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The Paradox of Universality: preferences for universal basic income in Finland and Spain

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THE PARADOX OF UNIVERSALITY: PREFERENCES FOR UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME IN FINLAND AND SPAIN

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Para mis abuelas María y Esperanza

"*For women have sat indoors all these millions of years, so that by this time the very walls are permeated by their creative force, which has, indeed, so overcharged the capacity of bricks and mortar that it must needs harness itself to pens and brushes and business and politics*."

Virigina Woolf, A Room of One's Own (1929)

Contents

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Abstract

Universal basic income (UBI) is becoming an increasingly salient policy alternative to reform the welfare state. Defined as a universal, unconditional and periodical cash payment made to all of the population on an individual basis, regardless of socio-economic conditions, working status or ability, the idea of a UBI has moved from being considered a radical utopia, to an increasingly attractive policy proposal to tackle the various challenges that current welfare institutions are unequipped to address, like the rising labour automation, changing labour market demands, exacerbating income insecurity, changing socio-demographic structure of the population and crucially, the lasting and severe socio-economic consequences of the covid-19 pandemic. Despite the growing saliency and the promising effects of such an alternative, we know little about the politics of this proposal, and even less, about the public support for this policy idea.

Existing accounts of public opinion support for UBI consistently show that the traits of individuals matter to explain support for this policy (Chrisp, Pulkka and Rincón, 2020; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020; Vlandas, 2020), and so does the specificities of policy design (Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019). Yet, existing work raises more puzzles than answers. One of the critical questions that current research is unable to dilucidate is what particular characteristics of UBI make this policy more or less attractive in relation to other policy alternatives. A second important paradox that existing studies in the field have raised concerns the fact that the predictors of UBI support are the same as those of targeted instruments and conditional transfers, or general support for redistribution. This landscape shows a hazy picture of UBI support, which complicates understanding who the coalition of UBI supporters are, and what these levels of UBI support are really showing.

In this context, the key objective of this thesis is to understand the determinants of public opinion support for UBI. Building on the work of multidimensional attitudes to the welfare state, I begin by exploring the effects of policy design on support for UBI. Theoretically, I build on welfare and political psychology work of deservingness heuristics to explain why individuals should be discouraged by UBI's key attributes of universality and unconditionality.

Aside from this recent focus on policy design, recurring accounts of UBI and welfare preferences point to material self-interest and value-laden motivations to explain support for specific policies. I explore under which conditions these factors moderate support for different UBI characteristics. In line with much previous research I find that left-wing ideology is a common predictor of support for universality, albeit these individuals still

prefer means-tested benefits over universal cash transfers. A novel finding is that I show for the first time that the effect of ideology on support for universality is conditional on the UBI model proposed. Those on the right, boost its support for universality significantly if UBI is proposed as a mechanism to replace the core of universal welfare. Strikingly, I find that material variables do not have an effect on support for UBI.

This contexts naturally gives rise to the question of who really support and prefers a UBI over other policy alternatives? I propose an argument that can account for this question and reconcile some important paradoxes of preferences, like the left-wing division over the desirability of this proposal. I contend, and show that, individuals do not have homogeneous perceptions about which polices are more redistributive, and these beliefs together with redistribution preferences shape support for universal cash transfers. The core coalition of supporters are those who favour redistribution and perceive universality to be a more effective design for cash transfers.

Because preferences do not exist in a vacuum and are sensitive to the debates taking place, I examine the impact of information on preferences. Contrary to previous work, I show that neither scientific evidence nor belief-congruent information has an impact on attention or support for policy proposals. Prior beliefs per se however, do determine these dynamics, showing that the coalition of supporters for UBI has a higher predisposition to access any type of information on UBI.

All in all, this dissertation has unveiled important dynamics of UBI support and reconciled several literatures in the field, settling some of the paradoxical findings delivered by previous work. Altogether, the conclusions derived from this dissertation have important implications to the study of welfare preferences and the politics of welfare reform.

Abstract (Castellano)

La renta básica universal (RBU) se está convirtiendo en una alternativa política cada vez más destacada para reformar el Estado del bienestar. Se suele definir como un ingreso universal, incondicional y periódico que realizado a toda la población de forma individual, independientemente de las condiciones socioeconómicas, la situación laboral o la capacidad individual para trabajar y contribuir en la sociedad. La idea de una RBU ha pasado de ser considerada una utopía radical a una propuesta política cada vez más atractiva para hacer frente a los diversos retos que los actuales estados de bienestar no están preparadas para abordar.

Los estudios existentes en materia de opinión pública respecto a la RBU muestran sistemáticamente que los rasgos de los individuos son importantes para explicar el apoyo a esta política (Chrisp, Pulkka y Rincón, 2020; Roosma y van Oorschot, 2020; Vlandas, 2020), así como las especificidades del diseño de esta política (Dermont y Stadelmann-steffen, 2019). Sin embargo, la literatura desarrollada en esta materia presenta más enigmas que respuestas. Una de las cuestiones fundamentales que la investigación actual no puede dilucidar es qué características particulares de una RBU hacen que esta política sea más o menos atractiva en relación con otras alternativas.

Este contexto da lugar a la pregunta de ¿quién apoya y prefiere una RBU sobre otras alternativas políticas? Propongo un argumento que puede dar cuenta de esta cuestión y reconciliar algunas importantes paradojas de las preferencias, como la división de la izquierda en el apoyo a la RBU. Sostengo, y demuestro, que los individuos no tienen percepciones homogéneas sobre qué políticas son más redistributivas, y que estas creencias, junto con el apoyo a la redistribución, determinan el apoyo a las transferencias monetarias universales. Así, estos resultados indican que el núcleo de la coalición de apoyo de la RBU no son ni de izquierdas ni con bajos ingresos –como se demuestra en estudios anteriores- sino que son personas que están a favor de la redistribución y perciben que las políticas universales son más eficientes para reducir las desigualdades económicas. En definitiva, esta tesis ha desvelado importantes dinámicas de apoyo a la RBU y ha reconciliado varias literaturas en este campo de investigación, resolviendo algunas de las conclusiones paradójicas aportadas por trabajos anteriores. En conjunto, las conclusiones derivadas de esta tesis tienen importantes implicaciones para el estudio de las preferencias hacia la reforma del estado de bienestar y al proceso político de esta reforma.

Abstract (Català)

La renda bàsica universal (RBU) s'està convertint en una alternativa política cada vegada més destacada per a reformar l'Estat del benestar. Se sol definir com un ingrés universal, incondicional i periòdic que realitzat a tota la població de manera individual, independentment de les condicions socioeconòmiques, la situació laboral o la capacitat individual per a treballar i contribuir en la societat. La idea d'una RBU ha passat de ser considerada una utopia radical a una proposta política cada vegada més atractiva per a fer front als diversos reptes que els actuals estats de benestar no estan preparades per a abordar. Aquests reptes inclouen la creixent automatització de l'ocupació, amb les seves diverses conseqüències en el mercat laboral, com la desocupació tecnològica o els canvis en la demanda de l'ocupació, la creixent inseguretat econòmica, la canviant estructura sociodemogràfica de la població –amb una major població anciana i descens de naixements- i, sobretot, les duradores i greus conseqüències socioeconòmiques derivades de la pandèmia de la covid-19. Malgrat la creixent notorietat i els efectes prometedors

d'una RBU, sabem poc sobre la política d'aquesta proposta, i encara menys, sobre el suport públic a aquesta idea.

Els estudis existents en matèria d'opinió pública respecte a la RBU mostren sistemàticament que els trets dels individus són importants per a explicar el suport a aquesta política (Chrisp, Pulkka i Rincón, 2020; Roosma i van Oorschot, 2020; Vlandas, 2020), així com les especificitats del disseny d'aquesta política (Dermont i Stadelmann-*steffen, 2019). No obstant això, la literatura desenvolupada en aquesta matèria presenta més enigmes que respostes. Una de les qüestions fonamentals que la recerca actual no pot dilucidar és quines característiques particulars d'una RBU fan que aquesta política sigui més o menys atractiva en relació amb altres alternatives. Una segona paradoxa que plantegen els estudis existents en aquest camp concerneix els determinants del suport a la RBU; aquests són els mateixos que els d'altres polítiques i ingressos condicionats, i també els del suport a la redistribució. Aquest panorama planteja una sèrie de preguntes, com quina és la coalició de suport d'una RBU i què mostren realment aquests nivells de suport a la RBU.

En aquest context, l'objectiu d'aquesta tesi és comprendre els determinants del suport de l'opinió pública a la RBU. Basant-me en el treball de les actituds multidimensionals cap a l'estat del benestar, començo explorant els efectes del disseny de les polítiques sobre el suport al RBU. Sostinc, i demostro, que els individus no tenen percepcions homogènies sobre quines polítiques són més redistributives, i que aquestes creences, juntament amb el suport a la redistribució, determinen el suport a les transferències monetàries universals. Així, aquests resultats indiquen que el nucli de la coalició de suport de la RBU no són ni d'esquerres ni amb baixos ingressos –com es demostra en estudis anteriors- sinó que són persones que estan a favor de la redistribució i perceben que les polítiques universals són més eficients per a reduir les desigualtats econòmiques. En definitiva, aquesta tesi ha revelat importants dinàmiques de suport a la RBU i ha reconciliat diverses literatures en aquest camp de recerca, resolent algunes de les conclusions paradoxals aportades per treballs anteriors. En conjunt, les conclusions derivades d'aquesta tesi tenen importants implicacions per a l'estudi de les preferències cap a la reforma de l'estat de benestar i al procés polític d'aquesta reforma.

Introduction

The welfare state has been one of the greatest advancements of modern democracies, and it is essential in preserving the modern way of life. Yet, the sustainability and efficiency of welfare as we know it today is facing multiple challenges that are pressing the need for reform. One of the key proposals on the table to renovate current welfare structures and institutions is Universal Basic Income (UBI). Defined as a universal, unconditional and periodical cash payment made to all of the population on an individual basis, regardless of socio-economic conditions, working status or ability, the idea of a UBI has moved from being considered a radical utopia, to a salient and increasingly desirable policy alternative to the existing net of conditional and targeted cash transfers (Van der Veen and Groot, 2000; Widerquist et al., 2013; Halmetoja, De Wispelaere and Perkiö, 2019; Perikoo, Rincón and Van Draanen, 2019; Torry, 2019). Despite the saliency of such idea, we know little about the politics of UBI, specifically about its support amongst the public. The aim of this dissertation is to understand public opinion support for this policy proposal, delivering a comprehensive account of UBI support and contributing to welfare state preference research more broadly.

Existing accounts of public opinion support for UBI consistently show that the traits of individuals matter to explain support for this policy (Chrisp, Pulkka and Rincón, 2020; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020; Vlandas, 2020b), and so does the specificities of policy design(Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019). Yet, literature in the field so far has not been able to elucidate what particular characteristics of UBI make this policy more or less attractive, in relation to other policy alternatives. Even more perplexing is the fact that current research shows that the predictors of UBI support are the same as those of targeted instruments and conditional transfers, or general support for redistribution. This landscape shows a hazy picture of UBI support, which complicates understanding who the coalition of UBI supporters are, and what these levels of UBI support are really showing.

Section 1, *The puzzle*, justifies the importance of addressing the question of individual preferences for UBI. Section 2, *Existing explanations*, presents and discusses the existing accounts that have been drawn to explain support for UBI, which have been mainly derived from the literature on welfare preferences. In section 3, *Overview of the argument*, I outline the central argument of this thesis and I explain up to four ways in which this

contribution adds to existing knowledge about individual preferences for UBI and welfare reform. The *Research design* section presents the methodological approach and the case selection, justifying their relevance for the theoretical and substantive questions here addressed. The *Results* section, summarises the findings in the five main papers. Finally, the last section provides an overview of this dissertation.

The puzzle (and why we need to solve it)

Current explanations of public opinion support for UBI have been predominantly focused on how the characteristics of individuals have an impact on support for this policy proposal. These accounts consistently show that precarious individuals, i.e., those with low-incomes, unemployed and oftentimes young, are the key backers of this policy proposal (Vlandas, 2019, 2020b; Chrisp, Pulkka and Rincón, 2020; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020), a population group which has been previously labelled as 'the precariat' (Standing, 2011) . This work also shows that particular ideological inclinations also predict support for UBI, in this case, being left-wing becomes a prominent factor in explaining support for this policy. Yet, paradoxically, these individual predictors of UBI support also explain support for targeted welfare programs (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020; Vlandas, 2020b), and are the classical predictors of redistribution demand too (i.e., Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019). Some more recent work however, has shown that support for UBI does not derive automatically from a preference for more redistribution given that, demand for the latter is higher than for the former (Dermont and Weisstanner, 2020).

Hence, while this growing work on UBI support is contributing to advancing the field substantially, it also raises more questions than answers. First, what does this shared support for UBI and other contending policy alternatives showing? Which policies do these individuals prefer, and ultimately, who are the key backers of UBI policy? The findings in the field so far do not clarify whether UBI support is a product of a demand for more government intervention, or a true *preference* for UBI over other alternatives. Relatedly, existing research is unable to elucidate what about a UBI appeals to public opinion and which characteristics generate opposition.

In part these puzzles stem from a methodological pitfall which is that traditional survey questions bundle-up a series of dimensions which do not enable to grasp the policy design effects on policy support. This is further complicated by the fact that different surveys use varying definitions of UBI (Chrisp, Pulkka and Rincón, 2020). Recent attempts have been made to deliver a more comprehensive account of UBI support by exploring how its design features play out in determining approval for this policy idea (Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019). From this work we learn that there is a demand for a generous UBI that restricts its accessibility criteria to exclude non-nationals. Yet, this study looks particularly at different forms and versions of a UBI, which cannot shed a light over how UBI support compares to other alternative and competing policy proposals. Of course, this is a question which has been beyond the scope of existing research, yet it remains essential to fully grasp public opinion dynamics for UBI support. To sum up, existing research is unable to detect whether individuals prefer a UBI over other policy alternatives, and what particular features of a UBI make this policy more attractive or repealing to the public.

An additional void stems from the fact that existing work has explored static accounts of preferences that do not explore how the informational dynamics of the debate may be influencing public support for this policy alternative. Few exceptions exist in terms of exploring how the UBI debate may have influenced individual opinions about the issue, yet these have not studied a crucial dimension of the UBI debate which is its potential effects with regards to employment, and whether the presence of scientific information makes a difference to policy preferences. To fill these gaps, this dissertation has drawn from the wider welfare preference research and political economy preferences to establish accounts of preferences. In the forthcoming section I revise this work in detail and explain in which ways one may draw from this research to explain support for UBI. Before this however, I briefly outline the main reasons for the relevance of this research question.

Why should we invest efforts to understand public opinion towards UBI? UBI has moved up the media and political agenda at a vertiginous pace in the last decades. What was once considered a radical utopia confined to the realm of philosophy books, is now becoming an ever more feasible and desirable policy alternative to the current configuration of the welfare state. A broad range of problems have signalled the need for such a policy, from the structural unemployment and changing labour market demands derived from the automation of jobs (Frey and Osborne, 2017b; Busemeyer and Kemmerling, 2020), to

changing socio-demographic characteristics of the population with ageing populations and low birth-rates (Pierson, 2000; Busemeyer, Goerres and Weschle, 2009). In face of these challenges, it is ever more evident that there is a need to reform the welfare state. Current cash transfers have a series of problems that compromise their efficiency from the non-take-up problem, to unemployment and poverty traps, bureaucratic complexity and accruing costs of maintenance, as well as stigamtising recipients (Van Oorschot, 1991; Link and Phelan, 2001; Matsaganis, Levy and Flevotomou, 2010; Davutoğlu, 2013; Gilroy, Heimann and Schopf, 2013; Baldini *et al.*, 2016).

Yet, critical to this debate has been the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic where the need for a robust safety net has become evident in the face of an unprecedented crisis that will have long-term and lasting negative socio-economic consequences. In this context, UBI has become an increasingly appealing idea given the particularities of its design (Johnson and Roberto, 2020; Prabhakar, 2020; Ståhl and MacEachen, 2020). Yet, the existence of problems and desirable policy solutions is not sufficient to promote change. Crucial to the politics of welfare reform is that policymakers are willing to take up relevant policy proposals and promote their implementation. For most of the time however, these actors are short-sighted and motivated by short-term goals, and political gains derived from the proposition of particular solutions. In this context, public opinion support becomes a key good in the politics of welfare reform, given the rewards it may offer to policymakers.

While public opinion is crucial to understand the political viability of new, emerging proposals, other work signals the importance of public opinion to understand how welfare states have been developed. Traditional accounts of the welfare state point at the role of cross-class pressures to the development of welfare states as we know them today (Esping-Andersen, 1990a, 1999; Skocpol, 1999). In a similar vein, 'dynamic representation' literature contends that public opinion can inform us about the development of welfare state politics, because the public articulates their preferences into political demands and behaviour, rewarding or punishing political parties and policymakers depending on whether they translate their preferences correctly. In this sense, vast research exists on how the public conditions policymakers (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Brooks and Manza, 2007), how citizens can hold government accountable: (Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson, 1995); and policymaker responsiveness to citizen preferences (Jacobs, 1993; Wlezien, 2005). All in all, these accounts signal the

importance of public opinion and the individuals in society in shaping the development of welfare state and the politics of UBI.

Accounts of preferences

Existing accounts of UBI support draw on the two main lines of argument established in the literature of welfare preferences: material self-interest and other-regarding motivations. This dichotomy is presented under a variety of labels from 'homo economicus' vs. 'homo sociologicus' (Lindenberg, 1990), selfishness vs. altruism (Elster, 1991), self-interest vs. love and duty (Mansbridge, 1990). According to these two accounts, welfare state preferences are configured as a function of how much an individual directly benefits from a policy in material terms (material self-interest), or how congruent a policy is with individual values and ideology (other-regardingness).

Yet, a crucial pitfall of this direct application of preferences accounts to UBI, is that these theories were originally developed to explain support for other issues like redistribution, which is a concept that diverges substantially from that of a UBI. In fact, the use of the same accounts to explain support for different concepts is something prevalent in the literature of welfare preferences, and what Svallfors (2012) has labelled as the 'dependent variable problem' of welfare state research. The mixed set of conceptualisations and measurements has led to very different conclusions regarding the explicative power of existing accounts of welfare preferences. In this section, I offer a detailed account of the state of art regarding welfare preferences, and in particular, UBI support. I highlight the main contributions and learnings from this work, and also signal the existing theoretical voids and empirical limitations to current research to set the foundations before moving on to provide by own account of UBI support.

What explains support for UBI?

Material self-interest

One of the most frequently used explanations for support for the welfare state is economic (Lipset, 1960; Gilens, 1995; Van Kersbergen, 2002) or primitive self- interest (Campbell *et al.*, 1960). The argument follows that individuals are rational creatures that maximise their own material self-interest (Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Curtin and Cowan, 1975; AuClaire, 1984; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Cook and Barret, 1992). A classical point of departure is the Meltzer-Richard (MR) theory, based on a rational and fully-informed individual who chooses to maximise its material utility by supporting redistribution if he/she is situated under the mean income. Because the income distribution in most societies is skewed to the right, the mean income is larger than the median income, and as such, any individual who has an income below the mean should gain from redistribution and therefore show higher support for redistribution. Although MR used this theory to explain government size –concluding that in societies where inequality is larger government should be larger too, as a consequence of demand- literature on preferences has applied this logic of self-interest to explain support for different social policies and is the common theoretical grounding of much work today. This account has been used to explain support towards a diverging set of policies, from unemployment benefits, targeted pension reforms, to minimum incomes, pro-poor policies and ultimately universal basic income (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Fernández-Albertos and Manzano, 2012a; Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; Gallego and Marx, 2016; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020; Vlandas, 2020b).

While the logic of the material self-interested calculus is applicable to any sort of policy, given that the rationale is that individuals are expected to support policies they expect to win from, the literature provides less convincing accounts of the material self-interest rationale when it comes to explaining support for universal versus means-tested cash transfers[1]. Various accounts automatically connect support for redistribution to support for targeted schemes (e.g., Fernández-Albertos and Manzano, 2012a; Cavaillé and

[1] The concept of universal cash transfers is used throughout this dissertation to refer to a UBI. The opposite of universal cash transfers are selective ones, which may be referred to as targeted, conditional, or means-tested.

Trump, 2015; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019), which paradoxically, as shown by previous work also leads to higher support for universal basic income (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020; Vlandas, 2020). Taken together these accounts are theoretically unconvincing if we want to explain which of these policy alternatives individuals *prefer* and why this is the case. At the theoretical level, one of the pitfalls that this dissertation identifies in terms of existing accounts, is this conceptual embroil between *outcomes* -i.e., redistribution- and *policy tools* -i.e., different types of cash transfers. Differentiating conceptually between these two sets of constructs is essential to understand preferences for welfare reform and develop sound theoretical accounts of how individual characteristics should have an effect on policy support. Such an approach is crucial to disentangle which sort of policies individuals prefer and why, and this argument will be presented in more detail in the overview of the argument section.

Other-regardingness

A second line of argument to explain welfare state preferences proposes that individuals care beyond their own material self-interest, and are also driven by other-regarding concerns (Van Oorschot, 2000; Fong, 2001; Linos and West, 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011). Non-material accounts of preferences can be broadly distinguished into two sets of explanations: one which highlights the importance of individual ideology, and the other which emphasises the role of recipients' characteristics –and how deserving these are perceived to be- in driving preferences for different policies.

Ideology

The main premise of other-regarding accounts of preferences is that individuals are not exclusively rational calculators that seek-out their best material interests at all times. Individuals also have values and beliefs that shape their demands and preferences. In this sense, ideas about the drivers of existing inequality, fairness concerns, religiosity, and values of reciprocity, altruism and egalitarianism are prominent indicators of welfare

preferences and redistribution attitudes (Kangas *et al.*, 1995; Fong, 2001; Kangas, 2003; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Scheve and Stasavage, 2006; Kangas, 1997). Alongside these, ideology emerges as a broadly accepted and key predictor of attitudes (Margalit, 2013). Understood as a 'system of beliefs and values' not only about how the world works, but how it should work too, ideology seems a key driver of the legitimacy of welfare intervention. Such is the importance of ideology to welfare preferences that according to Alesina and Giuliano (2009), preferences for re-distribution –or how much should be taken from the rich and given to the poor- is in fact the "ideological dividing line between the political left and the political right, at least on economic issues" (p. 2).

Traditional work on preferences tends to pit those on the right, preferring minimal government involvement in the economy and laissez-faire economic approach, against those on the left, which rate higher in egalitarian and social justice values and defend a pre-emptive and active government intervention to reduce inequalities derived from the market. In this sense, the classical prediction when it comes to UBI preferences is that those on the left should support UBI more than those on the right.

As I will expose in the overview of the argument, this account of preferences is overly simplistic for two reasons. The first is that despite stronger left-wing support, these accounts fail to explain whether left-wing individuals should prefer a UBI over other alternatives and why. This is not a minor point and indeed, is crucial to understand the politics of UBI. From a theoretical perspective it is reasonable to expect that those on the left should give more support to universality, but it is not entirely convincing to expect these individuals to prefer this policy over other alternatives, and hence, to be the key coalition backing this proposal. While ideas on the left-wing side of the political spectrum have its roots in socialism, which originally adovacted for de-commodification, that is, emancipation of the worker from the labour market -i.e., to free the worker from labour market dependence for material survival-, there has been a gradual left-wing shift to advocate for the eradication of poverty rather than the emancipation of workers (Esping-Andersen, 1990b). This deviation is epitomised by the left-wing divide on the views and desirability of universal basic income (Parjis, 2018).

A second reason why it is unconvincing that those on the left should support a UBI, is that a UBI has been defended from a left-wing perceptive as a form of welfare enhancing (Parjis, 2018), but also defended from a liberal perspective as a replacement to the welfare

state (Murray, 2009)[2]. In this sense, and as I will argue in the *Overview of the argument* section, accounts connecting ideology and support for UBI should consider the conditional impact of ideology depending on which form of UBI is presented.

Deservingness

Another explanation in terms of values contends that it is not so much about an individuals' ideological predispositions, but preferences may be determined by recipients' characteristics and how worthy these recipients are perceived to be. Indeed, early work on welfare state research documents the existence of unequal/asymmetric patterns of support towards welfare conditional on recipients' characteristics (Coughlin, 1980; Pettersen, 1995). Some authors implicitly connect this to early development of social relief in the 1800s with the advancement of the British poor laws which distinguished between those individuals who were worthy of relief and those who were not (Golding and Middleton, 1981; Katz, 1989). Very early work already identified patterns of universal support versus more contentious policies which were not broadly supported by society. The task of deservingness theory is to explain the specificities of what determines deservingness – and in turn, support for the welfare state. Several categorisations have been made in this respect: (1) disability, proximity and docility (De Swaan, 1988), level of need, locus of responsibility, gratefulness and pleasantness (Cook, 1979), the level of control as a dominant factor (Will, 1993). In his review, Van Oorschot, (2000) concludes on five criteria that determine the deservingness of a group. Deservingness perceptions derive from an individual or collective assessment of the perceived neediness of the group, the capacity of controlling their situation, how reciprocal recipients are, their identity and attitudes (Van Oorschot, 2000; van Oorschot, 2006; Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; van Oorschot and Roosma, 2015). The overarching argument of this work is that recipient characteristics determine a deservingness assessment, and in turn shape popularity of different social policies.

[2] Note that a typical reference in a UBI advocated from a right-wing perspective and as a means to replace the welfare state is oftentimes that of Milton Friedman (1962). Nevertheless, what Milton Friedman proposed is a Negative Income Tax which substantially diverges from the idea of a UBI. Some literature explaining the differences in these two proposals are the following: Van Parijs, 2004; Harvey, 2006; Tondani, 2009.

While all of this work explains which characteristics of individuals matter to be considered deserving recipients, they do not fully get to the point of why these considerations are so important to individuals when making decisions about welfare support. To account for this, work on political and evolutionary psychology has developed a line of research on deservingness heuristics which theoretically and empirically expose how these considerations have evolved as adaptive mechanisms for human species survival during ancestral times, where hunter and gathering groups of humans had to ensure that help was only provided to those in need and that were reciprocal (Petersen *et al.*, 2011; Petersen, 2012, 2015). In this dissertation, I draw on this work to highlight the importance of deservingness considerations, and the challenges of supporting universal and unconditional policies.

Policy design

Altogether however, deservingness considerations are closely related to policy design because given that how a policy is consifgured determines who the recipient population groups are. Increasingly, a growing line of research incorporates benefit design and structure into the accounts of support for different welfare policies. Such is the importance of the design dimensions that some work has started unveiling how different individual motivations affect different facets of social policy –i.e., giving and taking sides- (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015), or how ideological cleavages appear in some types of policies –i.e., pro-poor policies- but not in others –e.g., welfare services- (Fernández-Albertos and Manzano, 2012a).

More fine-grained accounts of preferences in terms of policy design have been developed by recent work (Gallego and Marx, 2016; Ballard-Rosa, Martin and Scheve, 2017; Bechtel and Liesch, 2017; Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019). In this multidimensional approach to the study of welfare preferences, studies analyse the impact of policy characteristics on policy support and analyse how the traits of individuals moderate these policy effects. While there is no overarching theory on how policy design affects support for policies, I build on all of the previous work aforementioned to explain how support for UBI is configured multidimensionally, through its policy design. In a very similar contribution, Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen

(2019) explain how the generosity of a UBI policy and reducing access to out-groups increases support for a UBI. I advance this work however, by taking a cross-policy approach and looking at UBI support multidimensionally, in a way that I can account for support for UBI in the face of other competing policy alternatives. Such an approach is key to understand to what extent universal cash transfers are preferred over means-tested alternatives, or whether its unpopularity/support stems from its universality or unconditionality.

Novel explanations: perceptions and information

To explain support for different taxes and transfers policies the literature has also looked at the perceptions that individuals have regarding a broad range of matters from the distribution of income, who the winners and losers, or which outgroups benefit (a few examples from this vast research include: Bay and Pedersen, 2006; Bublitz, 2017; Cansunar, 2018; Engelhardt and Wagener, 2018; De Romémont, 2020; Trump, 2016). Yet, the focus on these perceptions has been almost exclusively centred on perceptions about the problem, and scarce work focuses on which perceptions individuals have about the various policy solutions. Some limited work has looked at the impact of specific program performance (Van Oorschot *et al.*, 2017; Laenen, 2018), but this has not been translated to understand the differences between UBI support and means-tested schemes. As argued in the material self-interest section, and as it will be further developed in the *Overview of the argument* section, these perceptions constitute a central theoretical piece to the puzzle connecting redistribution demands to support for specific policy proposals.

Trying to make sense of how the informational dynamics and context affect preferences, there is a cross-disciplinary burgeoning literature on how information, framing and motivated processes of individuals affect their preferences. Preferences do not exist in a vacuum however. They are not static overtime, and do not only alter as a result of individuals' traits and positions, but also due to contextual factors like policy debates. In this sense, preferences exist in a context of complex information dynamics and debates. Understanding how these trends affect preferences is essential to providing comprehensive accounts of preferences. This is especially relevant when it comes to understanding UBI preferences given that a considerable portion of the UBI debate

revolves around the potential effects of UBI on employment, with the rise of experiments to test these effects. Hence, an important pathway to explore is the role of objective information, in this case, scientific evidence to secure support for the policy in question.

Existing accounts of the impact of scientific information on public opinion offer mixed evidence of these effects. These set of assorted findings have been attributed to the biased processing information of individuals. In this sense, the prevalent accounts in the literature argue that individuals process information in a selective way, guided by their motivations. Motivated reasoning theories contend that the processing of information is not neutral or filer-free, but rather driven by individual motives. The literature deposits and consistently shows that individuals seek out to confirm their prior beliefs and rarely do they strive to reach accurate conclusions (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979; Kunda, 1990). The latter is more costly in terms of cognitive effort and may give place to cognitive dissonance, which is only avoidable if individuals re-asses and change their beliefs (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979; Kunda, 1990; Kruglanski and Webster, 1996). Given the associated costs with re-evaluating beliefs systems and scarce resources, individuals will follow strategies to avoid information that contradicts their beliefs, which may result in discounting information that is not in line with prior beliefs, and selecting that which is belief-congruent only; but they will also evaluate more strongly information which supports their ideas and find motives to reject that which does not (a non-exhaustive list of work includes: Kunda, 1990; Taber, Cann and Kucsova, 2009; Nir, 2011; Druckman, 2012; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014; Guess and Coppock, 2020). These accounts of biased information-processing deeply contrast with the depiction of a rational homo economicus, calculating individual, that favour policies which benefits them, as developed in the first part of this section. To reconcile these accounts, in the *Overview of the argument*, I provide the conditions under which individuals may opt for reaching more accurate conclusions rather than being guided by confirmatory-based motivated reasoning.

Overview of the argument

When choosing which policies to support citizens face multiple concerns. Even in the scenario of having to decide on support for one policy package, individuals face multiple considerations given that cash transfers are comprised of a series of characteristics that

may elicit different opinions, and contribute to move support in different directions. As such, individuals have to weight these different elements and decide on an overall level of support. The juggling of various factors makes universal basic income, as well as any other cash transfer is fundamentally a multidimensional issue (Roosma, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2013a; Gallego and Marx, 2016; Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019), which impinges directly on the core political question of 'who gets what' (Laswell, 1939). As shown by much previous work the 'who' part of this question is a central aspect of welfare preferences (Van Oorschot, 2000; van Oorschot, 2006). Given the embeddedness of deservingness heuristics, the mainstream view that targeting is the most redistributive mechanism, and accounting for the difficulties in making material calculations when everyone receives a benefit (further discussed in paper 2), this thesis' overarching argument is that it is the universal and unconditional character of a UBI that generates opposition. Individuals, when given a choice, will prefer selective cash transfers that are targeted to population and conditioned to ensure individuals are reciprocal, over universal and unconditional ones. Nevertheless, the argument of this dissertation follows, that under particular circumstances, individuals may increase their support for one of the core characteristics of UBI: universality. Given the theoretical accounts previously outlined, this dissertation argues that imposing stricter conditionality that ensures individuals to be reciprocal, or legal requirements that ensure that population out-groups are not benefited, will boost support for universality.

A second argument of this dissertation is that particular population sub-groups are predicted to support UBI more than others, but this does not imply that they *prefer* this policy over others. This dissertation argues that the benefits of a UBI are not clear for all individuals. While low-income and left-wing individuals will show more support for universal policies than their higher-income and right-wing counterparts, they will still prefer targeted schemes over universal ones. Four main reasons underpin the foundations for this argument. One, targeting and selectivism is the mainstream welfare rationale. This means that this mechanism is generally conceived as better to attain more redistribution (Thompson and Hoggett, 1996; Wong, 1998; Kuivalainen and Niemelä, 2010; Gugushvili and Hirsch, 2014). Second, the material calculations of individuals are much clearer in the context where a specific sub-group of the population is eligible to become the key receptors of this benefit. If everyone receives a transfer, while it is evident that those with

low-incomes become better-off in absolute terms, it becomes less clear who wins in relative terms. Third, the psychological predispositions of individuals to give to those in need who will also be reciprocal are deeply embedded, and have become almost automatic, unconscious cognitive heuristics that individuals draw on to make decisions. For these reasons, this dissertation contends that even those who give more support to universality and unconditionality will prefer other policy alternatives with selective designs. I develop and test this argument in paper 2 of this dissertation.

However, an important hue must be made to this argument especially in relation to ideology. Existing work assumes -and shows- that UBI support is larger across those on the left, given that it is introduced as a mechanism to strengthen welfare provision. Nevertheless, prevailing accounts of UBI can be divided into those which defend it as a means to replace the welfare state (Murray, 2009), and those who view it as a means to enhance existing welfare provision. Because the policy's objectives radically alter the impact of this policy, I argue that support for UBI is *conditional* on the policy model presented, and more particularly, whether UBI is presented in a welfare retrenching or a welfare enhancing perspective. I also test this argument in paper 2 of this dissertation.

In this context, a natural question to ask is who would actually prefer a UBI over other forms of welfare intervention? With the objective of tackling this research question, this dissertation develops its third argument which contends that individuals do not only have preferences for government involvement and redistribution, but they also have perceptions about the most efficient ways to get there. As previously argued, it is reasonable to expect that individuals mostly believe that selective forms of cash transfers are the most suitable to redistribution given this is the orthodox welfare rationale (Thompson and Hoggett, 1996; Wong, 1998; Kuivalainen and Niemelä, 2010; Gugushvili and Hirsch, 2014). Nevertheless, this dissertation proposes that, given the saliency of the UBI debate and the growing concerns of the problems with this patchwork of conditional cash transfers, individuals have access to a broader and more diverse set of information, and it is likely that they come to develop different perceptions about the most effective cash transfers. These perceptions impinge directly upon the material calculation of individuals suggested by previous work on material self-interest, and also influence how their value-laden motivations may lead them to prefer one form of policy intervention or another. In essence, individuals with the same redistributional demands may prefer substantially different policies depending on which they perceive as more redistributive.

These perceptions on whether universal or selective cash transfers are more redistributive is in turn, what determines a preference of one for of cash transfer over the other. I advance this argument and test it in papers 3 and 4 of this dissertation.

Preferences do not exist in a vacuum however. They are not static overtime, and do not only alter as a result of individuals' traits and positions, but also due to contextual factors like policy debates. This is even more so when the debate is salient like in the case of UBI, and in particular its effects on employment, with the development of experiments all across the globe. The argument that this thesis proposes is that the information in this environment also affects individual attitudes toward policy proposals. While much evidence has been provided to explore the effects of UBI, vast research shows that this has a limited impact on citizens and rather information is filtered through prior beliefs, which in turn determine which information is selected and evaluated more strongly (Kunda, 1990; Lodge and Taber, 2000; Taber, Cann and Kucsova, 2009; Druckman and Bolsen, 2011; Druckman, 2012). Research in the field of preferences –depicting rational, calculating individuals who decide based on their self-interest- stands in stark contrast to the literature on information processing and motivated reasoning that depicts a much more emotional and biased individual, which leads to a theoretical impasse of predictions. To reconcile these two sets of literature, the argument proposed in this dissertation is that individuals under particular circumstances, must rather prioritise reaching accurate conclusions rather than confirming their prior beliefs. If the benefits derived from questioning one's beliefs exceed the costs associated to it, then it is plausible that individuals will rather achieve accurate conclusions rather than confirm their beliefs. It follows that those individuals who are directly affected by an issue should be expected to profit more from belief updating, but also those who care strongly about an issue. I further advance this argument and test it in paper 5 of this dissertation.

To pack up the arguments proposed by this dissertation into one idea, even if the most attractive features of universal basic income are its design, this innovative policy format comes to detriment in terms of political support. Universality and unconditionality compromise the political viability of this alternative by reducing support for this policy, which may be enhanced by combining it with other attractive policy features. This thesis also argues that political support for this policy has been overstated given that even those individuals who supported the policy will still prefer means-tested schemes. However, the key variable that tilts the balance between UBI and selective schemes are perceptions

about the policy's efficiency. These beliefs help explain under which conditions individuals will actually prefer a UBI over other policy alternatives, but will also condition how individuals process information. In this sense, scientific evidence supporting the policy of a UBI, or running in detriment to it, will have a very limited impact on policy support.

Key contributions to the literature on UBI and welfare state preferences

The first contribution of this thesis is that it argues and empirically conveys that support for UBI is multidimensional. While this argument of multidimensionality is far from being novel in the literature of UBI, and welfare preferences (Roosma, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2013a; Gallego and Marx, 2016; Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019), an important hue in the design and theoretical conception of this dissertation is what adds novelty to the contribution of multidimensionality. In contrast to previous work, I look at policy support through a cross-policy lens. That is, rather than exploring the dynamics of support towards one particular policy proposal, I construct the theoretical propositions and configure the empirical approach in a way that enables understanding support for UBI in the face of other, competing and alternative policy proposals. In this sense, an important contribution is that in this dissertation one can account for UBI support multidimensionally.

Relatedly, this cross-policy support enables this dissertation to contribute to disentangling one of the empirical puzzles in existing work regarding UBI support: that the individual-level predictors of UBI support are the same than for targeted schemes. Through this cross-policy approach, this dissertation detects not only the degree to which particular individuals give support to UBI's core features, but the extent to which they actually prefer a UBI-type policy than other selective policy alternatives.

This thesis does not only make an empirical contribution, but contributes to the field theoretically too. It provides a theoretical argument to explain under which conditions individuals would actually prefer a UBI. It extensively draws on existing research on welfare state institutions, and deservingness heuristics to explain why individuals will rarely support universal cash transfers. Yet, I make a novel but intuitive argument to account for the conditions under which individuals will prefer a UBI. In doing so, I point

to a significant shortcoming in the literature on welfare preferences that has equated support for redistribution with support for targeted or selective schemes. I argue that this connection is theoretically underdeveloped, and offer an alternative explanation to how redistribution support connects with support for specific tools like universal or selective cash transfers. I posit that just as individuals have preferences for redistribution, and perceptions about inequality, distribution of income and other factors, these individuals ought to have perceptions about which policies may be more effective for redistribution. In this sense, an important distinction is universal and selective cash transfers given the different incentives and mechanisms each policies provide. These perceptions, together with redistribution support, is what shape whether an individual prefers selective cash transfers or universal ones. In this sense, for the first time in welfare preference research this thesis unpacks the relation between support for redistribution and welfare state support by measuring three different constructs: (1) perceptions about which benefits designs are more redistributive, (2) support for redistribution and (3) support for different cash transfer designs.

The final contribution of this thesis is the incorporation of informational dynamics in the study of UBI preferences. Particularly, I examine the extent to which scientific information and prior beliefs shape both attention and support for new policy proposals. This entails both a theoretical and empirical contributions. At a theoretical level, this dissertation bridges two different sets of literature that have scarcely spoke to each other, and in doing so, it provides a more comprehensive account of how individuals use information to update their preferences. Empirically, this section contributes by applying theories of motivated reasoning to a new substantive topic which is support for universal basic income. The contributions here outlined have important implications to the study of UBI and welfare preferences more broadly, but also to the politics of welfare state reform, which are all discussed in the concluding remarks section.

Research design

Case selection

Context is crucial in welfare state research because it directly carves into the material calculations of individuals and legitimise what is fair in giving to society. This thesis relies on comparative survey data gathered in Finland and Spain. In this section we justify why these two cases are suitable for comparison and how the context may affect our results and learnings.

Finland and Spain are two particularly good cases to study support for UBI. In terms of welfare design, they represent two most different cases (Mills, Durepos and Wiebe, 2010), with varying levels of de-commodification, universalisation and expenditure, yet, both countries have shared an intense welfare reform debate with special attention to universal basic income, culminating in two experiments that tested the effects of this policy in different domains, especially labour market activation.

Finland and Spain represent two very different typologies of the welfare state in the framework developed by Gösta Esping-Andersen (1990;1999). Finland represents the Social Democrat or Nordic welfare state. Spain on the other hand, was not included in the original classification, but was included in later version as the continental type of welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1999). However, other contributions have argued for the development of an alternative typology, labelled as the southern or Mediterranean welfare state (Ferrera, 1996). Rather than the specific welfare model which they represent what is crucial is their characteristics as welfare states, especially, in their level of de-commodification, stratification, and redistributive potential, and most crucially, in terms of the minimum income schemes. While Finland counts with a generous three-tier system of income protection schemes, that attains a high take-up rate and is rated as a high-equality achiever, Spain did not count with a state-wide minimum income scheme until June 2020 (after the time of the survey) (Frazer and Marlier, 2016). In this sense the Spanish system of income protection was decentralised and varied substantially across autonomous regions, but consistently showed lower benefit take-up rates, generosity and equality outcomes that the Finnish system of income protection (Frazer and Marlier, 2016).

Aside from the stark differences that Finland and Spain share in terms of the welfare institutions, they share one important commonality, which is a high saliency of the welfare state debate, and in particular, of the proposal of universal basic income (UBI). Both contexts have enjoyed a prolonged interest for the idea, culminating in pilot projects to test this idea. In the following sub-section I specify more details of the UBI debate in Finland and Spain.

Basic income in Finland and Spain

In this section I briefly outline the development of the UBI idea and debate in Finland and Spain. The purpose of this section is to provide a contextual overview to guide readers into how UBI has developed in both contexts and highlight important commonalities that these two cases share, and that are relevant to the study of public opinion preferences for UBI.

Finland is oftentimes referred to as the Nordic exception when it comes to the saliency of its basic income debate. Contrary to Sweden, Norway or Denmark, Finland has experienced a prolonged interest of the UBI debate whether from the academic field, to political actors, and a high saliency peak as a result of the experiment that was carried out between 2017-2018 (Halmetoja, De Wispelaere and Perkiö, 2019). In particular, Perkiö (2012) argues that interest in Finland for the idea can be divided into three main waves:- initial interest in the 1980s, 2006-2007 and 2011-2012.

The first wave of interest was driven by the Green Party in Finland, although the financial depression reduced attention to this policy which received renewed interest in the decade of 1990s where research initiatives returned UBI to the spotlight of the welfare state reform debate (De Wispelaere, Jurgen, Halmetoja and Pulkka, 2019; Halmetoja, De Wispelaere and Perkiö, 2019). By 2000, an influential member of the green party, and key advocate of UBI within this party, became minister of social affairs. However, the key peak of attention occurred later on during the discussion and implementation of the field experiment leaded by the leading centre party in the coalition government (Stirton, Lindsay, De Wispelaere, Perkiö and Chrisp, 2017; De Wispelaere, Jurgen, Halmetoja and Pulkka, 2019).

In terms of party politics, attention, and support for UBI is diverse in Finland. While original proposals were launched by the green party, it has been the centre coalition government which launched the field experiment to test potential effects of this idea, and in fact, it has only been the Social Democratic party who has explicitly spoken against this idea. After the pilot project, attention to the proposal of UBI resumed to lower levels (see Torry 2020 for a detailed overview of the pilot project).

In Spain, the UBI debate gained traction in 2014, when Podemos introduced this proposal within its political manifesto. Nevertheless, this was not the first time that UBI had been advocated by a political actor in Spain. In 2005, and 2008, several attempts were made by the green and left-wing parties in Spain to place UBI on the political agenda. In February 2015, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), (Left Republican party from Catalunya) issued a law proposition, and later that same year, in the months of march and may both ERC and a coalition of parties including the green party from Catalunya (ICV), the radical left party from Spain at that time (Izquierda Unida, United left), and the green party from Spain (Izquierda Verde), asked for the creation of a sub-commission to study the idea of a universal basic income, within the commission of Employment and Work. This petition included the original definition of a UBI as a 'universal, unconditional, individual cash payment made to all of the population even if this is not willing to work' (*Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales 04 febrero* 2005; *09 de mayo de 2008*; 14 de marzo de 2005). Despite these efforts, the law proposal was rejected and never entered a debate in the parliamentary arena, and neither did it have a significant impact on mainstream media.

It was not until just under a decade later that attention to UBI in Spain reached an important political and media interest. As aforementioned, the proposal of universal basic income (UBI) by the newly formed radical left-wing party Podemos was in part responsible for the peak of interest to the proposal of a UBI. Nevertheless, the introduction of this proposal by Podemos followed a series of civil society mobilisations that also helped generate the breeding ground for this idea to gain traction. Particularly relevant to this process was the M15 protest and citizen mobilisations in 2011, which culminated in a camping protest which occupied the central squares of many cities in Spain and preceded the occupy movement globally. Within these protest, activists and citizens organised into different working groups based on a series of topics. One of such groups was that of universal basic income. This context was also the hotbed of what we

know today as Unidas Podemos, which started forming as a political organisation at that time. One of the characteristics of this formation was the development of topic circles, which were groups within the political party of Podemos which discussed particular topics. The circle of basic income was one of the most popular ones, voted as one of the key ideas in the party[3]. In 2014, for the European Parliament elections, Podemos introduced this idea in its political manifesto. However, by May 2015 when the next elections were celebrated in Spain (autonomic elections), they had already withdrawn the proposal from the political manifesto.

Parallel to this development was the popular legislative initiative, which was a citizen petition to the Spanish parliament, to consider the issue of universal basic income. This petition, where various civil society organisations in Spain participated did not reach the minimum number of signatures required to be considered and was finally deposed (personal communication with Isabel Franco, former Spanish MP and activist of UBI).

Later in 2016, the debate re-gains some traction with the B-Mincome pilot project proposal, designed and carried out in some of the poorest districts in Barcelona. Although the design was far from being a universal basic income, this pilot project had as objective to test the potential effects of a universal and unconditional basic income in Spain. The B-MINCOME was an experiment launched by the Ajuntament de Barcelona (Barcelona City Council) and funded through the European Union and participation from Urban Innovative Actions, a European Union agency. The B-Mincome project is a collaborative project where other entities like the Young Foundation, NOVACT, UAB (IGOP), Ivalua and the Polytechnic university in Barcelona participated in different ways. It was carried out between 2017-2019, dates very close to the Finnish experiment too.

All in all, Spain and Finland share very similar characteristics in terms of the UBI debate. First, both of them have a long-history of the idea, where left-wing political actors proposed this idea even before it gained broader saliency. Second, both contexts have endured field experiment to test this idea, increasing the saliency of the debate in in similar dates. Third, a recent comparative contribution shows that the debate in mainstream media has mostly revolved around the same frames (Perikoo, Rincón and

[3] See: https://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20170212/414276760840/el-texto-que-defiende-la-renta-basica-universal-del-circulo-de-siero-el-que-cosecha-mas-apoyos.html ; https://www.redrentabasica.org/rb/presentacion-de-la-propuesta-mas-votada-en-vistalegre-ii-podemos/

Van Draanen, 2019). Fourth, and most important to the study of public opinion on UBI, in neither scenario there is a political party which has been the leading and exclusive champion of the idea, so there is no reason to believe that the nature of the debate in these two contexts may be influencing attitudes through a partisan logic. This being said, one must acknowledge the limits of having only two contexts in order to understand how preferences are shaped across context. Indeed, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to make any causal inferences regarding the influence of contextual variables, like welfare institutional design or the nature of the debate on preferences. With this in mind, this dissertation contends that Finland and Spain present two interesting and insightful scenarios to understand support for UBI.

Methodological approach

This dissertation draws principally on experimental data, and more particularly on two survey experiments, given the advantages that these provide in front of other empirical strategies to address the questions under study within this dissertation. In this section, I outline the various advantages of experiments with regards to the specific research question under study.

First and foremost, experiments allow for the identification of causal effects which is difficult with observational data or traditional survey questions. In this dissertation, I am particularly interested in identifying the causal effects of policy design, upon policy support. Traditional survey questions cannot tackle this because they bundle up a series of policy features and ask for one specific rate of support, in a way that by design one cannot discern which characteristics are driving support in different directions. By eliciting different characteristics randomly, conjoint experiments are well-suited to establish a causal association between policy features and policy support (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2019). Crucially, they do not only detect the causal impact of one policy feature on support – as this could be also done with other experiments like vignettes – but they are also able of detecting the trade-offs and other interactive dynamics between policy attributes, which are central to the theoretical and empirical contribution of this paper. For these reasons, much research on welfare attitudes is increasingly drawing on this methodological design to investigate

preferences for welfare reform (a non-exhaustive list includes: Gallego and Marx, 2016; Bechtel and Liesch, 2017; Hankinson, 2018; Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019; Busemeyer and Kemmerling, 2020)

Conjoint experiments are also particularly useful to limit social desirability bias, which is a key concern to the substantive question of interest in this dissertation. As nonobtrusive designs, conjoint experiments are especially suitable for measuring the impact of each attribute in a decision when there are sensitive items or social desirability bias (Shamir and Shamir, 1995). Given that numerous characteristics are all present in one moment in time, 'sensitive' items are hidden across a range of multiple other factors so individuals' choices seem less evident to them.

Aside from the particular advantages of conjoint experiments, and experiments in general to identify causal effects, experiments haven proven especially useful to the study of individual behaviour and preferences, which are at the core of this dissertation. Different experimental designs allow for measuring individuals' real preferences, rather than measuring these preferences through other techniques that "evoke behaviours or attitudes in a rather detached way (McDermont, 2002).

In particular, I use online survey experiments instead of the lab or field setting because of their value added in terms of both external and internal validity (McDermont, 2011). Some argue that lab experiments rate higher in internal validity, but these settings often limit the external validity of findings (Druckman *et al.*, 2011). In this sense, survey experiments seem an ideal tool that allows the combination of strong internal validity and causal identification, with a accessing a broader and representative sample of respondents, that allow for improved external validity, given the reduced number of participants and the artificiality of lab settings. Online surveys provide a broader access to a larger and more diverse range of respondents that is not only suitable for the validity of findings (Mutz, 2011), but equally to test particular hypothesis in this dissertation which relate to the heterogeneity of public opinion and how individual characteristics influence support for UBI. Relatedly, by achieving a larger pool of respondents through survey experiments –rather than field or lab experiments- one can test numerous hypothesis without compromising the statistical power, that would be undermined by the lower number of participants derived in field or lab experiments. Similarly, these experiment types impose higher economic and organisational costs, which not necessarily compensate its limited advantages given the existing survey experimental tools.

This is not to say that experiment surveys do not come without limitations. One potential limitation of survey experiments is the fact that these provide hypothetical scenarios of choices and situations which do not necessarily appear in the real world, and if they did, they may behave differently, given the differing incentives and costs attached to this behaviour. This is not a major threat to this dissertation given that oftentimes in the real-world citizens are not faced with the choice to support one policy proposal or another in a vacuum[4]. Oftentimes, individuals may choose to support this policy or not, in a context where there are other intervening variables like a political candidate or party which supports the proposal –and hence individuals have to choose whether or not to support this party or candidate- or in a mobilisation campaign, where the incentives and costs of supporting any proposal differ substantially given the context. In this sense, one must acknowledge that while findings are limited to speak to the different contexts where these decisions may apply, they do get to the roots of how support for UBI is configured. Therefore, I recommend readers to take all these findings with caution when extrapolating these results to real-world behaviour.

All in all, and given these advantages and limitations of survey research (for a review on recent advancements see Sniderman, 2018), this seems the most appropriate tool to address the questions under study.

Results

Altogether this dissertation has advanced our understanding of public opinion support towards basic income substantially. Findings can be summarised along six main lines. First, I find that policy design has an effect on support for UBI, albeit with important cross-context variation. While in Finland universality is not a contentious feature, this is indeed the case in Spain. Despite this, I do find that in Finland support for UBI is not unconstrained given that individuals prefer to make policies conditional to reciprocity or inability to be reciprocal. Aside from the differences in preference in policy design, results across contexts are consistent when it comes to preferences about how cash transfers should be funded. Results show that individuals consistently penalise reducing costs from

[4] An example of this is in the Swiss referendum on UBI in 2014.

existing welfare provision and give a considerable support to funding policies by the rich (these findings are presented in papers 1 and 2 in this dissertation).

A second critical finding of this dissertation is the conditions under which individuals will support UBI's core characteristics of universality. In Spain, curving the possibility that out-groups like non-citizens will receive it boosts support for universality while this is not the case in Finland. I find that funding mechanisms are very important across these to contexts to guarantee political viability of universality albeit with important variation. While in Finland a flat-rate taxation will increase support for universality, individuals in Spain will boost their support for this feature if funded by the rich.

A third outcome of this dissertation concerns the heterogeneity of preferences for UBI. Paper 2 shows that the traditional predictors of UBI like being left-wing do predict support for UBI's core characteristics, but if given a choice, these individuals would still prefer means-tested and conditional schemes. Two important hues are worth commenting in this sense. First, contrary to the expectations and to much previous work, I find no income effects on support for universal basic income. Second, in line with one of the arguments developed in this dissertation, the effect of ideology is *conditional* on the type of UBI that is proposed. That is, left-wing individuals significantly reduce their support for universality if a policy is funded through reducing the existing universal welfare provision, while those on the right significantly boost their support for universality if this is the case.

A fourth main take-away from this dissertation is the idea that individuals do not only have a determined redistribution support, but that perceptions about how the most effective ways to attain redistribution vary across individuals and contexts. Most individuals have the view that targeted or means-tested programs are more effective for redistribution, but, an important part of the population does perceive universal cash transfers to be better suited tools for redistribution. These perceptions are not predicted by ideology and are unrelated to redistribution support.

Relatedly, a fifth finding is that these perceptions have an impact on support for cash transfers. In paper 4 I explore whether these perceptions mediate support for different cash transfer designs, and in particular, UBI. I find that this is indeed the case, especially in Spain, where those individuals who perceive universality to be better for redistribution

actually prefer universal benefits. This finding is not replicated in Finland, where together with findings from paper 1 suggest that universality is not a polarising dimension.

Finally, I explore the impact of information on support for UBI and cash transfers. Contrary to previous research I show that scientific information does not increase attention or shape support for policy proposals, and neither does belief-congruent information. Rather, prior beliefs per se, have a direct impact on attention and support. Such beliefs are impermeable to information, even when they face large incentives to update their beliefs, in order to translate their interest to relevant policy preferences.

All of these findings have important implications to the study of welfare preferences, information-processing and the politics of UBI and welfare state reform, which are all thoroughly discussed in the conclusion section, and within each of the relevant papers within this dissertation.

Outline of dissertation

This dissertation is divided into seven main sections, including this first introductory chapter, five empirical papers, and the concluding remarks.

The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. Paper 1 inductively explores the effects of policy design on support for UBI in Finland, specifically looking at under which conditions individuals would support UBI's core characteristics of universality and unconditionality. It draws on a conjoint experiment which is designed to represent the different dimensions shared by most welfare cash transfers, and that randomly varies the attributes presented, which represent different forms of cash transfers, including a UBI. This paper shows that indeed, cash transfer design matters to support, but it is not the universality of UBI which generates opposition, but rather its unconditionality. This paper provides evidence of what cannot be observed in most common survey questions that is which policy attributes generate support and opposition.

Paper 2 explores these matters in Spain, with two important extensions. At a theoretical level, it draws on political and evolutionary theories to explain why individuals, constrained by the established deservingness heuristics will tend to oppose UBI's core characteristics of universality and unconditionality. A second theoretical and empirical

extension in this paper is the exploration of heterogeneous effects by assessing the impact of individual characteristics on support for UBI's core features of universality and unconditionality. This paper provides evidence that helps disentangle the puzzle of UBI and means-tested policy support. It shows for the first time, that if given a choice, even individuals who are most supportive of a UBI still prefer means-tested schemes, conveying that political support for UBI had been overstated by previous work. Additionally, this paper provides first-time evidence that the impact of ideology on UBI is *conditional* on the model of UBI that is presented.

Next, paper 3 and 4 discuss a potential explanation of why individuals would come to support a UBI, over other selective alternatives. Paper 3 proposes the theoretical argument that individuals have different perceptions about which policies are effective in redistributive terms, and empirically tests whether this is the case using survey questions. Paper 4 tests the proposition that these perceptions hence mediate how support for redistribution is translated into support for specific forms of cash transfers, and notably, support for UBI. Altogether, these two papers provide consistent evidence that there had been an important yet omitted variable in welfare state research capable of explaining support for UBI.

Finally, in Paper 5 I explore the effect of information on attention and support towards UBI, and more particularly whether the presence of scientific information or prior beliefs moderate these dynamics. I study this question by employing a two vignette experiments in Finland and Spain. This paper provides evidence that scientific information does not have an impact on UBI attention or support. Rather, prior beliefs per se drive both attention to information and support for UBI, which give further robust evidence of the results found in paper 4: that prior beliefs are of paramount importance to defining preferences.

Finally, I offer a concluding remarks chapter where I condense all the findings in this dissertation and provide a discussion of their implications and limitations, offering pathways for future research.

Paper 1: What's not to like? Benefit design, funding structure and support for a universal basic income

Rincón, Leire
Vlandas, Tim
Hiilamo, Heikki

Abstract

Despite the growing literature on the politics of a universal basic income (UBI), we still do not know what characteristics of a UBI generate support or opposition. We know much about the individual predictors of a UBI, but we know little about what the attractive or repealing features of a UBI are, and how this support compares to other competing policy alternatives like means-tested and minimum incomes. We address the knowledge gap by employing a conjoint experiment fielded in Finland, where a UBI has received significant media and political attention. Our results suggest that the most contentious dimension of a UBI is – surprisingly - not its universality, but instead its unconditional nature. Individuals are more likely to support policies that condition receipts upon searching for employment or being genuinely unable to work, and less likely to support policies that are unconditional. On the funding side, support also tends to be lower for UBI when it is attached to reducing existing benefits, but higher when it is funded by increasing taxes, especially to the rich. Generally, individuals tend to support taxing the rich, but support for universality is actually boosted when it is combined with flat-rate taxation. These findings contribute to a wider literature on the politics of UBI and to our understanding of demand for social policy reform in a context of competing policy alternatives.

Introduction

Recent welfare state reform debates have brought renewed attention to universal basic income (UBI), which has existed as a policy proposal for over 100 years. A UBI would give every individual a universal, unconditional and regular cash payment, with no strings attached or means-testing. Despite its current popularity, further heightened by the economic fallout of COVID-19 pandemic, we still know relatively little about the politics of UBI. Indeed, there is much literature on UBI, but there remains an important gap concerning the dynamics of public support for UBI. Traditionally, much work has debated the normative justifications and desirability of a UBI (some examples include:- Van Parijs, 2004; McKay, 2007; Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2008; Standing, 2008; for a detailed review check Winderquist et al., 2013).

More recently, empirical work has turned to understanding public preferences for a UBI (Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2019a; Parolin and Siöland, 2020; Vlandas, 2020b). Yet, most work to date concentrates on how individual characteristics are correlated with support for a UBI. These studies find that more vulnerable individuals -i.e., low-income, young, unemployed- and those left-leaning are more likely to support UBI (Vlandas, 2019; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020). There is also cross-national variation, with higher support in countries where labour market activation policies are present and unemployment coverage is scarce (Vlandas, 2020a).

While this literature is valuable in advancing our knowledge about the scale of support for UBI in different contexts and highlighting potential characteristics associated with such support, these studies still leave certain important questions unanswered. Recent survey analysis shows that the same individual attributes predicting support for other – often more targeted – welfare state policies can explain support for a UBI despite its universality (Vlandas, 2019, 2020b; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020; Chrisp et al., 2020). However, they cannot account for *which* characteristics of a UBI are more or less popular, or how support for UBI relates to support for other policy proposals: for example, are targeted schemes and means-tested benefits more popular than a UBI?

This article examines empirically which precise characteristics of a UBI are most important for shaping support for this policy proposal. We adopt an inductive research design because there are no clear theoretical expectations about which dimensions of UBI

should be expected to make it more or less attractive.[5] On the benefit design side, it is not clear whether it is universality or unconditionality that drives support. On the funding side, we do not know which funding model is likely to make it most appealing. We also have limited evidence about whether funding or benefit design dimensions should matter most.

Methodologically, we build on recent experimental research identifying the causal impact of competing policy designs, justifications and framings. In terms of benefit design, Dermont and Stadelmann-Steffen (2017) find that entitlement criteria, generosity and funding have the strongest effect on policy support. Another study by Jensen (2012) shows that individuals would not be favourable to a policy that replaces other social benefits. Other studies on universal cash transfers show that concerns about immigration hinder support for this policy (Bay and Pedersen, 2006; Muñoz and Pardos-prado, 2017).

Our contribution lies at the intersection of studies that analyse how individual characteristics drive support for a UBI and the experimental work on how policy design affects support for a policy. We move beyond the state of the art by examining individual policy support in a cross-policy and multidimensional perspective. We study how benefit and funding design affects support for a UBI, and under which conditions support for UBI's core characteristics -namely, universality and unconditionality- are promoted or hindered. Our inductive research design relies on a conjoint experiment carried out in Finland, which is motivated by recent welfare reform debates, in particular on basic income experiment in 2017-18. The presence of enduring labour market problems further increases issue salience (Halmetoja, De Wispelaere and Perkiö, 2019).

Our findings reveal that universality, in terms of the recipient population sub-groups and the legal entitlements of residence or citizenship, are not key dimensions of contention. Instead, it is UBI's unconditionality, and how is funded, that is key in determining support. The latter seems to generate resistance, as individuals are more supportive of policies where recipients are required to search for employment, or prove that they cannot work, rather than no-strings attached cash transfers. Funding also plays an important role to secure policy support: we detect a demand for redistributive funding mechanisms by

[5] Note that one could certainly theorise that individuals with particular ideological or material dispositions are more or less likely to support a UBI, but this is distinct from a focus on the dimensions within a policy itself (rather than the individual).

taxing the rich, and crucially like previous work, we find that retrenching current welfare policies is highly unpopular (e.g. Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2017).

Given that universality and unconditionality are the most distinguishing traits of a UBI, we also explore under which conditions these two features elicit support among individuals. We find little evidence that many other policy characteristics affect the popularity of universal and unconditional benefits. One exception is support for universality, which appears to be enhanced by specifying funding that would come from flat-rate taxation. In addition, we find evidence for what we term a 'Robin Hood' effect whereby popularity is higher if a cash benefit is targeted on the poor, but funded by the rich.

Taken together, our results suggest that the difficulties associated with crafting a political coalition in support of a UBI are not rooted in a general lack of demand for redistribution or government intervention. Instead, individuals prefer other forms of intervention because of deservingness considerations and alternative preferred policy designs, . Support for UBI may therefore be best configured through framing strategies that tap into the population demands for redistribution, reciprocity and helping those in need .

In the next section, we describe the key characteristics of a UBI and review existing welfare state literature to identify which policy dimensions are important for individual support. Next, we motivate our inductive research design and describe our conjoint experiment. After presenting and discussing our findings, we conclude with wider implications and avenues for future research.

State of the Art: UBI and the salient dimensions of cash benefits

Key characteristics of a UBI

UBI differs from traditional tax-funded cash benefit schemes in its two most distinguishable features: universality and unconditionality. The degree of universality refers to the share of the population that is covered. It is often contrasted with selectivity, because universality implies that everyone should be eligible for receiving welfare support. In terms of cash transfers, flat-rate pensions or child benefits are usually

considered universal (Anttonen and Sipilä, 2014), although their selectivity based on eligibility criteria such as age, contrasts with the absolute universality of UBI where everyone receives a cash transfer (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004). Thus, a key distinguishing characteristic of UBI in relation to other cash transfers is the extent to which different parts of the *population* are eligible, and in particular the fact that with UBI all population sub-groups are covered.

However, even the most universal cash transfer may come with some sort of selectivity, if only in terms of who should be eligible in a territory, which is for instance the case with legal requirements restricting benefits to citizens or residents (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004). These legal requirements may in turn impinge directly upon the calculations of individuals when they come to form opinions about cash transfer policies. For instance, we know from previous work that immigration concerns may negatively alter the support for a universal policy (Bay and Pedersen, 2006; Muñoz and Pardos-prado, 2017).

A second key characteristic of UBI is its unconditionality. A policy is characterised as unconditional when it is not subject to any form of prerequisite, means-test in terms of income, which would restrict a persons' eligibility under certain conditions, or behavioural requirement (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004). For instance, a UBI would not require individuals to comply with any ex-ante or ex-post behaviour or requirement to receive a UBI. This contrasts with the wide range of conditions embedded in most existing social policies. For instance, the unemployed are often required to search for a job to be eligible for unemployment benefits (Immervoll and Knotz, 2018). Conversely, in-work benefits are conditioned on being already employed. These examples highlight both the 'in-need' and reciprocity dimensions of deservingness (Van Oorschot, 2000). Within many welfare state debates, the focus is on whether new income-support policies should be introduced, and whether these should be conditional on active and meaningful participation in society even if it is not through employment. The most paradigmatic example of this is one of UBI's cousin proposals known as the participation income (Atkinson, 1996).

Universality and unconditionality are therefore analytically distinct dimensions, although in practice they can be – and are often – linked. Indeed, a policy may be universal, but conditional, which is for instance the case of Atkinson's participation income (a cash transfer for everyone but in exchange for meaningful participation in society). Conversely, the opposite is also possible since a cash benefit can be unconditional but not

universal. Examples include minimum incomes or any cash transfer which is not for all the population but requires no form of conditionality to receive it. The opposite of universality is not conditionality but selectivity, while the opposite of unconditionality is imposing conditions.[6]

Two other important dimensions that characterise a UBI include individuality and generosity. A UBI is granted on an individual basis, rather than at the household level. With respect to benefit generosity, the level is not a priori set within the standard definitions of a UBI (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004). Individuality may not be a particular contentious feature given the fact that many other existing benefits are already granted at the individual level -i.e., pensions and unemployment benefits. Nevertheless, it is still true that many income support schemes are granted at the household level, so the extent to which this feature is a contentious one remains an empirical matter. The importance of the level of generosity is similarly ambiguous since a wide range of existing benefits are set at varying levels of generosity.

Finally, the introduction or reform of social transfers comes at a financial cost, which may be covered through revenue-raising strategies like the introduction or reform of taxes, or through cost-saving mechanisms like the reduction and retrenchment of other existing welfare spending. Previous research documents the high unpopularity of welfare-state retrenchment (Pierson, 1996, 2000). However, not all types of retrenchment entail similar electoral penalties (for recent contributions, see Giger and Nelson 2010; Schumacher 2012). Welfare retrenchment of policies aimed at preventing life cycle risks (e.g. Jensen 2012) such as health, old age, and education have been shown to be particularly unpopular. More recent studies on the multidimensionality of cost and revenue raising reforms suggest that voters care about the personal income losses incurred through tax reforms, but that they are also very weary of imposing costs on the poor (Ballard-Rosa et al., 2017; Bechtel and Liesch, 2017). While we know that welfare-retrenching funding mechanisms are generally unpopular; the extent to which this is only the case for universal or targeted policies is ultimately an empirical matter.

To sum up, we have identified up to six dimensions of a universal basic income: universality, understood in terms of (1) population sub-groups and (2) legal requirements;

[6] For more discussion of the differences between these two concepts, see De Wispeleaere and Stirton (2004).

(3) unconditionality; (4) 'individuality'; (5) generosity; and (6) funding mechanisms. We have reviewed what we know about why these dimensions are likely to be important and argued that an inductive approach is the most appropriate one given the lack of clear theoretical expectations about their likely effects on support for a policy proposal.

Empirical approach

Case Selection and data

We study support for a UBI in Finland. This is a good case to study given the recent intense political and public debate on welfare state reform driven by the need to improve labour market activation, and culminating in a pilot project to test basic income for unemployed persons. The two-year basic income experiment in Finland between 2017 and 2018 was the first nationwide statutory randomized controlled trial testing the effects of an unconditional basic income for unemployed persons (Halmetoja, De Wispelaere and Perkiö, 2019). Due to the widely discussed experiment, basic security benefits in general and basic income in particular, became well-known policy ideas for the public in Finland.

Traditionally, the Left Alliance and the Greens have advocated for a UBI, but surprisingly the experiment was implemented by a centre-right government. This is particularly relevant because it means that in Finland basic income is not associated with any particular party or ideological strand. Therefore, a survey that asks respondents about different benefit designs and funding mechanisms for various social policy alternatives such as a UBI is particularly appropriate. Due to the ongoing debate, Finnish respondents had many opportunities to think about the different problems and dimensions of policies, which probably makes them better informed that citizens in other countries.

Nevertheless, Finland presents a series of specific institutional and contextual characteristics that may affect our findings. We now outline the Finnish context in terms of welfare institutions, and in the discussion, we explain how this context may be influencing our findings. Finland belongs to a set of countries within the Social Democratic welfare regime characterized by a strong de-commodification potential

through extended universalistic programs (Esping-Andersen, 1990a; Kangas and Kvist, 2019). This means that individuals are not as dependent on labour-market participation for income and material subsistence as in other welfare states, something which is known as the de-commodification potential. Decommodification is facilitated through encompassing basic and earning-related social security benefits, rather than focusing exclusively on minimal needs-based assistance. One of the main characteristics of the Nordic or social democratic welfare regimes, in which Finland is usually classified, is its highly universalistic character (Esping-Andersen, 1990), which tends to result in low levels of poverty and high equality in terms of outcomes, .

However, the welfare state in Finland is multidimensional and is not only characterised by this universalistic character typical of the Nordic typology. This is for instance reflected in its level of social expenditures, where the Finnish welfare state spends much less than its Nordic counter-parts, albeit with high income redistribution and low inequality (Korpi and Palme, 1998). Given the interest mediation, the Finnish welfare state has been accompanied by a parallel evolution of an earning-related benefit system, which contributes to high dualisation. In Finland, due to the economic recessions in the early 1990s and after the global economic collapse of 2008, economic necessities have been prioritised at the detriment of social policy, especially relative to other Nordic countries (Pekkarinen, 2005). During the recession, the Finnish welfare state was able to cushion most of the economic shocks and guarantee security when most needed. However, the prolonged recession have exposed growing ‘pockets’ of poverty and social exclusion underlining the question of the adequacy and tightness of basic income transfer schemes (Kangas 2019).

Method

Conjoint experiments are increasingly used in the study of preferences, especially policy proposals and multidimensional issues. This method breaks down every decision object (namely, a policy proposal, candidate, profile, etc.) into a set of dimensions (key characteristics) and attributes (different levels within each dimension). By making respondents choose between these sets of varying dimensions/attributes, conjoint

analyses can detect the trade-offs implicit in each decision in choosing one profile over the other.

In previous work, conjoint designs have been mostly used to measure voter preferences for different candidates (Franchino and Zucchini, 2015; Hainmueller et al., 2014; Kirkland and Coppock, 2018; Schwarz, Hunt, and Coppock, 2018; Tomz and Houweling, 2016), but they are also increasingly used to understand public opinion towards different policies related to welfare such as unemployment benefits (Gallego and Marx, 2016), pension reform (Häusermann, et al., 2019), basic income (Dermont and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2017), or housing policy (Hankinson, 2018). The suitability of this method for our particular question lies in its capacity to establish causal relations between the presence of particular policy attributes, and support for a policy.

Traditional survey questions bundle up a series of different policy characteristics, so one cannot identify the specific effect of each policy feature on its support level. By eliciting different characteristics randomly, conjoint experiments are well suited to establish a causal association between policy features and policy support. Crucially, they do not only detect the causal impact of one policy feature on support – as this could be also done with other experiments like vignettes – but they are also able of detecting the trade-offs and other interactive dynamics between policy attributes, which are central to the theoretical and empirical contribution of this paper.

Our experiment was fielded by a commercial polling agency (Netquest) to a representative sample of 1,000 respondents in Finland during the month of March 2019, as a part of a broader survey. The respondents are selected from a non-random convenience sample[7] from a pool of respondents chosen by Netquest, but there are strict quotas based on gender, age, and geographical region (see section A1 in the appendix)[8]. The survey was administered online using the Qualtrics software and the duration was approximately 15 minutes.

To understand which type of reform is preferred, we employ a fully randomized conjoint experiment which varies in the attributes presented along 6 dimensions shared by income

[7] We use the concept of non-random because these individuals had to register to Netquest to participate in the survey, and were not randomly drawn from the population. Nevertheless, this is the common praxis in most research, and this does not imply that the sample is biased in any way –given that we imposed quotas on key characteristics like region, gender and education.

[8] Note: all figures and tables from the appendix are numbered preceded by the letter A.

cash transfers, as described in table 1: two dimensions of universality[9] –population sub-groups and legal requirements; conditionality; unit of recipients (individuals versus household); generosity; and funding mechanisms. Table A2 in the appendix displays how we collapse the attributes for the analysis and explains why and how we decide to adopt this collapsing. For the benefit generosity dimension, we use the quantity in euros (for more details, see table A3 in appendix).

	Conjoint Dimension	**Attributes**
Benefit Design	Universality I (Target Population Sub-Groups)	Targeting Need (Dependency/Under Poverty Threshold)
		Targeting Minors
		Not Targeting (Giving To Everyone)
	Universality II (Legal Requirements)	Citizenship
		Residence (Combine 6 Months, 1 Year And 5 Years Residence)
	Conditionality	Unconditional (No Conditions, Or Being Unemployed And Not Having To Look For Employment)
		Participatory Conditions (I.E., Training, Education; Community Work)
		Need (Looking For Employment, Or Being Unable To Work)
		Employment (Having Some Form Of Employment, Like Self-Employed, Part-Time Or Full-Time)
	Recipients	Households
		Individuals
	Generosity	Covers Living Costs
		Beyond Living Costs
		Eurodividend (200€)[10]
Funding Mechanisms	Funding Mechanisms	Capital/Technology Taxation
		Reducing Targeted Welfare Spending
		Reducing Universal Welfare Spending
		Environmental Taxation
		Increase Inheritance Tax
		Cut Spending On Defense
		Increase Personal Income Tax To Everyone
		Increase Personal Income Tax To Highest Incomes

Table 1. Conjoint design: dimensions and attributes.

[9] Note that this is outlined in the theoretical section

[10] The concept of eurodividend was developed by Van Parjis (2013) and proposed as a pan-European income scheme to every individual with the specified level of generosity of 200€, as a starting symbolic quantity. Because the concept of euro-dividend is part of the UBI debate, and having a very minimal, symbolic quantity is also considered by some as a potential stepping Stone to the introduction of a full basic income scheme, we include this minimal, symbolic quantity to test preferences for different UBI

In each round, respondents are shown two policy proposals, which all exhibit the same core dimensions but then vary the attributes *within* some of the core dimensions. Each respondent is asked to complete four conjoint tasks, after responding to a series of sociodemographic questions. For each task, respondents are required to choose between the two proposals that appear in front of them and to rate each one of them. A screenshot of the task is shown in Figure A4 in the appendix. Table 2 below provide details of the wording for each question we included. It also describes how we operationalize our two dependent variables. We have two main dependent variables: a forced choice (between the two policies shown to respondents in each round), and a support rate (given to each of the two policies per round). Our analysis mainly relies on the support rate as dependent variable, for reasons that are discussed in the next paragraphs, but the analysis of the forced choice dependent variable can be found in the appendix.

Dependent variable	**Question wording**	**Operationalisation**
Forced choice	Please read the two income proposals carefully, and choose from the following options your preferred proposal	0, 1, where 1 is the selected policy
Support rate	Please rate each policy according to how likely you are of voting in favour of it. Note that 0 is not at all, and 10 means definitely voting in favour of it.	Ordinal scale 0–10, where 0 is no support and 10 is full support.

Table 2. Wording of the two dependent variable questions and operationalization of the dependent variables.

To maximise data quality we exclude all responses that have taken less than 10 minutes to go through the whole survey, and we keep only those respondents that have completed the whole four conjoint rounds, with consistent responses[11] (n= 653). To guarantee that the results are robust given the cognitive demand of completing four conjoint rounds and satisficing concerns that may arise due to the number of rounds (Bansak, et al., 2018;

schemes and welfare reform. We label this quantity as eurodividend, because it is the concept from where we take this quantity from.

[11] In this case it means consistency between dependent variables. As explained in the appendix, there is a forced choice and a support rate dependent variable. Consistent responses are those which reflect the same preference in both dependent variables (inconsistency would mean preferring one policy option in the forced choice, but having the other rated as higher in the support rate dependent variable).

Bansak, Hainmueller, and Yamamoto, 2017), we carry out robustness checks with only two conjoint rounds.

To analyse results of the conjoint experiment we calculate two quantities of interest. The first is the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE), which is defined as the marginal effect of one attribute averaged over the joint distribution of other attributes (Hainmueller et al. 2014; 2020). It is interpreted as the probability of choosing one policy proposal when that attribute appears, usually in reference to an abstract counterfactual level, which is set as the baseline (Teele et al. 2018). We report this quantity in the appendix but our main analysis presented in this paper, relies instead in marginal mean analysis as developed by recent research (Leeper et al. 2019) for substantive and empirical congruence with the approach that we undertake in this paper.

In contrast to the AMCE, the marginal mean (MM) does not come with a baseline or arbitrary reference category, so it is more representative of an attribute's mean without taking into consideration the remaining factors (Leeper et al. 2019). Indeed, the reference category in the AMCE means that all the effects or coefficient sizes of the attributes we find are always interpreted *in relation* to the baseline category. As an example, in the universality dimension, taking as the baseline (reference) category 'giving to everyone' would mean that the effect of targeting those in need or minors would always need to be interpreted *in relation* to giving to everyone. Hence, in this latter case, one could not compare the significant differences between attributes if one particular pair was not within the same dimension and even if the attributes were in the same dimension, one could not compare them if one of these is not set as the baseline category. This means that one could not compare the effect of targeting need to that of targeting minors, as this would always have to be compared to giving to everyone. It is also the case that one could not compare the effect of targeting need to – for instance - restricting eligibility criteria to citizens only. In sum, we focus on the marginal mean analysis because this is a more relevant quantity for our research question, since we are most interested in the overall effect of an attribute on policy support.

To perform the relevant analysis, we reshape the data so that each observation (i.e. data row) is a policy proposal k of a task j, presented to a respondent i. This means that for the total 653 respondents, we have a total of 4948 observations, where each observation is a policy package or profile, shown to one respondent, in one specific round, which was either selected or not. Each respondent chooses one out of two profiles at any given time.

The respondent then completes 4 of each of these rounds, meaning that he/she observes a total of 8 policy profiles. Each respondent is required to select one policy proposal from each pair and rate the two of them which leaves us with two dependent variables –forced choice and support rate.

We code our first dependent variable Y1 - forced choice- as 1 if the policy proposal is selected, and 0 if it is the unselected policy proposal. Our second dependent variable Y2, the support rate, is a number ranging from 0 to 10, depending on the support given to the policy proposal -both to the unselected and selected one. Each observation includes a vector of the attributes presented in that observation. Our dependent variables Y1 and Y2 are modelled as a function of X which a vector is containing the attributes that the respondents were exposed to. This can be analysed with a simple Ordinary Least Squares linear regression (Hainmueller, et al 2014).

Results

We begin by exploring the main effects of different policy dimensions - and with them distinct attributes - on support for different policy proposals. We explain which dimensions are more important in shaping support for different policy proposals, which are the popular and unpopular features of a UBI, and how support for a basic income relates to other policy proposals, depending on its specific features. In the second part of the results section, we examine under which conditions individuals support two key characteristics of UBI -universality and unconditionality.

Which dimensions are important in shaping support for policy proposals?

Our results suggest that the policy dimensions considered in this study, vary in the extent to which they play a role in configuring policy support of UBI (figure 1). Behavioural conditionality and funding dimensions appear especially relevant, whereas neither target groups nor legal requirements -crucial for the universal character of basic income- seem to have an effect on policy support.

More specifically, we find that the unconditional character of UBI decreases support for this policy (this attribute gathers a marginal mean of 4.49). Conversely, conditions

targeting individuals in need and establishing reciprocal attitudes of recipients - i.e. where recipients are looking for employment, or prove that cannot work – have a positive effect on policy support gathering a marginal mean of 4.66, which is significantly higher than any other characteristic in the benefit design dimensions. These results echo the importance of reciprocity found in studies social policy attitudes (e.g. Van Oorschot, 2000). In this respect, our results further suggest that not all forms of reciprocity are equally important: conditions involving training or community work are especially unpopular (with a marginal mean of 4.17), which implies that a UBI or traditional unemployment policies, are more popular than a participation income proposed for instance by Atkinson (1996).

The second crucial dimension shaping support for a UBI concerns how the policy is funded. Reducing costs from existing universal welfare schemes –i.e., health, education and pensions- to fund a UBI appear particularly unpopular, in line with an older welfare state literature (Pierson 1996; 2001) as well as previous conjoint experiments (Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019). Support however is not hindered as much when reducing costs from selective welfare benefits like low-income support or housing benefits for instance, which runs counter to theories of deservingness and life cycle risks prevention (Jensen, 2012). A potential explanation for this surprising finding is that this particular attribute may be susceptible to heterogeneous effects, if support is driven by material concerns about who benefits directly from specific, targeted policies. On the tax side of funding proposals, we find that there is a strong demand for increasing taxes to the rich, which is the most popular of all attributes within the design (with a marginal mean of 4.96).

Several dimensions do not seem to have an effect on support. First, the population subgroups or target groups dimension does not seem to be a relevant dimension shaping support. This would explain why there is support for a UBI as much as for targeted policies: the target groups dimension does not seem to have an effect on support. Second, legal requirements do not have a statistically significant effect on policy support. Third, increasing generosity does not seem to reduce support: this is a crucial finding for the politics of UBI since it shows that generosity is not the main political obstacle to introducing the policy. On the other hand, this also suggests that making UBI proposals more generous will not increase its political feasibility. We do find, however, that very low and symbolic quantities have a negative impact on policy support. This may suggest

that a proposal like a euro dividend may not be the most attractive option for public support (Van Parijs, 2013). Finally, the unit of recipients also does not seem to matter greatly on policy support. Thus, while there might be genuine economic and normative debates about whether the individual or the household should receive a UBI, this does not affect political support in Finland.



Figure 1. Marginal means of the support rate for dependent variable. The vertical line indicates the average support level for all respondents, across all the policy packages evaluated. The dots indicate the marginal mean, and the confidence intervals are set at 95%. The arrows next to the funding proposals indicate whether these are revenue-increasing or cost-reducing. The analysis of the forced choice dependent variable can be found in appendix figure A7, the AMCE analysis is found in A8 and the discussion of the coherence of these findings is provided in appendix A9. The robustness checks appear in figures A10 to A12 in the appendix, A13 being a discussion of the robustness of results.

What makes universality appealing?

We now turn our attention to exploring under which conditions support for UBI's most characteristic features –universality and unconditionality- may be promoted or hindered, by specifically looking at how other design elements shape support for these attributes. We begin by exploring universality. Our findings suggest that manipulating some dimensions in some cases matter while in others it does not (Figures 2 and 3). On the one hand, tightening behavioural conditions, or restricting the citizenship-residence conditionality does not boost support for universality in contrast to previous work

(Muñoz and Pradós-Prado, 2012). On the other hand, benefit generosity dimension alters the support levels for universality, albeit in unexpected ways (figures A16 and A17 in appendix). Indeed, while generosity has no direct effect on policy support, lowering generosity indirectly *reduces* the support for universality[12].



Figure 2. Can tighter conditions increase support for universality? Interaction between conditionality and universality (population sub-groups) dimension.

Next, we analyse the effect of funding mechanisms on support for universality (see figure 4 in the main text and for robustness checks figure A13 in the appendix). Interestingly, we find that while increasing taxes to the rich is a very popular funding mechanism, when it comes to giving to all (universality), individuals prefer taxing everyone too (i.e., increasing personal income tax to all). In fact, we find that this attribute gathers one of the highest marginal means (higher than the average level of support) and is statistically different from taxing the rich. This suggests the following 'give-all', 'take-all' dynamic: if the government distributes cash for all, then everyone should pay for it. We also find that two other funding mechanisms seem to gather higher marginal means than the average in the interaction between universality and funding mechanisms, and these are environmental taxation and corporate/capital taxation.

[12] Although we did not have clear theoretical expectations, it would have been reasonable to expect the opposite: lowering quantities may increase support for giving to everyone.

All of the three mechanisms have been considered as important funding sources for a potential UBI. For instance, income tax may be required to fund the cost of a UBI, even at relatively low level of generosity (Arcarons et al., 2014). Second, the popularity of environmental taxation makes a green new deal combining carbon taxes with a UBI potentially politically viable (Howard et al., 2019). Third, increasing and/or introducing new taxes on capital and corporations also appears to boost support for universality (see Figure 2). This is consistent with debates about the increased concentration of corporate wealth, driven by technological development and the corona-crisis.



Figure 3. Can tighter legal requirements increase support for universality? Interaction between target groups dimension and legal requirements. The vertical line indicates the average level of support for respondents. The dots are the marginal means with 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 4. Interaction between target groups and funding mechanisms dimensions. The vertical line indicates the average level of support for respondents. The dots are the marginal means with 95% confidence intervals. Figures A14 shows the analysis with the forced choice dependent variable, and figure A15 shows the robustness checks for the support rate dependent variable.

Overall, our results about universality suggest that having a universal benefit for everyone may be more justifiable if everyone is also responsible for funding it, than only incurring costs to the better-off. A striking finding is that the funding mechanisms which boost support for universality are not the same as the funding mechanism that are more popular (e.g. increasing taxes to the rich). In fact, we find that this generally popular funding mechanisms is not popular in and of itself, but also boosts support for in need target groups –which was not generally a popular feature (4.39 in the main effects, but 5.27 when interacted with taxing the rich). These results seem indicative of a 'Robin Hood' effect: while individuals do not support giving to those in need, in general, their support for this option becomes high when funding comes from the rich. This suggests that there is a demand for redistribution from the rich to the poor, because individuals do not want to pay for the poor but will support such a policy if funded by the rich. Overall, this seems

to be the preferred form of welfare reform when combining policy recipients and sources of funding.

What makes unconditionality appealing?

The second key characteristic of a UBI is its unconditionality. For reasons of space, all results for interaction effects and robustness checks are shown in appendices A20 to A27. Similar to universality, our results show that few other design dimensions alter the support given to unconditionality. Support for unconditionality is not increased when restricting population sub-groups to those in need or minors, but neither is support hindered for this attribute if combining it with full universality. Instead, we find that combining two restrictive designs boosts support, as shown in the interaction figure between universality (population subgroups) and conditionality in Figure 3. When both these dimensions focus on population in need, support increases significantly. The marginal mean is the largest (5.02) across all the interactions and is higher than the main effects of the marginal mean of these attributes when considered separately (Figure 1). If imposing behavioural criteria increases the support towards particular in-need population sub-groups, then clearly these groups are not perceived as deserving enough.

Our results suggest that funding mechanisms may alter the support for unconditionality, although in different ways than how these influence universality. The funding mechanisms which seem to increase support for unconditionality the most is increasing personal income tax to the highest incomes, but this is not statistically different from spreading the tax burden on the whole of the population or capital and corporations, and it is not different from the reduction of current costs –in welfare or other areas like defence. Given that the interaction of funding mechanisms and support for unconditionality or universality works differently, the key political challenge is boosting support for both these attributes. In Finland, any UBI proposal aiming to attract public support should complement existing benefits schemes and derive funding from progressive tax schemes. Our findings suggest that increasing taxes to all and/or corporate/capital taxation, may be a suitable pathways that are also politically feasible as they boost support for universality and do not particularly hinder support for unconditionality.

Discussion and conclusion

This paper started with the objective of addressing an empirical gap in the literature on UBI. Existing scholarship on UBI support and welfare reform had not analysed what elements of a UBI generate support and opposition, and how support for a UBI compares to other policy proposals. To answer this question, we adopted a novel conjoint design fielded in Finland which allowed us to pay closer attention to the multidimensionality of support for a UBI. Our contribution has shed a light over which are the most important dimensions of a UBI to secure support. Our results indicate that universality is not a key contentious dimension, in terms of legal requirements or population sub-groups. This helps us make sense of the high levels of support for a UBI across Europe (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2019a; Vlandas, 2020b): whereas much literature shows that giving benefits to all groups reduces support because it entails covering groups that might be seen as underserving, the results from our conjoint experiment in Finland shows that universality does not in itself elicit opposition. In addition, our findings show that it is the unconditional character of a UBI that elicits opposition among some individuals. Individuals are more likely to support policies that are conditional on looking for employment, or genuinely being unable to work, echoing what we know about deservingness in terms of need and reciprocity (Van Oorschot, 2000). The funding of a UBI also appears crucial. We find that taxing the rich increases support whereas reducing universal welfare benefits decreases support, suggesting that there is a demand for welfare enhancing policies that are progressively financed. Overall, our results suggest that a progressively-funded UBI, with forms of conditionality attached is the ideal policy proposal for public opinion in Finland.

Moreover, we examine under which conditions support for universality and unconditionality increases, as the two key characteristic attributes of a UBI. We find little evidence that other design characteristics matter in this respect, and even less, that more stringent and limiting policy characteristics actually boost support for these policy features. Our results suggest a ‘give-all’, ‘take-all’ dynamic, whereby giving to everyone increases supports if it is funded by everyone. Yet, the preferred form of welfare reform

is in line with what we term a 'Robin Hood' effect: take from the rich and give to the poor.

These findings have important implications for the politics of welfare reform and UBI. First, in terms of the politics of welfare reform, we have shown that a UBI may be more politically feasible than other alternatives like a participation income (Atkinson, 1996) or a euro-dividend (Van Parijs, 2013). Second, we observe a strong rejection of a roll-back of the welfare state so that a UBI is unlikely to be politically viable if it is combined with retrenchment of existing benefits. Third, we show that there is strong support for redistribution in its traditional form of taxing the rich to provide benefits to the poor. Finally, given that we find limited evidence that altering other policy features may boost support for universality and unconditionality, a UBI will need to rely on its redistributive potential to appeal to wide segments of the electorate.

There are also a number of wider implications for the literature on welfare reform and deservingness theory. First, in contrast to much existing work, we show that legal requirements do not change support for a cash benefit, which is at odds with the expectations from studies on immigration and the welfare state, as well as for deservingness theory (Van Oorschot, 2000; A.-H. Bay and Pedersen, 2006; van der Waal, de Koster and van Oorschot, 2013; Muñoz and Pardos-prado, 2017). Second, we identify distinct attitudes in the 'giving' and 'taking' dimensions of a policy (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015), but further show that these two sides interact to produce different patterns of support: the impact of some 'taking' features is not the same on all 'giving' attributes, and vice versa. For instance, while giving to the poor is boosted when taking from the rich, this is not the case for giving to everyone: here, flat-rate funding mechanisms seem more popular. In contrast to an older 'something for nothing' literature (Citrin, 1979 and subsequent work), we find that individuals support more taxes on a smaller portion of the population (the rich) to support the funding of targeted schemes (i.e., schemes that go to particular population subgroups like the poor, dependent or minors). However, these individuals will share the cost of policies if they reach to everyone (i.e., support of universality is higher when funded by taxes on everyone), suggesting that individuals compensate support for expansions with cost-covering strategies, which does not add credit to the idea that individuals want more government intervention for less expenditure.

Overall, this paper has laid the foundations of a new multidimensional and cross-policy support perspective of welfare state reform, unveiling the configuration of support for

new proposals like a universal basic income. This opens up three avenues for further research. First, we need more work on the heterogeneity of results and how individual characteristics affect multidimensional dynamics of support towards UBI and welfare state reforms. For instance, future research could explore how the effects of well-established characteristics such as risks and income depend crucially on the policy dimension under consideration. Second, future work should examine whether these findings travel to other institutional and economic contexts, which was limited in this study by our focus on one country. For instance, we find that universality is indeed not a core-dividing dimension, but this may be attributable to the fact that our survey was fielded in a relatively universalistic Finnish context. Future work should explore these dynamics in other contexts.

Paper 2: A Robin Hood for All:- Support for universal cash transfers in a context of policy competition, a conjoint experiment in Spain

Rincón, Leire

Abstract

Support for universal basic income is one of the key puzzles of the politics of welfare reform. There is a strong left-wing division, and research shows that the variables that predict UBI favourability –like being left wing or low-income- also explain support for policies with the opposite rationale. What do these results convey about welfare reform preferences, and which individuals actually *prefer* a UBI more than other policies? In this paper, I tackle these questions with a conjoint experiment fielded in Spain. Results show that UBI's universality generates opposition. Results reveal however, that progressive funding mechanisms and restricting eligibility criteria to citizens only, can boost approval for this policy. Like previous work I find that being left-wing predicts support for UBI's core features -universality and unconditionality- but these individuals still prefer means-tested schemes, showing that support for UBI has been overstated. Crucially, however, I show how the impact of ideology on support for UBI's key attribute of universality is conditional on whether this policy is introduced in a welfare enhancing or welfare retrenching fashion.

Introduction

Technological development, labour automation and changing socio-demographic trends are placing great strains on welfare states (Armingeon and Bonoli, 2006; Colombino, 2015; Frey and Osborne, 2017a). The recent covid-19 pandemic has conveyed the need for a more robust safety net that can act as a buffer in times of crisis that current welfare structures are not equipped to tackle (Johnson and Roberto, 2020; Prabhakar, 2020; Ståhl and MacEachen, 2020). The looming economic recovery prospects are calling for an imminent need for welfare state reform, in a context of constrained budgets. With this background, universal basic income has moved from being a radical utopia to a desirable policy solution that through a simple design may tackle several of these challenges in an effective way.

Despite the growing saliency of this policy, its political support remains a puzzle. Left-wing coalitions are strongly divided over the value of such a policy (Van Parjis, 2018). Research on public opinion raises more questions than answers, by showing that the individual predictors of UBI support are the same as those of other policy proposals that follow opposite rationales[13] (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2019; Vlandas, 2020). What are we to make of this political landscape of UBI support? What is it about a UBI that generates support or opposition? If being low-income and left-wing predicts support for a UBI, does this mean that these individuals prefer a UBI policy or they'd still pick means-tested schemes over this newer alternative? What mechanisms -i.e., material self-interest or other-regardingness- explain support for UBI?

In this paper, I tackle all of these questions by exploring under which conditions individuals support a universal basic income, in a context of competing policy alternatives, looking specifically at the role of policy design and individual characteristics in shaping support. This contribution relates to the work on welfare state preferences which looks at the impact of different policy features in shaping support for specific proposals, and shows which policy attributes generate opposition or support and which are the trade-offs of reform (Gallego and Marx, 2016; Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019). I closely follow this approach to examine

[13] Apparently, this may not be a contradictory or puzzling trend because support for very different policy alternatives may simply be indicating more support for government intervention and redistribution. Even if this is the case, the question remains which of these policy alternatives individuals prefer and why. Understanding these questions is indispensable if we are to fully grasp support for UBI

support for UBI and build on this by looking at a broader range of cash transfers rather than focusing exclusively on one proposal, which has been the common practice in previous research. This approximation enables to capture whether individuals actually prefer a UBI over other policy alternatives, and what about a UBI generates support or opposition.

This paper proposes that it's UBI's universality and unconditionality -its most distinctive features[14] - which generate opposition to this policy proposal, given that they radically depart from the orthodox welfare rationale of giving to those in need and collide with the long-standing cognitive deservingness heuristics of giving only to reciprocal individuals (Petersen, 2015). However, the argument follows that support for universality may increase under certain conditions if other deservingness considerations are met, and current welfare provision is ensured. This theoretical framework acknowledges the heterogeneity of public opinion and accounts for individual-level mechanisms shaping support for both universality and unconditionality -which are UBI's most distinctive features. Following from previous work (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020; Vlandas, 2020b), I contend that while it is plausible that the low-income and the left-wing individuals give higher support to UBI's core characteristics these individuals are likely to still prefer targeted and conditional schemes, given the intuitive redistributive character of these policies, that constitute the orthodox welfare rationale, and deservingness heuristics.

To test these claims, I employ survey and experimental data, collected in Spain in March 2019. Spain presents a suitable case study given the saliency of the welfare debate and in particular, the UBI proposal. Conjoint experiments have been increasingly used in the field of political economy and welfare preferences to account for the multidimensionality of attitudes and the trade-offs associated to policy reform (Gallego and Marx, 2017; Hankinson, 2018; Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019). However, unlike these current studies I employ a cross-policy conjoint design, which is structured around the key dimensions shared by most welfare cash transfers, and varies in the attributes presented to represent different types of cash transfers, including a UBI.

[14] It is crucial to note that we are only referring to welfare state cash transfers. Welfare state services like education or health are universal, and unconditional in Spain.

Results show that the most contentious feature of a UBI is expectedly, its universality. Contrary to expectations, unconditionality is not ~~a particularly unpopular feature~~. I convey ways in which support for UBI may be boosted. It is by binding current welfare expenditure and funding the proposal through progressive mechanisms like taxing the rich, that this policy receives larger public backing. Restricting eligibility criteria through legal requirements so that citizens are the only key potential recipients also has a positive effect on support. In contrast to previous work, I show that while the low-income do convey a greater support for redistribution and government intervention, material variables do not predict support for UBI's most defining features. In line with the argument I propose, I show that being left wing does predict support for universality and unconditionality. Nevertheless, these individuals still prefer means-tested and selective schemes. Finally, I show that the effect of ideology on support for UBI's key feature of universality is conditional on whether UBI is presented as welfare enhancing or retrenching.

These findings have important implications to the study of preferences and support for welfare state. Overall, I show that UBI support has been over-stated by previous work in the sense that individuals with specific characteristics like being low-income or left-wing, are said to support more a UBI than other groups, yet, this is not to say that they are the key backers of this policy proposal, given that they still prefer means-tested schemes. This shows that higher support for UBI amongst these individuals was more reflective of a higher demand of government intervention rather than a preference for UBI. Results unveil however, that the key to UBI's support is more about its policy design than population coalitions, boosting support if combined with particular attributes.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following section presents the theoretical framework where I provide an overview of policy features of UBI, and their expected effects on support. Next, I turn to explain how individual characteristics and preference mechanisms may affect support for UBI through its specific policy design. I then turn to specify the methods and the relevance of the case selection. Thereafter, I move to outline results and close with some concluding remarks.

Theoretical framework

UBI dimensions

Universal basic income (UBI) is defined as a universal and unconditional, individual, cash payment, made on a regular basis. While welfare states vary considerably in the type of cash transfers they provide to their population (Frazer and Marlier, 2016; Natili, 2018), UBI is distinctive from existing policies in its universal and unconditional character. That is, that all of the population is eligible to receive it (universal), and that there are no forms of conditionality attached to it whether it is behavioural, ex-ante or ex-post requirements. I begin by explaining the differences between these two key features, and move to explain why these may be highly unpopular elements of cash transfers.

The concept of universality has been defined in various different ways (Rothstein, 1998; De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004; Anttonen and Sipilä, 2014) but generally refers to the population groups to be covered. Within basic income, universality refers to the fact that the whole of the population is eligible to receive this policy. Other cash transfers have been labelled as universal too, such as flat-rate pensions or child benefits (Anttonen and Sipilä, 2014), but they impose some sort of selectivity through age, which contrasts with the absolute universality of UBI where everyone is eligible. Another defining feature of UBI, which deviates from the mainstream welfare logic is its unconditionality (Immervoll and Knotz, 2018). Policy recipients are not subject to any form of prerequisite, behavioural requirement or means-testing that would restrict a persons' eligibility under certain conditions (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004). To cite some examples of how common conditionality is in social policy, one can look at unemployment income support, which generally requires recipients to be active in job search or training. Another example are in-work benefits that are conditioned on being already employed.

Under which conditions will individuals support a UBI proposal? Drawing on the political science and political psychology literature on deservingness heuristics I argue that universality and unconditionality ought to reduce the support for this policy proposal. These theories posit that that many current political phenomena, especially those concerning human relations and decision-making processes, -including which policies to

support, and hence, preferences- are based on the long-established cognitive processes that developed during ancestral times to guarantee species and individual survival (Petersen, 2012, 2015). In small-scale hunter and gathering human groups it was essential to avoid free-riding as much as it was to give to those in need, to ensure individual, group and species survival. Giving to those in need, or who could not hunt, was not adaptive if they later engaged in free-riding, hence, it was essential to give to those needy individuals that were reciprocal and avoid the 'cheaters'(Petersen, 2012). In this context, the human mind evolved a quick categorisation process of reciprocators vs. cheaters, which gradually became an adaptative deservingness heuristics. Given the long process of brain configuration, recent research still shows that individuals categorise benefit recipients and use shortcuts to make decisions about support for welfare (Petersen, 2012, 2015; Petersen et al., 2012; Van Oorschot et al., 2012), rather than evaluating the technicalities of social assistance programs, reducing the complexity of this decision-making process (Petersen, 2015). This long-standing cognitive process helps explain not only which sort of recipients are perceived as more deserving, but why this deservingness heuristic primes in welfare decision-making and how this cognitive short-cut has evolved to an unconscious, automatic process (Petersen et al., 2011; Petersen, 2009, 2015).

Aside from this work, other research on deservingness in the field of political science has accumulated vast research on the specific characteristics that recipients ought to have in order to be deemed deserving of support. Such worthiness is determined by five main factors: the degree of need of recipients, lack of control over their situation, the attitudes they show towards welfare, reciprocity and how close these recipients are in terms of identity (Van Oorschot, 2000). By design, universal and unconditional cash transfers do not guarantee any of these principles.

Taken together, it is only natural that universality and unconditionality are contentious features to public opinion, given that they clash with the conventional form of welfare of giving to the needy but also with the long-established adaptive mental processing embedded in human cognition that were developed to identify and give to those individuals in need, who will be reciprocal too. In this context, it is reasonable to predict that universality and unconditionality will reduce support for cash transfers (H1).

Under which conditions will support for universality increase?

If reciprocity is a valued good in human relations and connects with the cognitive heuristic of deservingness used to support social policy, then it is reasonable to expect that ensuring that individuals will be reciprocal will increase support for universal cash transfers. In social policy, reciprocity is ensured in the form of attaching conditions to recipients like looking for employment, but other forms of conditions could include participating in meaningful participation in society (Atkinson, 1996); such conditions, are crucial to deservingness considerations and public opinion preferences (Van Oorschot and Komter, 1998).

Aside from reciprocity, other characteristics may tap into respondents' perceived deservingness of the recipients, as outlines by Van Oorschot (2000), for instance the identity of recipients, and how close this identity is to the one of the population that pays in. In this sense, vast research documents public opinion sensitivity to the fact that social policy may benefit out-groups who are deemed less deserving (Van Oorschot, 2000), and more particularly, some work specifically shows that immigration concerns may negatively alter the support for a universal policies (Bay and Pedersen, 2006; Muñoz and Pardos-prado, 2017) . Following this line of argument, it is reasonable that the prospects of support for universality are improved if by design the policy ensures that population out-groups will not be benefited. This is often done through legal requirements of residence and/or citizenship (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004), and even the most universal and unconditional cash transfer has to restrict population access to a particular political territory (Torry, 2019). In this sense, the prediction is that restricting eligibility criteria to citizens will increase support for universality.

Finally, the introduction of policy proposals like a UBI also comes at a cost, which may impinge directly over the willingness to support a universal cash transfers. Common funding mechanisms may involve raising revenues or reducing current spending levels in other areas. In the UBI debate this is beyond a mere technicality but has a direct consequence over its objectives and redistributive potential. In fact, there are two main types of UBI proposals. On the liberal or right-wing spectrum, a welfare-replacing universal cash transfer is advocated, which could be funded through the reduction of current welfare provision, replacing the welfare state through one simple cash transfer. From a left-wing, left libertarian and republican perspective, a UBI may be introduced to enhance current welfare provision, and only replace some of the already existing and targeted welfare to simplify the bureaucratic process, and eliminate poverty and

unemployment traps (an example of UBI's defence as a replacement of welfare includes: Murray, 2009; Views on UBI as a right and welfare enhancing tool include: Pettit, 2007; Sheahen, 2012; Wispelaere and Morales, 2016; Van Parjis, 2018).

Aside from which form of UBI is advocated, we know from previous research, that retrenching welfare and reducing existing benefits is highly unpopular. Nevertheless, such unpopularity varies across policies (for recent contributions see Giger and Nelson, 2013; Schumacher, Vis and Van Kersbergen, 2013), with health, old age, and education policies – generally aimed at preventing life cycle risks- being unpopular forms of retrenchment (Jensen, 2012). Recent work also shows that while individuals care about their own material loss, they are also wary of incurring losses on the least well-off (Ballard-Rosa, Martin and Scheve, 2017; Bechtel and Liesch, 2017). Following from these findings, it is reasonable to expect that a UBI that is implemented as a welfare replacement cash benefit will be highly unpopular. Empirically, this means that funding mechanisms that rely on reducing existing welfare expenditure or flat rate taxation – affecting all, including the lowest income thresholds- should be particularly unpopular.

Overall, the first hypothesis about how the particularities of a UBI design affect its support are the following:

H1a. Unconditionality and universality will reduce support for cash transfers[15].

H1b. Support for universality will increase when imposing stricter conditionality and legal requirements; Retrenching welfare policies will reduce support for universality.

Individual determinants of support

We know from previous work however, that public opinion is a highly heterogeneous group when it comes to preferences and motivations, hence, focusing exclusively on the effects of policy design will only tell part of the story of UBI support. To advance existing research, this paper also explores the effects of individual characteristics on support for UBI's most distinctive features: universality and unconditionality. In this sense, political economy literature on preferences can be mainly divided into two main accounts. A first departure point of preferences for welfare is material self-interest (Campbell *et al.*, 1960;

[15] Hence these are the features that reduce support for UBI.

Lipset, 1960; Curtin and Cowan, 1975; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; AuClaire, 1984; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Cook and Barret, 1992; Gilens, 1995; Van Kersbergen, 2002). According to this account of preferences, individuals support policies that directly benefit them in material terms. Income is a prominent preference predictor in this sense, where low incomes are expected to support redistribution in general terms and targeted policies more specifically (Fernández-Albertos and Manzano, 2012b; Cavaillé and Trump, 2015),. However, recent research is also showing that being low-income is also a predictor of universal cash transfers (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2019a; Vlandas, 2020b). Given that those with lower incomes benefit more in material terms from redistributive government intervention and giving the existing findings in previous research, it is reasonable to expect that low incomes will give more support to both targeted and universal policies, and conditional as well as unconditional ones, in comparison to medium and high incomes. However, which policies should low-income *prefer*? While there is vast research showing how universal policies would radically improve the conditions of those worst-off in both material and non-material terms (Groot, 1997; Standing, 2008; Davutoğlu, 2013; Calnitsky, 2016), there are various reasons to predict that lower incomes will still prefer targeted schemes, over universal and unconditional ones. First, targeting is the mainstream policy design for redistribution, contributing to the view that this is the most redistributive mechanism, and hence, the policy that provides the highest material advantage to low-incomes individual. Relatedly, it is more intuitive to think that the low income will win more in relative terms through targeting than through universal cash transfers -given that other income strata may also benefit from universality, and hence the material calculations are not so evident. Third, as I have argued before, the human brain has developed to refrain from giving to anyone, and focus on how deserving -i.e., in need and reciprocal- recipients are. In theory, this should prevail across low incomes even if they may benefit more from a universal cash transfer. For these reasons, the second hypothesis on individual characteristics is as follows:-

H2a. Low incomes will show higher support for both targeted/conditional policies and universal/unconditional policies, in comparison to medium and high income groups.

H2b. Low income will prefer targeted and conditional policies over universal and unconditional ones.

While there are various "indicators" used to predict preferences on the basis of other-regardingness (Kangas, 1995, 2003; Fong, 2001; Linos and West, 2003; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Scheve and Stasavage, 2006), ideology remains a prominent predictor of preferences in the literature (Margalit, 2013). Understood as a 'system of beliefs and values' shaping understanding of how the economy and government work but also normative considerations about this, ideology is a key driver of the legitimacy of benefits and has been said to predict support for UBI too, increasing support amongst those on the left (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2019a; Vlandas, 2019, 2020b; Chrisp, Pulkka and Rincón García, 2020).

Typically, existing work posits those on the right against those on the left, with diverging ideas on human nature and hence, the role of government and market in securing individual material prospects and well-being. Economic ideas on the right-wing side of the ideological spectrum are rooted in liberalism, which contends that the market is an emancipatory institution that left to its own devices without state interference, will serve as a means for individual self-assurance and thriving. For this reason, those on the right tend to oppose government intervention in the economy, given the perceived distortions it may generate. However, even those on the right have come to accept a minimal government intervention as necessary evil to support those who cannot provide for themselves through labour market participation, like the dependent, sick or elderly. In this context, means-tested policies are essential to really prove that an individual is unable – rather than unwilling- of labour market participation, and to direct resources to those most in need (Friedman, 1962; Esping-Andersen, 1990a).

On the other hand, those on the left-side of the political spectrum have its roots in socialism, emerging as a response to the commodification of individual and individual life in capitalist economies. In this framework, social policy is understood as a means to secure social rights, with strong entitlements but modest benefit levels that could cover social needs. The socialist paradigm concerning de-commodification is about the emancipation of the worker from the labour market -i.e., to free the worker from labour market dependence for material survival- however, the views on how to get there diverge within the left-wing spectrum, as epitomised by the strong left-wing division regarding the desirability of a UBI. In fact, there has been a gradual left-wing shift to advocate for

the eradication of poverty rather than the emancipation of workers[16] (Esping-Andersen, 1990b). At the individual level however, left-wing individuals tend to rate higher in egalitarianism and understand welfare as a question of rights, showing generally more support for government spending and involvement in the economy.

In this sense, it seems reasonable to contend that left-wing individuals should generally give higher support to universality and unconditionality than those on the right, although two important hues may be considered. First, higher left-wing support for universality and unconditionality relative to the right does not necessarily imply that left wing-individuals *prefer* a UBI over selective or conditional schemes. Given that targeting is the orthodox view of welfare state, and deservingness heuristics, it is reasonable that those on the left will prefer targeting on the basis of need, or giving to reciprocal individuals, rather than universal and unconditional policies.

A second important hue to this initial expectation concerns the UBI model under consideration. I argue that support for UBI's most characteristics feature -universality- is *conditional on* the UBI model presented, and more particularly, whether UBI is presented in a welfare retrenching or a welfare enhancing perspective. Key to this, are the funding mechanisms employed. Hence, the argument follows that while in general terms left-wing individuals will show higher support rates for universality, this effect will change depending on how the policy is funded. The prediction is that right-wing individuals will increase support for universality if the policy is funded through reducing the existing welfare provision, while left-wing individuals will reduce their support for universality in this case.

Taken together, the hypothesis on ideology is the following:-

H3. Left-wing individuals will show higher support rates for universality and unconditionality than right-wing individuals; but left-wing individuals will still give higher support to selective and conditional schemes.

[16] Note that Esping-Andersen (1990) outlines a series of political reasons like an unclear clientele, focusing on the working class and fiscal or budgetary constraints, rather than reasons to do with the redistributional consequences of policies or technical aspects. This in turn, has led socialists to advocate for minimal and means-tested policies in spite that the rationale for these policies contrasts deeply with other ideological strands.

H3b. If UBI or universal and unconditional cash transfers are presented in a welfare retrenching fashion, then, right-wing individuals will give higher support than left-wing individuals.

Methods

Case Selection and data

I study preferences for UBI in a context of competing policy alternatives in Spain. At the time of the survey, there was no clear ideological champion of UBI in this context[17], which is particularly useful to understand preferences for UBI without partisan bias. Crucially, the proposal has been salient in the political and media arenas, leading to an experiment carried out to test potential effects of a UBI in Barcelona, known as the B-MINCOME project that was fielded between 2017 and 2019. Overall, Spain presents a relevant case study to analyse preferences for UBI, given the context of high saliency of the debate and hence, knowledge of public opinion about the topic, but also, the fact that there is no particular ideological or partisan champion of the idea.

Although Spain was not included in the initial categorisation of Esping-Andersen's *Three Worlds of Welfare capitalism* (1990), it was later incorporated in the 1999 version as the continental model, and it was also classified as the Mediterranean or Southern welfare state (Ferrera, 1996).-The Spanish welfare model is characterized by a middle-level de-commodification, given that benefits are generally dependent on labour-market participation, making Spain a welfare state protection with high insurance components. While in terms of health it resembles the Nordic or social democrat typology in its universal character, employment protection and cash-benefits are closer to the continental type of welfare states, in the sense that benefits and welfare rights are attached to labour market participation and are marked by institutional fragmentation (i.e., private vs public employees, agricultural vs. other self-employed) (Esping-Andersen, 1999). In this sense, one of the crucial and most characteristic features of the southern model is the dualization

[17] It must be acknowledged however, that this has not always been the case in Spain. Izquierda Unida (United Left), a left-wing party in Spain that merged with Podemos (We Can) in 2016 to form Unidas Podemos (United, we can), did include this proposal in their political manifesto during the 1990s, but the debate on the topic never reached a high saliency level. Later, in 2014, Podemos incorporated this policy proposal in its political manifesto for the 2014 European Parliament Elections. By the following elections however, in 2015, Podemos eliminated this proposal from their political program and electoral manifesto, and since then no other party has included the idea as such.

in terms of income maintenance protection: with a generous protection of those within regular and institutionalised forms of employment, and weak subsidies to those in irregular sectors (Ferrera, 1996).

Crucial to this contribution however, in Spain's cash transfer support network. At the time of the survey Spain did not count with a centralised, state-wide cash transfer system or minimum income scheme -in fact, it was not until June 2020, as a response to the coronavirus pandemic that Spain accelerated the introduction of its first state-wide minimum income scheme. Until then, this form of assistance depended on the autonomous regions, which highlights another important characteristic of this welfare state: its decentralised nature. While the central state retains control of the social security (pensions) and unemployment insurance, regions control around 80% of the total expenditure on welfare, including social assistance plans. Crucially, Spain and its autonomous regions strongly rely on means-testing and social assistance policies, that rather than pre-emptively tackling poverty or need, they offer a residual last-resort income support system. In this sense, Spain relies on the orthodox rationale of the welfare state: targeting is effective to redistribute and tackle poverty (Frazer and Marlier, 2016).

Data and research design

This paper draws on survey and experimental data from a survey that was fielded by a commercial polling agency (Netquest) to a sample of 1000 respondents in Spain during the month of March 2019, as a part of a broader survey. The respondents consist of a convenience sample[18] from a pool of respondents chosen by Netquest, with quotas based on gender, age, and geographical region and are representative of the Spanish population (see appendix B1). The survey was administered online using Qualtrics software and the duration was approximately 15 minutes.

[18] We refer to our sample as convenience sample because the respondents are part of a pre-registered respondent pool gathered by the commercial survey agency Netquest. These are not randomly drawn out of the population –hence why we do not refer to this sample as random- but they are respondents who previously registered with Netquest. This is not to say that the sample is biased in some way given that we employ a series of quotes to maintain proportionality with the population's characteristics. This sampling is used in most survey research (e.g., Gallego and Marx 2016 in this journal).

Conjoint experiments are increasingly being used in the study of preferences, especially the multidimensionality of policy preferences, which traditional survey questions are not equipped to tackle because they bundle up a series of different policy characteristics, so one cannot identify the specific effect of each policy feature on its support level.

Contrary to this, conjoint experiments break down every decision object (namely, a policy proposal, candidate, profile, etc.) into a set of dimensions (key characteristics) and attributes (different levels within each dimension). By making respondents choose between these sets of varying dimensions/attributes, conjoint analyses can detect the trade-offs implicit in each decision in choosing one profile over the other. Recent research is increasingly employing conjoint experiments to understand public opinion towards welfare policies, such as unemployment benefits (Gallego and Marx, 2016), pension reform (Häusermann, et al., 2019), basic income (Dermont and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2017), or housing policy (Hankinson, 2018). However, in this contribution I depart from existing work by adopting a cross-policy approach rather than looking at how varying characteristics *within* one specific policy alter support for the proposal in question.

Another value-added of conjoint experiments is that, as nonobtrusive designs, they are especially suitable for measuring preferences in a way that social desirability bias is not a key concern. Given that conjoint experiments show respondents multiple attributes, those sensitive ones are packed within other considerations, so respondents' motivations may remain unnoticed in their view (Shamir and Shamir, 1995).

Conjoint design

To understand which type of reform is preferred I employ a fully randomized conjoint experiment which varies in the attributes presented along 6 dimensions shared by income cash transfers, as described in table 1: population target groups; conditionality, legal requirements; unit of recipients (individuals versus household); generosity; and funding mechanisms. Table B2 in the appendix displays how the attributes are collapsed for the analysis and its justification. For the benefit generosity dimension, I use the quantity in euros (for more details, see table B3 in appendix). The number of dimensions and attributes is similar to the ones used in most studies. The two key dimensions are population target groups and conditionality. As outlined in the theoretical framework, the

population target group dimension refers to which population sub-sets are eligible to receive this policy, whether it is those in need, minors, or everyone -an option that represents the universality feature of UBI. The conditionality dimension refers to the behavioural requirements that recipients must abide to, either before or after receiving the benefits, and includes the unconditionality dimension characteristic of UBI. These are the two key dimensions of interest for the sub-group analysis and the interaction effects (see footnote 9).

	DIMENSION	ATTRIBUTES
Benefit Design	**Target Population Sub-Groups**	**Targeting Need (Dependency/Under Poverty Threshold)**
		Targeting Minors
		Universality (Giving to everyone, non-targeting)[19]
	Conditionality	**Unconditional (No Conditions, Or Being Unemployed And Not Having To Look For Employment)**
		Participatory Conditions (I.E., Training, Education; Community Work)
		Reciprocity/inability (Looking For Employment, Or Being Unable To Work)
		Employment (Having Some Form Of Employment, Like Self-Employed, Part-Time Or Full-Time)
	Legal Requirements	Citizenship
		Residence (Combine 6 Months, 1 Year And 5 Years Residence)
	Recipients	Households
		Individuals
	Generosity	Covers Living Costs
		Beyond Living Costs
		Eurodividend (200€)[20]
Funding Mechanisms	**Funding Mechanisms**	Capital/Technology Taxation
		Reducing Targeted Welfare Spending
		Reducing Universal Welfare Spending
		Environmental Taxation
		Increase Inheritance Tax
		Cut Spending On Defense
		Increase Personal Income Tax To Everyone
		Increase Personal Income Tax To Highest Incomes

Table 1. Conjoint design: dimensions and attributes as employed in the main analysis. The full conjoint design can be found in appendix B2.

[19] The attributes in bold are the attributes employed for the heterogeneous effects section (income and ideology). To perform the interactions, the dimensions of target population sub-groups and conditionality are used, but the results only show the results regarding universality and unconditionality attributes which are the ones theorised within the previous section. The interaction analysis is performed with the target population sub-group dimension and the rest of the dimensions, but the graphs display results only for the universality attribute as this is the key variable of interest. Full interaction results are available in the appendix.

[20] The concept of eurodividend was developed by Van Parjis (2013) and proposed as a pan-European income scheme to every individual with the specified level of generosity of 200€, as a starting symbolic quantity. Because the concept of euro-dividend is part of the UBI debate, and having a very minimal, symbolic quantity is also considered by some as a potential steppingstone to the introduction of a full basic income scheme, we include this minimal, symbolic quantity to test preferences for different UBI schemes and welfare reform. We label this quantity as eurodividend, because it is the concept from where we take this quantity from.

In each round, respondents are shown two policy proposals, which all exhibit the same core dimensions but then vary the attributes *within* each dimension. For each task, respondents are required to choose between the two proposals that appear in front of them and to rate each one of them. A screenshot of the task is shown in Figure B4 in the appendix. Table B5 in the appendix details the wording of the questions included and describes the operationalization of the two dependent variables. Each respondent is asked to complete four conjoint tasks, after responding to a series of sociodemographic questions. There are two main dependent variables: a forced choice (between the two policies shown to respondents in each round), and a support rate (given to each of the two policies per round). The survey was pre-tested in both Finland and Spain, to ensure that the task was not complex, and that it resonated with respondents' understandings of welfare.

The main analysis relies on the support rate dependent variable because this quantity is more indicative of the level of support for each policy, and more appropriate to the question under study, than the forced choice. The forced choice question demands respondents to choose between two alternatives, which is essentially an indication of their preferred choice but not of the degree to which they are favourable to this alternative, and the extent to which this support is similar or differs from the other alternative. This quantity may indicate the 'least worst' or 'best of best' policy support, or even indifference between the two alternatives, which is not as informative to the substantive question under study. In the support rate question, on the contrary, respondents are free to provide a more specific indication of the rate of support between two alternatives -and hence, the attributes therein. This entails a range of differences like the fact that they can show relatively higher or lower support for any one particular policy, penalising or rewarding more strongly those that they like/dislike, and get a more precise indication of the differences in support between different alternatives. For this reason, the main analysis relies on the support rate dependent variable, although the forced choice is included in the appendix[21].

To maximise data quality, I exclude all responses that have taken less than 10 minutes to go through the whole survey, and keep only those respondents that have completed the

[21] As it will be easy to detect, the forced choice effects, although consistent with the general findings, show somewhat smaller coefficient sizes precisely because of the substantive differences.

whole four conjoint rounds, with consistent responses[22] (n= 748). To guarantee that the results are robust given the cognitive demand of completing four conjoint rounds and satisficing concerns that may arise due to the number of rounds (Bansak, et al., 2018; Bansak, Hainmueller, and Yamamoto, 2017), all the analysis is performed with only two conjoint rounds as robustness checks (which are available in the appendix).

To analyse results of the conjoint experiment I calculate two quantities of interest. The first is the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE), which is defined as the marginal effect of one attribute averaged over the joint distribution of other attributes (Hainmueller et al. 2014; 2020) and has been commonly used throughout most conjoint work. It is interpreted as the probability of choosing one policy proposal when that attribute appears, in reference to a counterfactual level, which is set as the baseline (Teele et al. 2018). I report this quantity in the appendix except for the main effects where I show both the marginal means and AMCEs. The rest of the analysis in the paper relies on the marginal mean analysis as developed by recent research (Leeper et al. 2019).

The marginal mean, in contrast to the AMCE, does not count with a baseline or arbitrary reference category, so it is essentially representative of an attribute's mean without taking into consideration the remaining factors (Leeper et al. 2019). This is more relevant for this study given that the central interest here concerns the overall effect of an attribute on policy support. More importantly, this is even more the case with the interaction results where the baseline reference is not theoretically grounded. Crucially, this is also the established quantity of interest for sub-group analysis. Section B6 of the appendix also details how the dataset is restructured for analysis.

Results

Policy design and support for UBI

Results give partial credit to the first hypothesis about the effect of universality, but suggest that the expectation concerning unconditionality should be rejected. Findings

[22] Consistent responses are those which reflect the same preference in both dependent variables, i.e., that the policy selected in the forced choice is never rated lower than the other alternative, in the support rate dependent variable.

show that the universality dimension is indeed a contentious one. Targeting individuals in need –below the poverty threshold or dependency- increases support for a policy proposal, with a marginal mean of 4.48, which is higher than the average level of support and is significantly higher than universal policies (4.17). Nevertheless, this trend is not present in the (un)conditionality dimension. Results suggest that unconditional policies enjoy lower support than the average (with a marginal mean of 4.24) but this is not statistically different from different forms of conditionality. Overall, results suggest that the contentious element of a UBI policy is its universality. This seems to suggest that prioritising giving to those in need is more important than any other consideration.

No other policy dimensions seems to have an effect on policy support[23]. An important exception to this are funding mechanisms, and particularly, two attributes seem to alter support significantly. First, reducing universal welfare provision to finance a reform is a heavily unpopular mechanism (marginal mean of 4.0). Increasing inheritance taxation (4.14) and personal income tax to everyone (4.21) also gather low marginal means and in fact, do not seem statistically different from reducing universal welfare state spending. On the contrary, taxing the rich significantly increases support for a proposal (gathering a marginal mean of 5.09).

Note that these results are robust across the AMCE quantity of interest as you can see in Figure 2. In essence, AMCE results show that targeting population sub-groups in need is preferred over unconditionality (the baseline quantity). No other dimensions have a significant effect on support except for funding mechanisms. In line with marginal mean results, AMCEs show that reducing universal welfare provision reduces support for cash transfers significantly, while increasing inheritance taxation increases support (in comparison to the baseline category which is increasing environmental taxation). Taken together, these results suggest that in Spain there is an intense demand for redistributive policies in the classical or traditional sense: taking from the rich and giving to the poor. These findings suggest that opposition for basic income is not related to a lack of demand for redistribution or government intervention, but rather a preferred *form* of government intervention or policy design, which diverges from the logic of universality: targeting or giving to those in need.

[23] A minor exception is benefit generosity where I find that the lowest quantity (200€) significantly reduces support about covering living costs.



Figure 1. Marginal mean of the support rate dependent variable. The vertical line indicates the average support rate. The dots are the marginal means, and the confidence level is set at .95.



Figure 2. Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCE) of the support rate dependent variable. The dots represent the AMCE, and the confidence level is set at .95.

Under which conditions do individuals support universality?

In the theoretical section, I argued that restricting policy eligibility through other benefit dimensions, like legal requirements, conditionality or maintaining current welfare provision should increase support for UBI's core characteristic of universality. Results concerning imposing behavioural forms of conditionality suggest that this is far from being the case: imposing conditions does not increase support for universality[24]. However, in line with the predictions, I do find that restricting legal requirements increases support for universality, significantly more than including residents, which is in line with previous work (Muñoz and Pardos-prado, 2017).



Figure 3. Support for universality conditional on funding mechanisms, legal requirements and conditions[25]. The vertical line indicates the average support rate. The dots are the marginal means, and the confidence level is set at .95.

[24] While this may be a striking finding given the literature on deservingness heuristics, it is key to note that these theories posit that reciprocity is valued given that the individuals are in need and cannot provide for themselves. Under this framework, increasing reciprocity by giving to all -including to those who are not in need- departs from this logic. However, as you can see in appendix table B14, I do find that indeed, increasing reciprocity conditions to those individuals in need boosts support for a policy proposal, going in line with deservingness heuristics theories.

[25] The analysis was performed through an interaction between the population sub-groups dimension and the three other dimensions separately. The graphs show only the results with the attribute of universality within the target groups dimension.

Finally, I do find that retrenching welfare services reduces support for universality, but crucially, I find that one particular funding mechanism may radically boost support for this alternative: taxing the rich boosts support for universality. In fact, the combination of universality and taxing the rich becomes as popular as giving to traditionally deserving groups like those in need or minors funded through this same mechanism[26]. As it will be discussed in the concluding remarks section, this suggests a 'Robin Hood for All' effect – or that universal cash transfers may be as popular as traditional social policies if they are funded by those who have the most, being redistribution from the rich, to all.

Who supports universality?

So far, I have outlined how support for cash transfers is configured in terms of policy design, unveiling the most popular and unpopular features of a UBI, and explored under which conditions support is fostered for UBI's most distinctive and contentious feature. I now turn to explore how individual characteristics shape support for these two key characteristics of UBI: universality and unconditionality[27]. Results suggest that income is not a key predictor of UBI support (see Figure 3), given that there is a lack of significant differences between the preferences of individuals in different income groups. Not only the preferences of the low income do not differ from other income groups when it comes to UBI's key characteristics, but, in line with H2 findings show that the low income prefer targeted schemes to universal ones.

[26] Note that the marginal mean for increasing taxes to highest incomes and giving to everyone is of 5.19, even higher than giving to those in need with the same funding mechanism is of 5.11, although the difference is not statistically significant. The marginal mean of the funding attribute is of 5.09, which increases the marginal means of the giving attributes respectively (those in need is 4.48 and everyone 4.17). The combination of universality with a relevant funding mechanism increases support up to about one point difference.

[27] Note that the analysis includes the most prominent alternatives to universality and unconditionality in mainstream social policy. In the case of universality this is targeting those population sub-groups in need, and in the case of unconditionality this is conditioning on recipients to be reciprocal (reciprocity) or unable to do so (inability).



Figure 4. Marginal mean analysis of the support rate dependent variable across different income groups. The vertical line indicates the average support rate. The dots are the marginal means, and the confidence level is set at .95. The two first attributes belong to the universality dimension (which population sub-groups are targeted) and includes universality or needs-based targeting. The second two attributes belong to the conditionality dimension, and include no conditions and conditioning on need -inability to work or unemployed.

Similarly, in the case of conditionality, low incomes do not show more support for unconditionality than other income groups, and strikingly they do not show a preference for making policies conditional on reciprocity or inability over unconditionality (see figure 3).

Finally, I turn to explore how ideology shapes preferences towards UBI's two core attributes. Results are supportive of the hypothesis: left-wing individuals show significantly higher support rates for universal schemes in comparison to those on the right wing, but also targeting on the basis of need in comparison to those on the right (see figure 5). Essentially, in line with the hypothesis presented, those on the left support more any form of policy than those on the right. The (un)conditionality dimension shows similar patterns. Those on the left given higher support to unconditionality than the rest

of the ideological counter-parts, but still do not prefer this option to other forms of conditions -i.e., inability or reciprocity.



Figure 5. Marginal mean analysis of the support rate dependent variable across ideology groups. The vertical line indicates the average support rate. The dots are the marginal means, and the confidence level is set at .95. The two first attributes belong to the universality dimension (which population sub-groups are targeted) and includes universality or needs-based targeting. The second two attributes belong to the conditionality dimension and include no conditions and conditioning on need -inability to work or unemployed.

I now turn to explore the second part of H2, concerning the conditional effect of ideology on support for universal policies, depending on whether these are welfare retrenching or not. As predicted, I find consistent evidence that those on the right will increase support for universality, provided the pillars of universal welfare are retrenched (see figure 6). In relation to those on the left, support for universality is one point and a half higher for those on the right when funded through retrenching universal welfare provision. Looking at the preferences within right-wing individuals support for universality ascends to a marginal mean of 5 which is higher than the average support given to any cash transfer by those on the right (4.39), but also to the support given to universality per se (3.88) (see table 2 below).

An interesting finding emerges which is the significantly lower support rate given to universality when it is funded through the reduction of targeted welfare -i.e., pensions, housing, low-income support- which is supported less by those on the right than the left. Although this finding may seem conspicuous it reflects the concept of UBI as a welfare

simplification tool -not retrenching- to the existing patchwork of social assistance benefits which is filled with administrative hurdles, employment and poverty traps and stigma of conditional benefits, and the advocacy of one universal cash transfer that guarantees material existence as a universal right (McKay, 2001; Parjis, 2018; Martinelli, 2020). Nevertheless, an important remark here, the statistical significance of this effect disappears in the robustness checks (see appendix B20) so we cannot conclude that those on the left give more support than those on the right to universality funded through this mechanism.



Figure 6. Support for universality conditional on the funding mechanisms. The figure shows the marginal means across ideology groups for the interaction between target groups and funding mechanisms. The graph only includes the attributes which are theoretically relevant universality and welfare retrenching mechanisms. Robustness checks can be found in figure A20.

Ideology	Average support	Support for universality	Funded through universal welfare retrenching	Funded through targeted welfare retrenching
Centre	4.13	4.03 (0.10)	3.68 (0.20)	4.16 (0.28)
Left	4.58	4.41 (0.11)	3.64 (0.24)	4.80 (0.24)
Right	4.39	3.88 (0.20)	5 (0.21)	3.18 (0.37)

Table 2. Average support levels of policies across ideology. The first column shows the average support level given to all cash transfers designs across ideology. The second column shows the main effects marginal mean for the attribute of universality. The third and fourth columns show the marginal mean of the attribute of universality interacted with two different forms of welfare retrenchment. The numbers in brackets indicate the standard errors.

Conclusions

Amongst the various proposals on the table to reform the welfare state, universal basic income is increasingly gaining traction as a promising alternative that may tackle various complex and interrelated problems through a simple design. Yet, its political landscape is puzzling to say the least, where existing research is not fully equipped to explain what about a UBI generates support or opposition and who the key coalitions behind this idea could be.

In this paper, I shed a light on these questions through survey and experimental data from a representative sample of respondents in Spain in March 2019. I show that UBI's universality is a contentious feature, while its unconditionality is not. Nevertheless, I convey how specific policy combinations may boost support for universality: employing progressive funding mechanisms like taxing the rich and securing that only citizens will be eligible for this cash transfer –rather than including residents too- increase support for UBI. Crucially, I find that reducing current welfare expenditures places a heavy political cost on UBI. Finally, I show that particular individual characteristics may predict support for UBI's core defining features -universality and unconditionality. Contrary to previous work, I find that income is not a key predictor variable in this sense, but ideology is. Those on the left do indeed show more support for universality and unconditionality than other ideological groups, yet those on the left still prefer conditional and needs-based income support.

These findings have numerous implications to the study of welfare preferences and UBI support. First, the finding that a boost in support for UBI's unpopular characteristic of universality comes if the policy is funded by the rich entails a broad range of political, practical and theoretical implications. This shows that while support for UBI is compromised by its universalistic character, this opposition does not come from a lack of redistribution demand, given that once that it is funded by the rich -a form of redistribution, also known as redistribution from- its support ascends to the levels of targeting to those in need. This finding contributes to the literature on the two facets of redistribution, by showing that the taking and giving sides of social policy are not only subject to different considerations (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015), but that these may interact to reinforce each other. At a theoretical level, it shows that deservingness considerations may be altered or dissolved if the funding mechanism through which policy reforms or

new policy proposals are funded -be it because it is generally popular or considered fair. It shows that people will not only support more redistribution if individuals give back but rather, if those who have surplus chip into the welfare of all.

A conspicuous finding is that support for universality does not change when imposing conditions of reciprocity or inability, which seems to contrast the deservingness heuristics literature. However, these theories posit that reciprocity is key to individuals *in need*, not everyone, which is corroborated by the results here presented. This shows that preferences for UBI follows a logic that diverges from conventional social policy, which suggests that future work should explore out-of-the-box theories and variables to further explain UBI support dynamics and how support for UBI competes with other policy alternatives.

Second, the findings show that UBI support, and in particular, which population sub-groups are the key coalition of support behind this policy, had been overstated by previous research. I show that no socio-demographic group exhibits a true preference over a UBI, and those on the left, although showing higher support for universality and unconditionality still prefer selective, means-tested schemes. Future work should examine why this is the case, and may look at particular unobservable variables in this study like exposure to information, perceptions, values or political sophistication.

It is particularly striking that income turns out not to be a predictor of universal and unconditional policies which contrast with previous research (Delsen and Schilpzand, 2019; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2019a; Vlandas, 2019, 2020b; Chrisp, Pulkka and Rincón García, 2020). This may show that what previous work was capturing is a higher demand of government intervention per se, rather than a polarisation across UBI's core characteristics. In a sense, this evidence goes in line with research that shows that two different aspects of redistribution (taking from the rich, giving to the poor), prime different individual motivations, and hence generate different patterns of cleavages across material and ideological variables (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015). In line with this research, I show that the giving to the poor side of social policy and redistribution do not prime the income-maximising motivations of individuals.

On the other hand, ideology appears as a very polarising variable, albeit conditional on the policy attributes and interactions. In line with previous work on the lack of ideological polarisation on welfare state support in Spain (Fernández-Albertos and Manzano, 2012b), results here also convey the absence of an ideological cleavage in support for welfare,

given that that reducing universal welfare is a funding mechanism that does not polarise the preferences of different ideological groups. Like this work, I do find ideological cleavages in emerge in giving to the poor. However, a novel finding is that this logic changes when it comes to the restructuring of the welfare state. Once that universal cash transfers are presented as a means to replace existing welfare, right-wing individuals boost their support for universal welfare state retrenchment, which is penalised by those on the left. The implication of this finding is that welfare consensus in Spain is not as robust as otherwise thought, and it may likely crumble in the event of a welfare-restructuring proposition.

This paper relies on data from one country, but future research could explore in which ways these findings are transferrable to other contexts. In this sense, existing work on comparative welfare states shows how the institutional configuration of welfare affects the saliency of different welfare dimensions in the public debate (Larsen, 2008) or that they the extent to which individual characteristics matter in shaping their preferences (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012a). In this respect, work that explores the multidimensionality of UBI in other contexts may find that individual characteristics play a different role in shaping policy support, or that some dimensions that matter to public opinion in Spain, matter less in other welfare contexts. In this line, some recent research shows that universality is not a contentious dimension at all in more universalistic welfare states (reference anonymised).

Despite the limitations, this research also comes with several strengths. By employing a conjoint experiment, this study has been able to identify causal effects of policy design, which have been indispensable to uncover which are the attractive and despising elements of a UBI. Moreover, the design has proven relevant to detect support dynamics in a context of competing policy alternatives, which in my reading has been done in this contribution for the first time. In this sense, this study has been able to uncover which policies are preferred over others and why, contributing to the study of the politics of UBI and welfare reform in the 21st century.

Paper 3: Revisiting redistribution: perceptions on the redistributive impact of cash transfers

Rincón, Leire

Abstract

While there is a vast scholarship on redistribution support, we know little about which cash transfers individuals *perceive* as more redistributive tools. Understanding this is particularly relevant given that universal basic income is increasingly seen as a desirable alternative to existing selective schemes. I explore this question by drawing on original survey data from Finland and Spain. Results suggest that most individuals perceive targeted schemes as more redistributive, albeit with variation across contexts. These perceptions are not predicted by ideology and are unrelated to redistribution support. Crucially, I find that perceptions have an indirect impact on support for redistribution in Finland, where middle-incomes are more supportive of redistribution *if* they perceive universality to be more redistributive, which offers evidence of an individual-level mechanism of macro-level literature on welfare states (i.e., Korpi and Palme, 1998). These results have far-reaching implications for the study of welfare preferences and the politics of redistribution.

Introduction

Which policies do individuals perceive as most redistributive, and what determines these beliefs? Do these perceptions about what it takes to attain higher redistributive outcomes affect support for redistribution? There is vast research on the individual level determinants of redistribution support (some key research includes: Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Giger and Nelson, 2013; Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019). Moreover, recent work extensively covers the influence of perceptions on support for redistribution, but this research mainly focuses on beliefs about the nature of the problem, for instance, perceptions on immigration, inequality or one's income position (some examples include: Bublitz, 2017; Asli Cansunar, 2018; Berens and Gelepithis, 2018; Engelhardt and Wagener, 2018; Fatke, 2018; Kim and Lee, 2018; Trump, 2018; Ahrens, 2020; López *et al.*, 2020). However, there is scarce research which examines perceptions about the potential *solutions* to this problem, or what it takes to attain redistribution more efficiently, and whether these beliefs shape redistribution support. In fact, the literature tends to implicitly or explicitly assume that individuals perceive targeted policies as more redistributive (Fernández-Albertos and Manzano, 2012; Cavaillé and Trump, 2014; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019). In this paper, I tackle this issue by exploring which policies individuals perceive as more redistributive, and whether these perceptions influence support for redistribution.

This question is becoming increasingly relevant in a context of competing policy alternatives to reform welfare cash transfers, where new alternatives like universal basic income (UBI), are growing in saliency, and questioning the convention that targeted schemes are more effective tools for redistribution. Ideas like a UBI are changing the nature of the debate given that they do not only present new policy tools, but represent a paradigm change about how welfare should be understood and distributed in a context of new socio-demographic and labour market challenges (Offe, 1992; Ingrid Robeyns, 2000; Cunliffe and Erreygers, 2004; Johnson and Roberto, 2020; Prabhakar, 2020; Ståhl and MacEachen, 2020). UBI stands as radical departure point from existing means-tested cash transfers, as by definition this policy proposes handing cash out to everyone -a universal,

unconditional, and individual cash transfer- to solve the problems that would otherwise be tackled through a patchwork of different targeted and means-tested cash transfers[28].

The predominant view in the literature connecting redistribution -and its individual level predictors- to support for targeted or means-tested schemes, is paradoxical in at least to main ways. In this paper I argue that individuals need not perceive targeted policies as more redistributive. First, there is a large academic debate as to whether targeted schemes are more effective for redistribution (Van Oorschot, 1991; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Gugushvili and Hirsch, 2014; Brady and Bostic, 2015). New proposals like universal basic income are providing new insights on why universality may be more redistributive, and making these claims more accessible to public opinion given the saliency of the debate (Erreygers and Cunliff, 2003; Colombino, 2015; De Wispelaere, 2015; Parjis, 2018). Secondly, work which explains support for UBI shows that the same individual-level predictors of support for targeted schemes predict support for universal cash transfers too, which are also the traditional predictors of redistribution support (Vlandas, 2019, 2020b; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020).

These empirical findings and both the political and academic debate give rise to the question of which policies individuals perceive as more redistributive. In this sense, I propose that individuals vary in the perceptions they have about which policies are more redistributive -whether this are universal or targeted cash transfers. I argue that being left-wing may be associated to the belief that universality is more redistributive, given the value-laden and material self-interest considerations that may influence perceptions. Finally, I contend that these perceptions may have an impact on support for redistribution, given that targeted and universal cash transfers have different winners and losers, and have different policy costs associated to it. I argue that this should translate to higher incomes opposing redistribution especially *if* they perceive that universal schemes are more redistributive -being associated to higher costs that they should pay in.

I explore this question with novel data collected from a survey fielded in Finland and Spain in March 2019. These two contexts provide suitable cases for comparison given the

[28] An important note must be made on terminology for clarity purposes. This paper mainly distinguished between universal and selective cash transfers. By the former, I refer to benefits that are for everyone in a particular political jurisdiction, and unconditional. In essence, the traditional definition of basic income: a universal, unconditional, and individual cash transfer made to all population, without means-test and regardless of work ability. By selective cash transfers I particularly refer to means-tested forms of income support, that is, not for everyone, but in relation to an individual's full sources of income (Torry, 2019)

variance they present in their welfare state designs, and especially, in their reliance on universalism and selectivism. While they resemble in their strong insurance-based components and the saliency of welfare state debate –both culminating in basic income pilots-, these two contexts differ substantially in their reliance on universality and selectivity principles with regards to their cash transfers, with higher universality in Finland and stronger reliance on means-testing in Spain.

The findings can be summed up along four main lines. First, in line with the expectations perceptions are not homogeneous within or across contexts. Generally speaking, most individuals perceive targeted schemes to be more redistributive, but there are a larger proportion of individuals in Finland perceiving universal schemes to be more redistributive, suggesting an important influence of context and welfare institutions. Secondly, I show which factors predict these perceptions. Results in Spain suggest that there are no observable variables that predict perceptions, while this is not the case in Finland: high incomes have a higher probability of believing that universality is a more redistributive mechanism. Third, I show that perceptions are independent from preferences for redistribution or ideology. Finally, findings suggest that the income hypothesis should be rejected: high incomes oppose redistribution regardless of perceptions. Despite this, remarkably, I find evidence that middle incomes in Finland are more supportive of redistribution if they perceive that the more effective mechanism to attain this are universal policies, which they will also benefit from. In essence, perceptions have an indirect effect on support for redistribution. These findings go in line with Korpi and Palme's paradox of redistribution, and show evidence of an individual-level mechanism of their macro-level findings.

These results have far reaching implications to the study of preferences and welfare state support. First, by showing that perceptions vary across individuals and contexts, and that these are not correlated with support for redistribution, I show that there has been a crucial yet omitted variable up to date in the study of preferences. Second, these findings also help make sense of survey work on basic income support, which suggested that the same individual-level predictors of UBI support can explain support for targeted schemes: these individuals may share an underlying demand for redistribution and government intervention, rather than be a support for a specific policy proposal. Future work should test whether these perceptions are the key mediating variable explaining which policies these individuals would *prefer*. Moreover, these findings also contribute to explain why

there may be a strong left-wing division on support for this proposal (Van Parjis, 2018): this cleavage may have roots on different perceptions about how to best attain redistribution.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the forthcoming section, I provide an overview of the theoretical building blocks of this contribution. I begin by explaining the debate on which policies are perceived as more redistributive, and provide arguments of why individuals are expected to have different perceptions about which policies are more redistributive and theorise which factors should lead to these perceptions and under which conditions such beliefs may have an impact on support for redistribution. Then I outline the methodological approach, case selection and specify the empirical strategy. The fourth section outlines the results, and finally the paper closes with some concluding remarks, limitations, and pathways for future research.

Theoretical Framework

Redistribution mechanisms and perceptions

Redistribution defines the reduction of income and wealth inequalities, and its description oftentimes includes the specific mechanisms employed for these purposes, like *taking* from the rich and *giving* to the poor (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015). In this sense, the orthodox welfare rationale or conventional wisdom is that cash transfers which are distributed selectively, only to those in need, through targeting or means-tested mechanisms are suitable redistributive tools. These ideas date back to the Poor Laws, and is still today the most conventional form of welfare state policy (Lewis, 2001; Seccareccia, 2015). While services -education, health- and pensions are universal in most welfare states, cash transfers are conditional and targeted in most advanced democracies[29]. Following this convention, work on preferences has implicitly or explicitly equated support for redistribution -or its individual-level predictors- with

[29] Note that this paper is about the perceptions of specific policy instruments or tools, and in particular cash transfers. It is not about welfare policy areas in general or specific services like education and Health.

support for targeted cash transfers[30] (some examples include: Fernández-Albertos and Manzano, 2012; Cavaillé and Trump, 2014; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019).

Yet, existing work is increasingly calling into question that the forms of selectivism implicit in giving to the poor are the most redistributive policy designs. In particular, three strands of work challenge the connection between redistribution support and targeted schemes: (1) macro-level research on the politics of welfare (following the work of Korpi and Palme, 1998); (2) policy-level work on the specific effects of cash transfer instruments (Van Oorschot, 1991; Standing, 2009; Matsaganis, Levy and Flevotomou, 2010; Davutoğlu, 2013; Baldini *et al.*, 2016); and finally, (3) public opinion research on support for UBI and other forms of cash transfers (Vlandas, 2019, 2020b; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020).

A first set of work which questions the classical link between targeting and redistribution outcomes stems from Korpi and Palme's (1989) seminal contribution on the paradox of redistribution. They showed that paradoxically, universal welfare states attain higher redistributive outcomes than those welfare states who concentrate resources to those most in need, because universal benefits generate a larger pool of beneficiaries -including the middle classes-, which in turn, expands support for welfare state. Much research since then has examined this proposition steering a large academic debate on the topic (a non-exhaustive list includes: Gugushvili and Laenen, 2019; Baek, 2010; Marx, Salanauskaite and Verbist, 2013; Brady and Bostic, 2015; Van Lancker and Van Mechelen, 2015; Jacques and Noël, 2018).

A second strand of work, focuses on how specific policy designs affect redistribution outcomes. This work distinguished between selective cash transfers, and universal ones. Although universalism has received a broad range of definitions and multiple varieties of this concept exist, it is generally understood as an endowment or a right for each

[30] This argument is not always made explicitly, but sometimes indirectly, like in the case of Hauserman et al., (2019) "Targeting is supposed to foster support for the reform among the direct beneficiaries of targeted expansions (i.e., the lower-income voters) as well as among left-wing voters who are opposed to greater inequality." In their contribution, Cavaillé and Stella-Trump (2012) suggest that redistribution is giving to the poor "redistribution conceived as taking from the 'rich' and redistribution conceived as giving to the 'poor'" (p.2), without opening the possibility that other designs like giving to all may be more effective for redistribution. Finally, in Fernandez-Albertos and Manzano's (2012) contribution, universalism is associated to lower redistribution and targeting is associated to higher redistribution: "low-class voters are distinctly associated with pro-poor policies, while high-class voters prefer to take universalistic positions." In their analysis pro-poor policies are operationalised as policies for the poor – or exclusively targeted to the poor. In this paper I depart from the idea that targeting to the poor may be generally a more redistributive mechanism or make the poor better off.

individual regardless of work or ability (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Rothstein, 1998; Kildal and Kuhnle, 2005; Brady and Bostic, 2015). In this sense, when it comes to cash transfers, universal cash transfers are income support schemes given to every individual, unconditionally[31]. Selective schemes are only granted to some population sub-groups through employing different filters, usually through means-testing, targeting and conditioning, which results in needs-based cash transfers.

Some work shows that universal cash transfers are may be more efficient for redistribution in both in material and non-economic terms. Materially speaking, they enable lower income individuals to enjoy the same living standards as other groups in society (Korpi, 1983), reducing the non-take up problem (Van Oorschot, 1991; Matsaganis, Levy and Flevotomou, 2010) and preventing unemployment and poverty traps commonly associated to targeted schemes (Groot, 1997; Davutoğlu, 2013; Gilroy, Heimann and Schopf, 2013; Roosma, van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2016). They are also tools to simplify the complex and costly bureaucracy which underpin selective and means-tested cash transfers (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2011). In non-economic terms, universal policies eliminate the stigma associated to targeted benefits as they are granted as a right (Michael, 2001; Wispelaere and Morales, 2016). On the other hand, some work argues that targeting may be a more redistributive mechanism by focusing resources on those who need it the most, and avoiding resource depletion through giving to those who need it less (Blank, 1996).

Finally, a third strand of work that leads us to question the link between targeting and redistribution concerns research on public opinion preferences. In this sense, while vast research shows how redistribution support –or its individual level predictors- lead to support for targeted schemes (Fernández-Albertos and Manzano, 2012b; Charlotte Cavaillé and Kris-Stella Trump, 2015; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019), some other work has shown that these characteristics also contribute to explaining support for universal policies too (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2019a; Vlandas, 2020b).

So far, I have outlined why it is reasonable to expect that not all individuals perceive targeted schemes as more redistributive, given the saliency of claims that universal cash

[31] Note that there is no single country which has a universal and unconditional cash transfer. Even if UBI is proposed as a universal and unconditional cash transfer, it is usually thought out as restricted to one specific political area, and with a filter devised to restrict population eligibility like including only citizens or residents, or age (i.e., including or excluding minors).

transfers could be more effective for redistribution. While variation in perceptions is expected, it is reasonable to predict that targeted schemes will be generally perceived as more redistributive, given that this is the orthodox welfare rationale and it is a more intuitive mechanism.

Implicit in this argument, however, is the effect of welfare institutions on perceptions. Indeed, previous work shows how institutions and in particular, welfare institutions, are capable of determining the perceptions, ideas and values of individuals (Stone, 1997; Osili and Paulson, 2008), and normative beliefs about welfare (Cha and Thébaud, 2009; Svallfors, 2012). Indeed, this idea that institutions shape beliefs is held within a long-lasting literature in historical institutionalism (Goldstein, 1988; Hall, 1993; Hall and Taylor, 1996). It naturally follows that if institutions influence individual ideas, then they may also influence perceptions about the efficiency of policy design and how welfare should be structured. While there is no welfare state which fully relies on a universal cash transfer, yet there is important variation in the extent to which different welfare systems adhere to the principle of universality (Anttonen and Sipilä, 2014). In this sense, it is reasonable to expect that welfare states which rely more extensively on the notion of universalism with regards to their cash transfers, may foster the belief that this rationale is more redistributive. On the other hand, welfare systems relying on means-testing and targeting, may promote the idea that this rationale is more effective. From this, I derive the first hypothesis about the distribution of perceptions: -

H1a. Targeted schemes will be perceived as more redistributive policy designs by a larger proportion of the population.

H1b. A larger proportion of individuals will perceive universal policies to be more redistributive in universalistic welfare states, in comparison to more residual welfare states[32].

Drivers of perceptions

But where do these perceptions come from? So far, I have argued that context, and in particular, welfare institutional design may influence the distribution of perceptions. I

[32] Note that the final part of the hypothesis is in relation to the proportion of individuals with universal priors in Finland in comparison to Spain; whether universality is the dominant perception, that is, that the majority of individuals hold is universal, remains an empirical matter.

explore two potential mechanisms that may determine perceptions[33]. First, some work contends that self-interest is a prime shaper of beliefs (Weeden and Kurzban, 2014). This is further backed by a large literature on motivated reasoning which shows that individuals may *choose* what to believe through discounting information which does not confirm their beliefs, self-selecting or evaluating more positively information that corroborate their perceptions (a non-exhaustive list, to cite some examples: Taber, Cann and Kucsova, 2009; Slothuus and De Vreese, 2010; Druckman and Bolsen, 2011; Kuru, Pasek and Traugott, 2017). This means that individuals have power over what they believe, or rather, choose to believe, with self-interest mediating this.

A reasonable expectation in this sense is that individuals perceive that the policies which *directly* benefit them are more effective for redistribution. Applying this argument leads to the prediction that the low-income individuals should perceive means-tested policies as more redistributive in comparison to higher incomes given that they will *directly* benefit from these[34]. On the contrary, high income individuals would only *directly* benefit from cash transfer if it were universal[35][36]. Hence, if material self-interest predicts perceptions it is likely that the low-income generally perceive means-tested benefits as more redistributive and higher incomes perceive universal cash transfers as a more effective alternative for this purpose. Nevertheless, the high income individual hypothesis may be trumped by the associated costs that these individuals perceive about welfare, and the idea that they will have to pay in more. There is much research on how high incomes oppose progressive taxation –they are wary about the costs imposed on them. Even regardless of the progressivity of tax systems –which is low generally (Prasad and Deng, 2009)- higher incomes are generally associated to higher tax contributions (Barnes,

[33] Existing scholarship offers no account of how perceptions and beliefs about the most redistributive policy designs may be formed, or what these should be. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a fully-fledged theoretical account of perception formation with regards to selective or universal policy schemes, I theoretically and empirically explore the possibility that self-interest, values, context and other related perceptions may shape this process.

[34] Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that although low-income individuals benefit directly from means-tested policies, so do they from universal cash transfer. It may be the case hence that they perceive these as more effective for redistribution and it may still be indicative of material self-interest.

[35] In this theoretical account I am only considering the giving side, and not the taking. Much research on preferences takes into accounts the trade-offs between what a recipient may receive, and what he/she should pay in. Many UBI proposals suggest that individuals with high incomes would pay more than what they would receive, but in this contribution, given that there is no specification of what the cash transfer would look like, I only focus on the giving side and obviate the effect of the 'taking'.

[36] This would be in line with other arguments in previous work like Fernandez-Alberto's and Manzano (2012) "In contrast, the social class of the respondent is distinctly associated with policies that have different redistributive consequences: low-class voters are distinctly associated with pro-poor policies, while high-class voters prefer to take universalistic positions." (p.441)

2015). In this sense, it is reasonable to expect higher incomes interest in universality, to be less determinant given the higher costs associated to it. Hence, overall, I expect no income effect on perceptions.

A second strand of work, suggests that ideology may be a shaper of perceptions about the most redistributive mechanisms. Typically, existing work posits those on the right against those on the left, with diverging ideas on human nature, the role of government and market in securing individual material prospects and well-being (Coughlin, 1980; Svallfors, 1997; Linos and West, 2003; Margalit, 2013; Achterberg, van der Veen and Raven, 2014). Those on the left-side of the political spectrum tend to conceive social policy and welfare as a means to secure social rights, with strong entitlements and a generous, universal provision (Esping-Andersen, 1990b). The left-wing also tend to display more egalitarian attitudes. On the other hand, those on the right of the ideological spectrum understand that the market -left to its own devices- is a better provider of economic well-being (Kitschelt, 1997; Mair, 2007). However, a recognition that not everyone is capable of labour market intervention have leaded those on the right of the ideological spectrum to accept a minimal government intervention. In this sense, welfare should be residual and only as a last resort provision where the market cannot serve as a means of income support (Esping-Andersen, 1990a). Existing work shows the important role that ideology plays on redistribution support (Jæger, 2008; Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018). Given the impact of ideology in structuring beliefs about how much government intervention is desirable, and even for the economy to operate efficiently, it is reasonable to expect that ideology also shapes beliefs about the most efficient ways in which the government should intervene. In this sense, one should expect that ideology predicts perceptions about which policies are more redistributive, with those on the left-wing having a higher probability of perceiving that universal cash transfers are more redistributive, and those on the right perceiving that a minimal needs-based government safety net is sufficient to attain effective redistribution. If this is the case, this would then explain why ideology is a predictor of UBI support.

H2. Being left-wing will be positively associated with perceiving that universality is more redistributive[37].

[37] Note that I explore this empirically. In this framework both the left-wing and high income should universal perceptions. While some work argues that material and ideological variables, note that much other work shows that these are independent (De la O and Rodden, 2008)

How perceptions affect support for redistribution

Why, and ultimately, how, should these perceptions about which policy designs are more redistributive should affect support for redistribution? Just as perceptions about the nature of the problem influence support for redistribution (some examples include: Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Bublitz, 2017; Asli Cansunar, 2018; Fatke, 2018; Kim and Lee, 2018), it is only reasonable that perceptions about *what it takes* to redistribute influence the willingness to support redistribution too. If material self-interest affects support for redistribution (in line with Meltzer and Richard, 1981, and subsequent research), it is likely that individuals support more redistribution when they associate it to a specific tool or mechanism from which they would also benefit. In this paper, I argue that if individuals *perceive* that the policies that are likely to benefit them *directly*, are more redistributive, then they are likely to support redistribution more. Empirically, this should translate in the finding that low incomes support more redistribution when they perceive targeted policies to be more redistributive, and higher/medium incomes supporting more redistribution if they perceive universal benefits to be more redistributive.

However, an alternative mechanism is also possible. Research shows that individuals are wary about the costs of welfare provision and the tax structure (Jensen, 2012; Bechtel and Liesch, 2017). Higher incomes are particularly wary given they must pay in more than other income thresholds under progressive funding taxation structures (Edlund, 2003; Barnes, 2015; Hennighausen and Heinemann, 2015). If this is the case, then we should expect that when redistribution is perceived as more costly, support for redistributive interventions is hindered. In this sense, universal cash transfers are likely to be perceived as more expensive options given the larger pool of recipients. It follows that if higher income individuals perceive this option as more effective for redistribution, this may lead to a higher opposition to redistribute, in order to avoid paying in more. This should not be the case with other income ranges. First, the low income should be the prime winners of redistribution whether it is targeted or universal because they are likely to pay in and receive. The middle incomes, although they may also pay in, they may also win from universal cash transfers more than higher incomes, and hence do not reduce support across perceptions – something which moves in line with the traditional Kopri and Palme's paradox of redistribution (1998).

H3. High income will be positively associated to support for redistribution for individuals with targeted priors and negatively correlated for individuals with universal priors.

Methods

Case study

To explore which perceptions individuals, have on the redistribution potential of different policies, this paper relies on data collected by an original, novel and comparative survey launched in Finland and Spain in March 2019. The case selection is motivated by the representation of two very different welfare contexts, which contrast in their universalistic character (Esping-Andersen, 1990a)[38]. Finland has been classified as the Social Democrat or Nordic typology, characterised by a strong de-commodification potential through extended universalistic programs. In terms of outcomes, the Nordic model is considered a high-equality achiever, in part due to its universal character, encompassing basic and earning-related social security benefits. Spain represents the Southern or Mediterranean model, which in contrast to Finland, is characterized by a middle level decommodification and dependency on the family and voluntary organizations (Ferrera, 1996). Finland relies much more strongly in universalistic principles while Spain has a strong component of social assistance and minimal needs-based policies, set as a last resort safety net than pre-emptive redistribution policies. While Finland has a three-tier system of income protection, with strong universal components, Spain at the time of the survey, did not count with a nation-wide minimum income scheme (Frazer and Marlier, 2016).

Aside from the differences in the institutional design, Finland and Spain share commonalities regarding the debate on reforming welfare: both experienced high saliency of the debate, with pilot projects on testing specific elements or the potential impact of new proposals like universal basic income. Hence, while providing a contrast in their reliance on selectivity and universalism, these two contexts resemble in the saliency of

[38] Note that while I draw on welfare state typology literature the case selection is not motivated by the fact that Spain and Finland have been classified along different welfare types, but rather due to the variance they present in their reliance on universality and means-testing in cash transfer schemes.

the welfare state reform debate, and universal basic income, which provide two suitable scenarios.

Data and empirical strategy

This survey was fielded by a commercial polling agency (Netquest) to a pool of 1000 respondents in Spain and 1000 respondents in Finland (2000 in total) during the month of March 2019. The respondents consist of a non-random[39] convenience sample from a pool of respondents from Netquest, with quotas based on gender, age, and geographical region (the quota criteria used in the survey distribution are shown in tables C1.1. and C1.2. in the appendix). The survey was administered online using Qualtrics software and had an approximate duration of 15 minutes. To ensure quality of responses, all respondent observations, which took the survey in less than 10 minutes, have been eliminated leaving a total of 653 observations in Finland, and 748 observations in Spain.

Measuring preferences and perceptions for redistribution

To measure preferences for redistribution, this survey draws on the typical question of redistribution support, which reads as follows: "Please indicate how supportive you are towards income and wealth redistribution in your country, that is, taxing individuals, businesses or organisations with higher incomes and wealth, and sharing this with those individuals with lower incomes. State your degree of support in the following scale, where 0 is not supportive at all, and 10 is completely supportive.". This variable is employed for the analysis as a numeric scale, but also re-coded for different analysis, as shown in table 1 below[40].

To measure perceptions about the redistributive potential of different policy tools, this survey draws on a bipolar 9-point scale rating question, as shown in the screenshot figure

[39] Note that non-random means that these respondents were not randomly selected from the population, but from within a pool of respondents available to Netquest. This is the typical sample pool used by much survey research (i.e., Gallego and Marx, 2016)

[40] It is worthwhile noting that this question has an implicit redistributive mechanism -targeting- as it is the typical redistribution question used in other studies. The implications of this are discussed in the appendix C1.3 to C1.6, where I show that this is not a concern to the analysis here presented.

below. This variable is both used as a numeric scale, but for other analysis, including sub-group regressions, the answers were re-coded in the following way: 1-4 targeting; 5 neutral; 6-9 universal. A more detailed discussion of the relevance and appropriateness of this question is available in the appendix (see section C1.6 in the appendix). Table 1 below includes the different forms this variable was employed for different analysis. I also measure these perceptions using an alternative question as outlined in sections C1.7 to C1.9 of the appendix. The purpose of this second dependent variable is to test whether results are robust.



Figure 1. Screenshot of the question of redistribution perceptions[41].

The analysis in this paper is centred around two main questions: (1) what determines perceptions, (2) whether perceptions have an impact on redistribution support. There are two main dependent variables, as outlined in table 1, alongside the specific regression strategy employed. First, to analyse determinants of perceptions, I operationalise the dependent variable as a 9-point numeric scale, employing an OLS regression, and then a dichotomous variable that is 1 if an individual perceives universality to be more redistributive, or 0 if targeting is perceived as more redistributive. Then I perform both OLS and GLM regressions.

To understand whether perceptions explain support for redistribution I employ the redistribution support variable as a numeric scale, and perform a step-wise OLS regressions, with and without perceptions to understand the impact of this variable. Finally, I perform simple OLS regressions with sub-sets of data, grouping respondents

[41] Note that the relevance of this question and how far it captures the variable we seek to analyse is discussed in the appendix section C1.6.

across perceptions, to understand the indirect effect of these perceptions. The regression models and their independent variables are explained in the appendix section C2.

Dependent variable	**Operationalisation**	**Analysis**	Independent variables
Perceptions	0-9 scale (numeric)	OLS	socio-demographic controls
	Dichotomous[42]	GLM	socio-demographic controls
	Dichotomous	OLS	socio-demographic controls
Redistribution support	Numeric scale	Step-wise OLS regression	Different models with socio-demographic controls; some including perceptions while not others
		OLS- Subset analysis (across groups with different perceptions)	Socio-demographic controls

Table 1. Summary of dependent variables and regression strategies.

Results

Perceptions about the redistributive potential of cash transfers

In line with the expectations outlined in the theoretical framework, results show that most individuals perceive selective policies as the most redistributive policy designs, albeit with variation within and across contexts. While the proportion of individuals considering that targeting is more effective is similar across contexts, with 66,5% of respondents in Finland and 65,3% in Spain[43], the proportion of individuals perceiving universalism to be more redistributive is significantly larger in Finland, with 16,8% of respondents having this perception, and dropping to 13,5% in Spain[44]. Note that while the differences are small in magnitude, they are still statistically significant. Interestingly, results also show

[42] Re-coded as specified in the text above
[43] p-value of difference in proportions test= 0.69
[44] p-value of difference in proportions test= 0.04

important differences amongst those individuals who are unsure[45] about which benefit design is more redistributive, with 16,7% in Finland, rising to 21,1% in Spain[46]. As explained in the methodological section, I also employ an alternative measurement and operationalisation of the dependent variable -described in sections C1.7 to C1.9 of the appendix- which also shows supportive evidence of these results: there is a higher proportion of individuals in Finland that have universal priors in comparison to Spain.

Predictors of perceptions

But what explains perceptions? And in particular, is it the case that left-wing individuals reflect a larger probability of perceiving that universal schemes are more redistributive? Results suggest this is not the case. Most of our models suggest that ideology does not have a significant impact on perceptions, with one exception: model 2 in table 2 below, shows that being left-wing significantly lowers the probability of perceiving that a universal cash transfer is more redistributive[47]. In Spain, all regression models indicate that there are no observable socio-demographic variables that can predict perceptions about which policies are more redistributive. However, all the regression models in Finland consistently show that being high income -also medium income for the risk model- is positively correlated with perceiving that universal benefits are more redistributive[48]. As discussed in the theoretical section, this may be a reflection of material self-interest, whereby higher incomes perceive that the policies from they would also directly benefit, are more redistributive.

Overall, a consistent finding throughout the models is that ideology is not a predictor of perceptions at least in the expected ways -with left-wing individuals perceiving that

[45] These are the individuals who positioned themselves in the middle of the perceptions scale; it could be that they are not clear or sure about which are the most redistributive, or that they are neutral about this and think that both designs are equally redistributive.
[46] p-value = 0.04
[47] Note that this finding does not hold in the rest of the models as shown in the appendix
[48] These findings are corroborated by all regression models using the main perceptions dependent variable in its dichotomous form. The risk models show that being medium and high income increases the probability of believing that universalism is more redistributive. In the employment models, these findings are maintained only for the high incomes. These regression models can be found in appendix C2.2.

universal policies are more redistributive[49]. This is particularly striking given that being low-income and left-wing are key predictors of support for UBI. These results suggest that findings from previous work on support for UBI and selective schemes, were more reflective of a higher demand for government intervention than a specific policy proposal. The findings presented also help make sense of the strong left-wing division over UBI: while left-wing individuals may agree on the overarching goals and desire for redistribution, they do not hold homogenous perceptions of the most efficient ways to get there, and hence, this may be the reason why they are polarised over UBI. Crucially, and in a similar vein as with ideology, I show that perceptions are unrelated and unexplained by redistribution support. The graphs in appendices A4 and A5 show how these two variables are empirically unrelated: individuals with different perceptions have the same distribution of redistribution support[50].

[49] The results and discussion of the models with the alternative dependent variable can be found in the appendix section C2.3.

[50] Note that a correlation analysis between these two variables in the numeric scale form deliver a correlation coefficient of -0.069 (p-value = 0.07) for Finland, and a correlation of -0.048 (p-value of 0.19) in Spain

	Dependent variable:	
	Perceptions (numeric scale)	
	OLS	
	(1)	(2)
Constant	4.89*** (0.69)	4.70*** (0.42)
Redistribution support	-0.001 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)
Income: Medium	0.57* (0.27)	0.31 (0.19)
Income: High	1.24* (0.54)	1.21** (0.38)
Gender: Men	-0.48 (0.26)	-0.24 (0.16)
Education: No university studies	0.27 (0.26)	0.10 (0.18)
Risk: Low	-0.03 (0.34)	
Employed		-0.43 (0.35)
Pensionist		-0.47 (0.43)
Unemployed		-0.19 (0.42)
Ideology: Left	-0.22 (0.31)	-0.41* (0.20)
Ideology: Right	-0.22 (0.33)	-0.32 (0.21)
Age	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Observations	247	610
R^2	0.07	0.05
Adjusted R^2	0.03	0.03
Residual Std. Error	1.97 (df = 237)	1.98 (df = 598)
F Statistic	1.88 (df = 9; 237)	2.63** (df = 11; 598)
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001	

Table 2. OLS regression models predicting redistribution perceptions for respondents in Finland. The dependent variable of perceptions is a numeric scale that ranges from 1 to 9. Model 1 includes subjective risk of unemployment, while model 2 includes employment status.

	Dependent variable:	
	Perceptions (scale)	
	OLS	
	(1)	(2)
Constant	4.90*** (0.65)	3.89*** (0.79)
Redistribution support	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.03)
Income: Medium	0.07 (0.32)	0.09 (0.21)
Income: High	0.08 (0.37)	0.28 (0.27)
Gender: Men	0.37 (0.23)	0.20 (0.18)
Education: No university studies	-0.10 (0.23)	-0.07 (0.17)
Risk: Low	-0.41 (0.31)	
Employed		0.10 (0.61)
Pensionist		-0.14 (0.63)
Student		0.31 (0.70)
Unemployed		0.16 (0.64)
Ideology: Left	-0.12 (0.26)	-0.01 (0.19)
Ideology: Right	-0.35 (0.33)	-0.18 (0.25)
Age	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Observations	351	669
R^2	0.02	0.01
Adjusted R^2	-0.001	-0.005
Residual Std. Error	2.04 (df = 341)	2.07 (df = 656)
F Statistic	0.96 (df = 9; 341)	0.73 (df = 12; 656)
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001	

Table 3. OLS regression models predicting redistribution perceptions for respondents in Spain. The dependent variable is a numeric variable ranging from 1 to 9. Model 1 includes subjective risk of unemployment, and model 2 includes employment status.

Do perceptions explain support for redistribution?

Overall, results suggest that perceptions about the redistributive character of policies do not have an impact on the overall level of support for redistribution (see regression models in appendix C3.1 to C3.4 and C3.5 to C3.8). These OLS step-wise regression models show that perceptions do not have a statistically significant impact on support, and the coefficients are very small in Spain and Finland. However, perceptions do seem to have an indirect impact on support, although not in the expected ways. In particular, I do not

find that high income individuals' support for redistribution is conditional on their perceptions: high incomes are always opposed to redistribution, regardless of whether they perceive universality or targeting to be more effective for this. However, I do find that perceptions have an impact on support for redistribution for those in medium income thresholds, suggesting that middle income individuals are especially supportive of redistribution if they perceive that universal schemes are more redistributive. The models for individuals with universal priors suggest that the preferences of the middle income do not differ from those of the lowest incomes. However, for those who believe that targeting is a more efficient redistributive mechanism, the coefficient of medium incomes becomes statistically significant, and negatively correlated with support for redistribution, with a very similar magnitude than individuals with high incomes (see table 4 below).

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution support			
	(U)	(U)	(T)	(T)
Constant	7.19** (2.12)	4.86*** (1.19)	7.20*** (1.05)	5.52*** (0.59)
Income: High	-2.83 (1.50)	-2.93** (1.05)	-1.79 (0.96)	-1.29* (0.65)
Income: Medium	-1.70 (0.84)	-1.04 (0.69)	-1.30** (0.45)	-1.01*** (0.30)
Gender: Male	1.36 (0.79)	0.74 (0.54)	0.52 (0.42)	0.38 (0.26)
Education:University degree	0.75 (0.75)	0.82 (0.57)	-0.21 (0.44)	-0.32 (0.28)
Risk: Low	-2.24* (1.00)		-1.07 (0.57)	
Employment status: student/retired		-0.02 (0.85)		-0.45 (0.36)
Employment status: Unemployed		-0.29 (0.77)		-0.57 (0.38)
Ideology: Left	0.85 (0.96)	1.84** (0.65)	0.19 (0.51)	0.75* (0.31)
Ideology: Right	-2.90** (0.87)	-1.11 (0.65)	-2.26*** (0.53)	-1.95*** (0.32)
Age	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)
Observations	42	100	152	411
R^2	0.54	0.26	0.28	0.22
Adjusted R^2	0.43	0.19	0.24	0.20
Residual Std. Error	2.20 (df = 33)	2.57 (df = 90)	2.47 (df = 143)	2.54 (df = 401)
F Statistic	4.80*** (df = 8; 33)	3.55*** (df = 9; 90)	7.05*** (df = 8; 143)	12.42*** (df = 9; 401)
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001			

Table 4. OLS regressions predicting redistribution support in Finland across subsets of respondent observations, grouped by perceptions (universal and targeted).

Similar to the case of Finland, results in Spain suggest that being high income predicts opposition to redistribution across all models and for individuals with different perceptions. Like in Finland however, the opposition is greater across individuals with universal priors. In contrast to the case of Finland, I find that being medium income always generates opposition to redistribution.

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	5.63*** (1.53)	6.46*** (1.08)	7.21*** (0.84)	6.13*** (0.50)
Income: High	-2.48* (1.07)	-1.80* (0.82)	-1.34* (0.53)	-0.99* (0.40)
Income: Medium	-1.96* (0.93)	-1.45* (0.69)	-1.14* (0.47)	-0.66* (0.31)
Gender: Male	0.15 (0.68)	0.26 (0.52)	0.82* (0.33)	0.54* (0.26)
Education: no university studies	0.60 (0.70)	1.09* (0.52)	0.26 (0.34)	0.04 (0.24)
Risk: Low	1.09 (0.81)		0.15 (0.47)	
Employment status: Student/retired		-1.07 (0.68)		0.13 (0.28)
Employment status: Unemployed		0.70 (0.75)		-0.22 (0.38)
Ideology: Left	2.59*** (0.72)	2.20*** (0.56)	2.12*** (0.34)	1.96*** (0.26)
Ideology: Right	-1.43 (1.08)	-1.64* (0.77)	-0.57 (0.46)	-0.51 (0.35)
Age	0.02 (0.03)	0.005 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.001 (0.01)
Observations	56	94	230	438
R^2	0.36	0.39	0.23	0.18
Adjusted R^2	0.25	0.33	0.20	0.16
Residual Std. Error	2.37 (df = 47)	2.38 (df = 84)	2.32 (df = 221)	2.44 (df = 428)
F Statistic	3.24** (df = 8; 47)	6.07*** (df = 9; 84)	8.35*** (df = 8; 221)	10.23*** (df = 9; 428)
Note:	*p **p ***p<0.001			

Table 5. OLS regressions predicting redistribution support in Spain across subsets of respondent observations, grouped by perceptions (universal and targeted).

Taken together, our results give strong evidence to Korpi and Palme's (1989) thesis of the paradox of redistribution. In their seminal contribution, Korpi and Palme showed that paradoxically, those welfare states which target less and are more universalistic, manage to attain higher redistributive outcomes, because they generate a pool of low and middle income recipients that constitute a solid political backing for welfare. These findings offer evidence of an individual-level mechanism of support for redistribution and welfare state support. Middle income individuals will indeed support redistribution as much as lower income strata *if* they perceive that the best way to attain redistribution is through universalistic policies that will benefit them too. If this is not the case -i.e., they perceive

targeting as more redistributive-, then they will significantly oppose redistribution in relation to lower incomes, even reaching the same opposition levels than individuals with higher incomes.

Concluding remarks

This paper has sought to bring coherence to an academic and empirical puzzle that had been overlooked by existing work, namely, which policies individuals perceive as more redistributive tools. In particular, this paper has questioned the traditional -implicit or explicit- assumption that means-tested policies are perceived as redistributive tools. Questioning this premise is far from being a new topic, as much existing work challenges the automatic connection between redistribution support -and its individual-level predictors- with support for targeted schemes, including work at the macro and policy level, and preferences research on UBI and other cash transfers. However, for the first time, this paper examines which policies individuals perceive as more redistributive, and tests where these perceptions come from and whether they influence support for redistribution. In doing so, I bring novel evidence that of an individual-level mechanism of Korpi and Palme's paradox of redistribution, also, helping uncover the paradoxes of preferences existing in UBI and cash transfer preferences research. To do so, this paper relies on comparative survey data from Finland and Spain which present two suitable cases for comparison.

Results can be summed up across three main lines of argument. First, I show that, despite common assumptions prevalent in the literature on preferences, individuals have different perceptions about which policies are more redistributive. I find important variation within and across contexts. There is a larger proportion of individuals in Finland perceiving universal cash transfers as more redistributive, in comparison to Spain. Second, I find that only in the case of Finland, individual-level characteristics explain variation in perceptions. Being high income is associated to a perception that universal policies are more redistributive. Crucially, I find that these perceptions are unrelated to support for redistribution and ideology in both contexts. Do these perceptions explain redistribution support? Finally, I find that perceptions do have an indirect effect on redistribution support in Finland. In particular, middle income individuals will support redistribution as

long as they perceive that the most effective way to get there are universalistic programs that they will benefit from too. If this is not the case, middle income individuals with targeted priors oppose redistribution as much as high income individuals. Overall, these findings show novel evidence of an individual-level mechanism explaining Korpi and Plame's paradox of redistribution.

The results here presented have numerous implications for the study of welfare preferences, redistribution and UBI support. First, by showing that perceptions are not homogenous and independent from redistribution preferences, this contribution shows that there has been an important yet omitted variable in the literature on support for redistribution and welfare preferences: perceptions about which are the most effective redistributive designs. This finding helps makes sense of the puzzling landscape on UBI support, especially in terms of having the same individual-level variables predict support for both UBI and selective schemes, and also, the prominent left-wing division about the desirability of such an idea. Given that ideology is independent from perceptions, it may be the case that left-wing are generally supportive of more government intervention and more redistribution but diverge substantially in the best way to get there. Hence, what survey work has shown so far is a higher demand for intervention or welfare expansion, rather than a true preference for selective or universal schemes. In this sense, future work should examine the extent to which these perceptions will explain support for UBI and other targeted schemes.

Secondly, our findings have far reaching implications to the study of redistribution preferences. In like with Korpi and Palme, findings reveal that the middle level classes support redistribution to the same extent as lower incomes in more universalistic welfare states, as long as they perceive that the most effective tool for redistribution will benefit them too. This is evidence of an individual-level mechanism present in a macro-level theory, but these findings also have broader implications to the study of preferences. In particular they suggest that under some conditions, perceptions may alter the mechanisms behind redistribution support. Generally, however, these perceptions are independent of redistribution support, so future work should examine to what extent support for specific policy proposals is driven not only by how much an individual support redistribution, but which mechanisms he/she perceives as more redistributive.

This paper does not come without limitations, and has also raised important questions, leaving several pathways for future research. While it is beyond the scope of this paper

to explain why individuals come to develop different perceptions about which policies are more effective for redistribution, future work should further explore this. Given that I show important contextual variation, forthcoming research could examine this across a broader range of contexts and explore the mechanisms through which context mediates perceptions. An important non-finding is that these perceptions cannot be explained by redistribution support or ideology. Future research should therefore explore other mechanisms and factors that might contribute in development of these perceptions. Crucially, further studies should also explore the impact of perceptions, and test whether these perceptions actually shape support for different policies, especially cash transfers and UBI. Overall, this paper has served as a building ground to pursue research on redistribution perceptions about policy solutions, showing that this is certainly a worthwhile endeavour.

Paper 4: The paradox of basic income: how redistribution preferences and perceptions shape support for welfare cash transfers

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Abstract

Support for universal basic income (UBI) remains paradoxical in several ways. First, the left-wing is strongly divided over this policy and existing work shows that demand for redistribution is higher than demand for a UBI. Survey research opens more question than answers, by showing that individual-level predictors of UBI support are the same than for targeted schemes. In order to reconcile these paradoxes, this paper advances the argument that the relationship between redistribution support and cash transfer preferences is conditional on the subjective efficiency of the policy design. Empirically, this paper draws on original survey and experimental data from Finland and Spain. Results give credit to our argument, albeit with important differences across context. In Spain, support for UBI is predicted by its perceived redistributive efficiency, more so than in Finland, where individuals are less polarized over universality. On the contrary, individuals in more residual welfare states show consistently higher support for policies they perceive as more redistributive, and universality is indeed a contentious dimension even for pro-redistribution individuals. These results have far-reaching implications for the study of welfare preferences and the politics of universal basic income.

Introduction

Universal basic income (UBI) has moved from being considered a radical utopia to a salient and desirable policy alternative, yet its political support remains a puzzle. This is indeed a timely matter given its potential to solve some of the key, contemporary challenges faced by welfare states, like rising levels of structural unemployment derived from the automation of employment and changing labor market trends, with increasing intermittent job patterns, which exacerbate income insecurity (Frey and Osborne, 2017a) and give rise to a new class of unprotected and precarious individuals (Standing, 2011). Welfare states are also coming under heavy strains with changing socio-demographic patterns like ageing populations and plunging birth-rates (He, Goodkind and Kowal, no date; Esping-Andersen, 2009; Serrano, Latorre and Gatz, 2014). Rising wealth levels coupled with increasingly depressed individuals at the bottom of the income distribution are exacerbating inequality and poverty, in a way that poses severe threats to social cohesion and individual wellbeing (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999; OECD, 2009; 2015). Current social protection schemes are proving insufficient to improve this situation (World Development Report 2019; Gilbert 2019). More critically, the covid-19 crisis has posed a serious threat to the full recovery of the economy and made evident the need for a pre-emptive income safety net to act as a buffer in times of crisis (Prabhakar, 2020; Ståhl and MacEachen, 2020).

In this context, UBI has moved from being considered a radical utopia to a salient and desirable policy proposal. Defined as a universal and unconditional cash transfer, paid to everyone individually and periodically, without means-testing, and regardless work status or ability, UBI has two key properties which make it particularly attractive in relation to existing proposals, but may compromise its political feasibility: these are its universality and unconditionality. These two features prove advantageous to existing schemes, as they could potentially improve non-take-up rates, unemployment and poverty traps, recipient stigma, and reduce the bureaucratic complexity and the associated costs of existing policies (Van Oorschot, 1991; Link and Phelan, 2001; Matsaganis, Levy and Flevotomou, 2010; Davutoğlu, 2013; De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2013; Gilroy, Heimann and Schopf, 2013; Calnitsky, 2016). As such, debates on welfare reform are increasingly revolving around whether to universalize cash transfers in line with a UBI, or to introduce new

proposals that follow the path of existing ones, but that cover new, unprotected population groups.

Despite the growing interest on UBI, its political support remains a puzzle in two main ways. Paradoxically, the left, which is strongly committed to egalitarianism and the reduction of inequality, is strongly divided over the desirability of basic income, with some sectors strongly advocating for it and pointing to the shortcomings of targeted schemes, while other parts firmly oppose the universalization of cash transfers (Parjis, 2018). Existing research on support for this idea is not well equipped to decipher why this is the case, and in fact raises more questions than answers. Recent studies show that the low-income, left-wing and high risk, are key predictors of support for universal cash transfers, yet paradoxically, these are also predictors of support for targeted welfare schemes (Chrisp, Pulkka, and Rincón 2020; Roosma and van Oorschot 2019a; Vlandas 2019, 2020). One could argue that these preferences may be reflective of a higher demand of redistribution and government intervention by these individuals, not an actual preference for UBI, but recent work suggests this is not the case given that the demand of UBI is lower than redistribution (Dermont and Weisstanner, 2020). In this context, which policies do individuals prefer and why? How does support for redistribution connect to support for UBI?

The theoretical arguments that abound in the literature, as well as the empirical strategies are not well equipped to solve these matters and present an important scholarship void. Existing work poses a theoretical impasse which adds difficulty to predict UBI support. In fact, current work equates support for redistribution -and its individual level predictors- to support for specific cash transfer proposals, like targeted schemes. This logic is empirically unconvincing, given that existing research shows that these characteristics also explain support for UBI; but these arguments are also theoretically questionable given the ongoing academic debate on which policy designs and welfare institutions are more redistributive (Van Oorschot, 1991; Korpi and Palme, 1998). The literature on preferences for redistribution is accumulating much research on the role of perceptions in explaining support for redistribution, yet this focuses on perceptions about the nature of the problem (Bublitz, 2017; Cansunar, 2018; Fernández-Albertos and Kuo, 2018; Trump, 2018; Muñoz and Pardos-Prado, 2019). As such, there is an important scholarship void in explaining UBI support, but also in how the work has connected support for redistribution to specific policy proposals.

In this paper, we test whether perceptions about which policies are more redistributive, explains a preference for universal or means-tested schemes. If this is the case, this should empirically translate in that pro-redistribution individuals will not support the same policies, but they will support those policy instruments which they deem more redistributive, with some groups preferring universal policies while others preferring targeted schemes.

To test our proposition, this paper relies on survey and experimental data from Finland and Spain, which present suitable cases for comparison, given the variation they present in the extent to which their welfare cash transfers are more/less targeted and universal. Finland represents a welfare context, which with regards to cash transfers, relies more on the logic of universalism, while Spain is based on means-testing and targeted forms of welfare support. Despite these differences in their welfare rationale, both contexts have experienced a recent debate on welfare state reform, with universal basic income as a key proposal and pilot projects to test key elements of a basic income. To measure support for welfare state reform, we rely on a conjoint experiment, a method which is being increasingly used to understand the multi-dimensionality of welfare state preferences (Gallego and Marx, 2016; Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019).

Our results give credit to our theoretical argument. First, while we show that support for redistribution predicts support for universality and unconditionally, pro-redistribution individuals do not have a stronger preference for this policy forms. We show that perceptions explain support for these features, especially in the case of Spain where these dimensions are more contentious. Pro-redistribution individuals in Spain who perceive that universality is more redistributive are the key backers of UBI. In Finland, this is not the case, and individuals with different perceptions are not polarize over these features, but they are over targeted or conditional ones. This suggests a second important finding which is that different welfare states polarize individuals over different elements of cash transfer design. Thirdly, a potential implication of our argument is that individuals opposed to redistribution should support more cash transfers which they perceive as less redistributive, but results suggest this is not the case. Rather, these individuals show higher support for minimal government intervention or generally low support for all forms of cash transfers.

Taken together, these findings contribute to existing work in three main ways. First, they contribute to explain support for UBI, reconciling the numerous paradoxes regarding this support like the strong left-wing division (Parjis 2018), parallel support for targeted schemes (Roosma and van Oorschot 2019a; Vlandas 2019, 2020) and why UBI demand is lower than redistribution demand (Dermont and Weisstanner 2020). Perceptions mediate how redistribution support is linked to support for UBI or targeted schemes, albeit with differences in how polarizing some dimensions are across contexts. The implications move beyond support for UBI and have implications for current work which automatically connects support for redistribution with targeted schemes. This work shows that this automatic link only tells part of the story.

Third, having a comparative approach enables to speak to work on welfare institutions. Our results go in line with some previous work on the role of welfare state institutions in altering the importance of individual-level factors in shaping the demand for more welfare state (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012b; Beramendi and Rehm, 2016a), given the cross-context variation we find on the impact of perceptions and redistribution support on support for specific cash transfers. Specifically, we find that pro-redistribution individuals in more residual welfare states give higher support to policies which they perceive are more redistributive, but this is less so in more generous and egalitarian welfare states. Similarly, our findings are also congruent with the work on how welfare institutions influence the debate and saliency of welfare dimensions. According to this work, in universal welfare states the debate about who gets what is generally low-key, while this is more salient and contentious in welfare states that rely on targeting and means-testing (Larsen, 2012). Our results partly echo this, given that in Finland preferences are not polarized in the universal/unconditional features -i.e., showing a general acceptance of these features regardless of perceptions- while in Spain these characteristics are indeed contentious.

The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical framework, explaining in detail why variation is expected in the perceptions regarding the redistributive impact of different policies, and how these perceptions, given everything else is constant, should have an impact over preferences on welfare state reform. The third section outlines the empirical strategy. Thereafter, the findings of this study are presented. Before exploring our hypothesis about perceptions, we begin by generally exploring how support for redistribution shapes cash transfer support. Finally,

the paper closes with some concluding remarks about the implications of these results and future research pathways.

What We Know

The traditional departure point of much political economy work on preferences focuses on how individual characteristics of respondents explain support for redistribution and/or specific welfare cash transfers (some early work includes: Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Pratto, Stallworth, and Sidanius 1997). Research developed later on however, has explicitly or implicitly equated support for redistribution with support for specific cash transfers, notably means-tested cash transfers. The working hypothesis in the literature is that those individuals who should support redistribution should also support means-tested cash transfers, directed to the poor (Fernández-Albertos and Manzano, 2012a; Cavaillé and Trump, 2014; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019)[51]. This has proven theoretically inconsistent and empirically puzzling when attempting to explain support for universal basic income. The literature has automatically extended of these arguments to explain UBI support, and showed that indeed these predictors of redistribution support and targeted schemes also do their job in predicting support for UBI. Taken together, this work is both theoretically inconsistent and empirically puzzling.

Hence, this paper departs from the premise that the qualitative jump between redistribution support and preferences for specific welfare cash transfers is both theoretically and empirically unconvincing. Theoretically, there is a mismatch between redistribution as a concept and the specific policy tools employed to attain such outcome. Redistribution refers to a general outcome or desirable goal about whether or not the income distribution in a country should be altered, while policy support is related to a

[51] For instance, Fernandez-Albertos and Manzano (2012) argue that "Specifically, we have argued that support for the welfare state and support for redistribution are not the same thing. Because many welfare state programmes are distribution neutral or even regressive, there is no reason to assume that those favouring redistribution will necessarily be those who support welfare state expansion." (p.442). Hauserman et al., (2019) argue that "Targeting is supposed to foster support for the reform among the direct beneficiaries of targeted expansions (i.e., the lower-income voters), as well as among left-wing voters who are opposed to greater inequality." (p.4). Cavaillé and Trump (2015) distinguish two sides of social policy with regards to redistribution, and automatically connect the 'giving' side to giving to those in need: "support for redistribution from the wealthy is distinct from support for redistribution to the poor and the unemployed." (p.147)

specific instrument, with a concrete policy design and a delimited recipient population. The outcome and the instrument must be connected in some way so that theoretical predictions linking both these objects are fully coherent. Empirically, this connection is not supported by existing work given that this work shows that support for redistribution and its individual level predictors are associated to both means-tested and universal schemes (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2019a; Vlandas, 2020b).

Related to this mismatch between redistribution and cash transfer support is the ongoing academic debate on which policy designs and welfare institutions are *actually*, more redistributive. Work at the macro-level shows that less means-tested welfare states attain higher redistributive outcomes, given that they generate a broader mass of political support for such schemes (Korpi and Palme, 1998). Secondly, literature on the effects of different cash transfers provides solid reasons to believe that universal cash transfers may be more efficient for redistribution given their improved take-up rate and reducing unemployment and poverty traps, as well as the stigma associated to means-testing (Van Oorschot, 1991; Link and Phelan, 2001; Barchiesi, 2007; Matsaganis, Levy and Flevotomou, 2010; Gilroy, Heimann and Schopf, 2013; Baldini *et al.*, 2016).

These two sets of work call into question the traditional link between means-testing and redistribution outcomes, albeit they do so at different levels of analysis and point to different mechanisms (Van Oorschot, 1991; Korpi and Palme, 1998). Despite these differences, both stories add credit to the notion that we should re-consider the link between targeting and redistribution. A recent contribution shows that indeed perceptions about which policy proposals are more redistributive vary within and across contexts and are unrelated to redistribution support (anonymous reference).

In this paper we examine whether these perceptions mediate how support for redistribution is translated into specific welfare cash transfer support. In line with previous work, we hypothesize that more support for redistribution will translate into a higher support for means-tested and universal schemes. However, we are interested in understanding whether, and under which conditions individuals will prefer universality over means-testing.

Our argument is that individuals' perceptions mediate how their support for redistribution is translated into support for specific proposals. Provided that everything else is constant, we should expect pro-redistribution individuals to support those policies which they

perceive as more redistributive. As described in figure 1 below, empirically this should translate into increased support for universal and unconditional policies if these individuals *perceive* universality as more redistributive; or alternatively, increased support for targeted policies if individuals perceive targeting as a more efficient mechanism. This implies two sets of differences in preferences: (1) *within group preferences*, which refer to the fact that individuals with the *same* perceptions -be it universal or selective- give a higher support rate to those policies they perceive as more redistributive; and (2) *across group preferences*, that individuals with *different* perceptions will give different rates of support to universal or selective schemes[52] -i.e., those with universal priors will show higher support for universal schemes than those with selective priors.

In this line, the first hypothesis is as follows: -

H1. Pro-redistribution individuals will give more support for policies they perceive are more redistributive -generating within and across groups' preference cleavages.

[52] The concept of universal is used to refer to a UBI sort of cash transfer –that is universal and unconditional- but it is also employed to refer to the particular dimension within a UBI which is universality, that is, that all the population is eligible in principle to receive it (although it may be later conditioned on particular requirements). The concept of selectivity or selective cash transfers, is used to refer to any cash transfer which is not universal and unconditional –hence, that imposes some sort of filter to recipients. Finally, means-tested or targeted benefit is used to refer to any sort of cash transfer that is restricted to population sub-groups or conditioned upon need.



Figure 1. Theoretical proposition. Schema (1) outlines the typical predictions in the literature, while schema (2) outlines the theoretical proposal in this paper.

A direct implication of our argument concerning individuals who are opposed to redistribution, is that these individuals should favor those policies which they deem *less* redistributive. However, automatically applying our core argument to individuals opposing redistribution is not entirely convincing, as it implicitly assumes that these individuals demand less redistribution or more inequality, but this need not be the case. Individuals opposed to redistribution may simply prefer lower government intervention in the economy or current levels of intervention (status quo). If this is the case, a lower demand for redistribution should rather translate into a lower demand for government intervention in general, rather than a modification of cash transfer policies. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that these individuals will show lower levels of support to all policies -with no differences across specific designs- or, it may be the case, that they do show a higher support for minimal needs-based assistance. In this sense, our hypothesis regarding anti-redistribution individuals is the following:

H3. Individuals opposed to redistribution will not show significant differences in their preferences across perceptions, but exhibit lower support rates for all policies in comparison to individuals who favor redistribution and a preference for minimal needs-based assistance -regardless of their perceptions.

Method

To test these claims, we rely on data from a survey that was fielded by a commercial polling agency (Netquest) to a pool of 1000 respondents in Spain and 1000 respondents in Finland (2000 in total) during the month of March 2019. The respondents consist of a non-random convenience sample from a pool of respondents from Netquest, with quotas based on gender, age, and geographical region (the quota criteria used in the survey distribution are shown in appendix tables D1.1 and D1.2). The survey was administered online using Qualtrics software and had an approximate duration of 15 minutes. To ensure quality of responses, we eliminated all respondent observations which took the survey in less than 10 minutes, alongside those who showed incoherent answers[53], leaving us with a total of 653 respondents in Finland, and 748 respondents in Spain.

Case selection

The case selection is motivated by the variance that these two contexts present in the degree to which they rely on targeting and universalism. Finland belongs to a set of countries within the Social Democrat category characterized by a strong de-commodification potential through extended universalistic programs. In terms of outcomes, the Nordic model is considered a high-equality achiever, with high de-commodification potential, thanks to its universal character, encompassing basic and earning-related social security benefits (Esping-Andersen, 1990a). Finland counts with a comprehensive network of more universalistic cash assistance programs, and counts with a comprehensive income support network, counting with three types of minimum income schemes[54]. On the other hand, Spain represents the Southern or Mediterranean model, which contrary to the universalistic Nordic institutions, is characterized by a middle level de-commodification and a greater reliance on the family and non-profit organizations (Ferrera, 1996). The welfare provision is moderate in comparison with Finland. In terms

[53] An in-congruent response would be selecting one policy option, but rating the un-selected policy higher than the selected option.

[54] This is the Basic Social Assistance (BSA), Additional Social Assistance (ASA) and Preventive Social Assistance (PSA). The BSA is a minimum income scheme, which can be additionally complemented to cover other further living costs through the ASA, and can be further complemented by the PSA to promote independent living and prevent poverty.

of cash transfers, Spain relies more heavily on means-tested, needs-based, and last resort income support. In fact, it was not until June 2020 when the first national minimum income scheme in Spain was established, which is still much more under-developed and targeted than that of Finland (Frazer and Marlier, 2016).

According to a detailed review of national minimum income schemes, Finland is closer to establishing a solid network of universal protection (Ruoppila and Lamminmäki, 2009; Frazer and Marlier, 2016). Finland's coverage extension is not only more comprehensive than that of Spain but has had positive evolution during the last years. At the time of the survey, the most comprehensive coverage in Spain was that of the minimum income scheme in the Basque country which is still partial – while the rest of the autonomous regions have a very limited coverage, and have not evolved substantially. The take-up is partial in Finland and generally limited in Spain, which also translates to a partial poverty reduction in the former and a limited impact in the latter, with even a negative evolution overtime. In terms of the benefit levels, both contexts enjoy an inadequate coverage although Finland has positively evolved overtime while Spain has not. Additionally, in Finland these minimum income schemes are better integrated with other policies like ALMPs and quality services. Overall, the Finnish income support system is more comprehensive and universal than that of Spain (Frazer and Marlier, 2016).

Crucially, however, Finland and Spain share similarities in the extent to which the reform of welfare and cash transfers has been a highly debated topic. Both contexts have experienced high saliency of the welfare reform debate, with pilot projects on new proposals like universal basic income. This makes these two contexts suitable to compare public opinion, as we depart from a high saliency of the welfare reform debate and new policy proposals like basic income, but variance in the extent to which they rely on the notion of universality in their welfare cash transfers.

Measuring cash transfer support through a conjoint experiment

To analyze how perceptions shape support for welfare state reform this paper draws on a conjoint experiment. Since their adaption to the field of political science through the potential outcomes' framework (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014), conjoint experiments are being vastly employed in the field to understand multidimensional

choices and preferences, and are increasingly used to analyze the causal effect of specific welfare policy design on support (Gallego and Marx, 2016; Hankinson, 2018; Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019), and also to explore the taxation or cost-dimension of welfare policies (Ballard-Rosa, Martin and Scheve, 2017; Bechtel, Michael M and Liesch, 2017). One of the key assets of this empirical strategy is that they enable assessing the multidimensional character of preferences, by breaking down choices into its component parts. What respondents typically observe is two sets of profiles (for instance, two policy alternatives). These two options that share the same dimensions, but the specific attributes presented randomly vary. In this context, dimensions are the key characteristics, like in this case, population sub-groups or conditionality, while the attributes are the different levels within a given dimension. For instance, for population sub-groups dimensions the attributes could be universality (for all) or targeting (to those in need); while conditionality could range from conditional forms to unconditional. By making respondents choose between two policy options that randomly vary the attributes presented, conjoint analysis can detect the trade-offs implicit in each decision, disclosing which features increase support and which generate opposition, establishing a causal connection between policy design and policy support.

Employing a conjoint experiment is particularly relevant to the question that concerns this paper for two main reasons. Preferences for welfare state are increasingly understood as multidimensional. This is crucial for our specific question under study regarding the universality and unconditionality, two features which are defining of a UBI, but to cash transfer schemes generally, as every policy must specify which are the population sub-groups eligible a priori, and which are the conditions to be attached[55]. The second value-added of conjoint experiments to this research question is that they are non-obtrusive designs, and as such, are especially well suited to reduce social desirability bias (Shamir and Shamir, 1995), which could be a key concern to the substantive question of this study. Welfare policy, which is ultimately about who should receive what and who is deserving,

[55] A reasonable observation to make at this stage is why employ a conjoint experiment with multiple dimensions, when the key characteristics of UBI with respect to other cash transfers are only two, for which a vignette experiment may also be employed. The main reason we employ a conjoint is because cash transfers share multiple dimensions and the interest here is not only to understand how these two core dimensions and its attributes affect support, but how they have an impact on preferences, bearing in mind other important features of cash transfers like legal requirements, funding mechanisms, or generosity. While we do not report these in the main findings we take them into account too.

is certainly a matter susceptible to social desirability bias under which individuals may feel compromised in expressing their preferences about socially deserving groups.

We now turn to describe our specific design. To measure support for universal or selective cash transfers -that is, UBI or other alternatives-, a fully randomized conjoint experiment is employed, containing 6 dimensions which can be categorized along two main groups: benefit design and funding mechanisms. A detailed description of these dimensions and attributes is listed in section D1.3 in the appendix. While we follow previous work in measuring preferences for cash transfers multidimensionally (Gallego and Marx, 2017; Dermont and Stadelmann-steffen, 2019; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019), and hence more broadly speaking, support for welfare schemes multidimensionally too (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2013; Roosma, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2013b, 2013a; Charlotte Cavaillé and Kris-Stella Trump, 2015; Gallego and Marx, 2016; Bremer and Bürgisser, 2017; Häusermann, Kurer and Traber, 2019)., our approach varies from existing work in that our conjoint design is constructed to measure support in a cross-policy approach[56]. By cross-policy approach, we refer to the fact that we do not look at support for one specific policy proposal, but rather across a variety of cash transfer proposals. We focus on the core dimensions shared by most welfare cash transfers -i.e., population sub-groups and conditions- and vary the attributes presented to represent different policy proposals -i.e., a UBI, minimum incomes, salary complements, unemployment schemes, etc. This enables us to capture to which extent to a universal or selective cash transfers is preferred and the magnitude change of support.

As outlined in the theoretical framework, basic income's key characteristics are that is both universal -i.e., does not stipulate any particular population sub-group- and is also unconditional -i.e., does not impose any form of conditionality that may restrict eligibility criteria. However, a selective cash transfer can be selective -or non-universal- because it restricts the population sub-groups, *and/or* because it imposes conditions that restrict the eligibility criteria only to some individuals but not to all. For instance, a cash transfer can be universal -i.e., all of the population may be susceptible to being eligible for a particular cash transfer- but such policy may stipulate that recipients may fulfil certain conditions like being unable to work, or looking for employment. On the other hand, a policy may

[56] In our reading all of the conjoint experiments concerning welfare preferences have looked at specific policy proposals like universal basic income, unemployment policy or pensions, and explored how changes in the design of these policies had an impact on support

not be universal -i.e., applying a selective filter of age or income- but may be unconditional -i.e., no behavioral requirements attached. An example may be child income support: it is not an income support scheme where all the population may be eligible for application, as only those population sub-groups with children may apply, but it may be unconditional in the sense that these recipients do not have to fulfil with any particular conditions. This is strictly linked to support for a UBI, given that a UBI is both universal and unconditional. Hence, the extent to which a policy is more or less universal or selective varies, and it crucially depends on who the population sub-groups are, and the conditions that must be fulfilled to be eligible for this policy.

To sum up, we study how perceptions affect preferences across two dimensions: population sub-groups and conditionality, and specifically, two attributes within each of these dimensions. This focus is established to understand how far means-tested or universal cash transfers are preferred. The main analysis shows results for these two dimensions and four attributes in total -although the analysis is computed with all of the dimensions- and the appendix shows the full results, with the rest of dimensions and attributes. Table 2 below shows the key dimensions and attributes, how they are collapsed for the analysis and which categories belong to the universal or targeted spectrum.

Dimension	**Attributes**	**Collapsed categories for analysis**
Target groups	To those under poverty threshold	Population sub-groups in need.
	To those with dependent family members	
	Everyone	Universal
	Unable to work	Need / reciprocity
	Unemployed but looking for employment	
	Unemployed and not looking for employment	Unconditionality
	Unconditional	

Table 1. Conjoint design of the two main dimensions and attributes. The full conjoint design is available in appendix D1.3.

Dependent variables and data treatment

In each round, respondents are shown two policy proposals which share these core dimensions but randomly vary in the attributes presented. For each task, respondents are required to choose their preferred policy option from the two proposals that appear and

rate each one of them. A screenshot of the task can be seen in section D1.4 of the appendix and the wording of the questions is available in table 2 below. One round consists of analyzing the two proposals, selecting the preferred one, and rating each of these. Respondents are asked to complete 4 rounds, after having answered several socio-demographic questions.

Dependent variable	**Question wording**	**Operationalisation**
Forced choice	Please read the two income proposals carefully, and choose from the following options your preferred proposal	0, 1, where 1 is the selected policy
Support rate	Please rate each policy according to how likely you are of voting in favour of it. Note that 0 is not at all, and 10 means definitely voting in favour of it.	Ordinal scale 0–10, where 0 is no support and 10 is full support.

Table 2. Wording of the dependent variable questions.

To analyze the data, we reshape the main dataset so that each observation (row) is a policy proposal k of a task j, presented to a respondent i. This means that for 653 respondents in Finland, we have a total of 4948 observations, where each observation is a policy package or profile, shown to one respondent, in one specific round, which was either selected or not. Each respondent observes two profiles at one time, completes 4 of each of these rounds, meaning that he/she observes a total of 8 policy profiles. In Spain we have 748 respondents, and 5992 observations. We have two main dependent variables –forced choice and support rate. We code our first dependent variable Y1 - forced choice- as 1 if the policy proposal is selected, and 0 if it is the unselected policy proposal. Our second dependent variable Y2, the support rate, is a number ranging from 0 to 10, depending on the support given to the policy proposal -both to the unselected and selected one. Each observation includes a vector of the attributes presented in that observation. Our dependent variables Y1 and Y2 are modelled as a function of X which a vector is containing the attributes that the respondents were exposed to.

Quantities of Interest

Usually conjoint analysis has relied on the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE), which is the marginal effect of one attribute averaged over the joint distribution of other attributes, which can be calculated with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). This quantity is interpreted as the probability of choosing one policy proposal when that attribute appears, in reference to a counterfactual level, usually set as the baseline. Following recent research, we employ marginal means to compare preferences across subgroups (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley, 2018), in this case to understand the difference in support for welfare state reform when the level of redistribution support is constant but perceptions about which type of policy design is more re-distributive vary. The marginal mean, in contrast to the AMCE does not count with a baseline or arbitrary reference category, so it is essentially representative of an attribute's mean effect keeping the rest constant. This is precisely the key advantage of marginal means, as conditional AMCEs vary depending on which baseline categories are used (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley, 2018). Because this paper is concerned uniquely with heterogeneous effects across different groups, the analysis relies on marginal means of the support rate dependent variable, but the appendix includes the analysis for the forced choice dependent variable, AMCEs and plots of the estimated marginal mean differences.

Redistribution support and perceptions

Table 3 below, outlines the measurement and operationalization of redistribution preferences and perceptions, in the order that they appeared within the survey.

Variable	Question	Measurement	Re-coding
Redistribution support	Please indicate how supportive you are towards income and wealth redistribution in your country that is, taxing individuals, businesses or organizations with higher incomes and wealth, and sharing this with those individuals with lower incomes. State your degree of support in the following scale, where 0 is not supportive at all, and 10 is completely supportive.	1-10 scale	0-3 = Against re-distribution 4-6 = Indifferent 7-10 = For re-distribution
Redistribution perceptions[57]	Please indicate which statement you agree with the most by positioning yourself in this scale. (1) Means-tested benefits are more effective for redistribution, because they target benefits on those who need it the most (2) Universal benefits are more effective for redistribution because they do not attach stigma or generate benefit dependency	0-9 bipolar rating scale	1-4 targeting; 5 neutral; 6-9 universal.

Table 3. Measurement of redistribution preferences and perceptions.

Results

Redistribution support and preferences for cash transfers

In the theoretical section we argued in one with previous work that redistribution support should predict support for cash transfers, with individuals in favor of redistribution showing higher support rates to all forms of cash transfers –a preference over one form or another should be driven by perceptions. Results are suggestive of the predicted effect of redistribution support. Findings show that individuals supportive of redistribution show significantly higher levels of support for universal and unconditional policies than individuals who oppose redistribution (across group preferences). As predicted, pro-redistribution individuals do not prefer universality over means-tested or conditional schemes (within group preferences). In the case of Finland, pro-redistribution individuals show more support for universality and unconditionality than individuals who are neutral or are opposed to redistribution (see Figure 2; universality gathers a marginal mean of 4.69 for pro-redistribution individuals, and 3.88 for those opposed to redistribution; in the case of unconditionality this is 4.66 and 4.32 respectively).

[57] A screenshot of the question can be found in appendix D1.5.

Nevertheless, this does not imply that pro-redistribution individuals *prefer* universal and unconditional policies, to targeted and means-tested alternatives. In fact, they do not show significant differences in support between universal policies and targeting population sub-groups, suggesting this dimension is not contentious for them. In terms of conditionality, however, we find that pro-redistribution individuals actually *prefer* making policies conditional on need, rather than having unconditional ones (marginal means of 4.66 and 5.08 respectively).



Figure 2. Support for redistribution and support for UBI.

In the case of Spain, results are quite similar. Individuals in favor of redistribution show significantly more support for both universal and unconditional policies -marginal means of 4.49 and 4.43 respectively-, than individuals with who are opposed to redistribution -marginal means are 3.14 and 3.49 respectively, almost one point difference to individuals in favor of redistribution. Still, individuals who favor redistribution show a preference for

targeted schemes – targeting gathers a marginal mean of 4.68 for these individuals, whilst universality 4.49; conditional policies gather a marginal mean of 4.80 while unconditional ones drop to 4.43.

We detect three important differences across contexts. First, pro-redistribution individuals in Spain prefer targeting over universality, which is not the case in Finland- except for the conditionality dimension. This suggests that the universality dimension is a contentious dimension in Spain even for individuals who support redistribution, but this is not the case in Finland. A second difference in the preferences of pro-redistribution in Spain, is that these individuals do not show statistically different support rates than individuals who are neutral about redistribution, in any of the dimensions, as shown in the appendix (sections D3.2 and D3.4). Finally, the gap in support rate towards the different policy design features between individuals who support and oppose redistribution is larger in Spain than in Finland, with an average of one point in Finland and two in Spain– note that these findings are robust to respondent satisficing (as shown in the D3.5 and D3.6).

To sum up, our results seem to suggest that pro-redistribution individuals show generally a higher support for government intervention in relation to individuals who are not so much in favor of this. Nevertheless, these individuals are not the key supporters of UBI as they do not have a preference over universal and unconditional forms of policy. This goes in line with recent survey work which shows that the individual level predictors of UBI support, also predict support for targeted schemes, and that the demand for UBI is lower than the demand for redistribution (Dermont and Weisstanner, 2020). However, is it the case that perceptions mediate support for redistribution and support for a UBI policy or targeted cash transfers? We now turn to examine this question.

Cash transfer preferences across pro-redistribution individuals

We now turn to test our key argument about perceptions. We hypothesized that perceptions predict support for universality and unconditionality -or the opposite: targeting and conditioning- in a way that redistribution support does not. In this sense, we outline two types of expectations one regarding the preferred options within a group of

individuals with the same perceptions, and second, across groups of individuals with different perceptions (as described in the methodological section).

Do perceptions explain support for universality and unconditionality in Finland? Our results suggest this is not the case: individuals with universal priors do not support more universal and unconditional policies than selective schemes[58] - within group preferences- and neither do they show higher support levels for these policy features than their counterparts with selective priors –across group preferences[59]. Individuals with universal priors do not show significant differences in the rate of support for any of the attributes, suggesting that while they do not prefer universality or unconditionality over selective schemes, these are not contentious dimensions for them. Crucially, we do not observe this pattern for individuals with selective priors, who show significantly higher support rates for making policies conditional on need (inability to work or unemployed). Regarding the target groups dimension, these individuals with selective priors also show a preference for targeting over universality –although it only becomes statistically significant in the robustness checks, as shown in the appendix D4 (figure D4.4). In this sense, it seems that while universal priors do not predict a preference over universal and unconditional features of cash transfers, they do have an effect in making these dimensions less polarizing for them, than for individuals with selective priors -who indeed show a preference over targeted and conditional schemes. A striking finding is that individuals with different perceptions do not show significant differences in the support rate given to the universality and unconditionality features (characteristics of a UBI), but they are polarized in the selective features.

[58] The marginal means for universality is 4.49; while for targeting this is 4.25. On the conditionality dimension, unconditionality gathers a marginal mean of 4.40 while conditional policies 4.04.
[59] In fact, universality gathers a higher marginal mean for individuals with selective priors: 4.81 and 4.47 for universalists although this difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, unconditionality gathers a marginal mean of 4.64 for individuals with selective priors and 4.40 for those with universal priors.



Figure 2. Preferences across pro-redistribution individuals in Finland and Spain.

We now turn to explore whether perceptions explain support for unconditionality and universality in Spain. Our results show supportive evidence of our hypothesis. Individuals with universal priors *prefer* universal policies –marginal mean of 5.37- than targeted schemes -4.88 - and also support more this option than their counterparts with selective priors –dropping to 4.30. However, in the conditionality dimension we do not find that individuals with universal priors prefer unconditional schemes to conditional ones – 4.72 for unconditionality, and 5.14 for conditionality. Nevertheless, the differences in support rate between a conditional and unconditional scheme is not statistically significant, suggesting this is not a contentious feature for universalist individuals. Figure 2 shows that universalists show higher marginal means than individuals with selective priors -4.72 and 4.30 respectively- for unconditional scheme a difference that becomes statistically different in the robustness checks (appendix D4, figure D4.6).

Overall, our results show that perceptions contribute to explain support for UBI's core features of universality and unconditionality. In Spain, perceptions do explain increased support and a preference over these features, but in the case of Finland, these individuals

do not find these features particularly contentious. This serves not only to explain support for UBI but for cash transfers reform in general, but also reflect different trends in the extent to which individuals will give higher support to policies they perceive as more redistributive (this is more the case in residual welfare states). Moreover, findings also suggest that the extent to which different policy attributes are more or less contentious also varies across contexts. While in Spain there is no preference gap in targeted schemes –that is, individuals give the same degree of support to targeting regardless of perceptions - individuals do show preference cleavages in the universality/unconditionality features. Conversely, Finnish respondents do not vary in the support given to universality/unconditionality, but polarization occurs in the targeting dimension. This is consistent with previous work that shows how welfare institutions define the discussion of welfare reform, especially with regards to who the deserving groups in society are, and which are the salient and controversial dimensions. In universal welfare states, the discussion about who is deserving -or in other words, who should be targeted and under which conditions- becomes less important (Larsen 2012).

Extensions of the argument

Finally, we argued that a direct implication of our core argument was that individuals opposing redistribution would favor policies which they conceived as less redistributive. Empirically, this translate into higher support for universality and unconditionality when individuals perceive that targeted schemes are more effective but are opposed to redistribution. We argued however, that this need not be the case given that these individuals do not demand more income inequality but rather, lower government intervention. In this sense, these individuals would generally give low support to all interventions and prefer minimal, needs-based assistance. Results show supportive evidence of this trend.

In Finland, individuals who oppose redistribution and perceive targeted schemes to be more redistributive do not show any significant differences in support for universality/targeting and unconditionality/conditionality (see figure 3). Neither do they show significantly higher support rates for unconditional or universal policies in relation to individuals with universal priors that oppose redistribution. However, some interesting

findings emerge. Individuals who oppose redistribution but believe that universalism is more re-distributive, show higher a higher support rate towards targeting individuals in need, than those who believe selectivism is more effective, and this is statistically significant – marginal means are 5.06 and 3.96 respectively. Interestingly, the preference cleavage on targeted attributes also appears across pro-redistribution individuals, but in the opposite direction –pro-redistribution individuals with selective priors give higher support to targeting than individuals with the opposite priors do. Taken together, the evidence shows that individuals opposed to redistribution do not show higher support for those policies they consider less redistributive: individuals with selective priors show no significant differences in preferences, and individuals with universal priors show support for targeted schemes, which are both a form of minimal needs-based assistance but also what they view as the least redistributive policy.



Figure 3. Preferences of individuals opposed to redistribution in Finland and Spain.

In the case of Spain, similar to that of Finland, we do not find that individuals who oppose redistribution and have targeted priors support more universal and unconditional

schemes. In fact, individuals with targeted priors show no significant differences in their preferred form of policy design in the conditionality dimension, and in the universality/targeted dimension, they prefer policies which they do not deem less redistributive –i.e., targeting over universality, with marginal means of 3.74 over 2.95 respectively. Crucially, there are no significant differences in support rates across individuals with different perceptions, with the exception of conditioning on need, where individuals with targeted priors show a significantly higher support rate than individuals with universal priors.

Overall, in terms of preferences within groups with the same perceptions, we do not find evidence that anti-redistribution individuals show higher support for policies which they perceive as less redistributive. On the contrary, where significant differences emerge within groups of the same perceptions, universalists give more support for unconditionality and individuals with selective priors give more support to targeted schemes, who are against redistribution. This finding suggests that individuals opposed to redistribution in Spain do not face the same incentives to maximize their preferences, in comparison to their pro-redistribution counterparts, or anti-redistribution individuals in Finland, because the provision of redistribution is lower in Spain than in Finland. This story of redistribution supply-demand may also explain why pro-redistribution individuals in Spain show more consistent evidence of supporting policies that they perceive to be more redistributive, than individuals in Finland. This is in line with literature on how welfare states moderate the impact of individual characteristics -in this case perceptions- on the demand for more welfare state provision, as shown by previous work (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012b).

Robustness

Before we move on to our concluding remarks, we discuss four key issues regarding the validity, reliability and scope conditions of our findings. A first causality-related concern regarding the validity of results is whether the differences in preferences across the groups presented are driven solely by differences in perceptions. That is, whether perceptions are causally mediating the redistribution support and support for welfare cash transfers.

A first potential risk is that individuals with different perceptions across contexts vary in observable characteristics. To discard this possibility we perform a regression analysis where we predict perceptions with observable socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. As the regression tables and distribution plots of appendix section D2 show, perceptions are not predicted by any observable covariates including redistribution support -which according to the chi-squared test performed are also independent of perceptions (p-value in both contexts is lower than 0.001). This shows that individuals with different perceptions do not vary in any other observable characteristics included in this study, other than perceptions.

An exception to this is that being high income is positively correlated with universal perceptions in Finland. Hence, not only perceptions but also some other mechanism associated to high income –like material self-interest- or other covariates that vary with income may be driving these preferences aside from perceptions. To discard this possibility we analyses the distribution of income across perceptions –showing there are no important differences, as outlines in appendix D2.5- and analyze the differences in preferences across income groups as shown in appendix D1.6. Overall results indicate that the differences in preferences are not related to any other observable variable that are not perceptions.

Given that we do not manipulate perceptions, a potential risk to acknowledge is unobserved heterogeneity, that is, that respondents vary in other unobservable characteristics other than perceptions. While we cannot detect to what extent these individuals vary in unobservable characteristics, nevertheless we argue this is further reason for future research to explore this question. It is worthwhile commenting on why we discarded a manipulative design: manipulating perceptions does not guarantee that an individual actually believes in the perceptions that they would have been attributed to. In this sense, and given that individuals already have perceptions about this issue, we would have encountered other sorts of problems.

A second issue concerns the differences in preferences for pro- and anti-redistribution individuals across contexts. A puzzle that emerges from results is why respondents in Spain show more evidence of prioritizing their redistribution motive in comparison to individuals in Finland –i.e., preferring policies which they deem more redistributive. We argue that context may be shaping the incentives of individuals who support redistribution to maximize their preferences differently. However, another plausible alternative is that

the individuals who favor redistribution in both contexts are different in observable characteristics, which in turn, determine how far individuals will show more support for policies which they consider more redistributive –given that the policies they should favor for redistributive purposes, may not be the same that benefit individuals or that are congruent with their values. To test whether this is the case, we predict redistribution preferences with observable variables to test whether these are different across Finnish and Spanish respondents. Our OLS models indicate that most of the variables have the same role in predicting preferences across welfare states. Only two differences emerge, which we argue, are not suggestive of the idea that individual differences are driving how preferences are being maximized. For our risk models in Spain, being left-wing and male predicts support for redistribution while this is not statistically significant in Finland. In Finland, being within the medium income threshold and high risk predict support for redistribution (see appendix D5 for regression results and a detailed discussion). The tendency is the same in Spain, so we argue this does not compromise results. In any case, if these characteristics were driving how individuals prioritize their redistribution motive, we would observe the opposite: Finnish respondents would maximize more than Spanish respondents because of risk. Overall, this analysis suggests that welfare states affect the incentives individuals in similar positions and sharing similar preferences have of prioritizing their redistributive motives.

Finally, an issue which is typical to most conjoint experiments concerns respondent satisficing across a higher number of complex tasks, which can affect response quality (within a task but more importantly as the number of tasks increases). To tackle this concern, all the analysis is also carried out with the two first rounds of the conjoint tasks, where satisficing should not be a concern. Graphs D3.5 and D3.6 show the robustness checks for cash transfer preferences across different redistribution stances; graphs D4.5 and D4.10 in the appendix show the robustness checks for cash transfer preferences across different perceptions for pro-redistribution individuals, and D4.14 and D4.18 show the same for individuals opposed to redistribution. As shown in these graphs, results are generally consistent with the findings previously described.

Finally, it is worthwhile commenting on a potential issue of tautology between perceptions and preferences. One may argue that it may be tautological to examine whether perceived effectiveness of universality predicts support for universality. We argue this is not the case, given that perceptions about the methods to attain particular

outcomes are substantially different from a given degree of support to that particular outcome.

Concluding remarks

This paper addresses the political support of an increasingly salient idea: universal basic income. Understanding the preferences for such a policy proposal is timely given its potential to tackle a complex range of challenges faced by welfare states today. Despite the interest of this topic, support for UBI remained paradoxical in at least two main ways. First, the egalitarian left-wing are strongly divided over the desirability of this policy. Second, the individual characteristics that predict support for UBI also predict support for selective schemes like minimum incomes or unemployment benefits, which differ substantially from a UBI. Making sense theoretically and empirically of these findings is complicated, especially given the scholarship void in the literature regarding work connecting redistribution support to specific policy preferences.

To reconcile the empirical paradoxes and address the theoretical shortcomings of existing work, we proposed a straightforward, yet novel, theoretical explanation for how redistribution support is articulated into specific cash transfer preferences, including a UBI. We proposed that the relationship between redistribution support and cash transfer support is conditional on the subjective or perceived efficiency of the cash transfer design. This means that pro-redistribution individuals would not necessarily support a UBI, unless they perceived it as redistributive.

To test this argument, we employ survey and experimental data in Finland and Spain, empirically examining how redistribution support has an impact on preferences for different cash welfare designs, and how perceptions moderate the support given to different cash transfers within groups of individuals in favor or against redistribution. Our results suggest this is the case, albeit with variation across context.

First, we show that like much previous work support for redistribution predicts support for universality and unconditionality. Those individuals who are pro-redistribution show indeed higher support rates for these attributes, but this does not mean that these individuals prefer this form of policy design. In Finland, these individuals do not show a

preference for targeting or universality, while in Spain they actually show higher support rates for targeting. What then, explains support for universality and unconditionality? We show that perceptions do, especially in the case of Spain where these dimensions are more contentious. Pro-redistribution individuals in Spain who perceive that universality is more redistributive are the key backers of UBI. In Finland, this is not so much the case, given there are no significant differences in these features. Nevertheless, perceptions do not explain the anti-redistributive support of UBI, which makes sense, given that a UBI for retrenchment is advocated to simplify welfare and lower government involvement in the economy, rather than generate more inequality.

These findings have important implications for the study of UBI support and welfare preferences more generally. First, our results add leverage in explaining preferences for new policy proposals like universal basic income and the political dynamics in shaping and securing the coalitions of support for this proposal. We unpack the paradox of support for universal schemes which shows that these preferences are predicted by the same individual-level variables than support for targeted schemes (i.e., see Roosma and Van Oorschot, 2019; Vlandas, 2020). This paper shows that this can be partly explained by an important, yet omitted variable up to date: the perceived efficiency of policy designs. We show that lower support for cash universalization does not come from a lack of demand of redistribution, but rather a perception that this is not an adequate measure for reform to obtain more redistribution. As such, we account for why previous work has identified that support for redistribution is lower than demand for a UBI (Dermont and Weisstanner, 2020).

We are also able to account for why UBI support varies across contexts. Results suggest this may be rooted in the cleavages that the notion of unconditionality and universality pose in a particular context. While in Spain the consensus is settled more strongly across targeting, in Finland there is more consensus in universal and unconditional schemes, which could explain why previous survey work shows a higher support rate.

The results here presented not only speak to the preferences and politics of UBI, but have important implications for the study of welfare preferences and the politics of reform. A first implication concerns the widespread assumption that redistribution support equates to preferences for targeted schemes. We have shown that individuals do not only have preferences about redistribution, but they also have perceptions about the most efficient ways to reach this goal, and these perceptions play a role in moderating how the demand

for redistribution is articulated, with important contextual differences. This implies that approaches that automatically connect support for redistribution with support for means-tested schemes are misguided, and only explain part of the story. To fully understand preferences, redistribution support and their predictors have to be distinguished from support for specific policy tools, and these two variables must be connected by theoretically sound arguments.

While we provide novel evidence of the role of perceptions in shaping welfare policy preferences, our findings go in line with previous literature. Results are consistent with previous work on how welfare state institutions impinge over the importance of individual-level characteristics in determining support for different policy proposals (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012b; Beramendi and Rehm, 2016b). In this case, we show that perceptions and redistribution preferences seem more important in altering support to policy proposals in Spain, a more residual welfare state, than in Finland, as individuals give consistently more support to policies, which they deem more redistributive, in the former than in the latter case.

Results also go in line with work examining the link between welfare state design and the nature of the public debate on welfare reform, which predict and show that the saliency of different policy dimensions and deservingness considerations vary according to the welfare institutional design (Larsen, 2012). Our results add credit to this by showing that in Spain, a more means-tested welfare state, universality and unconditionality are more contentious policy features than targeted schemes, but also in comparison to Finland, where these universal dimensions do not polarize preferences as much. This seems to go in line with work on the influence of macro-level welfare institutions that show that in more universal welfare systems, more individuals benefit from these policies in a material, self-interested way, and subsequently generate a widespread support for these policies (Esping-Andersen, 1990a; Korpi and Palme, 1998).

This paper has also raised important questions and left open several paths for future research. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explain why individuals come to develop different perceptions about which policies are more re-distributive, we have shown that research analyzing the process of perception formation and change in this respect is certainly a worthwhile endeavor. Give the variation across contexts, future work

should examine more in depth contextual moderators that might come into play in explaining these perceptions. Because traditional political economy variables do not seem to predict these perceptions, future research should rather explore other factors, like personal experiences and informational exposure. Important questions arise from the development of perceptions, but equally crucial is the interaction of these beliefs with values and other-regrading considerations that may be further explored. While there is a broad scope of future research possibilities, this paper has laid the foundations for future work on perceptions and in doing so, it has solved important empirical and theoretical puzzles of UBI support.

Paper 5: Priors are priority: the effect of scientific information on attention and support to policy proposals

Rincón, Leire

Abstract

To what extent does scientific information shape attention and support for universal basic income? Existing research on motivated reasoning posits that individuals generally self-select and register information which is in line with their prior beliefs, with a limited impact of scientific evidence. However, the conditions under which individuals may curtail this biased information-processing remain to be explored. I argue that two conditions may play a role in this process: the direct influence of an issue over an individual or the extent to which the issue is percievd an important matter. I study these questions through two vignette experiments on the topic of universal basic income in Finland and Spain. Contrary to previous research I show that scientific information does not increase attention or shape to policy proposals, and neither does belief-congruent information. Rather, prior beliefs *per se*, have a direct impact on attention and support. Such beliefs are impermeable to information, even when they face significant incentives to update their beliefs, in order to translate their interests to relevant policy preferences. This paper makes both a novel theoretical contribution by building and bridging literature on preferences and information-processing, and test this proposition using a timely and relevant policy case which has far-reaching implications to the study of communication, public opinion and politics of welfare reform.

Introduction

Citizens are constantly confronted with information regarding policies, and while they must make choices about which policies to support according to their values or interests, we still know little about how individuals process this information and in turn, shapes their attention and support to policy proposals. This is of paramount importance in the current context of mis-information, fake news where different political actors bias information to their interests(Kuklinski *et al.*, 2000; Amarasingam, 2011; Schaffner and Roche, 2017; Martens *et al.*, 2018; Peters *et al.*, 2018; O'Connor and Weatherall, 2019). There is burgeoning literature on motivated, and especially, partisan motivated reasoning (a non-exhaustive list includes: Lebo and Cassino, 2007; Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2013; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014; Robison, 2020), but in comparative terms, we know far less about how public opinion processes scientific information (an exception includes: Sides, 2015). This paper advances this knowledge by tackling two main questions: to what extent does scientific evidence shape attention and support for political proposals? Under which conditions will individuals reduce their dependence on priors, prioritise reaching accurate conclusions and update their preferences based on objective information? In particular, does being directly affected by an issue or caring strongly about it reduce such reliance on priors? I examine these questions in the context of the timely and salient welfare reform debate, and in particular the effects of universal basic income on unemployment rates.

Research on information processing has shown mixed evidence on the effects of scientific information on public opinion. The literature on motivated reasoning posits that individuals do not process information neutrally, but this process is usually biased by their motivations. Generally, individuals are motivated to confirm their beliefs, which leads them to discount information that condradicts these, select that which is belief-congruent, and evaluate it more strongly too. However, in the context of policy attention and support, this belief and emotionally-driven depiction of individuals radically contrasts with the rational, self-interested and calcutaing individual that knows what's best for his/her interests, that is portrayed in the literature on political economy preferences (e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981). These two contending views on individuals may be reconciled if we allow individuals to vary their information-processing strartegies according to their

situation. In this vein, some work already predicts that if motivation and ability is high, dependence on prior beliefs is reduced (Van Knippenberg and Daamen, 1996).

In this line, I hypothethise that most individuals will process information to confirm their beliefs, yet, this reliance on prior beliefs may be disrupted if individuals are directly affected by an issue or care strongly about it. I contend that under these circumstances, the incentives to reach accurate conclusioons and update preferences accordingly, will outperform the benefits from avoiding cognitive dissonance and reducing the cognitive costs involved in confirmatory-based motivated reasoning.

To test these claims, I rely on a survey experiment administered in March 2019, in Finland and Spain. The design consists of a 2x2 vignette experiment which manipulates the presence and absence of empirical information about the effect of a new policy proposal -in this case, universal basic income- on a valence issue like (un)employment rate, manipulating policy effects as positive or negative outcomes -i.e., increasing or decreasing employment rate respectively. The objective here is to apply theories of motivated reasoning to explain how information dynamics affect welfare reform preferences, and in particular, attention and support to the policy proposal of universal basic income. While the main contribution is empirical, by drawing on literature of political economy preferences this paper also makes a theoretical contribution by outlining the conditions under which confirmatory motivated reasoning may not prevail.

In line with some previous work, I find that scientific evidence does not make a difference to information selection and policy support, but neither does recieving belief-congruent information. However, I find that prior beliefs on their own do have an effect on self-selection to information and policy support. If an individual believes a policy to be effective, in this case UBI, then he/she will have a higher probability of paying attention and supporting a UBI policy, regardless of whether he/she received belief-congruent information or scientific evidence. Contrary to expectations, this reliance on prior beliefs does not change if an individual is directly affected by an issue or considers it important.

These findings have substantial implications to the study of public opinion, information-processing, and preferences. First, I provide novel evidence of the influence of prior beliefs and selective information-processing on preferences. Rather than being influenced by the congruency of information, individual selection to information and support for policy proposals is exclusively determined by prior beliefs. Future work should examine

why this is the case and whether we can find this across other contexts too. Second, the fact that I find that science does not matter even in contexts where it is on the best interests of individuals to react to this information pictures a pesseimistic landscape with regards to the ability of public opinion to be responsive to scientific andobjective information. Third, null findings on the scenarios under which individuals may reduce reliance on prior beliefs -i.e., being affected by an issue or caring strongly about it- calls into question the rationality implicit in various theories of political economy prefereces, especially those which point at material self-interest as a key driver of support. Rather, these findings suggest that even if material self-interest is a motor of preferences, this follows more from a subjective and biased perceptions rather than objective indicators of which policies benefit individuals. This also derived into important implications for the literature on misperceptions which are discussed in detail in the concluding remakrs section.

Overall this paper has contributed to the study of information-processing, political psychology, communication and public opinion both theoretically and empirically. At a theoretical level, I connect motivated reasoning and political economy literature on preferences to argue that if the benefits from updating information are higher for individuals than confirming their prios, this reliance will reduce and empirical evidence will be more effective. Empirically, I show this is not the case. But find that prior beliefs on their own have an important effect.

This has far-reaching implications to the politics of UBI and welfare reform: research in this field conveys that individual preferences are shaped by material-self interest or value-laden motivations. In this study however, I show that these are not necessarily a product of objective calculations, but rather, subjective perceptions about what's more efficient in their view, which are highly impermeable to objective and scientific information. Beyond the preferences literature, this contribution also speaks to the politics of UBI, conveying that the general levels of support are sticky and impermeable to science and derived from pilot projects. Importantly, results suggest that the coalition opposing UBI has low chances of accessing novel infromation and hence updating their support, which is not the case of the supporter coalition –who is always more likely of accessing information even if this contradicts their views.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. I begin by providing an overview of the theories on motivated reasoning, with special attention on research on the impact of scientici evidence, and I also draw on the field of political economy preferences. I then

refine these accounts to develop my argument about self-selection to information and support to UBI. Next, I turn to the empirical section, outlining the methodological approach which relies on a vignette experiment and justifying the case selection in terms of context and the substantive case study of UBI and employment. The following section presents the results, and I close the paper by providing some concluding remarks.

Theories of information-processing and motivated reasoning

The study of how humans process scientific or factual-based information has generated an intense theoretical and empirical discussion since its inception (Reinard, 1988; Duchon, Dunegan and Barton, 1989), yet the evidence so far is mixed (Baesler and Burgoon, 1994; Kopfman *et al.*, 1998; Gaines *et al.*, 2007; Nisbet and Mooney, 2007; Liu and Ditto, 2013; Zebregs *et al.*, 2014; Sides, 2015). On the one hand, some work shows that empirical evidence does not have an effect on individual attitudes and beleifs, with narratives being more effective (Taylor and Thompson, 1982; Reinard, 1988; Kazoleas, 1993). On the other hand, another set of studies shows that scientific or factual evidence is more effective for comprehension, attitudinal and behavioural change (see for example: Sides, 2015), through enhancing credibility and a sense of causal relevance[60] (Kopfman *et al.*, 1998; Tal and Wansink, 2014). In line with this approach, the scientific literacy model of opinion formation argues that knowledge and evidence help accurate assessments of risks and benefits (Kahan *et al.*, 2008; Druckman and Bolsen, 2011b).

Finally, a third set of studies move beyond considering the type of information, and broaden the scope to consider the impact of moderating factors in information-processing. The most prominent of such theories is motivated reasoning, which contends that individual information-processing is motivated by the desire of reaching one of two potential goals: confirming previous beliefs, understood as confirmatory-based motivated reasoning, or reaching accurate conclusions, usually labelled accuracy motivated reasoning (although other terms have been used to describe similar processes as outlined by Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). Confirmatory-based motivated reasoning, also known as

[60] Here, empirical information is not only understood as a statement saying that the information is factual-based but rather, it is a form of presenting evidence also through statistics, figures or causal facts (Gastel, 1983; Tufte, 2001; Dahlstrom, 2010; Tal and Wansink, 2014).

directional motivation, is a strategic mechanism of information-processing, through which one reaches a desired outcome, which usually serves to justify or confirm one's beliefs and ideas. On the other hand, under accuracy motivated reasoning, the individual prioritises reaching correct and precise conclusions rather than affirming one's priors (Hart *et al.*, 2009). Overall, individuals strive to fulfil one of the two such goals when processing new information (Leeper and Slothuus, 2014).

The conventional view in existing research however, is that individuals tend to rely generally on confirmatory-based motivated reasoning because it is less costly cognitively speaking, and avoids cognitive dissonance, which describes a psychnoloigcal stress or tension derived from holding ideas that contradict each other (Festinger, 1957; Akerlof and Dickens, 1984; Hart *et al.*, 2009). To bypass cognitive tensions, individuals must discount information that contradicts their beliefs or accommodate their beleifs system to new information (Aronson, 1979). Because the latter is more demanding, individuals rely most of the time on confirmatory-based motivated reasoning.

Individuals pursue different information selection and evaluation mechanisms to hold on to their prior beliefs, both during the selection and evaluation stages of information-processing. In terms of information-seeking behaviour, individuals will pick up, self-select or pay attention to information which is in line with their prior beliefs (Kahan *et al.*, 2008; Druckman and Bolsen, 2011b) and discount information which is not aligned with these ideas (Gaines *et al.*, 2007; Lodge and Taber, 2007; Taber, Cann and Kucsova, 2009b; Liu and Ditto, 2013). Regarding information-evaluation, individuals who engage in confirmatory motivated reasoning will evaluate infromation which is congruent with their beliefs more strongly, or dedicate efforts to downplay and criticise information which runs counter to their predispositions (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979; Kunda, 1990; Kruglanski and Webster, 1996).

In this sense, I hypothethise that individuals will not self-select more to information backed by scientific evidence, and neither will they support more strongly policies backed by such scientific evidence. In line with previous work I hypothethise that belief-congruent information should have a positive effect on self-selection to information. Given the resilience of prior beliefs, and that information is evaluated more or less strongly depending on these priors, it is reasonable to expect that support levels will remain quite stable across informational inputs. One must acknowledge that an alternative story is also plausible, as suggested by the literature on counterarguments and backlash,

which shows that individuals who are shown information running contrary to their prior beliefs actually reinforce these (Zaller, 1992; Lodge and Taber, 2007; Kahan *et al.*, 2008).

H1. Empirical evidence will not have an effect on attention or support.

H1a. Information will have an impact on self-selection to more information: belief-congruent information will have a positive effect on self-selection to more information, and belief-incongruent information will have a negative effect.

H1b. Information will not have an impact on support.

Under which conditions will individuals disrupt their reliance on prior beliefs?

In spite of the established literature on motivated reasoning, this depiction of public opinion as emotional and biased individuals, provides a stark contrast to the depiction of individuals in the literature of political economy preferences, as rational and calculating individuals by material self-interest. Altogether, the core argument in this contribution is that these two theoretical predictions may be reconciled by accounting for the conditions under which individuals may be driven by their beleif systems and identify those under which they'd rather prioritise attaining accurate conclusions. In this sense, under which conditions should individuals dwindle the reliance on their pre-concieved ideas? Previous work shows that motivation and ability are essential to reduce reliance on prior beliefs and take up new information even when these inputs contradict one's priors (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Chen and Chaiken, 1999). Drawing on the political economy literature, the argument that this paper presents is that some individuals will face higher incentives to process information in order to reach accurate conclusions rather than confirm their prior beliefs. This is likely to occur under two particular scenarios. The first of such conditions is being directly affected by an issue. Given that individuals have little to win from accuracy-based information processing in general terms –given the accured cognitive costs that this option entails-, public opinion is generally expected to rely on their priors to process information. However, individuals affected by an issue are likely to be directly affected by the policy solution too, so the accured costs of questioning their beliefs are by far outweighted with the potential benefits derived from reaching correct

and unbiased conclusions and being able to accurately translate their interests into relevant policy preferences[61].

Research on public opinion has also shown that issue saliency also leads to higher motivation and reduces dependence on prior beliefs (Krosnick, 1988, 1990; Holbrook *et al.*, 2005). Most of this work looks at issue saliency at the macro-level, but there are strong reasons to believe that issue importance at the individual level will also affect how individuals process information. Issue saliency in this context is defined as the individual-level subjective perception of the importance, relevance and gravity of a particular topic (Boninger, Krosnick and Berent, 1995; Lecheler, De Vreese and Slothuus, 2009).

In this framework, individuals who are directly affected by an issue or consider it an important matter, are not expected to seek to confirm their priors but rather reach accurate conclusions. This means that scientific evidence -the most objective and reliable type of evidence- should generate higher attention rates across these individuals, and moderate whether information has an impact on support, increasing support if the policy solution in question achieves positive outcomes, and decreasing if it achieves negative outcomes.

As such, the second hypothesis and the empirical expectations are the following:-

H2: Individuals who are directly affected or care strongly about an issue will:

H2a. Increase attention to UBI when provided with scientific evidence.

H2b. Increase support for UBI if the information provided is positive and accompaigned by empirical evidence; decrease support for UBI when information is negative and accompaigned by empirical evidence.

Methods

To test these claims, I rely on data from a survey that was fielded by a commercial polling agency (Netquest) to a representative convenience sample of an online panel of respondents in Finland and Spain, during the month of March 2019. Respondents were

[61] This proposition contrasts to attribute theory which contends precisely the oppopsite. According to this theoretical framework, when an issue directly affects an individual (sometimes referred as an obtrusive issue), information has a lower impact or no impact at all (Zucker, 1978), precisely because he/she counts with first-hand information which may render new or external information less credible (Lavine, Johnston and Steenbergen, 2012; Leeper, 2014; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). I contend that while this make work for issue perceptions, it is les credible in the contexto of policy solutions which have not yet been implemented.

drawn through quotas on gender, age, and geographical region (the quota criteria used in the survey distribution are shown in appendix tables E1 and E2). Although the original sample was of 1000 respondents in each context (2000 in total), to ensure quality of responses I eliminated observations who did not complete the whole survey. This delivers a total of 857 observations in Finland, and 882 observations in Spain. The survey was administered online using Qualtrics software and had an approximate duration of 15 minutes. The structure of the survey is the following: individuals were asked a series of socio-demographic questions, then they faced four conjoint rounds, and then they were asked questions about prior beliefs (see description below), and then they finally accessed the vignette experiment.



Figure 1. Survey flow.

Experimental design

Experimental tools are particularly relevant for the topic under study given the risks of using observational data, in relation to selection bias and endogeneity bias in information processing of citizens. For this purpose, randomising information treatments allows us to attain a high level of internal validty of the effect of information on self-selection to information and support, and how prior beliefs moderate this process.

The experimental design consists of a 2x2 vignette experiment in which I combine two treatments: (1) absence/presence of empirical evidence, and (2) type of policy outcome produced by basic income on employment rate[62]. All the treatments begin with the announcement of a text which has appeared in a media outlet, and the definition of basic income. The exact wording is the following: "You will now read a statement which has appeared in a media article: Basic income is a universal, unconditional and individual income that the entire population would receive periodically, regardless of their abilities, their socio-economic or employment status." I included a definition of basic income to ensure that all respondents departed from the same conceptual basis. The control group only received this text and was directly asked to decide whether they wanted to know more about the topic, and give a specific rate of support for this policy idea. The treatment groups received an extra piece of text where evidence was either present or absent, and the policy outcome took a positive or negative value, which delivers a total of four treatment conditions, outlined in the table below.

To construct the treatment, I draw from existing evidence and reports about the effects of basic income trials on employment rates. Given that evidence is mixed so far, with some results indicating that the employment rate increased and others indicating that it remained stabled or decreased[63], I argue that respondents were not decieved.

Before moving on to the dependent variables, I briefly outline how these treatment conditions manipulate the concept of interest. I argue that empirical evidence is manipulated in two main ways: one, through mentioning the specific methods through which the data or information has been gathered - experiments, which are a key scientific method- but also by adding data. One may argue that this is not a scientific report, but most of the time, individuals do not receive scientific evidence through the original reports or official sources that generate this research, but rather, through mainstream or social media, which is the main source of information for individuals. Hence, I argue that the fact that the scientific information is provided through a media outlet does not

[62] The appendix offers a detailed discussion of the particularities of this topic, and and approipateness to study this question, with the discusión section oferring details on how the nature of the topic may affect result. Still, I argue that UBI is a very relevant matter to study in relation to employment, and the issue of employment is also an adequate topic given it represents a valence issue which is adequate for various reasons as outlined in appendix E3.

[63] Finland is the classical exemple of an experiment where employment rates remained unchanged (during the first year); or that employment increased (during the second year) (see Torry, 2020 for an overview). As an exemple of an experiment which decreased rates of employment is Evelyn Forget's re-examination of the Manitoba experiment (Forget, 2011, 2013).

question its reliability or credibility as a scientific information piece given that the media also report on scientific advancements, and it is the common source of information for most individuals. Specifying such a neutral source also enables to control for potential source effects that could interfere with treatment effects.

Dependent variables: self-selection to information and support

In the study I measured two dependent variables: self-selection to more information and support. To measure self-selection I ask respondents whether they would like to know more about UBI, and give them three posible options: (1) learning more about UBI, (2) learning more about related proposals and finally, (3) skipping this step. The answers are re-coded as 1 if the individual want to know more about UBI, and 0 otherwise. The second dependent variable, support rate for UBI, is measured through a question which reads as follows: "Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 10 how likely would you be of voting in favor of the introduction of a universal basic income (UBI) policy?". This variable was operationalised as a numeric scale.

Measurement of priors, issue importance and the effect of an issue on the individual

In this paper I conceptualise prior beliefs about UBI's effect on employment as whether an individual percieves universal cash transfers or selective ones to be more effective for unemployment and poverty traps. I do this through a 9-point bipolar rating question, which has universal cash transfers and selective ones to each extreme. A screenshot of the question can be seen in the figure below. This variable is operationalised as a numeric scale from 1 to 9 for the main regression analysis. However, to deliver a more straightforward visual interpretation of results through the predicted probability plots, the analysis relies on a re-codification of this variable. Individuals who placed themseleves between 1-4 points were re-coded as individuals with selective or targeted priors; those individuals who placed themseleves in the middle of the rating scale (5) were re-coded as prior-neutral; and those who placed themseleves on 6 to 9 as universal. See appendices E4 and E5 for a distribution of prior beliefs.



Figure 2. Screenshot of the prior beliefs question.

To measure the individual-level importance attached to the issue of employment, I employ an item ranking survey question, containing 8 different topic items, in which individuals are asked to sort out different policy issues in a ranking of more to less important. The question wording employed for the measurement of the MIP shown to respondents is the following: "In your view, which is the most important problem for Spain/Finland at the moment? Please order the following issues, placing the most important ones at the top, to the least important ones at the bottom". The list of problems included were: corruption, gender inequality, drugs, unemployment, pensions, poverty, environmental problems, other problems associated to employment, social issues: housing, health or education (as one) and finally, I included other as a category here respondents could introduce any other problems –note that none of these answers were related to employment. To provide a random order of issues, I arranged these alphabetically. I re-coded this variable as 1 if an individual had placed the issue of unemployment in the first to third most important problem, and 0 otherwise[64].

To measure how obtrusive unemployment is as an issue in an individuals' life I ask about their subjective unemployment risk. The question wording was "How likely do you think it is that in the next 12 months you will lose your current employment?" The options ranged from Very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely and very unlikely- I re-coded the former two as 'high risk' individuals and the latter as low risk.

[64] Note that while choosing the third position is an ad hoc measure of importance, the analysis was also carried out using unemployment in the first position, and first or second position, but the results are the same.

Analysis

For the main analysis of the attention dependent variable, I employ general linear models models (logit) where the dependent variable is binary (self-selecting into more information about UBI takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise, the latter including respondents who skip this step or self-select into information about alternative proposals). I perform different models in a step-wise fashion, including only treatment, adding prior beliefs, and then adding socio-demographic controls. I also include models with socio-demographic controls without prior beliefs, to observe how the inclusion/exclusion of prior beleifs affects the significance and magnitude of other socio-demographic variables. Finally, I include models with treatment and prior beliefs interaction terms. I perform the same analysis with an OLS regression strategy (available in the appendix) and show that, although the magnitude size varies, the significance and direction of all variables is the same.

For the analysis of the support rate I perform OLS regressions where the dependent variable is numeric. I employ the same variety of models as with the attention rate dependent variable. Finally, to explore the hypothesis of accuracy motivated reasoning for individuals for whom an issue is important or directly affects them, I undertake two strategies. First I rely on regression models with triple interaction terms between prior beliefs, issue condition –a dummy of whether an issue is important to these individuals or directly affects them- and treatment conditions. These results are available in the main analysis section. Secondly, I perform regression analysis with two subsets of data, one with respondents for who the issue is important or directly affects them and other with those form whom it is not. This subsetting has also been employed by previous work (e.g., Guess and Coppock, 2020). I present these results in the appendix, and as I show here, the findings across both strategies are generally consistent.

Attention check

I introduce an attention check after respondents receive the treatment and respond to the dependent variable questions. The attention check consists of asking respondents where the text they had previously read appeared, giving them the options to choose between

three outlets. The quality of this answer is indicative of how attentive or focused the indviduals were in reading the text, which is later included as a control variable. I do not remove the incorrect respondent observations, given that I want the results to be as representative as possible and these apparently incorrect observations are also part of the variance in attention intensity that the population shows. I perform all the regression analysis with these attentional checks to test whether the individuals who pay more or less attention differ in their information-selection and policy support dynamics. The regression results including the attention checks are included in the appendix.

Results

Descriptive results

Before examining the hypothesis, I explore results descriptively, looking at the distribution of the two dependent variables (see table 1 below). Attention levels are generally higher in Spain, but support levels seem higher in Finland overall. Treatment effects, however, are similar across contexts (see figure 3 below). First, there are no significant differences in the mean levels of attention and support across treatment suggesting that treatment has no effects. Second, I find that the highest attention rate is achieved by T1 in both contexts, while the lowest is for T2. This is not the case for the support rates dependent variable, where the highest level of attention in Finland is attained in T1, while in Spain this is for T4. In any case, these differences are not statistically significant. This is shown by the predicted portability plots too.

Treatment	Finland				Spain			
	Attention		Support		Attention		Support	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
0	0,25	0,43	6,14	2,48	0,37	0,49	5,45	2,5

1	0,28	0,45	6,25	2,37	0,4	0,49	5,16	2,66
2	0,21	0,41	5,94	2,76	0,36	0,48	4,57	2,54
3	0,25	0,43	5,99	2,8	0,39	0,49	5,33	2,39
4	0,25	0,43	6,17	2,54	0,38	0,49	5,46	2,62

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the treatment effects across Finland and Spain.



Figure 3. Predicted probability plots of the attention rate dependent variable. The predicted values are computed from an OLS regression including treatment conditions and socio-demographic controls.



Figure 4. Mean level of support across treatments in Finland and Spain.

Motivated reasoning

In line with our hypothesis, results show that empirical evidence does not have an effect on attention and support. Contrary to the expectations, belief-congruent information is irrelavant to attention or support, but prior beliefs *per se*, do have an impact on both attention and support. In the following paragraphs I examine this in detail for both dependent variables.

Attention

Results show supportive evidence of our hypothesis, given that treatments with evidence do not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of paying attention in comparison to treatments without this type of information. However, as Figure 4 below shows, the second part of the hypothesis regarding the role of prior beliefs should be rejected both in Finland and in Spain.

Contrary to expectations, results across contexts suggest that individuals do not self-select more to information when information is in line with their prior beliefs. Nevertheless, an important difference emerges across contexts: results in Spain suggest that priors have a direct effect on attention, while this is not the case in Finland. In Spain, all regression models show that priors are positively correlated with attention to UBI. The higher the prior (i.e., more universal), the higher the probability of self-selecting into more information for UBI. In the case of Finland, we find evidence of this is limited instances (models with priors and controls only) and the effect is much smaller than in Spain –the coefficients in Spain range from 0.14 to 0.19, while in Finland this drops to 0.08.



Figure 5. Predicted probability plots of the attention rate across prior beliefs. The predicted values are computed from an OLS regression including treatment conditions, prior beliefs and socio-demographic controls. The predicted values of the regression models containing only treatment conditions and priors, and an interaction term between treatment conditions and priors can be found in appendices E8 to E11.

I next turn to explore the relative impact of other variables on attention to UBI. Results in both Finland and Spain show that being left-wing increases the probability of paying attention to UBI significantly, although the size of the coefficient almost doubles in the case of Finland (0.53-0.58, while in Spain these range from 0.32-0.38). Crucially however, the effect of ideology remains even when getting priors out of the equation, and the effect of both variables becomes higher when the two are included in the models (i.e., see model 5). Additionally, I find that in Finland, being both employed and unemployed –where the reference category is other, i.e., retired or student- has a positive effect on attention, being even larger for those employed.

To sum up, I find consistent evidence across contexts which suggests that empirical evidence does not have an impact on attention, and that individuals will not self-select more into information that is congruent with their beliefs. However, I find that in Spain, individuals with universal priors consistently show a larger probability of accessing information about UBI. Before moving on to analysing support, I explore potential reasons why Universalists in Spain consistently show higher attention rates to UBI.

There are two possible stories of why we may be observing these trends. One, it could be the case that perceptions of efficiency drive attention only to the *perceived* effective policy proposals. Hence, we would observe that universalists do not pay more attention

to other policy proposals. Another plausible account of this trend is that individuals with universal priors are different in some unobservable way (given that they do not differ in observable characteristics) and have higher interest and openness to learn not only about UBI but about any policy, in which case, we would observe that they also show a higher probaility for wanting to know more about alternative proposals. To test which is the case, I compute different regression models predicting attention to alternative proposals, as show in the appendix section E12. Results show that the probability of self-selecting into more information about alternative proposals is not different across individuals with different priors. This indicates that perceptions of policy efficiency drive attention to UBI. Of course, this is not to say that perceptions have a direct and causal impact over attention to UBI. It may be the case that these individuals have particular unobservable predispositions (not observed in this study), for instance openness to contrary or counter-status quo views, that may have derived into having these priors, and/or be more open and willing to learn more about the policies they perceive as effective. I perform the same tests in Finland, as shown in the appendix E13, but I find no statistically significant differences.

Support

According to our second hypothesis, support should be driven by prior beliefs, and information should not have a significant effect. Results give credit to the fact that priors drive support. Regression results in Finland show no significant treatment effects and no conditional effect of treatment across priors on support. Findings do indicate however that priors have an effect on UBI support, and those with universalist percpections always have a higher probability of supporting UBI. Results in Spain also suggest that individuals who have universal beliefs are always more likely of supporting UBI, even though I also find that treatment has an effect. All models –except the models with interactions show that treatment 2, which is negative information without evidence- show that this condition lowers support, and has a larger effect than that of priors –i.e., ranging from -0.81 to -0.90, while priors have an effect of 0.26 to 0.41. In the interaction models this treatment effect disappears and the effect of prior beliefs actually increases. However, no interaction between treatment and priors is statistically significant.



Figure 6. Predicted probability plots of the support dependent variable across prior beliefs. The predicted values are computed from an OLS regression including treatment conditions, prior beliefs and socio-demographic controls. The predicted values of the regression models containing only treatment conditions and priors, and an interaction term between treatment conditions and priors can be found in the appendix E14 and E15.

I now turn to explore the relative impact of other socio-demographic variables on support for UBI. In line with previous work on the predictors of UBI, I find that being low-income, unemployed and left-wing are predictors of UBI support, albeit with some differences across contexts. A common finding across contexts is that being left-wing is positively and significantly associated to UBI support, and that, even when controlling for these socio-demographic variables the effects of prior beliefs is maintained, but the effect of the former is larger than that of the latter. For instance, in Finland, being left-wing has a coefficient of 0.77 to 0.88, while priors are much lower ranging from 0.16 to 0.17. In Spain, being left-wing ranges from 1.28 to 1.38, while priors range between 0.26 to 0.41. Two differences emerge across context. In Finland, being unemployed predicts support for UBI and the effect of unemployment is very similar to that of being left-wing (it ranges between 0.71 to 0.79). The findings of the effect of unemployment do not replicate in Spain, where actually results convey that low income is associated to higher support for UBI. In the Spanish context however, the effect of income is half of that of ideology, where the coefficients range from 0.68-0.69, suggesting ideology is a key variable predicting support.

Under which conditions will individuals prioritise reaching accurate conclusions?

In the theoretical section, I hypothesised that individuals for whom the issue was important or were directly affected by it (i.e., in high unemployment risk), should be motivated to prioritise reaching accurate conclusions rather than confirming their prior beliefs. Empirically this should translate to higher attention rates when presented with information containing scientific cues, and a change in support levels when presented with this type of evidence (decreasing support if the outcome is negative, and increasing support if the outcome is positive). Results suggest this is far from being the case, albeit with important contextual variation.

Attention models in Finland reveal that individuals under high risk do not pay more attention to UBI when information contains evidence, and neither do they show important differences in support rate when the information accompaigned by evidence. Results in this context suggest the hypothesis on accuracy-based motivated reasoning should be rejected. In a similar vein, results in Spain concerning the dependent variable of attention suggest that this hypothesis should be rejected. In terms of support, however, I find evidence that the impact of information is conditional on issue status (or how directly an issue affects an individual), even if I do not find constsnet evidence that individuals directly affected by an issue will consistently change their support levels when presented with scientific evidence. What regression model in tbal 3 shows, alongside the predicted probability plots of figure 6 and 7 show, is that under high risk, individuals with universal priors will significantly reduce their support for universality, especially if presented with scientific evidence. I argue that this is not sufficiently consistent evidence to argue that individuals who are directly affected by an issue change their support levels when faced with scientific evidence because this does not occur across individuals with the opposite priors, and also, universalists do not change their support levels when faced with 'positive' information. This is not to say that the results are incoherent, in fact, in the forthcoming paragraph I argue that these are reasonable findings.

First, considering that individuals with universal priors have views that run counter the status quo it is reasonable that these are also the individuals who change support levels more easily than individuals whose views are similar to the status quo. Second, the fact that universalists mainly change their support levels under negative information with evidence also suggests a risk-aversion change in support levels, which is reasonable given

that they are under high risk. A conspicuous finding in this sense, is that individuals with targeted priors under high risk show higher support for UBI than universalists. However, as it is evident from the predicted probability plots (especially in figure 6) this is a result of universalists dropping significantly their support rate for UBI under T1. Individuals with targeted priors actually do not show significant differences in their support for UBI in the control group or T1.

	Dependent variable:	
	Attention (1)	Support (2)
Treatment 1:Priors:Low risk	-0.07 (0.08)	0.51(0.41)
Treatment 2:Priors:Low risk	0.01(0.09)	0.42(0.47)
Treatment 3:Priors:Low risk	-0.03(0.10)	-0.75(0.55)
Treatment 4:Priors:Low risk	0.04(0.09)	0.84(0.52)
Observations	384	384
R^2	0.06	0.11
Adjusted R^2	-0.01	0.05
Residual Std. Error (df = 358)	0.45	2.48
F Statistic (df = 25; 358)	0.84	1.84^{***}
Note:	*p0.05**p<0.01***p<0.001	

Table 2. OLS regression results for Finnish respondents predicting attention and support rate, including a triple interaction term between treatment conditions, prior beliefs and risk. The results of the full model can be found in the appendix E16 and E17.

	Dependent variable:	
	Attention	Support
	(1)	(2)
Treatment1:Priors: Low risk	0.09 (0.11)	1.49** (0.56)
Treatment2:Priors: Low risk	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.51)
Treatment3:Priors: Low risk	0.09 (0.12)	0.44 (0.57)
Treatment4:Priors: Low risk	-0.03 (0.09)	0.17 (0.44)
Observations	441	441
R^2	0.11	0.24
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.19
Residual Std. Error (df = 415)	0.48	2.34
F Statistic (df = 25; 415)	2.01***	5.12***
Note:	*p<0.05**p<0.01***p<0.001	

Table 3. OLS regression results for Spanish respondents predicting attention and support rate, including a triple interaction term between treatment conditions, prior beliefs and risk. The results of the full model can be found in the appendix E18 and E19.



Figure 7. Predicted probability plots for the support rate dependent variable in Spain, across individuals with different issue status. The predicted values are estimated from an OLS regression including a triple interaction terms between treatment conditions, prior beliefs and issue status. Note that prior beliefs are re-coded into three categories, as outlined in the methods section.



Figure 8. Predicted probability plots for the support rate dependent variable in Spain, across individuals with different issue status. The predicted values are estimated from an OLS regression including a triple interaction terms between treatment conditions, prior beliefs and issue status (regression in table 3).

Next, I turn to examine whether the importance attributed to an issue changes support. There is no consistent evidence that individual for whom an issue is important are more responsive to scientific information. In Finland, in fact, there are no signitifcant differences in information-processing dynamics, while in Spain there are some nuances. As clearly conveyed in the predicted probability plots in figures 8 and 9, there are important differences on the levels of support given to UBI between the control and treatment 1, depending on issue importance. The support gap to UBI increases between individuals with different priors in T1, while this gap closes in T1 when individuals care stringly about the issue of unemployment. This suggests that issue importance is a key moderator in driving support for UBI. Once more, the fact that these alterations in support levels occurs for individuals who have universal priors and under negative information, shows the same trends as in the risk analysis. First that universalists seem more responsive to information, and second, that they show risk-averse behaviour.

	Dependent variable:	
	Attention (1)	Support (2)
Treatment 1:Priors:MIP	0.09 (0.05)	0.46 (0.32)
Treatment 2:Priors:MIP	0.08 (0.05)	0.10 (0.31)
Treatment 3:Priors:MIP	0.09 (0.05)	0.59 (0.32)
Treatment 4:Priors:MIP	0.08 (0.05)	0.40 (0.30)
Observations	780	780
R^2	0.05	0.08
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.05
Residual Std. Error (df = 754)	0.43	2.52
F Statistic (df = 25; 754)	1.74**	2.76***
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001	

Table 4. OLS regression results for Finnish respondents predicting attention and support rate, including a triple interaction term between treatment conditions, prior beliefs and issue importance. The results of the full model can be found in the appendixE20 and E21.

	Dependent variable:	
	Attention (1)	Support (2)
Treatment 1:Priors:MIP	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.81** (0.30)
Treatment 2:Priors:MIP	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.31)
Treatment 3:Priors:MIP	0.03 (0.06)	-0.21 (0.28)
Treatment 4:Priors:MIP	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.64* (0.27)
Observations	771	771
R^2	0.06	0.17
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.14
Residual Std. Error (df = 745)	0.48	2.41
F Statistic (df = 25; 745)	1.78**	6.09***
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001	

Table 5. OLS regression results for Spanish respondents predicting attention and support rate, including a triple interaction term between treatment conditions, prior beliefs and issue importance. The results of the full model can be found in the appendix E22 and E23.



Figure 9. Predicted probability plots for the support rate dependent variable in Spain, across individuals with different issue status. The predicted values are estimated from an OLS regression including a triple interaction terms between treatment conditions, prior beliefs and issue importance. Note that prior beliefs are re-coded into three categories, as outlined in the methods section.



Figure 10. Predicted probability plots for the support rate dependent variable in Spain, across individuals with different issue status. The predicted values are estimated from an OLS regression including a triple interaction terms between treatment conditions, prior beliefs and issue importance (regression in table 5).

Conclusion

Does scientific evidence shape attention and support dynamics to policy proposals? Exisitng research is inconclusiveabout the impact of scientific information on public opinion. Analysing this topic in the field of welfare state preferences requires drawing from two sets of literatures –motivated reasoning and political economy of preferences- which depict a very different reality of individuals, with biased, belief-driven individuals on the one hand, and rational, calculating, interest-maximising individuals on the other. In this paper, I reconcile these two accounts by arguing that while most of the time individuals will be guided by beliefs, under certain conditions they may strive to form more objective conclusions, so that they can accurately translate their interests into preferences.

The core proposition of this contribution follows existing work on motivated reasoning: that individuals will prioritise information that is in line with their prior beliefs, and empirical evidence should not have an impact in this process. I theorise however, that under particular circumstances, individuals will face higher incentives to achieve accurate conclusions, because the benefits derived from re-adjusting their beliefs and being able to express interest-sentitive preferences will outwieight the cognitive costs of questioning their ideas and experiencing cognititve dissonance.

Results give little credit to these expecations, but the consistently show the importance of prior beliefs. First, I do not find evidence that individuals self-select more to belief congruent information. Nevertheless, prior beliefs do have an impact on self-selection to information and support to policy proposals. Secondly, I find that circumstances change little about how information is processed. Neither being directly affected by an issue or caring strongly about it alter information processing dynamics. An exception to this however, is being under high risk in Spain. Here, even individuals who believe this policy is efficient will reduce their support levels significantly if they receive negative information accompaigned by evidence. Crucially, they will not reduce support when information is positive and supported by evidence.

The findings presented here have a broad range of implications to the study of public opinion, motivated reasoning and politics of welfare. First, results suggest that the role of empirical evidence is limited in securing policy attention and support, in line with previous work (i.e., Druckman and Bolsen, 2011). While the findings here are not novel

to the literature on motivated reasoning, it does contrast with political economy accounts of rational and calculating individuals. A key implication derived from this, is that even if individuals perform calculus about which policies benefit them the most, this seems to be a far less objective and unbiased process than previously thought. This finding also connects to the literature on how misperceptions shapes preferences, and shows that even under correct and objective information these misperceptions may not always be revised.

Results also speak to the field of motivated reasoning, and more precisely, the factors that exacerbate or mitigate bias in information processing (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2013; Parker-Stephen, 2013). I find no evidence that the process of information-selection reinforces biases in opinions (Jerit and Barabas, 2012; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014), given that individuals do not self-select more to information which is in line with their ideas, and neither do they discount information which does not fit in with their prior beliefs. These findings run counter studies on motivated scepticism and motivated reasoning (Gaines *et al.*, 2007; Lodge and Taber, 2007; Taber, Cann and Kucsova, 2009b). Even if these findings are derived from a specific case study as is the effect of UBI on employment, these results offer a pathway for future work to explore how interest or other potential factors derived from particular perceptions may moderate how individuals process information.

What can we make of these findings that run counter to the established literature? Information selection is not about how congruent information is with ideas, but rather about ideas in and of themselves: individuals who perceive a policy to be effective or in other words, an idea to be desirable have a larger probability of self-selecting to more information, regardless of the information shown. This suggests that if there is bias in information processing it is rather likely to come from *re-interpretation* of information or its evaluation, rather than selection. Given that results show no significant differences in support across information treatments, it may be the case that individuals are evaluating information differently depending on whether it fits with their priors or not.

These findings also have important implications for the politics of welfare reform and UBI. Currently, many states are relying on pilot projects and experiments to discern the consequences of the potential introduction of a UBI. This study shows that the prospects of scientific evidence leading to support updating are low. Individuals who are already convinced about this policy's effectiveness are more likely to access all types of information about the policy, more so than individuals who do not perceive it as effective.

In the long-run these trends may lead to an asymmetry between the supporter and oppose coalition of UBI. If supporters of a UBI are more predisposed to access any information on UBI this may increase the chances of reconsidering their support on the long-run, while scepticism amongst the opposition coalition to UBI could be 'sticky' given the lower likelihood of accessing other types of information and updating their beliefs accordingly.

Normatively speaking, the impermeability of individuals to scientific evidence offers a pessimistic landscape on public opinion's ability to update their preferences accurately and be responsive to objective information. On the contrary, this makes individuals vulnerable to the framing and manipulation of less reliable information. Future research could examine why public opinion is sceptical about science and study under which conditions this lack of responsiveness may be altered.

As discussed, this paper has contributed to two main sets of literature and advanced current knowledge in various fronts. Moreover, it has done so through an internal and externally strong design. Internally, the manipulation of information makes a robust case for the causal effect of information on support. Externally, we build on an existing discussion and data of a relevant and salient policy alternative. Our sample of respondents is also highly representative of the overall population, and a comparative perspective offers variation of how context may influence findings.

Nevertheless, the findings here presented do come with their limitations. First, the use of two specific policy and issues –UBI and unemployment-, while providing a rich and relevant case study, naturally raises the question of whether these findings would travel to other topics, which calls for future research to explore. Moreover, this topic is closely related to the question of when and how to intervene in society, which is an ideological – even moral- question, so how far do values play a role here? In essence, the potential of generalising results across topics may be specific to the topic under study. Second, one must acknowledge that opinions take time to change, and these findings speak to the immediate effects of small informational inputs, which although highly relevant, may not be conclusive about broader informational dynamics. Thirdly, readers are advised to take these findings with caution given that these are sensitive to both how perceptions are measured, but also to the fact that these are measured rather than manipulated. Although this is a common praxis in much research, it entails the problem of unobserved

heterogeneity. That is, individuals with different perceptions may vary in other unobservable characteristics which in turn, may drive both perceptions and information-processing dynamics or only the latter. Rather than a weakness, these findings call for future research to explore the origins of these perceptions, and to explore whether these findings replicate when these perceptions are manipulated rather than measured.

In this sense, and despite the limitations, this contribution has also opened up several pathways for future research to explore. Showing that prior beliefs have such an important effect even in a case where the policy has not yet been implemented, naturally gives rise to the question of how prior beliefs are formed and how individuals with competing beliefs differ. Future work should look at this in detail. Other prospective research areas to examine are how issue and policy characteristics interact to produce different information-processing patterns. A necessary pathway to explore is that concerning the impact of scientific evidence, and why is it that public opinion is not as responsive to this type of information.

Overall, while the limitations and need for future research must be acknowledged, this contribution has shed an important light on preference and information processing dynamics. In doing so, it has bridged two literature scholarships: the political economy work on preferences and information-processing theories. This contribution shows the richness of carrying out inter-disciplinary research and connecting different sets of literatures.

Concluding remarks

This dissertation has explored the determinants of support for universal basic income. Analysing this question is a pressing issue, given the imminent need for welfare reform evidenced by a broad range of challenges from technological development, and labour automation, labour market transformation, growing economic insecurity, changing socio-demographic structure, as well as the lasting socio-economic impact of the covid-19 pandemic. While recent work has began inquiring over the determinants of UBI support, research so far has raised more puzzles than answers. A common finding in the scarce literature available demonstrates that the determinants of UBI support are equivalent to those of targeted schemes, and support for redistribution. This motivates the question of which policies do individuals really prefer and why? How does support for redistribution connect to support for specific policy instruments, and what features of UBI generate support or opposition? This dissertation has tackled all of these pressing issues in a comparative perspective. In this concluding section, I provide an overview of the main findings, point to the potential limitations of these results, discuss thoroughly their implications and provide pathways for future research to explore.

Papers 1 and 2 of this thesis show that policy design matters greatly to policy support. To my reading, this dissertation reports for the first time which characteristics of UBI make this policy more or less appealing, and how support for this alternative, compares to other policy proposals, by adopting not only a multidimensional approach but a cross-policy perspective too. While the former multidimensional approach was prevalent in the literature, this cross-policy approach is novel in welfare state research. A significant finding in this respect is that in more universalistic welfare states, like Finland, the policy

element of universality does not generate resistance, while in more residual welfare states like Spain, this is the dimension that compromises political support for UBI. This is not to say that in Finland a UBI is not a contentious policy proposal: quite on the contrary, I find that it is the unconditionality attribute which generates opposition in this context. In Finland, a key element of support for cash transfers is ensuring that individuals are reciprocal to society or really prove that they themselves are unable to provide for themselves. While both these findings reveal the importance of deservingness heuristics, they do raise the question of why different dimensions matter to different extents across contexts.

A naturally arising question is under which conditions individuals will boost support for UBI's key elements of universality and unconditionality? Findings in this dissertation reveal that a combination of policy design features may be effective in attaining this goal, albeit with remarkable differences across context. In Finland, support for universality is best guaranteed through flat-rate taxation ('for all, paid by all'). In stark contrast, in Spain support for universality reaches the popularity of giving to those in need if funded by the rich. In fact, this is particularly striking given that in both Finland and Spain, taxing the rich has an overall positive and significant effect on support for policy proposals. While in Finland this support drops in the context of a universal cash transfer, in Spain support for universality boosts as a result of combining it with this funding mechanism. I discuss the implications of this findings later on.

However, most existing research showed that the characteristics of individuals matter considerably to secure this UBI support. To bridge these findings with the multidimensional approach undertaken in this dissertation, I look at how the characteristics of individuals affect support for the specific characteristics of UBI. In doing so, I have shown that UBI support has been generally overstated by previous work. First, I find that material self-interest does not shape preferences, and second I find that while being left-wing does, these individuals still prefer targeted and conditional forms of policies over UBI. While these results decipher the dynamics of UBI support, they also raise the imperative question of who supports, and actually prefers a UBI policy over other policy alternatives?

To answer this question, in paper 3 I challenge the view that individuals have homogeneous perceptions about what is best to their interests, even when they are in the same structural, material and ideological position. Crucial to their interests is the efficiency of these policy tools to attain their desired outcomes. In this third paper, I propose, test and show that perceptions about the efficiency of policies vary across individuals and are unrelated to their redistribution demand and structural and value-laden motivations. In paper 4, I show that inconsistent empirical accounts of preferences can be explained by their perceptions about which policies are more redistributive. Results give credit to the argument, albeit with important differences across context. In Spain, support for UBI is predicted by its perceived redistributive efficiency, more so than in Finland, where individuals are less polarized over universality. On the contrary, individuals in more residual welfare states show consistently higher support for policies they perceive as more redistributive, and universality is indeed a contentious dimension even for pro-redistribution individuals. These findings provide a potential mechanism for the strong left-wing division on UBI. Taken together, the findings in papers 2 and 4 help resolve the paradoxes observed in the extant literature on support for UBI.

Preferences do not exist in a vacuum however. They are not static overtime, and do not only alter as a result of individuals' traits and positions, but also due to contextual factors like policy debates. In this sense, preferences exist in a context of complex information dynamics and debates. Understanding how these trends affect preferences is essential to providing comprehensive accounts of preferences. This is especially relevant when it comes to understanding UBI preferences given that a considerable portion of the UBI debate revolves around the potential effects of UBI on employment, where numerous pilot projects have been carried out to test the consequences of the policy. Is public opinion responsive to scientific information? Results show that this is far from being the case.

Contrary to existing research, findings here do not show that individuals self-select more to information that is congruent with their beliefs. However, this is not to say that priors are not important: results show that prior beliefs per se determine both attention and support levels to policy proposals. Specifically, I find that individuals who perceive

universal policies to be more redistributive, have a higher tendency to self-select into more information and support more UBI, even when the information is negative and is accompanied by evidence. I show that, under no circumstance –like whether an individual is directly affected by an issue or cares strongly about it- do people focus on achieving accurate conclusions by paying more attention to science and modifying preferences when information is accompanied by science. Taken together with the findings on papers 3 and 4, these results show that perceptions are crucial to the articulation of preferences.

These findings do not come without its limitations and various hues should be acknowledged. While these findings contribute to uncovering some of the most pressing issues in preference research, an important note to concede is that these derive from survey and experiment data. Although this data rates high in terms of internal validity, survey questions and experiments provide hypothetical scenarios to respondents, and are not observations made from real-world events. As discussed elsewhere, individuals rarely face the situation of having to choose support for a policy proposal without having to account for other considerations -i.e., like which political party proposes the alternative, or a mobilisation campaign in the event of a referendum. For these reasons, I advise readers to take these findings with caution and do not extrapolate them to contexts and situations which entail other costs and incentives to individuals. Nevertheless, these findings are a reliable indication of the incipient overall level of support in the population.

While the extrapolative potential of these findings is limited, the two experimental designs in this dissertation have been constructed and pre-tested to ensure the maximum level of external validity. First, concerning the conjoint experiment the cross-policy approach adopted provides a much more realistic scenario to respondents. In real world settings, respondents are not only faced with one policy alternative -be it unemployment benefits, a UBI, or a minimum income scheme to set some examples- but they face the opportunity to vote for or cast their preferences for multiple alternatives. Hence, this cross-policy account of welfare state preferences and UBI support is not only more comprehensive, but it is more robust externally too. To ensure that these decisions resonated with citizens' concerns about welfare reform and UBI, both experiments were pre-tested across Finland and Spain. To enhance the external validity of the vignette

experiment, the treatment was constructed by drawing on findings from real pilot projects on the effects of UBI on employment. All in all, survey and experimental methods are extremely well-suited tools to measure and test micro-level mechanisms and discern causal effects of preferences. Hence, this method constituted the optimal design for the research question under study. For this reason, a recommendation for readers is that they take the general findings and learnings rather than focus on the precise effects and estimates here presented, acknowledging that these are sensitive to the specific design.

One could argue that many factors have not been taken into account to explain preferences in this dissertation such as gender and labour market status which are two increasingly important variables in the field of preferences research but also crucial to political science (see for instance the special issue on insiders and outsiders in PSRM; on the importance of gender: Cook and Wilcox 1991; Inglehart and Norris 2000). Accounting for the effects of gender and labour market status are not a simple question of plugging in new variables, but these factors connect to income and ideology in complex ways. This requires a sound theoretical development and robust computing techniques to deliver the effects of these variables, which were beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, these two factors were taken into consideration int the survey design and will be explored by my future research. For these reasons, I recommend readers of this dissertation to understand that this account of welfare and UBI preferences is still a partial one, given that it does not comprehensively address other important variables that may be under play.

Readers may raise concerns of the case selection in terms of the generalizability and transferability of findings and what can we make of these. Indeed, vast research shows how context moderates the importance and saliency of different policy dimensions (Larsen, 2012), and alters the incidence of individual level factors in shaping policy preferences (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012). Even within this dissertation I show that perceptions vary across contexts in significant ways. In this sense, the suggestion for readers is to take these learnings bearing in mind the sensitivity of findings to context. Even if these two scenarios provide an interesting balance in terms of differing welfare institutions but equally salient policy debate, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to account for how welfare institutions or policy debates at the macro-level affect

preferences. Even with the choice of alternative contexts this would not have been a feasible research objective to endure given the limitations of making causal inferences with two scenarios.

One of the core findings of this dissertation is the prominence of perceptions in shaping preferences. However, readers should take with caution these findings given that they are sensitive to the fact that perceptions were measured and not manipulated, and provided that findings are also susceptible to the particular ways in which perceptions were measured. Regarding the former -i.e., measurement rather than manipulation of perceptions- one must acknowledge the risks of unobserved heterogeneity between individuals with different perceptions. Still, this approach is a common praxis in much research on perceptions (i.e., Laenen 2018; Van Oorschot et al. 2017). Rather than a weakness I argue this is a reason for readers should take with caution these findings, but also for future research to explore where these perceptions come from, and whether these have an effect on preferences when they are directly manipulated.

Altogether, this dissertation has contributed in discerning the factors that determine support for UBI. Results here presented provide compelling evidence that while policy and individual characteristics matter greatly, policy perceptions are an important matter that had not been fully developed by previous work to explain support for UBI. Consequently, the results show among other things, that this is an important avenue to explore. Collectively, the finding here presented also point to the need to pursue the multidimensional path that welfare state research had undertaken, but equally highlight the need to account for preferences in a cross-policy approach to deliver a full picture of support for different policy proposals. In the following sections I discuss the implications of these findings to the specific research fields and policy problems they speak to.

Implications of the findings for literature on preferences

The implications of this dissertation for the literature on preferences are both theoretical and empirical. On a theoretical level, while the results of this dissertation clearly point on the direction of previous work in showing that material self-interest and value-laden

motivations shape policy preferences, the findings here presented demonstrate the need to fully and consistently develop these accounts, comprehensively connecting support for specific outcomes (i.e., redistribution), one's position and the specific policy tools. This dissertation has uncovered a crucial yet previously omitted variable that helps reconcile the paradoxical findings of previous work.

Additionally, also at a theoretical level, this dissertation by showing the importance of prior beliefs in shaping policy preferences both in terms of preferred design but also in how these preferences are (and in fact, are not) updated when receiving reliable information, has compromised the view of individuals as rational calculators that always pursue their best interests. This implications of these findings are that rather than being objective and rational when calculating what's best to their individual interests, humans are oftentimes rather driven by their prior beliefs about what's best rather than unbiased and reliable indicators.

At an empirical level, this thesis has contributed to uncovering which policy proposals are preferred and by whom. The main implication derived from this finding is the importance of keep exploring welfare state preferences as the multidimensional phenomena they constitute, as suggested by previous work, but equally to adopt a cross-policy approach that can more comprehensively explain for preferences, which does not only offer a more complete account of this phenomena, but also adapts more realistically to the real-world scenarios where individuals must choose between different policy alternatives.

Implications of the findings for the literatures of motivated reasoning

This dissertations' findings concerning motivated reasoning run counter much of the work in the field. Rather than finding that individuals self-select more and evaluate more strongly belief-congruent information, the findings here suggest that prior beliefs *per se*, determine these dynamics, and affect attention and support to policy proposals. While one must acknowledge that UBI offers a very specific and hence limited case study, these findings may be of interest to extract potential hypothesis that explain the conditions under which individuals will require belief-congruent information. Results show that

across our sample, no individuals -regardless of their priors- pay more attention to belief congruent information. These finding may be concealing interest for a policy: those with high interest access more all types of information, and those with low interest access to type of information. This is a variable worthwhile exploring in future research.

Implications of the findings for the politics of UBI and welfare reform.

Most work on UBI preferences points as the 'precariat' as a population sub-group that may not only benefit from a UBI, but that also support this novel policy alternative. The main implication derived form this thesis is that this is not so much the case. Given that the low-income do not show more support for UBI than other income thresholds and given that even those left-wing still prefer means-tested alternatives over universalistic ones, the prospects of finding a core political backing from UBI will not necessarily come from these individuals. Rather, the findings in this study entail that specific policy combinations should be promoted to increase political backing for a UBI -i.e., excluding non-nationals and imposing progressive funding mechanisms, like taxing the rich. This is striking given the lack of public discourse on taxing the rich, which has been mostly reserved to social movements like the M15 in Spain or Occupy movement at a global level. Despite this, results in this dissertation reflect that there is an underlying and important cross-national demand for taxing the rich.

Relatedly, results speak to the strong left-wing division over the desirability of UBI documented by previous work (Parjis, 2018). The findings derived from this dissertation offer a plausible explanation of why, in spite of common objectives of most left-wing individuals and political actors, they diverge substantially in the policy tools they prefer to attain these outcomes. Perceptions of the most effective ways of attaining these outcomes are an indispensable piece of the puzzle to make sense of these often paradoxical trends.

A complementary implication of these findings to the politics of UBI concern who the core backers of these idea are. These individuals are those who perceive universality to be more redistributive, and that favour redistribution. Results however, are pessimistic

about the impact of information in updating these preferences, especially when it comes to scientific information and pilot projects. Despite this, results do not completely disqualify the use of pilot projects outright. These instruments have a variety of functions and effects that also determine their desirability, even if public opinion may remain unmoved by findings. This does not discredit their potential to rise the saliency of the ideas and to move to more effective and objective forms of policy-making through the generation evidence.

Road ahead

This dissertation has opened several pathways for future research to explore. First, future research on the multidimensionality of UBI and welfare preferences may delve into exploring why different dimensions vary in the degree of contentiousness across context. While there is already some existing work which points at potential reasons why this may be the case (i.e., Larsen 2012), further research is needed to explain the mechanisms connecting macro-contexts and micro-preferences in terms of policy design.

Second, given the crucial role of perceptions, the mechanisms through which individuals come to develop different beliefs about policy proposals awaits for further investigation. In countries with a more universalistic welfare design, there is a larger proportion of individuals who perceive universalism to be a more redistributive design. A part form looking at the characteristic of individuals, such as psychological predispositions and personality traits, exposure to information or political sophistication, the findings in this thesis suggest that contextual moderators should also be taken into account.

The findings here presented have raised important concerns in terms of the lack of responsiveness of public opinion to scientific evidence. Future studies could fruitfully explore this issue further by looking at trust in science or comprehension of scientific information. All in all, this dissertation has provided a building ground advancing extant literature, to explore welfare preferences multidimensionally and through a cross-policy lens, strengthening theoretical account and incorporating new theories to provide more comprehensive explanations of welfare reform preferences in the 21st century.

Appendices

Appendix A: Paper 1

A1. Respondent quotas.

	Categories	Number	Target number	Target percentage
Gender	Male (1)	498	489	49%
	Female (2)	511	511	51%
Age	18–29(2)	192	192	19%
	30–39(3)	157	157	16%
	40–49(4)	181	181	18%
	50–59(5)	193	192	19%
	60–69(6)	146	146	15%
	70–84(7) (70+)	131	131	13%
Region	Itä – Östra län	111	110	11%
	Etelä – Södra län	417	416	42%
	Länsi – Västra län	354	354	35%
	Oulun – Lapin – Uleåborgs län	118	120	12%

A2. Justification for dimensions, attributes and collapsing of different attributes

Dimension	Attributes	Collapsed Categories	Justification
Target population sub-groups	To those under the poverty threshold	Targeting need	We collapse the categories of dependency and poverty because, although different in terms of potential deservingness considerations, they are still two categories subject to *need* of recipients.
	To those with dependent family members		
	To those with minors	Minors	
	Everyone	Universalization	
Legal requirements	Residency permit 6 months ago	Residency	We introduced different residency requirements to add variation, but we collapse them for the main analysis for the purpose of clarity
	Residency permit 1 year ago		
	Residency permit 5 years ago		
	Citizenship	Citizenship	
Conditionality	Full-time employed	Conditional on employment	We designed the conjoint experiment with different specific conditions, but we collapse them into their main thematic categories for the purposes of clarity.
	Self-employed		
	Part-time employed		
	Involved in volunteering or community work	Conditional on participating in society in different ways	
	Training or education		
	Unable to work	Targeting need / reciprocity	
	Unemployed but looking for employment		
	Unemployed and not looking for employment	Universalization	
	Unconditional		
Generosity	Eurodividend	Does not cover living costs	We decide to collapse different extents of living costs/poverty threshold because, although we built them according to theoretical constructs, we did not
	Covers living costs without housing	Covers part or all of living costs	

Dimension	Attributes	Collapsed Categories	Justification
	Minus 25% of poverty threshold		have a clear theoretical expectation of, for instance, why individuals should differ in preferences of -25% poverty threshold or the poverty threshold level itself.
	Poverty threshold		
	Plus 25% of poverty threshold	Above minimum need	
Recipients	Households		No collapsing needed
	Individuals		
Funding mechanisms	Increase taxes to corporations	Capital/technology taxation;	We chose to design this dimension so that it included budget-neutral forms of funding (that is, reducing current spending), because we believe that budget-neutral forms are of interest per se, but they also include an important part of the welfare remodelling debate: rolling back current welfare models, but adding an income guarantee (as stipulated by the above dimensions). We include a series of detailed options per category (i.e., environmental taxation, reducing targeted welfare), because we believe that including a generic funding mechanism is not enough for respondents to have a clear idea of the implications. Moreover, including detailed options is also relevant as these may be very subject to national debates. We considered a variety of collapsing mechanisms, such as: budget-neutral/increasing or introducing new taxes. The inconvenience of this is that there is, per se, no theoretical expectation behind these preferences: it is not only about whether one increases, introduces new taxes or uses the current budget, but about which types of mechanisms are used. Another alternative we
	Increase capital income tax		
	Introduce a tax on technology		
	Introduce a tax on inter-bank financial transactions		
	Cutting unemployment benefits	Reducing targeted welfare spending	
	Cutting social assistance for low income families		
	Cutting housing benefits		
	Cutting pension spending	Reducing universal welfare spending	
	Cutting spending on health		
	Cutting spending on education		
	Introduce a new environmental tax	Environmental taxation	
	Increase Environmental taxes (Finland: excise liquid fuels; Spain: hydrocarbons)		

Dimension	Attributes	Collapsed Categories	Justification
	Increase inheritance tax		considered was to collapse into forms of progressive vs. regressive funding mechanisms, but these distributive effects are also conditional on other characteristics of the policy design, and we could not automatically infer what mechanisms respondents consider to be regressive/progressive. Our hypothesis for this paper, being focused on general effects, is concerned with the reduction of two broad types of welfare expenditure. While we collapse these into two relevant categories (universal/targeted), we were adamant of collapsing the rest of the options into one, precisely because they are theoretically very different. Therefore, with the remaining collapse followed by a thematic categorization: environment, capital, and the remaining categories we left as individual. We think that a possibility could be collapsing the increase of PIT (2 options) and inheritance into one, as thematically they make sense. However, these are options that are very contentious in both contexts, and that are clearly distinguishable in terms of progresiveness (especially the options of personal income tax).
	Cut spending on defense		
	Increase personal income tax to everyone		
	Increase personal income tax to highest incomes		

A3. Construction of the quantity dimension.

Measure	**Quantity (in euros)**	**Calculation and data source**
Eurodividend proposal	€200	
Covers living costs without housing	€500	Level of social assistance for a single person in 2019
-25% poverty threshold	€900	Calculated from poverty threshold for a single person in 2016 (National income statistics)
Poverty threshold	€1200	Calculated from poverty threshold for a single person in 2016
+25% poverty threshold	€1500	Calculated from poverty threshold

A4. Screenshot of the conjoint experiment. Respondents saw the table in finish language.

First round

In the following table you will see two policy proposals. The first column indicates the main characteristics and the following two specify the features of the two proposals. Please read carefully both alternatives and select the proposal you prefer.

Policy characteristics	Proposal 1	Proposal 2
To whom the benefit is directed	Everyone	Individuals with minors under their charge
Conditions to recieve the benefit	Having full-time employment	Being involved in studying or training
Benefit recipients	Families/households	Families/households
Quantity	550€	550€
Legal requirements	Having a residence permit (since at least 6 months ago)	Having a residence permit (since at least 6 months ago)
How it will be funded	Reducing housing expenditure	Reducing education expenditure

A5. Marginal mean of the forced-choice dependent variable.



A6. Average marginal component effect (AMCE) of the forced-choice dependent variable.



Note: The dots indicate the AMCE, and confidence intervals are set at 95%. Those attributes where the dot is set at 0, are the baseline or reference categories.

A7. Discussion of the implications for the forced choice analysis for main effects

Marginal mean analysis of the forced choice dependent variable shows the same patterns than support rate, especially with regards to the recipients, generosity, legal requirement dimension and funding mechanisms. Some slight differences appear in the conditionality dimension, where, although we find the same tendency (need as a condition is preferred), this is not statistically different. We also find that similar to the forced choice there is no statistical difference between a universal policy and targeting those in need (within the target group dimensions), although unlike in the support rate, minors do have a statistically significant negative impact. This is also something reflected in the AMCE analysis. So overall, results are very similar in the two analysis of the forced choice dependent variable, with two minor exceptions, which rather than a substantive change of results are reflective of changes in significance. To a certain extent it is reasonable that some differences appear because of the operationalisation of the two dependent variables, and substantively of how respondents make decisions. In a forced choice, the respondent is selecting one policy over the other, however, this says little about how much/less the respondent is supportive of the policy. In our methods section we explain why we use support rate as a main dependent variable giving strong theoretical reasons of its value-added, but we follow previous work in analysing the forced choice dependent variable as a robustness check.

A8. Robustness check: Average marginal component effect (AMCE) of the forced-choice dependent variable, of the two first rounds.



Note: The dots indicate the AMCE, and confidence intervals are set at 95%. Those attributes where the dot is set at 0, are the baseline or reference categories.

A9. Robustness check: Marginal Means of the forced choice dependent variables only for the two first respondent rounds.



Note: The vertical line in the second graph indicates the average level of support. The dots represent marginal means and the lines 95% of confidence interval.

A10. Robustness checks: Marginal Means of support rate dependent variables only for the two first respondent rounds.



Note: The vertical line in the second graph indicates the average level of support. The dots represent marginal means and the lines 95% of confidence interval.

A11. Discussion of the implications of the robustness checks of the marginal mean analysis of the support rate dependent variable.

The support rate dependent variable robustness checks confirm our main findings A series of dimensions do not seem to matter on their own, once more these are: target groups, generosity, recipients and legal requirements. The only minor difference that we do find here is that the lowest level of benefit generosity (200€), does seem to significantly reduce support in comparison to the rest of the quantities. We also find supportive evidence that need is the most popular form of conditionality (although in this case it is not statistically different from unconditionality), and funding though taxing the rich boosts support while cutting universal welfare reduces support for a policy package. We argue that while there may be some differences of significance, this may be rather reflective of a lower number of cases because the patters reflected are the same.

A12. Marginal means of the target and funding interaction (forced choice dependent variable).



A13. Robustness check of interaction: marginal means of the target and funding interaction (support rate dependent variable), only including the two first respondent rounds.



A14. Robustness check of interaction: marginal means of the target and conditionality dimensions (support rate dependent variable), only including the two first respondent rounds.



Discussion of the robustness checks of the marginal mean support rate analysis of the interactions between dimensions. Our robustness checks of the funding dimension and target groups interaction still convey the same patterns as our results: increasing taxes to

the rich is the most popular funding method for targeting those in need, while environmental taxation (but also taxing capital, and income taxes to everyone are). Like we have discussed in previous sections however, some slight differences may appear in that substantively speaking respondents may not make the same type of choice or use the same heuristics when having to make a choice or giving an extent of support.

Our robustness checks confirm our main findings (Figure 2 in paper). The most popular mechanism for targeting those in need is increasing taxes to the rich, as is the case with targeting minors. However, this pattern is reversed when it concerns universal policies: support for this form of funding decreases, while increasing taxes to everyone, environmental taxation and taxing capital become statistically significant.

As we report in the paper, targeting policies to those in need, and making them conditional on need, increases support for a policy proposal. Making policies unconditional to those in need is also quite popular too. Unlike we expected, restricting universal policies through imposing some form of condition does not increase support. We only find that imposing participatory conditions is more popular than remaining unconditional, but this form of conditionality is not statistically different from the other forms of conditions.

A15. Robustness of target and legal requirement dimension



A16. Interaction of target and generosity dimension



A17. Robustness: Interaction of target and generosity dimension



A18. Interaction of target and unit of recipient dimension



A19. Robustness: Interaction of target and unit of recipient dimension



A20. Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and legal requirements (support rate dependent variable).



A21. Robustness: Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and legal requirements (support rate dependent variable).



A22. Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and unit (support rate dependent variable).



A23. Robustness: Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and unit (support rate dependent variable).



A24. Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and generosity (support rate dependent variable).



A25. Robustness: Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and generosity (support rate dependent variable).



A26. Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and funding (support rate dependent variable).



A27. Robustness: Marginal mean analysis of the interaction between conditions and funding (support rate dependent variable).



A28: Validity and reliability

In this section we discuss the validity and reliability of our findings. We tackle concerns for task complexity, relevance of survey questions to respondents, and respondent satisficing. To ensure that task complexity was not an issue, we pre-tested the survey several times with a broad range of respondents, observing how these performed the tasks. Individuals engaged with the task in a straightforward manner and the attributes resonated well with respondents' notions and understandings of welfare state (it did not sound remote to them).

Another related concern could be whether these combinations are unlikely to appear in the real world, and to what extent this could compromise the validity of our findings. For instance, a respondent could observe a cash transfer proposal given to everyone, unconditional, of very generous quantity (above the poverty threshold level), financed by a reform of personal income tax by everyone; a combination which might not be feasible

and therefore affect support levels. In all the pre-testing sessions this concern did not arise among respondents, because their focus is to assess their desirability for the elements of the policy. We also argue that because we do not speak of the specific quantities of taxation and whether the funding mechanisms that appear would be the only funding mechanisms, we allow room for practical feasibility. It is also key to loosen the combinations we allow, to be able to test how these combinations work. If we imposed too many conditions, we could not test how different policy configurations play out in determining support.

A third concern is respondent satisficing. Our pre-testing indicated that four rounds are an optimal number for respondent engagement. The number of tasks and dimensions is also very similar to the number found in previous work. However, to eliminate concerns of respondent satisficing we also perform all the analysis with robustness checks of the first and second round to make sure that findings are consistent throughout rounds. As outlined in the results section, findings are generally robust with few exceptions that do not compromise our findings as results are consistent in tendency across analyses, although there are differences which appear significant.

A final concern may be how our case selection influences the generalizability our results. One of the obvious factors which may influence attitudes towards welfare state reform is the domestic welfare state institutions. In this sense, we find, contrary to much other work, that targeting need is not crucial, legal requirements neither, nor that generosity is not dependent on who is targeted either. It may be the case that having a universalistic welfare state influences preference for welfare state by rendering the consideration behind this dimension less important, as predicted by much literature (Korpi and Palme, 1998). However, this is something that future work could analyse.

Appendix B: Paper 2

B1. Respondent quotas. The table includes the final number and proportion of respondents per quota category, and the target or objective number and proportion[65].

	Categories	Number of respondents	Target number	Respondent percentage	Target percentage
Gender	Male	374	500	50%	50%
	Female	374	500	50%	50%
Age	18-24	79	119	10,6%	12%
	25-34	106	152	14,2%	15%
	35-44	151	223	20,2%	22%
	45-54	154	204	20,6%	20%
	55-64	145	172	19,4%	17%*
	65-74	113	130	15,1%	13%
Region	Andalucía	134	182	18%	18%
	Aragón	21	28	2,8%	3%
	Principado de Asturias	17	22	2,3%	2%
	Illes Balears	20	24	2,5%	2%
	Canarias	36	45	4,8%	5%
	Cantabria	9	13	1,2%	1%
	Castilla y León	43	52	5,7%	5%
	Castilla-La Mancha	37	44	4,9%	4%
	Catalunya	119	163	15,9%	16%
	Comunitat Valenciana	79	106	10,6%	11%
	Extremadura	18	23	2,4%	2%
	Galicia	40	58	5,3%	6%
	Madrid	100	140	13,3%	14%
	Murcia	24	32	3,2%	3%
	Navarra	11	14	1,5%	1%
	País Vasco	34	47	4,5%	5%
	La Rioja	6	7	0,8%	1%

[65] As it can be seen from the target percentage and actual proportion of respondents per quota category, the proportion of respondents aimed at and finally obtained are very similar suggesting that although the number of respondents drops after the cleaning process, the sample is still representative.

B2. Full conjoint design, as respondents saw the options. Column 3 shows how the different categories were collapsed.

Dimension	Attributes	Collapsed Categories
Target population sub-groups	To those under the poverty threshold	Targeting need
	To those with dependent family members	
	To those with minors	Minors
	Everyone	Universalization
Legal requirements	Residency permit 6 months ago	Residency
	Residency permit 1 year ago	
	Residency permit 5 years ago	
	Citizenship	Citizenship
Conditionality	Full-time employed	Conditional on employment
	Self-employed	
	Part-time employed	
	Involved in volunteering or community work	Conditional on participating in society in different ways
	Training or education	
	Unable to work	Targeting need / reciprocity
	Unemployed but looking for employment	
	Unemployed and not looking for employment	Universalization
	Unconditional	
Generosity	Eurodividend	Does not cover living costs
	Covers living costs without housing	Covers part or all of living costs
	Minus 25% of poverty threshold	
	Poverty threshold	
	Plus 25% of poverty threshold	Above minimum need
Recipients	Households	
	Individuals	
Funding mechanisms	Increase taxes to corporations	Capital/technology taxation;
	Increase capital income tax	
	Introduce a tax on technology	
	Introduce a tax on inter-bank financial transactions	
	Cutting unemployment benefits	Reducing targeted welfare spending
	Cutting social assistance for low income families	
	Cutting housing benefits	
	Cutting pension spending	Reducing universal welfare spending
	Cutting spending on health	
	Cutting spending on education	
	Introduce a new environmental tax	Environmental taxation
	Increase Environmental taxes (Finland: excise liquid fuels; Spain: hydrocarbons)	
	Increase inheritance tax	
	Cut spending on defence	

Dimension	Attributes	Collapsed Categories
	Increase personal income tax to everyone	
	Increase personal income tax to highest incomes	

B3. Construction of the quantity dimension.

Measure	Quantity (in euros)	Calculation and data source
Eurodividend proposal	€200	Quantity proposed by Van Parijs 2013, in his proposal of the euro-dividend
Covers living costs without housing	€450	Calculation of living costs without housing from INE statistics
-25% poverty threshold	€550	Calculated from poverty threshold
Poverty threshold	€680	Calculated from the Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (Life Conditions Survey)
+25% poverty threshold	€850	Calculated from poverty threshold

B4. Screenshot of the one conjoint experiment task. Respondents saw the table in Spanish language.

First round

In the following table you will see two policy proposals. The first column indicates the main characteristics and the following two specify the features of the two proposals. Please read carefully both alternatives and select the proposal you prefer.

Policy characteristics	Proposal 1	Proposal 2
To whom the benefit is directed	Everyone	Individuals with minors under their charge
Conditions to recieve the benefit	Having full-time employment	Being involved in studying or training
Benefit recipients	Families/households	Families/households
Quantity	550€	550€
Legal requirements	Having a residence permit (since at least 6 months ago)	Having a residence permit (since at least 6 months ago)
How it will be funded	Reducing housing expenditure	Reducing education expenditure

B5. Wording of the two questions and operationalization of the dependent variables.

Dependent variable	Question wording	Operationalisation
Forced choice	Please read the two income proposals carefully, and choose from the following options your preferred proposal	0, 1, where 1 is the selected policy
Support rate	Please rate each policy according to how likely you are of voting in favour of it. Note that 0 is not at all, and 10 means definitely voting in favour of it.	Ordinal scale 0–10, where 0 is no support and 10 is full support.

B6. Data reshaping process, dependent variables and analysis.

To perform the relevant analysis, I reshape current data so that each observation (data row) is a policy proposal k of a task j, presented to a respondent i. This means that for the total 748 respondents, leaving a total of 4948 observations, where each observation is a policy package or profile, shown to one respondent, in one specific round, which was either selected or not. Each respondent observes two profiles at one time, completes 4 of each of these rounds, meaning that he/she observes a total of 8 policy profiles. Each respondent is required to select one policy proposal from each pair and rate the two of them which leaves us with two dependent variables –forced choice and support rate. I code the first dependent variable Y1 - forced choice- as 1 if the policy proposal is selected, and 0 if it is the unselected policy proposal. The second dependent variable Y2, the support rate, is a number ranging from 0 to 10, depending on the support given to the policy proposal -both to the unselected and selected one. Each observation includes a vector of the attributes presented in that observation. Dependent variables Y1 and Y2 are modelled as a function of X which a vector is containing the attributes that the respondents were exposed to. This can be analysed with a simple Ordinary Least Squares linear regression (Hainmueller, et al 2014).

B7. Marginal mean of the forced-choice dependent variable.



B8. Average marginal component effect (AMCE) of the forced-choice dependent variable.



Note: The dots indicate the AMCE, and confidence intervals are set at 95%. Those attributes where the dot is set at 0, are the baseline or reference categories.

B9. Average marginal component effect (AMCE) of the support rate dependent variable.



B9. Discussion of the implications for the forced choice analysis for main effects

Marginal mean analysis of the forced choice dependent variable shows the same patterns across the AMCE and marginal mean analysis, especially with regards to the recipients, generosity, legal requirement dimension and funding mechanisms. A difference that appears is in the universality dimension where the trend that is that individuals do not prefer targeted schemes over universal ones, or targeting minors. However, this difference is only natural given that the dependent variable is different. Looking at the AMCE of the support rate, the same trends and significance levels appear than in the marginal mean analysis of the support rate dependent variable, so one can be confident that results vary across different types of analysis and quantities of interest, and that the minor differences that appear occur when changing the dependent variable.

To a certain extent it is reasonable that some differences appear because of the operationalisation of the two dependent variables, and substantively of how respondents make decisions. In a forced choice, the respondent is selecting one policy over the other, however, this says little about how much/less the respondent is supportive of the policy. In our methods section we explain why we use support rate as a main dependent variable giving strong theoretical reasons of its value-added, but we follow previous work in analysing the forced choice dependent variable as a robustness check.

B10. Robustness: Average marginal component effect (AMCE) of the forced-choice dependent variable, including only the two first conjoint rounds.



B11. Robustness: Marginal means of the forced-choice dependent variable, including only the two first conjoint rounds.



B12. Robustness checks: Marginal mean of the support rate dependent variable, only including two first conjoint rounds.



B13. Discussion of the implications of the robustness checks of the marginal mean analysis of the support rate dependent variable.

The robustness checks in sections A10 to A12 show that respondents have been consistent in their preferences across rounds and hence, respondent satisficing should not be a concern: results are robust across rounds and all dimensions.

B14. Marginal means of the target dimension interacted with the rest of the dimensions (support rate dependent variable).

Population sub-group attributes	Attributes of other dimensions	Estimate	Standard error	z-value	P-value	lower CI	upper CI
	CONDITIONS						
Universal	**Employed**	4,198	0,119	30,961	1,81E-210	3,964	4,432
	Need/reciprocity	3,895	0,22	15,42	1,20E-53	3,464	4,327
	Participatory	4,223	0,161	23,191	5,58E-119	3,908	4,537
	Unconditional	4,154	0,137	26,587	9,49E-156	3,885	4,423
Minors	**Employed**	4,007	0,121	29,067	9,44E-186	3,77	4,243
	Need/reciprocity	4,609	0,284	14,474	1,77E-47	4,052	5,165
	Participatory	4,331	0,148	25,857	2,01E-147	4,041	4,622
	Unconditional	4,285	0,146	25,886	9,64E-148	3,998	4,571
Need	**Employed**	4,477	0,092	43,204	0	4,297	4,658
	Need/reciprocity	4,675	0,152	27,431	1,18E-165	4,377	4,974
	Participatory	4,495	0,098	40,696	0	4,302	4,687
	Unconditional	4,262	0,097	38,836	0	4,072	4,452
	FUNDING MECHANISMS						
Everyone	**Environmental taxation**	4,356	0,164	2,357	7,46E-109	4,035	4,677
	Increasing inheritance tax	3,731	0,267	1,209	1,22E-19	3,207	4,255
	Increasing PIT to all income thresholds	4,038	0,3	1,178	4,86E-18	3,449	4,626
	Increasing PIT to highest incomes	5,192	0,297	1,581	2,56E-42	4,611	5,774
	Reducing defence spending		0,269	1,277	2,44E-23	3,412	4,468
	Reducing targeted welfare spending	4,209	0,168	2,206	8,05E-94	3,879	4,538

	Reducing universal welfare spending	3,787	0,146	2,257	7,87E-99	3,502	4,073
	Taxing capital/corporations	4,466	0,16	2,484	3,45E-122	4,153	4,779
Minors	**Environmental taxation**	4,931	0,202	2,197	6,06E-94	4,536	5,326
	Increasing inheritance tax	4,583	0,261	1,565	3,50E-41	4,072	5,095
	Increasing PIT to all income thresholds	4,052	0,265	1,339	7,20E-27	3,532	4,572
	Increasing PIT to highest incomes	4,933	0,359	1,235	4,80E-21	4,23	5,637
	Reducing defence spending	4,722	0,283	1,493	2,06E-36	4,168	5,276
	Reducing targeted welfare spending	4,08	0,18	1,988	6,12E-74	3,727	4,432
	Reducing universal welfare spending	3,949	0,16	2,159	2,05E-89	3,636	4,262
	Taxing capital/corporations	4,223	0,13	2,87	3,88E-167	3,969	4,478
need	**Environmental taxation**	4,282	0,14	2,695	5,99E-146	4,007	4,557
	Increasing inheritance tax	4,112	0,194	1,865	1,16E-63	3,732	4,491
	Increasing PIT to all income thresholds	4,319	0,185	2,061	2,43E-80	3,956	4,682
	Increasing PIT to highest incomes	5,113	0,182	2,538	4,17E-128	4,757	5,469
	Reducing defence spending	4,77	0,181	2,355	1,39E-108	4,414	5,125
	Reducing targeted welfare spending	4,597	0,112	3,653	3,37E-278	4,377	4,817
	Reducing universal welfare spending	4,122	0,112	3,233	2,86E-216	3,902	4,341
	Taxing capital/corporations	4,713	0,102	4,123	0	4,513	4,914
	QUANTITY						
Everyone	**Above the poverty threshold**	4,389	0,151	25,836	3,45E-147	4,094	4,683

	Eurodividend	3,801	0,147	22,479	6,62E-112	3,513	4,088
	Living costs	4,236	0,094	39,828	0	4,052	4,42
Minors	**Above the poverty threshold**	4,068	0,161	22,1	3,14E-108	3,752	4,385
	Eurodividend	4,455	0,154	25,628	7,46E-145	4,153	4,758
	Living costs	4,288	0,093	40,749	0	4,106	4,471
Need	**Above the poverty threshold**	4,449	0,1	39,341	0	4,253	4,646
	Eurodividend	4,309	0,118	32,275	1,58E-228	4,077	4,54
	Living costs	4,556	0,064	63,442	0	4,431	4,681
	REQUIREMENTS						
Everyone	**Citizenship**	4,414	0,132	29,627	6,64E-193	4,155	4,673
	Residency permit	4,093	0,083	43,552	0	3,931	4,255
Minors	**Citizenship**	4,089	0,139	25,842	2,98E-147	3,817	4,361
	Residency permit	4,34	0,083	46	0	4,177	4,504
Need	**Citizenship**	4,624	0,099	41,72	0	4,43	4,817
	Residency permit	4,441	0,057	69,644	0	4,33	4,552

B15. Marginal means of the conditionality dimension interacted with other variables (support rate dependent variable).

Conditionality attributes	**Attributes from other dimensions**	**Estimate**	**Standard error**	**z**	**p**	**lower**	**upper**
	FUNDING						
Employed	**Environmental taxation**	4.15	0.17	21.2	9,78E-86	3.82	4.49
	Increasing inheritance tax	3.67	0.24	13.08	4,28E-25	3.2	4.15
	Increasing PIT to all income thresholds	4.15	0.23	15.8	3,12E-42	3.69	4.6
	Increasing PIT to highest incomes	5.21	0.26	17.93	6,83E-58	4.69	5.72
	Reducing defence spending	4.43	0.26	15.37	2,62E-39	3.93	4.93

	Reducing targeted welfare spending	4.58	0.17	24.38	2,73E-117	4.25	4.9
	Reducing universal welfare spending	3.89	0.14	24.56	3,57E-119	3.62	4.16
	Taxing capital/corporations	4.46	0.12	33.98	4,71E-239	4.23	4.69
Need/reciprocity	**Environmental taxation**	4.28	0.32	11.9	1,20E-18	3.66	4.9
	Increasing inheritance tax	5.12	0.42	11.13	9,25E-15	4.31	5.94
	Increasing PIT to all income thresholds	5.13	0.4	11.59	4,45E-17	4.35	5.92
	Increasing PIT to highest incomes	5.75	0.48	10.86	1,76E-13	4.8	6.7
	Reducing defence spending	3.29	0.51	5.49	4,04E+06	2.29	4.29
	Reducing targeted welfare spending	4.42	0.22	17.63	1,43E-55	3.98	4.85
	Reducing universal welfare spending	3.39	0.24	11.93	8,60E-19	2.92	3.87
	Taxing capital/corporations	4.8	0.28	15.42	1,20E-39	4.26	5.35
Participatory conditionality	**Environmental taxation**	4.79	0.21	20.19	1,31E-76	4.37	5.2
	Increasing inheritance tax	4.75	0.25	17.19	3,38E-52	4.27	5.23
	Increasing PIT to all income thresholds	3.65	0.33	9.61	7,40E-08	3.01	4.3
	Increasing PIT to highest incomes	4.93	0.3	14.67	9,94E-35	4.34	5.52
	Reducing defence spending	4.54	0.24	16.58	9,54E-48	4.06	5.02
	Reducing targeted welfare spending	4.16	0.16	23.09	6,50E-104	3.85	4.47
	Reducing universal welfare spending	4.11	0.17	21.71	1,84E-90	3.79	4.44
	Taxing capital/corporations	4.67	0.15	27.16	1,89E-148	4.37	4.98
Unconditionality	**Environmental taxation**	4.33	0.18	21.23	4,86E-86	3.98	4.68
	Increasing inheritance tax	3.46	0.29	10.06	7,98E-10	2.88	4.03
	Increasing PIT to all income thresholds	4.03	0.25	13.89	7,45E-30	3.53	4.53
	Increasing PIT to highest incomes	4.49	0.27	14.94	1,85E-36	3.97	5.01
	Reducing defence spending	4.95	0.26	16.94	2,46E-50	4.44	5.46

	Reducing targeted welfare spending	4.42	0.17	23.05	1,47E-103	4.09	4.76
	Reducing universal welfare spending	3.87	0.15	22.87	9,80E-102	3.58	4.16
	Taxing capital/corporations	4.4	0.15	26.51	7,61E-141	4.11	4.69
	QUANTITY						
Employed	**Above the poverty threshold**	4.3	0.12	30.6	1,37E-191	4.06	4.55
	Eurodividend	4.21	0.15	24.83	4,77E-122	3.91	4.5
	Living costs	4.32	0.08	45.99	0	4.16	4.48
Need/reciprocity	**Above the poverty threshold**	3.99	0.22	15.57	1,15E-40	3.55	4.43
	Eurodividend	4.41	0.27	14.32	1,59E-32	3.88	4.95
	Living costs	4.65	0.15	26.94	8,04E-146	4.35	4.95
Participatory conditionality	**Above the poverty threshold**	4.56	0.15	26.61	5,52E-142	4.27	4.86
	Eurodividend	4.08	0.16	21.93	1,29E-92	3.76	4.4
	Living costs	4.44	0.1	41.01	0	4.25	4.63
Unconditionality	**Above the poverty threshold**	4.18	0.15	23.87	6,15E-112	3.88	4.49
	Eurodividend	4.29	0.16	24.36	4,52E-117	3.98	4.59
	Living costs	4.25	0.09	41.6	0	4.07	4.42
	REQUIREMENTS						
Employment	**Citizenship**	4.36	0.13	28.82	1,15E-169	4.1	4.62
	Residency permit	4.28	0.07	53.02	0	4.14	4.42
Need/reciprocity	**Citizenship**	4.51	0.2	20.06	1,77E-75	4.12	4.91
	Residency permit	4.4	0.14	27.93	1,09E-157	4.13	4.67
Participatory conditionality	**Citizenship**	4.38	0.14	28.42	1,23E-163	4.11	4.65
	Residency permit	4.41	0.09	45.29	0	4.24	4.58
Unconditionality	**Citizenship**	4.29	0.14	26.99	2,19E-146	4.02	4.57
	Residency permit	4.22	0.08	46.42	0	4.07	4.38

B16. Income: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across income groups (full conjoint design)



B17. Robustness: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across income groups (full conjoint design) – including only the two first rounds



B18. Ideology: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across ideology groups (full conjoint design)



B19. Robustness: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across ideology groups (full conjoint design)- including only the two first conjoint rounds



B20. Labour market status: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across groups with different labour market status (full conjoint design)



B21. Robustness: Labour market status. Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across groups with different labour market status (full conjoint design)- including only the two first conjoint rounds



B22. Risk: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across groups with different risk levels (full conjoint design)



B23. Robustness: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across groups with different risk levels (full conjoint design)- including only the two first rounds



B24: Validity and reliability

In this section I discuss the validity and reliability of the findings. In particular, I tackle concerns for task complexity, relevance of survey questions to respondents, and respondent satisficing. To ensure that task complexity was not an issue, the survey was pre-tested several times with a broad range of respondents, observing how these performed the tasks. Individuals engaged with the task in a straightforward manner and the attributes resonated well with respondents' notions and understandings of welfare state (it did not sound remote to them).

Another related concern could be whether these combinations are unlikely to appear in the real world, and to what extent this could compromise the validity of our findings. For instance, a respondent could observe a cash transfer proposal given to everyone, unconditional, of very generous quantity (above the poverty threshold level), financed by a reform of personal income tax by everyone; a combination which might not be feasible and therefore affect support levels. In all the pre-testing sessions this concern did not arise among respondents, because their focus is to assess their desirability for the elements of the policy. We also argue that because we do not speak of the specific quantities of taxation and whether the funding mechanisms that appear would be the only funding mechanisms, we allow room for practical feasibility. It is also key to loosen the combinations allowed in the design, to be able to test how these combinations work. Imposing too many conditions, would not enable testing how different policy configurations play out in determining support.

A third concern is respondent satisficing. The pre-testing indicated that four rounds are an optimal number for respondent engagement. The number of tasks and dimensions is also very similar to the number found in previous work. However, to eliminate concerns of respondent satisficing the analysis is performed with the robustness checks of the first

and second rounds to make sure that findings are consistent throughout rounds. As outlined in the results section, findings are generally robust with few exceptions that do not compromise the general trends in the results, as these are consistent throughout, with minor differences.

A final concern is how the case selection influences the generalizability our results. One of the obvious factors which may influence attitudes towards welfare state reform is the domestic welfare state institutions. In this sense, contrary to much other work, I find that targeting need is not crucial, legal requirements neither, nor that generosity is not dependent on who is targeted either. It may be the case that having a universalistic welfare state influences preference for welfare state by rendering the consideration behind this dimension less important, as predicted by much literature (Korpi and Palme, 1998). However, this is something that future work could analyse.

Appendix C: Paper 3

Appendix C1

C1.1. Respondent quotas: target quota and respondent distribution after data cleaning process, for respondents in Finland

	Categories	Number of respondents	Target number	Respondent percentage	Target percentage
Gender	Male	297	489	45,5%	49%*
	Female	356	511	54,5%	51%*
Age	18-29	86	192	13,2%	19%*
	30-39	71	157	10,9%	16%*
	40-49	112	181	17,2%	18%
	50-59	137	192	21%	19%
	60-69	126	146	19,3%	15%*
	70+	121	131	18,5%	13%*
Region	Itä - Östra län	67	110	10,3%	11%
	Etelä - Södra län	267	416	40,9%	42%
	Länsi - Västra län	239	354	36,7%	35%
	Oulun - Lapin - Uleåborgs län	80	120	12,3%	12%

C1.2. Respondent quotas: target quota and respondent distribution after data cleaning process, for respondents in Spain

	Categories	Number of respondents	Target number	Respondent percentage	Target percentage
Gender	Male	374	500	50%	50%
	Female	374	500	50%	50%
Age	18-24	79	119	10,6%	12%
	25-34	106	152	14,2%	15%
	35-44	151	223	20,2%	22%
	45-54	154	204	20,6%	20%
	55-64	145	172	19,4%	17%*
	65-74	113	130	15,1%	13%
Region	Andalucía	134	182	18%	18%
	Aragón	21	28	2,8%	3%
	Principado de Asturias	17	22	2,3%	2%
	Illes Balears	20	24	2,5%	2%
	Canarias	36	45	4,8%	5%
	Cantabria	9	13	1,2%	1%
	Castilla y León	43	52	5,7%	5%
	Castilla-La Mancha	37	44	4,9%	4%
	Catalunya	119	163	15,9%	16%
	Comunitat Valenciana	79	106	10,6%	11%
	Extremadura	18	23	2,4%	2%
	Galicia	40	58	5,3%	6%
	Madrid	100	140	13,3%	14%
	Murcia	24	32	3,2%	3%
	Navarra	11	14	1,5%	1%
	País Vasco	34	47	4,5%	5%
	La Rioja	6	7	0,8%	1%

C1.3. The issue of redistribution preferences question

Given that the redistribution preferences question contains an element of targeting, it could be the case that individuals who perceive targeting as - more redistributive element are inclined to show a higher level of support for redistribution than those who perceive universal policies to be more redistributive. However, as shown by both distribution plots of preferences for redistribution across individuals with different perceptions individuals with universal and targeted prior have a very similar distribution of preferences for redistribution, which does not compromise the results in terms of distribution of preferences.

C1.4. Distribution of perceptions across support for redistribution (Finland)



C1.5. Distribution of perceptions across support for redistribution (Spain)



C1.6. Discussion of the relevance of the question wording for the perceptions of redistribution question.

A 9-point bipolar likert scale question is employed to measure perceptions for various reasons. First, the bipolar question setting is used to reflect the dichotomous nature of the logic of cash transfers. Although much research recognises that benefits are multidimensional, the debate on means-testing and universality is one which is dichotomous. The general line of this debate is that regardless of the type of means-testing is employed or degree of targeting, targeted schemes already have a particular type of filter for recipients that changes the logic of the benefit system generating a series of incentives, traps and conditioning that diverges substantially from universality.

The 9-point scale is employed to have a neutral option for individuals.

Finally, one may argue that the question specifies not only a redistributive mechanism, but a specific motive by which this mechanism may be more redistributive (both for targeting and universality). This was employed to reflect the nature of the debate and help position individuals who are more remote in the debate, trying to avoid having a bias of answers, in the sense of having a high concentration of informed individuals in the universality side of the spectrum, and a mixture of informed and non-informed individuals in the targeted extreme.

Another point that one may consider is that individuals may agree with the mechanisms but not the motive – here however, the key interest is the specific mechanism regardless of the motive –given that there are many other reasons why different individuals may believe one is more redistributive than another (as outline din the paper). The only concern would be that the motive changes the original position of the answer, but now I argue why this is not an issue. First, there may be the case that one individual slightly changes their position because they do not agree with the reason. However, this is not to worry because it is likely that an individuals does not substantially change the response only due to the motive, and especially if they strongly believe in this redistributive mechanism. It may be the case that the specific motive makes an individual change their mind with regards to which is the most redistributive mechanism. I argue that this is not concerning because then they select the option they believe under a context of information. In essence, the specification of the mechanism is not a threat to the perceptions question.

C1.7. Measuring perceptions about redistribution alternatively – question wording.

We are now going to present you with two hypothetical scenarios in two different countries. In both countries, those individuals with higher incomes pay more taxes. Country - has - basic income, that is, - universal, unconditional, individual cash payment ma to all population on - monthly basis. Each person receives the same quantity, but those with higher incomes pay more. Country B has an income support scheme only for those individuals who have lower incomes receive - monthly payment, and those with higher incomes pay more (but they pay less than in country A). Which country do you think is more beneficial for individuals with lower incomes? Here, beneficial is understood as those which have improved material prospects

C1.8. Measuring perceptions about redistribution alternatively – results



C1.9. Measuring perceptions about redistribution alternatively – discussion

Results of the alternative measurement of perceptions show very similar findings than the main dependent variable. First, there is - significantly higher proportion of individuals in Finland that perceive universal policies to be more redistributive in comparison to the case of Spain. Here the difference is 4% higher in Finland, while in the main dependent variable this is 3% which is very similar. The difference in perceptions regarding selective schemes is more prominent, without main dependent variable showing 1% difference, higher for Finnish respondents. Results above suggest the opposite: - higher proportion of individuals in Spain perceive selective schemes to be more redistributive, specifically 67% of the population, in comparison to 63% of the Finnish respondents. This 4% difference is also quite low, and overall, results suggest that the findings are robust: more individuals in Finland perceive universalism to be - more redistributive policy than in Spain, although the mainstream view is that selective schemes are more redistributive.

C1.10. Household income question wording and re-coding

Question wording	**Spanish options**	**Re-codification (Spain)**	**Finnish options**	**Re-codification (Finland)**
Please indicate the net disposable income (that is, income after tax) of your household, on - monthly basis – including wages, benefits, and other sources of income	Less 300€ 301 - 600€ 601 - 900€ 901 - 1.200€ 1.201 - 1.800€ 1.801 - 2.400€	1.200 or less = Low income; 1.201 – 3.000 = Medium income Above 3.000 = High income	Less than 1000 € 1000 - 2000 € 2001 - 3000 € 3001 - 4000 € 4001 - 5000 € 5001 - 6000 € 6001 - 7000 €	3000 or less = Low income; 3001 – 6000 = medium income; Above 6000 = High income

	2.401 - 3.000€ 3.001 - 4.500€ 4.501 - 6.000€ Above 6.000€		7000 - 10 000 € Above 10 000 €	

C1.11. Other socio-demographic variables: risk, employment status, ideology and gender (question wording and re-coding)

Variable	Question wording	Response categories	Re-codification
Employment status	Please indicate in which of the following situations you are now.	- Employed - Pensioner (and have worked before) - Pensioner (have not worked before) - Unemployed (have worked before) - Unemployed (Have not worked before) - Domestic worker (non-remunerated) - Care leave – same category as domestic worker - Student - Other situation, which?	Employed = Employed; Unemployed options = Unemployed; Pensioner, domestic worker, students and other = Pensioners and others;
Risk	How probable do you think it is that in the following 12 months, you will lose your job?	Very probable Quite probable Not very probable Not probable at all	Very and quite probable = High unemployment risk; Not very probable and not probable at all = Low risk;
Ideology	Please indicate whether you feel more on the right or left, ideologically speaking, where 0 is left, and 10 is right.	1 – 10	1 – 4 = Left 5 – 6 = Centre 7 – 10 = Right
Gender	Please indicate your gender.	Male Female	

Appendix C2: Predicting perceptions

C2.1. Model descriptions

As explained in the main text, in the regression models the dependent variables takes two main forms: (1) a numeric scale from 1 to 9, and (2) dichotomous where this variable is re-coded as 1 if priors are universal (6-9 in the scale), or 0 if selective (1-4 in the scale) discarding the ones who aren't sure or are neutral about this. For the former I perform several OLS regression models, and for the latter I employ both OLS and a General linear model. Now I turn to the independent variables included in the models. Redistribution support is a numeric variable ranging from 0 to 10. The income variable is taken from the household income question and re-coded into three categories: low, where I re-coded any quantity under 3.000€ in the case of Finland, and 1.200€ in the case of Spain; medium - 1.200€-3.000€ in Spain and 3.001€ - 6.000€ in Finland- and high - above 6.000€ in Finland and above 3.001€ in Spain. Age is a numeric variable. Employment status is a categorical variable including employed, unemployed, retired, student, and where the baseline category is non-remunerated domestic worker, and recoded as described in the table above. I also include risk models taken and re-coded from the question shown in the table above, and the ideology variable which is also described in A11 above. Overall, all the socio-demographic questions and re-coding are outlined in A10 and A11. The regressions are Ordinary Least Squares and General Linear Models, depending on the form of the dependent variable.

C2.2. Regression models for respondents in Finland employing the dichotomous re-codification of the main dependent variable, taking the form of 1 if priors are universal and 0 if they are selective.

	Dependent variable: Perceptions			
	Numeric		Categorical	
	OLS		*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.40* (0.17)	0.38*** (0.09)	-0.31 (1.01)	-0.40 (0.55)
Redistribution support	0.0003 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.05)
Income: Medium	0.17* (0.07)	0.06 (0.04)	1.11* (0.43)	0.40 (0.28)
Income: High	0.30* (0.13)	0.27** (0.08)	1.78* (0.75)	1.48** (0.47)
Gender: Men	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.31 (0.38)	-0.04 (0.23)
Education: No university studies	0.06 (0.06)	-0.002 (0.04)	0.36 (0.40)	-0.03 (0.25)
Risk: Low	-0.02 (0.08)		-0.16 (0.51)	
Employed		-0.07 (0.08)		-0.41 (0.46)
Pensionist		-0.06 (0.09)		-0.36 (0.58)
Unemployed		0.01 (0.09)		0.12 (0.53)
Ideology: Left	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.18 (0.48)	-0.47 (0.29)
Ideology: Right	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.30 (0.50)	-0.46 (0.31)
Age	-0.01* (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)
Observations	194	511	194	511
R^2	0.07	0.04		
Adjusted R^2	0.03	0.02		
Log Likelihood			-94.09	-241.65
Akaike Inf. Crit.			208.17	507.30
Residual Std. Error	0.41 (df = 184)	0.39 (df = 499)		
F Statistic	1.62 (df = 9; 184)	2.13* (df = 11; 499)		
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001			

C2.3. Regression models for respondents in Finland predicting perceptions using an alternative dependent variable measurement based on the question of two country scenarios, as specified in section 6 of this appendix. As with the main dependent variable, this one takes the value of 1 if priors are universal and 0 if they are selective.

	Dependent variable: Perceptions (alternative)			
	Numeric		Categorical	
	OLS		*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.50** (0.18)	0.52*** (0.10)	-0.01 (0.71)	0.08 (0.44)
Redistribution support	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.05 (0.05)	0.03 (0.03)
Income: Medium	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.05)	0.15 (0.28)	0.19 (0.20)
Income: High	0.04 (0.14)	0.05 (0.09)	0.17 (0.55)	0.23 (0.41)
Gender: Men	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.15 (0.27)	-0.14 (0.18)
Education: No university studies	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.27)	-0.23 (0.19)
Risk: Low	-0.06 (0.09)		-0.23 (0.35)	
Employed		-0.04 (0.08)		-0.15 (0.36)
Pensionist		-0.22* (0.10)		-1.00* (0.45)
Unemployed		-0.01 (0.10)		-0.05 (0.43)
Ideology: Left	-0.03 (0.08)	0.005 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.32)	0.02 (0.21)
Ideology: Right	0.001 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.003 (0.34)	-0.12 (0.23)
Age	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)
Observations	247	610	247	610
R^2	0.01	0.06		
Adjusted R^2	-0.03	0.04		
Log Likelihood			-168.88	-384.37
Akaike Inf. Crit.			357.76	792.74
Residual Std. Error	0.51 (df = 237)	0.47 (df = 598)		
F Statistic	0.27 (df = 9; 237)	3.45*** (df = 11; 598)		
Note:	*p **p ***p<0.001			

C2.4. Regression models for respondents in Spain predicting perceptions using the dichotomous re-codification of the main dependent variable, taking the form of 1 if priors are universal and 0 if they are selective.

	Dependent variable: Perceptions (main)			
	Numeric		Categorical	
	OLS		*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.29* (0.14)	0.07 (0.17)	-0.92 (0.90)	-2.29* (1.11)
Redistribution support	0.01 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.05 (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)
Income: Medium	-0.05 (0.07)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.27 (0.43)	0.09 (0.31)
Income: High	-0.03 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.19 (0.49)	0.24 (0.38)
Gender: Men	0.06 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	0.42 (0.32)	0.15 (0.25)
Education: No university studies	-0.02 (0.05)	0.001 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.33)	-0.002 (0.24)
Risk: Low	-0.13 (0.07)		-0.71 (0.39)	
Employed		0.01 (0.13)		0.07 (0.85)
Pensionist		-0.13 (0.13)		-0.95 (0.89)
Student		-0.02 (0.15)		-0.21 (1.02)
Unemployed		0.01 (0.14)		0.09 (0.89)
Ideology: Left	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.32 (0.36)	-0.15 (0.27)
Ideology: Right	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.39 (0.48)	-0.09 (0.35)
Age	-0.0000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Observations	286	532	286	532
R^2	0.03	0.02		
Adjusted R^2	-0.004	-0.01		
Log Likelihood			-137.66	-243.24
Akaike Inf. Crit.			295.32	512.49
Residual Std. Error	0.40 (df = 276)	0.38 (df = 519)		
F Statistic	0.86 (df = 9; 276)	0.77 (df = 12; 519)		
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001			

C2.5. Regression models for respondents in Spain predicting perceptions using an alternative dependent variable measurement based on the question of two country scenarios, as specified in section 6 of this appendix. As for the main dependent variable, this one takes the value of 1 if priors are universal and 0 if they are selective.

	Dependent variable:Perceptions (alternative)			
	Numeric		Categorical	
	OLS		*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.58*** (0.15)	0.40* (0.18)	0.38 (0.67)	-0.39 (0.82)
Redistribution support	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)
Income: Medium	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.004 (0.05)	-0.33 (0.33)	-0.02 (0.21)
Income: High	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.70 (0.39)	-0.08 (0.28)
Gender: Men	0.004 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.24)	-0.06 (0.18)
Education: No university studies	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.13 (0.24)	-0.06 (0.17)
Risk: Low	0.06 (0.07)		0.26 (0.33)	
Employed		0.01 (0.14)		0.03 (0.64)
Pensionist		-0.05 (0.14)		-0.24 (0.66)
Student		0.09 (0.16)		0.36 (0.72)
Unemployed		0.05 (0.15)		0.21 (0.67)
Ideology: Left	0.11 (0.06)	0.05 (0.04)	0.49 (0.27)	0.22 (0.19)
Ideology: Right	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.36)	-0.33 (0.27)
Age	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Observations	351	669	351	669
R^2	0.03	0.02		
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.004		
Log Likelihood			-221.07	-421.77
Akaike Inf. Crit.			462.14	869.55
Residual Std. Error	0.48 (df = 341)	0.47 (df = 656)		
F Statistic	1.11 (df = 9; 341)	1.22 (df = 12; 656)		
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001			

3. Appendix C3: predicting redistribution support

C3.1: Stepwise OLS regressions predicting redistribution support for respondents in Finland (these are the risk models and do not include perceptions)

	Dependent variable:					
	Redistribution support					
	OLS					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	6.48*** (0.14)	6.38*** (0.17)	6.48*** (0.18)	7.90*** (0.49)	7.62*** (0.52)	6.59*** (0.82)
Income: Medium	-1.15*** (0.24)	-1.18*** (0.24)	-1.11*** (0.25)	-1.14** (0.36)	-0.87* (0.35)	-0.91** (0.35)
Income: High	-2.45*** (0.48)	-2.52*** (0.48)	-2.39*** (0.49)	-3.15*** (0.70)	-2.53*** (0.67)	-2.52*** (0.67)
Gender: Men		0.24 (0.22)	0.21 (0.23)	0.15 (0.35)	0.40 (0.34)	0.44 (0.34)
Education: No university studies			-0.31 (0.24)	-0.32 (0.35)	-0.17 (0.34)	-0.06 (0.34)
Risk: Low				-1.43** (0.44)	-1.17** (0.43)	-1.26** (0.43)
Ideology: Left					0.57 (0.40)	0.49 (0.40)
Ideology: Right					-1.68*** (0.41)	-1.76*** (0.41)
Age						0.02 (0.01)
Observations	621	621	621	247	247	247
R^2	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.14	0.23	0.24
Adjusted R^2	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.13	0.21	0.21
Residual Std. Error	2.75 (df = 618)	2.75 (df = 617)	2.75 (df = 616)	2.67 (df = 241)	2.55 (df = 239)	2.54 (df = 238)
F Statistic	21.01*** (df = 2; 618)	14.39*** (df = 3; 617)	11.24*** (df = 4; 616)	8.15*** (df = 5; 241)	10.09*** (df = 7; 239)	9.21*** (df = 8; 238)
Note:	*p **p ***p<0.001					

C3.2: Stepwise OLS regressions predicting redistribution support for respondents in Finland (these are the employment status models and do not include perceptions)

	Dependent variable:					
	Redistribution support					
	OLS					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	6.48*** (0.14)	6.38*** (0.17)	6.48*** (0.18)	5.19*** (0.42)	4.91*** (0.41)	4.78*** (0.49)
Income: Medium	-1.15*** (0.24)	-1.18*** (0.24)	-1.11*** (0.25)	-1.22*** (0.25)	-0.83*** (0.24)	-0.84*** (0.24)
Income: High	-2.45*** (0.48)	-2.52*** (0.48)	-2.39*** (0.49)	-2.50*** (0.51)	-1.92*** (0.48)	-1.93*** (0.48)
Gender: Men		0.24 (0.22)	0.21 (0.23)	0.14 (0.22)	0.28 (0.21)	0.29 (0.21)
Education: No university studies			-0.31 (0.24)	-0.37 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.23)	-0.14 (0.23)
Employed				1.54*** (0.45)	1.63*** (0.42)	1.56*** (0.45)
Pensionist				1.29** (0.44)	1.67*** (0.42)	1.50** (0.54)
Unemployed				1.90*** (0.53)	2.02*** (0.50)	1.93*** (0.53)
Ideology: Left					0.91*** (0.25)	0.90*** (0.25)
Ideology: Right					-1.66*** (0.26)	-1.68*** (0.26)
Age						0.005 (0.01)
Observations	621	621	621	610	610	610
R^2	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.21	0.21
Adjusted R^2	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.19	0.19
Residual Std. Error	2.75 (df = 618)	2.75 (df = 617)	2.75 (df = 616)	2.72 (df = 602)	2.55 (df = 600)	2.55 (df = 599)
F Statistic	21.01*** (df = 2; 618)	14.39*** (df = 3; 617)	11.24*** (df = 4; 616)	9.03*** (df = 7; 602)	17.39*** (df = 9; 600)	15.65*** (df = 10; 599)
Note:	*p **p ***p<0.001					

C3.3: Stepwise OLS regressions predicting redistribution support for respondents in Finland (these are the risk models and include perceptions)

	Dependent variable:						
	Redistribution support						
	OLS						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	6.30*** (0.23)	6.65*** (0.24)	6.55*** (0.26)	6.66*** (0.27)	7.94*** (0.59)	7.71*** (0.61)	6.59*** (0.93)
Perceptions	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.001 (0.08)
Income: Medium		-1.14*** (0.24)	-1.16*** (0.24)	-1.10*** (0.25)	-1.14** (0.36)	-0.86* (0.35)	-0.90* (0.35)
Income: High		-2.39*** (0.48)	-2.46*** (0.49)	-2.33*** (0.50)	-3.14*** (0.70)	-2.50*** (0.68)	-2.52*** (0.68)
Gender: Men			0.23 (0.22)	0.19 (0.23)	0.14 (0.35)	0.39 (0.34)	0.44 (0.34)
Education: No university studies				-0.32 (0.24)	-0.32 (0.35)	-0.17 (0.34)	-0.06 (0.34)
Risk: Low					-1.43** (0.44)	-1.17** (0.43)	-1.26** (0.43)
Ideology: Left						0.56 (0.40)	0.49 (0.40)
Ideology: Right						-1.69*** (0.41)	-1.76*** (0.41)
Age							0.02 (0.02)
Observations	653	621	621	621	247	247	247
R^2	0.005	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.14	0.23	0.24
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.12	0.20	0.21
Residual Std. Error	2.82 (df = 651)	2.75 (df = 617)	2.75 (df = 616)	2.75 (df = 615)	2.68 (df = 240)	2.56 (df = 238)	2.55 (df = 237)
F Statistic	3.16 (df = 1; 651)	14.30*** (df = 3; 617)	10.98*** (df = 4; 616)	9.15*** (df = 5; 615)	6.76*** (df = 6; 240)	8.80*** (df = 8; 238)	8.15*** (df = 9; 237)

Note: *p **p ***p<0.001

C3.4: Stepwise OLS regressions predicting redistribution support for respondents in Finland (these are the employment status models and include perceptions)

	Dependent variable:						
	Redistribution support						
	OLS						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	6.30*** (0.23)	6.65*** (0.24)	6.55*** (0.26)	6.66*** (0.27)	5.36*** (0.48)	5.08*** (0.47)	4.95*** (0.55)
Perceptions	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Income: Medium		-1.14*** (0.24)	-1.16*** (0.24)	-1.10*** (0.25)	-1.21*** (0.25)	-0.82*** (0.24)	-0.83*** (0.24)
Income: High		-2.39*** (0.48)	-2.46*** (0.49)	-2.33*** (0.50)	-2.45*** (0.51)	-1.87*** (0.48)	-1.88*** (0.48)
Gender: Men			0.23 (0.22)	0.19 (0.23)	0.13 (0.23)	0.27 (0.21)	0.28 (0.21)
Education: No university studies				-0.32 (0.24)	-0.37 (0.24)	-0.15 (0.23)	-0.15 (0.23)
Employed					1.52*** (0.45)	1.61*** (0.42)	1.54*** (0.45)
Pensionist					1.25** (0.45)	1.64*** (0.42)	1.48** (0.54)
Unemployed					1.88*** (0.53)	2.00*** (0.50)	1.92*** (0.53)
Ideology: Left						0.89*** (0.26)	0.89*** (0.26)
Ideology: Right						-1.68*** (0.26)	-1.69*** (0.26)
Age							0.004 (0.01)
Observations	653	621	621	621	610	610	610
R^2	0.005	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.21	0.21
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.19	0.19
Residual Std. Error	2.82 (df = 651)	2.75 (df = 617)	2.75 (df = 616)	2.75 (df = 615)	2.72 (df = 601)	2.55 (df = 599)	2.55 (df = 598)
F Statistic	3.16 (df = 1; 651)	14.30*** (df = 3; 617)	10.98*** (df = 4; 616)	9.15*** (df = 5; 615)	7.96*** (df = 8; 601)	15.69*** (df = 10; 599)	14.26*** (df = 11; 598)

Note: *p **p ***p<0.001

C3.5: Stepwise OLS regressions predicting redistribution support for respondents in Spain (these are the risk models and do not include perceptions)

	Dependent variable:					
	Redistribution support					
	OLS					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	7.02*** (0.22)	6.90*** (0.24)	6.84*** (0.27)	7.67*** (0.48)	6.57*** (0.48)	7.07*** (0.64)
Income: Medium	-0.70** (0.26)	-0.72** (0.26)	-0.71** (0.26)	-1.11** (0.41)	-1.19** (0.37)	-1.17** (0.37)
Income: High	-0.66* (0.32)	-0.70* (0.33)	-0.67* (0.33)	-1.29** (0.47)	-1.36** (0.42)	-1.33** (0.42)
Gender: Men		0.27 (0.21)	0.27 (0.21)	0.17 (0.28)	0.52* (0.26)	0.59* (0.26)
Education: No university studies			0.11 (0.21)	0.08 (0.29)	0.05 (0.26)	0.11 (0.27)
Risk: Low				-0.35 (0.39)	-0.04 (0.36)	0.01 (0.36)
Ideology: Left					1.98*** (0.28)	1.98*** (0.28)
Ideology: Right					-0.86* (0.38)	-0.86* (0.38)
Age						-0.01 (0.01)
Observations	675	675	675	351	351	351
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.21	0.21
Adjusted R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.20
Residual Std. Error	2.70 (df = 672)	2.70 (df = 671)	2.70 (df = 670)	2.61 (df = 345)	2.36 (df = 343)	2.36 (df = 342)
F Statistic	3.93* (df = 2; 672)	3.18* (df = 3; 671)	2.44* (df = 4; 670)	2.35* (df = 5; 345)	13.06*** (df = 7; 343)	11.61*** (df = 8; 342)

Note: *p **p ***p<0.001

C3.6: Stepwise OLS regressions predicting redistribution support for respondents in Spain (these are the employment status models and do not include perceptions)

	Dependent variable:					
	Redistribution support					
	OLS					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	7.02*** (0.22)	6.90*** (0.24)	6.84*** (0.27)	6.70*** (0.80)	6.68*** (0.74)	6.73*** (0.92)
Income: Medium	-0.70** (0.26)	-0.72** (0.26)	-0.71** (0.26)	-0.70** (0.27)	-0.65** (0.25)	-0.65** (0.25)
Income: High	-0.66* (0.32)	-0.70* (0.33)	-0.67* (0.33)	-0.69* (0.35)	-0.75* (0.32)	-0.75* (0.32)
Gender: Men		0.27 (0.21)	0.27 (0.21)	0.33 (0.22)	0.46* (0.21)	0.46* (0.21)
Education: No university studies			0.11 (0.21)	0.12 (0.22)	0.10 (0.20)	0.10 (0.20)
Employed				0.15 (0.78)	-0.61 (0.72)	-0.62 (0.74)
Pensionist				-0.10 (0.81)	-0.69 (0.75)	-0.68 (0.76)
Student				0.31 (0.84)	-0.70 (0.78)	-0.73 (0.84)
Unemployed				-0.02 (0.81)	-0.83 (0.75)	-0.84 (0.77)
Ideology: Left					1.89*** (0.21)	1.89*** (0.21)
Ideology: Right					-0.79** (0.29)	-0.79** (0.29)
Age						-0.001 (0.01)
Observations	675	675	675	669	669	669
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.17	0.17
Adjusted R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.004	0.15	0.15
Residual Std. Error	2.70 (df = 672)	2.70 (df = 671)	2.70 (df = 670)	2.71 (df = 660)	2.50 (df = 658)	2.50 (df = 657)
F Statistic	3.93* (df = 2; 672)	3.18* (df = 3; 671)	2.44* (df = 4; 670)	1.31 (df = 8; 660)	13.24*** (df = 10; 658)	12.02*** (df = 11; 657)
Note:	*p **p ***p<0.001					

C3.7: Stepwise OLS regressions predicting redistribution support for respondents in Spain (these are the risk models and include perceptions)

	Dependent variable:						
	Redistribution support						
	OLS						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	6.70*** (0.20)	7.23*** (0.28)	7.11*** (0.29)	7.05*** (0.32)	7.82*** (0.55)	6.71*** (0.54)	7.27*** (0.71)
Perceptions	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Income: Medium		-0.70** (0.26)	-0.72** (0.26)	-0.70** (0.26)	-1.10** (0.41)	-1.19** (0.37)	-1.17** (0.37)
Income: High		-0.65* (0.32)	-0.68* (0.33)	-0.66* (0.33)	-1.29** (0.47)	-1.36** (0.42)	-1.32** (0.42)
Gender: Men			0.27 (0.21)	0.27 (0.21)	0.18 (0.28)	0.53* (0.26)	0.61* (0.27)
Education: No university studies				0.10 (0.21)	0.07 (0.29)	0.05 (0.26)	0.11 (0.27)
Risk: Low					-0.37 (0.40)	-0.05 (0.36)	-0.003 (0.36)
Ideology: Left						1.97*** (0.28)	1.97*** (0.28)
Ideology: Right						-0.87* (0.38)	-0.87* (0.38)
Age							-0.01 (0.01)
Observations	747	675	675	675	351	351	351
R^2	0.002	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.21
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.19
Residual Std. Error	2.68 (df = 745)	2.70 (df = 671)	2.69 (df = 670)	2.70 (df = 669)	2.61 (df = 344)	2.36 (df = 342)	2.36 (df = 341)
F Statistic	1.75 (df = 1; 745)	3.10* (df = 3; 671)	2.76* (df = 4; 670)	2.25* (df = 5; 669)	2.01 (df = 6; 344)	11.45*** (df = 8; 342)	10.35*** (df = 9; 341)
Note:	*p **p ***p<0.001						

C3.8: Stepwise OLS regressions predicting redistribution support for respondents in Spain (these are the employment status models and include perceptions)

	Dependent variable:						
	Redistribution support						
	OLS						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	6.70*** (0.20)	7.23*** (0.28)	7.11*** (0.29)	7.05*** (0.32)	6.91*** (0.82)	6.88*** (0.75)	6.96*** (0.93)
Perceptions	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
Income: Medium		-0.70** (0.26)	-0.72** (0.26)	-0.70** (0.26)	-0.69* (0.27)	-0.64** (0.25)	-0.64** (0.25)
Income: High		-0.65* (0.32)	-0.68* (0.33)	-0.66* (0.33)	-0.67 (0.35)	-0.73* (0.32)	-0.73* (0.32)
Gender: Men			0.27 (0.21)	0.27 (0.21)	0.34 (0.22)	0.47* (0.21)	0.47* (0.21)
Education: No university studies				0.10 (0.21)	0.12 (0.22)	0.09 (0.20)	0.10 (0.20)
Employed					0.16 (0.78)	-0.60 (0.72)	-0.62 (0.74)
Pensionist					-0.11 (0.81)	-0.70 (0.75)	-0.69 (0.75)
Student					0.34 (0.84)	-0.67 (0.78)	-0.71 (0.84)
Unemployed					-0.002 (0.81)	-0.81 (0.75)	-0.83 (0.77)
Ideology: Left						1.89*** (0.21)	1.88*** (0.21)
Ideology: Right						-0.80** (0.29)	-0.80** (0.29)
Age							-0.001 (0.01)
Observations	747	675	675	675	669	669	669
R^2	0.002	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.17	0.17
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.005	0.16	0.15
Residual Std. Error	2.68 (df = 745)	2.70 (df = 671)	2.69 (df = 670)	2.70 (df = 669)	2.71 (df = 659)	2.49 (df = 657)	2.50 (df = 656)

F Statistic	1.75 (df = 3.10* (df 2.76* (df 2.25* (df 1.34 (df = 12.21*** (df 11.17*** (df 1; 745) = 3; 671) = 4; 670) = 5; 669) 9; 659) = 11; 657) = 12; 656)
Note:	*p **p ***p<0.001

Appendix D: Paper 4

D1.1.: Quota of Finnish respondents

	Categories	Number of respondents	Target number	Respondent percentage	Target percentage
Gender	Male	297	489	45,5%	49%*
	Female	356	511	54,5%	51%*
Age	18-29	86	192	13,2%	19%*
	30-39	71	157	10,9%	16%*
	40-49	112	181	17,2%	18%
	50-59	137	192	21%	19%
	60-69	126	146	19,3%	15%*
	70+	121	131	18,5%	13%*
Region	Itä - Östra län	67	110	10,3%	11%
	Etelä - Södra län	267	416	40,9%	42%
	Länsi - Västra län	239	354	36,7%	35%
	Oulun - Lapin - Uleåborgs län	80	120	12,3%	12%

D1.2.: Quota of Spanish respondents

	Categories	Number of respondents	Target number	Respondent percentage	Target percentage
Gender	Male	374	500	50%	50%
	Female	374	500	50%	50%
Age	18-24	79	119	10,6%	12%
	25-34	106	152	14,2%	15%
	35-44	151	223	20,2%	22%
	45-54	154	204	20,6%	20%
	55-64	145	172	19,4%	17%*
	65-74	113	130	15,1%	13%
Region	Andalucía	134	182	18%	18%
	Aragón	21	28	2,8%	3%
	Principado de Asturias	17	22	2,3%	2%
	Illes Balears	20	24	2,5%	2%
	Canarias	36	45	4,8%	5%
	Cantabria	9	13	1,2%	1%
	Castilla y León	43	52	5,7%	5%
	Castilla-La Mancha	37	44	4,9%	4%
	Catalunya	119	163	15,9%	16%
	Comunitat Valenciana	79	106	10,6%	11%
	Extremadura	18	23	2,4%	2%
	Galicia	40	58	5,3%	6%
	Madrid	100	140	13,3%	14%
	Murcia	24	32	3,2%	3%
	Navarra	11	14	1,5%	1%
	País Vasco	34	47	4,5%	5%
	La Rioja	6	7	0,8%	1%

D1.3: Full conjoint design: the attributes column includes all the attributes that respondents saw within the tasks, and the collapsed categories shows how these attributes were collapsed for the analysis in this paper.

Dimension	**Attributes**	**Collapsed Categories**
Target population sub-groups	To those under the poverty threshold	Targeting need
	To those with dependent family members	
	To those with minors	Minors
	Everyone	Universalization
Legal requirements	Residency permit 6 months ago	Residency
	Residency permit 1 year ago	
	Residency permit 5 years ago	
	Citizenship	Citizenship
Conditionality	Full-time employed	Conditional on employment

Dimension	Attributes	Collapsed Categories
	Self-employed	
	Part-time employed	
	Involved in volunteering or community work	Conditional on participating in society in different ways
	Training or education	
	Unable to work	Targeting need / reciprocity
	Unemployed but looking for employment	
	Unemployed and not looking for employment	Universalization
	Unconditional	
Generosity	Eurodividend	Does not cover living costs
	Covers living costs without housing	Covers part or all of living costs
	Minus 25% of poverty threshold	
	Poverty threshold	
	Plus 25% of poverty threshold	Above minimum need
Recipients	Households	
	Individuals	
Funding mechanisms	Increase taxes to corporations	Capital/technology taxation;
	Increase capital income tax	
	Introduce a tax on technology	
	Introduce a tax on inter-bank financial transactions	
	Cutting unemployment benefits	Reducing targeted welfare spending
	Cutting social assistance for low income families	
	Cutting housing benefits	
	Cutting pension spending	Reducing universal welfare spending
	Cutting spending on health	
	Cutting spending on education	
	Introduce a new environmental tax	Environmental taxation
	Increase Environmental taxes (Finland: excise liquid fuels; Spain: hydrocarbons)	
	Increase inheritance tax	
	Cut spending on defence	
	Increase personal income tax to everyone	
	Increase personal income tax to highest incomes	

D1.4: Screenshot of what respondents saw in each task.

First round

In the following table you will see two policy proposals. The first column indicates the main characteristics and the following two specify the features of the two proposals. Please read carefully both alternatives and select the proposal you prefer.

Policy characteristics	Proposal 1	Proposal 2
To whom the benefit is directed	Everyone	Individuals with minors under their charge
Conditions to recieve the benefit	Having full-time employment	Being involved in studying or training
Benefit recipients	Families/households	Families/households
Quantity	550€	550€
Legal requirements	Having a residence permit (since at least 6 months ago)	Having a residence permit (since at least 6 months ago)
How it will be funded	Reducing housing expenditure	Reducing education expenditure

D1.6: Screenshot of the perceptions question.

Please indicate which statement you agree with the most by positioning yourself in this scale.

Means-tested benefits are a more effective for redistribution, because they target benefits on those who need it the most

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Universal benefits are a more effective for redistribution because they do not attach stigma or generate benefit dependency

D1.7: Data reshaping process, dependent variables and analysis.

To perform the relevant analysis, I reshape current data so that each observation (data row) is a policy proposal k of a task j, presented to a respondent i. This means that for the total 748 respondents, leaving a total of 4948 observations, where each observation is a policy package or profile, shown to one respondent, in one specific round, which was either selected or not. Each respondent observes two profiles at one time, completes 4 of each of these rounds, meaning that he/she observes a total of 8 policy profiles. Each

respondent is required to select one policy proposal from each pair and rate the two of them which leaves us with two dependent variables –forced choice and support rate. I code the first dependent variable Y1 - forced choice- as 1 if the policy proposal is selected, and 0 if it is the unselected policy proposal. The second dependent variable Y2, the support rate, is a number ranging from 0 to 10, depending on the support given to the policy proposal -both to the unselected and selected one. Each observation includes a vector of the attributes presented in that observation. Dependent variables Y1 and Y2 are modelled as a function of X that a vector is containing the attributes that the respondents were exposed to. This can be analysed with a simple Ordinary Least Squares linear regression (Hainmueller, et al 2014).

D1.8. Screenshot of the redistribution perceptions question.



Appendix D2: Redistribution perceptions

D2.1: OLS and GLM regressions predicting perceptions for respondents in Finland. The dependent variable is the dichotomous re-codification of the main dependent variable, taking the form of 1 if priors are universal and 0 if they are selective.

	Dependent variable: Perceptions			
	Numeric		Categorical	
	OLS		*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.40* (0.17)	0.38*** (0.09)	-0.31 (1.01)	-0.40 (0.55)
Redistribution support	0.0003 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.05)
Income: Medium	0.17* (0.07)	0.06 (0.04)	1.11* (0.43)	0.40 (0.28)
Income: High	0.30* (0.13)	0.27** (0.08)	1.78* (0.75)	1.48** (0.47)
Gender: Men	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.31 (0.38)	-0.04 (0.23)
Education: No university studies	0.06 (0.06)	-0.002 (0.04)	0.36 (0.40)	-0.03 (0.25)
Risk: Low	-0.02 (0.08)		-0.16 (0.51)	
Employed		-0.07 (0.08)		-0.41 (0.46)
Pensionist		-0.06 (0.09)		-0.36 (0.58)
Unemployed		0.01 (0.09)		0.12 (0.53)
Ideology: Left	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.18 (0.48)	-0.47 (0.29)
Ideology: Right	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.30 (0.50)	-0.46 (0.31)
Age	-0.01* (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)
Observations	194	511	194	511
R^2	0.07	0.04		
Adjusted R^2	0.03	0.02		
Log Likelihood			-94.09	-241.65
Akaike Inf. Crit.			208.17	507.30
Residual Std. Error	0.41 (df = 184)	0.39 (df = 499)		
F Statistic	1.62 (df = 9; 184)	2.13* (df = 11; 499)		
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001			

D2.2: OLS and GLM regressions predicting perceptions for respondents in Spain. The dependent variable is the dichotomous re-codification of the main dependent variable, taking the form of 1 if priors are universal and 0 if they are selective.

	Numeric *OLS*		Categorical *logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.50** (0.18)	0.52*** (0.10)	-0.01 (0.71)	0.08 (0.44)
Redistribution support	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.05 (0.05)	0.03 (0.03)
Income: Medium	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.05)	0.15 (0.28)	0.19 (0.20)
Income: High	0.04 (0.14)	0.05 (0.09)	0.17 (0.55)	0.23 (0.41)
Gender: Men	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.15 (0.27)	-0.14 (0.18)
Education: No university studies	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.27)	-0.23 (0.19)
Risk: Low	-0.06 (0.09)		-0.23 (0.35)	
Employed		-0.04 (0.08)		-0.15 (0.36)
Pensionist		-0.22* (0.10)		-1.00* (0.45)
Unemployed		-0.01 (0.10)		-0.05 (0.43)
Ideology: Left	-0.03 (0.08)	0.005 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.32)	0.02 (0.21)
Ideology: Right	0.001 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.003 (0.34)	-0.12 (0.23)
Age	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)
Observations	247	610	247	610
R^2	0.01	0.06		
Adjusted R^2	-0.03	0.04		
Log Likelihood			-168.88	-384.37
Akaike Inf. Crit.			357.76	792.74
Residual Std. Error	0.51 (df = 237)	0.47 (df = 598)		
F Statistic	0.27 (df = 9; 237)	3.45*** (df = 11; 598)		
Note:	*p **p ***p<0.001			

D2.3: Distribution of perceptions across redistribution support (Finland)



D2.4: Distribution of perceptions across redistribution support (Spain)



D2.5. Discussion of shapers of perceptions.

The main purpose of this section is to show that perceptions are unrelated to support for redistribution and identify whether there are any observable covariates that predict perceptions and may influence support for redistribution. The main objective of this analysis is to ensure that only perceptions are driving the differences in welfare state preferences, across individuals with different redistribution support levels. As shown by the regression models and the distribution graphs of redistribution support across individuals with different perceptions, there is no evidence to believe that perceptions are predicted or explained by redistribution support. Regression models in Spain suggest that no observable variable can explain perceptions. In Finland, there is evidence that being high income and medium income –the latter only in the employment models- predict having a universal prior (i.e., believing that universal cash transfers are more redistributive). This would be of concern if we find that there is a higher concentration of high/medium income individuals within the group with universal priors than those with targeted priors, which may also be driving the differences in preferences across individuals with different priors. It is not the case that we find a higher proportion of high income individuals believe that universality is more redistributive. In terms of high income respondents, we have 17 observations (47,2%) who believe targeted schemes are more redistributive, 12 (33%) believing that universality is more redistributive and 7 (19,4%) who are less balanced to the universal/targeted extreme in their perceptions. The proportion of high income individuals believing that targeting is more effective is not higher than that of low (70,4%) or medium incomes (65,4%). In essence, it is not the case that we find that individuals with universal priors have a higher concentration of high and medium income individuals that may drive the differences in preferences.

D2.6. Preferences across income groups in Finland.

A potential concern deriving from the fact that income predicts perceptions in Finland, is that the differences in preferences may also be driven by differences in income distribution across perceptions. To discard this, we have shown above that this is not the case: there is not a higher distribution of high income individuals across universal perceptions. However, to ensure that these preferences are not driven by high income, we test how cash transfer support works across income groups, and show that the preferences of high income are not the same as the preferences of universalists. High income individuals in Finland support significantly less universality in comparison to other forms of design like targeting, but also in relation to other income groups. This is not something that we observe across universalists: they do not show differences in preferences across designs or in comparison to individuals with other priors. In the conditionality dimension, this is the same: the preferences of income groups are differences to the preferences of individuals with different perceptions. Universalists show significantly lower support for conditioning on need than individuals with selective or targeted priors, which is certainly not the case across high income individuals. Overall, we discard the possibility that

universal-targeted perceptions gap in cash preferences is correlated or related to income, or any other observable variable.



Appendix D3: Redistribution support and cash transfer preferences

D3.1: Preferences for the population sub-groups and conditionality dimension, across individuals with different redistribution preferences. The table shows the estimates for the marginal mean support rate dependent variable. (Finland)

Redistribution stance	Dimension	Attribute	Estimate	Standard error	Z value	P-value	Lower CI	Upper CI
Against	**Target**	**Universal**	3,88	0,15	25,38	4,55	3,58	4,18
		Targeted	4,10	0,11	39,02	0,00	3,90	4,31
	Conditions	**Conditional**	4,24	0,21	19,96	1,26	3,82	4,65
		Unconditional	4,32	0,16	27,38	4,20	4,01	4,63
For	**Target**	**Universal**	4,69	0,10	48,11	0,00	4,50	4,88
		Targeted	4,59	0,07	63,57	0,00	4,45	4,73
	Conditions	**Conditional**	5,08	0,15	33,77	4,61	4,78	5,37
		Unconditional	4,66	0,11	43,62	0,00	4,45	4,87
Neutral	**Target**	**Universal**	4,31	0,17	24,74	3,52	3,97	4,65
		Targeted	4,08	0,13	31,29	5,56	3,82	4,34
	Conditions	**Conditional**	4,15	0,22	18,80	7,23	3,71	4,58
		Unconditional	3,99	0,19	21,08	1,20	3,62	4,36

D3.2: Preferences for the population sub-groups and conditionality dimension, across individuals with different redistribution preferences. The table shows the estimates for the marginal mean support rate dependent variable. (Spain)

Redistribution stance	Dimension	Attribute	Estimate	Standard error	Z-value	P-value	Lower CI	Upper CI
Against	**Target**	**Universal**	3,14	0,15	20,41	1,40E-88	2,84	3,44
		Targeted	3,69	0,12	31,22	5.82e-214	3,46	3,92
	Conditions	**Conditional**	3,39	0,26	13,31	2.15e-40	2,89	3,89
		Unconditional	3,49	0,17	20,61	2.45e-94	3,16	3,82
For	**Target**	**Universal**	4,49	0,09	51,30	0,00E+00	4,32	4,66
		Targeted	4,69	0,06	77,35	0,00E+00	4,57	4,81
	Conditions	**Conditional**	4,81	0,14	34,33	3.24e-258	4,53	5,08
		Unconditional	4,43	0,09	50,85	0,00E+00	4,26	4,60
Neutral	**Target**	**Universal**	4,25	0,16	27,32	2.76e-164	3,95	4,56
		Targeted	4,54	0,11	41,88	0,00E+00	4,33	4,75
	Conditions	**Conditional**	4,34	0,26	16,60	7,07E-59	3,83	4,86
		Unconditional	4,16	0,15	28,44	5.82e-178	3,87	4,44

D3.3: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across individuals with different redistribution preferences, full conjoint design (Finland)



D3.4: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across individuals with different redistribution preferences, full conjoint design (Spain)



D3.5: Robustness checks: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across individuals with different redistribution preferences, full conjoint design. The analysis only includes the two first respondent rounds. (Finland)



D3.6: Robustness checks: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across individuals with different redistribution preferences, full conjoint design. The analysis only includes the two first respondent rounds. (Spain)



Appendix D4: Redistribution perceptions and preferences for cash transfer reform

D4.1: Marginal means of the forced choice dependent variable across pro-redistribution individuals with different perceptions (Finland)



D4.2: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of the support rate dependent variable for pro-redistribution individuals with different perceptions (Finland)



D4.3: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across pro-redistribution individuals with different perceptions. Full conjoint design. (Finland)



D4.4: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across pro-redistribution individuals with different perceptions. Full conjoint design. (Finland)

Priors	Dimension	Attribute	Estimate	Standard error	Z-value	P-value	Lower CI	Upper CI
Targeted	**Target**	**Universal**	4,81	0,12	40,41	0	4,58	5,05
		Targeted	4,54	0,09	50,34	0	4,37	4,72
	Conditions	**Conditional**	5,14	0,17	29,54	8,78E-178	4,80	5,48
		Unconditional	4,64	0,14	33,92	3,00E-238	4,37	4,91
Universal	**Target**	**Universal**	4,48	0,23	19,69	2,41E-72	4,03	4,93
		Targeted	4,26	0,17	25,42	1,48E-128	3,93	4,59
	Conditions	**Conditional**	4,04	0,36	11,31	1,12E-15	3,34	4,74
		Unconditional	4,40	0,24	18,69	5,63E-64	3,94	4,86

D4.5: Robustness checks: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across pro-redistribution individuals with different perceptions. Full conjoint design. The analysis only includes the two first conjoint rounds. (Finland)



D4.6: Marginal means of the forced choice dependent variable across pro-redistribution individuals with different perceptions. Full conjoint design.



D4.7: Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) of the support rate dependent variable, across pro-redistribution individuals in Spain.



D4.8: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across pro-redistribution individuals in Spain. Full conjoint design.



D4.9: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across pro-redistribution individuals in Spain.

Priors	Dimension	Attribute	Estimate	Standard error	Z-value	P-value	Lower CI	Upper CI
Targeted	**Target**	**Universal**	4,31	0,104495676	41,21	0,00E+00	4,10	4,51
		Targeted	4,61	0,07264959	63,48	0,00E+00	4,47	4,75
	Conditions	**Conditional**	4,70	0,171214182	27,45	6,76E-152	4,36	5,04
		Unconditional	4,36	0,106776112	40,80	0,00E+00	4,15	4,57
Universal	**Target**	**Universal**	5,37	0,242095736	22,19	4,76E-96	4,90	5,85
		Targeted	4,88	0,169930834	28,73	1,41E-167	4,55	5,22
	Conditions	**Conditional**	5,14	0,401289878	12,82	1,34E-24	4,36	5,93
		Unconditional	4,72	0,236950198	19,93	2,43E-74	4,26	5,19

D4.10. Robustness checks: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable across pro-redistribution individuals in Spain, with the full conjoint design. The analysis only includes the two first task rounds.



Anti-redistribution individuals

D4.11: Marginal means of the forced choice dependent variable for individuals opposed to redistribution across different perceptions (Finland).



D4.12: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for individuals opposed to redistribution across different perceptions (Finland).



D13. Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable for individuals opposed to redistribution across different perceptions. Full conjoint design (Finland)



D4.14: Robustness: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable for individuals opposed to redistribution across different perceptions. Full conjoint design. The analysis includes only two first rounds of respondent tasks (Finland)



D4.15: Marginal means of the forced choice dependent variable for anti-redistribution individuals with different perceptions (Spain)



D4.16: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for individuals opposed to redistribution across different perceptions (Spain).



D4.17. Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable for anti-redistribution individuals with different perceptions (Spain)



D4.18: Robustness: Marginal means of the support rate dependent variable for anti-redistribution individuals with different perceptions (Spain). Full conjoint design. The analysis only includes the two first respondent rounds.



Appendix D5 – Redistribution support

D5.1: OLS regressions predicting redistribution support in Finland and Spain.

	Dependent variable:			
	Redistribution preferences (numeric)			
	Spain	Finland	Spain	Finland
Constant	5.26***	5.09***	5.46***	4.53***
	(0.50)	(0.83)	(0.32)	(0.53)
Income: Low	1.36**	2.53**	0.73*	1.98**
	(0.42)	(0.67)	(0.32)	(0.49)
Income: Medium	0.17	1.66*	0.09	1.14*
	(0.30)	(0.66)	(0.26)	(0.49)
Gender: Men	0.52*	0.40	0.43*	0.33
	(0.26)	(0.34)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Risk: Low	-0.04	-1.17**		
	(0.36)	(0.43)		
Employment status: Student/retired			-0.08	0.03
			(0.22)	(0.24)
Employment status: Unemployed			-0.11	-0.47
			(0.30)	(0.31)
Education: Univeristy studies	-0.05	-0.17	-0.12	-0.18
	(0.26)	(0.34)	(0.20)	(0.23)
Ideology: Left	1.98**	0.57	1.87**	0.98**
	(0.28)	(0.40)	(0.21)	(0.26)
Ideology: Right	-0.86*	-1.68**	-0.79**	-1.58**
	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.29)	(0.26)
Observations	351	247	669	610
R^2	0.21	0.23	0.17	0.19
Adjusted R^2	0.19	0.21	0.16	0.17
Residual Std. Error	2.36 (df = 343)	2.55 (df = 239)	2.49 (df = 660)	2.58 (df = 601)
F Statistic	13.06*** (df = 7; 343)	10.09*** (df = 7; 239)	16.42*** (df = 8; 660)	17.09*** (df = 8; 601)
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001			

D5.2: Multinomial regressions predicting redistribution support in Finland and Spain.

	Dependent variable:							
	Spain (Against)	(For)	Finland (Against)	(For)	Spain (Against)	(For)	Finland (Against)	(For)
Constant	0.27	-0.26	-1.34	-0.84	-0.80*	-0.35	-0.38	-0.58
	(0.73)	(0.51)	(0.94)	(0.97)	(0.40)	(0.30)	(0.52)	(0.56)
Income: Low	-2.87**	0.13	-0.91	1.68	-1.04*	0.02	-0.98*	0.84
	(1.11)	(0.42)	(0.64)	(0.87)	(0.46)	(0.31)	(0.47)	(0.53)
Income: Medium	-0.61	-0.12	-0.33	1.41	-0.25	-0.07	-0.70	0.45
	(0.41)	(0.31)	(0.60)	(0.87)	(0.33)	(0.26)	(0.46)	(0.54)
Gender: Men	0.29	0.66*	0.02	0.37	0.20	0.52**	-0.09	0.20
	(0.38)	(0.26)	(0.39)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.20)
Risk: Low	-0.65	-0.18	0.53	-0.82*				
	(0.57)	(0.37)	(0.64)	(0.40)				
Employment status: student/retired					0.15	-0.04	0.10	0.09
					(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.22)
Employment status: Unemployed					0.82*	0.47	0.45	-0.004
					(0.40)	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.28)
Education: Univeristy studies	-0.09	0.19	0.29	-0.25	0.11	0.10	0.32	-0.11
	(0.38)	(0.26)	(0.38)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.21)
Ideology: Left	-1.68*	1.33**	0.58	0.84*	-0.61	1.44**	0.09	0.96**
	(0.66)	(0.28)	(0.54)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.20)	(0.36)	(0.23)
Ideology: Right	1.03*	0.37	1.39**	-0.19	0.84**	0.27	1.10**	-0.38
	(0.44)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.40)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.24)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	619.54	619.54	492.25	492.25	1,204.05	1,204.05	1,192.15	1,192.15
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001							

D5.3: Discussion of the regression results predicting redistribution preferences in Finland and Spain.

In this section, we discuss the regression models predicting redistribution preferences in Finland and Spain. One of the key issues that we discussed in our paper regarding how to interpret the different patterns of how redistribution support and perceptions shape preferences for universal/targeted cash transfers across contexts, concerns whether pro-redistribution individuals are similar across contexts. This is key to understand why the same redistribution stance –and perceptions- may gather different results in different contexts. In essence, the objective of these models is to understand whether individuals with the same redistribution stance vary in other observable characteristics across countries.

To test this, we perform different regression models to understand the predictors of regression preferences across contexts. Taken together, results show that we have no reason to believe that there are important differences in the covariates that predict redistribution preferences across contexts.

For our risk models in Spain, being left-winged and male is positively associated to being supportive of redistribution, while this is not statistically significant in Finland. In Finland, being within the medium income threshold is associated to higher support for redistribution, while high risk is associated to higher support for redistribution.

Having higher risk associated to a higher demand towards redistribution in Finland, we would have expected these individuals to maximise preferences even more than in Spain, but we find this is not the case –both in the OLS and in multinomial models. This shows that regardless of what explains redistribution preferences (which is beyond the scope of this paper), we have no reason to believe that the individual characteristics of individuals (rather than the contextual factors), explain preference maximisation patterns across

contexts. In other words, it is reasonable to interpret that these results should make us think that it is the individual characteristics of respondents which explain why they are preference maximising differently, but it points in any case, to the alternative that it is more to do with contextual differences and welfare institutions' characteristics, as discussed in the paper.

The employment models show similar results for respondents in Finland and Spain. The only important difference that emerges across contexts is that once more, individuals in the medium income category seem to show higher support for redistribution than those in the high-income category, something that also appears within the risk models. Once more however, and in line with the discussion above, we find that our results are consistent with the idea it is not the individual differences across pro-redistribution individuals in different contexts which are driving differences in how individuals maximise their preferences, but rather it may by the impact of contextual differences and welfare institutions which alter how preferences are maximised.

Appendix E: Paper 5

E1. Respondent quotas for Finnish respondents. The table includes the actual number of respondents obtained for each category and the original target number

	Categories	Number	Target number	Target percentage
Gender	Male (1)	498	489	49%
	Female (2)	511	511	51%
Age	18–29(2)	192	192	19%
	30–39(3)	157	157	16%
	40–49(4)	181	181	18%
	50–59(5)	193	192	19%
	60–69(6)	146	146	15%
	70–84(7) (70+)	131	131	13%
Region	Itä – Östra län	111	110	11%
	Etelä – Södra län	417	416	42%
	Länsi – Västra län	354	354	35%

	Oulun – Lapin – Uleåborgs län	118	120	12%

E2. Respondent quotas for Spanish respondents. The table includes the actual number of respondents obtained for each category and the original target number

	Categories	**Number of respondents**	**Target number**	**Target percentage**
Gender	Male (1)	499	500	50%
	Female (2)	501	500	50%
Age	18–24(2)	199	119	12%
	25–34(3)	153	152	15%
	35–44(4)	220	223	22%
	45–54(5)	205	204	20%
	55–64(6)	172	172	17%
	65–74(7)	131	130	13%
Region	Andalucía	182	182	18%
	Aragón	28	28	3%
	Principado de Asturias	22	22	2%
	Illes Balears	24	24	2%
	Canarias	45	45	5%
	Cantabria	13	13	1%
	Castilla y León	52	52	5%
	Castilla-La Mancha	44	44	4%
	Catalunya	163	163	16%
	Comunitat Valenciana	106	106	11%
	Extremadura	23	23	2%
	Galicia	58	58	6%
	Madrid	140	140	14%
	Murcia	32	32	3%
	Navarra	14	14	1%
	País Vasco	47	47	5%
	La Rioja	7	7	1%

E3. Discussion of the case study selection: UBI and employment.

I examine the impact of information and prior beliefs on support for new policy proposals using universal basic income and its relation to the issue of unemployment. In this section I describe the case study and outline its relevance with regards to the study of information-processing. Universal basic income is defined as a cash transfer made to every individual,

periodically and unconditionally, regardless of socioeconomic or working status. Up to date, it has not been fully implemented in any context, but the development of the debate has been such that UBI has moved from being a utopian idea defended on the grounds of freedom (Van Parijs, 1995, 2004c), to becoming a seriously considered policy alternative to reform the welfare state, with pilot projects running worldwide to study the potential effects of a universal basic income (Standing, 2017; Van Parijs, 2017).

As a welfare state reform instrument, UBI is defended as a welfare simplification tool, where many existing programs and transfers may be re-arranged into this cash benefit. Nevertheless, depending upon the nature of its implementation mechanisms UBI can serve to fulfil two main overarching goals: welfare enhancement or retrenchment (Caputo, 2008), and hence why this idea gathers supporters all over the ideological spectrum. Those who defend it on the grounds of welfare retrenchment see this benefit as a means of simplifying all of the existing welfare services, in-kind goods and benefits, into one unique cash transfer. On the other hand, those who see UBI as a welfare enhancement tool defend it as a partially-complementary[66] transfer to the existing welfare provision. Here, its advocates defend it not only as the introductions of another cash transfer, but emphasise the efficiencies of its design to overcome a series of problems related to existing schemes (i.e., stigmatisation of welfare recipients: Calnitsky, 2016; Eyal, 2010; or non take-up problem: Van Oorschot, 1991). Crucially, most of the mainstream debate on basic income revolves around the issue of (un)employment.

First, it has been defended as a permanent tool to tackle the issue of structural unemployment and lack of labour market demand derived from increasing digitalisation

[66] Here I use the term partially-complementary because there are different proposals to introduce a UBI from a welfare enhancing perspective, and to what extent it would replace existing cash transfer schemes, which also vary across contexts, as different areas have different cash transfer programs. Generally speaking a UBI would likely replace most low-income support and minimum incomes, but it is likely that it would only mean a partial replacement of pensions and would not mean a replacement of benefits such as disability (N.B.: always from a welfare enhancing perspective).

and the automation of work, both in routine and non-routine employment (Frey & Osborne, 2017; Colombino, 2015; Cottey, 2014; Steinvorth, 2014). Traditional unemployment subsides are said not to be sufficient to provide to the increasing mass of workers that will be made redundant as a consequence of this development. UBI is also seen as an effective means to sustain the population in the event of needing re-training to re-adapt to the new labour market demands. Third, by design UBI is equipped to solve unemployment traps, which define the labour market participation disincentives of individuals who are receiving unemployment subsides (Gilroy, Heimann and Schopf, 2013). These disincentives emerge from the fact that taking up a job is per se more costly both in material and time terms, and oftentimes the employment remuneration is not enough to compensate the cost of taking a job. Only in material terms, taking up a job accrues living costs due to transport, food, care-services for children or dependent family members, amongst others. Because a UBI would not be lost in taking up a job, the incentives to do so under this scenario increase because this means extra income, personal and professional fulfilment, etc. Finally, a potential advantage of a UBI versus unemployment subsidies, is that a UBI does not carry a negative social stigma associated to subsidies.

Of course, this is only one side of the argument, and detractors of UBI as a solution to unemployment have also put forward a collection of reasons of why such policy is ineffective to tackle the issue of unemployment. These include the resource leakage of giving to those who do not require this benefit and disincentives to work (individual motivation to work is not enough). However, the purpose of this section was not to give an overview of the basic income debate in terms of employment, but rather to show in which ways these to issues are connected in mainstream debates about welfare reform.

Studying support for UBI and unemployment is particularly appropriate for this matter and timely for various reasons. UBI is a very salient policy proposal being discussed globally. An important part of the discussion relates to its empirical effects for which pilot projects have been designed in various contexts. Both in Finland and Spain, there have been pilot projects with the objective of trying out aspects of a universal basic income and its impact on labour market activation. Crucially, it is being discussed in relation to its capacity to solve unemployment issues, without reducing the incentives to find employment. Employment is not only particularly relevant to study in relation to UBI due to this matter, but it is equally suitable as it is a valence issue, meaning that there consensus on its desirability and outcomes (Stokes, 1985, 1992). There is no moral or ideological divergence of whether I need more or less of it, so the debate is about the means of achieving this, rather than the desired outcome. This is particularly convenient because I can keep constant the desirability policy outcomes. Unemployment is also an important matter in and of its own to study public opinion, almost always being a key issue on the table in modern states. As country case studies I use Finland and Spain, which are particularly relevant scenarios as both count with pilot projects which have sought to analyse the potential impact of a UBI on employment.

E4. Distribution of prior beliefs (Finland)



E5. Distribution of prior beliefs (Spain)



E6. Treatment distribution across socio-demographics characteristics (Finland)

Variable		**Control**	**T1**	**T2**	**T3**	**T4**
Gender	Female	102	77	106	80	79
		0,12	0,09	0,12	0,09	0,09
	Male	74	91	70	83	95
		0,09	0,11	0,08	0,10	0,11
Risk	High	16	21	19	8	14
		0,02	0,02	0,02	0,01	0,02
	Low	67	64	60	63	69
		0,08	0,07	0,07	0,07	0,08
Priors	Neutral	38	36	31	20	40
		0,04	0,04	0,04	0,02	0,05

	Targeted	107	103	109	108	98
		0,12	0,12	0,13	0,13	0,11
	Universal	31	29	36	35	36
		0,04	0,03	0,04	0,04	0,04
Mip	0	49	57	58	61	60
		0,06	0,07	0,07	0,07	0,07
	1	120	102	112	92	106
		0,14	0,12	0,13	0,11	0,12
Income	Low (0-3000€)	97	95	99	87	101
		0,11	0,11	0,12	0,10	0,12
	Medium (3.001€ - 6.000€)	66	54	63	52	54
		0,08	0,06	0,07	0,06	0,06
	High (more than 6000€)	7	14	5	10	13
		0,01	0,02	0,01	0,01	0,02
Employment status	Employed	87	89	81	73	86
		0,10	0,10	0,09	0,09	0,10
	Unemployed	36	32	34	30	33
		0,04	0,04	0,04	0,04	0,04
	Other (students and pensionist)	52	45	56	57	52
		0,06	0,05	0,07	0,07	0,06
Education	University degree	63	67	56	66	57
		0,07	0,08	0,07	0,08	0,07
	No university degree	113	101	120	97	117
		0,13	0,12	0,14	0,11	0,14

E7. Treatment distribution across socio-demographics characteristics (Spain)

Variable		**Control**	**T1**	**T2**	**T3**	**T4**
Gender	Female	86	77	90	97	94
		0,10	0,09	0,10	0,11	0,11
	Male	85	102	86	84	81
		0,10	0,12	0,10	0,10	0,09
Risk	High	13	16	15	10	17
		0,01	0,02	0,02	0,01	0,02
	Low	95	90	83	83	72
		0,11	0,10	0,09	0,09	0,08
Priors	Neutral	39	30	40	48	42
		0,04	0,03	0,05	0,05	0,05
	Targeted	105	128	119	109	100
		0,12	0,15	0,13	0,12	0,11
	Universal	27	21	17	24	33
		0,03	0,02	0,02	0,03	0,04
Mip	0	57	50	48	58	59

		0,06	0,06	0,05	0,07	0,07
	1	112	120	122	116	111
		0,13	0,14	0,14	0,13	0,13
Income	Low (0-3000€)	36	27	36	35	45
		0,04	0,03	0,04	0,04	0,05
	Medium (3.001€ - 6.000€)	83	103	85	102	88
		0,09	0,12	0,10	0,12	0,10
	High (more than 6000€)	33	35	37	25	28
		0,04	0,04	0,04	0,03	0,03
Employment status	Employed	113	115	104	100	97
		0,13	0,13	0,12	0,11	0,11
	Unemployed	18	17	29	30	25
		0,02	0,02	0,03	0,03	0,03
	Other (students and pensionist)	39	46	43	50	50
		0,04	0,05	0,05	0,06	0,06
Education	University degree	95	97	100	88	81
		0,11	0,11	0,11	0,10	0,09
	No university degree	76	82	76	93	94
		0,09	0,09	0,09	0,11	0,11

E8. GLM regressions predicting attention rate in Finland

	Dependent variable:					
	Attention rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	-1.10**	-1.43**	-1.92**	-1.56**	-1.16**	-1.72**
	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.46)	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.56)
Treatment 1	0.15	0.17	0.14	0.13	0.01	0.13
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.52)	(0.54)
Treatment 2	-0.22	-0.22	-0.24	-0.24	-0.67	-0.81
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.56)	(0.58)
Treatment 3	-0.02	-0.03	0.08	0.09	-0.34	-0.05
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.55)	(0.57)
Treatment 4	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	-0.06	-0.46	-0.47
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.55)	(0.57)
Priors		0.08*	0.08*		0.02	0.03
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Income: Low			-0.13	-0.20		-0.12
			(0.34)	(0.34)		(0.35)
Income: Medium			-0.23	-0.29		-0.23
			(0.35)	(0.35)		(0.35)
Employed			0.56**	0.59**		0.56**
			(0.20)	(0.20)		(0.20)
Unemployed			0.45	0.48		0.44
			(0.25)	(0.25)		(0.25)
Ideology: Left			0.57**	0.53**		0.58**
			(0.20)	(0.20)		(0.20)
Ideology: Right			0.23	0.21		0.24
			(0.21)	(0.21)		(0.21)
Gender: Men			0.18	0.17		0.17
			(0.17)	(0.17)		(0.17)
Treatment 1:Priors					0.04	0.001
					(0.12)	(0.12)
Treatment 2:Priors					0.11	0.14
					(0.12)	(0.13)
Treatment 3:Priors					0.08	0.03
					(0.12)	(0.13)
Treatment 4:Priors					0.11	0.10

					(0.12)	(0.12)
Observations	857	857	803	803	857	803
Log Likelihood	-477.18	-474.76	-440.71	-442.68	-474.13	-439.68
Akaike Inf. Crit.	964.36	961.52	907.41	909.36	968.26	913.37
Note:	*p<0.05**p<0.01***p<0.001					

E9. OLS regressions predicting attention rate in Finland

	Dependent variable:					
	Attention rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	0.25**	0.19**	0.11	0.18*	0.24**	0.15
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Treatment 1	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.001	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Treatment 2	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.11	-0.12
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Treatment 3	-0.005	-0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.06	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Treatment 4	-0.003	-0.004	-0.01	-0.01	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Priors		0.02*	0.01*		0.003	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Income: Low			-0.03	-0.04		-0.03
			(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)
Income: Medium			-0.05	-0.06		-0.05
			(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)
Employed			0.10**	0.10**		0.10**
			(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)
Unemployed			0.08	0.08		0.08
			(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.05)
Ideology: Left			0.11**	0.10**		0.11**
			(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)
Ideology: Right			0.04	0.04		0.04
			(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)
Gender: Men			0.03	0.03		0.03

			(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)
Treatment 1:Priors					0.01	-0.0002
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Treatment 2:Priors					0.02	0.02
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Treatment 3:Priors					0.01	0.01
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Treatment 4:Priors					0.02	0.02
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	857	857	803	803	857	803
R^2	0.003	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.03
Adjusted R^2	-0.002	0.002	0.02	0.01	-0.001	0.01
Residual Std. Error	0.43 (df = 852)	0.43 (df = 851)	0.43 (df = 790)	0.43 (df = 791)	0.43 (df = 847)	0.43 (df = 786)
F Statistic	0.56 (df = 4; 852)	1.43 (df = 5; 851)	2.03** (df = 12; 790)	1.84** (df = 11; 791)	0.91 (df = 9; 847)	1.62* (df = 16; 786)
Note:	*p<0.05**p<0.01***p<0.001					

E10. GLM regressions predicting attention rate in Spain

	Dependent variable:					
	Attention rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	-0.51**	-1.04**	-1.20**	-0.68*	-1.19**	-1.40**
	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.44)
Treatment 1	0.09	0.12	0.09	0.08	-0.44	-0.40
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.50)	(0.52)
Treatment 2	-0.05	-0.01	-0.10	-0.13	0.18	0.15
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.47)	(0.49)
Treatment 3	0.08	0.07	-0.01	0.01	0.68	0.65
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.47)	(0.49)
Treatment 4	0.01	-0.004	-0.06	-0.02	0.41	0.44
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.47)	(0.49)
Priors		0.14**	0.14**		0.18*	0.19*
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.08)	(0.08)

Income: Low			0.07	0.06		0.07
			(0.24)	(0.24)		(0.24)
Income: Medium			0.04	0.03		0.05
			(0.20)	(0.19)		(0.20)
Employed			0.15	0.15		0.13
			(0.17)	(0.17)		(0.18)
Unemployed			0.16	0.14		0.10
			(0.26)	(0.25)		(0.26)
Ideology: Left			0.37*	0.32*		0.38*
			(0.16)	(0.16)		(0.16)
Ideology: Right			-0.31	-0.30		-0.34
			(0.24)	(0.23)		(0.24)
Gender: Men			0.02	0.02		-0.01
			(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.15)
Treatment 1:Priors					0.16	0.14
					(0.12)	(0.12)
Treatment 2:Priors					-0.05	-0.07
					(0.11)	(0.12)
Treatment 3:Priors					-0.16	-0.18
					(0.11)	(0.11)
Treatment 4:Priors					-0.11	-0.13
					(0.11)	(0.11)
Observations	882	882	792	792	882	792
Log Likelihood	-585.84	-577.89	-517.97	-525.05	-573.67	-514.01
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,181.68	1,167.77	1,061.95	1,074.10	1,167.35	1,062.02
Note:	*p<0.05**p<0.01***p<0.001					

E11. OLS regressions predicting attention rate in Spain

	Dependent variable:					
	Attention rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	0.37**	0.25**	0.21**	0.34**	0.22**	0.17
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Treatment 1	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.09	-0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Treatment 2	-0.01	-0.002	-0.02	-0.03	0.04	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Treatment 3	0.02	0.02	-0.003	0.002	0.16	0.15
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Treatment 4	0.003	-0.001	-0.01	-0.01	0.09	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Priors		0.03**	0.03**		0.04*	0.05*
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Income: Low			0.02	0.01		0.02
			(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)
Income: Medium			0.01	0.01		0.01
			(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)
Employed			0.03	0.03		0.03
			(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)
Unemployed			0.04	0.03		0.02
			(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)
Ideology: Left			0.09*	0.08*		0.09*
			(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)
Ideology: Right			-0.07	-0.07		-0.07
			(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)
Gender: Men			0.005	0.01		-0.002
			(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)
Treatment 1:Priors					0.03	0.03
					(0.03)	(0.03)
Treatment 2:Priors					-0.01	-0.02
					(0.03)	(0.03)
Treatment 3:Priors					-0.04	-0.04

					(0.03)	(0.03)
Treatment 4:Priors					-0.02	-0.03
					(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	882	882	792	792	882	792
R^2	0.001	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.04
Adjusted R^2	-0.004	0.01	0.02	-0.0001	0.02	0.02
Residual Std. Error	0.49 (df = 877)	0.48 (df = 876)	0.48 (df = 779)	0.49 (df = 780)	0.48 (df = 872)	0.48 (df = 775)
F Statistic	0.14 (df = 4; 877)	3.34^{***} (df = 5; 876)	2.11^{**} (df = 12; 779)	0.99 (df = 11; 780)	2.80^{***} (df = 9; 872)	2.08^{***} (df = 16; 775)
Note:	*p<0.05**p<0.01***p<0.001					

E12. OLS regressions predicting attention to alternative proposals (Spain)

	Dependent variable:	
	Attention towards alternative proposals	
	(1)	(2)
Constant	-1.15^{***} (0.42)	-1.23^{**} (0.56)
Treatment 1	-0.08 (0.32)	0.04 (0.65)
Treatment 2	0.41 (0.30)	0.77 (0.60)
Treatment 3	-0.05 (0.32)	-0.84 (0.66)
Treatment 4	0.44 (0.30)	0.90 (0.59)
Priors	-0.10^{*} (0.05)	-0.08 (0.11)
Income: Low	-0.09 (0.31)	-0.07 (0.31)
Income: Medium	0.09 (0.25)	0.11 (0.25)
Employed	-0.26 (0.22)	-0.25 (0.22)
Unemployed	-0.22 (0.32)	-0.23 (0.33)
Ideology: Left	-0.14 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.21)
Ideology: Right	-0.38 (0.30)	-0.39 (0.30)
Gender: Men	0.11 (0.19)	0.10 (0.20)
Treatment 1:Priors		-0.03 (0.17)
Treatment 2: Priors		-0.11 (0.16)
Treatment 3: Priors		0.21 (0.15)
Treatment 4: Priors		-0.13 (0.15)
Observations	792	792
Log Likelihood	-360.84	-357.66

Akaike Inf. Crit.	747.68	749.33
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001	

E13. Predicted probability plots of attention to alternative proposals (Spain).



Note: 1.The model includes socio-demographic controls and interaction terms between treatment conditions and prior beliefs. Prior beliefs in this model as recoded as three categories as outlined in the methods section.

E14. OLS regression predicting support rate in Finland

	Dependent variable:						
	Support rate						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	6.14**	5.51**	4.44**	4.44**	5.24**	5.60**	4.36**
	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.43)	(0.61)
Treatment 1	0.11	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.11	0.53	0.89
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.59)	(0.59)
Treatment 2	-0.19	-0.17	-0.22	-0.22	-0.24	-0.35	-0.11
	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.59)	(0.58)
Treatment 3	-0.14	-0.15	-0.16	-0.16	-0.15	-0.49	-0.46
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.60)	(0.61)
Treatment 4	0.04	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.0002	-0.28	-0.39

	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.60)	(0.59)
Priors		0.16**	0.17**	0.17**		0.14	0.18
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Income: Low			0.74	0.74	0.57		0.77
			(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)		(0.39)
Income: Medium			0.32	0.32	0.20		0.35
			(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)		(0.40)
Employed			0.40	0.40	0.48*		0.41
			(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)		(0.21)
Unemployed			0.71**	0.71**	0.79**		0.72**
			(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)		(0.26)
Ideology: Left			0.85**	0.85**	0.77**		0.88**
			(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)		(0.22)
Ideology: Right			-0.10	-0.10	-0.14		-0.08
			(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)		(0.22)
Gender: Men			-0.06	-0.06	-0.07		-0.08
			(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)		(0.18)
Treatment 1:Priors						-0.10	-0.20
						(0.14)	(0.14)
Treatment 2:Priors						0.05	-0.03
						(0.14)	(0.13)
Treatment 3:Priors						0.09	0.08
						(0.14)	(0.14)
Treatment 4:Priors						0.08	0.10
						(0.14)	(0.13)
Observations	857	857	803	803	803	857	803
R^2	0.002	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.02	0.07
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.05
Residual Std. Error	2.59 (df = 852)	2.57 (df = 851)	2.51 (df = 790)	2.51 (df = 790)	2.54 (df = 791)	2.58 (df = 847)	2.51 (df = 786)
F Statistic	0.41 (df = 4; 852)	3.21*** (df = 5; 851)	4.70*** (df = 12; 790)	4.70*** (df = 12; 790)	3.62*** (df = 11; 791)	2.08** (df = 9; 847)	3.91*** (df = 16; 786)
Note:	*p<0.05**p<0.01***p<0.001						

E15. OLS regression predicting support rate in Spain

	Dependent variable:						
	Support rate						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	5.45**	4.50**	3.52**	3.52**	4.57**	4.17**	2.99**
	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.39)	(0.50)
Treatment 1	-0.29	-0.24	-0.24	-0.24	-0.26	0.12	0.37
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.56)	(0.57)
Treatment 2	-0.88**	-0.81**	-0.85**	-0.85**	-0.90**	-0.23	0.02
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.55)	(0.56)
Treatment 3	-0.12	-0.13	-0.33	-0.33	-0.29	0.47	0.33
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.56)	(0.56)
Treatment 4	0.01	-0.02	-0.21	-0.21	-0.15	0.16	0.16
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.55)	(0.56)
Priors		0.26**	0.28**	0.28**		0.35**	0.41**
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Income: Low			0.69*	0.69*	0.68*		0.69*
			(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)		(0.28)
Income: Medium			0.38	0.38	0.37		0.41
			(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)		(0.23)
Employed			-0.04	-0.04	-0.04		-0.03
			(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)		(0.20)
Unemployed			0.51	0.51	0.47		0.52
			(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)		(0.30)
Ideology: Left			1.36**	1.36**	1.28**		1.38**
			(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)		(0.19)
Ideology: Right			-0.32	-0.32	-0.31		-0.30
			(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)		(0.26)
Gender: Men			0.04	0.04	0.04		0.05
			(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)		(0.18)
Treatment 1:Priors						-0.10	-0.17
						(0.14)	(0.14)
Treatment 2:Priors						-0.16	-0.24

						(0.13)	(0.14)
Treatment 3:Priors						-0.16	-0.18
						(0.13)	(0.13)
Treatment 4:Priors						-0.05	-0.10
						(0.13)	(0.13)
Observations	882	882	792	792	792	882	792
R^2	0.02	0.06	0.14	0.14	0.10	0.06	0.15
Adjusted R^2	0.01	0.05	0.13	0.13	0.08	0.05	0.13
Residual Std. Error	2.54 (df = 877)	2.49 (df = 876)	2.42 (df = 779)	2.42 (df = 779)	2.48 (df = 780)	2.50 (df = 872)	2.42 (df = 775)
F Statistic	3.68^{***} (df = 4; 877)	10.39^{***} (df = 5; 876)	10.84^{***} (df = 12; 779)	10.84^{***} (df = 12; 779)	7.59^{***} (df = 11; 780)	6.02^{***} (df = 9; 872)	8.36^{***} (df = 16; 775)
Note:	*p<0.05**p0.01***p<0.001						

E16. OLS regressions predicting attention and support across respondent subsets, high and low unemployment risk (Finland)

	Dependent variable:			
	Attention		Support rate	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.31	0.28	5.12^{*}	5.34^{**}
	(0.48)	(0.17)	(2.24)	(0.96)
Treatment 1	0.003	0.04	3.24^{*}	0.08
	(0.34)	(0.19)	(1.58)	(1.04)
Treatment 2	-0.03	-0.22	0.53	-1.11
	(0.38)	(0.18)	(1.77)	(1.01)
Treatment 3	0.07	0.07	-3.27	1.56
	(0.55)	(0.19)	(2.58)	(1.07)
Treatment 4	0.26	-0.21	3.54	-1.10
	(0.39)	(0.18)	(1.83)	(1.03)
Priors	0.001	0.02	0.34	0.18
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.27)	(0.16)
Income: Low	-0.17	-0.004	-0.04	0.36

	(0.39)	(0.10)	(1.82)	(0.56)
Income: Medium	-0.13	-0.09	-0.24	0.24
	(0.39)	(0.10)	(1.80)	(0.54)
Ideology: Left	0.06	0.07	0.31	1.14**
	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.64)	(0.39)
Ideology: Right	0.18	0.01	1.28	0.03
	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.76)	(0.35)
Education: University degree	-0.01	0.06	-0.29	-0.64*
	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.66)	(0.31)
Gender: Men	0.06	0.05	-0.76	-0.12
	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.58)	(0.30)
Treatment 1:Priors	0.03	-0.04	-0.57	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.34)	(0.23)
Treatment 2:Priors	-0.01	0.02	-0.19	0.16
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.41)	(0.22)
Treatment 3:Priors	0.03	-0.03	0.52	-0.40
	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.47)	(0.23)
Treatment 4:Priors	-0.04	0.01	-0.61	0.18
	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.45)	(0.21)
Observations	76	308	76	308
R^2	0.10	0.05	0.25	0.09
Adjusted R^2	-0.12	0.002	0.06	0.05
Residual Std. Error	0.50 (df = 60)	0.45 (df = 292)	2.30 (df = 60)	2.51 (df = 292)
F Statistic	0.45 (df = 15; 60)	1.04 (df = 15; 292)	1.31 (df = 15; 60)	2.03** (df = 15; 292)
Note:	*p<0.05**p<0.01***p<0.001			

E17. OLS regressions predicting attention and support including a triple interaction term between treatment, priors and issue status (Finland)

	Dependent variable:	
	Attention	Support rate
	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.21	4.56**

	(0.25)	(1.34)
Treatment 1	0.02	3.41*
	(0.29)	(1.59)
Treatment 2	-0.12	0.50
	(0.33)	(1.81)
Treatment 3	0.25	-2.21
	(0.49)	(2.68)
Treatment 4	0.24	3.43
	(0.35)	(1.93)
Priors	0.002	0.37
	(0.05)	(0.27)
Low risk	0.07	0.82
	(0.26)	(1.41)
Income: Low	-0.02	0.35
	(0.10)	(0.52)
Income: Medium	-0.09	0.20
	(0.09)	(0.51)
Ideology: Left	0.06	0.91**
	(0.06)	(0.33)
Ideology: Right	0.04	0.21
	(0.06)	(0.31)
Education: University degree	0.04	-0.63*
	(0.05)	(0.28)
Gender: Men	0.05	-0.22
	(0.05)	(0.27)
Treatment 1:Priors	0.03	-0.60
	(0.06)	(0.35)
Treatment 2:Priors	0.01	-0.26
	(0.08)	(0.42)
Treatment 3:Priors	0.003	0.34
	(0.09)	(0.49)
Treatment 4:Priors	-0.02	-0.67
	(0.09)	(0.47)
Treatment 1:Low risk	0.02	-3.24
	(0.35)	(1.90)
Treatment 2:Low risk	-0.10	-1.59
	(0.38)	(2.07)
Treatment 3:Low risk	-0.18	3.79

	(0.53)	(2.88)
Treatment 4:Low risk	-0.45	-4.44*
	(0.40)	(2.19)
Priors:Low risk	0.02	-0.19
	(0.06)	(0.31)
Treatment 1:Priors:Low risk	-0.07	0.51
	(0.08)	(0.41)
Treatment 2:Priors:Low risk	0.01	0.42
	(0.09)	(0.47)
Treatment 3:Priors:Low risk	-0.03	-0.75
	(0.10)	(0.55)
Treatment 4:Priors:Low risk	0.04	0.84
	(0.09)	(0.52)
Observations	384	384
R^2	0.06	0.11
Adjusted R^2	-0.01	0.05
Residual Std. Error (df = 358)	0.45	2.48
F Statistic (df = 25; 358)	0.84	1.84***
Note:	*p0.05**p<0.01***p<0.001	

E18. OLS regressions predicting attention and support across respondent subsets, high and low unemployment risk (Spain)

	Dependent variable:			
	Attention		Support rate	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.16 (0.33)	0.25* (0.12)	3.85** (1.35)	2.44** (0.59)
Treatment 1	-0.19 (0.50)	-0.14 (0.15)	4.65* (2.06)	-0.33 (0.74)
Treatment 2	-0.56 (0.43)	0.01 (0.16)	-2.76 (1.75)	0.33 (0.78)
Treatment 3	0.14 (0.60)	0.12 (0.16)	1.61 (2.47)	-0.43 (0.78)
Treatment 4	-0.10 (0.43)	-0.02 (0.16)	0.18 (1.77)	-0.05 (0.78)
Priors	0.01 (0.06)	0.06* (0.02)	0.40 (0.26)	0.44** (0.12)
Income: Low	0.22 (0.20)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.23 (0.82)	0.56 (0.43)
Income: Medium	0.03 (0.19)	0.01 (0.06)	-1.30 (0.76)	0.77** (0.29)
Ideology: Left	0.25 (0.15)	0.09 (0.05)	1.12 (0.61)	1.67** (0.27)
Ideology: Right	0.47 (0.24)	-0.08 (0.07)	2.26* (0.98)	-0.48 (0.37)
Education: no university degree	-0.06 (0.16)	-0.17** (0.05)	1.63* (0.66)	0.14 (0.26)
Gender: Men	0.11 (0.14)	0.02 (0.05)	0.61 (0.59)	-0.02 (0.25)

Treatment 1:Priors	0.04 (0.12)	0.04 (0.04)	-1.19* (0.50)	-0.03 (0.19)
Treatment 2:Priors	0.19 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.15 (0.45)	-0.20 (0.19)
Treatment 3:Priors	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.25 (0.50)	0.03 (0.19)
Treatment 4:Priors	0.04 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.24 (0.38)	-0.13 (0.18)
Observations	64	377	64	377
R^2	0.24	0.10	0.52	0.22
Adjusted R^2	-0.004	0.07	0.37	0.18
Residual Std. Error	0.50 (df = 48)	0.47 (df = 361)	2.07 (df = 48)	2.32 (df = 361)
F Statistic	0.98 (df = 15; 48)	2.78*** (df = 15; 361)	3.49*** (df = 15; 48)	6.69*** (df = 15; 361)
Note:	*p<0.05**p<0.01***p<0.001			

E19. OLS regressions predicting attention and support including a triple interaction term between treatment, priors and issue status (Spain)

	Dependent variable:	
	Attention (1)	Support rate (2)
Constant	0.31 (0.28)	3.51* (1.39)
Treatment 1	0.15 (0.45)	5.43* (2.22)

Treatment 2	-0.23 (0.38)	-1.67 (1.85)
Treatment 3	0.36 (0.54)	1.81 (2.63)
Treatment 4	0.09 (0.38)	0.45 (1.87)
Priors	0.04 (0.06)	0.44 (0.28)
Low risk	-0.10 (0.30)	-1.05 (1.47)
Income: Low	0.03 (0.08)	0.62 (0.39)
Income: Medium	0.01 (0.06)	0.55* (0.27)
Ideology: Left	0.11* (0.05)	1.59** (0.25)
Ideology: Right	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.25 (0.35)
Education: no university degree	-0.16** (0.05)	0.33 (0.24)
Gender: Men	0.03 (0.05)	0.07 (0.23)
Treatment 1:Priors	-0.05 (0.11)	-1.53** (0.52)
Treatment 2:Priors	0.11 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.47)
Treatment 3:Priors	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.41 (0.54)
Treatment 4:Priors	0.01 (0.08)	-0.30 (0.40)
Treatment 1:Low risk	-0.27 (0.48)	-5.71* (2.35)
Treatment 2:Low risk	0.24 (0.41)	2.01 (2.02)
Treatment 3:Low risk	-0.24 (0.56)	-2.23 (2.75)
Treatment 4:Low risk	-0.12 (0.41)	-0.52 (2.03)
Priors:Low risk	0.02 (0.06)	0.0003 (0.31)
Treatment 1:Priors:Low risk	0.09 (0.11)	1.49** (0.56)
Treatment 2:Priors:Low risk	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.51)
Treatment 3:Priors:Low risk	0.09 (0.12)	0.44 (0.57)
Treatment 4:Priors:Low risk	-0.03 (0.09)	0.17 (0.44)
Observations	441	441
R^2	0.11	0.24
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.19
Residual Std. Error (df = 415)	0.48	2.34
F Statistic (df = 25; 415)	2.01***	5.12***
Note:	*p<0.05**p<0.01***p<0.001	

E20. OLS regressions predicting attention and support across respondent subsets, high and low issue saliency (Finland)

	Dependent variable:			
	Attention		Support rate	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.18	0.01	4.39***	5.46***
	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.77)	(1.19)

Treatment 1	-0.02	0.25	0.65	2.09*
	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.71)	(1.15)
Treatment 2	-0.14	0.12	-0.31	1.00
	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.73)	(1.10)
Treatment 3	-0.10	0.29	-0.80	1.29
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.76)	(1.14)
Treatment 4	-0.14	0.15	-0.76	0.98
	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.75)	(1.08)
Priors	-0.01	0.10***	0.13	0.48**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.20)
Income: Low	0.04	-0.22	1.43***	-1.25
	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.49)	(0.77)
Income: Medium	-0.005	-0.21	1.01**	-1.81**
	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.48)	(0.79)
Ideology: Left	0.05	0.23***	0.82***	1.12***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.29)	(0.37)
Ideology: Right	-0.003	0.11*	-0.22	0.27
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.27)	(0.38)
Education: University degree	0.11***	0.10*	-0.34	-0.37
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.33)
Gender: Men	0.05	0.04	-0.09	0.11
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.32)
Treatment 1:Priors	0.02	-0.08*	-0.09	-0.52*
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.27)
Treatment 2:Priors	0.03	-0.06	-0.04	-0.18
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.26)
Treatment 3:Priors	0.03	-0.08	0.20	-0.37
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.26)
Treatment 4:Priors	0.04	-0.05	0.20	-0.25
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.25)
Observations	512	268	512	268
R^2	0.03	0.12	0.09	0.11
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.07	0.06	0.06
Residual Std. Error	0.43 (df = 496)	0.44 (df = 252)	2.53 (df = 496)	2.47 (df = 252)
F Statistic	1.03 (df = 15; 496)	2.29*** (df = 15; 252)	3.14*** (df = 15; 496)	2.05** (df = 15; 252)
Note:	*p**p***p<0.01			

E21. OLS regressions predicting attention and support including a triple interaction term between treatment, priors and issue saliency (Finland)

	Dependent variable:	
	Attention	Support rate
	(1)	(2)
Constant	-0.10	3.73***
	(0.17)	(1.00)
Treatment 1	0.22	2.27*
	(0.20)	(1.17)
Treatment 2	0.08	0.89
	(0.19)	(1.11)
Treatment 3	0.26	1.43
	(0.20)	(1.14)
Treatment 4	0.12	0.85
	(0.19)	(1.09)
Priors	0.09**	0.46**
	(0.04)	(0.21)
Issue saliency (mip = 1)	0.30*	1.28
	(0.18)	(1.02)
Income: Low	-0.02	0.77*
	(0.07)	(0.41)
Income: Medium	-0.04	0.32
	(0.07)	(0.41)
Ideology: Left	0.12***	0.89***
	(0.04)	(0.23)
Ideology: Right	0.03	-0.13
	(0.04)	(0.22)
Education: University degree	0.11***	-0.35*
	(0.03)	(0.20)
Gender: Men	0.05	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.19)
Treatment 1:Priors	-0.07	-0.54**
	(0.05)	(0.27)
Treatment 2:Priors	-0.05	-0.13
	(0.04)	(0.26)

Treatment 3:Priors	-0.07	-0.39
	(0.05)	(0.27)
Treatment 4:Priors	-0.04	-0.20
	(0.04)	(0.25)
Treatment 1:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	-0.24	-1.67
	(0.23)	(1.36)
Treatment 2:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	-0.22	-1.23
	(0.23)	(1.33)
Treatment 3:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	-0.36	-2.24
	(0.23)	(1.36)
Treatment 4:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	-0.26	-1.65
	(0.23)	(1.33)
Priors:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	-0.10**	-0.35
	(0.04)	(0.24)
Treatment 1:Priors:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	0.09*	0.46
	(0.05)	(0.32)
Treatment 2:Priors:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	0.08	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.31)
Treatment 3:Priors:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	0.09*	0.59*
	(0.05)	(0.32)
Treatment 4:Priors:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	0.08	0.40
	(0.05)	(0.30)
Observations	780	780
R^2	0.05	0.08
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.05
Residual Std. Error (df = 754)	0.43	2.52
F Statistic (df = 25; 754)	1.74**	2.76***
Note:	*p**p***p<0.01	

E22. OLS regressions predicting attention and support across respondent subsets, high and low issue saliency (Spain)

	Dependent variable:			
	Attention		Support rate	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.18 (0.12)	0.25 (0.16)	2.12*** (0.58)	4.45*** (0.79)
Treatment 1	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.21)	1.53** (0.70)	-1.95* (1.01)
Treatment 2	0.08 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.22)	0.38 (0.66)	-0.15 (1.07)

Treatment 3	0.14 (0.14)	0.25 (0.21)	0.63 (0.69)	0.01 (1.02)
Treatment 4	0.16 (0.13)	0.04 (0.21)	0.97 (0.67)	-2.18** (1.02)
Priors	0.06** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.60*** (0.12)	0.08 (0.16)
Income: Low	0.10 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.10)	1.02*** (0.34)	0.36 (0.50)
Income: Medium	0.03 (0.06)	0.04 (0.09)	0.39 (0.28)	0.36 (0.43)
Ideology: Left	0.07 (0.05)	0.09 (0.07)	1.43*** (0.23)	1.42*** (0.33)
Ideology: Right	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.49 (0.32)	0.37 (0.50)
Education: no university degree	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.27 (0.22)	0.33 (0.32)
Gender: Men	-0.002 (0.04)	-0.0000 (0.07)	0.09 (0.22)	-0.31 (0.32)
Treatment 1:Priors	0.01 (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.44** (0.17)	0.31 (0.24)
Treatment 2:Priors	-0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.32* (0.17)	-0.28 (0.27)
Treatment 3:Priors	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.24 (0.17)	-0.07 (0.23)
Treatment 4:Priors	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.29* (0.17)	0.35 (0.22)
Observations	527	244	527	244
R^2	0.05	0.08	0.18	0.17
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.02	0.15	0.11
Residual Std. Error	0.48 (df = 511)	0.49 (df = 228)	2.43 (df = 511)	2.38 (df = 228)
F Statistic	1.85** (df = 15; 511)	1.31 (df = 15; 228)	7.38*** (df = 15; 511)	3.07*** (df = 15; 228)
Note:	*p**p***p<0.01			

E23. OLS regressions predicting attention and support including a triple interaction term between treatment, priors and issue saliency (Spain)

	Dependent variable:	
	Attention (1)	Support rate (2)
Constant	0.28* (0.14)	4.41*** (0.72)
Treatment 1	-0.17 (0.20)	-2.11** (1.02)
Treatment 2	-0.10 (0.22)	-0.29 (1.08)
Treatment 3	0.21 (0.20)	-0.21 (1.02)

Treatment 4	0.01 (0.20)	-2.09** (1.02)
Priors	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.16)
Issue saliency (mip = 1)	-0.11 (0.17)	-2.21*** (0.84)
Income: Low	0.05 (0.06)	0.81*** (0.28)
Income: Medium	0.04 (0.05)	0.40* (0.23)
Ideology: Left	0.08** (0.04)	1.44*** (0.19)
Ideology: Right	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.24 (0.27)
Education: no university degree	-0.07** (0.04)	0.28 (0.18)
Gender: Men	-0.002 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.18)
Treatment 1:Priors	0.09* (0.05)	0.38 (0.24)
Treatment 2:Priors	0.03 (0.05)	-0.22 (0.26)
Treatment 3:Priors	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.23)
Treatment 4:Priors	-0.01 (0.04)	0.34 (0.22)
Treatment 1:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	0.13 (0.25)	3.61*** (1.23)
Treatment 2:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	0.18 (0.25)	0.67 (1.26)
Treatment 3:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	-0.07 (0.25)	0.85 (1.23)
Treatment 4:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	0.15 (0.25)	3.09** (1.22)
Priors:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	0.03 (0.04)	0.55*** (0.20)
Treatment 1:Priors:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.81*** (0.30)
Treatment 2:Priors:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.31)
Treatment 3:Priors:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.21 (0.28)
Treatment 4:Priors:Issue saliency (mip = 1)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.64** (0.27)
Observations	771	771
R^2	0.06	0.17
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.14
Residual Std. Error (df = 745)	0.48	2.41
F Statistic (df = 25; 745)	1.78**	6.09***
Note:	*p**p***p<0.01	

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