³ 'La Vanguardia' 1 April 1982: 'Las noticias sobre el envío de buques de la Royal Navy al archipiélago no son confirmados ni desmentidos por el Ministro de Defensa. Se trata de meras filtraciones' is subsequently confirmed officially 3 days later: 'Una flota integrada por una treintena de buques de guerra zarpará mañana lunes de Southampton en dirección a las Malvinas. El anuncio fue hecho ayer en la Cámara de los Comunes por la primer ministro, Margaret Thatcher' ('La Vanguardia' 4 April 1982).

the world of constructed reality and, thereafter, of presenting constructed reality in terms that appear totally credible. Traditional sources of popular wisdom are effectively replaced by mediated forms of common knowledge, thereby reinforcing and confirming the interpretation given to events by the newspaper.

5.3.2. Imperatives

Imperatives are much more overt, direct appeals to readers to recall information of interest to the reporter.

(vii) Hay que recordar que la acción de Buenos Aires se ha desencadenado tras el impasse en que se hallaban sus conversaciones con Londres - reanudados en 1977 - para resolver pacíficamente la cuestión de las Malvinas (3 April, p. 4);

(viii) Hay que recordar que la venta del flamante portaviones HMS Invencible a Australia fue concertada hace 3 semanas para reducir los gastos de defensa (4 April, p. 6);

(ix) Hay que recordar que este partido es el que más preocupado está en salvar su imagen y prestigio de la humillación que está estos días sufriendo Gran

Breña (7 April, p. 3);

(x) Hay que recordar por último que una invasión o desembarco en las Malvinas - actualmente una fortísima guarnición de Argentina - colocaría a la población local ante la perspectiva de un trágico baño de sangre (8 April, p. 13);

(xi) Hay que temer, en efecto, que un gobierno que lucha por su supervivencia caiga en alguna exageración en aras de satisfacer a la humillada opinión pública británica (6 April, p. 4).

The use of imperatives, like brackets, reinforces the framework within which constructed reality will naturally take its place. In examples (vii)-(xi), reporters invite readers to recall items of information that form part of their shared common knowledge (made available in earlier newspaper reports).

A closer look at the information on which this knowledge is based, however, reveals an amalgam of fact, opinion, interpretation and hypothesis. In only one of the above examples (viii) is the information brought to mind based on

hard fact¹²⁴. In examples (vii) and (ix), it is based on the newspaper's interpretation of facts; in example (x), on the reporter's interpretation of a hypothetical situation - something which is not even based on fact.

Since a pre-condition of recall is prior knowledge, by exhorting readers to recall interpretations of fact or hypotheses in exactly the same terms as they are asked to recall facts, these interpretations are effectively raised to the status of fact and assimilated into the reader's knowledge as such.

A closer look at example (ix) will show how this occurs. It is clear that, at the point in time when this appeal to recall was made, an invasion of the Falkland Islands, bristling with Argentine defenders, had not taken place. Recall was therefore impossible since no prior knowledge of the objective reality of an invasion carried out in these circumstances could have existed.

In the absence of this prior knowledge based on objective reality, the use of the imperative 'hay que recordar' must necessarily appeal to readers' prior knowledge of the situation

¹²⁴ The 'Invincible' had in fact been sold to Australia within a programme of reductions in the cost of Britain's defence budget.

described, based on some other form of reality. This may be found in earlier newspaper reports. Having read these reports, readers' prior knowledge of the situation, though hypothetical, is absolutely real - 'I read it myself' - so that it can, in fact, and does, become the object of recall.

In so doing, it assumes the status of objective reality - an impossibility in real terms because the invasion has not taken place - and, by extension, fact. This reality - which has effectively been constructed - is assimilated by readers as fact, given its verosimilitude.

Readers' interpretation of the situation based on common sense knowledge coincides in this case with their interpretation of the same situation based on common knowledge. In the event of an invasion of a well-defended island, the death toll would be high. The repeated use of the imperative in the examples given above therefore belies the readers progressive move away from reality (vii) into the realm of constructed reality (xi).

This move away from reality is paralleled, through the recall of the information contained in each item, with the constant reinforcement of the discursive end established by the paper at the outset of the news-story - the press-constructed framework within which future events will be interpreted - why the

Argentiniens were justified in invading the Falklands (vii); why the glorious days of the British Empire can be considered to be over (viii); why the Conservative government should have reacted to the Argentinian invasion the way it did (ix); and why a negotiated solution should be found to the crisis rather than the use of force (x).

Example (xi), a 'look-alike' form, is the natural extension of this tendency as the personal opinion expressed by the reporter is accepted as fact and assimilated into the readers' knowledge as such.

5.3.3. Formulae

By repeating formulae used in the first news items on the subject at the beginning of the Falklands crisis when the preferred reading of events was established, reporters also constantly remind readers of the context within which they were originally used and the framework within which events are to be interpreted. Readers' interest is retained as recognition of these formulae provides a means to identifying items as part of a familiar discourse.

Thus, Argentina's invasion of the Falklands, likened by General Galtieri to previous 'gestas liberadoras' (3 April 1982), is

referred to repeatedly as 'la gesta de las Malvinas' (11 April 1982); 'la gesta histórica de recuperar el territorio nacional' (15 April 1982); 'el país por primera vez en su historia tiene ocasión de llevar a cabo una gesta nacional' (16 April 1982); and is understood in terms of past glories: 'en muchos rincones de esta monumental Buenos Aires las inscripciones recuerdan las gestas nacionales del pasado. Las de 1806 y 1807 se repiten en muchos parques públicos. Fueron las batallas contra Inglaterra en las que Buenos Aires, siendo todavía una colonia española, se levantó en armas para rechazar al invasor. La gesta de la gente de la época...es una de las glorias nacionales' (16 April 1982).

The heroic, epic connotations of these references contrast with the pathos of those associated with 'el viejo león británico'¹²⁵ faced with the humiliation of what is interpreted as its inability to prevent the taking of the islands: 'ha supuesto una humillación para el orgullo nacional británico ... El viejo león británico no puede quedarse con la humillación (esta es la palabra que suena en Londres) de que un país sudamericano le pise la cola' (4 April 1982).

The possibility of Argentina taking on the task force is

¹²⁵ The lion being a symbol closely associated with royalty, the Royal coat-of-arms, and the legendary crusader, Richard the Lion-Heart.

relished, 'con tal de vencer por fin el león inglés' (14 April 1982); 'esta "guerra" emocional patriótica contra el león inglés' (15 April 1982); 'La posibilidad de volver a castigar 'el león inglés' está en la mente...' (16 April 1982).

As far as Britain is concerned, the dispatch of the naval task force is interpreted in terms of: 'una auténtica expedición colonial en pleno siglo XX'; 'la expedición de una gran escuadra' (4 April 1982); 'un conflicto a lo siglo XIX' (8 April 1982).

Britain's 'herido orgullo nacional' is seen to be the driving force behind her sending the naval task force to recover the islands and her desire to negotiate a satisfactory settlement to the dispute: 'el orgullo nacional británico no aguanta la humillación de este "hecho consumado"' (4 April 1982); action is taken 'para satisfacer...el orgullo nacional herido' (4 April 1982); 'levantar otra vez el malherido orgullo británico' (6 April 1982); 'no hay duda de que el orgullo británico ha sido herido en profundidad'; 'sin entrar en consideraciones sobre si la respuesta suscitada por el herido orgullo británico ha sido o no desproporcionada' (14 April 1982); 'Gran Bretaña, aún deseando una solución pacífica que ponga a salvo su herido orgullo nacional, considera fundamental la presión militar' (15 April 1982); 'Para salvar el herido orgullo británico...

necesita... el restablecimiento de la soberanía en la colonia' (17 April 1982). 'Orgullo' and 'honor' would appear to be freely interchangeable 'el malherido honor nacional'; 'un debate de honor malherido' (4 April 1982); un conflicto en el que hay más honor en litigio que otra cosa' (6 April 1982); 'salvar el honor herido de la dama de hierro' (8 April 1982).

Early on the identification of Mrs. Thatcher as 'la dama de hierro' is established¹²⁶, and repeated reference to 'la dama de hierro' is made in situations clearly referring to actions and decisions taken by Mrs. Thatcher, to recover the Islands - 'la dama de hierro lleve adelante su proyecto de recuperar militarmente las islas' (4 April 1982)¹²⁷ not to resign - 'la dama de hierro contestó secamente "No, lo que hace falta ahora es fuerza y resolución"' (6 April 1982); to send the task force to the Falklands 'la firmeza de "la dama de hierro"' (15 April 1982).

The terms 'la primer ministro' or 'Margaret Thatcher', however, are frequently juxtaposed with references to 'futuro político'

¹²⁶ 'La Vanguardia' 4 April 1982, Enoch Powell: 'sostuvo que éste será la ocasión para saber 'de qué metal está hecha la Señora Thatcher' (denominada como se sabe, 'la dama de hierro').

¹²⁷ Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, op. cit., p.170: 'The full cabinet met. Each member was asked by name if he supported this decision, thus binding the Government as a whole'.

thereby reminding readers of the fact that Mrs. Thatcher's political future is dependent upon the outcome of the conflict: 'el futuro político de la primer ministro parece destinado a la muerte repentina' (6 April 1982); 'la primer ministro sigue en peligro y su futuro depende de los acontecimientos' (6 April 1982); 'el futuro político de Margaret Thatcher (ese futuro dependerá del desenlace de la crisis' (15 April 1982); 'La primer ministro...su porvenir al frente del gobierno puede ser puesto en duda' (22 April 1982); 'podría costar a Margaret Thatcher su futuro político' (22 April 1982).

The advantages of the use of these formulae is that they offer conceptual simplicity and memorability. They signify paradigms that can be applied to new 'instances', however remote from the initial referent¹²⁸, and they are an essential factor in unifying discourse.

The above analysis would, therefore, indicate that the construction of reality is dependent upon an open-ended framework in which sources of 'information' are not limited to fact (they may range from rumour to personal opinion). Verosimilitude is achieved through regular reference to the reader's prior knowledge of the subject selected for treatment.

¹²⁸ Fowler, *op. cit.*, p.177.

In those cases in which this prior knowledge is not based on fact, but is common to the newspaper and its readers, repeated recall keeps this common knowledge at the forefront of the reader's mind until it is eventually assimilated as fact. Once this occurs the pre-conditions exist for the construction of a reality based on this common knowledge. It is in fact a reality unique to the newspaper and its readers.