Political Discourse during the European Economic Crisis: Epistemic Stance and Legitimizing Strategies in Greek Political Discourse (2010-2012)

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In appreciation

Abstract

This study presents a multidisciplinary framework for the analysis of evidential meaning in the Greek political discourse during the period of the current European debt crisis, and moving beyond a mere content analysis it sheds light on how political elites position themselves towards the knowledge they communicate, taking also into consideration the several ideological and political aims related with the legitimization of austerity. Our main point is that the construction of evidential meaning is a form of a social act, therefore an approach is developed that enhances the discursive approaches to the Epistemic Stance with a detailed theory of context. Emphasizing the context sensitivity of the expression of evidential meaning, we spell out the various Epistemic Stance types adopted by the political actors across several institutional genres, as well as their legitimizing function, since they enhance the speakers' evidential standing and authority during the struggle for exercising epistemic control over the audience.

Resumen

El presente estudio establece un marco multidisciplinar que pretende analizar el significado evidencial del discurso político griego durante la crisis de la deuda europea; su objetivo, más allá de un mero análisis de contenido, es arrojar luz sobre el modo en que las élites políticas se posicionan en relación con la información que comunican, tomando en consideración también las diversas metas ideológicas y políticas relacionadas con la legitimación de la austeridad. Nuestra afirmación principal es que la construcción del significado evidencial es una forma de acto social; por tanto el estudio se desarrolla según un enfoque que potencia los acercamientos discursivos a posiciones epistémicas, junto con una pormenorizada teoría del contexto. Al señalar la sensibilidad contextual de la expresión del significado evidencial, explicitamos los tipos de posición epistémica que adoptan los actores políticos procedentes de instituciones de diversa índole, además de su función legitimadora, pues potencian la autoridad y el rango evidencial de los que hace gala el hablante a la hora de ganar control epistémico sobre la audiencia.

Preface

This Ph.D. thesis is an original work by Georgios-Alexandros Polymeneas, submitted for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy at the University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. The research described herein was conducted under the supervision of the Professor Teun A. van Dijk in the Department of Translation and Language Sciences. No part of this thesis has been previously published. The purpose of this dissertation is to introduce and demonstrate a (critical) discourse-oriented approach to the analysis of evidential meaning construction along with its ideological implications in the Greek political discourse produced during the historical initial phase of the current sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012).

This dissertation should interest discourse analysts as well as scholars in social sciences whose research interests are related with discourse production and comprehension within the field of politics. It should also be of interest to political parties and organizations, as well as to media professionals and corporations.

Last, this project would not have been completed without the financial support of the Saripoleion Foundation, based in the School of Philosophy at the University of Athens.

It goes without saying that I remain the only person to blame for the content of this study.

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Introduction

1.1. Aims

In the beginning of 2010, a report by the European Commission highlighted the severe irregularities of the Greek Excessive Deficit Procedure Notification (cf. Minsk and de Hann 2013). This serious warning followed several other indications, evidenced since 2008 in different fields of the Greek economy, which made apparent its vulnerable status in a time of the global financial crisis (Petrakis 2011: 276). The EC report triggered a wide debate across the Western world regarding the so-called 'Greek problem', the Greek sovereign debt crisis. Soon it became apparent that Greece could not deal with the skyrocketing figures of fiscal deficit and external debt to GDP ratio without the strong support of the other Eurozone members. It was only four months later, in May 2010, when the Greek Parliament voted for a bailout program, designed and supervised by the so-called 'troika' of ECB, EC and IMF.

The present doctoral project deals with the discursive construction of the dominant, i.e. the governmental, knowledge on the economic crisis within the very recent Greek political context (2010-2012). It pays attention to the analysis of the linguistic expression of evidentiality that, at least semantically, is prototypically concerned with 'the sources of information or sources of knowledge behind assertions' (Dendale & Tasmowski 2001: 340). In order to address the issue of knowledge representation in discourse, we focus on the notion of an epistemic stance, which examines evidential expressions under a pragmatically and interactionally oriented perspective. Within political contexts, it has been argued that expression of a speakers' commitment towards the knowledge they communicate can be seen as a rhetorical device of persuasion and authority construction (Reber 2014; Marín-Arrese 2013). However, an analysis of evidential meaning in political settings should also take into account the critical question of how politicians use these expressions as forms of manipulation at the multiple levels of a given context (Hart 2011; Berlin & Prieto-Mendoza 2014: 391).

In addition, the study explains how evidential meaning serves as a legitimizing means of dominant discourses. Any type of linguistic device that contributes to the discursive realization of epistemic meaning is related with legitimization strategies as

it marks the base of knowledge on which a speaker conveys information. Speakers legitimize their assertions by linguistically coding a certain stance towards the epistemic status of the information that they represent in their discourses. As has been pointed out (Hart 2010), legitimization strategies contribute indirectly to audience coercion and manipulation – with obvious political implications.

In general, crises are constituted in discourse (Hay 1996), while the 'Greek case' in particular has already attracted the attention of discourse scholars (see collective works edited by Wodak & Angouri 2014, Hatzidaki & Goutsos 2017). The period under investigation (2010-2012) features cataclysmic developments as well as intense social changes that dramatically altered the life of the country's middle class. Under the term "crisis" is labeled a series of events and processes, varying from election campaign rallies and anti-power movements (Martin-Rojo 2016) to parliamentary debates and specific austerity policies.

Conceiving politics as a realm that cannot exist without language use, it goes without saying that the study of discourse in such periods gains in importance. Crises are triggered by discourse, but at the same time they trigger discourse. In particular, crises can be understood as both the product and cause of manifold debates in public sphere that they result to multilevel polarized discourses (Boukala 2014; Hatzidaki 2017) and more particularly are enacted in various settings, mostly formal, but also in daily ones (a thorough overview of the discourses of the Greek crisis is provided in Hatzidaki & Goutsos 2017: 13-29).

Despite the growing interest for the discourses in/of the Greek crisis, Hatzidaki & Goutsos (2017: 4) point out that there is a limitation in terms of research scope, since the vast majority of the existing relevant scholarly literature a) provides useful insights mostly on how "outsiders" (foreign Press, foreign political actors etc. talk and write about the Greek crisis; b) is content-oriented, as it is mostly conducted in the field of political science and communication, so linguistic nuances are largely overlooked, and c) is less attracted by discourses of policy makers compared to discourses derived from Mass Media. The present study broadens the discussion in all three points mentioned above as it provides an insight account how the Greek optician construct their discourse of the crisis and it emphasizes the discursive realization of their stance towards the knowledge they communicate.

At this point a remark should be made. Just as elite discourses in crisis extend over a variety of genres, likely political discourse in general also consists of a class of genres and is defined not by its linguistic features, but its contextual ones: who speaks, to whom, under which conditions, for what purposes and goals. Although politicians speak differently about crisis on different occasions, it is vital to focus on the common elements of the various discursive representations.

So far we have seen the relation between a specific historical context and discourse produced within this context. However, a cognitive interface is needed, especially when it comes to the issues of the construction of (political) knowledge in text and talk. As discourse and society are not directly connected, the interface mediates their relationship. The discursive and societal structures differ and no causal relationship can be applied for their analysis. Accordingly, this gap is bridged by focusing on the cognitive dimensions of discourse interaction. The speakers/hearers construct mental models in which they represent and adapt the various elements of any given communicative situation. These models are later expressed and shared through discourse. Nevertheless, the individuality of discourse production/comprehension is interconnected with social dimensions, as it is not only based on mental representations, but also takes place in socially situated interactions (van Dijk 2014). The cognitive interface can, therefore, reveal how the discourse processing is working and how the speakers/hearers talk and think within communicative situations.

This is of great importance for political settings, because political agents are constantly appealing to their recipients' knowledge and on this basis represent their attitudes towards knowledge. Much of political action is nothing but an attempt to transform (political) groups' beliefs and attitudes into knowledge, i.e. shared 'factual' beliefs, commonly accepted, with little or no need for justification. In this respect, what is part of shared knowledge can be presupposed in discourse. Political agents try to designate the mental models (and subsequently the context models) of their audience in such a way that the evaluative and less commonly shared attitudes become part of shared group knowledge (van Dijk 2008b, 170). In other words, they try to manipulate the context models of their audience, legitimizing their attitudes as 'factual' and 'objective'.

A critical approach to discourse and political knowledge takes into account the issues of power, abuse and domination. More particularly, it sees discourse as a means of manipulation and examines how knowledge representations in discourse are formulated and implied in text and talk (van Dijk 2010) and their relation with institutions of power, such as parliament, media organizations etc.. The point is that political elites manipulate citizens both on the macro and micro level. On the macro level, they want to establish their knowledge on and legitimize their interpretation for crisis, whereas on the micro level they want to achieve particular goals (for example winning a voting session for a crucial act) depending on the nature of each communicative situation.

The above discussion can be summarized to the following research aims:

As the central issue of the study is to examine how Greek political actors position themselves towards the knowledge they communicate about the crisis, a "triangular" model of analysis must be adopted. Following the socio-cognitive approach to the critical study of discourse, three interconnected aspects are taken into consideration: The discursive aspect focuses on the realization of various types of epistemic stances, and in particular their relation with the domain of evidentiality; the social aspect focuses on the specific financial policies adopted, which reproduce social and economic inequalities, and more importantly how these policies are legitimized in the discourse produced by the political actors; and the mediating cognitive aspect focuses on how participants' political context models are constructed and manage discourse production/comprehension with respect to austerity policies legitimization.

Given all the above:

The main objective of the proposed study is to explore and thoroughly analyze the realization of various types of the Epistemic Stance (Mushin 2001; Marín-Arrese 2011a; 2013; 2015a; 2015b), in different genres but within the same political context, and then to examine the relationship between the discursive expression Epistemic Stance and its legitimizing function, i.e how the linguistic resources of the Epistemic Stance activate the process by which the speakers offer epistemic guarantees for the truth and validity of their assertions in various forms of evidence (Hart 2011).

The objective further entails:

➢ Elaboration of a model of Epistemic Stance so as to efficiently describe and explain what is observed in Modern Greek and especially in Greek political discourse from which the data of the study are derived. As far as I am aware, there is no discursive approach to the issue in the relevant Greek literature.

➢ Analysis of political and historical context of the period under study.

➢ Analysis of the construction of a political context model within which the discourse production and comprehension take place. The theory of context should inform the model ES. In this respect, questions are raised such as: Which aspects of knowledge are parts of the context models created by the political actors? Which aspects of knowledge are highlighted or marginalized in different communicative situations (or in different political periods) and why?

Last but not least, the study proposed here is a problem-oriented study and sees the Greek economic crisis and austerity as political and economic problems seeking to strengthen the resistance of vulnerable social groups against political and economic elites.

The rest of the chapter develops as follows: The coming section provides an overview of the interplay between knowledge, politics and political cognition, while in 1.3. we examine how knowledge expression and distribution is a vital part of economic crises in general. In 1.4 we focus on the expression of evidentiality, the linguistic component of the study, whereas in 1.5. we provide a brief overview of legitimization process and how is related with institutionalized settings. The section 1.6. provides the historical and political context of the Greek crisis. After taking the discussion in precedent sections into consideration, we formulate the research hypothesis of the study (1.7.). Last, in 1.8. is presented the outline of the thesis.

1.2. Politics, Political Cognition and Knowledge

A study in political discourse needs, of course, to define to some extent what is political and how it is related with discourse. Politics can be approached in two ways: First, as a struggle for power, domination and resistance. Secondly, as a form of co-operation, through the resolution of interest clashes. An additional distinction can be

made between institutional politics and "everyday" politics (Chilton & Schäffner 2002: 6). The latter refers to everyday conflicts –say between a parent and a child-, whereas the former is confined with institutional politics – parliamentary debates, party conference speeches, political interviews etc. The study proposed here deals with the institutional dimension of politics.

Hay offers fourteen definitions of politics (2007: 61-62), but as he points out all of them share four features: choice (politics as choice); capacity for agency; deliberation; and social interaction. What is entailed by this common basis is that talking about politics is about making choices, which are dependent upon decision (deliberation) and strategies (agency) and they are realized within a complex system of controversial interests. Similarly, in their summary of the discussion about the importance of decision-making in measuring power, Garner et al. (2012: 55-58) pose several questions regarding the underlying values of decisions; the process through which decisions are made; and the power resources of decision makers. Hence, politics is about decision making and about taking specific action and finding solutions.

Taking the above into account, it can be argued that politics have an inherent deliberative nature, as any political actor has to weight his options and decide which is better for him/her self, given the certain –each time- circumstances. It goes without saying that deliberative also means argumentative. However, this might be a quite "idealistic" view of politics. As Hay (2007: 69) puts it: "to associate politics with deliberation is neither to endorse all activity which falls under that rubric, nor to commit ourselves to taking the legitimating rhetoric of formal politics at face value". For instance, when the Prime Minister addresses to the Parliament about the necessity of voting for the memorandum agreement it is not quite evident that he wants to convince his party members or gain the consensus of the opposition parties members. Besides, political parties are institutions "equipped" with so many and so intensive internal mechanisms of control, especially when it comes to crucial issues, such as voting for an important act. Well structured argumentation is not the only aim of parliamentary speeches or of any other type of text that is characterized political. Equally primal is effectiveness. Politicians seek to be effective in order to achieve their political goals by establishing certain interpretations which, of course, favor their interests, their ideologies and their policies.

Interpretations are related to knowledge, i.e. to "all kinds of meanings that people use to interpret and shape their environment" (Jäger & Maier 2009: 34). Conventionally, i.e. in strict epistemological and philosophical terms, knowledge is a justified true belief, and hence distinct from mere beliefs or opinions (Musgrave 1993: 3). Therefore, knowledge is constructed on three basic premises: A belief that P; P is true; A can justify his belief that P. What is implied from the above is a) the priority of belief over knowledge; and b) the co-existence of three conditions that finally determine what is and what is not knowledge (Lehrer 1990: 9) is: a truth condition; an acceptance condition; and a justification condition. Such an approach overlooks the relative character of knowledge, i.e. the contextualism that prevails in knowledge production, distribution and acquisition (we will return to this subject in 2.5).

However, there are approaches that at least sketch a dynamic and interactional framework of analysis. Williamson (2002) mentions the close and multi-functional relationship between knowledge and action in which the former is related with the human mind, while the latter with the external world. Moses (2008) recognizes that the properties of any situation determine any kind of action occurring with them. For an individual to adapt her/his behavior to the situation at hand is crucial for the efficiency of the action. Never the less (s)he has to draw on her/his personal knowledge to make the proper choice of action. As the social realm involves intersubjectivity, the success of an individual action is also determined by the outcome of the actions of others, who in turn deploy their own knowledge. Therefore and in order for an individual to act within a particular situation it is inadequate to rely solely on his personal, privately accessed knowledge, but (s)he has also to take into consideration the other participants' knowledge as well. Along these lines, Zagzebski (1999: 92) understands knowledge as "a highly valued state in which a person is in cognitive contact with reality". It can be argued that what is implied here is a cognitive interface, which mediates the relationship between the subject and external reality; however, this position is not further elaborated.

From a different perspective, Minsky (1986) correlates knowledge production, communication and acquisition with mental models, which are not merely seen as storage devices in which knowledge is represented. Being cognitive and subjective in nature, mental models are "self-made answering machines" (ibid.: 303) that help

individuals to answer questions and efficiently operate in the social realm. In this respect, knowledge about an issue actually involves the activation of a mental model that can be used by the individual in order to provide answers to that issue.

Knowledge, along with beliefs, attitudes, and ideologies, is a form of a social shared cognition and, hence, is stored and represented in Long Term Memory. As such, it has a fundamental social nature. It also constitutes the basis of all cognition, because a society cannot develop specific beliefs, attitudes etc. unless they share sociocultural knowledge that organizes the system of social cognition in a way that is cognitively and socially functional (van Dijk 2014: 95).

Against this cognitive framework knowledge is distinct from beliefs, attitudes etc. on the basis of "relativeness". Compared to them, knowledge is more stable. It goes without saying that knowledge is not a concrete entity. Rather, it can be divided in different types (personal, social, interpersonal, cultural etc.), each one of which has different features and is differently structured, acquired and transmitted. All these kinds of knowledge are derived from the discursive surroundings while discourse processing takes place In general, knowledge is shared by the members of a community and, thus, is presupposed in discourse.

Specifically in the realm of politics, political cognition deals with "the acquisition, uses and structures of mental representations about political situations, events, actors and groups" (van Dijk 2002: 206). Similarly, knowledge within politics involves mental structures consisting of "factual" beliefs shared by a political group. A useful distinction (van Dijk 2002: 218) between Common Ground knowledge and group Knowledge can be applied in politics. This proposal focuses on the second type; however the division should become more clear.

Common Ground knowledge refers to general knowledge that is socio-culturally shared across different communities; it is undisputed and never is subject to controversies (van Dijk 2014: 225). The relevant scholar tradition is influenced by the work of Serge Moscovisci on social representations (1994, 2008). Grounded on the theory of social representations, Elcheroth et al. (2011) suggest that social representations are socially shared knowledge (2011: 736). This point highlights three crucial issues: 1) as knowledge is socially shared and gradually becomes implicit,

hence interpretations of and about knowledge can be seen as the means of the meaning making, 2) who are those who make interpretations; and 3) how, i.e. directly or/and omitted, knowledge is shared. Similarly, Jovchelovitch (2007: 87) defines the "context of knowing": the who, the how, the why, the what, and the what for of representation. Once again, this kind of knowledge is beyond any challenge. Of course in any given historical moment the criteria of what is knowledge changes, and changes on the basis of unequal relationships (social, cultural, political). However, this change affects the whole society – not just some communities within society. With regard to the present study, the knowledge about what "Parliament" is or, more specifically, the knowledge that Greece is a country suffering a sovereign debt crisis can be defined as Common Ground knowledge, because they are accepted by all political actors independent of their political party or political ideology.

On the other hand, Group knowledge includes attitudes and beliefs that are taken for granted by the members of a specific group. Never the less, outside of the group what is presupposed and, hence, "true" can be considered as a mere belief. In politics, much of political knowledge is group knowledge (van Dijk 2002: 219).

The "relative" character of group knowledge further implies that the boundaries between belief and knowledge are blurred and depend on power relations, that is, whether or not a group can establish its beliefs as knowledge. Secondly, it implies that during the process of legitimizing a belief as knowledge, one should explicitly talk or write on the basis of that knowledge, because his/her group knowledge is not general knowledge. The relation between discourse and knowledge needs a cognitive interface since knowledge is stored in our memory and is represented in mental models used in discourse production and comprehension. Following the socio-cognitive approach (Van Dijk 2008, 2009a, 2009[2]b, 2010, 2014), mental models, i.e. the subjective representations of a situation and its properties (setting, participants, actions and events) provide the needed interface. Basic to the models' function is the ongoing social adaptation of all those properties to the communicative situation. To put it differently, every language user has to make his/her representations relevant to the situation in order to communicate effectively. Without mental models the understanding and the production of discourse is impossible.

The model of the nature of each communicative situation is called the context model. Context models share the features and functions of mental models What is more, context models control which aspect of knowledge of the mental model will be represented in discourse, and they also control which varieties from all the available]iscursive resources are relevant for a situation. In other words, context models control not only what we talk or write about, but also how we talk or write it.

Against this framework, the issue of how political context, i.e. context models in political communicative situations, are constructed increases in importance. Group knowledge is part of that models and certain aspects of it are represented, either explicitly or implicitly, in discourse. Specifically, the present proposal focuses on the political context(s) models of the Greek debt crisis, and their mediating role between, on the one hand, the construction and realization of the various ES types adopted by the political actors towards the knowledge they communicate in political settings, and, on the other hand, neoliberalism and austerity.

In institutional settings, in general, and in political ones, in particular, knowledge has a crucial significance: it is used by policymakers to inform their decisions or to enhance the organizational output (Boswell 2009: 29). There are two main approaches relevant to production and diffusion of knowledge within institutions. The one is instrumentalist, influenced by Weber's work, and the other echoes Foucault's theory on knowledge and power.

The instrumentalist approach understands organizations and institutions as systems of formal and informal rules that are accepted and obeyed by their members, who have to fulfill several performance-oriented goals derived from those rules (Weber 1978: 971). Within this framework, knowledge is used as an instrument which helps political actors to implement policy goals and ensure that their decisions contribute towards organizational goals (Boswell 2009: 31). In our data, such view of knowledge is quite evident in relation with the legitimization goals that the political actors have to fulfill. Especially on the semantic level, several legitimization strategies were enacted based on the premise that official, elite knowledge about the crisis is a symbolically powerful means for establishing the government's decisions.

Foucauldian approach deviates from the above as knowledge is not conceived as a superstructure that legitimizes pre-given interests (Boswell 1999: 38) nor as field which is under the total, straightforward and top-down control exercised by an all-powerful subject   Rather, he provides a multifaceted account of relations between power, knowledge and discourse, and how they serve as a means of social control (Foucault 1977, 1979, 1980). Conceiving discourse as bodies of knowledge, which in turn encompass a set of rules and criteria that control what can and cannot be said and, hence known, in a given period and for a definite society, i.e. in a specific historical moment (1978: 14-15), Foucault emphasizes the pivotal role of power in the production of that knowledge (1977). Power produces knowledge, but at the time knowledge presupposed power. In this respect, manifold power relations that embrace everything, and permeate and characterize the social body cannot be established, consolidated and implemented without the production, circulation and functioning of discourse (1980: 93). This means that discourse cannot operate without serving power relations, setting up positions in which subjects perform according to the dominant set of epistemic rules and criteria. It is important to note that this process is not achieved by any type of discourse or by any set of criteria. Therefore, institutions have the privilege to establish what sorts of knowledge can be known and shared.

The above implies a dialectical relationship between knowledge and power, as both are seen as mutually constitutive (Radaelli 1995). Knowledge produces "effects of truth" which in turn reproduce power (Foucault 1980:93). In our data, this is also manifested in the discourse of all political actors, who as they take advantage of their privileged access to powerful forms of discourse, constantly aim to discursively construct themselves as epistemically powerful sources of knowledge in a way that their discourse will become self-legitimized.

1.3.   Economic crises and the knowledge of crisis

It is a difficult task to answer appropriately what a crisis is. Crises are created under certain historical conditions and are affected by historical events. Despite their uniqueness (or rather "uniqueness"), the reality itself doesn't allow to consider them as exceptional phenomena. Rather, crises are pervasive throughout history and highly frequent in the recent decades (Kindleberger & Aliber et al. 2005: 6). From a Marxist

point of view depressions, which are understood as crises, are seen as unavoidable and inherent mechanisms of the capitalist system. Crises temporarily destabilize the natural state of equilibrium and by the time they finish the equilibrium is reestablished (Stråth & Wodak 2009: 27). In more simplistic terms it can be argued that the institutional structures and mechanisms that allowed capitalism to continue doing what it was supposed to do are no longer capable of doing so. Accordingly, all these structures and mechanisms should be either replaced or repaired.

What does it really mean, the "knowledge of crisis". It might be plausible to claim that the knowledge of crisis has (at least) two dimensions: Firstly, it can be conceived as "epistemic" knowledge, as the knowledge of particular scientific fields, e.g. political economy, macroeconomics etc. There are scientists that examine crises (see for instance the classic works of Minsky 1986 and Leijonhufvud 2000): they propose models, they analyze data, they make observations and interpretations; they publish relevant scholarly literature on the issue etc. Even the expected distinction between reputed and marginalized voices is evident. As far as it concerns the present proposal, I'm not interested in this dimension.

As regards the second dimension, any financial crisis is not an "abstract" subject. It takes place in life contexts as it affects States and citizens; it involves relations among political and economic institutions; it demands solutions which are grounded on negotiations between political and financial institutions and organizations. In this respect, knowledge of crisis can be seen as part of the broader knowledge of the political field. It entails knowledge about the structure and function of the political and economic system, but also entails group political knowledge and attitudes. Politicians are trying to achieve effective policymaking against the crisis on the basis of the scientific production made by the economists. The measures implemented by a State are influenced by the estimations and the predictions of the economists[1].

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[1] Never the less, the role of economists in the current global economic crisis and, especially, their failure to provide adequate interpretations about what is happening has become a subject of broad discussion, e.g. see the recent debate in Greece, after IMF admitted that made technical mistakes on the Greek bailout program. For an interesting critic on the systemic methodological weaknesses of the economics profession see Colander et al. (2009).

At this point a second distinction, which cuts across the previous one, can be proposed and applied to the data of the proposed study. Knowledge on crisis can be divided into "know that" knowledge and "know how" knowledge. The first includes data, figures and interpretations regarding questions such as how and why the crisis was created or, more generally, interpretations describing the "situation of the crisis". The second includes measures, policies and actions about crisis confrontation. Since the study proposed focuses on the political field, it is needless to say that the policies proposed by the governmental personnel are adapted to the political context of the time, so they are not solely based on the relevant scientific production.

Additionally, the knowledge of crisis it is not totally accessible and, what is more, is grounded on unequal political and social relations. It will be demonstrated in the relevant analytical chapters that knowledge being communicated by prominent members of the Greek political elite is not equally accessed, since it is derived from procedures in which participating members and representatives of the economic and political elites. It will be also shown that in many communicative situations, the political actor not only take advantage of this privileged access to knowledge, but they may further mystify its original source for reasons related with rhetorical and ideological purposes. Proposing a macroeconomic model for crises, Chang (2006: 2) integrates in his analysis the asymmetry of information between the government and the public, claiming that this asymmetry is the reason why financial crises are accompanied by political crises.

From a cognitive perspective, the above mention inequality is reflected on the structure of knowledge. In their study on political attitudes and knowledge, Beret & Krosnick claim that knowledge related to important attitudes is more elaborated (1995: 107). The discursive "consequence" of the asymmetrical character of knowledge is evident in particular discursive strategies used by politicians. Being able to thoroughly manage the content of their political knowledge in different political situations, they discursively represent their knowledge in way that is relevant for every situation.

1.4. Evidentiality

This section offers a concise account of the literature on evidentiality, with an emphasis on its pragmatic and discourse dimensions, especially its function in political discourse.

1.4.1. Preliminary remarks

The terms "evidentiality" and "evidential" are defined as indicators of sources of knowledge[2]. Strictly speaking, evidentiality is the grammatical category "referring to an information source" (Aikhenvald 2003: 1). The study of evidentiality has a long history in linguistics, probably because it is explicitly coded by grammatical morpheme and clitics in many of the languages that were first studied by American structuralists linguists. In early studies, such as the one of Sapir (1921, cf. Jacobsen 1986: 4), they are found references to certain forms expressing "the source of nature of speaker's knowledge". Similarly, in Boas (1947) evidentials are described as a group of suffixes expressing "source and certainty of knowledge" (cf. Jacobsen 1986: 4). The terms became broadly known through Jacobson's work (1957). However, it was not until the publication of Chafe and Nichols' (1986) seminal collective volume on the issue that the study of evidentiality was systematized. Evidentiality deals with the linguistic resources that mark/encode the source of information on which one's utterance is based or, in other words, "how the speaker has come to know the proposition expressed by the utterance" (Fox 2001: 167). Many languages have a special evidential morphology, but Western European languages, as well as Greek, mostly express the source of knowledge in lexical terms –this does not entail though that some lexical items have gone through a process of grammaticalization and have an evidential meaning.

Before we continue, some remarks should be made regarding the terms that will be used. In the study of evidentiality there is a diversity of terms that may (absolutely or largely) coincide referring to the same notion, or the same term may be used differently by different researchers. This is quite plausible because evidentiality a) is a

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[2] In relevant studies other terms have also been used instead of source of knowledge. Chafe (1986), Squartini (2008), Cornillie et. al (2015) use the term "mode of knowing" even though there is no absolute coincidence between them; Willet (1988) "source of information"; Marín-Arrese (2013) "domain of evidence".

far from coherent category; b) has diversified linguistic resources across the languages and c) has been examined from many different standpoints. Following Hanks (2012), in the present study we prefer the term knowledge instead of information, because it allows to be bring into play not merely the evidence per se, but also the speaker's access to the information (Hanks ibid: 172). Such view, facilitates a discursive approach to evidentiality, which among many emphasizes the relationship of the speaker with the knowledge being communicated. We also adopt the terms domain of evidence in order to refer to the various ways (sensorial, cognitive etc.), through which a speaker acquires knowledge. It goes without saying that when different terms are proposed by the researchers we will explicitly refer to them.

1.4.2. From grammar and pragmatics to discourse

From a semantic point of view, Mithun (1986: 86-90) divides types of evidence into two basic categories: direct and indirect. The former includes visual, auditory and other sensory first-hand access to evidence, while the latter is further subdivided into reported and inferred evidence. Reported evidence includes second-hand and third-hand information, i.e. information uttered by others (hearsay) and then becoming known to the speaker, and folklore. Inferring refers to information produced after a speaker's reasoning. Evidentiality is also linked with epistemic modality, i.e. assessment of the reliability of information. It seems that 'in actual language use reference to knowledge that leads to a proposition is often interpreted as a kind of evaluation of it' (Cornillie 2009: 57).

Contrary to a narrow definition of evdentiality, according to which evidential expressions solely mark and specify 'the kinds of evidence a person has for making a factual claim' (Anderson 1986, 273), other researchers (e.g. Chafe 1986; Ifantidou 2001; Fetzer & Oishi 2014) define evidentiality in a broader sense, by also taking into account the various attitudes towards the knowledge represented in a given utterance (Chafe 1986, 262). Evidentiality thus is just one among many sets of resources available for expressing one's attitudes toward information and assessing one's knowledge (Sidnell 2012, 295). Hence, it is administrated by the more general notion of epistemicity, as it is concerned with matters such as truth, certainty, doubt,

reliability, inference, factual/imaginative stance, reporting, personal experience, surprise/expectedness etc. (Bednarek 2006a: 637). This broader conception of evidentiality is adopted here.

Thus, evidentiality should be seen as a pragmatic-cognitive phenomenon and not as a solely semantic one (Boye & Harder 2010: 13). Semantic approaches, such as the famous classification of evidential expressions proposed by Chafe (1986: 263), are based on a fixed inventory of grammatical and lexical evidential forms. On the other hand, a pragmatic-cognitive approach promotes a dynamic view on the construction of evidential meaning, paying attention to several features of communicative interaction. Fetzer and Oishi (2014: 321) point out that the pragmatic function of evidentiality a) 'secures a communicative act to the hearer reader' and b) 'promotes/shares an understanding of a state of affairs'. Ifantidou (2001: 14-15) stresses the importance of the implicit expression of evidentiality, arguing that a pragmatic inference regarding the source and reliability of information conveyed in an utterance forms a different understanding and can play a role in the interpretation of the utterance itself.

Against this framework, Bednarek (2006a: 635) argues that the study of evidentiality does not have to be limited to the study of particular, explicitly or implicitly inferred, grammatical and lexical forms. Rather, it can take into account questions such as who is the source of information, what is the basis of someone's knowledge and how certain their knowledge is. She proposes a more general concept, namely 'epistemological positioning', which deals with multiple aspects of the expression of epistemicity.

Holding the position that the pragmatics of evidentiality should explore 'the ways in which speakers talk about their epistemological status' (2001: 51), that is the *things* that speakers do, Mushin introduces the term 'epistemological stance'. Similarly to 'epistemological positioning', epistemological stance also deals with the expression of epistemicity in a broad sense. The discursive representation of epistemological stance cannot be seen as 'pre-given', but is rather dynamically adapted and negotiated on the basis of contextual relevance.

1.4.3. Evidentiality in political discourse

There is ample literature on evidentiality across different political settings, including studies taking into account important aspects such as the respective genre, the broader historical and cultural context etc. From a pragma-cognitive perspective, Fetzer (2008; 2014) focuses on cognitive verbs (*I think*, *I mean*, *I believe* etc.) in order to investigate their grammatical and syntactic patterns, their pragmatic function and the context in which they appear. She distinguishes particular means by which they intensify or attenuate the pragmatic force of an utterance expressing degrees of epistemicity (possibility, probability, certainty) (Fetzer 2014: 68), as well as other types of commitment (emotional, social) (Fetzer 2008: 386). At the same time they are linked both to the way in which the speaker expresses her own or reformulates her recipients' personal and collective identities. In sum, Fetzer points out that political agents, when using cognitive verbs, manage to perform as private and public figures (2008, 389).

Drawing upon pragmatics and functional linguistics, Simon-Vandebergen et al. (2007) explore how 'taken-for-grantedness' is constructed in culturally different political settings. They conclude that it is not only a rhetorical strategy that creates solidarity between the speaker and her audience, but also a device of manipulation, as speakers tend to present highly controversial positions as if they were part of the shared knowledge (Simon-Vandenbergen et al. 2007: 65), claiming for themselves the status of 'someone in the know'. Despite the detail of their study, Simon-Vandenbergen et al. treat manipulation as a mere pragmatic-functional aspect of political context and do not elaborate on the ideological and social consequences of that aspect.

Trying to develop a discourse-oriented approach to evidentiality, Ionescu-Ruxandiou (2014), Constantinescu (2014), Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza (2014) and Reber (2014) examine various aspects of the phenomenon within political contexts. Ionescu-Ruxandiou focuses on the interplay between modality and evidentiality and makes the claim that evidentiality is both implicitly and explicitly conveyed in discourse (2014: 152) by examining how the strategic uses of (un)certainty operate in political debates that contribute both to the speaker's ethos and the audience's manipulation.

Constantinescu (2014) adopts a pragma-dialectical perspective and offers a cross-temporal analysis of Romanian parliamentary discourse, focusing on epistemic and evidential shifts that occur in the data. Given the argumentative nature of the genre, the semantic classifications regarding the reliability of the source of knowledge and the degree of the speaker's commitment towards that knowledge should both be reinterpreted on the basis of context (2014, 146). Berlin and Pietro-Mendoza (2014) and Reber (2014) explore the construction and establishment of evidence in political discourse. Based on Chafe's classification of evidentials, Berlin and Pietro-Mendoza' study is informed by CDA insights, especially as regards the role of context in discourse production, whereas that of Reber addresses crucial questions, such as knowledge asymmetry among participants and how this is discursively realized. Both studies are promising, even though evidentiality is examined here on the basis of specific evidential expressions and not as a broader discursive phenomenon.

1.4.4. Evidentiality in Greek

Discussing the marking of evidential meaning in Modern Greek, Joseph & Philipaki Warburton point out (1987: 185): "A speaker's authority for making an assertion such as through personal witnessing, secondhand information, and the like, can only be expressed by lexical means and not morphologically". Aikenvald comments that in the Balkans the lack of grammatical evidential markers, as observed in Modern Greek, is rather unusual, while Joseph suggest a socio-cultural interpretation for the phenomenon, according to which "evidentials probably did not diffuse into Greek because of […] the Greeks' attitudes towards their knowledge". In general, as the system of Modern Greek is lacking an a explicit grammatical code for the source of evidence, the category of evidentiality is largely overlooked by the relevant research, especially that conducted in the fields of syntax and semantics. Tsangalidis (2012) observes that the category is even excluded from the descriptive grammars of Modern Greek, while it is not even mentioned in studies Also, there is no agreement on the translation of the term in Greek: Some researchers (Tsangalidis 2012) use the literal translation of the term ('τεκμηριωτικότητα'); others (Veloudis 2001; 2005) seem to reduce the scope of the original notion as they propose the term 'αυτοπικότητα' which is literally translated to English as 'eyewitnesness'; whereas in relevant literature, one

study in Greek was found in which the term was left intentionally untranslated from English (Kostikas-Tselepis 2004)

From a pragmatic point of view, it has been pointed out that in Modern Greek the evidential meaning is manifested in verb types that function as pragmatic markers, such as parenthetical *'λέει'* 'say-3SG' and '*παρακαλώ*' ('I beg') (Setatos 1994a; 1994b, Tsangalidis 2012); in some specific syntactic structures of the modal verb *'πρέπει'* ('must') (Pietrandrea & Stathi 2010) or the modal subjective marker 'na' (Delveroudi et al. 1994, Veloudis 2001; 2005, Staraki 2013) or the future marker 'tha' (Giannakidou 2011, Giannakidou & Mari 2012) and in some uses of modal adverbs (Ifantidou 2001; Friedman 2003). From a discoursive analytical account, Politis & Kakavoulia examine the evidential of the direct discourse in the Greek Press. Before concluding, a brief notice should be made. As will be shown in Chapter 2, a discourse approach to evidentiality requires adopting the dynamic notion of (epistemic) stance. Both from a discourse analytical and sociolinguistic perspective, there are studies dealing with Greek data and contexts (Georgakopoulou 2013; 2014, Georgalou 2014; 2017). As far as we are aware, there is no systematic analysis of epistemic stance based on data from Modern Greek, let alone an analysis focused on the Greek political discourse.

1.5. Legitimization

To put it simply, legitimization provides the answer to a series of questions regarding an action or, more broadly, a social activity: "Why?"; "Why should we do this?"; "Why should we do this in this way?" (van Leeuwen 2007: 93). Social actors have to provide safe and sound reasons that justify past/present/future actions. Legitimization is a process taking place within institutional settings by which institutional actors justify their actions, policies, discourses etc., on a prevalent epistemic and moral base, which are both defined by values, beliefs and norms, definitions (Schumann 1995: 574). Actually, legitimization entails that an institutional actor has a firm belief that he/she thinks/acts/talks in accordance with the socially constructed system of those values, beliefs etc., and, what is more, it presupposes institutional restrictions which are defined by law, custom, regulation rights and duties. In both cases, legitimization

serves as a justificatory means for an "official", i.e. within an institutionalized context, action.

However, this is a special kind of justification as it embraces both epistemic and moral values. Regarding the first, the types of knowledge that can provide sound reasons for an action vary in terms of their reliability, so not all types of knowledge have implications for the legitimizing process. Regarding the second, an action also becomes legitimized when it is justified in terms of values such as "good"/"bad' "right"/"wrong", the so-called deontic legitimization. An institutional actor may stress the necessity of an action by appealing to moral values predominating in the group he addresses. What stands for both epistemic and moral (or deontic) values is the fact that the same type of evidence may be assessed differently in different communities. As the epistemic and/or moral criteria vary between the communities of different institutions, it is then plausible that the reasons provided for doing an action could be assessed differently. Regarding the epistemic aspect of legitimization in particular, the same type of knowledge may not share the same epistemic status within the communities of different institutions.

1.6. The Greek Crisis in context

In this section we will examine the ideological background of the three-year bailout programs as well the impact on the Greek economy caused by the two programs implemented in the period under study

1.6.1. The "Troika" Economic Programs

Here is discussed the economic adjustment programs run by the EU-ECB-IMF troika. These programs are viewed as the main macro-economic tool adopted by European leaderships for dealing with the problems of the national economies in the Eurozone. In the beginning of the chapter, the content of the programs were briefly presented, along with what was entailed by the lending agreements between the Greek state and the "troika". The "specificity" of the programs was that they had never run before in the EU. This novel situation revealed a significant lack of experience among European authorities. This is why the IMF's intervention was seen as absolutely necessary. Apart from funds, the IMF contributed "know-how" gained in the

worldwide environment in which similar programs had been implemented. Consequently, programs introduced in Europe are influenced by the IMF programs.

It can now be said that the IMF is the most powerful non-governmental institution in the world, because it manages the public finance of many states, and it also regulates the life of the majority of the world's population (Michopoulou 2012: 10). When domestic governments that are addressing the IMF have limited or no capacity for negotiation, due to their serious financial problems, and, thus, they are obliged to introduce austerity policies that are exclusively based on what the IMF think of as an appropriate tool for dealing with those problems. Of course, the IMF helps countries repay part of their debt, but, as Peet (2009: 126) points out, this help comes with high unemployment rates, poverty, and loss of national sovereignty.

Since the programs proposed by the IMF echo the neoliberal view of neoclassical economic theory, they entail particular measures that are implemented irrespectively to all countries (Michalopoulou 2012: 11). Examining the general lines of the IMF' interventions can prove a rewarding task for the deeper understanding of the Greek programs. The Greek program (as well as the Irish, Portuguese and Cypriot ones, which were implemented later) differ from the previous IMF programs. The most striking difference is that the Eurozone states have a common currency policy. Never the less, the backing knowledge is common in all IMF programs. Also, similar knowledge is accepted by the European partners the EU and the ECB. If it weren't so, the IMF would not have intervened in the European crisis. What becomes relevant for the purposes of the present study is the fact that the dominant political knowledge about the Greek economic crisis was shaped on this basis. Political leaderships, defending their decisions and policies, which reflected the positions of the "troika", relied on the knowledge produced by the dominant institutions that currently regulate the country's fiscal and financial policies.

Regarding the ideological background of these programs, the general scope of the IMF is to offer loans in order for countries in need to deal with problems in balance of payments, implementing specific measures that secure national and international prosperity (Conway 1994). In particular, great effort is necessary in the field of fiscal policies, towards which are directed the majority of reforms proposed in economic adjustment programs (IMF 1987: 25). There is a negative association between loan

programs and economic performance. According to Barro & Lee (2005: 1243), this is due to the fact that the IMF programs are formed in response to economic problems. Thus, it is difficult to address whether countries that implement these programs would be better off without the rescue package. The philosophy that underlies the IMF's scope, as well as the conditions under which the loans are offered have both been subject to extensive criticism. In Nowzad (1981: 7) it is stated that the IMF was always a pro-capitalist institution, focusing on free markets, private investment and price mechanisms. As for loans' conditionality, i.e. the specific requirements that are demanded by the IMF, this reflects the asymmetry in power between the institution and those states seeking support, since the IMF absolutely imposes its terms (Buira 2003). As said above, the dominant doctrine followed in the IMF programs, including those of the EU, was the "Washington consensus" according to which the central goals are the stabilization of the economy, deregulation, and privatization (Rodrik 2002). In this respect, macroeconomic discipline gains importance, but only in terms that are accepted by the markets (Stiglitz 2002: 230).

A crucial question related to the above should correlate the programs with the social implications they cause. Until the middle of the 1980's, the IMF and the World Bank shared the same belief regarding the poverty issue, treating it as a national matter in which there was no will to intervene (Michalopoulou 2012: 31). As a result, there was no relevant social concern about the programs. Even though there was a revision of the IMF's strategy, the so called "third approach", no substantial progress was made in the confrontation with poverty. Peet (2009) claims that the majority of policies are still oriented to the improvement of economic growth rates, and no attention is given to the distribution of that growth. Yet, due to severe austerity, wages, pensions and social benefits, which address less privileged classes, are cut, whereas new taxes are imposed, and the old ones increase. It is easy to assume that this strategy deepens the gap between the elites and those who lack power. The middle and low classes suffer, as their incomes vanish, whereas the upper class is the least affected, exploiting the privileged access to political elites (Michalopoulou 2012: 35).

1.6.2. Assessing the bailout programs

The realism of the economic adjustment programs implemented in Greece has been contested (see for instance Varoufakis et al. 2011, Dafermos & Nikolaidi 2011, Papadimitirou et al. 2013), focusing mainly on the disputed optimism that prevails in the forecasts, as well as the controversial efficiency of austerity policies that are introduced. Dafermos & Nikolaidi point out that the programs are too optimistic on the macro-economic level, and their efficiency is overrated regarding the restoration of growth rates (2011: 1).

Between 2010 and 2012, two different versions of the economic stability program have been implemented (the first and second memorandum). In the meantime, several updates have been made to each version, despite the fact that both were followed without any deviation. The need behind the revision and updates can be explained by the unachievable fiscal goals set, as well as because of the constant focus on measures which aggravate recession (INE GSEE, annual report 2012: 259). Supposedly, this is the price that the Greek economy has to pay in order for the confidence in markets to be restored. However, Jansen (2010: 6) critically questions "if the market confidence is not being restored while the Greek economy is at the same time being pushed into recession, double digit unemployment and rising poverty, then what's the point?".

Even though fiscal rates seem to be restored in the short-term, there is no sign of optimism regarding the efficient management of fiscal problems. What is observed is the radical devaluation of average standards of living. INE GSEE characterizes the current policy as "poverty policy", which addresses none of the weaknesses of the Greek economy. Rather, the fiscal problems remain, because recession and unemployment are reducing the state revenues, and more cuts in spending are needed which, in turn, feed recession and unemployment. Particularly, it should be stressed (INE GSEE 2013: 45) that the "poverty policy" replaces the policy of internal devaluation, since there is an evident failure in the sector of exports. Yet, this policy affects only the weakest classes of the society in which it is apparent that the distribution of the gross product is against the interests of those classes.

In this respect, the status of the Greek economy suffers several changes, the most significant of which regards the transformation of unemployment into structural

parameters, i.e. unemployment remains high irrespective of the demand for goods and services (INE GSEE 2013: 48). Unemployment along with wage reductions destroy a country's productive capacities, and they also rearrange the economy's priorities in favor of neoliberal doctrines, mainly through poverty rising among the population, and well fare's distortion (INE GSEE 2013: 49).

1.7. The research hypothesis of the study

The hypothesis of the research can be posed as follows:

Within the historically significant period of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, national political elite had to speak about the crisis, and discursively represent their knowledge, opinions, beliefs etc. about the origins of the crisis; the decisions needed to be made in order the crisis to be confronted; the power relations with the international creditors; the specific policies that should be implemented and so on. What is more, the management of the crisis by the political elite took place amid a series of other political events, triggered by the crisis, that ranged from modified intra-party power relationships to generalized resistance movements (Occupy) against austerity or institutionalized and agreed procedures, such as general elections. Here, we are interested in the explicit as well implicit expression of evidential meaning manifested in various discourses of six important political actors at the time, the three Prime Ministers and the thee Ministers of Finance. As said, evidential meaning is connected with how speakers position themselves towards the knowledge they communicate by adopting various types Epistemic Stance. Conducting a cross-genre analysis, we suggest that the way in which political actors construct their Epistemic Stance is largely affected by the properties of both narrow and broader context of the communicative situations in which they are engaged. Therefore, the discursive realization of their positioning indexes how they interpret the situation in which they participate as well as how they manage to accomplish their pragmatic, political, ideological aims and goals. Against this framework, we also suggest that the political actors strategically express their knowledge, and, more crucially, they strategically manage the various domain of evidence from which they acquire knowledge in order to efficiently legitimize their assertions and actions, and gain epistemic control over their audience. The discourse produced have significant social effects, as they serve

for the establishment of austerity, which in turn reproduces and broadens unequal relationships among the social groups.

1.8.   Outline of the study

In the present chapter we sketched the analytical framework of the present study. We presented a triangular approach, co-articulating linguistic, cognitive and social parameters, and we recognized that the cognitive component mediates the linguistic and social one. For that reason, we briefly introduced and examined terms that are relevant to our study, such as mental models (cognitive component), evidentiality (linguistic component) and legitimization (social component). In our attempt to justify that this is a problem-oriented study, we also informed the above scheme with information about the social and political context of the study, emphasizing 3-year financial support programs and their social implications that are triggered by the austerity policies implemented. Last, we outlined the objectives of the study that they were concerned with elaboration of the above general framework in order to be perfectly adjusted to the scope and aims of the present analysis, as well as we also stated the hypothesis of the study which takes into consideration a) the various Epistemic Stance types found in the data; b) their context-depended strategic use by the political actors for legitimizing purposes; and c) their contribution to the reproduction of social and economic inequalities through austerity.

In what follows we will briefly present the structure of the present study. In Chapter 2 we will present the theoretical background of the study, which is divided in three parts. The first is considered with the notion of evidentiality, but also with how it should be treated within a discursive approach to the construction evidential meaning in real communication settings. The second part, is dedicated to mental and context models theory developed by van Dijk (2008a, 2009), and, in particular, to their role in the construction and realization of knowledge in discourse. We also examine the crucial character of the cognitive aspect in the discursive expression of knowledge through the linguistic resources that are deployed by the speakers in various Epistemic Stance types. The third part is concerned with legitimization process and epistemic stance legitimization strategies in institutional and political settings, and how the

expression of knowledge through the various Epistemic Stance types has direct and indirect legitimizing implications.

In Chapter 3 we present the methodology adopted for the analysis of the Epistemic Stance types as well as a classification of the types that corresponds to what was found the data. We also present how we will deal with the legitimizing function of the Epistemic Stance Types. In the last section of the chapter, we present an analytical overview of the data analyzed coming from 6 prominent political figures of the Greek politics in the period under investigation.

Chapter 4 is the first chapter of the analytical part of the study and is concerned with a detailed examination of Epistemic Stance types and of various linguistic resources that discursively construct evidential meaning and contribute to the expression of knowledge in the Greek political discourse at the times of the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012).

In Chapter 5 we examine in a micro-level analysis the strategic use of the Epistemic Stance types made by the three Prime Minster included among the political actors in relation with legitimization purposes, such as the discursive construction of political actor as an authoritative source of information or the contribution of an Epistemic Stance type the legitimization of austerity policies.

The last Chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the conclusion of the study as well as to the study's contribution to the analysis of Epistemic Stance and knowledge expression in Greek political discourse at the historical and political period under examination. The last section of the chapter features issues emerged in the present study and call for a further analysis.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. Evidentiality

Within the relevant literature, three main questions are raised by the researchers. 1) The scope and definition of the term evidentiality and evidential; 2) the relation between evidentiality and epistemic modality; and 3) the "ontological status" (Boye & Harder 2010: 1) of the category of evidentiality. It is not possible to provide a thorough overview of the three issues here.

2.1.1. Narrow and broad definitions of evidentiality

According to a narrow definition of evidentiality, the category focusses on the specification of the source of information. As Anderson (1986: 273) puts it: "Evidentials express the kinds of evidence a person has for making a factual claim". In his view evidentials are related with the kind of justification needed for making a factual assertion. Therefore, evidentiality is concerned with indexing whether knowledge conveyed was seen, heard, inferred or told (DuBois 1986, Hill & Irvine 1993. Within this framework, only grammaticalized expressions of evidentiality are taken into account (Aikhenvald 2004:6).

Broadly defined, evidentiality is much more than the mere marking of evidence (Chafe & Nichols 1986: vii), and includes any linguistic expression of various attitudes towards that knowledge (ibid 1986: 271). Therefore evidentiality is concerned not only with the domain of evidence (sensory, inferential etc.), but also with the source of utterance; the degree of the speaker's certainty towards the knowledge (s)he conveys; the assessment of the validity of the information being communicated as well as the recipient's stance towards that information and how it is influenced by the reliability of the source of information and the validity of the domain of evidence (see among many Mushin 2001; Bendnarek 2006a; Marín-Arrese 2011a; Sidnell 2012; Gu 2015; González 2018). The present study sees evidentiality in its broader terms.

2.1.2. Evidentiality and epistemic modality

The second issue is concerned with the relation between evidentiality and epistemic modality. Since the first attempts of linguists to define evidentiality, there was a link between sources of information and certainty of knowledge (Dendale & Tasmwoski 2001: 340). Also, the broader definition of evidentiality takes into account the speaker's assessment of the degree of certainty of the knowledge (s)he communicates, which is very close to the traditional definition of epistemic modality concerned with the expression of the speaker's (un)certainty about whether a state of affairs will occur/has occurred/ is occurring (Nuyts 2001a: 21). The result of this evaluation can be explicitly expressed through a continuum of various degrees, beginning from absolute and ending to absolute uncertainty with intermediate points expressing probability and possibility. It appears in actual communicative settings, the expression reference to knowledge is simultaneously interpreted as a kind of evaluation of it (Cornillie 2009: 57), and especially the speakers of languages without a separate system of grammaticalized evidentials "found it difficult to understand evidentials as anything other than a proxy for epistemic modality, which was a familiar category to them" (Nuchols & Michael 2012: 181).

Reviewing the issue, Dendale & Tasmowski (2001: 341) suggest three distinct types of relation between evidentiality and epistemic modality: Disjunction, inclusion and overlap. Many researchers (see for instance Anderson 1986, DeHaan 1999, Aikhenvald 2004, Speas 2008) claim that evidentiality and epistemic modality are conceptually different, understanding the two concepts in their narrow sense (Willet 1988: 54). In an attempt to clarify, but not to adopt, the distinction, Cornillie (2009: 47) comments that within this framework evidentiality is seen as the "reasoning process that leads to a proposition", which is how the speaker acquired her/his knowledge, whereas epistemic modality is the evaluation of "the likelihood that this proposition is true". Such an approach is mostly applied in languages that have a separate system of evidential morphemes and clitics. Despite being distinct notions, evidentiality and epistemic modality is difficult to separate in speakers' minds, while there is no one-to-one relationship that exclusively connects evidentiality with the expression of the source of information and epistemic modality with the evaluation of the reliability of that information (Fetzer & Oishi 2014).

The second kind or relationship is inclusion, when one of the two concepts falls within the scope of other. A crucial aspect here is which one of the two categories is subordinate to the other. For instance, Matlock (1989) conceives evidentials as a broader category which codes part of epistemic modality, as it expresses to some extent the speaker's degree of certainty about the information (s)he communicates. Based on this, Plungian (2001: 354) argues that epistemic judgments involve some kind of knowledge, while the some does not apply vice-versa. On the other hand, it is argued (Palmer 1986, Willett 1988, Nuyts 2001 that evidentiality is primarily modal (Willett 1988: 52) in a sense that it contributes to the indirect marking of the epistemic assessment of the information.

The third kind of relation is overlapping. Evidentiality and epistemic modality partially intersect (van Auwera & Plangian 1998, Narrog 2005) The interface is found in the category of inferred evidence (van Auwera 1998), which signals a cognitive-based evidence that was acquired through the speaker's reasoning process, but also indexes an epistemic assessment made by the speaker regarding her/his degree of (un)certainty about the propositional content of the information (s)he communicates.

2.1.3. The status of evidentiality: grammar, semantics or pragmatics

The last issue is that of the ontological status of evidentiality or, in other words, whether evidentiality should be treated as a grammatical, semantic or programmatic phenomenon. Regarding the first, this is a position held by many researchers who stick to the narrow definition of evidentiality (Bybee 1985, Anderson 1985, Aikhenvald 2003; 2004) and they see it as a grammatically proper phenomenon. According to this view, evidentials are seen as markers -of a term that emphasize the assumedly purely grammatical status of the phenomenon- that add a secondary specification to a factual claim, and their primary meaning is to index the source of evidence (Anderson 1986: 274). Even though it is recognized that not every language has a grammatical evidentiality and that in other languages lexical means can also have an evidential function, they are still excluded from the analysis (Aikhenvald 2003: 1-2). However, precisely because many languages lack an evidential grammatical category it is hard to classify evidentiality as a grammatical category (Lazard 2001).

Conceived as a semantic phenomenon, evidentiality is used in its broader sense, and it is not restricted to the marking of evidence per se (Chafe 1986: 262). Along these lines, the analysis goes beyond grammatical structures and includes many other linguistic elements (e.g. modal verbs and adverbs, sensory verbs etc.), while various epistemic considerations are taken into account, such as the expression of the degree of validity of the evidence, which in turn influences the speaker's degree of certainty and overall of her/his commitment towards the proposition (Mayer 1990).

The approach that sees evidentiality as a pragmatic-cognitive phenomenon promotes a more dynamic view of the study of creation and communication of evidential meaning, because crucial interactional features of the communicative situation are considered. Fetzer and Oishi (2014: 321) point out that the pragmatic function of evidentiality a) "secures a communicative act to the hearer/reader"; and b) it "promotes/shares an understanding of a state of affairs". Similarly, Papafragou et al (2007: 255) correlate the coding of evidence and, particularly, the coding of the source of evidence with modification of one's or others' beliefs and mental states, because knowing what type of evidence has led the speaker to communicate her/his knowledge plays an important role in how this knowledge is going to be processed by the hearer. Ifantidou (2001: 14-15) stresses the importance of implicit expression of evidentiality, arguing that a pragmatic inference regarding the source and reliability of information conveyed in an utterance forms a different understanding and might also play a role in the interpretation of utterance itself. The above positions bring into discussion the issue of reliability (see below) and, contrary to more formal approaches to the study of evidentiality, it is claimed this dimension of the evidential meaning is unstable and dynamic, largely influenced by the communicative interaction. A pragmatic cognitive approach to evidentiality does not limit the discussion to issues such as the very coding (grammatical or lexical) of evidential meaning or whether or not evidential expression expresses a core or secondary meaning of the proposition. Rather, "proper" evidentials expression are seen as one among many linguistic resources with which knowledge and relation to knowledge can be expressed (Sidnell 2012: 295) by the speakers, and, more crucially, attention is paid to what speakers do when they express the source of their knowledge along their evaluation of that knowledge (Mushin 2001: 51). It appears that through the construction of evidential meanings the speakers aim, among many things, to persuade their audiences (Fetzer

2008; 2014); constructing epistemic alliances (Simon-Vandenbergen 1998; 2000, Simon Vandenbergen et al. 2007); strategically expressing (un)certainty (Ionescu-Ruxandiu 2014).

Despite the broader and dynamic view they provide to the study of evidentiality, many analyses that fall within the scope of the pragmatic-cognitive approach do not go beyond a sentence-level analysis, while, among the contextual and interactional parameters that are taken into consideration, strategic and ideological aspects are not addressed, such as the issues of asymmetry between the actual source of knowledge and its discursive realization; epistemic rights within the communicative interaction; epistemic control over discourse and participants; knowledge asymmetry; authority; boundaries between persuasion and manipulation; legitimization etc. as will be argued below, only a discursive approach to evidentiality can provide a thorough framework of analysis within which the discursive production and distribution of knowledge, along with the attitudes of the participants towards it, will be seen with respect to both their linguistic realization as well as to the contextual parameters that intervene, such as the roles and identities of the participants, the very nature of the communicative situation in which they are engaged, the participants aims, goals and values, the broader historical and social context etc.

2.1.4. Classification of evidentiality

Given the grammatical system of each language, there are several variations of evidential systems (for a thorough typological overview see Aikhenvald 2004). Never the less, in the grammatical systems of evidentiality there are particular semantic parameters that are evident and they can be summarized as follows (Aikhenvald 2004: 367): Visual, Sensory, Inference, Assumption, Hearsay, Quotative.

From a semantic point of view, a traditional classification (Chafe 1986: 263) of the category of evidentiality includes a four-part distinction of sources of knowledge (or "modes of knowing" in Chafe's terms): belief (expressed by cognitive non-factive verbs); induction (expressed by the epistemic modifiers, e.g. 'must' or 'it seems', and adjectives, e.g. 'obvious'); hearsay (the expressions of which "are not clear-cut" and involve communicative verbs, e.g. 'to say', 'to be told', but also fixed phrases, e.g. 'to

be supposed to', and adverbs, e.g. 'obviously';); and deduction (expressed by modal auxiliaries, e.g. 'should', 'would').

Another broadly cited classification (Mithun 1986: 86-90, Willet 1988: 57) features two subdivisions: knowledge that is acquired directly (direct evidence) and knowledge that is acquired indirectly (indirect evidence). The former includes visual, auditory and other evidenced accessed by sensory first-hand means.

Along the same lines, but under the term epistemicity (see below), Boye (2012) defines evidentiality as epistemic justification and distinguishes two types, direct and indirect epistemic justification (ibid.: 20). The first includes sensory or first-hand acquired justification, whereas the latter includes inferential and reportive justification.

Some researchers (e.g. Langacker 2017: 30) further divide sources that index how the speaker has acquired evidence through internal experience (pain, emotions etc.) and sources that index experience-based evidence emerging from an external stimulus (visual, auditory). The indirect evidentials include two subcategories, inferred evidence and reported evidence. Inferring refers to information produced after a speaker's reasoning process on the basis of her/his own general knowledge and/or some type of other evidence. Reported evidence includes second-hand and third-hand information, i.e. information uttered by others (hearsay) and then becoming known to the speaker, and folklore.

Also, depending on the standpoint of each researcher, the "prototypical" classification of evidential categories has occasionally been revised and augmented in order to include less classical subcategories. In Lazard (2001) and DeLancey (2001) it is proposed that the subcategory of mirativity or admirativity be included, which codes information "being new and surprising to the speaker". or Ifantindou (2001) and Squartini (2012) suggest that a class of cognitive verbs ('remember') or directives ('recall') should be treated as evidentials that signal memory as the source of information. In other works (Blackmore 1994) attention is paid to what is called "non-linguistic" evidentials, such as intonation, prosodic features, quotation marks.

Due to evidentiality's lack of coherence as a semantic category (Nuyts 2017: 58 xxx), new classifications have been proposed bringing into the fore different evidential dimensions. In Nuyts (2001a; 2001b) and Cornillie (2007) source-evidentiality, which refers to different mode of knowing, is differentiated from (inter)subjectivity, i.e. the shared status of the evidence (and the proposition). Squartini (2001, 2008) draws upon on classifications of Willet (1988) and Frawley (1992) and comments on the necessity to pay attention to the interplay between the mode of knowing, or type of evidence (Anderson 1986), which signals how information was acquired, and the source of evidence, i.e. the origin of information (Self vs. Other).

Plungian (2001) proposes a schema based on two oppositions, direct vs. indirect evidence; and personal vs. mediated access to evidence. In this respect, evidence attested through senses is characterized [Personal, Direct], evidence acquired through inference is characterized [Personal, Indirect], and mediated evidence, and acquired through the discourse of a third-source is [Mediated, Indirect].

Merging the schemes of Squartini (2008) and Plungian (2001), and conceiving the notion of evidentiality within the broader domain of epistemicity, Cornillie et al. (2015: 6) develop a triangular 'model' featuring three independent evidential dimensions, each one of which features specific values: 1) Mode of knowing, which coincides with the term used by Squartini and includes visual, auditive, inferential etc evidence; 2) Source of evidence (again along the same lines with Squartini), based on the dichotomy [+/-Personal]; and 3) Type of evidence, which indexes whether the information was acquired by the speaker directly or indirectly.

The implications of the above "triangle" are extremely relevant to a discursive approach to evidentiality. What is striking is the non-hierarchical organization of the scheme. As there is no one-to-one correlations between the values of different dimensions, this allows the speakers to dynamically construct and negotiate evidential meanings, which leads us to pay attention to the possible asymmetries (or epistemic mismatches, see below) in their combinations are highlighted (Cornillie et al. 2015: 7). This is particularly important for a discursive approach to evidentiality because as will be shown these asymmetries are not the direct product when specific grammatical or pragmatic conditions apply, but they are context-sensitive and in many cases are strategically deployed by the speakers.

Along these same lines but also largely influenced by the principles of cognitive grammar (Langacker 2007; 2009; 2014), Marín-Arrese (2013: 418-419) proposes a triangular classification as well, which includes the domain of evidence; mode of knowing and source. Her classification is complemented with two more paremeters that influence the reliability of the communicated knowledge and define the (inter)subjectivity of the utterance, the degree of salience to the speaker of the utterance, and the degree of the speaker's responsibility towards the utterance. As it will be analyzed in detail below (3.2.), we are not going to provide additional information. The first parameter is indexed via three different degrees, explicit, implicit, and virtual. The second parameter is defined in terms of personal, opaque and shared responsibility. We will return to this issue later.

Continuing with discourse-oriented approaches to evidentiality, another two classifications should be mentioned, the one of Mushin (2001) and the one of Bednarek (2006a). Both will be analytically commented on below, so at the moment it is sufficient to refer to the organization of their proposals. Mushin (ibid: 58) distinguishes five types within which the linguistic resources can be categorized that express evidential meaning and index the stance of the speaker towards the knowledge (s)he communicates: 1) Personal Experience; 2) Inferential; 3) Reportive; 4) Factual; and 5) Imaginative. Bednarek (ibid: 639) makes a distinction between the source of a proposition that signals whether a proposition is originated from the speaker and when it is attributed to a third source; and the basis of proposition which features the different domains of evidence from which the speaker acquired her/his knowledge, i.e. perception, general knowledge, proof, obviousness, unspecified and hearsay.

2.1.5. Evidentiary scale

Apart from the classification of evidential values, researchers have provided a scalar evaluation of those values in terms of the reliability of the various values of the evidential dimension of the domain of evidence. Chafe (1986) proposes a scale at the terminal points of which are placed belief and deduction, expressing respectively reliability and unreliability, and in the intermediate points are found induction and hearsay.

The same holds true if we follow the Willet's (1988) organizational scheme: Directly acquired evidence, i.e. sensory based evidence, is seen as more reliable than indirectly accessed evidence. As Papafragou et al. (2007: 256) point out "perceptually grounded beliefs […] are considered to be our most secure form of contact with the world around". On the other hand, an inference, regardless of whether it is valid or not, may be proved that is based on unreliable premises, while the reliability of a discourse-based evidence, a hearsay if we adopt the traditional terms, is mainly dependent on the status of the source from which it is originated.

Within that framework, the evidentiary scale gives rise to a main pragmatic function of evidentiality which, i.e. the strengthening or weakening of the speaker's commitment to the knowledge being conveyed. Typically, resources that realize evidential meaning allow the speaker to be as informative as needed (Maxim of Quantity in Grician terms), and to avoid obscurity and ambiguity (Maxim of Manner) (Aikhenvald 2004: 381). Given that the speaker assumedly tries to be adequately informative, Horn (1972, cf. Papafrangou et al. 2007: 257) suggests that the discursive construction of knowledge with linguistic resources that are ranked low in the evidentiary scale lead the recipient to infer that the speaker was not in a position to infer more valid evidence. Although the pragmatic function of evidentials are broadly addressed (Ifantidou 2001: 1), many of the analysts who limit their observations to clause level fail to take into consideration the crucial inference of the context to these pragmatic phenomena, as well as that of the cognitive dimension which also influences discourse production and comprehension.

Relevant to the discussion of the evidentiary scale is the issue of whether or not there is a domain of evidence that pertains to all of the rest. Whitt (2010: 11) claims that (sensory) perception is integral to all types of evidential meaning. On her part, Bednarek, recognizing (mental) perception/inference as the pertaining domain, as she claims that it shades into sensory perception. Against a socio-cognitive framework of analysis (see below), van Dijk (2014: 261), emphasizes the cognitive basis of the expression of evidential meanings and states that "virtually all knowledge or belief that signaled it has been acquired by perception, inference or discourse is derived from the activation of 'old' mental models".

2.1.6. From pragmatics towards discourse

2.2.6.1. Epistemicity

The notion of epistemicity as a general descriptive category concerned with the expression of epistemic meaning is introduced by Boye (2012), who mainly elaborates on the idea of Chafe (1986: 262) about the "range of epistemological considerations" coded in the linguistic realization of evidentiality. By "epistemological consideration", Chafe means all the other parameters related with the expression of evidential meaning, and they go beyond the grammatical or semantic marking of the evidence per se. Such a view totally aligns with the broader conception of evidentiality which was presented above, and which is reflected in the work of Chafe. Regardless of the number of works that have pointed towards the notion of epistemicity, Boye's work is the first that systematically describes and explains the interplay between the variants of epistemic meaning, namely evidentiality and epistemic modality. Boye discusses other variants of the epistemic, but finally they are considered as having evidential/epistemic modal meaning or they are excluded from the analysis (see ibid.: 31-35).

Epistemicity is a superordinate category applied cross-linguistically and it is defined in terms of the notion of justificatory support (ibid.:277). Evidentiality is defined in terms of epistemic justification, while epistemic modality is defined in terms of epistemic support. On a semantic level, the two are interrelated in the sense that direct epistemic justification (see Boye's classification above) is connected with the expression of epistemic full support, and indirect epistemic justification is connected with the expression of partial epistemic support (ibid.: 130). From a cognitive point of view, the justificatory support structures, which define the notion of epistemicity, are understood together as a survival skill because they enable the speakers to assess the reliability of conceptual information about actions and states. In other words, Boye suggests, we would not have been able "to distinguish between hypotheses and hard facts" (ibid.: 296). The notion of epistemicity also addresses the interactional character of human communication, which is quite relevant to a discursive approach to evidential meaning. In this respect, epistemic meaning, co-articulated by the expression of epistemic justification and epistemic support in utterance, is a social-

communicative skill (ibid.), because it allows the speakers to share and communicate the product of the cognitive process by which they assess the degree of epistemic support and/or the validity of the type of epistemic justification of their utterances.

2.1.6.2. Reliability

The question of the reliability of a discursively marked source of knowledge occurs in the studies of evidentiality, even in those that adopted a narrow definition of the category under discussion. Typically, it indicates that a source of knowledge is trustworthy. In actual language use, though, reliability is frequently equated or directly connected with the epistemic meaning of likelihood, and, as Cornillie (2009: 57-58) points out, this explains why the concepts of evidentiality and epistemic modality are confused and the one is projected on to the other (see the relevant discussion above).

Reliability is a crucial parameter for the acquisition and the expression of knowledge from the three main evidential domains because it is the needed condition for a belief to be justified and hence be accepted as knowledge. Therefore, what we know is based on some reliable perception/cognitive/discursive based type of evidence (van Dijk 2014: 33).

In most grammatical and pragmatic studies in evidentiality, reliability is understood as a fixed parameter that has a one-to-one relation with the various domains of evidence. Obviously, this is not applicable to a discursive oriented approach to evidentiality, which should take into consideration the relative character of knowledge as well as the interactional and contextual parameters that play a role in the discursive construction and communication of knowledge. Reliability is then seen not as something stable, but it varies from time to time and from epistemic community to epistemic community indexing historical, social and epistemological changes in the epistemic criteria on which knowledge is defined. The interactional character of reliability is reflected when it is considered the (inter)subjective marking of the source of evidence, i.e. whether it is external to the speaker and hence accessible by others than the speaker her/himself (Cornillie 2009: 58). In this respect, when the utterance indexes that knowledge conveyed is shared, then it is seen as more reliable. Also, reliability is determined by the dimension of authority. The more credible a source is

considered the more reliable the information derived from it is. The contextual parameters come into play when the speaker has to discursively construct her/his knowledge within a specific communicative situation. From the socio-cognitive account relevant to our study, as series of features are stored in the participants' mental models and are activated in the subjectively constructed context models of each communicative situation in which they are engaged. Even though, the features may be stable, their interpretation may change from an event to event and, thus, the way they are discursively realized. The epistemic impact of the context is therefore corelated with how the speakers' interpret their identity and role and their relations with the audience in terms of authority and power (van Dijk 2014: 153).

2.1.7. Discursive approaches to the study of evidentiality

Not surprisingly, the interest for the discursive functions of evidentiality has developed through studies that examine languages with non-grammatical evidentials (Mushin 2013: 628-9). Also, such an approach contributes to the analysis of the complex and non-defined in term of logical necessity relationship between the domain of evidence and the evaluation of that domain as reliable, while it also takes into consideration the participant's intentions and purposes within a specific context (González 2015). In this respect, evidentiality also functions as a deictic phenomenon as it refers "to a speaker and her/his complex management of information" (Figueras-Bates & Cabedo-Nebot 2018: 5).

Before commenting on specific works that advocate for a discourse-driven study of the evidential meaning, we briefly see some general notions that pertain all those works. Here, we focus on the (epistemic) stance, (inter)subjectivity and epistemic rights and their role in the construction, communication and processing of evidential meaning.

2.1.7.1. Stance

Stance is defined as "personal feelings, attitudes, value judgments or assessments" (Biber et al. 1999: 966) about the propositional content of a message, and it is marked in grammatical and lexical expressions (Biber & Finegan 1989: 92). What is directly implied by the two definitions is the subjective and evaluative character of stance.

Regarding the former, we will refer below to the issue of (inter)subjectivity. Regarding the latter, among the various kinds of stance (affective, attitudinal)[3], here we are interested in the epistemic stance, i.e. how the speaker commits her/himself with respect to the knowledge (s)he communicates.

However, there are crucial parameters of stancetaking that are not taken into consideration in the above definitions. Englebretson (2007: 14-15) summarizes the five principles of stance, which include: 1) stance as a physical, embodied action; 2) stance as a public act; 3) stance as an interactional parameter of a communicative situation; 4) stance as an index of the broader physical and sociocultural context; and 5) stance as a consequential act. The first two parameters are deeply intertwined with the core notion of stance, i.e. evaluation, while the rest broaden the discussion of the notion of stance talking and they make it extremely relevant to a discursive approach. Especially within the field of politics, which is a realm of struggle and contest, such a broad understanding of stance can shed light on how politicians think and talk.

Therefore, it is necessary to adopt a more dynamic definition of stance, as the one proposed by Du Bois (2007: 163) who sees stance-taking as a form of a social act performed by a public actor through overt communicative strategies, by which (s)he evaluates subjects; positions subjects; and aligns with other subjects within a sociocultural field. Conceived as an act is expected to be situated in contexts -not in linguistic forms- and, subsequently, to be shaped by the properties of the contexts but more crucially to be contested with the acts of the other participants in that context (idid.: 173). The evaluative character of stance brings into discussion the issue of responsibility -to which extent the speaker commits her/himself to the validity of the utterance he communicates, and how this validity can justify her/assertions. As will be shown, responsibility is a matter of the (inter)subjective positioning of the speaker. Relevant to this is also the issue of the identity of the stancemaker. Du Bois sees this as a crucial parameter of stancetaking, but his analysis does not elaborate on the crucial issue of authority, which, as will be shown, is mainly correlated with the expression of the speaker's responsibility towards the knowledge (s)he communicates. Derived from the above, stance cannot be separated from the sociocultural values that

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[3] Other researchers (Bertman et. al 2002: 258) have proposed the term "discursive stance" which co-articulates several dimensions of text construction. Under this perspective, the dimension of Attitude various includes the expression of speaker's epistemic, affective and deontic commitment.

it explicitly or implicitly invokes. Those values are largely presupposed and, especially for an epistemic stance, they are culturally embedded in specific regimes of knowledge and authority (Hassler 2015: 185)

When it comes to an epistemic stance, the main interest concerns the role of evidence in the expression of epistemic justification (reliability)/support (certainty) for a statement or claim. In particular and with respect to the knowledge being communicated, it pertains to the speaker's (inter)subjective positioning, i.e. whether (s)he and to what degree it inscribes full, personal accountability for that knowledge, or whether (s)he represents as shared (Marín-Arrese 2013: 411). The interplay of evidential linguistic resources and the discursive realization of epistemic stance requires a broad definition of evdentiality. Also, it further implies an open inventory of linguistic resources, manifested in "all language use" (Stubbs 1986: 1) with which the speakers realize their epistemic stance according to their motivations (rhetorical, interactional etc.) within a particular communicative context (Mushin 2013: 635). In this respect, evidentiality through the specification of the source and mode of access to knowledge may carry an indication of the speaker's attitude and commitment towards the validity of the communicated information (Marín-Arrese et. al 2017: 1; see also Biber et al. 1999, Marín-Arrese 2011a; 2011b).

The way in which political actors construct their epistemic stance says much more than just how they position themselves towards the knowledge they communicate. Through the specific choices they make, they accomplish specific pragmatic goals, such as persuasion or (mis)alligment with the receivers; they construct arguments for specific class-oriented financial policies that broaden social inequality; they construct a preferred identity of "responsible politicians"; and, under a critical perspective, they legitimize their assertions and actions; they seek for epistemic control over the conception of "reality" even through manipulation and lying.

2.1.7.2. (Inter)subjectivity

Related to the (epistemic) stance, (inter)subjectivity is directly connected with the expression of the speaker's accountability towards the knowledge (s)he communicates, and it indexes whether the speaker assumes personal responsibility for

the evaluation of the evidence or whether the assessment is potentially shared by others (Marín-Arrese 2015a: 267).

The notion of subjectivity was introduced by Benveniste (1973 [1958]), denoting the capacity of the speaking self to view himself as subject of the emancipation. Subjectivity is realized by markers and expressions that index the speaker's attitude and viewpoint (Traugott 2012: 35), and it refers to the ways (that is linguistic resources) with which language systems realize the "expression of self and representation of a speaker's (or more generally locutionary agent's) perspective or point of view in discourse (a speaker's imprint)" (Finegan 1995:1-2). Within this framework, Tragautt (1983) develops the concept of subjectification that is understood as a mechanism of diachronic language evolution whereby speakers recruit meanings in order to encode and regulate their own attitudes and beliefs (2012:35).

Commenting on Traugott's (inter)subjectivity, Nuyts points out that evidentiality and epistemic modality 'widen' the perspective on the state of affairs expressed in a proposition, providing "abstract characterizations of the status of the state of the affairs in the language user's reasoning about the world" (2012: 65). Then, the role of the speaker in order to subjectively qualify the proposition increases in importance, because qualification is based on his/her knowledge of information regarding the degree of potency of the proposition or its source; on his/her assessments of that knowledge; and, of course, on his/her interpretation of the situation in which is engaged. i.e. on the purely subjective context model of that particular situation. Accordingly, the more 'widely' qualified a proposition, the more subjective it becomes in terms of the speaker's intervention.

On the other hand, intersubjectivity addresses the relation between speaker and addressee. In particular it is concerned with the explicit realization of the speaker's attention to the image or self of the addressee "in a social or an epistemic sense" (Traugott & Dasher 2002: 11). Related to intersubjectivity, the mechanism of inersubjectification indexes the speaker's interactive stance towards the hearers (Tragautt 2010: 35).

Nuyts' (2001; 2012) adopts a different approach. Subjectivity and intersubjectivity are the two terminal points of a continuum in which the former indexes the assessor's personal responsibility in making an epistemic assessment, whereas the latter indexes shared responsibility among the assessor and a group of people, in which the hearer may or may not be included (Nuyts 2012: 58). The choice depends on whether or not assessor assumes or knows that her/his positions and her/his stance towards information communicated are more or less in alliance with the addressees.

In both cases, (inter)subjectivity is a discursive tool of negotiation of mutual and/or contradictory positions held by the participants in a communicative situation (ibid.). As such, it can be strategically used in order to form, or not form, common ground between the assessor and her/his audience, a move related with legitimization purposes. On the basis of Common Ground, a speaker can enhance her/his own credibility; impose common discursive goals; and persuade addressees to think and/or act in a desired manner (Cap 2006: 49). It should be noted here that within the political field, in which the present study is interested, commitment and responsibility have not only to merely be intersubjectively shared, but they have to support public justification (Iaţcu-Fairclough 2012: 131). It is possible, though, for the speaker to interpret the communicative situation on the basis of her/his context model in such a way that it would be considered more relevant to portray her/himself as a credible source of information being in a position to make explicit epistemic assessments.

2.1.7.3. Epistemic rights and responsibility

The systematic study of epistemic rights and responsibility primarily flourished within the tradition of Conversation Analysis (Heritage & Reymond 2005; Stivers 2005; Raymond & Heritage 2006; Stivers et al. 2011) and refers to the conventional constraints that regulate the production, distribution and negotiation of certain types of Knowledge (Drew 1991: 45). Rights are understood as entitlements, i.e. what speakers may do, and, similarly, responsibility is conceived in deontic/moral terms as what a speaker must do (Einfield 2011: 2093). It is crucial to say that responsibility is defined in totally different terms from the ones presented above, having purely deontic meaning, so we shall not elaborate on it. Both rights and responsibility are not treated as static concepts, but their interactional and relative nature is emphasized: without considering the given communicative interaction as well as the roles of the

participants in that interaction, and the social relationships among them, the speaker may not effectively claim rights and responsibility over the knowledge being communicated. The collection of entitlements and responsibilities in a given moment determine the status of the speaker, i.e. the category of membership (Sacks 1972). In other words, both entitlements and responsibilities control, more precisely it is the very subjective interpretation of the two concepts made by the participants that indeed control, who may, given her/his status, express and convey knowledge. Also, it affects who the speakers design their audience (Sidnell 2012), an interactional process, which is related with the knowledge that the speaker has; the amount and type of knowledge that (s)he is entitled or obliged to explicitly express in a given communicative situation as well as with her/his assumptions of what the recipients already know.

The above indicate that in conversations much of knowledge communication is held by various asymmetries, not only in terms of entitlements and responsibilities but also in those of epistemic access and primacy (Stivers et al. 2011: 9). By epistemic access here is meant the mode of access (direct or indirect) to the evidence, as well as the type (personal/restricted/shared) access to specific domains of evidence and, more particularly, to specific knowledge acquired from that domain. Just as not all speakers have the same degree of access to all discursive genres, they equally have the same rights about access to knowledge sources. For instance, a governmental official may attend official institutional meetings and sessions, and then have access to the discourse and knowledge produced, whereas the presence of an ordinary citizen is prohibited. Related to the issue of access is the issue of authority - who has the right to access and express a specific knowledge- which will be examined in Chapter 5. Epistemic primacy control priority in talk (ibid.), however a speaker's claim for primacy is based on the knowledge (s)he possesses (e.g. from which the domain of evidence was acquired; what is its degree of accessibility) as well as on her/his role in communicative interaction.

Relevant to a discursive study of the epistemic stance is to shed light on how the various linguistics resources available used by the speaker to realize her/his epistemic stance a) reflect her/his epistemic entitlements and responsibilities; and b) construct asymmetries in knowledge distribution. In this respect, evidential expressions should be understood as a means that do not merely reflect the source of knowledge and the

speakers' evaluation towards that knowledge, but also an asymmetry between what the speakers assume to exist between what they know and what their recipients know (Hill & Irvine 1993; Fox 2001; Sidnell 2012). There are three important aspects that the Conversation Analysis tradition does not address, but we will discuss in the present study: 1) A context model informed analysis of how these abstract notions such as the role of the speaker or epistemic access and primacy are interpreted in a given situation by the participants and, subsequently, how those interpretations control the discourse production and comprehension. 2) The possible strategic deployment of the realization of ES in order for the speaker to establish and benefit from the asymmetries occurring in the communication of knowledge. 3) The critical reading of the conventional constraints, i.e. to which extent asymmetries in knowledge production, distribution and negotiations are not neutral and contribute to the accomplishment of ideological goals on the part of the speakers.

2.1.8. Models that elaborate on a discursive approaches to evidentiality

2.1.8.1. Epistemological Positioning

Under the broad term of epistemicity, Bednarek (2006a) proposes the concept of "Epistemological Positioning" (henceforth EPP) on the basis of which she studies the linguistic expressions of assessments concerning knowledge. EPP does not limit the scope in its discussion of evidential meaning, but addresses questions such as "who is the source of information?"; "what is the basis of someone's knowledge?"; "How certain is the [speakers'] Knowledge?" (ibid.: 635). All of these three parameters co-articulate and shape the expression of EPP.

Source of information

With respect to the first question, Bednarek makes a general distinction, which was previously adopted by other researchers as well (Sinclair 1988, Hunston 2000) between averred and attributed utterances through which special attention is paid to the interplay between the source from which knowledge originates and the category of evidentiality. As will be shown, this division is particularly relevant not only for the realization of a speakers' stance towards the information they communicate, but has a direct implication to the operation of the legitimization process in discourse. Averred

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utterances reflect the voice of the speaker, whereas attributed ones represent a piece of information as derived from a third source. Averred utterances are further divided into based and non-based utterances, depending on whether or not the evidential bases of the utterance is discursively indexed. A finer distinction is made within the category of based averred utterances. Whether the basis is external or internal to a speaker, Bednarek divides between "outside-self based averrals" and "inside-self based averrals". As she mentions, though, this division has nothing to do with the marking of the degree of subjectivity adopted by the speaker. It is crucial to point out that every utterance is finally averred because even the attributed utterances are embedded into averred ones.

Basis of knowledge

Indexing how knowledge is acquired, the concept of a base of knowledge corresponds to the traditional definition of evidentiality. However, Badnarek makes a fine classification of the various bases of knowledge that does not reflect the semantic properties of a pre-given set of expression, but as it appears simply by looking at the names of the categories themselves, it follows a text-driven methodology "based on manual analysis of small scale text-corpora" (ibid.: 639). Five main bases are identified: Perception, General Knowledge, Proof, Obviousness and Unspecified.

Perception includes sensory based evidence, but it also includes mental perception/inferences expressed by impersonal verbal predicates ('it seems'; 'it appears' etc.). To these two types of perception, mental and sensory, another one is added, what Bednarek calls "showing" (ibid.: 640), which features verbs such as "reveal"; "show"; "confirm".

General knowledge signals that the content of the utterance being conveyed is part of a common epistemic background, shared by the producer of discourse and the audience. What Bednarek implies and is crucial for our analysis, is the relevant character of generally shared knowledge - what constitutes a common background for one community is not considered in the same way by a different community.

Under the category of proof are included all those expressions which index that the utterance is backed by some sort of hard proof. The example given for this basis is the

verb phrase "tests found". Again what is implied here is that the evaluation of the epistemic status of the evidence has not to do with the evidence per se, but with the evaluation made by the speaker according to his own epistemic criteria and to the contextual properties of the communicative situation in which (s)he is engaged.

The next basis of knowledge is called obviousness, and it refers to that kind of knowledge that is assessed as self-evident. As Bednarek points out: "the meaning of this category is very close to perception and it can be paraphrased as "not needing evidence" (ibid. 641).

The last category is called unspecified. Despite the fact that it includes an expression that appeared only once in the data ("it emerged that"), Bednarek suggests that more study is needed (ibid.: 641). Actually, the unspecified basis signals that the basis of knowledge was not specified by the speaker, and that it can only occasionally be inferred by the context.

(Un)certainty, mirativity and extent of knowledge

Within the notion of EPP it is addressed the issue of how the degree of certainty of knowledge is realized. Defining evidentiality and epistemic modality as two interrelated subordinate categories of EPP, Bednarek examines both epistemic modal expressions that directly index the degree of the speaker's (un)certainty and evidential expression that indirectly assess the degree of (un)certainty. As said and regardless of the fact that in many evidential studies the degree of (un)certainty is correlated with the marking of the speaker's degree of subjectivity, here there is no one-to-one relation. An attributed utterance that conveys knowledge having an evidential basis accessible to everyone has a high degree of objectivity. Likewise, knowledge having its basis in an internal type of evidence and its source as the speaker is more subjective. Nevertheless, neither the former nor the latter are respectively more or less certain.

Deviation from knowledge, or mirativity in traditional studies of evidentiality, includes all of those linguistic resources that signal (un)expected, newly learned knowledge. Actually, whether the knowledge communicated is more or less expected by the speaker is a matter related to the specific context in which it appears as well as

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with the speaker's general knowledge of the world and knowledge of the specific situation. As Bendarek puts it (2006b: 191), "The parameter of EXPECTEDNESS involves the writer's evaluations of aspects of the world (including propositions) as more or less EXPECTED [...] or UNEXPECTED". In the paper discussed here Bednarek does not examine this parameter. She admits that there is no agreement on whether mirativity should be seen as an aspect of epistemic meaning, but her claim is that such evaluations index the factual - frame in her terms- knowledge so mirativity should be therefore included in the analysis of EPP (Bednarek 2006a: 656; 2006b: 199)

As for the extent of knowledge, Bednarek includes personal and impersonal predicates, as well as adverbs that mark shared knowledge, relatively intersubjective, the commitment to which is opaque. Bednarek does not elaborate further on the issue, but it can be said that the resources to which she refers can be studied as resources that mark the truth/validity of an utterance. In the present study, the extent of knowledge is examined when the political actors explicitly express commonly shared knowledge, e.g. "we know", or when the adopt a Factual ES type.

2.1.8.2. Epistemological Stance

In what follows we will comment on Mushin's concept of an epistemological stance. In order to avoid repeated citations, the rest of the section will be based on Mushin (2001: 51-81). Where additional references are needed, they will be explicitly provided. Initiating from the points that 1) the majority of the research in the studies of evidential meaning limits the discussion to a mere semantic mapping of domains of evidence (or, in terms adopted by that approach, sources of information) onto linguistic resources; and 2) the speakers not only talk about how what they know is required, but they have also assess that knowledge within a particular context in which they have chosen or are required to talk, Mushin (2001: 52) introduces the concept of an Epistemological Stance (henceforth ES), which is further divided into five separate types not a priori defined, but based on linguistic evidence.

The notion goes beyond language-specific forms used for the realization of evidential meaning and addresses how speakers across languages realize their stance towards the knowledge the knowledge they acquired and communicate. Mushin assumes that in

actual language use, the speakers do not solely represent the domain on which their knowledge is based, but also accomplish other pragmatic functions.

Mushin systematically analyses two issues which highlight the pragmatic and interactional character of the construction of evidential meaning, and, thus, they make inadequate an analysis focused on a close set of linguistic expressions. First, she addresses the mismatches occurred between the actual domain of evidence and the evidential category selected by the speakers. In this respect, ES becomes context-dependent, as it equally reflects the actual, "historical" in Muhsin's terms, origin of the speakers' knowledge, but it also reflects "a subjective construal based on their current recall and on pressures and interests associated with the current speech situation" (ibid: 53). Mismatches can be used as rhetorical tools for evasion, the mystification of a speaker's responsibility, persuasion and even manipulation, and they also index what actually occurred in real life communication - speakers cannot identify one particular source of knowledge, because in many cases their knowledge was acquired through exposure to multiple sources. As Mushin concludes, each speaker does not automatically adopt a type of ES, but rather (s)he adopts the type that (s)he considers "the most appropriate to envoke in the discourse context" (ibid: 55).

The second issue is concerned with the multifunctional character of evidential resources. Mushin goes for an open set of linguistic resources that realize evidential meaning. The notion of ES allows researchers to include not only forms that are typically associated with evidentiality, but virtually any linguistic element that contributes to the realization of a speakers' assessment of the knowledge they communicate, as well as to various strategies that this assessment may imply.

Types of ES

Mushin defines personal experience ES "as the product of a conceptualizer's direct and personal experience" (ibid.: 59). Personal experience ES is correlated with a speaker's private states, such as emotions and sensations. In this respect, this type of ES is purely subjective and the responsibility towards information conveyed exclusively depends on the speaker, who -apparently- has personal access to the 'truth' of the information. Among linguistic resources available for the realization of

this type of ES, Mushin emphasizes 'expressive' language, i.e. first person references, affective exclamations, explicit mentions of personal intentions, feelings etc. Typically, the speaker through personal experience ES type indexes a high degree of certainty and confidence (ibid.: 67), because such information is rarely challenged as it is generally odd to challenge other's feelings.

When a speaker adopts inferential ES, the information is represented as a product of her/his own reasoning process (ibid.: 66). The inference or deduction is based on some body of evidence, which may consist of different informational types. This type of ES has three basic features: First, the evidence is external to the speaker, i.e. is not part of her/his private state, as in personal experience ES. Second, indexes the speaker's capacity for reasoning, as (s)he represents information as a conclusion based on deduction. Third, it expresses various degrees of the speaker's certainty and her/his commitment to the reliability of information conveyed. For these three features, inferential ES is considered relatively subjective. Undoubtedly, the conclusion of the speaker can be easily challenged if a recipient thinks that s/he has stronger evidence supporting a different view. Despite there is a broad range of resource available to a speaker who wants to expressed knowledge acquired through inference, Mushin examines only epistemic modals.

Reportive ES types refer to information represented as being acquired by the virtue of what someone else has said, in which the speaker has no direct access to the discursive evidence. Mushin recognizes the rhetorical function of this type of ES as means through which the speaker may distance or ally her/himself, but more crucially she recognizes the various ways through which it can be discursively realized, which include not only whether the third source is specified or not, but also a variety of linguistic resources which do not "prototypically" refer to the information being conveyed as the product of the speech act, but instead conventionally imply that the information was acquired through what a third person has said. Also, in Mushin's analysis the reliability of this type of ES is directly correlated with contextual parameters, namely with the identity and the credibility of the source of knowledge and with the evidence per se.

Another type of ES is Factual, reflected in the absence of any representation of the source of information (ibid.: 74). As suggested by its name, when the speaker adopts

this type of ES (s)he assumes that the knowledge conveyed is already shared and known. More particularly, Mushin observes this type of ES in the expression of General/Cultural knowledge that concerns "world truths", however she is not only limited to that type of knowledge and includes any information that is discursively represented as "fact". This type of ES enforces the epistemic status of the knowledge being communicated and has several rhetorical and ideological implications, since the speaker, whether strategically or not, leads the recipients to process that knowledge as unchallengeable.

The last type is the imaginative ES type, seen as a blend of personal experience and factual ES types, embedding knowledge in a fictional storyworld. With the former ES type it shares a lack of access by all, other than the speaker to the knowledge being conveyed. Imaginative ES is primarily concerned with the expression of private states, just as the personal experience ES type is. Regarding the latter type, imaginative ES has in common the downplay of the importance of making explicit the source of information and that it is discursively realized in such a way so that the recipients process the knowledge being conveyed as facts - even though they may believe that this knowledge does not exist in the real world, the accepted as factual because it is grounded in a fictional world. Mushin particularly observes this type of ES in fairytales and folklore narratives.

2.1.8.3. Epistemic Stance

Starting from the point that stance-taking should be seen as a form of social action that allows a speaker to assess realities and show support or justification for the validity of the utterance he communicates (Marín-Arrese et al. 2017: 1), Marín-Arrese (2011b; 2013; 2015a; 2015b; 2017) develops a model of the Epistemic Stance which draws on Langacker's (2007; 2014) distinction between effective and epistemic levels; the work on stance by Du Bois (2007) and Englebretson (2007) on stance-taking, which was briefly presented above; and the notion of engagement elaborated by Martin & White (2005), which emphasizes the dialogical and rhetorical interplay between the various authoritative voices occurring in discursive contexts as well as the need for an open inventory of linguistic resources through which the speakers position their "voice" and engage with other "voices". In what follows I mostly draw

on Marín-Arrese 2011a; 2013 and 2015b. In the case of a different reference, a citation will be provided.

For Marín-Arrese, an Epistemic Stance refers to the "positioning of the speakers/writers with respect to the knowledge about the described events and their commitment to the validity of the communicated information" (2015b: 210). In particular, an Epistemic Stance realizes a) the speakers implicit/explicit subjective positioning towards their assertions, which expresses the speaker's degree of certainty; b) the speaker's implicit/explicit intersubjective positioning which expresses how the speakers (mis)align themselves with potential addresses but also with text-external voices; and c) the speaker's commitment to the validity of their assertion, which is defined in terms of the domain of evidence, i.e. mode of knowing in the traditional classifications of evidentiality (see above), through which the communicated knowledge is acquired and in terms of the mode of access to that domain.

Within this framework, a variety of linguistic resources is taken into consideration: resources that express purely epistemic meaning, e.g. epistemic modals and adverbs indicating various degrees of certainty; resources that express truth-factual validity; and resources that express different kinds of evidential meanings on the basis of three different domains of evidence.

Marín-Arrese (2013: 418-419) proposes a triangular classification as well which includes the domain of evidence, the mode of knowing, and the source. The domain of evidence is related with the domains of experience (Langacker 1991) and corresponds but does not coincide with the dimension of mode of knowing found on Cornillie et al. (2015). The dimension is divided into three categories: 1) experiential evidentiality, realized by personal predicates of perceptual or mental observation; Adverbs, predicative adjectives and nominals (e.g. 'to see'; 'It is evident'; 'Obviously'); 2) cognitive evidentiality, realized by verbs denoting mental state as well as adverbs, predicative adjective and nominals (e.g. 'to know'; 'to think' ; 'to believe'; 'this means'; 'presumably' etc.); and 3) communicative evidentiality that is expressed through personal predicates of communication and verbal interaction (e.g. 'to say'; 'to be told'; 'this means' etc.). The mode of knowing refers to the kind of access, direct vs. indirect, the speaker has to the knowledge being communicated; this

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is the type of evidence in terms of Cornillie et al. (2015). Finally, the dimension of the source specifies whether the knowledge originates from the speaker (internal) or not (external). Articulating the three dimensions above, Marín-Arrese (2013: 435) provides a detail classification of the linguistic resources that serve for the production of evidential meaning.

With respect to the domain of evidence, mode of access and source of evidence, the various Epistemic Stance resources contributing to the construction of evidential meanings are classified as follows: Experiential, Direct, External; Experiential, Indirect, External; Cognitive, Indirect, External; Cognitive, Direct, Internal; Communicative, Direct, Internal; Communicative, Indirect, External; Mediated, Communicative, Direct, External; Personal/Mediated, Communicative, Direct, Internal.

However, Marin-Aresse discusses a broader discourse-oriented approach to evidentiality (see below), so her classification is complemented with two more parameters that influence the reliability of the communicated knowledge and define the (inter)subjectivity of the utterance, the degree of salience of the speaker to the utterance; and the degree of the speaker's responsibility towards the utterance. The first parameter is indexed via three different degrees, explicit, implicit, and virtual. The second parameter is defined in terms of personal, opaque and shared responsibility. We will return to the issue later in the next chapter.

Compared to the models discussed above, this approach is the only discursive approach that sheds light on the strategic functions and ideological implications of how the speakers position themselves with respect to the knowledge they discursively realize. In particular, it is concerned with legitimization. Studying journalistic and political discourse, Marin-Aresse (2009; 2011a; 2011b; 2013; 2015a; 2015b) claims the Epistemic Stance resources that contribute to the discursive construction of epistemic legitimization strategies. The speakers strive for epistemic control, which is defined in purely cognitive terms as "the knowledge of the world (both 'real' and mentally constructed)" that in turn "is constantly augmented and adjusted on the basis of a new experience" (Langacker 2017: 15,20). In this respect, the main sources of epistemic control are the various domains of evidence from which the speakers acquire their knowledge. In relation with the Epistemic Stance resources, the speakers

strategically exploit them in order to make their recipients accept the communicated knowledge of the events as valid (Marín-Arrese 2013: 414). It becomes, then, of great importance to explore how Epistemic Stance resources strategically contribute to the management of the recipients' acceptance of information. More particularly it should be seen how the specific realization of an Epistemic Stance within a specific context allow the speakers to overcome recipients epistemic "safeguards" and legitimize the truth and validity of the communicated knowledge. For purposes of manipulation, the speakers may intentionally misinform their audience with respect either to the domain of evidence being realized in their discourse, or the degree to which they mystify or not their responsibility with regard to the reliability of the information conveyed. Against this framework, we provide a thorough analysis of the issue in chapter 5.

2.1.8.4. EPP, EPS and ES pros and cons

The approaches presented above have several advantages that are quite relevant to a discursive approach to evidential meaning in general as well as to the methodology adopted in the present thesis in particular. First, they refer to knowledge instead of information, highlighting thus the interactional -and not the formal- character of knowledge production, communication and consumption. Second, they rely on an open set of linguistic resources, especially Marín-Arrese's model, allowing thus a multifunctional approach to the construction of evidential meaning. What is more, all concepts are independent from the specific properties of every language system. They propose a cross language approach to the study of discursive construction of the speakers' (inter)subjective positioning towards their utterances. Third, they pay attention to the interactional parameters that influence how the speakers assess their knowledge, as in all approaches evidential meaning is not seen as an objective means for marking the source of knowledge. More crucially, they all emphasize that the evaluative process intertwined with the speakers' epistemic positioning is not a static one-to-one relation between the discursive realization of domains of evidence and their assumed reliability. Mushin's model of ES in particular highly recognized the inference of the context of the communicative situation, and more particularly the speakers' evaluation of the contextual properties that controls the adoption and realization of an ES type. Fourth, focusing on what it happens in real language use they directly correct context with mismatches between the actual domain of evidence,

from which the speaker acquired the knowledge he communicates, and the discursive realization of that knowledge. This point brings into discussion the pragmatic (e..g. epistemic alignment/misalignment; claim for epistemic authority etc.) and rhetorical (e.g. persuasion) implications of an epistemic stance, as it can be strategically deployed in relation with the speakers' goals and aims that are relevant to the communicative situation in which they are engaged. Particularly the model of Marín-Arrese which has been applied to several genres of political discourse - just as the present study - offers a systematic analysis of the interplay between the epistemic stance and legitimization/manipulation making possible, thus a more critical reading of the epistemic stance resources.

On the other hand, there are some cons that should be spelled out. First a terminological backing concerned with the model of Mushin. The term "epistemological" seems to be misleading and confusing as it refers to the science of epistemology and not the epistemics of discourse. For that reason, in Chapter 3 we opt for the term epistemic. Many of the analyses provided in each model are based on single clause utterances, even though the researchers have used corpora of authentic discursive material. Especially, Marín-Arrese, while she does contextualize her data, insists more on a quantitative collocational analysis of the various epistemic stance resources. The clause level analysis offers a limited view to important issues, such as the construction of evidential meaning throughout the discourse or it's negotiation by the participants. The emphasis to clause-level analysis brings into discussion another point: with the exception of Marín-Arrese, the rhetorical effects and implications - let alone the ideological ones- of the discursive construction of evidential meaning are not thoroughly studied. More importantly parameters such as the speakers' authority over the knowledge they communicate or their responsibility towards that knowledge are not addressed. Third, all researchers recognize the importance of context and how its evaluation is made by the speaker is crucial for the discursive construction of an epistemic stance, however none of the studies are informed with a systematic analysis of the contextual properties. In this respect, the role and the identity of the speaker; the goals/aims (s)he expects to fulfil during any communicative situation, her/his beliefs/norms/values; the audience which (s)he addresses; as well as the setting (time and place) in which a communicative event takes place; the narrow and broader historical and social context should all be taken into account in terms of how they are

interpreted by the speaker and, subsequently, control the way (s)he realizes an epistemic stance. This is what the present study will attempt to do. Similar to the above is the following point; Marín-Arrese provides a systematic and thorough analysis of epistemic legitimization strategies, however she does not make the connection with the broader social implications triggered by those strategies. In this respect the focal point of every critical analysis of language, i.e. how discourse generates and maintains social inequalities, remains unnoticed.

2.1.9. Concluding remarks

In the first part we provided an overview of the literature of studies on evidentiality. At the beginning (2.1.1. -2.1.3.), we commented on three issues about evidentiality - the scope of the term; the interplay between epistemic modality and evidentiality; and the ontological status of the category. Regarding the first, it was explained that for the purposes of the present study a broader definition of evidentiality should be adopted, concerned not only with the marking of the source of evidence, but also including the expression of the speaker's commitment towards the knowledge (s)he communicates. Regarding the second, it was stated that a distinction between epistemic modality and evidentiality is methodologically mandatory, but in real life communication it becomes impossible for the concepts to be separated in speakers' minds. As for the last issue, it was shown that regardless of being treated as a grammatic, semantic or pragmatic phenomenon, the analysis of evidentiality should go beyond the just mentioned levels of analysis.

In the next subsection (2.1.4.) we discussed the various classifications of evidentiality that have been proposed. Since most of the studies discussed fell into the scope of grammar and semantics, the classifications included only the source of knowledge or the mode of knowing while several other evidential values were largely overlooked by the mainstream research at the time.

In (2.1.5.) the scalar nature of evidentials was discussed, i.e. that each one indexes a different degree of reliability. Again, the issue of reliability was limited to semantic analysis, without taking into account it highly context-depend nature.

In 2.1.6. was highlighted the need for less formal approaches to the evidential meaning. Drawing on the broader definition of evidentiality, two concepts were introduced that highlighted the interactional character of the category under discussion. The one was that of epistemicity, a general category that included both epistemic and evidential expressions. Epistemic meaning is co-articulated by the expression of epistemic support (epistemic modality) and epistemic justification (evidentiality). The other concept was that of reliability. It was demonstrated that contrary to what had been claimed by other, traditional studies in evidentiality, reliability has a relative character that is highly dependent on the narrow and broader context that frames any communicative event and interaction.

The subsection 2.1.7. was dedicated to discursive approaches to the construction of evidential meaning. For that reason, the relevant notion of the (epistemic) stance. Stance was introduced, understood as a form of social action which is closely related with various type of evaluations and indexes how speakers position themselves towards the utterances they communicate as well as towards the other participants in a communicative event. The evaluative character of stance brought into discussion the issue of (inter)subjectivity, i.e. how speakers expressed their responsibility towards the knowledge they communicate. Defined as action, stance was situated in context within which various identities were enacted as well as relationships among the participants. Therefore, the way speakers produce and negotiate was influenced by interactional parameters, such as epistemic rights and responsibilities, which were introduced in our analysis.

In 2.1.8. we reviewed the three models that elaborate on a discursive approach to evidentiality, namely *epistemological positioning* (Bednarek); *epistemological stance* (Mushin) and *epistemic stance* (Marín-Arrese). Each one of them was thoroughly presented with a special emphasis on classifications schemes proposed, as well as on the variety of linguistic resources included by the researchers in their analysis. All studies recognized the multifunctional character of evidential expressions as well as the significance of context in discursive realization of evidential meaning, two elements quite relevant to the objectives of the study. However, all of them lacked a systematic and in-depth approach to the various functions of context.

2.2. The Socio-cognitive approach to discourse

2.2.1. Knowledge in interaction

In this section we will present aspects of the socio-cognitive approach to discourse (van Dijk 2008; 2009; 2014). For the sake of space, it is not possible to provide a full overview, so our observations will include only what is relevant to our study of the discursive construction of evidential meaning. In this respect, we will see how knowledge acquisition, production, distribution and comprehension should be seen in a discourse analytical perspective as well as how a cognitive interface, that of mental models, regulates the above mentioned parameters within the communicative settings. In what follows I draw on van Dijk (2009; 2014). Citations to other works will be explicitly stated.

While all works related to the analysis of evidential expressions refer to knowledge, none of them elaborate on the issue, implicitly adhering to the classical epistemological definition of knowledge "as justified true belief". As it was also shown much of these studies, especially the ones adopting a narrow definition of evidentiality, stick to the very formalistic notion of information. Last, with exception of the approaches analyzed in detail above, most of the works on evidentiality neglect the importance of discourse, reducing the relevant discussion to a conception of discourse as a technical piece of evidence, from which is derived information of variable degrees of reliability, and overlooking the fact that most human knowledge is acquired, produced and managed through discourse as well as that this knowledge is not only expressed in text and talk, but also depends on other related discourses.

Contrary to the inadequate formal epistemological definition just mentioned, van Dijk defines "social knowledge as the shared belief of an epistemic community, justified by contextually, historically and culturally variable epistemic criteria of reliability" (2014: 21). A series of implications is triggered by the above definition: First, knowledge is fundamentally social in nature, i.e. it refers to groups/communities, their common experiences and memories. This is seen in various senses (ibid.: 94): 1) In acquisition, as knowledge is mostly acquired in social situations through interaction and discourse; 2) In distribution, as knowledge is shared among the members of a community; 3) In Justification, as the epistemic criteria that define knowledge are

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socio-culturally dependent; and 4) In intentionality, as justified social beliefs are about socially relevant issues.

Second, what is directly implied by the definition is the relational character of knowledge – the criteria that determine the reliability of knowledge vary from time to time and from epistemic community to epistemic community. In traditional studies of evidentiality (see Chapter 2), the main criterion related with the reliability of knowledge is the source from which that knowledge is derived, i.e. through perception, inference and discourse. In real life circumstances, though, what justifies a belief and, hence, turns it into knowledge, is not a monolithic set of stable criteria related to how knowledge was acquired by the speakers, but is defined instead by the subjective interpretations of the speakers of those criteria and their reliability. Also, dependent on the communicative situation in which they are engaged, the same speakers may construct different interpretations of the same criteria. Knowledge, then, and its discursive realization is contextual. Actually, as it appears in our study, political actors assume as extremely important the knowledge which criteria are relevant and appropriate to which communicative situation and epistemic community. Never the less, an important point should be made here: the relative character of knowledge is observed across communities and contexts; within the same community knowledge is stable, accepted and processed as 'truth' or 'fact''. Therefore, politics is seen as a realm within which different knowledges are contested, so it becomes ideal for revealing this relativism but also for observing how political actors take advantage of it when they discursively produce and communicate knowledge.

Last, *socially* shared beliefs further imply a counterpart, *personal* shared justified beliefs, i.e. knowledge acquired through personal and private experience. Nevertheless, individuals justify their personal beliefs by applying the epistemic criteria accepted by the community in which they belong. Personal knowledge is than largely based on the activation of socially shared knowledge.

2.2.2. Knowledge and mental models

Within a cognitive approach to discourse, there is increased importance for the interplay between the speakers' minds and discursive representations of both external (events, experiences, actions etc.) and internal (emotions, opinions, desires etc.)

aspects of states of affairs. "Realities" (events, actions, participants, social structures and relations) are not directly represented in discourse, but they are mediated by a cognitive interface, social cognition, which features knowledge and other socially shared beliefs being stored in long-term memory. Social cognition then consists of all subjective mental constructions and representations of experiences of situations, i.e. mental models. Being dynamically and subjectively constructed by individuals, mental models define past, present and future experiences of everyday life and are stored in episodic memory, the part where our personal experiences are represented - therefore they are personal and unique. Recalling an experience of a past event or making a conjecture for a future event requires the activation of an old mental model relevant to the event that has been stored in the memory of the individual.

In this respect, knowledge of a specific event or situation is mentally represented by a mental model of that event or situation that meets the criteria of reliability shared by the members of an epistemic community. What is more, knowledge is acquired, changes and produced through the generalization, abstraction and decontextualization of mental models of experience. Knowledge is discursively constructed on the basis of these subjective mental models of experience.

Regarding their structure, mental models are relatively simple, and as such feature schematic categories, e.g. Setting, Participants, Events/Actions and Goals. They can also be organized in larger and more complex schemes in order to define complex series of events and actions. Mental models are "scalable" in the sense that if personal knowledge, as defined above, becomes shared within a community, it may become social knowledge, given it meets the epistemic criteria set by the community. If it becomes generalized over several situations, it constructs generic knowledge. However, this bottom-up process is completed by a top-down one, in which every personal and unique mental model it partly activated by the generic knowledge of events or situations, as well as by old mental models

Let's briefly summarize the main function of mental models. As already said, they control the overall interaction of individuals with the natural environment and as well as with other human beings. In addition, they represent and construe internal information, embodied mental information to which the individual has private access.

2.2.3. Modeling discourse: Situation models of discourse

Individuals not only construe mental models of the situations they have experienced or observed, but also of the situations they have knowledge of through discourse. Besides, these models are a major source for acquiring knowledge since most of knowledge is transmitted via text and talk. In other words, the speaker communicates various aspects of an old model which is activated and shapes, along with other knowledge, the new situation model that, in turn, controls which aspects of the old model are relevant to the current interaction. Therefore, their role in the production and distribution of discourse and knowledge is crucial as they are "the primary means of the reproduction of knowledge in society, both in everyday interaction and in much of public discourse" (ibid.: 53).

Situation models of discourse are a specific kind of mental model. They share the same structural and functional properties. In relation with discourse production and processing, situation models of discourse are semantic in nature. That is, they represent what discourse is about, what is being expressed through the various choices made by the speakers from grammatical, syntactic and lexical levels, while at the same time they control discourse's local and global coherence. Just as mental models, semantic models of discourse are more detailed than meaning which is finally discursively represented. This explains why the participants in a communicative situation have to infer what remains implicit on the basis of their mental models of the knowledge, as well as why misunderstandings are created during discursive interaction – participants do not share the same situation model. However, in semantic lever commonly shared generic knowledge offer a guarantee that understanding will be adequate.

2.2.4. Modeling discourse: context models

Just as in the case of the notion of knowledge, context is generally used in rather vague terms. As far as the study of a discursive approach to evidentiality is concerned, we saw before that relevant studies recognize the crucial role of the context in realization of the speakers' positioning towards the knowledge the communicate, but they do not explain how context controls the linguistic choices of the speakers. Therefore, just as the formal definition of knowledge is not adequate in order to

explain how knowledge is produced, a similarly a monolithic view that understands the various "dimensions of communicative situations as stable and "objective" is equally incomplete when it comes to discourse production and comprehension. Contexts are understood as "subjective definitions of the currently relevant dimensions of such situations by the participants" (van Dijk 2009: 245). As said above, aspects of the social knowledge are not directly represented in discourse, but is mediated by a cognitive interface. Context models mediate between abstract parameters of personal experience and social knowledge, on the one hand, and discourse on the other.

Context models are the pragmatic counterpart of the semantic situation models of discourse – they represent the communicative situation itself, and namely those parameters of the communicative situation that at each moment are relevant to and appropriate for the participants (for an adaptation of the theory of context models to the discourse of the Greek Occupy Movement see Goutsos & Polymeneas 2015; 2017). Van Dijk (2009) provides a detailed analysis of the standard set contextual parameters, but here we will be limited to a brief presentation of them: Setting (Time, Place); Participants with their personal (age, gender), social (role, class, social identity) and mental (beliefs, goals) properties; and Activity/Conduct. Again, what is stored in the participants context models is not a static definition of those categories, but the subjective interpretations held by each of those categories, constantly adapted to each communicative situation. Therefore, *context models* include participants' interpretation, as well as constructions or definitions of aspects of the social environment that make discourse socially relevant and appropriate (van Dijk 2006: 163).

As a special kind of mental model, context models share the structural and functional characteristics mentioned above, so there is no point in repeating them. A brief mention should include two of them: First, they are dynamic as they constantly adapt to any possible changes occurring during the discursive interaction - the participants may update their knowledge during a conversation or as they read a text; or they may also change their opinion, emotions, goals, even their social identities within the same communicative interaction. Second, context models are pre-planned. They may be unique and personal, but this does not exclude that a large part of them are already

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constructed before participants engage in a communicative situation. For instance, the political actors in the present study have a large set of context models for a parliamentary debate or a political interview. Likewise, many of the goals they want to accomplish in a communicative situation are already defined on the basis of each political actor's context model.

What is important though in relation with the discourse production is that context models control how discourse is adjusted to the parameters of a specific communicative situation and becomes appropriate. Crucial here is the K-device that features in every context model and manages the linguistic choices made by the speaker in relation to what amount of knowledge is assumed by the speakers as taken-for-granted. A final point, which is extremely relevant to the realization of an epistemic stance, is that context models control not only how something is being said, but also what information of the situation model is appropriate to the current situation.

Before examining how context models can offer a new look at the study of the epistemic stance, we should briefly refer to the two following notions.

2.2.5. Common Ground and K-device

Common Ground defines shared knowledge in a specific communicative situation, i.e. within a specific context. There are various types of Common Ground, which may feature anything from the common knowledge of the same language/dialect to common ideology, norms and values. In fact, what Common Ground indicates is that participants share the same mental models, so a large part of the mutual knowledge may be left tacit, as it is assumed as shared and, thus, accepted. In this respect, the mental models of the speaker embed the assumed mental models of the other participants. Undoubtedly, those models of the others' models are incomplete and hypothetical, based on various assumptions made by the speakers regarding what their recipients might already know. Accordingly, on the basis of their context models, the speakers decide to presuppose aspects of knowledge that they interpret as irrelevant to the current communicative situation, and at the same time they assume that if the knowledge presupposed is not shared, the recipients will explicitly ask for it. The critical question here is how speakers exploit the Common Ground to accomplish their rhetorical, political and ideological goals. In other words, how on the basis of

their context models they intentionally assume what knowledge is already known and then they presuppose it or they explicitly represent it as commonly accepted, even though they are aware that the knowledge communicated does not form part of the Common Ground.

This whole process is managed by K-device, that controls which aspects of knowledge, beliefs, attitudes etc. will be explicitly realized -and by which linguistic means- in discourse, and which will remain implicit. More importantly, the K-device controls all the epistemic properties of discourse, including of course the expressions and means that realize evidential meaning, and operates in various levels of the knowledge management via the control of the following (van Dijk 2014: 227): Types of knowledge (what do I know); Source of (or access to) knowledge -how knowledge is acquired by the speakers; Quality of knowledge, which is related to the expression of the degree of the speakers confidence and certainty; Target of knowledge, which indicates deontic aspects of knowledge transmission (what recipients need to now); Entitlement of knowledge, which is concerned with the epistemic rights of the speaker with respect to the knowledge he communicates as well as with his role as authoritative source. Relevant to our study are the dimensions of Source, Quality and Entitlement.

2.2.6. Evidential meaning and mental models

On the basis of the framework of mental models discussed above, we will specifically examine how evidential meanings are constructed, distributed and comprehended in communicative situations. For what follows I draw on van Dijk (2014: 259-275). Just as in the previous approaches presented above, van Dijk (opts for an open set of grammatical and discursive linguistic resources that express evidentiality. Most importantly, he stresses the interactional and social function of evidentials which are not seen as mere indicators of the source of information and its validity, but as part of more complex epistemic strategies which establish, confirm and enhance the credibility of speakers, their reliability as a source of knowledge and as authority who had (privileged) access to reliable sources of information (ibid.: 269-270).

What determines the expression of evidentiality in discourse is the interplay between the participants old and new mental models. In order to explicitly or implicitly index

an assertion of a current or past event the source from which they may have acquired their knowledge, speakers should have represented it mentally in the first place. In other words, they should reactivate the old mental model in which they represent the evidential base of the knowledge being communicated. In this respect, a reference to a perception-based evidence, requires on the part of the speakers to reactivate the old mental model of that experience in which they feature as observers or experiencers. Similarly, they reactivate a mental model of experience when they refer to inferential evidence, which may in turn be based on knowledge acquired through the speakers' perception or through sensory manifestations represented in the speakers' generic knowledge. Regarding, discursive based, two separate mental models are independently activated, the semantic situation models (the propositional content of that discourse), and the pragmatic context model (the mental representation of the communicative situation with all the features spelled out above). As will be shown, Greek political actors seem to take advantage of the fact that these two models are separately accessible and, hence, they intentionally represent a gist of the content of the discourse produced by a third part, or in other cases not mitigate the role of the producer of that discourse.

It is also mentioned that old mental models represent the degree of access to the evidence as well as the degree of speakers' (inter)subjectivity towards the utterance. Applying the terms of Marín-Arrese (2013; 2015a), it can be claimed that the old mental models include the other two dimensions of evidential meaning, the type of access to the evidence, as well as the source [Self/Other] of evidence.

However the actual expression of evidential meaning in discourse is controlled and managed by the new models of the communicative situation constructed by both the speakers and recipients who are engaged in the communicative situation. This implies in the first place that Common Ground (see above) influences how speakers position themselves towards the knowledge they convey. Also, the context models of the speakers regulate what kind of information about the source of knowledge is relevant to the communicative situation, and more crucially, they control the strategic and legitimizing functions of the evidential meanings. On the basis of the speakers subjective interpretations of the communicative situation, the new context models manage the selection of the evidential resources in relation with the speakers'

intention to appear as credible source or to discredit alternative sources, and they also manage whether or the represented domain of evidence in the old model will be identically represented or it will be differentiated (e.g. what Mushin calls mismatch) in the new model.

2.2.7. Concluding remarks

This subsection was concerned with the sociocognitive approach to discourse production and comprehension. Specifically, we examined how the theory of context models can contribute to a discourse-oriented analysis of the construction of evidential meaning.

In the first place we examined the social and relative character of knowledge, as well as the inadequacy of the classical epistemological definition of knowledge as justified true belief when it comes to real life communication. In this respect, it becomes crucial to examine in which communicative context knowledge becomes justified, by whom, for whom, and according to what criteria. It was pointed out that these parameters were subjectively interpreted by the participants on the basis of a cognitive interface, social cognition, which mediates "reality" and discourse. Any type of knowledge that the speakers have about events, actions, participants etc. as well as beliefs, opinions etc. are represented in mental models, which in turn construct social cognition. In the following subsections, we elaborated on the structure and functions of both semantic models of communicative situations and pragmatic context models. The former represents what discourse is about, whereas the latter represent how discourse is realized in specific communicative settings. It appeared then that the construction of evidential meaning does not only require an activation of an old situation model representing the semantic content of the knowledge being conveyed or the domain of evidence in which it was originated, but also the activation of the old model of the communicative situation is required. It was shown that in real communicative settings is important to examine what extent of that knowledge is shared by the participants by the participants and, hence, taken for granted. In addition, what gains in importance in the discursive construction of evidential meaning is the interplay between old and new mental models, which largely determines not only the expression of evidential meaning in the current

communicative situation, but also the strategic use of the discursive construction of evidential meaning across the various communicative situations.

2.3. Legitimization, discourse and epistemicity

2.3.1. Epistemic Stance Strategies

Concepts such as authority, credibility, truthfulness, speaker's sincerity, evidential reliability have been directly linked with legitimization process, which means that legitimization strategies are closely related with the expression of epistemicity (Chilton 2004: 22; Hart 2010: 91; 2011: 6, Marín-Arrese 2015a: 263; 2015b: 211).

Still, though, discourse studies have paid little attention on how epistemicity and epistemic stance in particular can contribute to legitimization. As has been pointed out in 2.1.6., epistemicity consists of the concepts of epistemic support and epistemic justification. Both epistemic support and epistemic justification operate in a level above the proposition, since they belong to interpersonal metafunction (Hart 2010: 94). In this respect, epistemic stance indexes, in terms both of likelihood and validity, speakers' stance with respect to communicated assertions, and it can be seen as a mechanism for legitimization since it includes expressions regarding speakers' knowledge and evidence that support and/or justify their claims in making an assertion (Marín-Arrese 2011b: 790; 2015b: 211).

In general, a legitimization strategy is seen as a form of argumentation that endorses/ mitigates representations depending on the speaker's interests, power and authority, and it aims at overcoming any possible defensive mechanisms on the part of the hearer that largely control the acceptance/rejection of those representations assessing their truth and validity with respect to official and/or moral norms (Marín-Arrese 2015a: 261, Hart 2010: 90; 2011: 752, van Dijk 1998: 530). As said, institutional settings are the realms in which legitimization takes place. Also, they are the realms in which several interests are contested and challenged. Therefore, a speaker may exploit legitimization strategies or, in other words, he may exploit the linguistic resources available realizing a legitimizing strategy, in order to manipulate the audience and affect, and even control his beliefs, knowledge, actions etc. in desired ways, i.e. to

shape preferred context models of the events, actions and actors being represented in discourse.

At this point, a useful remark can be made as regards the terms that will be used in the rest of the chapter. In discourse, legitimization strategies operate in various levels. Most researchers provide a thorough account of their semantic enactment, i.e. what is being said, and, then, how it serves as a means of legitimization. Drawing on Hart's distinctions (see below) between legitimization of actions and legitimization of assertions, we will use the more specific term "epistemic stance strategies", instead of the more general term discursive "legitimization strategies". Epistemic stance strategies are solely related with the legitimization of assertions (Hart 2011: 757), and they are involved in strategic and context-depended realization of the various ES types observed in the previous chapter. They aim at 1) expressing the speaker's position regarding their commitment to the truth of their assertions and to the evidence that supports it; and 2) influencing the hearer's epistemic stance towards information conveyed in a way that aligns with the interests of the speaker. Along the same lines, Marín-Arrese (2011b; 2015a) proposes the term "epistemic legitimization strategies" which coincides with Hart's, since it refers to the "speaker/ writer's positioning regarding beliefs, knowledge and evidence that support or justify their claims when making an assertion" (2015b: 261). Despite the accuracy of both terms, we will use "epistemic stance strategies" because it is also seen to be consistent also in accordance with the concept of Epistemic Stance that has already been introduced.

Being primarily epistemic entails particular implications on how legitimization strategies function within discourse. They aim at the acceptance on the part of the hearer of a) the knowledge, which a speaker claims to have on the information being communicated, and b) the validity of the status of the information (Marín-Arrese 2013: 414). More critically, though, legitimization strategies are also deployed by speakers in order to strive for epistemic control. The speaker claims that has better knowledge and recognition of the 'real facts' (Chilton 2004: 117) and, therefore, he either boosts or attenuates the force of an assertion depending on whether or not is more or less aligned/distanced with what speaker's perceives as "reality". Epistemic control is a prerequisite in order one to establish his own preferred epistemic criteria on the basis of which he can, in turn, represent his beliefs, opinions, attitudes as being

generally shared knowledge. In this respect, epistemic legitimization strategies have significant ideological purposes as they influence hearers' mechanism of epistemic vigilance, and they actively contribute to manipulation of the audience regarding the veracity of the communicated assertions.

The relationship between legitimization, discourse and epistemicity should be identified with respect to the two domains of epistemic support, i.e epistemic modality, which indexes speaker's stance towards an assertion, and epistemic justification, i.e. evidentiality, which signals the source of the assertions.

In particular, epistemic support 'endorses representations of events by providing external coherence to claims through epistemic commitment based on evidence and authority' (Hart 2010: 170). Many studies that fall within the early tradition of critical linguistics and CDA (see among many Fairclough 1989; Fowler 1985; 1991; Werth 1999) have understood epistemic modality as a linguistic means by which scalar legitimated authority is expressed on the basis of personal, subjective judgments of validity and predictability attribute through modal forms to the proposition uttered. On the other hand, the realization of evidential categories is also important in strategic discourse. Speakers implicitly qualify the validity of proposition by referring to it's source (Saeed 2003: 143), whereas hearers may recognize the "force of evidence", which, in turn, may boost/attenuate and even substitute the confidence they have to the speaker (Sperber 2001). This brings again into discussion the issue of interrelation between epistemic support and epistemic justification, since speakers adopt a particular position regarding the truth of the proposition taking into account the basis of their source of information, and their intentions, aims and goals set for each communicative situation (Mushin 2001: 58).

2.3.2. Legitimization of assertions and legitimization of actions

Yet, the systematic analysis of semantic category of evidentiality –let alone the dynamic and discursive and interactional concept of epistemic stance- had been neglected in the relevant literature of (critical) discourse studies (see though Sinclair 1988; Fowler 1991; Fairclough 2003, van Dijk 2000; 2003; 2011; 2014). As a matter of fact, only attribution of utterances to a source external to the speaker, or "authorization" in van Leeuwen terms, has been directly or indirectly linked to the

discursive construction of legitimization. Attributions function as a (de)legitimizing device by indexing authorial distance from or endorsement to the external voice.

However, attributed utterances are only one discursive structure by which evidentiality is expressed. Evidentiality is also relevant to rationalization strategy since any reasoning process is related with cognitive based evidence, namely various types of inferences. Though, van Leeuwen does not make a direct connection between the two strategies (authorization and rationalization) and evidentiality nor he emphasizes the role that evidentiality in these strategies.

Hart (2010; 2011) has developed a typology of legitimization strategies which takes into account speaker's epistemic stance, i.e. the source of the assertion and the stance towards the assertion. Hence, he makes a macro-level binary distinction between legitimization of actions[4] and legitimization of assertions (2011: 756). In the present chapter attention is paid to the latter.

According to Hart, legitimization of assertions is required for legitimization of actions, and it is primarily conceived as 'a process by which speakers in order to overcome the epistemic safeguards of their audience, offer "guarantees" for the truth of their assertions in various forms of evidence' (Hart 2011: 757-8). This type of legitimization is realized by the semantic domains of evidentiality and epistemic modality, which both contribute to the external coherence of a proposition, i.e. to the situational and contextual relations among the discursive elements. The external coherence is related with issues such the sincerity/insincerity of the speaker; his reputation as competent and benevolent communicator; and finally with the degree of validity regarding the evidence on which his assertion is made. As has been pointed

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[4]Legitimization of actions is linked with the various strategies regarding the discursive representation of actor and actions as well as of their attributed positive or negative qualities. Drawing upon the work of Reisigl & Wodak (2001), Hart (2010) correlated the legitimization of action with the strategies of identification, framing and deictic positioning. Identification concerns which social actors are discursively realized, either explicitly or implicitly; in which semantic roles; and to what degree of salience. Framing is linked with the qualities, positive or negative, which are attributed to events, actors and action through several discursive structures, such as metaphors, predication etc.. Deictic positioning indexes the spatiotemporal and social relations between elements that constitute the discursive world, and the external 'reality'.

out earlier in this study, epistemic communities tend to assess differently the same evidence, as their epistemic criteria also alter from time to time and from community to community. What –or the one who- is considered reliable within a community in a particular historical period, may be seen as less or no reliable outside that community or even within the same community but in different historical context. Even though he treats epistemic modality and evidentiality as two separate domains, as other scholars do (Hardman 1986, Willet 1988; Boye & Harder 2010), Hart does not neglect the obvious connection between them, which has broadly pointed out in relevant literature (recall the relevant discussion in chapter 2.6.1.) and concerns the correspondence between the degree of likeability (certainty, possibility, probability) and the strength of evidence.

Evidentiality and epistemic modality are respectively connected with two interrelated legitimization strategies, objectification and subjectification. The former involves speaker's subjective qualification of the probability of an assertion with respect to its source or its evidential base. However, it is a primary hearer's oriented strategy, emphasizing the assessment made by hearer's part of the validity of the communicative utterance. The speaker stands back and consults and 'objective' authority.

Subjectification involves speaker's qualification of the probability of an assertion with respect to his own claim of authority as well as to his own experience. Contrary to objectification, it profiles the role of the speaker as an explicit appraiser in the evaluation of the reliability and the likelihood of the event communicated through the assertion. Hence, the speaker conceives himself as an authority. Both strategies co-construct legitimization in discourse aiming at persuading audience to accept preferable epistemic evaluations. Accordingly, they are involved in interpersonal metafunction and are both bound with the concept of authority.

Their theoretical origins can be traced back to the discussion on the diachronically differently defined notions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity[5]; however they are primarily related with the source and quality of evidence. Therefore, subjectification

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[5]See the discussion in 2.3.2.; see also Langacker (1987), Traugott (2010) and Nuyts (2012) for a discussion on the various notions of (inter)subjectivity.

can be related with the subjective marking of the information conveyed. As regards objectification, which is connected with the indexing of the source of information, it can related with the intesubjective marking, even though in Nuyt's analysis the "quality of evidence", a notion referring to evidentiality, is seen as indirect in terms of marking process (2012: 60). He may admit "assessors have better or worse evidence for assessing the existential status of a state of affairs and may sometimes want to signal it" (ibid), but in his view when an assessor typically indicates subjectivity, when (s)he has vague evidence, and, on the contrary, when it is quite likely for the assessor to indicate intersubjectivity in cases of strong evidence. It goes without saying that in real discursive interaction there are evident asymmetries between the degree of validity of a piece of evidence and the linguistic realization of the stance adopted by the speaker towards it. Nevertheless, objectification or, in other words the objective attribution of an information to a third source, also implies an agreement between the speaker and the audience on the epistemic criteria that qualified the status of the source. It also implies that the speaker acknowledges that the third source has a status and/or even an authority relevant to the situation is in which (s)he participates and this is why (s)he objectively attributes to that source the assertions conveyed. As was demonstrated, even in cases in which the speaker wants to overtly align/distance her/himself from the source and indicate her/his own personal stance for (de)legitimization purposes, (s)he may do so with pro/disclaimers which (s)he either knows/assumes that are already shared within the community of the addresses or discursively realizes in such a way as being commonly shared by the audience. Then, the common commitment -as well as the choice to particularly mark this commitment- of the speaker and the audience regarding the epistemic criteria or the stance towards the assertions of a third source makes it plausible to correlate objectification with intersubjective marking.

2.3.3. Discursive legitimization strategies in institutional settings

Within political contexts in general, and also within the current context of the European financial crisis in particular, the relevant literature has proposed several discursive strategies which are deployed in institutional settings, such parliament, mass media etc.

Even though the historical and political context significantly differs from the one in which we are interested in the present study, Reyes (2011) provides a comprehensive typology of legitimization strategies deployed in the discourse of two ex USA Presidents. In particular, he examines how George W. Bush and Barrack Obama, both coming from two distinct political traditions, republicans and democrats respectively, manage to justify the action the US military force presence in two armed conflicts, specifically Iraq (2007) Afghanistan (2009) during the so-called "war on terror".

Reyes concludes that he has identified five legitimization strategies (2011: 785-787). 1) Legitimization through emotions. This type operates through the appeal to emotions, which "allows social actors to skew the opinion of their interlocutors or audience regarding a specific matter" (2011: 787). As matter of fact, this is a particular type of constructive strategy as it realizes the "us vs. them" by which positive qualities are attributed to the in-groups, whereas negatives ones are attributed to the out-groups, and therefore positive and negative emotions are respectively triggered to the audience. Despite his attention to emotion, Reyes does not integrates any insights of cognitive and/or evolutionary psychology neither he implements the findings of relevant works in discourse studies (see for instance Chilton 2004; Hart 2010; 2014). 2) Legitimization through hypothetical future is concerned with how it becomes justified the call for present actions in order an anticipated threat to be efficiently confronted. 3) The third type is legitimization through rationality, which is enacted by reference to a reasoning process that justifies the actions presented. This type totally corresponds to theoretical rationalization sub-category in van Leeuwen's classification. 4) Voices of expertise is the fourth type of legitimization strategy, and it is deployed in order to prove that experts in a specific field back with their authoritative knowledge the action proposed by the politicians, Obviously this type coincides with authorization legitimization strategy proposed by van Leeuwen. 5) Last but not least, is altruism. As a legitimization strategy, altruism makes sure that speakers argue on their proposals in a way that does not seem to be prevailed by personal interests but rather by the common good. It is quite plausible to claim that Reye's altruism shares many features with van Leeuwen's moral evaluation, as both strategies emphasize on the significance of commonly shared and established moral values as a means for successful justification of actions.

Focusing on the European economic crisis, Vaara (2014) analyzes the discourse of Finnish media on the issue, and concludes that six different types of legitimization strategies were indentified (Vaara 2014: 506-514): position based authorization, which includes institutional authorities and the "voices of common people"; knowledge based authorization, i.e. voices of scholars or experts on a field; rationalization; moral evaluation, which is mainly concerned with the (un)fair nature of the economic policies proposed, asked or implemented in the Eurozone; mythopoesis which is realized by alternative future projections as well as by the contrast between present and future narratives; and, finally, cosmology, a type of legitimization strategies that operates by reference to an argumentation of inevitability, the so-called TINA argument, massively exploited on the dominant discourses in the European economic crisis.

Fonseca & Ferreira (2015) examine legitimization in the current context of economic crisis in Portugal, and distinguish four main strategies: 1) "State of exception". This strategy is used when the speaker refers to exceptionality of the situation, which in turn justifies the necessity of actions proposed (2015: 687). 2) Blame allocation. In their findings, Fonseca & Ferreira (2015: 692-693) argue that blame allocation strategy is used both in Us vs. Them dichotomy and in narratives about the causes of the crisis. 3) No alternative options and appeal to emotions. This strategy is mainly realized by past and future narratives that both a) delegitimize any alternative actions and justify the action proposed by the speaker who claims that this action is the only one that adheres to shared moral values and "common sense", and b) aim at triggering specific emotions to the audience (2015: 694-695). 4) Effectiveness. The speaker exploits the strategy of the effectiveness when he presents the merits and positive outcomes of the action they propose. In this sense, the action is justified by reference to its useful nature (2015: 703).

Never the less, all of the above typologies solely focus on the semantic level of legitimization, i.e. on what is being said. They neglect two more important aspects of any legitimizing process, i.e. how legitimization is constructed; and how discourse itself serves as a means of legitimization, that is how discourse becomes self-legitimizing. In this respect, we should recall the work of Rojo & van Dijk's (1997) work on legitimization, which draws upon van Leeuwen's classification, but, what is

more, it sheds light on the two above mention aspects. Briefly, on semantic level they distinguish 10 different legitimization strategies:1) Legality; 2) Legal procedures; 3) Authorization; 4) Normality and standing procedures; 5) Consensus; 6) Comparison; 7) Special circumstances, seriousness and threat; 8) Carefulness; 9) Negative other-presentation and positive self-presentation; and 10) Concession and denial.

More importantly Martin-Rojo & van Dijk (1997: 542) explore how legitimization is discursively formed by particular structures and choices in various levels of expression (syntax, rhetoric, argumentation, lexical style etc.). They identify five main aspects of legitimizing discourse: 1) Lexical style; 2) Syntactic structures and semantic roles; 3) Rhetorical structures; 4) Argumentation; and 5) Integration. Lexical style includes all particular choices by which actions and actors are discursively represented as well as the evaluative expressions referred to both of them. In other words, it is examined how referential and predication strategies contribute to the persuasive functions of discourse and, what is more, to the formation of the preferred mental models. In the analysis of the syntactic structures and semantic roles, the authors pay attention to the strategic use of passive and active voice verb structures as well as the use of normalizations. By emphasizing rhetorical structures, it is analyzed the contribution of particular figures of speech, such as hyperbole, metaphor, euphemism, irony, repletion etc, to the legitimization process. As for argumentative structures, it goes without saying that they function as persuasive devices or, in other words, as a means indicating "a successful intentional effort at influencing another's mental state through communication in a circumstance in which the persuadee has some measure of freedom" (O' Keefee 2002:5). Especially in political settings, argumentation, as any discursive structure, is a vehicle of access, control and even abuse of power, being related with collective decision making as well as with mobilizing of audience towards common goals and values (Zarefski 2009: 115). Iaţcu-Fairclough (2009) points out that legitimization strategies are inherently argumentative as they invoke socially shared systems of norms and beliefs, and provide justifications for answering questions that prevail political field, such as "what ought to be done?" or "what be best to do?". In her view, legitimization is a social, political and argumentative practice (ibid.: 133). Therefore, political actors exploit legitimizing arguments not only in order to persuade audience, but also in order to obtain and maintain political power concealing, thus, contradicting interest

and demands, and establishing desired systems of beliefs and norms. Last but not least, integration refers to all textual devices available to the speaker in order to accomplish the legitimization procedure. That is, the same semantic strategies may be used for different representations depending on the context of the communicative situation as well as on the particular level of expression (lexical style, rhetorical structures etc.) which constructs legitimization.

Apart from emphasizing on what and how is being said in legitimizing discourse, Martin-Rojo & van Dijk explore the means by which discourse can legitimize itself, i.e. the self-attributing of its authority through its objective style. In fact, self-legitimizing discourse occurs when "the power and authority of the institutions and of its representative are evoked, maintained and reproduced by means of several discursive choices" (1997: 550).

Three moves of self-legitimizing discourse have been identified: First, the monopolization of social legitimacy. Hence, the source of discourse is legitimized through of process of investiture which operates on the basis of the image created by the political actor which supposedly has to be in accordance with the representation of the authority. The second move is the monopolization of the truth which allows the speaker to present his discourse as a pure reflection of the reality. In this respect, a process of objectivation takes place enabling speaker to establish his representations, which in turn are part of his personal mental models, as true and trustworthy. Here, the speaker aims at making vivid the opposition between true and false. The third move is the consistent use of linguistic and discursive forms that are socially appropriate, constructing thus a discursive territory which serves as a means of knowing, and is being prevailed by a particular "reality" which maintains its own actors, actions, beliefs, norms, values and social hierarchies.

Given all the above, the pivotal role of context in general (Vaara & Tienari 2008: 986) and context models in particular becomes apparent. All the legitimization typologies proposed were realized by particular choices from all levels of discourse adapted to a given context, i.e. they were considered by the speaker relevant to the contextual features of the communicative situation in which they appeared (Ahonen 2009). Therefore, it appears that a general classification can be implemented, but crucial differences in sub-categories or it semantic features of the main categories are

depended on the discursive, social, organizational and historical context of discourse production and comprehension. Similarly, the linguistic and discursive choices are those who are relevant to the communicative situation within which participants are engaged. In other words, their choices are controlled by their personal context models on the basis of which he interprets the properties and features of that communicative situation.

2.3.4. Concluding remarks

In the third part of study's theoretical background we examined the legitimization process in institutional and political settings and introduced the concept of legitimization strategy which referred to "argumentation that endorses/ mitigates representations depending on the speaker's interests, power and authority, and it aims at overcoming any possible defensive mechanisms on the part of the hearer that largely control the acceptance/rejection of those representations assessing their truth and validity with respect to official and/or moral norms". Then, as we argued for the need of methodological distinction between legitimization of actions and assertions, and following Hart's (2010) typology, we elaborated on epistemic stance strategies which are concerned with legitimization of assertions, and they have a dual aim: a) to express the speaker's position regarding their commitment to the truth of their assertions and to the evidence that supports it; and 2) to influence the hearer's epistemic stance towards information conveyed in a way that aligns with the interests of the speaker. It was also shown that the linguistic resources used for the expression of evidentiality significantly contribute to legitimization of assertions and shed light on the discursive construction of authority. In the last subsection, it was provided a cross-linguistic overview of various classifications of discursive legitimization strategies, within all of which the pivotal role of context was recognized.

3. Methodology and Data

In this Chapter we will present the methodology that we adopt for the analysis of ES types within their Greek political context as well as for the analysis of their legitimizing function. The third section features a detailed table of the data that were analyzed in the present study.

3.1. Classification of Epistemic Stance Types

Starting from the standpoint that knowledge consists of socially shared justified beliefs, the preliminary principle of the present study was that the discursive expression of evidential meanings should be analyzed by focusing on the interactional parameters that pertain to this process. The first direct implication of this position was not only to understand evidentiality in its broad terms, but to elaborate on the dynamic notion of an epistemic stance which a) sees the positioning of the speaker towards the knowledge (s)he communicates as a form of social action; b) recognizes that the expression of evidential meaning it is reduced to the marking of the source of information, but it also involves speakers' evaluation; and c) it articulates various dimensions related with that process, such as the speakers' evaluation about the degree of credibility of the domain of evidence from which knowledge was acquired; the speakers' evaluation of the degree of certainty and validity of the assertion they communicate; the speakers' degree of responsibility towards the assertion.

Being situated in actions entails that epistemic positioning is situated in discourse, which in turn entails that it is situated in context. For this reason, we mostly draw on the concepts of ES and EEP as proposed respectively by Marín-Arrese and Mushin. As explained, we kept the balanced and abstract scheme of the evidential dimensions as described in ES and within it we embedded the bottom-up classification developed in EPP. We informed this merged model by an explicit socio-cognitive theory of context (van Dijk) that provides the theoretical framework for the production, distribution and comprehension of evidential meaning in real life communicative situations.

In this respect, we maintain the basic distinction of the three evidential domains (experiential, cognition and communicative). However, since under the category of

experiential evidential we include not only sensory acquired evidence, but also evidence acquired through emotions, we rename it to personal experience domain evidence. Likely and in order to emphasize the discursive and contractual character of our analysis, we also opt for the term discursive evidentiality instead of communicative. To this three categories, we added a new one that does not any of the above evidential domains. This is the case when the speakers refer to "facts" and commonly accepted truths, so they consider irrelevant to explicitly refer to the domain of evidence from which they acquired their knowledge, because it actually adds nothing to the validity of the information being conveyed. This category is called "Expression of truth-factual validity" and is also found in recent work of Marín-Arrese (2015a). The other two evidential dimensions, mode of knowing and source remain the same.

In these three categories we embed the EPS Types proposed by Mushin (2001), but in our analysis we significantly broaden the set of the linguistic resources that realize them, as we include resources and discursive structures that appeared in our data and not in her analysis which took place in a totally different setting. From now on instead of EPS we will use the term of ES as it is more accurate.

Respectively, Personal experience ES is included in personal experience domain of evidence. Inferential ES is included in cognitive domain of evidence. In the same evidence we include the explicit expression of knowledge through all verb typed of cognitive factive verbs as well as the expression of counterfactual state of affairs. Reportive ES is included in the discursive domain of evidence. Again, in order to emphasize the dynamic character of the process of discursive representation, we propose the term Discursive ES, instead of the formal and narrow in its scope Reportive ES. Factual ES is includes in the category or expression of truth-factual validity. The last category of Mushin's model is the Imaginative ES and refers to the expression of irrealis world through folklore and fairytale. It was expected to find such data given the context that she researched. On the contrary the political of our study never realized such an ES type, so Imaginative ES is excluded from our analysis. The closest structure to the Imaginative ES is the counterfactuals which are analyzed in the cognitive domain of evidence since they are typical products of the

speakers' reasoning process, but they have some particular characteristics making them different to Inferential ES.

3.2. Analyzing Epistemic Legitimization

In order to shed light on the role of epistemic positioning within the process of legitimizing assertions, we follow a crucial distinction made by Hart (2011), who draws on Bednarek's (2006a) earlier work, between averred and attributed assertions. Along the same lines, Marín-Arrese (2011b) distinguishes personal evidentiality on a macro level, a category that includes averred assertions, and mediated evidentiality, which includes attributed assertions.

Averred assertions echo the voice of the speaker her/himself (Hunston 2000: 178) and they are based on a(n) specified (Personal experience, cognitive, communicative) or unspecified base of knowledge, i.e. domain of evidence in Marrín-Arese terms. Attributed assertions, on the contrary, are derived from someone other than the speaker (Hunston 2000: 178), and they are subsequently linked to what many epistemologists classify as hearsay and mindsay. However, as we will see in section 4.3.3., attributed assertions may include older discourses of the speaker himself. Also, it must be noted that attribution and averral may be present in the same utterance, because in many cases an attribution can be embedded in an averred utterance (Hunston 2000: 179). Complementary to this, we also implement the two micro-strategies of objectification and subjectification in our data, which successfully interrelates the degree of the source's reliability to the degree of the speaker's commitment.

The distinction mentioned above apparently refers to one of the three evidential values, i.e. the source of knowledge, which is closely related to the act of legitimization. As for averred assertion, the analysis that follows shows how political actors, being engaged in a particular context, interpret their evidential standing as a source of knowledge and contribute to the legitimization of their assertions by making specific linguistic choices. On the other hand, the analysis of attributed assertions can be highly complex, and, what is more, the very act of attribution can take various forms, concerning the particular linguistic choices by which it is realized, or the degree to which the speaker distances himself from or aligns himself with the external

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voice. It becomes apparent, then, that the contribution of source-tagging to the legitimization process is quite evident: controversial claims are communicated with the speaker avoiding accountability. As Sinclair (1988: 8) points out, attributed assertions transfer responsibility for what is being said, and, what is more, they reflect the speaker's epistemic assessment towards the sources of knowledge he represents in his discourse. It should be noted here that source tagging and attributed assertion may be both used for legitimization of the speaker's own claims as well as for delegitimization of his opponents' position. In the former case, the source of knowledge which the speaker mediates is considered as reliable, so he attempts to align his own position with that source, whereas in the latter case the status of the source is deliberately degraded.

Epistemic positioning, though, co-articulates two more evidential parameters which should be also taken into account; domain of evidence and mode of knowing. When information is discursively constructed and communicated, both parameters are correlated with the notion of reliability as well as with the various degrees of the speaker's responsibility towards the conveyed information.

It goes without saying that different domains of evidence have different degrees of reliability, and therefore are strategically deployed when one wants to legitimize his assertions. In general (Willet 1988; Matlock 1989: 215), perceptual evidence is considered more reliable than inferences or reported evidence. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that reliability can be identified solely in relation to evidential values. On the other hand, its degrees are determined to a great extent independently as contextual parameters prevail: who utters what; under which occasion; for what purpose etc. (Cornillie 2009: 46). Hence, reliability is related to how those contextual properties are interpreted by the hearer in a particular communicative situation.

Similarly, mode of knowing refers to the distinction between direct and indirect access to evidence. Direct access is linked to the sensory domain of evidence, and some kinds of inferences that are based on sensory evidence directly perceived by the speaker. On the other hand, indirect access primarily involves any evidence derived from a third source, i.e. not the speaker, as well as inferences that are not supplemented by external sensory, but by general world knowledge or the speaker's own previous experiences. Typically, an inferential process based on external sensory

evidence corresponds to a stronger epistemic commitment, whereas a conjecture, with the speaker taking fully account of it, indexes a weaker evaluation (Givon 1982). According to Matlock (1989: 215), both types of inferences index lower degree certainty compared to indirect reported evidence.

However, it occurs that in real life communication settings, in general, and in political ones, that are highly institutionalized, the contextual categories, such as the position of the speaker, the narrow and broader goals of the communication etc, determine the interpretation of the above mentioned evidential categories, which in turn affects their discursive realization. It appears that speakers' assessments are largely controlled by their own context models as well as by the assessments they assume their recipients have stored in their context models.

Yet, a full account of how legitimization is discursively constructed and how it operates though epistemic legitimization strategies should not only include the three core evidential values but three more parameters: the degree of salience or overtness of the speaker's designation in the utterance; the degree of the speaker's responsibility/accountability of the veracity of the information; and the degree of the speaker's commitment to the force of his assertions.

Regarding the first parameter, three more degrees can be distinguished (Marín-Arrese 2013: 429): explicit, implicit and virtual reference to the speaker. Regarding explicit reference, the speaker is designated as himself being the source of knowledge. Hence, the validity assigned by hearers depends on the evidential standing of the speaker as a source of information (White 2006: 64). At this point it is necessary to recall the discussion on context models and how they control discourse comprehension. In this respect, the authority and the validity of the speaker are properties that are stored in participants' context models so the whole operation of the legitimization process is largely controlled by the interpretation of those properties and how they become relevant to a particular communicative situation.

Therefore, and despite the fact that the higher the degree of explicitness, the more subjectively profiled the information communicated is, hearers may consider the communicated information more reliable given the evidential standing of the speaker. Implicit reference is linked to the epistemic modal expressions, since the presence of

the speaker is indexed by his subjective epistemic assessments regarding the degree likelihood of the proposition. As for virtual reference, a conceptualizer is also implicitly evoked, but in a generalized fashion through impersonal predicates that defocus any mental activity.

With respect to the second parameter, the degree of responsibility, three degrees are additionally distinguished: personal, shared and opaque (Marín-Arrese 2013: 430). Personal responsibility indicates that the speaker personally subscribes to the assertion communicated. It is thus realized by expressions which explicitly convey that the speaker's assertions are part of his own conception of reality. Shared responsibility indexes the existence of a collective subject, which typically includes the speaker himself and other participants in the communicative situation. Accordingly, it is realized by expressions that include the inclusive 'we'. Opaque responsibility neither indexes personal nor shared responsibility and the speaker is not explicitly designated. It can be argued that it is realized by expressions that constitute what Cap calls "common ground" (2006; 2008; 2013), which enacts credibility; imposes common discursive goals; and unifies different discursive parties in a common concept of reality which "does not yield any more explanatory power than what comes from the traditional understanding of the concept" (Cap 2008: 27).

The third crucial parameter is concerned with the degree of the speaker's commitment to the force of their assertions. The speaker can either consciously enhance or mitigate in order to "align more closely with or distance himself or herself from the assertion through the degree of commitment expressed" (Berlin 2008: 375). Strategic deployment of enforcing/mitigating commitment takes place independently of the speaker's actual belief in the content of the assertion communicated, so it becomes highly context-sensitive in terms of discursive realization. Therefore, under a critical perspective, it is actually seen as an efficient means of gaining epistemic control over the audience, and manipulating the recipient's perception (Marín-Arrese 2015a: 263). In addition, the concept of commitment is related to that of entitlement (Brandom 2000: 193), which also indicates that its nature is heavily contextually dependent. A speaker is entitled to make assertorial commitments given the very context of the communicative situation and her/his role/position as a speaker within it. For instance, in some contexts, an eyewitness has a high degree of credibility which involves

features of entitlement, whereas in others, an expert may be entitled to make more credible assertorial commitments. Respectively, in our analysis the three Prime Ministers are apparently entitled to index their degree of commitment towards their assertions as they have a role extremely relevant to the communicative situation, vested in institutional authority. Their position within the political field entails access to particular forms of discourse, and hence, knowledge, both being available to specific members of the political elite.

The speaker's commitment can be distinguished into three separate levels. The first level indicates full commitment, which is mainly realized by expressions that typically imply the validity of the proposition. In her study of parliamentary discourse, Marín-Arrese (2015a) refers to cognitive factive predicates and impersonal factive predicates as the main resources enhancing speakers' commitment. The second degree is concerned with the expression of medium commitment. This degree allows the speaker either to avoid full enhancement or even to mitigate his commitment to the utterance. Therefore, linguistic resources that explicitly profile his subjective beliefs and convey tentativeness, such as cognitive non-factive predicates, are the most typical ones for indicating medium degree of commitment. The third degree is linked with speaker's evasion of committing himself to the utterance. Evasion is related to what Brandt (2004) observes as "aphonic stance", i.e. the use of a language that is characterized by intentional obscurity and imprecision. Bull (2008) suggests that aphonic stance is quite relevant to political discourse because evasive language is generally evident in political contexts. However, in the data of our study it seems that political actors avoid adopting aphonic stance, since appearing as though having a lack of knowledge, signaled by hypothetical, dubitative or non-assertive expressions, is considered harmful to a speaker's status and authority as a source of information.

3.3. The data of the study

The data of the research include texts (spoken and written) of the Prime Ministers (George Papandreou, Lukas Papademos and Antonis Samaras) as well the Ministers of Finance (George Papakonstantinou, Evangelos Venizelos and Yiannis Stournaras) from 2010 to 2012. They also include texts produced by Venizelos and Samaras

during the last legislative elections. The corpus consists of various genres of political discourse, such as parliamentary speeches; interviews; official statements; press conferences; electoral campaign discourses; speeches to unions etc.

The data are mainly retrieved from the official pages of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance, whereas in some cases were collected from the personal pages of George Papandreou, Evangelos Venizelos and George Papakonstantinou. With the exception of Papademos who is a technocrat, the selection is limited to texts of PASOK and Nea Dimokratia members, because these parties were (and still are) memorandum supporters.

As regards the time span of the data, the selection is based on division made in section 1.2. Accordingly, the period of crisis under study can be divided in the following five sub-periods:

- 1/3- 6/5/2010 (First memorandum)
- 1/5- 30/6/2011 (Medium Term Economic Program, squares' movement)
- 1/1/2012- 12/2 2012 (Second memorandum)
- 1/4/ - 17/6/2012 (Double legislative elections)
- 1/10/2012- 7/11/ 2012 (labor market reform, midterm fiscal program)

More concretely:

March-May 2010

George Papandreou	**George Papakonstantinou**
Speeches	**Speeches**
Parliament: 9	Parliament: 5
Cabinet's Meeting: 6	Parliamentary Group: 1
Parliamentary Group: 3	
Other: 1	
Interviews: 2	**Interviews:** 3
Statements: 1	
Total: 22	**Total: 8**

Total: 30

Table 3.1. Data from the period March-May 2010.

May-June 2011

George Papandreou	**Evangelos Venizelos**
Speeches	**Speeches**
Parliament: 3	Parliament: 7
Cabinet's Meeting: 1	

Other: 1
Interviews: 1   **Interviews:** 2
Statements: 2
Total: 8   **Total: 9**

Total: 17

Table 3.2. Data form the period May-June 2011.

January-February 2012

Loukas Papademos   **Evangelos Venizelos**
Speeches   **Speeches**
Parliament: 1   Parliament: 1
Cabinet's meeting: 1   Parliamentary Group: 2

Interviews: 1   **Interviews:** 2
Statements: 2   **Statements:** 2
Total: 5   **Total: 7**

Total: 12

Table 3.3. Data from the period January-February 2012.

April-June 2012

Antonis Samaras   **Evangelos Venizelos**
Speeches   **Speeches**
Election Campaign: 3   Election Campaign: 2

Interviews: 3   **Interviews:** 5
Opinion Article: 1
Total: 7   **Total: 7**

Total: 14

Table 3.4. Data from the period April-June 2012.

October-December 2012

Antonis Samaras   **Yiannis Stournaras**
Speeches   **Speeches**
Parliament: 2   Parliament: 2
Parliamentary group: 1
Other: 1
Interviews: 1   **Interviews:** 1
Statements: 1   **Statements:** 1
Total: 6   **Total: 4**

Total: 10

Table 3.5. Data from the period October-December 2012.

3.4. Concluding remarks

In what preceded, we outlined the methodological framework that will be applied to
the analytical part of the study concerned with the spelling out of various ES types

found in the data as well as with their legitimization function within the given political context. In relation with the objectives and the aims of the study, the framework should operate both in micro- and macro-level of analysis.

We draw on the triangular model of classifying evidential resources proposed by Marín-Arrese (2013) and developed in Cornillie et al. (2015) that features three core evidential values (domain of evidence, mode of knowing, and source of knowledge). However, we applied some minor terminological changes. Within that framework, we embedded the various EPS types (with the exception of Imaginative EPS) spelled out in Mushin's work (2001), but in our analysis a much broader set of linguistic resources will be examined. To this scheme was included a detailed theory of context, which as was argued it was seen as a prerequisite for a discourse-oriented analysis of evidential meaning.

As for legitimization strategies, we argued for the methodological necessity of two macro-distinctions. The first was concerned with a division between legitimization of assertions and legitimization of actions, whereas the second was specifically related with the legitimization of actions and featured a dichotomy between attributed and averred utterances. Our framework was then supplemented by the insights of Marín-Arrese about the discursive realization of the various degrees of a) speakers' salience in utterance; b) speakers' commitment towards the assertion; and c) speakers' responsibility as regards the information being conveyed.

The last section provided detailed overview about the data used in the study, and featured information about the identity of the speakers as well as about the genre to which each examined discourse belonged.

4. Epistemic Stance in Greek political discourse

4.1. Personal Experience domain of evidence

4.1.1. General

In this section we examine how personal experience ES (as discussed above) is discursively realized in the Greek political context. Mushin in her analysis comments on the linguistic means that realize the expressive function of language, including virtually any element denoting a speaker's direct and conscious perceptual experience, i.e. the inevitably private access to emotions and sensations. Typically, the linguistic means realizing this type of ES are in the 1st person reference of verbs expressing either sensory acquired evidence or emotional states, such as feelings etc.; expressive language as well as elements bearing an affective meaning. Making a reference to this type of evidence, the speaker indexes knowledge to which (s)he has private and exclusive access. Therefore, this type of knowledge is accessed directly by the speaker, who can be the only source [+Self] of it, and it is linked with both a high degree of certainty (largely dependent on the context) and empathy. As said before, a speaker deploys this type of ES in order to express knowledge that typically is not privately accessed, and (s)he thus triggers specific rhetorical implications. One can hardly challenge the knowledge that is expressed in such terms.

In what follows we examine how personal experience evidence occurs in the data of our study. First, we examine the expression of emotional states and then we move on to the realization of evidence acquired through the speaker's senses.

4.1.2. Emotion based evidence

Strictly defined, i.e. from a biological perspective, emotions involve changes to body systems that mobilize and dispose an organism to behave in particular ways (Turner 1996; 1999). Emotions are also embedded in social structures and cultures (Turner 2007: 66). As people interact face to face they arouse emotions, which are generated under specific sociocultural conditions, which in turn are shaped and/or changed

under the influence of those emotions (ibid.). The close relationship[6] between emotions and politics (Edelman 1967: 5) was identified since the first attempt for a systematic analysis of political discourse, Aristotle's "Rhetoric", where *pathos*, i.e. the discursive construction of the emotional response the speaker intends to trigger in the audience (Amossy 2014: 303), is considered among the three crucial objectives of persuasion - the other two are logos and ethos. The aim of pathos is to trigger intense emotion through rhetorical instigation (Reisigl 2008: 97), so it is opposed to the argumentative character of logos, while for Weber emotions are associated with irrationality (Weber 1978 [1922]). On the other hand, a cognitive approach to emotions suggests that emotions are internal to the cognitive processes so they play an important role in decision-making (Barret et al. 2002: 291; see also Damasio 1994; Cosmides & Tooby 2000).

Tannen (2003:19) claims that Western cultures perceive some genres of political discourse, such as political interviews, in a way that privileges emotional tension over consensus and co-operation. Emotional appeals in political discourse can also have direct legitimizing, i.e. justifying, effects (Reyes 2011: 785) and they may turn into effective means of emotive coercion (Chilton 2004: 118). Besides, as many studies in the field of social psychology have shown (e.g. Aronson 2003, Molek-Kozakowska 2010, Moir 2010), people's choices and decisions are often motivated by simple emotions. Within the context of the Greek crisis, studies from a psychological and sociological perspective (e.g. Demertzis et al. 2011, Georgiadou et al. 2012, Potamianos et al. 2015) have shown that the discursive construction of the significant life changes entailed by the implemented austerity policies has triggered and then intensified an emotional "recession" (Davou & Demertzis 2013: 114) among the Greek citizens, who experience both basic (anger, fear) as well as social (despair, shame) emotions (ibid.: 96).

4.1.2.1. Shared emotions

It may sound absurd in the first place to talk about shared emotions in a sense that one can have access to her/his own private emotional domains, but (s)he cannot directly access the private domains of others. In this respect, only inferences can be made

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[6] As a matter of fact, Chilton claims that specific emotions are automatically stimulated in the political use of language (2004: 204).

about what a third person feels, which may be based on either sensory evidence, i.e. one sees or hears the emotional reactions of a third person and, therefore, assumes how (s)he might feel, or discourse- based, someone has learned from a third source about another's feelings.

Political actors, though, express how others may feel. As said before, such kinds of mismatches are quite efficient as rhetorical tools, so it is expected from political actors to take advantage of them. What is more, it seems that political actors interpret one of the basic features of their institutional identity in a way that makes it relevant for them to express others' feelings. The notion of "representativeness" is inherent to the organization of Western Civic Democracies. Within that political context, political actors do not solely express themselves, nor do they speak for themselves when they are engaged in communicative situations in which they have to perform as political actors. Rather they simultaneously represent their party, their voters, different social/political groups etc. Therefore, it is implied that they are in a position not just to know, but also to have access to others' feelings. Nevertheless, this is just a rhetorical trick, which contributes to the accomplishment of their strategic aims and goals. Here, the intervention of the context models of political actors is crucial, because it rests precisely on the basis of those models, which are unique and personal for every communicative situation in which they are engaged, they interpret the properties of their identity, as well as the properties related to the situation, such goals and aims, and they accordingly adapt their linguistic choices. This is the case of (1)[7]:

(1)   Τώρα μπαίνουμε στη νέα φάση, και είναι κρίμα να χάσουμε αυτή την
        ευκαιρία, αφού κάναμε τόσο κουράγιο και αφού κάναμε τέτοιον αγώνα
        και υποστήκαμε τέτοιες θυσίες. Από τους πολίτες ζητούμε να σεβαστούν
        τις δικές τους θυσίες.

        Now we enter a new phase and it's a pity to lose this opportunity, since
        we had had the heart and made such a struggle and suffered such
        sacrifices. We ask the citizens to respect their own sacrifices.

        [Venizelos, Ethnos Interview, 4/5/2012]

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[7] In order to provide a better understanding of the original texts, all translated excerpts maintain any structural, grammatical, syntactic and lexical 'idiosyncrasies' when necessary.

The passage is derived from a print interview of Venizelos in the period of the 2012 election campaign. Venizelos adopts a more personal tone through the expression 'it's a pity' that reflects his own feelings. The political actor seeks to evoke a sense of empathy with the readers adopting this more informal style, which also includes the use of metaphors, such as 'struggle' or 'sacrifices'. However, he avoids fully engaging himself as he opts for first plural person verb types ('we had had'; 'We ask'). Given that this is the conclusion of his answer, the speaker aims particularly at emotionally affecting the audience, a move that is considered complementary to the more formal style that he had adopted for the major part of his reply.

In our data, though, there are some instances in which politicians felt it was appropriate –if not necessary- to express their own purely subjective view of the information they conveyed. The reason for doing so is that the event to which politicians refer is an event beyond politics that calls for everyone's empathy. On such instance was the death of three bank employees[8] during the protest on 5/5/10, the day on which the fist bail-out program was discussed in the Parliament. The following passage (2) is from the beginning of George Papandreou's speech on that date:

(2)   Είμαστε όλοι βαθιά συγκλονισμένοι από τον άδικο θάνατο τριών εργαζομένων, συμπολιτών μας. Συμπολίτες μας που έπεσαν θύματα μιας ωμής δολοφονικής ενέργειας. Εκεί οδηγεί η ανεξέλεγκτη βία, εκεί οδηγεί η πολιτική ανευθυνότητα.

We all are deeply shocked by the unfair death of three employees, our fellow citizens. Our fellow citizens were the victims of a raw criminal action. This is where uncontrolled violence leads; this is where political irresponsibility leads.

[Papandreou, Parliamentary Speech, 5/5/2010]

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[8] As a response to the proposed first bail-out program, the General Confederation of Greek Workers called a nation-wide strike on May 5. The estimated people who matched in the streets of Athens vary from 100.000 to 500.000. Be as it may, this was one of the most massive strikes since the early '80s, which was to be haunted by the death of three bank employees. At the riots during the protest, protesters set fire to a Marfin Bank branch, throwing Molotov cocktail bombs. Even though this was a strike day, many employees of the bank, like many employees of the private sector in general, had gone to their jobs and were working inside the building at the time of the attack. Most of them managed to escape, but three did not make it in time and died of asphyxiation from the bomb's toxic fumes.

Papandreou adopts personal experience ES in the first clause, but he represents his feelings, intersubjectively shared, via the use of the first plural person verb type ('we all are deeply shocked'). This may seem controversial in the first place, because the Prime Minister cannot have literal access to others' emotional states. Yet, the particular grammatical choice is not considered irrelevant to the specific situation. First, the incident to which the speaker refers was so shocking that it was plausible to infer that also others -not only himself- is emotionally affected by it. Moreover, this inference was further strengthened by the fact that various social and political groups as well as individuals had already publicly expressed their feelings. Therefore, this is a case of an epistemic mismatch since an inference is represented as an experience-acquired by evidence, but by no means has a strategic function as the discourse unfolds. Second, particular features which shape the identity of the "Prime Minister" are represented in the speaker's context model and become activated during the discursive interaction. Respectively, the political actor considers it relevant to talk on behalf of a collective subject.

4.1.2.2. Personal emotions

Since cases such as the one briefly discussed just above are rare in our data, it is far more relevant to examine how perception-based evidentiality is realized in the discourse of Greek politicians. Attention is paid to sensory verbs as well as to discursive markers and fixed expressions that also index perception and sensory based evidence.

(3)   Και η δική μου οργή είναι τεράστια, όταν καθημερινά και συνέχεια
        βλέπω να αναδύονται από τα Υπουργεία, από τη διαχείριση του πλούτου
        του Ελληνικού λαού, η τραγωδία της ανευθυνότητας, η αντίληψη του
        πλιάτσικου που επικρατούσε, η απόλυτη ασυδοσία και αναισθησία.

        And my fury is great as well, when daily and constantly I see the tragedy
        of irresponsibility; the prevailing sense of despoilment; the absolute
        impunity and inconsideration; [all of them] to be emerged from the
        Ministries and [the practice of] management of the Greek people's
        wealth.

                    [Papandreou, Parliamentary Speech, 6/5/2010]

Above is a typical example of an experiential ES type. At the beginning of the passage the speaker explicitly expresses his inner emotional state ('And my fury is great as well') and then he appeals to sensory-based evidence ('...when I daily see the tragedy...inconsideration'). The linguistic resources deployed index direct access to evidence being conveyed and the use of first person verb types ('I see') as well as of first person pronouns ('my') allow the political actor to fully commit himself to the assertion and inscribe full responsibility regarding its validity. Obviously, this is the case of the specific type of ES - only the speaker can have access to the domain of evidence, so it cannot be challenged.

The political actor attempts to empathize with his audience, but it seems to exclude the actual addressees of his speech, i.e. the MPs in the room. Rather, Papandreou assumes that his actual audience is made up of ordinary citizens, and he infers that they may also be furious with the past administrations. Therefore, in a critical moment for the government during which the MPs are called to approve a bail-out agreement that entails measures to which the majority of society is opposed and rallying against them, the Prime Minister appeals to his emotions in order to demonstrate that he shares the same emotions with the citizens -at the beginning of the passage. The grammatical word 'and' triggers a structural presupposition, as it indexes that it is not only the speaker who has those emotions[9].

4.1.3. Sensory based evidence

This subcategory is related with what in many evidential studies is understood as first-hand attested evidence. The access to this domain of evidence is direct and only the speaker can be the source of information. As said above, for some researchers (Whitt 2010) this domain is the dominant evidentiary domain, as the speaker's access to all other domains is primarily accomplished through her/his senses. A typical example of knowledge acquired through senses was presented just above, so there is no need to comment again on it.

In the following passage, the political actor conveys auditory-based evidence.

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[9] As will be shown in Chapter 5 the passage in (3) is part of a broader excerpt of Papandreou' speech in which the speaker explicitly expresses his feelings. For more details see also the English translation of this speech at the appendix.

(4)   Ακούω παραδείγματα για την Αργεντινή, για την Ουρουγουάη, ακούω παραδείγματα για την Τουρκία, ακούω παραδείγματα για την Ουγγαρία πολύ πιο πρόσφατα. Καμία από τις χώρες αυτές δεν έχει τα δυο χαρακτηριστικά που σας λέω τώρα: δεν μετείχε σε μια Νομισματική Ένωση του επιπέδου του ευρώ και δεν είχε το επίπεδο ζωής που έχει η Ελλάδα και το πραγματικό ΑΕΠ που έχει η Ελλάδα.

I hear examples referring to Argentina, to Uruguay. I hear examples referring to Turkey. I hear more recent examples referring to Hungary. None of these countries had the two features I will mention: None of these countries had the two features I will mention: None of them participated in a currency union such as the Euro, and [none of them] had the standard of living of Greece, and the real GDP of Greece.

[Venizelos, Parliamentary Speech, 27/6/11]

In (4) the political actor uses a series of sensory based assertions realized by the verb 'to hear'. Within the political realm one of the prominent sources of information is a political actor's senses, namely his auditory perception, since politics are constituted in discourse. Therefore, what a political actor hears is extremely valuable and important evidence. Moreover, by explicitly stating that this evidence is something that (s)he had heard, (s)he explicitly takes responsibility of what he conveys. In a move that is observed in the political settings (Berlin & Pietro-Mendoza 2014: 493), Venizelos highlights the sensory basis of this discourse-based evidence precisely because his aim is to demonstrate that he has first-hand and direct access to it, exploiting its assumed high degree of reliability (Willet 1998) and boosting his own credibility.

The choice of the specific ES type is concerned with the speaker's attempt to discursively construct himself as the source of information and not with the information itself. Whereas the political actor is foregrounded in (3) by overtly assuming the responsibility of the utterance conveyed, there is no clue of what he has actually heard. He assumes that just by referring to countries having been aided by the IMF, he will activate audience's General Knowledge and, consequently, the recipients will infer the content of the examples named by the political actor. The aim of Venizelos is not to convey, even indirectly, what a third source has said. Rather, his aim is to combine the subjective character of the ES type with the supposed credibility of his institutional role as the source of information in order to introduce his own

discursive evidence ('None of these countries had the two features I will mention'), which challenges and opposes what has been said by the unnamed third source.

4.1.4. Other expressions for sensory based evidence: Obviousness

Apart from verbs expressing evidence acquired through senses, political actors also use verb phrases or adverbs that also realize the same ES type. These expressions also have an organizing function within discourse, therefore they can be seen as discursive markers indexing several pragmatic moves, such as introducing new information, confirming or elaborating an existing one. In all cases, the speaker seeks to construct an epistemic relationship with the recipients. In what follows we will examine two specific cases, the adjective *σαφές* ('clear') and the adverb *προφανώς* ('obviously').

4.1.4.1. [It] is clear

(5)   Και αύριο που θα ψηφίσουμε, το δίλημμα το οποίο τίθεται για όλες τις πολιτικές δυνάμεις, είναι ένα και πολύ σαφές: Είτε ψηφίζουμε αυτό το νομοσχέδιο είτε αφήνουμε τη χώρα να καταρρεύσει. Κάθε πολιτικό κόμμα σε αυτή την Αίθουσα αύριο θα κληθεί να απαντήσει χωρίς φιοριτούρες, χωρίς λογική «άλλα λόγια ν' αγαπιόμαστε».

Tomorrow, which is when we are going to vote, the sole dilemma posed to all parties is quite clear: We either vote this bill or we let the country collapse. Tomorrow, every single political party in this room will have to provide a straightforward answer which addresses the issue[10].

[Papakonstantinou, Parliament Speech, 5/5/2010]

In the above, the political actor uses the adjective 'clear' in order to introduce new information ('We either vote... collapse'). This information is epistemically strengthened as it is represented as something that can directly be acquired via the senses by virtually any recipient. As has been said, perception-based evidence is generally assumed to have high degree of validity as it is external to the speaker and is accessible to others. It should be noted here that the utterance, in which the adjective appears, triggers an epistemic legitimization strategy 'define the situation'[11] and,

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[10] In this specific clause Papakonstantinou uses to fixed expression which cannot be literally translated into English. The political actor literally says: "Tomorrow, every single political party in this room has to answer without embellishments or without the sense of "saying irrelevant thing to be beloved".

[1111] See 5.3.2.3.

subsequently, it is discursively represented as a 'fact'. It is plausible to claim that there might be a subtle relation between the two sentences of the passage. The valid sensory acquired information which is introduced is epistemically strengthened by the overall 'factive' nature of the first sentence and vice versa.

4.1.4.2. This is clear

In (6) the political actor uses *σαφές* (clear) in the verb phrase 'this is clear'[12].

(6) **IER:** Ήδη ακούω τον κ. Όλι Ρεν να μας συστήνει μειώσεις μισθών στον ιδιωτικό τομέα. Άκουσα δήλωση του κ. Όλι Ρεν...
IEE: Οι μισθοί στην Ελλάδα στον ιδιωτικό τομέα είναι χαμηλοί, να το πούμε καθαρά, δεν είναι υψηλοί. Και ούτε έχουν αυξηθεί...
IER: Ο Επίτροπος μας κάλεσε να τους μειώσουμε.
IEE: Άκουσα τι είπε ο κ. Ρεν. Στην Ελλάδα υπάρχει ένα πρόβλημα τιμών στον ιδιωτικό τομέα. Υπάρχουν, δυστυχώς, ολιγοπωλιακές δομές και αγορές, που δεν επιτρέπουν, αν θέλετε, να πέσουν οι τιμές. Αυτό είναι σαφές και αυτό κάνει πολύ κακό στην ανταγωνιστικότητα της χώρας. Το βλέπουμε ξεκάθαρα.

IER: I have already heard Mr. Olli Rehn suggesting the salaries of the private sector to be reduced. I have heard a statement by Mr. Rehn…
IEE: The salaries of private sector are low in Greece, we should clearly state, they are not high, nor they have increased.
IER: The Commissioner suggested that we reduce them.
IEE: I have heard what Mr. Rehn has said. In Greece there is a problem in prices in the private sector. Unfortunately, there is an oligopoly structure and market that both do not allow the prices to fall. This is clear, and it damages very badly the competitiveness of the country. We see that very clearly.

[Papakonstantinou, Alter TV Interview, 21/4/2010]

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[12] In the passage that follows the speaker also uses the adverbs *καθαρά* and *ξεκάθαρα*, which both share the meaning of 'clearly'. In particular *καθαρα* is derived from the adjective *καθαρός* ('clear') and among the meanings that has features as a qualifier is 'without a doubt' (http://www.greek-language.gr/greekLang/modern_greek/tools/lexica/triantafyllides/search.html?lq=%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B8%CE%B1%CF%81%CF%8C%CF%82&dq=, date of last access 21/7/2018). This is, of course, a metaphorical meaning. Similarly, *ξεκάθαρα* is a compound adverb formed from the grammatical prefix *ξε-*, which has an emphatic meaning in this particular case (http://www.greek-language.gr/greekLang/modern_greek/tools/lexica/triantafyllides/search.html?lq=%CE%BE%CE%B5-&dq=, date of last access, 21/7/2010), and the adverb *καθαρα* ('καθαρά'). In the analysis of the excerpt no attention will be paid on these two adverbs.

In the whole excerpt above, the two interlocutors are dynamically engaged in meaning construction and negotiation, as they attempt to interpret a discursive piece of evidence, i.e. an official statement by the European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro at the time, Olli Rehn. At the last turn of the passage, the political actor initially adopts an experiential ES type indexing that he has direct sensorial access to the discursive evidence, a move that allows him to claim an epistemic right to make an interpretation -he has personal firsthand knowledge of the statement, so he can process the statement on his own. Also, the experiential ES type enables him to change the subject of discussion, as the new information brought into discussion by the IER at the beginning of the passage is actually no longer new. Both interlocutors are aware of it, and what is more, the assumed knowledge asymmetry implied is negated since both the IER and the IEE had the same sensorial ('I have already heard Mr. Rehn'; 'I heard what Mr. Rehn has said') access to the evidence.

Indeed, in the second sentence of his turn, the political actor introduces a new topic, the issue of prices in the private sector ('Unfortunately… to fall'), representing the information conveyed as a 'fact' without any kind of objective evidence which may support his claim. Rather, he assumes that his position is already part of the general knowledge of his recipients. Then, in the third sentence of his turn ('This is clear… the country') he elaborates on a factual assertion being conveyed, but first he uses the hedging 'this is clear' in order to make a reference to the previous sentence. As was observed in (5), there is a connection between the factual assertion and the uses of expressions that index a sensory-based evidentiality. Having constructed the information conveyed in the second sentence as a 'fact', he then represents it as a type of external, sensory based evidence, directly accessible to virtually everyone. Once again, the supposedly 'unchallengeable' character of a 'fact' is enforced by the high degree of validity that sensory-based evidence has.

4.1.4.3. Obviously

The discursive marker προφανώς ('obviously') was used by most of the political actors. In particular, in the data of Papandreou it occurs 6 times, in that of Samaras 4 times, while is more frequently occurred in the data derived by Papakonstantinou (13 times) and Venizelos (30 times). The discursive marker has three distinct pragmatic

functions: 1) Introduces new knowledge; 2) Confirms and elaborates already shared knowledge.

Let's consider the following:

(7)   Χάθηκε πολύ εύκολα ένα απόθεμα εμπιστοσύνης και αξιοπιστίας που χτίζαμε χρόνια. Το χάσαμε ως προς τους αριθμούς. Δυστυχώς, χάσαμε και το πολιτικό απόθεμα εμπιστοσύνης, χάσαμε την πολιτική στήριξη. Προφανώς, σε αυτά που ακούγονται και σε αυτά που λέγονται για την Ελλάδα υπάρχει και μία πολύ μεγάλη υπερβολή. Υπάρχουν πράγματα που μας εξοργίζουν όλους. Προφανώς και η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση πρέπει να αναλάβει τις ευθύνες και δεν το κάνει αυτή τη στιγμή. Προφανώς και υπάρχει μία τεράστια κερδοσκοπία γύρω από την Ελλάδα και γύρω από το ευρώ, αλλά, μέσα σε αυτή την κατάσταση εμείς, ανεξάρτητα από τις αιτίες, καλούμαστε να πάρουμε αποφάσεις.

A reserve of trust and reliability that was developed was lost quite easily. We lost it due to statistics. Unfortunately, we also lost the reserve of trust in political terms; we lost the political support. Obviously, there is a great amount of exaggeration in what is heard or said about Greece - there are outrageous things. Obviously, the EU has to take responsibility - they haven't done it so far. Obviously, there is a great deal of speculation against Greece and against the Euro, but we have to make decisions in this situation without taking into account the causes that made it.

[Papakonstantinou, Parliament speech, 5/3/

he above passage, George Papakonstantinou uses a series of utterances which start with the marker *προφανώς* ('obviously'). In the beginning of the excerpt he adopts a Factual ES type representing his assertions as facts (A reserve… we lost the political support). As a matter of fact, this part of the passage forms a short past narrative (see for detail 4.4.4.), through which a special historical and political frame is constructed, namely the inferior position of the Greek State toward its EU partners. Then he deploys the discursive marker in order to introduce new information ('[T]here is a great amount of exaggeration… outrageous things'; '[T]he EU has… so far'; '[T]here is a great deal of speculation… that made it'). Even though this information is new, the use of 'obviously' indexes that this information A) is, in terms of a piece of evidence, external and can be directly accessed; and b) it is considered by the speaker as taken for granted, or at least as commonly accepted, precisely because of (a). Therefore, the political actor constructs a broad space of agreement with his

recipients, which allows him to represent his party positions as something that everyone agrees upon.

Given the specific historical context within which the speech was produced, it must be noted that one of the speaker's aims that is featured in his personal context model of the communicative situation, is to construct consensus. In March of 2010 the Greek Government had not activated yet the ESM support mechanism; actually, the mechanism was not even formed, and only tense negotiations were taking place about how the Eurozone and the EU would confront the Greek crisis. The government of the PASOK party had started to pass the first package of austerity measures with the hope that it would be sufficient and a bail-out would not be requested. As these kind of measures damage the image of any government, especially when, as happened in PASOK's case, a party takes the office having excluded austerity measures from its pre-election program, it was vital for the government to find allies within the parliament - not for reasons of majority (PASOK had elected a sufficient number of MPs to pass the measures), but for reasons of sharing the political burden that austerity measures typically entail.

In the coming passage, the political actor, i.e. Evangelos Venizelos, also introduces new information. Contrary to the excerpt analyzed just above, here the political actor uses the discursive marker *προφανώς* ('apparently')[13] in order to overtly distance himself from what the other interlocutor says.

(8)   **IER:** Δηλαδή κατά τη γνώμη σας, δεν "παίζει" το σενάριο μιας κυβέρνησης της Αριστεράς;
IEE: Αστειεύεστε, προφανώς. Κατ' αρχάς, δεν προκύπτει αριθμητικά. Δεύτερον, έχει απορριφθεί πανηγυρικά και μετά πολλών επαίνων από την κυρία Παπαρήγα και από τον κύριο Κουβέλη. Ο ίδιος ο κύριος Τσίπρας απευθύνθηκε στον κύριο Καμμένο και εισέπραξε τις αντιδράσεις των κορυφαίων στελεχών του.

IER: So, in your opinion, the scenario of a Left Government does not have any chances?
IEE: You are kidding, apparently. Firstly, for this scenario the needed number of MPs is lacking. Secondly, this scenario has been solemnly rejected by both Mrs. Papariga and Mr. Kouvelis. Even Mr. Tsipras when

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[13] The sarcastic tone of the political actor when he uses *προφανώς* is the reason why the translation 'apparently' was preferred to more literal 'obviously'.

he addressed Mr. Kammenos, had to confront the reactions of his top executives.

[Venizelos, Ethnos Interview, 4/5/12]

The turn, the discursive adverb '*προφανώς*' ('apparently'), appears in a typical case of ironic style, as the political actor subtly signals his criticism towards the utterance he conveys (Sperber & Wilson 1981). By making an explicit assessment of the content of information ('you are kidding') provided by the IER, the aim of the speaker is to emphasize that he is not epistemically aligned with his interlocutor. In this respect, the adverb has a dual function, on the one hand it introduces new information, i.e. the opinion of the IEE, which is totally distinct from that of the IER; and on the other hand it highlights the ironic tone of the assertion, signaling the extent of misalignment between the IER and IEE. The speaker, though, wants to save face towards his interlocutor, so he does not directly discredit the claim of the IER, but he explicitly violates the maxim of relevance to sarcastically index that the IER has already violated the maxim of truth. In this respect, Venizelos does not directly answer the question and infers that the content of the question cannot be valid. The aim of the speaker is to discredit to an extent any possibly assumed validity of the IER's utterance, so he uses 'apparently' to represent his evaluation of the content of the utterance as something that can be externally and directly acquired, and not as a product of his own reasoning. However, the political actor complies with the contract of his role as an IEE and he then provides the answer to the question of the IER. This move also saves face, since a possible denial to answer or a change of the subject of discussion could have been interpreted by the IER as a subtle attack or at least as a direct challenge of his own dominant role, which is precisely to have answers to the questions he poses.

The next passage was also found in the data of Venizelos. It is an excerpt from his speech delivered in the Parliament during the discussion on the mid-term fiscal plan.

(9)   Όλα όσα ειπώθηκαν για την ανάγκη να υπάρχει ένα σχέδιο Μάρσαλ, για την ανάγκη να βελτιωθούν τα επιτόκια, είναι σωστά. Προφανώς έχει γίνει αντιληπτό από τους εταίρους μας ότι χρειάζεται εντατική υποστήριξη η Ελλάδα στον τομέα της ανάπτυξης, για την ανάσχεση της ύφεσης, για την απελευθέρωση κονδυλίων.

> What was said about the necessity of having a Marshal Plan and the necessity of better interest rates, was right. Obviously, it has been noticed by our partners that Greece needs intensive support in the field of development, and [it needs support] for both confronting the recession and funding decontrol.

[Venizelos, Parliament speech, 28/6/11]

Here the discursive marker 'obviously' does not introduce new information. Rather, the political actor uses the marker to confirm already shared information, which appears at the beginning of the passage where the speaker adopts a Discursive ES type as he communicates a discursive based evidence ('What was said… it was right'). He, then, elaborates on it ('[I]t has been noticed… funding decontrol'). The marker contributes to the extension of knowledge as the information conveyed is represented as commonly accepted. To this end it also contributes the explicit epistemic assessment made by the political actor at the closing of the first sentence of the passage ('[I]t was right') by which he shares the responsibility of the validity of what was said by a third part. Therefore, the political actor manages to construct a broad space of agreement, within which all the participants share and accept the same amount of knowledge.

Considering the broader context, this evidence indexes the criticism made by the opposition parties to the anti-development policies proposed by the 'troika;' and, subsequently, to the Government that accepted those policies during the negotiations. That said, the 'obviously' marker has another pragmatic function in the above excerpt. The speaker constructs an epistemic alliance with those, i.e. the opposition, having conveyed that information. It appears, then, that the aim for constructing consensus among the political parties in Parliament is part of the context model the speaker[14] constructs for the communicative situation, so he makes linguistic choices that are relevant to that aim.

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[14]A brief political and historical background might be useful here in order to be clarified why Venizelos wanted to be epistemically in alignment with his political opponents. This speech was delivered only few days after the political actor had substituted George Papakonstantinou in the Ministry of Finance following a governmental reshuffle made by George Papandreou. Venizelos was a keen supporter of the position held among many PASOK officials according to which the Government, despite having most of the seats, had to seek for alliances within the parliament in order the 'cost' of decisions in the field of economy to be shared.

4.1.5. Mismatches: Auditory evidence as visual evidence

(10) Ξέρουμε ότι βρισκόμαστε σε επιτήρηση. Αλλά σε επιτήρηση για την οικονομία μας. Και μου δίνεται σήμερα η ευκαιρία, κύριε Καρατζαφέρη, να ξεκαθαρίσω και πάλι, ότι δεν είμαστε σε επιτήρηση για κανένα άλλο θέμα. Αν κάποιος τολμούσε να συνδέσει αυτά τα δύο ζητήματα σε βάρος μας, θα αποτελούσε για εμάς ένα πολιτικό "casus belli". Το επαναλαμβάνω, διότι βλέπω ότι υπάρχει μια περιρρέουσα φιλολογία τους τελευταίους μήνες και κάποιοι δείχνουν υπερβάλλοντα ζήλο για να δημιουργήσουν εντυπώσεις, συγχέοντας ανεύθυνα μάλιστα τα δύο αυτά ζητήματα.

We know that we are under supervision. But we are under supervision for our economy. And I can now take this chance, Mr. Karatzaferis, to make clear again that we are under supervision for no other reason. If anyone had dared to connect those two issues against us, this would have been casus belli in political terms. I repeat it because I hear some strange rumors [to be communicated] in the last months, and some people are quite keen on creating false impressions [of the events], as they irresponsibly connect the two issues.

[Papandreou, 30/4/10]

In the above excerpt, a perception-based verb 'to see' ('I repeat it because I see…') is used to indicate information ('rumors') that is typically acquired through hearing. Without neglecting that this may be just a slip, it is a case of an epistemic mismatch, as it may involve a two-part relationship, i.e. the actual source of information and its discursive realization, but those two parts are rarely connected in the data of the study. As explained in the section in which discursive based evidentiality is analyzed, the primary source of this kind of evidence is the perception of the speaker, who has heard what another speaker has said. Nevertheless, in various contexts, including the political context, the speaker prioritizes the discursive aspect of the evidence instead of its sensorial one. In the passage above the political actor considers it more important to represent the evidence as sensory acquired, as he adopts Experiential ES type and then he avoids the typical mismatch occurred in many similar cases.

There is, though, an obvious mismatch among the resources used for the realization of the specific ES type, which can be explained on the basis of the different degrees of validity between an evidence acquired through vision and that acquired through hearing. However, it is not only the assumed higher validity of perception-based evidence that makes the speaker consider that choice as more relevant to the

communicative situation in which he participates. As he personally addresses another political leader, Mr. Karatzaferis, Papandreou wants to be fully engaged in the utterance, and he, therefore, prefers an ES type that allows him to construct a fully subjectified utterance and overtly describe personal responsibility. His aim is not only to convey what is said by a third party, but to make it appear that he has firsthand access to what has been said.

The high degree subjectification is indexed by a series of evaluations regarding either the validity of the evidence ('rumors') or the overall acting of this unnamed third part ('[K]een on giving the false impression'; '[T]hey irresponsibly connect'). Especially the former will be analyzed in detail among the ways in which a political actor can represent the discourse of a third part in her/his own discourse. All those evaluations reflect a cognitive process on the part of the speaker. Again, he does not merely communicate what others have said, but he interprets it as evidence of low validity and he understands it as a part of general behavior which is also negatively evaluated. This cognitive involvement leaves traces in the choice of the verb 'to see'. Among its meanings (Triantafyllidis 1998)[15], 'to see' denotes that one realizes/understands something, and even that (s)he has thought over a situation.

4.1.6. Mismatches: Cognitive evidence as visual evidence

What was discussed above becomes more apparent in the following passage

(11)   Επομένως, από εδώ βλέπω: Πρώτον, να υπάρχει το λάθος της κοσμοθεωρίας. Που τους οδηγεί να νοσταλγούν ό,τι ναυάγησε. Και να εμποδίζουν ό,τι πετυχαίνει. Δεύτερον, δίνετε λάθος απαντήσεις σε λάθος ερωτήματα. Υποτάσσετε την υποχρέωση να στηρίξετε την Ελλάδα ξανά στα πόδια της, στις ιδεοληψίες σας να φτιάξατε τον κόσμο ολόκληρο και μάλιστα με λάθος τρόπο.

Therefore, this is what I see. Firstly, a wrong word view, which guides them [the SYRIZA party] to miss whatever has failed and to prevent whatever succeeds. Secondly, you [the SYRIZA party] give the wrong answers to the wrong questions. The obligation to support Greece to

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stand on its own feet, becomes subjugated to your ideological obsession with building a new world from scratch on the wrong terms.

e political actor uses the verb 'to see' in the beginning of the passage ('Therefore this is what I see'). There is no doubt that the verb has the metaphorical meaning discussed in the previous excerpt. The speaker, though, prefers to represent the cognitive process in terms of a perception verb in order the evidence to which he refers, i.e. his conclusion ('Therefore') following a reasoning process which is based on what his opponents say and believe, to be discursively constructed as being external to the speaker and having an objective character in the sense that it can be acquired through vision. By adopting an experiential ES type, the political actor manages to take full responsibility of the validity of the utterance, exploiting his evidential standing as the source of information, and at the same time the evidence conveyed is processed as being virtually accessible to everyone. A connection between evidence acquired through vision and a Factual ES type is indexed in the excerpt. What the political actor sees, i.e. the specific information which is communicated, is realized by a series of factive assertions ('Firstly, a wrong worldview… from scratch in wrong terms). Therefore, what is implied here is an epistemic connection according to which, since the information conveyed is external to the speaker and acquired through perception, it assumedly has an 'objective' character so the speaker can adopt a Factual ES type overcoming epistemic and/or cognitive constraints that may affect the understanding of the utterance.

In (12) the political actor, who is again Antonis Samaras, expresses shared in group knowledge using the verb 'to see'.

(12)   Είδαμε το συμφέρον της χώρας όταν καταψηφίσαμε το Μνημόνιο. Κι είδαμε πάλι το συμφέρον της χώρας όταν ψηφίσαμε το κούρεμα του χρέους.

        When we voted the Memorandum down, we saw [what was] good for the country. And when we voted for the debt haircut, we saw again [what was] good for the country.

In the above passage the political actor communicates cognitive based information, namely a part of in-group knowledge, in terms of a perception verb. It is impossible for one to literally see the good for the country. Rather, (s)he can realize or understand it on the basis of some kind of evidence -particularly, on the basis of benefits and consequences entailed by either the support or disapproval of specific decisions. The metaphorical function of the verb is the same as the one discussed in the previous excerpt. However, here, Samaras shares the responsibility towards the validity of the assertion using the first person plural verb type ('we saw'). Since, the explicit expression of the knowledge that is commonly shared among the in-groups will be analyzed below, it is sufficient to conclude the presentation of this use of the verb 'to see' at this point.

(13)   Στην πραγματικότητα, υπάρχουν αυτοί που βλέπουν τον κίνδυνο, που έχουν την αίσθηση του συσχετισμού των δυνάμεων σε μια συντηρητική, μονόχρωμη και μονοδιάστατη Ευρώπη, που αναγκάζονται με κόπο, δυσκολία και κόστος πολιτικό, ηθικό, συναισθηματικό να διατυπώσουν μια δύσκολη αλλά ολοκληρωμένη πρόταση για το μέλλον του τόπου και αυτοί που είτε αγνοούν την κατάσταση είτε θέλουν να πιστεύουν ότι μπορούν να τη διαμορφώσουν, σύμφωνα με τη δική τους βούληση, είτε απλώς κρύβονται πίσω από όσους είναι αποφασισμένοι να λάβουν δύσκολες αποφάσεις και με δεδομένο το ότι θα ληφθούν από άλλους οι δύσκολες αποφάσεις, αυτοί επιλέγουν τον εύκολο ρόλο της διαμαρτυρίας ή των υποσχέσεων που εξωραΐζουν μια πραγματικότητα και αποκρύπτουν από τον Έλληνα πολίτη την αλήθεια.

In fact, there are those who see the danger and realize the power relationship within a conservative, solid and monolithic EU; those who have to make a hard but thorough proposal for the future of the country with trouble, difficulties and cost in political, moral and emotional terms. And there are those who either ignore the situation or they want to believe that they can shape it according to their own will, or they just hide themselves behind the ones who are determined to make hard decisions. Taking for granted that those decisions will be made by others, they choose the effortless protest or promises which whitewash reality, and they hide the blunt truth from the Greek citizens.

[Venizelos parliament speech 12/2/12]

Just as was discussed in the previous passages, here Venizelos uses the verb 'to see' in the third person plural to discursively express information which is cognitively acquired by a third group. Therefore, there is nothing to be added to the analysis of the metaphorical meaning to the specific verb.

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What is striking, though, in the excerpt above is the difference in evaluation between perception based and cognitive based evidence. The political actor referrers to two different groups, to neither of which he typically belongs, as for both he uses third person plural verb types. The one group is positively evaluated in terms of their political, in a broad sense, actions and behavior ('[T]hose who have to make…emotional terms'; [T]he ones who are determined to make the hard decisions'), whereas the other is negatively portrayed ('[T]hey either just hide behind…; [T]hey choose the effortless protest… from the Greek citizens). The qualitative distinction also applies in terms of knowledge relationships. The negatively evaluated group appears to know less ('who either ignore') compared to the positively evaluated group. Also, there is a difference between how each group acquire their knowledge. This is the point at which the political actor considers more epistemically strong the perception-based evidence. The group favored by the speaker has direct and sensorial access to information ('they see'), whereas the other group has an access based on cognitive processes ('they believe'). On this basis, it is not strange that the negatively evaluated group is also related with the notion of invisibility in the sense that their attitude and actions are aiming at making the things, and especially what is considered as 'the truth', less visible ('[T]hey hide themselves…; '[T]hey hide the blunt truth from the Greek citizens').

4.1.7. Concluding remarks

In 4.1. we made a distinction between perceptional domains of evidence, examining separately the emotion-based and the sensory-based evidence. Regardless of the type of evidence they conveyed, political actors adopted this type of ES in cases in which they wanted to be fully engaged with the utterances they communicate and to appear to have direct access to the information being communicated. However, this was largely controlled by contextual parameters, as in many cases they mismatched the actual domain of evidence with the ES type they adopted in order to accomplish pragmatic goals (such as persuasion, introduction of new knowledge etc.) or to construct aspects that are relevant to their identity as high ranking members of the political elite. Especially for knowledge that was represented as acquired through visual perception, it appeared that the speakers took advantage of the evidential dimension of the source of knowledge, since an evidence external to the speaker has a

high degree of accessibility. With the construction of their personal context models, they considered what was appropriate for the communicative situation in which they were engaged, opting for a relatively broad set of linguistic resources that realized this type of evidence.

4.2. Cognitive domain of evidence

4.2.1. General

The cognitive domain of evidence reflects knowledge that is acquired from the speaker's private mental domains of reference. Depended on the type of access to the evidence, within the scope of this category fall both expressions that explicitly express the speaker's personal and shared knowledge -this is the case of cognitive factive verbs- as well as expressions that signal that the knowledge was inferred, or it is product of the speaker's conjectures or personal assumptions on the basis of personal experience or general knowledge. Particularly for our analysis of epistemic stance, cognitive domain of evidence plays an important role in the discursive construction of the various evidential meanings. In order a speaker to adopt epistemic stance and, more crucially, to realize it in discourse, (s)he has first to activate a mental model in which it is stored and represented the cognitive basis of knowledge, and, then, he has to discursively adapt it to a new mental model that is constructed for the each time current communicative situation in which (s)he participates.

In what follows we examine direct and indirect access to this domain of evidence. As said, direct access includes the explicit expression of personal and shared knowledge. Also, we will include all expressions that signal others' knowledge, namely the second and third person types of cognitive factive verbs, even though they are typically inferences. The reason for doing so is to provide a coherent overview of how explicitly shared knowledge is communicated and more crucially assessed and negotiated by the political actors within the context of the Greek crisis. Indirect access to cognitive domain of evidence is signaled by cognitive non factive verbs, which along with modal verbs and adverbs, are the prototypical linguistic means for the expression of inferential ES type. Here, we are also concerned with conjectures, realized by clauses with the epistemic marker *-tha*, and with counterfactual

conditionals that, as will be shown, they may in principle reflect an inference made by the speaker, but in terms of the expression of evidential meaning they have several particularities that are needed to be examined separately.

4.2.2. Explicit Expression of knowledge

4.2.2.1. General

In the present section we examine how (inter)personal knowledge, which is "the justified beliefs of individual members acquired by applying the epistemic criteria of their community to their personal experiences and inferences" (van Dijk 2014: 21), is explicitly realized in and shared through the discourse of Greek officials. It is needless to say that this is how the speakers refer to their own knowledge, the one that a speaker has as a person. This does not mean, though, that the cases in which knowledge is shared among the speakers and (some) of the recipients are excluded.

Here we are interested in cognitive factive verbs, such as 'I/we know'. cognitive factive verbs along with cognitive non-factive verbs ('I think', I believe' etc.) form the semantic category of cognitive verbs -also found in literature as private verbs (Biber et al. 1999) or psychological verbs (Leech 1983)- and are concerned with the speaker's psychological disposition, i.e. her/his private domain of reference or cognitive state(s), to which (s)he has privileged access (Fetzer 2014: 70). Cognitive factive verb types indexing both subjectivity, through the first person singular types, e.g. 'I know', and intersubjectivity through the first person plural types, e.g. 'We know'.

These types of verbs express a full degree of commitment from the speakers' part towards the force of their assertions. As was discussed, enforcing the mitigation of one's commitment is a context-depended process as in many cases has little to do with the actual beliefs of the speaker. Regarding other linguistic means, such as impersonal factive predicates, which also fully enhance a speaker's commitment towards an assertion, will be examined in section 4.4.. Also, through the first person verbs types allow the speaker to be fully designated as the conceptualizer of the utterance, which in turn results in assuming full responsibility, either personal, in cases of verb types in

singular, or interpersonal, in cases of verb types in plural, for the communicated utterance.

Cognitive factive verbs function as "agnostic qualifiers", in Caton's (1966) terms, indexing uncertainty and/or lack of knowledge, in instances such as 'I do not know'. These expressions are typical of an evasive style or, as Brandt (2004) suggests, "aphonic stance", by which the speaker avoids making any kind of commitment regarding his assertions because (s)he may want to save face from utterances that can be proved false. As will be shown below, even though aphonic stance resources are not frequently used by the political actors, they do not only signal lack of knowledge but in certain contexts they may imply knowledge asymmetry in a sense that the speaker indexes that is fully aware of what (s)he knows, and what not.

In what follows we examine the verb *to know,* expressed in Greek by two different verbs, *ξέρω* και *γνωρίζω* and how it contributes in realization and negotiation of the speaker's knowledge. We look at the most prominent structures found in our data: the ones in which the verb is followed by a complementizer (either a that- verb phrase or a noun phrase) as well as parenthetical structures.

4.2.2.2. Personal Knowledge

4.2.2.2.a. I know that

The passage in (1) comes from a George Papandreou's speech delivered in the European Parliament in 2010, amid the speculation of the international markets over the Greek bonds.

(1)   Αυτό είναι το δεύτερο σημείο που θα ήθελα να τονίσω: Γνωρίζω ότι η
        Ελλάδα έχει διαρθρωτικά προβλήματα, αλλά υπάρχει άλλο ένα
        πρόβλημα που πρέπει να δούμε, το πώς θα δημιουργήσουμε τα
        απαραίτητα βήματα για να προστατεύσουμε τις απαραίτητες αλλαγές
        που κάνουμε.

        This is the second point I'd like to stress: I know that Greece has
        structural problems, but there is another problem that we shall look at;
        that is how we will create the necessary steps to protect the necessary
        changes we made.

        [George Papandreou, European Parliament Speech, 5/3/2010]

Papandreou uses a that-complementizer ('[T]hat Greece has structural problems') by which the content of the proposition is conveyed as common ground knowledge. Besides, the factive predicates of cognitive verbs, realized as 'that-complementizers', manifest semantic presuppositions, which entail that the proposition in predicate is consider as 'true' and hence presupposed (Betrucelli-Papi 2000). What the Prime Minister says through the predicate is indeed not an opinion or belief that is needed to be processed as taken-for-granted for context depended reasons, but it is a verified fact. The position that the Greek economy faces serious structural problems can hardly be challenged. The speaker makes a reverse epistemic mismatch –instead of presenting as a fact the information he conveys, avoiding therefore

It seems that the pragmatic functions of semantic presuppositions (see Lambrecht 1994: 61, Betrucelli-Papi 2000: 11, Simon-Vandenbergen et al. 2007: 49) should gain in importance in understanding why the political actor fully inscribed himself to an assertion that is fact, so there is no point for a speaker to take full responsibility for its validity. This is especially the case in a communicative situation like the one under examination, in which the audience, mainly foreign MEPs, expects the speaker to admit the problems that the Greek economy faces. In this respect, it is considered by the speaker more relevant to construct an utterance in which he is the source of the utterance is fully designated in order to make it clear that he has personal knowledge of this kind of expectations. Also, this move contributes to the epistemic alignment between the political actor and his audience. By referring to the structural problems of the Greek economy, Papandreou creates a space of agreement, in which he explicitly positions himself, then using the disclaimer 'but' to introduce a new piece of information, which is concerned with the speaker's desired future actions. Therefore, the 'that-complementizer' backgrounds information already known to the recipients, creating an epistemic alignment between the speaker and the hearers, and allowing Papandreou to foreground a new one ('[…] but there is… we made').

Taking the narrow and broader contexts of the specific communicative situation into consideration is crucial for the study of the linguistic choices made by the political actor. It is not possible to cover here all of the properties featured in Papandreou's mental model about the European Parliament, the MEPs or the act of delivering a political speech. However, contextual properties that are represented in the speaker's

context model and are relevant to the linguistic choices made by the speaker should be considered. Amid a broadly hostile mood regarding how previous Greek administrations handled various issues of the national economy, Papandreou addresses representatives of Greece's European partners. Therefore, one of his aims is to distance himself from what his predecessors have done and admit the mistakes that had been made. Moreover, the Greek Prime Minister must seek for a solution for the proper State's financing without threatening Greece's position within the Eurozone and the EU. At the time the speech is given, an extended debate was ongoing regarding how the EU should handle the economic crisis, not only in Greece but also in other member states that were facing liquidity problems. Despite not having a substantial influence on the decision-making process, the European Parliament is a body having high symbolical status. Therefore, a second aim related with the speech of the Greek Prime Minister is a call for action.

The first person singular verb type of the cognitive factive verb 'I know' explicitly contributes to the above. The political actor appears personally aware of the criticism against his country, and by admitting the rightness of that criticism in his explicit referral to it as part of his personal knowledge, he epistemically aligns himself with the international audience. Also, this more subjective realization of this otherwise taken-for-granted information conveyed by his utterances makes his desire as the speaker more evident, that is to distinguish between himself and the previous and assumed irresponsible leaders. He is then able to foreground a new piece of information relevant to what the EU should have done on international level in order to confront the Greek sovereign debt crisis.

Explicitly expressing personal knowledge apart from purely epistemic functions can also contribute to discourse organization. Let's have a look at (2)

(2)   Δεν είναι σήμερα ημέρα για λόγια και εξαγγελίες. Από αυτά έχει χορτάσει ο Ελληνικός λαός. Η Κυβέρνηση και ο κάθε Υπουργός κρίνεται από την πράξη, σήμερα. Το ξέρω, όπως ξέρω ότι θα κριθούμε από την εμπέδωση του περί Δικαίου αισθήματος στην Ελλάδα, από την ευνομία, από την καταπολέμηση της ασυδοσίας και της διαφθοράς. Από αυτό που λέει σήμερα ο Έλληνας, και δικαίως: «γιατί να μην τιμωρηθεί κάποιος;». Ναι, θα κριθούμε και από αυτό.
Όπως ξέρω ότι θα κριθούμε από το αν θα σπάσουμε τη γραφειοκρατία και τη διαφθορά, που απωθούν ακόμα και τους σωστούς επιχειρηματίες,

που απωθούν ξένους επενδυτές και μαζεύουν μόνον όσους θεωρούν τη χώρα μας ως ευκαιρία για αρπαχτή.

Όπως ξέρω ότι θα κριθούμε από την αναμόρφωση του πολιτικού συστήματος, της Δημόσιας Διοίκησης, από τη διαφάνεια, τη νέα, ξεκάθαρη και όχι διαπλεκόμενη σχέση μεταξύ εκτελεστικής, δικαστικής, μιντιακής ή ακόμα και εκκλησιαστικής εξουσίας.

Όπως ξέρω ότι θα κριθούμε, αν άρουμε αδικίες και κοινωνικές ανισότητες. Τα βάρη να μοιράζονται, να μην μπορούν οι ισχυροί και οι πλουσιότεροι να ζουν σε βάρος του φτωχότερου, που σηκώνει στις πλάτες του αβάσταχτες υποχρεώσεις.

Όπως ξέρω ότι θα κριθούμε από την προστασία των αδυνάμων, ιδιαίτερα, εκείνων που καμία σχέση δεν είχαν με την κρίση, μέσα από ένα σοβαρό δίχτυ ασφαλείας. Θα κριθούμε για το πώς θα προστατεύσουμε τον άνεργο, πώς αλλάζουμε τα νοσοκομεία μας, πώς παρέχουμε πρόνοια σε όσους έχουν πράγματι ανάγκη.

Όπως ξέρω ότι θα κριθούμε από τις μεγάλες αλλαγές στην παιδεία, ώστε να γίνουμε καινοτόμοι, ικανοί, δυναμικοί στους τομείς όπου έχουμε συγκριτικά πλεονεκτήματα.

Όπως ξέρω ότι θα κριθούμε από την αλλαγή του προτύπου ανάπτυξης. Να γίνουμε πιο ανταγωνιστικοί, να μπούμε στην πράσινη και ποιοτική ανάπτυξη. Να φέρουμε επενδύσεις στη χώρα μας.

Today is not the day for empty words and promises. The Greek people are fed up with that. Today, the Government and every Minister are judged on their actions. I know that, as I know that we all will be judged on the establishment of the feelings of justice in Greece; on the rule of law; on the fight against unaccountability and corruption; on what the Greek people say today in a fair manner: 'Why is nobody getting punished?'. Yes, we will be judged on that.

As I know that we will be judged on whether we break bureaucracy and corruption that put off even the proper entrepreneurs; that put off foreign investors and attract only those who see our country as a chance for snatch.

As I know that we will be judged on the reform of political system, public administration and transparency, i.e. the new overt –and not enmeshed- relation between the executive power, the judiciary, the media power, even the power of the Greek Orthodox Church.

As I know that we will be judged on whether we correct injustices and social inequalities. The burdens should be shared; those in power and those with wealth should not be able to live at the expense of those who are poorer and lift unbearable obligations on their shoulders.

As I know that we will be judged on the protection of those in weakness - especially those who had no relation with the crisis- creating a serious safety net. We will be judged on how we protect unemployed people; how we change our hospitals; how we provide welfare to those who are truly in need.

As I know that we will be judged on the great reforms in education so that we will become innovative, capable and dynamic in the fields that we have comparative advantages.

> As I know that we will be judged on the shift of the development model. We should become more competitive; we should be part of a green and qualitative development; we should bring investments in our country.

[Papandreou, Parliament speech, 6/5/10]

Here the Prime Minister did not solely aim at introducing his own beliefs and opinions by repeatedly using the structure 'As I know that we will be judged by'. He also aimed to achieve rhetorical goals. The repetition in political discourse adds empathy and offers rhythm, feature that can both contribute to the persuasion of the audience. More crucially, Papandreou by constantly using the phrase 'As I know that we will be judged by' manages to construct himself as a leader in a way that is relevant to his context model. Given the critical instance in which this speech is delivered, Papandreou discursively establishes himself as a responsible leader with personal knowledge of citizen's expectations as well as of what his government should do in order to be efficient.

Both the status and the institutional role of the speaker also influence how the recipients may process this knowledge. Being the president of the Government and speaking at a formal and official communicative situation, it would be inappropriate and politically and culturally irrelevant for Papandreou to merely express his own knowledge. He may use a first person singular type to epistemically strengthen his own position as the source of the communicated information, but at the same time he undoubtedly expresses the knowledge shared by the members of his government and the members of his party. The above becomes obvious in the ease with which the speaker switches from first singular to first person plural. Besides, one of the aims during the situation within which the speech takes place is to emphasize the unified government's stance towards the issue of the rescue of the Greek economy.

Apart from the pragmatic-cognitive functions of the 'As I know that we will be judged by' phrase, it is interesting to semantically examine the criteria by which the PM knows his government will be judged. It can be argued that these criteria are represented here as taken for granted, because there is a general agreement on the tasks a government has to accomplish in order to be considered successful –at least according to the standards of Western civic democracies. Among commonly assumed fair demands that any government should fulfill include the curbing of corruption and

bureaucracy ('[T]he establishment of justice in Greece… on fighting against unaccountability and corruption'; '[W]e will be judged on whether we break bureaucracy and corruption'; '[W]e will be judged on the reform of our political system, public administration and transparency'), protecting the vulnerable social and economic groups ('[W]e will be judged on whether we correct injustices and social inequalities, awarding more social justice'; [W]e will be judged on the protection of those in weakness'), and broad reforms in several domains of policy making ('[W]e will be judged on the great reforms in education'; [W]e will be judged on the shift of the development model').

Consequently, it can be argued that the source of Papandreou's knowledge is the general, cultural knowledge of how Western civic democracies operate. This knowledge could have been represented as factual. Instead, Papandreou prefers to represent it as having been acquired by his own mental perception. Therefore, he exploits the reverse mismatch between source of information ('world truth') and the epistemic stance adopted in order to build the image of a responsible leader who is willing to offer real changes and is aware of the standards that a successful and responsible government should meet.

However, given the situation in which Papandreou is involved, the criteria selected implicitly trigger certain representations about the general situation in Greece concerning its public administration. The representation of the Greek administration system as diachronically insufficient forms a macro-proposition of Papandreou's speech. Note also the distinction implied between the 'negative' past and 'positive' present, as realized by in the first and second period of the passage, where is highlighted that *today* only political actions are those that count, not words or promises. Papandreou draws upon the knowledge he assumes his audience has on the status Greek administrations. In this way, he manipulates the mental models his audience constructs about the crisis in Greece. This is a case of political implication, which usually creates a chain based on assumed and non-verbally expressed knowledge of the participants in every political context. We will deal with political implications in Chapter 5.

4.2.2.2.b. I know + noun

In the following excerpt the cognitive verb type is not followed by a 'that-complementizer', but by its object, a noun.

(3)   Ξέρω -και ξέρω καλά - την απόγνωση, την οργή που νιώθουν πολλοί από εσάς. Εγώ δεν είμαι ΠΑΣΟΚ και να λέω ψέματα, δεν έχω το μαγικό ραβδί να απαλύνω ψεύτικα τον πόνο σε μια στιγμή του καθενός. Αλλά, γνωρίζω και αγωνίζομαι.

I know –and I know well- the despair and anger that many of you feel. I'm not PASOK to tell lies; I do not have a magic wand to falsely ease each one's pain overnight. But I know, and I fight.

[Samaras, election campaign speech, 3/5/2012]

What is striking here is that the political actor is fully committed to and takes personal responsibility ('I know') of information of which the actual source is hardly accessible. Concretely, Samaras says that he knows the despair and anger of some of the recipients. As they both indicate private mental and emotional states respectively, are inner, subjective and accessible only by the experiencer. In fact, Samaras may either have heard or seen what his receipts feel –so the source of his utterance is sensory- or he may have read about it –a case of discursive evidentiality. Be that as it may, the political access cannot personally have such kind of knowledge; he can only infer it from the evidence at his disposal.

The mismatch between the actual source of information and the ES type realized by Samaras can be explained on the basis of the context in which the speaker is engaged. The political actor not only wants to be epistemically in alliance with his audience explicitly stating that and they all do share the same knowledge. What is more, he wants to do so in a personal and more engaged way, therefore he opts for the first singular person of a cognitive verb. He emphasizes that he has personal knowledge, because he wants to appear in empathy with the audience, and because he wants to discursively construct himself as a leader who knows what his audience goes through. This subjectification becomes more evident, as the passage unfolds, at the point where the political actor is contrasted with his political rivals on the basis of moral issues ('to tell lies'). He uses the personal pronoun 'I', whereas, Evangelos Venizelos, the leader of the PASOK party, is mitigated, and instead a metonymy is used, "PASOK". Note that this is the last speech before the first general election of 2012, so it is

important for Samaras to inspire and rally most of his audience, and to this end considers it more relevant to promote his own moral properties as a leader instead of his party positions.

4.2.2.2.c. I know as parenthetical

In the following passage, coming from a speech of George Papandreou, the cognitive factive verb is used as a parenthetical, which means that structurally is independent from the sentence within which it is inserted (Bußmann 1996: 349). Parenthetical verbs do not describe what is going on, but rather they signal a speaker's commitment regarding the degree of reliability of the utterance (s)he communicates (Urmson 1952: 485, cf. Simon-Vanderbergen 2000: 42).

(4)   Πολλοί εργαζόμενοι, το ξέρω, έχουν χάσει σήμερα το δικαίωμα να ονειρεύονται. Θέσεις εργασίας μειώνονται εδώ και χρόνια. Εργοδότες καταπατούν τα εργασιακά δικαιώματα, χωρίς καμία ποινή, ειδικά τα εργασιακά δικαιώματα των πιο αδύναμων.

Today many employees have lost, I know, the right of making dreams. Job openings have been reducing for years. Employers violate working rights, especially the ones of those who are more vulnerable, without facing any punishment.

[George Papandreou, speech to national GCGW Congress, 19/3/2010]

In the above passage the use of the cognitive factive verb *ξέρω* 'I know' is little concerned with indexing the source of information. The political actor realizes a series of utterances as 'facts'. The parenthetical verb serves other pragmatic and contextual purposes.

First, Papandreou addresses a special audience, card-carrying members of the GCGW. Therefore, it is relevant to the situation to present as taken-for-granted, i.e. as 'facts', the content of the utterances which refers to the structural problems of the Greek labor market. The first person singular verb types contribute not only to the creation of a space of agreement between the speaker and the recipients, but also to explicitly index that the Prime Minister –not an in-group- has personal knowledge on the issues.

Second, the use of cognitive factive 'I know' in (4) allows the speaker to portray himself as a thoughtful leader who even has personal knowledge of issues, which are

not easily accessible. Papandreou uses the parenthetical structure in the first utterance, which unlike the rest two of the passage cannot be verified by some form of official data. He claims that he knows the inner state of other people ('of making dreams), which is inevitable, just as it was for Samaras in (3). He may be aware of the difficulties in the labor market for the majority of the employees by acquiring official data or having heard of personal stories, but he cannot have personal knowledge. Never the less, he prefers to weaken the epistemic status of his utterance, as he considers it more relevant to realize a subjective utterance, because this contributes to the discursive construction of desired features of his identity as a political leader. Papandreou speaks to trade unionists, who, supposedly, represent the working class. They are not pursuing careers in politics, but rather seek to promote the interests of their influencing the power relations within the fields of politics. Papandreou, according to the context model he has constructed for this situation, makes linguistic choices that enable him to appear engaged with the audience, an empathizing person having knowledge of the issues that are critical for ordinary people and not a distant politician who only understands objective numbers. In the next section we deal with the explicit expression of shared knowledge.

4.2.2.3. Shared in-group Knowledge

4.2.2.3.a. We know that

Explicit expressions of shared in-group knowledge include cognitive factive verbs in the first plural person ('we know' as well as expressions of agreement ('we agree') which also index that knowledge is shared among the participants in a communicative situation. As in the previous section we begin our analysis with the most dominant structure found in the data, a cognitive fact verb followed by a 'that-complementizer', and then we move to structures, which include cognitive factive verbs without a 'that-complementizer'.

The political implications of presuppositions triggered by factive predicates are clearly manifested in the next excerpt. As Betrucelli-Papi (1997: 12-13) has noted, in various settings presuppositions may entail exploitation. Since they are taken for granted, the producers assume what recipients already know, presuppositions are harder to challenge and, especially in political settings, background controversial

propositions as if they were shared-knowledge (Sbiza 1999, Simon-Vandenbergen et al. 2007: 61). Hence, they serve as manipulative devices. Let's consider (5):

(5)   Γνωρίζουμε όμως ότι η Ελλάδα δεν αντιμετωπίζει μόνο δημοσιονομικό έλλειμμα, αλλά και εκείνο που θα ονόμαζα έλλειμμα αξιοπιστίας.

        We know, though, that Greece is facing not only a budget deficit, but also what I would call a credibility deficit.

                    [Papandreou, Bookings Foundation Speech, 9/3/2010]

Papandreou uses first person plural of the cognitive *γνωρίζουμε* ('we know') evoking shared responsibility regarding the information conveyed in the complementizer ('that Greece... deficit'). The Prime Minister backgrounds the information in the beginning of the 'that-clause' ('that Greece... fiscal deficit') and then he foregrounds the information on which he wants to focus. Also, he opts for a reserve epistemological mismatch in the first part of the complemetizer, as he could have presented the information about Greece's fiscal deficit based on objective data rather than as a part of shared knowledge between himself and recipients.

However, Papandreou regards as more crucial and relevant to the context the rhetorical effect of creating an epistemic common ground with his addressees. This solidarity-oriented strategy has further implications. Papandreou creates a space of agreement ('we know') and then introduces new information about the Greek crisis, i.e. the notion of a credibility deficit'. As the modal phrase clearly indicates, the responsibility regarding the validity of the information is fully personal and the degree of certainty is attenuated. This is quite plausible as the speaker introduce a self-made term, a metaphorical neologism, i.e. 'credibility deficit'. Never the less, from a cognitive point of view the basic function of any metaphor is to represent a conceptual domain in terms of another. In some cases, this connection is noticed, while in others, i.e. conventionalized or dead metaphors, it is not. In both cases the speaker presupposes that the knowledge of two domains is already shared among the recipients, and this a prerequisite for a metaphor to function efficiently. Also, in (3) the noun phrase is semantically related ('but also') with the *that*-clause, so it is processed as presupposed material.

The 'credibility deficit' noun phrase metaphor is a case of recontextualization. In Chapter 5 the legitimizing function of recontextualizations in the discourses of the Greek politicians will be examined. The scope of the present analysis is limited to issues of knowledge expression. Recontextualization is an indicator or overt or covert relationships between different social practices and between the discourses tied to those practices (Fairclough & Chouliaraki 1999; Fairclough 2003). Papandreou re-contextualizes the technical financial term 'deficit' within the field of international and institutional relations. He assumes that his audience is aware of the terminology of both fields, but more importantly he conveys as granted a new knowledge of how relationships among state partners should conceived –as a reflection of financial figures.

Looking at all speeches examined in the study, the metaphor was used only by two actors, Papandreou (2 occurrences) and Papakonstantinou (occurrences), and only in one period, from March to May 2010 when negotiations and discussions for the first bail-out were taking place.

The findings are not surprising given the historical context. The 'credibility deficit' metaphor refers to the false statistics constantly provided by the Greek Authorities to the Eurostat about several financial measures of the Greek economy, and especially about the magnitude of the primary deficit. As of the agreement on the first bail-out (May 2010), it was impossible for the Greek administrations to provide fraud statistics due to strict supervision by the 'troika' of every aspect of policy making that influences the State's national economy and finance. Therefore, the government of George Papandreou had to restore the State's credibility.

4.2.2.3.b. We know+ object

The following excerpt was retrieved from a speech of Papakonstantinou given during a PASOK MPs session. The Minister of Finance addresses the audience four days after the official request of a bail-out package, but, and this is crucial, the bill accompanied the bail-out agreement, has not been yet submitted to the Parliament in order for the body to decide for its approval. The political actor, then, has to convince the MPs of the governmental party about the 'rightness' of the Government's decision to activate the ESM mechanism, as the loan interest rates skyrocketed.

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(6) Όλοι ξέρουμε την κρισιμότητα των στιγμών, βλέπουμε την κατάσταση στην οικονομία, βλέπουμε τις δυσκολίες του δανεισμού, βλέπουμε την κατάσταση στις διεθνείς αγορές. Όλοι αντιλαμβανόμαστε ότι ένα κράτος, με έλλειμμα 30 δισ. και χρέος 300 δισ. δεν μπορεί να δημιουργήσει ανάπτυξη, όσο δεν τα ελέγχει αυτά. Δεν μπορεί να δημιουργήσει επενδύσεις, δουλειές, θέσεις εργασίας, να δημιουργήσει πλούτο και να το μοιράσει πιο δίκαια. Όλοι καταλαβαίνουμε ότι, όταν χρωστάς, δεν είσαι ελεύθερος. Όταν χρωστάς, εξαρτάσαι από τους πιστωτές σου και είσαι αναγκασμένος να ακούς κι αυτά που λένε. Είσαι αναγκασμένος να παρακολουθείς τις αγορές, πόσο μάλλον όταν οι ίδιες οι αγορές, κάποια στιγμή, έρχονται και λένε: «δεν μπορείς πια να δανειστείς από εμάς».

We all know the critical nature of the moment, we see how things are in the economy, we see the difficulties in borrowing, we see the situation in the international markets. We all recognize that a State having a 30 bn. Euros deficit and a 300bn Euros debt cannot create development as long as those figures are out of control. It cannot create investments, jobs, it cannot create wealth, and then to distribute it fairly. We all understand that when you owe, you are not free. When you owe, you are depended on your creditors and you are obliged to hear what they say. You are obliged to follow the markets, especially when it comes a time when the markets have their say: "you can no longer borrow from us".

[Papakonstantinou, PASOK PG speech, 27/4/10]

The political actor uses various linguistic resources switching from one ES type to another. We cannot analyze all of them here. Attention will be given to those who fall in within the domain of cognitive based evidence, and particularly to the ones making explicit what the speaker evaluates as commonly shared in-group knowledge. These include the main clause at the beginning of the passage ('We all know the critical nature of the moments') as well as the first clause at the beginning of each paragraph ('We all recognize that… control'; We all understand that… free'). It appears that the political actor uses cognitive-based evidentiality for reasons related with the specific interaction.

As far it concerns the first of the three utterances, it introduces a series of assertions that can be processed by the audience as facts. Also, the speaker avoids making any explicit evaluation of how the situation in the Greek economy *actually* is, or to refer to the way the markets treat the Greek state, but still everyone understands what the Minister implies: the Greek economy suffers, and the markets are quite reluctant to guarantee new loans to the Greek State. This happens because the speaker

successfully presupposes the common knowledge of his audience. They have a vast amount of knowledge on these issues so there is no point for them to be explicitly communicated.

In this respect, the use the first person plural type of the cognitive factive 'to know' serves the speaker's aim to be epistemically aligned with his recipients. Addressing to the MPs of the government, Papakonstantinou wants to express and highlight in his discourse the common knowledge, making explicit that they all share a specific viewpoint with regard to the crisis.

Similarly, the other two utterances in which cognitive 'to recognize' and 'to understand' are used in the first plural forms equally contribute to the creation of a space of agreement among the participants. As was shown above, the use of 'that-complementizers' is also crucial in this process. More than representing as 'fact' the content of the utterances included in 'that-complementizer', the speaker wants to emphasize the intersubjective character of the assertions or, in other words, to make clear that he and the audience share the same epistemic criteria about how they evaluate the particular political situation. However, this is not just a matter of epistemology. As said, when the speech was given a crucial parliamentary debate on the first bail-out program was pending. The explicit appeal to the common knowledge is also a direct appeal to the common identity of the participants, which can subsequently justify why all the PASOK MPs should have a unified, positive stance towards the bailout.

Before concluding our remarks on (6), it should be mentioned that the speaker seems to organize to some extent the various resources that he has at his disposal in order to index different domains of evidence. First, as pointed out, at the beginning of every paragraph, he opts for the cognitive verb types, which are accompanied either by linguistic resources realizing the information communicated as acquired by a different source (e.g. senses) or by raw, authentic and objective data, such as numbers. Second, the construction of a broad space of agreement which features already known information, but the speaker considers it relevant to the context to highlighted in the terms of its intersubjectivity through the uses of the first plural verb types, it is actually what enables the political actor to introduce a new information without having to provide evidence regarding its validity. At the closing of the passage,

Papakonstantinou alters his style, becoming informal and conversational and he adopts Pseudo-Discursive EP representing in direct speech the voice of the markets. Here occurs an evident epistemic mismatch between the actual source of the information and how it finally becomes discursively realized. The aim of the speaker is not only to introduce new information related with the stance of the international markets towards the Greek State, but also to include within this already established space of agreement the evaluation of the source of information. The voice of the markets is the only one that is realized, which is an apparent advantage given the importance of this kind of evidence within politics. What is more, though, is that Papakonstantinou attempts making his audience process as part of the common knowledge, the superiority of the voice of the markets, that is the unequal relationship between, on the one hand, the transnational financial organizations and, on the other hand, the political institutions of any Western civic democracy.

The passage in (7) is retrieved from a Samaras speech during the election campaign of June 2012.

(7)   Το ξέρουμε: υπάρχουν κάποιοι εκτός Ελλάδας που θέλουν τη χώρα μας «μαύρο πρόβατο». Να τη βγάλουν από το Ευρώ, για να τη φάει ο λύκος και να παραδειγματιστούν και οι υπόλοιπες χώρες.

We know it: there are some outside Greece who want our country to become a 'black sheep'. They want to expel it from the Euro so that it will be eaten by the wolf, and for the rest of the countries to learn from that.

[Samaras, Election Campaign speech, 15/6/12]

Here, the speaker uses the first plural person of the cognitive verb *ξέρω* in order to communicate shared knowledge. What he does is to introduce a new piece of information ('there are some… learn form that') which is represented as supposedly shared. In the above passage, though, the main function is concerned with the organization of discourse instead of indexing the domain of evidence from which the communicated information is acquired. The political actor uses a cognitive factive verb, but he immediately switches to Factual ES type in the rest of the excerpt in order to discursively realize the new information. The use of fixed idiomatic phrases ('black sheep'; 'to be eaten by the wolf') is crucial to this analysis, as a vast amount

of knowledge is tacitly conveyed through their pragmatic and culturally determined meanings.

4.2.2.3.c. We know as parenthetical

In (8) the first plural person type is used as parenthetical:

(8)   **IER:** Πάμε τώρα στη συζήτησή μας με τον Υπουργό Οικονομικών, τον κ. Γιώργο Παπακωνσταντίνου. Κύριε Υπουργέ, θέλω να ξεκινήσω από το ερώτημα που είναι στα χείλη όλων των Ελλήνων, αν θα προσφύγουμε στον μηχανισμό στήριξης και πότε τοποθετείται αυτό χρονικά;
      IEE: Κύριε Χατζηνικολάου, καταρχάς επιτρέψτε μου να πω ότι η χώρα - το ξέρουμε όλοι- βρίσκεται σε μία δύσκολη οικονομική κατάσταση. Έχει ένα πάρα πολύ υψηλό έλλειμμα, έχει ένα πολύ μεγάλο χρέος, έχει δυσκολίες, τις οποίες καλείται να ξεπεράσει.
      IER: Ένα έλλειμμα που ακόμα δεν ξέρουμε πόσο είναι, θα μάθουμε αύριο από τη Eurostat.

      IER: Let's move on to our discussion with the Minister of Finance, Mr. George Papakonstantinou. Minister, I'd like to begin with a question, which is common among all the Greeks – will we activate the support mechanism and when will this happen?
      IEE: At first, mister Chatzinikolaou, allow me to say that the country– we all know it- is in a difficult financial situation. It has a very high deficit; it has a very high debt; it faces difficulties that it has to overcome.
      IER: A deficit, of which we still do not know its scale. We will learn it tomorrow from the Eurostat.

      [George Pakonstantinou, Alter TV Interview, 21/4/2010]

This is a different case compared to what we have seen so far, because the excerpt is coming from a TV political interview. Interviews are one of the main channels through which politics are mediated (Eckström 2001: 564). For Heritage & Greatbatch (1991: 130), news interviews are seen as a social institution constituted by a configuration of normative conventions. Those conventions are powerful, tacit and taken-for-granted, and they regulate both linguistic and interactional aspects of this discursive genre (Heritage & Clayman 2002: 6). However, they cannot be applied without the collaboration between the participants which is a pre-requisite for "doing interviews".

As highly institutionalized, news interviews, as well as political interviews, feature some stable characteristics (Eckström 2001; Heritage & Clayman 2002): 1) A pre-

given allocation or roles, the Interviewer (IER), the Interviewee (IEE) and the Audience. The IER is a professional journalist, while the IEE is a person having some connection to recent events -in a case of a political interview; the IEE is expected to be a politician. As for the Audience, typically they plays no active role, but they are overhearing. 2) The discussion typically is about a subject related to recent and important events. 3) The interaction among the participants is formal and is managed through questions and answers. In particular, the turn taking in interviews is constrained by the conventions of the genre (Heritage & Greatbatch 1991: 97-101): The IER is the one who asks, whereas the IEE is the one who responds; the IER is not expected to be engaged in actions other than questioning, just as the IER is not expected to initiate a pair of Q&A; the IER allows the IER to extensively speak, and the IEE has to make his contribution relevant to what (s) he has been asked, without neglecting though her/his own goal that (s)he wants to achieve. Both the IER and IEE are expected to collaborate and adhere to the conventions because otherwise they are not able to efficiently realize their institutional roles and exploit the power and authority derived from them.

The IER, as expected, is the one who controls the discussion, especially at the very beginning of an interview ('I'd like to begin with a question… when will this happen?'). In order for the question to have validity and relevance, as well as the IEE "to be forced" to some extent to answer, the IER assumes that his question is not a product of his own reflection and reasoning, but also what 'all of the Greek people' are wondering. This move is related with the interactional and contextual parameters of the interview and is mainly considered with the identity as IER that the journalist wants to construct during this official communicative event.

Here we focus on how the IEE negotiates the question posed. He appears to tacitly admit the plausible and expected character of the questions, as he does not reject it. But he avoids providing an answer. Rather, he attempts in his turn to change the issue of discussion. From the activation of ESM we switches to the problems that the Greek economy faces, providing a series of 'factual' assertions all which define ('the country… situation'; 'it has… deficit'; it has… debt'; it faces difficulties') the current situation of the national economy.

Crucial to a formation of a space of agreement within which the factual assertions are taken for granted is the parenthetical phrase 'and we all know it'. Even though he refers to objective numerical data, which include the amount of the public debt, he explicitly ascribes shared responsibility to his assertion. The reason for this can be traced to narrow and broader context of the communicative event under discussion.

As far as it concerns the former, Papakonstantinou opens his turn with a performative utterance ('allow me to say'). He wants to foreground himself as the source of the information that will follow. As will be shown below (see section 4.3.), in the realm of the Greek politics discursive based evidence is not only considered relevant by the political actors, but also of high importance in terms of how valid it is. Since politics are primarily argumentative are also polyphonic, so they articulate various and conflicting discourses, which are permanently contested. In this respect, the tension between political opponents is mainly taking place as a clash between "what we say vs. what they say". Also, all political actors taking advantage of their institutional role construct themselves as a credible source, which subsequently contributes to several epistemic legitimization strategies. In the passage above the speaker may refer to himself as a source of information, but the use of parenthetical clause strengthens his credulity, as well as the validity of information he conveys in a sense that he does not communicate merely his own mere beliefs, rather he refers to something that he assumes that is unquestionably part of common knowledge.

In addition, the use of the parenthetical 'we all know it' allows the speaker to a) explicitly confirm the space of agreement constructed by the IER, and b) shift the subject of discussion. Considering (a), the political actor accepts it as the base of discussion, so he appears co-operational with the IER, which is supposedly expected by both the IER and the audience and it is supposedly dictated by the pragmatic and interactional conventions of the specific genre. This move is related with face-saving strategies, since Papakonstantinou aims at taking both the IER and the audience with his own part. Considering (b), the IEE typically does not share the same 'rights' with the IER as communicative interaction takes place. He has limited or no access to the control of the discussion; he is obliged to provide the information asked by the IER etc. However, in real life interaction many of the conventions are not stable but negotiated by the participants. This is what the speaker does in (7), as he validates the

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space of agreement realized through 'we all know it' in order to shift the subject of discussion without losing face or being questioned whether or not he has any true intention to answer the question. Similarly, to the IER who introduced to discussion a subject that is part of audience's knowledge, Papakonstantinou swifts the subject also by appealing to what is commonly known. This is a quite effective move, and the IER accepts this 'violation' of the genre's conventions, elaborating the new subject introduced during the IEE's turn.

Concluding from the discursive function of the cognitive factive verb in the passage above, broader contextual parameters can shed light on why speaker considers relevant the particular phrase to the communicative situation in which he is engaged. The interview is given amid the negotiations of the Greek Government and the ECB, the EU and the IMF on a bail-out program. At the time of the interview, the activation of the ESM scheme has neither been asked about, nor has the official figure of the 2009 deficit been announced, which was a decisive factor for the bailout planning. The Minister of Finance, then, wants to avoid any official discussion regarding whether or not will ask for the ESM bail-out, and more importantly, before any announcement is made by the official authorities of the EU, he wants to avoid any speculation as regards the magnitude of several fiscal figures, such as the magnitude of the debt, the debt to GDP ratio or the exact figure of the primary deficit. This is why he opts for a generic assumedly 'factual' assertion, which is explicitly represented as part of common knowledge, instead of providing, objective and more reliable numerical evidence that can justify his claims.

4.2.2.4. Negotiating explicitly shared knowledge

Even though information which remains implicit is processed by participants in a communicative event as part of commonly shared knowledge -and this is why many political actors take advantage of this pragmatic function and deliberately avoid making explicit references so as to tacitly construct their beliefs, opinions, and attitudes as part of assumedly shared knowledge- there are instances in which political actors conveniently ignore knowledge that is not explicitly communicated in discourse in order to achieve context-depended aims. In this case, the desire to remain implicit results in a constant negation of what is supposedly commonly accepted. Making shared knowledge explicit is not only a matter of creating a space of

agreement, but is also influenced by the speaker's intention to clearly distance himself, or more precisely as we are referring to in-group knowledge, to distant the in-groups from the out-groups.

This is the case for (9) below.

(9)   Ναι, ας το παραδεχτούμε, κυρίες και κύριοι συνάδελφοι, δεν αποφασίζουμε μόνοι μας, τελούμε υπό διεθνή έλεγχο. Διότι είμαστε εξαρτημένοι από δάνεια, που μας χορηγούν θεσμικοί μας εταίροι και πρέπει να κάνουμε αυτή την προσπάθεια με σφιγμένα τα δόντια, προκειμένου να ανακτήσουμε τη δημοσιονομική κυριαρχία και τη δημοσιονομική αυτοδιάθεση της χώρας.

Yes, let's admit it, ladies and gentlemen, fellow MPs, we do not make decisions on our own, we are under international control. Because we are depended on the loans provided by our institutional partners and we must bite the bullet to reclaim the country's fiscal sovereignty and fiscal self-determination.

[Venizelos, Parliament speech, 27/6/11]

The speaker, Evangelos Venizelos, addresses the Parliament during the debate on the approval of the Medium-term fiscal plan, which includes additional austerity measures and cuts to the ones initially requested by the first bail-out agreement. He uses the cognitive verb 'to admit' in the first plural person type to construct what all the MPs should take for granted regarding the status of power relationships between the Greek State and its creditors. The personal pronoun 'we' refers not only to the in-groups, but also to all MPs regardless of their party. Therefore, Venizelos assesses the information he conveys as generally shared among all of the parties represented in the Parliament.

This move is related with his attempt not to solely construct a broad space of agreement and explicitly demonstrate that all the MPs are on the same line, but rather it has to do with his aim to delegitimize the positions of his opposition. By making explicit the knowledge that all the participants in the room share, the Minister of Finance implies that all those MPs who oppose to the approval of the mid-term plan are already aware that the Greek State has no other choice but to approve as long as the creditors ask to do so. The political actor, thus, differentiates the political party he

belongs to form the other opposition parties, and he represents himself as responsible and fully aware of how the 'true' situation is.

4.2.2.5. Uncertainty and lack of (inter)personal knowledge

4.2.2.5.a. (Inter)personal knowledge as a means for expressing uncertainty

Apart from making personal knowledge apparent in order to express 'true' beliefs given the context in which they are engaged, the political actors may also use these resources for communicating uncertainty, and epistemically disassociate themselves from the utterance they convey. This is the case of the verb phrase 'as far as I know' which is used by the speaker in the following excerpt.

(10)   **IER:** Ο κ. Παπαδήμος δεν επέστρεψε μαζί σας σήμερα από τις Βρυξέλλες. Από ό,τι πληροφορούμαστε μετέβη στη Φρανκφούρτη όπου θα είχε μία συνάντηση με τον κεντρικό τραπεζίτη, τον κ. Draghi. Έχετε κάποιο σχόλιο για τη συνάντηση αυτή, υπό την έννοια ότι το προηγούμενο διάστημα υπήρχαν διαρκείς αναφορές στις πιέσεις που ασκούνται και από διεθνείς φορείς για την εκλογή του επίσημου τομέα στην διαδικασία αναδιάρθρωσης του χρέους; Υπήρξε κάποια συζήτηση στη χθεσινή Σύνοδο Κορυφής γι' αυτό το θέμα; Είναι κάτι το οποίο η ελληνική πλευρά με τον ένα ή με τον άλλον τρόπο θεωρεί ότι θα διευκολύνει, ότι θα φύγει ένα βάρος πρόσθετο από πάνω μας; Ευχαριστώ.
IEE: Με τον Πρωθυπουργό ήμασταν μέχρι σήμερα νωρίς το πρωί στις Βρυξέλλες και πράγματι από ό,τι ξέρω μετά θα ταξίδευε στη Φρανκφούρτη, αλλά δεν γνωρίζω το πρόγραμμά του. Εάν αναφέρεστε σε συνομιλίες του Πρωθυπουργού με τον κ. Draghi, πρέπει να σας πω **ότι** αυτές είναι πυκνές, διότι και χτες όλη την ημέρα συνυπήρξαν στη Σύνοδο Κορυφής και εγώ συνυπάρχω με τον κ. Draghi στο Eurogroup. Άρα δεν υπάρχει τίποτε το ασύνηθες ή τίποτε το καινούργιο στα θέματα αυτά.

IER: Mr. Papademos did not return with you from Brussels today. As far as we are informed, he travelled to Frankfurt, where he met the central Banker, Mr. Draghi. Do you have any comments on this meeting, given that constant references were made on the pressures by international partners about the choice of the official sector regarding the debt restructuring? Does the Greek part think of the above as something that would facilitate [the process], that a burden would be removed off our shoulders? Thank you.
IEE: We were with the Prime Minister in Brussels until early in the morning today, and, indeed, as far as I know, he would later travel to Frankfurt, but I do not know his schedule. If you are referring to the discussions between the Prime Minister and Mr. Draghi, I have to tell you that these discussions are dense, because yesterday and throughout

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the Summit they were both present together, just as we are both present, myself and Mr. Draghi, in the Eurogroup. This is not, then, something unusual or something new.

[Venizelos, Press Interview,31/01/12]

Here the political actor explicitly communicates his uncertainty ('as far as I know') about the information he was asked by the journalist to provide – an allegedly held meeting between the Greek Prime Minister and the ECB head, Mario Draghi. It is interesting, though, that the political actor attempts to comply to some extent with the expectations of this role as the IEE. In this respect he avoids ascribing any responsibility of conveying information that may be false, but he uses a strong epistemic resource, the marker 'indeed' in order to confirm and make an explicit evaluation with regard to the likelihood of another event, the travel of the Prime Minister to Frankfurt.

On the basis of his context model, never the less, he interprets the situation taking into account not the merely semantic implication of his responses, but also the pragmatic and interactional ones, all of them derived by the very nature of the communicative event. In particular, the political actor assumes that by simply making explicit his uncertainty about the information he conveys, the recipients may infer what is convenient for them; he therefore adopts aphonic stance, i.e. he expresses his full lack of knowledge on the issue being discussed ('I do not know his schedule'). Aphonic stance will be analyzed below, but it should be stated here that in the data of the present it is rarely used by the political actor. Typically, this move violates the maxim of quantity, as the political actor provides less information than is expected. Also, the expression of lack of knowledge makes the IEE irrelevant as provider for the information asked. This is where intervenes the speaker's general knowledge of the genre, as well as of the interactional and cultural features of political press interviews. Venizelos knows that his lack of any relevant knowledge may be interpreted not as such but as a deliberate use of evasive language in his effort to avoid answering the question of the IER. Also, it allows the recipients to freely interpret this publicly made admittance of having no knowledge on the basis of their interests or, more crucially, on the basis of the interests of the media corporation they work for. Therefore, the speaker immediately switches ES type. First, he uses a discursive ES type ('I have to tell you… in the Eurogroup') and then to Factual ES type ('This is… or new') in

order to limit the space for possible interpretations, different to the ones the speaker wishes to be inferred by the journalists, especially in a situation when the Greek Government is amid negotiations with the creditors of the private and official sectors.

With regard to the discursive ES type, it must be noted that contrary to the avoidance of assuming any kind of responsibility at the beginning of the passage, here the speaker inscribes full personal responsibility of the utterance he conveys. As will be shown below 4.3. this kind of evidence is considered valid and symbolically powerful by the speaker, as it promotes their own credibility as sources of information. Similarly, the adoption of Factual ES type is also related with the discursive construction of a epistemically strong utterance that is processed by the recipients as a fact (for more details on this ES type see section 4.4.). Venizelos, thus, attenuates one of the most prominent news values, that of 'unexpectedness' (Harcup & O'Neill 2016), as he represents the formal and informal personal communication among officials as a common practice, so there is no need to provide a specific comment on it. In this respect, he discourages any other journalist attending the press interview to insist on the issue.

4.2.2.5.b. Making explicit the lack of knowledge

In this section we deal with the explicit construction of lack or insufficient possession of knowledge, which is realized by "agnostic" markers, i.e. expression such as "I do not know" or "we do not know". Brandt (2004) proposes the term "aphonic" stance which includes all linguistic resources that reflect lack of knowledge. In general, these expressions index a knowledge asymmetry, the speaker appears to know less than expected. In analysis of the form 'I don't know' in oral unplanned genres in Spanish, González (2018: 151) spells out several pragmatic functions that go beyond the mere marking of speaker's lack of knowledge. Some of her insights can be applied in data of our study that derived from oral interviews, a genre that features online and largely unplanned discourse production.

In the data of the present study, political actors do not frequently opt for them given that a governmental official should always be informed. However, there are cases in which they consider it relevant to the very nature of the communicative context to

express lack of knowledge, either personal or in-group. One instance is the excerpt in (11):

(11) Διότι, μην κάνετε λάθος και οι υγιέστερες ελληνικές επιχειρήσεις σήμερα δοκιμάζονται και βλέπουν ότι μπορεί να πέσουν έξω και δεν ξέρω πόσο ακόμα θ' αντέξουν.

Because -do not get it wrong- even the wealthiest Greek enterprises suffer, and they see that they may go under, and I do not know for how long they can struggle.

[Samaras, SKAI TV interview, 3/6/12]

The political actor comments on how consecutive general elections (May and June 2012) affect the market. He admits that he has no knowledge ('I do not know'), and he wants to avoid any assessment (Goffman 1967, cit foun in González 2018; González 2018: 152) by making a conjecture that may threaten his credibility. However, it is also pragmatically implied a knowledge asymmetry in favor of the speaker. Samaras may explicit statement that he is totally unaware of how long the private sector of the national economy would be able struggle with the political uncertainty entailed by the election, what he implies though is that he has superior knowledge on the damage caused by the then current political situation in Greece. As a matter of fact, the leader of the ND party explicitly strengthens the 'rightness' of the content of his position by the parenthetical verb phrase 'do not get it wrong', which in turn validates his implied superior knowledge. Therefore, he expresses lack of knowledge in order to overtly distance and contrast himself from opinions and beliefs that he considers false, e.g. the Greek enterprises are not affected by a prolonged election period.

In the following passage the speaker communicates an intersubjectively shared lack of knowledge.

(12) Ξεπερνάμε τα όρια αυτής της βουλευτικής περιόδου και της επόμενης βουλευτικής περιόδου και δεν ξέρουμε - ποιο θα είναι το αποτέλεσμα, ποια θα είναι η τελική κρίση της ιστορίας, αλλά έχουμε τη σπάνια ευκαιρία να μπορούμε να διαμορφώσουμε μόνοι μας τις προκαταρκτικές προϋποθέσεις της ιστορίας και αυτό το πλεονέκτημα πρέπει να το χρησιμοποιήσουμε με τον καλύτερο και επωφελέστερο τρόπο για τον Έλληνα πολίτη.

> We exceed the limits of the current parliamentary term as well as the ones of the next parliamentary term, and we do not know what will be the outcome; which will be the final judgment of history, but still we have the rare chance to shape the initial prerequisites of history, and we have to use this advantage in the best and most prolific way for the Greek citizens.

[Venizelos, Parliament speech, 12/2/12]

This is a typical instance of using an agnostic marker ('we do not know') –the speaker does not want to commit his in-groups to an assertion that may prove wrong, so he avoids making any prediction or reference to the expected impact of the second bailout program on the national economy. It is rather unexpected for a governmental official –let alone a Minister of Finance- to express lack of knowledge about the outcome of the policies the fellow MPs must vote on. Taking the communicative context into account, the linguistic choice made by Venizelos can be explained. Semantically he appears to have no knowledge, but as the data suggest, and even in the same speech from which the above passage was retrieved, he makes frequent references to the positive outcome of the program. Therefore, the 'aphonic' stance in (12) has another discursive function, contextually depended, as it is closely tied with legitimizing aims. The supposed lack of any possible projection triggers a particular epistemic legitimization strategy, 'the state of exception', which is precisely what the speaker attempts to do at the specific point of his speech (for more details on the function of the particular strategy see section 5.3.2.3).

4.2.2.6. What we have to know: Deontic in-group knowledge

The present study falls within the field of epistemic critical discourse analysis, so it is primarily concerned with the notion of epistemicity. In this respect the classical notion of deonticity, typically opposed to that of epistemicity, is largely out of our scope. Deontic is related with what is 'right' in a moral sense (Chilton 2004: 117), so it becomes tied with norms and values. However, moral norms and values are part of any system of social knowledge, as they reflect what a speaker thinks of what is 'good' vs. 'bad'; what is 'legal' and what is not; and finally of what (s)he thinks of what is authoritative and what is not (Saed 1997: 127). Chilton points out that deontic meanings overlap with "feelings as well as 'Factual' representations. The speaker will

seek to ground his or her position in moral feelings or intuitions that no one will challenge" (2004: 117).

In the data of the present study, political actors referred to what both in-groups and out-groups have to know. This perception of knowledge in deontic terms has little to do with what is right or wrong. It reflects assumedly 'inherent' values and norms that constitute 'reality'. In this sense, the discursive communication of knowledge in such terms can be seen as a process of manufacturing 'facts' –what is ought to be known, what is good to be known it is considered so because it reflects 'how the reality is'. Despite the obvious differences with the Factual ES type, especially in what regards the complete dissociation of the speaker from the utterance being conveyed and the lack of representation of its actual source, expression of deontic knowledge partly overlaps with that ES type as they both index what is assumed as Common Ground. Let's consider the following:

(13)   **IER:** Μου λέτε δηλαδή ότι τον Ιούνιο δεν θα μας ζητήσουν [οι πιστωτές] νέα μέτρα;
IEE: Κοιτάξτε, τον Ιούνιο θα χρειαστεί να συζητήσουμε τον Προϋπολογισμό του 2013. Και τον Ιούνιο του 2013, τον Προϋπολογισμό του 2014. Το δικό τους επιχείρημα ποιο είναι; Γιατί πρέπει να ξέρουμε και τον διάλογο. Το δικό τους επιχείρημα, ότι «εάν κάνετε τις διαρθρωτικές αλλαγές, αν ανοίξετε επαγγέλματα, αν λειτουργεί ομαλά η αγορά, εάν πέσουν οι τιμές […], εάν κάνουμε λοιπόν τις διαρθρωτικές αλλαγές χωρίς δισταγμούς, χωρίς καθυστερήσεις, θα μειώσουμε την πίεση στους μισθούς και στις συντάξεις.

IER: Then, are you saying that [the creditors] won't ask for new measures in June?
IEE: Look, we will need to discuss the 2013 budget in June. And in June of 2013 we will discuss the 2014 budget. What is their argument? Because we ought to know the discussions. Their argument goes like this "If you make the structural changes; if you open up the closed-shop professions; if the market operates in an orderly way; if the prices go down […] if we make the structural changes without hesitation and delays, we will reduce the pressure on salaries and pensions.

[Venizelos, Mega TV Interview. 22/2/2012]

The political actor refers to the knowledge the IER ought to have, but he does not addresses all of the audience watching the interview. Specifically, Venizelos refers to a particular domain of evidence, i.e. communicative ('We ought to know the discussions'), which, as will be show in the relevant section, shares high epistemic

and symbolical status within the Greek political context. The Minister of Finance profiles the voice of the 'troika' as a knowledge that one must have, and he subsequently represents it in direct speech. It is interesting that this knowledge is good to have not only in terms of its validity, but also more critically in terms of its necessity, since what is implied in the passage is the asymmetry in power relations between the Greek State and the troika. Unless one knows what the troika is asking, (s)he cannot understand why the Greek government decides what it decides. In other words, the creditors' authority and power over the Greek domestic financial policies is seen by the political actor as something unchallengeable, a constitutive part of the 'reality'.

4.2.2.7. Making explicit others' knowledge

In the present section we are dealing with how political actors explicitly express not personal or in-group knowledge, but knowledge that others have. The focus is again on factive cognitive verbs, but this time on second and third person verb types, such as 'you know' or 'they know'. Typically, these expressions are based on inferences made by the speaker regarding the epistemic mental state of another interlocutor(s). As the speaker has no direct access to epistemic mental states of the others, i.e. to their knowledge, beliefs etc., (s)he can only infer on a basis of some evidence, sensory or discursive, what other participants may or may not know, believe etc. However, when such external evidence is missing the speaker relies solely on her/his own reasoning process. In particular, the access to other minds is based on sharing the same context –the speaker activates mental representations, i.e. context models, and assumes that the exact same representations are activated at the same time in the minds of the hearer(s) (Givón 2005: 101). More precisely, as Givón (ibid.: 103): "Since both I and my interlocutor share the same speech situation, then if I have a mental model of entities that are accessible in this speech situation, then my interlocutor must have the same mental model". Obviously, this is a dynamic, on-going process; the speaker then has to constantly update what the recipient(s) already knows as the discourse unfolds. The assumptions made by the speaker about the private epistemic state of the other participants in a communicative event by no means solely indexes a symmetry in terms of access to knowledge. They do also index knowledge asymmetry, so the speaker also assumes what the recipients may not

know, and either to highlight these unequal relations or to introduce a new piece of information or to extent and elaborate on already existing knowledge. Moreover, the vast literature on the Theory of Mind has demonstrated that this reasoning process is heavily influenced by cultural variables. There are social contexts within which, in various degrees, one is allowed to infer what the recipients think or believe, and more importantly, what they can explicitly express.

Within the Greek political context, political actors mostly cite or talk about what others have said, but, as there are no cultural norms that prohibit them to talk about what others know or think, they also explicitly express what is assumedly part of others' mental states. However, it should be noted that reference to others' discourses presupposes the existence of an external and objective piece of evidence, i.e. what others have actually said, whereas expressing others knowledge is seen as less reliable, particularly due to the lack of a similar kind of external and accessible to everyone evidence. This difference in terms of validity explains why Greek political actors prefer to refer to what others have said, and it also explains the pragmatic functions of the expressions that make explicit what others know.

4.2.2.7.a. Others minds knowledge: You know

In the data of the present study, political actors use the specific linguistic resources in order to expose not what others know, but what they do not know. The analysis is limited to the second plural verb types of cognitive factive verbs *ξέρω/γνωρίζω* ('to know'). As will be shown, the Greek politicians make inferences about the others' epistemic mental states for three main purposes: 1) When they wish to highlight their superior position in knowledge relationships, i.e. when they want to show that they know more that the recipients or more critically than their political opponents; 2) When they want to introduce a new piece of information their recipients were unaware of; 3) When they want to create a space of agreement by validating that themselves and recipients share the same knowledge; and 4) When they want to extend already existing and shared knowledge by adding new information to it.

Emphasizing knowledge asymmetry

Regarding (1) let's consider the following passage.

(14)   Εδώ ακόμη και τώρα ξέρετε τι αντιμετωπίζω στο Eurogroup όταν ζητάμε να μας δανείσουν η Σλοβακία, η Σλοβενία, η Εσθονία; Και λέμε «βοηθήστε μας γιατί ο λαός μας πάσχει, κάνει θυσίες, μειώνουμε τον κατώτερο μισθό κατά 22%», αν και ο κατώτερος μισθός αφορά το 13% των εργαζομένων. Και ξέρετε τι μου λένε; «Ναι, ο κατώτερος μισθός για το νέο εργαζόμενο μέχρι 25 χρόνων στην Ελλάδα είναι 511 ευρώ, στη χώρα μου», μου λέει ο Εσθονός που μας δανείζει ή ο Σλοβένος, «είναι 180 ευρώ και μου ζητάτε δάνειο».

Even now, do you know what I go through in the Eurogroup when we ask Slovakia, Slovenia or Estonia to lend us money? And we are like "Help us because our people are suffering; they are making sacrifices; we're reducing the minimum wage by 22%", -despite the fact that this wage applies only to the 13% of the employees. And do you know what they say? "Indeed, in Greece the minimum wage for young employees until 25 years old is 511 Euros, while in my country", says the Estonian [official] or the Slovenian [one], who lend us money, "[the minimum wage] is 180 Euro, and here you are asking for a loan?"

[Venizelos, Mega TV Interview, 22/2/2012]

In the passage above the knowledge asymmetry among the political actor and the recipients of his discourse is manifested in the two questions in which appear the 'you know' verb types ('Even now, do you know what… money?'; 'And do you know what they say?') Before starting the analysis of the excerpt it must be noted that we will not comment on how the type of evidence is being used in order that knowledge tbe realized in a discourse, but it appears that the speaker's choice to provide discursive evidence, even by adopting Pseudo-Discursive ES (see 4.3.2.2.) is related to the assumed validity that this type of evidence has.

Obviously, the speaker does not use the questions to seek information from his recipients –after all such a move would have been irrelevant to the convention of the genre of TV interviews, although it occurs in similar settings. He considers, then, this linguistic resource as an effective discursive means to introduce new knowledge to which he has privileged access, as he already knows that the IEES cannot be aware of what is discussed among the officials in the Eurogroup sessions. This asymmetry in terms of access implies that –the political actor does not explicitly state the IERS –and subsequently the whole audience- knows less, but, as he is already aware of the fact that the IERS do not know the information he is about to contribute to the discussion, he takes advantage of it and he easily promotes the governmental view on the negotiations between the Greek State and the EU partners not as a matter subjected to

various and even conflicting interpretations, but as a matter of 'reality'. Therefore, the new knowledge being conveyed is knowledge having special symbolic and political status and due to its limited access becomes more powerful –just as the person who is entitled to possess it. In this respect, the political actor guides the audience to accept as granted his beliefs, constructing an agreement space, which includes nothing but his own representation of the events.

Despite having no means at their disposal to verify the knowledge being conveyed and the fact that they lack free access to it, the IERS consider it valid. This, of course is related with the context model, which each one of the IERS has constructed for the particular communicative situation. It appears that as the model becomes activated, specific features regarding the authority of the political actor are also activated. Based on their general knowledge on the institutional status of their IEE, the IERS assume him to be a credible source that communicates valid information.

However, there are instances in which knowledge becomes negotiated through the contestation of opposing views, and the political actor exploits the knowledge asymmetry to make his own position dominant.

(15) **IER:** Πείτε μου, αξιοποιήσατε αυτές τις δυνατότητες στη διαπραγμάτευση, γιατί εγώ διάβασα σήμερα σε μεγάλη ξένη εφημερίδα ότι η παρουσία σας στο Eurogroup δεν ήταν καλή, δεν πήγε καλά.
IEE: Ακούστε να σας πω. Ας αρχίσουμε από το δημοσίευμα.
IER: Των Financial Times.
IEE: Ας αρχίσουμε από το δημοσίευμα των Financial Times. Ξέρετε τι εννοεί το δημοσίευμα; Ότι όταν στο Eurogroup θέτεις θέματα προς διαπραγμάτευση, η παρουσία της χώρας δεν πηγαίνει καλά, διότι ....
IER: Μα, εκείνοι λένε ότι δεν περάσατε τίποτα απ' αυτά που ζητήσατε. Ούτε καν τη χρονική μετάθεση της ψήφισης του μεσοπρόθεσμου για να πάρετε χρόνο.
IEE: Όταν θέτεις θέματα στους εταίρους σε ένα Συμβούλιο, γίνεσαι δυσάρεστος. Οι εταίροι μας είναι συνηθισμένοι σε μια συγκεκριμένη αντίληψη, σε μια νοοτροπία. Δε θέλουν να ανοίγεις νέα θέματα. Πρέπει αυτό να το κάνεις με πολύ μεγάλη προσοχή και πρέπει να το κάνεις στοχευμένα.

IER: Tell me, did you utilize these options during the negotiations, because I read today on an acknowledged foreign paper that your presence in the Eurogroup was not good, it did not go well.
IEE: Let me tell you. Let's start from the press report.
IER: [The press report] of the Financial Times.

IEE: Let's start from the press report of the Financial Times. Do you know what the report suggests? That when you introduce issues for negotiation in the Eurogroup, the participation of the State does not go well because…

IER: But they say that from what you asked nothing was approved -not even the rescheduling of the midterm fiscal plan voting in order to gain some time.

IEE: You become unpleasant to the fellow [EU] partners, when you introduce issues during a summit. The [EU] partners are familiar to a specific perception, mentality -they do not want to open new issues. You have to be very careful when you do so, and you have to do it with a plan.

[Venizelos, Alter TV interview,24/6/2011]

The IER brings into discussion a type of discursive evidence, a press report by an explicitly referred-to source. As it appears, both participants tacitly accept the high evidential standing of the source and its credibility, but there is a contestation about the interpretation each one of them imposes on the evidence.

The political actor attempts to introduce his view on the press report by posing a direct question to the IER –just as happened in (14) above ('Do you know what… suggests?') implying that he has superior knowledge on the issue compared with that of the IER. However, the IER interrupts the turn of his IEE and challenges him by providing a gist of the content of the press report. Contrary to what was observed in the previous passage, here Venizelos cannot efficiently establish an asymmetrical knowledge relation because the information being communicated is based on an objective type of evidence accessible to virtually everyone. He cannot claim, then, to have better knowledge, but only to have a different view on how this information should be interpreted, which is a subjective matter.

In the next turn of the interview though ('You become unpleasant… with plan'), where he elaborates on the position he expressed before being interrupted by the IER, he appeals to a form of knowledge that requires specialized access and has high symbolic status. It's a knowledge acquired through participation to the meeting of various EU summit meetings, and as such is hardly challenged. Indeed, the IER allows the IEE to complete an extensive turn (only the start of which is provided in the passage), not only because it is expected to do so due to his role as the IER, but

also because he can access what Venizelos supports. Undoubtedly, this 'knowledge' – or more accurately something supposedly verified through observation patterns of various strategies adopted during collective decision-making processes heavily influenced by narrow and broader political and other interests -- cannot be easily challenged by anyone who has not participated in the various official and unofficial bodies of the EU and is unaware of the EU politics. The political actor exploits his relevant experience, derived from his 'entitlement' as a politician to have access to those processes and institutions, and he represents it as generally shared knowledge, as he adopts the Factual ES type. In this respect, he implies that he knows more about how the EU bodies operate so his interpretation on what was the point of the press report is more valid and credible.

Introducing new information

In the coming passage, new information is also introduced to the discourse, but this time, even if there is a knowledge asymmetry, the political actor mitigates it and seeks to construct a space of agreement by introducing new information in the discourse.

(16)   Ξέρετε, έχουν επιστρέψει πάνω από 15 δις από τότε που γίναμε κυβέρνηση. Οι τράπεζες θ' αρχίσουνε σιγά-σιγά να δανείζουνε ιδιώτες και επιχειρήσεις. Και έτσι θα ξεκινήσει, δειλά-δειλά στην αρχή πιο μεστά προς το άμεσο μέλλον, η ανάκαμψη. Άρα, λοιπόν, εγώ βλέπω το ποτήρι μισογεμάτο, όχι μισοάδειο.

You know, more than 15 bn. Euros have returned since we have taken office as government. The banks will gradually begin to provide loans again to persons and enterprises. And this is how recovery will begin, tentatively at the beginning, and then more stably soon. I see then the glass half-full, not half-empty

[Stournaras, Enikos.gr Interview, 7/12/12]

In (16) the speaker uses the second plural verb type 'you know' without any complementizer which functions as a discursive marker for providing new information. This information, the numerical data, is objective and assumedly credible. Even though Stournaras does not name the source of the information conveyed, it can be argued that it is derived from the official reports conducted by the relevant department of the Ministry of Finance. This kind of evidence has priority and, in some cases, exclusive access. Therefore, he knows more than the IER and,

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what is more, in terms of plain semantics is impossible for the IER to know as much about the issue as the Minister. The choice then of the specific verb seems irrelevant to the context, as the IER not only does not share the knowledge that the political actor infers is shared, but also he is fully unaware of what is communicated by the speaker.

However, the pragmatic function of the cognitive factive verb allows the political actor to represent the new information as supposedly commonly shared, and to build thus a space of agreement and an epistemic alliance with the IER. By attributing to the IER an amount of information that could not have been acquired otherwise, the speaker expects to take advantage of this move and, shortly after to be able to communicate without challenges his inferences ('The banks will… future'), as he has gained the tacit agreement of and acceptance by the IER.

Verifying already shared knowledge

The third reason for which the political actors explicitly express the other's knowledge is when they want to verify and re-check the existence of an already shaped space of agreement.

(17)　Ξέρετε πολύ καλά ότι τα διαθέσιμα του Δημοσίου θα εξαντληθούν σύντομα, αν δεν λάβουμε την πέμπτη δόση του δανείου. Παράλληλα, όμως, έχουμε και το μέλλον, τα επόμενα χρόνια. Γι᾽ αυτό, δίνουμε μια δύσκολη μάχη διαπραγμάτευσης, για να διασφαλίσουμε την ηρεμία, την ασφάλεια και τη σιγουριά μας.
Θα συναντήσω, αύριο και μεθαύριο, τον Πρόεδρο του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου , κ. Βαν Ρομπόι, και τον Πρόεδρο της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής , κ. Μπαρόζο, ακριβώς γι' αυτά τα θέματα. Αυτά συζητά και ο νέος Υπουργός Οικονομικών , ο κ. Βενιζέλος, στο σημερινό έκτακτο EUROGROUP.

You very well know that the State's cash will shortly be diminished, unless we take the fifth instalment of the bail-out. At the same thime though, we have to look at the future, the coming years. This is why we give a hard fight of negotiating -in order to secure normality, security and confidence. Precisely on these issues, I will meet the president of the European Council, Mr. Van Rompai, and president of the European Committee, Mr. Baroso, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow respectively. The Minister of Finance, Mr. Venizelos, also discusses these issues in today's extraordinary Eurogroup summit.

[Papandreou, Vote of confidence, 19/6/11]

This is evident in the above passage, where Papandreou refers to information that is already known ('[…] that State's cash will… of the bail-out). He correctly assumes that what he conveys is part of knowledge, which is commonly shared among the recipients, and he emphasizes this as he uses the adverbial phrase 'very well' by which he assesses the degree of 'sharedness' of the content of the information being conveyed.

This rechecking of the agreement space has little to do with the information per se or with the very act of assessment in terms of how many shared it. It is considered by the political actor as a necessary move to introduce a new piece of information, as it appears in what follows in the above passage ('Precisely… Eurogroup summit'). This information may be relevant to the general subject being discussed by the political actor during this parliamentary meeting for providing a vote of confidence to the government, i.e. the actions having been taken by the PASOK government in order to confront the crisis, but it is irrelevant, in narrow terms, to the information included within the space of agreement between the speaker and the audience – that is, the balance of the state's cash and the necessary state to accept the planned installment of the bail-out program.

Extending already shared knowledge

The last case in which the political actors explicitly express what others know is when they elaborate on a commonly known subject adding new information to it. Actually, this is the difference from what was observed in the passage in (17).

(18)   Έχουμε κόμματα και πολιτικές ηγεσίες **που** αρκούνται στον εύκολο και ευχάριστο ρόλο της αντιπολίτευσης, της κριτικής και του εύκολου λόγου, της εύκολης δημαγωγίας. Ξέρετε, αυτή είναι μία άνιση κατανομή ρόλων, μια άδικη κατανομή ρόλων.

We have parties and leaders who are content with the easy and pleasant role of being the opposition; of making criticism; of saying pleasant words; of being demagogues. You know, this is an unequal and unjust allocation of roles.

[Venizelos, Mega TV Interview 28/4/12]

Above, the speaker makes an assertion ('We have… of being demagogues'), which is then elaborated in the second period of the passage starting with the cognitive factive

'to know' ('You know'). Obviously, the recipients, the IEES doing the interview, cannot know what Venizelos is about to say. However, the political actor attributes this knowledge to the IEES, because he considers the particular linguistic resource as a pragmatic means for expanding and concluding the information he has conveyed in the previous assertion. It should be noted that the assertion in the beginning of the passage includes several assessments realized through adjectives ('easy and pleasant'; 'pleasant') or through lexical choices that bare a semantic attitudinal meaning such as 'criticism' or 'demagogues', all of which reflect the speaker's subjective stance. In this respect, the use of the verb to know enables the speaker to downgrade the subjective character of his assertion; to appear less engaged with its content; and to represent the conclusion of his evaluations as more or less commonly shared and expected.

4.2.2.7.b. Other minds lacking knowledge: You do not know

As was observed in cases of expression of personal or in-group knowledge, political actors also discursively realize what out-groups do not know. Again, given the indirect access to other minds' epistemic stance, the speaker they do infer what others are unaware of. The lack of knowledge is manifested in negative statements with cognitive factive verbs, e.g. 'you do not know', or in verb phrases with the verb *αγνοώ* ('to ignore'). It goes without saying, that in both cases the political actors want to emphasize the knowledge asymmetry between themselves and their interlocutors - mainly belonging to their political opponents. The aim of the speakers is to negatively represent the out-groups by making them appear unaware of a knowledge that they should have possessed. Therefore, their credibility as sources of information is disregarded, while their responsibility, a highly acclaimed and desired feature of the ideal identity of any politician, is also degraded.

(19)   Άρα, λοιπόν, χρειαζόμαστε τη δόση για να καλύψουμε το πρωτογενές έλλειμμα του προϋπολογισμού, δηλαδή, να πληρώσουμε μισθούς και συντάξεις. Δεύτερον –που το αγνοείτε - να καλύψουμε το πρωτογενές έλλειμμα του ισοζυγίου τρεχουσών συναλλαγών. Δηλαδή, ακόμα κι αν ξεχάσουμε τους τόκους, δεν τους πληρώσουμε έτσι επειδή μας ήρθε, θα έχουμε ένα έλλειμμα εκεί 7% , το οποίο είναι φάρμακα, καύσιμα, τρόφιμα, μηχανολογικός εξοπλισμός. Πώς θα πληρωθούν αυτά; Με τι συνάλλαγμα;

Therefore, we need the installment in order to finance the budget's primary deficit, i.e. to provide wages and pensions. Second -you ignore it- [we need

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the installment] to finance the primary deficit of current transactions. In other words, even if we forget about the interests -we do to pay them just because we want to do so- we will have an approximately 7% deficit which corresponds to medicines, fuel, food, machinery. How will all these be paid? With what currency?

[Stournaras, Parliament speech, 11/11/12]

The above passage is retrieved from a Stournaras' speech delivered during the session for the approval of the state's budget of 2013. The Minister of Finance adopts a Factual ES type in order to argue on the necessity of bail-out program's pending installment ('Therefore we need… pensions'), and then, as the discourse unfolds, he continues with the same type, but he also uses the parenthetical verb phrase ('you ignore it') in order to emphasize the knowledge asymmetry between himself and the MPs of the opposition parties, namely the ones of the major opposition party, SYRIZA. In this respect, the political actor manages to attack the SYRIZA MPs, who are represented lacking basic knowledge on the State's economy. Contrasted to their inadequate knowledge, he appears credible not only because he has what is assumed as necessary knowledge, but also because he elaborates this knowledge by providing supplementary objective numerical data ('we will have a deficit of approximately 7%'). Therefore, the distinction between the in-groups and the out-groups is constructed on the basis of what each group knows and/or ignores. The in-groups are those who possess knowledge, whereas the out-groups are those who lack assumed important knowledge.

4.2.2.7.c. Others minds' knowledge: They know

Just as the second person verb types, the third person verb types are used to expresses asymmetrical relations between the participants about the knowledge they have. The political actors either infer that others know more or, more precisely, that their knowledge reflect criteria that count or considered more important than others within the political context, or that others know less or totally lack knowledge.

(20)   Γι' αυτούς είναι σημαντικό να ξέρουν για ποιο λόγο δανείζουν, με ποιους όρους δανείζουν, γιατί πρέπει να βοηθήσουν την Ελλάδα και τους Έλληνες, ιδίως όταν πρόκειται για χώρες με πολύ μικρότερο κατά κεφαλήν εισόδημα, για χώρες με πολύ μικρότερους μισθούς και πολύ μικρότερες συντάξεις, για χώρες οι οποίες έχουν ένα επίπεδο ζωής πολύ

δυσμενέστερο από το επίπεδο ζωής που έχουμε κατακτήσει στην Ελλάδα τις τελευταίες δεκαετίες.

For them, it is important to know why they are lending; under which terms they lend; and why they have to support Greece and the Greeks, especially those countries with lower income per capita, countries with much lower wages and pensions, countries that have a standard of living worse than the one we have gained during the last decades..

[Venizelos, Pasok Parliamentary Group Speech, 2/2/12]

Above, the political actor infers what the rest of the EU partners wish to know. In this respect he does not appeal to a knowledge that the others possess, but what kind of information they do consider as important to acquire knowledge. The inference is not based on an explicitly referred-to type of evidence. It can be assumed that this is derived from discourse-based evidence, either acquired by what the partners have publicly stated or from what the actor has personally acquired while he was taking part in the summits of the Eurogroup and Euro-working group.

In this passage the superior position of the partners is reflected by the fact that there are those who want specific information in order to approve the program, and their criteria is considered more important by the political actor. In this respect it can be claimed that the speaker intentionally leaves vague what the evidential base of his inference is, in order to construct his authority as a source of information, as he appeals to information that that are accessible only to him due to his institutional position. Given that he addresses his fellow MPs, it is not a hard task to achieve - as a matter of fact in the communicative situation the speaker enjoys the highest degree of acceptance about his credibility as the source of information. Venizelos, therefore, constructs an asymmetrical knowledge relation from which immediate receivers, all of them in-groups, can benefit. By making explicit what the EU partners (want to) know, the political actor shares with his in-groups an assumedly hard to access knowledge. The point is for all of them to be provided with a knowledge that they have acquired only because they are members of the governing party, and therefore they can claim that it is their party and the government supported by them that allows them to have such knowledge, because it is their party and supported government participating and accessing how decisions are made on an international level.

The passage in (21) demonstrates how the speaker takes advantage of making explicit what others do not know.

(21)   Δεύτερον, μήπως οι εταίροι μας μπλοφάρουν και είναι αναγκασμένοι να μας σώσουν και να μας δανείσουν, ανεξάρτητα από το αν εμείς θα αποδεχθούμε και θα εφαρμόσουμε το πρόγραμμα; Αυτά μπορούν να τα λένε μόνο όσοι δεν γνωρίζουν τη σημερινή κατάσταση στην Ευρώπη, μόνον όσοι έχουν άγνοια κινδύνου, μόνον όσοι αγνοούν όχι μόνο το τι λέει η Γερμανία, αλλά και το τι λένε οι μικρές χώρες που σας ανέφερα, τι λένε οι χώρες που μετέχουν στο Διοικητικό Συμβούλιο του Διεθνούς Νομισματικού Ταμείου, όπως η Κίνα, η Βραζιλία, η Ρωσία.

Second, what if our partners are bluffing and they are obliged to rescue us and lend us, regardless whether we accept and implement the program? Such things can be said only by those who do not know the current situation in Europe, only by those who are unaware of the danger; only by those who ignore not only what Germany says, but also what is said by the small countries to which I previously referred or [what is said] by the countries participating to the IMF's board, e.g. China, Brazil, Russia.

[Venizelos, Parliamentary Speech, 12 /2/2012]

In the above excerpt the political actor uses three expressions to index the lack of knowledge of the others. The first is 'only by those who do not know'; the second 'by those who are unaware of'; and the third 'by those who do ignore'. As in cases seen before, the knowledge acquisition is seen as a means for distinction between the in-groups and out-groups. Venizelos at the beginning of the passage adopts a pseudo-Discursive ES type as he represents in free indirect speech the voice of an assumedly collective subject, the opposition ('what if our partners bluff and they are obliged to rescue us and lend us, no matter whether or not we accept and implement the program?') and then he distances himself from the utterance by explicitly attenuating the credibility of its supposed source. The others are lacking knowledge of how power relationships are shaped and evolving within Europe and transnational institutions. It is quite interesting that others have no knowledge of a specific type of evidence, discursive, which again is considered by the political actor as one of high validity and epistemic importance. Having constructed an asymmetrical relationship in respect to the knowledge being shared between the in-groups and the out-groups, the speaker contrasts his own discourse to the one of the others in terms of validity ('what is said by the small countries to which I previously referred').

4.2.2.7.d. Others minds' knowledge: (S)he knows

The passage below is a short excerpt of Antonis Samaras's speech to ND party MPs a few days before the discussion of the labor market reform bill. The Prime Minister refers to public section corruption, and particularly to some public servants, who should have been fired but remained in their positions.

(22)   Χιλιάδες δημόσιοι υπάλληλοι εξετάστηκαν για πειθαρχικά παραπτώματα, βρέθηκαν ένοχοι, η υπόθεση τελεσιδίκησε, κι όμως έπεσαν «στα μαλακά». Το ξέρει ο καθένας το πώς. Κι έμειναν στις θέσεις τους ή επέστρεψαν μετά από σύντομη «αργία» και πληρώνονται κανονικά, επίσης σε βάρος του συνόλου.

Thousands of civil servants were examined for disciplinary misconducts and they were found guilty -the case was closed- but they landed on their feet. Everyone knows how. And they remained in their positions or they returned after a short 'suspension', and they are regularly paid against the body politic.

Here, the use of the unmodal verb type ('knows') boost speaker certainty. Still, the evidence on which Samaras makes his deduction is of a cognitive nature, namely what is assumed as general knowledge of how the public sector deals with legal and moral issues. What gains importance here is not only the fact that Samaras implies that he has access to what all the recipients know about the public sector, so that he can infer it, but also the fact that he explicitly constructs the general knowledge of his audience ('everyone knows'). He considers this knowledge shared and taken-for-granted, because he doesn't argue or explain why the employees weren't fired but allows his recipients to reach their own conclusions.

It can be argued that the choice of inferential ES was mainly in accordance with contextual goals, and not with the discursive representation of how information was acquired by Samaras. The Prime Minister switched to the subjective inferential ES because he wanted to portray himself as an authoritative source that can assume with great certainty what other people know. This goal was quite likely to be achieved as the audience consists of ND party MPs, hence Samaras could hardly be challenged. More importantly, the adoption of this ES type in order to present his implied beliefs on the corruption of the public sector as commonly shared ('everybody knows'), and the privileged status of public servants who remain in service despite the fact that they should have been suspended.

Taking into account the broader political context, Samaras establishes a certain negative view about justice and the lack of professional merit within the public sector. This view reflects the standard conservative ideological belief, according to which when the State becomes employer then bureaucracy, inefficiency and corruption are generated. Particularly, within the Greek political context, the public sector has constantly been linked with the clientelist state[16], and especially in the times of the financial crisis was portrayed negatively as a 'corruption hub', which needed extensive reforms and was dissimilar to the healthy private sector. Moreover, public sector workers were represented as more lazy and as having more benefits compared to private sector workers. However, all or a part of these beliefs are simply implied by Samaras, who assumes this part of his audience's general knowledge.

Similar points to those mentioned above are evident in (23):

(23)   Δοκιμάζονται και οι προγνώσεις, οι έρευνες, δοκιμάζεται τελικά και ο ίδιος ο πολίτης, ο οποίος ξέρει πολύ καλά πως κρατάει στα χέρια του τη μοίρα τη δική του, των παιδιών του, της πατρίδας. Ξέρει επίσης πολύ καλά ότι η ψήφος του δεν είναι μια ψήφος διαμαρτυρίας, μια ψήφος πίεσης, μια ψήφος διαπραγμάτευσης στο εσωτερικό της χώρας, αλλά είναι μια ψήφος αποφασιστικής σημασίας, με πολύ σημαντικές επιπτώσεις σε ατομικό και οικογενειακό επίπεδο. Ξέρει επίσης ο πολίτης ότι είναι άλλο πράγμα μια ψήφος τιμωρίας κομμάτων και πολιτικών προσώπων και άλλο πράγμα μια ψήφος τιμωρίας, που μετατρέπεται σε ψήφο αυτοτιμωρίας της πατρίδας και των ίδιων των πολιτών.

Also, the forecasts are tested, the polls [are tested] and at last citizens are tested, who know well that they hold their fate in their hands; [the fate] of their children; [the fate] of the country. They also know very well that their vote is not a protest vote, a vote for pressure, a vote for domestic negotiation, but it is a vote of decisive importance with a very important impact on the individual and family levels. Citizens also know that a vote for punishing parties and a punishment vote that transforms into a vote for the self-punishment of a country and of the citizens are two completely different things.

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[16] Parties use hiring in the public sector, usually under vague or illegal criteria, as an enticement in order to persuade voters. The clientelist state is a serious perpetual problem of the Greek public administration, evident from the very first moment of the existence of the modern Greek state. It should be noted, though, that during the last four decades, after the fall of military coup, and till 2015, power was shared between only two parties, the social democratic PASOK and the conservative ND. Accordingly, both of them have serious responsibilities, a fact that Samaras, president of the latter at the time of the speech seems to neglect.

This is a passage from a Venizelos' response that appeared in a print interview given to 'Ethnos'[17] just a couple of days before the first general elections in 2012. The question that triggered Venizelos's answers was formulated as such: 'in two days people decide. What is your instinct about the elections' outcome?"

It is extremely interesting to examine how Venizelos addresses the readers. For the sake of his response, he constructs an imaginary collective subject of 'citizens' (in singular in the original text) to whose cognitive background he claims to have access. So, the leader of PASOK speaks as if being in the know of what 'citizens' think of the elections. Instead of presenting his opinions, Venizelos attributes them to an arbitrary and abstract construction, while his personal voice is represented as the voice of many. Venizelos uses the reoccurring verb phrase 'they know that', a structure, which was analyzed in the previous section, so there is no need to repeat how it functions about discourse organizations and understanding.

4.2.3. Inferential ES type

The main feature of inferential ES is that information conveyed by the speaker is represented as inferred or deducted. Various types of evidence can be used as the basis of inference, but the speaker has to acquire them either directly, in case of first hand attested sensory evidence, or indirectly, in the sense that his reasoning process is based on his general encyclopedic knowledge, which has to be activated by the context models he constructs for any communicative situation, and then form a conclusion. However, there are cases in which evidence is lacking and the speaker is responsible for the reasoning process. This product of inferential process is called conjecture and is also included in the analysis that follows. Obviously, if the recipient believes that (s)he has stronger evidence or evidence that is more credible than the one used by the speaker, (s)he can easily challenge the conclusion. Nevertheless, this type of ES is used because it is more distant and less subjective compared to personal

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[17] The 'Ethnos' was -and still is- a pro-centrist paper. At the time under discussion was very tied to a PASOK oriented audience. However, after the title was bought by a new media group, DIMERA, in 2017 a supportive stance towards the SYRIZA-ANEL coalitional government was adopted.

experience ES since information is conveyed not as a mere reflection of the speaker's inner state, but as a product of his own reasoning.

As regards the linguistic realization of inferential ES type, Mushin (2001) is concerned with epistemic modal verbs and adverbs. It was mentioned, though, that in the present study cognitive non factive verbs are included as well as cases in which the epistemic marker *-tha* is used. Finally, we also deal with conditional clauses that index counterfactulity.

4.2.3.1. Cognitive non-factive verbs

4.2.3.1.a. I think

The first person singular 'I think' has been associated with the indication of the speaker's opinions and attitudes (Palmer 1986: 126), so it related with the expression of "the speaker's epistemic judgment" (ibid. 168). Nevertheless, the most researches emphasized how the verb affected the indexing of the modal meaning of the utterance. Halliday sees it as an interpersonal metaphor for modality (1994: 354-55), while, from a semantic point of view, it expresses either opinion or belief, depending on the evaluation of the utterance's degree of probability (Persson 1995, Aijmer 1997). In the classical work of Chafe (1986), the verb "I think" is briefly referred to as a marker of belief, and no elaboration is made on the issue.

Reviewing the discussion about the use of 'I think' in political discourse, Simon-Vandenbergen (1999; 2000) suggests that there is still a lot of disagreement about crucial pragmatic aspects of the verb. First, it remains unclear whether it is typical in highly institutionalized political interviews (Juncker 1986) or in daily conversations (Chafe 1986). Second, there is no consensus on whether the lack of the speaker's commitment is concerned with the speaker's attempt to save her/his face and not to appear to be incredible (Juncker 1986), or, on the contrary, it is related to the speaker's aim to avoid bluntness, and, accordingly, to save the hearer's face (Aijmer 1997, Turnbull & Saxton 1997). Third, the use of "I think" in political settings is related to the expression of the uncertainty, as suggested by Juncker (1986), or it expresses authority (Macauley 1995), as it signals that the speaker who makes the epistemic assessment has the knowledge and position that allow her/him to make such

assessments about the epistemic status of the utterance, or, finally, it signals both uncertainty and authority (Holmes 1990, Aijmer 1997)?

In our data, "I think" is used by the political actors not as means of expressing uncertainty, but rather as a means which puts emphasis, due to its subjectively indexed character, on the source of inference, i.e. the political actor himself. Also, it will be shown that in cases in which meaning is constructed and negotiated online, as in cases of TV political interviews, the political actor uses "I think" precisely because he wants to construct a space of mutual agreement with his interlocutor, so he downplays his own certainty.

I think that

(24) Κυρία Κοσιώνη, νομίζω ότι ένα πράγμα το οποίο έχουμε μάθει, και τουλάχιστον εγώ προσωπικά έχω εισπράξει τους τελευταίους μήνες είναι ότι, όταν κάνεις κάτι το οποίο είναι λογικό, έχει το αίσθημα του δικαίου και ο κόσμος το καταλαβαίνει, τότε μπορείς να ανταπεξέρχεσαι και να χειρίζεσαι τις οποιεσδήποτε αντιδράσεις υπάρχουν συγκεκριμένων συντεχνιών ή ομάδων που πλήττονται. Αρκεί αυτό που να κάνεις να είναι δίκαιο και λογικό.

Mrs. Kossioni, I think that there is one thing that we all have learned, and as far as I'm personally concerned I have realized it -when you do something that is reasonable, it corresponds to the sense of justice and the people understand it, then you can manage any reactions from specific guilds or groups that are affected. [You do it] as long as what you do is fair and reasonable.

[Papakonstantinou, Skai TV Interview, 31/3/10]

Here the political actor uses the cognitive non-factive 'to think' with that-complementizer in order to realize a generic inference. The subjective character of the inference is not only indexed by the selection of the verb per se, which indicates that the source of information is [+Self], but also by the first person singular type. While it is a common practice among the political actors studied here to make inferences about the private mental states of the others and to claim that they have access to those states, in the excerpt Papakonstantinou explicitly refers to the base of his inference which is part of his private mental state ('[A]nd as far as I am concerned'). However, he does so not because he wants to ascribe a modest degree of commitment towards the assertion, but rather because he wants to emphasize the personal basis of

inference. The topic of the particular turn of the interview is how the government in general and personally the Minister of Finance will handle the reactions of various social and trade unionist groups that will be affected by the policies in the field of labor market, which are provisioned by the Sustainability and Growth Program, while intense negotiations between the Greek administration and international partners are taking for the creation of the ESM support scheme. The information of the speaker which supports his own reasoning process is derived from an externally attested source, i.e. possibly private discussions with the representative of those groups or, more likely, a knowledge of the groups and people's attitudes towards the measures, according to various polls. In both cases the base for the inference made has a communicative discursive character.

I think as parenthetical

Another use of 'to think' is the parenthetical one, as it appears in the above excerpt.

(25)   Σας μιλάω με μεγάλη ευθύτητα και νομίζω και με καθαρότητα: Βρισκόμαστε —στο πλαίσιο μιας συνεχούς διαπραγμάτευσης. Η διαδικασία είναι ανοιχτή. Κάθε λίγο και λιγάκι έχουμε αξιολογήσεις, έχουμε εκθέσεις αξιολόγησης, έχουμε προσαρμογές.

I speak honestly and, I think, with clarity. We are amid an ongoing negotiation. The process is still open. Every once in a while, we have evaluations, we have reports on evaluation, we have adjustments.

[Venizelos Mega TV Interview, 17/6/11]

The political actor uses the first singular person verb type *'νομίζω'* ('I think') at the beginning of the passage. However, the main function is mainly pragmatic rather than indexing an ES type. The speaker attenuates epistemically the second part of the first clause of the passage, but this move can be interpreted by the interactional character of the genre of the interview. It seems that this is a rather implicit appeal to the IEES to confirm that he accepts the degree of reliability of the IER as the source of information whether they agree with him or not. As the IEES remain silent, the IER interprets that confirmation is active, so he feels allowed to convey a series of factive assertions. Therefore, the speaker makes no inference in order to indicate how he acquires the information he conveys, but he makes on inference about whether he is epistemically aligned with the IEES.

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4.2.3.1.b. They think

This connection of inferential ES with Discursive ES is more evident in the excerpt below:

(26)   Τυπώνοντας δραχμές, πολλοί νομίζουν ότι λύνεται αυτό το πρόβλημα. Αυταπατώνται. Δεν μπορείς, διότι δεν μπορείς όταν είσαι χρεοκοπημένος να πληρώσεις με δραχμές τις εισαγωγές βασικών αγαθών είτε αυτά είναι φάρμακα είτε καύσιμα είτε τρόφιμα. Επιπλέον, η εκτύπωση δραχμής σε μία χρεοκοπημένη οικονομία θα οδηγήσει σε υπερπληθωρισμό, σε δραματική υποτίμηση, σε χάος, σε μαφίες που θα λυμαίνονται τη χώρα.

Many people think that this problem can be solved by printing drachmas. They are denying the reality. When you have gone bankrupt you can't pay the import of basic goods in drachmas, whether they are medicines or fuel or food. Moreover, the printing of drachmas within a failed economy will lead to hyperinflation; to a dramatic devaluation; to chaos; to mafias that will despoil the country.

[Stournaras, Parliamentary Speech, 11/11/12]

In the above Stournaras addresses the Parliament during the discussion on the annual budget bill of 2013. Even though an explicit reference to those represented as 'many' is avoided, it can be easily inferred from the broader context that Stournaras mainly attacks the major opposition, SYRIZA. Moreover, Stournaras's aim was precisely to weaken the epistemic strength of the arguments claimed by his political opponents as well as the coalitional government's ones. Again, this aim is a general aim when it comes to politics, but what is important to consider here is how Stournaras interprets this aim in relation to the context of the communicative situation in which he is engaged and how his context model of this situation controls which structures – in our case how ES types will be strategically deployed – will realize the aim being set.

First, the lack of source tagging attenuates the strength of the epistemic status of what the group labeled under the pronoun 'many' believes. A prototypical recourse for the construction of strong evidential meaning is to refer to an authority or at least to specifically refer to a source that may be considered credible. When a source is omitted it can be inferred that its authority is assessed negatively by the speaker.

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Likewise, the choice of the verb 'to think' weakens the epistemic strength of out-group position. Stournaras represents his information as inferred from the cognitive background of SYRIZA members. An epistemological mismatch is quite evident because the only source from which Stournaras can acquire information about what his opponents think is by their discourses, by what they have said or written. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what happens in politics, a field within which different types of discourse clash. Besides this, the verb 'to think' is broadly used as an introduction to direct or indirect speech. However, the structure witnessed here is typical neither for the former nor the latter. Particularly for indirect speech the prototypical structure is 'introductory verb + 'that-clause''. In contrast, Stournaras simply provides a gist of what the major opposition believes. Accordingly, instead of using Discursive ES, he opts for inferential ES because he can, thus, use a verb type that bears an inherent epistemic evaluation.

A special point should be made here which is relevant to the context dependency of evidential and epistemic meaning (Saussure 2011). In the present study similar structures to the one just analyzed are included in Discursive ES. The criteria determining which type of ES is realized are contextual. For instance, here Stournaras emphasizes on the cognitive 'aspect' of information in order to highlight the knowledge asymmetry between himself and his opponents. By neglecting their beliefs, Stournaras implicitly claims that he has the 'right', 'true' opinion on the issue discussed, a move that becomes apparent in the rest of the passage. Conversely, in other cases, what gains in importance is the acquisition of the information from what a third has said. Hence, there is no solid division between the linguistic resources that realize the different kinds of ES. Rather, resources should always be examined in relation to the context, which are produced and comprehend.

As discourse unfolds, Stournaras makes an explicit evaluation of his opponents' views by uttering the single word clause 'They are denying the reality', by which he claims that what they believe is false. Then, the Minister of Finance makes two inferences ('You can't pay in drachmas… the country') from his cognitive background, namely his expert knowledge on economics due to his institutional position and his former professional occupation, in order to justify his evaluation. Both inferences depict the potential switch to national currency in an extremely negative manner. Particularly,

Stournaras emphasizes the lack of basic products and the last period an overwording (Fairclough 2003) is observed regarding the negative consequences of the drachma reintroduction (degrading, chaos, mafias). Note the lack of any modal marker, grammatical or lexical, by which the proposition is evaluated as more or less certain, despite being a personal inference which gives it a subjective status. Stournaras relies upon his knowledge and represents himself as a credible source because of his position so as he interprets the situation he chooses not to provide 'objective' evidence, but to simply imply that since he is the one that says so about the currency switch then there is no reason for any doubts to be raised. Also, it seems that Stournaras deploys audiences' general knowledge of what happens when a State defaults. However, there is no experience of such a situation either in Greece or in the rest of the EU, so this knowledge is constructed by the mainstream domestic and international media, based on what people *believe* to have happened in recent examples of State defaults such as Argentina in 2001[18].

4.2.3.1.c. I believe

Within a pragmatic-cognitive framework of analysis similar to the one applied to the study of "I think", it is argued that "I believe" encodes the speaker's own true beliefs, and it is seen as a pragmatic booster, i.e. as a means for intensifying the force of arguments (Fetzer 2008: 393; 2014: 68). It can also contribute to the expression of the speaker's degree of uncertainty towards the utterance, since it is assumed epistemically stronger than "I think", which typically marks the speaker's (un)certainty.

In our analysis, the functions of the cognitive non-factive '*πιστεύω*' ('I believe') are similar to the ones discussed in the previous excerpts that featured the verb 'to think'. In addition, "I believe" has a low frequency of occurrence in our data, a point that it

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[18] In the Greek political discourse, the case of Argentina is very frequently referred to, along with other States of the Latin America, e.g. Venezuela, as the "worst case scenario" for the Greek economy. In fact, a metonymic process has been undergone, since many politicians, especially those from conservative and social-democratic blocks, simply refer to the country's name in the phrase "we will turn into Argentina", in order to imply default and all the negative consequences which will derive from this event. This populist practice of using these kinds of metonyms is still evident.

might denote that in the speaker's minds there the difference between the two verbs is not so clear-cut.

Let's consider the following:

(27)   **IER:** Εδώ αυτό το σχέδιο αυτό τελειώνει ή εξακολουθούν να το επιθυμούν εκτιμάτε εσείς;
     IEE: Όχι, πιστεύω ότι αυτό ήταν που παίχτηκε. Η πραγματική διαπραγμάτευση και η πραγματική απόφαση είναι ότι οριστικά εγκαταλείπουν κάποιοι τις σκέψεις ότι η λύση για την Ελλάδα είναι η χρεοκοπία και κάποιοι άλλοι τις σκέψεις, ότι η λύση για την Ελλάδα και την Ευρώπη είναι η έξοδος από την Ευρωζώνη.
     Είχε ετοιμάσει το IIF ένα έγγραφο το οποίο κυκλοφόρησε σε επιλεγμένους αποδέκτες για το τι μπορεί να σημαίνει μια χρεοκοπία της Ελλάδος. Τι μπορεί να σημαίνει για την Ευρωζώνη, για την Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα, τι μπορεί, να σημαίνει για την παγκόσμια οικονομία.

     IER: Your estimation is that his plan is canceled so far, or it is still desired by some?
     IEE: No, I believe that this plan is over. The actual negotiation and the actual decision is that some definitely abandon the thought that default is a solution for Greece, while some others also abandon the thought that exiting the Eurozone is a solution for Greece. The IFF had prepared a document, which was distributed to selected receivers, about what a Greek default might mean for the Eurozone, the ECB and for the world economy.

[Venizelos, Mega interview, 22/2/12]

What should be noted regarding the excerpt in (27) is that the political actor complies with the conventions of the genres of political interview and he tacitly recognizes in this turn the superiority of the IER not only in topic management but also in how he should realize his epistemic assessment. It is the IER the one who calls the IEE to communicate his own reasoning process ('What's your estimation'), and the IEE accepts it.

It should be noted, though, that this move on the IER's part is not generally relevant to the genre of political interviews – the journalists when they pose a question, they seek information – not mere estimations. In this respect, the IER allows the political actor to avoid an epistemically strong commitment towards the assertions he is going to communicate, even though that the topic under discussion, namely how many of

Greece's international partners are positioned towards a possible Grexit, is a very critical issue in the domestic political agenda.

On his part, the IEE initially adjusts to the conventions of the genre, making an inference which is based on discursive based evidence, assumedly the official and unofficial talks with the international partners, to which he has privileged access granted on his institutional role. It seems though the broader political parameters, which feature in the speaker's personal contextual model of the specific communicative situation, intervene, and therefore, the way that they are interpreted by the political actor crucially control how he speaks. Being aware about the political and social importance of the issue that is questioned by the IER, Venizelos does not solely provide an epistemically weak inference as a reply. On the contrary, he supports his assertion by adopting more strong ES types. Shortly after the first sentence of his turn, the political actor adopts Factual ES type ('The actual negotiation and the actual decision is… a solution for Greece) which triggers an epistemic legitimization strategy which will be discussed below, called 'define the situation'. Then, he brings into discussion discursive based evidence ('The IFF had prepared a document…'), about which the speaker also has special and exclusive knowledge, because as was pragmatically entailed by the verb phrase at the beginning of the utterance ('The IFF has prepared a document'), and historically verified by the events following the interview, the document was never published.

Despite the evidence to which Venizelos refers not being accessible and its degree validity being directly related to the assumed credibility not only of its initial source, but also of that of the speaker, who is the only one having such knowledge among all other participants in the communicative situation, the political actor manages to strengthen the validity of the evidence as he makes three particular moves. First, he explicitly attributes it to its source, the IFF, which is accepted as a source of high evidential standing, and, what is more, having a powerful position in terms of power relationships. Second, he specifies the evidence's nature, e.g. it is written, so it is more valid than an oral one, as well as its institutional status, e.g. unofficial since it was never published. The unofficial character of the document could have been seen as a factor that attenuated the epistemic validity of the evidence. However, Venizelos, turns this 'disadvantage' into an advantage. Exploiting his generally accepted

evidential standing as the Minister of Finance, he represents the content of that document in brief, knowing that no one can challenge him as he is the only one that possesses that knowledge. Having absolute control on what amount of knowledge will be made accessible to others, the political actor does not explicitly name the receivers of the document, but he qualifies them as 'selected' thus letting the audience infer that these receivers are the ones who 'count'; the ones who made the decisions, so they are powerful. Therefore, combining a) the source of the document, b) the status of the receivers, and c) the content of the document, Venizelos guides the audience to infer not only that even unofficial evidence known by very few people and practically unchallengeable can have high degree of validity, but also that precisely because of its unofficial status and the limited number of people aware of it, this document includes information, projections and knowledge that cannot be massively shared, especially amid tense political procedures such as the negotiations of the Greek State with its partners.

4.2.3.1.d. Inferring 'old' knowledge: the case of remind

As said, all evidential meaning is based on the activation of old mental models. The domain of evidence, from which the speaker has acquired his knowledge, the mode of access to that evidence as well as the speaker's evaluations are all represented in the mental models that the speaker constructs. The case of the verb remind differs in a sense that instead of a particular domain of evidence it meta-presents the very action of activating the old mental model. What is more, verbs such as "to remind" refer to knowledge in the strict terms of justified true belief. What one reminds other(s) must have been shared beforehand, accepted and known among the audience – you cannot remind someone of something that is not known, i.e. something that has been already processed as fact. What is more, an asymmetry of knowledge relations is implied, because the speaker tacitly claims that (s)he continues to possess knowledge which the recipients may have already forgotten. Still though, the political actors may deploy the epistemic force of the verb "remind" to accomplish their context-specific aims and goals, and subsequently to represent as old knowledge their current – at the time of speech – beliefs and opinions, or to introduce totally new knowledge, which as such it may be challenged or contested, as already accepted and shared.

The next passage is from George Papandreou's speech on 27/6/11 during the discussion of the medium-term economic program.

(28)   Κυρίες και κύριοι συνάδελφοι, θυμίζω το άμεσο πρόβλημα που αντιμετωπίζει η χώρα μας: τη διαχείριση του υπέρογκου χρέους που κληρονομήσαμε όλοι από την κυβέρνηση της Νέας Δημοκρατίας.

Fellow members, I remind [the House] the immediate problem which our country faces: the management of the excessive debt which we have all inherited from the ND Government.

[Papandreou, Parliamentary Speech, 26/6/2011]

Even though this section includes second and third person verb types, it can be claimed that the speaker adopts inferential ES in the above excerpt. As in the previous examples of inferential ES, the cognitive 'I remind' indexes that the speaker deducts his information from the (assumed) cognitive background of his recipients. He makes an inference that what he is saying is already known, which is a quite plausible inference because Papandreou refers to a concrete and 'objective' fact the size of the Greek public debt. It seems, though, that the adoption of inferential ES in place of the more relevant Factual ES, is controlled by the speaker's context model, having certain implications which are relevant to the local and global context.

On the discursive level, the inference made by the Prime Minister frames the factive assertion that follows ('the management of… the ND Government'), which is the foregrounded information in his utterance. In other words, inferential ES introduces the most important part of the utterance, which is represented as a 'fact'. Moreover, the factive assertion is a typical example of the 'defining the situation' formulation (see section x.4 for more details on the issue) and functions as a macro-proposition semantically organizing Papandreou's discourse[19].

In this respect, it can be argued that inferential ES, a relative subjective type of ES, attenuates the epistemic strength of factive assertion. Rather, the information realized by this type of ES embeds a definite presupposition ('the immediate problem') which makes direct reference to the foregrounded part of the utterance. As mentioned in the

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[19] Of course, this function is not quite evident in the above passage, but it cannot be questioned if one has a look at how the rest of discourse has unfolded.

previous section, when a speaker uses a presupposition he assumes the information expressed as already known. So, Papandreou does not use Factual ES, but he still conveys part of the information as generally known, i.e. taken for granted.

Additionally, the adoption of inferential ES functions at cognitive-pragmatic level as well. Papandreou creates a common ground with his audience by adopting inferential ES – he emphasizes the intersubjective character of the information conveyed, because he explicitly assumes ('I remind [the House]') that the piece of evidence he is about to refer to is already part of audience's general knowledge. He makes, thus, an epistemic alignment check with the recipients of the speech. Given the political context, a crucial parliamentary section amid massive public protest against austerity policies, Papandreou interprets the need for sharing his knowledge as more relevant to the communicative situation. Hence, he implies that everybody shares the same knowledge about the nature of country's problems, e.g. the excessive debt, as well as who should be accused for it, e.g. the previous ND government, so they shall also agree on the policies proposed in order to confront the problem. Also, instead of solely focusing on 'objective' facts, i.e. the figures of public debt, Papandreou considers the choice of a more subjective ES relevant to the situation, so he can portray himself as a credible source of knowledge and, what is more, as a leader who is in position to infer what the recipients know.

4.2.3.2. Modal verbs/adverbs

There is a vast literature regarding the issue of modality and modal expressions, which, of course, cannot – not even briefly – be presented here. Some fundamental points about the relationship between epistemic modals and evidentiality were discussed in 2.1.2., while it was also presented how, under the broad of epistemicity, epistemic modals contribute to the construction of the speaker's epistemic stance. As it appears in our data, the political actors avoid to epistemically modify their utterances by using explicit modal markers, because one of their main aims that prevails actor's linguistic choices is to construct themselves as credible sources and to affirm authority and epistemic primacy by appearing to have in depth knowledge of what they discuss. This, of course, has to do with the contextual dependence of modalities (and evidentials) (van Dijk 2014: 277), and namely with model-theoretic framework which was presented for evidentials and is applicable to modalities as

well. The speakers' degree of (un)certainty or the speakers' assessment of the likelihood of an event to occur as well as any subjective aspect that is reflected in the relation between the speakers' beliefs and the reality are represented in relational meta-models (ibid.), which the speakers subjectively construct (ibid.). Apart from cognitive terms, though, extremely relevant to our analysis is how modalities are used for texturing identities (Fairclough 2003: 166). In this respect, we understand epistemic modal expressions in social and interactional terms, as they enact identities, roles and relationships between the participants (van Dijk 2014: 278).

4.2.3.2.a. It may/ might

(29)   Κυρίες και κύριοι συνάδελφοι, οι ημέρες είναι πάρα πολύ κρίσιμες και πρέπει να πούμε σ' αυτές τις συνεδριάσεις για το Μεσοπρόθεσμο και τον Εφαρμοστικό Νόμο όλη την αλήθεια χωρίς φόβο και χωρίς πάθος.
Μπορεί να ισχυριστεί κάποιος ότι η περιγραφή της κατάστασης λειτουργεί εκβιαστικά ή εκφοβιστικά. Έχω πει όμως στην πρώτη μου ομιλία ως Υπουργός Οικονομικών, στη διαδικασία της παροχής ψήφου εμπιστοσύνης, ότι δεν πιστεύω ούτε στη στρατηγική του φόβου ούτε στην ιδεολογία της μιζέριας.
Η κατάσταση είναι δύσκολη, είναι απειλητική. Πρέπει να σώσουμε την εθνική οικονομία. Πρέπει να διασφαλίσουμε τη σταθερότητα του ελληνικού τραπεζικού συστήματος, που έχει όλα τα προσόντα και όλες τις εγγυήσεις που απαιτούνται από το κράτος και την Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα προκειμένου να είναι σταθερό.

Fellow MPs, these days are very critical and during the sessions for the Midterm Fiscal Plan and the Implementation Bill we have to say the truth without fear of favor.
One may claim that the situation is described in coercive or intimidating terms. As I have said, though, in my first speech as the Minister of Finance during the session of vote of confidence, I do not believe either in the strategy of fear nor in the ideology of misery. The situation is difficult, threatening. We must rescue the national economy. We must secure the stability of the Greek banking system, which has all the properties and the guarantees demanded by the State and the ECB to be stable.
                            [Venizelos, Parliamentary Speech, 27/6/2011]

The inferential assertion is found in the second sentence of the passage ('One may claim… terms). This is a generic inference that is based both on the political actor's general knowledge on how opposition parties express and react to controversial policies proposed by the government as well as on his specific knowledge about how the specific parties of the opposition have been publicly positioned about the Midterm

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Fiscal Plan and the Implementation Bill. Venizelos attenuates the epistemic status of the likely to occur discursive assessments made by the opposition MPs ('coercive'; 'intimidating') using the epistemic modal verb *'μπορεί'* ('may'), so he overtly distances himself not from the utterance itself, i.e. the very act of one opposition MP to express his/her claim, but from the qualifiers.

As the discourse unfolds, Venizelos further distances himself. In the succeeding sentence he makes a reference to previous self-discourse ('As I said), a strong kind of evidence for devaluating the possible claims of the opposition, while in what follows he firstly uses factual assertion ('The situation is… threatening') and then a series of deontic claims ('We must rescue…' 'We must secure') that index a claim on the part of the speaker that is right in *moral* terms. This move reminds of what Dunmire has stated about how and why political actors deploy a rhetorical trick in order to appear that they shape the future not on the basis of their interests, beliefs, opinions, knowledge etc., but on the basis of necessity (2011: 87). It also reminds us of Chilton's view on how deontic meaning overlaps with 'factual' representations in a sense that the speaker grounds her/his position in moral feelings that cannot be disputed (2004: 117).

As noted, the political actor infers not the degree of likeability of an event to occur, but what other MPs, assumedly those in opposition, might say about his own definition of the situation. In other words, he infers how his recipients may explicitly interpret and assess his own discourse. This brings into discussion an issue that will be addressed below, the close connection between inferential ES type and Discursive ES type. It appears when the political actors have to infer information which belongs to the cognitive domain of a third person, they typically infer a discursive based evidence.

The epistemic modal verb *μπορεί* ('it might') is used in (30). Venizelos talks to his fellow PASOK MPs one day (11/2/2012) before the crucial Parliament discussion of the second bail-out program, urging for the necessity of positive voting.

(30)   Αλλά εμείς πρέπει να σιγουρέψουμε το πρόγραμμα της 26ης Οκτωβρίου
        για να μην ανοίξουν τέτοιες συζητήσεις, οι οποίες μπορεί να οδηγήσουν
        σε αμφισβήτηση τη νομική και πολιτική βάση όλου του προγράμματος.

However, we have to secure the program of October 26[th][20], so as not to open discussions that might lead to the questioning of the legal and political framework of the whole program.

The modal verb manifests probability. Also, inferential ES is realized by the epistemic noun 'doubt' which also attenuates the degree of certainty indexing possibility. Both epistemics are 'products' of Venizelos's inferences from his knowledge on relations between the creditors, EU partners and Greek government, which has been acquired due to his role as Minister of Finance. In this respect, he considers himself eligible – and he is also considered as such by his follow MPs – to make inferences about what might happen in case the Parliament doesn't vote for the program.

Apart from knowledge asymmetry mentioned among Venizelos and the rest of the MPs, it can be argued that the fact that Venizelos is in a position to explicitly assess the epistemic strength of the information conveyed indexes the high authoritative status of Venizelos, as well as of any Minister of Finance. Accordingly, Venizelos thinks that it is appropriate to evaluate the information because he has the role to do so. Likewise, his recipients expect from him to do so for the same reason.

4.2.3.2.b. Possibly

The significance of explicit epistemic evaluation is better illustrated in the following excerpt:

(32)   Οι θυσίες των πολλών μάς έδωσαν τον χρόνο- και δεν έχω κανέναν σκοπό να πάνε χαμένες ούτε οι θυσίες ούτε ο χρόνος. Έχουμε μία μοναδική, ίσως τελευταία, ευκαιρία να κάνουμε όσες αλλαγές περιμένουν όλοι οι Έλληνες για χρόνια.

The sacrifices of the many gave us time, and I have no intention for those sacrifices or the time to be wasted. We have a unique chance, possibly the last chance, to make all the changes that Greeks have been waiting for years.

[Papandreou, "Ta Nea" Interview, xxx/6/2011]

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[20] This is the agreement of 26/10/2011 which was sealed during the turbulent EU-Summit in Cannes.

The above passage is a Papandreou interview in a daily print newspaper 'Ta Nea' in June 2011 amid the discussions for the medium term economic program. The inferential ES is adopted within a parenthetical clause which begins with the epistemic modal adverb ('possibly… last chance'). Papandreou draws upon his knowledge as a politician and, particularly as the Prime Minster, i.e. as a political actor with privileged access to certain power resources, in order to argue about the necessity of the reforms and the policies adopted. Hence, Papandreou not only knows more about how crucial is to adopt the proposed policies by his government and the 'troika', but also to evaluate the 'criticality' of the historical moment claiming that Greece might not have many more chances to change.

It should be also noted that (31) is one of many examples found in texts under study in which the macro-proposition of 'hard but needed policies' is manifested. The Prime Minister establishes this macro-proposition in his discourse using a moral tone in his reply manifested in the definite noun phrase 'the sacrifices', which marginalizes the political effects and the background of the policies implemented. Assuming that all citizens have the same interests; same class position; and some attitudes and opinions about what is the 'common good' and how it is achieved, Papandreou represents austerity as a 'needed offer' for the country's common good. Moreover, a second macro-proposition is also evident, that of the 'past vs. present dichotomy'. When the Prime Minister refers to the long waited changes he lexically implies that those changes hadn't been implemented in the past. In this respect, the past is once more portrayed negatively, while the present is represented as a turning point – *possibly* the last turning point – for the Greek economy's reform.

4.2.3.3. Tha-clauses

In this section we are dealing with inference expressed through *'θα'-clauses'* ('tha'-clauses). The marker *'tha'* has a variety of functions in the Modern Greek grammatical system. Here we are interested in the function of '*tha*' as a future marker for the grammatical formation of future tenses. As Klairis & Babiniotis mention (1999: 64-65), apart from temporal representation, future verb types also have an epistemic meaning, as they express the speaker's predictions, conjectures, desires or a relative degree of certainty. In a formal analysis of '*tha*', Giannakidou (2012) suggests that the marker has a primary modal meaning expressing uncertainty

(nonveridicality), when the mode of access to the evidence is indirect – as it happens in cases of inferential process – whereas a purely temporal meaning is manifested only when the speaker acquires the evidence directly. As will be shown below, from a discursive perspective that the boundaries are not so clear-cut. The political actors may express a temporal meaning, without having direct evidence at their disposal or they can make an inference based on some kind evidence, without indexing uncertainty.

The passages that are examined below fall within what Scollon & Scollon (2000) have called anticipatory discourses, i.e. discourses that a) orient to the future, and b) assume specific stances towards it. In such discourses two main kind of assessments are manifested. On the one hand, there are the epistemic assessments which are concerned with the knowledge of future, whereas on the other hand there are the assessments regarding the capacity of the social actors to affect the future. Regarding, epistemic assessments, both excerpts signal a probalistic stance (Dunmire 2011:57) towards the future, according to which future is neither fixed nor entirely free. The political, who in both passages is Antonis Samaras, makes some projections which may or may not be validated depending on the decisions being made. This brings us to the second kind of assessments which is related with "agentivity". The political actor in (33) and (34) claims that social actors effect the future events.

(33)   Μόλις ψηφιστούν τα νέα μέτρα και πάρουμε την επόμενη κρίσιμη δόση, η ρευστότητα θα αρχίσει πάλι να χρηματοδοτεί νοικοκυριά και επιχειρήσεις, η αβεβαιότητα που καλλιεργείται απ' έξω θα σταματήσει, η ψυχολογία θα αλλάξει, ο φόβος επιστροφής στη δραχμή – θα εξαφανιστεί, η Ελλάδα θα βγει από την επενδυτική «καραντίνα» όπου είχε μπει εδώ και χρόνια. Οι περικοπές θα είναι για πρώτη φορά λιγότερες από το χρήμα που θα εισρεύσει στην ελληνική οικονομία, ενώ θα αρχίσουν να υπάρχουν και επενδύσεις απ' έξω.

As soon as we vote the new measures and get the next, crucial installment [of the bail-out], liquidity will finance households and enterprises; all this uncertainty, to which foreigners give rise, will be reduced; the mood will change; the fear of returning to the drachma will be eliminated; and, finally, Greece will no longer be kept in investments' "quarantine" in which was put for years. For the first time, the cuts will be fewer in numerical figures compared to the money that will flow in the Greek economy, while many from abroad will start to make investments.

[*Samaras, ND Parliamentary Group speech, 4/11/12*]

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In this passage the political actor conveys a series of assertions using *tha-clauses*, all of which are products of his own reasoning process. However, only the two of them, the one at the beginning of the passage ('[L]iquidity will finance… enterprises') and the other just before the end of it ('[T]he cuts will be fewer… put for years']), can be considered as inferences in a strict sense, because they are the only clauses which have an evidential base, namely the relevant projections given in statistical data which are included in the reports of the relevant authorities, either domestic, such as the Greek Ministry of Finance, or transnational, such the Eurogroup, the IMF or the ECB. The information communicated in the clauses has been acquired through a discursive form of evidence, the original source of which is considered as one of high reliability.

On the contrary, the rest of the *tha-clauses* are merely conjectures, as the external evidence is totally missing, and the speaker is the only one responsible for their validity. The speaker simply projects particular actions and behaviors as an immediate effect of the implementation of the program. It is plausible to claim that a form of external evidence might be what the relevant academic literature suggests on the issue being discussed by Samaras or what the international practice in similar cases to Greece has shown. Such an explanation though will be a mere conjecture too, since even a brief hint of such references is missing from the excerpt.

As will be shown in the next section, such choices are seen to be relevant for the political actors as, due to their institutional role, as supposedly credible sources. But this also operates vice versa – making conjectures, a rather weak structure in epistemic terms, allows the speakers to index that they do ascribe personal responsibility towards the assertions they communicate, because they have the authority to do so, and, subsequently guide their audience to process the utterances as valid and coming from a reliable source.

(34)   Αν οδηγηθούμε σε ρήξη με τους εταίρους και έξοδο από το ευρώ, η οικονομία θα μείνει χωρίς καύσιμα, οι επιχειρήσεις χωρίς ρευστότητα, τα νοσοκομεία και οι ασθενείς χωρίς φάρμακα. Και η απίστευτη σημερινή ανεργία, θα διπλασιαστεί και θα μετατραπεί σε εφιάλτη.

If we end up breaching our relations with our partners and exiting the Eurozone, the economy will run out of its fuels; enterprises will lose liquidity; hospital and patients will have no medicines. The unprecedented today's unemployment will double and turn into a nightmare.

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This is a case of anticipatory discourse which is realized by conditional clause, which indexes a conjecture made by the political actor. As conditional clauses vary in the degree of their epistemic status, their strength/weakness depends on the choice of linguistics resources made by the speaker as well as on his credibility as a source of information. The source of conjectures, just as of any other product of a speaker's reasoning process, is [+Self], the political actor, though, discursively represents a series of emerging threats as future 'facts' constructing thus a particular knowledge of the future that includes lack of basic goods and of financial liquidity. Despite a semantic and epistemic disposition, it appears that in real discursive settings anticipatory discourse and fact may correlate. Dunmire (2008: 85) uses the term epistemic future in order to refer to all knowledge, beliefs and judgments that are concerned with a future reality. In the excerpt above, the link between conjecture and factuality can be traced to the assumed and expected lack of external evidence that is generally observed in both cases. Samaras forecasts the near-term future of the Greek economy without referring to any evidence – he intentionally and strategically constructs a particular mental representation of a State's financial default as if this is already part of his audience's general knowledge. Similarly, when a speaker adopts Factual ES type (s)he also avoids any reference to evidence because the information conveyed is already verified, i.e. a 'fact'.

In her analysis of conditional clauses in policy making documents, Dumnire (2008: 94) suggests that the function of conditional has more to do with asserting the dependence of protasis and apodosis on the truth of one another rather than to indicate likeability of an event to occur. A crucial aspect in (34) is that Samaras refers to a "proximal future reality", which is positioned relatively close to the speech moment (Fleischman 1982:17). The tense choices made by the speaker locate the future closer to his 'now', so his conjectures gain a stronger epistemic status. To this the contextual parameter of the time when Samaras gave his speech also contributes. This is his campaign speech before the second general elections of 2012. The future he discursively represents is indeed close in physical time terms to the speech moment. Apparently, this kind of future representation has legitimizing functions since the political actor constructs a specific future world guiding the audience to formulate

their perception and interpretation of the present events in response to that world (Edelman 1971). We will return to the issue in Chapter 5.

4.2.3.4. It seems

(35)   Αυτό φαίνεται ότι δεν είναι εφικτό, ήταν μια λάθος πρόβλεψη, μια πρόβλεψη που έγινε σε μια εποχή, πριν μεγαλώσει η κρίση χρέους στην Ευρώπη και πριν χρειαστεί να ενταχθούν κι άλλες δύο χώρες της Ευρωζώνης σε αυτό το μηχανισμό στήριξης.

This seems that is not feasible -it was a wrong provision; a provision made in a period before the growth of the European debt crisis and before two more countries in the Eurozone were forced to join the Support Mechanism.

[Papandreou, Vote of Confidence Speech, 19/6/2011]

The passage is part of George Papandreou's speech during the parliamentary discussion for providing a 'vote of confidence' to the PASOK government in June 2011. The pronoun 'this' refers to 'troika's' provision about the estimated time in which Greece would borrow from the international markets once again. The impersonal verb phrase at the beginning of the utterance ('this seems that') expresses possibility and also mitigates the agent of false provision. Papandreou makes an inference based on official reports and specific data which prove that the initial provision will not be achieved. Even though, the outcome is quite certain and not disputed, the Prime Minister expresses it as less certain. Moreover, it appears that the period introduced by 'it seems' frames a discursive move aiming at accounting for the wrong provision. Papandreou excuses the failure of the estimations made by the 'troika', focusing on the differentiation of the initial conditions on which estimations were based. It is not implausible to claim that attenuation of the speaker's strength is in accordance with his effort not to fully blame the 'troika' for bail-out shortcomings.

4.2.4. Counterfactual state of affairs

In this section we are dealing with counterfactual thinking, through which the speakers represent the information they covey as hypothetical or, more precisely, as something that could or might have happened (Lewis 1973; Olson 1995; Byrne 2002).The expression of counterfactual state of affairs is prototypically connected with conditional clauses which, in strict terms, include at least some premises that are

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contrary to fact. Iatridou (2000) specifies counterfactuals as a set of grammatical constructions to a past or present situation that is contrary to fact. In Modern Greek, they are grammatically indexed by the modal marker $\theta\alpha$ ('tha') combined with verb types of [+perfect] aspect, while syntactic means include the conditionals. In terms of content, a two-fold division is witnessed.

Much of discussion among philosophers, logicians and formal linguists (Goodman 1947; Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 1976) is about how knowledge -defined in formal terms-is acquired through false conditional premises. This may allow one to evaluate as irrelevant to the natures of political settings the expression of false conditionals. Never the less, not only such expression do actually occur in such settings, but they also index the need for a much broader approach as regards their function within real communicative settings regardless being formal or informal. Indeed, studies developing a cognitive (e.g. Sweetser 1996; Focaunnier 1996, 1997; Dancygier & Sweetser 2005) and/or social psychological (e.g. Kahneman & Miller 1986; Olson 1995; Roese & Olson 1996; Roese 1997; Mandel et al. 2005) reading of counterfactual do not emphasize so much the matter of truth/false values. Undoubtedly, when they occur in discourse require from interlocutors to keep in mind a possibility that they might be false, but at the same time are temporarily being processed by the recipients as supposedly true (Walsh & Byrne 2005: 63). What gains in importance though, is the complex relation between prediction, which is part of conditional meaning, and the past-time refence, though which counterfactuals are realized. In this respect, more attention is paid to how the past could or would have turned out differently. Such an approach highlights the plausibly argued context-sensitive character of counterfactuals (Dancygier & Sweetser 2005: 71; Hogeweg 2009: 184). Counterfactuals are, then, seen as mental representations of alternatives past events/actions, situated in alternative/possible world, and bearing an evaluative character since they specify alternatives that are seen as better or worse than actuality (Epstude & Roese 2008: 168; Zing-Schmidt 2017: 31).

Therefore, the whole process is based on speaker's cognitive work. Obviously, the access mode to this evidence is indirect as it reflects the speaker's own reasoning, and, as such, it is also an originated source. As said, counterfactual thinking has a supposedly 'factual' character, in a sense that the information being discursively

represented refers to an 'out-of-the-real-world' state of affairs (Mushin 2001: 76), so the speaker, even though (s)he is the one who made the epistemic assessment about the counterfactual character of this world, (s)he distances himself from the utterance as if (s)he lets it speak for its own without making the evidential domain from which their knowledge was acquired explicit. It goes without saying that the political actor takes advantage of this quasi factual character of such conditionals and constructs a hypothetical world which serves their own rhetorical, political and ideological aims which are considered each time relevant to a communicative situation.

People tend to imagine contradicting to reality state of affairs either spontaneously, when they are surprised, or deliberative, when they reflect on what would have happened under a different condition, i.e. when the make epistemic evaluations through a "what-if" reasoning (Hilton et al. 2005: 41; Jing-Schmidt 2017: 31). Here we are interested in the latter. A variety of studies (e.g. Zeelenberg et al. 1997, 1998; Zeelenberg 1999; Roesen 1999; Mandel 2003) has suggested that counterfactual thinking has a significant influence when it comes to decision-making, which is quite relevant to the data examined in the present study, because it provides an explanation of reality "by reconstructing the causal sequence of past events and deriving significance from the evaluation of reality against its alternative" (Jing-Schmidt 2017: 31). Also, it is related with the emotion of regret and relief, "counterfactual emotions", as Jing-Schmidt calls them (ibid.). Regret is experienced when a undesired outcome is causally attributed to one's own faulty decision, therefore a different past decision could have changed the route of the event that did actually occur. On the other hand, relief is a positive effect and occurs when a threat is successfully removed (Carver 2009). As will be shown, both feelings were triggered in the passages analyzed below, however it far beyond the scope of the present study to provide a thorough account of the issue. Compared to the real state of affairs, the counterfactual one is represented by the Greek politicians either as ideal (regret for the actual past decisions) –or at least a lesser evil- or as negative (regret for the actual past decisions). In both cases, what is boldly asserted is that a wide range of options is unavailable and certain policies shall be implemented, despite their severe implications on society. The lack of any alternatives is justified because either the status of the Greek economy is not ideal, so there is no room for policies; or because

any more tolerant policies would seriously damage the economy, so they cannot be implemented as well.

In what follows, the linguistic resources realizing counterfactual state of affairs are examined. Since conditionals are the most frequently used resource, they are presented in passages that fall within both categories of content. For the rest of the resources, the excerpts provided belong either to one category or the other.

4.2.4.1. Counterfactual conditionals

4.2.4.1.a. Counterfactual world as an ideal world

Let's consider 36:

(36)   Μπορούσαμε να τα έχουμε αποφύγει όλα αυτά; Αν είχαμε παράξει εισόδημα τα τελευταία χρόνια, σίγουρα. Αν είχαμε κάνει μια στοιχειώδη δημοσιονομική προσαρμογή τα τελευταία έξι χρόνια, σίγουρα. Εάν τα τελευταία δύο χρόνια της Ν.Δ. δεν είχαν ξεφύγει τελείως τα δημοσιονομικά της χώρας, σίγουρα. Εάν δεν είχαν καταρρεύσει τα έσοδα και οι δαπάνες δεν είχαν φύγει κάτω από κάθε προσδοκία, σίγουρα. Εάν δεν προσλάμβανε η προηγούμενη Κυβέρνηση, όπως προσλάμβανε στο δημόσιο τομέα, σίγουρα. Εάν δεν προσέθετε επιδόματα ατάκτως ερριμμένα, σίγουρα. Εάν δηλαδή, σήμερα δεν δίναμε επιχειρήματα που λένε «μα πώς είναι δυνατόν να κάνετε δημοσιονομική προσαρμογή χωρίς να κόψετε μισθούς στο Δημόσιο, όταν τα τελευταία έξι χρόνια, η μισθοδοσία στο Δημόσιο έχει αυξηθεί 60% και 70%»; «Πώς είναι δυνατόν να κάνετε δημοσιονομική προσαρμογή, όταν το 2009 που υποτίθεται ότι παγώσατε τους μισθούς, το μισθολογικό κόστος στο Δημόσιο αυξήθηκε πάνω από 10%»; «Πώς είναι δυνατόν να μην κάνετε κάτι για την ανταγωνιστικότητα της χώρας, εάν δεν βλέπαμε όλοι μας ότι πήρατε ένα έλλειμμα στο εξωτερικό ισοζύγιο στο 6% και το πήγατε στο 12% και 14%»; Εάν δεν είχαν γίνει αυτά, θα είχαμε επιχειρήματα. Εάν αυτή η χώρα δεν είχε δώσει ψεύτικα στοιχεία τον περασμένο Οκτώβριο, θα είχαμε επιχειρήματα, να πάμε και να πούμε ότι έχουμε ένα αξιόπιστο πρόγραμμα και ορίστε τα στοιχεία του πρώτου τριμήνου και δεν χρειάζεται τίποτα περαιτέρω και με βάση μόνο αυτά να δανειστούμε.

Could we have avoided all these [measures]? If we had produced income in the last years, that's for sure. If we had made an elementary fiscal adjustment in the last six years, that's for sure. If fiscal figures had not gone out of control in the last two years of ND's governance, that's for sure. If incomes had not fallen, and spending had not gone beyond any provision, that's for sure. If the previous government had not hired (public servants) in the way they had, that's for sure. If they had not paid allowances without a plan, that's for sure. In other words, if we had not

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provided arguments, enable them to say: 'But how is it possible for you to make a fiscal adjustment without cutting public sector's salaries, since in the last six years the public sector's payroll has been increased by 60%-70%?' 'How is it possible for you to make a fiscal adjustment, since in 2009, when you supposedly fixed the public sector's salaries, the payroll cost nevertheless increased over 10%?' 'How was it possible for you to have ignored your country's competence, if all of us had not seen that you received a 6% external balance deficit, and you raised it to 12% and 14%?" If none of these [things] had happened, then we would have had arguments. And if this country had not provided false data during the past October we could have claimed that we had a reliable program and based on the first quarter's data no additional measures would have been needed and we could have been able to borrow money.

[Papakonstantinou, Parliament speech, /10]

Papakonstantinou organizes this part of the speech posing a question ('Could we have avoided all these?') at the beginning of the utterance. He creates a hypothetical, counterfactual space, in which the answer to that question is placed. Since the question is hypothetical, the answer is hypothetical as well. Papakonstantinou exploits a particular syntactic pattern using a series of conditionals with negative verb types ('if we had not…'; 'if fiscal figures had not…'; 'if incomes had not…'; 'if the previous government had not…'; 'If they had not...'; 'If none of these had happened…') evoking consecutive negative frames which organize his knowledge and his recipients' knowledge on how public administration should had been performed in Greece.

The speaker depicts what should have been done in Greek economy as counterfactual. What is referred to in this world reflects the Minister's opinions and beliefs of how a state should run as far as its fiscal administration is concerned. Given his institutional role, Papaknostantinou does not merely convey his personal beliefs, but rather his party's beliefs. The intersubjective character is reinforced by the first plural person verbs used in the passage, so the representations are processed as generally accepted. Besides, Papakonstantinou strategically refers to verified facts which had taken place during ND's governance. Due to their semantics, the conditional triggers a counterfactual presupposition. When political actor says, for example, 'if fiscal figures had not been out of control in the last two years of ND's governance, that's for sure', it is semantically implied that fiscal figures were out of control in the last two years of ND's governance, which is an assertion that is proceeded as taken for granted.

Even though implications and presuppositions in political settings are usually used when speakers want to communicate controversial positions, there is nothing controversial in Papakonstantinou's claims, as he refers to verified facts. In this sense, it can be argued that all these implied positions constitute a part of the General Knowledge of how ND had run the state for a given period of time.

Papakonstantinou carefully places the epistemic adverbial phrase 'that's for sure' at the end of every conditional. The epistemic evaluation attenuates any possibly epistemic shortcoming due to the adoption of imaginative ES and, at the same time, it boosts the Minister's authority status. Using this modal expression, Papakonstantinou reaches conclusions based on his knowledge, which is deemed credible due to his former education as well as his current position within the government. The hypothetical state of affairs is attributed to the nature of policies and plans, because they were never implemented, and not to their effects.

Nonetheless, there are other instances in which the speakers construct an ideal hypothetical state of affairs, but they do not supply much information about it. This is precisely the case in (37):

(37)   Γιατί το δίλημμα ήταν και είναι: θυσίες και περικοπές ή καταστροφή και θάνατος της ελληνικής οικονομίας. Αν υπήρχε τρίτος δρόμος, αν μπορούσαμε να πάμε σε ένα ασφαλές καταφύγιο χωρίς τις θυσίες, να μην έχετε καμία αμφιβολία ότι θα είχαμε διαλέξει αυτόν τον τρίτο δρόμο.

Because the dilemma was- and still is- sacrifices and cuts or destruction and death of the Greek economy. Had there existed a third road; had we been able to go to a safe shelter without sacrifices, we would had chosen that third road, no doubt about it.

[Venizelos, Mega TV Interview, 22/2/2012]

This is a turn of Venizelos' interview broadcasted on Mega Channel a few days after the agreement on the second bail-out program. He initially defines the situation using a dilemma ('sacrifices and cuts or destruction and death of the Greek economy') and then constructs a counterfactual world. Yet, it is worth noting that Venizelos exploits metaphors, *'θάνατος'* ('death') *'θυσίες'* ('sacrifices'), which reflect the speaker's moral norms and values, for commenting on a political issue. Each one of the poles of the dilemma is centered on either the notion of 'sacrifice' or 'death'. Venizelos draws

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on the audience's general knowledge of sacrifice and implicitly represents Greek economy, a complex and regulated system of financial and power relations among different institutions, enacted both in international and national level, in terms of a vivid subject.

Venizelos portrays any other reciprocally accepted solution among the Greek state and its creditors as hypothetical. It is quite interesting that he refers to that solution as a 'shelter', drawing again on the audience's general knowledge about what a shelter is; where it is found; in which occasions it is needed; what it provides to inhabitants etc. It must be noted that such metaphors, in which politicians refer to states or institutions in terms of a building, and namely a house, are quite frequently used in political settings (see for instance Chilton & Illye 1993, Chilton 1996).

A final point is concerned with how counterfactual conditionals affect the epistemic status of the speaker. Venizelos does not provide any evidence as regards the lack of alternatives. He simply relies on his knowledge as the Minister of Finance. He presents himself as a credible and authoritative source because of his role. The adoption of imaginative ES, along with the Factual ES used in the first period of (49), implies a knowledge asymmetry between the speaker and recipients and allows the former to be established as an authority. Despite not being explicitly expressed, Venizelos claims that his position is true because he, the Minister of Finance, says so, and he, supposedly, knows more about what happened in the negotiations with the foreign creditors and partners. Regardless of the reference to a hypothetical situation, it appears that politicians consider this type of ES as one which is relevant to many communicative situations, because they exploit the feature it shares with the Factual ES, so that they can convey information while simultaneously downplaying how they acquired it or from which source they acquired it. They simply imply that what they say is so, because *they* say so.

4.2.4.1.b. Counterfactual world as a negative world

Conditionals are also used when politicians want to refer to a negative hypothetical situation, again aiming at the justification of the governmental policies. Let's consider the following:

(38) Το κοινωνικό κόστος που συνεπάγεται το πρόγραμμα αυτό είναι περιορισμένο σε σύγκριση με την οικονομική και κοινωνική καταστροφή που θα ακολουθούσε εάν δεν το υιοθετήσουμε. Μια άτακτη χρεοκοπία θα έριχνε τη χώρα μας σε μια καταστροφική περιπέτεια, προκαλώντας ανεξέλεγκτο οικονομικό χάος και κοινωνική έκρηξη. Οι αποταμιεύσεις των πολιτών θα κινδύνευαν. Το κράτος θα αδυνατούσε να πληρώσει μισθούς και συντάξεις, και να καλύψει στοιχειώδεις λειτουργίες, όπως τα νοσοκομεία και τα σχολεία, αφού έχουμε ακόμα πρωτογενές έλλειμμα πάνω από 5 δισ. Ευρώ. Δεν θα μπορούσαμε να εισάγουμε βασικά αγαθά (φάρμακα, πετρέλαιο, και μηχανήματα), αφού η χώρα συνολικά θα έχανε κάθε πρόσβαση σε δανεισμό και η ρευστότητα. Επιχειρήσεις θα έκλειναν μαζικά, αδυνατώντας να αντλήσουν χρηματοδότηση. Η ανεργία, η οποία είναι ήδη απαράδεκτα υψηλή θα αυξανόταν ακόμα περισσότερο. Η χώρα θα παρασυρόταν σε μια μακρά δίνη ύφεσης, αστάθειας, ανεργίας και παρατεταμένης εξαθλίωσης. Οι εξελίξεις αυτές θα οδηγούσαν, αργά ή γρήγορα, στην έξοδο από το ευρώ. Από χώρα του πυρήνα της Ευρωζώνης, η Ελλάδα θα καταντούσε χώρα αδύναμη, στο περιθώριο της Ευρώπης. Αυτή θα είναι η μοίρα της χώρας εάν δεν υπογράψουμε τη δανειακή συμφωνία και οδηγηθούμε σε άτακτη, ασύντακτη χρεοκοπία. Αυτή είναι η ωμή πραγματικότητα

The social cost entailed by the present bail-out program is limited compared to the financial and social destruction that would have followed if we do not adopt it. A disorderly default would have led our country to a destructive adventure, causing financial chaos beyond any control, and social unrest. Citizen's savings would have been in danger. The State would have been incapable of paying salaries and pensions and providing essential services, such as hospitals and schools, since we still have an over 5bn Euros primary deficit. We wouldn't have been able to import basic goods (medicines, oil, machines), since the country would have lost any access to lending and liquidity. Companies would have massively been closed down, incapable of being financed. Unemployment, which already is unacceptably high, would have increased. The country would have become embroiled in a long-term era of recession, instability, unemployment and prolonged misery. Sooner or later, a Grexit would have been forced out by all those developments. Once at the core of the Eurozone, Greece would have become a weak country at the margin of Europe. This will be the country's fate, if we do not sign the lending agreement and be led to a disorderly default. This is the blunt reality.

[Papademos, Parliamentary Speech, 12/2/2012]

As is also evident in the previous excerpts, Papademos frames the conditional clauses with a Factual ES ('The social cost of the present program is limited compared to…') and then he develops a lengthy hypothetical narration of what would have happened if Parliament had not voted for the bail-out. A special point should be made on the grammatical formation of the conditional used here. Papademos does not stick to the

proper formation of this kind of conditional, according to which past perfect is used in the conditional clause and modal maker 'tha' with [-perfect] verb in the main clause. The deviation is observed in conditional clause, where simple present verbs types are used instead ('if we do not adopt it'; 'if we do not sign'). It can be argued that this syntactic formation is a quasi conditional, baring a more 'factive' character given the verb types in the conditional clause, which are placed closer to the deictic center of the speaker, and, thus, express a higher degree of certainty.

Aside from this, Papademos uses a long series of verb types expressing probability ('A disorderly default would have led…'; 'Citizen's savings would have been…'; 'The State would have been…'; 'We wouldn't have been…'; 'Enterprises would have massively closed…'; 'Unemployment, which already is unacceptably high, would have been…'; 'The country would have become…'; 'a Grexit would have been…'), and refers to a possible world in which the Greek Parliament has already rejected the bail-out. He provides no evidence on why he depicts this world so negatively; simply implying that he is in a position to know better, constructing thus an authoritative status of himself as a source. The knowledge asymmetry is implicitly justified on the grounds of both Papademos' institutional role and former career and occupation. As Prime Minister, he had an active role in negotiations and EU Summits on the Greek debt crisis, so it is claimed that he has thorough knowledge on power relations between the Greek state and the institutions engaged in negotiations. Moreover, it can be assumed that Papademos, being the Prime Minister, knows the magnitude of impact a possible rejection of the bail-out program might have on the Greek economy and society. As a former scholar and ex director of the Bank of Greece[21], he obviously has expert knowledge on finance and economics so that his projections can be considered credible.

Given the above, it seems that on the basis of Papademos's personal context model the property of his identity, and particularly his role, plays a pivotal role in expressing his opinions, beliefs and knowledge. Papademos interprets his role as highly authoritative,

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[21] Note that Papademos was neither an elected Prime Minister nor had he ever been engaged in politics before. He was a well-known technocrat and former member of the academia. Due to his career as well as his lack of any engagement with the Greek political scene, he was jointly selected by the three-party coalitional government to lead the negotiations for the PSI procedure and the second bail-out program.

and he also assumes that the audience expects him to foreground his authority. The type of ES adopted is quite relevant to that interpretation as it makes the knowledge asymmetry between the speaker and his audience vivid.

The political actor carefully uses special and technical terms ('deficit', 'liquidity' 'financed', 'disorderly default'), which boost his credibility reflecting his expert knowledge on the issue. His context model controls this specific wording, which seems to be relevant to how Papademos interprets his role in the specific communicative situation. Interestingly enough, as he speaks about the negative implications on the Greek economy caused by a hypothetical rejection of the bail-out, he mixes technical vocabulary with scenes of everyday life ('Citizen's savings would have been in danger. The State would have been incapable of paying salaries and pensions and providing essentials services, such as hospitals and schools…'; 'We wouldn't have been able to import basic goods (medicines, oil, machines…'). This negatively depicted counterfactual world would mainly affect middle and lower class employees and pensioners and, in general, those who are not wealthy, without savings and assets, as well as those who need the welfare state and have no access to private education or health. Combining scientific knowledge with daily examples, extremely relevant to a major part of the Greek people, Papademos tries to convince the recipients about the necessity of the bail-out, claiming that a possible rejection would be catastrophic because science says so and also reality would say so. The former is something that only experts can question, whereas the latter is much more contestable. However, embedding his lengthy projections in a counterfactual world, he can present them without having to provide any kind of evidence, apart from his personal knowledge.

A final point should be made about the epistemic modal expression at the end of the passage ('This is the blunt reality'). This phrase has the same function as the one at the beginning of the utterance. Papademos switches to Factual ES at the end of his lengthy conditional, because he wants to boost the epistemic status of the utterance, which in its main part was referring to a hypothetical situation. Here a semantic contradiction is witnessed as the speaker assesses as 'real' and 'true' information previously attributed to a hypothetical world. At discursive level, though, this contradiction strengthens the epistemic status of the utterance. The speaker makes a strong assertion as regards to

the degree of certainty of his projections: they may be hypothetical, but they are not part of an entirely different state of affairs as is implied because of the use of this ES type. Instead, they are part of a conditionally real state of affairs, which is just distant to the current state of affairs, and it can become real under certain circumstances. Given the context, a possible disapproval of the program is seen as a condition that can verify Papademos projections.

In the corpus of the study, a slightly different strategy deployed by other political actors when they wanted to portray a negative imaginary situation was also witnessed. They did not explicitly represent it, as Papademos did in (53). On the contrary, they allowed the audience to make an inference stemming from their general knowledge on what happens when a State defaults. It goes without saying though that this knowledge in not 'neutral' but instead it has been formed, and manipulated, by utterances like the previous one.

In the following excerpt Antonis Samaras is making an official statement after the agreement with the 'troika' on a new package of financial measures, which will entail a payment of a 31.3 bn. euros bail-out installment. However, the payment would be made only if the agreement was approved by the Parliament along with the 2013 budget plan.

(39)   Το πρόβλημα από δω και στο εξής δεν είναι εκείνο ή το άλλο μέτρο…
        Το πρόβλημα είναι το ακριβώς αντίθετο: τι θα μπορούσε να συμβεί, αν
        δεν περάσει η συμφωνία και οδηγηθεί η χώρα στο χάος. Και πόσο πιο
        οδυνηρή θα ήταν για ολόκληρο τον ελληνικό λαό μια τέτοια εξέλιξη.
        Από οικονομική άποψη και – ακόμα χειρότερα -από πολιτική άποψη.

        From now on, the problem has nothing to do with the one or the other
        measure…The problem is quite the opposite: what could have happened,
        if the agreement won't be approved and the country will be led to chaos.
        And how painful a development like this would have been for the Greek
        people as regards the economy and, even worse, as regards politics.

        [Samaras, official statement, 30/10/2012]

In contrast to Papademos, Samaras is not quite specific ('what could happen, if the agreement isn't approved'; 'And how painful would a development like this be for the Greek people') when he represents an imaginary state of affairs in which an agreement between the government and the 'troika' is not achieved. Of course, he makes some

explicit evaluations opting for words with negative meaning, such as 'chaos' and 'painful', which leaves traces for the recipients to make specific deductions – the ones desired by Samaras. The inference, though, is made by the audience on the grounds of their general knowledge.

Similarly to (38), in the conditional clause the subjunctive present tense verb type is used rather than the expected past tense. The quasi conditional still places the information in a non-real world, but at the same time ties it up with the reality, implicitly claiming a cause and effect connection. Despite adopting imaginative ES, Samaras exploits his authority status and causally relates the hypothetical world with the outcome of the Parliament's discussion on the proposed agreement and budget plan. It is indirectly conveyed that the hypothetical state of affairs will remain as such if the agreements are voted; otherwise, what is depicted as hypothetical will turn into reality.

4.2.4.2. Rhetorical questions

Rhetorical questions also serve as a means for realization of a counterfactual state of affairs. The function of this discursive structure has already been analyzed in the previous section, so the relevant remarks won't be repeated here. Let's examine the following:

(40)   Τι θα είχε συμβεί αν δεν είχαμε προλάβει να κατοχυρώσουμε όλο αυτό το κεκτημένο που κατοχυρώσαμε και είχε προηγηθεί το ξέσπασμα της κρίσης στην Ισπανία; Θα ήταν τόσο εύκολο να μας δώσουν 240 δισ. Ευρώ από τα 700 δισ. Ευρώ που έχει όλα κι όλα στη διάθεσή της η Ευρωζώνη για να αντιμετωπίσει την κρίση;
Θα ήταν εύκολο να μας δώσουν τόσο χαμηλά επιτόκια και τόσο γενναιόδωρο σχέδιο για τις ελληνικές τράπεζες, δηλαδή για τις καταθέσεις του ελληνικού λαού;

What would have happened if we hadn't protected our due in time and the outburst of the Spanish crisis[22] had proceeded? Would it have been so easy to get 240bn Euros out of a 700bn total which is at the disposal of the Eurozone to confront the crisis? Would it have been so easy to get

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[22] Venizelos refers to the developments having occurred in the first quarter of 2012 which include the austerity measures package implemented by Rajoy's Government to reduce deficit to GDP ratio and restore growth rates.

such a low interest rate and such a generous plan for the Greek banks, i.e. for the savings of the Greek people?

[Venizelos, Election Campaign Speech, 15/06/12]

The imaginary situation is implicitly depicted by a series of questions. The first ('What would have happened if…') is general and vague in terms of content, and the audience has to infer the answer from their general knowledge. The implicature evoked is that the status of the Greek economy would have much worse if the second bail-out had not been activated in February 2012. The second and third question ('Would it have been so easy… to confront the crisis?'; 'Would it have been so easy… of the Greek people?') are both rhetorical. The audience has to infer the answer, but it is guided to infer a specific answer, namely a) 'troika' wouldn't have given 240bn euros bail-out; and b) interest rates wouldn't have been so low neither would a plan for the banks' financing had been agreed.

As has been mentioned in the section of Factual ES, rhetorical questions are linguistic resources usually used to convey a controversial position as taken for granted. Here, they represent a hypothetical situation, negatively evaluated, but they still have the same function as in Factual ES. Despite Venizelos' adoption of imaginative ES, it is evident that the Minister attempts to represent his conjectures, his beliefs on the issue, as quite certain and non-challengeable. In fact, he causally relates them to the hypothetical state of affairs, implying that the Greek economy would have definitely been in worse conditions unless the second bail-out had not been approved, consequently there is no point to discuss and argue about other alternative policies. Taking all the above into consideration, Venizelos exploits imaginative ES and rhetorical questions in order to present his beliefs as 'factual' thus attempting to legitimate the necessity of the bail-out, and what is more, the lack of any other alternative.

4.2.5 Concluding remarks

In 4.2. we were concerned with the cognitive domain of evidence, following a separate analysis for the explicit expression of knowledge; the knowledge acquired through inferences; and the knowledge prevailing in a counterfactual state of affairs. Regarding the explicit expression of knowledge, the various types of cognitive factive

verbs were taken into account. Our analysis articulated the different syntactic structures of the verbs (followed or not by a that-complementizer clauses; parentheticals) in relation with interactional (negotiation of knowledge, epistemic mis(alignment, knowledge relations among the participants) and cognitive parameters (the transformation of mere belief into personal/shared knowledge). What was crucial was the fact that even reverse mismatches, based on the interplay between the old and new mental models of the participants, did not weaken the politician's positions, but instead enhanced their credibility.

In the analysis of the inferential ES we broaden the set of resources that had been proposed by Mushin, in addition to modal verbs and adverbs, we included cognitive non factive verbs. In the case of Modern Greek, a special reference it made to the clauses with the modal marker –*tha*. It appeared that through the modal evaluations regarding the degree of certainty and or likelihood of occurrence of the information conveyed, the political actors attempt to construct epistemic alliances with the participants in specific communicative situations. What is more, on the basis of their context models, they interpret their institutional role in a way that makes relevant the realization of this type of ES. As contradictory as it may sound, in many communicative situations the political actor recognizes all these resources that typically downplay the epistemic status of their assertions, as a prolific means for overtly ascribing full responsibility with respect to the information conveyed, and, hence, for indexing their authority –they make explicit evaluations, because they are in a position and have the knowledge to do so, and, what is more, they appear to be personally in control of the crisis (Boin et al. 2005:17).

Under the category of the cognitive domain of evidence we also included the expression of a counterfactual state of affairs realized by counterfactual conditionals as well as by noun phrases and other lexical means that explicitly indicate that the knowledge communicated originates in a non-real world in which it has a factual character. As they construct a context model of counterfactual situations, political actors exploit the explicit epistemic evaluation made in order to emphasize that they are in a position that allows them to have such extent knowledge and experience, both represented in old context models referring to a situation accessible only to themselves, that they are entitled to make valid inferences.

4.3. Discursive domain of evidence

4.3.1. General

This section deals with the realization of what Marín-Arrese (2011: 271) calls communicative evidentiality, i.e. the expression of knowledge based on a discursive domain of evidence, and it partially coincides with what Mushin calls Reportive ES. In Mushin 2001), as well as in other traditional approaches to evidentiality, this category is limited to the expression of hearsay, i.e. a piece of discourse derived from a source other than the speaker. However, in the present study we call it Discursive ES as we adopt a broader definition including all kinds of discursive evidence, which are either originated from the speaker or not. Regarding the latter, we follow the discursive approach to the representation of a third party's discourse. Regarding the former, the references made by the speaker to previous self-discourses are taken into consideration. This dichotomy draws on the classification proposed by Marín-Arrese (2013), according to which discourse-based can be either acquired through indirect access, i.e. the case of "hearsay", or direct access, which is the case when the speaker uses performatives that indicate phatic/emphatic mode of communication as well as when (s)he makes explicit reference to utterances (s)he has previously uttered. We also include what we call Pseudo-discursive evidence, which reflects quasi discursive evidence which has supposedly been uttered previously by a third source and the speaker reports in direct speech during the current communicative situation.

Expressing discourse-based evidence, the speaker typically distances himself from what is being communicated, transferring the responsibility for what is being said (Hart 2010: 101, Sinclair 1988:8). As the accountability concerning the information lies either within the epistemic status of the source or within the receiver's state of knowledge, the speaker may even communicate controversial or highly dubitative claims without affecting her/his own credibility as the source of information. As will be shown, though, in most occasions, the speaker becomes engaged as they explicitly or implicitly (mis)align themselves with the evidential status of the information they communicate.

Attribution of an assertion may involve source tagging, the explicit identification of the source of information (Hart 2010: 98), which plays a crucial role regarding the

speaker's attitude towards the information (s)he represents in discourse. Also, it affects the stance of the receivers towards the same information since not all sources are considered equally credible and this has a direct impact on the legitimization of the speakers' discourse (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999, Van Leeuwen 2008).

According to Fairclough (1995: 117-118), the discourse of a third person, i.e. a speaker other than the current speaker, can be represented by direct quotation, which coincides with what is generally known as direct speech; summary, which features indirect speech as well as any other linguistic means that provide a gist of what was said; or formulations, which include not only basic information, but also the evaluation of that information. The term formation originates in Conversation Analysis tradition (see for instance Edwards 1994; Depperman 2011) and it refers to numerous possible alternatives available to the speaker to represent what was being talked about by the previous speaker, focusing not on the specific forms used but on the referents (Sidnell 2010: 30).

In Greek political discourse, Discursive ES is realized by personal predicates of communication and verbal interaction. The political actors use all of the available means (direct quotation, summary, formulation) provided. More particularly, verbs and verb phrases without evaluative meaning simply introduce or summarize what someone else has said. This occurs because in many cases the lexical meaning, namely providing a gist of what was said, is adequate considering the properties of the context of the communicative situation.

In what follows the various resources used for the realization of the ES type will be examined. For the representation of others' discourse we mainly draw on Fairclough's classification mentioned above. We also deal with self-discourses as well as with the issue of negotiation of discourse-based evidence.

4.3.2. Others' discourses

4.3.2.1. Direct quotation

In this section we will deal with manifestation of direct speech in the data of the political actors. Even though direct speech is assumedly an accurate representation of

what someone else has *actually* said, we found different degrees of validity (high, medium, low) of the supposedly verbatim information being conveyed. An example of the first degree is found in the passage below:

(1)   Θέλω να διαβάσω τη φράση εκείνη από το μνημόνιο, την οποία λανθασμένα ο κ. Σαμαράς νόμισε ότι ανήκει στην εισηγητική έκθεση του νομοσχεδίου.
Λέει, λοιπόν, αυτή η εξαιρετικά ήπια φράση: «Μετά τις εκλογές στην Ελλάδα, τον Οκτώβριο, η συνειδητοποίηση ότι το αποτέλεσμα για το δημοσιονομικό έλλειμμα και το δημόσιο χρέος για το 2008 και το 2009 ήταν σημαντικά χειρότερο από αυτό που είχε ανακοινώσει η προηγούμενη Κυβέρνηση, οδήγησε σε απώλεια εμπιστοσύνης, σε αύξηση του κόστους χρηματοδότησης και μείωση της ανάπτυξης και της απασχόλησης». Υπάρχει Έλληνας πολίτης που να μην το πιστεύει αυτό; Αυτό δεν είναι καν μια φράση που έχει γράψει η ελληνική Κυβέρνηση. Είναι φράση την οποία έγραψαν η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα και το Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο.

I want to read out loud that phrase from the text of the Memorandum, which Mr. Samaras mistakenly thought that it was included in the Explanatory Report of the current Bill. So this quite mild phrase states: "After the election of October 2009, the realization that the outlook of the fiscal deficit and public debt for the years 2008 and 2009 would be significantly worse than the one announced by the previous Greek government, led to a confidence loss, a rise of the lending cost and a fall in development and employment".
Is there any Greek citizen who does not believe it? This is not even a phrase written by the Greek government. This phrase was written by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

[Papakonstantinou, Parliament Speech, 6/5/2010]

In this excerpt the political actor accurately reproduces a phrase included in a text issued by the 'troika'. The fact that this phrase appears in a published written text, which is an objective form of evidence to which anyone substantially contributes to the validity of the evidence. Also, the Minister of Finance explicitly refers to the sources of that evidence ('This phrase was written… the International Monetary Fund'), so he fully designates the utterance as echoing the voice of the experts. The aim of Papakonstantinou is to disassociate himself and take no responsibility for the information he conveys not because he considers it controversial or unreliable - as a matter of fact, by posing the rhetorical question ('Is there any Greek citizen… does not believe it?') he implicitly aligns himself epistemically with the

propositional content of the utterance. Rather, he takes advantage of the high evidential of the source being referred to in order to attack to his party's political rivals and present the negative view of the previous government not as a mere reflection of his own party-interested motived opinion, but as an objective 'truth', guiding his audience to likewise construct their own context models.

More interesting are utterances which manifest medium or low degree of validity of the discursive based evidence. In order for any potential misunderstandings to be avoided, the medium or low degree of validity is not determined by the stance of the political actors in the examples below. As long they use direct quotation they typically represent the discourse of a third in absolutely accurate and valid terms. The assessment is based on how accessible that information is, which is an important parameter because, as said before, discursive based evidence is external to the speaker, therefore its degree of accessibility, along with the credibility of the source, heavily influences the degree of its validity.

Let's consider (2):

(2)   Ξέρετε τι μου έλεγαν για τις αλλαγές όλες αυτές τις μέρες, και ιδιαίτερα στην αρχή της θητείας μας, όταν πηγαίναμε στο εξωτερικό με ένα φιλόδοξο πρόγραμμα, και εταίροι, και πιστωτές; «Τα έχουμε ξανακούσει. Δεν σας πιστεύουμε, ως Ελλάδα. Ώσπου να βάλετε τάξη στη διαφθορά, θα έχετε χρεοκοπήσει. Αν βάλετε τάξη στη διαφθορά!»

Do you know what I was being told by partners and creditors all these days, and especially in the beginning of our term, when we were abroad presenting an ambitious [fiscal] program? "We have heard all this before. We don't believe you. By the time you tackle corruption, you will have been in default - if you ever manage to tackle corruption.

[Papandreou, Parliamentary Speech 6/5/2010]

In this passage the information derived from the EU partners and international creditors, is directly represented without the actual source of the utterance being specified. The recipients of his discourse cannot check whether what has been said to the Prime Minister is accurately represented in his discourse –and probably no one can, as the text in direct speech is assumedly a segment from private communication. This is the reason the Prime Minister frames the Discursive ES with a question highlighting the knowledge asymmetry between himself and his audience ('Do you

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know what…[fiscal] program?'). The question in the beginning of (24) clearly implies that recipients could not know what has been said, so they have to trust the Prime Minister.

The realization of Discursive ES by direct quotation has some strategic advantages. Despite the utterance being attributed to a collective subject, Papandreou explicitly names the sources ('partners'; 'creditors') of his information, because they are generally considered trustworthy and, what is more, having a high status of power. The political actor does not simply refer to credible sources who might provide an 'objective' view of the Greek State's financial problems, but he conveys the beliefs of those who guaranteed the Greek bail-out program. Based on audience's knowledge on the political context of the negotiations of the first bail-out program, the third part source are tacitly assumed being in a superior position against the Greek State, therefore their voice 'matters more'. The content of their speech, which appears within the brackets, is concerned with two topics: the corruption of the Greek public administration and country's lack of reliability when it has to fulfill its international commitments. Such arguments occur very frequently in Papandreou's speeches, but here, he attributes them to third sources, because he wants to distance himself from the negative views regarding the governance of ND, and, accordingly, benefit in terms of objectivity. What he is conveying, is not solely what he (and his party) believes, but what the foreigners do. As 'external' observers and given the power asymmetry manifested in their relations with the Greek State, their view is more objective and reliable. In this manner, he depicts the 'objective condition' which had prevailed during the negotiations of the financial aid. Even though Papandreou and his government are in accordance with the foreigners' view, information is discursively represented in such a way that the Prime Minister cannot be accused that his motive is to simply attack the previous government, which is a well-known move in political settings, especially among parties that alternate in power. Papandreou places the issue of fiscal mismanagement on a larger scale which exceeds local politics clashes. Highlighting the disappointment and disbelief of the fellow partners, Papandreou tries to indirectly establish his party's view on the situation: the Greek State's creditors will not trust it and will not accept any other solution or scheme of financial aid, unless it agrees to a bail–out program supervised by foreign institutions. It appears, then, that the discursive-based evidence derived by the particular sources also has a

deontic effect on influencing the government's actions. The political actor implies that his audience shall not only be in epistemic alliance with the partners and creditors beliefs, but they must act on the basis of those beliefs whether they regard them or not.

In the coming passage, the degree of verbatim information is low.

(3)   Επιτέλους η χώρα αυτή έχει ένα δικαίωμα στο μέλλον, στην αισιοδοξία, στην προοπτική. Δεν μπορεί να καθηλώνεται σε μια τετριμμένη, ανακυκλούμενη κομματική αντιδικία: φταίτε – φταίμε, τα κάνατε καλύτερα, τα κάναμε χειρότερα και τούμπαλιν. Με συγχωρείτε, αυτό είναι κατώτερο των περιστάσεων, αγγίζει τα όρια του κωμικοτραγικού, υπό τις παρούσες συνθήκες.

      This country, at last, has a right to a future; has a right to optimism and prospect. It cannot be at a standstill due to a cliché, reoccurring struggle among the political parties: "It's your fault -It's our fault"; "You made it better- We made it worse" and vice versa. I beg your pardon, but, given the circumstances, this [attitude] is below par, verging on grotesque.

[Venizelos, Parliamentary Speech, 27/6/2011]

Here the political actor supposedly represents what a third party has said in direct quotation, in the form of a fictional oral dialogue with brief turns between two unnamed speakers. He opts for direct speech structure, but the information being conveyed is far from expressed verbatim by Venizelos. He adopted Pseudo-discursive ES type only for stylistic reasons, as his point is not to accurately represent what the third parts are saying, but to make what he considers as reoccurring pattern of political argumentation more vivid – the pointless disagreements among the parties. It is precisely this standardized and conventionalized nature of those disagreements, which allows the political actor not to attribute the discursive-based evidence to a particular source. On the contrary he constructs two non-specified collective subjects (both are realized by 'we' verb types) with which all political parties can be supposedly identified. As has been shown (e.g. Tsakona 2008, 2009; Archakis & Tsakona 2009, 2010), within the Greek political context, a political actor exploits discursive resources that manifest orality in order to construct an identity of 'eloquent orators', on the one hand, and of 'authentic' and 'ordinary' leaders on the other hand.

In Chapter 5 the ideological implication of conversationalization (Fairclough 2003; 2010, Chilton & Schäffer 2002) of political discourse will be analyzed.

4.3.2.2. Pseudo-discursive ES type

Contrary to the passages mentioned above in which it cannot be justified whether or not the information conveyed in direct speech is indeed uttered as accurately as it is represented, and only a question about the degree of accuracy can be posed, in what follows, the constructed "discursiveness" of the evidence is indexed by the speakers. This is a subcategory of Discursive ES, which I call Pseudo-discursive. Another difference to the Discursive ES is found in the degree of the speaker's engagement to the utterance being attributed to someone else other than the speaker himself. Typically, when the speaker conveys information originated from a third source (s)he is disassociated from the utterance and allows the authority of the source to speak for its own. Pseudo-discursive ES type, on the contrary, involves the engagement of the speaker, because what is represented as what someone else has said is just what the speaker thinks that third source would say. Therefore, the information communicated is acquired through inference, but it is represented as if it was acquired through the discourse of a third part. In order to realize it, the speakers exploit linguistic resources, such as modalized assertion with the marker –'tha' ('would') which indexes the hypothetical status of the assertion being represented as a discourse originated from a third source, and the discursive marker –su le[e]I (lit. '(s)he say you').

4.3.2.2.a. Pseudo-discursive with the modal maker –tha ('would')

Let's consider the following:

(4)   Θα μου πείτε: Τι μπορεί να ενδιαφέρουν τον Έλληνα πολίτη όλα αυτά;
        Γιατί πρέπει να ενδιαφέρεται ο Έλληνας πολίτης που βλέπει να
        μειώνεται το εισόδημά του, να μειώνεται ο μισθός του, να μειώνεται η
        σύνταξή του, να είναι άνεργο το παιδί του ή άνεργος ο ίδιος, να
        πληρώνει περισσότερους φόρους, να μη βλέπει τη συμπίεση και τη
        μείωση των τιμών σε βασικά είδη που διαμορφώνουν το καλάθι του
        φτωχού νοικοκυριού ή του μεσαίου νοικοκυριού; Γιατί πρέπει να
        ενδιαφερθεί ο Έλληνας πολίτης γι' αυτές τις φαινομενικά τεχνικές και
        δυσνόητες λεπτομέρειες;
        Γιατί όλα αυτά είναι βαθιά πολιτικά και όλα αυτά επηρεάζουν τη ζωή
        του. Επηρεάζουν το δημοσιονομικό πλαίσιο, επηρεάζουν την υπόσταση

και την αξιοπρέπεια και την υπερηφάνεια της χώρας, επηρεάζουν τη δυνατότητά μας ν' αποκαταστήσουμε αδικίες και ανισότητες, ν' ανακτήσουμε το χαμένο έδαφος, να ξαναβρούμε τους ρυθμούς της χώρας, να ξαναποκτήσουν οι Έλληνες αισιοδοξία, προοπτική, να φύγει πάνω από τη χώρα το βαρύ σύννεφο της συλλογικής απαισιοδοξίας και κατάθλιψης.

One would ask: How might the Greek citizens be interested in all these [things]? Why should the Greek citizens be interested when they see their incomes getting reduced; their salaries getting reduced; their pensions getting reduced; their children being unemployed; or while being unemployed themselves, [they see that they] are paying more taxes, and they do not see price depression and reduction of the basic goods needed by a lower or middle class household. Why should the Greek citizens have to be interested in those seemingly technical and hard to comprehend details?
Because all of these are deeply political in nature and they affect their lives. They affect the fiscal framework; they affect the existence, dignity and pride of the country; they affect our capability to restore injustices and inequalities; to recover; to set again the pace of the country; to reacquire for the Greek people optimism, perspective; to move the black cloud of collective pessimism and depression away from our heads.

[Venizelos, PASOK Parliamentary Group Speech, 2/2/2012]

Here, Evangelos Venizelos uses the modal marker 'would' ('You would say') and makes it explicit that the Discursive ES he adopts, which is realized by direct quotation, is not real but it may occur in the near future. He then attributes to his recipients a series of direct questions ('Why the Greek people… hard to comprehend details'). The Minister 'participates' in a simulated dialogue in which he seeks to dramatically enact a dialogue with opposing voices rather than represent their criticism. This strategy is also evident in different political and cultural settings and contexts (Fairclough 2003: 48). Even though the discursive evidence provided is constructed, it must be noted that Venizelos manages to strengthen his epistemic status because he appears to have such a deep knowledge of what his fellow MPs would assumedly argue, that he can make a valid, in his view, deduction from their cognitive background.

As mentioned above, in cases in which the accuracy of the third party's discourse is very low, an epistemic mismatch is manifested because the speaker typically conveys her/his own inference on what the third party could have said. However, in examples like the above, the speaker may take advantage of this mismatch and establish an

asymmetry in knowledge relations with the audience: Venizelos appears to know in advance what his audience thinks, and not only knows it but he can also express it discursively by adopting their voice. It might be argued that the choice of this ES type is influenced by how the political actor understands politics, and more particularly by how his knowledge is performed and implemented within a civic democracy. This knowledge, and especially the belief in the core value of a civic democracy, i.e. the representativeness, is stored in his personal context model. Therefore, he thinks that is relevant to the communicative situation to tacitly claim what the people think and what they would say, because he serves and represents them in Parliament.

Last, this move has rhetorical and organizational implications as well, because the political actor aims at vividly contrasting the 'discourse' of his opponents with his own discourse. His main point is not to convey what the others would say, but to express his own positions. One should consider of whom the audience of Venizelos at the particular communicative situation consists. The political actor addresses his fellow MPs, therefore he can justify that he knows beforehand what they might say on the issue being discussed since they all shared the same in-group knowledge. More crucially, the political actor solely metarepresents what the fellow MPs of PASOK would say, but he meta-metarepresents the 'voice of ordinary' people of which they are aware the PASOK MPs. As he concludes this meta-metarepresentation, he then moves to the second turn of the constructed conversation in which he provides a series of counter-arguments against the claims of the citizens. In this respect, the political actor seems to consider the Pseudo-discursive ES relevant because among his aims in the particular communicative situation is to provide guidelines for his fellow MPs about how they would response to a possible criticism, and he wants to do so on more vivid and 'close to reality' terms which is why he constructs a conversation.

The first turn of the constructed conversation, in which we are interested here, is realized by a series of relative clauses ('who see their incomes getting reduced'; '[who see] their salaries getting reduced'; '[who see] their pensions getting reduced'; '[who see] their children being unemployed), all of which trigger a factual presuppositions (>>incomes are reduced; >>salaries are reduced; >>pensions are reduced; >>children are unemployed). In this manner, the political actor boosts his

own epistemic authority – not only does he know what others think and is in the position to express it, but he also expresses it in the highest degree of certainty.

4.3.2.2.b. Pseudo-discursive ES type with the marker 'su le[e]i' (lit. '(s)he says you')

In our data political actors realized Pseudo-discursive ES type with the discursive parenthetical marker *su leei*[23]. Typically, it is considered as a relative colloquial stylistic element and is generally found in unofficial communicative situations, mainly oral. Nevertheless, it also appears in official and institutionalized settings, particularly in those in which the political actors are expected to use both informal and formal lexical style, as happens for instance in political interviews. The marker shares a lot in common with the parenthetical marker *'λέει'* (lit. '(s)he says)'; 'it is rumored'), which will be discussed below, but it also significantly differs from as a) it always indexes an agent who conveys the acquired through discourse evidence, and b) expresses a varied degree of the speaker's certainty towards the utterance. Contrary to the examples examined above, the marker indicates an evident epistemic mismatch: even though the communicated information may be represented as originated from a third part and be expressed in direct speech, it reflects what the speaker assumes that the third party would have said in a hypothetical situation. Therefore, the speaker based on his own reasoning process infers the discourse of the third party and discursively represents it as if (s)he has access to some kind of discursive-based evidence. Let's consider the following:

(5)   Η διαφωνία μας είναι ιδεολογική και πολιτική. Αυτοί κυριαρχούνται από ένα συντηρητική και νεοφιλελεύθερο μοντέλο για όλη την Ευρώπη και για την Ελλάδα. Σου λέει: «ό,τι κάναμε στη Γερμανία, την Ολλανδία, τη Φιλανδία, θα το κάνουμε και στην Ελλάδα». Εμείς τους λέγαμε πάντα και τους λέμε, ότι δεν εφαρμόζουν σε μια χώρα με τις ελληνικές ιδιορρυθμίες, σε μια χώρα του νότου, με παραοικονομία, με φοροδιαφυγή, χωρίς βιομηχανικές δομές, χωρίς ένα ανταγωνιστικό ευρωπαϊκό μοντέλο ανάπτυξης, το ίδιο μοντέλο.

Our disagreement has both an ideological and a political basis. They are firm believers in a conservative and neoliberal model to be applied to Greece and the rest of the EU. They are like: "We should do in Greece what we have done in Germany, Holland, Finland". We tell them, and we have been constantly telling them that the same model cannot be implemented

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[23] Literally su leei can be translated as '(s)he says you. However, it functions more or less as the colloquial expression 'To be like' when is used to introduce the discourse of someone's else).

without a developmental plan in a country with particularities, in a country of the European South having black economy and tax-evasion, one that is lacking industrial structures.

[Venizelos, ERT TV Interview, 13/6/12]

The political actor uses direct quotation ('We should in Greece… Finland) but it is far from evident that the information conveyed was not accurately uttered as this, as there is no hint about who, where and under which circumstances the directly quoted assertion is delivered. The political actor provides a gist of the position of the EU partners, and more precisely his own inference of what they say based on their publicly expressed positions about the Greek crisis. The marker *sou leei* indicates therefore an epistemic mismatch. The information being conveyed is acquired through the speaker's own cognitive process, but it is represented as discursive-based evidence which is assumedly objective and has high epistemic especially within the political context. This mismatch has a direct effect on the degree of epistemic validity of the utterance, because discursive-based evidence, which is external to the speaker and can be directly accessed by anyone, is epistemically stronger than an inferential one that reflects a subjective reasoning process for which only the speaker is responsible.

Rather implicitly, the marker also contributes to the authority of the speaker, because it tacitly indexes that the speaker is in a position and has such knowledge that renders her/him able to make such evident mismatches, and what is more, that (s)he has such an assumedly credibility as a source of information so that her/his inferences about what another speaker has said to be processed as valid. At the time of the interview, Venizelos was the leader of PASOK party, but given his service as Minister of Finance and deputy Prime Minister both in the PASOK government (2011) and in coalitional government led by Papademos (2011-2012) can claim that he has the needed knowledge to make such inferences.

Additionally, stylistic parameters also intervene and influence how the political actor realizes his ES. In the passage, Venizelos wants not only to represent what the international partners say, but also to demonstrate that the Greek government has a strong objection towards their proposals ('Our disagreement'; 'We said… saying

them')[24]. The excerpt represents a clash of opposing discourses, i.e. what they say vs. what we say, so the direct quotation adds to the orality of the passage and allows the political actor to represent it in conversationalized terms, a move that contributes to the construction of the desired identity of an eloquent orator who masters the linguistic resources available.

However, there is a difference on how the opposing discourses are realized within the passage. The voice of the partners may be represented as direct quotation but as we saw it is the mere reflection of what the speaker would assumedly say. Moreover, in terms of lexical choices their voice is represented in daily style, while technical or abstract terms are totally absent. This choice made by the political actor has as a primary aim not to attenuate the authority of the partners, but to index that the speaker can represent and explain complex events and actions in plain and simple terms. On the other hand, the voice of the government may be indirectly represented through the *that-clause* ('[T]he same model cannot be…industrial structures'), but the source from which the assertion has originated is discursively constructed as a collective subject ('We said, and we have been constantly saying') that unanimously acts. As for the lexical style, the voice of the government features some technical terms ('developmental plan'; 'black economy'; 'tax evasion'; industrial structures'), a move that typically enhances the authority of the source of information.

4.3.2.3. Summaries

Under the category of summaries, we prototypically found indirect speech as well as any other linguistic resources (verbs, verb phrases and nouns) that represent a gist of what was said by the third speaker.

In the passage below a typical case of indirect speech:

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[24] Here one should have knowledge of the broader political context in order to understand why it is considered so important for Venizelos to emphasize the disagreement between the Greek government and the 'troika'. According to the majority of the Greek opposition parties, the PASOK government while in office did not negotiate with the 'troika' as hard as they should have. Therefore, one of the aims of the speaker is to challenge that view, especially in a TV interview that is broadcasted only 4 days before the election of June 2012.

(6)   Λένε ορισμένοι ότι το νέο πρόγραμμα θα αποτύχει. Κάνουν λάθος. Η δημόσια συζήτηση έχει επικεντρωθεί στις συνέπειες του πρώτου προγράμματος στα εισοδήματα και στην απασχόληση και προεξοφλεί ότι το νέο πρόγραμμα θα έχει παρόμοια αρνητικά αποτελέσματα και δεν θα επιτευχθεί η έξοδος από την κρίση.

Some say that the new (bail-out) program is going to fail. They are wrong. The public discussion has been focused on the first program's impact on incomes and employment and prejudges that the new program will have a similar negative outcome and an exit from the crisis will not be achieved.

[Papademos, Parliament Speech, 12/2/2012]

In the above, the verb 'Λένε' ('They say') is followed by a that-clause which includes the information that has been acquired by a third speaker ('the new (bail-out) program is going to fail'). The political does not explicitly mention the source of this information. The pronoun 'some' is quite vague, however its reference can be easily deducted from the context. SYRIZA party and KKE (Greek Communist Party), as well as some independent MPs of the right wing who have formed the parliamentary group 'Aneksartiti Elines' (Independent Greeks) are all included in the pronoun 'some'. As source tagging is lacking in (6), the status of the content of the assertion is weakened. In particular, Papademos represents this information as plainly shared within society; as a saying of an anonymous collective source, and not as a parliamentary opposition to his Government's policies. In this respect, the speaker aims to attenuate the epistemic and political status of his opponents. By not mentioning the source of the information, he discursively marginalizes opposition parties. They are not represented within his discourse, because in this particular instance, they are not considered as sources worth explicit reference.

Furthermore, Papademos does not only convey information uttered by a third speaker, but he also explicitly assesses that information with a disclaimer realized in the utterance that follows ('They are wrong'), so he overtly distances himself and challenges what the third party has said. This is an epistemically strong assertion which reflects the speaker's certainty (see for more details the next section) and in which the difference between the degraded status of the third speaker and the high status of the speaker is contrasted. In this respect, the initial degrading of the information conveyed in the beginning of the passage ('Some say that… will fail') is

intensified by the disclaimer in the second sentence. Therefore, it can be argued that the Prime Minister constructs/establishes himself - and probably a part of the audience expects him to perform- as a trustworthy and authoritative source, being able to make thorough evaluations about others' sayings due to his institutional role.

In the excerpt in (6), the political actor does not use an indirect speech structure, but he generally conveys the content of a third party discourse.

(7)   Μιλούν για επαναδιαπραγμάτευση, αλλά αρνούνται να αναλάβουν οποιαδήποτε ευθύνη, όταν καλούνται σε συνδιαπραγμάτευση. Θέλουν τα χρήματα που εμείς, με τις θυσίες του Ελληνικού λαού εξασφαλίζουμε, αλλά δεν θέλουν το πολιτικό κόστος των δύσκολων αποφάσεων. Ευκαιρία ζητούν να σηκώσουν τη σημαία, αλλά δεν αντέχουν το βάρος της ευθύνης να στηριχθεί σε πραγματικές, ισχυρές βάσεις η γαλανόλευκη. Είναι πρώτοι στα εύκολα, αλλά κρύβονται στα δύσκολα.

They talk about renegotiation, but they deny taking any responsibility when they are called to co-negotiation. They want the money that we ensure with sacrifices made by the Greek people, but they do not want the political cost of those hard decisions. They are looking for a chance to be up in arms, but they cannot bear the burden of responsibility of establishing the Greek flag on a truly solid base. They show off in good times, but they hide in hard ones.

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[Papandreou, Parliament Speech, 26/6/2011]

Here the speaker, George Papandreou, makes no explicit reference to the original source of the discursive based evidence ('They talk') attenuating its epistemic strength. Despite being unnamed, their identity can be easily inferred from the context which provides a gist of what his opponents say. They are not mentioned, but as in the excerpt above, they are easily inferred from the context. Particularly, this is a part of Papandreou's attack at the Major opposition party at the time, ND. Typically, the discourse-based evidence originated from the major opposition has a validity at least due to the institutional position of the source of information. The reference to the voice of ND party is not made, though, because their discourse is highly assessed, but

because Papandreou wants to emphasize the contradiction between what ND say and what they ultimately do. Also, the inconsistency of their actions appears to be the main topic of the passage, as Papandreou extensively criticizes it as his discourse unfolds.

Within summaries are also found nouns that refer to a "piece of discourse" acquired by a third source, and by which political actors realize this ES type. In Modern Greek there is not a distinct category of evidential nouns. In actual language use, though, there are nouns that trigger an evidential meaning, as they provide a summary of what a third speaker has said. In our data noun such 'article' or 'statement', as well as 'proposals', 'inquiries' or 'argumentation'. In the following we examine how the noun 'announcement' is used by the political actor.

(8)   Βεβαίως, την ημέρα που εκδόθηκε η ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής για τα στοιχεία του 2009, έκλεισε στην ουσία και η δυνατότητα της χώρας μας να δανειστεί από τις αγορές και γι' αυτό, την επόμενη, ζητήσαμε την ενεργοποίηση του μηχανισμού στήριξης.

Of course, the day on which the [European] Commission's statement on the data of 2009 was issued, our country's capability to borrow from the markets was actually lost, and this is why, the very next day, we asked the activation of the ESM scheme.

[Papandreou, Parliament speech, 6/5/10]

This brief excerpt is from a George Papandreou speech given in May 2010 in the Parliament. The Discursive ES is realized by the noun '*ανακοίνωση*' 'announcement', which refers to a document issued by the European Commission referring to the ultimately estimated figure of the Greek primary deficit for the year 2009. In (1) it was explained why written documents as discursive-based evidence are epistemically stronger compared to oral ones.

What is striking in this example is that the adoption of the particular EP type has little to do with the expression of evidential meaning per se, but with how this meaning can contribute to the legitimization of speaker's assertions. Obviously, the content of the statement is considered already known as there in no explicit reference to it. This can be explained by the fact that the political actor wants to use the discursive based evidence as a means for justification of the Government's action, so

he needs to foreground the authority of the source, and not to convey information about what is being said. Therefore, he tags the source of the announcement. i.e. the European Committee, which is already assumed as an authoritative and credible source.

4.3.2.5 Formulations

With formulations, the political actor also represents the speech of a third source, but the linguistic resource (s)he uses bear an inherent evaluative meaning, either in semantic terms, i.e. positive or negative semantic prosody[25] (Sinclair 2003; Partington 2004), or in terms of the validity of its propositional content. In what follows we examine formulation realized by verbs and verb phrases, and by nouns, nominalizations and noun phrases.

4.3.2.5.a. Formulations with verbs and verb phrases

Let's take (8) and (9) which were retrieved from the Papandreou and Samaras corpus respectively:

(9)   Σήμερα, έξω από το χορό, συνεχίζετε να φυγομαχείτε. Μηδενίζετε κάθε προσπάθεια και θυσία του Ελληνικού λαού. Εύκολη, ανέξοδη κριτική.

        Today, as you are not trying to get into our shoes, you just avoid struggling. You eliminate every effort and sacrifice of the Greek people. This is just an easy and gratuitous criticism.

        [Papandreou, Parliament Speech, 27/6/2011]

(10)   Τους δύο πρώτους μήνες αφότου αναλάβαμε, κάθε μέρα, δεκάδες δηλώσεις ξένων αξιωματούχων πιθανολογούσαν ότι η Ελλάδα θα βγει από το ευρώ**.** Αλλεπάλληλα δημοσιεύματα του ξένου τύπου το προεξοφλούσαν. Η Ελλάδα έμοιαζε να έχει μπει σε μια «καραντίνα αναξιοπιστίας» και να την σκεπάζει ένα βαρύ σύννεφο αβεβαιότητας. Τώρα όλα αυτά σχεδόν τελείωσαν. Και μετά από τις δύο κρίσιμες

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[25]Semantic prosody is defined as a form of evaluative meaning, good or bad, that is shaped by the speaker's social attitudes (Sinclair 2003: 117, Partington 2004: 131). Semantic prosody goes beyond the level word level and its "aura"(Partington 2004) is defused in the utterance. As semantic prosody is largely depended on the speaker's worldview and it reflects the interactional character through which evaluative meaning are ascribed to the semantics of a world type under the influence of the broader historical and social context, Stubbs proposes the term discursive prosody (2001: 66).

ψηφοφορίες των επομένων ημερών τελειώνουν οριστικά! Και αμετάκλητα…

In the first two months after we took power, tens of statements made every day by foreign officials were conjecturing that Greece will be out of the Euro. Successive foreign press reports prejudged it. Greece seemed to have been held in an 'unreliability quarantine' and to have been covered by a dark cloud of uncertainty. Nowadays, all this is almost over. And after the two crucial voting sessions held within the next days, this is definitely and irrevocably over.

[Samaras, Parliamentary Group Speech, 4/11/2012]

In both excerpts we cannot assume what other parties say, because the two political actors only evaluate the content of the discourse they represent, and they hardly convey any kind of information as regards that content per se. More specifically, in (8) Papandreou represents the discourse of the third source with the verb *'μηδενίζετε'* ('eliminate'). One needs to be familiarized with Greek political context in order to know beforehand and successfully infer during Papandreou's speech what other parties have actually said by which they eliminate the sacrifices of the Greek people. However, the fact that this information is assumedly already shared is not the only reason why Papandreou avoids representing what his opponents have said. It appears that one basis of his own context model that the Prime Minister considers relevant to the communicative situation is to discredit the discourse of his political opponents. Therefore, he opts for resources that allow him to communicate what his opponents have said, but more crucially to assess their discourses. Besides this, formulations crucially marginalize the propositional content of the discourse-based evidence, as they foreground the evaluation of that content made by the speaker.

Similar remarks can be concluded about (9). Antonis Samaras makes a reference to what was said abroad by specifically named sources ('foreign officials'; 'foreign Press') about Greece as soon as the government led by him took Office. However, he does not convey what they exactly said, but through the verbs '*πιθανολογούσαν*' (*'were conjuring'*) and *'προεξοφλούσαν'* ('prejudge it') he rather communicates an explicit assessment about what the foreigners could have likely said.

In the previous section it was noted that in some discursive environments the boundaries between Inferential and Discursive ES are vague. This vagueness was

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witnessed in verb types that inherently bear an epistemic lexical meaning. Likewise, verbs 'to conjecture' or 'to prejudge' are also used to introduce, directly or indirectly, a piece of discourse but at the same time the speaker makes an evaluation of the epistemic status of the discourse's propositional content. As the data of the study has shown, it is dependent on context whether a verb type should be treated as a linguistic resource realizing Inferential or Discursive ES. In the passage above, Samaras' aim is to praise his government's efforts and achievements in a brief period of two months. To do so, he provides some 'discursive facts', i.e. the projections expressed by multiple resources in the beginning of his stint, of which all of them were finally falsified in Samaras' view. As for the cognitive aspect of those verbs, it becomes attenuated as it is irrelevant to the aims set by the speaker in that context.

Concluding, it can be argued that both political actors adopt Discursive ES because they want to represent themselves as sources that not only convey what a third speaker has said, but also as sources with such thorough knowledge on the issue they are talking about that they can either approve or discard what the third speaker has said, without providing any evidence to justify their evaluation. The intervention of the speakers' context model is evident in the production of discourse. Both Papandreou and Samaras interpret the properties of their institutional role in relation to the communicative situation in which they are engaged and, accordingly, they produce their discourse. Hence, they consider the strategic use of Discursive ES which pays attention to the epistemic assess of the content and contributes to the representation of the speaker as an authoritative source of information relevant to those properties.

4.3.2.5.b. Formulations with verbs and verb phrases

As observed in the case of summaries, political actors also deploy nouns and nominal phrases as formulations as well.

(11)   Η Ελλάδα θα βγει από την κρίση και θα πάρει τη μοίρα της στα χέρια της. Με ανάπτυξη, χωρίς μνημόνια και ύφεση. Με ανταγωνιστικότητα, χωρίς στρεβλώσεις. Με αληθινά δικαιώματα για τους πολλούς, όχι με σκανδαλώδη προνόμια για λίγους. Με ενότητα, όχι με διχασμούς. Με δημοκρατική σταθερότητα. Όχι με κλυδωνισμούς λαϊκισμού και δημαγωγίας.

Greece will come out of this crisis and will take its fate into its own hands having development, not memorandums and recession; having competitiveness, not distortions; having genuine rights for the many, not scandalous privileges for the few; having unity, not conflicts; having democratic stability, not shakings of populism and demagogy.

[Samaras, Parliament speech, 7/11/12]

At the end of the excerpt, the nouns *'λαϊκισμός' (*'populism'[26]*)* and mainly *'δημαγωγία'* ('demagogy') refer to information being acquired through the discourse of a third source. Both nouns bear a) a negative semantic prosody, and b) an epistemic assessment inherent to their lexical meaning. An assertion qualified as 'populism' or 'demagogy' is epistemically weak, as it supposedly includes lies or positions that have no relevance to reality, but they are always pleasantly heard. The political actor does not provide any hint of what those speakers have actually said nor names them. He simply provides a formulation, in faircloughian terms, of what was said. Once more, it seems that in political contexts, politicians interpret the use of Discursive ES as a means for making explicit epistemic evaluations, establishing themselves as trustworthy sources that are entitled to make such assertions.

Among evaluative nouns, a group of compound nominalizations that denote that something has been said about an issue is witnessed. In this sense, it can be argued that those nouns have an evidential meaning which is articulated through an evaluative one. The first compound of the nominalization has a variable evaluative meaning. A speaker can virtually place any noun at this position and adopt a stance

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[26] A brief comment should be made here. Populism, as any other kind of –isms, typically refers to an ideology (e.g. racism, nationalism etc.). The structure of ideologies is quite complex, but there are more or less seven categories on the basis of which ideologies are organized: actions, membership, power resources, identities, aims, values, beliefs/opinions. As *Actions* is not only meant what the members of an ideological group do, but also what they say, i.e. their discourses. Apparently, due to its extremely negative meaning, populism is always attributed to the 'others' who exploit it as strategy in order to achieve their aims and establish their interests. At least within the Greek political setting, the term is mainly referred to others' discourses. Of course, it has ideological connotations, which nevertheless transcend the whole political spectrum. Conservative parties usually accuse left parties of populism and vice versa. Likewise, a government discards the criticism of the opposition parties as populist, regardless of their ideological orientation and so on. Along these lines, the term 'populism' is used as a means for degrading others' beliefs/opinions, who not only avoid considering the objective and undisputed conditions of the issue being at stake at a certain time, but also manipulate citizens.

towards the information represented. The second compound is stable and either consists of the bound lexical suffix –λογία ('-logy'), which is signified as "the speech produced in the way denoted by the first compound" (Babiniotis 2002), or of the similar to the previous suffix *'–φωνία'* ('-phony') which signals the existence of a voice (Babiniotis 2002). Accordingly, political actors form nominalizations such as καταστροφολογία, lit. *catastrophy-o-logy ('disaster-mongering); κινδυνολογία, lit. *danger-o-logy ('scaremongering'); αερολογία, lit. *air-o-logy ('nonsense'); κακοφωνία, lit. *mal(ecious)+phony ('discordance').

In the excerpt below, George Papandreou uses two such nominalizations, namely *'κακοφωνία'* ('discordance') and *'κινδυνολογία'* ('scaremongering'):

(12)   Και έχουμε μια Ευρώπη κακοφωνίας που επέτρεψε και επιτρέπει καθημερινή κινδυνολογία να δεσπόζει πάνω από το κεφάλι της Ελλάδας και άλλων χωρών.

   And we have a Europe of discordance that has allowed and still allows scaremongering to dominate over Greece and other countries.

[Papandreou, 29/6/2011]

As has already been mentioned, virtually any linguistic means can realize the ES. In (12) a fixed verb phrase is used so that the speaker can adopt a negative stance towards what his opponents say.

(13)   Κι αν υπάρχουν παρατάξεις που χαϊδεύουν, όπως έκαναν απόψε, αυτιά όταν κόβουμε από αγρότες και συνταξιούχους, τότε- θα το πω ωμά - ότι ψήφους ψαρεύουν.

   And even if there are parties that caress ears, as they did tonight, while we were cutting [incomes] from farmers and retirees, then I will say it bluntly: they are seeking votes.

[Samaras, Parliament, 7/11/2012]

In the present passage, though, the information within the 'that-clause' ('that caress ears') is concerned. Samaras uses a fixed verb phrase 'to caress ears', i.e. to say something that is pleasant for the recipient, regardless of whether it is true or not, in order to refer to an evaluation of what has been said during the discussion by the opposition parties, especially by the major opposition party at the time, SYRIZA. As

was also manifested in passages above, the Prime Minister attempts to establish himself as a source of high authority, entitled to comment on the validity of what his opponents say. He just foregrounds his personal interpretation of the others' discourse, making an explicit negative evaluation of it, while he makes no reference to what they have actually said. The content of the hearsay, which is supposedly provided by Samaras, is largely implied and it can only be inferred since one has additional contextual information. Moreover, Samaras also mitigates the source of information, which is discursively represented by the vague pronoun 'some' in order to weaken the credibility of their assertions as well as their status as sources of information.

4.2.3.6. The marker 'le[e]i' (lit.'one says you')

The impersonal use in third singular person *'λέει'* (lit. 'one says you') of the verb *'λέω'* ('to say') is often described as having an evidential meaning concerning information acquired through discourse of a third source (Friedman 2003, Joseph 2003, Aikhenvald 2004: 142). Tsangalidis (2012) suggests that the specific verb type may have been involved in a process of grammaticalization, similar to the ones occurred and led to the rise of evidential hearsay markers in other languages. The marker is included in formulations because it bears an inherent attitudinal meaning as it appears in discourse as a statement expressing an uncertain rumor or assumption (Setatos 1994a: 137) and as an instance of reservation of acceptance on the part of the speaker (Setatos 1994b: 154). Since the literal translation of the marker adds nothing to the comprehension of the text, I follow the translation of Tsangalidis (2012) who uses the impersonal verb phrase 'it is rumored' in examples like the one in (14).

Surprisingly enough, among a total of 147 occurrences of the verb type *'λέει'*, only one was impersonal having the evidential meaning described above. The one that follows:

(14)   Μας ρωτάνε για τα μέτρα του Ιουνίου. Πού θα βρεθούν, λέει, τα 11 δισεκατομμύρια περικοπών που θα χρειαστούν για τα επόμενα δύο χρόνια. Η απάντηση είναι απλή. Κυρίως από περικοπή σπατάλης.

        They ask us about the measures in June. How, they say, 11bn Euros worth of cuts will be saved that are needed for the next couple of years. The answer is simple: Cuts in the State's overspending.

The political actor conveys an inquiry ('How… of years') made his political opponents about the efficiency of austerity measures proposed by this party. Before we continue, the speech is delivered during the election campaign of the first general election in 2012, so the measures that the political actor refers to are just proposals made by his party in case they take office. Note here that the source of the inquiry is not named, and the utterance is attributed to an unspecified collective 'they'-subject, so the credibility of the source of information is strategically attenuated. Samaras further discredits the third source through the use of parenthetical *le[e]i* expressing his own reservation about the truth of the utterance.

4.3.3. Self-discourses

In many occasions speakers may refer to a 'piece of discourse', but this piece may be acquired from what they have said before. In this manner, political actors perform as if they were the official voice of their party or government, which is quite plausible given their position within a party of a government's hierarchy. Usually, the use of Discursive ES is realized by communicative verbs, mainly 'say' in first singular/plural types.

Let' consider the following:

(15)   Αυτό που λέμε είναι ότι δεν σημαίνει ότι αν δεν πάει κάτι καλά πρέπει οπωσδήποτε να κόψεις μισθούς και συντάξεις. Ακόμα υπάρχουν περιθώρια μείωσης δαπανών που έχουν εν μέρει και το χαρακτήρα σπατάλης.

What we say is that if something doesn't go right, this doesn't mean that you have to cut salaries and pensions no matter what. There is still a buffer for cuts in spending that is in part seen as a waste of money.

[Yiannis Stournaras, Enikos.gr Interview, 7/12/12]

The speaker Stournaras adopts Discursive ES, referring to what his party has already said, i.e. to opinions, beliefs and proposals that have been expressed in previous instances. This piece of older discourse is used as compelling evidence because – it goes without saying – Stournaras considers ND discourses as credible. The use of first

plural person ('What we say') indexed an intersubjective stance towards the utterances so that the responsibility regarding its validity is shared. Also, the first plural broadens the extent of the information conveyed, as Stournaras refers to a supposedly shared position, not to his personal view. Furthermore, the use of first plural implies that the government has a solid and united voice.

At this point three remarks should be made regarding the adoption of Discursive ES by which politicians make a reference either to the discourse of their opponents or to their own discourse. Adopting Discursive ES in order to convey their own previous discourses, politicians construct a political identity which is characterized by consistency. What they say now is in accordance to what they have said before. Hence, they implicitly claim that they are credible and hold a strong belief in their views. Secondly, this use of discourse-based evidence realizes a well-known discursive strategy, Us vs. Them. In particular, this strategy turns into "what we say vs. what they say". Even though in very few occasions in our data this contrast was direct and overt, it did nevertheless transcend a great part of the discourses. The last remark is more general in its scope. Discursive ES highlights the inherent discursive nature of politics. Politics is a realm in which different ideologies, opinions, beliefs etc. are contested, but in order to be contested they first need to be discursively realized. In this way, politics is a battle for domination between opposed discourses.

4.3.4. Negotiation of discourse-based evidence

Whether discursive based evidence originates from a third source or had previously come from the same source who refers to it, it may not only serve to signal a specific epistemic position of the speaker towards it, but it is also highly likely to be dynamically contested and challenged, constantly shaped and reshaped, especially within interactional settings. The study includes data from such settings, namely from political interviews, in which a discursive piece of evidence can be challenged in terms of its validity, i.e. whether the information communicated was actually said, or in terms of its meaning, i.e. what does the information acquired through the discourse of a third source actually mean.

Regarding the first case, let's examine the passage below.

(16)   **IER**: Ο κ. Σαμαράς λέει «ο Αρχηγός του πρώτου Κόμματος θα είναι ο Πρωθυπουργός». Δεν θα αναλάβει κόστος ο κ. Σαμαράς; Δεν μπορεί, λέτε;
IEE: Ο κ. Σαμαράς δεν λέει αυτό. Ο κ. Σαμαράς αυτοαποκλείεται. Ο κ. Σαμαράς λέει «θέλω να είμαι Πρωθυπουργός…» το αφήνει λίγο φλου, «αυτοδύναμη πλειοψηφία ή όχι, αλλά αδέσμευτος, δεν θέλω το ΠΑΣΟΚ να μου δεσμεύει τα χέρια». «Πως μπορώ…» -λέει- «να συνυπάρχω με το ΠΑΣΟΚ και να κάνω εξεταστική Επιτροπή;». Πάλι φαντάζεται εξεταστικές Επιτροπές για την οικονομική πολιτική.
IER: Αυτό το δήλωσε και στην καμπάνια.

IER: Mr. Samaras says: "The leader of the first party will be the Prime Minister". Is he not going to take on political cost? Is he not capable of doing so –is this what you are saying?
IER: This is not what Mr. Samaras says. Mr. Samaras negates himself. Mr. Samaras says: "I want to be the Prime Minister…", and this is it. He is quite vague, but then he continues: "…Having the absolute majority of seats or not, but still to be uncommitted; I do not want PASOK to tie my hands". He says: "How can I align with PASOK and at the same time form an Inquiry Committee?" Once again, he dreams of an Inquiry Committee for the financial policy.
IEE: Indeed, he said that during the pre-election campaign.

[Venizelos Mega TV Interview, 28/4/2012]

The IER represents in direct quotation what another speaker has said ('Mr. Samaras says') and asks his interlocutor to comment on this particular piece of discourse. However, the IEE does not follow evades the convention of the genre and denies the validity of the evidence being presented ('This is not what Mr. Samaras says). Instead of providing the information asked by the IER, the political actor represents in direct what the third speaker has said, but he uses a disclaimer before Samaras' sayings ('Mr. Samaras negates himself') through which he makes an explicit negative assessment about the content of what the third speaker has said.

It should be noted that contrary to the IER, who represents the discourse of Samaras quite accurately, the IEE adopts Pseudo-discursive ES type – he may provide a gist of his political rival's opinions, but this does not entail that they were uttered in the way and style that the IEE represents them in his discourse. As a matter of fact, Venizelos communicates his own interpretative inference on the basis of the publicly made statements of Samaras, therefore what he represents is not discursive-based, but a reflection of speaker's own interpretation of that evidence.

The second case of negotiating discursive-based evidence appears when the meaning of the evidence is contested.

(17)   **IER:** Η οποία όμως Ισπανία -μου λέτε ότι τη βοηθάει το timing προφανώς- μπήκε σε διάσωση χωρίς μνημόνιο.
IEE: Κάνετε λάθος. Κάνετε κολοσσιαίο λάθος.
IER: Γιατί κάνω κολοσσιαίο λάθος;
IEE: Το απόλυτο λάθος. Μπαίνει σε μνημόνιο καραμπινάτο με την τρόικα να είναι κουαρτέτο, δηλαδή είναι οι τρεις της τρόικας και η Ευρωπαϊκή Αρχή Τραπεζών -άρα λοιπόν πιο ισχυρή επιτήρηση- και παίρνει, ενώ έχει μια οικονομία πενταπλάσια για τις Τράπεζές της, 100 δισ. Ευρώ, δηλαδή με βάση τα δικά μας 50 δισ. Ευρώ έπρεπε να πάρει 300 δισ. Ευρώ η Ισπανία.
IER: Λέτε ότι το μνημόνιο στην Ισπανία εφαρμόζεται προκαταβολικά. Αυτό λέτε.

IER: However, Spain managed to get a financial rescue without a memorandum –as you told me, they were obviously favored by the timing [in which negotiations took place].
IEE: We make a mistake. You make a huge mistake.
IER: Why am I largely mistaken?
IEE: This is absolutely a mistake. Spain enters into an undisputed memorandum status, in which the troika becomes a quartet, because the European Banking Authority is added to the three [institutions]. The supervision, then, is closer. Despite having an economy 5 times as big as the Greek, Spain is financed by 100bn Euros for its Banks, which it should have 300 bn. Euros compared to 50bn. Euros of finance given to Greece.
IER: So, you say that in Spain a Memorandum is implemented in advance. This is what you say.

[*Venizelos, ERT TV Interview, 13/6/12*]

This is a brief excerpt of a TV interview of Venizelos. We are interested in the last turn of the conversation ('So you say… what you say'), however the previous turn is also needed in order for the turn to be sufficiently comprehended. From the beginning of the passage, the two interlocutors negotiate the information being conveyed as each one of them has a different interpretation of the same event, i.e. the financing of the Spanish banks. What is interesting in the last turn of the passage, is the IER communicates a discursive-based evidence ('you say'), but such an evidence has not previously existed. What is attributed to the IEE is not something that he had explicitly said in his turn. On the contrary, the journalist represents as reported information what the political actor may imply. This is an evident epistemic mismatch, because what is discursive represented as evidence acquired through the

discourse of a third person, is the product of the IER's own reasoning. However discursive evidentially is more reliable and more 'objective', compared to the subjective character of an inference. Also, the IER does not ask for confirmation about the validity of her inference using, for instance, a cleft sentence or posing a direct question about it, as she did in the second turn ('Why am I largely mistaken). Rather she represents this allegedly discursive evidence as valid.

4.3.5. Concluding remarks

In 4.3. we examined the discursive domain of evidence. The analysis proved what is evident from everyday experience, but that has been largely overlooked by many studies of evidentiality, the dominant role of discourse in the production and communication of knowledge. Contrary to monolithic conceptions of discourse as a formal type of evidence, we draw on CDS studies concerned with the representation of discourse (Caldas-Coulthard 1994; and mainly Fairclough 1995) and we examined the various discursive structures through which the political actors realized their ES. Again, a more fine distinction was made between self-discourses and discourse produced by a third source. It was shown that knowledge acquired through discourse was considered by the participants as highly reliable and of high symbolic status. More importantly it was revealed that this type of ES is highly evaluative, because many of the linguistic resources through which it is realized bare an inherent evaluative meaning – this contradicts classic approaches to discourse-based evidence according to which a speaker communicates discursive-based evidence and thus attributes the responsibility of what is being communicated to a third source. What is more, it appeared that for the political actors their credibility as the sources of knowledge was influenced by whether they make such an evaluation about either the content of the discourse or the credibility of the source, and not by whether they conveyed reliable discourses from assumed credible sources. The above could not have been explained without the insights of the socio-cognitive approach. Depending on the context of the communicative situation, political actors either selectively activate an old semantic model of the discourse situation, or on the basis of their new context model they discursively represent what was said about themselves by a third source, or they enact an old pragmatic context model, and in this case they may recall

the parameters (Actor, Setting etc.) of the situation from which they acquired the discursive based knowledge, but they do not recall what this discourse was about.

4.4. Expression of Truth-factual validity

4.4.1. General

According to Mushin (2001: 93), Factual ES is manifested in the absence of any trace that may refer to the source of information. This is either because information is considered as already known by recipients, i.e. a part of Common Ground or general cultural knowledge, or because the source of information is evaluated as unimportant, given the specific instance in which discourse is produced. The latter also means that explicit reference to the source of information may add nothing to the level of credibility of the source and/or validity of the information. Moreover, with this ES type the speaker remains 'offstage' and, therefore, (s)he is not engaged in what is discursively represented. Disassociating her/himself from the representation, (s)he achieves a maximum degree of objectivity. In this sense, it is quite plausible why this type of epistemic stance is used when the speaker refers to 'world truths', such as 'two plus two equals four'.

It should be noted, though, that virtually any kind of proposition can be represented as factual, just as any discursive representation of any kind of evidence may differ from the actual mode of knowing from which the evidence was acquired (Cornillie et al. 2015: 7). When a speaker adopts an ES type, (s)he does so, not within a social void, but within a specific communicative situation. On the basis of the context model that (s)he has constructed for that particular situation, he might deliberately mismatch the actual source of information with the type of stance he adopts while he produces discourse. Thus, not any information realized as factual is indeed factual. Also, this specific type of ES represents information as objective and unchallengeable, as is the case of any 'world truth'. This has both rhetoric and cognitive implications.

Regarding the former, any information that is represented in a way that no additional proof or evidence nor explicit reference to the source is needed is generally accepted as a solid and highly credible one. Accordingly, and in order to exercise epistemic control over the audience or to establish her/himself as a source of high epistemic

status, a speaker may adopt this type of ES either because he wants to enhance the force of her/his assertions, or more crucially, to represent them as being undisputed, while knowing that they are not.

From a cognitive account, the use of this ES type, especially when an epistemic mismatch is observed, has a specific implication – it facilitates the transformation of a mere opinion or belief into commonly shared knowledge. As said above, relativism prevails the discussion of knowledge criteria within and between the epistemic communities (van Dijk 2003: 95), so the boundaries are fuzzy between what is assumed 'true' knowledge and a mere belief. Despite not being historically and culturally stable and resistant, epistemic criteria do apply within an epistemic community in a given period of time. In this respect knowledge within a community is indeed accepted as a justified true belief and the members of the community communicate and process it as such. Therefore, the cognitive process through which beliefs are transformed into knowledge gains in importance and is related to the issue of epistemic control over the community.

When it comes to politics, both rhetorical and cognitive implications mentioned above are important. A politician aims at a positive self-presentation, part of which is characterized by a high degree of trustworthiness and credibility. Especially in Greek politics, the myth of the eloquent orator is fundamental in how politicians perceive and interpret their own role within the parliamentary setting (Tsakona 2009). Of course, this is not a purely rhetorical or cultural matter. It also presupposes a certain type of cognitive intervention, since each politician's context of model determines which properties of his role as a parliamentarian are assumed to be relevant to the situation in which he is engaged. An additional cognitive aspect relates to how Common Ground Knowledge is conveyed in political discourse. As is observed (van Dijk 2002), politicians are constantly and intentionally trying to establish their group knowledge, which are opinions and beliefs 'taken-for-granted' within a specific (political) group, as Common Ground. Hence, Factual ES is a linguistic resource which, when deployed by political actors, plays a crucial role about the legitimation of their views on an issue.

In the rest of the section we will analyze how this type of ES is particularly realized in the discourse of the political actors. We divide between explicit and implicit

expression of Factual ES. Regarding the former, non-modalized verb types, noun and noun phrases, and allegories expressing factual truth are included. More particularly, we see how the political actors express facts by constructing them in the present or the future as well as by exploiting narratives. Regarding the latter, we are interested in how direct and rhetorical questions can contribute to the construction of a 'true' state of affairs.

4.4.2. Present "facts"

Factual ES is adopted when political actors want to 'define the situation' about which they are talking. Politicians tend to make use of this discursive formulation, when they have to comment on a certain situation or to call for a specific action. As van Dijk (2008: 191) puts it: "[I]f one wants to explain or justify why one acted in a specific way (usually criticized way), it makes sense to describe a situation in which such acts appear necessary, logical comprehensible, unavoidable or otherwise acceptable". In what follows we will present a brief analysis of 'define the situation' structure, because, due to its close relation with justification, i.e. the principal function of legitimizing process, it will be thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 5.

(1)   Δεν ζούμε σε συνήθεις καιρούς. Ζούμε τη χειρότερη διεθνή και εγχώρια κρίση της μεταπολεμικής περιόδου. Μπορούμε να ξεπεράσουμε την κρίση. Όμως, μαγικές λύσεις δεν υπάρχουν.

We do not live in normal times. We are experiencing the worst international and national economic crisis of the post-war era. We can overcome the crisis. There are no magical solutions, though.

[Papademos, New Year Eve Address, 31/12/2011]

Papademos comments on the current historical period and describes it as not usual. On this basis, i.e. the special nature of our times, he can justify the term 'crisis', which is used in the second period, in order to refer to the national and international economic situation. Additionally, he presupposes that his audience has a general knowledge on recent world economic history, as he claims that the current economic crisis is the worst since the WW II. But even if Papademos does not assume that the audience has that specific historical knowledge, he is still entitled to make such assertions. His entitlement comes from his institutional role. He is the Prime Minister, so he supposedly knows better concerning how severe the current crisis is. More

crucially, though, Papademos is entitled to make such assertions due to his former occupation. Before taking office, he was a distinguished academic in economics and, afterward, a 'technocrat', widely known for his stint as director of the Bank of Greece. In this respect, the base of the factual character of his assertions is found in his expertise in economics.

Note here that all periods trigger certain existential presuppositions. In the first period, what is presupposed is the non-usual character of the historical period in which he and the Greek people are engaged. In the next two, the 'fact' that there is a crisis is also presupposed. Challenging the 'commonsensical' character of the economic crisis may not seem plausible. Apart from this, the fact that the international financial system entered a crisis period is deemed as generally accepted. Nevertheless, the notion of the word 'crisis' remains vague. There is no justification of the causes of the 'crisis' and, what is more, of the implications that are entailed at a social level. The very notion of the word can inscribe various –and even contradictory- interpretations, which are based on each speaker's values, ideology and symbolical resources. Accordingly, when one presupposes that a crisis exists, he also presupposes all the interpretations inscribed to the word.

Again, the mismatch between the actual source of information and its discursive realization seems to be dependent on the context. Based on his personal contextual model, Papademos interprets how a Prime Minister has to speak for an official address and how this can highlight his authority and expertise. The Factual ES is in accordance with those properties. Moreover, Papademos considers the formal and contextual constraints of the particular genre, that of an address. An address is delivered is special occasions or on specific dates. Even though it has a highly symbolic status, its practical implications are limited. Unlike a parliamentary speech, the Prime Minister delivers an address not to persuade the people before a crucial voting session, but, for instance, to make his position on an issue clear. Given that it is broadcasted, it should be more or less brief. As a result, limited space or time is at the producer's disposal for backing up his position. He has to simply present the facts, define or/and comment on the reasons concerned in the address, and probably call for specific actions. Last but not least, recipients of an address are all the citizens, i.e. a broad and non-homogeneous audience. The amount of knowledge on an issue

presented is neither shared equally between the recipients and the Prime Minister nor among the audience's members. As Papademos cannot offer too many details or evidence to the recipients that lack expert knowledge on economics, he presents his position as a 'fact' which, thus, can hardly be challenged.

The same formal and contextual constraints were also evident in the other two of the three addresses which are included in the corpus of the study. Within 2010-2013, the only Prime Ministers who delivered an address were Papandreou in 2010 and Papademos in 2011 and 2012. This scarcity underlies the symbolical importance of that particular genre. Notwithstanding the annual New Year's Eve address, the other two were produced on very critical dates. What is observed is that in all texts of that genre, producers tend to opt for Factual ES.

4.4.3. Constructing future "facts"

Let's consider the following:

(2)   Δημόσιο χρέος: Η λύση που φέρνει η 26η Οκτωβρίου, η λύση που φέρνει το πρόγραμμα -και χωρίς το πρόγραμμα και τις δεσμεύσεις η λύση αυτή δεν υπάρχει γιατί δεν υπάρχει χρηματοδότηση, δεν υπάρχει PSI- είναι το PSI. Παίρνουμε 30 δισ. Ευρώ, διαγράφουμε 100 δισ. Ευρώ από τα 200 δισ. ευρώ που έχουν οι ιδιώτες διεθνώς, τα υπόλοιπα 100 δισ. ευρώ τα χωρίζουμε σε δύο μεγάλες ομάδες: 30 δισ. ευρώ τα πληρώνουμε με τα λεφτά που μας δίνουν οι εταίροι μας και για τα 70 δισ. ευρώ δίνουμε νέα ομόλογα.

Public debt: The solution that the [agreement of] October 26th brings, the solution that the program brings, is the PSI –and without the program and the commitments, there will be no solution, because there will be no financing, no PSI. We take 30bn Euros, we write off 100bn Euros out of 200bn Euros, obtained internationally by the creditors, and we divide the rest 100bn Euros in two broad groups: We pay 30bn Euros from the money provided by our partners, and as for the 70bn Euro we offer new bonds.

[Venizelos, Parliamentary Speech, 12/2/2012]

Let's begin with the use of non-modalized present tense verb types ('it brings'; 'we take'; 'we write off'; 'we offer' etc.). Semantically, the choice of present tense forms is quite plausible because in Modern Greek present forms denote both present and future reference (Moschonas 1990; Bella 2007). In (34) Venizelos initially refers to a

present situation ('Public Debt… is the PSI'), whereas the rest of the passage refers to a future situation, i.e. the planned allocation of the bail-out installments ('We take… we offer new bonds').

However, from a pragmatic and cognitive perspective this choice influences the epistemic status of the information conveyed. First, the two 'that-complementizers' in the beginning of the passage ('The solution that… the solution that…') trigger a factive presupposition, i.e. the information expressed within the 'that-clause' is taken for granted by the speaker –and it can hardly be challenged. In Venizelos's view there is nothing to be doubted about whether or not the joint resolution of October 26th and the new bail-out program under negotiation offer a solution –they surely do. It is undisputed, as well as whether or not the PSI procedure is that solution –it certainly is.

Secondly, the use of present tense in the above signals not just a location in time, but also a specific speaker's epistemic attitude towards the utterance he produces. The present is characterized in terms of immediate experience (Jaszcolt 2009), therefore this has a specific type of effect on how the political actors epistemically position themselves towards the utterance they communicate. Following the principles of Langackager's cognitive grammar, Bella (2001, 2007) claims that in Modern Greek the use of present tense forms is characterized by [-distance] and [+ relevance]. In this respect, Modern Greek speakers tend to use present tense in their discourse, when they convey information which is placed close to their deictic center. This proximity should be understood not only in temporal terms, but also in psychological and cognitive ones. In terms of cognitive proximity, what a speaker knows is generally characterized by [-distance], which means that is discursively placed closer to her/his deictic center. As Bella (2007: 259) argues, present tense in Modern Greek indexes a speaker's high degree of certainty, because whatever becomes conceptualized as 'now', is plausible to be regarded by the speaker as 'true'- and thus- certain as well. Similarly, Chilton (2003: 57-60) points out that discursive means that express the 'rightness' and 'appropriateness' of political decisions are placed closer to a speaker's deictic center. The political actor chooses present tense verb types, which denote temporal [-distance], so that he can represent information for which he (implicitly) claims that he has some sort of deep knowledge.

This has an apparent rhetorical implication here as the political actor refers to future situations, i.e. what is provisioned by the bail-out agreement, in terms of a situation that takes place in the present. In this respect, the temporal function of the present tenses is mitigated, and therefore its function is profiled as a means for realizing epistemic evaluations.

Obviously, Venizelos opts for epistemological mismatch. The validity of his assertions is based not on facts, but rather on inference or even on some forms of discursive-based evidence, i.e. official/unofficial discussions with EU partners and 'troika' or even special reports on the issue of the Greek debt. Moreover, the access to all this information is not open to everyone. Due to his institutional role, Venizelos knows more than his audience does. This knowledge asymmetry, though, is implicitly claimed. Venizelos relies on the authority and credibility of his position in order to present his proposal in the maximum degree of objectivity.

Also, it must be noted that the 'factual' and 'objective' character of his utterances is enriched by the explicit reference to numerical data. This argumentation strategy is called 'number game', and it falls within a broader category of rhetorical strategies, that of 'factivity' (van Dijk 2008: 209). The relevance of the 'number game' to Factual ES is quite obvious, since numeric reference supports the 'objective' character of this particular type of ES. Apart from 'objectivity', numerical data convey credibility and precision in political discourse. Political actors tend to employ these strategies when they want to show that they obtain in-depth knowledge on an issue. Here, the exceptionally detailed reference to the amount of bail-out installments is not needed but is considered relevant for two main reason: First, the Greek crisis is understood by the political actors under study as a primarily technocratic problem. In this respect, the detailed reference to numbers guarantees the credibility of the governmental proposal. Second, it seems that it is expected that Venizelos should have such knowledge, given his institutional role. A Minister of Finance must "know the numbers" and be very precise concerning the financial cost of the proposal he is making. Apparently, this expectation is essentially a cultural expectation, and has been inscribed by the way Venizelos interprets his role within the specific context.

4.4.4. Past Narratives

Factual ES is also used when referring to past events. This is a plausible choice. Past events have been or can be verified; they are facts. Especially in political discourse, speakers refer to past events, mostly already known, and subsequently they adopt a Factual ES because it is the most relevant ES type among the others. Undoubtedly, a politician can lie, making up an event and placing it in the past. In this case, the made-up event represents a situation to which no one can have access or can verify, so the recipients have to consider whether they trust the speaker and the truth of his sayings.

Factual ES is quite frequent when politicians have to narrate a series of past events. In the data under study, those narratives appear in discourse when the speaker wants to make a clear-cut distinction between what happened in the past and what will happen in the present/future. Under this distinction, the past is typically represented in negative terms and is linked with the present by a "cause and effect relation". Another feature of past representation is that it is either depicted as inclusive, i.e. the speaker and all recipients are engaged in it, or as exclusive, i.e. some of the recipients, particular political opponents, are engaged in it.

Some insights from the field of narrative analysis can be helpful resources for the needs of the present analysis. In the classic definition by Labov (1972), narratives are recapitulations of past event, experienced by the teller and being unknown to the recipients. Therefore, narratives were tightly associated with the communication of personal experiences (Fludernik 1996: 20) mainly in informal and daily settings. It has been mentioned above that there is a high degree of validity in the Personal Experience domain of evidence, so it makes no surprise that storytelling functions as efficient argumentative devices. Narratives construct a "testimony" that can be used as evidence allowing tellers to back up their positions and achieve a wider support even for controversial claims (Schiffrin 1990; Carranza 1998; De Fina 2000). Especially in political settings, politicians see in narratives a discursive mechanism of empathy creation (Briggs 1996; De Fina & Georgakopoulou 2012: 136).

Nevertheless, this so-called "canon" of narrativity does not fit other types of storytelling (De Fina & Georgakopoulou 2012: 108), so a different approach is required. For instance, Ochs & Capps (2001: 57) suggest that a narrative also

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accounts for purely rhetorical purposes – not just for communicating personal experience - and that the sequence of the narrated events is organized in a way that construct a particular perspective, specifically designated for a particular audience who in turn co-shapes the narrative's meaning. This is quite obvious in the excerpts below in which the political actors do not convey personal experiences but already known facts that constitute part of the historical knowledge about the Greek crisis. So, it becomes vital to see how those stories function within the specific communicative situations in which they occur.

Since the conventional approach to storytelling excludes a lot of stories that occur across genres, the umbrella term "small stories" has been developed (Bamberg 2004, 2006; Georgakopoulou 2005a, 2005b and 2007; Bamberg and Georgakopoulou 2008). Small stories are shorter compared to conventional narratives, and feature narrative activities[27], e.g. "tellings of ongoing events, future or hypothetical events, shared (known) events, but also allusions to (previous) tellings, deferrals of tellings and refusals to tell" (De Fina & Georgakopoulou 2012: 116).

Thus far we have examined passages that also fall into the category of small stories, such personal experiences in 4.1.2. or projections in 4.2.3.3.. However, what differentiates the passages below is that they refer to already known historical knowledge, i.e. they are shared stories (Georgakopoulou 2005a). As a matter of fact the political actors re-tell an explanatory story about the causes of the crisis with which the recipients are familiar. It is plausible to claim that the narrative expression of shared, Common Ground knowledge establishes particular perspectives on the crisis, but what is more, it functions as a "familiar tale" (Norrick 2000) and as such it has a significant character among the members of the community within which it is shared. Such stories resemble accounts, a notion initially used in sociolinguistics (Scott & Lyman 1986), which refers to explanatory stories designated to provide an answer to a "why" or "how" questions, and they are primarily recipient-oriented since they are told as a response to a question (Riesmann 1997). Typically, the stories analyzed below were produced in a setting of a relative low degree of interaction, so they were not created after a specific question had been posed. Nevertheless, as will

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[27] In a typology of small stories, Georgakopoulou (2007: 208), identifies 3 different types of small stories: breaking news; projections; and shared stories.

be shown in detail in Chapter 5 much of process of the discursive realization of the various ES types is largely controlled by the legitimizing aims set by each political actor. Shared stories about the causes of the crisis function as justificatory means of the austerity policies proposed, providing an answer to why those policies must be implemented. In this respect, shared stories create a sense of "common experience" which has specific epistemic implications, since it allows the political actors to create a space of agreement with their audience.

4.4.4.1. Narratives of "distant" past

(3) Ναι, φταίξαμε όλοι, άλλοι λιγότερο, άλλοι περισσότερο, όλοι όσοι κυβέρνησαν την Ελλάδα, που ήταν άτολμοι, που δεν έκαναν έγκαιρα τις αλλαγές που έπρεπε, για να μην φτάσει η χώρα εδώ όπου έφτασε, που ανέχθηκαν παρανομίες, ή εξέθρεψαν μια Πολιτεία, που δεν λειτούργησε με όραμα και σχέδιο, αλλά με τη λογική των δώρων, των κάθε είδους δώρων.

Μάθαμε στην αντίληψη, του παίρνουμε χωρίς να δίνουμε. Και κάθε φορά, δίναμε κι από ένα δώρο σε συνδικαλιστές, σε επαγγελματική ομάδα, σε κάποια κατηγορία εργαζομένων, σε αλλότρια συμφέροντα, σε Μέσα Ενημέρωσης, για να τα έχουμε καλά μαζί τους, σε επιχειρηματίες. Δίναμε συνέχεια μικρά και μεγάλα δώρα, χωρίς μάλιστα να έχουμε και τα λεφτά για να το κάνουμε. Άλλοτε νόμιμα, άλλοτε παράνομα. Με το Βατοπέδι, με τα ομόλογα, με τις μίζες κάθε είδους.

Yes, we were all at fault, more or less, all of those who governed Greece; all those who were lacking in boldness; those who did not make the changes that should have been made in timeso that the country would not have reached the point it did; all those who tolerated illegalities or they fed a State that did not function with vision and plan, but with the rationale of gifts- any kind of gifts. We became accustomed with the rationale of getting without giving. Every time we offered a gift to trade unionists; to occupational groups; to some class of workers; to ulterior interests; to Mass Media in order to get along with them; to entrepreneurs. We were always giving small and big gifts, without having the money to do so. [We were giving gifts] sometimes legally and sometimes illegally. In the Vatopedi case; in Social Funds' bonds; in any kind of bribes[28].

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[28] Vatopedi case and Social Funds' bonds are two prominent scandals that took place during the 5-year stint (2005-2009) of ND party. The former is concerned with a real estate scandal in which the convent of Vatopedi and members of the cabinet along with ND's officials were engaged, while the latter refers to an initiative taken by some boards of Social Funds to invest an amount of their deposit in toxic collateral bonds with high risk returns, and eventually become evaporated. As was revealed, the

Papandreou makes a series of assertions ('we were all at fault'; 'We became accustomed to the rationale of getting without giving'; 'We were always giving small and big gifts, without having the money to do so' etc.) that are based on various verified instances of mismanagement in public administration, and he summarizes a historical period of thirty five years, namely the period after the fall of the military regime in 1974 up until the time he was speaking in 2010. He makes a division between the negative past and the present/future. Despite there being no explicit reference to what Greece should/must do now, it is far from implied that what should be done in public administration must be totally the opposite of what had been done so far.

His narration gains in credibility because Papandreou speaks as the Prime Minister, so he is supposedly a reliable source due to his role, as well as because he adopts Factual ES his narration, which is manifested in the lack of modal markers as well as in the absence of any source of information he coveys. The lack of source tagging can be dually justified: On the one hand, the context model of Papandreou invests in the institutional role of Papandreou with authority, so he interprets the power derived from his role in a way that allows him to establish his beliefs on the basis of that authority. On the other hand, Papandreou aims at presenting his narration, in which he interprets the causes of the current state of the Greek economy, not as a mere personal opinion but as a fact, as something that should be processed as 'true'. Once information is (or is being represented) as commonly shared and undisputed, there is no need to mention the source of that information since it adds very little to its credibility –they all know it and, hence, it is unlikely to be challenged.

Typically, when Factual ES is adopted, the speaker remains offstage. In the passage above though, Papandreou engages himself since he extensively uses 'we' verb types ('we became accustomed; 'we offered'; we were giving' etc.), indexing an intersubjective stance towards the assertions.

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initiative was under the government's watch, and what is more, it was taken after the government's advice.

The use of 'we'- verb types explicitly realizes the 'taken-for-grantedness' of what is said. In addition, it is assumed that that *all* recipients not only knew, hence the beliefs conveyed are supposedly part of audience's general knowledge, but they also tolerated and reproduced the corruption. Representing society as a unified whole with shared beliefs on the State's malfunctions, Papandreou aims at equally sharing with literally everyone the political responsibilities of the country's emergency situation, regardless of the fact that there is asymmetry in power relations/access and clashes of different and contradicting views on how public administration should be executed within a 'Western' civic democracy.

Another interesting aspect is the switch between first plural and third plural person. The Prime Minister begins with first plural ('we were all at fault') and then switches to third person ('all those who governed'; 'all those who were lacking in daring') down to the half of the passage, when he switches again to first plural person. Contrary to what was observed in (2), here the contradiction between the two parts is less obvious because the 'in-group' ('we') is also negatively presented. As a matter of fact, the broader historical context blurs the division. Papandreou attacks mainly the previous government ('all those who governed'; 'all those who were lacking in boldness'), even though a) it was his party, founded by his father, that had mostly been in office in the period referred, and b) he himself had been a prominent member of many previous governments.

However, the distinction has strategic scopes. Papandreou may admit the mistakes of the 'in-groups' ('we were all at fault'), but he implicitly differentiates his government from the previous ones on the basis of the negatively evaluated properties that he attributed to them. Therefore, recipients are guided to assume that the newly elected PASOK government does not lack in boldness or hesitate to make the appropriate changes in the appropriate time. Accordingly, the dichotomy between Us and Them is reformulated. Within the 'out-groups' previous PASOK governments are also included. In relation to this, Papandreou particularly seeks to emphasize the difference between past and present. The past was a period of corruption in which counter-productive views dominated in public administration, whereas the present is a period in which courageous and fair policies must be implemented. Hence, his party can cope with the demands of these historical and critical times. Last but not least,

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Papandreou wants to present his government's decision to ask for a bail-out program as an example of daring and suitable policy-making action, relevant to the historical context.

4.4.4.2. Narratives of recent past

Commenting on the dichotomy between past and present, it should be noted that with few exceptions, such as the Olympic Games in 2004 or the EU membership in 1979, the pre-2009 period is generally negatively portrayed in the narratives manifested in the data of the present study. However, as the texts of the corpus cover a time span of two years, it appears that reference to immediate past, i.e. to a period after 2010, is always presented positively. Accordingly, a division is made between distant past, which includes a broad period of 25 years, in which the Greek state followed a model that could no longer be sustainable, and the immediate or very recent past, in which all the policies requested by the 'troika' are implemented.

This is precisely the case in (4) and (5) below:

(4)   Τα τελευταία πέντε χρόνια, όμως, η οικονομία βρίσκεται σε ύφεση. Αυτό οφείλεται κυρίως στο γεγονός ότι αναπτυσσόταν στηριζόμενη σε συνεχώς αυξανόμενο δανεισμό. Όταν τα δανεικά τελείωσαν, το κράτος δεν μπορούσε πια να χρηματοδοτεί δαπάνες, η κατανάλωση υποχώρησε, και η οικονομική δραστηριότητα συρρικνώθηκε. Το μοντέλο ανάπτυξης που είχαμε μέχρι το 2009 δεν είχε μέλλον. Ήταν καταδικασμένο να τερματιστεί. Αυτό συνέβη όταν τα ελλείμματα διαμορφώθηκαν σε υπερβολικά υψηλά επίπεδα, κληροδοτώντας μας ένα τεράστιο χρέος.

In the last five years, though, the economy is in recession. This is due to the fact that it had developed by being supported from constant and increasing lending. When lending was over, the State could no longer finance its spending, the consumption abated, and the economic activity shrunk. The development model we had till 2009 had no future. It was doomed to end. This happened when deficits formed in excessively high levels, leaving us a huge debt.
[Papademos, Address, 11/2/2012]

(5)   Τα τελευταία δύο χρόνια μειώσαμε το πρωτογενές δημόσιο έλλειμμα από 24 δισ. ευρώ σε 5 δισ., μείωση που αντιστοιχεί σε 8 εκατοστιαίες μονάδες του ΑΕΠ. Ανακτήσαμε περίπου το 1/3 της ανταγωνιστικότητας που χάθηκε κατά τα προηγούμενα δέκα έτη. Οι προσπάθειες και οι θυσίες του ελληνικού λαού αποδίδουν και δικαιούνται το σεβασμό όλων.

In the last two years we reduced the primary fiscal deficit from 24bn. Euros to 5bn. Euros, a reduction equal to 8% of the GDP. We regained almost 1/3 of competitiveness that was lost within the last 10 years. The efforts and the sacrifices of the Greek people are bearing fruit and deserve everyone's respect.

[Papademos, Address,11/2/2012]

The contrast between how Papademos narrates the pre- and post- 2009 period is more than apparent. There is also another striking difference in the two passages. Whereas the Prime Minister provides concrete evidence making explicit reference to specific data, e.g. the amount and the reduction's percentage of deficit; the competitiveness rate, in order to support his conclusion at the end the passage (4) ('The efforts… everyone's respect'), in (3) he avoids any objective evidence when he refers to the period before 2009. He simply makes a linear narration using a series of assertions throughout the excerpt. Papademos's decision not to supply any evidence at that point of his speech is influenced by his context model. Hence, he considered any evidence irrelevant because he referred to facts. Despite its simplicity, no one can question whether Papademos says the truth or not. More crucially, Papademos's goal to present his interpretation of the causes of the Greek crisis as 'taken-for-granted' and as certain as a 'world truth' is, controls his choice to adopt Factual ES, because this type of EP is the most relevant to the accomplishment of his goal. Last but not least, Papademos speaks as the Prime Minster and as an expert in economics. Those properties are stored in his context model and he interprets them in relation to the communicative situation. Aiming at boosting his authority status and strengthening the epistemic status of his voice, the adoption of Factual ES is the most relevant choice among the available at his disposal.

4.4.5. Nouns and noun phrases realizing Factual ES

Among the linguistic resources realizing Factual ES, stance nouns, such as 'reality' or 'fact', should be mentioned as well as predicates such as 'the truth is' expressing factive meaning. In a study of stance nouns, Montserrat (2015) has observed that:1) They bear a truth attested value. As suggested by their literal meaning, those nouns make a direct reference to 'reality' or to a fact' and what is implied is that the speaker conveys something that is 'real' and can be directly (perception) or indirectly (known

through an inference or hearsay) witnessed. 2) They express speakers' strong epistemic commitment to the content of the utterance. 3) They intensify the illocutionary force of the speech act per se; and 4) they have particular implications in discourse organization, creating a boundary between what is conceived by the speaker as 'the real world', on the one hand, and speaker's personal opinions and evaluations, o the other. What is interesting in the last point is that the boundary set by the speaker doesn't manifest anything apart from his evaluation of the content. What he represents as reality is what is assumed to be processed as such, and in cases of more controversial positions, what he tries to represent as 'real' so that no strong supportive evidence should be required.

4.4.5.1. Reality

In the passage below the speaker uses the noun 'reality', expressing truth validity regarding the content of his assertion.

(6)   Ας έχει ο κάθε πολίτης εικόνα, για το τι θα πει 36 δις ευρώ έλλειμμα. Το ποσό, δηλαδή, που μας έβαλε μέσα η Νέα Δημοκρατία σε ένα μόλις χρόνο. Μιλάμε για τα τριπλάσια χρήματα από αυτά που δίνουμε κάθε χρόνο για όλο μας το Εθνικό Σύστημα Υγείας. Μιάμιση φορά, το ποσό που πληρώνει το κράτος σε συντάξεις. Αυτή ήταν η υπεύθυνη διακυβέρνηση της Νέας Δημοκρατίας. Μια πραγματικότητα σκληρή, αδιαμφισβήτητη. Εκεί μας φτάσατε.

May every citizen have a view of what a deficit of 36 bn Euros means, the amount that ND had charged us just within a year. We are talking about money three times as high as the annual budget of the whole National Health System. One and a half times as high as the amount paid by the State for pensions. That was the responsible governance of ND. A cruel and undisputed reality. That is the point you made us reach.

[Papandreou, Parliamentary Speech, 276/2011]

It is it quite interesting that the political actor associates reality in the phrase 'a cruel, undisputed reality', appeared at the end of the passage, with objective numbers, since he has already deployed 'number game' strategy since the beginning of the excerpt. The speaker contrasts what he assumes as 'reality' to an evaluative statement regarding the administration of the previous government ('That was the responsible government of ND'). Obviously, the statement about the previous government is ironic. Within the classical rhetorical studies, ironic statements express the opposite

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meaning of that which is being discursively realized. However, the dynamic approach within the Relevance Theory seems to suit the passage above better. Given the dialogical nature of politics as well as the importance of discursive-based evidence in political context, Papandreou does not simply mean the opposite of what he says. He echoes the voice of ND members, and through irony he epistemically distances himself from the validity of that assertion. The speaker addresses an audience that is supposedly aware of what is the official position about how they evaluate their own period of governance. To this discourse, then, Papandreou contrasts his own which is represented as a 'fact'.

4.4.5.2. .It is fact

In the coming excerpt the verb phrase '*είναι γεγονός ότι*' (It is a fact that') is used by the speaker.

(7)   Είναι γεγονός ότι το υπό εξέταση σχέδιο νόμου φέρνει πρόσθετα
        επώδυνα μέτρα, τα οποία λειτουργούν σωρευτικά στις μεγάλες θυσίες
        και βάρη που επιβάρυναν τον ελληνικό λαό τα τελευταία χρόνια. Ας μου
        επιτραπεί, όμως, να επισημάνω ότι λειτουργεί, κατά το δυνατόν, και
        εξισορροπητικά, κατανέμοντας τα βάρη σε όσους δεν επωμίστηκαν ό,τι
        τους αναλογεί.

        It is a fact that the bill under examination brings additional painful
        measures, which function cumulatively with the big sacrifices and
        burdens that have burdened the Greek people in the last years.
        Let me mention, though, that it is as equilibrating as possible, allocating
        burdens to those who did not bear their share.

                            [Stournaras, Parliamentary Speech, 7/11/2012]

Adopting Factual ES when it comes to acknowledgment of the negative implications ('It is a fact that… in the last years') of the bill, Stournaras forms a space of agreement with the recipients. He accepts the criticism and he also admits the hard nature of the measures required. However, this seems to be a necessary discursive move, as shortly after he differentiates the specific bill he proposes from the previous ones. This move is indexed by the use of the disclaimer 'though'. It appears that passing from already known or even presupposed information to new information becomes facilitated by such organizational moves: an expression that lexicalizes the 'commonsensical' status of the information is placed at the beginning of the utterance, forming the discursive background, and then follows the new information which is foregrounded. In this

respect, Stournaras's choice of Factual ES is not based on epistemic criteria. Rather, he exploits the discursive functions and the rhetorical benefits provided by this type of ES.

4.4.5.3. The truth is

In the following excerpt the speaker uses the verb phrase *'η αλήθεια είναι ότι'* *('the truth is that')* which also expresses factive meaning.

(8)   Είναι αλήθεια ότι το μεσοπρόθεσμο πρόγραμμα αποτελεί υποχρέωση, που επιβάλλει το Πρόγραμμα Οικονομικής Στήριξης της χώρας, αλλά δεν πρόκειται μόνο για υποχρέωση, αποτελεί κυρίως αδήριτη αναγκαιότητα.
The truth is that the program of financial support necessitates the Midterm Fiscal Plan. However, this is not just an obligation -it is an absolute necessity.

[Stournaras, Parliamentary Speech, 7/11/2012]

In the above Stournaras makes an assertion expressing truth factual validity through which he enhances the validity of the evidence on which it is based as well as boosting his illocutionary point (González 2015: 171). Through the use of the marker, the speaker makes a reference to his assumedly sincere view on the roots of the Greek crisis, showing at the same strong attitudinal positioning which can be shared by others as well (ibid.) The 'truth' to which the speaker refers is discursive based evidence, i.e. the text of the bill that accompanied the second bail-out program, and which regulates the implementation of the Midterm Fiscal Plan. What is interesting here is how epistemic and deontic meanings are interrelated, which has already been suggested from a cognitive perspective on the study of modal meanings (Talmy 1988). The speaker implies that the actions and the policies implemented by the government should not only correspond to epistemic right ('The truth is that') but also to legal right ('necessitates'). More crucially, as the discourse unfolds, the speaker makes a smooth transition from epistemic to purely deontic meaning, as he emphasizes what is legally right, i.e. the necessity for the Greek State to fulfill the legal obligation towards its creditors ('However… an absolute necessity'). In this respect, the speaker manages not to represent his own personal belief about the midterm fiscal plan as a plain 'fact', which is based on a valid discursive-evidence, namely the legal documents of the program, but rather to evoke a legal/deontic frame. Taking the above into account, it

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can be argued that such phrases "bridge objectivization (of facts) with subjectification (of personal stance) (González 2015: 171). Following Saed (1997: 127), this frame reflects speaker's belief systems about morality and legality, and, what is more, his stance towards authority and power. Therefore, it is not the validity of implied evidence that enhances the force of Stournaras' assertions, but the unequal power relations between the Greek State and its creditors, that should legally be maintained.

4.4.6. Allegories

In our data are also instances in which factual knowledge is tacitly activated through allegories. Allegories are often treated similarly to metaphors, as they both presuppose a vast amount of Common Ground Knowledge, but they are pragmatically processed in different way (Unger 2017). According to Unger, allegories are instances of ostensive communication, i.e. a mode of communication in which the communicator acts in a way that makes overt the intention to communicate something. Within the field of narrative studies, allegories are often associated with decontextualized personal stories that represent collective experiences (De Fina & Georgakopoulou 2012: 147), and hence they serve as powerful testimonies.

Allegorical narratives, which aren't many in our data, highlight the critical character of the then current historical moment. Most of them draw upon folklore and cultural knowledge, making straight correlations with widely known myths and story motives from the Greek (ancient and modern) literature. However, there is one allegory that is grounded on a specific historical event which has little to do with the Greek economic crisis as well as the Greek cultural context. In what follows, the political actor constructs an allegory for the Greek crisis and more particular of the political handling of the crisis, based on the event of the nuclear accident in Fukushima.

(9)   Κοιτάξτε, έχω πει πολλές φορές ότι εντάξει έχει ευθύνες το συνεργείο διάσωσης, δεν είχε πάρει τις στολές για το πυρηνικό ατύχημα, δεν ήξερε πώς να χειριστεί τη Φουκουσίμα, υπήρχε και τσουνάμι, νομίζαμε ότι είναι πλημμύρα και τελικά απεδείχθη ότι ήταν η καταστροφή του κόσμου. Αλλά αυτοί που είχαν την ευθύνη για την αμεριμνησία, την έλλειψη προνοητικότητας, τις λανθασμένες επιλογές, αυτοί δεν έχουν καμία ευθύνη, είναι ωραίοι έτσι;

        Look, I have repeatedly said that the rescue crew, of course, was to blame for: they hadn't NBC suits; they did know how to handle the

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situation in Fukushima; they though that water just flooded, but it was actually a tsunami, and it turn out that all this was a massive catastrophe. However, all those who had been responsible for this lackadaisical attitude; for this improvidence; for the wrong choices; all those shall not be blamed? They are the nice guys, aren't they?

[Venizelos, Mega TV Interview, 28/4/12]

The political actor is not speaking literally about the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, which took place in 2011. This is his reply to the whether or not PASOK should only be accused for their decision to ask for a bail-out. The speaker uses an allegory, and just as occurs in the cases of metaphor, he conceptualizes one domain in terms of another. Here, the problems of the Greek economy and the status of the State's finance are represented in terms of a nuclear accident, the PASOK government as the rescue crew, and the previous administration as the 'nice guys', i.e. those who were responsible before the rescue crew for making a plan in a case of emergency. Instead of explicitly expressing his belief that the previous government, that of ND, had contributed through their irresponsible administration in the field of national economy to the current's government decision to activate the ESM mechanism, he tacitly assumes that all of his recipients share such an amount of knowledge that allows them to make the correlations between one domain and the other. However, the case of allegories is not only related to the transfer of knowledge in strict semantic terms. The speaker activates a complex system of socially shared beliefs, norms and values along with specific historical and general knowledge, and he assumes that this system is also activated in the recipients' minds, and hence shared and presupposed. Therefore, through allegory the political actor constructs supposedly already known representations, but he also shapes these representations as it influences a community's perception of social situations (Schon 1979).

More specifically, Venizelos manipulates his audience into drawing upon the mental model they have built not only for the particular event in Fukushima, but also upon the mental model they have constructed about what a nuclear accident is and who and how they are involved in its confrontation. In other words, the political actor exploits the historical and general knowledge of his audience in order to exercise epistemic control over them. Through the allegory of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Venizelos

manages his personal opinions about the ND administration to be processed by the audience as taken-for-granted.

4.4.7. Using question for introducing Factual ES

4.4.7.1. Direct questions

Factual ES is implicitly introduced by questions. Within institutional and official settings, questions may index difference in social status and inequality of relations between the interlocutors. Depending on context, a question might manifest the addresser's ignorance on an issue, and, at the same time, imply that the addressee might have that knowledge. Conversely, an addresser may pose a question, even though he already knows the information he is seeking, because he wants to check whether the addressee also shares that information, or to evaluate the degree of the addressee's knowledge. Also, the entailment to pose questions, i.e. access to the specific speech act, is not guaranteed nor equally shared by all interlocutors in various settings. Those who are 'privileged' to ask are, subsequently, in an authoritative position as they can set and control the topic and speakers' turns during a discussion. In this respect, questions gain in symbolic power as they become linguistic means marking asymmetry in knowledge, power or social status.

As observed in the data of the study, political actors address questions to their audience, but they also provide the answer in many occasions given the low degree of interaction observed especially in political speeches. In addition, with the use of questions political actors manage to organize discourse; elaborate their positions; and achieve specific aims and goals which are related to the very nature of the communicative situation in which political actors are engaged. At the same time, they highlight the knowledge asymmetry between them and their audience. Questions are not used because political actors seek information. Rather, they are used as textual, and more importantly, contextual parameters to intervene in using questions. Questions allow politicians to explicitly express that they already know which might be the plausible questions that could be raised. In other words, they appear having deep knowledge on the recipients' beliefs as well as on their expectations.

The following passage depicts all the above:

(10)   Άλλωστε τι είναι πραγματικά το Μνημόνιο; Είναι η πολιτική συμφωνία
         που έχει κάνει η Ελλάδα με τους εταίρους και πιστωτές της, προκειμένου
         αυτοί να αναλάβουν το βάρος της δημοσιονομικής διάσωσης της χώρας.
         Και ποια είναι η βασική παραδοχή του Μνημονίου; Ότι θέλουμε ένα
         σύγχρονο κράτος που λειτουργεί υπέρ του πολίτη, ότι θέλουμε ένα άλλο
         μοντέλο ανάπτυξης, ότι θέλουμε υψηλότερη εθνική ανταγωνιστικότητα,
         ότι θέλουμε δικαιοσύνη, ότι θέλουμε να δώσουμε στον καθένα την
         ευκαιρία να ζήσει με ευρωπαϊκούς όρους πραγματικά πατώντας σε ένα
         στέρεο έδαφος και όχι σε μια «φούσκα» ή σε μια ψευδαίσθηση.

         Besides, what really is the Memorandum? It is the political agreement
         that Greece has made with its partners and creditors, in order for the
         latter to take on the heavy burden of the country's fiscal rescue. And
         what is the basic premise of the Memorandum? That we want a
         contemporary State which functions in favor of the citizen; that we want
         a different development model; that we want higher national
         competitiveness; that we want justice; that we want to offer to everyone
         the opportunity to live by European standards, stepping on solid ground
         and not on a bubble or an illusion.

                    [Venizelos, Vote of Confidence Speech, 6/11]

He poses two direct questions ('what really is the Memorandum?' and 'And which is the basic premise of the Memorandum?') and he provides the answer to both. In the first answer he defines the situation (see above for more details). Particularly, he provides a kind of definition of the Memorandum. Venizelos adopts Factual ES in order to establish his interpretation and definition of the Memorandum as objective, neutral and true. As the use of third person verb types indexes opaque responsibility towards the assertion being communicated, the speaker can tacitly share with the audience because the information conveyed is represented as it can be potentially accessible (Marin-Arrese 2013: 431). It goes without saying that what Venizelos defines as a memorandum is simply one definition – among many – which echoes, the beliefs of his party – and the beliefs of the international institutions engaged – on how the Greek economy can recover as well as on the appropriate political initiatives within the given political context. In this respect, in the Minister's definition of the Memorandum the amount of money provided by the agreement is indirectly highlighted, whilst he neglects not only the power asymmetry between the parts involved, i.e. the Greek state and the 'troika', but also the class character of the policies entailed by the bail-out program. As shown elsewhere (1.6.), the IMF's three-year bail out programs are planned on a particular ideological and political basis, that of neoliberalism.

The second question is answered by a series of 'that'-clauses. The non modal present tense verb types ('we want') are typical of Factual ES. In Venizelos's words, the core of the program is the extensive reform of the Greek economy and administration. It is quite interesting how he shifts to first plural person, representing the premises of the program as a common demand, and thus, as generally known or shared. Using 'that-clauses', by which their content becomes presupposed, Venizelos generates a set of political implicatures. Focusing on the merits of the program, the Minister implies that all those merits are not fulfilled yet and are about to be achieved. Hence, Greece is represented as a State with serious flaws, which permeated the political and social domain for decades, which prevailed political and social domain for decades. Forming a polar scheme, past vs. present/future (see also above), the past is represented in negative terms, directly opposed to the positive terms of the future that is guaranteed by the bail-out. From Venizelos point of view, the implied and taken for granted negative representation of the past is seen as part of general knowledge regarding the political and economic situation in Greece during the last decades.

Even in interviews, though, where the interviewer and the interviewee interact with each other and jointly construct the discursive meaning, questions, when they come from the IEE, have organizational function within the process of meaning construction. Let's consider (11) below, which is part of a Papakonstantinou's long turn during a TV interview given in April 2010. At the time, the Greek government still had access to international markets and was in negotiations with the 'troika' for the conditions of a *possible* future bail-out program:

(11)   Εγώ κάνω το εξής πολύ απλό ερώτημα. Σήμερα, τα αντικειμενικά στοιχεία είναι χειρότερα απ' ό,τι ήταν πριν από τρεις μήνες; Η απάντηση είναι ότι σήμερα έχουμε έναν προϋπολογισμό, ο οποίος εκτελείται καλύτερα απ' ό,τι προβλεπόταν. Σήμερα έχει φανεί -και όλοι το παραδέχονται– υπάρχει μια Κυβέρνηση, που είναι έτοιμη να κάνει μεγάλες αλλαγές.

I pose this simple question: Today, are the objective data worse than they were one year ago? The answer is that today we have a budget plan that is executed better than it was forecasted. Today, it has been revealed, and everyone admits it, that there is a Government that is ready to make big changes.

[Papakonstantinou Alter TV Interview, 21/4/2010]

Papakonstantinou rejects any objections about delays in implementing policies that would have reduced the spread figures and interest rates. Then, he poses his question ('Today, are the objective data worse than they were one year ago?'). He replies to his answer adopting Factual ES ('that is executed better than it was forecasted'; 'that there is a Government that is ready to make big changes') in order to depict the current situation in the Greek economy and, implies, that markets will sooner or later recognize the government's efforts. Papakonstantinou's beliefs are based on certain facts and figures, what the Minister calls 'objective data', which are just implied though. Moreover, he presents his beliefs as shared by others in the parenthetical clause 'and everyone admits it', using at this point of the passage an implied discursive-based evidence which he assumes as already known by the IER and the audience. The source of that evidence is not specified, a move which would have made the Minister's claim more concrete. Given the context at the time, one can infer that by 'everyone' Papakonstantinou implies the foreign partners and institutions, i.e. the European partners, the IMF, the foreign Press, the rates agencies etc. The lack of specific source tagging may weaken the Minister's claim, but on the other hand, it does not seem to have so much importance at that point of his turn. Papakonstantinou adopts Factual ES because he interprets the communicative situation in a way according to which an explicit reference to an external source would add nothing to the credibility of his utterance, whereas he sees it more relevant in that situation to present himself as credible source exploiting the status and authority of his institutional role, which allows him to have deep knowledge on the issue.

4.4.7.2. Rhetorical questions

Apart from being explicitly realized, Factual ES is implied in many instances. Rhetorical questions are the main formulation by which a speaker implies that information conveyed is a 'fact'. Rhetorical questions are a special type of question, as they do not function as a means of seeking information. When addressed, the speaker presupposes the answer and he also assumes that recipients know the answer too. Hence, the communicative function of the rhetorical question is to check and confirm that information is shared, known, and what is more, undisputed and taken for granted.

Rhetorical questions, in particular, have rhetorical and symbolical implications. First, they topically organize discourse and offer a sense of disguised vividness and dialogicality. Second, they construct relationships between producer and recipient. Typically, they construct coalitional relationships, as the producer assumes that the recipients have the same amount of knowledge, so he implies the answer. This may not be true, but the use of rhetorical questions coverts knowledge asymmetry in some extent. Nevertheless, this type of question can also be used as a manipulative strategy. In his attempt to jointly construct meaning with recipients, the producer may deliberately guide them to process beliefs, opinions etc. as taken-for-granted. Occasionally, rhetorical questions mark controversial relationships. The producer presents as common knowledge the information implied by a rhetorical question and uses it in order to criticize or attack recipients.

The passage that follows includes a series of rhetorical questions.

(12)   Ακούω πολύ συχνά το επιχείρημα ότι «αφού ξέρετε ότι η δύναμή μας είναι η αδυναμία μας, χτυπήστε το χέρι στο τραπέζι, ασκήστε τον εκβιασμό της μη συμμόρφωσης, ούτως ή άλλως η πέμπτη δόση θα καταβληθεί». Μα και η έκτη δόση θα καταβληθεί; Και η έβδομη δόση θα καταβληθεί; Και οι δανειακές ανάγκες των επομένων πολλών ετών θα καλυφθούν χωρίς να έχουμε πρωτογενή πλεονάσματα;

Very frequently I hear the argument that 'since you know that our strength is our weakness, put your foot down; blackmail with no compliance. Besides, the fifth installment is going to be paid'. The sixth installment, though, will it be paid too? And the seventh installment, will it be paid? And the country's long-term lending needs will be covered without having a primary surplus?

[Venizelos, Parliament 27/6/2011]

Before posing his questions, Venizelos strategically adopts a constructed Pseudo-discursive ES ('since you know that our strength… is going to be paid.'). What he presents as an argument, uttered by an unnamed source and realized by a direct quotation is a concise version of the major criticism against the negotiation strategy adopted by the Government. Since this criticism was, at the time, more or less claimed by all opposition parties, the speaker attributes it to a collective, unnamed subject.

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In order to respond, the political actor poses three consecutive rhetorical questions ('The sixth installment, though, will it be paid too? And the seventh installment will it be paid? And country's long-term lending needs will they be covered without having primary surplus?'). The fact that all of them are about the installments of the bail-out program and Greece's financial needs, is quite revealing about governmental rhetoric on the Greek debt crisis. Apart from this, no matter the party being in office, in many passages it has been clear that officials limit the discussion of the crisis to numbers, i.e. loans needed, fiscal aims to be achieved, cuts that are unavoidable etc.

The answer to each question is the same and is implied. Of course, the answer is 'no'. Being implied, it means that the answers are taken-for-granted, and hence, are understood by the audience as 'facts'. By tacitly claiming that installments will not be paid, the Minister of Finance implies that a) the State won't have the money needed to pay its creditors as well as wages and pensions; b) the State will have bankrupted given (a); c) the Government will have failed its European partners, as the agreement made between the two parts will not have been followed; d) any different negotiation strategy will have disastrous effects. Accordingly, Venizelos advocates the governmental handlings having been made so far, and, what is more, implies that no other tactic could have been followed.

4.4.8. Concluding remarks

In the last section, 4.4., we examined the factual ES or the explicit expression of truth-factual validity. Again, our approach was broader compared to one proposed by other researchers (Mushin, Marín-Arrese) in terms of the set of linguistic resources that discursively realize this type of ES. It was shown that not only should personal and impersonal verb and noun phrases be taken into account, but also speech acts, such as questions and rhetorical questions as well as more complex discursive structures, such as narratives and allegories. This type of ES was broadly used by the political actors because it crucially contributed to representing their beliefs as "facts". Therefore, as they constructed the context model of the current communicative situation they selectively omitted the actual domain of evidence represented in their old mental model, and from which their knowledge originated. Undoubtedly, the political actors considered this type of ES quite relevant to the communicative situation in which they

were engaged. Through the construction of "facts", they claimed epistemic supremacy over the knowledge being conveyed and they, therefore, enhanced their credibility and established asymmetrical knowledge relationships with their recipients.

5. Epistemic Stance Strategies in Greek Political discourse: A Microanalysis

5.1. General

In the previous chapter we saw which types of epistemic positioning were adopted by the Greek political actors in their discourses on the sovereign debt crisis, as well as how those types were linguistically realized. It appeared that a variety of linguistic means were used by the speakers and in a multifunctional manner, in the sense that they were exploited in order to realize different types of EP. What is more, speakers' context models controlled both the adoption of the ES type as well as its discursive realization. Political actors opted for this or that ES type, and subsequently for this or that linguistic means in order to express it depending on the specific nature of the communicative situation: the occasion in which they talk; to whom they talk; with what aim etc.. In this respect, political actors interpret the contextual parameters and then they strategically make their choices on grammatical, syntactic, lexical and discursive level.

In the present chapter we will focus on the ideological and political implication of the strategic use of the ES types. In particular, special attention will be drawn on how various ES types contribute to the legitimization/delegitimization process of the assertions of the political actors under study. Moreover, it will be shown how the strategic realization of epistemic positioning aims at gaining epistemic control, which in turn leads to manipulative language use. The political actors position themselves in such a way towards the beliefs, knowledge and evidence they convey, that they manage to lead their audience to accept information in discourse both in terms of truthfulness and validity. Therefore, their viewpoint on the Greek financial crisis and austerity becomes legitimized.

Focusing on the epistemic aspects of legitimization process, two interrelated concepts gain in importance, (social) power and authority. Regarding the former, power is traditionally defined in terms of ability to enforce one's own or collective wills, actions, behaviors over others. From a critical perspective, though, this is not a mere ability, i.e. a skill, but rather the control over one's own or collective wills, actions, behaviors, which can lead to power abuse in cases of unequal power relationships

(van Dijk 2008. Power is evident *in* discourse, where the engaging actors are interacting in unequal power relationships as regards the identities they enact and the positions they occupy within discourse; and the control they exercise over the content of discourse (Fairclough 1989: 46). Also, power is evident *behind* discourse, where particular discourses are shaped as effects of power, so they include (extra)linguistic conventions that signal unequal power relations (Fairclough 1989: 58-59).

Regarding the latter, the notion of authority encompasses power and legitimacy, as it refers to the control (power) over and the right (legitimacy) to influence other peoples' actions. Besides, one of the fundamental aspects of every system of authority is that it tries to establish and reproduce the belief of its legitimacy (Weber 1977: 325). From a discursive perspective, relevant to authority is the issue of reliability. Reliability is defined by the identity and institutional position of the speaker, but it also and primarily has to do with whether or not the source of knowledge (this evidential value is in direct correspondence with authority), type of evidence and domain of evidence should be considered trustworthy by both speaker and hearers.

Here we are dealing with epistemic legitimization, which, in general, is closely related with knowledge, since it enables speaker to claim that has 'better' knowledge on an issues and that he/she is aware of the 'true' facts. In order an official action to be justified and gain hearers' acceptance, it requires a reliable and truthful type of evidence is needed to the speakers so that they can offer epistemic 'guarantees' for the truth of their assertions (Hart: 2011: 758). As was shown, the discursive marking of evidence, along with the speaker's position towards the validity of that evidence, is realized by epistemic positioning resources. Accordingly, when speaker's assertions are realized as being part of Common Ground Knowledge and, thus, have a high epistemic status - they become legitimized. Never the less, the above operates vice versa as well: Legitimization process is a pivotal aspect of the quite fuzzy discursive and cognitive procedure by which beliefs and opinions are transformed into knowledge, since speaker's discursively justifies assertions, actions, behaviours, practices etc. on a supposedly solid, commonly accepted and often remain implicit moral and/or epistemic basis defined by particular beliefs, norms, duties, rights, law, regulations.

In order to shed light on how knowledge is produced and shared in and through discourse, one has not to stick with the classic definition of knowledge, according to which knowledge is a justified true belief, but rather context should be taken into account. Hence, knowledge is a justified true belief for certain members of a given community, who bare particular identities when they think, talk and act as members of that community, and they also share the same criteria about which type, mode and source of evidence constitute 'the truth' and are reliable enough to offer a sound justification for a belief. When that process takes places within institutional contexts that control how engaging members baring particular roles and positions think and act, legitimization is typically accomplished by text and talk (van Dijk 1998: 255).

In what follows we will deal with the relations between legitimization and epistemicity and how they are manifested in discourse. Next, we will provide an overview of epistemic legitimization strategies being evident in various official settings. Before moving to the main part of the chapter, the analysis of legitimizing function of attributed and averred assertions in three speeches delivered by the three different Prime Ministers that served the office between 2010-2012, we will present the methodological tools adopted for the aims and scopes of the analysis.

5.2. The need for a microanalysis

As mentioned above, this chapter attempts to study in which way and to which extent various ES types contribute to the legitimization of the speakers' assertions. Bearing in mind that the legitimization of assertions is a necessary move in legitimizing actions, it is inevitable to indicate the particular and in-context correlations between strategic realization of the speakers' positioning towards their assertions, on the one hand, and specific strategies manifested that endorse and legitimize the desired representations by the speakers on the other hand.

For that reason, we spelled out epistemic positioning strategies in three different speeches delivered in Parliament by George Papandreou, Loukas Papademos and Antonis Samaras, three political actors that served as Prime Ministers between 2010 and 2012. The entire transcription of every speech is available in the Appendix. Before explaining why a detailed microanalysis was preferred, a trivial but useful distinction should be made, regarding the nature and the kind of goals and aims which

each one of the political actors under study tries to achieve in each communicative situation in which he is engaged.

One the one hand, political actors seek to legitimize their authority, mostly derived by their institutional positions and roles, discourse and actions with respect to political goals on a micro or local level. These goals may be related to the cohesion and unity of their own parliamentary group or to the power relationships between their group and the other groups represented in Parliament. Moreover, political actors aim at empowering their own position within the particular political and social context of the Greek economic crisis. Being in a position to a) negotiate with the 'troika' and the EU partners over austerity measures; b) call the rest of the MPs to vote in favor of those measures; and c) to properly execute the austerity policies amid generalized lack of social and civic tolerance, political actors face a great deal of overt and covert criticism not only from other parties and social groups, but from their own party as well, since 'antagonisms' are also manifested in relationships among the in-group members. Therefore, political actors exploit their privileged access to parliamentary discourse, a resource of high symbolical power, and they adopt particular strategies not only because they want to persuade the MPs and the audience about the 'rightness' of their positions and because they want to represent their beliefs as commonly accepted knowledge, but also because they may seek to strengthen their institutional position and secure their power over both their in-groups and out-groups. Apparently, this process has little to do with what is at stake at the time of the economic crisis, since it is mainly motivated by events and actions that do not influence the way politicians in power think and talk about the crisis. How the crisis unfolds and which initiatives are taken by each government have a certain impact on the power relationship among the members of the same political groups and parties as well as among different political group and parties[29].

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[29]The data analyzed in the present chapter includes speeches delivered in three parliamentary sessions about the bail-out programs and specific measures and reforms related to the efficient implementation of the three-year economic adjustment programs proposed by the 'troika'. In these sessions, not all of the majority of the MP's voted in favor of the austerity packages. Particularly, the first bail-out program was approved by 157 out of 160 PASOK MPs, and those who disagreed were expelled from the parliamentary group and became independent MPs. Contrary to her party's guidelines, Dora Bakoyianni, ND MP, voted in favor of the measures and was also expelled from the major opposition

One the other hand, aims and goals should be taken into account on a macro level. Political actors attempt to legitimize particular fiscal, labor and social policies which echo the core principles of austerity. In section 1.6. we saw the ideological and political background of the notorious three-year economic adjustment programs implemented by local governments around the world and supervised by the IMF, as well as the particular effect on the Greek economy. Therefore, epistemic legitimization strategies manifested in the discourse of prominent members of the Greek Government serve as a means through which a) political actors justify their assertions by making explicit or implicit reference to different domains of knowledge and types of evidence that are both evaluated for their reliability, and b) the fuzzy cognitive process of transforming mere opinions and beliefs into knowledge becomes facilitated on a discursive level, as political actors, while interpreting the contextual features of the communicative situation, either emphasize or marginalize various sources of knowledge in their discourses. Realized in discourse, epistemic legitimization strategies index how political actors take advantage of their privileged access to symbolic resources, such as different kinds and forms of discourses, as well as of the power by which their institutional position is vested in order to control and then manipulate the way their audiences think about the crisis. Political actors seek epistemic control over their audiences by claiming that they have 'better knowledge' of the 'facts' in their attempt to construe an 'objective' representation of 'reality' and subsequently justify their actions and the policies they propose as 'commonsensical' and inevitable. In this respect, political actors make their discourses dominant, which reflect the ideology and values of neoliberalism, while simultaneously challenging and denouncing any opinion and belief that resists neoliberal principles. It goes without saying that the present study is interested in how epistemic legitimization strategies contribute to the accomplishment of political actors' macro-level goals.

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party's parliamentary group. During the discussion of the second bail-out program, 45 MP's were expelled from the three parliamentary groups (PASOK, ND and LAOS) that supported the coalitional government, because they all voted against the program. In November 2012, after the Parliamentary approval of the midterm fiscal plan 2013-2016 and the labor market reform, both prerequisites for an installment of the second bail-out program, 7 MP's were expelled from the parliamentary groups of ND and PASOK as they disapproved with their voting of the bill.

In order to better examine how epistemic legitimization strategies operate in the Greek governmental discourse, we identified them in three different parliamentary speeches. Given that political actors seek to legitimize their austerity discourse on a macro level, it became apparent that the most 'vivid' instantiation of that process would be found in communicative situations in which austerity is the main topic, and not one among many – it may have even been the most important. Typically, in all speeches forming the body of the data (parliamentary speeches, interviews, addresses, official statements etc.) of the study, political actors discussed and thought about austerity. The Prime Ministers as well as the Ministers of Finance not only constructed and then legitimized the dominant knowledge on the crisis and austerity, but they also delegitimized the position of their opponents.

Nevertheless, not all of the discursive genres to which they had access shared the same symbolical status nor had the same impact. Genres vary in terms of symbolical power, which is largely dependent on the degree of access to them. The more limited the access to a genre is, the more it gains in terms of symbolical power. Elites, political, economic or other, control the access to those resources in order to fully establish their interests.

In this respect, parliamentary discourse is considered a privileged form of discourse because only few powerful figures, MPs, have access to it in order to participate in decision-making procedures concerning central issues of every Western state that affect social and economic life (Wilson 2001). Moreover, parliamentary discourse is intertwined with two of the three main pillars of any civic state, legislative and executive power; therefore, it should be seen as a realm in which power is exercised: "the power to make decisions, to control resources, to control other peoples' behavior and often to control their values" (Jones & Wareing 1999: 32). Exploiting the power derived from parliamentary discourse, political actors "express, negotiate, and justify their political positions and policies, as well as to evaluate, attack, and delegitimi[z]e those of the opponent" (Arcakis & Tsakona 2009: 362). Also, the features of parliamentary discourse are not stable and common, but they are rather largely dependent on the very properties of the institutional context in which this discourse is produced, distributed and comprehended. Participants' actions, relationships, identities and discourse per se are defined by particular institutional regulations and

parameters as well as "by the current political regime, by the political culture as it has historically developed over a long period, and as it currently exists, and by the social formation in which it functions" (van der Valk 2003).

In an attempt to classify Greek parliamentary discourse, Tsakona (2012: 99) followed the work of Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli and Steenberger (2004), and applied the five institutional parameters[30] that influence the form and function of the genre under discussion. "[T]he Greek political system is a competitive parliamentary one without a second chamber. This combination strengthens the competition between the government and the opposition [...] Moreover, the only veto player is the President of the Republic, who has, according to the Constitution, the power to object to any law passed by parliament, but has never done so, at least during the last four decades [...] Finally, the Greek parliament provides free access to its written proceedings (via the official website) and recently (since 2010) to selected videotaped material" (Tsakona 2012: 99).

Steiner et. al (2004), though, distinguish one more non-institutional parameter, the degree of polarization of the topic under discussion, which also influences parliamentary deliberation. In our case, each one of the three selected speeches refers to the most central political and social topics of the period under study, namely the two bail-out programs approved by the Parliament as well as the midterm fiscal plan 2013-2016.

Taking into account all of the above, the distinction to focus on these three speeches in order to investigate how political actors deployed epistemic legitimization strategies in their discourse was dictated by several reasons: 1) the occasion on which the speeches are delivered. Political actors have to discursively construct their knowledge on the Greek crisis and legitimize their position in a communicative situation extremely important given the broader political and historical context. 2) The particular discursive genre that is used. As mentioned above, parliamentary discourse is a critical resource of symbolic power, and a resource to which speakers have

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[30]Steiner et al. (2004) distinguish the following parameters: 1) Consensus versus competitive democracies; 2) Presence versus absence of veto points and veto players in the legislative process; 3) Presidential versus parliamentary systems; 4) Unicameralism versus bicameralism; 5) Public versus non-public arenas.

limited access. 3) The contextual parameters that define the discourse production and comprehension. The political actors were all Prime Ministers at the time they delivered their speeches, subsequently they bore quite a powerful institutional role, the most powerful according to the Greek Constitution, which influenced how they spoke in the particular communicative situations. Moreover, as Prime Ministers, all of them can plausibly make a claim of having better or superior knowledge on the issue being discussed, which also has a significant role in how they discursively legitimize their positions. Another critical contextual feature is concerned with the outcome of the parliamentary meetings, the voting session. In the discussions we focus, the MPs had to finally decide whether or not they approve of the governmental proposal, which could not have been turned into a State's law unless it was supported by the relevant majority of the body[31]. Political actors do not solely aim to persuade their audience, but they also bear in mind that this process should develop into a law, which provides a very strong form of legitimization. Therefore, political actors may exploit various epistemic legitimization strategies when they talk about the crisis, but only in few occasions does the outcome result in the highest symbolic form of legitimization, that of a law.

Trying to examine how epistemic legitimization strategies were discursively constructed, we had to find data that shared all of the above 3 features: a critical occasion in which the speech is delivered; parliamentary discourse; and more or less common contextual parameters. In the corpus of the study the most prominent material consisted of the three speeches analyzed below. The occasion in all of them was extremely critical because MPs had to decide whether or not the financial aid provided by Greece's creditors under strict terms was going to be approved. Apparently, all political actors used parliamentary discourse, whereas the contextual properties were common: the speeches were delivered by the Prime Ministers, in a parliamentary meeting that proceeded a voting session.

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[31]The number of the MPs needed for a bill to be passed may vary depending on the nature of the issue discussed and the Government's will each time. Typically, relevant or absolute, 150+1 majority is needed, but the Parliament's regulation in special cases allows the Government to ask for an augmented majority of the 2/3 of the body, i.e.180 votes. In the discussions from which the speeches were retrieved, the bills proposed would have been approved without the vote of the relevant majority of the body.

In particular, on 6/5/2010, George Papandreou addressed the Parliament during the discussion "Measures for the implementation of the provided by the member-states of the Eurozone and the IMF support mechanism of the Greek economy''[32] and called the body to approve the first bail-out program which included particular obligations in the section of fiscal, welfare and labor market. Similarly, Loukas Papademos on 12/2/2012 discussed the "Approval of the drafts of the agreement and the MoU for the reduction of the national debt and the rescue of the national economy" during the parliamentary meeting and called the body to vote for the second bail-out program. Antonis Samaras in his speech in the discussion of the "Approval of the midterm fiscal plan 2013-2016 – Urgent measures for the implementation of law 4046/2012" asked the body to support the proposed bill on labor market and fiscal reforms, which was a prerequisite for an installment of the agreed bail-out program.

Concluding remarks

In 5.2. we highlighted not only the context-sensitive character of legitimization process, but we also showed that the interplay between micro- and macro-the legitimization is important for our analysis of how political actors, namely the three Prime Ministers included among the political actors of the study, take advantage of their access to parliamentary discourse in order to achieve their context-defined aims and goals, as well as to gain epistemic control over their audiences. In particular, in all of the three speeches analyzed it was observed that the speakers, on the basis of their personal context models, made choices to strengthen their own evidential standing as sources of knowledge. The intervention of the context was quite evident because the three speakers had to discursively construct and deploy epistemic legitimization strategies that were simultaneously effective on two levels: First on a micro-level related with in- and intra-group aims and goals, such as to appear as decisive and responsible leaders who do not succumb to the criticism made their political opponents; and second, on a macro-level as all of three actors had to legitimize the assertions in order to convince the Parliament to pass austerity policies.

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[32]In each discussion the MPs had to comment on and then to vote for a proposed bill by the Government. Actually, what appears as the title of every discussion is the title of the bill as was submitted and published by the Parliamentary proceedings.

5.3. Analysis

5.3.1. Attributed utterances

Attributed utterances fall within the category of Discursive ES. In sum, Discursive ES is realized by linguistic choices marking that the knowledge conveyed by the speaker has been gained from third-party sources, i.e. is mediated. In section 4.3. it was pointed out that the term 'mediated' referring to knowledge acquired by reported evidence is much more accurate than a 'third-party source' because it emphasizes the discursive and interactional aspects of this type of evidence, and not on its mere semantic properties. Above it was pointed out that previous discourses produced by the speaker, and not only by a third source, can also be included in this category.

A crucial parameter in legitimization of attributed utterances is source tagging, the attribution of assertions to an assumedly objective source having authority (Hart 2010: 100), which is understood as a means for overcoming recipients epistemic safeguards as it provides the speaker with a 'guarantee' concerning the validity of the proposition. This kind of mediated evidentiality perfectly corresponds to van Leeuwen's legitimization strategy of authorization (2008: 105); van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999) – legitimization by reference to authority. In van Emeren et al (2002: 131) it is stated that this type of legitimization strategy is related to ad verecundiam fallacy, which allows the speaker to rely on the voice of an expert and, therefore, enhance the validity of an argument, presenting it as a fact. Nevertheless, in our data source tagging was also evident in cases in which political actors overtly distanced themselves from the assertions, so the source was specifically named in order to be delegitimized in terms of credibility.

Attributed utterances can be categorized depending on whether they are objectively or subjectively attributed. Objective attribution, a move that implies that the degree of validity (high, medium, low) of the evidence conveyed is solely based on the assumed evidential status of the voice producing the utterance. Among such voices, experts, persons having access to institutionalized power, impersonal institutions, and in general 'someone in whom institutionalized authority is vested' (van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999: 104) are typically found.

On the other hand subjective attribution indexes that the actor that mediates the utterances makes an assessment of their content. The speaker takes no responsibility regarding their content, but he evaluates their validity, using either proclaims or disclaims. With proclaims the speaker endorses other voices, whereas with disclaims he distances himself from them. What must be noted, though, is that in both cases the speaker closes down the dialogic space. By using disclaims, he directly suppresses alternative voices. By using proclaims, he achieves the same goal indirectly, since alternative voices are omitted and mitigated. As will been shown, though, a speaker may use proclaims and/or disclaims as his discourse unfolds even in cases in which (s)he has previously objectively mediated an utterance of a third source.

5.3.1.1. Objectively attributed utterances

In what follows, we will deal with objective attributions occurring in the speeches of George Papandreou, Loukas Papademos and Antonis Samaras and then we will proceed to subjective attributions. Mostly, objective attributions are made when a discourse of a third source is conveyed. However, they are also observed in instances in which the political actors represent previous self-discourses.

5.3.1.1.a. Objectively attributed other-utterances

Let's consider excerpts (1) and (2):

(1)   Ξέρετε τι μου έλεγαν για τις αλλαγές όλες αυτές τις μέρες, και ιδιαίτερα στην αρχή της θητείας μας, όταν πηγαίναμε στο εξωτερικό με ένα φιλόδοξο πρόγραμμα, και εταίροι, και πιστωτές; «Τα έχουμε ξανακούσει. Δεν σας πιστεύουμε, ως Ελλάδα. Ώσπου να βάλετε τάξη στη διαφθορά, θα έχετε χρεοκοπήσει. Αν βάλετε τάξη στη διαφθορά!»

Do you know what I was being told by partners and creditors during all these days, and especially in the beginning of our term, when we were abroad presenting an ambitious (fiscal) program? "We have already heard all this before. We don't believe you. By the time you tackle corruption, you will have been in default - if you ever manage to tackle corruption.

[Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

(2)   Βεβαίως, την ημέρα που εκδόθηκε η ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής για τα στοιχεία του 2009, έκλεισε στην ουσία και η δυνατότητα της χώρας μας

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να δανειστεί από τις αγορές και γι' αυτό, την επομένη, ζητήσαμε την ενεργοποίηση του μηχανισμού στήριξης.

Of course, the day on which the [European] Committee's announcement on the data of 2009 was issued, our country's capability to borrow from the markets was actually lost, and this is why, the very next day, we asked the activation of the ESM scheme.

[Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

Both passages were analyzed in Chapter 4. However here we are interested in how Papandreou's assertions are legitimized through the particular type of ES adopted by him. In (1) the source of the utterance is named, but not specified, i.e. personally referred, as is being attributed to two collective subjects, 'creditors' and 'partners' whose authoritative status is acknowledged by Papandreou. It can be argued that this kind of source tagging is a typical case of personal authority in van Leeuwen's terms, as "the authority is vested to people because of their role and status in a particular institution" (2008: 106). Taking into account the power relations within the EU and global economy, the subjects are not personalized, but still have high authoritative status. Hence, any belief, and in general any discourse, explicitly attributed to them becomes more valid. Also, recipients construct a mental model about the causes of the Greek crisis, which features creditors and the EU-partners as actors – and therefore sources of information – of high validity and authority. The audience is led to evaluate these discourses by the speaker as more powerful and credible compared to discourse coming from the major opposition party.

Since the negative representation of the Greek State's administration model is presented as an opinion of a third, reliable source, Papandreou avoids being accused of having narrow political interests, such as particularly blaming the previous government for their administration during their five-year term, and, hence, he does not appear less credible or responsible as a political actor. Apparently, Papandreou, as any politician that has to assess his predecessors, has no admiration for his opponents, however if he hadn't attributed this part of his speech to a third source, it would not have been an easy task to establish his opinions as well grounded, because a major part of the audience, supposedly the MPs of ND party, would have raised serious objections. Therefore, he overcomes the audience's epistemic constraints and becomes able to justify the necessity of the urgent approval of the proposed rescue program on

the basis of what a third, reliable and powerful source believes about the status of the Greek economy.

Also, he stresses the asymmetry in relation to the two parts of the negotiations, namely his government and the 'troika'. The asymmetry operates in two interconnected levels, one explicit and one implicit. The explicit one, on which Papadreou focuses, is the discursive level. The discourse of the Greek government is not considered credible ('we don't believe you') by the creditors and EU partners, therefore it is their discourse that becomes powerful, and their views and beliefs on the Greek economy that count. What is implied, though, is that the asymmetry in discourses subsequently indexes an asymmetry in power relations, which in turn also justifies the Greek government's decision to accept the bail-out.

The second passage is an indirect reference to an institutionalized discourse, i.e. the announcement on the exact amount of the Greek primary deficit for 2009 issued by the European Committee in April 2010. In Bednarek's classification (2006a: 644) these utterances are treated as PROOF rather than HEARSAY, but, in the present study they index communicative domain of evidence. Papandreou presupposes that his audience is already aware of the content of the announcement, so he makes no relevant reference to it. Indeed, the announcement as well as its findings, were widely discussed not only in Greece, but also internationally. Additionally, concerning the content of this announcement, the Prime Minister had justified the decision of the Government to ask for the activation of the ESM support mechanism scheme and to proceed to negotiations with the 'troika' for a bail-out program in his address on 23/4/2010. Papandreou's intention is clearly to exploit the status of the source of the announcement in order to provide a credible justification for his government's policies ('…this is why, the very next day, we asked for the activation of the ESM scheme') and to legitimize his assertions. The explicit reference to the European Committee corresponds to the category of 'impersonal authority' (van Leeuwen 2008: 108). Even though the speaker attributes the utterance objectively, he makes a specific evaluation ('Of course') at the beginning of the passage, which explicitly indexes how powerful and valid the discourse derived from the EC is interpreted by the speaker.

In the passage below, Papademos mediates objectively the discourse of a third source, but he leaves 'traces' in order for his audience to process it as one of low credibility.

(3)   Λένε ορισμένοι ότι το νέο πρόγραμμα θα αποτύχει. Κάνουν λάθος. Η δημόσια συζήτηση έχει επικεντρωθεί στις συνέπειες του πρώτου προγράμματος στα εισοδήματα και στην απασχόληση και προεξοφλεί ότι το νέο πρόγραμμα θα έχει παρόμοια αρνητικά αποτελέσματα και δεν θα επιτευχθεί η έξοδος από την κρίση.

Some say that the new (bail-out) program is going to fail. They are wrong. The public debate has been focused on the first program's impact on incomes and employment, and prejudges that the new program will have a similar negative outcome and an exit from the crisis will not be achieved.

[Papademos, 12/2/2012]

Papademos attributes the above utterance to a source of a low degree of validity, as he makes no specific reference to the name or the identity of that source ('Some say'). Still, he draws on the knowledge he assumes that his audience has and guides them to infer that by 'they', he primarily implies the parties of the opposition, but also other voices who mainly come from the academic field and had expressed their concerns about the second bail-out program. Subsequently, he attenuates the status of the third party's sayings, as he mitigates either the institutional role of the source in case of the opposition parties, or the authority of the source in the case of the expert voices. Moreover, and in order to fully de-legitimize their discourse, Papademos adds a disclaim ('They are wrong') which is expressed in the highest degree of certainty, as he adopts Factual ES type. Therefore, the Prime Minister first strategically downgrades the status of the source from which the criticism towards his government is derived, and then he exploits the strong epistemic nature of Factual ES in order to challenge that criticism, and construct himself as a source of high validity.

Similarly, the noun 'public debate' realizes Discursive ES type and indexes that the utterance is attributed to a third source, which again remains unspecified and, hence, its validity is attenuated. One should note that under the notion 'public discussion' Papademos includes a variety of genres appearing in public discourse. However, it seems that an asymmetry in terms of their symbolical status is tacitly acknowledged. Attempting to delegitimize discourses that challenge the governmental view, the Prime Minister strategically underrates their credibility not only by avoiding any specific attribution to a specific source, but also by implying that these discourses are less powerful compared to the discourses produced by himself and his government. In

other words, it seems that he implies that no matter what kind of concerns are expressed by the opposition parties and those who criticize the 'troika' dictated policies, their discourses lack credibility because their sources are not in a position to have full knowledge of the content of the policies and the anticipated outcomes as well as of the negotiations that had taken place and led to this particular bail-out program.

Likely, in the following excerpt Papademos also prefers to objectively attribute a third party's discourses and then to overtly distance himself with a disclaim:

(4)   Έτσι υπηρετείτε με τον καλύτερο τρόπο τα συμφέροντα των πολιτών ακόμη κι εκείνων που σήμερα σας ζητούν να μην ψηφίσετε. Γιατί ο άλλος δρόμος συνεπάγεται και για αυτούς απείρως μεγαλύτερες θυσίες.

In this way you best serve the interests of citizens, even of those asking you not to vote today. Because the other way entails immensely more sacrifices for them.

[Papademos, 12/2/2012]

Here the Prime Minister conveys a fictional discourse in indirect speech derived from a specified source, the Greek citizens ('those asking you not to vote'). Despite the well-known opposition of a large part of the Greek society to the measures of the new bail-out program[33], and the pressure put on the governmental MPs not to vote for it[34]

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[33]According to 'Political Barometer 97, December 2011', an opinion poll conducted by Public Issue opinion poll company conducted on behalf of 'Kathimerini' daily newspaper and 'SKAI' TV/radio broadcast station(s), 71% claimed that they are against the Memoranda ('Personally, today, would you say that you are in favor or against the memoranda?' was the exact question of the poll), and 81% claimed that they are disappointed by the Papademos led government (How satisfied do you feel with the way the coalitional PASOK-ND-LAOS government is handling the country's problems?' was the exact question). Apparently 'Political Barometer' was not the only poll conducted at the time on the same issues, however its result are quite representative of the outcome given by other, similar opinion surveys. The results are available in Greek at http://www.publicissue.gr/1944/varometro-dec-2011 (date of last access 6/1/2018).

[34]Recall the discussion in Appendix 1 in which it was mentioned that several MPs of the Government had openly been opposed to the measures entailed by the proposed bail-out program. As a result 46 MPs of PASOK and ND voted against the party line, and they were then expelled from the parliamentary groups (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/12/greece-austerity-cuts-euro-bailout, date of last access 6/1/2018), while the LAOS party resigned from the government opposing to

by voters, an utterance as the one indirectly represented in the discourse of Papademos was never produced. As a matter of fact, he is aware of the negative stance held by the majority of Greek society towards the measures. He may not have been accurate in a strict sense, however he is right concerning what he supposes the MPs have been told by their voters as well as from 'ordinary' citizens[35], and he uses Factual ES in order to represent it as an unquestionable 'truth'.

However, the Prime Minister does not represent a fictional discourse only for rhetorical reasons. He takes advantage of it in order to openly distance himself with the disclaimer that follows ('Because the other way entails immensely more sacrifices for them') in which he adopts Factual ES type. Also, he implies that he has more knowledge on the issue than his recipients, and, more importantly here, the opposing Greek citizens. Papademos provides no evidence to support this assertion, but he exploits his own authority and represents it as a fact in order to strengthen its epistemic status. Respectively, Papademos has constructed himself as a credible source of information and guides his recipients to consider him as one, as he attempts to control their own context models. This move largely contributes to the delegitimization of the assertions of the third part – the Prime Minister has just distanced himself from them in order to attenuate their validity.

Before moving on to the next excerpt, a comment should be made on how Papademos legitimizes his actions. In (4) he enacts two semantic legitimization strategies. First, by representing that the alternatives to bail-out choices proposed by opposition parties will entail much more severe measures as a 'fact', he attempts to legitimize

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the new austerity measures (http://www.grreporter.info/en/karadzaferis_changed_his_mind_about_memorandum_voridis_and_georgiadis_are_leaving/6058, date of last access 6/1/2018).

[35]One should note here that in 2010, when the first bail-out program was approved by the Greek parliament, most of the MPs were frequently receiving public condemnation in their public appearances, including verbal and even physical abuse. See for instance the blocking of the major national parade on 28th October 2011, as protesters shouted 'traitor' at the President, Karolos Papoulias, and other officials (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-protest/greek-protesters-call-president-traitor-halt-parade-idUSTRE79R27O20111028, date of last access 6/1/2018) or the physical attack on ex Minister and ND MP, Kostis Hatzidakis (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/8203980/Former-Greek-minister-attacked-by-mob-as-riots-break-out-in-Greece.html, date of last access 6/1/2018).

his government's policies on the basis of a lack of any other alternative. As said, constructing a representation of the crisis within which any alternative to austerity is seen unrealistic or worse, the inevitable character of the social injustice entailed by the economic adjustment programs implemented in the Eurozone becomes normalized in the discourses in the European economic crisis. Papademos calls the MPs to vote for the bail-out because this is the only sustainable and available solution. Moreover, Papademos triggers a lexical presupposition (Yale 1996: 28) with the noun phrase 'immensely more sacrifices', as he tacitly acknowledges that even the proposal made by his government after negotiating with the international creditors and the 'troika' also includes sacrifices for the Greek citizens.

The metaphor 'sacrifices', denoting the outcome of the austerity measures, plays a pivotal role. In their so far classical definition, Lakoff & Johnson see metaphors as linguistic devices that enable "conceptualizing one domain in terms of another" (1980: 61). Domains refer to a form of organization of speakers/hearers encyclopedic knowledge and experiences of a topic. This "as-if" relationship constructs mental maps between concepts of a source domain and concepts of a target domain, and lies at the core of knowledge transfer via discourse. In particular, a less familiar, abstract domain, i.e. target domain, is represented on the basis of non expert and familiar knowledge of a familiar area of experience, i.e. source domain. Yet, this is not a mere semantic relationship manifested in specific lexical choices that refer to or, which is the case in (15), predicate[36] a topic. Much more than just transferring knowledge, metaphors produce and, more critically, extend knowledge because they activate certain mental representations of events, actors, process etc. reflecting a socially shared system of attitudes, beliefs, norms, values and knowledge (Charteris-Black 2011[2]: 44). Then, the functionality of metaphors apparently transcends semantics, and aims at integrating the target topic within a particular point of view, a frame, which consists of particular concepts and assumptions (Croft & Cruze 2004).

This brings the relevance of context models which control discourse production and comprehension into discussion. Metaphors activate particular frames, which are a complex system of socially shared representations of various cognitive forms, such as

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[36]Resigl & Wodak (2001: 46) define predication as a process that results in framing the actors, actions, events and process in terms of quality, quantity, time, space etc. through linguistic choices.

knowledge, beliefs, attitudes etc., all of which are featured in participants' context model. A metaphor indicates that the speaker not only has knowledge of the two domains that are conceptually correlated, but also that (s)he presupposes that the audience shares an efficient amount of knowledge on the source domain in order to efficiently process the target topic in terms of the source topic. Taking into account what the speaker assumes to be relevant and appropriate to the situation (s)he is engaged, the crucial factor here is the intervention of the K-device that controls which aspects of that knowledge, beliefs, attitudes etc. will be explicitly realized in discourse and which will remain implicit as well as how, i.e. by which discursive structures – in our case this is a metaphor – will be realized. Therefore, a metaphor reflects representations that are assumedly shared between the members of a community, but it also shapes these representations as it influences a community's perception of social situations (Schon 1979). Also, given their flexibility, which is lack of precision or specificness, metaphors leave traces which allow hearers to make their own interpretations about the text (Charteris-Black 2011[2]: 38), and, what is more, they allow recipients to assume that they impose their own interpretations in understanding the world. Thus, metaphors are an effective means for constructing preferred mental models of an event or situation. Since they influence the way recipients think, they subsequently influence the way recipients talk and/or write; process and assess information; act; and behave (Steuter & Will 2008: 8).

In (4) 'sacrifices' denote POLICY MAKING IS AN OCCULT RITUAL since a sacrifice, in literal terms, is the offering of something valuable as demanded by a real or fictional being (e.g. a deity) for the achievement of a goal which cannot be accomplished otherwise. Apparently, the abstract domain is the complex process of fiscal policy making, which is largely dependent on the outcome of negotiations between the Greek Government and the 'troika'. However, the knowledge from the OCCULT RITUAL domain can be also seen as abstract. Yet, the pattern of sacrifice is deeply rooted in Greek culture since it is a thematic constitutive of oral literary tradition, such folktales and demotic songs. What is more, it indicates what Tziovas (2001: 119) has observed: Greeks prefer oral to written genres, and conceive them as more 'authentic'. This phonocentrism, i.e. the dominance orality and associated practices, prevails over a wide range of activities, either formal or informal, extending from everyday telephone conversations to official parliamentary meetings, as is the case

here (Tsakona 2009: 89). In this respect, the 'SACRIFICE' metaphor is processed as a conventional or dead metaphor, a cliché. Recipients are accustomed to the use of that metaphor, and they even expect to come across it, as it is a vivid remnant of oral style, so its interpretation does not demand much conscious activity from their part (Goatly 2007: 22).

Metaphors in political settings, though, always have a "pragmatic added value" (Musolff 2016: 4). Even in their cognition-oriented CMT, Lakoff & Johnson acknowledge that in politics and economy, metaphors "matter more, because they constrain our lives" (1980: 236). Apart from evasiveness, a typical feature of political discourse which was mentioned above, metaphors enable political actors to develop persuasive arguments; to construct political myths and to efficiently communicate their own leadership charisma; to provoke affective response; and to provide guarantees rooted in background knowledge that familiar experience patterns are efficient in dealing with new and unfamiliar experiences (Charteris-Black 2011[2]; Musolff 2016).

Under a critical perspective, one should wonder how metaphors set the scene, which is that they promote certain conceptualizations and diminish others (Stenvoll 2008: 37). In other words, how do they contribute to construction, in the first place, and, then, to dominance of desired context models? Also, what determines the degree of effectiveness of a metaphor is how a speaker's intentions are concealed (Charteris-Black 2011[2]: 44). Respectively, what gains in importance is to investigate which aspects of world knowledge are conceptualized and which are mitigated by a metaphor, and how the knowledge discursively realized reflects the speaker's interests. Last but not least, metaphors should be also seen as linguistic devices of legitimization given their argumentative function. A metaphor tacitly indexes the speaker's assumptions of how world knowledge is organized in the audience's mind. Hence, drawing upon on what is supposedly shared knowledge, a political actor can use a metaphor for legitimization purposes both on the level of assertions and actions. As for the former, a metaphor indexes what the speaker assumes as generally shared knowledge, so it indexes a stance towards the knowledge that justifies his assertion. As for the latter, it is precisely the appeal of that knowledge, deriving from shared

cultural and historical assumptions which involve shared representations, beliefs, norms and values, that enables the speaker to provide justifications for his actions.

Regarding the issue of dominance, a crucial parameter is the symbolic status of the genre within which a conceptualization is generated. As was analyzed above, parliamentary discourse is a source of high symbolical power limitedly accessible by the country's political elite, the MP's. Therefore, powerful discourse facilitates the production and dominance of knowledge that is preferred by those who control the access to these discursive genres. The metaphor POLICY MAKING AS AN OCCULT RITUAL introduces a rather mystical, arcane quality to the field of policy making, which is normally concerned with what is termed Realpolitik (Polymeneas 2017: 100). Respectively, it implies that the outcome of policy making cannot always be justified by objective criteria, but rather it is decided by vague demands which are solely based on the asymmetrical power relations between the one who asks a sacrifice and the other who is obliged to offer it. In other words, not only the asymmetry between the Greek Government and their so-called partners becomes normalised and taken-for-granted, but also austerity and its consequences in the labor force and society are seen as something that the Government has to accept.

The second parameter related to dominance of this particular conceptualization is related to the frequency of its appearance. This is not to imply that dominance is a matter of quantity. However, when political actors exploit the symbolical power of the discourse to which they have access, and they then constantly draw on specific linguistic resources in order to construct preferred context models of a situation, it is plausible to argue that the more a conceptualization occurs, the more dominant it becomes.

The metaphor of 'SACRIFICE'[37] denoting either the outcome of the measures, as in (15), or the measures themselves[38] was frequently used in the data of our study by all political actors as it appears in the table below.

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[37]Even though the vast majority of the metaphors found were realized by the plural types sacrifices (112 out of 121 occurrences), 'SACRIFICE' in SMALL CAPS indicates that all the other types in singular and plural are also included in the table.

Political Actor[39]	'SACRIFICE' POLICY MAKING AS AN OCCULT RITUAL		
	Measures	Outcome of the measures	Total
George Papandreou	14	27	41
Loukas Papademos	-	17	17
Antonis Samaras	2	8	10
George Papakonstantinou	7	2	9
Evangelos Venizelos	15	14	42
Yiannis Stournaras	-	2	2
			121

Table 5.1.: Appearances of 'SACRIFICE' metaphor in the data of each political actor.

It is interesting that the metaphor is more frequently used in periods where a new bail-out is to pass from the Parliament, a fact possibly implying that political actors consider this metaphor an efficient means of persuasion (see table 5.2.). In particular, in data deriving from 2010, George Papandreou uses the metaphor 21 times, while a total of 30 occurrences is indexed for the same period when data from Papakonstantinou corpus (9 occurrences) were added. In the period of the intense negotiations of the second bail-out program (January-February 2012), a total of 37 appearances is found – Evangelos Venizelos uses 20 times, while Loukas Papademos 17 times. Only in the chronologically last time period (October-December 2012), the times of appearances of 'SACRIFICE' are significantly reduced. However, if we compare data of Samaras from April-June 2012 and October-December 2012, it appears that the Prime Minister uses the specific metaphors many more times, 9 occurrences compared to only 1 occurrence.

'SACRIFICE' METAPHOR (POLICY MAKING AS AN OCCULT RITUAL)	
Time Period	Times used
2010 (Mar-June)	30
2011 (June)	28
2012 (Jan-Febr.)	37
2012 (Apr.-June)	15

[38]See for instance: "We know that these sacrifices are heavy, but necessary." (Papand., Cabinet's meeting, 2/5/10).

[39]The number of occurrences refers to all data of each political actor. However, for methodological reasons, not all of a data come from the same period. Namely, in the George Papandreou corpus the data included is from 2010 and 2011; in Loukas Papademos' from 2012 (January- February); in Antonis Samaras' from 2012 (April-June and October-December); in George Papakonstantinou's from 2010; in Evangelos Venizelos from 2011 and 2012 (January- February and April-June); in Yiannis Stournaras' from 2012 (October-December). More details are provided in Chapter 3.

2012 (Oct-Dec)	11
Total	121

TABLE 5.2.: Numbers of occurrences of 'SACRIFICE' metaphor in the time periods under study.

(5)   Βεβαίως, στον υπαρκτό σοσιαλισμό των ονείρων τους υπήρχαν «εργασιακά δικαιώματα», όπως τα καταλάβαιναν εκείνοι, όχι όπως εκείνα που έλεγε προηγουμένως ο Φώτης Κουβέλης.

Of course, in their imagined bona fide socialism 'working rights' existed in a way only understood by them, and not in the way that Fotis Kouvlis had previously described.

[Samaras, 7/11/12]

In (5) the political actor does not explicitly refer to what the leader of the center-left party DIMAR at the time, Fotis Kouvelis, has said, but he acknowledges him as a source of high evidential standing, whose discourse is 'valid' and 'right' compared to that of the SYRIZA party, which is implicitly referred to in the personal pronouns 'their' ('[I]n their imagined bona fide socialism') and 'them' ('[I]n a way only understood by them'). By making an explicit personal reference to the source of discourse, an evident instance of personal authorization, the Prime Minister appeals to the authoritative status of Kouvelis, which is based on his institutional role.

Moreover, broader political context should be taken into account in order for the reason why Samaras recognizes Kouveli's authority to be fully comprehended. The leader of DIMAR was an ex prominent MP of SYRIZA and at the time the speech was delivered he supported the ND-PASOK-DIMAR coalitional government. Hence, Samaras was endorsing the discourse of his governmental partner, so it was plausible to make an appeal to the personal authority status of the source.

In sum, the excerpt reveals the great extent to which evidential assessment and legitimization is dependent on the narrow and broader context. In his discourse the Prime Minister was aiming at attacking the major opposition party, SYRIZA. In order for the aim to be accomplished, he delegitimized their discourse by endorsing the discourse of an ex-SYRIZA politician and then current governmental ally.

Let's see (6) in which counter-discourse is objectively attributed to its source:

(6)   Κάποιοι, μην έχοντας τι άλλο να πουν, μας λένε ότι δεν έγινε διαπραγμάτευση. Πώς φαντάζεστε ότι φτάσαμε ως εδώ; Χωρίς διαπραγμάτευση;

Having nothing else to say, some say that there was no negotiation. How do you think that we reached this point? Without any negotiation?

[Samaras, 7/11/2012]

Recipients having a general knowledge of the Greek politics and the time can infer to which group the pronoun 'some' refers, yet Samaras avoids any specification – a move that particularly aims at attenuating the status and the institutional authority of the source of the assertion. Moreover, the disclaimer in the beginning ('Having nothing else to say') also contributes to delegitimization of others' discourse as it is realized in Factual ES. In this respect, the Prime Minister leaves traces for his audience so that they impose a particular evaluation regarding the significance of the arguments expressed by the opposition parties. Equally, the two following rhetorical questions serve as delegitimization devices. Rhetorical questions can be seen as a means for realizing Factual ES (4.4.), subsequently Samaras effectively challenges the mediated assertion of his opponents represented in indirect speech, by implying that he and his government had negotiated with the 'troika'. As the content remains implicit, it is tacitly considered as taken for granted. Therefore, the responsibility as regards to its validity is shared. The Prime Minister actually does not provide any evidence that discards the claims of his opponents. Yet, he exploits his own evidential stand as a source of information, largely constructed by the explicit and implicit adoption of Factual ES, and he also takes advantages of the linguistic resources that are considered relevant to his institutional role so he succeeds in attenuating the status of the accusations expressed against his government.

5.3.1.1.b. Objectively attributed self-utterances

Apparently, a political actor, making an explicit attribution of assertion to himself or to the group (s)he belongs, overtly indexes as assuming herself/himself or her/his group as credible and reliable sources of information. What is also implied, though, is how discourse, as a domain of evidence, is generally perceived at least within the Greek political setting. Apart from the substantial significance of discourse in political interaction (see 1.3.), political actors evaluate discourse, especially powerful

genres as the one under discussion in the present chapter, as a strong and accepted piece of evidence to such extent that it can even be considered as independent from its initial originator. Therefore, in order to legitimize their assertions, the speakers do not hesitate to deploy even their own previous discourses by representing them as objective justificatory means, even though they were obviously engaged in their production. This is a move that indexes the self-legitimizing power of discourse (Rojo & van Dijk 1997), particularly when produced, distributed and comprehended in institutionalized settings.

In (7) the Prime Minister provides a discourse produced by himself – and not by a third source as evidence. In section 4.3. it was shown that this is a common move in political settings.

(7)   Και ο λογαριασμός, όπως είπα, είναι οδυνηρός, ακόμα και άδικος για πολλούς κιόλας.

And the outcome, as I said, is painful, and even unfair –not for a lot of people at that.

[Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

Given that the evidence is not mediated but the speaker refers to himself, it can be argued that in utterances as such the Discursive ES type is not adopted. On the other hand, though, (8) reflects how political actors consider and think of their own discourses – they see it as a piece of evidence, which, as long as it has been uttered, it is independent of its producer, even in cases as the above in which not only they coincide the emancipator at the time of the utterance and the source of the mediated information, but what is mediated was uttered within the same speech. Pragmatically this verb phrase 'as I said' operates as a discursive marker that contributes to the local coherence.

By making a reference to what he has already said, Papandreou presents himself as credible and consistent, while he also enhances the epistemic status of his previous discourses per se by implying that they share a high degree of validity, since he can still refer to them. He also appears to be a sincere leader who speaks honestly, expressing full commitment towards his assertion through the first singular verb type ('[I] said') and avoiding any kind of evasiveness regarding what ought to be done.

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Hence, he legitimizes his assertions on the basis of self-reference, particularly on the basis of what he has said before, so his discourse is processed by the recipients as a strong piece of evidence.

At the same time, Papandreou promotes a kind of leadership that ignores what might have been pleasant for his party and the society, and sticks to commonly accepted values, such as responsibility. As the leader of the Government, he appears willing to carry the burden of such severe measures in order to save the State's economy. Respectively, the Prime Minister portrays a positive-self presentation, a move that contributes not only to the legitimization of actions, but it is also critical in legitimizing assertions because positive-self presentation directly affects how the speaker is perceived by the audience as a source of information.

It must be noted that the assertion in (7) semantically appeals to the social unfairness of the measures proposed, while it is also implied as a punitive stance from Greece's partners and creditors. This strategy is primarily past-oriented in the sense that there is a justificatory connection[40] between the past irresponsible policies and the unfairness of the requested policies in the present. The latter are the inevitable outcome of the former. It may seem contradictory, but the appeal to 'social unfairness' is a strategy that contributes to the legitimization of austerity policies. The acknowledged unfairness of the measures even by those who propose it, namely Papandreou's government, is seen a necessary – and in fact the only – condition for the approval of the bail-out by Greece's partners and creditors. It is, then, implicitly inferred that the Parliament has to vote for the bail-out exactly as it is offered given

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[40]In the Greek text, George Papandreou uses a conventional metaphor, not easily translated in English, which denotes a connection between past and present. In a literal translation he says: 'And the *bill* –as I said – is painful, and even unfair – not for few' (my *emphasis*). The term 'bill' (λογαριασμός) here refers to the sum of an amount owned for a good or service that has been already consumed (Triantafyllidis 1998, http://www.greek-language.gr/greekLang/modern_greek/tools/lexica/search.html?show=basket, date of last access 17/2/2018). It must be noted that in Modern Greek, the word *bill* does not a have a definition that coincides or resembles to that of "a proposed law presented to parliament for discussion" (Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/bill, date of last access 17/2/2018), which is extensively used in English-speaking settings.

the lack of any other alternative. As was discussed above, social unfairness is also realized by a specific metaphor, 'sacrifices'.

Antonis Samaras deploys subjective attribution to delegitimize counter-discourses.

(8)   Είπαμε ότι θα αποτρέψουμε την έξοδο της Ελλάδας από το ευρώ. Και το κάναμε.

         We said that we will prevent the Greece's exit from the Eurozone. And we did it..

                                                                              [Samaras, 7/11/2012]

Antonis Samaras reminds the audience what his party has said. Political leaders tend to use first plural person ('we said'), the inclusive 'we', because they represent the members of their party, and they also assume that their opinions and beliefs are shared and accepted at least among the members of their party. Even though the 'taken-for-grantedness' of the utterance is emphasized by intersubjective stance adopted, the Prime Minister, in his effort to highlight the consistency and credibility of his government's discourse, adds a proclaim ('And we did it') realized by Factual ES.

5.3.1.2. Subjectively attributed utterances

Next, we will deal with subjectively attributed utterances. It should be noted that only Papandreou and Samaras represent information derived from another source deploying resources that bear in their meaning an inherent evaluation of the validity of the mediated information. On the contrary, Papademos avoids making subjective attributions in his speech. To some extent, this can be explained by how Papademos conceived his role as Prime Minister of a coalitional government. Distant from parliamentary politics and a distinct technocrat, Papademos plausibly avoids such a commonly observed choice in parliamentary communicative settings. Besides, the reason of his engagement in Greek politics was the fact that he was a person trusted by the creditors, given his previous stints in several highly ranked positions in national and supranational institutions, as well as his apparent expertise in economics and negotiations. Moreover, the scope of his Government was specific, since he would step out of the office and call for early General Elections as soon as the negotiations on the private debt haircut were completed, and the new bail-out program was

approved by the Parliament. Therefore, he had no interest in being personally engaged in political clashes, so appearing superior to his political opponents was not an aim included in his context models. Rather, he aimed at establishing the image of an 'objective' technocrat unaffected by narrow political interests. Respectively, he solely drew upon his authority and on this basis he considered making subjective evaluations of attributed assertions irrelevant.

In the following passage coming from Papandreou's speech, the Prime Minster associates himself to the discourse that is being attributed to a third source.

(9)   Και ήρθε η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή να διαψεύσει και εσάς, και πάλι εκτιμώντας ότι η πραγματικότητα ήταν ακόμα χειρότερη από ό,τι εμείς την είχαμε υπολογίσει.

And the European Committee came to disprove of you as well, estimating once again that the reality was even worse than our estimations.

[Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

Here the speaker overtly endorses the discourse of the European Committee, and at the same time disregards the discourse of ND-the pronoun 'you' refers to the ND party. No information is provided about the estimations made by the EC, but only the fact that the EC calculations of Greece's primary deficit were totally different, and more importantly less optimistic to those of ND. This is because the estimations were actually already known to the public –so it was considered irrelevant to be again mentioned in the speech, but it was also because Papandreou considered it more relevant to overtly express his distance to the discourse of the ND party and his alliance to that of the EC. Typically, this is a case where an impersonal authority and an explicit appealing to an assumedly source of high status legitimizes one's assertions. In addition, it contributes to the legitimization of the actions proposed by the speaker. Then, the approval of the rescue package is justified because the EC claims that the Greek economy is in a rather severe situation.

In contrast to what was observed in the previous section, here the political actor Papandreou makes a linguistic choice ('to disprove') which has an inherent epistemic evaluation in its core meaning. It is quite interesting that the objectivity and the status of the EC is being undisputed to such extent that even the PASOK's discourse is

disclaimed ('the reality was even worse than our estimations'). The Prime Minister leads the recipients to construct a mental model of the EC that largely lays on the issue of validity and how credible is assumed the ES type as a form of discursive realization of a source of information. In his effort to discursively construct these representations, he even slightly distances himself from the discourse of his own party in order to acknowledge the credibility of the EC as source of information. As the knowledge produced by this specific source is considered reliable and objective, then the explicit appeal to that source legitimizes speaker's assertions.

Likely, Samaras uses subjective attribution in order to endorse the mediated discourse or to index a particular distance from what is communicated. In the following passage indirectly reported information is endorsed by the speaker:

(10)   Κι όλοι παραδέχονται ότι η προσπάθεια που γίνεται σήμερα δεν έχει προηγούμενο.

        And they all acknowledge that the effort that is being carried out today is unprecedented.

                                                                    [Samaras, 7/11/2012]

Antonis Samaras makes no particular reference to the source of information, but its content is represented as generally shared ('they all acknowledge'). The Prime Minister does not exploit personal or institutional authority in order to legitimize his assertion; rather, he exploits the use of the pronoun 'all', which implicitly includes the institutions and partners that supervise or support the implementation of austerity programs. In this respect, the pronoun refers only to those in power, and, accordingly, only their beliefs and view are considered as 'rightful' or 'valid'. In addition, the specific lexical choice 'to acknowledge' signals an evaluation regarding the validity of the utterance, because the speaker overtly endorses the content of the proposition. The Prime Minister aligns with the reported utterance.

The second category of subjective attribution includes the speaker's distancing from the reported information, and was more frequently encountered in his speech. Both in (11) and (12) Samaras uses the same verb 'demagogue', with minor differentiation in the case of (11), where the verb is used in a compound form with the lexical prefix -

kata which intensifies the meaning of the word that accompanies (Trintafyllidis 1998[41]).

(11)   Κάποιοι δημαγωγούν για εκείνο ή το άλλο δυσάρεστο μέτρο. Αλλά μαζί με τα δυσάρεστα μέτρα που όχι μόνο, όπως είπα, θα τα αποκαταστήσουμε, αλλά ανοίξαμε και το δρόμο να γίνει αυτό μόλις βγούμε από τα ελλείμματα– πάρθηκαν και μέτρα που πρεπε να τα είχαμε τολμήσει από χρόνια.

Some demagogue over this or that unpleasant measure. Yet, along with the unpleasant measures, which, as I have told you, pave the path for us to cancel them as soon as we end with deficits, we also took measures that we had to dare taking years ago.

[Samaras, 7/11/2012]

(12)   Επίσης, άμεσα θα ολοκληρωθεί η ανακεφαλαιοποίηση των τραπεζών. Δεν θα σωθούν μόνον τράπεζες, όπως ορισμένοι καταδημαγωγούν.

Also, the recapitalization of the Banks will be accomplished forthwith. Not solely the Banks will be rescued, as some demagogue.

[Samaras, 7/11/2012]

In both excerpts the source of the mediated utterance remains unspecified –as it appears– a common strategy by Samaras when he represents discourses from which he distances himself and attempts to downgrade the status of their source. Again, the Prime Minister assumes that his audience already know that such criticism is mainly derived by his opposition parties in general, and the major opposition party in particular, SYRIZA. A difference between (11) and (12) is that only in the latter is provided information about what the third part has actually said ('Not solely the banks will be rescued'), which is of course a mere summary of what has been said, and not an exact representation in direct or indirect speech, since the mitigation of the actual source of the utterance prohibits such linguistic choice. On the other hand, in (11) there is no information about what some had actually said, and what gains in importance is the negative evaluation ("to demagogue") of that information in terms of reliability and validity. In both passages the negative evaluation of the assertion is

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[41]The definition is available at http://www.greek-language.gr/greekLang/modern_greek/tools/lexica/search.html?show=basket (date of last access, 7/1/2018).

profiled and based on the authority of the speaker. Thus, Antonis Samaras manages to de-legitimize the discourses of his opponents.

Note also that in (11) the Prime Minister objectively attributes to himself previous (self-)discourses ('[W]hich, as I have told you, pave the path…with deficits') making evident the clash between the opposing discourses, a clash that it constitutes a very proper part of how politics operate in Western civic democracies in general. This move is strategically employed for (de)legitimization purposes. Self-discourse in the second period of the passage is embedded within sentences realized in Factual ES, and therefore it strengthens its validity. Opposed to the unspecified reference to the source of the counter-discourse, the explicit naming of the source of self-discourse also contributes to the speaker's reliability. The two discourses are contested in a way that allows the Prime Minister to establish his own views and guide his audience to similarly process the information conveyed.

Let's also consider (13) which was presented in 4.3.2.5.b.:

(13)   Κι αν υπάρχουν παρατάξεις που χαϊδεύουν, όπως έκαναν απόψε, αυτιά
        όταν κόβουμε από αγρότες και συνταξιούχους, τότε- θα το πω ωμά - ότι
        ψήφους ψαρεύουν.

        And even if there are parties that caress ears[42], as they did tonight, while
        we were cutting [incomes] from farmers and pensioners, then I will say it
        bluntly: they are seeking votes.

                                                                    [Samaras, 7/11/2012]

Samaras provides only a summary of what has been said, but he does so by explicitly distancing himself from the content of the information using a fixed verb phrase ('to caress ears') which has an inherent negative epistemic evaluation. When one attempts to caress somebody's ears it means that he or she deliberately manipulates the audience by saying nice things even though they are lies. Hence, in his attempt to delegitimize their discourse, the Prime Minister provides only what his opponents have said, avoiding any reference to a particular source, and portrays them as conscious, narrow-minded liars whose only aim is to satisfy their party's goals ('they are seeking votes'). In 4.3. it was discussed that Greek political actors on the basis of

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[42] To caress ears is a Greek fixed verb phrase meaning 'to say what others want to hear'.

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their context models consider it more relevant to the communicative situation to evaluate the discourse they convey rather than to actually inform their audience of what has been said by a third source –the core function of Discursive ES type.

Note that Samaras uses Factual ES type in order to interpret their intentions, so there is no need to provide a solid justification. At the same time the first singular person 'I say' allows him to explicitly designate himself as the source of that assertion; to take full responsibility of its truth; and to fully commit himself to it also by using the adverb 'ωμά' (bluntly) which when is used in a context like the one in the excerpt above has a meaning 'without any effort of embellishment (of the reality)' (Triantafyllidis 1998[43]), i.e. 'do or say something in full honesty'. Therefore, his speculation on his opponents' intention and scope becomes 'valid' not only because it is discursively represented as a 'fact' but also because it is derived by a source of high evidential –the Prime Minister himself– which was efficiently and strategically constructed.

In politics, discourse, as a type of evidence, is considered among the most significant justificatory means being at the disposal of a political actor. More crucially, in 4.3. was shown that the authority of the political actors is largely depended on whether they make explicit evaluation of the validity of other- or self-discourses they communicate. This appears to be a relevant practice among all political actors studied here, but it significantly deviates from the classic evidential approach to this type of evidence, according to which when a speaker mediates the discourse of a third part (s)he just transfers the responsibility of what is said to that external source. It becomes crucial, then, for Samaras to legitimize his discourse by opposing it to that of his opponents ('our discourse vs. their discourse'). In order to achieve so, he represents the two discourses in different ways. Regarding the former, he adopts Factual ES type and fully aligns himself with the assertion by taking full responsibility of its validity and representing himself as a reliable source. Regarding the latter, he avoids any reference to the source of the assertions and only provides an

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[43]The definition is retrieved from the online version of the Modern Greek Dictionary (1998). http://www.greek-language.gr/greekLang/modern_greek/tools/lexica/triantafyllides/search.html?lq=%22%CF%89%CE%BC%CF%8C%CF%82+-%CE%AE+-%CF%8C%22&dq= (Date of last access 20/12/2017).

epistemically negative representation of what they had said –an evaluation and not the content of the discourse per se. Therefore, Samaras exploits his institutional position and, on the basis of his context model as well as of the context models that his audience assumedly has -of course since he doesn't have direct access to other's mind, he has to infer it- he interprets the properties of his role in a way that allows him to treat the same kind of evidence radically different in order to legitimize his own discourse and delegitimize the discourse of his opponents.

Also, it should be noted that the discourse –or rather the evaluation of its content– derived by the third party, i.e. the government's political opponents, is framed by conditional clause ('And even if…'), which shortly afterwards is negated ('[A]s they did tonight'), a move that contributes to the delegitimization of the position held by the opposing parties. Samaras considers that the action of 'caressing ears' and the discourses entailed by that action are both inappropriate, irrelevant and contrary to what he thinks as an ideal parliamentary debate, and this is why he places them within a counterfactual world.

However, not only actually communicated utterances are subjectively attributed. In the passage below, Papandreou adopts Pseudo-discursive ES type (4.3.2.2.), which is frequently used by all political actors being analyzed in the present study.

(14)   Τότε, θα μου πείτε «γιατί δεν το κάνετε;». Μα αυτό κάνουμε – απαντώ – και συνεχίζουμε να βάζουμε τάξη.

         'Why didn't you do it?' you will ask then. But – I reply- this is exactly what we are doing, and we keep setting the country in order.

                                                                      [Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

Despite being attributed to a collective 'you' subject, which is not specified as it can equally refer to the MPs in the Parliament or to the Greek citizens in general, the question represented in direct quotation ('Why didn't you do it?') was never really uttered as the modal 'would' denotes. On the contrary, it was entirely constructed by the Prime Minister therefore the attribution is purely subjective. Here, Papandreou exploits his assumed validity derived by his position, and represents what a collective subject would say in the specific communicative instance. He then constructs himself as a leader who is aware of the probable criticism that would be raised against his

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Government. Typically, this is a personal inference made by the Prime Minister. Drawing on his knowledge regarding the expectations of this 'you'-subject, Papandreou infers what they might ask. This inference implies that the mental models of the speaker and the recipients coincide. The speaker knows what recipients think and more crucially he considers it as part of shared knowledge between himself and the audience since he infers it before it is actually discursively realized. In this respect, the Prime Minister confirms that he and the recipients do share mental representations which are tacitly activated, that is they are taken for granted by both parts.

The evident mismatch between the source of information and the ES type adopted by the speaker can be related with rhetorical and legitimization purposes, so it is largely depended on how the speaker's K-device controlled the way he talked given the particular context. The question in direct speech refers to the efficient confrontation of corruption within the public sector[44]. Constructing a question which is attributed to a collective –and hence more objective– source, the Prime Minister stresses the need to deal with that serious problem.

From a rhetorical point of view, then, the Pseudo-discursive ES type enables the speaker to introduce a new topic in his speech that is a) supposedly expected by his audience, otherwise it would not have 'raised' a relevant question; and b) supposedly unpleasant to the speaker because it forces him to talk about his party's mistakes and failures, as the question in the passage triggers a structural presupposition, i.e. the specific sentence structure presupposes that the information in some part of the structure should be processed as assumedly true (Yule 1996: 28). In (9) the information presupposed is "you did nothing about it", which is nevertheless immediately negated by the speaker. Still, though the negation ('[T]his is exactly what we are doing') of the presupposition in direct question does not aim to challenge what Papandreou realizes as the collective voice of the people, but rather to create a space of alliance and agreement between the Government and the people, within which both share the same knowledge and set the same priorities regarding the confrontation of corruption.

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[44]For the sake of brevity it is not possible to provide the whole passage. Yet in order for any misunderstanding to be avoided, it should be explained that the question addresses the issue of tackling corruption. The full meaning of the question is "why you do not tackle corruption?"

As for legitimization purposes, it should be mentioned that the use of Pseudo-discursive ES type in the excerpt allows the political actor to tacitly construct himself as a credible source of information and legitimize his assertions. The utterance of the collective you-subject is in fact subjectively attributed, and the content is inferred. However, in discursive level he bears a quasi-objective character, which facilitates the Prime Minister to overcome the audience's epistemic safeguards. Instead of making an inference, which is the actual source of information, Papandreou considered more relevant to the context of the situation and to the communicative aims and goals featured in his context model, to rely on linguistic resource that enable him to opt for an epistemically stronger ES type in order to enhance in terms of validity his own, personal inferences.

On a semantic level, this short constructed Q&A between the Prime Minister and the collective you-subject implicitly refers to the irresponsibility of the past (see for more details (15) και (16) below), when corruption dominated the public sector, and on that basis the policies proposed by the Government become legitimized. Also, the Prime Minister's response ('[W]e keep setting our house in order') refers to social fairness, which, as appears in the speeches under analysis, typically refers to anticipated outcomes of implemented policies, but in the above passage fairness is placed in the present. What is done by the Government is ought to be done in order to restore previous unfairness. Moreover, the expectation of social fairness legitimizes to some extent extraordinary and hard decisions which are seen as inevitable means for achieving the desired and anticipated aim.

Concluding remarks

In 5.3. we dealt with the second macro-category, the averred utterances. Again, a finer distinction was made between based and non based averred utterances. The term basis corresponds to domain of evidence, which is the term we used throughout the study. The assertions of the first category are realized by the ES types expressing personal experience and cognitive domains of evidence, whereas the latter by expression indexing truth-factual validity.

In our analysis of the utterances having an experiential or emotional base of evidence, it appeared that Loukas Papademos again was differentiated from the other two

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speakers -he only once used this type of averred utterances, a move which was related with his interpretation about his role as a Prime Minister. As will commented, Papademos makes linguistic choices that allow him to convey his assertion in the maximum degree of objectivity. In this respect, he considers irrelevant to the communicative situation, in which he is engaged assertions that entail a high degree of speaker engagement. The other two political actors, Papandreou and Samaras, strategically used this kind of assertion expressing either personal or shared degree of responsibility towards the validity of the knowledge being conveyed (see the analysis in 4.1. that illustrates how an intersubjective stance is relevant to this kind of personal evidence). The main focus in the section was the strategic use of personal experience evidence, in order to legitimized the need for consensus among the political forces as well as among the Greek citizens. It appeared that through this kind of evidence, which is practically unchallengeable, the political actors introduced broader issues that -of course- are not taken for granted. However, an assertion originated in such domain of evidence indexes full personal responsibility and due to fact that only the speaker has direct access to this kind of evidence, there is no space for dialogicality left. Therefore, the content of the assertion becomes uncontested, while its validity is solely dependent on the status of the source of information.

Regarding the averred utterances of cognitive domain of evidence, they were divided in two subcategories that were defined by the mode of access to the evidence, direct or indirect. With direct access the political actors explicit express personal or shared knowledge, whereas with indirect accesses they realized inferences. It was observed that the political actors used the authority the institutional position in order to express their assertions as knowledge, but at the same time the fact that they were explicitly expressing shared knowledge enhanced their own authority as the sources of that knowledge. In semantic level, the knowledge being explicitly expressed was related with the inevitable character of the austerity measures that were justified either in terms of legality or in terms of moral obligation, i.e. the case of sacrifices mentioned above.

The analysis of passages that indicated indirect access to cognitive domain of evidence included the strategic use of anticipatory discourses. Just as in the case of explicitly shared knowledge, the political actors exploited their evidential standing to

make predictions about the future status of the Greek economy without providing any specific or concrete evidence that could back those predictions. However, this also functioned vice versa: the conjectures about such issues, enhanced the authority of the speaker, because a) they involved a high degree of subjectivity -even when this subjectivity was intentionally downplayed, a conjecture remains a product of the speaker's own reasoning; and b) they were interpreted as a linguistic resource that tacitly indexed an asymmetry between the political actor and the audience. What is more, the anticipatory discourses used were constructed in a way that let the speaker to imply that it is possible to have knowledge of the future events, and that he can affect them. Therefore, the audience was not only guided to accept the validity of the predictions because of the status of the source, but also the political actor let the audience infer that the validity of the prediction is backed by some official, institutional knowledge that is accessible only by the speaker. As a matter of fact, many of those conjectures could have been attributed to a third source, such as official reports.

However, the political actors opted for an epistemic mismatch in order to represent those provisions as the result of their reasoning, and hence to take advantage of the implied asymmetry. As was shown, this asymmetry was strategically negotiated by these political actors. In cases in which they aimed at the persuasion of their audience through the construction of an epistemic alliance, the political actor mitigated that asymmetry by implicitly representing their exclusive knowledge as supposedly taken-for-granted and, hence, shared. On the contrary, in cases in which the political actors attacked to their political opponents this asymmetry reflected in the anticipatory discourses was emphasized. From a semantic point of view, the political actors enacted several epistemic legitimization strategies, such as "social fairness", by focusing on the positive future outcomes of the program, or "state of exception".

Last, each political actor on the basis of his own interpretation of how he should discursively construct himself as Prime Minister and political leader opts for different lexical styles, all of which had legitimizing implications. It was shown that authorized and technical vocabulary, the financial jargon, enriched the status of the speakers because they appeared to have in depth knowledge of the field of economics and finance. Also, it made them sound more distanced and objective. On the other

hand, informal and daily vocabulary -in some instances in appropriate for the setting and the communicative situation of a parliamentary session- allowed the actors to more easily construct an epistemic alliance with and persuade their non-specialized audience. In both cases, but mostly in the one of authorized jargon, the discourse functioned as a self-legitimizing device.

5.3.2. Averred utterances

As said, averred utterances echo the voice of the speaker/writer, who is assumed as the source of the utterance. However, averral can be seen as a more general category –not merely a counterpart of attribution assertions– since every attribution is inevitably embedded within an averred text. Depending on a) the type of domain of evidence from which the information represented in discourse was retrieved, and b) whether or not this domain is named, averred utterances can be divided into (evidentially) based and non-based. The dichotomy based vs. non-based is named after the taxonomy of various bases of knowledge (perception, proof, general knowledge) proposed in Bednarek (2006a). As explained, here is adopted a different taxonomy, that of Marrín-Arese (2013) who distinguishes between three domains of evidence (experiential, cognitive and communicative). Communicative domain of evidence is manifested in attributed utterances, whereas the other two in based utterances, and they include the various modes of knowing expelled by Bednarek.

5.3.2.1. Based averred utterances

In based utterances the domain of evidence is specified. Following the three-part division explained in Chapter 3, in the present section we examine experience and cognitive based utterances.

5.3.2.1.a. Personal Experience based utterances

In general, political actors tend to avoid making reference to what they have *actually* seen or heard, that is to base their utterances on perceptual/experiential evidence. As seen in 4.1., in instances in which political actors became expressive and expressed their inner state it was due to the assumed shocking and 'beyond politics' character of the events they were commenting on, or they just made epistemic mismatches for rhetorical and pragmatic purposes exploiting, thus, the assumed validity of such type

of directly accessed evidence. This type of it can't be challenged, because – obviously- only the speaker has direct access to his own emotions and senses. Hence, the speaker has to be believed by the hearers, who in turn do not question the validity of the evidence, but rather the credibility of the speaker.

In the following excerpt, Papandreou expresses his feelings about the corrupted status of the Greek public administration. Given his institutional role, which is vested in power, Papandreou is assumed as a credible source. Apart from that, though, it is considered socially inappropriate in these settings one to question others' feelings, in a sense that it cannot be proved whether or not the experiencer actually feels in the way (s)he claims.

(15)   Και η δική μου οργή είναι τεράστια, όταν καθημερινά και συνέχεια βλέπω να αναδύονται από τα Υπουργεία, από τη διαχείριση του πλούτου του Ελληνικού λαού, η τραγωδία της ανευθυνότητας, η αντίληψη του πλιάτσικου που επικρατούσε, η απόλυτη ασυδοσία και αναισθησία.

And my fury is great as well, when daily and constantly I see the tragedy of irresponsibility; the prevailing sense of despoilment; the absolute impunity and inconsideration; [all of them] to be emerged from the Ministries and [the practice of] management of the Greek people's wealth.

[Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

Papandreou justifies his assertions adopting Personal experience ES type. ('And my fury is great as well, when daily and constantly I see the tragedy of irresponsibility'), and he refers to both internal and external sources available to the speaker for acquiring knowledge from the Personal experience domain of evidence. The internal source is marked by the explicit mention of his feelings ('my fury'), whereas the external source is indicated by the reference to visual evidence ('when I daily and constantly see'). Therefore the Prime Minister takes full responsibility regarding the validity of the information he communicates, but as he conceives irresponsibility, despoilment and the other named demerits of public administration as something that can be attested by vision, he somehow objectifies them and makes them appear as entities that anyone can have visual access to.

Still, the fact that the Prime Minister assumes that it is appropriate to base his assertion on an experiential base in order to talk about phenomena typically justified by different, much more objective modes of knowing, it indexes that Papandreou interprets his institutional position as source of high credibility that is entitled to appeal to personal senses for making valid assertions for such a serious issue. And it is precisely that assumed credibility of the source, shared also by his audience and forming part of their own context models, which legitimizes the assertions made.

Semantically, the Prime Minister explicitly refers to the 'irresponsibility of the past', which is a common semantic legitimization strategy in discourses in/of the current economic crisis (Ferreira & Fonseca 2015: 692). Therefore, the Prime Minister establishes particular representations regarding the past status of public administration and guides the audience to construct a context model featuring such mental representations in the form of beliefs and opinions about how the public sector was performing for years.

Similarly, in (16) he also adopts Personal experience ES type, enacting the same semantic legitimization strategy:

(16)   Γιατί αυτό που συνέβη τα προηγούμενα χρόνια, αυτό που αντικρίσαμε
         μετά από τις εκλογές, δεν έχει προηγούμενο στα χρονικά της χώρας
         μας, ίσως οποιασδήποτε χώρας.

         Because what has happened in the previous years; what we came across
         after the election is unprecedented in the history of the country –maybe
         in the history of any country.

                                                             [Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

Contrary to (15), though, the responsibility regarding the validity of the assertion is shared, as the utterance indexes a high degree of intersubjectivity ('what we saw'), so the speaker assumes that his recipients are in epistemic alliance with him by sharing more or less the same stance towards the assertions he communicates. Even though the use of first person plural verb types has been associated with the construction of elusive, vague 'we-communities' (Fairclough 2003; 2010[2]) which, as discourse unfolds, may unclearly swift from inclusive-we references, i.e. the pronouns refers to the speaker/writer along with the addressee(s), to exclusive-we references, i.e. the pronoun refers to the speaker/writer plus one or more others but it excludes the

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addressee(s), here it is quite clear who belong to the 'we-subject', primarily the members of the Cabinet and then the MPs of PASOK. The function of 'we'-references is persuasive as it signals the unity and the common perceptions shared among the members of the Cabinet. On this basis, Papandreou also tacitly assumes that he shares the same General Knowledge about Greek politics with his audience in order to make a negative assessment ('unprecedented') of –and therefore negatively represent– the actions of the previous Government. Then, his opinion appears to echo a generally accepted view and, particularly, to form part of General Knowledge, but in fact it is just based on the assumption made by the political actor of what his recipients may already know.

As said, the legitimization of assertions is indirectly involved in the legitimization of actions. Having accomplished assertorial legitimization, the Prime Minister enacts two semantic legitimization strategies, 'irresponsibility of the past', and the 'state of exception'. Regarding the former, one may look at the discussion above (passages 9 and 15). Regarding the latter, the exceptionality of the historical moments with which a government or a political actors has to make critical decisions is a common reference in discourses not only of the current financial crisis (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 129), but also of any severe crisis, whether it occurs in capitalism or not, threats state's sovereignty (Agamben 2000: 133; 2005:1).

Especially within the current global financial crisis, the appeal to exceptionality by the political elites limits political debate, abolishes contestation of their political actions, and generally supports the argument that desperate times call for desperate measures (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). Papandreou cynically admits the unfairness of the measures, which are seen as an unavoidable damage in the Government's effort to deal with a particular 'state of exception', the economic crisis. Similar findings are also indexed in political contexts relevant to the Greek one, such as the Portuguese political setting Fonseca & Ferreira (2015: 687).

It should be noted, that there is interrelation between the two semantic legitimization strategies mentioned, as well as with social (un)fairness. Actually, it seems that the "state of exception" argument becomes strengthened when a political actor attempts to legitimize a specific action, such as the approval of an economic adjustment program or specific austerity policies that may devaluate the labor force or have

negative impacts on the welfare State, and as justificatory means he uses overt and/or covert appeals to failures and errors of the past irresponsible administration(s); necessary unfair character of policies proposed in order for past irresponsibility to be confronted; and future fair outcomes that would restore unfairness –in "normal" times none of these would have occurred. Vice versa, by enacting a "state of exception" strategy, a political actor can justify why hard and unfair policies should be implemented.

Papademos makes only one reference to knowledge acquired by his senses.

(17)   Άκουσα με προσοχή την κριτική που ασκείται από πολλές πλευρές. Ρεαλιστικές εναλλακτικές δεν άκουσα.

   I carefully heard the criticism made by many sides. What I didn't hear was realistic, alternative solutions.

[Papademos, 10/2/2012]

The Prime Minister indexes the source of the information ('I heard'), though what gains in importance in the particular discursive setting is not the source per se but the information –the discourse ('criticism') produced by a third part, which apparently indexes a different, third party source[45]. Papademos avoids identifying the sources of criticism, which means that their status becomes undermined. More critically, the content of criticism is mitigated too. Given the context, it can be inferred that criticism is made by the opposition parties and several MPs of the majority, who disagreed with the bail-out program. Summarizing, though, all the objections under the general label 'criticism', despite the different origin and goals of each one of them, is an effective means of weakening their strength and validity.

The term 'criticism' bears an implicit negative evaluation, and in the Greek political context it is frequently used by majority parties to downgrade the position of an opponent as it indexes lack of consensual spirit from his part. In this sense, the meaning of 'criticism' is reduced to a counter-productive practice which serves narrow political interests and endorses the a priori disapproval of any proposals made. In the first period of (17) ('I carefully heard the criticism made by many

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[45]For reasons of classification, (16) is included in based averred assertions.

sides'), though, is not quite clear whether or not Papademos adopts the aforementioned and not a neutral view on criticism because as said before he makes no inherent evaluations when he represents the discourses of a third part in his own discourse. Never the less, the period that follows ('What I didn't hear was realistic, alternative solutions') distances himself from the implied assertions of the opposition parties. The assertion of Papademos, who adopts Personal experience ES type taking advantage of its strong evidential validity, contributes to the delegitimization of the opposing discourse. As the Prime Minister equates criticism to unrealistic and irresponsible views and beliefs, he tacitly guides his audience to process that discourse as deriving from sources of low validity and credibility, totally unaware of the dynamics operating both in the negotiations of the Government at the time with its international creditors as well as in the relationships among states, and between states and supranational institutions. The appeal to 'political realism' is also found in the discourses of the European economic crisis, which were produced within different political settings (Fonseca and Ferreira 2015: 695).

Similarly to the speeches made by Papandreou and Papademos, there are few cases in which experiential evidential base of epistemic positioning is signaled in speeches of Samaras as well. Let's consider excerpts in (18) and (19):

(18)   Θα ήθελα να ευχαριστήσω άλλη μια φορά, τα άλλα δύο κόμματα της κυβέρνησής μας – το ΠΑΣΟΚ και τη ΔΗΜΑΡ – για τη στήριξη που προσέφεραν σε αυτή την προσπάθεια.
Όπως θέλω να ευχαριστήσω και το κόμμα μου, τη Νέα Δημοκρατία, για τη μεγάλη στήριξη που μας δίνει.
Και πάνω απ' όλα να ευχαριστήσω τον Ελληνικό λαό που ξέρει, που υπομένει και που περιμένει από μας.

Once more, I'd like to thank the other two parties of our government, PASOK and DIMAR, for their support in this effort. As I'd like to thank my party, ND, for the massive support they provide. And, what is more, I'd like to thank the Greek people who understand, endure and have expectations from us.

[Samaras, 7/11/2012]

In the above the Prime Minister's feelings are expressed. Since Personal experience ES type is purely subjective and it indexes the speaker's direct access to evidence, it is assumed of high degree of validity. Personal Experience ES type also implies that

the speaker is taking full accountability for the validity of the utterance. By the particular ES type adopted along with the first person singular verb types used, Antonis Samaras foregrounds himself and boosts his own authority as the source of information. However, this holds true for virtually any speaker adopting the particular ES types, so it has nothing to do with the assumed properties that a political actor, namely the Prime Minister, should have when he addresses the body of the Parliament. More critically, this ES type is prototypically irrelevant to the contextual properties of parliamentary discussion, since the validity of the assertions cannot by challenged or questioned by the recipients who are unable to have access to the emotions or the speaker's internal state, and they should just rely on the locutor's reliability as a source of information. Therefore, it is avoided in parliamentary debates, except for cases in which the political actor wants to express feelings – purely personal after all–, and due to its contextual irrelevance is interpreted as epistemically weak given the aims, goals and overall properties and features of a parliamentary discussion which typically calls for objective and accessible evidences.

In this respect, it is very interesting that Samaras makes such a choice in his discourse in order to refer to a specific governmental strategy, consensus. He may not refer to the concept itself, but it is clearly communicated in (18). It seems that the Prime Minister acknowledges the generally strong evidential base of this particular ES type, and deliberately chooses to underrate its contextual irrelevance. Consensus is a core issue of parliamentary and political debates. Foregrounding his own personal experience and then relating it with a key element of how politics in civic democracies do operate, Antonis Samaras manages to represent himself as a factor of the consensus, which in the passage prevails in three distinct levels. The Prime Minister refers to the consensus among the governmental allies ('I'd like to thank the other two parties of our government'); among his own party members ('As I'd like to thank my party, ND…'); and finally among the Greek people ('I'd like to thank the Greek people…') who also support the government[46].

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[46] Especially in the last period, the Prime Minister exploits a vast amount of common ground knowledge that remains implicit. By indicating that the Greek people know to how to come through, Samaras implies the negative outcomes of the severe austerity policies dictated by the bail-out programs. He further implies the unjust nature of these policies, but, as he aligns with what the bail-out

The need for consensus is a common reference not only among the three Prime Ministers, but also among all the six political actors with whom the present study is dealing. More concretely, Antonis Samaras, by adopting various types of EP, makes in his speech 7 direct or indirect references to the need of and/or positive consequences of consensus. Similarly, Papandreou and Papademos make 6 and 3 references respectively in the speeches under investigation. A broader look at the data of the study reveals that Papandreou, Papademos and Samaras made constant appeals to consensus among political parties and social groups as a prerequisite for the efficient confrontation with the economic crisis in all of their discourses included in our data.

Political Actor	Appeals to consensus	
	In speeches under analysis	In whole corpus
George Papandreou	6	27
Loukas Papademos	2	12
Antonis Samaras	7	16

Table 5.3.: Number of times the three Prime Ministers referred to consensus.

Taking the broader political context into account, it makes sense why the most references, 27, are found in the corpus of George Papandreou –during his stint consensus was at stake as the PASOK government had none but occasional support

programs entail, he subsequently implies the necessity of the policies. As for the expectations which are also mentioned in his speech, knowledge on previous discourses by Samaras is required. At the time this speech was delivered, the coalitional government of ND, PASOK and DIMAR had spent only 5 months in office. During the electoral campaign, Samaras has constantly represented his rival, Alexis Tsipras, leader of the SYRIZA and major opposition party at the time of the speech, as a threat to the presence of Greece within the Eurozone and the EU. Accordingly, he posed a dilemma to the voters. A vote for a Government led by ND would secure Greece's position within the EU, whereas a vote for a Government led by SYRIZA would turn the Greek state into a European outcast. Respectively and given the result of the elections, Samaras interprets the voters' expectation as a will for the crisis to be efficiently confronted without any possible implications regarding Greece's status quo, while at the same time, the newly elected government would avoid the mistakes of the previous one. Therefore, the Prime Minister represents himself as a responsible leader, opting for political stability and being fully aware of the trust that is offered to his government, and dedicated not to betray that trust neither to appear inferior to the expectations shared among the Greek people.

by other MPs outside PASOK's parliamentary group[47]. On the contrary, Papademos and Samaras were leading coalitional governments supported by a broad majority of MPs.

However, not only in the data of the three Prime Ministers but also in those of the three Ministers of Finance, the need for consensus is manifested. Interestingly enough the references are not so evident in the speeches delivered in the same sessions as those analyzed in the previous chapter, but in interviews and in speeches within a different communicative context. Again, in the corpus of the actors having to advocate for consensus the references were much more frequent compared to those found in the data of the political actors who served either in a single-party Government or in a coalitional one[48].

Political Actor	Appeals to consensus

[47]There is also a significant difference between the data of 2010 and those of 2011. In 2011, a year after the implementation of the first economic adjustment program, much of the Government's 'political capital' was consumed so the need for support within the Parliament in order for specific bills related to the program to be approved had become an urgent matter. (for an overview of the political context see Appendix 1.

[48]The case of Evangelos Venizelos, who makes the most appeals to consensus among the political actors, is interesting enough. As the Minister of Finance he made very few references in his speech to the body of the Parliament on 12/2/12. On the contrary, he made many more references (12) barely six months before (June 2011), when he addressed to the Parliament during the discussion of the Medium Term Economic Adjustment Program, while a total of 20 appeals were found in the data from speeches, interviews etc. from June 2011, as table 5.4. shows. The difference cannot be explained unless we take political context into account. In 2011 Venizelos, a constant pro-consensus advocate since 2010, served in a single party government, whereas in February 2012 he was member of a coalitional cabinet. Contextual parameters are also essential when it comes to data from May-June 2012. During the pre-election campaign, Venizelos, no longer Minister of Finance but president of the PASOK party, made 17 references to consensus, because, according to the polls and as it was verified by the vote of the citizen, his party has lost the dynamics to form a single-party government, and the only viable aim was to gain such a number of seats that would allow PASOK to determine which party may have the majority of seats in a probable coalition –which was eventually the outcome of the June 2012 election with the formation of a three party (ND-PASOK-DIMAR) government. Venizelos then had to highlight the necessity of consensus among the political parties and stress its importance in relation with the negotiations with the 'Troika'.

	In the same session with the PM's speeches	In whole corpus
George Papakonstantinou	2	6
Evangelos Venizelos	1	47
Yiannis Stournaras	1	3

Table 5.4.: Number of times the three Ministers of finance referred to consensus.

Consensus is intertwined with institutional environments, therefore it is bound with the notion of legitimacy –various levels of support are justified on the basis of the people's trust towards democratic institutions. Respectively, "people who trust that political power is appropriately exercised will show more support to policy efforts", whereas those who believe that their government does not deserve trust are, accordingly, more reluctant to support (Gelissen 2002: 86-87). Yet, trust should not be seen as identical to legitimacy, but rather as an instantiation of the dynamics developed among the citizens that explains people's attitudes and beliefs towards the governmental actions (Misztal 1996). Within the political context of capitalism in European economies, consensus is perceived as a diachronic element, a prerequisite for the good performance of the economy (Bruff 2008: 1).

In particular, it becomes extremely relevant to the analysis of Antonis Samaras' speech that is about extensive reforms in the labor market, which in turn have effects on the power balance between the State, the Employers and the Trade Unions. Consensus requires the construction of a political will as well as long term-commitments, and is cultivated on the basis of prior "common understandings", which in turn form a set of common expectations (Visser & Hemerijck 1997; Hall & Soskice 2001). Among the reasons why the need for consensus is considered vital for the political landscape, is the shared awareness of vulnerability (Hemerijk & Visser 2001: 226). In this respect, it seems relevant for Greek political actors to call for consensus given a) their will to agree with the troika on the terms of bail-out programs or reforms which entail a series of austerity policies and internal devaluation of the labor force; and b) the already known fragile and vulnerable status of the Greek economy amidst the turmoil of the economic crisis. So, when Samaras acknowledges in (18) the support provided to the Government, he implicitly enacts to various members of his audience a context model in which both (a) and (b) are part of general knowledge stored in k-device. It is crucial, though, to reflect on why certain "wills" and "awarenesses" do emerge, while others are downplayed (Bruff 2008: 32).

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Hence, Samaras manages to legitimize austerity on the basis of consensus, constructing a context model which control, in favor of the government interests, the attitudes and beliefs of the addresses towards the policies implemented. However, in the passage such a political principle is represented as a personal, more or less, matter, as something for which one has to be thankful, and it is not justified in terms of a conscious and consistent principle of how that Government conceived politics within the context of the crisis.

In addition, Samaras not only aims at legitimizing his Government's actions but, what is more, to legitimize his assertions on consensus. In this respect, he takes advantage of the ES type adopted in order to represent as taken for granted the 'fact' that there is indeed consensus. Personal experience ES type explicitly designates the speaker and, then, information is subjectively profiled. Typically, Samaras expresses his own beliefs about consensus, but as he constructs himself as the only and reliable source of the utterance, he manages to transform this belief to an undisputed fact –a move that facilitates its legitimization. Particularly interesting is the use of that-clauses in "I'd like to thank the Greek people that they know to stand [the crisis] and have expectations from us" which trigger two [factive??] presuppositions: a) the Greek people stand the crisis; and b) the Greek people have expectations from the Government. Both presuppositions represent as a fact a somehow unified stance towards the crisis, and the government adopted by an abstract subject, the Greek people. In other words, the political actor assumes that the propositional content of the two subordinate clauses is part of the Common Ground of the participants, that is, already existing knowledge stored in the situation models of the recipients. Similarly, the existence of that collective subjective is unquestionable since the noun phrase "the Greek people" triggers an existential presupposition embedded in two factive ones.

Such a merely semantic approach does not provide a full account of the function of presuppositions in the particular discourse. Besides, it is highly questionable whether the two subordinate clauses provide old information, and hence, tacitly conveyed knowledge. For instance, many would challenge the claim the all Greeks stand the crisis, and, more crucially, that have expectations of the Government –many citizens, political and social groups had several times taken the streets and protested against

austerity policies precisely because they did not have any expectation that the Government could resist or overthrow those policies or even guarantee the restoration of the national economy.

Then, actual interpretations depended on the particular text and context are also needed in order for presuppositions to efficiently operate in interactional and societal level. Therefore, in such an analysis, knowledge of the actual (political) context framing discourse production should be taken into account. The political actor, Antonis Samaras, has constructed a context model of the communicative situation, i.e. the particular parliamentary session in which it will be decided whether or not the reforms of the labor market will be approved, a matter that features as a discursive aim to strengthen the importance of consensus among the society on the necessity of the policies proposed despite their hard character, and, what is more, to positively portray that coalitional government the led by himself can guarantee the desired consensus. Apparently, the appeal to consensus is used as a means for legitimizing the strict policies in the labor market and welfare state. In this respect and in order to achieve the above mentioned aims, the speaker considers appropriate the use of presuppositions, which crucially contribute to the legitimization of his assertions as they construct a space of mutual agreement on the content of the proposition (Hart 2014: 180). In our case this is the assumed perception that a collective subject referred to as 'the Greek people' "truly" exists, primarily unified on the basis of its national identity, which is apparently one of the many identities (social, professional, class etc.) that a constructed collective subject may bear. Taking for granted that the Greek people *indeed* act in a particular way, audience is led to assume that this is the outcome of consensus that supposedly prevails over a highly diverted and stratified entity, the Greek society.

Still though, the above operates in a merely semantic level. The aim of the speaker is not to create meaningful utterances in a narrow sense. In this respect, social and political clashes and antagonisms are mitigated, and the belief on social consensus becomes the only one 'true'.

In (19) Samaras draws on auditory sense, as Papademos did, in order to legitimize his assertions.

(19)   Κι όμως, ακούσαμε εδώ πέρα κάποιους- και πιστέψτε με, είμαι από το
        1977 βουλευτής αυτά δεν έχουν ακουστεί άλλη φορά- στις πιο κρίσιμες
        στιγμές, στις μεγάλες πολώσεις ακούσαμε ύβρεις, προκλήσεις.
        Ακούσαμε για «χούντα», για «ολοκληρωτισμό», για «κόλαση».

        Still though, in the most critical times, amid intense polarization, we have
        heard some people –and trust me, I've been an MP since 1974, this is
        unprecedented- we have heard them in here making insults, provocations.
        We have heard about 'military coup', 'totaliariasm', 'hell'.

                                                              [Samaras, 7/11/2012]

Here the utterance is constructed in terms of inetrsubjectivity ('we have heard'),
which enhances the validity of the assertions as the responsibility towards the
utterance is shared –therefore the purely subjective character of Personal experience
ES type is partially mitigated in the passage, a crucial move as the Prime Minister
turns an evaluative representation of his opponents' discourses into a fact ('insults';
'provocations') –this is a typical case of a subjective attribution. Hence, the personal
evaluation made by the speaker as regards what a third source has said is represented
as more or less commonly accepted through the first person plural verb types, which
in turn imply the existence of a 'we-community' sharing a unified stance against the
claims of the opposition parties. Yet, the speaker comes on-stage in the parenthentical
verb phrase ('[A]nd trust me, I've been an MP since 1974), which strengthens his
own position as assessors of the utterances he mediates. By making an explicit
personal appeal to his long-term service as an MP –a move that indexes appeal to
personal authority– he attempts to construct a solid evidential base as a source of
information. He boosts his own credibility not solely as regards the validity of the
information he mediates, that is *what* the opposing have said, but also of the negative
evaluation of that information.

At this point it should be reminded that close relationship between auditory and
discursive based evidence. Typically, a speaker acquires through her/his auditory
sense what is being said by another speaker. In real communication settings, though,
(s)he may not opt to mark it (in cases of languages having a special evidential
system) or to represent it as discursive (hearsay in traditional classifications) for
reasons related with the particular communicative context each time. As said in 2.1.
this is not a case of a mismatch, but it rather indexes the priority of sensorial evidence

over the other types of evidence as well as the significance of context in the making process of the evidential meaning. Within the Greek political settings in which discursive evidence has a high symbolical role (see section 4.3.), the political actors draw on their personal context models and they generally mitigate the role of their auditory perception in the process of acquiring information, and consider more relevant to stress the fact that information is *reported* by someone else.

The above passage features some typical choices made by the speaker when Discursive ES type is adopted, such as the unspecified identity of the third source ('some') and the inherent negative evaluative character of the representations which convey what was said ('insults', provocation'). Both features are common when political actors aim at the delegitimization of the mediated discourses.

5.3.1.1.b. Cognitive based utterances (direct access)

In the present section is analyzed the relation between cognitive domain of evidence and legitimization process of assertions. For methodological reasons is followed the distinction between direct and indirect access to cognitive domain. The former is manifested in cognitive factive verbs, as well as in fixed phrases that also make explicit what is assumed by the speaker as a 'fact' and commonly shared knowledge.

Let's begin with the following excerpt from the speech of George Papandreou.

(20)   Εμείς, από την πλευρά μας, από την πλευρά της Κυβέρνησης, ξέρουμε το καθήκον μας. Ξέρουμε από τι θα κριθούμε.

       As far as we are concerned, as far as the Government is concerned, we know our duty. We know how we will be judged.

                                                                        [Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

In (20) the explicit use of the first plural person ('we') indexes intersubjective positioning and shared responsibility for the evidential support of the assertions. Though, it cannot be identified which individuals are included in the 'we'. In other words, the members of the epistemic community referred to as 'we' and being 'in knowledge' may vary. Does Papandreou include only his cabinet members or does he

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refer to the PASOK MPs or, more generally, to all card-carrying members of the PASOK party? In strict contextual terms, the 'we' pronoun includes PASOK's cabinet and MPs.

The first period ('As far we are concerned... duty') makes the knowledge shared within the epistemic community described above explicit. The importance of that move is analyzed in section 4.2. In the second period, the Prime Minister makes an inference ('we will be judged'), but especially emphasizes its plausibility and its strong evidential base making explicit the commonly shared knowledge ('we know'). The use of 'will' in contexts that the speaker has indirect access to evidence that support his knowledge, profiles an evidential meaning in favor of a temporal one (Giannakidou 2011, Giannakidou & Mari 2012). Typically, the political actor conveys an inetrsubjective opinion, realized as an inference. Though, taking into account the legitimization aims set by Papandreou, the use of the cognitive factive 'to know' enhances the validity of the assertion and mitigates the inferential process. In particular, the status of opinion represented, even though it is seemingly quite firm among the PASOK cabinets and MPs, is upgraded to 'knowledge'. Given that no supplementary evidence is given to justify the assertion, Papandreou manages to enhance the credibility of his party as source of knowledge.

The next passage is from Loukas Papademos' speech. The political actor also uses cognitive verb types in order to legitimize his assertions.

(21)   Γνωρίζω ότι για πολλούς από εσάς η σημερινή ψηφοφορία απαιτεί μια
        εξαιρετικά δύσκολη επιλογή και ίσως συνιστά μια δοκιμασία πολιτική,
        ενδεχομένως και ηθική. Σε κανέναν δεν αρέσει να αποφασίζει για μέτρα
        τα οποία βραχυπρόθεσμα συνεπάγονται θυσίες για τους πολίτες.

        I know that today's voting demands for many of you to make an
        extremely hard choice, and it may even set a political trial –even a moral
        one. Nobody enjoys deciding on measures that entail short-term
        sacrifices for the citizens.

                                                              [Papademos, 10/2/2012]

In the above, what the Prime Minister does not utilize is explicitly commonly shared knowledge as Papandreou did in the previous passage. Rather, he makes explicit that he accepts the knowledge of the MPs regarding their stance towards the approval of

the hard terms entailed by the bail-out agreement. What is more, through the "that-clause" he imposes as 'true' a definition of the situation (see below) ('[T]oday's voting demands for many of you… a moral one'). In this respect, the speaker ascribes not only political parameters to the MPs' decision but also moral ones. Despite not being explicitly named, it can be inferred that the political actor calls the audience to make a decision on the basis of their national duty towards the country. As will be shown below, moral appeals are also evident when the speakers attempt to convey their assertions as "raw facts" –a move that enables them to transform their beliefs to commonly shared knowledge, and hence to construct a solid epistemic base for the effective legitimization of their assertions.

Interestingly, the second period of the passage is also realized as a 'fact' despite the formulation "to know that-" is missing. What also contributes to the objectificiation of the assertion is the use of third person singular verb types by which the speaker does not take responsibility regarding the validity of the utterance. However, this happens not because the political actor tries to disassociate himself from the meaning being conveyed, but because he assumes that knowledge as taken for granted, so there is no point to overtly express his epistemic alliance. In this second period Papademos enacts a semantic legitimization strategy which appeals to the necessity of the implementation of the measures along with its inevitable unjust character (for a detailed analysis of sacrifices metaphor see at *5.3.1.1.*). Therefore, he realizes one of the central doctrines of transnational financial institutions, implementation of austerity, distortions of the welfare state, negligence of the impact of the policies on the most vulnerable parts of the society, as something that is 'true' and 'justifiable'.

Likely, Samaras makes explicit what is assumed as knowledge as he used the first plural type *'ξέρουμε'* ('we know'). In the passage bellow he realizes his stance toward the epistemic status of the assertion he conveys through the fixed verb phrase 'the truth is (that)'.

(22)   Η αλήθεια είναι πως όλα – και τα σωστά και τα άδικα – είναι συμβατικές υποχρεώσεις που ήδη έχει αναλάβει η χώρα. Μην παριστάνουμε ότι δεν το ξέρουμε αυτό.

The truth is that all the measures, both right and unjust included, are conventional obligations under which our country operates. We should not pretend not to know it. Let's avoid putting on a show.

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Samaras makes explicit the 'in-group' knowledge both by using the verb 'to know' in first person plural form ('[W]e don't know it'), which indexes intersubjectivity and shared degree of responsibility regarding the validity of the utterance, but also by the epistemic expression "The truth is that" at the beginning of the passage, which also triggers two factive presuppositions: The first is that the 3-year fiscal adjustment programs include unfair policies. The second is that the terms of the ongoing program are understood as obligations, so they are beyond any dispute and have to be followed no matter any objections raised[49]. As a matter of fact, this knowledge is not only shared by the 'in-group', but is also part of audience's general shared knowledge as the Prime Minister is mainly addressing those who criticize the governmental policies.

In this respect, a strong evidential base is created upon which the issue of legality is raised. Appealing to a commonly accepted legality of the procedures is a typical example of impersonal authorization strategy, which suggests that an action should or should not be done depending on whether or not is in accordance with the law (van Leeuwen 2008). Legality, then, justifies the necessity of voting the proposing bills, while it also justifies why any kind of criticism towards the Government or the Prime Minister is pointless.

5.3.2.1.c. Cognitive based utterances (indirect access)

The indirect access to the cognitive domain of evidence discursively indexed by cognitive non factive verbs and relevant fixed verb phrases, which realize inferences and conjectures based on speaker's general knowledge or personal assumptions.

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[49]It may seem baffling that the Prime Minister has to explicitly state as a fact that his Government is obliged to follow all the terms provisioned by the adjustment to which they have agreed. Yet, it was common in the political discourse of the time that the content of the programs to be overtly disputed by political actors belonging either to the governing or opposition parties. It was then expected -and known- by Samaras that his opponents as well as MPs supporting the coalitional government would doubt over the necessity of voting the two bills (Labor Market Reform and Midterm Fiscal Plan 2013-2016.

(23) Νομίζω ότι δεν υπάρχει κανείς στην αίθουσα αυτή, σε όποια πτέρυγα και αν κάθεται, που να αμφιβάλλει για τη βαρύτητα και την κρισιμότητα της συνεδρίασης αυτής.

I think that there is no one in this room, no matter his political wing, who doubts the critical character of this session.

[Papademos, 10/2/2012]

Papademos adopts inferential ES type ('I think that…') and explicitly indexes the medium degree of validity of the utterance ('I think'). However, pragmatic and interactional parameters should be taken into account in order to fully interpret the excerpt. Apparently, the verb 'to think' attenuates the epistemic strength of the proposition. However, Papademos uses it for pragmatic reasons –he tries to construct a broad space of agreement with the addressees and not to impose his own belief. At the same time, though, he represents as taken-for-granted that the audience shares the same view by strategically using the 'that-clause' ('that no one… of this session'). This particular view emphasizes the 'state of exception' ('the critical character') with which the Greek PMs have to deal.

As the discourse unfolds, it becomes quite evident how strongly firm the Prime Minister is that all the MPs recognize the 'state of exception' at that time. In the utterance 'Today's session is, indeed, of historical importance for the future of the country' he adopts Factual ES type to strengthen the validity of his information, while he also swifts from indexing personal responsibility and medium commitment ('I think') towards the propositional content of the utterance to indexing opaque responsibility, disassociating himself for the representation –though not fully, as an explicitly assessment ('indeed') regarding its reliability is made. Therefore, the exceptionality of the situation on which the proposed action by the government are legitimized becomes more 'objectified'.

In the following excerpt, the speaker adopts inferential ES type, making a rather strong prediction using the verb 'will' (see the discussion on tha-clauses in .

(24) Μετά από αυτή την περιπέτεια, θα βγούμε καλύτεροι, θα βγούμε νικητές, όχι μόνο απέναντι στα ελλείμματα και τα χρέη, αλλά κυρίως απέναντι στον αγώνα για ένα κράτος που σέβεται και προστατεύει τους πολίτες.

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> After this adventure, we will be better; we will be winners not only against the deficits, but also mostly against the struggle for a State that respects and protects the citizens.

[Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

The inference lacks any kind of evidence that may support it. Taking into account, though, how the rest of the discourse has unfolded, it can be assumed that the evidence supporting the inferential process is related to the official projections of the rescue program along with the general knowledge derived from similar cases similar to the Greek one, in which a three-year bail-out program was implemented under the IMF supervision. As a result, Papandreou doesn't make a mere conjecture, but rather a generic inference in which he combines his own reasoning with the implied external information,

Despite the reference to an 'inclusive we' subject, the degree of the responsibility of the assertion is purely personal, because the epistemic evaluation made by the speaker is not represented as shared by a wider group of people. However, as the Prime Minster takes the full accountability of the assertion, he also enhances his status as source of the information. In other words, he implies that his position and his experience gained through the negotiations with the 'troika' allow him to make such inferences. In this respect, the validity of the assertion is mainly dependent on the credibility of the source, and thus becomes legitimized.

Moreover, it should be noted that the strategic use of the future representation in the above passage. Shaping and projecting the conception of the future is among the function of the political discourse (Dumnire 2007: 21). In (18) a typical instance of 'anticipatory discourse' is realized, a discourse that 'orient[s] to and assume[s] specific stances towards the future' (Dunmire 2011: 56). In general, future representations are used in institutional settings as a type of legitimating device in order to justify an institution's near term policy or action (Dunmire 2008: 81). Deploying future representations, political actors not only create perceived future worlds, but also they affect the way the audience interprets the current events (Edelman 1971:7). Thus, they generate a common view, a common ground on which several evaluative dichotomies, such useful vs. harmful; just vs. unjust; good vs. evil, are taken for granted (Chilton 2004: 199). Edelman (1998: 8) recognizes in future

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representations a potential means that shapes addressees' political cognition and behavior. In other worlds, the strategic use of the future as a rhetorical resource shapes and influences the audience's contexts models of an event or situation, since people are led to have certain expectations of the future. As has been pointed out (Dunmire 2008: 85), much of the future in policy making settings has an epistemic dimension; namely, it is concerned with knowledge and beliefs about the future as well as with the status and credibility of that knowledge and belief.

In Dunmire (2011: 57), two main distinct categories of positions towards the futures that can be adopted by a speaker are mentioned. One position concerns the knowledge of the future, and the other concerns the actor's capacity to affect the future. Regarding the former, Papandreou holds an "oracular position", that is he represents the future as being or possibly being known. Regarding the latter, he bears an agentive stance, which allows agents to "bring about effects on future events". Hence, Papandreou's representation of the future has the form of a somehow 'factual claim' about the future 'reality'. This is an evidential function (Dunmire 2008: 82) that supports the arguments for more immediate policies and actions, and also attenuated the rather epistemically weak status of the inferential ES type.

Evoking fairly confident expectations about the positive future outcomes of the program, the Prime Minister shapes the audience's perceptions towards futures and current events. More crucially, he formulates their context model in a way that advocates his own goals and aims. Despite their disputed character, the government's policies and actions proposed at the time of the speech become legitimized by being represented as serving the compelling images depicting the future. Papandreou creates a 'positive' world of governmental political action and emphasizes the outcomes of the program as if they were facts, which enhances their validity.

Making predictions is related to a certain legitimizing strategy, theoretical rationalization, which is based on some kind of truth (van Leeuwen 2008: 116). Predictions are mainly based on the speaker's expertise, so they function as an index of speaker's authority. Papandreou cannot claim an expertise on economics given his scholar or professional background. Nevertheless, he has privileged access to specific forms and places of power, both of which may determine the efficiency of a bail-out program, as the one presented in the speech under analysis. In this respect, the

symbolic resources of making a prediction can be extended and include not only the speaker's special knowledge on the issue being discussed, but also his power in general. Predictions made by those being in power or simply having access to political power appear more credible and legitimate.

More concretely, what is predicted can be related with a restorations of "social fairness". It is enacted, thus, a semantic legitimization strategy, which highlights the positive future outcomes of austerity policies, so it enables the speaker to convince his audience about why they should approve the bail-out. This is a common strategy not only in the current context of the European financial crisis, but in every political and social context which is constructed by its powerful participants as 'critical' or 'exceptional' (Fairclough 2003, Fairclough & Fairclough 2012; Fonseca & Ferreira 2015), which is virtually all occasions in which political elites plan to takes actions or implement policies that have a negative impact on the lives of many, especially the most vulnerably, affecting either the welfare State (see, for instance, reforms in education, social insurance, health system) or civil (see, for instance, numerous (inter)national regulations and restrictions taken in the name of the 'war on terror') and labor rights (see laws that restrict the power and the degree of intervention of trade union in negotiations between employers and employees). As Fairclough (2003: 99) puts it, policies and actions within political settings become usually legitimized and seen as "inevitable" when are justified on certain good things that they will *do* happen.

Though, the positive outcome in Papandreou speech is represented in rather general terms, with no 'objective' references. As will be shown below, the other two Prime Ministers, Papademos and Samaras, when they refer to the positive outcome of the policies asked by the 'troika', they tend to provide numerical data regarding the improvement of several sectors of the national economy. Typically, a reference to numerical data is seen as a discursive means that contributes to the objectivity of the assertion as well as to the credibility of the speaker. An excessive use of such kind of evidence, the so called 'numbers game', does also play a significant role in the construction of speaker's epistemic positioning towards the utterance he conveys. Whether or not in Papadreou's context model this discursive choice was irrelevant to the communicative situation, it should be also stressed that Papandreou was the first

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ever Prime Minster to implement measures within the economic adjustment program supervised by the 'troika'. Specific projections were included about the evolution of the program, but it was only after two years, in 2012, amid generalized and augmented lack of public consent to additional measures within a prolonged program of financial aid, when the specific reference to numerical aims was seen as a vehicle to discursive legitimization of the inevitable character of austerity both in level of assertions and actions.

Appealing to "social fairness" should be seen as a semantic legitimization strategy complementary –and not contradicting- to that of "social unfairness". They are both exploited by political actors for the same goal –the legitimization of austerity policies. As was shown, the former is future oriented since the actions proposed, despite their nature, are the bitter prerequisites that should be generally accepted in the present in order financial stability to be restored in the future. On the contrary, social unfairness, is past oriented, allowing the speaker to establish preferred negative representations of the past and, subsequently, to control the way with which the recipients construct their own context model and, hence, think of particular past events, actors and actions. Then, the representation of the past serves to legitimization of the present actions.

Similarly, the other two political actors deploy anticipatory discourses when the construct a positive representation of the status of the Sate after the successive implementation of the economic adjustment program.

(25)   Βραχυπρόθεσμα, οι νέες ρυθμίσεις στην αγορά εργασίας μπορεί να επηρεάσουν αρνητικά το μέσο διαθέσιμο εισόδημα, αλλά μεσοπρόθεσμα θα συντελέσουν στην αύξηση της απασχόλησης. Θα αυξήσουν τις εξαγωγές αγαθών και υπηρεσιών, θα περιορίσουν τις εισαγωγές, θα αυξήσουν το μέσο εισόδημα των εργαζομένων.

In the short term, the new regulations in the labor market may have a negative impact on the medium available income, but they will contribute to the increase of employment on a long-term basis. Exports of goods and services will be increased; imports will be limited; the medium employee's income will be increased.

[Papademos, 10/2/2012]

Papademos adopts inferential ES type and realizes a series of inferences which vary on the degree of epistemic strength ('[T]he new regulations may have a negative impact'; '[T]hey will contribute' etc). For the negative ones is used the epistemically weak 'may', whereas for the positive ones the stronger 'will'. The inferences made by the Prime Minster are predictions regarding the outcomes of the program, a discursive move that indexes the 'in the know' position of the speaker as well as his authority and power status to make such prediction (see the relevant discussion in 4.2.3.3.). Similarly to Papandreou's speech, the reasoning process of Papademos is evidentially supported by the official projections included in the rescue program proposed. Presenting both the negative and positive outcomes of the program, the Prime Minister builds for himself the image of a responsible and objective leader who is fully aware of the whole spectrum of implication entailed by his proposal. Emphasizing the future outcomes is related with what van Leeuwen calls goal oriented instrumental rationality (2008: 114). The potentially achieved goals achieved constitute the purpose on the basis of which the necessity of voting for the program is justified. The appeal to the instrumental dimension of implementing the rescue program is signaled by the Papademos' choice to remain offstage and present his assertions as objective as possible, while at the same time remains opaque about the accountability regarding their validity.

In other instances Papademos draws again on a cognitive domain of evidence of knowing, but he focuses on the means, i.e. the program per se, which forms the basis of justification. This is the case in (26):

(26)   Η πλήρης, έγκαιρη και αποτελεσματική εφαρμογή του προγράμματος δεν θα είναι εύκολη. Θα απαιτήσει συντονισμένες προσπάθειες και σωστή διαχείριση. Βραχυπρόθεσμα, η εφαρμογή του προγράμματος θα έχει επιπτώσεις στην οικονομική δραστηριότητα και το διαθέσιμο εισόδημα.

The full,timely and successful implementation of the program won't be easy. It will require co-ordinated efforts and proper management. In short term, the implementation of the program will have implications for the economic activity and disposable income.

[Papademos, 10/2/2012]

Again, Papademos makes a series of inferences and exploiting the status of the program itself. This falls within the category instrumental rationalization, a

legitimization strategy that was used in (25) as well. The difference here is that Papademos presents the act of the implementation as the vital prerequisite for efficiently confronting the crisis. Instead of paying attention to the future goals, Papademos sheds lights on the means, that is the program per se which is additionally vested by the status of its initiators, i.e. the 'troika'. Hence, the rescue program is seen as an 'entity' on the basis of which the necessity of adopting and implementing the measures proposed by the troika is justified.

In (27) below some short excerpts from a rather extended part[50] of Papademos' speech are presented. The political actor mainly adopts Factual ES type, but at the beginning of the passage he bases his assertion on some kind of evidence –the economic adjustment program, and takes full responsibility of the assertion ("I want... to be presented concisely but pithily"). Yet, as his discourse is unfolded, information is discursively realized in a way that allows audience to process it as 'objective'. The speaker remains offstage through the constant use of third person verb types, passive voice syntax and nominalizations, all of which index opaque responsibility towards the assertion, while he attenuates his own credibility validity as a source of the assertion as he avoids any explicit expression of commitment. Moreover, a high degree of certainty towards the validity of the utterance is implicitly expressed through the use of epistemically strong present tense verb types (Bella 2007: 265).

(27)   Θέλω, και είναι αναγκαίο, στη σημερινή συζήτηση στη Βουλή να παρουσιαστούν συνοπτικά αλλά περιεκτικά οι στόχοι, οι πολιτικές και οι μεταρρυθμίσεις του νέου προγράμματος καθώς και οι προοπτικές εξόδου από την κρίση.
[…]
Οι μεταρρυθμίσεις στο δημόσιο τομέα περιλαμβάνουν συντονισμένες δράσεις για τη ριζική αναδιάρθρωση της δημόσιας διοίκησης, την αποτελεσματικότερη είσπραξη των φορολογικών εσόδων και την αντιμετώπιση της διαφθοράς, καθώς και ένα νέο και απλούστερο φορολογικό σύστημα το οποίο αποσκοπεί στην προώθηση των επενδύσεων, στον περιορισμό της φοροδιαφυγής και την δικαιότερη κατανομή του φορολογικού βάρους. Συνολικά, οι μεταρρυθμίσεις στο δημόσιο τομέα θα συμβάλουν όχι μόνο στον περιορισμό του δημοσιονομικού ελλείμματος αλλά και στην προώθηση της οικονομικής ανάπτυξης.
[…]
Ο δεύτερος στόχος είναι να αποκατασταθεί η ανταγωνιστικότητα, να προωθηθεί η ανάπτυξη και να αυξηθεί η απασχόληση. Το πρόγραμμα

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[50] The whole passage can be found at the Appendix.

περιλαμβάνει σημαντικές διαρθρωτικές αλλαγές στις αγορές εργασίας, αγαθών και υπηρεσιών, μεταρρυθμίσεις που αποβλέπουν στη βελτίωση του επιχειρηματικού περιβάλλοντος, με στόχο την προώθηση των επενδύσεων και εξαγωγών, καθώς και μεταρρυθμίσεις που θα συντελέσουν στην ταχύτερη απονομή της δικαιοσύνης. Και αυτές οι διαρθρωτικές αλλαγές θα επηρεάσουν θετικά την επενδυτική δραστηριότητα, τις εξαγωγές και την απασχόληση.
[…]
Τέλος, προκειμένου να διασφαλιστεί η χρηματοπιστωτική σταθερότητα και η ρευστότητα της οικονομίας, το πρόγραμμα προβλέπει την ενίσχυση της κεφαλαιακής θέσης και της ευρωστίας των τραπεζών, ώστε να αντιμετωπιστούν οι συνέπειες της αναδιάρθρωσης του δημόσιου χρέους και της παρατεταμένης ύφεσης. Αυτό θα γίνει με τρόπο που προάγει το δημόσιο συμφέρον και σέβεται την επιχειρηματική αυτονομία των τραπεζών. Η εφαρμογή της στρατηγικής αυτής θα συμβάλει ουσιαστικά στην αύξηση της πιστωτικής επέκτασης και της ρευστότητας της οικονομίας και στη στήριξη της οικονομικής δραστηριότητας.

I want and it is necessary in the current Parliamentary discussion that the aims, policies and reforms of the new [economic adjustment] program as well as the prospects of exiting the crisis to be presented concisely but comprehensively.
[…]
The reforms in the public sector include both coordinated actions for the significant restructuring of public administration; the more efficient tax collection; and the confrontation of corruption, and a new and simpler taxation system that aims at promoting investments; limiting the tax-evasion; and the fairer distribution of taxation burden. In sum, the reforms in the public sector will not only contribute to the reduction of public debt, but they will also contribute to promoting financial development.
[...]
The second goal is to restore competitiveness; to promote development; and to increase employment. The program includes significant structural changes in the labor, goods and service markets –reforms [are included] that aim to upgrade the entrepreneurial environment so as to promote investments and exports, [as well as] reforms that will contribute to a faster justice administration. And these structural changes will positively affect investment activity, exports and employment.
[...]
Lastly, the program provisions the strengthening of the capital position and the wealth of the banks in order for financial stability and liquidity to be secured, as well as the consequences of the public debt's restructuring and extended recession. This will be achieved in a way that promotes public interest and respects the operational autonomy of the banks. The implementation of this strategy will substantially contribute to the broadening of the economy's credit expansion and liquidity, as well as to the support of economic activity.

Papademos enacts the same semantic legitimization strategy discussed just above, since he emphasizes on the positive future goals of the program (goal-oriented legitimization) and on the program per se (means oriented legitimization). The critical aspect, though, that differentiates (27) from both (25) and (26) is the particular vocabulary used, the lexical style, that echoes a technocrat, managerial jargon that includes a lot of specialized terms with which only those having deep knowledge of economics and finance are familiar with (see for instance, 'restructuring of public administration'; 'taxation burden'; 'restrictions on public debt'; 'financial development'; 'competitiveness'; 'entrepreneurial environment'; 'investment activity'; 'capital position'; 'financial stability'; 'operating autonomy'; 'credit expansion'; 'liquidity'; 'economic activity').

Discursive meaning is not solely generated by explicit and implicit cohesion and coherence relations among the linguistic elements (Grice 1975, Halliday & Hasan 1976). Within the CDS literature, the significance of context in how discursive meaning is emerged has been highlighted from various perspectives, baring the process of (oral or written) text production and comprehension (van Dijk 2008a, 2009; Reisigl & Wodak 2009[2], Fairclough 2010[2]). Apparently, the immediate co-text contributes to meaning production, but it is only one of the various context levels that should be taken into account in a critical analysis of discourse. Discourses are historical (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 266) in a sense that any given moment of discourse integrates knowledge of previous discourses as well as of the communicative, social and historical context within which a discursive event takes place. Discourses are, therefore, related with other discourses, those produced earlier as well as those produced synchronically and subsequently, forming intertextual chains without which a thorough understanding of particular events and texts or their significance for the participants cannot be achieved (Fairclough 2010[2]: 420-421). Also, discourses integrate extra-linguistic and institutional variables of the situation within which they occur as well as knowledge of the broader social and historical context in which are embedded (Reisigl & Wodak 2009[2]: 93).

Regarding (27), what gains in importance is to amplify the analysis of lexical style beyond the first contextual level, the immediate co-text. Evidently, the speaker recontextualizes 'technocrat' discourses within parliamentary discourse. Initially developed in sociology (Bernstein 1990) and later elaborated within discourse studies (Fairclough & Chouliaraki 1999; Fairclough 2003), recontextualization signals a relationship between different forms of social practices, and, more concretely, how discourse of one social practice is recotextualized in another. Here, the discourse produced within particular settings, that of financial institutions, under a process of production and distribution reflecting a complex system of values, norms, beliefs, actions, actors, identities, roles etc. that operates both within the same institutions but also among different institutions, is relocated to another discourse, that of parliamentary debates, which are connected with exercising power and policy making.

As said, the Prime Minister attempts to legitimize his actions on the basis of positive outcomes and restoration of social fairness. Still, though, the occurring linguistic choices in the passage directly contribute to not only to the legitimization of his actions, but also of his assertions. This particular vocabulary style is vested by the authoritative status and power of the institutions within which it is produced. Within the modern Western Capitalism, financial institutions, either national, international or transnational, exercise power over societies, (in)directly affecting processes in the realm of politics. The authorized jargon used and standardized in those settings is then an instrument of conceiving 'reality', since it constructs a particular world-view, and (re)produces specific knowledge, beliefs, norms and values all of which reflecting the interest of financial elites. Financial jargon can be, accordingly, seen as a powerful symbolical resource, rather scarce in terms of access. Exploiting this jargon not only entails that specific hierarchies and unequal relations are integrated in discourse and then are reproduced, but also it entails superordinate position for the actors having access to that jargon, just as Papademos has. In this respect, this is an instance that discourse per se functions as a means of justification, i.e. the discourse legitimizes itself (Rojo & van Dijk 1997: 550).

Showing his fluency with the specialized terminology of the scientific fields of economics and finance, he draws on its symbolical power in order to index his

acknowledged academic expertise in those fields, and hence to appear more credible and having in-depth knowledge. Therefore, his own personal authority as well as the knowledge asymmetry between speaker and audience is implicitly stressed.

The use of any kind of authorized jargon automatically indicates a sharp division between those who know and those who do not (Rojo and van Dijk 1997: 558-559). This inequality enables the ones possessing the knowledge to opt for an evasive style, preferred in political settings and necessary for persuasive and manipulative purposes. In the passage under study, it is plausible to infer that the majority of the audience hardly can understand, let alone to question, what the Prime Minister says. What is more, in the Prime Minister's speech several predicted sets of complex social and economic events are represented, but in such a high level of abstraction and generality that cannot be conceived and comprehended by a non-expert. Therefore, the recipients are solely relied on the status and authority of the speaker as convincing evidence as regards the validity of the assertions communicated. At the same time, Papademos exploits financial jargon in order to construct himself as a credible speaker as well as to effectively conceal the core principle of the economic adjustment program, austerity.

He also tacitly assesses which knowledge is 'the one that counts' as well as which sources of knowledge should be seen as 'right' and remain unchallenged within the given political and historical context, whereas at the same time he mitigates any knowledge that proposes a different conception of the world. Having led his audience to process the utterance as 'objective' he manages to espistemically control the context models of his recipients and to legitimize the knowledge, and hence the voice, of the powerful financial elites and at the same time to (de)legitimize by mitigation any other counter-discourse.

Apparently, recontextualization is not solely a matter of lexical style. As the speaker considers relevant to the communicative situation to construct a 'reality' within which the policy-making amid a crisis should be represented in terms of financial jargon, this also indexes that he considers appropriate to intergrate the practice of policy making as it occurs in an transnational financial institution within the practice of policy making with the Parliament. The discourse used in (27) not only has perlocutionary effects, but it also has social effects as it indicates how things should

be done –it belongs in a genre of governance in Faircloughian terms (2003: 32). In other words, a shift of conception of doing politics is indicated from legally institutionalized procedures of democratic deliberation and decision-making to procedures heavily relied on vertical hierarchy and efficiency in terms of (numerical, statistical) outcome.

Taking into account the three last passages, it must be noted that the distinction between instrumental rationality and personal authority is blurred. The Prime Minister refers to the goals and the means that justify his assertions, whether realized by inferential or factual ES type, but he implicitly exploits his expertise in economics as well. Even though he does not make any explicit reference to his high evidential standing status as the source of information, nor does he take personal responsibility of information conveyed, he rightly assumes that his identity as reputed 'technocrat' is already known by its recipients, that it is a part of their General Knowledge of the Greek political landscape. Therefore, this directly contributes to how the audience processes and interprets his utterances and to how they assess him as a source of information.

In making an inference or a prediction about the outcomes of the program or even presenting the positive consequences of the policies entailed by that program as a 'fact', some degree of expertise is required, and not only an epistemic alliance with the discourses produced by the 'troika' which are largely reflected in the content of the bail-out agreements. Accordingly, the assertions uttered in the passages above are justified on the basis of the speaker's own cognitive domain of evidence, but it remains unclear whether are legitimized because Papademos as an expert says so or because the evidentiary standing of the program as a source of information is exploited. As a matter of fact, it is plausible to argue that Papademos strategically uses this evasive style in order to efficiently shape the attitude of his audience not only towards the program, but also towards Papademos himself. Hence, he guides audience to construct a context model in which are stored positive beliefs regarding the program as well as positive beliefs regarding him as a source of knowledge.

The following passages are derived from the speech of Samaras:

(28)　Με τη σωτηρία αυτού του τραπεζικού συστήματος θα απομακρυνθεί η αβεβαιότητα, θα επιστρέψουν οι καταθέσεις, θα υπάρξει ρευστότητα – το «αίμα της οικονομίας» δηλαδή- κι έτσι θα σωθούν θέσεις εργασίας και για πρώτη φορά θα δημιουργηθούν και νέες θέσεις στην επόμενη φάση.

Το σπουδαιότερο: θα ξεπληρώσουμε μέσα στους επόμενους μήνες το μεγαλύτερο μέρος και μέσα στην επόμενη χρονιά το σύνολο σχεδόν των ληξιπρόθεσμων οφειλών του κράτους σε ιδιώτες: επιχειρηματίες, αλλά και σε απλούς πολίτες. Κι αυτό θα προσδώσει επιπλέον ρευστότητα, θα ανακουφίσει την αγορά, θα φέρει πιο κοντά την ανάκαμψη.

Επί πλέον: θα απομακρυνθεί οριστικά η «δραχμοφοβία», ο φόβος για επιστροφή της Ελλάδας στη δραχμή! Αυτό θα αλλάξει την ψυχολογία και θα επιτρέψει να υπάρξει στροφή των επενδυτών στην Ελλάδα. Κάτι που έχει να γίνει πολλά χρόνια…

Τέλος, και προσέξτε το αυτό: για πρώτη φορά τα χρήματα που θα μπουν στην οικονομία την επόμενη χρονιά θα είναι περισσότερα από εκείνα που θα βγουν, από εκείνα που θα αφαιρεθούν από την οικονομία λόγω λιτότητας! Κι έτσι θα συγκρατηθεί η ύφεση και η άνοδος της ανεργίας. Θα αντιστρέψουμε την ελεύθερη πτώση των τελευταίων ετών.

By saving the bank system, uncertainty will be avoided and the savings will return; liquidity –the blood of the economy- will occur, and this is how job positions will be saved, and for the first time new ones will be created in the next phase [of the program].

What is more important is that within the coming months we will pay back the bigger part of the State's overdue debts to persons, entrepreneurs and ordinary citizens. And within the next year [we will pay back] almost the total amount of the debt that has fallen due. And this will add liquidity; it will relieve the market; it will bring financial recovery closer.

Moreover: the drachma-phobia, the fear of returning to the drachma, will be permanently avoided. This will change the general disposition and it will allow investors to return to Greece, which hasn't occurred in years…

Last, but not least: for the first time the money that will enter the economy next year will be more than the money that will exit due to austerity. This is how recession as well as unemployment increase will be restrained. We will reverse the free fall of the past years.

[Samaras, 7/11/2012]

Looking closer at the passage, the Prime Minister makes a series of inferences, which are realized by 'will' indicating an assumptive judgment, which in turn is based on what is generally known (Palmer 2001: 25), i.e. on an indirect evidence. The subjective character of the evaluation, though, is attenuated, due to the opaque responsibility regarding the validity of the utterance. The inferences reflect a reasoning process made by the Prime Minster, but the constant use of third person verb types contributes to the processing of the information communicated as being strong and valid projections about the future status the Greek economy even though

they are not supported by apparent evidence. In this respect and as the evidential basis of the inferences remains unknown, the anticipatory positive outcomes, the very product of the reasoning process, not only are in the foreground but they are also represented as somehow inevitable.

Yet, anyone having a general knowledge on how these inferences are made can easily assume that they are based on official reports and studies by particular institutions, within and outside the EU, which, of course, align with the basic principles of the adjustment program. Samaras assumes that his audience has such a knowledge, so he strategically implies that his projections are backed by such sources. Therefore, the knowledge produced by those institutions is implicitly seen as reliable and unquestionable and 'superior' compared to the knowledge produced by other institutions that challenge those projections and which was totally omitted by Samaras as well as by any other political actor, either the Prime Ministers or Ministers of Finance, included in the study. Therefore, Samaras tacitly endorses specific sources of knowledge and represents their discourses a) as fully internalized by him allowing him to legitimize his assertions; and b) as part of shared knowledge and, therefore commonly accepted, so there is no need to be attributed to their initial, original source. At the same time, though, the Prime Minister assumes that in the given political context a particular naming of the actual source of knowledge on which he tacitly legitimizes his assertions may be interpreted by the audience as a sign of 'weakness'. Reproducing the voice of the implied source and being reluctant to take full account of the validity of his assertions, the Prime Minister would have caused damage to his image as a supposedly bold leader with such an authority that entitles him to self-legitimize his assertions during a critical parliamentary discussion of a controversial bill.

Note here that general knowledge of Greek politics stored in the K-device of the recipients also contributes on the choice made by the Prime Minister: Samaras had won the then recently held elections (June 2012) assuring the voters that with him in the office negotiations with the 'troika' would be much harder than those having taken place under the PASOK government, and what is more, the government's consents to the 'troika's' demands would no longer be granted. Antonis Samaras assumes that this is known by his audience, so one of his main aims during the

discussion is to present the bills not as a mere implementations of what the creditors have asked, but as the result of mutually beneficial, but nevertheless hard, negotiations. Therefore, he has to discursively construct himself as a reliable source of knowledge, as a political actor who can offer guarantees for what he claims. In this respect, only full accountability of what he says can serve as a means for strengthening his own epistemic status as source of information.

Moreover, much of the access to epistemic guarantees supporting the evidence presented by the Prime Minister is restricted to political actors with relevant authority due to their institutional roles and positions. Being the Greek Prime Minister entails participation into discussions and negotiations, either official or unofficial, in which such knowledge is created, presented and conveyed. Nevertheless, Samaras avoids attributing this knowledge to its original sources, and, hence, he boosts his own authoritative status, as he presents himself not only as the source of the predictions, but also as being in an eligible position to make them. Note also that his lexical choices include ordinary vocabulary used for the description of complex financial procedures, and in general Samaras avoids technical terms or even 'number games' which index special, scientific knowledge and make one's discourse to appear more credible. In sum, the validity of the information conveyed through the above passage is derived by the high authoritative status of the original sources which remain unnamed. In this respect, Samaras exploits the evidential standing of his institutional role, that of the Prime Minister, and presents himself, and subsequently his governmental staff, as the original source. This move appears to fulfill the strategic goals that need to be achieved in the particular communicative context, i.e. a parliamentary session in which what gains in importance is a) how the power relationships between the parties are unfolded, and b) how the Government and the Prime Minister will enhance their credibility towards the audience they address to. Therefore, they should appear as having the 'right' knowledge, which includes the 'right' policies, in order to restore the country's fiscal status. Similarly to the other two Prime Ministers, Samaras spells out the positive outcomes of the program. As seen above the positive future representation is a common feature of discourses legitimizing severe austerity policies implemented in the current economic crisis.

It is worth mentioning that contrary to Papademos, in his attempt to legitimize his actions Samaras refers to the bill's positive impact on the Greek economy without recontextualizing discourses of transnational financial institutions. This move not only reflects the undisputed fact that Samaras is indeed much less familiarized with this discourse, but also that he considers appropriate not to disassociate himself to such extent from the assertions, but rather to speak 'the truth' plain and simple, so that anyone can understand. This becomes more apparent in the following:

(29) Εξηγούμαι: Την επόμενη χρονιά θα βγουν 9,2 δισεκατομμύρια λόγω ύφεσης, αλλά θα μπουν, μόνο από την επιστροφή των οφειλών του δημοσίου, 7 δισεκατομμύρια. Επίσης, θα μπουν τουλάχιστον 3 δισεκατομμύρια, σε πρώτη φάση, σε ρευστότητα από τις ανακεφαλαιοποιημένες τράπεζες. Ακόμα θα μπουν, από το ΕΣΠΑ, άλλα 5 δισεκατομμύρια. Γιατί η ανακεφαλαίωση των τραπεζών θα επιτρέψει να ανοίξει η κάνουλα χρηματοδότησης και για τα ΕΣΠΑ και για τα μεγάλα έργα που έχουν σταματήσει εδώ και δύο χρόνια και για την χρηματοδότηση των μικρομεσαίων.

I'll make clear myself: Next year, 9.2bn Euros will come out [from the market] due to recession, but 7bn Euros from settling the State's outstanding bills will come in. Also, recapitalized banks will initially give at least 3bn. Euros in cash liquidity, and another 5bn. Euro from the NRSF [National Strategic Reference Framework]. The recapitalization of the banks will run the tap of NRSF financing; of the public works [financing] that have been halted for a couple of years; and of small and medium enterprises [financing].

[Samaras, 7/11/2012]

Here the first person verb type at the hedge of the passage ascribes personal responsibility and the speaker's full commitment towards the assertions, a series of predictions that are based on the projections included in the bill proposed by the Government –still, this is mitigated in the particular passage and it is Samaras himself that appears as the source of the utterance. Even though the Greek political actors generally avoid to explicitly refer to themselves as sources of information, this does not entail, as is shown, that political actors mitigate the apparent evidential status of their institutional position. On the basis of their context models they interpret their role within a communicative situation as one that bears the highest degree of credibility, and among their aims is to efficiently construct a similar identity and likewise shape the context models of their audience, so that the recipients will accept the high evidential standing of the speaker as taken-for-granted. In this respect, the validity of

the assertions is solely based on the credibility of the speaker, particularly on the assumption made by the speaker that the recipients *have* to accept him as credible source due to his role.

In (29), though, Antonis Samaras does not construct his identity just by taking explicit and full responsibility of his assertions. It appears that he considers the lexical style he adopts relevant to the issue of credibility. The choices made by the Prime Minister ('9.2bn Euros will come out [from the market] due to recession, but 7bn Euros from settling the State's outstanding bills will come in'; '[W]ill run the tap of NFSR financing') typically are not appropriate to the formal context of the communicative situation. The Prime Minister refers to a complex legislative and financial process in simplistic and daily terms, adopting an informal style with which the majority of his audience is familiarized. This is an instance of political cross-discourse, i.e. the strategic use of linguistic resources that draw on ordinary style and are seen as incompatible to official settings (Alvarez-Cáccamo & Prego-Vásquez 2003). Respectively, he ascribes the feature of informality to the value of 'credibility'. The Prime Minister talks simply and plainly, in personal register, he just 'does the math', and, hence, he assumes that this allows anyone to understand what he says and either agree or challenge him. In this sense, a lack of evasiveness is tacitly claimed. Therefore, by explaining 'how things are' in a way comprehensible to ordinary people, the Prime Minister strengthens his credibility as he lets his discourse to be subjected to criticism by anyone.

More critically, though, the colloquial style serves as a means for constructing a space of alliance with the audience. The speaker discursively makes his knowledge accessible to all those who lack expertise in economics. Evidently, he aims to convince not those in the room, the fellow MPs, but rather his voters. He adapts his style to what he thinks is appropriate to beliefs, values and expectations shared by the majority of his recipients and not to what is appropriate to the narrow contextual features of the situation in which he is engaged –an official parliamentary meeting. Then, instead of being typically relevant to what is expected in these institutional contexts, he prioritizes the aim to efficiently design his audience, namely to be himself aligned with his recipients and share with them a bond in terms of common communicative and political interests. On the basis of that aim, the very linguistic

aspects of his speech are controlled by his context model of the situation. In the passage, Samaras crosses the boundaries of his official role and style and appears to know how to speak to his recipients in order for them to thoroughly understand, and has no intention to cheat them, thus fulfilling the assumed audience expectations of how a credible and sincere political actor should discursively perform. He, then, constructs an image of an 'ordinary', 'authentic' leader – one of the basic features of populist discourse (Jagers & Walgrave 2007: 322-323; Wodak 2015: 12).

The adoption of an informal style is a stable characteristic in parliamentary settings as politics are in interaction with everyday conversation (Chilton & Schäffer 2002: 7). It includes resources, such as metaphors, metonyms, polyphonic and dialectical speech, humor, informal vocabulary etc, all of which contribute to conversationalization of political discourse that generates an illusion of involvement in public affairs to the participants with restricted access to powerful symbolic resources. As far as the Greek political landscape is concerned, there is a strong tendency of political actors to adopt political cross-discourse with an emphasis on informal and everyday language (see among many studies Frenzi & Georgalidou 2007; Bakakou-Orfanou 2008; Tsakona 2009, 2012a, 2012b; Archakis & Tsakona 2009, 2010; Polymeneas 2012). Similarly to what was observed in the excerpt above, Tsakona (2009: 88) points out that Greek politicians primarily aim to attract attention rather than provide arguments, projecting "themselves, as friendly and trustworthy persons, working hard for the public benefit, using the 'language of common people' and, ultimately, understanding the public's desires and needs".

Taking into account all the data from Samaras' corpus, it appears that the recontextualization of elements of informal register within political discourse is a constant choice made by the political actor –much more frequently compared to the data from the other two Prime Ministers. This effort of political actors to construct a pseudo-solidarity sense between themselves and the voters, and to appear as 'one of us' mystifying the vast inequality in terms of power and access to power is also evident in discourses of conservatives and/or right wing populist leaders either in Europe (see for instance, Jagers & Walgrave 2007; Krzyżanowski & Wodak 2009; Semino & Koller 2009; Auers & Kasekamp 2013; Ruzza & Balbo 2013; Wodak 1996, 2013, 2015) or in the U.S. (Higgins 2009; Bonikowski & Girdon 2016).

In the following passage, George Papandreou calls the audience to make a series of generic inferences which though can be easily assumed on the basis the supposedly common knowledge between the speaker and his recipients.

(30)   Πέστε, εξηγήστε τι θα συμβεί, αν χρεοκοπήσει η χώρα, αν κηρύξει στάση πληρωμών. Τι θα γίνει με τους μισθούς και τις συντάξεις, που όλοι κοπτόμαστε κατά τα άλλα; Τι θα γίνει, κύριοι της Νέας Δημοκρατίας, με ένα κράτος, που δεν μπορεί να δώσει τίποτα; Τι θα γίνει με τις καταθέσεις των κόπων του Ελληνικού λαού, σε μια οικονομία που θα καταρρεύσει.

You have to say! Explain what will happen if the country goes bankrupt; if [the country] declares suspension of payments. What will happen to the salaries and pensions, in which we all are, supposedly, interested. What will happen, fellow MPs of the ND, in a state that cannot provide anything? What will happen to the Greek people's savings within an economy that will collapse?

[Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

The Prime Minister represents a counterfactual state of affairs, using an extended conditional throughout the passage in which the outcomes of a hypothetical default are implied. Papandreou exploits rhetorical questions addressed to a specific political group, that of the major opposition, ND, in order to implicitly construct a negative future world. Typically, he refers to them, but the contextual regulations of the Parliamentary debate prohibit dialogical exchanges between the MP on the floor and member(s) of the rest of the body, it can be claimed that the Prime Minister knows that his audience is much broader and he accordingly constructs his context model of the situation. The answers to the questions posed refer to a future situation that *will* occur and George Papandreou assumes that from part of General Knowledge, and this is why he presupposes their propositional content and tacitly calls the audience to infer it.

Even though the (implied) answers are typical generic inferences, their validity is boosted due to the fact that they are implicitly conveyed, and hence processed as a kind of knowledge shared between the speaker and the recipients. In order to secure that the preferred inferences will be made, Papandreou provides the audience with particular cues, which can be traced in 'that-clauses' ('[I]n a state that cannot provide anything'; '[W]ithin an economy that will collapse'). As this type of complementary

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clauses presupposes the truth of the proposition conveyed, some aspects of the 'negative' future world are taken-for-granted. Actually, the political actor in (30) takes the outcome of a possible rejection of the bail-out for granted, e.g. suspension of payments; a financially weak State unable to provide any kind of service to the citizen, which is in turn understood as a cause of unspecified effects and threats that the audience has to infer. Accordingly, drawing on their own mental models about State defaults and knowledge stored in those models about that kind of undoubtedly dramatic events, totally irrelevant to the General Knowledge about being a member-state of the EU and the Eurozone, the recipients are led to construct a specific negative representation of a future world in which the economic adjustment program has been rejected.

Despite not providing any type of concrete evidence in order to justify the reasons of the assumed implications for the Greek economy and society, the Prime Minister manages to legitimize his assertions as he exclusively exploits all the above pragmatic mechanism by which supposedly shared knowledge is tacitly produced, acquired and negotiated in discursive settings. Papandreou does not have to convince, because his utterances are constructed in such way that he a priori forms a space of agreement between the speaker and his recipients on the basis of mutually shared knowledge.

Moreover, Papandreou enhances his credibility as a source of information, even though he makes no specific and overt reference to himself in order to legitimize his assertions. Rather, he tacitly guides the recipients to consider him as a source of accepted evidential standing, and to subsequently construct a relevant context model featuring such positive properties about him. As he indexes that he shares the same knowledge with the audience to such extent that he even considers appropriate to the context of the interaction to explicitly refer to justificatory evidence that may support his claims, it is entailed that what remains implicit, namely a whole set of negative and threatening representations about the future, is commonly considered as 'true' and 'taken for granted' and, hence, is left presupposed. In other words, Papandreou does not have to talk the 'truth' about the consequences of a possible proposed program, because he conveniently assumes that all the recipients know and accept that 'truth', so it can be remained implicit and be inferred. More critically, it is also

inferred that Papandreou is a credible source as he communicates, whether tacitly or not, valid assertions commonly accepted.

This is a manipulative move, because undoubtedly the Prime Minister and his recipients do not share the same amount of knowledge regarding the possibility of a future default. It is not only the fact that the audience in its vast majority does not have an expert, or at least high, knowledge on economics as supposedly a Prime Minister does, but it is also an evident asymmetry in terms of access to sources from which the constructed mutual knowledge can be acquired. Because of his role, Papandreou has privileged access to specific forms of discourse and evidence and, hence, knowledge that allows him to know more than his recipients. Papandreou, then, exercises epistemic control over the hearers, as he deliberately a) mitigates a significant amount of his knowledge; and, crucially, b) guides the audience to adopt mutual epistemic criteria and to assume that the knowledge derived from the sources to which he, as Prime Minister, has access to, is unchallenged.

It should be mentioned, though, that Papandreou does not think that this implicitly constructed broad space of agreement includes all of his recipients. In a move that has both rhetorical and legitimizing functions, he constantly calls the MPs of the ND party to talk about what will happen in Greece in a case of a default. In other words he asks them to discursively express their beliefs and knowledge.

Rhetorically, this move allows Papandreou to efficiently control any possible objection occurred by his opponents. Either they would portray a negatively assessed future, confirming thus what the Prime Minister left implied, or they would overtly challenge the speaker, presenting a different view. In that case, Papandreou can exploit his evidential status as Prime Minister and either continue to mitigate or, on the contrary, to make apparent the knowledge asymmetry. Regarding the former, he can accuse his opponents of lying, because the severe effects of a default are 'taken-for-granted' so they all know that will occur. Regarding the latter, he can appear as having superior knowledge than his opponents, and he will also evaluate this knowledge as more 'important' because it is deriving sources from more powerful in political terms, such the IMF or the EC or the ECB etc.

As has already been said, Greek political actors recognize discourse per se as very strong type of evidence. Respectively, one of the aims in a political argument is precisely discourse (de)legitimization. In the passage under analysis, Papandreou manages to construct himself as a credible source of information and, therefore, legitimizing his discourse is making the audience to interpret it as valid and objective as it echoes 'the truth'. On the other hand, by asking his opponents in the Parliament to explicitly express their beliefs is an attempt to delegitimize their discourse by making it appear 'invalid' and lacking knowledge since it is not in alliance with his own.

Concluding remarks

In what preceded we dealt with the second macro-category, the averred utterances. Again, a finer distinction was made between based and non based averred utterances. The term basis corresponds to domain of evidence, which is the term we used throughout the study. The assertions of the first category are realized by the ES types expressing personal experience and cognitive domains of evidence, whereas the latter by expression indexing truth-factual validity.

In our analysis of the utterances having an experiential or emotional base of evidence, it appeared that Loukas Papademos again was differentiated from the other two speakers -he only once used this type of averred utterances, a move which was related with his interpretation about his role as a Prime Minister. As will commented, Papademos makes linguistic choices that allow him to convey his assertion in the maximum degree of objectivity. In this respect, he considers irrelevant to the communicative situation, in which he is engaged assertions that entail a high degree of speaker engagement. The other two political actors, Papandreou and Samaras, strategically used this kind of assertion expressing either personal or shared degree of responsibility towards the validity of the knowledge being conveyed (see the analysis in 4.1. that illustrates how an intersubjective stance is relevant to this kind of personal evidence). The main focus in the section was the strategic use of personal experience evidence, in order to legitimized the need for consensus among the political forces as well as among the Greek citizens. It appeared that through this kind of evidence, which is practically unchallengeable, the political actors introduced broader issues that -of course- are not taken for granted. However, an assertion originated in such

domain of evidence indexes full personal responsibility and due to fact that only the speaker has direct access to this kind of evidence, there is no space for dialogicality left. Therefore, the content of the assertion becomes uncontested, while its validity is solely dependent on the status of the source of information.

Regarding the averred utterances of cognitive domain of evidence, they were divided in two subcategories that were defined by the mode of access to the evidence, direct or indirect. With direct access the political actors explicit express personal or shared knowledge, whereas with indirect accesses they realized inferences. It was observed that the political actors used the authority the institutional position in order to express their assertions as knowledge, but at the same time the fact that they were explicitly expressing shared knowledge enhanced their own authority as the sources of that knowledge. In semantic level, the knowledge being explicitly expressed was related with the inevitable character of the austerity measures that were justified either in terms of legality or in terms of moral obligation, i.e. the case of sacrifices mentioned above.

The analysis of passages that indicated indirect access to cognitive domain of evidence included the strategic use of anticipatory discourses. Just as in the case of explicitly shared knowledge, the political actors exploited their evidential standing to make predictions about the future status of the Greek economy without providing any specific or concrete evidence that could back those predictions. However, this also functioned vice versa: the conjectures about such issues, enhanced the authority of the speaker, because a) they involved a high degree of subjectivity -even when this subjectivity was intentionally downplayed, a conjecture remains a product of the speaker's own reasoning; and b) they were interpreted as a linguistic resource that tacitly indexed an asymmetry between the political actor and the audience. What is more, the anticipatory discourses used were constructed in a way that let the speaker to imply that it is possible to have knowledge of the future events, and that he can affect them. Therefore, the audience was not only guided to accept the validity of the predictions because of the status of the source, but also the political actor let the audience infer that the validity of the prediction is backed by some official, institutional knowledge that is accessible only by the speaker. As a matter of fact,

many of those conjectures could have been attributed to a third source, such as official reports.

However, the political actors opted for an epistemic mismatch in order to represent those provisions as the result of their reasoning, and hence to take advantage of the implied asymmetry. As was shown, this asymmetry was strategically negotiated by these political actors. In cases in which they aimed at the persuasion of their audience through the construction of an epistemic alliance, the political actor mitigated that asymmetry by implicitly representing their exclusive knowledge as supposedly taken-for-granted and, hence, shared. On the contrary, in cases in which the political actors attacked to their political opponents this asymmetry reflected in the anticipatory discourses was emphasized. From a semantic point of view, the political actors enacted several epistemic legitimization strategies, such as "social fairness", by focusing on the positive future outcomes of the program, or "state of exception".

Last, each political actor on the basis of his own interpretation of how he should discursively construct himself as Prime Minister and political leader opts for different lexical styles, all of which had legitimizing implications. It was shown that authorized and technical vocabulary, the financial jargon, enriched the status of the speakers because they appeared to have in depth knowledge of the field of economics and finance. Also, it made them sound more distanced and objective. On the other hand, informal and daily vocabulary -in some instances in appropriate for the setting and the communicative situation of a parliamentary session- allowed the actors to more easily construct an epistemic alliance with and persuade their non-specialized audience. In both cases, but mostly in the one of authorized jargon, the discourse functioned as a self-legitimizing device.

5.3.2.2. Between based and non based utterances: counterfactual representations

In 4.2.4. it was discussed why counterfactual representations may also have an inherent factual character, which critically contributes to the epistemic justification of an utterance. Typically, a counterfactual representation draws on a cognitive domain of evidence, indexing a reasoning process being fully accounted to the speaker, who is based on her/his personal experience and to general knowledge of the events, actors, actions, relations etc. being conveyed. The only available evidence, then, is

internal, and as such not easily challengeable by a participant other than the speaker, thus reflecting the speaker's own assessment on the degree of likelihood of the utterance communicated. Semantically a counterfactual conditional presupposes the falsity of the expressed assertion, i.e. irrealis propositional content. Yet, when it comes to contextually framed discursive interactions, there are a lot of instances in which the speaker may construct a counterfactual mental space, but within that space both the conditional clause and its apodosis are true (Dancygier & Sweetser 1996: 73-75). Therefore, a counterfactual conceptualization can be seen as the 'furthest possible world' (Chilton 2014: 162) in relation to the position of the speaker, incompatible with the 'real' space of the speaker, but no less true.

This is precisely the case in the passages that follow. The three political actors construct their representations in terms of epistemic distance –as remote negative situations, which are however factual within that counterfactual context. These representations, either explicitly or implicitly conveyed, assumedly index the shared knowledge of how financial capitalism operates when it has to deal with cases as the one of the Greek State, mystifying the fact that are solely based on the actor's own reasoning process.

Let's consider (31) from Lukas Papademos' speech:

(31)   Το κοινωνικό κόστος που συνεπάγεται το πρόγραμμα αυτό είναι περιορισμένο σε σύγκριση με την οικονομική και κοινωνική καταστροφή που θα ακολουθούσε εάν δεν το υιοθετήσουμε. Μια άτακτη χρεοκοπία θα έριχνε τη χώρα μας σε μια καταστροφική περιπέτεια, προκαλώντας ανεξέλεγκτο οικονομικό χάος και κοινωνική έκρηξη. Οι αποταμιεύσεις των πολιτών θα κινδύνευαν. Το κράτος θα αδυνατούσε να πληρώσει μισθούς και συντάξεις, και να καλύψει στοιχειώδεις λειτουργίες, όπως τα νοσοκομεία και τα σχολεία, αφού έχουμε ακόμα πρωτογενές έλλειμμα πάνω από 5 δισ. Ευρώ. Δεν θα μπορούσαμε να εισάγουμε βασικά αγαθά (φάρμακα, πετρέλαιο, και μηχανήματα), αφού η χώρα συνολικά θα έχανε κάθε πρόσβαση σε δανεισμό και η ρευστότητα. Επιχειρήσεις θα έκλειναν μαζικά, αδυνατώντας να αντλήσουν χρηματοδότηση. Η ανεργία, η οποία είναι ήδη απαράδεκτα υψηλή θα αυξανόταν ακόμα περισσότερο. Η χώρα θα παρασυρόταν σε μια μακρά δίνη ύφεσης, αστάθειας, ανεργίας και παρατεταμένης εξαθλίωσης. Οι εξελίξεις αυτές θα οδηγούσαν, αργά ή γρήγορα, στην έξοδο από το ευρώ. Από χώρα του πυρήνα της Ευρωζώνης, η Ελλάδα θα κατάντούσε χώρα αδύναμη, στο περιθώριο της Ευρώπης. Αυτή θα είναι η μοίρα της χώρας εάν δεν υπογράψουμε τη δανειακή συμφωνία και οδηγηθούμε σε άτακτη, ασύντακτη χρεοκοπία. Αυτή είναι η ωμή πραγματικότητα.

The social cost entailed by the present bail-out is limited compared to the financial and social destruction that would have followed if we do not adopt it. A disorderly default would have led our country to a destructive adventure, causing financial chaos beyond any control, and social unrest. Citizens' savings would be in danger. The State would be incapable of paying salaries and pensions and providing essential services, such as hospitals and schools, since we still have an over 5bn Euro primary deficit. We wouldn't be able to import basic goods (medicines, oil, machines), since the country would lose any access to lending and liquidity. Enterprises would massively shut down, incapable of being financed.

Unemployment, which is already unacceptably high, would rise even more. The country would have become embroiled in a long-term era of recession, instability, unemployment and permanent misery. Sooner or later, these developments would cause a Grexit. Now at the Eurozone core, Greece would have become a weak country at the margins of Europe. This will be the country's fate if we do not sign the lending agreement and are led to a disorderly default. This is the blunt reality.

[Papademos, 10/2/2012]

In the above passage the domain of evidence is cognitive again with the speaker expressing a counterfactual state of affairs. It cannot be known whether the information conveyed is justified by the expertise of the source or by a more 'objective' kind rationalization, as any explicit evidence is missing. The speaker he profiles his subjective assessment of the degree of likelihood of the assertion extensively using counterfactual conditionals. In this respect, Papademos seems to interpret himself as a source of such a reliable status that he is allowed to establish in his discourse a 'valid' version of an irrealis world, which is, of course, a subjective product of his own reasoning process and his own epistemic assessment regarding how certainly or likely will occur what is represented in his discourse.

Eventually, Papademos relies on his own subjective context model and on its basis he associates his role as a speaker with reliability and authority, taking advantage of the general knowledge shared among his addresses regarding not only his current position, Prime Minister, but also his previous occupations in academia and (trans)national economic and financial institutions. He then constructs a version of a negative hypothetical future situation in which he explicitly infers the consequences to the Greek economy and society that will occur unless the bail-out program is

approved, and which is solely justified on the evidential status of the source, i.e the Prime Minister himself, whereas any other kind of evidence remains tacit.

In (31), therefore, the high degree of subjectivity of the speaker's epistemic stance is becomes gradually attenuated as recipients have to process an utterance which may be assessed as counterfactual by the emanicipator, but this hypothetical or irrealis world is discursively constructed by a source of high evidential status. In this respect Papademos does not have to directly or explicitly appeal to his authority. Moreover, framing the whole irrealis situation with the noun phrase 'This is the blunt reality', he manages to represent as 'future facts' the outcomes of a possible rejection of the second bail-out.

It can be argued that a cognitive mechanism operates here in manner relevant to the lattidute of acceptance facilitating the legitimization process. As the recipients process a series of 'facts' in an irrealis world, they might tend to by-pass the fact that this world is fictional and solely based on the speaker's very own epistemic evaluation. Hence, among the audience the degree of certainty regarding the emergence of the negative outcomes increases as the discourse unfolds.

Recalling the discussion in (27) about authorized jargon, in the present passage technical terms from the financial field are rarely used, and those occurred have are not very specialized. With the exception of 'disorderly default', the other terms appeared, such as 'primary deficit'; 'liquidity'; 'recession'; they are frequently occurring not only in the data of the other political actors, but also in the public discourse of/in the Greek crisis. It is quite interesting that the Prime Minister presents a negative future outcome in everyday vocabulary style ('destruction'; 'Enterprises would have massively been closed'; 'misery') and several metaphors ('destructive adventure'; 'financial chaos' 'social unrest[51]'; 'embroiled in long term recession'; 'at the margin of Europe') that can by no means be seen as part of an authorized jargon. Contrary to what was observed in (27), where the positive consequences of the program were presented in an authorized but rather evasive style that excluded many of the audience from actual comprehension, here the Prime Minister makes lexical choices that may be exaggerated in terms of their semantic content, but at least their

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[51]In the original Greek text, Papademos uses the phrase *κοινωνική έκρηξή* (lit. 'social explosion').

meaning is not restricted to members of an elite, ie. those who have academic knowledge in economics. Yet, the Prime Minister is not totally distanced from evasiveness. Especially his metaphors have a rather general, vague meaning that is largely depended on audience knowledge of the source domain used in each metaphor (see the discussion above). However, this knowledge is heavily constructed by the dominant discourse about the financial crisis, produced by powerful institutions (the Government, political institutions, mass media, financial institutions) both in local and global level, in which any alternative to the economic adjustment programs and austerity is negatively assessed and represented.

Quite interestingly, Papandreou merely implies a series of negative counterfactual representations:

(32)   Τι θα συνέβαινε στη χώρα, αν δεν είχαμε ήδη ενεργήσει, αν δεν είχαμε τελειώσει με το απαράδεκτο καθεστώς των «Stage», των συμβασιούχων από το παράθυρο;
Ποια θα ήταν σήμερα η θέση της χώρας και της Κυβέρνησης, αν δεν είχαμε θεσπίσει το νόμο για την απόλυτη αξιοκρατία στις προσλήψεις και την καθολική υπαγωγή τους στο ΑΣΕΠ;
Αν δεν είχαμε έτοιμο προς ψήφιση το Πρόγραμμα «Καλλικράτης», που εισάγει τεράστιες εξοικονομήσεις, συγχωνεύσεις, οικονομίες κλίμακας και αυστηρότατους ελέγχους;
Αν δεν είχαμε έτοιμο το νόμο για τη διαφάνεια, που προβλέπει την ανάρτηση όλων των αποφάσεων, όλων των κρατικών αξιωματούχων στο Διαδίκτυο, πώς θα τελείωνε η αδιαφάνεια και το θερμοκήπιο της διαφθοράς στο Δημόσιο;

What would have happened to the State if we hadn't already acted; if we hadn't ended the unacceptable status of the Stage programs and that of hiring contract staff through the back door?
What would have been the State's and the Government's position, if we hadn't legislated absolute transparency in [the public sector's] hiring and its inclusion under the processes provisioned by the Supreme Council for Civil Personnel Selection; if the Kallikratis program hadn't been about to be approved which introduces large cuts to spending; merging; economies of scale; and very strict controls?
If it weren't for the bill for transparency that stipulates all decisions made by the civil officials to be posted on the web, how would the lack of transparency have been confronted as well as this greenhouse of corruption within the Public Sector?

[Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

In the passage above, the speaker draws on his cognitive domain of evidence as he realizes a series of counterfactual conditional clauses, all of which trigger a structural presupposition allowing the audience to infer that the clause's propositional content is true.

> What would have happened to the State if we hadn't already acted (>>> we acted); if we haven't ended (>>> we ended *p*) the unacceptable status of the Stage programs and that of hiring contract staff through the back door?

In order for these presuppositions to not be misinterpreted, Papandreou deploys the discursive structure of rhetorical questions which also strengthen the 'truthfulness' of the propositional content.

As said in the relevant section, counterfactual conjectures are based on a cognitive domain of evidence to which he has indirect access in terms that the apodosis of the clause is based on a reasoning process, a deduction based on the hypothesis. Also, conditional clauses index a purely subjective stance towards the utterance, since inherently feature the speaker's full epistemic support regarding their likelihood. On the other hand, propositions are embedded in an irrealis world within which they have 'factual' status. In other words, recipients are guided to accept what is conveyed as 'factual' in a sense that propositional meaning is not grounded in the 'real' world, so it becomes hard to be challenged, while the totally subjective nature of the utterance also makes it hard for one to challenge the speaker's epistemic evaluation.

The significance of the source of information is downplayed when a speaker constructs a counterfactual state of affairs. As was shown, though, in the Greek political context political actors adopt this type of ES precisely because they draw on the assumed credibility of their institutional role, which not only enables them to construct an irrealis modal space, within which all representations have 'factual' character, but what is more to rely on such linguistic resources and make them relevant to a communicative setting, an official parliamentary discussion, in which prevail values, such as 'truth', 'sincerity', 'objectiveness' and 'accuracy'.

In (33) Papandreou constructs a fictional world through the conditional clause, and he assumes the representations included in it to be factual to such extent that he actually takes them for granted, letting the audience to tacitly infer them. He does say what

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would have been the result of the hypotheses he makes. Rather, at this point of this speech he opts for an evasive style, which allows him to draw on knowledge he assumedly shares with his recipients about the problems and the low status of public administration. Actually, he controls his recipients' context models of how public administration operates. Before making counterfactual conjectures in (33), he once more presented the corrupted administration of the previous government constructed in narrative, on the basis that he guided his audience to shape a preferred context model (see for more details). Therefore, in the passage above Papandreou he guides his recipients to tacitly reactivate all those representations that are already stored in their context models.

Semantically, the Prime Minister justifies the necessity of approving the bail agreement on making an implicit appeal to the irresponsibility of the past as well as on the positive self-presentation of the PASOK Government. Regarding the former, a series of implicit negative representations of how the Public Administration operated in the past are implied by the speaker. Through the rhetorical questions, Papandreou guides his audience to construct particular negative representations about a hypothetical present state which is seen as the immediate effect if the previous government, that of the ND party, would still have been in the office. In that hypothetical situation none of the actions would have been taken against corruption and uncontrollable expenditures. Regarding the latter, the specific reference to bills and legislative initiatives prepared by the PASOK government contribute to positive self-presentation, as they construct an image of responsible government, determined to permanently tackle diachronic problems of the Greek State. In this respect, the approval of the Economic Adjustment Program is understood as a responsible decision which must be made in order to secure the State's financing. Also, the positive representation of the government legitimizes the program's approval particularly on the basis of this stressed responsibility oriented mindset, which 'guarantees' actions that are efficient and within the deadlines of the policies asked by the creditors.

In this section we examined counterfactual assertions, a category that shares features from both macro-categories of averred utterances (based and non based). On the one hand, they overtly reflect a subjective epistemic evaluation about the degree of

likelihood of an event to occur - this evaluation is based on the cognitive domain of evidence. On the other hand, counterfactual statements, as was explained in 4.2.4., are constructed in a way that represents factual states of affairs within an irrealis world. Therefore, objectification and subjectification co-exist and both are deployed by the political actors for legitimizing purposes. Similar to other cognitive-based averred assertions, the validity of the counterfactual statements is largely dependent on the credibility of the speaker. At the same time, the realization of such statements let the audience assume that the speaker has some knowledge that allow her/him to make such evaluative statements. In this respect the political actors used this kind of assertion in order to enhance their own credibility as the sources of information. They exploited the assumed authority of their institutional role and established their preferred representations precisely on the basis of that authority. Obviously, a counterfactual state of affairs is epistemically weak and can be easily challenged since it is not backed by "verified" and "true" evidence. Within the settings being analyzed though, their validity was accepted because they were derived from the Prime Ministers. Important here is how the political actors negotiate the tacitly communicated Common Ground knowledge, especially in cases in which the counterfactual representation has to be inferred by the audience. It appeared that the political actors took advantage of functions of this kind of assertion in order to represent as "facts" -even being embedded in an irrealis world- their personal and group beliefs. In semantic terms, the political actors legitimized the necessity of the austerities measures to be implemented as they portrayed in negative terms what would have been entailed for the Greek society in case the bills weren't approved.

5.3.2.3. Non based utterances

In this final subsection non based averred assertions will be discussed. In this kind of assertion the domain of evidence which they are based on is unspecified or totally missing. When an averred assertion lacks a particular domain of evidence, its validity is related with the evidential standing of its source (i.e. the emancipator) and vice versa. In other words, a speaker of high evidential standing, who is vested with institutional authority, is likely to avoid any reference to the evidential base of his assertions, but at the same time a non based averred assertion indexes a source that is assumed as trustworthy. Since there is no trace of the domain of evidence, speakers

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opt Factual ES type when they make such assertions – a move that enacts the speaker's credibility (Cap 2008: 23; Cap 2006: 32), a prerequisite for successful legitimization. In Cap's view (2013: 53), assertions involve a series of features that contribute not only to the establishment of speaker's credibility, but also to the creation of a strong bond between the speaker and the addressee. Using this type of assertions the speaker refers to 'undeniable' and 'accepted' ideological ground works, expressing a 'common ground' that unifies himself and the audience as well as beliefs (and implied actions) that are in line with audience predispositions.

5.3.2.3.a. Utterances having unspecified base

Let us consider the passage in (33):

(33)   Οι δαπάνες αυξήθηκαν κατά 40 δισεκατομμύρια από το 2004 ως το 2009 – από τα 80 δισεκατομμύρια, σε 120 δισεκατομμύρια. Ουσιαστικά, διπλασιάσαμε το χρέος της χώρας μέσα σε λίγα χρόνια. Τη χρονιά των Ολυμπιακών Αγώνων, ο συνολικός προϋπολογισμός του κράτους ήταν 80 δις και, το 2009, ξοδέψαμε 40 δις παραπάνω, χωρίς να έχουμε Ολυμπιακούς Αγώνες. Από το 2004 και μέσα σε μία πενταετία, διορίστηκαν 60 χιλιάδες επιπλέον νέοι υπάλληλοι στο Δημόσιο, κι ας ήμασταν σε επιτήρηση, κι ας είχαμε ειδοποιήσει και την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, κι ας νοικοκύρευε η νέα διακυβέρνηση τότε το κράτος. Σαν να μην έφτανε αυτό, ξεπέρασαν τις 100 χιλιάδες οι νέοι συμβασιούχοι έργου, και σαν να μην έφτανε ούτε αυτό, 50 χιλιάδες παιδιά προστέθηκαν με ψευδεπίγραφα, δήθεν «Stage», υποτίθεται για την εκπαίδευσή τους. Ένα δεύτερο Δημόσιο φτιάχτηκε μέσα σε πέντε χρόνια.

From 2004 to 2009, spending was increased by 40bn Euros, from 80bn Euros to 120bn Euros. We doubled the country's public debt in a few years. In the year of the Olympic Games, the total state budget was 80bn Euros and, in 2009, we additionally spent more than 40bn Euros without hosting the Olympics Games. From 2004 and within five years 60,000 new public servants were additionally hired in the public sector, even though we were under supervision; even though we had warned the European Committee; even though the new Administration during that time was tidying up the State. And as if this weren't enough 100,000 contract staff project members, 50 thousand young people were added with the misnomer of the alleged "Stage" programs that were supposedly run for Young adults' training. A whole second Public sector was created in five years.

[Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

George Papandreou adopts Factual ES type in (12). He presents a series of objective, numerical data, without however referring to the source from which he acquired them, constructing a narrative about the previous administration. Apparently, the data come from the State's or the European Authorities' official reports and authorities, being generally assumed as credible. The emphasis on numbers, the so–called 'numbers game', is a well-known strategy in political settings and in the public sphere in general, as it communicates exactness and reliability. The point here is neither the data per se nor the facts, but more crucially how the speaker manages to appear more credible exploiting the 'objectiveness' of numerical data. Implying that he has in-depth knowledge, Papandreou provides an 'accurate' representation of how public spending had skyrocketed during the stint of his predecessor, Kostas Karamanlis, making a direct link between the increase in the annual State's budget and the number of public servants.

Also, in the passage above, first person plural along with third person verb types are mostly used, which indicate respectively an intersubjective or objective stance indicating the utterances conveyed, and therefore shared or opaque responsibility concerning the truth of their content. Accordingly, Papandreou draws on what he assumes to be generally shared knowledge that shapes the Background Knowledge in the recipients' context models. A proposition, the content and the 'truth' of which are represented as shared, apparently indicates common knowledge. The same holds true when a proposition is represented as an 'objective' fact, i.e. something beyond any dispute and already known.

Also, he exploits the audience's general knowledge of Greek politics by making specific references to events and situations that remain with no further elaboration. The Prime Minister supposes that his audience already knows how much the budget of Athens Olympic Games (2004) went beyond control and exploits that knowledge in order to highlight how excessive State spending was ('[I]n 2009, we additionally spent more than 40bn Euros without hosting the Olympic Games'.). Similarly, he draws on audience general knowledge on 'Stage' programs, guiding them to 'freely' infer a contrast that proves the mismanagement in the public sector between how these programs should have been operated and how they were actually operated. Last but not least, Papandreou activates particular stereotypes about the public sector ('A

whole second Public sector was created in five years.') in order to stress the poor efficiently in the State's finances. He triggers a whole negative frame regarding the public sector consisting of commonly shared and manipulative perceptions about its heavy toll on State budget; its lack of productivity; and how recruitments in the public sector are used as a means of buying off civilians' votes. Apparently, the public sector absorbs a relative large amount of State resources –this is a fact. Yet, in (33) there are popular negative attitudes towards the public sector that are represented as unchallenged facts.

Therefore, Papandreou constructs a narrative representing it as taken for granted, so he enhances its validity since there is no need to provide particular evidence to support. Rather, the Prime Minister remains offstage and lets the 'facts' speak by themselves.

As said, Factual ES type implies that the source of information is not important as it expresses 'world truths'. However, it may have either a persuasive or a manipulative function in cases in which information conveyed is considered as a fact or just be represented as such within a given context. Here, Papandreou indeed refers to facts in order to portray the ND governance in negative terms.

What is more, it appears that Factual ES type indicates something more about how political actors interpret their own role within the political communicative context. The Prime Minister considered relevant to opt for this type of ES, given his position in the communicative situation. In other words, he interprets as appropriate to his institutional role to use a series of Factual ES types in order to attack the previous government. Thus, the position of the Prime Minister is supposedly vested with such an authority and status that the speaker in that position is somehow entitled to make assertions of such a strong validity. Moreover, it is implied that the speaker is credible as he sticks solely to the facts, so the events and actions represented in his discourse are equally valid.

Along with the legitimization of his assertions and the boost of his own credibility as a source of information, Papandreou semantically points out the irresponsibility of the past government and allocates the blame of this irresponsibility in order to legitimize his current actions. According to Hood (2011: 6), blame allocation consists

of two moves: In the first move a specific action is presented, which is considered as being worse than it could have been if a different course of action had been taken, whereas in the second move the harm from that action is seen as unavoidable due to the serious omissions that cause it. In (33) the Prime Minister presents a series of 'bad' or 'wrong' actions, all of them located within the term of the ND government. Despite no reference being made to the ND party, the explicit time reference ('from 2004 to 2009') in the beginning of the extract leaves no doubt about the agent of the actions because it perfectly matches to the duration of the ND's administration. Papandreou stresses the negative impact of these past 'irresponsible' actions on the situation of the state's economy during that time in order to a) delegitimize them and put the blame on the ND party, and b) to trigger a political implicature according to which any other solution but the acceptance of the rescue package is inevitable.

The reference to the irresponsibility of the past is generally associated with the positive self-presentation vs. negative other-presentation (Fonseca and Ferreira 2015: 693). Papandreou, though, uses some first person plural verb types, even though his party wasn't in office. This move is not usual, but as the Prime Minister has directly attacked his political opponents in other parts of his speech, he sees this part as a chance to adopt consensus rhetoric.

Following Reyes' work on legitimization strategies (2011: 793), the past narratives in Papandreou's speech aim at spelling out the causes of the crisis establishing as 'true' a certain view of how administration was running for decades. The Prime Minister exploits the narratives in relation with certain legitimizing goals relevant to the specific context. As the negative representation of the past is taken for granted, the policies and actions proposed by Papandreou appear as the only responsible, and more crucially, inevitable in order for the crisis to be confronted.

Expectedly, past narratives realized by non-based utterances were also found in the speeches of the other two political actors, Papademos and Samaras. In the following passage, Papademos constructs a narrative concerning the main causes of the Greek sovereign debt crisis:

(34)   Είναι, όμως, αναγκαίο να κατανοηθεί ότι η κύρια αιτία της κρίσης είναι το γεγονός ότι για πολλά έτη το κράτος συστηματικά δαπανούσε πολύ περισσότερα από τα έσοδά του. Το αποτέλεσμα ήταν να διαμορφωθούν

τα δημοσιονομικά ελλείμματα σε υψηλά και αυξανόμενα επίπεδα, κληροδοτώντας μας ένα τεράστιο δημόσιο χρέος. Η επέκταση του κράτους πέραν των δυνατοτήτων του, η διόγκωση των δημοσιονομικών ελλειμμάτων, ο υπερβολικός δανεισμός, είχαν ως συνέπεια να δημιουργηθούν συνθήκες υπερκαταναλωτισμού – να δαπανούμε πολύ περισσότερο από όσο παράγουμε και να διευρυνθεί σημαντικά το έλλειμμα τρεχουσών συναλλαγών και ο εξωτερικός δανεισμός. Διαμορφώθηκαν επίσης συνθήκες αδικαιολόγητης ευφορίας και επανάπαυσης και προσδοκίες που βαθμιαία βασίζονταν σε μια εικονική πραγματικότητα. Παράλληλα, η χώρα μας συνεχώς ανέβαλλε κρίσιμες και αναγκαίες μεταρρυθμίσεις στο κράτος και το φορολογικό σύστημα, στην κοινωνική ασφάλιση και το σύστημα υγείας.

Όταν η διεθνής κρίση ανέδειξε περισσότερο τις δημοσιονομικές και διαρθρωτικές αδυναμίες της οικονομίας, όταν αυξήθηκε το κόστος δανεισμού σε απαγορευτικά υψηλά επίπεδα, τότε η χώρα οδηγήθηκε στη χρηματοδοτική στήριξη των Ευρωπαίων εταίρων της και του Διεθνούς Νομισματικού Ταμείου και υιοθέτησε το πρώτο πρόγραμμα οικονομικής προσαρμογής.

It is necessary though to understand that the main cause of the crisis is the fact that for many years the State was systematically spending much more than its income. As a result, the fiscal deficit reached high and increasing levels, giving us a huge public debt. The expansion of the State was beyond its capacity; the swelling of the fiscal deficits; the excessive borrowing; [all of them] resulted in creating conditions of overconsumption, i.e. spending much more than we produce, and increasing the current account deficit along with external borrowing. Also, conditions of unreasonable euphoria and complacency were formed and expectations that were steadily based on a fictitious reality. At the same time, the country was constantly postponing critical and necessary reforms of the State and the tax system, of the social insurance system and the health system.

When the international crisis brought out the economy's fiscal and structural weaknesses; when the borrowing cost was increased to prohibitive high levels, then the country was led to the financial aid of the European partners and the IMF, and adopted the first program of economic adjustment.

[Papademos, 10/2/2012]

In the passage above Papademos adopts Factual ES type. His assertions are not based on any kind of evidential justification, which is assumedly not needed as the Prime Minister simply refers to verified facts. Fiscal deficits, high public debt, excessive external borrowing, reluctance to adopt structural reforms in critical fields, e.g. public administration, taxation, welfare etc., all of the above are undeniable and, apparently there is no need for Papademos to supply evidence, particularly figures and stats, in order to provide strong 'guarantees' for the truth of his assertions. Nevertheless, by

adopting Factual ES type he discursively constructs a taken-for-granted representation of the distant and more recent Greek past until 2010. The factual character of the assertions, i.e. their propositional content is commonly shared, and it is enhanced by the lack of a subjective/intersubjective stance towards them. Papademos presupposes that his implied certainty towards the utterances, as manifested by the absence of any epistemic modal marker, is also accepted and shared by his audience. Also, the degree of accountability of the communicated utterance is opaque, which allows the speaker to remain off stage and present his information as more 'objective'.

Papademos however does not provide a mere representation of the events that took place in the past, but an explanatory narrative of what caused the intervention of the ESM support scheme to the Greek economy. In other words, he may focus on facts, but he also sees them as reasons that interpret the then current situation of the Greek economy, discursively representing a more or less 'state of exception' –not as far as the present and the needed actions to confront the crisis are concerned, but on how previous Governments have performed irresponsibly failing to adjust to 'commonsensical' macroeconomic principles. In particular, Papademos emphasizes on the irresponsibility of the past and he implicitly allocates the blame for this irresponsibility to the previous governments, in order to justify the necessity of the second bail-out program.

Along with the specific linguistic choice and the particular ES type adopted by the speaker, the validity of his claims is further strengthened by his personal authority. However, Papademos strategically avoids any explicit reference to it and lets the legitimizing power derived by his authority to be presupposed, so he can appear even more distant from and objective towards his utterances. In this respect, his authority becomes a part of the recipients' general knowledge as regards the indemnity of the speaker. It goes without saying that the assertions in (35) are legitimized on the basis of that authority –it is so because Papademos says so– but the implicit enactment of its power can be exploited by the speaker in order for his beliefs to be efficiently and tacitly constructed as general knowledge.

Subsequently, Papademos represents as undisputed 'truth' a particular interpretation of the causes of the Greek Crisis which echoes the views of dominant international

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and European Institutions, and to which other, challenging beliefs of political actors who share different views on how the financial system operates or should operate, can be contested. In other words, Papademos contributes to the construction of a particular knowledge on why Greece was so severely damaged by the economic crisis, and legitimizes it by adopting the particular ES type.

The negative representation of the past can also be presupposed as it appears in the following passage retrieved from Samaras' speech. Note here that for tacitly conveyed propositional content, the speaker draws on assumptions supposedly shared among the audience, whereas for explicitly shared content the source of the utterance is unspecified, despite the fact that the political actor is, supposedly, based on some official reports and statistics.

(35) Και ρωτάω: υπάρχουν πολλοί που δεν πλήρωναν καθόλου φόρους ή πλήρωναν ελάχιστα, όταν όλοι οι υπόλοιποι στενάζουν. Ναι ή όχι; Τους φορολογούμε με σχετικά χαμηλό συντελεστή: 26%! Είναι κακό αυτό; Αυτούς υπερασπίζονται κάποιοι εδώ μέσα;
[…]
Επιταχύνουμε το χρόνο και απλουστεύουμε τις διαδικασίες για την έναρξη μιας επιχείρησης. Να βρει δουλειά ο κόσμος. Γιατί διαμαρτύρονται κάποιοι; Να επαναφέρουμε την απίστευτη ελληνική γραφειοκρατία και να διώξουμε ξανά τους επενδυτές;
Κόψαμε απίστευτες σπατάλες σε συντάξεις-μαϊμού για πεθαμένους και επιδόματα σε τυφλούς που έβλεπαν πεντακάθαρα. Μήπως πρέπει να κάνουμε πίσω;
Βάλαμε μαχαίρι στη σπατάλη της δημόσιας Υγείας. Μιλάμε για τεράστια ποσά που έτρωγαν οι επιτήδειοι. Μήπως πρέπει να τους ζητήσουμε και… συγγνώμη από πάνω, που τους έχουμε χαλάσει το πάρτυ;
Είχαμε τόσους άχρηστους δημόσιους οργανισμούς και ψάχνουμε λεφτά για τα φάρμακα. Αυτό τελειώνει. Μήπως θέλουν να τους επαναφέρουμε τους άχρηστους οργανισμούς και να μην υπάρχουν φάρμακα για τον κόσμο, για τον οποίο δήθεν κόπτεστε;
Βάζουμε τις τράπεζες να πληρώσουν 555 εκατομμύρια για τα χρήματα που πήραν το 2008. Μήπως και γι' αυτό διαμαρτύρονται κάποιοι;

And I ask: There are many that did not pay at all their taxes or paid little, whereas all the rest are suffering. Yes or no? We tax them in relative low rate of 26%. Is this bad? Are these the people that some here defend?
[…]
We expedite and simplify the process of establishing a new enterprise, so people can find a job. Why are some people protesting? Shall we restore the incredible Greek bureaucracy and kick-out the investors?
We have cut the unbelievable extravagances of knock-off pensions granted to dead people, and allowances to the supposedly blind who had flawless vision. Do we have to step back?

We have radically cut all the waste in Public Health. We are talking about loads of money peculated by some tricksters and frauds. Should we apologize to them for spoiling their party?

We had so many useless public agencies while we are looking for resources to buy medicines. This ends [today]. Do they want us to refund the useless agencies and let medicines become scarce for people, in whom you [sic] are supposedly interested?

We ask the Banks to pay 555 million Euros for the [State] financing of 2008. Should some people be protesting even for this?

[Samaras, 7/11/2012]

Before moving to the analysis of how the negative past representation is signaled through the discursive resources deployed by the political actor, the explicit spelling out of the aim of his speech at the beginning of the passage should be mentioned ('And I ask'). This move reminds us of a similar move by the same actor in (28). As was pointed, these particular choices tacitly index that the speaker is 'entitled' due to his position in political interaction to claim that he has access to and knowledge of the authorized version of the events, while, on the basis of the power related to his position, he is fully committed to the assertion via the first person singular verb type used, enhancing thus his own truthfulness.

Apart from the above, in the present passage, the extensive series of rhetorical questions also index an asymmetry not only in terms of power relations –the political actor is in a position that allows him to set questions and, then, to control the subject of the discussion– but also in terms of access to knowledge –a rhetorical question does not serve a question's typical pragmatic function, i.e. seeking information. Instead, it indexes that the one who poses the question is already aware of the information being asked (see for more details 4.2.2.3.c.).

Respectively, the discursive resources used in (36) –the explicit reference by the speaker to his discursive aims at that moment of his speech as well as the rhetorical questions, enable the Prime Minister to claim monopoly of legitimacy and truth. Regarding the former, he exploits his superior role in the interaction, stressing not only his entitlement to particular discursive 'rights' within the interaction, but also his credibility particularly on the basis of those rights. Regarding the latter, the rhetorical questions contribute to the construction of his version of the events as commonly accepted and, hence, as assumedly 'true'.

The Prime Minister adopts a Factual ES type in order to represent his Government's actions, all of which aim at tackling severe issues of bureaucracy ('We expedite and simplify the process of establishing a new enterprise') and mismanagement in public sector ('We tax them'; 'We have cut the unbelievable extravagances'; 'We are talking'; 'We have radically cut all the waste in Public Health'; '[W]e are looking for resources'; 'We ask the Banks to pay 555 million Euros'). Samaras may not refer to a particular domain of evidence for justifying his assertions, but he refers to facts that he assumes that are already known to his audience, so any epistemic safeguards are efficiently overcome. To this end, the verb types in first person plural crucially contribute, observed both in factual assertions as well as in rhetorical questions ('Shall we restore'; 'Do we might have to step back'; 'Should we apologize'; 'Do they want us to refund') which signal a shared responsibility towards the validity of the utterance.

Nevertheless, the validity of the assertions is largely based on the credibility of the source of information, i.e. the speaker. As has already been pointed out, the political actors under study are drawing on their context models self-attribute values such as sincerity and credibility, so they see appropriate to make discursive choices that enhance those values. Similarly, they control the construction of the recipients' context models and leave specific traces in discourse so as to be interpreted as trustworthy sources of information. The audience is guided to accept Samaras' representation as fact not only because the speaker supposes that they are already known, but also because *the speaker* himself constructs them as such. Consequently, the assertions in (38) are legitimized by a) prototypically epistemically strong ES type adopted, and b) the constructed as if being commonly accepted image of the speaker as a reliable source.

The Prime Minister positively portrays his government by discursively constructing their unified actions against the corruption of the public section as 'facts'. Therefore he can justify their further actions, the approval of the bill under discussion, on the basis of their already known and proved responsibility for the sustainable and law abiding operation of the public sector. What is more, by the explicit reference to those actions in the assertions realized by Factual ES type, he enacts two semantic

legitimization strategies, which we have already seen before, 'appeal to social fairness' and 'irresponsibility of the past'.

The former is mainly explicitly conveyed ('We tax the min relative low rate of 26%'; 'We expedite and simplify the process of establishing a new enterprise, so people can find a job […]'; 'We ask the banks to pay 555 million Euros […]'), but is also tacitly inferred throughout the passage, because the taken-for-granted negative representation of the past along with the positively assessed action of the government, allows the inference that if the policies proposed are implemented then they shall bring justice in the public administration.

The semantic legitimization strategy of irresponsibility of the past is either explicitly ('We had so many useless public agencies') or implicitly conveyed by triggering various types of presuppositions, which are seen as very effective means for legitimizing assertions.

For instance, Samaras exploits existential presuppositions:

> There are many that did not pay at all their taxes or paid little.
> (>>> there are citizens that to do not pay what they account for in taxation)
>
> We have cut the unbelievable extravagances [...]
> (>>> there are extravagances)
>
> We have radically cut all the waste in Public Health.
> (>>> there is a waste in Public health)
>
> We had so many useless public agencies.
> (>>> there were useless public agencies)

Or lexical presuppositions:

> We expedite and simplify the process of establishing (>>>the process was neither fast or simple).
>
> We ask the Banks to pay 555 million Euros (>>> They Banks weren't asked so far to pay 555 million Euros).

Apparently, crucial to the construction of the positive representation of the government as well as to the negative representation of the past, or of the political opponents, are the rhetorical questions which trigger a series of structural

presuppositions, which in turn may embed other type of presupposition as well. The pragmatic and discursive function of rhetorical questions was discussed in 4.4.7.2.

(36a) Is this bad?
(>>> No, it's not bad [to tax the tax evaders])

(36b) Shall we restore the incredible Greek bureaucracy and kick-out the investors?
(>>> We will not restore bureaucracy)
(>>> We will not kick-out investors)
(Embedded: >>> there is bureaucracy)
(Embedded: >>> there are investors)

(36c) Do we might have to step back?
(>>> We do not have to step back)

(36d) Should we apologize to them for spoiling their party?
(>>> We do not apologize for spoiling their party)
(Embedded: >>> There was a party)

Apparently, the above spelled presuppositions operate in mere semantic level, but they have an impact on pragmatic and discursive level as well. They encapsulate a large amount of knowledge which is implicitly conveyed, and hence presupposed in discourse. Therefore, the speaker assumes that this knowledge is stored in the participants' LTM and forms part of their mental model of the status of public sectors in the not very distant past (bureaucratic obstacles to private entrepreneurship; numerous cases of corruption etc.). He, subsequently, considers relevant to the particular communicative situation in which he engaged to deploy discursive strategies that convey all those representations as part of mutually accepted knowledge. On the basis, then, of his personal context model the k-device controls how his choices, particularly, the realization of Factual ES type, and the use of rhetorical question, so that this knowledge is implicitly conveyed, especially via the rhetorical questions.

Simultaneously, though, the speaker attempts to control the construction of his recipients' context models. As Samaras' speech unfolds, the audience is guided to process all the speaker's representations that are subjectively generated but disguised as 'facts', as taken for granted. In other words, they infer that since the speaker talks in this particular way about what his government has done, and about the problematic status of the Greek public administration, his representations are unchallengeable.

Critical to this is also the inference that due to his institutional position, the speaker is assumedly right and credible. Accordingly, their general knowledge about the state of the public sector is shaped in a way absolutely in favor of the interests of the speaker, and they construct a mental model of the situation of the public sectors which exclusively rely on that knowledge. Based on the above assumptions made by the hearers, both positive and negative representations of the government and the opposition parties are respectively constructed, which in turn legitimize the proposed actions by the speaker, and delegitimize the ones derived by the opposition parties. Also, managing to control his recipients context modes, facilitates speaker's aim to efficiently activate other semantic legitimization strategies, such as the irresponsibility of the past and the social justice entailed by the policies proposed.

Taking all the above into account, the concept of political implicatures (van Dijk 2008: 188-190) becomes extremely relevant, which can be seen as a special kind of implicatures which are, in general, contrasted to semantic implications, in a sense that they are not merely derived from the generic knowledge of the world of the participants, but also from the specific and contextually bound knowledge that the participants share about the communicative situation. In this respect, relevant to the creation of implicit meaning is the participants' knowledge of all contextual features (time, place, identities, relationships among the participants, actions etc.) of the very communicative situation in which they are engaged (van Dijk 2014: 284).

In particular, political implicatures are derived from pragmatic and contextual inferences made by the political actors in institutionalized political settings, and they are specifically based on the particular political context of a political interaction. Closely related to the contextual aim of (de)legitimization of actions, policies, discourses etc, the sources of a political implicature can be observed in the participants' a) mental models of the topic(s) being discussed; b) personal context model of the very communicative situation; and c) general knowledge on political landscape that frames a particular political interaction (van Dijk 2008b: 189-190).

In this respect, Samaras does not simply pose rhetorical questions only to semantically convey a significant amount of knowledge, but he does so because he attempts to accomplish particular political aims which are interconnected with the contextual aims of the communicative situation in which he takes part, the

parliamentary session under study. In order to understand why the Prime Minister poses a series of rhetorical questions, and which is actually the content of knowledge being implicitly communicated, a mere semantic approach is inadequate unless it is supplemented by the very specific contextual features of the particular political interaction. The inadequacy of a solely semantic analysis is quite evident in the following rhetorical questions (in bold when needed) from (36):

(36e) We tax the min relative low rate of 26%. Is this bad? **Are in here some who come to the defense of those ones?**
(>>> No, no one can defend tax evader)

(36f) Do they want us to refund the useless agencies and let medicines become scarce for people?
(>>> No, they do not want to be refunded the useless agencies and medicines become scarce)
(Embedded: >>> There were useless agencies)

(36g) We ask the Banks to pay 555 million Euros for the [State] financing of 2008. Should some people be protesting even for this?
(>>> No, they should not be protesting)

Quite evidently a mere semantic analysis does not make much sense. In all three utterances above, the semantic content of knowledge is implicitly communicated not because Samaras realized his assertion in Factual ES type nor has he extendedly used rhetorical questions. On the contrary, what is relevant in order to explain why Samaras speaks in this way is the series of political implicatures triggered on the basis of contextual inferences made by the participants from their mental models of the status of the public administration and/or from their context model constructed for the particular parliamentary session and/or from their general knowledge on Greek politics.

In this respect, participants know that in the particular session the Prime Minister will ask to approve a bill, which entails major reforms in the labor market and the welfare state and which has been demanded by the 'troika' as a prerequisite for the programd installment of the financial aid. They also understand that in this particular point, the speaker attempts to legitimize the decision of his government to approve such a severe bill by appealing to the social fair outcome of some of the measures that will be implemented. They also share a mental model which supposedly includes a negative stance towards instances of corruption in public sections, and it becomes

activated by the speaker's specific references to several examples of corruption, such as tax evasion, fraud, State's financing waste etc. They can process that the rhetorical questions pragmatically function as devices that led the hearer to assume the desired for the speaker question. They understand that in the attempt to react to the criticism made by his political opponents and to efficiently delegitimize his positions, the Prime Minister addresses the questions to the opposing parties in general and to the major opposition party, SYRIZA, in particular, a radical left party which supposedly has firmed belief in fair wealth allocation, in protecting the most vulnerable members of society and in promoting peoples' needs against the interests of financial institutions. Subsequently, the political implicatures derived can be spelled out as follows:

Are here some who come to the defense of those ones?
(>>> No, no one can defend tax evader)
(Therefore) Chasing tax evasion is a social fair policy.
(Therefore) The bill should be approved despite it also includes other hard and unjust policies.
(Therefore) Those opposing to our proposed policies in taxation have no substantial reason to do so.
(Therefore) Those opposing to our proposed policies in taxation do so because they are not interested in social fairness, but in gaining narrow political benefits.
(Therefore) Those opposing to our proposed policies in taxation are irresponsible and their only motive is to appear pleasant to the people by discarding a hard bill demanded by the 'troika'.

Do they want us to refund the useless agencies and medicines become scarce for people?
(>>> No, they do not want to be refunded the useless agencies and medicines become scarce)
(Embedded: >>> There were useless agencies)
(Therefore) The bill should be approved because it tackles money wasting, and protects those in need, even though it includes other hard policies.
(Therefore) Those opposing to our proposed policies have no substantial reason to do so.
(Therefore) Those opposing to our proposed policies do it because they want to gain narrow political benefits.
(Therefore) Those opposing to our proposed policies are irresponsible and their only motive is to appear pleasant to the people by discarding a hard bill demanded by the 'troika'.

Even for this some should be protesting?
(>>> No, they should not be protesting)

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(Therefore) Asking banks to pay for the State financial aid they received is a socially just policy.
(Therefore) The bill should be approved, because it allocates the economic burdens fairly despite it also includes other hard policies.
(Therefore) Those opposing to our proposed policies have no substantial reason to do so.
(Therefore) Those opposing to our proposed policies do it because they want to gain narrow political benefits.
(Therefore) Those opposing to our proposed policies are irresponsible and their only motive is to appear pleasant to the people by discarding a hard bill demanded by the 'troika'.

Consequently, it appears that contextual parameters should prevail in the analysis of the above passage. The political actor rather aims at delegitimizing his opponents as he exploits rhetorical questions in order to implicitly convey, i.e. as taken for granted, a negative other-representations. He, thus, constructs his opponents' evaluation as part of shared knowledge, a move that enables him to tacitly draw on strong evidential base, background knowledge, that justifies his assertions, while the personal and subjective character of negative assessments attributed to his opponents remains mitigated. Also, in (36e-36g) the polarizing schema Us vs. Them occurs, which contributes to the legitimization of actions proposed by Samaras through the positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation.

The deliberate use of tacitly shared assumptions, triggered by the participants' contextual inferences, in order for the speaker's assertion to be legitimized on a solid base, is also signaled by a particular stylistic choice, irony. The relation of irony with implied meaning is spotted when Gricean conversational maxims are violated. Ironic statements, just like metaphors, are fine examples of flouting the maxim of quality, generating thus an implicature (Senft 2014: 36). Irony differs to other types of implicature in terms of intentionality. The speaker has an intent to violate the maxim of quality and construct an utterance that is obviously contrary to any belief about its literal meaning that it might be held by recipients (Birner 2013: 51). As a type of implicit meaning, irony then may rely on knowledge assumedly shared between participants, but this does not entail that the speaker remains in the background –irony signals the speaker's intention to express her/his negative attitude towards the ironic proposition. However, it is the audience that ultimately determines the degree of the effectiveness of an irony, which depends on whether or not and to what extent a

discrepancy is noticed between what the speaker says and believes. Pragmatically, the purpose of an ironic expression is to signal the speaker's criticism towards the utterance he/she conveys (Sperber & Wilson 1981: 311) and/or solidarity with those recipients who have come to recognize the irony (Clark & Gerrig 1984: 124), while it has the desired extra-linguistic connotations, because it contributes to the construction of the speaker as an 'eloquent orator' –a highly admired quality which in the Greek political context coincides to that of a competent and skilled politician (Tsakona 2009: 85). Concluding, the locus of irony is not solely in a word or even in a sentence, but "in the relationship between words, words and sentences, or sentences in a situational context" (Barbe 1995: 42).

Taking into account the contextual parameters, the recent tradition in the study of irony (Sperber & Wilson 1981; Clark & Gerrig 1984) highlights the dialogic, polyphonic aspect of an ironic expression instead of the semantic opposition between literal and non-literal meaning. Indeed, irony echoes previous discourses, supposedly already known by recipients, in a way that allows the speaker to openly mention his rejection towards them as being false, irrelevant or inappropriate (Sperber & Wilson 1981: 308). It appears that this is the cases in which Samaras becomes ironic in (36):

(36h)   We tax them in relative low rate of 26%.
(36i)   Should we apologize to them for spoiling their party?

Within a classic approach to irony, one should mention that the adjective 'low' is used ironically, signaling quite the opposite, i.e. high. Yet, this is not mere the case. The adjective loses its literal meaning, but within the current context Samaras primarily attempts to react to the opposing parties' derived criticism, according to which the measures of the bill do affect salaried employees, public servants and pensioners, and not those, the wealthiest, who systematically avoid taxation. Assuming that his audience is aware of this, Samaras constructs his utterance in such a way so as to echoically remind them of those previously produced discourses, and tacitly construct his negative stance towards them through irony, delegitimizing, thus, his opponents. Obviously, the effectiveness of the ironic utterance is influenced by whether or not the preferred assumptions are enacted constituting the shared knowledge between all the participants. In order for the ironic tone to be recognized, it is not enough for Samaras to imply that the discourses of his opponents are false, as the government actually

taxes those who have illegally gained wealth; this assumption must also be accepted by his recipients.

The distinction between literal and non literal meanings offers nothing for the analysis of (36i). Again, the aim of the political actor is to attack his opponents and delegitimize their discourses. The critique against the policies in public health implemented by the Samaras-led coalitional government focuses on the severe distortion of National Health System through the horizontal cuts in the State's financing. The political actor uses irony in order to reject the criticism made as irresponsible, claiming that those who do not approve the reforms in public health actually defend scandalous wastes (the so called 'party' in the utterance) that were taking place in the past. Unless the audience is fully aware of all this contextual knowledge, they cannot recognize the ironic speaker's tone and make the inferences preferred by the speaker.

In political settings, discourses gain high significance as domains of evidence, while it is also considered important by the political actors to express their (di)association to them (see for more details 4.3. and 5.3.). Therefore, it is plausible to argue that ironic statements are quite relevant to the context of political interaction and are seen by the participants as reliable discursive means for the accomplishment of specific discursive, contextual and political goals. Besides, the victims of an irony are, on the one hand, the originator, real or imagined, of the echoed discourse, i.e. the source of that discourse, and on the other hand those members of the audience that fail to notice the irony, i.e. do not share the same background knowledge with the speaker so they do not probably belong to the same group.

As said, the discourses being reminded by Samaras derived from his political opponents, and this is an inference plausibly made by the recipients with which he attempts to build a space of agreement. In terms of effectiveness, though, the ironic tone in both (36h) and (36i) is only understood and interpreted as a means of delegitimization only by the 'card carrying' supporters of the government, who nevertheless would share a negative attitude towards the opposition parties. Taking into account the broader political context which frames the speech delivered by Samaras, it can be argued that the discourses ironically echoed by the Prime Minster did not actually exist. This point is not related with how a third party's discourses are

represented and embedded in another discourse –the various realizations of Discursive ES- but with the propositional content. In this respect, none of the members of the opposition stated that a 26% rate to wealthy citizens is low –rather the point of criticism was the absence of any initiative for those who have high incomes and systematically tax evade. Likely, none of the MPs attempted to defend economic scandals in the public health sector –rather they emphasized that austerity policies in the Welfare State affect the most those who mostly need free access to public Health, the more financially weak. It appears, then, that the Prime Minister considers more relevant to the situation to discursively construct an irony that allows him to tacitly distance himself to the maximum degree from the utterance he communicates. Therefore, on the basis of his personal context model he considers appropriate not to just implicitly signal his negative stance towards the utterance, but also to stress his reaction to the criticism aimed at his government, by delegitimizing his opponents through irony. The audience attention is then shifted from what is being said and is directed towards the speaker who stresses as boldly as possible his disassociation from the claims of a supposedly irresponsible source.

From the above, it can be claimed that as a discursive strategy, irony can be exploited by the political actors for the realization of Discursive ES type due to its relation with previously produced discourses. Also, it should be noted that, just as in Discursive ES type political actors paid attention to the evaluation of the discourse they conveyed (see subjective attributions), irony serves as a discursive mechanism for making evaluations.

On the other hand, though, the element of background knowledge should not be underestimated. Rather is the most crucial parameter in the recognition of an irony and this is why it is included in the present section which is dealing with non based utterances. Ironic statements are quite effective in shaping a knowledge that echoes the speaker's interest and enables the political actors to represent their personal beliefs as commonly shared knowledge, as 'undisputed facts'. Accordingly, irony enhances the validity of assertions made by the speaker, and critically contributes to their legitimization. Due to its contextual dependency, it serves as a means for the (de)legitimization of an action as it pragmatically enacts the negative other-representation. Also, it strengthens the ironist's credibility, since it guides the

audience to assume that the speaker is in a position to know what has been said by a third source, and more critically to adopt a negative stance towards it, a move that indexes a possible knowledge asymmetry between the ironist and the victim of the irony. As the speaker discards an utterance in terms of its 'truth', he/she tacitly claims to be the 'rightful source' of discourse.

Before concluding the analysis of (36), a brief note on another stylistic choice made by Samaras should be made. As said, the Prime Minster exploits several discursive resources that mostly implicitly –still, not inefficiently– profile the involvement of the speaker in the designation of the utterance. The adoption of Factual ES, and the way it is interpreted in political settings, along with the ironic statement, strengthen the status of the source of information, i.e. the speaker. To this end the informal, colloquial lexical style of the political actor contributes specifically. The Prime Minister opts for a daily register as many of his lexical choice index ('so people can find a job'; 'kick-out the investors'; 'extravagances'; 'knock-off pensions'; 'load of money peculated'; 'tricksters and frauds' 'we spoiled their party'). The Prime Minister neglects what is contextual appropriate and appears to be an authentic and unconventional leader who talks in simple terms, so to be understood.

The last three passages provide an account that combines explanation of how Greek State got at the center of global capitalist crisis turmoil, and narrative. Besides, in institutional settings narratives are legitimate vehicles for explanation (Van Maanen 1988; Czarniawska-Joerges 1995). In section 4.4. it was discussed how utterances realized in Factual ES type significantly contribute to the construction of a narrative, imposing desired representations of events and actions, as the political actors attempt to gain epistemic control over their audiences. A core feature of any narrative is the central role of the source of the narrative, the narrator, in imposing particular causal relations, i.e. interpretations, between the series of the events and actions that compose the narrative (Vaara 2002: 115-116). Especially, within political settings, narratives are related with power and hegemony (Boje 1995) in a sense that highlight one, privileged voice and marginalize others (Brown 1998: 38). Therefore, the success of a narrative does not depend on whether it accurately and 'objectively' construct the external reality. Instead, it depends on whether or not they convince their recipients. By creating shared meanings and constructing epistemic alliances among the source

of the narrative and the audience, narratives function as justificatory means for beliefs and actions.

This brings us to the close relationship between narrative and legitimization. Along the lines of Van Leeuwen' work, the link is obvious in mythopoesis, i.e. small stories or fragments of narrative structures about the past and/or future (117-119). Exploring different kind of data, he distinguishes two main type of narrative, moral tales and cautionary tales, that both seem not to adapt in the passages under discussion because nothing about what the political actors say is about anticipating reward or punishment. However, in all (34)-(36), the approval of economic adjustment program (34-35) or the implementation of particular reforms in labor market are understood as the causal result of previous illegitimate actions and events, and in these sense are conveyed not only as inevitable, but also as a kind of hard reward in order to be restored the legitimate economic and financial order in a capitalist state. Therefore, the three Prime Ministers used causal tales as a means for establishing a particular negative representation of the past Greek administrations, focussing thus on the so-called "Greek particularity" as the main cause of the current sovereign debt crisis.

As crises generate spaces within which "discursive struggles" between contesting and contradictory narratives take place (Jessop 2002: 92-94), obviously the political actors aim at the exploitation of narratives in order not only to merely impose their preferred interpretations about the causes of the crisis, but also to transform their belief and opinions into knowledge. Already being in a position that allows privileged access to powerful forms of discourse, all the three political actors take further advantage of the strong evidential character of the narratives realized by a series of factual assertions, as well as of the direct cognitive and psychological effect being triggered in terms of constructing, strengthening and rupturing relations of (di)association between the speaker and the recipients. Hence, they make their own knowledge dominant and symbolize the crisis in a way that neither questions the nature of capitalism nor the inherent inequality of austerity, since they intensify the validity of a broadly used explanation with the global political context, according to which the current economic crisis emerged due to secondary deviances (corruption, lack of proper regulation in the market etc, irresponsibility of political authorities etc.), rather than due the very operation of capitalism as such (Žižek 2009: 19).

5.3.2.3.b. Utterances having no base

The last section takes into account instances in which the utterances do not draw to a specific domain of evidence –they are represented by the political actors as 'raw facts'. Non-based utterances are typically used in order the three speakers 'to define the situation' (van Dijk 2008b: 191) in contextual, political and historical terms. They make specific reference to the very parliamentary process to which they are engaged as well as to the actions included in this process as defined by the contextual parameters, and then they embed those actions within the broader political and historical context in order to appear 'logical', 'unavoidable' or 'accepted', and, thus, justified.

The following is an excerpt from the speech of George Papandreou.

(36) Και σήμερα, είναι πια απλά τα πράγματα: ή ψηφίζουμε και εφαρμόζουμε τη συμφωνία, ή καταδικάζουμε την Ελλάδα στη χρεοκοπία.

And today things are simple: We vote for and implement the agreement or we condemn Greece to default.

[Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

Here Papandreou adopts Factual ES type as he 'defines the situation'. He provides a representation of how the things are. Semantically, this can be seen as a type of theoretical rationalization legitimizing strategy. In a broad sense, it can be seen as a definition, but this particular type of rationalization is more evident in passages that follow. When a political actor defines the situation (s)he is based on "some kind of truth" (van Leeuwen 2008: 116). Yet, in the passage it remains unclear the evidence that support the truth of definition. Rather, it is an inference made by the political actor, but it is represented as a 'fact'.

As the first person plural verb types ('We vote'; 'we condemn') index, the responsibility towards the assertion is shared, hence its validity is enhanced, and so the propositional content of the utterance can more easily overcome the epistemic safeguards of the recipients and become legitimized. Contrary to other uses of the inclusive 'we', here it can be inferred who are referred in the passage –only the MPs

can vote for or against the bail-out agreement. However, it is highly unlikely that all in the audience accept the proposition expressed in the dilemma as 'true' or valid.

The Prime Minister's choice to construct his assertions as mutually shared is related with the very political aims of the speech. Papandreou knows that the agreement will pass, because PASOK has a majority of 160 out of 300 seats, and 150 votes were needed for the approval of the bail-out package. He also knows that MPs from other opposition parties have publicly stated that they will also vote for the financial aid[52]. Therefore, the dilemma posed operates just as a figure of speech and not as a 'true' representation of the situation because the second part ('[W]e codemn Greece to default') was likely to occur at the moment of the speech. The Prime Minister considers relevant to the situation to stress the shared responsibility for the validity of the utterance in order to implicitly index shared responsibility as regards the fate of the State. His aim is to portray his government in a positive manner, a responsible government that acts in the service of the national interest. At the same time, he represents negatively any of the MPs who set the State's financial status in threat, even though they are fully aware of how critical their own vote is. Apparently, the indexed shared responsibility towards the utterance directly contributes to legitimization of the assertion but it also is indirectly included in the legitimization of actions, particularly the necessity of the financial aid under the acceptance of hard conditions, as it triggers positive self-representations and negative other-representations.

Moreover, the discursive realization of the utterance enables the speaker to portray himself as a credible speaker. Is not only the adoption of Factual ES type that tacitly strengthens the evidential standing of the source of information, since what is communicated is assumedly accept as 'true' or as 'fact', but it is also the use of 'define the situation' formulation that implies that the speaker is supposedly a credible source to such extent that he can make the particular linguistic choice and establish, having a high degree of certainty and validity, a representation as the one of the dilemma in (12) as 'true'. Evidently, it is the institutional position of the political

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[52]The bill "Measures for the implementation of the Eurozone member-states and the IMF's Support Mechanism in the Greek economy" was actually voted by 172 MPs (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/06/greece-crisis-approves-austerity-measures, date of last access, 19/2/2018).

actor that is interpreted by him in such a way that he thinks it relevant to make such an epistemically strong assertion. His k-device, then, intervenes and controls by which linguistic resources he is going to construct his assertion in a way relevant to how the communicative situation is interpreted. Similarly, the audience is also guided to interpret on the basis of their context models the role and the identity of the speaker as properties that allow him to make strong assertions and accept the assumed validity of their propositional content. Accordingly, Papandreou legitimizes his assertion tacitly drawing on his presupposed evidential status, which is turn is co-determined by the contextual features of his role and enacted identity at the time the speech is delivered, as well as by the specific linguistic resources per se, used to realize the assumed credibility of the source of information.

Similarly, Papademos also refers to the critical nature of the parliamentary meeting at which his speech is delivered.

(37)   Είναι πράγματι ιστορικής σημασίας για το μέλλον της χώρας η σημερινή συνεδρίαση.

Today's session is, indeed, of historical importance for the future of the country.

[Papademos, 10/2/2012]

Despite remaining off stage in Factual ES type, the presence of the speaker here is traced in the evaluative discursive marker '[i]ndeed'. However, the third person verb types along with the opaque responsibility taken towards the utterance enable the political actor to represent his assertion as 'true' and known by everyone.

As for legitimization in semantic level, Papademos uses a formulation, defines the situation that strengthens his credibility as a source of utterance, and triggers a state of exception strategy ('of historical importance'). Representing the above information as assumedly shared among the participants he also assumes that the need of extraordinary measures is similarly accepted, which is what is precisely at stake in the session under discussion.

The following passage, (39), comes from the speech of Samaras.

(38)   Εδώ, στην Ελλάδα συνέβαιναν για χρόνια πράγματα που δεν συμβαίνουν πουθενά αλλού στον κόσμο! Και μας οδήγησαν στα πρόθυρα της χρεοκοπίας. Σήμερα τα αλλάζουμε όλα μονομιάς. Κι αυτό- αρέσει, δεν αρέσει σε ορισμένους - είναι μια πραγματική Επανάσταση: Καταργούμε προνόμια, ανοίγουμε επαγγέλματα, βρίσκουμε και κόβουμε τεράστιες σπατάλες. Κυνηγάμε τη φοροδιαφυγή που έχει πάρει διαστάσεις, μοναδικές στην Ευρώπη. Και τώρα αλλάζουμε το φορολογικό σύστημα, ώστε να αρχίσουν να πληρώνουν όσοι δεν πλήρωναν ως σήμερα. Και να ελαφρύνουν τα βάρη όσων πλήρωναν ως τώρα.

Here in Greece many things, which have never occurred elsewhere in the world, had been occurring for years. And which they led us on the verge of default. Today we change it all at a stroke. Whether some like it or not, this is a true revolution: We abolish privileges; we open up professions; and we cut huge wastage. We chase tax evasion that operates on a scale never before seen again in Europe. And now we reform the tax system so that all those who haven't payed their taxes till today will start doing so. And, thus, they shall lighten the burden taken by those who have been paying until now.

[Samaras, 7/11/2012]

In (39) Samaras starts with an assertion that lacks any kind of evidence ('Here in Greece many things […] on the verge of default.'). He avoids making neither any particular reference to certain examples that can justify his claim or to a source of information from which the knowledge he conveys is derived. The Prime Minster assumes that the audience already knows the past status of the public administration – a quite plausible, but also convenient assumption. Taking for granted that his audience has a specific and certain knowledge of how public administration was performed in the past, Samaras imposes a certain 'reality' about the state of the Greek economy without the need to provide any relevant evidence to justify it. He just activates that knowledge, which is seen as a part of the context model that each member of the audience builds during that particular communicative situation.

The factive character of the utterance is further enhanced by the lack of any modal markers as well as by the fact that the responsibility of the reliability of the utterance remains opaque given the use of the third person verb types. Moreover, in semantic level the two sentences of the utterance under discussion are connected with consequential logical relations. The grammatical marker 'and' indexes a causal relation between the two sentences, a relation that is implied, though, and based on tacit evidences, but it becomes 'justified' as the discourse unfolds. In this respect, the

implication used by Samaras legitimizes the governmental position that the cause of the crisis is traced back to the previous status of the Greek economy, so the proposed austerity (imposed by several policies and reforms during 2010-2012) is seen as the 'symptom' of a previous situation, and not as the cause of internal devaluation of labor force which in turn activates a recession spiral (see 1.6.2.).

By adopting Factual ES type, Samaras enhances the validity of his assertions, while they also share the higher degree of objectivity. He creates a solid evidentiary base in order to deploy the 'state of exception' legitimization strategy. Hence, the deviance ('…that have not been occurred elsewhere in the world') of the Greek case is taken for granted as it is represented as a fact –without any need of additional epistemic and/or evidentiary support. The Prime Minister controls the context models of his audience, and, in particular, he controls the background knowledge on the Greek economy and how can it be contrasted with the other European economies, in order to impose his party opinions as taken-for-granted knowledge.

Particular examples of that deviance (tax evasion, uncontrollable public spending, closed professions etc.) are introduced by Samaras shortly afterwards as part of a past vs. present dichotomy, which was discussed in 4.4.4.1 and 4.4.4.2.. The temporal deictic marker 'today' has pragmatic function –not semantic– as it particularly indexes this division between past and present. Hence, the previous situation in the fiscal and finance sector can be easily inferred on the basis of the current at the time of the speech policies implemented by the Government, whereas the present (and future) is portrayed in positive terms given the desired outcomes entailed by the same policies. At the same time, the audience on the basis of their context models can infer the previous status of the State's economy, assuming that, since those policies are introduced *now* by the government, they subsequently were not implemented in the *past*.

Note here that the policies mentioned in Samaras' speech supposedly aim at social fairness. Appealing to the fair nature of the financial policies is also a legitimization strategy used in the context of the European Economic crisis. The crucial aspect here is that this strategy is realized by a series of factive assertions ('we abolish privileges'; 'we open up professions'; 'we cut huge wastage'; 'we chased tax evasion'; 'we reform the tax system'), so the reliability of the utterance becomes stronger. The

responsibility of the utterance is shared since the Prime Minister uses verb types in the first person plural. However, this is a trivial function. Antonis Samaras does not switch to the first person plural because he wants to strengthen the epistemic status of his assertions. Rather, what is considered relevant to the very context of the communicative situation is the Prime Minister's aim to portray his government as a unified team who commonly work under his leadership in order to fix past mistakes in the fields of public administration and financial policies.

As the data of the present chapter reveal, Prime Ministers opt for first person plural verb types for a variety of reasons. In (40) Papandreou communicated utterances representing the responsibility of their validity as shared, because he aimed to establish these representations as taken for granted, and thus his appeal to the 'irresponsibility of the past' to operate more efficiently as a legitimization strategy. Only Papademos made significantly less references to the first person plural, a choice that is in accordance with the construction of himself as a source of information. Recall that Papademos was a 'technocrat', a not elected Prime Minister, and he subsequently exploited his personal authority as an expert in economics and appeared distant to the body since his stint had aims irrelevant to inner and/or inter party power-relations. (Fairclough 2000: 117).

Apart from the general, thematic definition of the situation, which, as was shown, is constructed in a way that calls the audience to infer the preferred interpretations and likely to adopt the desired stance by the political actors towards it, the speaker also provides 'narrow' definitions by which he represents their his own or his party's opinion and beliefs as facts.

In the passage below, Papandreou defines a rather vague concept, that of patriotism.

(39) Ένα πράγμα θέλω να πω: Πραγματικός πατριωτισμός σήμερα, είναι να κάνουμε το παν για να μη χρεοκοπήσει η Ελλάδα, να μην κάνουμε τη χάρη στη διεθνή κερδοσκοπία. Πατριωτισμός σήμερα, σημαίνει να βάλουμε τέλος στην Ελλάδα που μας πληγώνει, στα λάθη, ναι, δεκαετιών, αλλά ιδιαίτερα στα εγκλήματα των τελευταίων ετών.

There is one thing I want to say: today genuine patriotism is to do whatever it takes in order for Greece not to fail –we should not do international speculators the favour. Today patriotism is to get over with

> Greece that hurt us; [to get over with] errors of decades, but especially [with] the crimes of the last few years.

[Papandreou, 6/5/2010]

In the beginning of the excerpt the political actor ascribes full commitment and takes personal responsibility towards the utterance he conveys via the first person singular verb types ('There is one thing I want to say'). In a previous passage it was also discussed how performatives that explicitly spell the discursive aims critically contribute to legitimizations of assertions by enhancing the speaker's authority and credibility.

The Prime Minister apparently appeals to positively evaluated moral values, patriotism, it can be argued then that this is a typical case of moralization, which is understood as the speaker's attempt to draw on a moral basis reflecting accepted values and norms which justify the desired actions (van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999; Vaara & Tienari 2008; van Leeuwen 2008; Vaara 2014). In this respect, the implementation of austerity policies, no matter how hard they are, exceeds the realm of politics and political antagonisms, and becomes relevant to moral values. What is more, the intersubjective stance adopted shortly after through the first person plural verb types[53] allows the political actor to construct an Us vs. Them comparison, in which the in-group are positively portrayed as the adhere to the value of patriotism, whereas it is implied for the out-group that they are motivated by nothing more but narrow political interests.

As effective as it is to deploy moralizations in the particular context under study, it is equally crucial to mention that the political actor, while he remains offstage, enhances his own authority and strengthens his image as a leader by the very act of providing a definition –more concretely by redefining a rather cliché and overused vague notion, that of partriotism ('[T]oday genuine patriotism is…'; 'Today patriotism is…'). In this respect, it can be claimed that Papandreou deploys a rationalization legitimization strategy (van Leeuwen 2008: 116). Therefore, he interprets his position as one that is 'entitled' to provide such definitions represented as 'facts'. Actually, Papandreou

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[53]In the English text the use of the infinitive type was grammatically and syntactically appropriate. In the original text, on the contrary, the speaker extendedly uses first person plural verb types.

constructs an epistemically strong assertion in order to convey as taken-for-granted, hence he ascribes shared responsibility to the definitions, his party positions regarding a) the necessity of approving the bail-out program ('[T]oday genuine patriotism is to make whatever it takes in order for Greece not to fail –we should not do international speculators the favor'), and b) to impose a particular negative representation of the past administrations which also indexes an Us vs. Them comparison.

In the last passage below, (41), the speaker provides a counter definition ('Revolution is not…') and shortly after a definition ('Revolution is…). Both are realized as Factual ES types, while there is no sort of evidence that justifies their validity.

(40) Επανάσταση δεν είναι τα πύρινα συνθήματα και οι άναρθρες κραυγές. Επανάσταση είναι η ανατροπή όσων κρατούσαν τη χώρα πίσω, η κατάργηση όσων προνομίων απομυζούσαν τον Εθνικό πλούτο. Επανάσταση είναι το τέλος της αυθαιρεσίας των ισχυρών.

Revolution is not the chants and barbarous cries. Revolution is the overthrow of those [people] who were holding the country back; the abolishment of privileges that were sponging off the national wealth. Revolution is ending the arbitrariness of the powerful.

[Samaras, 7/11/2012]

Apparently, the Prime Minister assumes on the basis of his own context model that his institutional position allows him to provide definitions, the credibility of which is accepted. This entails that he interprets his role as being invested by a high authoritative status, and, what is more, it is implied that he has such an in-depth knowledge that it is legitimate to provide definitions. In this way he exploits his position and role along with the privileged access to forms of discourse, which remain implicit and are exploited for boosting the credibility of Samaras as a source of information.

The leader of ND party elaborates on the topic of 'revolution', particularly on what *is* and what *is not* a revolution. He attempts to legitimize his policies by providing a (counter)definition of a revolution. Recall the verb phrase 'Whether some like it or not, this is a true revolution' by which the speaker draws on particular representations of revolution held by the recipients and stored in their context models in order to tacitly claim an epistemic agreement on what a revolution is. One should notice that

in (41) Samaras avoids personal responsibility towards his assertions due to the use of the third person verb types. Nevertheless, he has constructed himself as the only source of those definitions which are only relied on the credibility of the source they derive, i.e. the Prime Minister himself. In this respect, Samaras manages to represent his own view on what is and what is not a revolution as a 'fact'. Still though, his prime aim is not to provide an epistemically sound definition, but rather to represent his own beliefs as such in way, that they adapt to the communicational goals of the situation as well as to cultural and political criteria assumedly shared by the audience. However, the same policies can hardly be defined as any kind of revolution by other actors and institutions, sharing different values, beliefs, identities etc. Unsurprisingly, in Samaras' terms a revolution coincides more or less with the content and consequences of the policies that are implemented by his government.

In addition, two more legitimization strategies operate within the same utterance. First, he reintroduces social fairness ('the overthrown of those [people] who were holding the country in stagnation; the abolishment of privileges that were sponging off the national wealth'; '[T]he end of the arbitrary of the powerful'). This brings us to the second strategy, positive future outcomes. Here the Prime Minister does not specifically spell out how the Greek economy and the Greek citizen will be benefited by the particular policies in the long term, but he implies it. Such an impressive transformation of a society, as the one represented in Samaras' speech, can only be a positive outcome. Hence, it is observed that a macro-legitimization strategy can embed other micro-legitimization strategies.

The same holds through for delegitimization strategies. In the beginning of the passage Samaras provides a counter definition of what is *not* a revolution ('Revolution is not the chants and the barbarous cries'), with which he refers to the discourses of his political opponents. He represents their discourses as 'chants' and 'cries' so he marginalizes them through a negative evaluation. Also, the noun phrase ('the chants and barbarous cries') triggers an existential presupposition that *there are* indeed chats and cries. Existential presuppositions contribute to the legitimization of assertions as they assume an intersubjective reality space (Chilton 2004; Hart 2014) within which propositions are treated as 'facts'. As discourses of third parties are largely the only form of evidence used by political actors when they attempt to

delegitimize the opinions, beliefs etc. of their political opponents, it gains in importance the fact that Antonis Samaras does so by deploying theoretical rationalization strategy, the realization of which was explained above. Therefore, the Prime Minister does challenge his opponents' discourses by appealing to his own. Rather he delegitimizes them by providing a definition, the validity of which is solely based on the strategic discursive construction of the Prime Minister himself as a credible source of knowledge.

Concluding remarks

The last category of averred assertions in Chapter 5 featured those assertions that were not originated in a particular domain of evidence. Just as happened with the other kinds of assertions, a finer distinction was needed. Respectively, we identified two subcategories, averred assertions with a) unspecified domain of evidence and b) no domain of evidence. Regarding the former, the political actors may have not explicitly referred to the evidential domain that backed their utterances but in discourse there were some traces of the possible domain of evidence. The case of utterances with no domain of evidence included assertions that left no similar traces in discourse. In general, these kind of assertions expressed truth factual validity (see section 4.4.) and were realized by Factual ES type because what was communicated was represented as "fact". In this respect, they enhanced the speakers' credibility and could be seen as realizations of objectification strategy, since they supposedly communicated "truths". As it was shown, this did not entailed that political actors stood back and just expressed commonly shared knowledge without ascribing any responsibility towards the knowledge they communicated. The political actors strategically used this kind of assertion. Again, their institutional role, and more precisely how it was interpreted on the basis of each actor's personal context model, allowed them to take advantage of the access to the particular linguistic resources, and legitimize their assertions. For that reason, we analyzed how specific complex discursive structures contributed to this end. The political actors opted for short past narratives; constructed specific political implicatures; used ironic structures, and they used definitions as a means for conveying their personal and group beliefs and as taken-for-granted knowledge.

6. Conclusions

In the last Chapter of this thesis we discuss the main findings of the study. First an analytical overview of the study is provided and then we proceed to the contribution of the present study to: a) the analysis of evidential meanings in political settings; b) the discursive realization of legitimization of the speakers' assertions and how they contribute to the legitimization of austerity policies; and c) a deeper and more systematic understanding of the construction of evidential meaning in Modern Greek. In the last section of the chapter we refer to issues of future research that emerge as a result of the present study.

6.1. Overview of the study

Chapter 1

Chapter 1 sketches the analytical framework of the present study, which features a triangular approach to the study of knowledge production within the Greek political context of the sovereign debt crisis. This approach features the co-articulation of discursive and social parameters, as well as of cognitive parameters, which mediate the previous two. General notions that were relevant to the study of knowledge production in the Greek political setting are preliminarily defined here, and included social and political cognition (cognitive component); evidentiality (linguistic/discursive component) and legitimization (social component). Especially for evidentiality, a brief overview was provided in its use in political settings, but most importantly an overview of its current formal analysis in Greek, which proved insufficient for a discourse-oriented study of evidential meaning.

The above scheme was implemented in a specific historical and political context, the first two years of the Greek crisis (2010-2012) characterized by the implementation of the 3-year bail-out program of financial support, supervised by the IMF-ECB-EC "troika". Therefore, it was necessary for the political context of the study to be considered in relation to the ideological and social implications of those programs. Our main point is to justify that this study is a problem-oriented study as it conceived austerity as a social problem that broadens inequalities within society.

More crucially, in Chapter 1 the main and secondary objectives of the study are outlined, concerning the detailed analysis of various Epistemic Stance types in the Greek political discourse and their relation with legitimization process.

Last, the precedent discussion that takes place in Chapter 1 led us to explicitly state the hypothesis of the study, which included the various ES types found in the data as well as their context-depended strategic use by the political actors for legitimizing purposes in relation with the reproduction of social and economic inequalities through austerity.

Chapter 2

Chapter 2 is dedicated to the theoretical framework of the study. Following the triangular analytical scheme (discourse-cognition-society) introduced in Chapter 1, the chapter is divided into three parts. The first part (2.1.-2.4.) is concerned with evidentiality and the epistemic stance. The second part (2.5.) demonstrates how a sociocognitive approach in general and the theory of context models in particular can substantially contribute to a systematic analysis of the discursive construction of evidential meaning. The third part (2.6.) relates with the social aspect of the triangle, the legitimization process.

The first part provides a detailed overview of both theoretical issues related with the notions, and the various classifications proposed by the relevant literature. More particularly, the inadequacy of formal and narrow approaches to evidential meaning is shown, when the analysis of expression and construction of knowledge moves beyond the clause level and is applied to real life communication. Our main point here is that we cannot examine how knowledge is produced, shared and comprehended without paying attention to what actually happens on the discursive level of analysis, especially in languages such as Modern Greek that lack grammatical markers for evidentiality. For that reason, we opted for a dynamic concept, that of the Epistemic Stance, which takes into consideration not only the mere marking of knowledge, but also interactional and contextual parameters that influence the expression of knowledge within discursive settings. Reviewing, though, the relevant literature it appears that despite the fact that all researchers recognized the context-depended

character of the construction of evidential meaning, they did not systematically theorize the context within which the discourse is produce.

This brings us to the second point, elaborated in the second part of the study's theoretical background: studying the construction of evidential meaning in discourse and how speakers position themselves towards the knowledge they communicate must be done in relation to the contextual parameters of each communicative situation. This allows us not only to highlight the relative character of knowledge (a position that contrasts the traditional approaches to evidentiality) or to move beyond predetermined closed sets of linguistic resources and include in our analysis less studied ones, as well as complex discursive structures, but it also allowed us to better understand and explain the epistemic mismatches between the actual domain of evidence from which knowledge was acquired and how it was represented in discourse; to spell out similarities and differences in knowledge expression across different speakers, genres and settings; and to examine the pragmatic, rhetorical and, more crucially, ideological implications triggered by the use of ES types in specific communicative situations within a historical context.

For that reason, we inform our analysis of ES types with the theory of context models developed within the socio-cognitive approach to discourse. Concretely, we see the relevance of context models to the expression, distribution and acquisition of knowledge, in general, and evidentiality in particular, within discursive settings. In addition, the process of evidential meaning construction is highlighted as primarily cognitive, since it involves the activation of old context models as a new communicative situation takes place. In Chapter 4, this interplay between old and new context models is examined as it influences not only the realization of the various ES types, but also the epistemic mismatches occurring in our data.

As it is not only important to see the interplay between the linguistic and social component, but also to understand how this indirect relationship is mediated by a cognitive interface, a socio-cognitive approach provides a thorough framework relevant to the scope and aims of our study. The social parameters are not merely reflected in discursive structures. Rather, they are interpreted in the first place by the speakers who, on the basis of their own context models make choices appropriate to the situations in which they were engaged.

Assuming a) only a discourse-oriented approach to the construction of evidential meaning is adequate to illustrate how knowledge is produced, negotiated and shared in real life communication, in general and in the Greek political setting in particular; and b) such analysis cannot be conducted without a detailed framework of how contexts influence text and talk, the issue of strategic uses of various ES types is discussed. It is shown that the marking of the source of knowledge and the expression by the speakers of some degree of commitment towards the knowledge they communicated is related with the legitimization process. The third part of the study's theoretical background is dedicated to legitimization in institutional and political settings. Aligned with the need for methodological distinction between legitimization of assertion and legitimization of actions, as proposed by Hart (2010), we elaborate on the concept of legitimization strategy and explain how it is used to express the speakers' position regarding their commitment to the truth of their assertions and to the evidence that supports it; and 2) to influence the hearers' epistemic stance towards information conveyed in a way that aligns with the interests of the speakers.

Chapter 3

Chapter 3 designates the methodology adopted in the present study in order to examine both the macro- and micro levels of the main hypothesis of the thesis. Also, the data analyzed from each political actor is presented in detail. Regarding the methodology, in the present study, the triangular scheme of classification of ES types proposed by Marín-Arrese is adopted, with some minor differentiations in terminology, and features three evidential value domains of evidence (personal experience; cognitive; discursive); mode of knowing (direct/indirect; and source of knowledge (Self/Other). Within this framework, the various types of EPS (we used the term Epistemic Stance types instead) were embedded, as identified by Mushin.

However, our analysis goes beyond the linguistic resources examined by Mushin, so either the scope of each EPS type is broadened or new linguistic resources is taken into consideration, such as specific categories of verbs or speech acts or complex discursive structures. The crucial component is that the above scheme was informed by a detailed theory of context. As for the study of epistemic stance strategies, we follow the above mentioned macro-division between attributed and averred assertions which is supplemented by an approach made by Marín-Arrese to the expression of the

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speaker's salience in the utterance; that of the speaker's responsibility towards the assertions; and the degree of the speaker's commitment.

Chapter 4

In chapter 4 we examine how the various ES types were realized by the six political actors within the particular political and historical context (2010-2012) of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. Following the distinctions between the Personal Experience domain of evidence; Cognitive domain of evidence and Discursive domain of evidence, we examine how various ES types are realized in discourse.

Regarding the Personal Experience domain of evidence, it appears that the political actors represented the knowledge they communicated as originating in that particular domain when they wanted to appear fully engaged with the utterance they communicate. Regardless of whether the knowledge expressed has an emotional or sensory basis, the adoption of Personal Experience ES type is to a great extent controlled by contextual parameters, because on many occasions it signaled an epistemic mismatch. What is more, the mismatches observed indicate a reverse relationship in terms of validity. To put it simply, even though political actors know that this domain is is typically considered less reliable (because only the speaker can have access to such information), they opted to discursively express their knowledge as originating from emotions or senses—even when the original source of information could have been more reliable. As shown, such choices might have been seen to threaten the epistemic status of knowledge, but they were after all totally justified by the very nature of the communicative situations in which they appeared. The political actors were not so much interested in presenting an utterance having the maximum degree of validity. Rather, on the basis of their own personal context model they considered it more appropriate to enhance their own credibility as sources of information by assuming full personal responsibility for the utterances they communicated.

In the Cognitive domain of evidence (4.2.) we examine Inferential ES type, the expression by which the political actors explicitly shared (inter)personal knowledge as well as others' knowledge, and the expression indexing a counter factual state of affairs. Again, it is demonstrated how crucial the intervention of the context is to the

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construction of evidential meaning. A systematic analysis of the speakers' context models, proved that most of the linguistic choices made had little to do with epistemic accuracy, but they were related with other, interactional (negotiation of knowledge, epistemic mis(alignment, knowledge relations among the participants) and cognitive parameters (the transformation of mere belief into personal/shared knowledge). Also, in cases in which they exploited resources, such as inferences or counterfactual expressions, that typically downplayed the epistemic status of the utterances, political actors managed to boost their own credibility by inscribing full responsibility for their assessments.

The last domain of evidence is the discursive one, which in the present study is examined beyond the traditional monolithic approaches that have understood discourse-based evidence in formal and decontextualized terms ("hearsay"; "testimony". It is demonstrated that this domain of evidence has special symbolic significance within the field of Greek politics. What is more, contrary to the mainstream traditional view, according to which the representation of a discourse of a third source is an objective way to represent knowledge, it is illustrated that Greek political actors, when adopting a Discursive ES, considered it relevant to make explicit evaluations about the validity of a third party's discourse.

Apart from the three separate domains of evidence, in Chapter 4 we also examine expressions signaling truth/factual validity. These expressions realized Factual ES type. It is not surprising to note that this type of ES was broadly used by the political actors. Obviously it is a type with a high degree of validity since it represents knowledge as shared and commonly accepted; as an undisputed "fact". At the same time, as the original domain of evidence is mitigated, the authority and the credibility of the political actor is enhanced. As will be commented on below, in the context models constructed by the Greek political actors two aims seem to be relevant to all communicative situations. First, the positive self-presentation as a credible source and second, the exploitation to the greatest extent possible of the assumed authority of their institutional role.

Before moving to the discussion of Chapter 5, it is important to mention the following. Contrary to what is observed in various sentence-isolated analyses of evidentiality, it becomes clear in our study that, as discourse unfolds, speakers may

not express as particular ES type in a sentence. The actual discourse production appears far more complex. The speakers constantly switch between using different ES types in their discourse, and they may also embed one ES type into another. Our analysis did not find some type of pattern that could explain the phenomenon. Each case is unique and it can be explained only by taking into account various micro-contextual parameters, as well as the nature of online, oral discourse production, since most of the data examined were oral genres and some of them shared a high interactional character. Nevertheless, this phenomenon is a very vivid instantiation of the high context-dependency of knowledge expression, communication and communication in real life communicative settings.

Chapter 5

The last analytical Chapter concerns the strategic uses of the various ES types as a means for legitimization. In order to better understand the function of legitimization strategies in relation with both a specific communicative situation as well as with a particular historical period, we conduct a micro-analysis of three speeches delivered by the three Prime Ministers, Papandreou, Papademos and Samaras. Within the general methodological framework of the study, this macro-analysis can be seen as complementary to the macro-perspective analysis that takes place in Chapter 4. More specifically, we examine the legitimization of assertions (strategies of objectification and subjectification), but as demonstrated throughout the whole chapter, the distinction between legitimization of assertions and legitimization of actions is useful for methodological reasons, but it appears in the analysis that they largely intersect. Along with the epistemic aspect of legitimization, there are a lot of "side effects" operating, related to the legitimization of actions.

In particular, we adopt a macro-distinction between attributed and averred assertions in order to provide a detailed overview of how legitimization strategies operate in the Greek political discourse. It is shown (5.3.) that through the selective use of source tagging, the political actors manage to index (mis)aligment from/with third sources and, hence, to enhance their own credibility as the sources of information. It is illustrated that the linguistic choices by which an assertion is attributed to a third source or, in other words, the way in which the political actors realize their Discursive ES, is largely controlled by the context of the communicative situation and has little

to do with the original evidential values of the information communicated. Depending on the aims that have to be accomplished, we see that political actors may attribute to a third reliable and powerful source their own beliefs, opinions etc. making them sound more "objective" and valid. On the contrary, they may also attribute to a third source, namely a political opponent, negative facts, verified, and as such having no need to originate in a particular source, in order to delegitimize the discourse of their opponents. Also, attributed utterances contribute to the enactment of several semantic legitimization strategies which mostly relate to the justification of the austerity policies that were discussed in the communicative situation under consideration in Chapter 5.

It is likely that the averred assertions that are examined in (5.4.) provide an index of how political actors interpret the communicative situation in which they are engaged, and how they shape their speech in order to accomplish several aims and goals represented in the speakers' context models. Averred assertions are further divided into those acquired from an evidential domain (Personal Experience, Cognitive), and those that do not overtly originate in a particular domain. It becomes evident from the analysis that in both occasions the speakers strategically realized the various ES types in close relation with how they had subjectively interpreted the properties of the communicative situation in which they participated as well as with how they had interpreted the qualifications of their institutional role. Our point is that the three political actors tended to neglect the various types of evidence per se and they intentionally exploited the evidential values associated with each type of evidence, along with the status of their institutional role, in order to construct themselves as credible sources with established authority. Instead of providing valid knowledge in accordance to accepted epistemic criteria, they showed more interest in using the status of those criteria for enhancing their own evidential standing to such an extent that their own discourse became a self-legitimizing device. In this respect, even in cases in which an objectification strategy occurred it was actually the product of the speakers' subjective qualification of the information conveyed as commonly accepted and shared, and hence represented as "fact".

It must be noted that all three political actors shared the same interpretation about how they should discursively perform their role as Prime Ministers. This indicates that

context models are personal, but they also have a strong social aspect because many of the representations of the various contextual properties are shared among different speakers and groups. On the other hand, our analysis also show the highly contextual character not only of the expression of knowledge, but also of its strategic use as a legitimizing device. Among the three political actors, Papademos was the one who made some linguistic choices different from the ones of Papandreou and Samaras. He particularly emphasized his high degree of objectivity as the source of knowledge. It was argued that these choices reflected the different political background of Papademos, which in turn was reflected in how Papademos constructed his context model on the basis of which he made the appropriate choices to represent himself as a credible source.

6.2. Study's contribution

Study's contribution to the analysis of Epistemic Stance in political discourse

Even though the discourse-oriented approaches to evidentiality acknowledge the importance of context, as well as its parameters that indeed influence how evidential meaning is discursively realized, they largely tend to deal with them in abstract, descriptive terms. The main contribution of our study lies precisely on the following: seeing context as a subjective, unique mental construction the parameters of which are represented in context models that control discourse production and comprehension. We recognize them as the cognitive interface that mediates between the abstract and socially defined categories, on the one hand, and their discursive relation based on the subjective interpretations of those categories made by the speakers, on the other. At the same time it offers needed empirical feedback to the socio-cognitive approach to context.

In particular, our study provides a hybrid framework for the analysis of an epistemic stance in Greek political discourse within the historical context of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. The analysis goes beyond the clause-level, which is the usual level of analysis of many studies on evidentiality. As far as we are aware, this is the first such approach of evidential meaning in Modern Greek, and one among very few within the relevant international literature on discourse-driven studies of evidentiality and the epistemic stance.

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Our main point is that unless the cognitive interface of the context model is taken into account, the complex process of the discursive construction of ES cannot be properly analyzed. It is indeed this context analytical perspective that led us to exclude from our analysis Mushin Imaginative EP since it appeared that the Greek political actors considered the linguistic resources that would realize the particular EP type. irrelevant to the communicative situations in which they were engaged.

What is further implied from the above is the broad and open character of the inventory of the linguistic resource that the speakers have at their disposal for realizing the various ES types. As expected, in Modern Greek, a language lacking a distinct grammatical system for coding evidential meaning, lexical and syntactic resources are deployed for the expression of ES.

Our analysis in Chapter 4 demonstrated that EP types can be realized by virtually all linguistic means, but, far from that, it can also be realized by more complex discursive structures, e.g. metaphors, allegories, narratives, Speech Acts (Questions, Assertions) and it can even be implied.

This variety can only be explained by context models. For the purposes of our study, the political actors recall the old mental model which features how knowledge was acquired and, then, on the basis of the new model the construct for the current communication in which they participate, they interpret the various parameters of the context and they discursively realize that knowledge in a way that is considered appropriate. In accordance with the subjective interpretation of those contextual parameters, the political actors may or may not convey the same amount of knowledge or they may represent it as originated in different domains of evidence from the actual one etc. Respectively, spelling out the various contextual properties of each communicative situation is the only way to explain why political actors made the linguistic choices they made. As was shown in the study, all of their choices in order to accomplish pragmatic, cognitive and ideological goals were context-dependent – and this was quite evident in the genre of political interviews due to their interactional character.

Never the less, there were also evident some re-occurring interpretations, applied nearly every time, in every communicative situation by all the political actors. This is

also explained if we consider the function of context models. As discussed in chapter 2, context models may be personal, unique and constantly updated, but at the same time they are also pre-planned. Given the nature of the communicative situation or their own positioning within the political spectrum, the political actors seem to share to a great extent the same interpretations about how they should discursively perform their institutional role. It appeared that their main aim across the various contexts was to discursively construct themselves as reliable and authoritative sources. This was evident in cases in which they realized their ES types in a way that allowed them to inscribe personal responsibility for the knowledge they communicated and, accordingly, to foreground the subjective character of their representations, as well as in "opposite" cases of factual ES in which they political actors omitted the original source of their knowledge, and were designated as the only source of assumed Common Ground knowledge. It is plausible to say that the Greek political actors more than constructing representations that meet the shared criteria of their community, they are interested in constructing themselves as credible and authoritative sources, to bypass any epistemic safeguards of their audience solely by their own evidential standing. This is relevant for the analysis of the ES within the Greek context, as it indicates a shift from what is being said to who said it. We will return to this issue below.

Just above, we indirectly referred to the issue of mismatches, which is a context-sensitive feature of the discursive realization of ES. What our study contributes to the relevant discussion is an explicit analysis of the context that controls the discursive realization of these mismatches. From a cognitive account, it was explained that mismatches are controlled by the interplay between the old and new context models constructed by the speakers, which has led us to revise the approach of Mushin, according to which speakers strategically exploit the epistemic mismatches shifting from a less reliable source to more reliable ones. This move was occurred in our data, but use of what we call reverse epistemic mismatch index the opposite shift: from reliable sources to less reliable.

The reverse mismatches reveal the relative character of the reliability of information. Knowledge is not placed in a continuum of reliability on the basis of formal and abstract characteristics of the domain of evidence from which it was acquired; rather

it subjected to the interpretations represented in the context models of the speaker. Our study showed that within the Greek political context, in general, and in the Greek political discourse, in particular, discursive-based evidence is the most reliable type of evidence -a view that contradicts traditional approaches of evidentiality. However, it should be noted that the positioning of the political actors with respect to the degree of reliability of this particular domain of evidence was not monolithic, but co-shaped by how other contextual parameters are interpreted. Respectively, it was shown in the study, that the same political actor may not hold the same evaluation of the reliability of a specific domain of evidence across all the communicative situations in which (s)he is engaged. This brings us to the third point derived from the examination of the reverse epistemic mismatches: the evaluation of the reliability of a domain of evidence is only one among the many interpretations made about the political on the basis of the context models they construct for every communicative situation. What is more, all of those interpretations are organized in a sense that some may be considered more relevant to the situation than others, and the political actors may accordingly make their choices. This explains why the political agent may have opted for reverse mismatch situations: the considered more appropriate to discursively construct a positive self-image through -typically less reliable - subjectified information, which though allowed them to appear as personally being in control of the crisis.

Lastly, in relation with the study of ES in political settings the study demonstrated the importance and multifunctionality of discourse-based analysis, contrary to many studies in evidentiality which have overlooked not only the interactional and social characters of the specific domain of evidence, but also the fact that most of our knowledge is constructed, produced and comprehended through discourse. Undoubtedly, as politics are constituted in and through discourse, the domain of evidence being discussed has significant importance. With a context-based analytical perspective, our study offered a detailed framework of analysis about how the Greek political actors expressed and positioned themselves towards knowledge that was acquired through discourse showing that they not only exploited it in cases in which they attributed the responsibility of what is being said to a third, but it was also used as an effective means for constructing their own personal credibility.

Study's contribution to the analysis of Epistemic Legitimization

Chapter 5 was dedicated to the analysis of epistemic legitimization in the Greek political discourse during the time of the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012). Our analysis was conducted by applying two macro-distinctions: First, the proposed by Hart (2010) distinction between legitimization of assertions and legitimization of actions. Second, the proposed by Bednarek (2006a) distinction between attributes and averred utterances. Within the analytical framework developed in Chapter 4 for the analysis of various ES types that occurred in our data, our focus was to examine how political actors legitimized their assertions in relation with the implementation of austerity policies, which we see as a form of a social problem because a) they reflect the main neoliberal and capitalist positions as regards the organization and the structures of the State; and b) they establish and broaden inequality among the social groups. Given the above, the study specific contribution to the analysis of epistemic legitimization within the Greek political context can be summarized as follows.

First, we demonstrated the importance of a detailed discursive micro-analysis when the ideological implications of discourse production are taken into consideration. Our analysis emphasized the specific linguistic choices made by three political actors (Papandreou, Papademos, Samaras) in three particular communicative situations, conceived as "vivid" instantiations of the social macro-level. In this respect, we detailed the various contextual parameters of each situation, paying attention to those features that make a political leader able to construct her/himself as a credible and authoritative source, a necessary move for the effective legitimization of assertions. We examined how the political actors discursively realized those features on the basis of their subjective context models that provide the cognitive interface that mediates society and discourse.

Second, the distinction between legitimization of assertions and actions was followed for methodological reasons. It was shown, though, that they co-exist in discourse and are difficult to separate when an analysis moves beyond the clause level. Therefore, we not only examined how the various ES types contributed to the legitimization of assertions, but also (inevitably, but secondarily) how the linguistic resources used by the political actors to realize their own epistemic positioning also contributed to the legitimization of their actions. It was also shown that within the broader historical and

political context of the European financial crisis they are used as common legitimization strategies across the various political settings.

Third, the discourse as a domain of evidence gains in importance when it comes to legitimization of assertions. It appeared that the main aim of the political actors was not primarily to legitimize the propositional content of their assertions. Taking advantage of the status of their institutional role, they were seeking to legitimize themselves as sources of information (authorization) regardless of the degree of reliability of the domain of evidence from which they acquired the knowledge they communicate. Also, they strategically worked for the legitimization of third party discourses that they considered powerful.

This brings us to the fourth point. It goes without saying that as legitimization is a dual process, the political actors equally aimed at the delegitimization of the discourse of their opponents. The political actors aimed at attenuating both the validity of the assertions made by their opponents as well as their opponents' credibility as sources of information. In this respect, they activated two special kinds of the Us vs. Them strategy, What we say vs. What they say; and Who are we who say so vs. Who are they who say so.

Fifth, the epistemic legitimization micro-strategy of objectification involves speaker's standing back as (s)he lets the evidence speak for itself. Never the less, the Greek political actors even when they relied solely on the reliability of the knowledge that they communicate they have made tacitly a series of evaluation. First, the very evaluation of the reliability of the knowledge, as on the basis of their personal context models they discursively realized a type of ES indicating thus their own assessment about the information's degree of reliability. Second, even in these cases in which they mitigated the domain of evidence and presented knowledge as raw fact, it was indexed that a tacit evaluation was made by the political actors, e.g. that they considered the communicative situation relevant, as well as their goals to mitigate the domain of evidence. Also, by communicating knowledge as a "fact", i.e. commonly accepted, the political actors enhance their own credibility status.

Sixth, taking into consideration the above three points, our study showed the context models construed by the political actors controlled the discourse production in a way

that facilitated the construction of the speakers as credible sources. The political actors managed to gain epistemic control over the discourse as well as over their audience, and to bypass any epistemic safeguards of their recipients solely on the basis of their own evidential standing.

Last, just as ES types were realized by a very broad directory of linguistic resources, the same held true for epistemic legitimization, which was efficiently operated both explicitly and implicitly by either "simple" or more complex discursive strategies and formulations.

Study's contribution to the analysis of evidential meaning in Modern Greek

As stated, evidentiality in Modern Greek is mainly studied within a formal syntactic or pragmatic approach. Also, the studies on stance-taking in general and in epistemic stance in particular are little in number, so our view on the issue is not sufficient. The realization of ES types in political settings, there is, to as far as we know, as there is a total lack of detailed work dedicated to the subjects. Our work proposed a quite strict discourse-oriented framework of analysis -something which was never attempted before. However, the above by no means entail that the present study can function as blueprint for the systematic analysis of evidential meaning and epistemic stance in Modern Greek. It just opens a broad discussion and poses challenging questions the exploration of which may prove prolific.

6.3. Issues for further research

The present study just scratches the surface of the issue studied. We provided a detailed analysis of the discursive construction of evidential meaning, in general, and the epistemic stance, in particular, as it manifested in the governmental political discourse from 2010 to 2012. We also took into account the ideological and political implications of the discursive realization of various types of ES. However, there are still many issues related to our study that have been little studied and need elaboration.

First, there is need for more studies on the evidentiality that will adopt a discourse-oriented approach, focusing their analysis beyond-clause levels. Especially for

languages lacking a grammatical system for marking evidence, this seems to be inevitable in order for the phenomenon to be thoroughly analyzed.

Second, an analytical context perspective must be adopted in studies dealing with the discursive expression of knowledge in order to have an overview of how speakers discursively construct their knowledge in different communicative situations. On the other hand, the socio-cognitive approach to discourse which offer such a theoretical framework should be informed by the empirical studies of the issue.

Third, we still know very little about the cognitive structure of mental models. Our points about them were based on what has been observed in the authentic discourse, but an account provided by cognitive sciences and social psychology is needed.

Fourth, a thorough account of how official knowledge was expressed by the pollical elites in the times of the Greek sovereign debt crisis should extent its limits over the specific period analyzed. What is more it should also include political discourses that have resisted that knowledge, focusing on how they constructed their "anti-knowledge" as well.

Fifth, as the Greek Crisis triggered a series of events and actions that drastically transformed the Greek society's structures; the social relationships among its groups and members and the allocation of wealth, any study of the Greek political discourse should take those social parameters into consideration.

Sixth, our knowledge of how knowledge is constructed and negotiated among the hierarchical EU's governing bodies is limited -if there is actually any. As we saw, much of the knowledge that the politicians communicated was knowledge hardly accessible by anyone, except for the political elites. Also, much of the sources (especially unofficial and official documents, reports, proceedings or simply the oral communication in official meetings) are not accessible. As a result of the European and international financial crisis and the neo-liberal austerity policies that were associated with it, a transition has emerged from identity politics and humanitarian campaigns dominated the 1990s and early 2000s to mass resistance in public spaces (Douzinas 2013; Martin-Rojo 2015), and it has marked so far the twenty-first century

politics. Obviously, this is a broader question going far beyond the scientific and academic purposes. It is a political demand for democracy.

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Appendix 1

In Appendix 1 is provided a timeline of the main events in the period under study

The timeline of the Greek crisis (2010-2012)

The first memorandum (May 2010)

Since the autumn of 2009 the sovereign crisis had been evident, but it became intense in the beginning of 2010, when a report by the European Commission was referring to the severe irregularities of the Greek Excessive Deficit Procedure Notifications (Mink & de Hann 2013). The newly elected (October 2009) Government at the time, that of PASOK [Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement] party, had to face a serious problem of "liquidity" as the international markets considered the Greek State unreliable and interest rates were getting higher and higher. Attempting to "calm the markets", as the governmental officials used to say, PASOK took action in the fields of both national and international politics. In early 2010 the parliament passed two austerity packages, while, at the European level, the creation of the European Financial Support Mechanism (EFSM; later known as European Stability Mechanism, ESM) was under discussion, which would be activated if a Eurozone member faced difficulties regarding the bond rates. Finally in the end of March 2010 the EFSM was created. In the scheme, the EU, ECB and IMF participated in the so called "troika". The scope of the ESM was to prevent the transmission of the crisis to the rest of the Eurozone, while the IMF's participation guaranteed financial and technical support. Initially, the Greek government denied rumors about a potential activation of the mechanism. Nevertheless, following a turbulent period in which the international markets were still unconvinced about the reliability of the Greek State, the PM, George Papandreou, on the 23rd of April 2010 in his address to the Greek people announced the Government's decision to join the mechanism. Greece agreed with the "troika" on a three-year program of financial support in May 2010. On 3/5/2010 the Greek State sent a letter of intent to join the mechanism. The programme included financial support of 110 bn. Euros.

In order to receive the bailout package, the Government had to convince the Parliament to vote for the agreement, a detailed Memoradum of Understatement,

which regulated the relation among the State and the "troika" and entailed several reforms and austerity measures. Despite PASOK's wide majority of 160 MPs out of 300 seats, nothing could be taken for granted, since the Memorandum entailed severe measures, that were echoing the neoliberal doctrine of "Washington consensus (see section x.5). In a two-day[54] session, the Memorandum was approved on 6 May. PASOK and LAOS [People's Orthodox Rally], a small right wing populist party, voted in favour of the Memorandum. The rest of the parliamentary parties, the conservative major opposition Nea Dimokratia [New Democracy], as well as the communists KKE [Greek Communist Party] and the radical lefts SYRIZA [Coalition of Radical Left] were against.

The Medium term Economic Program (June 2011)

As the "troika" have been stating in their reports, because of the difficulty of The Greek Sate to reach the goals of the Memorandum, new negations took place in which the reduction of the lending rate and the extension of the repayment period was decided upon. As a result, several revisions were needed in the initial agreement. This updated version of the Memorandum was called the "Medium Term Economic Program" and was to be discussed in the Parliament in June 2011.

Although the society appeared to be in a state of shock after the Marfin deaths (see footnote 1), the first gatherings of the squares' movement in May 2011 started to have their own significance within the political context. The movement was inspired by the Spanish indignados movements as well as by the similar movements of Arabic Spring, however it wasn't a "copy" of them. As has already been suggested (Sotiris 2011, Goutsos & Polymeneas forthcoming), the Syntagma protests took place in an altogether different context from that of other countries, since they were shaped by previous struggles against austerity measures and were influenced by the widespread

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[54] At the same time and as a response to the proposed bail-out programme, the General Confederation of Greek Workers called a nation-wide strike on May 5. The estimated people who matched in the streets of Athens vary from 100.000 to 500.000. Be as it may, this was one of the most massive strikes since the early '80s, which was to be haunted by the death of three bank employees. At the riots during the protest, protesters set fire to a Marfin Bank branch, throwing Molotov cocktail bombs. The majority of the bank's employees managed to escape, but the three did not make it in time and died of asphyxiation from the bomb's toxic fumes.

social and political tension regarding the Medium Term Economic Program. During June two general strikes were called (15, 28-29/6), ending in violent riots.

At the same time the PASOK party was losing part of its majority, many of its MPs resigned, refusing to vote again on the new severe measures. Papandreou decided on a government teshuffle and asked for a vote of confidence. Finally, the Medium Term Economic Program was approved in 29 June. LAOS supported again PASOK and the rest of the Parliament voted against. Also, the EU decided to start the procedure of the PSI, i.e. the voluntary haircut of the face value of bonds belonging to private funds (see also sections x.4 and x.5)

The second memorandum and the PSImk2 (February 2012)

As the PSI had failed (2011), the EU summit that took place in October 2011 decided a) to start a new procedure of the restructuring of the Greek debt, the PSImk2, and b) to offer a new bailout package of 130 bn. Euros for the financial needs of the years 2012, 2013 and 2014. The requirement for the rescue package was an agreement with the private creditors. In the meantime and with the governmental majority at stake, George Papandreou resigned as PM in November 2011 under the pressure of German and French leaderships and a "technocrat", Loukas Papademos, stepped into the office in order to form a caretaker government that would lead the negotiations with the "troika" and the private creditors, and also lead the country to legislative election in the Spring. The new PM was supported by PASOK, Nea Dimokratia and LAOS, gaining a wide consensus of 258 MPs. Papademos negotiated the terms of the new bail-out program and managed to agree with the private creditors. Under the threat of default, the Second Memorandum had to be voted on by the parliament. The second Memorandum included specific fiscal and financial goals. As for the first, in general, and in the public sector, in particular. Certain fiscal goals were set, such as the reduction of debt to GDP ratio by 120% by 2020. Despite the hard protests outside of the Parliament building, the bailout was approved on 12 February of 2012.

The two legislative elections (April, June 2012)

After the PSImk2 agreement was sealed in February, the caretaker government had fulfilled their role. The legislative elections were held on 6 May and brought great changes in the political scene. The parties of the governmental coalition had a serious loss of power, whereas the anti-memoradum parties gained high percentages of support. Nea Dimokratia won 18.85% of the votes. For the first time since 1974, the major opposition wasn't Nea Dimokratia or PASOK. SYRIZA gained 12.18% of the votes, marking the most significant change of the Greek political scene in the last four decades. PASOK came third (13.18%) losing almost as much as the two thirds of the 2009 performance. The second significant change was the participation of a pro-Nazi party, Chrisi Avgi (Golden Down), in the parliament for the first time in Greek history. Chrisi Avgi won 6.97% of the votes and they came sixth. Two new parties that have never participated before in elections had a distinctive performance. Anexartiti Elines (Independent Greeks), a populist right wing anti-memoradum party, came fourth (10.6%), while Dimokratiki Aristera (Democratic Left), a moderate center-left party, gained 6.11% (seventh place). As for KKE, they gained 8.48% of the votes. It is also noteworthy that the third party of the former governmental coalition, LAOS, did not reach the 3% limit (they gained 2.9%), and subsequently did not elect MPs.

As neither of the elected parties had gained the majority of the seats, they had to form a coalitional government. All the negotiations failed and, according to the Constitution, new elections had to been held within forty days.

After the failure of forming a coalitional government, new rumors were leaked about Greece's potential exit of the Eurozone. The second elections were held on the 17th of June and they confirmed the changes of power relations within the parliament. Nea Dimokratia won 29.66% of the votes, whereas the major opposition, SYRIZA, 26.89%. PASOK gained 12.28%, Anexartiti Elines 7.51%, Crisi Avgi 6.92%, Democratic Left 6.26% and KKE 3.98%. Once more, LAOS did elect MPs (1.5%). Neither of the party had the majority in the parliament and a new round of discussions started for the formation of a coalitional government. As SYRIZA was denying any cooperation, Nea Dimokratia agreed with PASOK and DIMAR. The new Prime Minister was Nea Dimokratia's leader, Antonis Samaras who stepped into the office on 20/6/2012.

Labor Market Reform and Mid-term fiscal plan 2013-2016 (November 2012)

As the economic adjustment program constantly failed in reaching the set goals (see also section x.6), the "troika" threatened to postpone the scheduled bailout disbursement in August 2012, pressuring the Government to proceed with the necessary reforms not only in fiscal policies, but in the labor market as well. The content of reforms was negotiated for approximately two months. As the agreement was made, the Parliament had to vote on the relevant bill. According to governmental officials, a possible rejection would cause the State's default within a few weeks, and by no means no later than the end of November. On the 7th of November the act was approved by 153 MPs of the governmental coalition, despite DIMAR's decision not to vote on the bill.

Appendix 2

In Appendix 2 are included the three speeches analyzed in Chapter 5

Speech of George Papandreou, 6/5/2010

Fellow MPs,

The yesterday's tragedy shocked all of us. As I was informed last night, among the victims were innocent children and a young pregnant woman, [all of them] were unfairly lost. We are accountable for this tragedy. Neither the violence nor the stones will get us out of being supervised. On the contrary, they will head us deep to recession and disrepute.

The course of the country is at stake. The economy, Democracy, social cohesion are at stake. Our self-image, but also the whole spirit of Greekness are at stake. Today we are all called upon, with no exceptions, to assume our responsibilities. Violence does not provide answers, it does not provide solutions, it causes new wounds.

We shall end up with vehemence, blood, riots, terrorism, with the unfair loss of innocent fellow citizens. Let us all isolate violence once and for all those who agree with our policies as well as those who disagree – those who protest peacefully, as they exercise the right given by the Law, by the Constitution. The Constitution which is democratically served by all the parties in the Parliament.

Let's give an end to such phenomena. We can't stand any more wounds. I understand the anger, I empathize. And my fury is great as well, when daily and constantly I see the tragedy of irresponsibility; the prevailing sense of despoilment; the absolute impunity and inconsideration; [all of them] to be emerged from the Ministries and [the practice of] management of the Greek people's wealth. A new example every single day. AGROTEMA –we sent the case to the Prosecutor. And we will keep sending and we should send to the Prosecutor [similar cases]. This is what the Greek people demand. All these matters, fellow MPs of the ND, have nothing to do with a sense of revenge. It is Greek people's sense of justice. It is the protection of the political, democratic system. The Greek people want at last to believe that the

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political personnel can serve the rule of law; can serve justice, and not ~~the~~ narrow political or personal interests. This is what they want to see today from this body. They want to see whether we truly serve the nation; whether we serve the citizen or whether we serve office politics, as we confront this great adventure of our country.

Another occasion: An ex Minister spent 28.000 Euros for the curtains of his office. Every single day a new example. All these cases will be sent to the Prosecutor, and then you can speak, fellow MPs of the ND.

Shame on you! Shame on you! The Greek people are paying and you are laughing? The Greek people are paying. Do you think that these are not problems? That they are minor issues? They are problems, because this attitude prevailed over all the Ministries. Because, when the Minster behaves like this, then everyone is allowed to wreak havoc and to feel beyond the law. What is worse, every Greek citizen is allowed to infer that this is tolerable, even the large scandals, such as the Vatopedi case, Insurance Funds bonds, the Siemens case.

And today things are simple: We vote for and implement the agreement or we condemn Greece to default. And there are some who wish for it, having interest to speculate on it.

We, personally I, the PASOK party, will not allow it. We will not allow the default or speculation against the country. And I haven't heard, as no one did, an alternative solution –we would appreciate it.You have to say! Explain what will happen if the country goes bankrupt; if [the country] declares suspension of payments. What will happen to the salaries and pensions, in which we all are, supposedly, interested. What will happen, fellow MPs of the ND, in a state that cannot provide anything? What will happen to Greek people's savings within an economy that will collapse?

There is one thing I want to say: today genuine patriotism is to do whatever it takes in order for Greece not to fail –we should not do international speculators the favour. Today patriotism is to get over with Greece that hurt us; [to get over with] errors of decades, but especially [with] the crimes of the last few years. Because what has happened in the previous years; what we came across after the election is unprecedented in the history of the country –maybe in the history of any country. It

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was a crime. From 2004 to 2009, spending was increased by 40bn Euros, from 80bn Euros to 120bn Euros. We doubled the country's public debt in few years. In the year of the Olympics Games, the total state budget was 80bn Euros and, in 2009, we additionally spent more than 40bn Euros without hosting the Olympics Games. From 2004 and within five years 60.000 new public servants were additionally hired in the public sector, even though we were under supervision; even though we had warned the European Committee; even though the new Administration during that time was tidying up the State. And as if this weren't enough 100,000 contract staff project members, 50 thousand young people were added with the misnomer of the alleged "Stage" programs, that were supposedly run for Young adults' training. A whole second Public sector was created in five years.

Did the Public Health system improve? Did the public education system improve? Did we have more growth? This is where the money went, fellow MPs. This is unprecedented. This is the legacy of the previous government; this is what we have to change.

You know very well –besides there have been studies done, we are at the centre of studies and commentators- that if corruption and this sense of clientelism were missing from the top level of politics, we could have saved, according to international studies, 8% of the GDP or 20 bn. Euros, much more than the amount we collect from the extraordinary measures. Then you would say 'Why didn't you do it?'. But – I reply- this is exactly what we are doing, and we keep setting our house in order.

What would have happened to the State if we hadn't already acted; if we hadn't end the unacceptable status of the Stage programs and that of hiring contract staff through the back door.

What would have been State's and Government's position, if we hadn't legislated absolute transparency in [public sector's] hiring and its inclusion under the processes provisioned by the Supreme Council for Civil Personnel Selection; if the Kallikratis program hadn't been about to be approved which introduces large cuts to spending; merging; economies of scale; and very strict controls?

If it weren't for the bill for transparency that stipulates all decisions made by the civil officials to be posted on the web, how the lack of transparency would have been confronted as well as this glasshouse of corruption within the Public Sector?

Do you know what I was being told by partners and creditors during all these days, and especially in the beginning of our term, when we were abroad presenting an ambitious (fiscal) program? "We have already heard all that. We don't believe you. By the time you tackle corruption, you will have been in default - if you ever manage to tackle corruption.

The extraordinary measures are the condition to gain reliability and to gain time –the lost time- for the big changes that were delayed for ~~the~~ decades. We would not be here today to make these decisions and ask the citizens to make these sacrifices, this effort, if this despoilment had not ~~been~~ occurred in the past.

You'd say: "We still had many problems before ~~of~~ that". Which of those problems though was solved in the previous years? Which problem handled by the previous government did not get worse? Corruption? Overspending? Tax evasion?

We experienced the most profligate and corrupted face of the power; the calumny of our country not only because of loans and debts, but also because of the continuous lies. In order for the ND not to accept the truth, they provided false statistics even today. Just two days before the elections, the ND stated to the EC that the deficit of 2009 is at 6% of the GDP. Why are we under supervision? For 2009, you know that. That's right, fellow MPs, this what they assured on Friday October 2nd of 2009 –I submit the document. This is your administration. Those culpable for this 'black hole' not only did they not feel the need to apologize, but they also accused us for exaggerating the data.

Unfortunately, even you Mr. Samaras, despite your apologies, aligned yourself to what happened in the previous years. And the European Committee came to disprove of you as well, estimating once again that the reality was even worse than our estimations. Yet again, we did not hear ~~not~~ a single acceptance from your part.

Of course, the day on which it was issued the [European] Committee's announcement on the data of 2009, our country's capability to lend from the markets was actually lost, and this is why, the very next day, we asked the activation of the ESM scheme.

We owe a sincere and thorough answer to the Greek people for "why did we reach this point"? We mentioned the responsibilities of the previous administration, but the whole truth –there is no point to mitigate it- is that in the previous years we experienced in their most severe version situations which already existed, and which we should overcome.

Yes, we were all at fault, more or less, all of those who governed Greece; all those who were lacking in boldness; those who did not make the changes that should have been made in time so that country would not have reached the point it did; all those who tolerated illegalities or they fed a State that did not function with vision and plan, but with the rationale of gifts- any kind of gifts. We became accustomed with the rationale of getting without giving. Every time we offered a gift to trade unionists; to occupational groups; to some class of workers; to ulterior interests; to Mass Media in order to get on their good side; to entrepreneurs. We were always giving small and big gifts, without having the money to do so. [We were giving gifts] sometimes legally and sometimes illegally. In the Vatopedi case; in Social Funds' bonds; in any kind of bribes.

However, it is not the employee nor any professional group that is at fault. I'd say even the powerful interests of the Mass Media are not at fault. What we have to blame, fellow MPs, is that we allowed our Democracy and our institutions to be captivated by those interests and this kind of mindset.

This why the changes are a matter of Democracy. We shall revitalize the democratic institutions. We shall make the Parliament, the Justice and the Mass Media to be independent; to be in control and under control. We shall leave this bad version of post 1974 Greece behind, which we all experienced in the most severe version during the last years –in all those dealings of complicity.

Today we pay the price. And we pay it hard and it hurts. But anyone, making even ~~making~~ the lowest effort, who contributes to this old version of Greece to be

preserved, ~~he~~ commits a crime. And this includes potentially all of us. Because we were all at fault for having a country like this. [They are at fault] even those who did not participate in administration, but they still had a voice and power; who blocked any necessary change by referring to alleged 'enemies' of the nation or the people; who had to set an obstacle against any effort for making any change –nothing had to change; who had to say 'no' to everything.

When it is time for accepting responsibilities, I regret for instead of proving our unity as nation, dedicated to a common effort, our country seems to its partners less decisive than it truly is, and, of course, less decisive to strain to meet its obligations and overcome the crisis.

Today I call upon the Major Opposition again: Dare for a single time to accept your responsibilities; Dare to make an overachievement –at least as far as it concerns ~~for~~ your responsibility about what has happened. Dare to support an effort which is for the rescue of the country. Dare for two reasons: [First], the parliamentary bodies of other countries as well as the people of other member-states decide on supporting Greece; decide on offering loans to Greece; decide unitedly on fighting for rescuing Greece.

What do we have to say to all of them? The political forces ~~we do~~ appear to act without unity, even among those who have particular responsibilities, Mr Samaras. And this brings us to the second reason. Because, if you do not assume your responsibilities, the conclusion will be simple: irresponsible as the Government; irresponsible as the major opposition. You deserted as the government; you deserted as the major opposition.

Unfortunately, fellow MPs, we are at a point where the only condition to change Greece is its rescue. We did not attempt to do so amid regular conditions. Let's turn this crisis into an opportunity for changing era and life. Because today we pay the price of the past, of old Greece. And the outcome, as I said, is painful, and even unfair –not for few. But let's turn this pain into hope –not misery nor fury. Because it would have been even more unfair not to take this historical chance for Greece to step ahead, and instead to sink deeper in to the crisis.

The lost taxes were, indeed, an injustice, as well as the lack of regulation, the corruption, the political favours, the inadequate welfare State; the dealings with the power. I call upon the Greek people: As we feel the pain of the sacrifice, let's get rid of all these incidents which hurt us and, as a matter of fact, resulted in those sacrifices.

We keep though all the things which we are proud of. And we are proud of being Greeks. And we say it out loud not only in Greece, but everywhere. [We are proud] of our history; our environment; our compassion; our solidarity to family and friends; our hospitality; our bravery; our dutifulness; our dynamism; our courage; our wittiness which is evident and prospers across the world.

But we have to act the same here, in our country, not only in Diaspora. We know we can. In moments like the ones which our country is experiencing, we have to be united and sincere with our hand on our heart. As Prime Minister, I assume my responsibilities and make decisions I consider necessary. I repeat what I said on Sunday: I do not care if this will be my only stint as Prime Minister. If the dilemma was my political career, on the one hand, or the rescue of the country, on the other hand, it wouldn't have been a dilemma at all. For me, politics is not a career, it is about the future of Greece. This is what I work for – for the county to stand on its feet. And Greece will stand on its feet. We will make it. Greece will change. Unfortunately, by making great sacrifices in order to create better conditions for the next generations.

The sacrifices are great, but we are already on a new path. We don't only ask of the employed persons or the pensioners to contribute. This could not be possible – to have them pay the price for all the others. What I can assure is that the biggest part of the giant effort of reducing deficits will not come from the reduction of salaries and pensions. It will come from the fair redistribution of wealth and burdens, it will come from cuts in overspending and in unneeded public spending; it will come from incomes; from development; from proper investments.

As far as we are concerned, as far as the Government is concerned, we know our duty. We know how we will be judged. We know our responsibilities. Today is not the day for hallow words and promises. The Greek people are fed up with that. Today, the

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Government and every Minister are judged on their actions. I know that, as I know that we all will be judged on the establishment of justice in Greece; on the rule of law; on fighting against unaccountability and corruption; on what the Greek people say today in a fair manner: 'Why isn't anybody getting punished?'. Yes, we will be judged on that.

As I know that we will be judged on whether we break bureaucracy and corruption that put off even the proper entrepreneurs; that put off foreign investors, and attract only those who see our country as a chance for snatch.

As I know that we will be judged on the reform of the political system, public administration and transparency, i.e. the new overt –and not enmeshed- relation between the executive power, the judiciary, the media power, even the Greek Orthodox Church power.

As I know that we will be judged on whether we correct injustices and social inequalities. The burdens should be shared; those in power and those with more wealth should not be able to live at the expense of those who are poorer and lift unbearable obligations on their shoulders.

As I know that we will be judged on the protection of those who are weak -especially those who weren't associated with the crisis- creating a serious safety net. We will be judged on how we protect unemployed people; how we change our hospitals; how we provide welfare to those who are truly in need.

As I know that we will be judged on the great reforms in education so that we will become innovative, capable and dynamic in the fields that we have comparative advantages.

As I know that we will be judged on the shift of development model. We should become more competitive; we should be part of green and qualitative development; we should bring investments in our country.

It's not the time to refer what we have done, what we do and what we will do. All these are our priorities and facilitate prospect and hope to come, as they create a sustainable and proud Greece. We will be judged though on the reactions of the other

parties, of society, of citizens. We are all needed for the gigantic work of deep and radical changes. This is why we must turn fury and protests into power and dynamic for change and creation in every field. We should reveal the faults everywhere, injustice, bureaucracy, waste, but, on the other hand, the chances, capabilities, skills, imagination and innovation of the Greek people. And we will be all judged by ~~the~~ History on whether we made the change or we failed.

Actually, all of us, our Movement, our Government, we are heading towards success and so that we can bring success to Greece.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the country has experienced much greater adventures and has made it. The Greek people have suffered much more. After this adventure, we will be better; we will be winners not only against the deficits, but also mostly against the struggle for a State that respects and protects the citizens. For a country making us proud, offering opportunities, not sinking creativity into corruption. If needed, we will take upon us the burden of responsibility for rescuing the country, in order to allow it to look ahead and claim a better future –there is no way we will show fear nor stop at any point.

We were founded as a movement in order to change Greece, so we are not afraid of doing so. We are not afraid of changing ourselves; we are not even afraid of recognizing our mistakes and fixing them. If it is needed for us to make hard decisions, we will do so, as we already did, as long as we know that they are needed for the country.

This is what we are doing today. The issue of the type of institutional majority was raised, whether or not it will be augmented. The main issue, ladies and gentlemen, is that of democratic and national responsibility. As the country is in that position and the parliamentary bodies vote –in many cases without party clashes- for the bail out for Greece, the national interest dictates a broad consensus within the Greek parliament

According to the institution, there no such issue of augmented majority. For each one of us the only issue raised is that of political responsibility. Be as it may, the bill will be approved by the parliamentary majority of PASOK –this is for being consistent to

our consciousness; to the country; and, of course, to our international obligations. Tomorrow in the EU in Brussels the decision about the aid to our country will be made, so that we can secure fiscal, financial and political stability in Greece. This is what the national interest dictates. This should have been and should be the stance of the major opposition party, in particular, in the voting that follows.

Though, the approval of the bill is just the beginning. The implementation of the thorough national plan, which the country needs, can only be achieved by the responsible stance of political forces; and only through the support of society and social partners. Therefore, each one is called to assume responsibilities not only today, but for the coming long period of time, amid the difficult coming era.

We vote for the bill which offers Greece the chance to change; to stand on its feet; to create wealth, which will be fairly distributed; to leave a particular modus opperandi behind, but also the social ethics that led to default, this current humiliation we are all living through.

It's time for changes and there is a single day or hour left for further delays. Voting the bill, though, we can claim that we will be working on turning Greece from the "Greek problem" into the Greek miracle.

Thank you.

Speech of Loukas Papademos, 12/2/2012

Fellow MPs,

Before starting my speech, I want to express my regrets for the riots taking place outside the building, and, unfortunately, sullying the entirely lawful demonstrations within any civic State. Vandalisms, violence and destruction have no place in Democracy and will not be tolerated. I would like make a plea for composure and reconciliation to all of you and to the citizens who are watching us. In this crucial time, we cannot afford clashes like these. We have to make decisions as a composed society. And when the time comes, the ultimate judge, who is none other than the people, will express themselves.

In the last couple of years, the MPs in this hall have met and discussed about difficult issues and have made decisions of the highest national responsibility and of the highest political cost. I think that there is no one in this room, no matter his political wing, who doubts the critical character of this session. Today's session is, indeed, of historical importance for the future of the country. The outcome, the decisions that will be made, will determine whether our economy will secure its financing for the coming years; whether we will alleviate the public debt by approximately 100 bn. Euros; whether we will continue the hard effort of consolidation and reform of our economy in order to achieve growth, maintaining our position in the Eurozone. Or, on the contrary, due to fatal error, cowardice or wrong decision-making, whether we will guide the country into a destructive default; into extended misery; into a fatal downslope of marginalization within Europe and expulsion from the Eurozone. I have the belief that the MPs will do their national duty.

For over two years, our country experiences the worst crisis of the post-war era. A crisis that began as a crisis of fiscal deficit and public debt, and it turned into an economic and social crisis, and now into a national crisis. This is why the choices and dilemmas of this day will determine the outcome of our country's most important strategic decision in the last years, i.e. our decision to join hands towards European integration as an integral member of the core of the EU and the Eurozone. Have no doubt, those are the great and ultimate stakes of today's decision.

We have before us a thorough and reliable program for the country's exiting from the fiscal and economic crisis. A program that secures, as no other, our place in the Eurozone; that prevents a destructive default. It is a tough program entailing painful sacrifices, added on those that have already been made, for broad levels of the society, more or less for the whole society. Despite this, it is a program that will lead us to a solid ground; it will lead us to the consolidation, reform and recovery of our economy in order to overcome the crisis and have growth and new jobs.

The causes of the crisis are multiple and interconnected. Also, many complex and interdependent factors have contributed to it and explain the intensity and duration of the crisis we experience. It is not time for a detailed analysis. It's time for decisions.

It is necessary though to be understood that the main cause of the crisis is the fact that

for many years the State was systematically spending much more than its income was. As a result, the fiscal deficit reached high and increasing levels, giving us a huge public debt. The expansion of the State was beyond its capacity; the swelling of the fiscal deficits; the excessive borrowing; [all of them] resulted in creating conditions of overconsumption, i.e. spending much more than we produce, and increasing the current account deficit along with external borrowing. Also, conditions of unreasonable euphoria and complacency were formed and expectations that were steadily based on a fictitious reality. At the same time, the country was constantly postponing critical and necessary reforms of the State and the tax system, of the social insurance system and the health system.

When the international crisis brought out the economy's fiscal and structural weaknesses; when the borrowing cost was increased to prohibitive high levels, then the country was led to the financial aid of the European partners and the IMF, and adopted the first program of economic adjustment.

Within the last couple of years, the progress made in restoring fiscal stability and international competitiveness has been important. The primary fiscal deficit was reduced from 24 bn. Euros to 5 bn. Euros, an 8% reduction of the GDP. Also, approximately the 1/3 of the competiveness that was lost during the last 10 years has been recovered. The Greek people's efforts and sacrifices, as they are indexed in the continuing recession and the rising of unemployment, are effective and deserve everyone's respect.

The denial of the great effort that is undertaken, of the progress that takes place, of the great economic and social cost demanded for the adjustment, as well as the critical stance of some partners are [all of them] concerning, disappointing and generating anger in the Greek people. Moreover, they weaken the effort of the complementation of the economy's restructuring and recovery. The Greeks work hard, they neither avoid sacrifices nor do they beg. We are a proud and dutiful people, who struggle to overcome the crisis.

It is a fact, though, that no matter the efforts and the progress made, the Greek economy still confronts three intertwined problems: A big fiscal deficit; low competiveness; and a high current accounts deficit. Besides, the liquidity of the

economy has been shrunk due to the fiscal crisis, and the banking system does not have enough resources for financing the economy. Also, the new financial support, the voluntary private debt restructuring and the adoption of the new economic adjustment program are necessary because of the deviation of the [actual] fiscal figures from the [nominal] targets set as well as of the accumulated overdue in the implementation of the reforms agreed in the past. The relevant decisions were made in the Summit meeting of the Eurozone.

Some say that the new (bail-out) program is going to fail. They are wrong. The public debate has been focused on the first program's impact on incomes and employment, and prejudges that the new program will have a similar negative outcome and an exit from the crisis will not be achieved.

I want and it is necessary in the current Parliamentary discussion the aims, policies and reforms of the new [economic adjustment] program as well as the prospects of exiting the crisis to be presented concisely but pithily.

Therefore the program serves the main and final aim, that of economic growth, while it sets three intermediate goals: fiscal consolidation; growth; strengthening of the banking system.

The first goal is to secure fiscal stability in an effective and permanent manner. For achieving so a reduction of State's expenditures by 1.5% of the GDP for 2012 is estimated, as well as additional measures corresponding to 5% of the GDP within the next couple of years, in order for a surplus up to 4.5% of the GDP in 2014 to be created. This is necessary for the gradual reduction of the public debt. The scheduled privatizations until 2015, up to at least 19 bn. Euros, will also contribute to the reduction of the public debt.

The reforms in the public sector include both coordinated actions for the significant restructuring of public administration; the more efficient tax collection; and the confrontation of corruption, and a new and simple taxation system that aims at promoting investments; limiting the tax-evasion; and the more fair distribution of taxation burden. In sum, the reforms in the public sector will not only contribute to

restrictions on public debt, but they will also contribute to promoting financial development.

The reforms of insurance funds and the adjustment of pensions aim to secure the sustainability of the fund in a way which mainly prevents those who have a low pension.

The second goal is to restore competitiveness; to promote development; and to increase employment. The program includes significant structural changes in the labor market, in the goods market and in the service market –[they are included] reforms that aim to upgrade entrepreneurial environment so as to promote investments and exports, [as well as] reforms that will contribute to a faster justice administration. And these structural changes will positively affect investment activity, exports and employment.

The reforms in the labor market aim to improve the competiveness of [labor] cost, and to reduce unemployment –especially among the young people- which has reached significantly high levels.

Subject of thorough analysis, discussion and hard negotiations was the statutory changes in labor market and the estimated reduction of the minimum nominal wage, which is determined by the General Collective Agreement, as well as the issue of the 13th& 14th [bonus] wages. As contradictory as it may seem, the reduction of the minimum nominal wage will lead to the increase of the employment and economic activity in the medium-term, and, therefore, to the strengthening of employees' average income. The reduction of the determined by the General Collective Agreement minimum nominal wage does not entail an automatic adjustment of the wages that are determined by the sector-wide or entrepreneurial agreements.

Within the operational framework of the labor maker, the interest of those being employed should not only be taken into account, but also that of the one million unemployed and of the hundreds of thousands who work illegally. We have seen how unemployment rose in the last couple of years by approximately 600.000 persons. And we also see 1 out of 2 young people being unemployed.

In short term, the new regulations may have a negative impact on the medium available income, but they will contribute to the increase of employment on a long-term basis. Exports of goods and services will be increased; imports will be limited; the medium employee's income will be increased. The international practice supports this view.

Last, the program provisions the strengthening of the capital position and the wealth of the banks in order for financial stability and liquidity to be secured, as well as the consequences of the public debt's restructuring and extended recession. This will be achieved in a way that promotes ~~the~~ public interest and respects the operational autonomy of the banks. The implementation of this strategy ~~it~~ will substantially contribute to the broadening of the economy's credit expansion and liquidity, as well as to the support of economic activity.

As far as other special policy matters and the process of restructuring debt which the creditors carry are concerned, the Government is committed to what the [relevant] ministers have said.

I carefully heard the criticism made by many sides. What I didn't hear was realistic, alternative solutions. Unfortunately, the only actual alternative solution to the present agreement is a disastrous default. The social cost entailed by the present bail-out is limited compared to the financial and social destruction that would have followed if we do not adopt it. A disorderly default would have led our country to a destructive adventure, causing financial chaos beyond any control, and social unrest.

Citizens' savings would be in danger.

The State would be incapable of paying salaries and pensions and providing essential services, such as hospitals and schools, since we still have ~~an~~ over 5bn Euros primary deficit.

We wouldn't be able to import basic goods (medicines, oil, machines), since the country would lose any access to lending and liquidity.

Enterprises would massively close, incapable of being financed.

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Unemployment, which is already unacceptably high, would rise. The country would ~~have~~ become embroiled in a long-term era of recession, instability, unemployment and permanent misery.

Sooner or later, these developments would cause a Grexit. Greece would ~~have~~ become a weak country at the margins of Europe. This will be the country's fate if we do not sign the lending agreement and are led to a disorderly default. This is the blunt reality. And to recall this is not a form of blackmail. Rather it means a responsible obligation of all of us towards the Greek people, who need to know what choices they have and what their consequences are.

Fellow MPs,

I thoroughly referred to the main midterm goals of the program, and to the provisioned policies and reforms needed in order [for the goals] to be accomplished. I did so for two reasons. First, to better understand that the program deals with the three main problems of the Greek economy in a holistic and cohesive way, and, second, to highlight that, through the accomplishment of the mid-term goals, the policies and reforms that will be implemented aim to achieve everyone's main and substantial goal, the recovery and growth of the Greek economy.

Contrary to what many think, the new Greek program has as a main objective to make our economy more productive and competitive; to be built on a solid basis in order to achieve high and sustainable development. The implementation of the new program along with the financing support and the restructuring of the debt, they will limit uncertainty and will increase the trust regarding the prospects of the Greek economy. As a result, the entrepreneurial activity will be strengthened, and the faster recovery of the economy will be achieved.

The full and early implementation of the program won't be easy. It will require co-ordinated efforts and proper management. In short term, the implementation of the program will have implications for the economic activity and disposable income.

We are fully aware of the sacrifices for the hardly suffered Greek people entailed on a short-term basis by the program. It is a program that reflects the urgent condition of

the Greek economy. It is a program that no Government would have adopted under regular circumstances. The short-term cost of the program is significant –at the extent to which it burdens the financially weaker. The program provisions measures, and additional measures will be taken if needed, in order to protect those who are affected the most by the crisis.

The implementation of the program, though, entails the recovery of the Greek economy in mid-term, possibly in 2013, and the growth of the economy by a 2.5%-3% growth rate in 2014 and 2015. Of course, any prediction is subjected to some degree of uncertainty. However, the available estimations support the prospect of exiting the crisis within the next couple of years.

We must not miss the opportunity to make our economy more productive and competitive. To save what we have gained, we must change whatever we have done wrong. To achieve high and sustainable development, we must consolidate the State and build a solid basis for the economy.

This country is where European culture began; [this country] suffered a civil war and a dictatorship, but it still prospered, created wealth and built a civic State, institutions and values. To have this country default and, due to one more mistake, to reach the point of national isolation and despair, would be a remarkable unfairness on history's part.

I know that today's voting demands for many of you to make an extremely hard choice, and it may even set a political trial –even a moral one. Nobody enjoys deciding on measures that entail short-term sacrifices for the citizens.

However, today we are all called upon to make a decision of significant importance for the future of the country; and to confirm the great decision made three months ago by the political leaders to support a Government of national unity. It is entirely on you, on your vote whether the country will remain in the Eurozone or will be led to a disorderly default. By voting for the economic program and opening the path for the lending agreement, you set a new basis for the consolidation and recovery of the economy. In this way you best serve the interests of citizens, even of those asking you not to vote today. Because the other way entails immensely more sacrifices for them.

In this way, we secure our country's and our children's future; we do to let all the sacrifices made in the last two years be wasted. We all know that we are judged by the History. And if we do not attempt to keep the country steady, this will not be forgiven [by History]. I'm sure that you know better than anyone else what your patriotic duty is. And you will fulfil it as decisively and responsibly as have you done up until now.

Speech of Antonis Samaras, 7/11/2012

Fellow MPs,

In the last four months, since the three-party coalitional government took office we are changing everything. We are rushing about fulfilling our obligations; breaking the isolation in the foreign affairs fields; stabilizing the conditions in the domestic field; recovering the country's reliability; negotiating a recourse having the prospect of recovery; finding money for salaries and pension; saving job positions…

Today we have to make the most critical decision that the Parliament has ever made in the last 37 years. Let's speak from the beginning in raw sincerity. Many of the measures that we have to approve today are right. They are the ones referring to structural changes and reforms. We should have taken them years ago. Without being asked to by no one.

There are also some other measures, which are about cuts in salaries and pensions. They are unjust measures, and there is no reason to sugarcoat them. The truth is that all the measures, both right and unjust included, are conventional obligations under which is our country. We should not pretend ignoring it. Let's avoid putting on a show.

We have been out of the markets for three years. We can't borrow regularly. Of course, the point is to overcome it. As long as we are in a situation like this though, we cannot be unaware of the restricted choices available.

Because doing so, would sink Greece in a much worse disaster. Even worse than any measure we approve today. And no one can be excluded from those measures. And even if there are parties that caress ears, as they did tonight, while we were cutting [incomes] from farmers and retirees, then I will say it bluntly: they are seeking votes.

They do not protect the national interests. What is worse: even though they are supposedly interested in the ordinary people who listen to us, they actually snub them.

And let us also say this. Greece is at the centre of a region which has more and more geopolitical instability. And many countries, either big or small, either EU-members or not, they see, for their own interest the need for our country to gain stability –not to be swept off by the wind.

Probably, two years ago, many wouldn't understand it. Now they understand it more and more.

So, Greece which was isolated up to now, can from this point on find support. But, fellow MPs, in order for the people to be rescued, they have to want to. And for them to become trusted by their allies, they have to be united in the domestic field and reliable in the foreign one.

In the last few months, we struggled with becoming reliable in the foreign field. And we won at a great extent. However, today, in this room we have to confirm the new reliability of Greece.

So today we vote for:

- whether we secure our position within the Eurozone or return to national isolation, surrendered to total default and ending up with the drachma. This is the decision we are making.

- Whether Greece, the national economy and Democracy gain stability or we succumb to the turmoil of an immediate default, which will trigger social clashes, extremism and domestic agony. This is the decision we are making.

- Whether we come through the crisis united as never before or continue to argue and blame each other as Greece goes deeper into the crisis.

This it to what we are responding today. This is the decision we are making.

Be it as it may, I recognize some to have some monopolizations or to imagine that they do so. For instance, the monopolization of [the idea of] returning to drachma. That's ok!

Do they think, though, that they have the monopolization of empathy to human pain? Do they think that we do not suffer? They have to understand that they are not more sensitive than us –they are more irresponsible. Because they drive the country towards much worse adventures, and to much more intolerable pain in the case that what they say comes true.

Fellow MPs, in the last months we struggled for bringing the recovery closer –and that's much more important. Therefore, what we vote for today ~~it~~ leads us to a new prospect. For the very first time:

•   Only 3.2 bn out of 31.3 bn of the next instalment will be received by the creditors as interest payments. Normally, the greater part of the instalments would be given for debt service. Now only 10% of the instalment will be given for debt service. This happens for the first time.

•   Also, the recapitalization of the Banks will be accomplished forthwith. Not solely the Banks will be rescued, as some demagogue. The whole bank system will be rescued, and this does not concern solely the "bankers", but also millions of depositors, hundreds of thousands of mid-scale entrepreneurs who are waiting for a loan approval or for a working capital, which is now missing, but is still needed for their enterprises. It's like they are a destination for a non profit line. There is no liquidity –that's the truth. And people wait for it and it concerns many more who are employed in enterprises and are at risk of losing their jobs due to a continuous credit stifle.

By saving the bank system, uncertainty will be avoided and the savings will return; liquidity –the blood of the economy- will occur, and this is how job positions will be saved, and for the first time new ones will be created in the next phase [of the program].

•   What is more: within the coming months we will pay back the bigger part of the State's overdue debts to persons, entrepreneurs and ordinary citizens. And within the next year [we will pay back] almost the total amount of the debt that has fallen

due. And this will add liquidity; it will relieve the market; it will bring closer financial recovery.

- Moreover: the drachma-phobia, the fear of returning to the drachma, will be permanently avoided. This will change the general disposition and it will allow investors to return to Greece, which hasn't occurred in years…

- Last, but not least: for the first time the money that will enter the economy next year will be more than the money that will exit the economy due to austerity. This is how recession as well as unemployment increase will be restrained. We will reverse the free fall of the past years.

This not a wish or a speculation. It is not an election promise. It's all fixed.

I'll make clear myself: Next year, 9.2bn Euros will come out [from the market] due to recession, but 7bn Euros from settling the State's outstanding bills will come in. Also, recapitalized banks will initially give at least 3bn. Euros in cash liquidity. The recapitalization of the banks will run the tap of NRSF [National Strategic Reference Framework] financing; public works [financing] that have been halted for a couple of years; and small and medium enterprises [financing].

We do not just hope for it, we do not wish for it. We already have it.

Moreover, I'm personally fighting –this is the proper verb- I'm fighting for getting immediately more than 31 bn. Euros in order to fulfil some other obligations and to start paying immediately some of the dues of the Public Sector.

Fellow MPs,

Here in Greece many things, which have never occurred elsewhere in the world, had been occurring for years. And which they led us on the verge of default. Today we change it all at a stroke. Whether some like it or not, this is a true revolution: We abolish privileges; we open up professions; and we cut huge wastage. We chased tax evasion that operates on a scale never before seen again in Europe. And now we reform the tax system so that they shall start paying all those who haven't done it till today. And, thus, they shall lighten the burden taken by those who have been paying until now.

All the above are a true revolution.

And apart from the subversions we make?

We should finally exploit our competitive advantages in order for the country to pull it out of the mire. Investments: they should be attracted so that the people can find a job.

After the extended institutional reform, we shall dare to revise the institutions in order for Greece to turn into a modern Civic Sate and not a hotbed of extremists, of those who are favoured by the power or a rectorate of card-carrying party members. This is what the people expect. And this is will be the rebirth of Greece.

Revolution is not the chants and barbarous cries. Revolution is the overthrown of those [people] who were holding the country in stagnation; the abolishment of privileges that were sponging off the national wealth. Revolution is the end of the arbitrary of the powerful. All these things end today.

In the past, Greece was constantly borrowing because it was consuming more than it was producing. We are trying to relieve the country from this dependence. The others have no program. Besides this, they have confessed it –they are not ready to govern. Nevertheless, they ask for elections. Just four months since the last double elections. This is how they respect the recent decision of the Greek people.

Still though, in the most critical times, amid intense polarization, we have heard some to –and trust me, I've been an MP since 1974- we have heard in here insults, provocations. We have heard about 'military coup', 'totaliariasm', 'hell'.

Fellow MPs, the structural changes we suggest do not bring hell. Hell is brought by those who kicked out factories and investments from this land. Hell was brought by those who paralyzed the cities [due to strikes] for years. [Hell] was brought by those who were continuously asking for amnesties and privileges that were not offered elsewhere in the world.

The hell is brought by the loss of competitiveness, for which all are accountable.

As regards 'totalitarianism', apparently they are fully aware of it. They have been supporting it for decades, they considered it 'paradise'. The paradise has collapsed, but it seems that many are still full of nostalgia for it.

Of course, in their imagined bona fide socialism 'working rights' existed in a way only understood by them, and weren't those [rights] about which Fotis Kouvlis had previously talked.

However, investments were missing; entrepreneurship was missing; competiveness was missing. And not to omit: democracy was missing. This is the way all of those regimes collapsed, and none of the people who were unfortunate to experience them want to remember ~~of~~ them. As far as consumption is concerned, Greece reached the European rates, but as far as production is concerned, Greece resembles that of any hard to forget socialist State –Statism, bureaucracy, party politics, and paralysis.

The lies are over though. This hybrid model, this failed economic model cannot hold more.

We want growth, competiveness and, of course, social justice. They want to take us back, where no one wants to go –out of the Euro, internationally isolated and with their political model, everywhere failed, to be fully restored: statism, ruthless bureaucracy, voucher for buying goods and a society in permanent deprivation.

Since it was brought into discussion, you shall remember, fellow MPs of the major opposition, two simple things:

-       We are the ones who established Democracy, so we are not fooling around with Democracy.
-       We are the ones who decided on the integration of Greece in the EU, so we are not fooling with EU orientation.

I think those two things are enough

Fellow MPs,

You can all judge, as the Greek people can do so of course, our work in those first 130 days. We said that we will prevent the exit of Greece from the Eurozone. And we did it.

We said that we would focus on recovery. And that's what we are doing now. With a program that halts recession, and you will notice it in the coming days.

We still haven't fulfilled all other promises we made yet, such as the relief of those having low pensions or the allowances for families with more than 3 children. On these issues, we were even forced to make cuts, smaller than the ones initially asked for, but still cuts.

However, our commitment to relieve all those who were unfairly treated is still in force. We will fulfil it within the next four years.

Likewise, the agreement we approve today includes for the first time the following condition. In the possibility that that actual results are higher than the targets set, we will exploit the greater part of the positive balance for readdressing unfairness; protecting social cohesion and offering an extra boost to development.

Also, it is expected that those measures will be the final painful measures. In other words, they are the last measures referring to salaries, pensions and social allowances. Resources for any additional fine tuning needed will come from supressing tax evasion and reducing state overspending.

It is also the first time that such a condition is included in the loan agreement. The only term it to implement what has been agreed upon and meet the targets.

And they all acknowledge that the effort that is being carried out today is unprecedented.

- For instance, Greece has recently gone up 11 places on the international ranking of competition, whereas for many years and until last year Greece was continuously falling.

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- Moreover and despite the fact that the Government did not receive a single Euro from loans, we managed to reach the deficit objective and even to go beyond them.

- Last, the return of the savings has already started, which is also happening for the first time in the last years. At the end of 2009 the amount of bank savings was over 220 bm. Euros. During the past June they have fallen to 145 bn. Euros. Today they are steadily increasing and are over 160 bn. Euros.

- The value of the Greek bonds, which has downfallen, is now steadily increasing –something known to those who are informed.

Imagine, therefore, what an impact will be made when this positive course will be confirmed by the vote of the Greek parliament after ~~the~~ tonight's session. The more ~~the~~ support you give, the sooner things will change, the more silenced the objections of those who still speculate on our fail will become even though they realize they have lost the bet.

It is, then, in our hands, in each one's hands, to make them silence forever. Tonight. With your vote.

Some demagogue over this or that unpleasant measure. Yet, along with the unpleasant measures, which, as I have told you, pave the path for us to cancel them as soon as we end with deficits, we also took measures that we had to dare taking them years ago. Actually, we should have taken them without being asked to do so.

For instance, we should put an end to the incredible party of the public procurement; to the orgy of overspending in public hospitals as well in national health system; to the overspending in local authorities, in public utilities and in public authorities that are sprouting like weeds and have no responsibilities; to the party of the NGO; to the overspending with the minister's limos; to the special pensions offered to card carrying trade unionists.

We got rid of all these and of many more that are about the privileges of the political personnel. Because we have to set the example ~~by~~ ourselves. Unless we are willing to suffer sacrifices, we cannot impose sacrifices on the people. We supported structural changes and reduction of waste even when we were the major opposition. They were

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both right, we support them, we vote for them and now we implement them and we go above and beyond.

All those who still support such distortions and such an overspending, they do not support established rights. They support scandalous privileges which, as a matter of fact, are the most scandalous injustices.

Also, the taxation system is changing and will undergo a thorough change. Tax burdens are getting lighter for those having an income as employees under 25,000 Euros. The tax fees of enterprises is reducing in order for competiveness to be strengthened, for investments to be attracted and for new job positions to be opened.

This is just the beginning. As soon as we confront deficits and recovery of the Greek economy starts getting stabilized, taxation will be even lower. We are not going to tolerate any tax-evader.

And I ask: There are many that did not pay at all their taxes or paid little, whereas all the rest are suffering. Yes or no? We tax them in relative low rate of 26%. Is this bad? Are there any people here who come to the defense of those ones?

We abolish the Code of revenues and the expenditures account, as many professionals had asked, and we replace it with a software system for transaction tax recording. Is this bad? Do those who are protesting wish to maintain the out-of-date Code?

We expedite and simplify the process of establishing a new enterprise, so people can find a job. Why are some people protesting? Shall we restore the incredible Greek bureaucracy and kick-out the investors?

We have cut the unbelievable extravagances of knock-off pensions granted to dead people, and allowances to blind ones who had flawless vision. Do we have to step back?

We have radically cut all the waste in Public Health. We are talking about loads of money peculated by some tricksters and frauds. Should we apologize to them for spoiling their party?

We had so many useless public agencies while we are looking for resources to buy medicines. This ends [today]. Do they want us to refund the useless agencies and medicines becoming scarce for people, in whom you [sic] are supposedly interested?

We ask the Banks to pay 555 million Euros for the [State] financing of 2008. Even for this some people should be protesting?

Having nothing else to say, some say that there was no negotiation. How do you think that we reached this point? Without any negotiation?

To begin with, what we found in the beginning of July showed a much bigger financial gap than the estimated by the last lending agreement. It was estimated at 18 bn. Euros for the next four years. We lower it at 13.6 bn Euros for the next couple of years, while we elaborate on extension scenarios. And we ensured that no additional painful cuts will be made if we implement what has been agreed and meet the targets.

And when we implement the structural reforms and manage to have significant savings in fields of public hospitals and Local Administration, then we will go beyond our targets and we could correct any unfairness that indeed take place today.

However, for doing so we have to do what haven't been done so far. [We have] to chase tax evasion as well as the partying rodents.

And right after the current voting we will proceed to changes in 'Teirsias' (Default Financial Obligations System & Mortgages and Prenotations to Mortgages System) as well as in loans settlement so that installations correspond to the current income of borrowers; in offset of debts of and to the State, and in an extended tax reform. We have already introduced lower tax rates for special groups of tax payers. We will elaborate on this as soon as the evolution of deficits allows us to.

Fellow MPs,

I address all of you, with no exception, to support this effort.

We are aware of the dangers which countries with similar problems to ours are going through.

Amid such conditions, social unrest does not result in liberation, which some are dreaming of. It results in damages beyond any estimation, domestic agony and in a society which will need decades to overcome it. It results in subjugation of the country and in looting of its wealth.

This is what repeatedly happened to other countries, and we must not allow it to happen this time in Greece. It's our responsibility, all of us, to deter it. Besides, the current body was elected to explicitly prevent the exit of the Euro; to be growth-oriented; to overcome all the predicaments which brought us to this point; and to get Greece out of the crisis. The three parties forming the government of national recovery rely on this recent and widely supported mandate.

Once more, I'd like to thank the other two parties of our government, PASOK and DIMAR, for their support in this effort. As I'd like to thank my party, ND, for the massive support they provide. And, what is more, I'd like to thank the Greek people who endure and have expectations from us.

I know that some have hesitations. What we do isn't easy. We are reversing the course of history. We disprove all negative estimations about our country. We reverse a fatal route heading too close to destruction. We are doing what no one ever dared to do in Greece before -a unique effort of recovering the country; of reforming the political system and shifting the growth paradigm.

Undoubtedly, these are not easy things to do. But we are not here for the easy things.

Greece will come out of the crisis and will take its fate in its own hands.

With development –without memoranda and recession.

With competitiveness –without distortions.

With true rights for everyone; and not with scandalous privileges for the few.

With unity; not with divisions.

With democratic stability; not with ~~of~~ populism and demagoguery.

And what is more, with freedom, the true freedom that the confident people of the world have who do not need loans or protectors.

Because these are the challenges of Freedom and Dignity we should meet. We shall get rid of needing loans; of needing Memoranda; of needing foreigners to set terms.

Free is not the one who displays a bravado when he is bound hands and feet. Free is not the one who ignores his own shackles –this is the one who usually ends up in worse ties.

Free is the one whose ties are undone or he cuts them. And achieving so, he gains allies, reliability and dignity.

I want a Greece safe and respectful, inspiring trustfulness, looking ahead to creativity, not back towards division.

A hopeful Greece, not a desperate one. An insistent Greece which shows courage in difficulties.

You know what?

When Greece insists, it will come out of the crisis, it will respond to this challenge.

I ask all of you to confirm a prospect as such for Greece. We will do it together. All I ask is a prospect as such. Nothing more, nothing less.

Thank you.