

Aguinaldo's British Men

Defending the Philippine Revolution through the Hong Kong and
Singapore Press, 1896–1902

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To my family,

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the transimperial intellectual exchanges between Britons from Hong Kong and Singapore and Filipinos during the Revolution of 1896-1902. It reveals that British newspapermen supported the Filipino propaganda campaign to justify that Filipinos deserved an advanced degree of self-government after expelling Spain from the islands in 1898. This collaboration was limited, however, because British editors' priority was defending the British Empire's agenda. They did not reproduce Filipino propaganda to support the archipelago's independence. Instead, they aimed to guarantee that the U.S. and Philippine authorities designed a protectorate after British governance models, a pacific solution beneficial for British regional interests. Support messages to the Filipinos from their Anglo-Saxon allies ceased when the conflict evolved into a guerrilla war similar to the South African War. Still, this dissertation argues that this collaboration was indispensable for Filipino voices to be heard, however faintly, in the U.S.

Resum

Aquesta tesi investiga diàlegs transimperials entre britànics de Hong Kong i Singapur i filipins durant la Revolució de 1896-1902. Demostra que periodistes britànics van contribuir a difondre la propaganda revolucionària per a justificar que els filipins mereixen un alt nivell d'autogovern després d'expulsar Espanya de les illes el 1898. Aquesta col·laboració, però, va ser limitada, ja que la prioritat dels editors britànics era defensar els interessos del seu imperi. En lloc d'advocar per la independència de Filipines, buscaven garantir que estatunidencs i filipins dissenyessin un protectorat seguint els models britànics, una solució pacífica beneficiosa pels interessos britànics. Quan la Guerra Filipina-Estatunidenca va transformar-se en un conflicte de guerrilles similar a l'anglo-bòer, aquests periodistes van aturar els seus missatges de suport als filipins, a qui identificaven amb els bòers. Malgrat això, aquesta col·laboració va ser necessària perquè les veus filipines s'escoltessin als EUA.

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Introduction

Francis D. Millet quickly traveled to San Francisco in the summer of 1898. A journalist for *Harper's Weekly* and the *London Times*, he was in a hurry to join General Wesley Merritt's expedition to the Philippines, the second of three U.S. expeditions to the Pacific archipelago in the midst of the 1898 war against Spain. Millet was one of the almost 500 journalists mobilized to report on the conflict, which most of them presented as a struggle for Cuba's liberation from the tyrannic Spanish yoke.¹ The crusade would reunite American society, divided since the Civil War, strengthen its new generations, and protect U.S. commercial interests from political instability in the nearby island.²

Besides the excitement of a national adventure that was waged on a new frontier supposedly for humanitarian reasons, Millet knew it also represented the "first foreign expedition of the Great Republic," and he wanted "to witness the very beginning of the inevitable expansion following an unbroken period of consistent isolation." It would be "a history-making event, the first act in the great international drama to be played on the board stained where the great powers of the world are in active competition for supremacy." He wondered, "who with a drop of red blood in his veins could fail to be tempted by this prospect?"³

The U.S. press was as engrossed in the conflict as Millet. It followed with great interest the events in the Caribbean and the Philippines, where the first noteworthy American victory of the war occurred: Admiral George Dewey's destruction of the Spanish Pacific Squadron on May 1st, 1898. The theatre of operations had expanded to the Asian possessions of the Spanish Empire, where the U.S. sought to neutralize Spanish forces. Millet's trip would follow these next steps in the Pacific.

¹ Michael P. Roth, *Encyclopedia of War Journalism 1807–2010* (New York: Grey House Publishing, 2010), 439.

² Among many other works on the 1898 War against Spain and the U.S. media, see Bonnie M. Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest: The Visual and Popular Cultures of the Spanish-American War of 1898*, (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011).

³ Francis D. Millet, *The Expedition to the Philippines* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1899), 2.

Millet's haste paid off, as he was able to follow the U.S. military to the Philippines. His enthusiasm, however, crashed upon experiencing a harsh control of information, exercised not only by the vilified Spaniards but also by the American military, whose authorities also monitored the news. Millet recounted that telegrams and letters first went through a censor and then were delivered to Hong Kong "by a government dispatch boat whenever the Commodore thought necessary to send her."⁴

In spite of the rigorous censorship in Manila, Millet described a way to overcome such control that was apparently easy. Instead of using the official American channels of information, Millet suggested bringing a private letter to Hong Kong and, from there, transmitting it to Europe, where it would travel just as expeditiously as if it had been sent in the form of a cable message from the Philippines since the beginning. For example, he shared a boat with fellow journalist Thomas H. Reid, stringer for the *London Times* and editor of the *China Mail*, to carry his texts to the British port.⁵

Thanks to this system, the *China Mail* bragged about how its representative had been able "to collect particulars from several eye-witnesses of the fight, and presented to the readers of the *Times* and his journal a most graphic account of the destruction of the fleet." They clarified that "immediately after the publication of this article, the text was telegraphed to the principal papers in the United States."⁶

This dissertation examines the informational links between the Philippines, the British ports of Hong Kong and Singapore, and the U.S. media—Millet's experience being only one example. It also studies how different actors exploited such linkages with varying levels of success to advance their political agendas during the Philippine Revolution, which included the Spanish-American War that Millet covered with such excitement, as well as the less publicized but equally important events that surrounded it.

⁴ Millet, 46.

⁵ Millet, 46.

⁶ "The *Times* Correspondents at Manila," *China Mail* (Hong Kong), Aug. 10, 1898, 5.

1. The Importance of Information during the Philippine Revolution: New Inquiries on a Well-Known Historical Context

As Amy Kaplan noted, the use of the term “Spanish-American War” to describe the conflict in question encapsulates how its cultural representations —such as the elegiac reporting of Francis D. Millet— reflected an exclusively U.S.-centered perspective on the three-month struggle against Spain in 1898. The term obscured to the contemporary public —as well as to later histories— the preceding struggles for independence Cubans and Filipinos fought and legitimized the imperial wars that came soon after.⁷

At the beginning of the U.S. war against Spain in April 1898, most people in the U.S. were not aware that the Philippine inhabitants’ demands for reforms inside the Spanish Empire began in the mid-nineteenth century and a revolution for independence had erupted in August 1896. By December 1897, the struggle between imperial and insurgent forces had reached a stalemate, and a truce was negotiated: Spain committed to applying reforms in the archipelago and, in return, revolutionary leaders promised to give up arms and go into exile. Filipinos, however, were preparing to resume the fight when the United States joined the fray.⁸

Given their prominent role in the ultimate Spanish defeat, Filipinos expected a say in the future administration of their country. The U.S. and Spain, however, excluded them from the peace negotiations that ended the war and decided the future of Spain’s lost territories. Spain ceded the Philippines to the U.S. for 20 million dollars, but many Filipinos, bitterly disappointed, would not submit to this mandate.⁹

⁷ Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 215. To represent all the belligerents involved, the conflict should be termed the Spanish-Philippine-Cuban-American War.

⁸ On the causes of the Truce of Biak-Na-Bato and the state of relations between Spain and the Filipino revolutionaries before the American arrival, see, among others, Andrés Mas Chao, *La guerra olvidada de Filipinas, 1896–1898* (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1998); Onofré D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation*, vol. 2 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2007).

⁹ Among many others, David F. Trask, *The War with Spain in 1898* (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996); Corpuz, *Roots of the Filipino Nation*, vol. 2.

The opposition of Filipino revolutionaries to the U.S. occupation turned America's so-called "Splendid Little War" —a short conflict that was popular in the United States and cost few American lives— into a much lengthier and costlier conflict. During the Philippine-American War, 4,000 U.S. soldiers, tens of thousands of Filipino soldiers, and more than 700,000 Filipino civilians died. That last number mainly resulted from epidemic diseases and the destruction of crops, implements, and housing, but also from direct assaults by American soldiers.¹⁰ These escalated in response to guerrilla warfare. U.S. counterinsurgency tactics resulted in atrocities similar to those the U.S. had attributed to the Spaniards when justifying its military intervention in Cuba during the previous years.¹¹

Meanwhile, U.S. public opinion was subjected to an intense debate regarding the "Philippine Question," —which is to say, the fate of the islands after the Spanish-American War and the future of U.S. involvement. When the U.S. landed in the Philippines in 1898, its citizens had very scarce or non-existent knowledge about the islands, its inhabitants, and the reasons why the U.S. might remain there. This is why, from that moment until the end of the Philippine-American War, U.S. citizens became the targeted audience of two opposing narratives about events and policies in those far-off Pacific islands, a dialogue that also touched upon wider themes of U.S. identity and history.

On one side, the expansionists —besides defending the strategic and economic benefits of controlling the Philippines— argued that the U.S. had a responsibility to protect the Philippines. They argued that, after having expelled Spain from the territory, Americans had the responsibility of guarding it from foreign imperial interference and raising the Filipinos up from a state that was considered savage and barbaric.

¹⁰ These accounts are taken from Michael Adas, *Dominance by Design. Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 134. For another calculation of the war's deaths, see John Morgan Gates, "Notes and Documents: War-Related Deaths in the Philippines 1898-1902," *Pacific Historical Review* 53, no. 3 (1984): 367–78.

¹¹ Reference explanations of the war and the events explained in the following paragraphs include Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century's Turn* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961); Stuart C. Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 2000).

Advocating what William McKinley called “benevolent assimilation”, they aspired to teach the islands’ population the art of self-government until it was ready to stand for itself. Moreover, they argued that most Filipinos welcomed the American arrival and that only a small fraction —the Tagalog followers of Emilio Aguinaldo— opposed it. According to the expansionists, that minority aimed to retain all of the power for themselves and establish a dictatorship.

On the other side, opponents of the expansion —mostly organized behind the Anti-Imperialist League— argued that the American annexation of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War constituted “a war of criminal aggression” against the Filipinos. It betrayed the republican, anti-imperialist and democratic nature of the U.S. and dragged the country into the messy disputes of foreign nations, a path that led to military conflict. Moreover, the acquisition of new territory, with its inhabitants, they believed, threatened to corrupt the U.S. citizenship with “un-civilized” individuals of mixed Malay, Spanish and Chinese blood.¹²

Facts became a crucial weapon in the struggle to portray the war as either an act of “benevolent assimilation” or a “war of criminal aggression.” The political and military authorities who supported expansion tried to control the flux of information that emerged from the islands. Contrary to the evidence reported elsewhere, the McKinley administration, since the beginning of the war, argued that American troops controlled almost the whole archipelago and the pacification was about to be complete.

Their opponents —who increasingly included ordinary U.S. citizens tired of the war— believed that “quick pacification” was taking too long and costing too much, as U.S. soldiers were encountering fierce resistance. Moreover, the war was being fought using torture and both soldiers and non-combatants were being mistreated —practices that the soldiers themselves recounted in letters to relatives that sometimes filtered to the media.

¹² The literature on the Anti-Imperialist League is extensive and further discussed in Chapter 5, 233–257. For some recent references, see Michael P. Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism: 1898–1909* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Erin L. Murphy, *No Middle Ground: Anti-Imperialists and Ethical Witnessing during the Philippine-American War* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020).

Due mainly to the efforts of the Anti-Imperialist League, the use of torture and other abuses became a nationwide scandal.¹³

The issue, however, remained on the front pages of newspapers for only a very short time. Historians who have analyzed the media reaction to the Philippine-American War have established that the press was generally very uncritical in its coverage.¹⁴ According to Richard E. Welch Jr., that was due to the fact that, for most of the conflict, the press did not have persuasive evidence to give credit to the rumors of American misconduct in the Philippines, they lacked information, and most editors “were afraid of the libel laws and were too much used to identify patriotism and nationalism with military honor to engage in a crusade against soldier misbehavior.”¹⁵

As for the war correspondents who traveled to the islands, they were obstructed by the control of the information by the military and, in many cases, they simply reproduced the official discourse.¹⁶ At least once, however, they did try to evade censorship in a famous episode using the method explained by Frank Millet. Through Hong Kong, they addressed a round-robin to all their editors denouncing the censorship imposed by the American military authorities and accused the military of deceiving the U.S. public so it would believe the situation in the islands was under control.¹⁷

¹³ On soldiers acting as correspondents, see Alan L. Stewart, “The Kansas Soldier as a War Correspondent 1898–1899” (master’s thesis, University of Kansas, 1948); James H. Berkey, “Imperial Correspondence: Soldiers, Writing, and the Imperial Quotidian during the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 2010); Berkey, “Empire’s Mastheads: Rewriting the ‘Correspondents’ War’ from the Edge of Empire,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, no. 2 (2011), <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7f4431z6>. For a specific analysis of the anti-imperialists’ use of soldiers’ letters, see Rowena Quinto Bailon, “Battling Destiny: Soldiers’ Letters and the Anti-Colonial Discourse in the Philippine-American War” (Ph.D. diss., The University of Texas at Dallas, 2014).

¹⁴ Richard E. Welch Jr., “The ‘Philippine Insurgency’ and the American Press,” *The Historian* 36, no. 1 (1973): 34–51; Welch Jr., *Response to Imperialism. The United States and the Philippine-American War 1899–1902* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979); B. M. Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest*; Christopher Einolf, *America in the Philippines, 1899–1902. The First Torture Scandal* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

¹⁵ Welch Jr., *Response to Imperialism*, 147.

¹⁶ On the American war correspondents’ experience in the Philippines, see Christopher A. Vaughan, “Obfuscating the New Other, Defining a New Self: Popular Discourses on the Colonization of the Philippines” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1997); Henry Lee, “The War Correspondent and the Insurrection. A Study of American Newspaper Correspondents in the Philippines 1898–1900” (master’s thesis, Harvard University, 1968).

¹⁷ For a narrative of that episode, see, among others, B. M. Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest*, 239. Miller explains at least another episode when, “after only a month of fighting, a frustrated correspondent

According to Henry Lee, who analyzed the experiences of three of those correspondents, the use of the method described by Millet was an exception in their overall coverage of the war. It was not used often because the letters that journalists sent through Hong Kong to their U.S.-based newspapers arrived with much delay, and their chief editors chose not to reprint them because they did not consider them newsworthy anymore.¹⁸

Still, the geographical proximity between the islands and the press in other nearby ports did allow a quick and uncensored traffic of news, as proven by recent research on colonial port cities like Hong Kong. Among others, historian Mark R. Frost has argued that from the mid-nineteenth century to the interwar period, colonial port cities were the nexus of a lively network that exchanged information in Asian waters. This exchange was promoted by “shifts in migration, a reordering of maritime networks, the application of new technologies and the adjustment of existing systems of transport and regional communication.”¹⁹

The connection of these cities to main steamer routes turned them into “especially busy centers for international traffic,” with the consequence being a significant “diffusion of news, views, and ideologies between colonial territories.”²⁰ The flow of information materialized in printed books, letters, pamphlets and, especially, periodicals, like the aforementioned *China Mail*. Although initially, most of these periodicals appeared to strictly provide service information, such as shipping lists and advertisements, by the turn of the century, they complemented that content with news and opinion texts that appealed to a growing and more diverse audience.

While the local content was generated by staff members, these newspapers also benefited from information that arrived in port from other territories in various forms:

of the pro-imperialist *Dallas News* stationed in Manila sent a special dispatch from Hong Kong to evade the censor.” B. M. Miller, 238.

¹⁸ Lee, “Chapter 5,” in *The War Correspondent and the Insurrection*, 1–2.

¹⁹ Mark R. Frost, “Asia’s Maritime Networks and the Colonial Public Sphere, 1840–1920,” *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 6, no. 2 (2004): 79.

²⁰ Frost, 79.

oral information from witnesses of newsworthy events, private correspondence, the chronicles of their own correspondents, other colonial newspapers, and the metropolitan press. At the same time, as the aforementioned *China Mail*'s report hinted, they also provided information to other regional media and even metropolitan media, participating in a bi-directional exchange of content. The richness of the content in this press, therefore, reflects once more the nature of these cities as lively “sites of interaction,” quoting Tim Harper and Sunil S. Amrith, with a lot of information being exchanged.²¹

According to Frost, this lively transnational public sphere also engaged with non-European populations, who consumed English-language newspapers that circulated between regional ports.²² Notable Filipino revolutionaries stand out as clear examples of such participation. Since the 1872 Cavite Mutiny, Filipino exiled communities, benefiting from the more liberal climate in Hong Kong, consumed literature censored by the Spanish regime and exploited the flow of communication to smuggle texts such as José Rizal's *Noli me Tangere* into the Philippines.²³ Also, in 1896, Hong Kong became the leading site of the Comité Revolucionario Filipino (in English, the Philippine Revolutionary Committee). In constant connection with events in the archipelago, the Comité orchestrated diplomatic and propaganda efforts to gain support and recognition of its causes —first the revolutionary movement and later the Philippine Republic.²⁴

Knowing that the war in the Philippines was very controversial in the U.S. and information about the islands was highly sought-after, we should locate Francis Millet's boat excursion to Hong Kong during the Spanish-American War and the round robin of the correspondents during the Philippine-American War in the same geographical

²¹ Tim Harper and Sunil S. Amrith, *Sites of Asian Interaction. Ideas, Networks and Mobility* (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

²² Frost, “Asia's Maritime Networks,” 85–86.

²³ John N. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement, 1880-1895: The Creators of a Filipino Consciousness, the Makers of Revolution* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1973), 94–114.

²⁴ The Filipino revolutionaries' connections with Hong Kong are further explored in Chapter 1, 56–75.

framework: that of the lively exchange of information in the ports surrounding the archipelago.

In doing so, the two episodes described above suggest more than meets the eye. First, they are a clear reflection of how media attention and the mood had changed from the Spanish-American to the Philippine-American War. Also, they reveal the key importance of controlling information as outlined previously. Most importantly, they highlight significant characters and connections that so far have been underexplored.

The most obvious connection is the informational linkages between Manila and Hong Kong. Secondly, Millet's adventure also suggests how British periodicals and journalists, like Thomas H. Reid, of the *China Mail*—who unlike Millet had not just arrived from the U.S. without any knowledge of the region, its politics, and its inhabitants—could have a more intimate understanding of events in the Philippines. And finally, both episodes point out to the capacity of the *China Mail* to “telegraph its article to the principal papers in the United States.”²⁵

Reflecting on both anecdotes raises questions so far unanswered. The most important one is how the exceptional circumstances that turned Hong Kong into a potential hub for uncensored information on the Philippine Revolution shaped the content published in its newspapers about the imperial transition surrounding the 1898 war. Along these lines, it is of special interest to know how Filipino revolutionaries based in Hong Kong related to the British port press while trying to support their national cause through diplomacy and propaganda, among other methods. In response to all these questions, this dissertation develops the following arguments.

First, it expands our previous knowledge of the relationship between Hong Kong Filipino revolutionaries and the press. As several historians have explained, the Philippine Republic tried to counter the Western discourse about the supposed savagery of Filipinos and their inability for self-government, one of the main arguments used by the expansionists to justify the “benevolent assimilation.” The revolutionaries aimed to

²⁵ “The *Times* Correspondents at Manila.”

demonstrate how civilized they were and show that they were capable of ruling a country, as was indicated by the organization of the Philippine Republic and their respect for the laws of warfare.

This research demonstrates that, among the methods that Filipino revolutionaries used to spread their message, one of the most successful was directly sharing their reports with British media outlets from Hong Kong in hope that their texts would be published and circulated abroad. They hired two British press representatives in Hong Kong to help in this effort, and a third sympathetic newspaperman based in Singapore also played a crucial role.




Figure 1. Map showing the proximity between the Philippines, Hong Kong and Singapore. Map by Albert Díaz Esteve.

Second, the project shows how these efforts and contact with the regional press began during the Philippine Revolution against Spain. Propagandists engaged in debates in these newspapers representing their insurrection as legitimate and contrasting their methods of organizing and waging war with the tyrannical and cruel methods of the Spanish Empire. It was during this episode that they made the first of their British media allies.

I argue that all of the analyzed newspapers and the British collaborators and sympathizers that I mentioned above spread revolutionary messages in the press hoping that stability in the islands returned as soon as possible under an imperial tutor. During the 1896–1897 Revolution, they hoped that Spain would introduce the desired reforms in its regime in the archipelago to defuse the uprising.

After the Spanish-American War started, the press under study argued that the U.S. would have to fight a long and costly war unless it recognized the Philippine Republic and that conflict would be detrimental to British interests. As a consequence, newspapers recognized, in varying degrees, the Philippine media campaign to demonstrate the high civilization of Filipino elites and proposed a protectorate designed after British models of governance.

The support of those newspapermen and the sympathy expressed in the regional press for the Filipino cause, however, reduced considerably from 1900 onwards. I argue this was because the American war against Filipino guerrillas was too similar to the British war against the Boers in South Africa.

Finally, my research demonstrates that, although all the efforts of Filipino revolutionaries had a significant impact on the regional press, they did not achieve as large an impact in the metropolitan public spheres as they had hoped. Some newspapers, however, did reproduce some messages from the Filipino revolutionaries and, progressively, their messages about civilization did convince some anti-imperialists in the U.S. Most importantly, they managed, with the help of those British sympathizers, to establish significant connections with the anti-imperialist leader George Frisbie Hoar.

2. Literature Review

This dissertation investigates the transnational dialogue between Filipino revolutionaries, British journalists from Hong Kong and Singapore, and U.S. public opinion during the 1896 to 1902 imperial transition in the Philippines.²⁶ In particular, it examines how the British Pacific press reacted to the Philippine Revolution and analyzes the collaboration between some British newspapermen and Filipino nationalists to shape the colonial discourse about Filipino capacity for self-government. Therefore, this research mainly builds upon two bodies of literature: the growing field of study looking at imperial contacts and the analysis of colonial discourses.

The transnational turn and the flourishing field of global, imperial, and postcolonial history have cultivated a new conception of the turn of the 20th century as a “world of inter-imperial dialogues,” quoting Paul A. Kramer.²⁷ People, goods, capital and, most notably for this research, ideas and information moved and crossed inter- and intra-imperial borders, circulating between metropolises and colonies and even between different empires.

To quote Kramer again, “consolidating colonial regimes in Africa and Asia” were, as a consequence, “stages for interacting and overlapping empires of commerce and evangelism, which drew ‘inter-imperial’ communities together around both common and competitive projects.” These inter-imperial crossings were crucial in the development of the colonial world: “In organization, policy making, and legitimation, the architects of colonial rule often turned to rival powers as allies, foils, mirrors, models, and exceptions.”²⁸

²⁶ Following Akira Iriye’s distinction between ‘inter-national’, implying “relationship among nations,” and ‘trans-national’, which suggests “various types of interactions across national boundaries,” this dissertation calls the relationship examined here a trans-national dialogue. It took place not only between nations and their officials but also with other actors, mainly journalists. Iriye cited in Kristin Hoganson and Jay Sexton, *Crossing Empires: Taking U.S. History into Transimperial Terrain* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2020), 2.

²⁷ Paul A. Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and U.S. Empires, 1880-1910,” *The Journal of American History* 88, no. 4 (2002): 1352.

²⁸ Kramer, 1316.

Since 2002, when Kramer's text was published and other works emerged pointing in a similar direction, transnational approaches to U.S. history have increased in popularity.²⁹ Enduring U.S. exceptionalism ceded ground to less nation-centric studies that have highlighted how the country's evolution, in particular its imperial expansion, was shaped not only by internal, national experiences but also through its relations with other empires.³⁰

Of particular interest to my research is the innovative work that has been accomplished during the last two decades dealing with the transnational contacts between the American and the British empires. Traditional studies had thoroughly explored the causes and consequences of the so-called "Great Rapprochement" by analyzing the diplomatic relations of the two countries.³¹ During the 1970s, studies of this relationship sparked interest in cultural and social links. Progressively, the focus on both countries' diplomatic elites broadened to include relations with other layers of society.³²

Departing from some of these earlier contributions, academics like Kramer and Frank Schumacher, advanced research on the inter-colonial connections between the two empires. In particular, Kramer researched how Americans referenced the British Empire and racial Anglo-Saxonism both to legitimize and to attack its overseas colonial

²⁹ Especially, Thomas Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002) and Frank Schumacher, "The American Way of Empire: National Tradition and Transatlantic Adaptation in America's Search for Imperial Identity, 1898-1910," *GHI Bulletin* 31 (2002): 35-50.

³⁰ For a recent example on the matter, see Andrew Preston and Doug Rossinow, *Outside In: The Transnational Circuitry of U.S. History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Hoganson and Sexton, *Crossing Empires: Taking U.S. History into Transimperial Terrain*.

³¹ Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914* (New York: Atheneum, 1968); Robert G. Neale, *Britain and American Imperialism 1899-1900* (Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1965); Alexander E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903* (London: Longmans, 1960); Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957); Richard H. Heindel, *The American Impact on Great Britain, 1898-1914* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1940).

³² Robert M. Hendershot, "Reflecting on the 'Cultural Turn': New Directions in the Study of Anglo-American Relations and the Special Relationship," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 18 (2020): 455-76, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-020-00059-6>. As notable precedents for the transnational turn in Anglo-American connections, see Stuart Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981); Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998).

adventures beginning in 1898. For his part, Schumacher researched the U.S.’ interest in European powers’ colonial knowledge, especially that of Great Britain.³³ Along the same lines, more recent analyses relevant for this research include Patrick M. Kirkwood’s work on political Anglo-Saxonism and Michael P. Cullinane’s investigation into the international dimensions of the Anti-Imperialist League.³⁴

Finally, as this study will examine dialogues that took place in the press, it also benefits from the extensive literature on media connections between the U.S. and the British Empire. This literature includes, on the one hand, works like Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton’s *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850–2000*, which delves into the “transatlantic media’s role in the construction of national identities and the emergence of global cultures.”³⁵ Among the essays included in this volume are interesting reflections about individuals who worked both for American and British media, a profile that some newspapermen studied in this dissertation shared. Other texts in this volume also addressed how the media created “national and transatlantic cultural identities.”³⁶

³³ For the work by Frank Schumacher, see, among others, “The American Way of Empire: National Tradition and Transatlantic Adaptation”; “Lessons of Empire: The United States, the Quest for Colonial Expertise and the British Example, 1898–1917,” in *From Enmity to Friendship: Anglo-American Relations in the 19th and 20th Century*, ed. Ursula Lehmkuhl and Gustav Schmidt (Augsburg, Germany: Wissner, 2005), 71–98; “The American Way of Empire: The United States and the Search for Colonial Order in the Philippines,” *Comparativ* 19, no. 1 (2009): 53–70, <https://doi.org/10.26014/j.comp.2009.01.04>; “Embedded Empire: The United States and Colonialism,” *Journal of Modern European History* 14, no. 2 (2016): 201–24, <https://doi.org/10.17104/1611-8944-2016-2-202>. Along the same line of researching the references of other empires during the American occupation in the Philippines, see Julian Go and Ann Foster, eds., *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

³⁴ Patrick M. Kirkwood, “An ‘Administrative Race’? Anglo-Saxonism and Imperial Administrative Networks in the Philippines and Southern Africa, c. 1898–1921” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2015); Kirkwood, “‘Lord Cromer’s Shadow’: Political Anglo-Saxonism and the Egyptian Protectorate as a Model in the American Philippines,” *Journal of World History* 27, no. 1 (2016): 1–26, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43901822>; Michael P. Cullinane, “Transatlantic Dimensions of the American Anti-Imperialist Movement, 1899–1909,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 8, no. 4 (December 2010): 301–14, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2010.522324>.

³⁵ Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton, *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850–2000* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), 1.

³⁶ Wiener and Hampton, 5. Along the same line of global communications’ networks, but with a higher focus on the technology that enabled it, see Dwayne R. Winseck and Robert M. Pike, *Communication and Empire. Media, Markets, and Globalization, 1860–1930* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).

Building upon this extensive literature on media history, which has analyzed the British Empire in great detail, this project pursues a more cohesive approach to imperial and media history. As Chandrika Kaul stated, scholars in both fields have worked “in essentially compartmentalized spheres.” Among other problems, they have largely failed to acknowledge the media’s “function and impact within the imperial context.” As a result, Kaul proposed adopting “an integrative approach to the study of the imperial experience, incorporating the role of the media in shaping the political, economic, social, and cultural dynamics of the British Colonies and Dominions, viewed from both the peripheral perspective of the colonized, as well as the metropolitan gaze of the colonizers.”³⁷

Embracing this idea, this study aims to explore the role of the British media in shaping not only the political and cultural dynamics of the British Empire, which included a diversity of opinions throughout its territories about any given event, but also the information available in the United States. British sympathizers of the Filipino cause who had media influence tried to spread their perspective on events in the islands knowing that censorship was preventing the entry in the U.S. of crucial information that might have impacted policy in regards to the Philippines.

In exploring the connections between Filipino revolutionaries and British journalists, this research also expands the growing literature on the global dimensions of the Philippine Revolution. Traditional approaches had already revealed some of its international aspects, like the First Republic’s diplomatic relations with other countries, especially Japan. More recently, the rise of transnational history is improving our understanding of colonialism in the Philippines. For example, the aforementioned studies of American imperialism compare colonialism in the Philippines to that in other

³⁷ Chandrika Kaul, *Media and the British Empire* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1. As an example and an explanation of this approach, see Kaul, *Reporting the Raj. The British Press and India, c. 1880-1922* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Kaul, “Researching Empire and Periodicals,” in *Researching the Nineteenth-Century Periodical Press. Case Studies*, ed. Alexis Easley, Andrew King, and John Morton (London: Routledge, 2018), 175–90. For a classic study on the importance of information in an empire, see Christopher A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

U.S. possessions and to other empires.³⁸ Other works have also examined the impact of imperialism on the metropolis, and the consequences of the imperial transitions.³⁹

Our knowledge about the transnational influences on the development of Philippine nationalism has evolved as well. For example, the connections of the *ilustrados* (in English, educated or enlightened Filipino inhabitants) and other Filipino revolutionaries to Europe and Asia have become increasingly clear thanks to several works. For example, Sven Matthiessen and Nicole CuUnjieng Aboitiz analyzed the neglected connections between the Philippine Revolution and other movements in Asia. While Matthiessen focused on the revolution's connections to Japan, CuUnjieng Aboitiz, in *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, explains how the intellectual roots of the revolution involved other parts of Asia.⁴⁰

Along these lines, this dissertation tries to expand our knowledge of the Philippine Revolution's international dimensions in Asia. The relationship examined here, however, is much different. First, instead of studying Filipino connections with other anti-colonial movements, this dissertation investigates their links to British journalists, whose primary audience was British imperial agents. These journalists were not interested in stimulating anti-colonial thought; they wished to accelerate the reestablishment of a stable colonial rule that benefited their regional interests.

³⁸ See, for examples, notes 33 and 34.

³⁹ Julian Go, *American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano, *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); Josep M. Delgado and M^a Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, eds., *Filipinas, un país entre dos imperios* (Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2011).

⁴⁰ Sven Matthiessen, *Japanese Pan-Asianism and the Philippines from the Late Nineteenth Century to the End of World War II* (Leiden: Brill, 2015); Nicole CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation. A Global Intellectual History of the Philippine Revolution, 1887–1912* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020). Also, Caroline Hau and Kasian Tejapira, *Traveling Nation-Makers: Transnational Flows and Movements in the Making of Modern Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Kyoto University Press, 2012); Julian Go, "Ilustrado Transnationalism. Cross-Colonial Fields and Filipino Elites at the Turn of the Twentieth Century," in *Filipino Studies. Palimpsests of Nation and Diaspora*, ed. Martin F. Manalansan IV and Augusto Espirito (New York: New York University Press, 2019), 128–50. Of course, one of the already classic works on the subject is Benedict Anderson, *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination* (London: Verso, 2006). For a very recent and notable example of the intellectual connections and movement of revolutionaries in Asia, see Tim Harper's *Underground Asia. Global Revolutionaries and the Assault on Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2021).

Also, the nature of these relationships was not based on intellectual exchanges. Instead, these connections primarily served to advance the interests of both groups of actors. Although open to negotiate some kind of “American protection,” the leaders of the Philippine Republic tried to influence regional newspapers to promote the idea that they deserved the highest degree of self-government and autonomy possible. Meanwhile, to varying degrees, these newspapers reproduced Filipino messages to encourage the U.S. to recognize the power of Filipino elites and peacefully negotiate a diplomatic arrangement for a stable future in the archipelago after the expulsion of the Spanish Empire. Since the beginning, their focus was not Filipino independence. Instead, in their messages, they insisted on a protectorate along British lines.

By exploring these topics, this dissertation builds upon the existent literature on Filipino transnational networks by showing how they built a mediatic network of advocacy that included British newspapermen in Asia in addition to the well-studied American anti-imperialists.⁴¹ This research also benefits from recent literature on transnational anti-imperialist networks like Priyamvada Gopal’s *Insurgent Empire: Anticolonial Resistance and British Dissent*, which analyzes the transmission of anti-colonial messages from the colonies to the metropolises.⁴²

While pursuing their own interests, British journalists in the region, in providing information to the revolutionaries, may possibly have influenced their strategies throughout the war. Clearly, this information allowed the revolutionaries to grasp how their struggle was perceived abroad and adjust their discourse accordingly.⁴³ Moreover,

⁴¹ For earlier contributions along this line, see Jim Zwick, “The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity,” *Amerasia Journal* 24, no. 2 (1998): 64–85, <https://doi.org/10.17953/amer.24.2.e14337j51286k027>. More recently, Murphy, *No Middle Ground*; Cullinane, “Transatlantic Dimensions of the Anti-Imperialist Movement.”

⁴² Priyamvada Gopal, *Insurgent Empire: Anticolonial Resistance and British Dissent* (London: Verso, 2019). For an original example of the flow of information between colonies and metropolises, see Michael Denning, *Noise Uprising. The Audiopolitics of a World Musical Revolution* (New York: Verso, 2015). The classic work on the importance of integrating metropolitan and colonial history is Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in *Tensions of Empire. Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1–56.

⁴³ John Morgan Gates, for example, defended that the information on the anti-imperialist movement in the U.S. encouraged an offensive of Filipino guerrillas in the fall of 1900 to influence that year’s Presidential Elections. This historian argued that, according to the Philippine Insurgent Records, their sources were “clippings from newspapers published in America, Europe, and Asia,” and the most common newspapers

the ways in which British journalists in the region responded to their propaganda might have led some revolutionaries to moderate their aspirations and reconsider the proposal of British sympathizers who advocated a protectorate. At a point, some revolutionaries must have realized that an independent Philippine Republic would not survive in the “Age of Empires,” as Óscar Campomanes eloquently called it.⁴⁴ Despite this possibility, my research cannot definitively prove that such an interaction impacted the development of Philippine nationalism during those years, a future line of inquiry that surpasses this dissertation’s goals.

Instead, this work’s main interest is to discover how the dialogue between the three parties described above —Filipino revolutionaries, British newspapermen in the Pacific and the audience of citizens they hoped to influence in the U.S.— helped shape representations of the Philippines, its inhabitants, their level of civilization and their preparedness for self-government. Ultimately, those representations would serve to justify the application of a particular political system in the archipelago.

By exploring this subject, this dissertation builds on a second body of literature analyzing the colonial discourses about the Philippines. Much of this literature stems from the classic studies of Edward W. Said on the relations between “the Modern Metropolitan West” and its colonized territories. In particular, Said analyzed the construction of stereotypes that were used to establish Western domination through culture — “all those practices, like the arts of description, communication, and representation, that have relative autonomy from the economic, social and political realms that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose principals aims is pleasure.”⁴⁵ Said argued that all those practices were “manifestly and unconceitedly a part of the Imperial process.” The spreading expressions of cultural discourses are crucial foundations for notions of consumer identity, the ways in which the world is

to encounter in those archives are precisely the *Hong Kong Daily Press*, the *China Mail* and the *Hong Kong Telegraph*, precisely the press analyzed in this dissertation. John Morgan Gates, “Philippine Guerrillas, American Anti-Imperialists, and the Election of 1900,” *Pacific Historical Review* 46 (1977): 51–64.

⁴⁴ Óscar Campomanes, “La Revolución Filipina in the Age of Empire,” *The Japanese Journal of American Studies* 18 (2007): 87–105.

⁴⁵ Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage, 1993), xii.

understood, and ways in which people relate to world. This includes political positions and the justification of various policies.

In analyzing the relationship between the Middle East and Great Britain, France, and the U.S., Said posited that colonizers traditionally think of colonized territories through the lens of *Orientalism*. This phenomenon, which is the subject of his groundbreaking 1978 book, is at the same time multiple things: an academic discipline; a collection of institutions; an imagery; a style of thinking based on “ontological and epistemological distinctions” between East and West; a way of relating to, talking about and teaching about the East as a collective entity; and the subject of a series of Western attitudes leading, ultimately, to domination.⁴⁶

Upon expanding his analysis to address case studies involving Africa, India, other parts of Asia, Australia, and the Caribbean, Said broadened his argument to address “a more general pattern of relationships between the modern metropolitan West and its overseas territories.” He identified “a general European effort to rule distant islands and peoples, related to the mentioned Orientalist descriptions of the Islamic world, as well as Europe’s special ways of representing the Caribbean islands, Ireland, and the Far East.”⁴⁷

Western representations of those territories and their peoples repeated a series of rhetorical figures conjuring a state of barbarism or semi-barbarism. As a consequence, Western empires, from their privileged position of technological advancement, shared a notion that they had to bring civilization to so-called primitive peoples, whose alleged state of inferiority justified imperial domination. Bringing civilization to these regions often meant “flogging or death of extended punishment being required when ‘they’ misbehaved or became rebellious, because ‘they’ mainly understood force of violence best; ‘they’ were not like ‘us,’ and for that reason deserved to be ruled.”⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Edward W. Said, *Orientalismo* (Barcelona: Penguin Random House, 2002), 20–23.

⁴⁷ Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, xi.

⁴⁸ Said, xi.

Said and others gave shape to postcolonial theory and postcolonial studies, which later academics have steadily improved upon. On the one hand, scholars have delineated several thematical axes that are fundamental to understanding colonial cultural relations, including gender and race. On the other hand, they have also been developing methodological approaches to refine our analysis of colonial discourses.

For example, Nicholas Thomas suggested that the most fruitful way of dealing with colonial discourses was to think outside of monolithic frameworks and dualisms, and “realize localized theories and historically specific accounts.” Doing so enables us to grasp the “varied articulations of colonizing and counter-colonial representations and practices.”⁴⁹ Thomas noted regional and temporal particularities in colonial discourses that were specific to a given geographic and chronological context in which a discourse emerged, the cultural background and interests of its creators, and the responses and challenges from the colonized people being portrayed.

Learning from these authors, this dissertation will expand upon an extensive body of literature on cultural representations of the Philippines during the late 19th century imperial transition —representations that were charged with political designs. Traditional studies about politics in the Philippines already pointed at representations of Filipinos as critical instruments to justify specific imperial policies. Following Said’s line of thinking, several studies have approached representations of the Philippines and its inhabitants through the study of different media, from photography and early cinema to journalism and literature.⁵⁰ Interesting works have also delved into the production of

⁴⁹ Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism’s Culture. Anthropology, Travel and Government* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), ix.

⁵⁰ For some references on each media, see Benito Vergara, *Displaying Filipinos. Photography and Colonialism in Early 20th Century Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1995); David Brody, *Visualizing American Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Nick Deocampo, “Imperialist Fictions: The Filipino in the Imperialist Imaginary,” in *Vestiges of War*, ed. Luis H. Francia and Shaw Velasco (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 225–35; David Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993); B. M. Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest*; Meg Wesling, *Empire’s Proxy. American Literature and U.S. Imperialism in the Philippines* (New York: New York University Press, 2011); Tom Sykes, *Imagining Manila: Literature, Empire and Orientalism* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2021). For a reference discussion about the study of the culture of the American Empire and the need to expand it, see Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 3–37.

colonial knowledge, analyzing, among other things, political campaigns, academia and its links to politics, and public displays, like world fairs and expositions.⁵¹

Another group of studies that is growing examines how Filipino revolutionaries tried to contest colonial discourses and their allegations of savagery and unpreparedness for political modernity. Among the earliest works to address the Filipino efforts to deny these images are traditional political studies of Filipino nationalism. John N. Schumacher's classic work on the Propaganda Movement stands out as an example. Schumacher analyzed how ilustrados based in Madrid tried to advance both political rights for the inhabitants of the Philippines and reforms in the Spanish regime in the islands. Among their most important actions was refuting the imperial conception of the Philippines as backwards in their political campaigns and disseminating Filipino cultural expressions.⁵²

As our understanding of culture as a critical space of political contest has grown, more studies have delved into the Filipino resistance to colonial discourses in a diversity of fields. These include, for example, Vicente Rafael's *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History*. Rafael tried to understand "the languages of rule, resistance, and collaboration as these are conjugated by the technologies of imagery in the production

⁵¹ On knowledge about the Philippines and political discourses, see Robert Hildebrand, *Power and the People. Executive Management of Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 30–51; George Herring, "Imperial Tutor: William McKinley, the War of 1898, and the New Empire, 1898–1902," in *Selling War in a Media Age. The Presidency and Public Opinion in the American Century* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2010), 18–47; Norberto Barreto Velázquez, *La amenaza colonial: el imperialismo norteamericano y las Filipinas, 1904–1934* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2011); Lanny Thompson Womacks, "'Estudiarlos, juzgarlos y gobernarlos: conocimiento y poder en el archipiélago imperial estadounidense,'" in *La nación soñada: Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas ante el 98*, ed. Consuelo Naranjo, Miguel A. Puig-Samper, and Luis Miguel García Mora (Madrid: Doce Calles, 1996), 685–93; Glòria Cano, "Evidence for the Deliberate Distortion of the Spanish Philippine Colonial Historical Record in The Philippine Islands, 1843–1898," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 39, no. 1 (2008): 1–30; Luis Ángel Sánchez Gómez, *Un imperio en la vitrina: el colonialismo español en el Pacífico y la exposición de Filipinas de 1887* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2003); Robert Rydell, *All the World's a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876–1916* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984); Paul A. Kramer, "Making Concessions: Race and Empire Revisited at the Philippine Exposition, St. Louis, 1901–1905," *Radical History Review* 73 (1999): 74–114.

⁵² J. N. Schumacher, *Propaganda Movement*; Also, J.N. Schumacher, *The Making of a Nation: Essays on Nineteenth-Century Filipino Nationalism* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991).

of colonial interventions and nationalist responses.”⁵³ In this collection of essays and in other works dealing with the Spanish rule, Rafael demonstrated how collaboration and resistances characterized Filipino responses to the culture of both empires.⁵⁴ More recent examples include works by Resil B. Mojares and Megan Thomas on how ilustrados engaged orientalism and nineteenth-century Western academic disciplines while crafting Filipino nationalism.⁵⁵

In summary, this dissertation investigates what Kramer described as a “world of inter-imperial dialogues.” It focuses on a transnational connection that aimed to nuance the colonial discourses Edward Said identified as a crucial foundation of imperialism. In particular, it reveals how Filipino nationalists and British journalists collaborated in shaping the colonial discourses on the Philippine Republic to influence the American Empire’s approach to dealing with its “new possessions.”

3. Methodology

This dissertation is mostly based on an in-depth analysis of newspapers whose coverage of the Philippine Revolution has not previously been explored. Additionally, to understand the inner workings of their content creation, I consult the papers and private correspondence of Spanish, American and Filipino politicians, administrators and journalists who were involved in creating this coverage. Because there were innumerable actors influencing the media and politics, as the project evolved, I focused on analyzing the sources related to the actors who seemed most important to my evolving research questions. For practical reasons, it was necessary to limit the archives I consulted.

⁵³ Vicente L. Rafael, *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 2.

⁵⁴ Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society Under Early Spanish Rule* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Rafael, *The Promise of the Foreign: Nationalism and the Technics of Translation in the Spanish Philippines* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005).

⁵⁵ Resil B. Mojares, *Brains of the Nation: Pedro Paterno, T.H. Pardo de Tavera, Isabelo de Los Reyes, and the Production of Modern Knowledge* (Quezon City: Ateneo University Press, 2006); Megan C. Thomas, *Orientalists, Propagandists, and Ilustrados: Filipino Scholarship and the End of Spanish Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).

Originally, when I began working on my dissertation, I was focusing on American war correspondence during the Philippine-American War of 1899–1902. As a consequence, I spent the first years of the project becoming acquainted with secondary literature on the conflict and conducting preliminary research in archives in the U.S. In particular, I consulted the archives of U.S. journalists and news agencies involved in covering the war.⁵⁶ Also, I did research in the archives of American authorities and officials who might have impacted the journalists' experience in the Philippines.⁵⁷ Finally, I read the records of Filipino revolutionaries to understand their relations with the foreign press.⁵⁸

In the spring of 2019, I confirmed that the British press from nearby ports was a potential source of information about the Philippines to contrast with the censored narratives of American journalists in the islands. In the fall of that year, I came across some clues in the Filipino revolutionary records that led me to pay more attention to the Filipino propaganda directed at Western war correspondents and, also, at this British colonial press. From there, I began investigating the effects of this relationship between Filipino revolutionaries and local British media—a topic I believed would make a greater contribution to the historiography. As my research questions evolved, I realized the importance of consulting archival material in the United Kingdom and the Philippines.

The disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, however, altered my research plans, severely limiting my ability to travel internationally to conduct archival research during the final two years of the project. Therefore, I am aware of the existence of interesting archival collections that could have further informed this study. Fortunately,

⁵⁶ In particular, I did research in the Morgan Library & Museum to read the papers of the war correspondent Martin Egan, and in the Associated Press Corporate Archives, both in New York. I also visited the Reuters Archive at Thompson Reuters in London.

⁵⁷ From official diplomats in the Philippines, I read the Rounseville and Edwin Wildman Papers, the John Barrett Papers, and the William Howard Taft Papers. From American authorities in Washington D.C. who could influence in the media policy in the Philippines, I read George Cortelyou's papers. Cortelyou was secretary to presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, and among other functions, he acted as the White House's Press Secretary. All this material is in the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. At the National Archives in Washington D.C., I did research in the Adjutant General Office Records (RG 94), the Bureau of Overseas Expeditions and Commands Records (RG 395), and the Bureau of Insular Affairs Records (RG 350).

⁵⁸ I read the copy available in the National Archives in Washington D.C., under the title Philippine Insurgent Records. This collection is further presented in the following pages.

these disruptions did not prevent me from consulting any material that is essential to offering a rigorous answer to my research questions. In the following sections, I detail the specific newspapers and collections that I analyzed.

3.1 Media Content Analysis

This project undertakes the first in-depth analysis of the reaction of the English-language press in the Pacific to the Philippine Revolution. As stated previously, this research is interested in publications that were in a privileged position to observe events in the islands; they were not subjected to Spanish or American censorship and could compare and contrast the two empires' official discourses with direct and, sometimes neutral, eye-witness reporting. This dissertation is especially interested in how these publications responded to the version of events told by Filipino revolutionaries.

In particular, its main cases of study are publications from Hong Kong. As previously mentioned, the inhabitants of this city had substantial commercial interests in the islands and there was an intense exchange of goods, people and information between both places. Hong Kong also had an influential and growing community of Filipino exiles who supported the fight in the islands by providing necessary resources, like arms, and soliciting international support through diplomacy and propaganda. This is why this research relies mostly on the study of the three daily newspapers published in this city: the *Hong Kong Daily Press*, the *China Mail*, and the *Hong Kong Telegraph*.⁵⁹ All three newspapers were accessed at the British Library in London and the digital repository of the Hong Kong Public Libraries.

As my research progressed, I realized that it would also be important to incorporate the *Singapore Free Press & Mercantile Advertiser* [henceforth, *Singapore Free Press*] into my analysis. The aforementioned papers from Hong Kong often cited this Singapore publication as their source for matters related to the Philippines. Moreover, in their correspondence, Filipino leaders also described the editor of the *Singapore Free Press*, William Graeme St. Clair, as an ally in spreading their communication campaign. Therefore, this Singaporean publication emerged as a fundamental piece of evidence to

⁵⁹ Frank H. H. King and Prescott Clarke, *A Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers, 1822–1911* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

understand the Filipino communication strategy. Editions of this newspaper were accessed at the British Library and in the digital newspaper archive of the National Library Board of Singapore.⁶⁰

Many of these newspapers also published weekly overland editions sold in Great Britain: The *Overland China Mail*, the *Hong Kong Weekly Press and China Overland Trade*, and the *Weekly Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*. In the case of the *Telegraph*, according to Frank H. H. King and Prescott Clarke, “at least in the first years of publication, it published no overland edition, but rather reprinted important articles in the regular edition before departure of the mails.”⁶¹ The analysis in this dissertation, however, covers all of the content related to the Philippines published in the daily editions because their editorials, special chronicles, letters to the editor, and shorter news were not always included in their overland editions and are relevant to understanding how Filipino voices were used.

Due to the constraints of time and space, my investigation does not include the *Straits Times*, the other daily newspaper published in Singapore, nor does it examine news publications in other British territories, like the *Times of India* or the *Ceylon Observer*. My project also excludes the French colonial press, which includes publications like *Le Courier de Saigon* and *L’Avenir du Tonkin*. All these newspapers participated in a regional debate about affairs in the Philippines, with their content appearing regularly in Hong Kong and Singapore papers. Therefore, these titles remain interesting case studies for future examinations that might shed light on how perceptions of the conflict in the Philippines and relations with the inhabitants of the islands were impacted by world diplomacy and the particularities of territories beyond the ones addressed in this study.

Having discovered that content in the Hong Kong and Singapore British press incorporated Filipino voices that might have influenced the opinions of readers about the conflict, the final part of my project determines whether or not the persuasive voices

⁶⁰ Given that the whole dissertation contains hundreds of references to specific articles from these newspapers, for economy reasons, their notes in the following chapters do not include the link to this database and the Hong Kong Public Libraries’ one. Still, almost all editions can be found navigating in those digital repositories.

⁶¹ King and Clarke, *Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers*, 71.

of Filipinos also appeared in the U.S. press between 1898 and 1902, when Americans arrived in the Philippines and the Hong Kong Junta was actively trying to influence public opinion in the United States. As previously mentioned, several historians have analyzed how both the inhabitants of the Philippines and the war were perceived in the media. No one, however, has undertaken an in-depth analysis of the presence of Filipino voices and viewpoints in the media's reporting on these matters.

While some historians have understood the Anti-Imperialist League as the defender of Filipino interests in the American public sphere, others have pointed out that a significant part of its discourse was based on a portrait of Filipinos as savages who might contaminate the American nation. The dissertation fills this important scholarly gap by determining the extent to which the media campaign of Filipinos countering Western discourses of their inferiority was present in the news being consumed in the American public sphere. It will also examine the role of the Anti-Imperialist League in supporting this struggle.

According to the American Newspaper Directory, there were 2,214 daily newspapers in the U.S. in 1898.⁶² To assess the presence of the messages from the Filipino Hong Kong Junta and its British sympathizers in these publications, I have searched for them in the most extensive online repositories of U.S. newspapers: Chronicling America, a website organized by the Library of Congress, and ProQuest Historical Newspapers Database. Because neither of these include the major Anti-Imperialist newspapers, I have also searched for these messages and published responses in the *Springfield Republican* and the *New York Evening Post*. Both titles are available at the Library of Congress in Washington D.C.

Lastly, it is worth making one final note about my methodology in relation to the content analysis. As previously established, this dissertation will scrutinize how newspapers in Hong Kong and select papers in Singapore included not only Western actors as sources of information but also Filipino ones. Toward this end, my project will also explore chronicles, reports, and opinion articles, in addition to editorial columns.

⁶² *American Newspaper Directory* (New York: Geo. P. Rowell & Co., Publishers, 1898), 13.

Taking into account the large number of editions available in the press between 1896 and 1902, I will examine a selection that was published around the time of significant events of the Philippine Revolution against Spain, the 1898 War and the Philippine-American War.⁶³

This project will not analyze sources dated after July 1902. This was the month when U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt formally declared the war over. More importantly, I selected this date to finish my analysis because, as Chapter 4 explains, Emilio Aguinaldo was captured in March 1901 and in the months after the British newspapers that I studied ceased publishing sympathetic messages about the revolution. The connection between Filipinos and their British supporters in the media subsequently ended.

3.2. Institutional, Corporate and Private Correspondence of the Actors Involved in the Mediation of the War

To better understand reactions to the Philippine Revolution in the media, this research is geared towards understanding the political links and influences between the media, Filipino revolutionaries trying to promote their cause, and Spanish and American authorities who aimed to control public opinion about what was happening in the archipelago. With this goal in mind, I have complemented the information found in the published press with other primary sources from institutional, corporate and private archives of different actors who were involved in the mediatic dimension of the war.⁶⁴

⁶³ During the relative brief lengths of the 1896–1897 Revolution against Spain, the Spanish-American War, and the Paris peace conference, the press was constantly publishing material about events in the Philippines and its frequent newsworthy events. Therefore, I have checked almost all their available editions between 1896 and 1898. In the case of Chapter 4, regarding the coverage of the whole Philippine-American War, I based my analysis on a wide selection of editions published surrounding the most newsworthy events of those four years: the outbreak of the war; the dissolution of the First Philippine Republic; the publication of the Schurman Commission Report and the change to guerrilla warfare; the arrival of the Second Philippine Commission; the American Presidential Elections; Emilio Aguinaldo's capture; the Inauguration of the Civil Government in July 1901; the "Balangiga Massacre" and the subsequent harsh campaign in Samar; and the whole first half of 1902, the period when the Senate Investigation about the American military misbehavior took place in Washington D.C.

⁶⁴ On the need to avoid understanding the media as a black box that generates content and delve into the political agendas, relations and experiences of their creators, see, among many others, Kevin Williams, "War Correspondents as Sources for History," *Media History* 18, no. 3–4 (2012): 341–60. On the need to combine the study of American Journalism History with other historiography, see Chris Daly, "The Historiography of Journalism History. Part 1: 'An Overview,'" *American Journalism* 26, no. 1 (2009),

To analyze the designs of the communication campaign of the Filipinos, this project relies on the Philippine Revolutionary Records, a giant archive of correspondence and documentation from Filipino revolutionaries that dates from between 1896 and 1906. American troops confiscated these documents as they extended their control around the archipelago. The collection remained in the U.S. until 1958, when it was transferred to the Philippines. Still, a copy is available on microfilm at the U.S. National Archives in Washington, D.C. under the title Philippine Insurgent Records (Microcopy No. 254).⁶⁵ In addition, Captain John M. Taylor, in charge of organizing the confiscated material, selected some of the content, mostly in Tagalog and Spanish, and translated it into English, compiling it in a 5-volume collection that was not published until 1971.⁶⁶ I will use this edited version to complement my research in the original Philippine Insurgent Records.⁶⁷

I am aware of other collections preserved by institutions in the Philippines that might further illuminate the Filipino propaganda campaign. They include, most notably, the National Archives of the Philippines, the National Library, and other collections available in university libraries. Due to the international travel restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, however, I was unable to consult these sources. They will remain a main focus of my analysis in a future expansion of this project.

To better understand the Spanish efforts to control the perception of the Philippine Revolution in Pacific, I have undertaken extensive research in the Biblioteca Tomás Navarro Tomás of the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) and the

141–47 and “The Historiography of Journalism History: Part 2: ‘Toward a New Theory,’” *American Journalism* 26, no. 1 (2009), 148–55.

⁶⁵ Henceforth, in spite of its title’s political implications, to stick to the official name of the archival sources I read, I refer to the Philippine Revolutionary Records as Philippine Insurgent Records or P.I.R.

⁶⁶ John R. M. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection against the United States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction* (Pasay City, Philippines: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971).

⁶⁷ On the history of the Philippine Insurgent Records, see Nerissa Balce, *Body Parts of Empire: Visual Abjection, Filipino Images and the American Archive* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2016), 59–60; John T. Farrell, “An Abandoned Approach to Philippine History: John R.M. Taylor and the Philippine Insurrection Records,” *The Catholic Historical Review* 39, no. 4 (1954): 385–407, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25015651?read-now=1&seq=1>.

Archivo Histórico Nacional, both in Madrid. I consulted the archives of the Capitanía General de Filipinas, the Ministerio de Ultramar, and the Ministerio de Exteriores.

Besides the material mentioned above about American experiences covering the war, I have conducted research in Massachusetts Senator George F. Hoar's archive to expand my understanding of the connections of the British Pacific-based press and the ways in which British individuals working as press representatives of the republic influenced the American public sphere.⁶⁸ Senator Hoar was one of the most well-known and influential anti-imperialists and, more than any of his colleagues, he was confident in the capacity of the Filipino revolutionaries for self-government. This is why I chose to consult his archive, hoping to determine whether or not British media representatives influenced the American Anti-Imperialists. Most of his papers are in the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston.

Finally, after changing the direction of my research, I wanted to understand the interactions between the press in Hong Kong and Singapore and the local British political authorities, who had their own interest in the conflict in the Philippines. Toward this end, I hoped to consult the archives of these authorities. I also wanted to look at the archives of American consular authorities in Hong Kong and Singapore to see how they might have reacted to the media. Although the project earned the necessary funds to take on both tasks, the difficulty of traveling and the closing of these archives due to the COVID-19 pandemic made this impossible. Both tasks remain as critical research goals for future revisions of this work.

4. Structure

Chapter 1 analyzes the efforts of Filipino nationalists to counteract the stereotyped images that had been presented to Western audiences and connects these efforts to international debates about the rules of civilized warfare. It pays close attention to the relationships that Filipino nationalists cultivated with British sympathizers in the nearby ports of Hong Kong and Singapore to promote their messages in the region. To better understand the strategic importance of this press, it also analyzes the media context of

⁶⁸ For the material about American experiences covering the war, see footnotes 56 and 57.

the South China Sea, emphasizing the fruitful exchange of information between ports in this region and the progressive inclusion of non-Western voices in this exchange—a flow of information that ultimately led to the metropolitan media spheres of Great Britain and the U.S.

After revealing the inner workings of the press in this region of the world and looking at how the Filipinos factored into it, the following three chapters will analyze how the media campaign of the Filipinos impacted the Pacific-based British press. Chapter 2 focuses on the beginning of this campaign during the Revolution against Spain in 1896–1897. At the time, there was a heated debate in the regional media about how Spain and the revolutionaries were waging the campaign and whether or not they were respecting the rules of civilized warfare. After several newspapers denounced the empire’s harsh treatment of the rebels, the Spanish authorities tightened their control of communications. The Filipinos, however, primarily through Howard W. Bray, responded by defending the legitimacy and honor of their struggle for liberation.

Chapter 3 examines how the press reacted to the Filipino civilization campaign during the Spanish-American War and the negotiations of the Treaty of Paris. After witnessing the 1896–1897 Revolution and observing the power of the newly constituted Philippine Republic in the islands, editors and journalists from Hong Kong and Singapore helped spread their message about Filipino civilization. Nonetheless, their defense of the capacity of Filipino revolutionary leaders for self-government did not extend into an argument supporting the ultimate independence of the Philippine Republic. Instead, they aimed to persuade the Americans of the need to negotiate with Aguinaldo’s government and arrange a protectorate following the models implemented by the British Empire in Egypt, the Straits Settlements, and some parts of India. They saw this as the only way to avoid a conflict that might damage everyone’s position in the region.

Chapter 4 investigates how and why newspaper editors in Hong Kong and Singapore later reduced their coverage of the events in the Philippines. Even after the dissolution of the Philippine Republic and the beginning of the guerrilla war, there were some lingering signs of sympathy toward the revolutionary cause in the press. These newspapers insisted again on the need for the U.S. to establish a protectorate following

British models of colonization. After Emilio Aguinaldo's capture, however, these expressions of sympathy quickly stopped. The newspaper editors in Hong Kong and Singapore chose not to denounce the harsh methods employed by the U.S. in the archipelago because the British Army was using similar methods in its counterinsurgency campaign in the South African War.

To conclude, chapter 5 shows how the Filipino campaign for recognition, based on defending the capacity of Filipinos for self-government, made its way to the U.S. with the help of British press representatives. In particular, it tracks how some of their messages appeared in the U.S. press. The chapter also shows how, even before the outbreak of the Philippine-American War in February 1899, the Filipinos and their representatives managed to convince Senator George F. Hoar of the validity of their message. In turn, Senator Hoar, an influent member of the Anti-Imperialist League, spread this message to other anti-imperialists.

Therefore, the British press representatives of Aguinaldo's government played an essential role in influencing the reaction of the British-based Pacific press to the Philippine Revolution and convincing Senator Hoar of the capacity of Filipinos for self-government. As a result, the last chapter argues that the relationship between the Filipinos and their British press representatives constituted a successful transnational advocacy network for the time it lasted.

1

“Force and Justice Inside. Culture and Propaganda Outside” The Filipino Civilization Campaign

This chapter provides the contextual basis of the dissertation. It examines how Filipino nationalists responded to the Spanish civilizing mission discourse and later the American “Benevolent Assimilation” rhetoric through well-designed propaganda strategies. To do it, the text departs from rich historiography on the evolution of Filipino nationalism and its public expressions.

Analysis of the 1872–1892 Propaganda Movement for the Philippines’ assimilation into the Spanish Empire show its campaigns were mainly based on challenging the stereotyped vision of the archipelago’s inhabitants as savages, and demonstrating they deserved a higher degree of self-government. The same idea of exhibiting the maturity of Filipino society laid the foundation of a later campaign during the 1898 War that continued once the Philippine-American War began. Seeking recognition in the international community during the conflict and the consequent right to determine the future of the Philippines, the newly created Philippine Republic tried to demonstrate its leaders’ capacity to rule an independent country, “under American protection.” The degree of that protection would be highly debated.

Relying on those previous works, Paul A. Kramer compellingly presented the continuity between these two discourses in his book *The Blood of Government. Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines*. In this analysis of how race structured the American Empire in the Philippines, Kramer stated that in 1898, Filipino revolutionaries, inheriting the Propaganda Movement’s fight, realized campaigns for recognition “waged in the language of civilization.”¹

This chapter reviews these well-known civilization campaigns but expands our knowledge about them in two manners. First, it goes into more detail on Filipino media

¹ Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government. Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 100.

strategies during the revolution against Spain between 1896 and 1897. Briefly, it introduces the argument that at this point time, a crucial idea of the civilization campaign, the Filipino respect for the rules of warfare, was articulated. Chapter 2 deals more in-depth with this topic. Second, the present chapter examines an underexplored dimension of the Filipino mediatic campaign: its links with Southeast Asian English-language media.

A review of the main Filipino primary source on the revolution, the Philippine Insurgent Records, and other edited collections of notable nationalists' writings reveals that Filipinos found strategic connections with men of media influence from Hong Kong and Singapore.² Very few works have analyzed those relationships and, in these cases, the information available on the topic is directly retrieved from the primary sources, which appear partially transmitted and without further context.³

This first section of the dissertation argues that, by exploring the Filipino revolutionary propaganda strategies delving into these efforts before 1898, and examining their transnational relations, we can better understand their main discourses and methods, their origins and evolution, and also the impact they achieved, which was much larger than previously recognized. Chapters two, three, and four, which investigate the results of these connections in the press of both British port cities, explore further this idea.

This chapter begins by studying the earlier Filipino challenges to Spanish colonial discourses that supported rigid colonial hierarchies excluding Filipinos from Spanish citizenship, among other consequences. Next, it moves to show how these ideas evolved and widened during the Philippine Revolution against Spain, the Spanish-American

² As mentioned in the Introduction, the chapter relies on the copy of the revolutionary papers available in the U.S. National Archives, in Washington D.C.: M254, "Philippine Insurgent Records, 1896–1901, with associated Records of the United States War Department, 1900–1906." I have also used John R. M. Taylor's edited collection of a selection of these records: *The Philippine Insurrection against the United States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction* (Pasay City, Philippines: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971). Other edited collections of primary documents used are Mariano Ponce, *Cartas sobre la Revolución, 1897–1900* (Manila: Biblioteca Nacional de Filipinas, 1932) and Apolinario Mabini, *La Revolución Filipina (con otros documentos de la época)*, ed. Teodoro Manguiat Kalaw (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1931).

³ The exceptions include Taylor, *Philippine Insurrection against the United States*, vol. 2, 486–518; Jane Slichter Ragsdale, "Coping with the Yankees, the Filipino Elite 1898–1903" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin Madison, 1975).

War and the Philippine-American War, and it looks at the methods used. Finally, it emphasizes the importance of one of their strategies: Filipino connections with regional British journalists.

1. The European Civilizing Mission and the Propaganda Movement

According to Eric Hobsbawm, between 1880 and 1914, the world outside Europe and the American continent—with the only exception being Ethiopia—was subjected to the formal or informal rule of a short list of countries: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United States, and Japan. Also, the Asian empires that remained independent fell under the zones of influence of Western powers' or suffered direct interventions in their administrations.⁴

These competing empires shared an ideology to rationalize domination. Although it was a complex and ever-shifting discourse formulated in very different ways, Euro-American powers placed themselves on a higher scale of enlightenment than their colonized populations, creating hierarchies based on race, religion, the possession of technology and science, etc. This alleged superiority entitled them to rule supposedly backward societies in order to uplift them.⁵ Some subjected peoples, of course, contested those discourses.⁶ Analyzing Filipino reactions in the media to these civilizing missions during their revolution is the main goal of this chapter, so it is necessary to briefly outline the specific colonial narratives they challenged and their first attempts to modify them.

⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, *Trilogía eras: la era del imperio (1875–1914)* (Barcelona: Planeta, 2014), 728.

⁵ The literature on the topic is huge. I have based this definition, however, in the one provided by Carey A. Watt and Michael Mann, *Civilizing Missions in Colonial and Postcolonial South Asia: From Improvement to Development* (London: Anthem Press, 2011), 4 and Michael Adas, “Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology,” *Journal of World History* 15, no. 1 (2004): 31–63, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20079260>. For studies on different empires' civilizing missions, see, among others, Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize. The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); Kenneth Pomeranz, “Empire & ‘Civilizing’ Missions, Past & Present,” *Daedalus* 134, no. 2 (2005): 34–45, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20027976>.

⁶ On colonized populations challenging the civilizing mission, see, for example, Adas, “Contested Hegemony”; Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

As Kramer demonstrated, in Spanish and American colonialisms in the Philippines, like in many other cases, race was one of the organizing principles imperial authorities used to structure relations with the natives of the archipelago. Race and the accompanying stereotypes of levels of preparedness for Western political modernity allowed Spain and the U.S. to justify their rule over the locals and exercise sovereignty.⁷

In the case of Spanish colonialism, the Philippine society was structured along racial lines since the regime's inception. Spaniards, born in the Iberian Peninsula, headed a rigorous hierarchy, followed by *criollos*, individuals born in the islands but of Spanish ancestry. After them came mixed-bloods from Spanish fathers and *india* mothers, mixed-bloods born from Chinese and *indios*, and, finally, *indios* or filipinos. In turn, this last category was also divided between the Hispanicized and Catholic population and between people from conquered and non-conquered territories of the archipelago who had received the different influences. Such power structures were strictly imposed in all aspects of life, manifesting in political and religious institutions, the economic and financial *status quo*, the islands' systems of taxation and labor, the justice system, territorial ghettoization, and many other everyday social practices.⁸

During the 19th century, exclusion improved. After the Seven Years' War, the loss of its Latin American empire, and the British challenge to its sovereignty in the Caribbean, Spain redesigned its relation with its last insular possessions: Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. As it was transitioning from the old regime to a liberal state, expressions of liberalism in Spain briefly benefited the inhabitants of the colonies. As an example, the 1812 Cadiz Constitution stands out, as it defended the equality of overseas territories and acknowledged the need for assimilating its citizens' rights to those in the peninsula.⁹

⁷ Kramer, *Blood of Government*. The following pages are substantially based on his analysis of the Spanish Empire available in Chapters 1 and 2 of this book, 35–158. The chapter also relies on M^a Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Gruoso, “La administración colonial de Filipinas en el último tercio del XIX. Dos procesos contrapuestos: la reactivación del interés español frente a la consolidación de una identidad nacional filipina,” in *Las relaciones entre España y Filipinas. Siglos XVI-XX* (Madrid-Barcelona: Casa Asia-CSIC, 2002), 123–42.

⁸ Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 38–43.

⁹ On the Spanish colonial regime in the Philippines during the 19th century, see Josep M. Fradera, *Colonias para después de un imperio* (Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2005); Fradera, *Gobernar colonias* (Barcelona: Península, 1999). On the specific impact of the Cadiz Constitution in the Philippines, see

Both liberal and conservative authorities, however, aimed to protect metropolitan interests, which in an equal parliament would have been contested by the majority of the population abroad. To avoid this and, at the same time, preserve its remaining colonies, the state denied this political equality, restricted the involvement of natives in metropolitan and colonial spheres of power and strengthened its control of all political and economic institutions in the colonies.

In the Philippine Islands, this mainly translated into the expansion of the Spanish Governor's functions and an increasing reliance on two branches of power. First, the army had important roles, not only in defending but also in governing and administering the archipelago. Second, since the beginning of Spanish colonization, the monastic orders led the evangelization of the islands, controlled education, and acted as intermediaries between the civil/military authorities and local populations, especially in parts of the territory where the presence of Spanish colonial authorities was limited. They also owned a lot of lands, and because of that, they had a fundamental influence on life in the archipelago.¹⁰

All these different wings of government tried to suppress expressions of popular discontentment and exclude native populations from participating in the political government of the islands. Filipinos did not have representation in Parliament nor equality of rights in relation to the peninsular citizens, and their power was limited to the local administration. To sum up, the inhabitants of the Philippines remained in an exceptional state: they were not Spanish citizens but remained under Spanish sovereignty.¹¹

This situation lasted until the end of the Spanish Empire's presence. As a result of the Glorious Revolution, in 1868, and of the Cuban Ten Year's War, Spain ceded some political representation to Puerto Rico and Cuba. However, the attempt to expand those rights to the Philippines failed, and the numerous liberal reforms implemented by the

Ruth De Llobet, "Orphans of Empire: Bourbon Reforms, Constitutional Impasse, and the Rise of Filipino Creole Consciousness in an Age of Revolution" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2011).

¹⁰ Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, "La administración colonial de Filipinas en el último tercio del XIX," 124.

¹¹ Fradera, *Colonias para después de un imperio*.

Ministerio de Ultramar (in English, the Overseas Ministry) and the governors-general of the Philippines between 1869 and 1871 were quickly curtailed.¹²

This marginalization was justified by referencing imperialist depictions of the indigenous inhabitants of the Philippines, which portrayed them as very heterogeneous populations still unprepared for the political rights granted to Spanish citizens.

According to Manuel Azcárraga, ex-civil governor of Manila, five of the six millions of natives in the Philippine Islands were still incapable of exercising those rights, and “they would neither need them or understand them.”¹³ Popular opinion in Spain shared the same ideas of the Philippines and its inhabitants, as seen in the media or in international expositions.¹⁴

Regardless of the Spanish efforts to control the Philippines, the islands’ society at the last third of the 19th century aimed for changes. Indeed, it was a very heterogeneous population with many religions, ethnicities, languages, and lifestyles, as well as new class divisions. All were progressively united, however, by discontentment against the Spanish rule and articulated a national conscience.¹⁵

First, the popular classes resented the abuses of the Spanish authorities’ representatives and the inequality between themselves and peninsular residents. For its part, the Filipino clergy suffered discrimination, as natives could not achieve important positions in the

¹² In contrast, influent economic reforms were applied successfully. Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, “La administración colonial de Filipinas en el último tercio del XIX.”

¹³ Quoted in Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, “Imperio, negocios, raza y nación: impresiones internacionales de Filipinas a fines del s^{glo} XIX,” in *Imperios y naciones en el Pacífico. Vol. I. La formación de una colonia: Filipinas*, ed. Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, Josep M. Fradera, and Luis Alonso (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2001), 445–46.

¹⁴ Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, “Imperio, negocios, raza y nación”; Agustín Muñoz Vidal, “Filipinas en la ilustración gráfica de la segunda mitad del siglo XIX en España,” *Revista española del Pacífico* VII (1998): 289–304; Sánchez Gómez, *Un imperio en la vitrina*.

¹⁵ For a brief and clear overview of the evolution of Filipino nationalism at the turn of the 19th century in relation to the Spanish rule, see Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, “La administración colonial de Filipinas en el último tercio del XIX.” The literature on the development of Filipino nationalism is very extensive. Some of the classic manuals on the matter are Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan* (Manila: University of the Philippines Press, 1956); Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (Quezon City: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1975); Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation*, vols. 1 and 2 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2007); J. N. Schumacher, *Propaganda Movement*; J. N. Schumacher, *Making of a Nation*.

church. Some of its campaigns against marginalization and repression, most notably the Cavite mutiny of 1872 that ended with the execution of three priests, ignited wider popular discontent. Other popular religious practices also mobilized the masses.¹⁶

Additionally, economic transformations in the archipelago generated a new elite class of landowners and merchants focused on agriculture for exports.¹⁷ As they directly negotiated with foreign merchants and resented the state's protection of the church's property of lands, what they saw as an obstacle to economic development, they also questioned the Spanish regime.¹⁸ Finally, the expansion of education in the archipelago led to the emergence of the ilustrados, who complemented their studies in the universities of the Philippines with courses in Europe and the U.S.

These young educated men, while traveling overseas, engaged with a global network of ideas that allowed them to test their stereotyped conceptions of "Mother Spain," compare Spain with different European countries, and develop a unique Filipino conscience.¹⁹ Later, they would try to share this evolving knowledge with people back in the Philippines as much as rigid Spanish censorship allowed them to do, smuggling copies of their texts to the archipelago.²⁰

¹⁶ Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, "La administración colonial de Filipinas en el último tercio del XIX," 132–35. On the influence of the Filipino clergy and the mobilizing power of catholic practices in Filipino nationalism, see John N. Schumacher, *Revolutionary Clergy: The Filipino Clergy and the Nationalist Movement, 1850–1903* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1972); Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840–1910* (Quezon City, Metro Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979).

¹⁷ Jonathan Fast and Jim Richardson, *Roots of Dependency: Political and Economic Revolution in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines* (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1979); Alfred W. McCoy and Edilberto C. de Jesus, eds., *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1982); Benito Legarda, *After the Galleons: Foreign Trade, Economic Change and Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999).

¹⁸ Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, "La administración colonial de Filipinas en el último tercio del XIX," 126.

¹⁹ For European international influences on ilustrado thought, see B. Anderson, *Under Three Flags*. For ilustrado relations with Asian intellectual and identitarian currents, see CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*.

²⁰ J. N. Schumacher, *Propaganda Movement*.

Most important, however, was their campaign in Spain for a new relationship between the islands and the metropolis. Based in Barcelona and later in Madrid, this minority of ilustrados formed the Propaganda Movement which, at its height from the 1880s until 1892, advocated the extension of Spanish metropolitan law and rights to the archipelago and the application of reforms that alleviated the tensions aforementioned. They did this through political lobbying —creating fruitful relationships with Spanish liberal and republican politicians— and a journalistic campaign carried out in their own newspapers in the peninsula, most importantly, *La Solidaridad* (1889–1895), and in other Spanish media.²¹

To advance their program, *propagandistas* (members of the Propaganda Movement) denounced how metropolitans had only scarce knowledge about the Philippines and its inhabitants and they directly confronted the racist and condescending stereotypes that justified low native participation in the archipelago administration: they argued that Filipinos were not children in need of a tutor and that their level of enlightenment made them worthy of a greater participation in their islands' government.

To begin with, they said the traditional racial distinctions that structured the Spanish Empire were made obsolete by “the evolutionary march of progress”.²² Others believed that those distinctions should vary depending on the needs of each colonial authority: while the state considered Filipinos mature enough to tax and recruit for military campaigns, the monastic orders insisted on their backwardness to justify their control of education.²³

In other cases, ilustrados admitted that some inhabitants of the islands were superstitious and indolent, not because those were intrinsic features of their race, but rather because of a series of circumstances caused by Spanish colonialism: the monastic orders kept Filipinos in a state of ignorance to continue dominating them, while the Spanish state drained “communities of their productive power” through its exploitative

²¹ The best analysis of the Propaganda Movement is still J. N. Schumacher's *Propaganda Movement*.

²² Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 54.

²³ Kramer, 54.

system of labor, taxation and military recruitment.²⁴ Additionally, propagandistas dismantled the appearance of enlightenment in the metropolis that empires projected in their colonies, exposing the ways in which they themselves were not living up to their own standards.²⁵

Beyond debating in the political arena, propagandistas also advanced their arguments in social and cultural spaces. Along this line, it is important to highlight how they engaged in different scholarly subjects, like ethnography and folklore. Although they were associated with European orientalism and colonialism, Filipino academics used them to establish the foundations of the Filipino nation, uncovering the archipelago's pre-Hispanic history and analyzing its folklore to serve anti-colonial purposes.²⁶

Finally, propagandistas presented themselves as examples of Filipino enlightenment in the European cities they inhabited. On the one hand, they tried to do this by excelling in fine arts. For example, Filipino painters Juan Luna and Félix R. Hidalgo won the painting contest of the Exposición de Bellas Artes in Madrid, in 1884. Significantly, Luna did so with a painting portraying the blood compact that, following ancient native customs, Miguel López de Legaspi had sealed with indigenous leader Sikatuna. Both leaders drank a mix of their bloods symbolizing the unity of both parties in a horizontal and equal relationship.²⁷

Along the same lines, ilustrados overseas demonstrated a Filipino model of social behavior that supposedly linked them to modernity. As Raquel Reyes argued, this model was deeply embedded with reflections on gender and sexuality. Responding to imperialist depictions of colonized peoples as feminized, weak, and in need of rescue, ilustrados tried to exhibit what they understood as gentlemanly virtues.²⁸

²⁴ Kramer, 58–59.

²⁵ Kramer, 57.

²⁶ Mojares, *Brains of the Nation*; Thomas, *Orientalists, Propagandists, and Ilustrados*.

²⁷ Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 59. For an interesting analysis of the different interpretations of the blood compact, see John D. Blanco, "The Blood Compact: International Law and the State of Exception in the 1896 Filipino Revolution and the US Takeover of the Philippines," *Postcolonial Studies* 7, no. 1 (2004): 27–48, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1368879042000210603>.

²⁸ Raquel A.G. Reyes, *Love, Passion and Patriotism: Sexuality and the Philippine Propaganda Movement, 1882-1892* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila, 2009).



Figure 2. José Rizal, Mariano Ponce and Marcelo del Pilar in Madrid, 1890. Among many other photographs, this portrait illustrates the propagandistas' civilization and gentlemanliness. According to Vicente Rafael, "one could think of this photograph as part of a larger attempt at nationalists self-fashioning." They visually challenged Spanish racial stereotypes surrounding the infantilization of Filipinos, which colonial authorities associated, in the case of men's appearances, with nakedness or the lack of a beard. By contrast, in Rafael's words, "this photograph shows the seriousness of expression on the ilustrados' faces that makes one think of collected interiors in command of their exterior representations, of rational minds holding together bodies in studied repose."²⁹

²⁹ Vicente L. Rafael, "Nationalism, Imagery, and the Filipino Intelligentsia in the Nineteenth Century," *Critical Inquiry* 16, no. 3 (1990): 605, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1343641>.

When the 90s arrived, however, the Spanish regime's resistance to the Propaganda Movement's efforts and worsening discontent in the archipelago led Filipinos, whose national identity had since evolved, to abandon assimilationist positions and progressively advocate for self-government and independence.

As a result of the lack of reforms, representatives of the Spanish regime kept committing abuses that raised popular discontent. Resentment especially increased against the monastic orders. When the price of the tropical products upon which most of the Philippine economy was based fell in the international market, the orders, which owned most of the land, increased pressure on their tenants, worsening living conditions.³⁰ Although land ownership had previously been a source of conflict, as the monopoly of the orders limited the economic production of agriculture and industry, the Spanish government sided with the orders, which increased the population's mistrust against it. These tensions, moreover, erupted in peasant revolts.

For their part, ilustrados surrendered in their demands for reforms in front of Spain's continuing intransigence. In the case of the Propaganda Movement, this metropolitan stolidity compounded with a lack of economic support, internal divisions between its members, and personal disagreements, all together resulting in divisions in the movement. One of its main leaders, José Rizal, disenchanted with any possibility of reforms, focused on improving education for the Philippines so its inhabitants could be ready for future independence.³¹

During the previous decade, propagandistas had already highlighted the importance of increasing Filipino education.³² Amongst other capacities, they emphasized the usefulness of their own command of Spanish, which was increasingly common during the 19th century among the elite, as a critical instrument to communicate on behalf of Filipinos in spite of the substantial linguistic diversity of the archipelago and to present

³⁰ Delgado and Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, *Filipinas. Un país entre dos imperios*, 28–29.

³¹ J. N. Schumacher, *Propaganda Movement*. See, especially, Chapter 12, "Rizal breaks with Del Pilar," and Chapter 13, "Decline and Death of *La Solidaridad*," 221–266.

³² J. N. Schumacher, 191–220.

directly all their arguments to Spain's politicians and the public.³³ In this new phase, in 1892, Rizal founded the Liga Filipina (in English, the Philippine League) to inspire the "propagation of all useful skills, be they scientific, artistic, literary, etc. in the Philippines."³⁴

The Spanish authorities quickly exiled Rizal, but the growing discontent led to an unstoppable anticolonial mobilization. A secret revolutionary organization, the Katipunan, appeared in Manila in 1892 to lead the struggle for independence. Its leader, Andrés Bonifacio, stood for complete independence and the equality and well-being of the whole Filipino population, and supported a violent struggle to achieve those goals. When the Spanish authorities discovered that it was organizing a guerrilla war in August 1896, a revolution broke out.³⁵

2. Facing the "Uplifting" Rhetoric during the Philippine Revolution

To sum up, during the last third of the 19th century, educated sectors of Filipino society fought for their rights inside the Spanish Empire by refuting accusations of savagery and lack of preparedness for political modernity. During the next phases of the revolution, they kept spreading similar messages. As Kramer noted for the year 1898 and onwards, Filipinos pursued a campaign of recognition that was also "waged in the language of civilization."³⁶ The civilization campaign is how this dissertation will

³³ Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 61. On Filipino ilustrados' relationship with the Spanish language, see Rafael, *Promise of the Foreign*.

³⁴ Quoted in Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 75.

³⁵ On the 1896–1897 revolution in particular, see, among others, Alicia Castellanos, *Filipinas, de la insurrección a la intervención de EE.UU* (Madrid: Sílex, 1998); Mas Chao, *La guerra olvidada de Filipinas, 1896–1898*; Onofré D. Corpuz, *Saga and Triumph: The Filipino Revolution against Spain* (Manila: Philippine Centennial Commission and the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, 1999). Also, see the manuals that encompass the whole revolution and its antecedents, among others, Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*; Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation*, vol. 2.

³⁶ Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 100–102. Teodoro Agoncillo first detailed this campaign for recognition through his analysis of the Philippine Revolutionary Papers, and has been cited since in different book chapters or articles focused on the Filipino propaganda during the 1898 war. See Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1960). After him, Silvino Epistola, *Hong Kong Junta* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1996); Augusto de Viana, "The Development of the Philippine Foreign Service During the Revolutionary Period and the Filipino-American War (1896–1906): A Story of Struggle from the Formation of Diplomatic Contacts to the Philippine Republic," *The Antoninus Journal* 2 (2016): 19–52.

henceforth refer to the propaganda efforts of Filipino nationalists based in Hong Kong during the three phases of the revolution.

Instead of trying to convince the Spanish politicians and citizenship that Filipinos were prepared for assimilation into metropolitan Spain, during the revolution the civilization campaign appealed to new audiences and had new goals. Already during the 1896–1897 uprising against Spain, it aimed to convince the international community that the revolution represented an oppressed nation’s legitimate fight for political rights and freedom from Spanish tyranny. Raising sympathy among foreign nations was important, foremost, to gathering material support. But as the revolution progressed, the civilization campaign’s main goal became to prove the Filipino nation deserved a recognition of sovereignty from the rest of the “civilized world” and the opportunity to decide the future of the islands once Spain was defeated.

Obtaining this international recognition became urgent when the United States joined the fight against Spain in 1898. The 1896–1897 revolution finished in a stalemate and in the Pact of Biak-na-Bató, Emilio Aguinaldo and other revolutionary leaders accepted exile and economic compensation from the Spanish Government in return for reforms in the archipelago. Although both sides signed the armistice, neither of them respected the treaty.

On the one hand, the Spanish regime did not implement the promised reforms and, moreover, it escalated its repressive methods against the population and the revolutionaries who stayed in the islands to keep fighting. Meanwhile, Emilio Aguinaldo and the rest of leaders in exile used the money obtained in the pact to buy new arms and organize the Filipino front to restart hostilities. Among their actions, they established relationships with U.S. diplomats in the region to coordinate opposition to Spain in case the existing tensions between the Spanish Empire and the North-American country over Cuba turned into a war.³⁷

³⁷ For a recent close analysis of the interaction between the U.S. consuls and Filipino revolutionaries, see Eric Grynawski, *America’s Middlemen: Power at the Edge of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 192–222.

Once the war started and Filipino revolutionaries and Americans fought together against Spain, the revolutionaries resumed their civilization campaign for recognition. Since early in the struggle, the American indecision towards Filipino independence in the event of a Spanish defeat perturbed Filipino revolutionaries. Fearing that the U.S. government might decide to occupy the islands, they increased their propaganda to try to guarantee that their struggle would be recognized internationally and they would have a fundamental voice in deciding the future of the Philippines once peace was restored.

Future events proved their mistrust was justified. After the end of hostilities, the U.S. and Spain did not recognize Filipino revolutionaries nor treated their newly-founded government as belligerents. Paying a sum of \$20,000,000, the U.S. bought the Philippines in the Treaty of Paris. American expansionist authorities justified the occupation of the islands to the American citizenry, again, by saying that Filipinos needed tutelage and protection. According to the first American civil governor of the islands, William Howard Taft, his country's "obligation" to prepare Filipinos for self-government was the "chief reason" for retaining the islands.³⁸

President William McKinley's administration and other politicians, with the support of many academics, made a big effort to promote a particular image of the Philippines and its inhabitants. Completely ignoring the ilustrados, or portraying them as a Tagalog minority that wanted to tyrannize the rest of tribes, self-proclaimed experts on the Philippines disseminated a tribalized image of the islands' population.³⁹ They advocated a practice of "Benevolent Assimilation": acquiring the islands to prepare the so-called savage inhabitants for self-government. At the same time, this discourse proclaimed that American protection would avoid the mistakes of European empires that had previously conquered the islands and exploited them.

³⁸ Cited in Michael Adas, "Improving on the Civilising Mission? Assumptions of United States Exceptionalism in the Colonisation of the Philippines," *Itinerario* 22, no. 4 (1998): 46, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0165115300023500>.

³⁹ Among many other examples, on McKinley's public relations efforts to sell the annexation, see Herring, "Imperial Tutor." On debates in Congress about the annexation of the Philippines based on a huge production of information on them, see Barreto Velázquez, *La Amenaza Colonial*; On academic discourses about the savagery of the Filipinos caused by the Spanish tutelage, see Glòria Cano, "The 'Spanish Colonial Past' in the Construction of Modern Philippine History: A Critical Inquiry into the [Mis]Use of Spanish Sources" (Ph.D. diss., National University of Singapore, 2005).




Figure 3. “Schools Begins,” by Louis Dalrymple. This caricature from *Puck* magazine exemplifies the common representation of the U.S. exercising “Benevolent Assimilation” in the Philippine Islands. Uncle Sam addresses the newly arrived subjects from the Philippines, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Cuba, sitting in the first row, and tells them: “Now Children you’ve got to learn these lessons whether you want to or not! But just take a look at the class ahead of you, and remember that in a little while, you will feel glad to be here as they are!” Notice how the image references other cases of U.S. expansion and race relations: in another part of the classroom, an African-American man cleans the window and a Native-American person, separated from the rest of the students, with their names written on their books, holds a book upside down.⁴⁰ Louis Dalrymple, “School Begins,” illustration published in New York by Keppler & Schwarzmann in *Puck* 44, no. 1142, January 25, 1899. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/2012647459/>.

The actual motives behind expansion were far more complex, and include a wide range of political, economic, financial, social, and psychological pressures, both national and external.⁴¹ Despite the varying degrees of relevance that different researchers have

⁴⁰ On U.S.’ racial relations and its expansion, see, among many others, Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876–1917* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000).

⁴¹ For a recent bibliographical review on the topic, see Colleen Woods, “The Burden of Empire: The United States in the Philippines, 1898–1965,” in *A Companion to U.S. Foreign Relations: Colonial Era to*

attributed to those causes or the debatable sincerity of those who supported this task of uplifting, all recognize that this rhetoric was widespread, both in political discourses and in the media. Many cultural expressions, that include journalism, photography, literature, cinema and public exhibitions reproduced the same image of the Philippines, supporting the principal premises of the Benevolent Assimilation discourse: that Filipinos needed protection.⁴²

2.1. The Arguments of the Civilization Campaign

In order to convince the international community and the U.S. citizenry—who could challenge the U.S. government’s expansionist policy—to recognize Filipino sovereignty and accept that the Philippines did not need an imperial tutor, Filipinos, during the whole revolution, tried to spread a set of messages highlighting their enlightenment and capacity for independence.

How Filipinos adopted specific and evolving messages in the successive phases of the revolution is detailed in the following chapters through the in-depth analysis of the English-language press that reproduced them. Because those media outlets were controlled or influenced by British actors and mostly expressed their opinions, however, it is important to clarify that revolutionary leaders, and later, members of the Philippine Republic, were the original sources and creators of those discourses. Their messages revolved around three main ideas: that the Filipino nation desired and deserved to be free from imperial rule; that its leaders, having organized the fight and constructed a functioning government, had the capacity to govern a nation; and that the struggle for liberation was waged following the rules of civilized warfare.⁴³

the Present, vol. 1, ed. Christopher R.W. Dietrich (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2020), 509–27.

⁴² Culture has ascended as a primary approach to the history of U.S. foreign relations. Most notably, after the publication of Pease and Kaplan’s *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, the literature on culture and empire has been growing. For a brief bibliographical review, see Sarah Steinbock-Pratt, “New Frontiers Beyond the Seas: The Culture of American Empire and Expansion at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” in *A Companion to U.S. Foreign Relations*, vol. 1, ed. Dietrich, 233–51. Besides the literature on the topic cited in the Introduction, notes 50 and 51, for another example, see Balce, *Body Parts of Empire*. The specific literature on these representations in the U.S. newspapers by both imperialists and anti-imperialists is further discussed in Chapter 5, 233–258.

⁴³ To describe the Filipino propaganda campaign during the following pages, I rely on the following sources: Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic*; Epistola, *Hong Kong Junta*; Kramer, *Blood of*

To begin, Filipinos justified their struggle, arguing that it was always inspired by the desire for freedom and protection against foreign aggression. For many years, Filipino nationalists had fought peacefully for the end of Spanish tyranny and, after exhausting nonviolent methods without achieving any reforms, patriots finally started their revolution for freedom long before the American intervention. They added that, during the Spanish-American War, Filipino and American leaders had reached an agreement to collaborate against their common enemy, provided Americans recognized Filipino “Independence under American protection,” terms that would turn out to be extremely controversial and debated. In this collaboration, they highlighted the fact that Filipino forces had defeated most of the Spanish garrisons around the archipelago and were controlling the territory.⁴⁴

Later, when the Philippine-American War began, Filipinos argued that the republic they had successfully built was only trying to protect its well-earned national sovereignty from foreign aggression. It was the U.S. who, in spite of all Filipino attempts to maintain peace and arrange a diplomatic solution to satisfy both Filipino aspirations and American interests in the Pacific, engaged in an illegitimate war of conquest under William McKinley’s imperialist government. They blamed the U.S. for the war, for example, in one lengthy chronicle published in Hong Kong, which said it was the Americans who started the Philippine-American War on February 4.⁴⁵

In some of their proclamations, they compared the Philippine Revolution with other well-known historical struggles for freedom, specifically, the American Revolution.⁴⁶ In others, they pointed out that, in reality, their revolution was “a singular fact in History,

Government, 87–157; de Viana, “The Development of the Philippine Foreign Service.” I complement them with my own reading of the Philippine Insurgent Records [henceforth, P.I.R.].

⁴⁴ As an example, see the telegram sent to foreign newspapers stating that Filipinos were in control of Iloilo. Chesney Duncan to several newspapers and diplomats (among them, “Advertiser – London,” “Advertiser – Singapore”), on different dates between January and March, 1899, P.I.R. folder 493, document 2.

⁴⁵ Kaibigan Nañg Bayan (in English, “Friend of the Country”), “Filipino Account of the Hostilities at Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 15, 1899, 2.

⁴⁶ On Filipino appeals to the American Revolution and comparisons of Emilio Aguinaldo and George Washington, see Bonifacio S. Salamanca, *The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901–1913* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1968), 18–21; Michael Cullinane, *Ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898–1908* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003), 36, 168, 213.

that could be printed for Europe’s admiration,” as not even “the great Napoleon overcame the number of a thousand prisoners.” It was not comparable to other great struggles, like that of Menelik II of Abyssinia, who triumphed “against the ten thousand Italians commanded by General Baratieri,” since they did not lack resources and soldiers for war.⁴⁷

Second, they proclaimed that during their struggles for freedom, Filipinos exhibited self-governing capacities. Filipino revolutionaries during the 1896–1897 campaign against Spain, as Kramer argued, upheld in their discourses some points of the assimilationist agenda regarding Filipino civilization and its capacity for self-government, and repeated their criticism of Spanish racial hierarchies. For example, Emilio Aguinaldo stated that the revolution would “show the world that we are worthy of having our own government—our own country, as we have our own language.”⁴⁸

Soon after the start of the Spanish-American War, Aguinaldo demonstrated that capacity by proclaiming the independence of the republic on June, 1898, and exhibiting the efficiency of the governmental structure that was created. Galicano Apacible, a notable member of the republic’s propaganda corps, signaled the importance of demonstrating that their government was taking shape, was well organized and would not embarrass Filipinos in front of any foreign powers. They would deny the accusations of foreign journalists and Filipino opponents who portrayed them as “shabby revolutionaries.”⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Isidoro de Santos to Emilio Aguinaldo, June 8, 1898. P.I.R. 406.1. Original in Spanish (Unless otherwise noted, all the translations cited in the main text from the Spanish originals are my own.): “Este hecho [in particular, the victory against the Spaniards in Cavite and Batangas] es singular en la Historia, que se podria imprimir para la admiracion de Europa, aun el Grande Napoleon no pasó a mil el mayor numero de prisioneros, y Menelik I de Abisinia (Africa) que es llamado Negrís, que venció a diez mil Italianos que estaban al mando del General Baratieri, no se puede comparar con nuestros hechos porque no les faltaba recursos y soldado en la guerra, y por cuyo motivo reciba su respetable persona [Aguinaldo] nuestra mas sincera felicitacion. [sic]”

⁴⁸ Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 79. For many other examples of these discourses, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation, 77–118.

⁴⁹ Galicano Apacible to Emilio Aguinaldo, July 28, 1898, P.I.R. 431.6. On the importance of creating a government, see the aforementioned letter from Isidoro de Santos to Emilio Aguinaldo from June 1898. De Santos explained that after a party celebrating the role of the U.S. consul in Singapore, Spencer E. Pratt, in arranging the collaboration between his country and the Filipinos, the consul had privately advised him to communicate his fellow revolutionaries the importance of erecting a constitutional government and exhibiting it in Europe to achieve the recognition of foreign powers. See de Santos to

Far from being a lowly insurgency, the government was keeping peace in all of the territories under its control and enjoyed the support of the inhabitants. For example, in a letter to foreign consuls written in October 1899, Felipe Buencamino, in charge of foreign affairs, highlighted that the republican government led by Don Emilio Aguinaldo was “accepted, fair, and stable;” that it was combatting foreign aggression; that besides using arms, it was using every occasion “to make the voice of reason and justice heard through diplomacy;” and that it was exhibiting all this while engaged in a clearly unequal fight, as shown “by the absolute superiority of the enemy arms.”⁵⁰

Finally, besides its self-governing capacities, the revolutionary government had also demonstrated Filipino civilization by respecting the rules of civilized warfare. As Albert Garcia-Balañà pointed out, several proclamations by revolutionary leaders between 1896 and 1897 demonstrate they were aware of the international concern about the rules that civilized nations had to follow in order to preserve humanity during war, regulations that were inaugurated by the 1864 Geneva Treaty and discussed again in the 1899 Hague conference. As a result, the same self-consciousness of the propagandistas who aimed to exemplify Filipino enlightenment, according to Garcia-Balañà, again influenced Emilio Aguinaldo’s decision to try to stick to a “defensive” or “regular” war during the revolution instead of engaging in a decentralized guerrilla war, Andrés Bonifacio’s option. Besides trying to retain control of the operations, Aguinaldo, as this historian suggests, seemed to know that guerrilla war might delegitimize otherwise “legitimate combatants” in international public opinion.⁵¹

Aguinaldo, June 8, 1898, P.I.R. Another version of this letter addressed to Felipe Agoncillo on June 9 is edited in Esteban de Ocampo and Alfredo B. Saulo, *First Filipino Diplomat: Felipe Agoncillo (1859–1941)* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 1977), 206–8.

⁵⁰ Model letter by Felipe Buencamino to foreign consuls, October 10, 1899, P.I.R. 442.7. Original in Spanish: “Entendiendo que tan grata ocasion debía ser aprovechada cerca del campo enemigo para intentar hacer la paz, deseo vivo de mi Gobierno, que a la vez que rechaza con las armas la invasion extranjera, no perdona momento ni ocasión de hacer oír la voz de la razón y la justicia por medio de la diplomacia... [...] Los nueve meses de guerra cruenta entre filipinos y americanos son prueba evidente de que el Gobierno Republicano, que preside D. Emilio Aguinaldo, es un Gobierno aceptado, justo y estable, poniendo de relieve esta verdad la misma desigualdad de la lucha, representada por la superioridad absoluta de las armas enemigas. [sic]”

⁵¹ Albert Garcia-Balañà, “Proyecto Memoria de Cátedra. Guerra colonial y mujeres enemigas. La cara oscura de las leyes de la guerra en la España global del siglo XIX. 1879–1897” (unpublished manuscript presented at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, September 2021), 173. I thank Professor Garcia-Balañà he shared with me his ongoing research. On the evaluation of the civilization of combatants depending on their way

During the Spanish-American War and the Philippine-American War as well, plenty of the revolutionary leaders' private correspondence and circulars shows the importance attributed to letting the world know the Filipino army was following the rules of civilized warfare. In their orders and in proclamations to foreign audiences, these leaders highlighted several aspects of their methods of fighting.

Among the civilized methods of war, the revolutionaries' treatment of war prisoners stands out.⁵² Filipino leaders were aware that, according to international law, only belligerents could take and be made prisoners, and governments should guarantee their good treatment. In a letter between Buencamino and General Emiliano Riego de Dios from October 1899 regarding the exchange of Spanish prisoners, Buencamino celebrated that the American military was indirectly acknowledging the Filipinos' right to hold prisoners and, therefore, their standing as a belligerent nation by accepting prisoners from a Filipino commission—even though American General Elwell Otis did not wish to receive the official letter regarding the delivery. At the same time, according to Buencamino, their treatment of those soldiers would secure “sympathy for their cause” and would show that Filipinos had “a political purpose in view,” and that they knew “how to develop it according to modern customs and usages.”⁵³

of fighting in the British Empire, see Glenn R. Wilkinson, *Depictions and Images of War in Edwardian Newspapers, 1899–1914* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

⁵² Several historians have highlighted the importance Filipinos attributed to their treatment of prisoners. Among others, see Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 132.

⁵³ Felipe Buencamino to Emiliano Riego de Dios, October 20, 1899, P.I.R. 442.6. The text provided in the P.I.R. is already the “rough draft” of John M. Taylor’s 1900 English translation. This chapter examines all these discourses to highlight the Filipino efforts to counterattack accusations on their savagery, but they are, of course, no guarantee that they were actually respected, just like there was an important difference between the American rhetoric of “Benevolent Assimilation” and its army’s appeals to the laws of warfare and their actual behavior. For the Filipino case, for example, Agoncillo noted that “the guerrillas, in violation of Aguinaldo’s orders and circulars, treated captured Americans with barbaric cruelty,” or that “the hatred of Americans” was such “that the guerrillas forgot or conveniently forgot Aguinaldo’s instructions regarding the good treatment to be accorded to the prisoners” (Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic*, 587–88). For a thorough examination of the U.S. Army’s abuses of the laws of warfare in the Philippines, see Einolf, *America in the Philippines*. See, also Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998). On torture and other ways of gathering intelligence, see Alfred McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire: the United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

Among many other examples of their propagandistic consideration for the prisoners in the Philippine Insurgent Records are the letters of five U.S. soldiers who, according to the archive, during their captivity, stated they had been “well treated” and that “the 1st Republic of the Orient” had “their very best wishes”.⁵⁴ For example, in one letter, dated September 10, 1899, a soldier confirmed to his family that he was treated like a guest, better than in the U.S. trenches. He also felt sorry they were not with him to see the beauty of the tropics and portrayed his host as “a man of wealth refinement and education” and the rest of Filipinos as free and heart-warming.⁵⁵

Along the same line, according to Stuart C. Miller, Aguinaldo tried to respond to accusations of barbarism by inviting four correspondents to inspect the prisoners’ conditions as neutral observers. When the correspondents traveled back to the American zone and published that prisoners were treated like guests, U.S. authorities banished them, demonstrating that Americans were also aware of this symbolism.⁵⁶

Another example that covers the importance of respecting the laws of civilized warfare is a circular to captain-generals and central officers, dated October 17, 1899. It encouraged Filipino fighters to “fight fiercely and like heroes in the battlefield,” but emphasized that it was also necessary to “consecrate justice and humanity.” That meant that Filipino patriots had to exemplify “uninterest, morality and integrity” by, among other things, defending private property, protecting defenseless people, including wounded enemies and prisoners, and treating civilians carefully to guarantee their support.⁵⁷ Also, the circular highlighted that the foreign residents in the Philippines had

⁵⁴ P.I.R. Index to folder 408.

⁵⁵ Soldier’s letter [his name is unreadable] to his family, September 10, 1899, P.I.R. 408.1. Original in English.

⁵⁶ S. C. Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation*, 93–95.

⁵⁷ “Circular a secretarías, directorios, capitanías y jefaturas generales[sic],” October 17, 1899, P.I.R. 418.7. Original in Spanish: “No solo es menester luchar como bracos y héroes en los campos de batalla, sino es preciso además consagrar culto a la justicia y la humanidad. El militar que defiende a la Patria sacrificando su sangre, su vida en la titánica lucha con el coloso Norte-americano, ha de ser tambien el defensor de haber de la propiedad, y del hogar de sus conciudadanos, a la vez que el apoyo y el amparo de los ancianos y de los seres débiles como las mujeres los niños y los mismos enemigos heridos o hechos prisioneros. [...] El patriota filipino, que pone a contribución sus servicios y su inteligencia para la regular subsistencia del Gobierno de la República y de nuestro noble y heroico ejercito, ha de ser también el ejemplo del desinterés, de la moralidad, y de la honradez. [sic]”

to be treated “with much cleverness” because some of them provided the enemy with “fake or truthful facts,” damaging their cause.⁵⁸

Orders like this one clearly reveal a desire of promoting an image of a humane and praise-worthy Filipino cause, in which patriots were united to resist a foreign aggressor and defend a noble goal in a gentlemanly way. In response, the circular argued, the “U.S. and other nations would recognize their independence,” and the Philippine Republic could occupy the place it deserved “among the civilized nations.”⁵⁹

In contrast, Filipino nationalists attacked the behavior of their enemies. First, from the end of 1896 to the first months of 1897, pamphlets that circulated around the center of Luzon, especially in Cavite, denounced how Spanish authorities attacked non-combatant people. Also, with the escalating violence employed by the Spanish to reconquer the last province where the core of insurgency remained, Aguinaldo invoked the laws again.⁶⁰ As Chapter 2 shows, they denounced those cruel methods in the foreign press.

During the Spanish-American War, they kept using the same attacks against the Spaniards, and shortly before the outbreak of the Philippine-American War, they also accused the American army of violating the rules of warfare. A most eloquent example is an October 1899 draft of a letter written to the foreign consuls, in which Buencamino described the American troops’ “constant transgression to the laws of warfare.” He reported them to the “leaders of civilized nations to put an end to the barbarous

⁵⁸ “Circular a secretarias,” October 17, 1899, P.I.R. Original in Spanish: “Restame hablar de los extranjeros que residen en nuestro territorio. El Gobierno de la República los declara bajo la salvaguarda del honor nacional. Su persona y propiedades están garantizados por nuestras leyes, mientras no delincan. Pero hay que tener mucha perspicacia en tratarles, porque hay de ellos que surten a nuestros enemigos datos falsos o verdaderos que son perjudiciales a nuestra causa. Se ha dado el caso de descubrirse esta felonía en más de uno que parecían ser los más afectos a los ideales del pueblo filipino. Cuando se llegue a este punto el Gobierno recomienda a los jefes y a las autoridades obren con toda energía, pero mediante pruebas claras y evidentes, y nunca por sospechas ni por chismes. [sic]”

⁵⁹ “Circular a secretarias,” October 17, 1899, P.I.R. Original in Spanish: “Es preciso ganar la sentencia favorable al reconocimiento y declaración oficial de nuestra Independencia, para que la República filipina ocupe el lugar que le corresponde en el concierto de las naciones civilizadas. [sic]”

⁶⁰ Garcia-Balaña, “Proyecto Memoria de Cátedra,” 169.

violations to the rights of humans and the laws of war, prescribed by the same American army but horribly transgressed in this occasion.”⁶¹

Showing he was well aware of its articles, he accused them of using *dum-dum* or expanding bullets, banned in the 1899 Hague convention. Also, he explained how in the town of Ángeles, U.S. soldiers had brutally finished off a Filipino captain, “blowing off his skull with a rifle butt and chocking him in a mud puddle.”⁶² The occupant navy, he continued, sank weak vessels, “abandoning their passengers to the rigor of the elements.” Last but not least, Buencamino added that they had avenged the Philippine army’s conquest of the gunboat *Urdaneta* by bombarding Orani [Bataan], for four days, destroying the defenseless town and killing elderly men, women, and children.⁶³

To conclude, Buencamino wrote that the U.S.’s war “only aimed to destruction and was contrary to the international practices that have humanized war.” He argued that its methods could not be justified, even if “Filipinos had ever used the same ones against the foreign aggressor that attacks defenseless towns.”⁶⁴

⁶¹ “Protests to foreign consuls against the conduct of the war by the U.S. forces,” October 7, 1899, P.I.R. 442.9. Original in Spanish: “Para conocimiento exacto público y oficial someto a S. Sa [Señoría] los anteriores hechos, a fin de que el Jefe del Estado, que tan dignamente representa, y que con los demás pueblos cultos forma la gran sociedad humana llamada Magna Civitas, se imponga de tan bárbaros atropellos al derecho de gentes y a las leyes de guerra, prescritas para el mismo ejército y armada americanos en sus vigentes instrucciones, pero horriblemente transgredidas en la presente ocasión, para baldón de los pueblos civilizados y escarnio de la humanidad.”

⁶² “Protests to foreign consuls,” October 7, 1899, P.I.R. Original in Spanish: “En los últimos combates librados en el avance hecho por las fuerzas americanas sobre los pueblos Bacolor, Ángeles y Porac, en nuestros heridos se ha reconocido por facultativos el empleo de balas explosivas, que deshojan y desgarran el organismo, haciendo inhumana y contraria a sus fines la guerra. [...] En la toma del pueblo de Ángeles, cayendo levemente herido en poder de las fuerzas americanas nuestro capitán Don Marcelo Luisa, fue horriblemente rematado por la soldadesca destrozandole el cráneo a culatazos y asfixiandole por inmersión de la cabeza en charco formado por compacto barro. [sic]”

⁶³ “Protests to foreign consuls,” October 7, 1899, P.I.R. Original in Spanish: “La escuadra complacese en echar a pique frágiles barquillas, barotos embarcaciones de mayor porte, durante su travesía y estación, en aguas de alguna rada o puerto, abandonando a sus pasajeros y tripulación a los rigores de los elementos. Últimamente, debido a la legal captura hecha por nuestras fuerzas de la cañonera ‘Urdaneta’, vengando tal vez esta afrenta, reunidos en número de doce buques de guerra frente a nuestras aguas del pueblo de Orani (Bataan) y por espacio de cuatro días han bombardeado el indefenso poblado, reduciendo a escombros y cenizas sus edificios y matando durante él infelices ancianos, mujeres y niños. [sic]”

⁶⁴ “Protests to foreign consuls,” October 7, 1899, P.I.R. Original in Spanish: “Hechos de tal género al par que evidencian públicamente una lucha limitada solo a la devastación y destrucción contraria en un todo a las prácticas internacionales que tanto han humanizado la guerra, claman a voz en grito por los fueros de la humanidad violada en sus sagrados derechos proclamados desde la creación hasta nuestros días, sin que

Finally, Filipino revolutionaries maintained that all these realities were willfully distorted in the accounts read in the “civilized world,” which also downplayed popular support for the revolutionary government, the revolutionaries’ chivalrous ways of waging war, and the violence and oppression committed by both the Spanish and the American empires against the Philippines’ population. They denounced the misrepresentation spread by the Spanish authorities—in particular, the monastic orders—and later, the “yankee lies.”⁶⁵ They were able to combat them with their own account of events thanks to a well-defined structure of propaganda that studied international media and engaged in its discussions on the Philippines.

2.2. The Spread of the Civilization Campaign in the Foreign Press

To spread all these messages, Filipino revolutionaries developed an elaborate mechanism for propaganda that, like its content, evolved in the different phases of the revolution. During the uprising against Spain, in 1896 and 1897, the previously mentioned discourses and proclamations by the leaders circled not only inside the archipelago but also outside. Ilustrados overseas both tracked topics of interest in the foreign press—for example, the discussion about the laws of warfare—and tried to influence it.⁶⁶

During these first years, the most important community seems to have been the ilustrados based in Hong Kong, whose liberal British rule had allowed several exiles to escape the Spanish authorities’ repression. Members of that community were connected to the Filipino groups in Europe and with events in the islands. For example, José M. Basa and his brother Matias were both accused of smuggling clandestine anti-friar propaganda from Hong Kong to the Philippines, and they also introduced copies of José Rizal’s censored *Noli me Tangere*, among other texts.⁶⁷

conducta tan poco ajustada a la guerra moderna pueda legitimarse por el uso que hayamos hecho alguna que otra vez de las mismas que la escuadra enemiga envia sobre nuestras indefensas poblaciones.[sic]”

⁶⁵ As an example of accusations to the “yankee lies,” see the letter from Galicano Apacible to Felipe Buencamino, August 10, 1899, P.I.R. 431.1. As an example of the misrepresentation the monastic orders caused, see “Circular a secretarias,” October 17, 1899, P.I.R.

⁶⁶ Chapter 2 deals extensively with the discussion of the laws of warfare during the revolution in the Hong Kong and Singapore press.

⁶⁷ J. N. Schumacher, *Propaganda Movement*, 112–13; On Basa and other members of this community working as diplomats for the Katipunan, see Vivencio R. José, “Katipunan External Affairs: Bonifacio’s

Just as the propagandistas tried to insert their messages in the Spanish press to garner public sympathy, evidence in the Spanish archives suggests they also made the same intervention, at least occasionally, in the Hong Kong press, as early as 1892. That year, the Spanish consul of that port kept track of the information its newspapers published on the Philippines, and alerted the Spanish ministry to several articles denouncing what came to be known as the “Calamba Hacienda Case.” As previously stated, Dominicans owned the lands many families cultivated and, since 1833, demanded a rent and other taxes from their tenants. The annual increase of the tax and the lack of written administrative control by the friars, among other problems, created tensions, which worsened during the 1880s due to a drop in the price of sugar.⁶⁸

In 1887, an investigation instigated by the government and carried out by José Rizal himself determined that the Dominicans had illegitimately extended the territory under their control far beyond the limits of the original land they had bought from the Jesuits and, moreover, they had not paid the taxes they collected on behalf of the government. As a result, following Rizal’s family, the tenants of the town stopped paying rent and when the Dominicans threatened to evict them, the Spanish authorities ended up protecting the monastic order, allowing the forced eviction of the tenants’ families, beginning with Rizal’s.

The Hong Kong press dedicated several articles to the subject. In December 1891, the Spanish consul in the British port city wrote the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to warn that the *Hong Kong Daily Press* and the *Hong Kong Telegraph* published on December 3 condemnatory articles about the evictions in Calamba. The texts denounced how the Dominicans had pressured the Spanish government to forcefully help in the eviction of the tenants without even waiting for a resolution from the Spanish Cortes on the

Politics and Foreign Policy,” *World Bulletin: Bulletin of the International Studies of the Philippines* 17, no. 4–6 (2001): 98–133.

⁶⁸ My synthesis of the Calamba Hacienda Case is based on Floro C. Quibuyen, “Towards a Radical Rizal,” *Philippine Studies* 46, no. 2 (1998): 151–83.

matter.⁶⁹ As both papers published the information on the same day, the consul suspected a Filipino had written it.⁷⁰

In response, the Spanish consul replied in a letter to the editors of both papers that the facts had been distorted, omitting all context about the cause of the tenants' denial to pay to the Dominican order and their fraud. It alleged that tenants were trying to burn the land and argued that the Spanish authorities were just trying to maintain peace while a legitimate order of eviction was being executed.⁷¹ During the following months, the *Telegraph* published more articles on the subject and harshly denounced Dr. Rizal's deportation while the Spanish authorities remained vigilant.⁷² Although it is unknown who was behind the texts, it seems reasonable to assume that the Filipino exiled community was at least aware of it.

The exiled community increased during the 1896 and 1897 revolution. Among its new members were Felipe Agoncillo, a lawyer from Taal who escaped the Philippines to avoid deportation to the Mariana Islands. He mobilized the existing community in Hong Kong and led in the creation of the Comité Revolucionario (in English, the Revolutionary Committee), with the main goal of sending supplies and arms to revolutionaries in the archipelago for the ongoing uprising.⁷³

Moreover, some of its members also dedicated themselves to applying methods practiced by the Propaganda Movement in Europe and exploited their proximity to the English-language press. Among them was, for example, Mariano Ponce, creator, writer and manager of *La Solidaridad*, secretary of the Asociación Hispano-Filipina in Madrid,

⁶⁹ "Oppression in the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 3, 1891, 2; "Persecution in the Philippines," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Dec. 3, 1891, 2

⁷⁰ Enrique Ortiz y Pi [Spain's Consul in Hong Kong] to the Ministerio de Exteriores, January 21, 1892, Archivo Histórico Nacional [henceforth, AHN], Madrid, Mº Exteriores, H,1925.

⁷¹ For his reply in the press, Castilian, "Persecution in the Philippines," Correspondence, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Jan. 19, 1892, 2.

⁷² "Priestly Persecution in the Philippines," editorial, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Jul. 30, 1892, 2; "The Rizal Case," editorial, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Sep. 3, 1892, 2; "Priestly Persecution in the Philippines," Telegrams, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Aug. 3, 1892, 2.

⁷³ de Ocampo and Saulo, *First Filipino Diplomat*, 54–69.

and noted member of Filipino masonic lodges in Spain. Ponce arrived in Hong Kong on November 1896 and soon was appointed secretary general of the Comité.

According to Resil Mojares, this ex-propagandista applied well-known methods to new goals: instead of campaigning for reforms, he wanted independence. After Dr. Rizal's execution he published press releases on the event and distributed copies of the poem he previously wrote, "Mi último adiós," on the masonic ceremony celebrated in Hong Kong on February 15, 1897. Additionally, he published bulletins, the "Notas Katipunescas" (1897–1898), on the revolution. He followed the foreign press and sent reports on the Philippines' situation and justifications for the revolution to correspondents overseas.⁷⁴

On October 28, 1897, Ponce announced in a letter that the central government had allowed for the creation of a central *junta* (in English, board or assembly) and "as many committees as necessary" to extend "on the world's surface a network, as wide as we can, of propaganda for our aspirations." This propaganda had to publicize everywhere that their movement was "uniform." Therefore, it was necessary to create a central headquarter to emanate "all orders and instructions that determine the conduct."⁷⁵ Although the temporary end of the war paused the project, such a structure was institutionalized during the Spanish-American War.

Soon after proclaiming the Philippine Republic in June 1898, the Filipino government was furnished with the necessary corps to spread propaganda, both internally and externally. On the one hand, the republic waged an intensive campaign to gather and spread information inside the archipelago. In this regard, its most powerful resources were nationalistic papers that allowed "the struggling Revolutionary Government to make its policies and opinions known to the people as well as to the outside world," and spread a nationalistic conscience alongside the *Heraldo de la Revolución, La*

⁷⁴ Resil Mojares, "Los itinerarios de Mariano Ponce y el imaginario político filipino," in *Filipinas. Un país entre dos imperios*, ed. Elizalde Pérez-Grueso and Delgado, 92–93. Several articles in the edited volume of Mariano Ponce's letters demonstrate his work with the foreign press. For examples, see Ponce, *Cartas sobre la Revolución*, 1, 4, 9, 15–18, 20, 32, 205–6.

⁷⁵ Ponce, 58.

Independencia, and other publications from other parts of the islands.⁷⁶ Additionally, such organs spread the civilization campaign among the Filipino population.⁷⁷

How this mechanism got its propaganda to foreign audiences, however, is of special interest for this dissertation. As soon as June 23, 1898, Aguinaldo created a Department of Foreign Relations, Navy and Commerce. During the summer, it institutionalized its propaganda corps, and the Comité Revolucionario established between 1896–1897 was reorganized into the Comité Central Filipino from Hong Kong.⁷⁸ Both committees, however, were better known as the Hong Kong Junta. Its functions were directing campaigns of propaganda abroad, establishing diplomatic relationships with foreign governments, and preparing and organizing arms expeditions.⁷⁹ The ultimate goal was achieving eventual recognition of Filipino independence and accepting a protectorate or annexation only if all military and diplomatic efforts were exhausted.⁸⁰

They also established, as far as their resources permitted, “agents and commissioners in all civilized nations.”⁸¹ In spite of a critical lack of resources and the difficulty, according to Agoncillo, of finding Filipino communities in other parts of the world, they could establish committees in Washington D.C., Paris, Madrid, London, Japan, and Australia. In addition to this initial effort from 1898, it is important to highlight the case of the U.S., from where Felipe Agoncillo had been expelled at the outbreak of the Philippine-American War. In 1900 they sent other envoys to establish important links with the American anti-imperialist leagues: Galicano Apacible traveled to Toronto, Canada, where he established important connections with the Cincinnati Anti-Imperialist League; Sixto López and her sister Clemencia López, for their part, also

⁷⁶ Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic*, 269.

⁷⁷ Besides Agoncillo, on the Filipino press during the revolution, see Jesus Z. Valenzuela, *History of Journalism in the Philippine Islands* (Manila: General Printing Press, 1933); John A. Lent, “The Philippine Press during the Revolution and the Filipino-American War,” *Asian Thought and Society* 3 (1978): 308–21; Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 98–102.

⁷⁸ de Viana, “The Development of the Philippine Foreign Service,” 30–31.

⁷⁹ Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection against the United States*, vol. 2, 486–87.

⁸⁰ de Viana, “The Development of the Philippine Foreign Service,” 31.

⁸¹ Apolinario Mabini to Galicano Apacible, September 12, 1898, P.I.R. 396.3. Original in Spanish: “En el exterior, establecer, según permitan nuestros recursos, Agentes y Comisarios en todas las Naciones Civilizadas.”

became important bearers of the Filipino civilization campaign in the U.S. from 1900 onward.⁸²

Additionally, they found sympathizers in other cities who helped them spread their messages. Among them was Ferdinand Blumentritt, who previously had a well-known relationship with José Rizal.⁸³ This ethnographer informed Filipino nationalists of European public opinion and also wrote in their favor. An example of those texts is a lengthy article published by the *American Anthropologist*. It was a review of Blumentritt's expert work and synthesized that he was "positive" Filipinos were "sufficiently advanced to be capable of independent self-government" and "ardent with that this shall be the outcome of wasting them from Spanish misrule."⁸⁴

As the Propaganda Movement and the exiled ilustrado community in Hong Kong had done during the revolution, the Hong Kong Junta and its correspondents, first, tracked the international public opinion and then reacted to it. They engaged political elites and the "civilized world's journals" to create a good impression.⁸⁵ A letter from Apacible to Felipe Buencamino exemplified this. Apacible thanked Buencamino for all of the information provided to Hong Kong and its representatives abroad, without which Filipinos could not begin "denying and erasing the bad impression" from "imperialist Yankees' interested whoppers," which portrayed things "darker than we [Filipinos] do."⁸⁶

⁸² On Galicano Apacible's trip see Encarnación Alzona, *Galicano Apacible: Profile of a Filipino Patriot* (Manila: National Commission for Culture and the Arts; National Historical Commission, 1977), 82–125; Canning Eyot, *The Story of the Lopez Family: A Page from the History of the War in the Philippines* (Boston: James H. West Company, 1904); Jim Zwick, "The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity"; Laura R. Prieto, "A Delicate Subject: Clemencia López, Civilized Womanhood, and the Politics of Anti-Imperialism," *The Journal of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era* 12, no. 2 (2013): 199–233, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43902949>.

⁸³ Harry Sichrovsky, *Ferdinand Blumentritt: An Austrian Life for the Philippines: The Story of José Rizal's Closest Friend and Companion* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 1987); B. Anderson, *Under Three Flags*.

⁸⁴ Ferdinand Blumentritt to Galicano Apacible, May 9, 1899, P.I.R. 409.5. Original in English.

⁸⁵ Galicano Apacible to Felipe Buencamino, September 12, 1899, P.I.R. 431.3.

⁸⁶ Apacible to Buencamino, August 10, 1899, P.I.R. Original in Spanish: "Esto es tan importante para nuestra campaña que antes sin estos documentos nos veíamos mas negros de lo que somos para desmentir y borrar la mala impresión que en la opinión producían las interesadas bolas de los yankees imperialistas. [sic]"



Figure 4. “Le Comité Philippin de Hong-Kong” as seen in Paris. For an example of the content published by the committees in the press near them, see the three-page report “M. Agoncillo et la Cause Philippine,” published in Paris’ *Le Monde Illustré*. This image of the Hong Kong Junta was accompanied by another of Felipe Agoncillo and another of the Filipino army, all of them exhibiting gentlemanly behavior and posture. All of them emphasize the main idea of the text, in which Agoncillo, who had recently arrived in Paris from the U.S., presented his mission as “getting the recognition of the independence of the Philippines, something denied by President McKinley, to whom Agoncillo exposed the social and political situation of the Philippine people, demonstrating that they are able to govern themselves.”⁸⁷ “Le Comité Philippine de Hong-Kong,” illustration published in Paris by *Le Monde Illustré* on April 8, 1899, 272–273. Retrieved from Bibliothèque National de France, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/>.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ “M. Agoncillo et la Cause Philippine,” *Le Monde Illustré*, April 8, 1899, 272–273. Original in French (The translation in the main text is my own): “faire reconnaître l’indépendance des Philippines, fut reçu, par le président Mac-Kinley[sic] à qui il [Agoncillo] exposa l’état social et la politique du peuple philippin, lui démontrant jusqu’à l’évidence sa capacité de se gouverner lui-même.”

⁸⁸ This article was localized because it was cited in the *Singapore Free Press*, what exemplifies the connections between the different committees, their correspondents, and their shared efforts. See “Le Monde Illustré of the 8th...,” *Singapore Free Press & Mercantile Advertiser*, May 8, 1899, 2.

Filipino revolutionaries also monitored foreign journalists in the islands, reading most of what they published.⁸⁹ They were aware of their sympathies and the censorship and pressures they suffered. With that information, the revolutionaries tried to curry favor with the journalists by sharing news, granting interviews, and inviting them to cross into Filipino-controlled territory so they could personally witness the organization of the republic and test their stereotypes of Filipino capabilities.⁹⁰

For instance, in 1898, they invited a certain “Captain Sullivan,” who wanted to travel around the provinces and see the common people. The author of the letter was led to believe that Sullivan was a “very anti-Yankee” Englishman, and so he recommended that the Filipino leaders in the archipelago encouraged his ideas and “let him see the tranquility that reigns in the provinces and its civilized state.” That way, both the world and the “English government” would receive the information that had been “ignored,” and that would help England “recognize the Philippine Republic.”⁹¹

A later example that stands out is Apolinario Mabini’s January 1900 “Letter to the American Correspondents.” Mabini questioned their objectivity, beginning his letter by insisting that they treated Filipino matters “with impartial criteria,” so the U.S. public opinion did not “go astray” and was worthy “of a great, free and wise nation.” Then, he asked them to convey some of the fundamental ideas of the propaganda campaign: that Filipinos did not hate foreigners and embraced those who accepted their freedom and prosperity; that their fight against the U.S. was a sacrifice that raised the nation and made it worthy of an administration that guaranteed Filipinos freedoms and being governed following the deeds and needs of the people; that it was necessary to create a

⁸⁹ On the censorship they suffered, see “Copy of Cablegram from Hong Kong—protesting against Gen. Otis Censorship,” July 1899, P.I.R. 419.1.

⁹⁰ As examples of the interviews they granted, see “Questions and Answers of Aguinaldo and American Correspondent” and “Paralitico (Mabini) gives conversation between Aguinaldo and a reporter of New York from the Oceania,” P.I.R. 61.5 and 61.6; Also “Newspapers European and Asian,” P.I.R. 394, which contains, among others, a report for *Le Figaro* by French journalist Jean Hess.

⁹¹ Howard Pratt to Vicente Reyes, October 9, 1899, P.I.R. 445.1. Original in Spanish: “Sus simpatias son enteramente con Filipinas y muy anti-yankee. Hay que fomentar sus ideas y dejarle ver como estan las provincias, la tranquilidad que se observa, y el estado tan civilizado [...] pues no solo se enterara el mundo pero lo que es mas el gobierno ingles tendrá [...] datos que ahora no posee, que ayudaran mucho para que Inglaterra reconozca la Republica Filipina. [sic]”

commission to facilitate dialogue and truthful knowledge because Filipino aspirations were not being clearly heard in the U.S.⁹²

On some occasions, those contacts turned out to be useful. For example, they celebrated the lengthy and detailed chronicle that H.R. Myers, “journalists for the *New York Journal*,” wrote in favor of the Filipino cause.⁹³ Knowing that in many other cases, however, their efforts were not successful, they denounced reporters who collaborated with the Spanish Empire, and later with the American one. In addition, they hired newspapermen to publish reports in their favor and considered bribing others “so they telegraphed and wrote their respective newspapers in the Filipino favor.” In a letter to Aguinaldo, Apacible justified that behavior by arguing that such tactics were necessary because “no matter how good we do there [in the Philippines], they only transmit the bad news.” Therefore, although it could be a high expense, it was necessary, “especially today, that Americans are mistreating us and inviting us to break our friendships.”⁹⁴

3. The Hong Kong Junta’s Allies in the English-language Pacific Media

While these propaganda methods were discussed in varying levels of detail in previous studies that cite the Philippine Insurgent Records, these primary sources also contain several references to three characters who contributed on several occasions to spreading the Filipino civilization campaign. They are Howard W. Bray, whom Aguinaldo appointed as press representative in November 1898 and who is better known for arranging the meeting in which Emilio Aguinaldo and Spencer Pratt organized Filipino-American collaboration against Spain; Chesney Duncan, ex-editor and journalist for the *Hong Kong Telegraph* who was also recognized as “General Adviser” in November

⁹² Mabini, *La Revolución Filipina*, vol. 2, 140–41.

⁹³ Isidoro de los Santos to Emilio Aguinaldo, March 18, 1899, P.I.R. 479.6.

⁹⁴ Galicano Apacible to Emilio Aguinaldo, November 6, 1898, P.I.R. 431.5. Original in Spanish: “...seria mejor soborne U. a los corresponsales extranjeros de los periódicos allí para que telegrafien y escriban a sus correspondientes periódicos a nuestro favor. Nombre U. a personas de su confianza para que se entiendan allí a los corresponsales. Parece que esto es necesario porque hoy por mas bien que hagamos allí, siempre es mala la noticia que remiten. [sic]”

1898; and William St. Clair, editor of the *Singapore Free Press*.⁹⁵ Although their contributions have not been greatly appreciated, they did achieve an important impact.

For example, on September 14, 1898, Isidoro de Santos described to Aguinaldo his meeting with American General Wesley Merritt. He narrated how he, the American consul in Singapore, Spencer E. Pratt, Howard W. Bray, and William St. Clair gave the general a favorable image of the Filipinos before he traveled to Paris to participate in the peace conference that would determine the future of Spain's ex-colonies. Santos himself asked the general to think about all the Filipinos, "who wished American intervention finished all Spanish authority in their country." The consul spoke in the Filipinos' favor and denied any reporter who opposed their cause access to the general. As for St. Clair, he "shared his opinions and gave some of his articles" to Merritt for the trip. About Mr. Bray, according to Santos, "it was not necessary to say anything: he was talking non-stop to the General, even in his cabin."⁹⁶

According to the same letter, William St. Clair had also helped "destroy the European and American press' terrible lies that ignorant or enemy brains" had spread. Those newspapers published "a mandible that revolutionaries were a crowd of ferocious ambitious [people] captained by an animal chief with no less thirst for glory." To contradict those lies, in that particular instance, they praised Emilio Aguinaldo's offer of the charge of president of the provisional government to Cayetano Arellano, a well-known ilustrado. St. Clair considered the proposal of "much political relevance" as it

⁹⁵ The references to these three characters in the texts that deal with the Filipino campaign for recognition are rare or, in the case of Howard W. Bray, portray him as an opportunist and do not evaluate the impact of his communication efforts. See, as examples, Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic*, 151, 317; Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image. America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 111. As for William St. Clair, some of his editorials, especially that from May 4, 1898, have been cited in other texts, like Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation*, vol. 2, 460. The only exception is Ragsdale, "Coping with the Yankees." However, this author does not evaluate their impact and offers some misleading details resulting from a lack of further context.

⁹⁶ Isidoro de Santos to Apolinario Mabini, September 14, 1898, P.I.R. 406.2. Original in Spanish: "Digale al presidente que tanto el Consul, como Mr. Bray y Mr. St. Clair han obrado de consumo para impresionar favorablemente al Gral. Merrit. De parte del consul, este le ha hablado a nuestro favor, y no contento con esto, no permitio y nego determinantemente acceso hasta el Gral. Merrit a toda persona y a todo reportero de los del bando no favorable a nosotros, no solo eso, elogió tanto la pericia y rectitud de juicio de Mr. St. Clair, quien de su parte no escatimó sus opiniones y reuniendo sus artículos le dio [para que] se recuerde en su viaje[.] De Mr. Bray no digo ya nada porque hasta dentro del camarote estuvo hablandole.[sic]"

allowed Aguinaldo to refute accusations that he was too ambitious. He telegraphed the episode to Europe as “tangible [proof of] the president’s unselfishness and as a response to the enemy press’ lies.”⁹⁷ Besides the already mentioned awareness of the image of Filipinos spread in the international press and the importance of quickly responding to it, this fragment clearly reveals St. Clair’s involvement in spreading the Filipino civilization campaign.

As the letter continues, the same can be said about Howard H. Bray. Isidoro de Santos explained that another of the accusations against Aguinaldo regarded his comments on the badges of officials of the revolutionary government, which had been publicly mocked and taken as a symbol of the arrogance of the leader. According to Santos, Filipino sympathizers had received criticism for their relationship with revolutionaries for that attitude, and several U.S. publications had criticized and made fun of the leader. The *New York World*, for example, had portrayed “America like a big old man sitting and between his open feet a carton puppet with a chain and a whistle [and] with the sign ‘Aguinaldo.’”⁹⁸

⁹⁷ De Santos to Mabini, September 14, 1898, P.I.R. Original in Spanish: “Este hecho ha causado impresión bastante a Mr. St. Clair calificándolo de un hecho de bastante importancia política en sentido de refutar y destruir los terribles infundios de la prensa europea y americana sugeridas por cerebros ignorantes quizás o enemigos publicando a mandoble que los revolucionarios eran una bandada de feroces ambiciosos capitaneados por nuestro jefe animal con no menos aspiraciones de grandeza, por lo que aquel mismo día en que lo supo Mr. St Clair lo telegrafió a Europa [...] como muestra palpable del desinterés que anima a nuestro presidente.[sic]” Other mentions to St. Clair acting as press representative are de Santos to Aguinaldo, March 18, 1899, P.I.R.; Bray to Reyes, October 9, 1898, P.I.R.

⁹⁸ De Santos to Mabini, September 14, 1898, P.I.R. For example, the *New York Times* informed about this matter in the following way: “The Hong Kong correspondent of the *Daily Mail* says: “Gen. Aguinaldo has issued an absurd proclamation dealing chiefly with official insignia. He, as president of the Philippine Ministry, is to wear a gold collar, with a gold triangular pendant engraved with the sun and three stars, and to carry a gold whistle as well as a stick with a gold handle and a tassel of gold. The badges of innumerable other officials are minutely dealt within the proclamation.” In “Gold Whistle for Aguinaldo,” *New York Times* [reprinted from *Daily Mail* (London)], Jul. 23, 1898, 7. The news appeared in many other newspapers and Aguinaldo’s portrait with the whistle became a recurring image.



Figure 5. Criticisms on “Aguinaldo in His New Uniform.” This illustration exemplifies the media reaction in the U.S. to Aguinaldo’s proclamation regarding the badges of the officials of the Philippine Republic. It was originally published in the *New York Evening Journal*. The caption reads as follows: “Aguinaldo, the leader of the Philippine insurgents, has issued a foolish proclamation making himself dictator, and naming the official insignia of himself and his new cabinet. He is to wear a gold collar[sic], with a sun and three stars, and carry a gold whistle.” “Aguinaldo in His New Uniform,” cartoon published in Los Angeles by the *Los Angeles Herald* on August 5, 1898, 2. Retrieved from Library of Congress, <https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/>.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ On Emilio Aguinaldo’s portrait as a dictator, see Abe Ignacio et al., *The Forbidden Book. The Philippine-American War in Political Cartoons* (San Francisco: T’Boli Publishing and Distribution, 2004), 115–17. Many other books deal with the graphic representation of Filipinos in the U.S. media. See, for example, Vergara, *Displaying Filipinos*; Servando D. Halili Jr., *Iconography of the New Empire. Race and Gender Images and the American Colonization of the Philippines* (Diliman, Quezon City: The University of the Philippines Press, 2007).

For his part, Mr. Bray had warned about another caricature in which Aguinaldo appeared in front of the Americans whistling, “like calling crowds of *negritos* [black persons] appearing from the woods.” Mr. Bray wanted to “contradict the cause of such wittiness, which, as a Spanish reminiscence, came to tarnish the brilliant course of events.” This is why Bray proposed telegraphing the *New York World* denying its accusations and arguing that some enemy propagated it.¹⁰⁰ Also, in other correspondence between different leaders and Howard W. Bray, this individual appeared to be a relevant member of the Filipino media campaign. According to John M. Taylor, he was the most important one.¹⁰¹

As for Chesney Duncan, he appeared cited in several exchanges as the author of telegrams sent to Europe portraying Filipino accounts of different episodes of the war, and as the following chapters show, he also published several texts in the Hong Kong and Singapore press.¹⁰² Additionally, according to Charles King and Frank Prescott, he edited Emilio Aguinaldo’s 1899 *The Truth about the Philippines*.¹⁰³

The beginning of these sympathizers’ relationships with the Filipinos, the reasons behind their support, and the impact they achieved are further analyzed in the following chapters. Their relations with Filipino nationalists, however, can be more easily understood by taking a brief look at the wider context in which they played out. Precisely, the diverse transnational interactions that happened in port cities like Hong Kong and Singapore, but also in broader Asian spaces, like the Indian Ocean, is the

¹⁰⁰ De Santos to Mabini, September 14, 1898, P.I.R. Original in Spanish: “...pongo también en conocimiento de usted [...] que el New York World ha gravado a la Am[é]rica como un gran viejo sentado y en sus pies abiertos un muñeco como gal. de carton con una cadena, y de la cadena el silbato y el sombrero con letrero diciendo Aguinaldo. Bray me dijo a m[i] de otra caricatura en la que sale nuestro presidente silbando ante los Americanos como llamando a bandadas de negritos saliendo de los bosques. Mr. Bray[,] con su carácter tan fogoso[,] está bastante resentido y dice que urgiría deshacer esta causa de dicharachia, que cual reminiscencia española ha venido a manchar el brillante curso de los hechos. [sic]”

¹⁰¹ Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection against the United States*, vol. 2, 497.

¹⁰² The records available on this character in the revolutionary papers are, among others, “Copies telegrams to press by Chesney, Newspaper correspondent,” Hong Kong, Mar. 12, 1899, P.I.R. 446.10. For his contributions in the Hong Kong press, see, among others, Chesney Duncan, “Philippine Affairs,” Correspondence, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 7, 1899, 2; Duncan, “A Distorted Telegram,” Correspondence, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 8, 1899, 2; Duncan, “The Intended Government of the Philippines,” Correspondence, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 9, 1899, 2.

¹⁰³ King and Clarke, *Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers*, 124.

object of growing historiographical interest. Among many others, scholars like Mark Ravinder Frost, Isabel Hofmeyr, and Tim Harper have analyzed the rich cross-border movements of a great variety of actors, information, beliefs, and ideas in the region and their diverse effects.¹⁰⁴

Among the most relevant conclusions reached by this body of scholarship for my own research are the cosmopolitanism of port cities and its effect on the local printed media. As Ravinder Frost pointed out, “shifts in migration, a reordering of maritime networks, the application of new technologies and the adjustment of existing systems of transport and regional communication” contributed to “a massive increase in the exchange of information across Asian waters” in the form of “printed books, letters, pamphlets and (especially) periodicals.”¹⁰⁵

Although much of this cultural exchange took place within the metropolis, this historian stated that it also happened between colonial territories, and this “facilitated the emergence of a transnational public sphere where non-Europeans could also play leading roles:”

Reading and the discussion of periodicals in a social context was one of the central preoccupations of British life overseas, but non-Europeans found it an equally congenial pastime. In colonial port-cities the greater number of Asian readers began both to congregate and flex their intellectual muscle. Especially from 1870, western-educated Asian professionals established debating clubs and literary societies, which maintained reading rooms and kept up subscriptions to the region’s major journals, so generating a new print-dominated political culture. [...] From Bombay to Hong Kong “overland” and weekly editions of English language newspapers circulated between regional ports. In the days

¹⁰⁴ This fascinating growing field of research is vast. I selected these historians as examples for their emphasis on, in the case of Tim Harper, how this cosmopolitanism influenced several revolutionaries and, in the other cases, for their interest of its reflection in the press. Frost, “Asia’s Maritime Networks”; Tim Harper, “Singapore, 1915, and the Birth of the Asian Underground,” in *Sites of Asian Interaction. Ideas, Networks and Mobility*, ed. Tim Harper and Sunil S. Amrith (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 10–37; Harper, *Underground Asia*; Isabel Hofmeyr, *Gandhi’s Printing Press. Experiments in Slow Reading* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

¹⁰⁵ Frost, “Asia’s Maritime Networks,” 79.

before copyright or syndication it was commonplace for articles and editorials from these papers that were deemed of particular relevance or interest to be reproduced in local dailies.¹⁰⁶

Port cities like Hong Kong became nexus in those networks, as their connection to the main steamer routes would turn them into “especially busy centers for this international traffic” and consequently significant locations for the “diffusion of news, views, and ideologies between colonial territories.”¹⁰⁷ Along the same lines, Tim Harper analyzed how Singapore, in 1915, was “one of the most global cities on Earth and also one of the most modern.” Its heterogeneous and constantly changing population included members of a network of “nation-makers” and “would-be revolutionaries”, who traveled across Asia, Europe, and the Americas. They also carried with them the diverse ideologies and ideas that circled around empires. Among them were Filipino revolutionaries at the turn of the 19th century.¹⁰⁸

As previously seen, it was in this context of transnational interactions that members of the Propaganda Movement immersed in the global circulation of ideas studied by Benedict Anderson.¹⁰⁹ Also, at the turn of the 19th century, they contacted other Asian intellectuals, as Nicole CuUnjieng Aboitiz has recently shown.¹¹⁰ But in addition to nourishing their ideologies, in port cities like Hong Kong and Singapore, Filipinos also tried to spread their own ideas and perspectives on their revolution by associating with the aforementioned newspapermen. In doing so, they could contribute directly to these transnational public spheres.

¹⁰⁶ Frost, 85–86.

¹⁰⁷ According to King and Prescott, “from 1844 to 1911, Hong Kong dominated South China journalism.” In their research guide to the China-coast newspapers, they argue: “this was a period which witnessed both the growth of the Colony —its population doubled between 1881 and 1906 from 160.000 to 320.000— and its decline as the main focus of the drama being enacted between China and the Western powers. Indeed, the non-Chinese community of Hong Kong had reached but 12.4000 by 1906, evidence that the four English-language newspapers must have found support difficult and must still have relied heavily on subscribers beyond the Colony—in Canton, Macao, and other South China ports for which Hong Kong was still the leader, and in Great Britain, where the *China Mail* continued to be of influence.” King and Clarke, *Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers*, 17, 26.

¹⁰⁸ Harper and Amrith, *Sites of Asian Interaction*, 23.

¹⁰⁹ B. Anderson, *Under Three Flags*.

¹¹⁰ Hau and Tejapira, *Traveling Nation-Makers*; CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*.

Recent studies on print media in the colonial world show that, in spite of being “colonial” and, in many cases, suffering restrictions, publications were also spaces of debate and interaction. According to Emma Hunter and Leslie James: “Even when operating within tight constraints and in circumstances far removed from the ideal of a free press, newspapers could provide a space where colonial subjects could critically reflect on political, social, economic, and cultural change.”¹¹¹

In the cases of the English-language press from Hong Kong and Singapore, these reflections were often embedded in publications that also provided commercial information such as shipping lists and advertisements. At the turn of the century, these publications continued to fill more than half of their daily editions with this information. With time, a growing and diverse readership, and the increasing availability of sources, the topics covered became more varied, ranging from events in the cities and their close surroundings to the whole empire.

This was possible because, in addition to the texts written by the on-site staff, correspondents were paid in other cities, and information was received through private correspondence and from witnesses of newsworthy events who visited the port. Information was also gathered from other colonial papers and metropolitan press. That often happened during the revolution. The reporting of other papers, along with the receipt of Reuters’ telegrams, allowed newspapers to update their readers with news from more distant parts of the British Empire and other international news.¹¹² At the same time, these publications also circulated in other port cities and the metropolis.

¹¹¹ Emma Hunter and Leslie James, “Introduction: Colonial Public Spheres and the Worlds of Print,” *Itinerario* 44, no. 2 (2020): 234, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0165115320000248>. For examples of the results of new approaches to the colonial print media, see the entire aforementioned number of *Itinerario*.

¹¹² Among many others, they would cite the *Japan Mail*, the *China Gazette*, the *Kuo Wen Pao*, the *Ceylon Observer*, the *China Gazette*; *l’Extreme Orient*; the *Penang Gazette*; the *Rangoon Gazette*; the *San Francisco Chronicle*; the *Overland Mail*; the *San Francisco Examiner*; the *American*; the *Manila Times*; the *Japan Mail*; the *Kobe Chronicle*; the *London Chronicle*; the *Chicago Record*; the *Cleveland Leader*; the *Siam Free Press*; the *Tacoma News*, the *New York Herald*. Also, they would make references to “reports in the vernacular press” or in the “native press.” The availability of news from different empires’ newspapers suggests that they were exciting spaces of debate or, at least, that they are useful sources to capture public opinion in many different empires regarding international subjects. See, for example, the debates between the French colonial press and the *Singapore Free Press*. Also, regarding the situation in the Philippines, they shared opinions from the British, but also Spaniards. For example, Evaristo Torres, “The Imputed Designs of the Spanish Priests in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Sep. 8, 1898, 2.

Not only daily editions circulated around the empire but also some newspapers printed editions in Great Britain. Both the *China Mail* and the *Daily Press* also published weekly overland editions directed to the residents back in their home country: the *Overland China Mail*, in print between 1848 and 1909, and the *Hong Kong Weekly Press and China Overland Trade*, between 1869 and 1911.¹¹³ In the case of the *Telegraph*, King and Prescott explain, “at least in the first years of publication, it published no overland edition, but rather reprinted important articles in the regular edition before departure of the mails.”¹¹⁴ The *Singapore Free Press* published a weekly edition bound to Europe as well.

It was this potential for wide circulation that attracted Filipino revolutionaries. They knew that these newspapers, as Hunter and James explain, “were addressed to the world,” what allowed readers and writers “to reach beyond the territorial state of the nation.” “It both offered editors a means of disciplining readers and writers”, but also “enabled editors, readers, and writers to use tools of critical reflections as a means of engaging and sometimes challenging colonial states.”¹¹⁵ In the words of Julie F. Codell:

In addition to the movement of people, goods, and ideas, the most popular and powerful determination for bridging “home” or “mother” country and its colonial peripheries was the press. English newspapers and periodicals circulated to the colonies, and news from the colonies bounced back to London, as well as to the rest of the British Isles and from colony to colony. The colonial press, both Anglo and native, quoted English papers regularly for readers in India, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and the Middle East. Everyone read the news from metropole and from colony simultaneously as news circulated in print and later in telegraphic news services. The press vanquished distances between “centers” and “peripheries” and juxtaposed differences through images as well as texts.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ King and Clarke, *Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers*, 59, 64.

¹¹⁴ King and Clarke, 71.

¹¹⁵ Hunter and James, “Introduction: Colonial Public Spheres and the Worlds of Print,” 237.

¹¹⁶ Julie F. Codell, *Imperial Co-Histories. National Identities and the British and Colonial Press* (Madison, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2003), 17.

Several studies have shown that media connections inside the British Empire were not equally connected.¹¹⁷ The Hong Kong and Singapore press, however, did offer Filipinos an interesting way to reach their intended audiences in the “civilized world.” Additionally, they could also reach the U.S. press.¹¹⁸

The Pacific newspapers to whom they appealed, however, had their own worldview and political agendas. At the turn of the 19th century, these publications were turning to more professional journalism instead of the personal style that had prevailed among them earlier, when the editor and his ideas were the basis of the newspaper. Moreover, communities of Chinese and Malays started participating in English-language newspapers and shared the opinions and concerns of their communities. In the case of Hong Kong, while the Chinese-language press developed, Chinese capital was also invested in English-language newspapers.¹¹⁹ In the cases that I analyzed, however, the editors still influenced the approach to some topics deeply, and most shared a perspective of the world based on the Anglo-Saxon racial hierarchy.

On the other hand, they enjoyed relative freedom, exemplified by the attacks they sometimes waged against particular administrations in their cities or by the criticisms they directed at other empires.¹²⁰ On some occasions, moreover, their journalistic

¹¹⁷ See, among others, the work by Simon J. Potter: “Webs, Networks, and Systems: Globalization and the Mass Media in the Nineteenth- and Twentieth Century British Empire,” *Journal of British Studies* 46, no. 3 (2007): 621–46; *News and the British World: The Emergence of an Imperial Press System 1876–1922* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); *Imperial Communication: Australia, Britain and the British Empire* (London: King's College, 2005). Also, Winseck and Pike, *Communication and Empire*.

¹¹⁸ On media information flows between Great Britain and the U.S., see, among others, Ellery Sedgwick, *The Atlantic Monthly, 1857–1909: Yankee Humanitarianism at High Tide and Ebb* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994); Wiener and Hampton, *Anglo-American Media Interactions*.

¹¹⁹ See, among others, Su Lin Lewis, “Echoes of Cosmopolitanism: Colonial Penang’s ‘Indigenous’ English Press,” in *Media and the British Empire*, ed. Kaul, 233–249; Tim Harper, “Globalism and the Pursuit of Authenticity: The Making of a Diasporic Public Sphere in Singapore,” *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 12, no. 2 (1997): 261–92, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41056967>; King and Clarke, *Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers*, 27; Elizabeth Sinn, “Emerging Media: Hong Kong and the Early Evolution of the Chinese Press,” *Modern Asian Studies* 36, no. 2 (May 25, 2002): 421–65, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X02002056>; Yizheng Zou, “English Newspapers in British Colonial Hong Kong: The Case of the South China Morning Post (1903–1941),” *Critical Arts* 29, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 26–40, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02560046.2015.1009676>.

¹²⁰ Francis Seow, *The Media Enthralled. Singapore Revisited* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 1–10; Michael D. Barr, *Singapore. A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2019), 91; King and Clarke, *Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers*, 65–67. Cf. Michael Ng, “When Silence Speaks:

services and political support were for sale. This activism was common in the case of many journalists engaged in the coverage of the Philippine Revolution. Correspondents who stood out for their reporting on that conflict were also involved in other political events. An example, further developed in the following chapters, is that of Thomas H. Reid, editor and reporter for the *China Mail*. Reid was a sympathizer of the early revolutionary movement of Sun Yat-Sen. More specifically, he “agreed to work for the sympathy and support of the British Government and the people of England.”¹²¹

According to Patrick Anderson, Reid was sympathetic toward Sun’s political ideas that demanded political freedom and constitutional reform, so he joined an attempted uprising in nearby Guangzhou and later wrote a series of articles entitled “The Politics of Sun Yat-Sen” that contributed to a positive portrait of the leader for the eyes of the British and the American public. He “wished to portray himself as a representative par excellence of a new breed of Westernized Chinese political constitutional reformed: liberal and compassionate yet hard-headed, clear-sighted, cool, poised, determined, and if need be, ruthless in a just cause destined to prevail.”¹²²

Therefore, Filipinos’ connections with British journalists from the cosmopolitan cities of Hong Kong and Singapore were part of a broader strategy of sharing their account of the revolution with the “civilized world.” Those intermediaries, however, had personal and national ideologies and political agendas that influenced the content they spread about the Philippine Revolution. The receptiveness of these editors to Filipino messages and the final goals they pursued in spreading the civilization campaign illuminate the “world of inter-imperial dialogues” described by Kramer, except not everybody had the same freedom and power to participate in the conversation.¹²³

Press Censorship and Rule of Law in British Hong Kong, 1850s-1940s,” *Law and Literature* 29, no. 3 (2017): 425–56.

¹²¹ Chun-tu Shueh, “Sun Yat-Sen, Yang Ch’u-Yun, and the Early Revolutionary Movement in China,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 19, no. 3 (1960), 311, 312. For other examples, see Henry O’Shea in Chapter 2, Chesney Duncan and William St. Clair in Chapter 3, and the same Thomas H. Reid in Chapter 4.

¹²² Patrick Anderson, *The Lost Book of Sun Yatsen and Edwin Collins* (London: Routledge, 2017), 32, 33.

¹²³ Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons,” 1352.

Conclusion

In summary, Filipino nationalists waged mediatic campaigns to advance their political rights during the Propaganda Movement. From 1896 on, they intensified them to legitimize their insurrection against Spain and, later, to obtain recognition of the Philippine Republic from the international community. They highlighted the advanced level of enlightenment reached by the Filipinos, primarily exhibiting their capacity for self-government and their respect for rules of civilized warfare.

Among the relationships they developed, their connections with British individuals with media influence from Hong Kong and Singapore remain underexplored. However, they were a means to address world audiences, which Filipinos needed to convince of their high level of civilization. The following three chapters investigate how these individuals contributed to the Filipino civilization campaign and why they did it.

2

Against a Spanish “Game of Bluff” The Philippine Revolution in the Hong Kong and Singapore Press, 1896–1897

This chapter demonstrates that during the Philippine insurrection against Spain, Filipino nationalists sowed the seeds of the communication campaign they developed in the region between 1898 and 1902. While the Hong Kong and Singapore press witnessed the outbreak of the revolution with skepticism regarding its significance and with contempt for the Filipino capacity to pose a serious threat to the status quo, they soon became aware of its importance.

These publications under study focused their coverage on discussing the uprising’s causes and the harsh methods Spain used to crush it. Some newspapers condemned the existing regime’s treatment of the local population and urged for reforms. Other editors, however, justified Spanish behavior, claiming that allowing Asians to question European authority posed a threat to all Western empires.

Meanwhile, the Spanish authorities and Filipino propagandists in exile observed how the press discussed these two positions regarding the Spanish rule in the islands and whether or not its military methods fit for civilized nations. Both sides soon began participating in that debate by stressing the legitimacy of their cause and emphasizing their civilized modes of waging war as opposed to those of the enemy. As a result, both sides began fruitful relationships with British sympathizers with influence in the media. In the revolution’s case, they were Howard W. Bray and William St. Clair, who would be vital in spreading its propaganda in future phases of the war.

1. The Outbreak of the Revolution: The Press Responds to the Grito de Balintawak

Contrary to the stereotypes disseminated both in Spain and in the U.S., in 1896 the Philippines were a profitable territory with very positive economic prospects.¹ Part of its prosperity relied on its lively commercial activity —fluctuating in value between 30,000 and 40,000 annual pesos in the last third of the 19th century, according to M^a Dolores Elizalde. Although there were many countries involved, the British Empire was one of the biggest beneficiaries of this trade. In 1881, Great Britain controlled 34% of the island's commerce, and another 34% corresponded to the trade with China and other British Asian ports, among them, Hong Kong and Singapore.²

Given these two cities' close economic ties with the Philippines, when the Revolution exploded on August 26, 1896 their English-language newspapers quickly turned their attention to the archipelago. The coup had begun in Manila and its surroundings when, after discovering the Katipunan's plot for an uprising, the Spanish authorities began the detention and deportation of suspects and declared a state of war. By the time the Hong Kong press confirmed the first news of disturbances on August 29, the insurrection had already expanded to Bulacán, Pampanga, Nueva Écija, Tarlac, La Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas.³

Trying to respond with urgency to their audiences' genuine concerns, newspapers printed every piece of news and rumors they received from telegrams and letters arriving in commercial ships, the Spanish consul at Hong Kong, the Manila papers, and other nearby colonial papers.⁴

¹ M^a Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Gruoso, "Filipinas, fin de siglo: imágenes y realidad," *Revista de Indias* LVIII, no. 213 (1998): 313. See, also, Josep M^a Delgado, "'Menos se perdió en Cuba.' La dimensión asiática del 98," *Illes i Imperis* 2 (1999): 49–64; Yoshiko Nagano, "'Intra-Asian Trade' at the Turn of the Twentieth Century," in *The Philippine Revolution of 1896. Ordinary Lives in Extraordinary Times*, ed. Florentino Rodao and Felice Noelle (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2001), 253–77.

² Elizalde Pérez-Gruoso, "Filipinas, fin de siglo," 323–24.

³ Mas Chao, *La guerra olvidada de Filipinas*, 32.

⁴ "The Rebellion in Manila," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Sep. 3, 1896, 2. See also "The Crisis in Manila," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Sep. 2, 1896, 2; "The Insurrection in the Philippines," Special Telegrams, *Singapore Free Press & Mercantile Advertiser* [henceforth, *Singapore Free Press*], Sep. 2, 1896, 2; "The

Amid the initial uncertainty, most journalists based their evaluations of the uprising on the scarce information available and their prejudices about the natives of the Philippines. As a consequence, the earliest editorials dedicated to the rebellion dismissed its importance.⁵ The *Hong Kong Telegraph* stated that the crisis was “merely a ‘storm in a tea-cup’” and that, whatever the trouble was, “the machinery of the government had been sufficiently powerful to nip it in the bud.”⁶

For its part, the *Hong Kong Daily Press* considered that “if ever [there] was a chance of success for a rebellion in the islands it should be now, when the Madrid Government has its hands full with the Cuban insurrection.”⁷ Despite the opportune timing and the many well-founded reasons to rebel against the Spanish control, this newspaper considered the nature of the Filipinos would limit its success:

That the Government and the priests lay a heavy yoke on the people, the extortion and corruption are rampant, and that there is in many respects good reason for discontent there can be no doubt, but there can equally, we think, be no doubt that the party of discontent are quite incapable of achieving emancipation from Spanish rule. The natives are not of the material of which successful revolutionists are made; they have no high aspirations, nor does the spirit of self-sacrifice find much place amongst them. [...] However, if a revolution did break out and were carried to a successful end it would be a misfortune from every point of view; it would mean a relapse into savagery, for the natives are not sufficiently advanced to set up any respectable form of Government for themselves, nor are the Spanish mestizos sufficiently numerous or influential class to hold the power in their own hands.⁸

Rebellion in the Philippines,” *China Mail* (Hong Kong) [reprinted from *Shanghai Daily Press*], Sep. 9, 1896, 3.

⁵ The *China Mail* and the *Singapore Free Press* did not dedicate their editorial columns to the Revolution, at least, until two weeks after its beginning.

⁶ “The trouble...,” Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Sep. 3, 1896, 2.

⁷ “Little apprehension...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Aug. 29, 1896, 2.

⁸ “Little apprehension.” For more examples of the studied press’ conceptions of the Filipino unfit for self-government, see “According to an article...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 1, 1896, 2; “The correspondence of Mr. J.W. Davidson,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 24, 1896, 2; “The

Soon after the sudden confusion faded, however, the newspapers analyzed realized that the situation was not under control as the Spanish authorities claimed. Throughout the conflict, the Governor-General of the Philippines tried to manipulate information to trivialize the uprising, and Hong Kong and Singapore newspapers struggled to disclose that the rebellion was much more extensive, powerful, and organized than observers initially thought.

Ultimately, their journalists managed to overcome the censorship thanks to the accounts of British residents and merchants present in the Philippines, information carried in commercial ships, and, from October 1896, the special correspondents present in the islands for short periods. The information one newspaper shared was often reprinted or commented on in other publications, complementing their narratives on the war. Consequently, the press under analysis was in a position to offer a critical investigation of the events in the archipelago.⁹

Nevertheless, different newspapers reacted to the available information differently, and their perceptions of the Spanish regime, the Philippine cause, and the futures they deserved differed. In particular, during the first months of the conflict, the four dailies examined can be classified as presenting two polarized discourses. One of these discourses appeared primarily in the *Hong Kong Daily Press*, whose content was reprinted or commented on, to a greater or lesser degree, in the *China Mail* and the *Singapore Free Press*. The other was predominant in the *Hong Kong Telegraph*.

reports ...,” Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Sep. 7, 1896, 2. Although the *China Mail* and the *Singapore Free Press* did not publish a similar editorial that reflected as clearly their opinions about the natives, they did offer other comments that made the same points. As an example, when the *China Mail* explained at the beginning of the insurrection that some native troops had joined the insurgents, they commented they would be “a welcome addition which will help to give organization to the otherwise headless, leaderless and misguided natives and half-castes for whom a terrible retribution is in store.” See “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Sep. 19, 1896, 3.

⁹ Frederick G. Hoyt reached a similar conclusion studying a much reduced sample of news from the *North-China Herald*, published in Shanghai. See Hoyt, “The Philippine Revolution Viewed from Shanghai, 1895–1897,” in *The Philippine Revolution and Beyond*, vol. 1, ed. Elmer A. Ordóñez (Manila: National Commission for Culture and the Arts, 1998), 440–441. As examples of criticisms to the Spanish censorship, see “The Manila Rebellion,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Singapore Free Press*], Oct. 16, 1896, 2; “Our contemporary...,” *China Mail*, Oct. 29, 1896, 2; “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Sep. 19, 1896, 2.

2. Condemnations of Spanish Atrocities in the *Hong Kong Daily Press*

On the one hand, the *Daily Press* spent the fall of 1896 doing what its editor believed the Spaniards should do: “inquiring into the grievances of the natives in a sympathetic spirit” so they could “readdress them when they are seen to be well founded.”¹⁰ As this newspaper made clear in its September 15 editorial, the uprising was not “a mere outbreak of a savage race impatient of the restraints imposed upon them by civilized rule.” To the contrary, it had originated in Manila amongst a people “from whom the instincts of the savage have been eradicated by three centuries of association with civilization.” Instead, the ultimate cause of the uprising was “discontent engendered by misgovernment.”¹¹

In particular, the chief grievance alleged was the oppression of the monastic orders. With several long editorials, the *Daily Press* described the “imperium in imperio” they enjoyed in the Philippines and why it had to disappear. According to most of the newspaper’s writers, the rule of these religious institutions conditioned the life of the people beyond that of the civil government because they played an essential part in controlling the archipelago. They used that power, however, only for their aggrandizement. The orders guaranteed “a steady stream of wealth” flowing to their coffers by forcing people “to defray the charges of their own parishes.”¹²

To preserve their influence and wealth, these brotherhoods used “contemptible and criminal measures,” like trying to keep the natives in “mental obscurity.” The revolution precisely derived from the fact that the most enlightened natives had understood that “their spiritual wants are not the only care of the priest” and that the aim of the church was “to monopolize all in the world worth having and to subordinate to their common will all beyond their mystic circle.”¹³ Along the same line, the orders persecuted men

¹⁰ “The news received...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Sep. 15, 1896, 2.

¹¹ “Little apprehension...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Aug. 29, 1896, 2.

¹² “The news received.”

¹³ “In another column...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Aug. 31, 1896, 2.

with liberal views by denouncing their supposed links to conspiracies, causing their deportation and the confiscation of the suspect's property.¹⁴

Besides the power the Spanish administration invested in the religious institutions, the *Daily Press* criticized other aspects of its rule. In another compelling editorial published on October 1, 1896, the newspaper replied to an article published in Manila by *El Comercio*. First, the *Daily Press* partially accepted *El Comercio*'s argument that the rebellion may have been caused, in part, not by oppression, but instead by institutions "too liberal for the state of advancement of the people." Exhibiting its racial biases, the Hong Kong paper agreed that "it is only within very narrow limits that liberal institutions can with safety be granted to an Asiatic people governed by a white race."¹⁵

The author of the *Daily Press* editorial, however, argued that *El Comercio* had "grasped but half the case," as beside the excess of liberalism they alleged there had also been "a lack of even-handed justice." "While the natives had had political privileges of a sort given to them," the editorial added, "the personal oppression of officials and priests, who paid little respect to those privileges," had been galling. In addition to the well-known abuses of the priests, officials also worked "to make money out of their offices, over and above their salaries." In such a "general squeeze system," contentment and good government were impossible. "A few empty forms supposed to be representative of political liberty, such as parish councils and honorific offices" did not compensate for such abuses.¹⁶

In other occasions, clearly addressing grievances with which Hong Kong and Singapore readers could emphasize, the *Daily Press* condemned the Spaniards' illiberal treatment of trade. In particular, this newspaper warned that by increasing their custom tariff, Spaniards hindered foreign trade that could help them get more revenue and reduce the taxes they imposed on the people.¹⁷ Along the same financial lines, it also denounced

¹⁴ "In another column."

¹⁵ "According to an article..." editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 1, 1896, 2.

¹⁶ "According to an article."

¹⁷ "The rebellions in Cuba..." editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Sep. 24, 1896, 2.

monastic orders tried to secure their enrichment, which also hampered the commercial designs of foreign traders.¹⁸

Finally, the *Daily Press* often attacked the restrictions placed on the liberty of the press. It argued that censorship prevented the natives from expressing their grievances in a constitutional way, “the result being that discontent that might otherwise lead to reform or expend itself in harmless talk” was “liable at any time to break out into open rebellion.” Comparing the Spanish Philippines to British India —an analogy they often turned to— they warned that similar unrest would take place in India after suppressing the congress or the native press, which constituted effective safety valves.¹⁹

As a consequence, the newspaper repeatedly urged Spain to fix the sources of discontent and warned that otherwise, even if the present rebellion ended, they would reappear in the future:

The general opinion seems to be that the rebellion will very soon be suppressed when the troops now arriving from Spain take the field. Assuming that this is successfully accomplished, Spain would do well to inquire into the sources of the discontent and to remove them as far as possible, not by conferring mock political liberties, but by instituting an order of things in which justice shall be the keynote of the Government and in which the priests shall be relegated to their proper sphere as spiritual advisers and not be allowed to dominate in things temporal. No impartial observer can desire the success of the rebels, which would mean simply a reign of anarchy, but the movement undoubtedly points to the existence of evils in the present order of things which can and ought to be eradicated.²⁰

¹⁸ “According to an article.”

¹⁹ “Reinforcements...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jan. 23, 1897, 2.

²⁰ “According to an article.”

During the rest of the conflict, the *Daily Press* kept mentioning all these long-distant causes of the revolution.²¹ From October 1896, however, the development of the campaign and the atrocities both sides were committing became leading topics of media coverage. Those perpetuated by the Spanish turned into another grievance against the colonial regime that worsened its relationship with the natives and complicated its future in the islands.

One of the first alarming reports of these harsh methods came from a private letter printed in the *Singapore Free Press* on September 8. Its author explained that the Governor-General of the Philippines did not want more prisoners and, as a result, had locked up 100 of them —according to other sources, 169— in what would be called the Black Hole, “a small room under bastions of San Sebastian Intra Muros without water and only a small window.” Fifty-four were dead the following day while, outside, “arrests and shootings [were] keeping the populace in awful funk.”²² For its part, the *China Mail* detailed other brutalities, sometimes in a very graphic manner, like the dismemberment of a Spanish soldier right in front of his wife or the drowning of Filipino prisoners.²³

Notwithstanding the impact of those texts, most information about the brutal reality of the war appeared during October and early November, when the *Daily Press* published long chronicles from special correspondents: three by the famous American journalist James W. Davidson, two by an author under the pen name “Alphia” and, finally, one under the pseudonym “Pedro”.

Davidson’s first report mostly focused on the arrival of reinforcements for the Spanish troops; denied the statements about the insurrection being over; and established a contrast between Governor-General Ramón Blanco’s conciliatory efforts to solve the

²¹ The *China Mail* offered similar reflections, although with less frequency. See, among others, “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *China Mail* [reprinted from *Nagasaki Express*], Sep. 17, 1896, 3; “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Sep. 30, 1896, 3; “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Nov. 2, 1896, 3.

²² “The Philippine Rebellion,” *Singapore Free Press*, Sep. 8, 1896, 2.

²³ “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Sep. 18, 1896, 3. Also “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Sep. 21, 1896, 3; “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Sep. 24, 1896, 3.

conflict and the reprehensible behavior of his subordinates.²⁴ In a lengthy article published two days later, the journalist synthesized the causes of the rebellion, corroborating the explanations offered by the *Daily Press*.²⁵ It was the realities Davidson shared in his next chronicle, published on October 23, that most dismayed British readers.²⁶

First, the correspondent narrated the arrival of Spanish troops to the islands. He highlighted the following: their unsoldierly look, “only comparable to the Chinese;” their “old gun metal cannon of the days of King Charles;” and Manila’s weak fortifications, which a single modern battleship could quickly destroy. In the rest of the text, Davidson condemned in detail the violent detention, torture, interrogation, and execution of all the natives suspected of supporting the rebellion. He confirmed the scandal published by the *Free Press* about the “dark hole of Manila” and vividly sketched several torture methods, like “whipping with rattans, thumb screws,” and other instruments used in the days of the Inquisition.

Later, he exposed how the executions took place in public places with Spanish spectators, as illustrated in Image 6. Observers regarded them “to a certain extent as a sort of exhibition and no doubt compensates for the loss of the bullfights,” with bands of music present to make the performance all the more enjoyable. On other occasions, the authorities deported natives or drowned detainees from the provinces in the river to avoid the costs of transporting and holding them in Manila.

²⁴ James W. Davidson, “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 17, 1896, 2.

²⁵ Davidson, “The Condition of Affairs in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 19, 1896, 2.

²⁶ Davidson, “The Present Condition of Affairs in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 23, 1896, 2.




Figure 6. Rebel executions “instead of bull fights.” The popular appeal of the executions is exemplified in this photograph of the execution of a group of alleged rebels: Soldiers, male citizens and a group of priests observe the firing squad at the center of Bugambayán field and in front of the sentenced to death, dressed in white. “Sequence of executions of Filipino insurgents in Bugambayán camp.” 1896–1898. Photo in the Museo del Ejército –Inventory Number MUE-120030–, Madrid. Retrieved from Biblioteca Virtual de Defensa, <https://bibliotecavirtual.defensa.gob.es/>.

As a result, the correspondent stated: “Spain makes great pretensions as a Christian nation and yet she, with the connivance of the Church, indulges in cruel practices the most contrary to the merciful teaching of Christianity.” To incorporate the Spanish point of view, Davidson added comments by interviewees who tried to justify the use of these methods. As “the natives had no fear of simple imprisonment,” they believed torture was an effective alternative to secure critical information, like the names of other prominent rebels.²⁷

²⁷ Davidson, “The Present Condition of Affairs in the Philippines.”

As a response to what the *Daily Press* termed a “painful picture,” “which made the ‘blood boil’ and that appeared abominable to the whole civilized world,” the newspaper published a furious editorial stating it was incredible that such methods were in use at the end of the nineteenth century. Again, its editor warned that such behavior foretold “the ultimate downfall of Spanish rule.” Even if the authorities managed to suppress the rebellion, “the memory of these cruelties will dwell with the natives, will intensify the hatred they bear towards their rulers, and will predispose them to make another blow for liberty at the first favorable opportunity.”²⁸

To that risk, the *Daily Press* added the possibility that a foreign power could intervene to stop Spain’s disrespect for the laws of humanity. In particular, they considered Japan “might plead the right to interfere for the protection of the Philippines.” Although “it would be a startling circumstance to see a pagan nation interfering for the protection of the subjects of a Christian Government,” they considered it possible due to Japan’s racial affinities and interests in annexing “those rich islands.”

Such a course of events was improbable due to previous treaties with Spain about respecting the Bashee Channel as demarcating both nations’ spheres of influence, as well as the opposition Japan would encounter from European powers. The text warned, however, that with “her unwise actions,” Spain was “opening the door for diplomatic representations,” like Japan recognizing the rebels as belligerents, and was also “paving the way for stronger measures at some time future.” The *Daily Press* thus concluded that no matter the Japanese reaction, if the alleged use of torture by Spain was an incontrovertible fact, there should be consequences: “Torture is not a thing to be tolerated by the civilized world in the present day and the Government that practices it must either reform its method or go under.”²⁹

Over the following days, the *Daily Press* published other chronicles and news that continued to point to ecclesiastical and civil abuses as the leading causes of the rebellion. Repeatedly, it reported on the outrages committed by the Spaniards in a

²⁸ “The correspondence of Mr. J.W. Davidson...” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 24, 1896, 2.

²⁹ “The correspondence of Mr. J.W. Davidson.”

campaign whose end seemed far off and considered the possibility of foreign intervention. Besides repeating these ideas in his two texts, Alpha brought up one final controversial topic: the Spanish attitude toward the natives.³⁰ He transcribed what would become an infamous speech delivered by the President of the Spanish Casino and Controller General of the State, Rafael Comenga, on October 13 during a welcoming banquet to honor the Spanish troops who recently arrived in Manila. Comenga's inflammatory words were aggressive and depicted the natives as treacherous savages that, if necessary, had to be exterminated:

‘Ye have just arrived in time; the cannibals are still in the woods, the beast of prey is still hiding in his lair-(bravo!)-and the hour has come to exterminate the savages; all ferocious animals should be killed –(hear,hear)- had weeds must be plucked by the roots (Great Applause). The object of war is destruction, its civilizing virtue works like a burning iron on the ulcer, destroying its corrupt tissues in order to secure a perfect cure. Show no pardon! (Hear, hear). Destroy! Kill!’³¹

As a response, in another editorial commenting on the London *Spectator's* criticisms of the Spanish regime, the *Daily Press* repeated that Spain's future in the Philippines would depend “on her good behaviour and will only hold them *en permanence* by reforming the administration and governing justly and liberally.” Therefore, they advised against Comenga's position, which would only make the situation worse: “[the rebel natives] will be goaded to despair and, leaving villages and plantations, betake themselves to the fastness of the interior and, like the Achinese, wage an endless war of unquenchable hatred with their oppressors.”³²

³⁰ Alpha [pseud.], “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 26, 1896, 2; Alpha, “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 29, 1896, 2.

³¹ Alpha, “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” Oct. 26. Admiral Montojo presented Comenga with the insignia of the Order of Naval Merit because he had worked as a propagandist for the Spanish authorities. The *Diario de Manila* explained the award was a “proof of esteem merited by the eminent writer” [Comenga] for defending the reputation of the Navy. Also, Comenga had been “a powerful auxiliary in developing a highly patriotic public spirit.” When the *China Mail* reprinted the *Diario de Manila's* text, it clarified that, besides writing the October 13 speech, Comenga was the author of “fulsome articles written for *El Comercio*.” “For Merit!” *China Mail* [reprinted from *Diario de Manila*], May 10, 1897, 5.

³² “In the interesting article...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 28, 1896, 2.

Although other Spanish voices in the pages of the publications that I studied shared Comenga's combative attitude, these papers also revealed the existence of a reformist tendency among the Spaniards.³³ Advocates of reform looked to Governor-General Ramón Blanco, who stayed in charge until December 13, 1896, when Camilo García de Polavieja replaced him. They praised Blanco's "moderation and wise conduct of affairs" and thought he "may be able to combine clemency with firmness in such a way as to restore order and confidence and to pave the way for a reform in the administration that will heal disaffection."³⁴ In portraying his efforts along these lines, the *Daily Press* and its correspondents also exposed the trouble he had with Spaniards who, like Comenga, supported a more oppressive response to the rebellion.

For example, in one of his two chronicles, Alphia explained that Blanco had prohibited the holding of more welcoming banquets to avoid increasing the tension even more, and also "the press had been forbidden to report such inflammatory speeches in future." Also, he exposed that he had sent his Second-Captain to Spain, "another excellent political move in the ace of tremendous opposition and extreme unpopularity with a certain section of the community." He explained that this *Segundo Cabo* belonged to the "Archbishop's party, who are for wholesale slaughter and destruction regardless of the consequences, and is the man who in the very first encounter shot down right and left every native visible, even hauling them out of their homes and butchering them, in cold blood, and who was also implicated in the tragedy of the 'Black Hole' of Manila."³⁵

Finally, he narrated the violence and abuses committed by the Spanish volunteers against the native population and celebrated that he had strengthened the measures to prevent them. Also, he transcribed the order Blanco published in the *Official Gazette* of Manila on October 20, asking that the extreme and rigorous measures adopted to

³³ Other cases of aggressive Spanish attitude are: "General Echaluze [sic] on the Philippine Revolt," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 29, 1896, 2; "Spanish feeling in Manila," *China Mail* [reprinted from *Straits Times*], Oct. 5, 1896, 2.

³⁴ "In the interesting article..." editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*.

³⁵ Alphia, "The Rebellion in the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 29, 1896, 2.

achieve a rapid and energetic suppression become “more temperate and moderate and above all conciliatory” now that the insurrection was under control.³⁶

Besides praising Blanco, there had been mentions of other Spaniards who wanted to denounce the situation in the islands and hoped for reforms.³⁷ In addition to that, the press in Hong Kong and Singapore occasionally published articles with the same reformist ideas from the Spanish republican newspaper *El País*.³⁸ The expression of such opinions manifests that newspapermen from this publication were conscious of the existence in Spain of a trend of opinion that could also support the necessary reforms that they defended to achieve lasting peace in the Philippines.³⁹

To sum up, during the fall of 1896, especially during October and the beginnings of November, the *Hong Kong Daily Press* analyzed the regimes of the monastic orders and the Spanish administrators in general, commented on the low degree of civilization achieved by the Filipino natives, and explored how the campaign was fought. Consequently, they praised Captain-General Blanco’s efforts to offer a reasonable response to the uprising and reforming of the administration to secure future stability. Although all the detailed information on which it based its conclusions circulated widely in the region, other newspapers did not give them any credit. That was the case of the *Hong Kong Telegraph*.

³⁶ Alpha, “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” Oct. 29.

³⁷ See, among others, Davidson, “The Condition of Affairs in the Philippines,” Oct. 19.

³⁸ “The Friars in the Spanish Colonies,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *El País* (Madrid)], Jan. 2, 1897, 2; “Military Service in the Philippines,” *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *El País*], Oct. 22, 1897, 2; “Spanish Opinion on the Philippine Question,” *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *El País*], Nov. 11, 1897, 2.

³⁹ On Spanish support for reforms in the Philippines and its expression in the media, see, among others, J. N. Schumacher, *Propaganda Movement*; Cayetano Sánchez Fuentes, “La prensa española y Filipinas, 1868–1872,” in *Extremo Oriente Ibérico. Investigaciones Históricas: Metodología y Estado de La Cuestión* (Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional y Centro de Estudios Históricos del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Históricas, 1989), 416; Manuel Sakisyanz, *Rizal and Republican Spain and Other Rizalist Essays* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 1995); Isabel Martín, “El reformismo filipino en *La Voz de Ultramar*,” *Historia y Comunicación Social* 3 (1998): 97–109; Glòria Cano, “*La Solidaridad* y el periodismo en Filipinas en tiempos de Rizal,” in *Entre España y Filipinas: José Rizal, escritor*, ed. M^a Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Gruoso (Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional y Centro de Estudios Históricos del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Históricas, 2011), 171–201.

3. Racial Solidarity with Spain in the *Hong Kong Telegraph*

Although the *Telegraph* also portrayed the Spanish methods of government as “rather primate and unscientific,” it unconditionally supported Spain’s permanence in the archipelago; this led it to defend the regime from many of the criticisms explained above.⁴⁰ To begin with, this newspaper offered a misleading evaluation of the causes of the revolution. In its editorial of September 7, 1896, it recognized that there had been discontent in Luzon in the last years, but it said that “among the purely native races little or none” existed. Like other writers had done, the author of the text dismissed the Filipino capacity to destabilize the Spanish regime and considered them a “happy tempered, easily contented race, with no political ambitions” that was, “on the whole, fairly well-governed.”

Assuming the local populations’ incapacity to create serious problems, the author of the editorial held responsible for the rebellion the Spaniards present in the Philippines. They were connected or in sympathy “with the liberals, radicals, socialists, and anarchists who exist in varying strength in all parts of Spain itself,” and in governing places like the Philippines, they had allowed mestizos to create a great deal of trouble. According to the *Telegraph*, those mestizos were the dangerous element, “almost *ex necessitate*, discontented with the existing social arrangements.” Reflecting its racial criteria that, as will be shown, clearly defined its editorial line, the newspaper defended mestizos with “white blood” who supposedly “inherited a higher range of ideas and greater capacities than the purely native races” making them “members of the superior race.” Because of that, they aimed to be admitted into government and society as “—what they are not— white men,” and wanted to upset existing institutions “in the hope that some change may give them a better opening.”⁴¹

In its next editorial, the *Telegraph* analyzed the accusations that all those “socialists, anarchists, and rebels” made against the religious orders, and argued there was no reason to encourage rebellion for any purpose. According to the paper, the monastic

⁴⁰ “The reports that have reached...,” Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Sep. 7, 1896, 2.

⁴¹ “The reports that have reached.”

orders were the only ones that could administer the Philippines, and it considered that the cases of bad men among the friars, ill-usages, and abuses of power were exceptional. Their modes of governance were, “perhaps, not up to the requirements of the very highest modern civilization,” but they were “just, equitable, and suited to the character and habits of the people,” and convenient for the Spainards:

The Government of Spain is backward in all ways, is obstructive, is *anathema* to all lovers of material progress in the way of railroads, manufactures, electric telegraphs and democratic institutions generally, but it has on the whole given a large measure of peace, good order, and material prosperity to a very large and a very peaceably disposed native population, a population which but for the presence of the Padres would long since have been sued up and exterminated. Anyone who knows the resident population of Manila must know well that there do not exist among them men competent to assume the rules of power under a new regime.⁴²

Along with its understanding of the suitability of Spanish modes of government in the Philippines, the *Telegraph* also disagreed with the *Daily Press* in the perception of how the campaign was developing. As days went by and evidence accumulated, this newspaper also republished information about Spanish torture, like the *Free Press*'s chronicle of the Black Hole and the problems the colonial regime was facing in the islands. For example, it commented on the unpreparedness of most of the young Spanish soldiers sent to the Pacific, the censorship, and the possibility that the war would last longer than expected.⁴³ However, it combined those texts with those from the Spanish authorities, like the consul in Hong Kong, José Navarro, and Manila papers, to applaud how they were taking strict but necessary measures to regain control of the situation and avoid any dangers for the foreigners.⁴⁴

⁴² “The Crisis in Manila,” Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Sep. 8, 1896, 2.

⁴³ See, for example, “The Revolution in the Philippines” *Hong Kong Telegraph* [reprinted from *Shanghai Times*], Oct. 2, 1896, 2; “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Dec. 7, 1896, 3; Henry O’Shea, “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Dec. 22, 1896, 2.

⁴⁴ See, for example, “The Outbreak in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Telegraph* [reprinted from *London & China Express*], Oct. 13, 1896, 3; “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Oct. 31,

More noticeably, the newspaper questioned the reliability of the accusations its contemporaries were making against Spain and started a serious debate about whether Spain was or was not following the rules of civilized warfare. The first of its most significant attacks came in an editorial published on October 24.⁴⁵ The text questioned the accuracy of James W. Davidson's chronicle of the inquisitorial methods of Spain, arguing that he had not spent enough time in the islands to witness events—he arrived on September 28 and left on October 13—and did not detail the places he visited, nor the names, nationalities, or trustworthiness of his interviewees. Because of this, its author accused him of having just repeated “the same old story told of Spaniards and priests everywhere and at all times, on an à priori assumption of what such people are bound to do.”⁴⁶

Adding to its indignation, the *Telegraph* denounced the *Daily Press*'s editorial where the latter mentioned the possibility of a foreign nation stepping into the Philippines. As previously mentioned, that editorial only warned that, if Spain had committed the barbarities Davidson narrated, it was possible that a foreign power with previous interests in the islands, like Japan, might intervene and annex them in the name of the Filipinos' protection (precisely what would happen later with the United States). Instead, the *Telegraph* scolded them for practically inciting the Japanese to take possession of the Philippines:

Any respectable English should be ashamed, without further proof that Mr. Davidson's report affords, to assert that the charge of inflicting torture, and torture of very brutal character, is too clear to admit of contradiction, and, on a mere supposition, to charge the Government of a civilized Power and its officers, to say nothing of priests, with conduct it qualifies as abominable, with

1896, 3; “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Nov. 19, 1896, 2; “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Nov. 26, 1896, 2.

⁴⁵ Also, only a few days after publishing the chronicle about Manila's “Black Hole”, they began a report on the situation stating that despite all the rumors about events in the Philippines, “the real cause of the trouble, the object of the revolutionists, and the names of the real leaders and instigators of the rebellion are still wanting.” Therefore, until they had more reliable information, they declined “to add fuel to the fire by publishing statements that can only tend to turn ripple on the surface into roaring billows.” “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Sep. 21, 1896, 3.

⁴⁶ “Mr. Davidson's Allegations,” editorial, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Oct. 24, 1896, 2.

grossly outraging the laws of humanity. [...] We condemn and abhor needless cruelty and torture, as much as anyone. We agree that it is a thing that ought not to be tolerated by any civilized government either in the case of a Chinese prisoner in the Hongkong Gaol or of a native rebel in a Spanish colony; but we like to see a charge proved and brought home before we convict and condemn, and we do not like to see the most monstrous charges accepted as undeniably true on the faith of mere public rumor and report. Will our contemporary accept the rumors and reports universally current in Chinese society in the interior as sufficient to sustain the charges made against European missionaries in China, and against Europeans generally? We think not. Then, if not, it should not judge others on rumors and reports which are in no wise better founded.⁴⁷

During the following two months, the *Telegraph* published several chronicles contradicting the *Daily Press*' accounts of Spanish misbehavior in the islands. The first one, published on November 17, was signed by "Impartial." Insolently ignoring all the efforts made by their contemporaries, the *Telegraph* editors presented it as "the first connected narrative of the movement in the Philippines that has appeared from any pen and the first comprehensive statement of the causes that led up to it." Its author, "both well informed and perfectly impartial," made only "justice to Mr. Davidson," who, despite his "perfect bona fides," only reported hearsay.⁴⁸

Impartial accused Hong Kong dailies of encouraging the revolution and then denounced both the rumors of torture and the Spaniards' problems as exaggerations. In particular, this author claimed Davidson showed "a little of American maliciousness" when he said that, "the Spaniards having now no bullfights to see have taken to witnessing the new spectacle of shooting rebels at the Luneta as a recreation." According to Impartial, the executed were adjudged traitors and paid the just penalty, and the crowd that assembled

⁴⁴ "Mr. Davidson's Allegations," editorial, *Hong Kong Telegraph*. The *Hong Kong Daily Press* replied to this accusation in "When Mr. Davidson...", editorial, Nov. 19, 1896, 2. Other newspapers also commented on the possibility that Japan tried to annex the Philippines, and made clear that, in such an event, they would side with the Europeans. See "We note from...", *China Mail*, Oct. 28, 1896, 2; "The Spanish Premier and His Country's Troubles," *China Mail* [reprinted from *Spectator* (London)], Oct. 17, 1896, 5.

⁴⁸ "We desire to call...", Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Nov. 17, 1896, 2.

to witness the execution was very small compared to what he had seen at public executions in England. Moreover, this writer stated he did not know anything about the famous Black Hole.

Next, he challenged Davidson's reports, stating that "with exceptions mentioned, Mr. Davidson has been fairly impartial for an American." U.S. nationals' sympathies relied entirely with Cuba, "on which they keep their eagle eye for ulterior motives," so it was not to be expected that they were "entirely impartial where Spain is concerned." Finally, Impartial also dismissed Alpha's words, and his anonymity, and explained that "is quite plain that he is either a sincere sympathizer with the rebels or he wishes to make up an interesting article, or [...] he is a mere echo of the countless unfounded rumors flying about."⁴⁹

In spite of Impartial's efforts, the principal correspondent who reported on the Philippines with a clear Spanish bias and who actually influenced the regional media was Henry O'Shea, editor of the *China Gazette* and stringer for the *New York Herald*. O'Shea traveled on November 28 to join the Spanish forces "in order to gain a personal knowledge of the rebel movements and the Spanish methods coping with them."⁵⁰ Between December 1896 and January 1897, he sent both telegrams and lengthy chronicles. This content was received with enthusiasm in the *Telegraph*, but also republished in the *Daily Press*, moderating this paper's position towards Spain.

While in his texts he recognized the strength of the Filipinos and their good organization, Henry O'Shea never presented it as a sign of their high level of civilization. Instead, these capabilities and their knowledge of the country made them "excellent fighting material for guerrilla operations." For O'Shea, this and the idea that all natives were "seized with a deadly hatred towards the Spaniards," were reasons to apply a harsh policy.⁵¹ Therefore, when explaining the substitution of Governor-General

⁴⁹ Impartial [pseud.], "The Rebellion in the Philippines," Correspondence, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Nov. 17, 1896, 2–3.

⁵⁰ "The Rebellion in the Philippines," *Hong Kong Telegraph* [reprinted from *China Gazette* (Shanghai)], Dec. 21, 1896, 2.

⁵¹ Henry O'Shea, "The War in the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *China Gazette*], Jan. 5, 1897, 2.

Ramón Blanco for Camilo Polavieja, known to be prone to merciless methods, the journalist seemed to share the opinion of most Spaniards and ecclesiastical authorities that it was a necessary change.⁵²

Along the same line of supporting brutal military efforts, he actively tried to change people's impression of the Spanish troops. In a text published on January 11, 1897, O'Shea directly denied Davidson's accounts, stating that his impressions were directly opposed to what he "and one or two others" had written: the soldiers' "demeanor towards the people" was most kindly, and strict discipline" was preserved. "Indeed, if anything—the chronicler added—the troops are too friendly and fraternize with the natives," who constantly tried to "tempt the loyalty" of the soldiers. Nonetheless, the journalist was glad to report, "for the honour of the white race," that the "insidious islanders" had not recorded a single success winning over a Spanish soldier to their side.⁵³ He ended his chronicle stressing again the Spanish army's exemplar behavior:

At Macauyan as little damage was done to the houses of the people of the town as possible, but a few stacks of rice which General Rios feared might be carried off by the retreating rebels had to be burnt as a matter of military precaution. The soldiers paid for everything they took in the way of food, and after the firing ceased, the people came out of their houses and showed no fear of the soldiers, which would hardly be the case had the stories of excesses told against the Spanish been well-founded. This is the more remarkable when we remember that practically every native is a rebel, open or undeclared, but all, women and men alike, are against the Government and determined to throw off the dominion of Spain, who has for the past twenty years hold the island embracing eight million inhabitants through the powers of the Church and barely two thousand soldiers."⁵⁴

⁵² O'Shea, "The War in the Philippines."

⁵³ For an example of a Spaniard that was with the rural constabulary in 1896 and joined the revolutionary army during the following war against the U.S, see Nick Joaquin, ed., *A Spaniard in Aguinaldo's Army. The Military Journal of Carrasco y Pérez* (Manila: Solar Publishing Corporation, 1986).

⁵⁴ O'Shea, "The Philippine Rebellion," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jan. 11, 1897, 2–3. O'Shea also defended the Spanish soldier's behavior in "The Philippine Rebellion," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jan. 21, 1897, 2.

In texts like this, O'Shea not only made clear his support for the Spanish soldiers but also declared his understanding of the conflict as a racial war, in which he supported "the honour of the white race." In his opinion, the rebellion was "rather social than political in its objects," and was "largely directed against the friars" who had "overeducated the people, filling them with new aspirations, which the example of recent Japanese successes has stimulated." As a result of that, he believed the Philippines wished "to throw off the yoke of the Europeans."⁵⁵

In all his contributions, O'Shea declared that his impressions derived from his personal observations and tried to present his accounts as more objective and rigorous than Davidson and Alpha's. Despite this, the Spanish authorities' archives demonstrate that he was biased. O'Shea committed to spreading messages favorable to the Spanish war effort, like the ones above, right before traveling to Manila at the end of November 1896, hoping the Spanish authorities would provide the support he needed. Before arriving in the Philippines, the Spanish consul in Shanghai, Hipólito de Uriarte, and the consul in Hong Kong, José Navarro, wrote letters directed to the Captain-General of the Philippines highlighting the journalist's intentions and endorsing him.⁵⁶

Navarro wrote that O'Shea aimed to report on the war and correct the "perverted opinion" that certain newspapers from Hong Kong and Singapore had created "in the Far West, and indirectly in Europe and America," with "correspondence where bad faith runs next to ignorance and absolute shortage of political logic." In particular, they referred to "the malevolent lies" published by Davidson in the *Daily Press*.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ O'Shea, "The Philippine Rebellion," Jan. 11.

⁵⁶ Hipólito de Uriarte's letter to the Captain-General of the Philippines appears partially reproduced in García-Balaña, "Proyecto Memoria de Cátedra," 174. For Navarro's letter, see the following paragraphs.

⁵⁷ José Navarro [Spain's consul in Hong Kong] to Capitanía General de Filipinas, November 26, 1896, Microfilm Collection of the Spanish Documents Section in the National Archives of the Philippines [copy available in the Biblioteca Tomás Navarro Tomás, from the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid (henceforth, NAP)], Gobierno y Administración, 1.8. Expedientes Gubernativos, microfilm 1108, legajo 3, documento 22. Original in Spanish: "...ciertos periódicos de Hongkong[sic] y Singapore han extraviado la opinión en el Extremo Oriente, y de rechazo en Europa y América, con correspondencias en que la mala fe corre pareja con la ignorancia y la absoluta falta al sentido político."



Figure 7. Portrait of Henry D. O'Shea. Reprinted from Arnold Wright's *Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong-Kong, Shanghai, and Other Treaty Ports of China* (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain Publishing Company, LTD., 1908), 360.

According to the consul, O'Shea considered that all European powers, "no matter which possessions they hold in the region and their relations with China and Japan," had the utmost interest in preserving the "prestige and superiority of the white race" among Asians. From his viewpoint, there wasn't "a worst political fault than expressing or even pretend to sympathize with any insurrectional movement like the one promoted in their archipelago."⁵⁸ As a result, O'Shea wanted to rectify "the errors disseminated and to direct the flow of opinion towards the line that protected the European and American political and colonial interests." He claimed that "what matters is not that a particular European nation loses or preserves one of its belongings." Rather it's to avoid "setting a precedent of an Asian people pretending to overcome European superiority, so far undisputed."⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Navarro to Capitanía General, November 26, 1896, NAP. Original in Spanish: "Opina en efecto y, con razón, Mr. O'Shea, que es de sumo interés por todas las potencias europeas indistintamente, tanto respecto de las posesiones que tengan en este hemisferio, como de sus relaciones con China y el Japón, su autoridad entre los asiáticos el prestigio de la superioridad de la raza blanca, y que no se puede cometer una falta política más grave que la de proferir o aún aparentar simpatías hacia cualquier movimiento insurreccional como el promovido en nuestro archipiélago."

⁵⁹ Navarro to Capitanía General, November 26, 1896, NAP. Original in Spanish: "En este orden de ideas [O'Shea] se propone escribir correspondencias que rectifiquen los errores esparcidos y encauzar la opinión por la vía que corresponde a los intereses políticos y coloniales europeos y norteamericanos,

Besides the idea of shared racial solidarity that motivated O’Shea’s numerous contributions to the regional press, this document also reflects eloquently the resonance his efforts found in the wider propaganda strategy of the Spanish authorities. In the same letter, Navarro said O’Shea could lend good support to the Spanish cause because his texts would have wide circulation in Europe and the United States. Other Spanish officials also knew that the English-language Asian press was the first step towards wider audiences, and as a result, they tried to guide its content.

O’Shea’s collaboration was a key instrument towards achieving that goal. This journalist’s known biographical details, which focus on later moments of his career, suggest what kind of arrangement he may have established with the Spaniards. During the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian government granted O’Shea a subsidy of \$2,500 to \$3,000 a month in exchange for agreeing to obtain Russian government approval for “all the articles, concerning the current war” and to exclude military, political, financial and industrial information compromising the “interests of Russia.”⁶⁰ According to the journalist’s biographer, Christopher Shepard, it was not uncommon that journalists of the period “understood that the dissemination of information could be utilized for financial gain, even if this involved a certain degree of political subterfuge.”⁶¹ Given that the tasks he fulfilled for the Spanish government were similar to his future Russian job, it seems reasonable to assume they had arrived to a similar deal.

recordándole que no se trata de que una nación europea pierda o deje de perder una de sus posesiones, cuidándose muy poco de ello las demás, sino de que no se siente el precedente de que un pueblo asiático pretenda triunfar de la supremacía europea, hasta ahora indiscutible.”

⁶⁰ Christopher Shepard, “Irish Journalists in the Intellectual Diaspora: Edward Alexander Morphy and Henry David O’Shea in the Far East,” *New Hibernia Review* 14, no. 3 (2010): 81, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20779267>. Interestingly, O’Shea refused to accept rival offers from the Japanese, and even dismissed his Japanese staff at the *China Gazette* and the *Shanghai Times*, which he owned. Such behavior seems coherent with the racial biases he had manifested. Another relevant biographical detail consistent with this Irish journalist’s defense of the Spanish cause is that he was a Catholic activist. In Shanghai, O’Shea was a notable member of the Catholic community. He campaigned for the impeachment and removal of Lebbeus R. Wilfley, a former U.S. attorney general for the Philippines and justice of the Court for China in Shanghai. This north-American enraged that religious community of the city because he referred to the Catholic clergy as “the popish clergy” and accused them of “robbing the poor, the widows and orphans” in court proceedings.” See Shepard, 81–82.

⁶¹ Shepard, 80.

Additionally, Spanish consuls themselves in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Singapore, and Saigon tracked the information that appeared in the press during all of 1897. When it was offensive for Spain, they attempted to influence it by taking legal actions, through more subtle diplomatic pressures or through public interventions.⁶² For example, Governor-General Camilo Polavieja himself presented the conflict as a racial war, just as O'Shea had done, in an interview with the *China Mail* published in January 1897. He looked for their neighbors' support by warning about the common danger Europeans were facing, which also justified the merciless methods used against those who objected to their rule:

He [Polavieja] contends that this war is entirely racial-Malays against Europeans -and he thinks it ought to act as a warning to other European nations holding Asiatic colonies-especially British, of our mutual interest in combatting these menaces to European supremacy. While Japan has done nothing to help the rebels, their example has stimulated the Philipinos to adopt measures for the establishment of a native Government in the Philippine Islands. He considers the only policy for dealing with these Malays is the adoption of severe measures. The Malay respects his chastiser, who declines to be misled by cajolery; he mistakes leniency or mercy for weakness.⁶³

According to Albert Garcia-Balañà, this interview and another appeared in the *New York Herald*, both published thanks to O'Shea, were General Polavieja's most extensive international justifications of the rigid campaign he was about to wage to reconquer Cavite, between February and March 1897. According to Garcia-Balañà, General Polavieja had already established a network of propagandists in the British West Indies during the Cuban Little War (1877–1881). Showing the same mediatic self-consciousness, the general at least wrote the *New York Herald's* text himself to delegitimize the revolution. He portrayed its leaders as a minority of Tagalogs and half-bloods leading 15,000 or 20,000 violent and ignorant peasants whose final goal was to

⁶² Some examples are discussed in the following pages. For other anecdotes of Spanish consuls trying to reply to the regional press are in the Archivo Histórico Nacional [henceforth, AHN], Ministerio de Ultramar, leg. 5329, exp. 8; Ultramar, leg. 5329, exp.8, doc. 298; Ultramar, leg. 5328, exp. 4.

⁶³ "The Rebellion in the Philippines," *China Mail*, Jan. 27, 1897, 3.

exterminate the white race. By portraying such a savage enemy, Polavieja tried to demonstrate worldwide that he had no other option than “strike heavily and hard.”⁶⁴

Finally, besides O’Shea, Spaniards found other British supporters who tried to protect their reputation from criticisms. According to an April 1897 letter from the Civil Government of Manila to the Captain-General of the Islands, the British doctor José Donelan petitioned the Hong Kong Governor to stop the “the rude and stupid campaign” that the city’s press had perpetrated against Spain. Allegedly, the Governor replied that the English press was free and the government could not act against it. “Recognizing the fairness of his petition”, however, he summoned the newspapers’ directors in a “friendly and patriotic tone” to talk about the matter. Seeing the publishers “had listened deferentially,” the Governor hoped they “would moderate and improve their language when talking about Spain and its rule in the Philippines.”⁶⁵

To sum up, between the Grito de Balintawak, in August 1896, and until December 1896, British public opinion in the Pacific offered two different responses to the revolution. The *Telegraph* tried to minimize criticism and support the Spanish actions to guarantee that a white regime was not questioned. By contrast, the *Daily Press* exposed all its failures to demand reforms and avoid further conflicts. Both positions were evident when the newspapers openly discussed the atrocious methods used to suppress the insurrection. In particular, the *Daily Press* chronicles and editorials had vilified the enraged attitude of some Spaniards and their use of harsh practices.

⁶⁴ Garcia-Balaña, “Proyecto Memoria de Cátedra,” 176–178.

⁶⁵ Gobierno Civil de la Provincia de Manila to Gobernador General de Filipinas, April 13, 1897, NAP, Guerra y Cuerpos de Seguridad. Rebeliones, Sediciones y Rebeliones, micro. 1760, leg. 22, doc. 58. Original in Spanish: “Este [José Donelan] escribió al Cónsul de S.M. Británica y aquí en contestación a esa misiva, manifestándole que la prensa de Inglaterra es libre, que los poderes públicos y especialmente el Gobierno no tienen acción contra ella, y que sin embargo de esto, reconociendo de justicia la petición formulada, había remitido en un despacho a los directores de la prensa y en tono amistoso a la par que patriótico para la colonia inglesa, les había hablado de tan importante asunto esperando confiadamente que en lo sucesivo el lenguaje de aquellos periódicos modificaríase y mejoraría notablemente con referencia a España y a su gestión en Filipinas, ya que los convocados habían escuchado deferentes y correctos y habían tomado en consideración las razones que les adujo el dicho Sr. Gobernador de Hong-Kong.[sic]”

As a response to those attacks, the Spanish authorities and their British sympathizers tried to control the flow of information and spread positive perceptions of their rule. During the following months, their efforts had some impact. As the next pages show, they managed to restrain criticism in the editorial and opinion articles these newspapers wrote and to reduce the spread of harmful news and reports.

On the one hand, the newspapers being studied moderated their editorial attacks to the Spanish regime in the Philippines. Between December and January 1897, most of the journals that I examined clarified that their criticisms against the Spanish imperial rule were not incompatible with the racial solidarity O'Shea talked about, but rather were a different way of understanding the required response.

None of the analyzed dailies, not even the *Hong Kong Daily Press*, had ever considered at any point that a Philippine victory was possible, a result they did not want either. Instead, their harsh criticisms aimed to encourage the necessary reforms Spain ought to apply to avoid further conflicts. For example, when reviewing the most important events of 1896 in its New Year's Eve editorial, the *China Mail* commented about the rebellion:

In the Philippine group there is quite as much room for improvement in the internal administration as in China or Turkey but our sympathies must be with the white race, although we hope the lessons taught by these rebellions will have a good effect in Madrid and may hasten the work of reform in the Spanish Colonies.⁶⁶

For its part, the *Singapore Free Press* recommended that Spain brought "herself to apply British principles in her relations with her colonies." She should offer "some form of local autonomy to Cuba" and a "similar concession for the Philippines." What islanders wanted, after all, was "the imposing of due limitations on the harsh despotism of the clerical orders, and the relaxation of an arbitrary and repressive civil administrative regime."⁶⁷

⁶⁶ "A Retrospect – 1896," editorial, *China Mail*, Dec. 31, 1896, 2.

⁶⁷ "In spite of the uncompromising...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 22, 1896, 2.

Finally, the *Hong Kong Daily Press* celebrated in its January 23 editorial that, with the arrival of new troops, the conflict seemed close to ending. According to the author, that was “the wish of every intelligent observer” next to the desire that the causes that led to the rebellion be resolved. As if he was replying to the *Telegraph*’s previous comments, the writer added: “whatever sympathy may have been felt for the rebels has arisen only from the feeling that they have been sadly misgoverned, but it cannot have amounted to a wish for their success, for any government that the rebels might establish would inevitably, having regard to the condition of the country, be worse than the one it should displace.”⁶⁸

Interestingly, the newspapers studied made all of these comments in spite of the upheaval that followed Dr. José Rizal’s execution, in December 30, 1896.⁶⁹ All the newspapers under study reported on it. For example, the *China Mail* published a very critical chronicle stating that it had been “a mistake from the authorities to deal with him as a rebel.”⁷⁰ The *Daily Press* also printed several texts about the murder, among them, three condemning articles from foreign newspapers.⁷¹ None of them, however, made any editorial comment about the event. Given the significance of the affair, that silence is striking, especially in the case of the *Hong Kong Daily Press*, which had dedicated a large number of faultfinding editorial columns—at least, eleven—to the Spaniards’ management of the revolution during the previous months. Its reaction to

⁶⁸ “Reinforcements...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jan. 23, 1897, 2.

⁶⁹ General Polavieja had already predicted the event could have an important echo in the press, and he tried to monitor it. Garcia-Balaña, “Memoria Proyecto de Cátedra,” 177.

⁷⁰ “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Jan. 14, 1897, 3.

⁷¹ In total, the newspaper published seven texts about the event. The three pieces critical with the execution are “The Friars in the Spanish Colonies,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *El País* (Madrid)], Jan. 2, 1897, 2; “A Paris Paper on an Old Chapter of Philippine History and Dr. Rizal,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Le Petit Temps* (Paris)], Jan. 6, 1897, 2; “The Alleged Torture in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Yokohama Box of Curious*], Mar. 19, 1897, 2. Besides them, the newspaper published: an editorial that appeared on December 19 as a response to the rumors of his execution; two texts from *El Comercio*; and a fourth one about Rizal’s marriage with Josephine Bracken, from Hong Kong. See “Dr. Rizal,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 19, 1896, 2; “The Rebellion of the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jan. 6, 1897, 2; “The Dramatic Marriage of Dr. Rizal,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jan. 7, 1897, 2.

this specific event exemplifies, again, that from this moment on, the *Daily Press*' editors measured the opinions they shared about the war.⁷²

More importantly, the Spanish authorities also managed to influence the stream of news—in other words, its reporting about facts—that newspaper provided. As General Camilo Polavieja had anticipated in his *China Mail* and *New York Herald* interviews, the campaign he carried out to reconquer Cavite between February and May 1897 aimed to annihilate the insurrection at any cost. He planned to erase any resistance from the rest of the territory and isolate the rebels in Cavite and then reoccupy that province. In order to do this, he applied brutal policies. Among them, there was the *reconcentrado* policy of bringing into the towns the population that lived in barrios two kilometers away from them, the orders for “persecuting with energy the traitors to their King and Fatherland,” and the execution of several influential members of the native society, like Rizal.⁷³

In spite of this recrudescence of the war, the *Daily Press* adopted a less severe attitude. Although it kept publishing comments admitting its editors did not approve how Spain had administered the islands so far, and occasionally made reference to brutalities, this content went from dominating its coverage to being anecdotal.⁷⁴ To inform the public about Polavieja's campaign in Cavite, the *Daily Press* relied basically on Henry O'Shea's chronicles during January and February, and later, on Spanish sources.⁷⁵

⁷² Specifically, for the year 1897, I found only three *Hong Kong Daily Press*' editorials that dealt with the Revolution: “Reinforcements...,” editorial, Jan. 23, 1897, 2; “Although the ultimate...,” editorial, Feb. 6, 1897, 2; “Now that the...,” editorial, May 27, 1897, 2.

⁷³ Mas Chao, *La guerra olvidada de Filipinas*, 70.

⁷⁴ The exceptions to this lack of criticism in the *Hong Kong Daily Press* are “A Paris Paper on an Old Chapter of Philippine History and Dr. Rizal,” [reprinted from *Le Petit Temps* (Paris)], Jan. 6, 1897, 2; “The Alleged Torture in the Philippines,” [reprinted from *Yokohama Box of Curio*], Mar. 19, 1897, 2; “Although the ultimate...,” editorial, Feb. 6, 1897, 2; From a Correspondent [henceforth, Correspondent], “The Philippine Rebellion,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 18, 1897, 2.

⁷⁵ The same editors of the *Daily Press* were conscious of their incoherence. In one of their editorials, they tried to justify their use of O'Shea's chronicles as their main source of information on the islands despite the controversy he had just started with Davidson. They stated the following: “Mr. O'Shea, the special correspondent of a New York paper and of the *China Gazette*, has recently published a number of interesting letters on the progress of the rebellion and the condition of the country, and, though we think we are correct in saying that his leanings are towards the clerical or ruling party, he has nevertheless been constrained to admit the existence of very grave abuses.” As examples, they cited O'Shea's criticisms to the Spanish custom policy, the liberty of the press and the explanations (not criticisms) he offered of the

Although O'Shea did mention the harshness of that new phase of the war under General Polavieja, he clearly justified it by arguing that the rebels were now more dangerous because they had better arms.⁷⁶ Furthermore, he admitted that probably a lot of innocent people were dying "owing to the impossibility of distinguishing the well-disposed inhabitants of a Philippine village from the rebels," and "also because of the way in which the people stick to their frail houses while fighting is going on all round." He considered such consequences justified alleging that "it is very difficult, if not indeed impossible, to prevent many innocent people thus becoming victims in savage or irregular operations," and he repeated that his "observation of the conduct of the Spanish soldiers in the field is altogether to their credit."⁷⁷

Therefore, the *Daily Press* moderated its comments regarding the Philippine Revolution. It not only decreased the attention it gave to the conflict, a natural phenomenon when a newsworthy event becomes older, but it also changed the sources it relied on. Notice that, during the previous months, this newspaper had been targeted by the Spanish authorities and its British sympathizers for the compromising information it had published and, more importantly, because that information spread to many other newspapers in the region.⁷⁸

By "moderating" the *Daily Press*' language, as intended by José Donelan when he pressured the British Governor in Hong Kong, and directing its flow of opinion, as

big power of the Church. However, they did not make any comment about his outright defense of Polavieja and the Spanish troops, whose behavior the *Daily Press* had previously attacked. See their editorial of January 23, 1897, 2. It is also eloquent of their change of attitude towards O'Shea's mission that, a few days before, the *China Mail* had reprinted an "amusing extract" from *El Comercio*, where the "strictly censored" Spanish newspaper praised the task that O'Shea had come to do in the Philippines, clearly presenting him as a biased ally of their cause. Although it would seem natural to mention it after its exchanges of accusations with the *China Gazette*, the *Daily Press* remained silent. See "The Rebellion in the Philippines," *China Mail* [reprinted from *El Comercio* (Manila)] Jan. 7, 1897, 3.

⁷⁶ Henry O'Shea, "The Philippine Rebellion," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *China Gazette* (Shanghai)], Jan. 28, 1897, 2.

⁷⁷ Henry O'Shea, "The Philippine Rebellion," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *China Gazette*], Jan. 21, 1897, 2.

⁷⁸ As examples of texts the *Hong Kong Daily Press*' texts reprinted in the *Singapore Free Press*, see "The Manila Rebellion," Oct. 21, 1896, 2; "Dr. Rizal," Dec. 28, 1896, 2. On the *Daily Press*' presence in the Shanghai's *North-China Mail* see Hoyt, "The Philippine Revolution Viewed from Shanghai, 1895-1897." Even, the *China Mail*, which was the direct rival of the *Daily Press* at Hong Kong, commented some of his competitor news: "We note that ...," Oct. 28, 1896, 2; "Our contemporary...," Oct. 29, 1896, 2.

O'Shea suggested, they achieved a wide impact in the regional press. Just as the Spanish authorities tried to influence the content of these media, however, so did the Filipino revolutionaries.

4. Filipino Voices Strike Back

During the first months after the outbreak of the revolution, there rarely appeared articles manifestly written by Filipinos. Instead, the most critical editorials published by the *Daily Press* and the most polemic texts about the Spanish atrocities were written by characters like the American James W. Davidson and by British residents in the islands, who did not seem to have a relationship with or even sympathy toward the Filipino revolutionaries.

For example, the writer of the letter that first described the controversial “Black Hole” of Manila clearly feared the natives but expected they would be quickly subdued when he stated “the only fear we have is of native troops joining rebels-*then good-bye!*”⁷⁹ In Davidson’s case, there is no evidence that indicates that he had a relationship with the Filipino revolutionaries either, no matter what accusations O’Shea may have made.⁸⁰ As a matter of fact, some time after leaving the Philippines, this American journalist wrote to the *China Gazette* to separate himself from the natives’ cause:

O'Shea states that what he is ‘amazed and horrified at is that any white man can be so short-sighted as to display blind but well-meaning sympathy with the natives of the Philippines in this horrible conspiracy, etc.’ That he refers to me as the short-sighted ‘White-man’ is not so stated, but that is certainly the impression that it would give the reader. In reviewing my letters carefully the only reference touching directly on the subject that I can find is contained in the third, where I state in referring to the treatment of the natives by the Church and

⁷⁹ “The Philippine Rebellion,” *Singapore Free Press*, Sep. 8, 1896, 2.

⁸⁰ For more biographical material about James W. Davidson, see Robert Lampard, *The Life and Times of James and Lillian Davidson* (Alberta, Canada: Rotary Club of Red Deer, 2006); David Curtis Wright and Hsin-Yi Lin, *From Province to Republic to Colony: The James Wheeler Davidson Collection on the Origins and Early Development of Japanese Rule in Taiwan, 1895–1905* (Calgary, Canada: University of Calgary Press, 2017).

Government: 'I do not wish to convey by that the idea that their grievances were of sufficient enormity to countenance open rebellion, but the combined oppression of the Church and Government is such as would tend to keep the natives in a constant state of dissatisfaction.' Whether Mr. O'Shea agrees with me or not on this point I do not know, but surely, he cannot construe that remark into an expression of sympathy with the natives in their conspiracy against the Spanish Government.⁸¹

Several clues indicate, however, that already during this first phase of their revolution, Filipinos paid important attention to their image. Although the general lack of attribution in the press makes it difficult to trace the links between published authors and propagandistas, the Spanish archives allow us to confirm, at least, Alphaia's identity. When Captain-General Polavieja received one of the two texts this author published in the *Daily Press*, the translator added a note. He believed the text's writer, "or at least its inspirer," was "a vicious foreigner without career, very keen to the *indios*, whom he loves for the good times they provide him, who lives in a filthy sewer in the Escolta [Manila]." The Governor-General added: "the correspondent might be Mr. Breis[sic], an Englishman with bad records."⁸²

Besides the two articles by Alphaia (Howard. W. Bray) —whose relationship with the Filipinos is explored in depth in the following pages— the Hong Kong press also shared some texts from Madrid's *El País* supporting Philippine political rights.⁸³ The Propaganda Movement had campaigned with those messages in the metropolitan public sphere inserting articles in newspapers like *El Imparcial*, *El Globo* and *La Publicidad* in addition to *El País*. This suggests that those texts were handed to the Hong Kong press

⁸¹ "Mr. Davidson and Mr. O'Shea on the Philippine Rebellion," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *China Gazette* (Shanghai)], Feb. 23, 1897, 2.

⁸² Quoted in Garcia-Balaña, "Proyecto Memoria de Cátedra," 173. Original in Spanish: "El traductor de este articulo[,] como otros de la misma mena[sic] que ya lleva publicados 'The Hong Kong Daily Press'[,] han sido escritos[,] o cuando menos inspirados[,] por un vicioso extranjero sin oficio ni beneficio muy dado a los indios a los que adora por los muy buenos ratos que le proporcionan[,] y que se alberga en una inmundicia cloaca de la Escolta [de Manila]."

⁸³ Besides the chronicles signed with the Alphaia pen-name, Bray also claimed to have been the source and translator for the content published in the *Daily Press* of Dec. 19, 1896, 2 regarding Rizal's murder. That he was the author was stated in *Deus et Libertas*, "The Late Dr. Rizal," Correspondence, *China Mail*, Jun. 1, 1897, 3.

by Filipinos connected with the Spain-based community.⁸⁴ In addition, the ex-propagandista Mariano Ponce also explained in his correspondence that he followed the Hong Kong press and shared some texts with them.⁸⁵

The idea that Filipino revolutionaries were monitoring the Hong Kong and Singapore press is reinforced by other evidence from March 1897. After the *Daily Press*' moderation, another of the studied newspapers, the *China Mail*, began publishing identified revolutionary voices. As it has been mentioned, it was evident that the *China Mail*'s editor watched the events through the same racial lenses that Polavieja and O'Shea used. Although this newspaper recognized that Filipinos were fighting better than expected, it considered them uncivilized and unprepared for self-government and their revolutionary leaders untrustworthy.⁸⁶ Its editors made clear that they expected and desired the ultimate triumph of Spain.⁸⁷

In spite of this, the *China Mail* had also denounced the Spaniards' censorship, depicted their regime as unsuitable, and recognized that both their forces and the rebels were committing "horrible outrages."⁸⁸ Between January and April, during the Cavite campaign, it mostly covered the conflict through the information Consul José Navarro shared with them but also by republishing accounts from foreign newspapers and providing critical readings of Spanish newspapers in Manila like *El Comercio*. This allowed the *China Mail* to inform readers about how the Spaniards were advancing throughout the territory and slightly moderate triumphant accounts by acknowledging

⁸⁴ J. N. Schumacher, *Propaganda Movement*.

⁸⁵ Mojares, "Los itinerarios de Mariano Ponce," 91–92. Several articles in the edited volume of Mariano Ponce's letters demonstrate his work with the foreign press. For examples, see Ponce, *Cartas sobre la Revolución*, 1, 4, 9, 15–18, 20, 32, 205–6.

⁸⁶ Besides many of the texts from the *China Mail* already referenced, see also "The *Singapore Free Press* and..." Jan. 9, 1897, 3.

⁸⁷ The text that perfectly synthesizes all those ideas is the following chronicle: "The Rebellion in the Philippines," *China Mail*, Dec. 12, 1896, 3. Also see the *China Mail*'s editorial from Jan. 29, 1897, 2.

⁸⁸ On Spanish censorship, see "The Aspect of Affairs..." editorial, *China Mail*, Sep. 16, 1896, 2; "The Rebellion in the Philippines," Nov. 16, 1896, 3. As examples of criticisms published in the *China Mail* against the Spanish regime, see "The Philippine Rebellion," [reprinted from *Nagasaki Express*], Sep. 17, 1896, 3; "The Honesty of the Spaniards," Dec. 23, 1896, 5. On their use of harsh methods of warfare to suppress the rebellion, see "The Philippine Rebellion," Sep. 18, 1896, 3; "The Rebellion in the Philippines," Sep. 21, 1896, 3; "The Rebellion in the Philippines," Sep. 24, 1896, 3; "The Rebellion in the Philippines," Nov. 2, 1896, 3.

that the Filipinos were better organized than expected, offering an unexpected resistance, and forcing the Spaniards to use hard methods to combat them.⁸⁹ Finally, from April onwards, they openly condemned those methods and began mocking the Spanish triumphal rhetoric by proclaiming that, no matter what they were pretending through their control of the media, the war was not over at all.⁹⁰

It was at that point in time when more and lengthier accounts from pro-Filipino sources began to appear. The most prominent one was that by the “Englishman of bad records,” as General Polavieja had stated: Howard W. Bray. So far, historiographical mentions of this character are generally limited to pointing out his role in bringing together Emilio Aguinaldo and Spencer Pratt to convey the Filipino-American collaboration in their fight against Spain. In mentioning this event, most historians label him as an interested merchant. In one of the most complete descriptions of Bray, Teodoro Agoncillo described him as “an opportunist who had been paid by the Hong Kong Committee, upon orders of Aguinaldo, the neat sum of P.5000 for his services as a press relations officer” “maligning the Spanish Administration.”⁹¹ According to other sources, Bray was promised a political position in Aguinaldo’s government.⁹² Certainly, Bray’s records seemed problematic, as Polavieja hinted: he had been involved in a court case

⁸⁹ The cases of contradictions of the Spanish version are abundant in the *China Mail*. On the Spanish use of hard methods of war, see “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” [reprinted from *Glasgow Herald*], Feb. 5, 1897, 3. On the organization of the Filipinos, see “The Paris correspondent...,” [reprinted from *Daily News* (London)], Mar. 5, 1897, 3; Correspondent, “The Present Situation,” Mar. 15, 1897, 3.

⁹⁰ As examples of the *China Mail*’s criticism of the Spanish colonial policy and methods of war, see “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” May 22, 1897, 5; “Mr. E. Freyre...,” Jun. 24, 1897, 3. As examples of the several occasions when the *China Mail* mocked the Spanish rhetoric, see “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” Mar. 30, 1897, 3; “Notes and News from Manila,” Apr. 15, 1897, 3; “Historical Obsequies of a Spanish Sparrow,” Jul. 12, 1897, 5. On the continuity of the war after April 1897, see “The Philippine Rebellion,” Jul. 6, 1897, 3; “The Philippine Rebellion,” Aug. 5, 1897, 3.

⁹¹ Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic*, 151. Along the same lines, Karnow, *In Our Image*, 111. A notable exception that pays more attention to Howard W. Bray’s press agent role is the aforementioned unpublished dissertation by Jane Slichter Ragsdale, “Coping with the Yankees.” Ragsdale took the Philippine Insurgent Records as the only source about these English-speaking publicist and did not examine their actual impact on the press. As a consequence, her thesis lacks important contextualizing facts. For example, it places the beginning of Bray’s collaboration with the Hong Kong Junta at Aguinaldo and Pratt’s meeting in Singapore. Also Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection against the United States*, vol. 2, 496–99.

⁹² Grynaviski, *America’s Middlemen*, 214.

involving property in Manila and an estate in Nueva Caceres worth, at his estimate, about \$60,000 that had apparently been decided against him.⁹³

His interventions in the newspapers that I analyzed, however, oblige us to consider his relevance in abetting Philippine aspirations. Under his signature, but more often under the nickname *Deus et Libertas*, he tried to argue in the Pacific British press and further away that Filipinos were prepared to rule themselves and proved so by fighting a civilized war against tyranny.⁹⁴ In particular, he highlighted the following points: the inaccuracies of the Spanish (and later, American) accounts of the war and their attempts to filter the truth; all the reasons Filipinos had to rebel; their capacity in organizing their struggle; and their chivalrous ways of waging war in contrast to their opponents.⁹⁵ Bray was, therefore, directly replying to Polavieja's own media discourse, which was delegitimizing the revolution and describing its members as savages who did not deserve to be treated under the civilized nations' rules of war.

He covered all these points in the first text I encountered signed under the *Deus et Libertas* pen name, which appeared in April 1897 in the *China Mail*. Given how well it represents the messages he would share during the following years, it is worth quoting at length. The article constituted a direct reply to Henry O'Shea's hagiographic account of the Spanish victory at Imus, published in the *China Gazette* on March 26. After denouncing O'Shea's links with the Spanish authorities and the consequent bias in his reports, Bray tried to prove his untruthfulness, stating that the troops O'Shea traveled with could not have got as close to Imus as they claimed due to the size of their boats

⁹³ Ragsdale, "Coping with the Yankees," 27.

⁹⁴ Among other proofs that *Deus et Libertas* is Howard W. Bray, see a letter directed to the Spanish Governor in Manila from the Spanish Consul in Hong Kong, José Navarro. He made such a connection between the two names while trying to reveal the authorship of an interview to Josefina Rizal, widow of the executed intellectual, published in the *China Mail* in June 1897. They call that newspaper "the mouthpiece of the Filipino subversives in the Crown Colony." See Ambeth R. Ocampo, *A Calendar of Rizaliana* (Manila: Anvil Publishing Inc., 1993), 166. Also, he signed one of his later articles in the *Free Press* with both names: "The Rumoured Philippino Rising at Ilo-Ilo," *Singapore Free Press*, May 11, 1898, 3.

⁹⁵ The texts we can be certain that Filipinos or Bray authored or handed in to the *China Mail* during that year are the following: *Deus et Libertas* [Howard W. Bray], "The Rebellion in the Philippines," Apr. 22, 1897, 3; "A Manila Newspaper on the Warpath," Mar. 24, 1897, 3; "The Widow of Dr Rizal," Mar. 29, 1897, 3; "The Late Dr Rizal," Jun. 6, 1897, 3. Moreover, it seems safe to assume that they were the translators of the following: "The Rebellion in the Philippines," Jul. 30, 1897, 3; "We have received...", Aug. 5, 1897, 2; "Veritas Prevalebit," [reprinted from *El País* (Madrid)], Aug. 18, 1897, 3.

and the short depth of the shore.⁹⁶ Given that the Filipino stronghold was out of the reach of the old canons of the Spanish navy and the tropical density blocked the view of the city from their position, the troops could not have caused the enormous damage they bragged about, nor could O'Shea have seen it.⁹⁷

Next, Bray tackled the prospects of the conflict and stated that the ultimate Filipino defeat at Imus “may temporarily check the rebellion, but will by no means suffocate it.” According to this author, “the seed of discontent against Spanish rule has taken too deep a root in fertile soil; the savage barbarity with which the war has been conducted, and unfortunate political prisoners treated [...] have only exasperated his compatriots.” As a consequence, they would keep fighting “until the haughty rule of Spain has been forever humiliated, and the blood of their martyrs avenged.”

In the rest of the text, Bray lamented how little the world knew had about the Filipinos and their struggle, due in part to the “lack of a well-organized staff of correspondents, like in Cuba, to keep the Western world properly informed of the true state of affairs,” which might induce the Great Powers to interfere. Retrieving past news, like Rafael Comenga's discourse, Bray argued that the Spaniards were going against civilization by repeating the abuses committed by religious authorities and encouraging the government's violence against the natives during the war. Also, he argued that with O'Shea's help, the Spanish authorities played “a game of bluff” and attempted to “mislead the public in believing the present rising is the outcome of racial hatred between the Whites and Asiatics.”

In contrast, Bray emphasized the natives' efforts in protecting all foreigners:

The rebels have done nothing to warrant such calumny. On the contrary, they have scrupulously respected all foreigners, and foreign property, even to the detriment of their own military operations, for which I am glad to see public

⁹⁶ Bray denounced those connections by citing an article from Manila's *El Comercio* praising O'Shea that the *China Mail* had already criticized here “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Jan. 7, 1897, 3.

⁹⁷ Deus et Libertas [Howard W. Bray], “The Rebellion in the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Apr. 22, 1897, 3. The following two pages also comment on this text.

testimony has been accorded them by the Chairman of a Hongkong Company having large interests at stake in the Philippines, in the immediate vicinity of which much fighting has taken place. They are waging a perfectly legitimate war against the Spaniards only, and for the same causes that in the beginning of the present century lost forever to the Spanish crown the possessions of Mexico, Guatemala, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile, and the present time will probably lose them Cuba. Can these, forsooth, be called racial wars? Were the previous risings in the Philippines ever denominated racial wars? No, the Spaniards have sown the wind, and they are now reaping the whirlwind, and any sentimental sympathy with them is misplaced.

Next, replying to the latest portraits of the Filipinos offered in the Hong Kong press, Bray went on to explain the benefits of over 350 years of Christianity. “Although under priestly control” they “had opened fountains of knowledge,” Filipinos no longer “tolerate[d] the old paternal, autocratic, intolerant Colonial policy of Spain.” Among other things, he described in detail how religious authorities denied people “from having a voice in their own government” and participating in the civil administration of their country that was instead filled with “hosts of useless and indigent civil employees, recruited in Spain as the nominees or clients of some politician or courtier with all the attendant abuses, and lack of previous training.”

After describing such outrages, Bray reminded readers that the Filipino aim to regain their liberty was the same as that which Spaniards themselves had fought for when they tried to free themselves from ancient Rome, and later, from seven centuries to drive the Moors out of Spain. Moreover, they were following “eminent political economists” who had “laid down the doctrine that no nation has any right to occupy the territory of others against their consent” and stated that “if a nation does so by violence, the conquered are perfectly within their rights in trying to throw the conquerors from their native soil.” Consequently, the Filipinos should not be “stigmatized as villains, cannibals, wild beasts, etc., for trying to give forcible effect to this doctrine.” In contrast, Bray made a very positive portrait of the Filipino race, referencing authors and establishing comparisons familiar to the British audience he was addressing:

Unfortunately the Philippine Islanders are too little known by the outside world, and for the matter of that by many of the foreign residents also, but the disparaging remarks of an irresponsible writer like Mr. O'Shea will not find much echo against the opinions of such authors as Wallace, Palgrave, Sir John Bowring and General Gordon. They are charming and courteous race, deferential without that cringing servility so common in the British Indian race. [...] Wallace refers to them as the fourth great Malay race, and the nearest akin in features, physique, and habits to the European race, of any native. They exhibit a reserve, diffidence, and even bashfulness, which is in some degree attractive; they are exceedingly polite and have all the quiet ease and dignity of the best-bred Europeans. That they are docile, and tractable, and easily governed, is evident from the fact of their Spanish masters having held the Islands for three and-a-half centuries, with only a handful of European troops. [...] General Gordon when referring to his Tagalog troops in the Taiping rebellion, spoke of them in highly eulogistic terms, placing them before the Japanese. 'They are a fine study body of fellows, faithful and longsuffering, bearing hardships without murmur, plucky and never losing heart in defeat. Such are the race the Spaniards affect to despise and insult!'

Finally, the author ended his defense of the Filipino cause by discrediting O'Shea's knowledge of the field, defending his expertise and impartiality about the matter, and appealing to that already mentioned sector of Spanish society that believed in the necessity of reforms.⁹⁸

From a close reading of this text, it can be concluded that, as a mouthpiece of the Filipino exiles in Hong Kong, Bray was extending the goals and efforts of the Propaganda Movement in this new phase in the development of Philippine nationalism and the regional press. As explained in Chapter 1, since the 1880s, the movement had tried to convince the Spanish public of all the reasons they had to demand reforms in the islands' administration: it denounced the grievances of both the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities. Also, members presented themselves capable of assuming

⁹⁸ Deus et Libertas [Howard W. Bray], "The Rebellion in the Philippines," *China Mail*, Apr. 22, 1897, 3.

more power in administering their islands as first rank Spanish citizens with representation in Parliament. Besides arguing that they possessed the necessary level of civilization in the Spanish press, they also tried to make that culture visible, spreading Philippine literature and art including works by painters Juan Luna and Félix Resurrección Hidalgo that won the 1884 Madrid Exposition of Fine Arts.

In this new context, Bray also tried to convince the British audience of all the grievances that justified the Filipino fight, again condemning Spain and underlining Filipino merits during the past years and the present war. However, as seen in the texts cited above, this press's perceptions of the natives were limited to stereotypes about the Asian population, and as Bray argued and the archives corroborate, some Spanish voices tried to distort the truth about what was happening in the islands.

As a response, he pointed to the Spanish authorities and O'Shea's dishonesty with crushing arguments such as showing the incoherence of his tales given the islands' geography. He also repeated all of the Spanish offenses complementing his explanation with shreds of evidence that the Hong Kong press had already published, like Comenga's discourse. Next, he tried to participate in the debate the local press had held about war methods and defended the excellent behavior of the Filipinos, referencing the report of a British company in the islands. Finally, he praised the natives' high level of civilization by repeating what previous British authorities had explained about them and clarified that he was not a filibuster, but rather a British expert on the situation, supported also by some Spaniards, entitled to talk due to his long years of living in the islands.

Besides seeing how directly he tried to defend the Filipino cause by responding to present debates and concerns of the British public, it is also worth noticing in this text how he managed to overlook sources that included natives talking about themselves. This fact, next to the evidence presented in the following chapters that Bray and two other British individuals were initially the principal source of Philippine points of view

in the Pacific-based British press, raises the question of how their whiteness may have impacted their reporting.⁹⁹

As predicted, after Filipino forces were defeated and lost the last territories under their control at the end of May, their struggle continued as a guerrilla war despite the Spanish declaration of victory. Although the amount of information about the matter diminished during the summer, both the *China Mail* and the *Singapore Free Press*, edited by William Graeme St. Clair, continued to comment on the Spanish censorship, the rebel's strength and evidence that war was still going on.¹⁰⁰ The *Free Press* did so by reprinting pieces from its Hong Kong contemporary and, during the fall, texts from Philippine sources.¹⁰¹

Its connection with Howard W. Bray seems to have begun when, on August 8, 1897, the newspaper reprinted a lengthy proclamation by Emilio Aguinaldo, in which the Filipino leader made clear their warlike attitude by praising the "second epoch" of their struggle for liberty and independence" and asked for the support of "all in whose breasts the sentiments of nobility palpitate" without making any "racial distinction."¹⁰² Touching most of the points that Bray had criticized in the aforementioned article, the writer of the text synthesized the Spanish administration's aggressions, how all those who had raised peaceful and lawful demands had been "executed or banished," which was the

⁹⁹ I disregard the possibility that they were excluded just for being an interested source because that press did reprint many other texts and interviews openly reflecting the Spanish and the American points of view of the conflicts.

¹⁰⁰ For example: "By a Private Letter..." *China Mail*, Sep. 9, 1897, 2; "It is Now a Year..." editorial, *China Mail*, Sep. 10, 1897, 2; "The Philippine Rebellion," *Singapore Free Press*, Sep. 22, 1897, 2; Deus et Libertas [Howard W. Bray], "The Philippines," *Singapore Free Press*, Oct. 2, 1897, 2; "What Little News..." *China Mail*, Nov. 11, 1897, 2; "The Philippines," *Singapore Free Press*, Oct. 5, 1897, 2; "During the past three months..." *China Mail*, Nov. 23, 1897, 2; John Foreman, "Spain's Colonial Policy," editorial, *China Mail* [reprinted from *Westminster's Review* (London)], Oct. 13, 1897, 2-3.

¹⁰¹ Until that point in time, the *Free Press* had been informing about the Philippine Revolution by mainly reprinting content from all the Hong Kong papers analyzed, telegrams, and private letters its editor received. Although it also pointed out that, ultimately, as Europeans they supported the White Race, it had also been critical against them by pointing out their censorship and the harsh methods they were employing. See all these points in their editorial "It Hardly Needed..." Dec. 18, 1896, 2. As examples of critical texts against Spain, see "The Philippine Rebellion," *Singapore Free Press*, Sep. 8, 1896, 6; "Notes from the Philippines," *Free Press*, Dec. 13, 1897, 3.

¹⁰² On Aguinaldo's change of rhetoric in the face of defeat from his initial ideas of an Asian race towards a more inclusive language that emphasized Philippine humanity, CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation*, 87-88.

reason why they were now fighting a war for civilization and culture and aspired to a lawful, just, and egalitarian government. After the chronicle, the translator, Bray himself, corroborated the good-will and legitimacy of the leader, his troops' respect for the laws of warfare, and their powerful position in the current hostilities to exhort the civilized nations to assist the natives to end Spanish rule.¹⁰³

On their part, the Spaniards kept paying attention to this press and tried to respond. For example, only a few days after Aguinaldo's proclamation had appeared in the *Free Press*, the Spanish consul in Singapore, Luis Marinas, directed a letter to the editor arguing that those arguments were "too old and frayed that did not deserve to be denied," but still contradicted them "just in case the object of the writer was distorting public opinion and make people believe that the insurrection continues."¹⁰⁴

Moreover, the consul informed the Governor General of the Philippines of the discussion in order to demand, as other Spanish diplomats had done, more information about the campaign to publish it in the local press and counteract damaging sources. Also, at least two correspondents from Manila, signing Veritas and Juan, wrote to the *China Mail* accusing it of publishing false adverse reports about the Spaniards and complaining that its informant was "no doubt one of the members of the Patriotic (!?) Directorate," proving again that this content widely circulated in the region.¹⁰⁵

All these exchanges demonstrate once again how this regional press became another contested space of the revolution. As a consequence of the regional awareness of the tenacious Philippine struggle, several newspapers interpreted the Pact of Biak-na-Bato of December 1897 as a sign that Filipino leaders had betrayed the rest of the population and accepted bribery. For example, the *Telegraph*, which was motivated by its

¹⁰³ "A Philippine Manifesto," *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 4, 1897, 2.

¹⁰⁴ Marinas informed the Governor General of the Philippines of the matter and sent him a copy of the text he published in the *Singapore Free Press*. See Luis Marinas to Gobernador General de las Islas Filipinas, August 9, 1897, NAP, Gobierno y Administración. 1.8. Expedientes Gubernativos, micro. 1108, leg. 2, doc. 31. Original in Spanish: "...argumentos son tan antiguos y gastados que no merecen la honra de ser refutados. Sin embargo, por si el objeto de tal remitente fuese el desvirtuar la pública opinión y hacer creer a las gentes que la insurreccion continua debo manifestar que no es cierto que Aguinaldo y sus doscientos o trescientos secuaces esten en las montañas de Luzón por su propia y libre voluntad.[sic]"

¹⁰⁵ Veritas [pseud.], "The Rebellion in the Philippines," Correspondence, *China Mail*, Nov. 30, 1897, 3; Juan, "The Philippines Rebellion," Correspondence, *China Mail*, Dec. 9, 1897, 3.

manifested racial solidarity with Spain and had been silent since May about the continued hostilities, made the most of the occasion to attack the leaders:

The Philippine revolutionists now in Hongkong have little to be proud of. They had a good cause, plenty of supporters in the Philippines, plenty of sympathy in the whole world, a fine country for a successful struggle, and they sold their cause and played treachery on their friends. They were bought out and are now escaping with their ill-gotten gains to live in ease on the pride of their brother's blood. We had at first a conviction that the insurrection was to some extent justified, that the natives were really oppressed and their fierce protests were based on truth; but after the way they have sold themselves, we cannot but doubt the accuracy of everything they have said from the first. It seems to have been a big barter from beginning to end, and the only thing which delayed the settlement was a pitiable haggle over the price. Presumably Polavieja, Aguinaldo & Co. arranged a tariff of charges, something after this style: Victory, plain... 8,5; Victory, sanguinary.... 10; Victory, heroic, with fancy frills and descriptive detail...20.¹⁰⁶

Interestingly, one of the articles critical of the Pact claimed that Filipinos wanted to use the money that Spaniards were offering in good faith to prepare the resumption of hostilities.¹⁰⁷ Howard W. Bray quickly prepared an interesting response arguing that the negotiations had not been “inglorious.” He defended the honor, good judgement, and courage of the leaders and, again, the civilized manner in which they had fought the war.”¹⁰⁸ Soon enough, the resumption of hostilities proved the writer to whom Bray replied was right.

¹⁰⁶ “The Philippine revolutionists...,” Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Jan. 4, 1898, 2.

¹⁰⁷ “The Philippine Peace,” *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 12, 1898, 3.

¹⁰⁸ Deus et Libertas [Howard W. Bray], “The Pacification of the Philippines,” *China Mail* [reprinted from *Singapore Free Press*], Feb. 2, 1898, 5.



Figure 8. The exiled leaders on their way to Hong Kong. Piñón, “Portrait of the Tagalog leaders in the train that took them to Dagupán, Pangasinan province,” after the signature of Biak-na-Bató, 1897. Photo in the Museo del Ejército –Inventory Number MUE-120068–, Madrid. Retrieved from Biblioteca Virtual de Defensa, <https://bibliotecavirtual.defensa.gob.es/>.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that between 1896 and 1897, the Hong Kong and Singapore press, aware of their audiences' interests in the Philippine Islands, paid close attention to the revolution. Although they all expected a prompt restoration of order under European rule, they fostered a rich debate about what should happen in the islands and, especially, about how Spain should fight against the insurgents. While some of them avoided criticisms and showed unconditional support for the harsh and quick suppression of the rebellion against European rule, others criticized their regime in the islands and the methods of war it was using to repress the insurgency, condemning them as unworthy of a civilized government.

Aware of that debate in this public sphere, Philippine voices and, most successfully, their sympathizer Howard W. Bray, tried to participate: they rephrased the arguments put forward by the Propaganda Movement about Philippine culture, repeated their reasons to fight, and also highlighted their good behavior in war. He managed to place such discourse in different newspapers; while at the beginning of the war it was the *Hong Kong Daily Press* that offered more detailed comments on the conflict but very few Philippine versions, in Spring 1897, the *China Mail* adopted that role and allocated much more space to their opinions. Finally, in the Fall of 1897, the *Singapore Free Press* became the main loudspeaker of the Filipino voices.

In the following two chapters, the dissertation moves on to show that Bray would defend the same arguments during the Spanish-American War and the Philippine-American War. It will explore how the analyzed papers reacted to that message when the hostilities resumed and the United States joined the war.

3

“This Part of the World Does Know”

The British Pacific Press’ Reaction to the 1898 War

As Chapter 2 proved, Britain’s Pacific press had been deeply interested in the Philippine Revolution. Given the significant British commercial interests in the islands, newspapers closely monitored the conflict and encouraged Spain to reform its administration in the archipelago to avoid further turmoil. They rarely questioned, however, the empire’s ultimate triumph in crashing the rebellion. Contrarily, the consequences for the Philippines of the Spanish-American War that quickly followed were much more uncertain and could impact the Pacific’s geopolitical order.

In a context of intense expansionist rivalries in Asia, when the prospects of Spain’s permanence in the Philippine Islands were severely damaged next to its Pacific Squadron in the Battle of Manila Bay, on May 1st, 1898, the future of the archipelago became a primary geopolitical concern for all the nations competing in the area. The U.S. claimed to fight Spain to protect its national interests in Cuba while liberating the island’s subjects from tyranny. It expanded the clash to the Pacific, allegedly, only to neutralize its enemy’s forces there. Although historical research has proved the previous American interest to expand to the area, in 1898, there was no guarantee that the U.S. would replace the old ruler after expelling it of its Asian territories.¹

Instead, that one of Britain’s rivals assumed the task and, along the way, undermined its control of the region appeared as a real possibility. As a result, the British Empire observed with exceptional interest the evolution of the war and the terms of the Peace Treaty that decided the fate of the Philippines. This chapter studies how its Pacific-based press reacted to those events.

¹ For classic accounts of this interpretation, see Thomas J. McCormick, *China Market; America’s Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967) or Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

1. Choosing Empire: Great Britain and its Media side with the U.S.

During the last third of the 19th century, the British Empire's preeminence was in danger. In the Asia-Pacific region, it was the power with more commercial and financial influences in China, and it controlled key ports —like Hong Kong and Singapore— and a network of bases, which protected its commercial routes with India. Several rival powers, however, aimed to extend their influence in the region.²

As a result, Britain took several actions to protect its hegemony. According to Nicholas Tarling, among others were imperialist interventions and consolidation in Malaya between 1870 and 1910. Along the same lines, Britain had kept an eye on their interests in the Philippines, with a strategic situation, when other powers, especially Germany, had attempted to win more influence in the archipelago.³

This regional imperial contest reached a peak when the center of all powers' interests, China, achieved its most vulnerable situation. While Great Britain had forced that country to open to international trade, China's 1895 defeat in the Sino-Japanese War marked the beginning of the scramble for influence. Besides the resulting Japanese penetration, also Germany, Russia, and France aimed to secure their spheres of control and, through loans to cover the war indemnity and railway and mining concessions, they strengthened their relation with the Qing dynasty.⁴

Seeing its Open-Door policy menaced, Great Britain searched for allies in the region. British authorities tried to negotiate with Russia, Germany, and the United States, without obtaining any formal alliance. In particular, in March 1898, the Foreign Office tried to get the U.S.'s guarantee of support to avoid any powers' attempts to restrict the Chinese trade. Washington D.C. replied it would stick to its traditional policy of not

² Christopher A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1790–1914* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 227–33.

³ Nicholas Tarling, *Imperialism in Southeast Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 145–49.

⁴ P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688–2015* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 398–407.

participating in European alliances, especially at a time when tension against Spain for Cuba was rising.⁵

This context caused that, when the Spanish-American war finally broke, all competitors showed great interest not only in the Caribbean, apparently, the center of the conflict, but also in its Pacific scenario.⁶ While Spain tried to secure European support and won the non-binding sympathy of, especially, the Catholic nations, Great Britain proclaimed an official policy of neutrality that benefited the U.S.' designs and encouraged an understanding between the Anglo-Saxon powers.⁷

The reasons behind that support are framed in a wider context of Anglo-American Rapprochement, begun in 1895. Both nations improved their social and diplomatic relations in what Courtney Johnson called a pattern of implicit strategic cooperation on two decisive endeavors: "first, the United States shared with the British Empire a global grand strategy of joint guardianship over the world's oceans;" second, "the two powers jointly sponsored an emerging system of international legal authority capable of restraining alterations in the territorial statu quo."⁸

⁵ M^a Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, "Observing the Imperial Transition: British Naval Reports on the Philippines, 1898–1901," *Diplomatic History* 40, no. 2 (2016): 225, <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhu106>.

⁶ For an overview of the interest its Pacific scenario raised, see Rosario de la Torre del Río, "Filipinas y el reparto de Extremo Oriente en la crisis de 1898," in *El Extremo Oriente Ibérico. Investigaciones históricas: metodología y estudio de la cuestión* (Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional y Centro de Estudios Históricos del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Históricas, 1989), 509–21; Tarling, *Imperialism in Southeast Asia*, 143–49. Although my focus is on British reactions, there is ample bibliography on other powers' press that testifies how mediatic the war was. See, for example, Sylvia L Hilton and Steve J.S. Ickringill, eds., *European Perceptions of the Spanish-American War of 1898* (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 1999); Paul J. Welch Behringer, "Images of Empire: Depictions of America in Late Imperial Russian Editorial Cartoons," *Russian History* 45, no. 4 (2018): 279–318, <https://doi.org/10.1163/18763316-04504001>; José Girón Garrote, ed., *España y Estados Unidos en 1898: La guerra a través de la prensa europea* (Oviedo: Universidad de Oviedo, 2018).

⁷ For a detailed analysis of the Foreign Office relations with Spain during the Spanish-American War see Rosario de la Torre, *Inglaterra y España en 1898* (Madrid: Eudema, 1989). For Spain's efforts to secure European support, see, by the same author, "1895–1898: Inglaterra y la búsqueda de un compromiso internacional para frenar la intervención norteamericana en Cuba," *Hispania* LVII, no. 196 (1997): 515–49, <https://doi.org/10.3989/hispania.1997.v57.i196.685>.

⁸ Courtney Johnson, "Alliance Imperialism' and Anglo-American Power after 1898," in *Endless Empire. Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy, Josep M. Fradera and Stephen Jacobson (Madison, WI: The University of Madison Wisconsin Press, 2012), 122. The literature on the diplomatic Anglo-American relations is very extensive. Among those focused on the context of the Spanish-American War, see Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898–1903*; Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895–1903*; Neale, *Britain and American Imperialism 1898–1900*; Perkins,

During the Spanish-American War, that translated in not so veiled transgressions of the official neutrality, some of which involved the Prime Minister himself. In 1898, Lord Salisbury had reached an agreement for a 99-year lease of Hong Kong and Mirs Bay, where the American Navy needed to repair and stock its Pacific squadron. To avoid breaking the terms of neutrality by accommodating one of the belligerents and, at the same time, avoid expelling the U.S., the British government delayed the formal transfer of sovereignty, so Mirs Bay remained under Chinese control.

A similar collaboration took place in Egypt, under British occupation. There, the U.S. consul-general requested the British authorities to prevent any Spanish war ships proceeding to the Philippines from stocking up on supplies in Port Said or Suez. As Robert Neale explained, despite the Spanish ambassador's complaints, the British consul-general persuaded "the Egyptian government to order the Spanish fleet to leave Egyptian ports at the conclusion of the twenty-four hours' stay permitted by international law, and he sought continually to prevent the Spanish admiral from loading any more coal than was necessary to enable his fleet to reach the nearest port of his country or some nearer destination."⁹

British officials in Hong Kong and Singapore also safeguarded U.S. operations in the area. For example, they intentionally allowed diplomatic relations in their ports between American officials and Filipino revolutionaries, or the latter's provision of arms, to face the shared Spanish enemy. In spite of the Philippine colonial authorities' complaints, London did not interfere in the officials in Asia's management, who kept favoring U.S. actions. As M^a Dolores Elizalde pointed out, "as late as August 1898 Salisbury sent specific instructions asking British officials to act with more care toward the spirit of neutrality, and only then were British representatives in Asia careful to follow that course of action."¹⁰

The Great Rapprochement. For a recent review of the state of the game, see Alan P. Dobson, "The Evolving Study of Anglo-American Relations: The Last 50 Years," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 18 (2020): 415–33, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-020-00060-z>.

⁹ Neale, *Britain and American Imperialism 1898-1900*, 49–55.

¹⁰ Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, "Observing the Imperial Transition," 226. Besides Elizalde's article, for a longer narration of both episodes and other expressions of British support, see Neale, *Britain and American Imperialism 1898–1900*, 35–80.

While the official policy of not disturbing any potential Anglo-American friendship had tried to be subtle, in Great Britain public opinion almost unanimously supported the U.S. action against Spain in the Caribbean and the Pacific and its expansion in both territories.¹¹ According to Geoffrey Seed, British media support was due to a combination of emotional, rational, and practical reasons.¹²

The most relevant was a sense of racial affinity between both Atlantic sides of the Anglo-Saxon brotherhood, cemented by linguistic, historical, social, and cultural bonds.¹³ Many British commentators defended that with such common heritage came a natural desire for expansion and compelled Americans to share with Great Britain the mission of uplifting savage races and granting that other powerful nations embraced “Anglo-Saxon senses of justice and honor.” Consequently, in much British press, Americans appeared as “fellow-labourers in the work of the better ordering of the world” rather than as colonial rivals.¹⁴

¹¹ Neale, *Britain and American Imperialism 1898–1900*, 112. As Elizalde points out, the first studies about British diplomacy during the Spanish-American War were mostly based on London press’ analysis. The support it showed for the American expansion was such that most historians argued Salisbury’s government was the instigator of McKinley’s decision to annex the islands. Later historiography, like Neal’s contributions, significantly nuanced the actual relations between both countries, but those early accounts serve as evidences of British public opinion’s clear support to the U.S. M^a Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, “De nación a imperio: la expansión de los Estados Unidos por el Pacífico durante la Guerra Hispano-Norteamericana de 1898,” *Hispania* 56, no. 196 (1997): 556, <https://doi.org/10.3989/hispania.1997.v57.i196.686>.

¹² Geoffrey Seed, “British Reactions to American Imperialism Reflected in Journals of Opinion 1898–1900,” *Political Science Quarterly* 73, no. 2 (1958): 254–72; Seed, “British Views of American Policy in the Philippines Reflected in Journals of Opinion, 1898–1907,” *Journal of American Studies* 2, no. 1 (1968): 49–64. For a more detailed account, see Iain Donald’s unpublished dissertation, whose analysis includes Scottish newspapers: “Scotland, Great Britain and the United States: Contrasting Perceptions of the Spanish-American War and American Imperialism, c. 1895–1902.” (Ph.D. diss., University of Aberdeen, 1999).

¹³ There is a vast bibliography on racial and ethnic identity basing the Anglo-American Rapprochement. Among others, see Stuart Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895–1904* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981); Anna Maria Martellone, “In the Name of Anglo-Saxondon, for Empire and for Democracy: The Anglo-American Discourse, 1880–1920,” in *Reflections on American Exceptionalism*, ed. David K. Adams and A. Van Minnen Cornelis (Keele: Ryburn Publishing/Keele University Press, 1994), 83–96; Serge Ricard and Hélène Christol, eds., *Anglo-Saxonism in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1899–1919* (Aix-en-Provence: Université de Provence, 1991); Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons;” Srdjan Vucetic, *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of Racialized Identity in International Relations* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). For a recent overview of this literature, see Clive Webb, “More Colours than Red, White and Blue: Race, Ethnicity and Anglo-American Relations,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 18 (2020): 443–46, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-020-00055-w>.

¹⁴ Seed, “British Reactions to American Imperialism,” 260.

Secondly, the press considered expansion the natural evolution of American policy. It argued that the country's history had demonstrated isolationism was only a phase, and growth beyond their current frontiers was necessary to solve existing social and economic problems and gaining international prestige and influence.¹⁵ Finally, observers also pointed out potential practical reasons to support the U.S. during the Spanish-American War. As their government, they hoped America's new foreign policy departure would offer opportunities for mutual assistance of the two English-speaking powers. The press implied they would collaborate to advance both countries' expansionist policies and security against hostile states.

As an example, they explicitly expected cooperation in China to maintain the Open-Door policy.¹⁶ This last argument was especially relevant when discussing the specific matter of the future of the Philippines. With very few exceptions, newspapers regarded the prospect of establishing American sovereignty in the archipelago with sympathy. The press repeated the strategic advantages of the U.S. presence in the Pacific, like the need to prevent the aggrandizement of its rivals in the region.

Popular support for annexation, however, was principally compelled on "grounds of moral duty" due to "remoteness of the archipelago and the supposed primitiveness of the Filipinos." The expulsion of Spain had created a void of government and, according to Seed, "no one suggested that the possibility of a satisfactory Filipino administration was worth serious consideration."¹⁷ As a result, Americans had to, citing Rudyard Kipling's famous poem, "take up the White Man's Burden" and civilize those less advanced peoples. Not only would they be much better administrators than the Spaniards but, due to their Anglo-Saxon heritage, using the *Spectator's* words, they would do it "so much better that any other power except ourselves."¹⁸

¹⁵ Seed, "British Reactions to American Imperialism," 256.

¹⁶ Seed, 265; Seed, "British Views of American Policy in the Philippines," 28.

¹⁷ Seed, "British Reactions to American Imperialism," 261. For many more evidences of the British press' opinions about Filipinos, see Donald, "Scotland, Great Britain and the United States," 298–305.

¹⁸ Seed, "British Views of American Policy in the Philippines," 50. For an analysis of Rudyard Kipling's "The White Man's Burden" representativeness of British public opinion on the Philippine Question, see Susan K. Harris, "Kipling's 'The White Man's Burden' and the British Newspaper Context, 1898–1899," *Comparative American Studies. An International Journal* 5, no. 3 (2007): 243–63,

The British media constantly referenced its own imperial expertise, especially in India and Egypt, which entitled them to urge the U.S. to “model itself on the mother country.” Despite writers’ generalized confidence in America’s ultimate success in the Philippines, they expressed specific concerns about its prospective experience.¹⁹ Knowing that their texts participated in a transatlantic dialogue and that similar ideas of Anglo-Saxon brotherhood were also discussed in North-American publications, as images 9 and 10 exemplify, some commentators offered constructive criticisms and advice about how to administer the islands.²⁰

<https://doi.org/10.1179/147757007X224025>; Harris, “‘The White Man’s Burden,’ the Philippines, and the Anglo-American Alliance,” in *God’s Arbiters. Americans and the Philippines. 1898–1902* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 129–53. On the diverse reactions to the poem in the U.S., see Gretchen Murphy, *Shadowing the White Man’s Burden: U.S. Imperialism and the Problem of the Color Line* (New York: New York University Press, 2010); John Lee, “King Demos and His Laureate: Rudyard Kipling’s ‘The White Man’s Burden,’ Transatlanticism, and the Newspaper Poem,” *Media History* 20, no. 1 (2014), 51–66, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13688804.2013.872414>; Laura Jeffries, “‘It Makes a Fellow Feel Responsible!’: Anglo-American Imperial Vistas and ‘The White Man’s Burden’ in *McClure’s Magazine*, 1898–99,” *Book History* 23 (2020): 169–205, doi:10.1353/bh.2020.0012.

¹⁹ Harris explains these dialogues and how the British tried to set an example in *Gods Arbiters*, 129–53.

²⁰ Among the extensive literature on British and American intellectual and social dialogues, for some focusing on the media and journalism contacts of the period, see, Sedgwick, *The Atlantic Monthly, 1857–1909*; Wiener and Hampton, *Anglo-American Media Interactions*; Joel H. Wiener, *The Americanization of the British Press, 1830–1914. Speed in the Age of Transatlantic Journalism* (Basingtoke: Palgrave, 2011).



Figure 9. Signs of the Anglo-Saxon Brotherhood reunion. “After many years” shows Columbia and Britannia shaking hands in the context of the “Eastern Question” and the Spanish-American War, illustrating the mentioned perception that both conflicts reunited both Anglo-Saxon countries for common interests. Louis Dalrymple, “After many years,” illustration published in New York Keppler & Schwarzmann in *Puck* magazine on June 15, 1898. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, Washington D.C., <https://www.loc.gov/item/2012647573/>.



Figure 10. “The White Man’s Burden.” This illustration, entitled after Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem, portrays John Bull leading Uncle Sam in their shared mission of “uplifting savage peoples” towards civilization. Victor Gillam, “The White Man’s Burden,” cartoon published in *Judge*, vol. 36, no. 911, on April, 1899. Photograph courtesy of the Ohio State University, Billy Ireland Cartoon Library and Museum, <https://hdl.handle.net/1811/e1ef7288-5afa-4170-b78d-c02d84f221ec>.²¹

²¹ For more examples of illustrations transmitting the same ideas, see Ignacio et al., *The Forbidden Book*. For a recent critical analysis of these illustrations’ message and their evolution, see Stephen Tuffnell, “‘The International Siamese Twins’. The Iconography of Anglo-American Inter-Imperialism,” in *Comic Empires: Imperialism in Cartoons, Caricature, and Satirical Art*, ed. Richard Scully and Andrekos Varnava (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019), 92–133.

They showed especial interest on two aspects: its relation to its inhabitants, and the Civil Structure they had to build. On the one hand, they exhorted the U.S. to reproduce their “principled imperialism,” “committed to interventions that would benefit both the home country and the colonial themselves.”²² Although the colonized would end up benefiting from that rule, they could initially present resistance and hostility. Therefore, North Americans had to adopt a paternalistic and strong attitude, and clarify that self-government was not a possibility any time near.

Along this line, according to Seed, one of the abundant examples of the orthodox view of the “unfitness” of the Philippines’ inhabitants for the systems of government appropriate to the Anglo-Saxon nations were warnings that the American government was insufficiently appreciative “of the difference in governmental mental aptitude between the Filipinos and the people of the United States.” During the following years, they blamed many of the colony’s problems on the “ridiculous” and “dangerous” assumption that its citizens were fitted for democratic government and the consequent attempts to make them participate in that rule.²³

On the other hand, they debated about whether Americans would make the most of that new colonial adventure, which could be not only convenient for the colonized, but also “purifying for the colonizers.”²⁴ To establish a strong, stable, honest, transparent, and uncorrupted structure to handle the colonies, British observers cautioned that the U.S. needed to improve its domestic governance by addressing endemic problems of its political culture, like nepotism and corruption. To achieve it, some British commentators suggested different solutions, like establishing a tradition “that saw training sons for service to the state as an honor” or offering good salaries for the members of the Civil Services.²⁵

²² Harris, *God’s Arbiters*, 132.

²³ Seed, “British Views of American Policy in the Philippines,” 52.

²⁴ Harris, “‘The White Man’s Burden’ and the British Newspaper Context,” 258.

²⁵ Harris, 257. Also Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons,” 1347–52.

As years went by and British designs for the American Philippines did not materialize, its press' interest declined and excitement turned into outspoken disillusionment.²⁶ We can conclude, however, that during 1898 the support for the American cause was almost unanimous in Great Britain.

Like in London, the press based in Hong Kong and Singapore indisputably sided with the U.S. from the first moment a confrontation with Spain appeared as a possibility. Although these newspapers had informed about the tension between the two countries since much earlier, it naturally received the utmost attention during the weeks leading to the declaration of war, on April 25, 1898.

In almost all the editorials and chronicles about the disputes leading to the outbreak of hostilities, and during the conflict itself, the analyzed press depicted Spain as a decrepit empire condemned to perish. Following the arguments some of them had exposed during the first phase of the Philippine Revolution, they criticized its attitudes and morals, its colonial maladministration, and its abuses upon the local population.²⁷ Even the *Hong Kong Telegraph*, who had fiercely defended the continuity of the old administration in the archipelago during the previous years, supported its defeat when challenged by the United States.

As soon as April 9, the *Telegraph* compared Spain with Don Quixote, "a nobly-born, high spirit, lovable man, with the instincts of a gentleman, the delicacy of a lady, and the pride of the devil himself." The writer argued that "the proof of an administration is in its net results," and added that "the net results of Spanish systems are discontent, poverty, rebellion, on every side." Therefore, the system of colonial administration of this "old, shaky, blind, deaf, toothless, rheumatic, impoverished, threadbare and starving" man was an evil that needed to be removed.²⁸

²⁶ Seed, "British Views of American Policy in the Philippines," 60-64; Kramer, "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons," 1344-1348; Donald, "Scotland, Great Britain and the United States," 320-334

²⁷ See, among others, "The War," *China Mail* (Hong Kong), Apr. 25, 1898, 3; "How Spain Exploits the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Singapore Free Press*], May 14, 1898, 2; "Dulce Est Pro Patria Mori," *Singapore Free Press & Mercantile Advertiser* [henceforth, *Singapore Free Press*], May 3, 1898, 3.

²⁸ Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Apr. 9, 1898, 2.

Only a few observers manifested support to the continuation of the Spanish regime and defended it in the press. The most notable was the British merchant John Dill Ross, a frequent contributor to the *Singapore Free Press* based in Labuan, North Borneo. In a series of three articles and a letter to the editor published between July and August 1898, he defended that the Spaniards had “neglected their press quite as much as their artillery.” Because of that, he wished to complement the current one-side perception of a very intricate story by indicating the implications of Spain’s defeat to British interests.²⁹

Besides showing surprise to the Spanish military drawbacks and defending its generals, “from whom I saw were keen intelligent men” and in command of troops that “looked efficient enough,” Ross defended that both under American or German influences, the Philippines would be placed under hostile tariffs. Not only “wherever the American goes his anti-British tariff follows him,” but he also reminded the excited pro-Americans the “threats, insults, and hostile legislation of so many years—from the days of the precious Alabama job, down to just before the outbreak of the present war.” Because of that, he warned that “time alone will prove the sincerity of the sudden friendship of Jonathan for John Bull,” and recommended caution.³⁰

As for the Filipinos, Ross alerted that Englishmen in the region considered them incapable of governing themselves even under an American protectorate and complained that “the bare idea of having the horrors of a South American republic enacted within twenty-four hours of the coast of British Borneo is intolerable.”³¹ Along the same lines, and indicating the outreach of Filipino propaganda, in another of his

²⁹ John Dill Ross, “The Future of the Philippines: From a British point of View,” To the Editor, *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 20, 1898, 2. Dill Ross was a regular contributor to the *Free Press* and wrote different series of articles focused on Far Eastern Affairs, like “From Moscow to Vladivostok,” “Of the pleasures of Pulp Papan,” or “Journey to Singapore,” re-edited in 1898 as a book entitled *The Capital of a Little Empire. A Descriptive Study of a British Crown Colony in the Far East*. His most famous work, however, is his two-volume book *Sixty Years: Life and Adventure in the Far East* (1911). Other exceptional cases of support for the Spanish cause are: Veritas [pseud.], “The Philippine Mining Co.,” Correspondence, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Apr. 15, 1898, 3; Enrique Martinez Magdan, “Admiral Montojo,” Correspondence, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, May 28, 1898, 2; “An Opinion on the Prospect of the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from the *China Gazette* (Shanghai)], Apr. 28, 1898, 2.

³⁰ Dill Ross, “The Future of the Philippines.” Also, John Dill Ross, “Las Islas Filipinas,” *Singapore Free Press* (Weekly), Jul. 21, 1898, 4.

³¹ Dill Ross, “The Future of the Philippines.”

texts he pointed out that the British residents in the Philippines, “and these gentlemen are surely in a position to say something on these matters,” distrusted Howard W. Bray, as seen in Chapters 1 and 2, one of the Comité Revolucionario Filipino’s press representatives that had already defended their cause during the revolution.³²

In addition, Ross commented that the accounts of the Spanish tortures and mistreatment of the population, especially by the friars, were overdrawn. Repeating the praises to General Ramón Blanco’s policy that some Hong Kong press had written during 1896 and 1897, he considered that had his “wise and human policy” been applied, the revolution would have died. Moreover, he added that the insurgents were now killing not only the friars but also innocent women and children.³³ For all of this, Ross concluded: “the best thing for the whole world is that the Philippines remain under the Spanish flag, with a reformed administration, under such guarantees as might be found practicable.”³⁴

This merchant had a deep knowledge of the country and close relations with its authorities and inhabitants, and it seems safe to assume that he was well aware of their opinions. In addition, the last chapter already showed the existence of a British community totally skeptical about a potential Philippine Republic who had tried to ease the criticisms of the Hong Kong press.³⁵ In addition, some of Dill Ross’ concerns, especially, the application of restrictive tariffs in the Philippines, became common after the war fever.³⁶

This evidence of a British community in Asia that sided with Spain finds further support on interpretations like Nicholas Tarling’s, who stated that “the British would have accepted, even preferred, the status quo.” Only when the expulsion of the Spanish rule became evident, they decided that U.S. rule was preferable to German rule, as they dismissed the possibility of native independence and did not wish to intervene

³² Dill Ross, “Las Islas Filipinas.”

³³ Dill Ross, “The Future of the Philippines.”

³⁴ Dill Ross, “Las Islas Filipinas.”

³⁵ See Chapter 2 of this dissertation, 91–106.

³⁶ Seed, “British Views of American Policy in the Philippines,” 60–64.

themselves unless it was essential to defend her interests.³⁷ Because of all of this, it is pertinent to declare that probably more British shared John Dill Ross' opinion, and that such resigned support towards the United States could have been common.

Despite that, other considerations, like the early certainty that Spain would lose the war or their own officials' support to the American war effort, made that such point of view was an exception in the studied press during the outbreak of the war.³⁸ Although the examined newspapers recognized the historical links between Great Britain and the Spanish-ruled Philippines, most of them backed their "American Cousins."³⁹ In Hong Kong, so open was their advocacy that the British consul in Manila warned that their harsh criticism of the Spaniards put in danger their countrymen in the archipelago. He wrote in a letter: "there is a very bitter feeling against Great Britain having thrown in as it is supposed, her lot with the United States, and the Hong Kong press which comes over here and is translated into Spanish does not improve matters."⁴⁰

Their expressions of support often included references to the British and American shared Anglo-Saxon identity. They drew historical links in racial and cultural terms and implied future collaborations to achieve alleged shared goals. A clear example was the chronicle about the Battle of Cavite that Thomas H. Reid wrote for the *China Mail* and the *New York Herald*. His *laudatio* of Dewey's fleet, his unique show of Anglo-Saxon pride, and his use of yellow journalism techniques, such as graphic depictions and

³⁷ Tarling, *Imperialism in Southeast Asia*, 148.

³⁸ As examples of the confidence of an American Victory, see "It will be seen...", editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Apr. 28, 1898, 2; "President McKinley's...", Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Apr. 13, 1898, 2; "Spain and the United States," *China Mail*, Apr. 21, 1898, 3. The *Free Press*, by contrast, was not as convinced of the American power superiority. See "The march towards...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Apr. 21, 1898, 2. Interestingly, another of the few exceptions that defended that the U.S. would have a hard time was written by the *China Gazette*, edited by Henry O'Shea, as seen in Chapter 2, hired by the Spanish colonial authorities during the revolution to spread a positive view of them. See "An Opinion on the Prospects of the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *China Gazette* (Shanghai)], Apr. 28, 1898, 2.

³⁹ For examples of British support for the U.S., see "And the good...", Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Apr. 2, 1898, 2; "The War," *China Mail*, Apr. 26, 1898, 3; "It will be seen...", editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Apr. 28, 1898, 2; "Anglo-American Interests," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, May 2, 1898, 2; An Unbiased Foreigner, "The Anglo-American Alliance," *China Mail*, May 3, 1898, 3.

⁴⁰ Nicholas Cushner, "British Consular Dispatches and the Philippine Independence Movement, 1872-1901," *Philippine Studies* 16, no. 3 (1968): 524, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42720303>.

exaggerations, qualified him for working as a special correspondent of both the British press and publications from William R. Hearst's and Joseph Pulitzer's New York:

On Sunday, I witnessed the total eclipse, the annihilation of the Spanish squadron, the finishing touch by Commodore Dewey of the work begun by England upwards of 300 years ago, when the great Armada for the invasion of England was harried and destroyed by the wrath of God and the hand of man. There was something appropriate to the fact that one of the most effective ships in the United States squadron bore the name of *Raleigh*, one of the first founders of Great Britain's colonial empire, [...]: and however we may regret the decline and decay of a once powerful rival, the first great Colonizing Power of modern times, it is impossible to withhold our admiration for the splendid courage of our American cousins.- the pluck, dash and fighting powers of a youthful Republic, founded on the principles of liberty and equality, [...] and whose sons, a branch of the great Anglo-Saxon race speak the same language as ourselves - a nation "sib" to us in every respect, a nation with whom Great Britain might well cement a compact for the preservation of peace and the peaceful development of trade and commerce and all that makes for the enlightenment and happiness of the general community.⁴¹

In the rest of his chronicle, Reid kept celebrating how now that the U.S. had decided to assume its role in World Affairs, both sides of the Anglo-Saxon brotherhood would overcome their "petty points of difference" and work together.⁴² As he made clear in the

⁴¹ From Our Own Correspondent [henceforth, Correspondent], "The War," *China Mail*, May 13, 1898, 3. This kind of exalted reporting complements the conclusions reached by Richard Fulton's study regarding the level of sensationalism and jingoism displayed by American and British journalists in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. According to Fulton, British journalists working for British media were much more moderate than American ones working for an American public. On this occasion, Reid was already writing with both audiences in mind. See Richard D. Fulton, "Sensational War Reporting and the Quality Press in Late Victorian Britain and America," in *Anglo-American Media Interactions*, ed. Wiener and Hampton, 11–31.

⁴² Another text that talked about the anti-British feeling among significant parts of the population, especially in Irish-American and German-American communities, is Unbiased Britisher, "The Anglo-American Alliance," Correspondence, *China Mail*, May 5, 1898, 3. To learn more about it see, among others, Edward P. Crapol, "From Anglophobia to Fragile Rapprochement: Anglo-American Relations in the Early Twentieth Century," in *Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I, 1900–1924*, ed. Hans-Jürgen Schröder (Providence, RI: Berg, 1993), 13–31; Stephen Tuffnell, "'Uncle Sam Is to Be Sacrificed': Anglophobia in Late Nineteenth-Century Politics and

last sentences cited, such kinship would involve the spread of civilization and the defense of free trade (an apparent reference to the China Question).⁴³ Bearing in mind the British metropolitan press's comments surrounding the Spanish-American War outbreak, texts like Thomas H. Reid's one published in Hong Kong and Singapore allow us to conclude that both public spheres shared many ideas about the conflict.

Another clear example of those arguments appeared in an opinion article the *Singapore Free Press* reprinted on June 22 from the *Times of India*. It applauded the U.S. abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine and its jump to external action in the search for new markets, bearing the "burden of opening up new territories to Western commerce" and taking its place among "the great exporting countries of the world to which its position and its resources entitle it." The writer celebrated that, as a consequence, "Great Britain would not be the solitary champion of free markets in the Chinese Empire" and, in a context where the future of the Philippines was still not defined, it stated that the United States would accept to fulfill his responsibilities towards them and rule the islands.

According to this writer, to do it, they could look at the example of Great Britain, which ought to be "sufficient to assure American citizens that communities in an intermediate stage of political development can be included in an Empire, but excluded from the full stages of citizenship, without endangering the liberties of the people of the mother country." Finally, it defended that after accepting those responsibilities, they would fulfill, in the Far East, "the requirements which its own interests press upon it, no less than upon the other great half of the Anglo-Saxon race."⁴⁴

Culture," *American Nineteenth Century History* 12, no. 1 (2011): 77–99, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14664658.2011.559749>.

⁴³ For more examples of the confidence in the region's press that U.S. expansion would bring commercial and strategical benefits, see "The British Lien on the Philippines," *China Mail*, Apr. 21, 1898, 3; "The question whether...", Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Apr. 1, 1898, 2; "In the interest...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 22, 1898, 2. This latter was a direct reply to John Dill Ross' arguments about a potential American restrictive tariff policy.

⁴⁴ "The Outward Movement of the United States," *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *Times of India*], Jun. 22, 1898, 3.

Interestingly, after reprinting the whole text, William St. Clair, editor of the *Free Press*, made a brief but eloquent correction. While expressing the impossible alternatives for the future of the Philippines, the author from the *Times of India* had stated: “neither by character not by experience are the insurgent leaders fitted to control great island territories which have never known the advantages of enlightened rule.” He added that “to hand the Philippines over to General Aguinaldo and his associates would be to plunge them into a welter of semi-barbarism, besides which even the present political-ecclesiastical régime would shine by comparison.” As we have seen, that was the most common perception in the metropolitan press, shaped by a racial ideology that rationalized the Anglo-Saxon domination of other peoples. However, St. Clair added a discrete asterisk to the sentence to point out at the end of the article: “That is just nonsense.”⁴⁵ The following section explores how St. Clair and other newspapermen’s proximity to the conflict challenged the metropolitan perception of the Filipino revolutionaries.

2. The Filipino Civilization Campaign and its Observers between April and August 1898

As seen in the previous chapters, during 1897, Filipinos had tried to justify their insurrection and highlight how they followed the rules of civilized warfare to fight Spain in the Hong Kong and Singapore press. During that first phase of the revolution, the media in both cities considered the Filipinos unprepared for self-government and dismissed the viability of a native republic even if Spain was defeated. Notwithstanding, as a result of Filipino approaches, the newspapers most sympathetic to their cause recognized the legitimacy of their demands and praised their organization and resistance facing the empire’s arms.

During the 1898 War, the same proximity to the theatre of operations and their connection to revolutionary propagandists also shaped the regional journals’ portrait of Filipinos. Although the civilization campaign earned drastically different levels of sympathy, all the papers analyzed acknowledged to some extent the Filipino

⁴⁵ “The Outward Movement of the United States.”

nationalists' power to influence the future of the archipelago. Some editors even reproduced many of the basic ideas of the Hong Kong Junta communication strategy. They challenged many prejudices about the indigenous' savagery that appeared in the United Kingdom and the U.S. media.

The *Singapore Free Press* was the newspaper Filipino voices impacted the most, just as it had been during the fall of 1897. When hostilities resumed at the eve of the Spanish-American War, instead of depicting it as a bilateral collision between a rising and a decaying empire, as much metropolitan press would do, the *Free Press* maintained Filipinos at the center of the conflict.

Since its outbreak on April 21, until the fall of Manila, on August 13, it published news and chronicles that pointed at the locals leading role in fighting against Spain and to how they were the ones occupying most of the territory during the Americans' lengthy wait for reinforcements.⁴⁶ Occasionally, it shared reports openly attributed to Filipino sources.⁴⁷ Howard W. Bray also kept signing opinion articles about the Spanish cruelties that legitimized the fight for liberation, similar to those seen in chapter 2.⁴⁸ Finally, also the editor of the newspaper, William St. Clair, started publishing editorials praising the anti-colonial struggle and reproducing most of the impressions its leaders wanted to convey.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ As examples of news that praise Filipino advances against Spain independently from the U.S. in the *Singapore Free Press*, see "Notes from the Philippines," Apr. 27, 1898, 3; "The Destruction of Cebu," Apr. 29, 1898, 3; Howard Bray/Deus et Libertas, "Rumoured Philippino Rising at Ilo-Ilo," May 11, 1898, 3; "The Philippine Rebellion," [based on an article from *La Oceanía* (Manila)], Apr. 30, 1898, 3; "British Subjects in Manila," May 3, 1898, 2; "Destruction of Spanish Squadron at Manila," May 6, 1898, 2; "The Insurgents in the Philippines," Jun. 16, 1898, 3; "The following observations....," Jun. 18, 1898, 2; "Fall of Manila at Hand," Jun. 18, 1898, 2; "The War," Jun. 24, 1898, 3; "Aguinaldo's Action," Aug. 1, 1898, 2; "The Philippino[sic] Revolution," Aug. 19, 1898, 2.

⁴⁷ Forwarded to Consul-General Spencer Pratt by General Emilio Aguinaldo's Secretary, "The Philippino Successes Near Manila," *Singapore Free Press*, Jun. 15, 1898, 3; "From a Philippino Source," *Singapore Free Press*, May 9, 1898, 2.

⁴⁸ For Howard W. Bray's signed texts in the *Singapore Free Press*, see "The Philippine Rebellion," May 3, 1898, 3; "The Rumoured Philippino Rising at Ilo-Ilo," May 11, 1898, 3; "Mr. H. W. Bray on the Future of the Philippines," Jun. 25, 1898, 3.

⁴⁹ For St. Clair's texts in the *Singapore Free Press*, see "Today's special....," editorial, Apr. 25, 1898, 2; "The expected....," editorial, May 3, 1898, 2; "That President....," editorial, May 13, 1898, 2.

This is the moment when, as introduced in Chapter 1, Filipino revolutionaries recognized this editor as a close sympathizer. As the content analysis of the newspapers revealed, already in August 1897 the *Singapore Free Press* began reprinting content favorable to the Filipino cause, some of it signed by Howard W. Bray.⁵⁰ Hence, the connection between Bray, as Filipino press representative, and William St. Clair began at that point time. That both of them built a close relationship is confirmed in several documents of the Revolutionary Records from the year 1898.

According to those letters, Bray was a crucial intermediary between the Hong Kong Junta and the *Free Press*, as he not only provided texts he signed but also some of the Philippine proclamations or pieces of news from the U.S. that seemed relevant for the cause.⁵¹ Although Bray may have inspired St. Clair, this Singapore editor penned himself many texts favorable to the Filipinos published in the editorial column of the newspaper. Letters in the Philippine Insurgent Records that mention the *Singapore Free Press*' articles and attribute them to St. Clair evidence that this character adopted their civilization campaign *motu proprio*.⁵²

Among those texts, the most eloquent appeared on May 4 and narrated the controversial meeting where Emilio Aguinaldo and the American consul Spencer E. Pratt had arranged their nations' collaboration. The article aimed to demonstrate two main ideas: first, that the revolutionary leaders had been fighting for the freedom and well-being of their people before the U.S. arrival; second, that the pact implied the recognition of Filipino independence under American guidance and protection.⁵³

To make his points, the author began detailing "the causes leading to the second appearance of the rebellion in the Philippines," which "was almost coincident with,

⁵⁰ See Chapter 2, 106–117.

⁵¹ Both documents appear in Taylor's compilation of the P.I.R. as Exhibits 522 and 533, respectively. Taylor, *Philippine Insurrection against the United States*, vol. 3 (addenda available in vol. 5), 16, 36.

⁵² See, for example, Howard W. Bray to Emilio Aguinaldo, September 10, 1898, P.I.R., 398.7. See its translation in Taylor's compilation as Exhibit 516: Taylor, vol. 3 (addenda available in vol. 5), 7. In addition to this, St. Clair's efforts to personally write to American senator George F. Hoar (as Chapter 5 explains) indicate this editor was not just Bray's mouthpiece.

⁵³ "The War. Important Political Arrangement," *Singapore Free Press*, May 4, 1898, 3. The following paragraphs also rely in this text.

though not instigated by, the strained relations between Spain and the United States.” He argued that the rebellion of 1896-1897 had arrived at a dead point where none of the parties could finish it, so the Revolutionary Government signed the Pact of Biak-na-Bato and agreed to lay down arms and go into exile on condition of the introduction of reforms. Knowing that some observers had interpreted the payment of a sum of funds to the exiled leaders as bribery, he clarified that they “had lost all their property or had had it confiscated and plundered,” so “the Government agreed to provide them with funds to live in a becoming manner on foreign soil.”

However, the Spanish rule did not carry any of their promises. Strategically, to remark the lack of credibility they had, the writer referenced an episode from the Cuban rebellion, which was much better-known to international audiences than what had happened in the Philippines. He described Biak-na-Bato as “another trick like that played on the Cubans after the peace of Canjun [Zanjón], arranged by Martinez Campos.” Because of this, remarking the high adhesion of the masses to the revolution, they retook arms against Spain, “not alone in the immediate districts round Manila but throughout the Archipelago, which merely awaits the signal from General Aguinaldo to rise *en masse*.” He would repeat that the President was only searching “protection to the people against the organized oppression and rapacity of the religious fraternities,” “improved civil and criminal procedure in courts,” and guarantee “in many ways improvements in the fiscal and social conditions of the people.”

It was then when Aguinaldo arrived incognito in Singapore with the purpose of consulting friends “about the state of affairs in the Islands generally” and about the possibility of war between the U.S. and Spain. Mainly, he wanted to inquire “whether in such an event the United States would eventually recognize the independence of the Philippines, provided he lent his cooperation to the Americans in the conquest of the country.” After days of conversations, Mr. Howard W. Bray “eventually arranged an interview” where Aguinaldo exposed the American authorities the “incident and objects of the late rebellion and the present disturbed state of the country.” Then, the author proceeded “to detail the nature of the cooperation he could give” and to declare what expected in return:

...he would guarantee to maintain order and discipline amongst the native troops [...] in the same humane way in which he had hitherto conducted the war, and prevent them from committing outrages on defenseless Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable warfare. He further declared his ability to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal principles and would be willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United States intend to give to Cuba.

Therefore, after emphasizing important antecedents of the Filipino struggle, the text clarified that the policy Aguinaldo had drawn in his conversations with the Americans embraced “the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers.” Although he did not specify the time of that protectorate, the author of the text did state it should be temporary. In addition, while developing these two main ideas, the text repeated the selflessness of its leaders, their broad support around the islands, their efforts to fight a civilized war, and their aims to establish a liberal government that improved the well-being of the people.⁵⁴

In short, in this text, and in many others, the *Singapore Free Press* reproduced the main arguments of the Filipino propagandists, with whom its editor was in close contact since 1897. Those assertions led the newspaper to conclude in another piece that with the “exemplar behavior demonstrated they could not be considered as rebels any more, but had now the rights and privileges of belligerents.”⁵⁵ The Great Powers could not pretend to sell them to the highest bidder.

The rest of the newspapers analyzed, who did not have such a close relation, received messages from the Filipino point of view during that summer of 1898 in a much slower pace. As seen in chapter 1, It was during those months when the Filipino Republic institutionalized the propaganda corps to reengage the civilization campaign it had

⁵⁴ “The War. Important Political Arrangement.”

⁵⁵ “The Philippine Revolution,” *Singapore Free Press*, Jun. 18, 1898, 2.

started during the Revolution against Spain, and it approached the media with special intensity during the fall of 1898.

Between June and August 1898, however, newspapers in Hong Kong slowly included some of the messages Filipinos aimed to spread about their enlightenment and about their power in the islands. These journals did it republishing content from the *Singapore Free Press*, directly from Filipino sources or through chronicles that journalists in the field published and that included references to some aspect of the Filipino effort to show enlightenment and, above all, an extensive control of the archipelago.

On the one hand, the *Hong Kong Daily Press*, during the first months of the war, showed an important contempt in some of its editorials about Filipino savagery, and many of the chronicles written in the Philippines it published offered comments that highlighted this idea. For example, on August 27, its editorial commented that the U.S. had found the Filipinos less reliable than they expected and less prepared for self-government.⁵⁶ Regardless of that, several chronicles and reports explained that Filipinos were behaving better than expected and trying to strengthen their positions. As a result, it also recognized that, “no doubt a substantial measure of autonomy will be granted to the natives.”⁵⁷

For its part, as previously seen, the *China Mail* started the Spanish-American War exaltingly siding with the Americans. Although during 1897, the newspaper had shared Howard W. Bray’s defenses of the rebellion against Spain, in 1898 it also talked about the Filipinos with much disdain. According to the *Free Press*, the newspaper was not “a friend of Philipinos.” In some occasions, its reporters acknowledged the efforts Filipinos were making to impress foreigners stating that, no matter their efforts, they did

⁵⁶ “The statement...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Aug. 27, 1898, 2. As another example, this paper showed mistrust at Howard W. Bray’s comments that Filipinos were ready to demonstrate a high degree of self-government in “Mr. H. W. Bray...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jun. 17, 1898, 2. As an example of chronicles that despise Philippine behavior, see “The Spanish-American War,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jun. 18, 1898, 2.

⁵⁷ “Peace negotiations...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Aug. 15, 1898, 2.

not believe them.⁵⁸ In other occasions, however, like on June 29, its correspondents sometimes did recognize their attempts of conducting the war in a civilized manner:

One of the most satisfactory features of the campaign being carried on by General Aguinaldo and his supporters against the Spanish garrison of Manila is the humanity he has displayed and the carefulness with which his orders have been carried out by his officers and men. Towards combatants and non-combatants alike, the insurgents have shown a restraint and consideration which contrasts favorably with the brutal treatment of prisoners and suspects on the others side. There is no need to recount the cruel deeds that have characterized the Spanish attempts to quell the insurrection since it broke out in the Philippine, an insurrection, be it remembered, the direct outcome of harsh and oppressive government by the ruling race. We know, of course, that Aguinaldo has pledged himself to conduct this campaign on humane principles, and by so doing he has earned for the insurgent cause a widespread respect and sympathy that augurs well for the future of the Philippines.⁵⁹

Finally, the *Telegraph* was the hardest critic of the insurgents among the publications studied, as it had been during the first phase of the revolution. Besides Reuters' telegrams and texts from American and British newspapers, most of its information came from lengthy and detailed chronicles about the state of the islands from a Resident Correspondent and a Special Correspondent. Like the editor of the newspaper, they both showed an apparent animosity towards the natives.

At first, the paper despised the support Americans could expect from them, and after their positions in the islands progressed, it warned that they were treacherous and would fight along the winning side.⁶⁰ In addition, it admonished that leaving Filipinos in total

⁵⁸ Correspondent, "The Political Situation at Manila Bay," *China Mail*, Aug. 2, 1898, 3.

⁵⁹ "General Augustin's[sic] Wife a Hostage," *China Mail*, Jun. 21, 1898, 3. During that summer, the *China Mail* also published, occasionally, proclamations spread by the Filipinos: "The Rebels and Peace," *China Mail*, Aug. 15, 1898, 3; "The Future of the Philippines," *China Mail* [reprinted from *Singapore Free Press*], Aug. 16, 1898, 5.

⁶⁰ "The Future of the Philippines," editorial, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, May 14, 1898, 3; From Our Resident Correspondent, "Further Manila News," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, May 31, 1898, 3.

independence would soon invite a Britain's rival invasion, the newspaper's primary concern, and would leave them in internal chaos and anarchy.⁶¹ Supporting such view were frequent comments implying the ignorance and savagery of the islanders and that, when decontrolled, they could unleash a violence spiral driven by vengeance against the Spaniards that led to terrible massacres.⁶²

Despite this, in some of its chronicles, especially in those by its Special Correspondent, although unenthusiastically, the *Telegraph* admitted that Filipino control of the islands was robust.⁶³ On account of that, in one of the multiple texts where they reflected about the future of the Philippines, they stated that "of course the wishes of the Filipinos will have to be taken into account to some extent" to secure a stable government.⁶⁴

Therefore, we can conclude that the civilization campaign during the summer 1898 began affecting the papers of the region analyzed. To very different extents, they reproduced basic ideas of that communication effort: their right to be recognized as a belligerent and self-governing nation earned by their lengthy struggle and the U.S. alleged promises, as the *Free Press* argued; their respect to the laws of warfare, as the *China Mail* indicated; or the practical recognition that they had be taken into account when the moment of the deciding the future administration of the archipelago arrived, as stated by the *Daily Press* and the *Telegraph*.

It is important to stress, however, that in any case, not even those newspapers that were more sympathetic to them, like the *Singapore Free Press*, their praise of the Filipino struggle led them to support their total autonomy. Ultimately, although recognized, all the native displays of civilization were tamed by the ethnocentrism of their Western receivers, who kept considering them unprepared for complete self-government.

⁶¹ "We have repeatedly....," Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Aug. 3, 1898, 2.

⁶² From Our Resident Correspondent, "The War," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Aug. 25, 1898, 2-3. Also, By Our Special Correspondent, "The War," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, May 18, 1898, 3; From Our Resident Correspondent, "The War," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Jun. 21, 1898, 2.

⁶³ See "The War," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, May 25, 1898, 2; "The War," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Jun. 6, 1898, 2; From Our Special Correspondent, "The War," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Jun. 6, 1898, 2; From Our Own Correspondent, "The War," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Jun. 28, 1898, 2; "The War," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Jul. 1, 1898, 2.

⁶⁴ "The conditions of peace....," Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Aug. 2, 1898, 2.

Instead, as summer went by and tensions rose between Filipinos and their American allies, all their attention to the Filipino struggle and their attempts to show enlightenment served them to alert the U.S. of the need to recognize their strength. They harshly criticized the north-American procrastination in openly determining their policy towards the Philippines and reacting to the Philippine Republic growing aspirations before it became an obstacle to the quick restoration of stability and peace under Western tutelage.⁶⁵

The most eloquent testimony of that position is the *Daily Press's* coverage of the Inauguration of the Philippine Republic, published on October 7. It perfectly exemplifies the Filipino civilization campaign through the festival's staging, the Western supremacist ideology that limited its efficacy on foreign observers, and the latter's alerts of the dangers of America's lack of pronouncement.⁶⁶

The chronicler began admitting that “the insurgents were strengthening their hand every day” given the uncertain future disposition of the islands. In case Spain returned, they had to be prepared to fight. If the United States were to hold the Philippines, “they would have already shown military activity and a successful provisional government, because they will have made a showing of what they can do and proved that they do possess qualities of organization and administration.” That display of preparedness, the civilization campaign analyzed in this dissertation, made the journalist praise Emilio Aguinaldo’s “ability and cleverness” and “his ambition to make his people free, and happy.”

Even so, the author expressed restlessness at the leader’s honest endeavors “to prove that as far as they themselves are concerned they are quite worthy of the control.” He hoped he would not be “guilty of such absolute folly” as resisting the American authority in the islands. In his opinion, that would lead to an absolute defeat and would be irrational, as “the U.S. would do its best to treat the natives with all fairness and give them both protection and prosperity.” In addition to these manifested reasons, the

⁶⁵ See, for example, “The War. The Future Government of the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Aug. 1, 1898, 3.

⁶⁶ Correspondent, “The Position at Manila...,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 7, 1898, 2.

correspondent's depiction of the party, carefully planned to exhibit the aptitudes of the Filipino Government, evidenced that no propaganda could alter the racist perception of the islanders.

Besides admitting that the food "was not that bad" and pointing out how all the foreigners received the kindest treatment, the writer debunked with huge condescendence each other aspect of the celebration, for example, the colorful decoration. According to him, "everything was done in the same tawdry, tinsel way that characterizes all Orientals, not even excepting the Japanese." In commenting on their appearance, he stated:

Perhaps the most amusing side of the festival to foreigners was the appearance of all ministers and members of congress in black evening dress and high black hats. It was almost grotesque to see these dark skinned[sic] natives in the heat of mid-day marching through the streets and assembling in black evening dress, especially as not one suit in ten fitted the wearer, while the hats looked as if they had been collected from the four corners of the earth.



Figure 11. Inauguration ceremonies of Emilio Aguinaldo at Malolos. Sept. 3, 1898. From the Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, W - Lot 5769 F.

Despite this, he asked readers not to be too critical, as the natives, “kindly-inclined, good people,” did their best and knew no better. He even recognized that they “made an impressive appearance” as a solemn occasion like the ratification of their Declaration of Independence required. By playing their part to perfection, they gave “plain evidence that with proper coaching and education they can eventually assist in the government of the islands to a greatest degree that was first deemed possible.”

Allegedly, the correspondent shared those scornful comments because he feared the natives would also build a “shady, showy Government provided they are granted autonomy or independence,” which was “the great central idea through everything said and omitted at Malolos.” He concluded his chronicle alerting of the risk of allowing that “both leaders and people become so imbued –even intoxicated– with the idea of independence by all these celebrations, proclamations, speeches, and gatherings that there will be serious difficulty in reconciling them even to American sovereignty.”⁶⁷

This account, therefore, proves once more that during Summer 1898, the Philippine civilization campaign impacted foreign observers. Nevertheless, it also illustrates that its translation on political rights and autonomy had insurmountable limits, and Filipino complete independence was always out of the question for the analyzed press.

Without trying to evaluate what Howard W. Bray truly believed about Filipino capacities for self-government, the press representative knew the existence of these limits, and as a result, while he spread the Filipino civilization campaign, the interventions he made on a personal basis tried to convey the idea that Filipinos would be open to an American Protectorate. Already in an interview from June 1898, he defended that the “only possible solution of the Philippine question was self-government for the Philippines under an American protectorate.”⁶⁸ He made clear that

⁶⁷ Correspondent, “The Position at Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 7, 1898, 2. The *Telegraph* offered similar comments about the dressing and the decorations in its chronicle: From Our Resident Correspondent, “Proclamation of the Philippine Republic,” *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Oct. 4, 1898, 2. In contrast, following with its sympathy to the Filipino cause, the *Free Press* reprinted an opposite depiction of exactly the same events: “The Philippine National Assembly,” *Singapore Free Press*, Oct. 3, 1898, 3.

⁶⁸ H.W. Bray, “The Future of the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Singapore Free Press*], Jun. 17, 1898, 2.

such was the idea he had been advising to Emilio Aguinaldo, and showed confidence that Filipino revolutionaries would accept it.

Indeed, in private, Bray tried to convince Emilio Aguinaldo of showing he would welcome American Protection. In a letter from Singapore dated August 26, 1898, Bray defended to the Filipino leader that he had to show himself open to a protectorate, because, even though he was convinced of Filipino capacities for self-government, the rest of the world was not prepared for that:

As far as I am concerned, if the Americans wish to place persons to represent them and watch out for good government in the provinces, I would not object hereto for the present, it would not last long and it would be a satisfaction to Europe and America. The Filipinos would do well not to demand the last pound of flesh for the present, and although they have confidence in their power and ability to govern themselves, with which I concur completely, such is not the opinion of the outside world nor of the foreigners in Manila. [...] My advice to the Filipinos is to accept with apparent pleasure prominent persons to assist them to govern; it is the only means I see of contenting and giving guarantees to the powers. The Filipinos should not be intoxicated by their successes and believe that now there is nothing in the way of their complete independence. After the brilliant example they have given of temperance and self-containment in the victory, it would be disastrous to commit an act at the ninth hour which would take away the sympathy of the world.⁶⁹

Bray was right. As the following section argues, all the region's newspapers considered an American Protectorate the best government for the islands. Although that was the solution already envisaged in the British metropolitan press, the effects of the Filipino civilization campaign in the Pacific increased during the fall of 1898, when the Hong Kong Junta was more active. The studied journals specified that the native government had to participate in its constitution and deserved a significant role in the future regime

⁶⁹ Howard W. Bray to Emilio Aguinaldo, August 26, 1898, P.I.R. 398.4. The English translation used here is available in Taylor's compilation as exhibit 515. *Philippine Insurrection against the United States*, vol. 3 (addenda available in vol. 5), 4.

because it was more mature than their contemporaries believed. When Spain and the U.S. discussed the Philippine Question during the peace conference that started on October 1st, the examined newspapers insisted on establishing such a model. To do it, many journalists used arguments of the Filipino civilization campaign.

3. The Advocacy for a Protectorate during the Peace Conference

During the Spanish-American War, all the British press in the Pacific studied vindicated that Spain had to abandon the Philippine Islands. They justified this position referencing its maladministration of the archipelago, its inhuman treatment of the local inhabitants, and the fact that these would keep fighting their oppressors, extending the instability harmful for those with interests in the region. The *Free Press* stated it, for example, in the following editorial, which also reflects its defense of the native administration again:

If then, the Joint Commission is to imply the smallest reassertion of Spanish authority [...], the American people, or their mandatories, will be responsible for the beginning of an interminable civil war in the Philippines where now, within the jurisdiction of Aguinaldo and his civil magistrates, all is peace: life and property, even of Spaniards, respected: revenue peacefully collected and applied to public purposes; and all the decencies of good government and justice faithfully and impartially observed.⁷⁰

On the other hand, the region's publications considered that, in case of standing alone, the new Philippine republic would invite other powers' conquests, especially Germany, which threatened British dominion in Asia and its Open-Door Policies.⁷¹ Having also dismissed a joint protectorate between different countries, they agreed with its London contemporaries that the U.S. was responsible for remaining in the archipelago.⁷²

⁷⁰ "Our latest war..." editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 2, 1898, 2. Also, "There can be..." editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 15, 1898, 2; "It is somewhat..." editorial, *China Mail*, Aug. 4, 1898, 2.

⁷¹ "Our latest war..." editorial, *Singapore Free Press*; "The Future of the Philippines," *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *Hong Kong Daily Press*], May 5, 1898, 2; "It is somewhat..." editorial, *China Mail*.

⁷² "We so fully..." editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 29, 1898, 2.

The examined papers also coincided with the metropole's opinion in defending that Americans had to follow British governance models like those applied in Egypt, the Straits Settlements, or some parts of India to compensate for their inexperience in colonial rule. These were cases of an "Anglo Protectorate model of enlightened governance over those unfit for self-government" that, according to Patrick M. Kirkwood, loomed large in Britain and the U.S.'s public imagination at the turn of the 20th century. Figures like Lord Cromer or Thomas Babington Macaulay, which appeared cited in the studied press, impersonated the "erudite Anglo-administrator overseeing the racial and administrative progress of peoples unfitted for self-government."⁷³ Their rules guaranteed a financially responsible, clean, efficient, and representative colonial government until the colonized achieved political modernity according to Anglo-Saxon doctrines.

The particularities of those protectorates could be adapted to different contexts. According to Kirkwood, some of these colonial supervisors considered government capabilities acquired through history and experience, while others saw them as an *innate* trait that belonged exclusively to distinctive governing races. Consequently, they disagreed on the length of tutelage required. The believers on the racial uplift of the colonized considered it should last until they achieved the necessary level of political maturity, so, in the end, the imperial tutor's presence would be limited. Meanwhile, skeptics of the colonized people's capacity to evolve advocated for the permanent rule of the distinctive governing races.⁷⁴ Likewise, the inclusion of those tutored populations in these colonial administrations could also vary.

Along this line, as we have seen before, the British imperialist press based a good deal of its defense for an American administration on the assumption that the natives were

⁷³ Patrick M. Kirkwood, "An 'Administrative Race'? Anglo-Saxonism and Imperial Administrative Networks in The Philippines and Southern Africa, c. 1898–1921" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2015), 58, 52. The literature on the British Empire as an "empire of Liberty" that protects tutored peoples until they reach a high level of political preparedness is extensive. See, among many others, Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire. A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830–1867* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Alan Lester, Kate Boehme, and Peter Mitchell, *Ruling the World: Freedom, Civilization and Liberalism in the Nineteenth-Century British Empire* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

⁷⁴ Kirkwood, "An 'Administrative Race'?" 5–13.

savages that still needed to be uplifted and “gradually brought into the light of Western Civilization.”⁷⁵ Moreover, they defended that their resistance would not last. Although many journalists in the region initially agreed with these assumptions, their local perspective progressively nuanced it.

On the one hand, even those who were less sympathetic with the Filipinos acknowledged their newly-founded republic had to participate in establishing the future regime in the islands for strategical considerations. They knew it controlled most of the archipelago and warned that “if the Americans were determined to refuse self-government to the Filipinos, they w[ould] have to subjugate them by what we fear will prove a long and sanguinary war.”⁷⁶ It is interesting to note that other men-on-the-spot not related to the media shared this perception. M^a Dolores Elizalde analyzed British navy officials’ reports about the situation in the archipelago and demonstrated that although they initially mistrusted the Filipino capacity for self-government, they also ended up reporting that the republic’s strength made it necessary to negotiate with them.⁷⁷

In other cases, some Hong Kong and Singapore newspapermen’s close coverage of the natives’ behavior during the insurrection against Spain and the Spanish-American War made them held distinctive attitudes towards the Filipino republic, like in William St. Clair’s case. Besides having an updated and detailed knowledge of their military control of the islands, these journalists highlighted that they already possessed an advanced level of political maturity and deserved respect.

This position became common after the fall of 1898, coinciding when, according to the Philippine Revolutionary Records, the Hong Kong Junta and its sympathizers were much more active. While in the summer, as we have just seen, the *Daily Press*, the *China Mail*, and the *Telegraph* had been reticent to recognize the Filipino displays of

⁷⁵ Harris, *God’s Arbiters*, 133.

⁷⁶ “From news received...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jan. 10, 1899, 2.

⁷⁷ Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, “Observing the Imperial Transition.”

enlightenment, during the fall they republished much more content from Filipino sources, and by January, 1899, their opinions had evolved.

For example, on January 7, the *Daily Press* recognized Aguinaldo's advances and appreciated his efforts to maintain peace and stability in the territory under his control. It stated: "the insurgents being then in possession, and having achieved, as they considered, their independence, are naturally reluctant to welcome a new set of masters." They were daily "strengthening their position, both morally and materially," and in Luzon, they had "brought their civil and military organization to its present state of perfection with the moral if not formal support of America." Consequently, the editor considered that "to ask them now to break it up like a worn-out plaything" was improper.⁷⁸

Consequently, they all advocated for recognizing the role of the Philippine Republic during the Spanish-American War, and the need to be taken into account when deciding the future government of the islands. In broad terms, they all considered that America should control the country's foreign relations and protect it from foreign invasion. Internally, the studied press had diverse opinions on which levels of competencies Filipinos should achieve. However, they all concurred with the *China Mail* when it said the inhabitants could appreciate "fairly liberal government," and that "those facilities they would obtain to as full an extent as circumstances permitted (upon Anglo-Saxon, i.e. American lines)."⁷⁹ For example, this newspaper suggested the locals handled municipal freedom. The *Singapore Free Press* defended that they could occupy higher positions in many more governmental departments: the native government should "settle its own fiscal arrangements, its legislation, its administration of justice, its police, its education system-but always, where misadventure may be possible, guided by professional advisers, selected, if necessary, by itself, but subject to the approval or

⁷⁸ "From news received...." editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jan. 10, 1899, 2. Also, "The year just....," editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 31, 1898, 2. For similar comments in the *China Mail* and the *Telegraph*, see "The situation in the....," editorial, *China Mail*, Dec. 29, 1898, 2; "The Philippino[sic] Question," editorial, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Dec. 21, 1898, 2.

⁷⁹ "It is somewhat....," editorial, *China Mail*, Aug. 4, 1898, 2.

disapproval of the American Resident-General.”⁸⁰ As for the *Daily Press*, it defended that “the conduct of the Filipinos during the past eight months justifies confidence being reposed in them to the extent of allowing them autonomy under these guarantees.”⁸¹

In their opinion, this system satisfied all the parties. The U.S. could enjoy the riches and strategic position of the islands, contribute to Anglo-Saxonism’s civilizing mission, and reform its national civil service. Filipinos would also accept this arrangement and prove they were “a progressive, law-abiding community, aspiring and striving after such independent functions of self-government as might be safe for them to endeavour to acquire, in the face of the overruling fact that their country would be, left to itself, the mere battle-ground of foreign antagonisms.”⁸²

At last, but not least, “the beneficial influence of America in the Far East” could prevent “the disturbance of political power in such a manner as to paralyze the action of the peace-loving and commerce-promoting nationalities already well-established on the shores of the Pacific - Britain, Japan, and the United States.” The *Free Press* added:

The collective interests, political and commercial, of these powers are of an absolutely overwhelming character, and the less the chance of conspiracy to disturb those interests the better for humanity at large. [...] The only solution is an American protectorate, ostensibly temporary, possibly, over the Philippines, thus at once, furnishing a lever for the liberation and elevation of a long oppressed and much-enduring people, and a security against the intrusion of disturbing influences, permanently unfriendly to the United States and to the nations whose sympathies and aspirations in the Pacific are thoroughly

⁸⁰ “If we are...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 12, 1898, 2. See, also, “Of the latest...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 2, 1898, 2; “Every day brings...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 19, 1898, 2.

⁸¹ “From news received...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jan. 10, 1899, 2. Also “Peace negotiations...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Aug. 15, 1898, 2; “The statement made...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Aug. 27, 1898, 2; “It will be observed...,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Nov. 4, 1898, 2; “The year just closing...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 31, 1898, 2.

⁸² “There can be...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 15, 1898, 2. Also “Mr. H. W. Bray on the Future of the Philippines,” *Singapore Free Press*, Jun. 25, 1898, 3; “The chief representative of the Philippine...,” *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 4, 1898, 2; “The Future of the Philippines,” *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 5, 1898, 2; “From news received...,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jan. 10, 1899, 2.

consonant with her own.⁸³

To defend this formula, between the war's end, in August 1898, and the Paris Peace Treaty ratification in the U.S., in February 1899, all the analyzed press, without exception, advocated for it in their editorials and chronicles or reprinted texts from their London contemporaries that conveyed the convenience of a protectorate.⁸⁴ In the newspapers less well-disposed towards the Filipinos, like the *China Mail*, some Protectorate defenses included comments that despised the natives. They warned Filipino strength was a danger Americans caused by not limiting the republic's ambitions.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, these newspapers also included accounts of their correspondents in the islands and other observers that praised the Filipino cause and their efforts.⁸⁶

In addition, all the studied press republished texts from the Hong Kong Junta, especially, from the British sympathizers identified in the Filipino revolutionaries' private correspondence: of course, Howard W. Bray; William St. Clair, the mentioned editor of the *Free Press*; and also, between November 1898 and the first half of 1899, Chesney Duncan, ex-editor and journalist of the *Telegraph*. Evidence indicates that even St. Clair and Duncan, who actively collaborated with the republic's propaganda efforts, did it at least, in part, because they were confident of a Protectorate's success in the Philippines following British models.

⁸³ "Of the latest...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 2, 1898, 2.

⁸⁴ See, for example, "More than one...", Local and General, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Sep. 19, 1898, 2; "What America Should Do," *Hong Kong Telegraph* [reprinted from *The Critic* (London)], Dec. 17, 1898, 2; "The Situation in the Philippines," *China Mail*, Sep. 27, 1898, 3; "Admiral Dewey and Aguinaldo," *China Mail* [reprinted from *London Globe*], Nov. 19, 1898, 3; "The Future of the Philippines," *China Mail*, [reprinted from *Standard* (London)], Dec. 16, 1898, 3; "The Future of the Philippines," *China Mail* [reprinted from *London & China Express*], Jan. 6, 1899, 3; Dr. Clay MacCauley, "An American Professor on the Situation," *China Mail*, Jan. 14, 1899, 3; "The Filipino Side of the Question," *China Mail*, Jan. 16, 1899, 3; "The year just...", editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 31, 1898, 2.

⁸⁵ From an Observer, "The Situation in the Philippines," *China Mail*, Dec. 28, 1898, 3; "Crisis in the Philippines," *China Mail*, Jan. 5, 1899, 3.

⁸⁶ Correspondent, "The Position at Manila," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Sep. 19, 1898, 2; Correspondent, "Aguinaldo's Withdrawal," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Sep. 21, 1898, 2; "The Philippine Question," *China Mail*, Sep. 21, 1898, 3; Correspondent, "Aguinaldo's Withdrawal," The Situation at Manila, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Sep. 21, 1898, 2; "Insurgent Traitors," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Nov. 15, 1898, 2; Correspondent, "Almost a Crisis Between American and Insurgent Forces," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 31, 1898, 2; Dr. Clay MacCauley, "An American Professor on the Situation," *China Mail*, Jan. 14, 1899, 3.

In William St. Clair's case, he had expressed such conviction much before publishing all the content cited in this chapter, and even before his newspaper published any information sympathetic to the Philippine Revolution or got in touch with them. As soon as December 1896, this editor wrote regarding the Philippines' troubles that Spain had "to apply British principles in her relations with her Colonies."⁸⁷ Later, he actively sought that type of regime for the archipelago.

Seeing that the U.S. arrival to the Pacific scenario was imminent, St. Clair got Howard W. Bray and consul-general Spencer E. Pratt in touch to vehicle the Filipino-American collaboration in their fight against Spain. In a text published in December 1898, he justified his step arguing why consul-general Pratt was the proper person to link both nations. He alleged that Americans would "have the initial advantage of securing him a *persona grata* with the Filipinos," and also "one who is convinced of the necessity of following out the already well defined British precedents in dealing with the problems of a Philippine Protectorate."⁸⁸ Therefore, St. Clair covered Filipino affairs since the first phase of the revolution hoping to create an authority in the islands similar to the British one.

Using John Galbraith's term, this editor was a man on the spot, and his local perspective and life-long implication in the British Malayan society influenced his strong opinion on the Philippine Question.⁸⁹ St. Clair participated in the expansion of British influence in the Malay States by joining the military in 1892, during the Pahang uprising.⁹⁰ Additionally, he was a very active member of the civil society of Singapore. Among

⁸⁷ "In spite of the...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 22, 1896, 2.

⁸⁸ "The Philippino[sic] Question," *Hong Kong Telegraph* [reprinted from *Singapore Free Press*], Dec. 17, 1898, 3.

⁸⁹ John S. Galbraith, "The 'Turbulent Frontier' as a Factor in British Expansion," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2, no. 2 (1960): 150–68, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/177813>.

⁹⁰ For an interesting analysis of how during that conflict the *Singapore Free Press*, for which St. Clair was already working, contributed to the formation of colonial knowledge on Malays that served as a justification of British expansion, see Netusha Naidu, "'Sly Civility' and the Myth of the 'Lazy Malay.' The Discursive Economy of British Colonial Power during the Pahang Civil War, 1891–1895," in *Racial Difference and the Colonial Wars of 19th Century Southeast Asia*, ed. Peter Carey and Farish A. Noor (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020), 179–210. The classic book on colonial knowledge and racial difference in Malaya is Syed Hussein Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native* (London: Frank Cass, 1977).

others, he was one of the promoters of the Singapore branch of the Straits Settlement Association, served as a Justice of Peace, helped in the foundation of the Singapore Philharmonic Society in 1891, and organized the Singapore Volunteer Rifles in 1901.⁹¹

According to his second editor, Walter Makepeace, St. Clair behaved as “a leader in all that affected the welfare of the Colony and the Federated Malay States, dealing trenchantly with such subjects as the military contribution, constitutional rights, public health and safety, the encouragement of arts, the spread of popular education—all, indeed that furthered the common weal.”⁹²

As Tim Harper explained, this British Malayan society where St. Clair belonged held a high self-image of their rule and of its effect on the Malay States. That perception was based on the myth that they had pioneered the development of the peninsula. Although the reality was much more complex, they shared a the “liberal fantasy of free trade and enterprise,” where their economic expansion also meant intellectual improvement. At the same time, they considered that such enlightened rule and commercial activity also required a strong or authoritarian government. Allegedly, as a result of these efforts, the Malayan Peninsula became a showcase of the benefits of British rule.⁹³

As the “Doyen of the press” in Singapore, St. Clair had also praised the expansion of British influence in the region and considered that a similar model, with its adaptability, could be adjusted to the Philippines.⁹⁴ He directly compared both cases in an editorial published in September 1898:

⁹¹ “Mr. W. G. St. Clair,” *Singapore Free Press*, Mar. 31, 1916, 7; “Doyen of Straits Press,” *Malaya Tribune*, Mar. 30, 1916, 9; Walter Makepeace, Gilbert E. Brooke, and John Braddell Roland, *One Hundred Years of Singapore* (London: J. Murray, 1921), 291–192; Arnold Wright, ed., *Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya* (London: Lloyd’s Greater Britain Publishing Company, 1908), 254–55.

⁹² “Mr. W. G. St. Clair.”

⁹³ Tim Harper, “The British ‘Malayans,’” in *Settlers and Expatriates: Britons over the Seas*, ed. Robert Bickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 237–38. On the British society in Singapore, see also, among others, John Butcher, *The British in Malaya, 1880–1941: The Social History of a European Community in Colonial Southeast Asia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979).

⁹⁴ See, for example, the editorial the newspaper published about Andrew Clarke, governor between 1873–1875, “who initiated the policy of Protected Native States in the Malay Peninsula:” “More than a quarter...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Apr. 2, 1902, 2. For a brief overview of the resident system’s expansion in Malaysia, see Ingelise L. Lanman, “Thorns in the Water: Britain in Malaya,” in *The Man on the Spot. Essays on British Empire History*, ed. Roger D. Long (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995),

We protect Native States on the Malay Peninsula. The administration is very largely manned by British officials, but the Malay Rulers' flags fly there, they have their own legislation, and their revenues are absolutely safe from Imperial confiscation. The value of a protectorate system, as we British know so well, lies in its infinite elasticity, and its marvelous adaptability to special and dissimilar conditions. [...] Then again, the institution of a protectorate may be of a temporary character. The protecting power is not tied down to its maintenance any longer than a regard for its own interests demands. Even then, as a temporary solution of the problem in the Philippines, it would be difficult to adduce any genuine practical argument against an American protectorate, while against any other alternative it would be far from difficult to produce destructive reasons, from the standpoint that the maintenance of peace in the Far East was an essential condition to the right evolution of the destiny of the Philippines.

Furthermore, St. Clair understood that Americans might well hesitate in accepting this role “were the population savage of unprogressive,” and considered that “the more nearly self-sufficient the locally set up administration may appear to be, as far even as provincial self-government is concerned, the more fully would the United States feel justified in according its protection to that people.”⁹⁵ That manifest concern explains that he actively collaborated with the Filipinos to prove to the U.S. how self-sufficient they were, even if the level of autonomy he envisaged was more limited than the one the Filipino leaders demanded.

183–200; Nicholas Tarling, *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Vol. II, The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 23–34; A. J. Stockwell, “British Expansion and Rule in South-East Asia,” in *Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol. III. The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 371–94.

⁹⁵ “The important state...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Sep. 8, 1898, 2.



Figure 12. Portraits of William G. St. Clair (left) and Chesney Duncan (right). Reprinted from Arnold Wright, *Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya* (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain Publishing Company, 1908), 254, 261.

In Chesney Duncan's case, his evolution towards becoming one of the Filipino's press representatives was much more drastic. His first work in Asia was as an assistant in Korean customs, where he took part in "the opening of the Hermit Kingdom to the trade and commerce of the world in 1883." Soon, he began working as a journalist for several British newspapers in the region, like the *Telegraph*, the *Japan Gazette*, the *Shanghai Mercury*, the *China Times* (published in Tientsin), and, occasionally, in Hong Kong's *China Mail*. As a resident of that island colony, Duncan "took an active and beneficent part in public affairs."⁹⁶ Among other activities, he organized the British Mercantile Marine Officers' Association and served during the plague epidemic the city suffered in 1894. Therefore, Duncan was a man on the spot with a particular perception of the region's geopolitics, like William St. Clair.

⁹⁶ Wright, *Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya*, 262.

During the Philippine Revolution's earlier stages, in 1896-97, Duncan was the *Hong Kong Telegraph* editor. As seen in chapter 2, this newspaper claimed that white supremacy in the region had to be unquestionable and, thus, it supported Spain and attacked the contemporaries that sympathized with the Filipino rebels. When the U.S. joined the fray in 1898, using Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds' term, that newspaper redrew the "global colour line" it had established to back the White race against the Asian one and relocated the limits of its loyalty to support, among the White population, the Anglo-Saxon against the Latin race.⁹⁷ As for the Filipinos, the *Telegraph* recognized their advances in the archipelago, but did not show any sympathy towards them and still shared many derogatory comments about their supposed savagery, violent instincts and ignorance.

By contrast, when the tensions between the Americans and Filipinos began to appear as a severe threat to the future peace of the Islands, that newspaper published more texts giving voice to the native leaders and trying to understand which policy they would defend if they could negotiate a protectorate with the U.S. That is the primary concern of an interview to Emilio Aguinaldo published in September 1898, right before the peace conference began.

Its author was the *Telegraph*'s Resident Correspondent in Manila, and tried to get the leader's impression on the policy the Philippines should adopt. According to his account, the correspondent "tried to put before him various possibilities of the intricate and complicated problem now coming forward for solution." All the alternatives the interviewer cited were precisely "the multifarious forms of autonomy in vogue in British India and Malaysia," the England suzerainty in Egypt, or autonomy such as that of the State of Selangor, or Johore, showing his British frame of understanding. In spite of the journalist's pressure, Aguinaldo dedicated his responses to highlighting that he was only the "First Citizen," and that he would obey the National Assembly.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁹⁸ From Our Resident Correspondent, "Aguinaldo Interviewed," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Sep. 24, 1898, 3.

This meeting took place shortly after the U.S. press mocked Aguinaldo's proclamation as *Dictador de Filipinas* and used it to impute authoritarian tendencies to the Tagalog elite. Given the president's insistence in the National Assembly's supreme power, it seems he was clumsily trying to present his rule as truly democratic. His success was limited, as the journalist admitted that such humbleness could be a good sign.

The reporter, however, was also alarmed at the General's "expression of helplessness and ignorance." He warned that, as a result of the lack of education in the Spanish dominions, Aguinaldo actually knew "very little of statecraft, forms of government, history of constitutional development, and actual facts of quasi-autonomous administrations." He grew suspicious at "his frequent *no sabe*," and to get him talking, he defended the importance of letting the world know the Filipinos and their aspirations:

...[I] tried again to show him that it was of the utmost importance for the good of the Philippines that the world should know as much as possible of the Filipinos and their views just now, and that he, as the duly elected 'First Citizen' ought to be better qualified than any other man in the world to speak for them and ought to be well posted on the various possible proposals for the future of the Islands. [...] Aguinaldo must have looked deeply into these questions, and must be able to tell the world what his people thought of their own future. The world could never be expected to place confidence in a leader or a race of whom it knew nothing.⁹⁹

Although Duncan had moved to the Philippines to report the previous June, we cannot confirm he did this interview because it is unsigned, and the paper received correspondence from at least two different people in the Philippines.¹⁰⁰ However, it seems highly possible Duncan wrote it as the texts he autographed from that moment on responded precisely to the concern expressed in the text: letting the world know the nature and aspirations of the Filipinos to find the best arrangement for the territory they

⁹⁹ "Aguinaldo Interviewed." Some days later, on October 4, a *Telegraph* correspondent met Aguinaldo again, where the Filipino was much more eloquent and tried to correct the impression of the last interview. See "The Baby Parliament," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Oct. 4, 1898, 2–3.

¹⁰⁰ "The American nation..." editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jun. 17, 1898, 2.

inhabited. In several letters in the fall of 1898, Galicano Apacible wrote from Hong Kong explaining to other revolutionary leaders that they were searching for a journalist to work with them.¹⁰¹ In November 1898, he informed Aguinaldo that the reporter they had hired had arrived, and that they were going to begin the campaign.¹⁰² Although that letter does not include any name, that month, the Junta recognized Duncan as a “General Advisor.”¹⁰³

The editorials the *Telegraph* published about the Filipinos when Chesney Duncan was its official editor suggest he did not trust their capacities for complete self-government. As a result, besides the economic arrangement they may have achieved, if Duncan accepted to work for the Filipino revolutionary government, whose members he had so hardly criticized before, it was not because he supported their independence, but their cooperation with the American government. While announcing a weekly journal he aimed to publish in Hong Kong spreading the truth about Filipino matters, Duncan wrote that the journal searched the “mutual understanding that can alone be the stable basis of a satisfactory working relationship between the United States Government and the republican Government on the Philippines.”¹⁰⁴ This is why he accepted to join Howard W. Bray and William St. Clair in projecting Philippine voices to the world.

4. The Joint Fight for Philippine Voices Abroad

Chapter 2 demonstrated that the Philippine civilization campaign in the Pacific British media had started in the Revolution’s first phase. As seen in the previous section, it achieved a louder echo during the celebration of the Paris peace conference in the fall of 1898, when the examined newspapers defended working with the existing Philippine

¹⁰¹ For several letters mentioning their attempts to find a journalist, see folder 431 in the P.I.R.

¹⁰² Galicano Apacible to Emilio Aguinaldo, November 19, 1898, P.I.R. 493.1. In a previous letter, Apacible informed Aguinaldo that he had written a journalist in Pekin “to come work for us”. That letter neither specifies any name, and we do not have any evidence that Duncan was in Pekin nor knowledge of any other journalist who worked for them and came from Pekin. However, the letter indicates they were willing to pay a journalist for their services, so they probably paid Duncan for that. See Apacible to Aguinaldo, November 6, 1898, P.I.R. 431.5.

¹⁰³ Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic*, 370.

¹⁰⁴ “Mr. Chesney Duncan...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 21, 1898, 2. See also “The Philippino[sic] Question,” editorial, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Dec. 21, 1898, 2.

government to create a protectorate following British models. It was even higher, however, right after the signing of the resulting treaty, on December 10.

Spain and the U.S. had conducted the negotiations bilaterally, excluding the involved colonized nations. In the Philippines case, Spain agreed to sell the islands to the Americans for 20 million dollars, and both went “perilously near to convincing the Filipino people and the Philippine government that they are but exchanging King Log for King Stork.”¹⁰⁵ As a response, between the fall of 1898 and the outbreak of the Philippine-American War, on February 4, 1899, the Hong Kong Junta and its British media allies pressed even more persistently to make the Americans recognize the Republic.

Most of these vindications first appeared in St. Clair’s *Singapore Free Press*, but other neighbor contemporaries without explicit links to the Filipino belligerents reprinted some of them or agreed with some of their arguments in their original texts.¹⁰⁶ As before, the campaigners insisted on defending the Republic’s preparedness for a high level of self-government, but other arguments won protagonism.

Intimately related to their propaganda about Philippine civilization was their criticisms that western audiences had an incomplete and distorted image of the geopolitical and social situation of the islands and underestimated its inhabitants’ level of development. The Junta and its sympathizers defended that the United States leaders and the public still had not been able to “grasp the nature of the problems that have accrued as a result of the war with Spain,” because they did not have any previous knowledge about the Philippines and were failing to estimate the internal position of things.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ “If we are...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 12, 1898, 2.

¹⁰⁶ See for example, “Further Filipino Success,” Reuter’s Telegrams, *China Mail* [reprinted from *Singapore Free Press*], Oct. 13, 1898, 3; and “The Filipino Revolution,” *China Mail* [reprinted from *Singapore Free Press*], Oct. 26, 1898, 4; “The Filipino Side of the Question,” *China Mail*, Jan. 16, 1899, 3.

¹⁰⁷ Bray commented that he had shared Aguinaldo’s proclamation with “Mr. Read [Thomas Reid] of the *China Mail* who, being also the correspondent of the *New York Herald* and the *Times of London*, he would telegraph it to both newspapers. Additionally, he also celebrated that some newspapers that were not totally sympathetic to the Philippine cause were changing their opinions, like the “*Daily Press* of this city”. Bray explained that Dr. Apacible and himself had dissipated any false ideas he had concerning

Instead, the United States public was well posted about Cuba, took it as a guiding analogy, and applied it to the Philippines case. According to St. Clair, that had proven a colossal mistake because “the Filipino people are as compact and unanimous as the Cubans are incapable of hanging together.” Aguinaldo had built a “strong Government, justified by its military triumphs,” and his regime had “resolved itself on a constitutional basis, into a civil administration” that dictated “its dealings with its now defeated oppressors with manifest humanity.” Unfortunately, the editor warned that “the internal knowledge of all this is not readily accessible to American observers, chiefly moving in military or club circles in Manila, and therefore imbued with the combative spirit.”¹⁰⁸

In addition to attacking a general lack of knowledge, they accused specific actors of twisting the representation of the Philippine government, like the Spanish religious orders and foreigners with economic interests that benefited from the *status quo*. For example, both Emilio Aguinaldo, in an interview, and Howard W. Bray, in an article, blamed a strong partisan of the Spaniards named Eugenio Blanco for producing a plot to incite a clash between the Filipinos and the Americans in Pampanga. According to Bray’s account, Blanco’s troops had joined Aguinaldo’s army, accepted bribes from the Church, and tried to infiltrate “some of the bad characters always to be found in every country” in the Filipino ranks to generate trouble. Although the authorities uncovered the conspiracy before it could do any serious harm, Bray denounced it as only one example of extended operations of “political trickery.”¹⁰⁹

Such efforts aimed to “suppressing important facts, magnifying molehills into mountains, and even stooping to based motives with the manifest object of damaging the reputation of the young Philippine Government, and influencing public opinion [...]

Philippine affairs” and that he was “adopting the politics and opinions of our good friend Mr. St. Clair of Singapore.” P.I.R. 398.4. Exhibit 515 in Taylor, vol. 3 (addenda available in vol. 5), 4.

¹⁰⁸ “Everything points...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 13, 1899, 2.

¹⁰⁹ H. W. Bray, “The Filipinos and the Americans,” *Singapore Free Press*, Sep. 28, 1898, 3. Aguinaldo narrated the same plot in the following interview: “The Baby Parliament,” *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Oct. 4, 1898, 2–3. Also, “The *Independent*...” *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 20, 1898, 2; H. W. Bray, “The Philippines Question,” *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 22, 1898, 3; Howard W. Bray, “A True Account of Aguinaldo,” *Singapore Free Press*, Apr. 5, 1899, 3.

by unworthy means.” To make things worse, those deceptions joined the yellow journals’ pandering for sensation and the ignorance and popular inclinations of the audiences and of “individual special and so-called resident correspondents” unable to discriminate between reality and biased information.

To those audiences that believed all the denounced misapprehensions of the situation and who, as a result, proclaimed that Filipinos should not be allowed an opportunity to govern themselves, he replied citing Thomas Babington Macaulay, one of the previously mentioned referents of the Anglo-Protectorate models. Such ending reveals how Bray, working for Filipinos since the revolution’s beginning, also reflected on the Philippine Question through British lenses. At least, he understood which cultural idioms he had to use to convince his targeted audience:

‘Many politicians are in the habit of laying down as a self-evident proposition that no people ought to be free till they are fit to use their freedom. The maxim is worthy of the fool in the old story who resolved not to go into the water till he had learned to swim.’¹¹⁰

As Bray already hinted in his text, besides revealing the lack of knowledge on Philippine matters and the attempts to manipulate it, the Junta and its sympathizers also argued that some foreign correspondents and news organizations were well aware of those political machinations and even participated in it. Chesney Duncan stated that he sent several texts to the Associated Press to correct their mistakes and added that, in some cases, they had voluntarily twisted his own corrections.¹¹¹ Also, he criticized the American journalist Edward Harden’s professionalism and objectivity.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ H.W. Bray, “The Filipinos and the Americans.”

¹¹¹ On the Associated Press dispatches, see Chesney [Duncan], “The Philippine Crisis,” *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 18, 1899, 3; “The Situation in the Philippines,” *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *Hong Kong Telegraph*], Jan. 23, 1899, 2; “The Philippine Crisis and the Cable (Telegrams to the Press Association),” *Singapore Free Press*, Feb. 3, 1899, 3; Chesney Duncan, “A Distorted Telegram,” Correspondence, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 8, 1899, 2. See also, in the Philippine Insurgent Records “Special correspondence published Chesney Duncan Telegrams,” February, 1899, P.I.R. 492.2.

¹¹² See “The Philippine Situation,” *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 11, 1899, 2.

Equally, St. Clair denounced the distortion of a Reuters' telegram about the significant Spanish surrender in Iloilo, "the last remnant of Spanish authority in the Visayas." While the version published in Madrid stated the city surrendered to the Americans, the editor alleged that a much more reliable account coming directly from Iloilo and sent to Manila by a Singapore gentleman demonstrated it was Filipino commanders who had carried out an amicable and regular capitulation. It was important to get the version of the affair straight because it exemplified, once more, how the National Government had occupied almost all the Spanish territory, save Manila, maintained law and order, and had to be recognized *de facto* and *de iure* by the Americans.¹¹³

Later, in his editorial of January 17, St. Clair stated that "whether it be in the Spanish interest or not, there have been persistent efforts made by cable and correspondence, both from Manila and London, to discredit the Filipino National Government." The apparent motive was to "entice the United States into a forward policy that would ignore the strength of the Filipino government, and eventually bring about inevitable hostility and discord."¹¹⁴

As the hostility of the U.S. increased and the prospects of a diplomatic solution to the existing tension faded away, another of the pre-meditated misrepresentations they tried to correct was that Filipinos had a hostile and provocative attitude with the American troops in the islands. The most eloquent example is the "Appeal by the Philippines" written by the Hong Kong Junta and published on December 13, 1898. It pointed out that "despite what others were saying," Filipinos had done all they could "to prevent a conflict," and supported that statement reviewing how they had acceded to every American request during the war with Spain, even when those were irrational.

Next, the appeal asked if "the cruel allegations that they would murder, loot, steal and commit incendiarism if given a free hand were supported" after seeing that "they

¹¹³ "Iloilo, the second..." editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 29, 1898, 2. The chronicle in which he bases his reflection is From Our Own Travelling Correspondent, "Latest From Ilo-Ilo," *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 29, 1898, 3. Other comments by St. Clair about the misrepresentation of the national government are "We should be..." editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 5, 1899, 2; "Today we give..." editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 9, 1899, 2; "Those who are..." editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 25, 1899, 2.

¹¹⁴ "Whether it be..." editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 17, 1899, 2.

conducted their campaign throughout Luzon, capturing all important points outside Manila, taking and treating humanely thousands of Spanish prisoners without being guilty of such acts.” To conclude, it implored “the intervention of the President, supported by the will of the people, to put an end to the slights shown to our leaders, officials, soldiers, and people by some of the American military and naval authorities and soldiers.”¹¹⁵

From January 1899, this final claim that the Americans were acting disrespectfully and even aggressively towards the natives was each time more familiar.¹¹⁶ Among other representative cases, Howard W. Bray wrote long chronicle that denounced American troops' abuses against the Filipinos.¹¹⁷ There stands out as well a long letter by an American initially published in the *República Filipina* that “confirms the unfavorable reports about the American army of occupation from other sources considered to be prejudiced.” On the one hand, the dispatch aimed to defend that the Philippine Republic had rightfully won its independence in the war against Spain, to which it was fully entitled, “the country being just as cultured as any other, and one that our own land does not even equal for polished manners.” On the other hand, it condemned U.S.’s actions by lamenting, among other charges, that “during the five months we have been half established here, the scandals committed by our soldiers have been countless.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ “The Philippines. Appeal by the Filipinos,” *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 13, 1898, 3. Also, “The United States and the Filipino People Government,” *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 6, 1899, 2; “General Aguinaldo and General Otis,” *Singapore Free Press*, Nov. 30, 1898, 3; Chesney Duncan, “The Philippine Question. International law on the Subject (Opinion of Hongkong barrister at law),” *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 21, 1898, 3; H. W. Bray, “The Philippines Question,” *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 22, 1898, 3.

¹¹⁶ For example, see Emilio Aguinaldo, “Manifesto of the President of the Philippine Government,” *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *Heraldo de la Revolución* (Manila)], Jan. 18, 1899, 3; “The Filipino Commission to the United States,” *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 5, 1899, 2; Ludovico [pseud.], “The Philippines,” *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *Shanghai Daily Press*], Dec. 15, 1898, 3; Apolinario Mabini, “The Philippine Republic,” *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 26, 1898, 2; “Philippine Autonomy,” *Singapore Free Press*, Mar. 19, 1899, 3.

¹¹⁷ Howard W. Bray, “American Behavior in the Philippines,” To the Editor, *Singapore Free Press*, Feb. 7, 1899, 2. For the reply by a British reader, see “A local correspondent writes....,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Feb. 8, 1899, 2.

¹¹⁸ Dr. Brown Riseux Legnez, “An American View of General Otis’ Proclamation,” *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 24, 1899, 3.

To conclude, another thesis the Hong Kong Junta and its British sympathizers asserted was that the Philippine Occupation violated America's supposed republican core values. They became central to their propaganda, knowing that anti-imperialist groups spread these same arguments inside the U.S. Their use is prominent in an editorial published after General Elwell Otis released the proclamation in January 1899 that declared American sovereignty in the Philippines and avoided recognizing the revolutionary government. St. Clair denounced that Filipinos were trying to do what the New England States did in 1775. Prohibiting such a course was betraying the cause of liberty and becoming the imposers of an alien rule, "possibly well-meaning, but quite incapable of understanding how hopelessly destructive of all future good influence this course implies."¹¹⁹ On another occasion, he stated that "the natural rights of man, of nationality, the unity of Republican principles, the equality and fraternity of democratic institutions, are requested, by the United States, to go to the devil." He defended that it was only in the Philippine side where "real civilization, real love for liberty, a real regard for the integrity of Republican principle" lay, not "in the side of the *soi-disant* liberators."¹²⁰

Citing some of their thoughts and emphasizing the anti-imperialists' influence in the U.S., St. Clair was also insinuating there was hope for stopping McKinley's occupation and establishing the Protectorate "they had advocated since the beginning." It did not imply any vicious alternation of the fundamental principles of the U.S. Constitution, supported Hoar's policy of non-intrusion, provided the U.S. with "a point d'appui for proper influence in the Far East," and yet preserved to "the National Filipino government their entire freedom and self-respect as to domestic administration."¹²¹

¹¹⁹ "Every true...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 6, 1899, 2. See also "The curious...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 13, 1898, 2.

¹²⁰ "The die is cast...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 10, 1899, 2.

¹²¹ "We are all...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 11, 1899, 2. Also, "There is one phrase...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 12, 1899, 2; "We understand...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 20, 1899, 2.

Conclusion

The examination of the English-language Pacific Press reveals an apparent influence from the Philippine civilization campaign. The analyzed newspapers accepted their arguments with very different enthusiasm, but all of them recognized the strength of the Philippine Republic. However, even their closest sympathizers never supported their total independence. Instead, they advocated for setting an American protectorate in the islands using the British example of colonialism.

Welcoming their arrival to the Pacific in the context of the Great Rapprochement, some of the studied British press tried to show “their American cousins” that it was the proper arrangement by working as loudspeakers of the Philippine propaganda. They praised the organization and effectiveness of the Philippine Republic for proving it deserved recognition as a legitimate interlocutor to design the future of the archipelago, even though it had to remain under strict American guidance.

After procrastinating during the whole war and even the Peace Negotiations, the U.S. failed to recognize them, and the examined journals adopted a highly critical attitude towards the American management of the situation. In particular, through the pages of the *Singapore Free Press*, William St. Clair participated and reproduced the attempts that Chesney Duncan and Howard Bray, press-representative and general adviser of the Philippine Junta, made to denounce the media misrepresentation of the Filipinos as savages and tried hard to correct those portraits. Considering how strong the argument about Filipino's supposed inability for self-government and their aggressive attitude towards the U.S. was for American expansionists, throwing the opposite views through the news channels was a genuinely revolutionary weapon.

From Freedom Fighters to *Banditti***The Pacific-based British Press' Response to the Philippine-American War**

The chapter analyzes how the Pacific-based British press reacted to the Philippine-American War. In particular, it inquires if the effective reception of the Filipino civilization campaign in the studied media during the 1898 war—presented in the previous chapter—evolved once the Philippine Republic resisted the occupation of Great Britain's "American cousins," first by challenging the U.S. Army in a regular war and, between 1900 and 1902, by turning into guerrilla warfare.

This research expounds that, during 1899, the newspapers studied can be divided between the *China Mail*, which adopted a radical pro-American stance, and the *Hong Kong Daily Press*, the *Hong Kong Telegraph*, and especially the *Singapore Free Press*, who kept including Filipino voices in their coverage of events. Despite this difference, all these newspapers paid close attention to the conflict, and defended that the Philippine Republic and the U.S. authorities could reach a diplomatic solution by erecting a protectorate, following British models of colonialism, and avoid further violence and instability.

When the Filipino army split in December 1899 and turned to guerrilla warfare, the coverage of the war decreased. Several attempts of negotiations and confrontations dispersed around the archipelago substituted impressive episodes like the naval battle of Cavite or the Spanish surrender in Manila, and media attention diverted towards breaking news in South Africa and China. Still, the Philippine Republic and the Hong Kong Junta managed to inspire defenses of its resistance to the U.S. occupation in some of the studied press. Again, the scarce comments that the media dedicated to the Philippine Question emphasized the need to halt the hostilities and establish a protectorate.

After Emilio Aguinaldo's capture, in March 1901, until the formal ending of the war in July 1902, accusations of the American army's misbehavior in the Philippines enraged the U.S. media. By contrast, all critical information against the U.S. occupation in the Philippines disappeared from the pages British editors published in Asia. They supported the American efforts to finish Filipino resistance permanently, which, contrarily to their earlier portraits, they showed now as an illegitimate insurrection.

The chapter argues that this change in tone mainly resulted from the studied editors' position towards its own empire's commitments and troubles. Although they were aware of the British Empire's interests in the Anglo-American Rapprochement already from 1898, the studied newspapers still had been free to criticize their cousins' clumsy conquest of the Philippines. What changed between 1901 and 1902 was that this press was defending tooth and nail the British army in South Africa from very similar accusations of violating the laws of warfare. In their defenses of the methods that Great Britain was employing to defeat the Boer resistance, they established evident parallelisms between the respective campaigns in which both sides of the Anglo-Saxon brotherhood fought.

1. Defending the Philippine Republic against U.S. Aggression in 1899

Between the outbreak of the war between the American Eight Army corps and the Philippine Republic's forces on February 4, and until mid-1899, the studied Hong Kong and Singapore press published a large amount of information about it. All the newspapers offered editorial comments and constant updates on the situation around the islands thanks to Reuters and special telegram services, long war correspondents' chronicles, and private accounts from witnesses that arrived at their ports. At the same time, the Hong Kong Junta and its British allies, Howard W. Bray, Chesney Duncan, and William St. Clair, continued their intense efforts of the previous months to model observers' opinions of the Philippine Question.

First, they kept defending the organization and behavior of the Philippine Republic and the cordiality with which they had tried to relate with the Americans and attacked the distortion that this image was suffering in the media. Second, they accused the

American authorities of pursuing a war of conquest while trying to present themselves as liberators and blamed them for failing to arrive at a diplomatic solution. Finally, they also denounced the harsh methods the U.S. Army was employing.

Just like during previous phases of the revolution, however, the media reacted differently to that information. Generally, we can divide the press between the *Singapore Free Press*, again, the most outspoken advocate of the Filipino civilization campaign, the *Hong Kong Daily Press*, and the *Hong Kong Telegraph*, who agreed and reproduced some of the Filipino messages, and finally, the *China Mail*, the fiercest critic of the revolutionary government.

As expected, the majority of Filipino views of the war appeared in the *Singapore Free Press* in the form of William St. Clair's editorials, "special telegrams received from Hong Kong," messages manifestly written by Filipino revolutionaries, and, occasionally, texts from foreign observers that sympathized with the Filipino cause.¹ As it did not have any professional correspondents in the islands, this newspaper also reprinted chronicles by other regional papers.

St. Clair was aware of each publications' attitude toward the Filipinos. For example, the *Free Press* noticed: "it isn't often that our friend the *China Mail* raises its face from its self-appointed task of polishing the Transatlantic top-boots."² Still, it reprinted some of this newspaper content that did not betray his editorial line, like accurate depictions of

¹ The media content analysis reveals that the *Singapore Free Press & Mercantile Advertiser* [henceforth, *Singapore Free Press*], and probably, William St. Clair, published at least 41 editorials about Filipino matters between February and June 1899. See, for example, the editorials published on Feb. 7, Feb. 8, Feb. 16, Feb. 17, Feb. 23, Mar. 27, Apr. 13, Apr. 24, and May 26. For "special telegrams received from Hong Kong" and other critical short news and reports, see "The Fighting at Manila," Feb. 11, 1899, 2; "The Outbreak of Hostilities," Feb. 24, 1899, 2; "The Real Situation at Manila," Mar. 6, 1899, 2; "'Freedom', an American...", May 15, 1899, 2; "The Philippines. A Gloomy State of Affairs," Jun. 3, 1899, 2. For texts manifestly written by Filipinos or their supporters, see Howard W. Bray and a Reputed Filipino, "American Behaviour in the Philippines," Feb. 7, 1899, 2; "How Hostilities Commenced," Mar. 3, 1899, 3; "Latest Proclamation of General Aguinaldo," Mar. 4, 1899, 3; "Manifesto to the Filipino People," reprinted from *Heraldo Filipino*, Mar. 7, 1899, 3; Howard W. Bray, "A True Account of Aguinaldo," Apr. 5, 1899, 2.

² "It isn't often that our friend...", *Singapore Free Press*, May 17, 1899, 2.

battles, interviews, troops' movements, or texts that precisely highlighted American disorganization or blunders. It did the same with the *Daily Press* content.³

When these news led St. Clair to recognize how Filipinos faced several difficulties and defeats, he added his own opinions on the matter and showed respect for their efforts while condemning U.S. actions in the islands. An example of such comments that condenses many of the ideas defended in the paper during the whole year appeared on July 7, following the fake news that Emilio Aguinaldo had been murdered in revenge for General Antonio Luna's death, who had been executed as a result of internal disputes.⁴

Retrieving one of the core civilization campaign's ideas, the text began by stating how difficult it was to know how far the Philippines' reported news were true and, if true, how far they were "represented in its proper perspective or proportion in relation to the general course of events." Next, the writer recognized that if Aguinaldo was dead after Luna's decease, Filipino resistance to American arms "must be almost hopelessly compromised by the disappearance of its two leading figures." Still, hinting that most of the local population supported the revolution, he argued that, besides other known leaders, the revolution had "a practically inexhaustible recruiting field to draw on."

The editorial moved on to denounce, "in common with nearly any intelligent on-looker of all nationalities," that the Philippine-American conflict was the product of the U.S. authorities' "sheer military and political stupidity." In addition, going back to the criticisms against media misrepresentation, the author added that "all the ornate flatulence of Transatlantic journalism in recounting the feats of the boys in blue shooting down the Filipinos on Philippine soil" would confuse historians understand "the irrational slaughter of Admiral Dewey's faithful friends and allies."

³ As examples of content in the *Singapore Free Press* reprinted from other papers, see "America and the Philippines," reprinted from *China Mail* (Hong Kong), Apr. 5, 1899, 3; "America and the Philippines," reprinted from *China Mail*, Apr. 20, 1899, 3; "America and the Philippines," reprinted from *China Mail*, Jun. 9, 1899, 3; "The Situation in the Philippines," reprinted from *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jun. 16, 1899, 3; "The Situation in the Philippines," reprinted from *China Mail*, Jun. 20, 1899, 3.

⁴ "Concerning news...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jul. 7, 1899, 2. The following paragraphs also comment on that text.

According to St. Clair, this Admiral's management of the situation and his close relationship and collaboration with the Filipinos led to the capitulation of the Spaniards of Manila, which had been a "soft job." After signaling that cooperation—as previously stated, one of the many reasons Filipinos alleged to prove they deserved to be recognized as belligerents—the writer denounced how Americans had betrayed their old Filipino allies, whom they saw as "'niggers' with rifles," and taught them that they had been "sold the largest breed of pup by the United States military commanders." Finally, the editor attacked the hypocrisy of the American "Benevolent Assimilation" and all the violence it brought with it:

The 'humane liberator' and 'modern knight errant' soon vanished, and the astounded Filipinos soon had to learn what it was to be manhandled by the American gentlemen from 'God's Own Country.' And from that time till now the sport which American soldiers and journalists call the 'jack-rabbit hunt' has gone on with fluctuating results. Even if it ends now, the history of the occupation of the Philippines will have a nasty taste in the mouth of any American observer of affairs in whom resides a remnant of right judgement and right feeling. And yet they talk of the 'insurgents' and 'rebels' as though the people of the Philippines had once been full-fledged American citizens and had cast off allegiance to the 'stars-and-stripes.'⁵

Although their editors' criticisms against the American management of the campaign were not as brutal as St. Clair's ones, the *Daily Press* and the *Telegraph* agreed with some of this newspaper's ideas. Both Hong Kong newspapers covered the war combining texts by American journals in Manila and other by pro-expansionist authors with Filipino proclamations and chronicles by their own on-site correspondents, who also challenged racist stereotypes of Filipino capacities.

⁵ "Concerning news." Along the same lines, see also "The Roman Church in the Philippines," Special Telegram, *Singapore Free Press*, Apr. 5, 1899, 2; "A special telegram...", editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Apr. 13, 1899, 2; "The proclamation of the U.S. Philippine Commission," *Singapore Free Press*, Apr. 22, 1899, 3.

For example, right after the outbreak of hostilities, the *Daily Press* published many telegrams from American newspapers or from observers in the islands that blamed Filipinos of having started the war. They warned, among other accusations, that American soldiers had suffered Filipino insolence and affronts, that Filipinos had been visibly preparing for attacking, and, once combats began, that the natives were not respecting the laws of warfare. In one account, they even accused the natives of behaving as cannibals against the American troops.⁶

By contrast, the same newspaper soon published the chronicle “Filipino Account of the Hostilities at Manila,” which aimed to contradict the “semi-official American” *Manila Times*’ accusations that the Filipinos had caused the final clash of February 4. It argued that the Americans had planned the attack with the final goal of pushing the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in the U.S. Senate, which had to be voted on February 6, by convincingly detailing the succession of events and the position of the troops. In addition, the text returned the accusations of misbehavior to the U.S. Army.

On this occasion, the *Daily Press* clarified that the text, signed in Tagalog by a “Friend of the country,” had been handed to them for publication, and they had decided to publish it “on the principle of giving a fair hearing to all parties.” However, it warned that “something much stronger than an *ex parti* statement will be required to induce the public to credit the allegations made against the Americans.”⁷ Regardless of this initial reticence, during the following months, it published many more texts by the Hong Kong Junta or its sympathizers.⁸

⁶ “Affairs in Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 9, 1899, 2; “The Fighting at Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 13, 1899, 2; “An Incident of the Fighting at Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 14, 1899, 2; “Iloilo Taken,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 15, 1899, 2. For later examples, see James Creelman, “Traitors at Home Urge on Filipinos,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Apr. 21, 1899, 2; “Affairs in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], Jun. 16, 1899, 2. For similar accounts in the *Telegraph* see From Our Own Correspondent [henceforth, Correspondent], “War in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Feb. 13, 1899, 3.

⁷ Kaibigan Nañg Bayan (In English, “Friend of the Country”), “Filipino Account of the Hostilities at Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 15, 1899, 2. Interestingly, other chronicles not signed by sympathizers of the Filipinos included depictions of the war that also portrayed extreme violence committed by both sides. See Correspondent, “The Fighting in Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 14, 1899, 2; Correspondent, “The War in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 18, 1899, 2.

⁸ For example, “Philippine Affairs,” Correspondence, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 7, 1899, 2; Chesney Duncan, “A Distorted Telegram,” Correspondence, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 8, 1899, 2; Chesney Duncan, “The Intended Government of the Philippines,” Correspondence, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar.

Besides those Philippine sources, their “own correspondents” in the islands were critical of the American campaign as well. On the one hand, they clearly denied the American authorities’ proclamations about the war being close to an end and criticized different aspects of their management, like press censorship or the contradictions of the “Benevolent Assimilation.” For example, on its coverage of the 4th of July in Manila, the *Daily Press* noticed the irony of the reading of the American Declaration of Independence:

In view of the harping that is being done on Anglo-American alliances and blood and water comparisons, it can hardly be pleasant for either party to have a person read to the assemblage: ‘The history of repeated injuries and usurpation... He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burned our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people’ etc. etc. It would be rather odd if some of these phrases were found in Aguinaldo's next proclamations; but that has nothing to do with the Fourth in Manila. [...] It was a peculiar scene, unusual and odd in many ways. There were numbers of native children, carrying American flags and being drilled in American songs, while perhaps half of their brothers and fathers are out on the lines potting away at the American defences. [...] But then this is an odd war anyway, and people who know are not surprised at anything.⁹

At the same time, these observers did not always convey a racialized and stereotyped image of the revolutionary forces, but increasingly portrayed their resistance as brave and challenging. A British doctor wrote a long example of this attitude. He traveled with “his American friends,” and hoped Filipinos would soon realize that the Americans were not like the Spaniards. Still, he said it was impossible not to sympathize with those

9, 1899, 2; “Agoncillo Denies that He Instigated Hostilities,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 17, 1899, 2; “The Filipino Leaders,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, May 30, 1899, 2. For cases in the *Telegraph*, see “A Challenge for General Otis,” *Hong Kong Telegraph* [reprinted from *Morning Post* (London)], Mar. 17, 1899, 2; “The Filipino Representatives in Tokyo,” *Hong Kong Telegraph* [reprinted from the *Kokumin* (Tokyo)], Mar. 24, 1899, 3; “Agoncillo in England,” Notes from Home Papers, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Apr. 14, 1899, 3.

⁹ Correspondent, “Independence Day in Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jul. 10, 1899, 2.

“*indios*,” and praised their bravery in facing a much stronger enemy and the ordeal they were going through for freedom.¹⁰

Finally, both newspapers, like the *Free Press*, published many pieces of news about the increasing unease in America with the war and, in particular, about the activities of the Anti-imperialist movement. That included comments from U.S. newspapers that also recognized the strength of the Philippine resistance.¹¹

Resulting from all this information, both the *Daily Press* and the *Telegraph* editorials during the spring and summer were very critical of the American handling of the occupation, recognized that Filipinos were strengthening and showing abilities for self-government, and kept pressing for an understanding between both parts. For example, after negotiations between the U.S. commissioners and the revolutionary government failed on April 30, the *Telegraph* editorial stated:

The United States, we are told, are now busily bringing the blessings of a free and republican government to the Philipinos. At least that is supposed to be the reason for subduing the Philippines. But the Philipinos, apparently do not want to be liberated any more than they have been, and are quite ready and willing to look after themselves and to dispense with the aid of the United States except as a protecting Power. If all that the Americans aim at is the establishment of an independent government under the protection of the United States, it does not appear to us that it is worthwhile to waste such a large amount of money and

¹⁰ Surgeon R.N., “The War in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Apr. 13, 1899, 2. For more examples of chronicles that nuance the British support for the American campaign and show respect for the Filipino cause, see Correspondent, “The War in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 15, 1899, 2; Correspondent, “Aguinaldo on the Rostrum,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jul. 28, 1899, 2. For examples of warnings that the situation was far from over, see “The Situation in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jun. 9, 1899, 2; Correspondent, “Affairs in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Aug. 12, 1899, 2. For examples in the *Telegraph*, see “The War in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Mar. 15, 1899, 2; Correspondent, “The War in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Mar. 20, 1899, 3. For criticisms against Otis, see Correspondent, “Affairs in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Aug. 28, 1899, 2.

¹¹ See, among many others, “America and the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Mar. 2, 1899, 2; “The Fighting Filipinos Win Respect,” *The Australian Mail*, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Apr. 22, 1899, 3; “‘Empire’ in Law and Morals,” *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *New York World*], May 12, 1899, 3; “The Hon. John Barrett on the Boston Anti-Imperialists,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Aug. 3, 1899, 2; “A Philippine Parallel,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *San Francisco Star*], Aug. 8, 1899, 2; “The President on Otis’ Conduct of the Campaign,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Aug. 9, 1899, 2.

such hundreds of lives in fighting a people whom they are apparently so anxious to befriend. It would be far cheaper, and, we believe, far more satisfactory to a very large proportion of the people of the United States, were honourable terms arranged with the Philipinos and this war which can certainly bring no glory to the American nation; brought to a satisfactory close.¹²

Finally, from all the newspapers analyzed, the *China Mail* was the most outspoken pro-American.¹³ Its coverage of the first months of the war stands out because its correspondent, Thomas H. Reid, who had already covered Admiral Dewey's victory at Cavite in May 1898, sent several chronicles under the headline "America and the Philippines."¹⁴ Given that he also worked for the *New York Herald*, it is not surprising how many of them exalted American troops' courage, reported heroic moments, and showed full conviction in the American Benevolent Assimilation.¹⁵

At the same time, both in its chronicles and other editorial comments, the *China Mail* despised the revolutionary government and also the Hong Kong Junta. The newspaper accused the Republic of being a disorganized minority of ambitious Tagalogs

¹² "Liberation or Extermination?" Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, May 30, 1899, 2. Also, "The news wired..." Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Feb. 8, 1899, 2; "Reuter has told..." Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Feb. 13, 1899, 2; "The United States..." editorial, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Mar. 2, 1899, 2; "In a recent issue..." Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Mar. 30, 1899, 3; "The Philippine Commission," Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Apr. 11, 1899, 2. As for the *Hong Kong Daily Press*, see "The proclamation issued..." editorial, Apr. 11, 1899, 2; "A telegram in the..." editorial, Jul. 25, 1899, 2.

¹³ As an example of the few criticisms this newspaper dedicated to the Americans during 1899, see "The Press Censor in the Philippines," *China Mail*, Dec. 5, 1899, 3.

¹⁴ See Chapter 3, 134-136. We know that he was the correspondent of the *China Mail* in the Philippines because they identified him in "Fighting at Manila," *China Mail*, Feb. 13, 1899, 3. Also, in a brief comment on March 4, the *China Mail* announced the following: "Mr. Thomas H. Reid, our special correspondent in the Philippines, has gone down to Negros with the expedition which left Manila on March 1" ("Mr. Thomas..." *China Mail*, Mar. 4, 1899, 2). After both moments, chronicles from the Philippines appeared under the signatures "From Our Own Correspondent" or "From Our Own Correspondent with the U.S. Army" [henceforth indicated as "Correspondent"]. As that was the only signature that appeared, however, we cannot confirm that at some other point, Reid was replaced by another journalist.

¹⁵ Among others Correspondent, "America and the Philippines," *China Mail*, Mar. 1, 1899, 3; Correspondent, "America and the Philippines," *China Mail*, Mar. 3, 1899, 3; Correspondent, "America and the Philippines," *China Mail*, Mar. 21, 1899, 3; Correspondent, "America and the Philippines," *China Mail*, Apr. 6, 1899, 3.

misleading the ignorant masses, whom they considered willing to accept American rule and desirous to recover peace.¹⁶

As for the Hong Kong Junta, the *China Mail* described it as an irresponsible body of Filipino refugees aided by one or two British subjects, with no legal standing and no local recognition who “favored the *Singapore Free Press* and the Associated Press.” The writer accused the Junta of having “a vivid imagination which enables it to distort facts, or, if necessary, to misrepresent happenings in the neighborhood of Manila[,] a fashion that would rupture the ordinary conscience.” As it circulated “extraordinary reports” in England and America, it considered it a very serious affair, and celebrated that “there is only one Junta among us—for which mercy may Heaven be thanked.”¹⁷

Consequently, the *China Mail* rarely reprinted this organ’s messages, and, when it shared proclamations by Aguinaldo or other revolutionary leaders, it often did it with critical comments.¹⁸ Another contrast with the previous newspapers analyzed is that it tended to be critical of the anti-imperialists and reprinted opinion from the U.S. that favored American expansion.¹⁹

¹⁶ For criticisms of the Philippine Revolutionary Government, see Correspondent, “America and the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Apr. 11, 1899, 3; “The Philippines for the Filipinos,” *China Mail* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], Apr. 28, 1899, 3; “Insurgents in Negros,” News in Brief, *China Mail*, Jul. 17, 1899, 3; “Aguinaldo Orates,” *China Mail*, Jul. 27, 1899, 3.

¹⁷ Inquirer, “Who or What is a Hongkong Philippine Junta?” Correspondence, *China Mail*, Apr. 27, 1899, 3. Also, “It is incredible that Aguinaldo...,” *China Mail*, Mar. 30, 1899, 3; “Aguinaldo’s Agents at Hongkong...,” *China Mail*, Mar. 30, 1899, 3; “Filipino Confidence in the Americans,” *China Mail*, Jul. 10, 1899, 3; “The Filipino Patriotic Fund,” *China Mail*, Jul. 19, 1899, 3; “Isabelo Artacho in Hongkong[sic],” *China Mail*, Jul. 18, 1899, 3.

¹⁸ As an example of those comments, see Correspondent, “America and the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Apr. 29, 1899, 3.

¹⁹ In one of the few cases of support for the anti-imperialist movement, the editors clarified: “The Richmond Times of 89th[sic] January last publishes the following vigorous letter from our old friend Colonel Mosby, who will be remembered by many residents here as one of the most honest and energetic American Consuls that Hongkong has seen. The views of the Gallant Colonel are perhaps not in line with those generally favored here, but they are well worth perusal, and they show how high the feeling has run in the States against forcible annexation.” See “Reasons against Annexation,” *China Mail*, Mar. 18, 1899, 3.

Despite all of this, it is interesting to note that its correspondent, Thomas H. Reid, did recognize that Filipino leaders had tried to earn the respect of the “civilized world,” and pointed out that he still “hoped for a peaceful solution to the problem.” He connected both ideas in his chronicle from March 6, when the Filipino government tried to get control of Manila.²⁰ Following his pro-American hagiographic accounts, Reid praised the American military superiority, which would allow them to “smash” the rebels and hopefully end the campaign soon. Next, he admitted that, “by their restraint after great provocation, the Filipinos earned, and justly earned, the respect and admiration of the civilized world in the brief campaign against the Spanish forces.”²¹

He lamented, though, that recent episodes in their fight against the U.S. were “alienating a great deal of the respect for Aguinaldo and his followers.” According to Reid, it was only because of the splendid work of American generals and vigilance that the city had been “saved from total destruction and the foreign residents from a coldblooded massacre.” Still, his personal knowledge of some Filipino leaders led him to defend both Aguinaldo and General Teodoro Sandiko from the accusation of having ordered the slaughter of all “white-faces.”²²

Had it occurred, it would have at once raised the whole of the forces of civilization against the Philippine section of the Malay race, as did the terrible Mutiny of India forty years ago. I know Sandico personally, and had formed a very high opinion of his intelligence and good intentions, and it is therefore astonishing to me that his name should appear on such document and whatever private evidence may be held at headquarters, I cannot believe that Sandico, or even Aguinaldo, would have preached a war of extermination against foreigners in the Philippines. [...] I think it is my duty to record my disbelief in this allegation of brutal savagery amongst the Filipino leaders. Sandico's name must have been used as a means of stirring up the disaffected native element; and in

²⁰ Correspondent, “America and the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Mar. 6, 1899, 3. The following two pages elaborate on this same text.

²¹ To see how the *China Mail*, which Thomas H. Reid edited since 1894, had recognized the Philippine civilization campaign in 1897, see Chapter 2, 108–117.

²² President McKinley used this rumor as a demonstration of the bloodthirstiness of the population from the islands. See Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 147.

spite of the allegation that the handwriting has been identified as Sandico's, I still refuse to believe that my old friend is guilty of the charges made against him. I may be mistaken in my advocacy. It may be that Sandico is no better than the men in the rebel side but, it is, in my opinion, an insult to Sandico's intelligence to assert that he issued this bloodthirsty order when he must know perfectly well its successful accomplishment would bring down upon the Filipino cause the execrations of Christendom, and led to a retaliatory war, if not extermination, at any rate of ruthless prosecution of the leaders and their ultimate execution.

This exoneration of the Filipino leaders, and manifesting their aim to be recognized as civilized and to avoid a racial clash like 1857 Indian Rebellion —perfectly known to his British audiences—, allowed Reid to defend that, in order to prevent such “war of extermination,” “all parties should endeavor to take a dispassionate survey of the neutral facts and to assist in bringing about a peaceful settlement along the lines dictated by utilitarian and humanitarian principles.”

Again, as he and all the rest of newspapers analyzed did, the journalist compelled the U.S. to follow the British example by saying that “experience in other Asiatic and semi-civilized countries teaches us that initial hostility does not necessarily imply the extermination of the weaker race.” He thought that “firmness, combined with gentleness, upright administration and the recognition of native customs, will speedily conquer a race, and bring about peace and contentment, and a return to industry and prosperity.”²³

²³ Correspondent, “America and the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Mar. 6, 1899, 1. Reid interviewed his “old friend” Antonio G. Escamillo, arrested by the American authorities in Manila after the beginning of the war for supposedly being the secretary or translator for Aguinaldo, which also allowed him to offer a more nuanced view of some revolutionaries. See Correspondent, “America and the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Mar. 2, 1899, 3.



Figure 13. Portrait of Thomas H. Reid. Retrieved from Arnold Wright's *Twentieth century impressions of HongKong, Shanghai, and other Treaty Ports of China* (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain Publishing Company, 1908), 257.

Reid defended the same capability of finding a diplomatic arrangement with the Filipinos by praising those that had already accepted American sovereignty. U.S. authorities were already trying to establish political collaborations with the minority of *ilustrados* and wealthy Filipinos who did not want outright annexation of the Philippines by the United States, but advocated Philippine autonomy under an American protectorate. Although many of these most famous contacts took place in occupied Manila, they also established them with prominent Negrenses, led by José Luzuriaga.²⁴

When the American expedition traveled to Negros, Reid joined it, and Luzuriaga asked him to write for the newspaper *La Libertad*. There, this British journalist acted as a loudspeaker of the Benevolent Assimilation and justified the Filipino *americanistas'* decisions. He defended that by “taking a strong stand for enlightened government,” invoking the aid of the United States, and not associating “themselves with the ill-advised revolutionary movement,” Filipinos would soon enjoy “an enormous prosperity,” and “work out their own destiny and reach a high place among the nations of the world.”²⁵

²⁴ M. Cullinane, *Ilustrado Politics*.

²⁵ “The Philippines,” *China Mail* [reprinted from *La Libertad* (Bacolod, Negros)], Mar. 20, 1899, 3.

To summarize, the first months of the Philippine-American War maintained the Comité Revolucionario Filipino and its British allies trying to influence the regional public opinion. Although the different papers reacted differently, they managed to publicly denounce the U.S. hypocrisy, the smearing campaign against the First Philippine Republic, the American Army misbehavior in the islands, and the Anti-Imperialist sentiment in the U.S. Moreover, even the editor and correspondent of its most hostile detractor, the *China Mail*, recognized that they had been the Revolution's leaders tried to maintain a civilized behavior, which left some space to try to find a negotiated solution to the problem, which was their shared ultimate desire.

All that attention in the Hong Kong and Singapore press began to decrease during the fall and until the Philippine government's organized resistance broke at the end of 1899. Both the *China Mail* and the *Daily Press* celebrated in their New Year's editorials the restoration of peace in the Philippine Islands.²⁶ As the *Daily Press'* correspondent had warned, however, it was too early to celebrate a complete pacification. In his chronicle of December 8, the reporter narrated how Aguinaldo kept "fighting against heavy odds." With heroic tone, he explained that the General had lost his little girl, his wife was sick, had "consigned his three-year-old son to the care of a faithful nurse, and made a last dash for liberty." At that point, the country was full of rumors, and according to the correspondent, "here and there natives will swear that they saw Aguinaldo yesterday, that he rode on a great white horse and went swiftly," like a legendary character.

Exemplifying again the regional's recognition of the Philippine Republic, he explained that "the splendidly organized Insurgent Government" was "scattered to the four winds" after the American fall operations. "All indications point[ed] to the complete demoralization of the insurgent army," and it seemed almost certain that there would never be "a well-organized Government to oppose the Americans again," as "the fabric of government is[was] shattered and the Insurgents will[would] never be allowed to rest long enough to set the ponderous wheels of government in motion."

²⁶ "Once again..." editorial, *China Mail*, Dec. 30, 1899, 4; "The opening..." editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jan. 1, 1900, 2.

He anticipated that Congress would meet in Washington and would be told that the insurrection was over, which, according to the writer, seemed to be true at that moment. Still, he warned that Aguinaldo was free, his Generals were still loyal to him, and there were troops scattered through the islands: “experience has taught us the remarkable recuperative powers of the little brown men, and though the rebellion seems for the moment crushed and dead it may revive when least expected.”²⁷

2. Fighting continues, but attention diverts in 1900

After the Revolutionary government’s dismemberment, news about the conflict drastically reduced. Such decrease of attention is comprehensible considering the cycle of the media. On the one hand, as months went by, combats in the Philippines turned into an apparently unending and complex succession of clashes scattered around the islands between the American army and the revolutionary forces, now fighting as guerrillas. As the *Telegraph* stated in March 1900, the war “still appeared as far from being satisfactorily settled as ever.”²⁸

At the same time, other events became more newsworthy. As the same *Telegraph* text noted, “with the war going on in South Africa one is rather apt to lose sight of other matters in face of the all-absorbing topic, but still we must not forget that there are other questions awaiting settlement which although not so nearly touching us as the South African problem, yet are of surpassing interest to those concerned.”²⁹ In June, as the *Daily Press* acknowledged, both the “Boer War, the Philippine insurrection, and all other military and naval affairs are shelved while interest is daily growing in the crisis that is generally reported to be approaching in North China,” the Boxer Rebellion.³⁰

²⁷ Correspondent, “The Climax of the Philippine Insurrection,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 8, 1899, 2. The *Daily Press* correspondent also talked about the end of the insurrection in his narrative of the death of the famous General Henry Lawton. That one is a prototypical piece of sensationalism, with lively and raw depictions of the battle scene. See Correspondent, “Major General Lawton Killed at San Mateo,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 25, 1899, 2.

²⁸ “The Philippine Question,” Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Mar. 7, 1900, 2.

²⁹ “The Philippine Question.”

³⁰ Correspondent, “Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jun. 16, 1900, 2.

Still, sharing the *Telegraph*'s opinion that Philippine matters were "one of those questions of surpassing interest," although with less frequency, all the newspapers analyzed kept reporting about the situation in islands.³¹ They did it mainly through the *Manila Times*, Reuters, and other British and American press, where criticisms of the American occupation were growing.³² In addition, the *Daily Press* and, with less frequency, the *China Mail* kept publishing chronicles from correspondents in Manila.³³

These same sources were also the most common ones in the *Singapore Free Press*, the most important provider of Philippine voices until that moment. Although this kind of content reduced substantially, some of the *Free Press* editorials and occasional publications from Filipino leaders, which also appeared in the *Hong Kong Telegraph*, manifested that St. Clair maintained its links with the Republic's foreign propaganda.

In this new context of guerrilla war, the Hong Kong Junta was still functioning, but had less impact on the studied media context. The American military attaché in Peking, Lt. Col. John S. Mallory, warned the authorities that the Junta still bought arms to continue the war. Despite his approaches to the British authorities to avoid it, on November 29, he informed of his discussion with the Governor of Hong Kong the following way:

The Governor was very decidedly of the opinion that it would be impossible for his government to comply with a request from the [...] United States for the suppression of the Junta in Hong Kong, or to resort to any measures in that direction unless the Junta or members of it should be convicted of a violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, whose contingency he thought highly improbable. [...] He also said that some inquiries he had caused to be made tended to show that at this time the Junta is quite inactive and the members widely scattered.³⁴

³¹ "The Philippine Question," Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Mar. 7, 1900, 2.

³² As examples of U.S. anti-imperialist opinions, see "The Philippine War," *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *San Francisco Call*], Jun. 22, 1900, 3; "Hoar and Aguinaldo," *China Mail*, May 29, 1900, 2.

³³ For examples, see Correspondent, "Manila," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 13, 1900, 2; Correspondent, "Commercial Conditions in Panay," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 17, 1900, 5; Correspondent, "Manila," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jun. 6, 1900, 2; Correspondent, "Manila," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 10, 1900, 3; Correspondent, "Manila," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 8, 1900, 3.

³⁴ Cited in Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic*, 321. Also, the *China Mail* reprinted a telegram from Washington dated November 25 that informed about the British denial to suppress the Filipino Junta

Indeed, the analysis of the Anglo-Asian press supports that the Junta had a lower media echo. This can be explained, first, because some important characters of the media campaign in the region had left Hong Kong to pursue their propaganda efforts abroad. For example, Galicano Apacible, who, according to the Philippine Insurgent Records played an important role in the Junta's approaches to the press, left in May 1900 to work as a diplomat in Europe and America.³⁵

His efforts, and those of other Filipinos, most famously, Sixto and Clemencia López, focused on spreading their messages directly in the U.S., strengthening their relationships with the American Anti-Imperialists, and trying to influence the U.S. presidential elections of 1900 through propaganda and, at the same time, to increase guerrilla activity.³⁶ In this contest, the Philippine Republic hoped for a Democrat triumph due to his candidate William J. Bryan's anti-imperialist stance, and they hoped to evidence that resistance still continued in spite of the unfruitful efforts of McKinley's administration.

In addition, no more content appeared in the studied press from mid-1899 signed by its two official press representatives, Chesney Duncan and Howard W. Bray. Although it is possible that they kept collaborating with the Junta avoiding to autograph any texts, other evidences indicate that, at some point after 1899, they stopped working for them. In Chesney Duncan's case, in 1900 he covered the Boxer Rebellion for the *London Daily Mail* and, during the rest of that year, he worked as manager of the *Shanghai Daily Press*. It seems safe to assume that he had previously abandoned his position as the Junta's "General Adviser" and left Hong Kong.³⁷

at Hong Kong and stated that U.S. authorities "will insist that measures be taken to prevent the violation of neutrality." See "The Filipino Junta," Local and General, *China Mail*, Dec. 31, 1900, 2.

³⁵ For Apacible's trip to the Vatican and, later, to the U.S., see Alzona, *Galicano Apacible*, 82–125.

³⁶ On the Filipino attempts to influence the elections, both strengthening their guerrilla warfare and through propaganda and relationships with the Anti-Imperialists, see, among others, Ragsdale, "Coping with the Yankees," 304–9; Gates, "Philippine Guerrillas, American Anti-Imperialists, and the Election of 1900." For a debate on the actual impact of foreign affairs on the election, see Thomas A. Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 24, no. 1 (1937): 43–52. For Sixto and Clemencia López's activism in the U.S., see Eyot, *The Story of the Lopez Family*; Zwick, "The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity"; Prieto, "A Delicate Subject".

³⁷ King and Clarke, *Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers*, 124.

As for Howard W. Bray, Isabelo Artacho, an old member of the revolutionaries who quickly turned to support U.S. annexation and caused media scandals to the Junta, sued him for libel in August 1899.³⁸ That episode would justify that he stopped signing his texts in favor of the Philippine cause to avoid further problems. Texts under his name or the pseudonym *Deus et Libertas*, however, had stopped appearing before that episode.

Even if after stopping publishing under his name, Bray kept working with the Junta, the last available evidence found in this research of his collaboration with them dates from the end of 1899, when he requested the Philippine government a loan of 6.000 \$ to pursue business in North Borneo.³⁹ Although it is difficult to specify when Bray stopped working as press representative and left Hong Kong, in March 1902 he was already engaged in businesses in Labuan.⁴⁰

To summarize, in 1900 the media were more focused on the conflicts in South Africa and China and the Hong Kong Junta provided them of less information —due to its focus in the U.S. or to having lost some of its collaborators—. As a result, proclamations by the Revolutionary leaders, chronicles exposing their versions of events, or opinion articles defending their cause did not appear as often as previously in the Anglo-Asian press studied. Still, the occasional appearance of this kind of texts in the *Free Press* and the *Telegraph* show that the Republic still counted on them to publicize their positions.

An example of this is “the copy of the latest manifesto of General Emilio Aguinaldo,” which the *Free Press* received “through a private channel” in June 1900. As St. Clair stated in the editorial column of the paper, the proclamation had been suppressed “by the American press censor at Manila, and it is therefore possible that no other copy may obtain publicity.” The editor considered the proclamation “a high-spirited appeal to

³⁸ “Action for Alleged Libel,” *Overland China Mail*, Aug. 5, 1899, 6.

³⁹ Ragsdale, “Coping with the Yankees,” 280–81.

⁴⁰ American anti-imperialists Herbert Welsh and Senator George F. Hoar discussed in March 1902 summoning Bray to the Senate Investigations on the Philippines, and mentioned that he was living in Labuan, North Borneo. Herbert Welsh to George F. Hoar, March 3, 1902, George Frisbie Hoar Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Carton 87, Folder “Mar. 1–4.”

civilization,” and most of its content repeated once more the main goals of the Philippine civilization campaign.⁴¹

In the text, Aguinaldo reminded the humanitarian principles the Philippine government and army followed, and asked the people who had returned to civil life to “observe strict neutrality” in case “the imperialists attempted to enlist them,” and to resist “as long as there are any strangers in the land trying to enslave the Philippine people.” The leader criticized that Americans were also trying to infantilize that nation.⁴²

The editorial moved on to repeat that Filipinos had fairly and honorably earned their freedom establishing alliances and friendships with Admiral Dewey and American consuls in Hong Kong and Singapore. Aguinaldo announced that, as the Republic tried to remain loyal to that cordial relationship, he had set the imprisoned “sons of America” at liberty. Again, it used the topic of their treatment of prisoners as a sign of their respect for the laws of warfare.

Finally, Aguinaldo hoped that the great Democratic party would win in the next election, and tried to raise support reminding its audience that some Americans had joined their side and disapproved of “the war which Mr. Atkinson [a notable U.S. anti-imperialist] calls criminal aggression.” The text, therefore, exemplifies that, in their 1900 propaganda, the main topics Filipinos addressed were the presidential elections and the rise of anti-imperialism, both understood as potential sources of support.⁴³

⁴¹ “Through a private channel...,” *Singapore Free Press*, Jun. 27, 1900, 2.

⁴² “Aguinaldo’s Latest proclamation,” *Singapore Free Press*, Jun. 28, 1900, 3. The following paragraphs elaborate on this text.

⁴³ “Aguinaldo’s Latest Proclamation.” Other texts that demonstrate the continuance of the Filipino communication efforts and that St. Clair kept in personal touch with them or was interested in their messages are: “One good result...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Sep. 6, 1900, 2; “Mr. Mabini before the Taft Commission,” *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *Hong Kong Telegraph*], Sep. 14, 1900, 3; “The Comite Central Filipino...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Nov. 1, 1900, 2; “A Filipino Memorial to Pope Leo XIII,” *Singapore Free Press*, Nov. 17, 1900, 3. On their part, the *Daily Press* and the *China Mail* also published “Peace for the Filipinos,” *China Mail* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], Mar. 21, 1900, 3; Felipe Malolos, “Filipino Manifesto to the American People,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Chicago Record*], Dec. 17, 1900, 5.

With all these sources of information —American press reports from Manila, pieces from the U.K. and the U.S., chronicles from correspondents in the archipelago, and occasional Philippine proclamations— during 1900 all the newspapers analyzed, without exception, pointed out that, despite the McKinley administration’s efforts to claim that the war was almost over, resistance continued.⁴⁴

While the *Free Press* and the *Telegraph* harshly blamed American stupidity for the Philippines’ never-ending problems, the *Daily Press* and the *China Mail* were more critical towards Filipino’s stubbornness. They all agreed, however, that both sides were responsible. In some cases, far from criminalizing the Philippine guerrillas, they showed an evident admiration towards their continued resistance. Once more, they defended the need to establish a protectorate following British lines.

All these ideas appeared repeatedly, adapted to the editorial line of each paper in the fewer editorial comments they dedicated to the Philippines. Those texts appeared, as expected, surrounding those events that seemed to bring a change to the situation in the islands, especially, the arrival of the Second Philippine Commission, on June 3, and when commenting the prospects, and later, the results of the Presidential elections from November.

An example that stands out revolving the first event was an editorial from the *Telegraph*. Influenced by General Elwell Otis’ insistence that the war was at an end, President William McKinley sent the Second Philippine Commission, headed by William Howard Taft, with the purpose of establishing municipal and provincial administrations and leading the transfer of U.S. authority from the military to a civil government. It ought to assume legislative command in September 1900 and, from that moment, after each province was declared pacified, the army would cede its control to

⁴⁴ On American proclamations of the end of the war or surrenders by Filipino insurgents, see “The United States and the Philippines,” *China Mail*, Mar. 21, 1900, 3; “Surrenders of Filipino Insurgents,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], Mar. 22, 1900, 2. On the continuation of hostilities see, among others, Correspondent, “Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 29, 1900, 2; Correspondent, “Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jun. 6, 1900, 2; Correspondent, “Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 23, 1900, 3; Correspondent, “Manila,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 12, 1900, 3; Correspondent, “Commercial Conditions,” *China Mail*, Mar. 17, 1900, 5; “The Philippines,” *China Mail* [reprinted from the *London & China Mail Express*], Jun. 6, 1900, 3.

the commission. When this process finished, Taft would become the new governor of the Philippine Islands.⁴⁵

The *Telegraph's* editorial, however, showed skepticism. The newspaper defended that, to achieve peace, the Commission had to dialogue with Filipino leaders. They argued that American expansionists had tried “to deceive themselves and the people of the United States” by repeating that “the Filipino opposition to the American rule was not the action of the whole population, but of a very small section who were working for their own ends.” Instead, they defended the legitimacy and strength of the Republic in the following manner.⁴⁶

Events speak for themselves, however, and the most sanguine well-wisher of the United States cannot help but admit that though the whole power of the Republic has been brought to bear upon the so-called insurrection, yet it has not waned in intensity, but has rather gathered force with time, despite the fact that the resources of the people have been strained to the uttermost and they have had to bear all the horrors of war when submission would have meant peace. Therefore, say we, if the present Commission is to establish a stable government, which will not cost the United States millions of dollars and hundreds of lives, it must take the bull by the horns and obtain the views of the Filipino leaders.

Next, the text made clear that those leaders were not “the few who have for private reasons handed in their allegiance and who certain Americans are so fond of parading as the flower of the Filipino stock.” Instead, they defended the “true leaders whose dogged resistance to both Spanish and American control has earned for them the love and respect of their fellow countrymen and who, in spite of immense hardships, have so far successfully defied the power of the United States.”

Although they did it with a less exalted language, the rest of newspaper agreed in the idea that, citing the *Telegraph* again, the Commission could “not approach the Filipinos

⁴⁵ Linn, *The Philippine War 1899–1902*, 216.

⁴⁶ “The Philippine Commission,” Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, May 30, 1900, 2. The following paragraphs also elaborate on this text.

with the idea that it has nothing but a set of savages to deal with to whom it can lay down the law and teach what it considers best for the Filipinos.”⁴⁷ That led them to defend another of the mentioned common ideas that they kept spreading: that the U.S. had to negotiate a protectorate with the native leaders.

For example, in October of that year, the *China Mail* eloquently detailed that formula in a comment on a John Foreman’s article in the *National Review*. Foreman dedicated “some well-merited criticisms upon American methods in the Philippine Islands,” and reviewed the history of the conflict before suggesting a compromise between the belligerents, to which the editors explained their opinion. First, they discarded the option of giving independence to the Philippines. They justified that decision with the well-known arguments that, allegedly, independence would lead to internecine troubles, interference of rival powers, and loss of strategic and economic interests and of international prestige.⁴⁸

Also, they claimed that they could not continue the warfare until the Filipino, “like the Red Man of the west[,] approaches[d] extinction as complete as the dodo or the auk” because “the vast majority of the American people would protest against the continuance of hostilities.” In their opinion “it would have been more satisfactory had the Filipinos agreed to work amicably with the American Government to reconstitute the administration of the islands.” As that option was at that point out of the question, however, “the next best thing [was] is to give Mr. Foreman’s proposal a fair trial and to test the professed ability of the Filipinos for self-government in a practical manner.”

That proposal consisted of negotiating with Tagalog representatives and seeking a peaceful solution of the difficulties. The initial proposal was “to establish a Philippine Chamber of Deputies in Manila, its acts to be supervised by an American Governor-General; the repayment of the twenty million gold dollars paid by the United States to Spain for the islands, with interest; the cession of an island to the United States as a

⁴⁷ “The Philippine Commission.” For a similar comment after the arrival of the Philippine Commission in another paper, see “The American Commission...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jun. 1, 1900, 2.

⁴⁸ “In his latest contribution...,” editorial, *China Mail*, Oct. 20, 1900, 4. John Foreman’s comments appeared under in “Will the United States Withdraw from the Philippines?” *China Mail* [reprinted from *National Review* (London)] of October 17 and 19, 1900, 3.

naval and military depot, in addition to Guam; and the control of the Philippine Customs until the debt is[w]as paid.”

Clearly thinking in British terms, they argued that “A[a]n American Resident in Manila would give the appearance of a Protectorate in the Philippines, a benevolent control of the slightest description.” They considered that such flexibility would help solve the financial and trading disagreements between both parties. Also, “with tact and wise European assistance,” “the many able men among the Filipinos” could maybe become a ruling class “capable of uniting the many dissimilar political, racial and religious entities embraced in the Philippine Islands, and eventually to create an Island Republic as virile and potent for good as the Island Empire of Japan promises to become at some future epoch.”

In case it did not work, the U.S. “in its role of benevolent protector, would be able to lend assistance to the native government, warding off foreign interference and preventing any other Power from stopping in to possess itself of territory freed from Spanish sovereignty by American gold.” Such an arrangement would be beneficial also for the U.S. because they could finally experiment their professed “wish to give the natives a liberal measure of self-government and to interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of the islands” and to dispense “their large permanent garrison in the archipelago” that during war times, when they were having no economical compensation, represented a heavy cost.⁴⁹

Finally, after the November 1900 elections, the tiredness they showed regarding the war increased. The *Telegraph* and the *Free Press* kept sharing the ideals that encouraged Philippine resistance to continue. For example, they informed of a meeting between Apolinario Mabini and Taft’s Philippine Commission where the leader argued that the American Government was restraining the sovereignty of the Philippine people and completely nullifying it. He denounced that “there cannot be popular government where

⁴⁹ “In his latest contribution.” For other comments before the November 1900 elections, see “One good result...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Sep. 6, 1900, 2; “It is interesting...,” *Singapore Free Press*, Sep. 25, 1900, 2.

the people are not given a real and effective participation in the constitution and performance of that government.”⁵⁰

Meanwhile, the *Daily Press* celebrated that General Arthur MacArthur, who had substituted General Elwell Otis, planned to adopt a more vigorous policy to end the guerrilla warfare. It considered that supporting Aguinaldo for a longer time was a public crime. Still, his resistance had to be recognized:

However much the individual Englishman or American may admire the pluck and obstinacy with which men like De Wet or Aguinaldo have hitherto upheld a lost cause, there is a time when the continuance of such an attitude becomes a public crime, and the result of the recent elections in both countries has been to indicate that in the opinion of both nations that time has fully arrived. By this it is by no means implied that any desire for a vulgar vengeance is in the air, or that any personal animosity against the Boers as a people or as individuals exists; or on the other hand that any section of the American people desires to withhold from the Filipinos the influence in the affairs of the Islands to which they are entitled.⁵¹

Despite their claims, months of resistance went on until General Aguinaldo’s capture, at the end of March 1901. Many of the studied newspapers published very graphic accounts of the event, in some cases, prototypical samples of yellow journalism, which read “like a romance in a boy’s book of adventure.”⁵² Almost all of them celebrated the piece of news, and some vividly narrated how the high-profile Kansas General Frederick Funston and his soldiers captured the Filipino leader by dressing up as prisoners and being led to his headquarters.

⁵⁰ “Mr. Mabini Before the Taft Commission,” *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *Hong Kong Telegraph*], Sep. 14, 1900, 3. Along the same lines, “The Philippines,” *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *Globe* (London)], Dec. 15, 1900, 3.

⁵¹ “It is apparently...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 11, 1900, 2. Also, “Two declarations...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Nov. 14, 1900, 2; “Hongkong[sic] and the Filipino Junta,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 14, 1900, 3; “Present Needs in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 15, 1900, 3. The *Daily Press* also published a defense of the protectorate in the Philippines by the famous American anti-imperialist journalist, Albert G. Robinson: “The Philippine Problem,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 18, 1900, 3.

⁵² “The capture of Emilio Aguinaldo...,” editorial, *China Mail*, Apr. 8, 1901, 2.

Nevertheless, instead of criminalizing Aguinaldo as a bloodthirsty insurgent, many of the studied newspapers comments, except the ones reprinted from American texts, credited in some degree the Filipino leader's struggle. For example, the *China Mail* celebrated the news and blamed the war to the Filipino's election of remaining in the field in front of an evidently superior power. Still, it also recognized some errors on the American part, signaled that "a more reasonable and tactful" would have prevented the war, and that Aguinaldo had "never been guilty of excesses towards the Americans like some of his officers." The writer even admitted that, "though he was in the wrong at the outset he had a certain excuse for dissatisfaction with the high-handed conduct of the American representatives who ruled from the Palace at Malacañan after the capture of Manila."⁵³

For its part, the *Daily Press* stated that the capture of "El Presidente" would have a great effect on the state of the Philippines," as he would difficultly be replaced. Although they warned that it was "perhaps unlikely" that the insurrection collapsed at once, they did celebrate Aguinaldo's capture while positively portraying him as a "brave enemy who can[could] resist no more."⁵⁴ The *Telegraph's* reverence for the Filipino leader was even stronger, as it denounced the method employed by Funston, lauded Aguinaldo's ideals and tenacity, and warned that many Filipinos would be willing to uphold the cause.⁵⁵

Meanwhile, the *Free Press* did not make any editorial comment and only reported the information about the capture.⁵⁶ Still, the only opinion article it shared in the following month regarding the matter was eloquent enough: an article by ex-consul in Singapore Spencer E. Pratt. After being one of the leading diplomats in arranging the Philippine-

⁵³ "The capture of Emilio Aguinaldo." In the *China Mail* case, it is interesting that it celebrated Funston's capture of Aguinaldo in this manner when, some years ago, it had attacked the Spaniards for employing a similar tactic against Antonio Maceo: "The trite aphorism..." *China Mail*, Jan. 13, 1897, 2. Along the same line of exalted reporting, see "The capture of Aguinaldo," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], Apr. 9, 1901, 2–3.

⁵⁴ "The news sent..." editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Apr. 3, 1901, 2.

⁵⁵ "The capture of Aguinaldo," Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Apr. 9, 1901, 2.

⁵⁶ "The Philippines," *Singapore Free Press*, Apr. 2, 1901, 2; "The Capture of Aguinaldo," *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *Hong Kong Daily Press*], Apr. 10, 1901, 3; "Aguinaldo," *Singapore Free Press*, Apr. 27, 1901, 2.

American collaboration against Spain, in 1898, Pratt had been accused of exceeding his prerogatives and granting tacit approval of the Malolos Government.⁵⁷

To defend himself from those charges, Pratt tried to deny his connections with Filipinos in public. For example, when John Foreman detailed the relationship between the U.S. consuls in the Pacific and the Hong Kong Junta in a famous and extensive study of the Philippine Islands, Pratt rashly refuted it and demanded a rectification.⁵⁸ When he did so, St. Clair defended him in front of the revolutionaries, arguing that he needed to protect his integrity as a diplomat.⁵⁹

The editor and the consul probably maintained a good relationship, and two years after the episode, St. Clair shared Pratt's public explanation of his view of the events, which hold the U.S. responsible for the war.⁶⁰ By detailing the relations between the Filipino and American forces since April 1898, the text proved "how needless any rupture was," and defended that Filipinos resisted and contended "for the rights which, if not by direct promise, at least by open acts, our government had caused them and caused the world to believe that would be accorded:"

...the misunderstanding which preceded the conflict was due to our action in making use of the Filipinos against, the Spaniards in every way that we possibly could, and when we thought that we could safely dispense with their aid and assistance, coolly ignoring them. This was certainly enough to have incited any people to retaliatory measures. The actual conflict, however, between ourselves and the Filipinos was started not by them, but by us, for it was our sentries who on the fourth of February fired the first shot. But even after the conflict had begun it could have been stopped, and certainly Aguinaldo was anxious that it

⁵⁷ For a detailed review of the relations between consuls Pratt and Wildman and the Hong Kong Junta, see Grynawski, *America's Middlemen*, 192–222.

⁵⁸ John Foreman, *Philippine Islands. A Political, Geographical, Ethnographical, Social and Commercial History of the Philippine Archipelago and its Political Dependencies, Embracing the Whole Period of Spanish Rule* (London: Sampson Low, Marston & CO., Ltd, 1899).

⁵⁹ William St. Clair to Howard W. Bray, June 16, 1899, P.I.R. 406.3.

⁶⁰ In addition, as seen previously, William St. Clair defended the role Spencer E. Pratt played in the negotiations and argued he supported his task because Pratt was aware of the necessity of following British models of governance. See Chapter 3, 155.

should be...⁶¹

Finally, the consul argued that Aguinaldo's capture did not imply the termination of hostilities that Americans had "brought upon ourselves in the Philippines," because the cause was a national one: "It can find a leader to replace Aguinaldo as it found Aguinaldo to replace the martyred Rizal." The consul warned that "the spark of independence has been kindled in the hearts of the people and will there remain, ready at any time to be fanned into flame.

Significantly enough, St. Clair made a heading for the article denouncing that the editor of *Collier's Weekly* had altered the original title of the text, "Why Aguinaldo Resisted," to the "absurdly improper and misleading" one of "Why Aguinaldo Rebelled." The whole text, and St. Clair's comment, corroborated once more how he kept considering the fight Emilio Aguinaldo carried on, even as a guerrilla war, justified. As seen before, also the rest of the editors studied admired to some degree that fight. That radically changed in 1902.⁶²

3. Backlash to the Army Scandal and the End of the War

As some of the mentioned editorials had warned, after Aguinaldo's capture and many other guerrilla leaders' surrender, the Philippine-American war continued in some regions with a recrudescence of violence. The strongest resistance endured, especially, in Batangas, in Southern Luzon, under the leadership of Miguel Malvar, and in Samar, headed by Vicente Lukban.

It was in this Southern Island where the most influent event in demonstrating that hostilities continued took place. On September 28, 1901, a Philippine ambush killed 48 U.S. soldiers out of a regiment of 74.⁶³ The event was named the "Balangiga Massacre," and, as Stuart Creighton Miller stated, no single event in the Philippine war shocked the

⁶¹ "Why Aguinaldo Resisted," *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *Collier's Weekly* (Springfield, Ohio)], May 22, 1901, 2. The following paragraph is also based in this text.

⁶² "Why Aguinaldo Resisted."

⁶³ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 219.

American people as much. Many U.S. editors considered it was “the worst disaster for the United States Army since Custer’s fate at Little Big Horn.”⁶⁴

Military authorities responded by increasing the harshness of their methods to end the conflict. Besides the mentioned Philippine accusations about Americans violating the rules of war, other historical records show that, since the beginning, there were cases of misbehavior in the U.S. army, such as abuses towards civilians. At the end of 1899 and early 1900, however, the Army’s methods to repress the insurgents harshened in Luzon, where the conflict was more severe, including the use of torture. Progressively, in this irregular war, the line between combatants and civilian population was more blurred.

As guerrilla war continued, the use of these practices extended to the rest of the archipelago. In addition, after the fall 1900 Philippine offensive —as previously mentioned, aimed at influencing the U.S. presidential elections—, Arthur MacArthur, the new Military Governor of the Philippines, pressured by both his subordinates and his superiors in Washington D.C., adopted a tougher policy. In that manner, it legitimized some of the violent counterinsurgency practices that some of his subordinates had already applied earlier.⁶⁵

Almost a year later, after Balangiga, American leaders authorized the most extreme measures against the remaining centers of armed resistance. Republican administration and military leaders argued that Balangiga demonstrated the need of using harsher methods to finally end the war and the inutility of showing leniency to the *insurrectos*. The *Manila Critic* exemplified such idea:

Apropos of the bands of ladrones styling themselves *insurrectos*, public opinion is undoubtedly in favour of a more vigorous policy by the army in dealing with these cut-throats. It is seemingly impossible to demonstrate to them by peaceful methods that law and order should prevail. The only lesson which seems to

⁶⁴ S. C. Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation*, 204.

⁶⁵ The literature on the military aspects of the war is extensive. See, among others, S. C. Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation*; Linn, *The Philippine War 1899–1902*; Samuel Tan, *The Filipino-American War, 1899–1913* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2002). For a detailed analysis of the use of torture, see Einolf, *America in the Philippines*.

appeal at all to them is the one of extermination. If they cannot be kept under control otherwise, they must be wiped out.⁶⁶

As a result, in the last phase of the war, from the fall of 1901 until the late spring of 1902, the use of torture was still very intense against the remaining resistance in Luzon and Samar. In addition, according to Christopher Einolf, who carefully analyzed the use of torture throughout the war, “it also occurred in areas where the fighting was essentially over against the remnants of the insurgency, people falsely accused of supporting the insurgents, and common criminals.”⁶⁷

This use of “marked severities,” however, slowly filtered to the U.S. public and caused an outrage. As Richard Welch synthesized, “rumors concerning atrocities committed by Americans in the Philippines were first heard in the winter of 1900.” Throughout 1901, “they had gained notice in a few of the more outspoken anti-imperialist papers and magazines, and by the winter of 1902 they had claimed the sporadic attention of the Senate Committee on the Philippines and inspired renewed effort and hope for the Anti-Imperialist League.”⁶⁸ As a result of its efforts, between January and July 1902, the Senate Investigation on Affairs in the Philippines brought to light the “truth about the Philippines,” bringing the nations’ attention to the Pacific and its never-ending conflict.

So far, the Pacific-based English press had demonstrated having access to Philippine and British sources alternative to the American ones and had been judgmental about some aspects of their occupation. Given they preserved their privileged position to observe events in the Philippines, did they offer a critical perspective or more complete accounts of the modes of warfare followed in the islands? This detailed analysis demonstrates they did not.

⁶⁶ “The *Manila Critic*...,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Manila Critic*], Oct. 14, 1901, 2.

⁶⁷ Einolf, *America in the Philippines*, 176–77. On the use of torture and other methods to extract information during the American colonial regime, see McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire*.

⁶⁸ Richard E. Welch Jr., “American Atrocities in the Philippines: The Indictment and the Response,” *Pacific Historical Review* 43 (1974): 234, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3637551>. On the U.S. press’ reactions to the Philippine-American War see also Einolf, *America in the Philippines*; Welch Jr., *Response to Imperialism*; B. M. Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest*. This topic and its bibliography are further explored in Chapter 5, 219–239.

After Aguinaldo's capture in April 1901 and the surrender of other Filipino generals, the analyzed press celebrated that on July 4, 1901, the military government led by Arthur MacArthur officially ceded the control of the Philippine Islands to the Civil Government William Howard Taft headed.⁶⁹ The *China Mail* termed the event "a memorable day in the history of the Philippine Islands."⁷⁰

From that moment on, the reduced coverage of the analyzed press mostly portrayed many parts of the archipelago as peaceful.⁷¹ It notably relayed in the Manila American press and other media from the U.S, and focused on commenting the decisions of the Civil Government, the calls of some Filipino ilustrados for recognition of the U.S. sovereignty as a precursor to the establishment of a representative government, the mourning "all around the islands" for the murder of President McKinley, the resuming of social activities in Manila, or the investment of American Companies and retired soldiers.⁷²

Contrarily, the mentions to the perseverance of Philippine resistance and the increase of U.S. repression were common but brief. Events that had previously inspired critical comments on the hypocrisy of the Benevolent Assimilation now rarely included

⁶⁹ On the surrender of other Filipino leaders, see "General Baldomero Aguinaldo...", *Singapore Free Press*, May 18, 1901, 2; "General Cailles...", *Telegrams, Singapore Free Press*, Jul. 4, 1901, 3; "Civil Government of the Philippines," *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *China Mail*] Jul. 16, 1901, 3.

⁷⁰ On the proclamation of the Civil Government: "Civil Government of the Philippines," *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *China Mail*], Jul. 16, 1901, 3. Also "Civil Government in the Philippines," *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *Daily Press*], Jul. 24, 1901, 3.

⁷¹ As examples of the exceptional critical comments, mostly, from the *Free Press*, see "Today is Independence Day...", *Singapore Free Press*, Jul. 4, 1901, 2; "Limitations of a Great Republic," *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *San Francisco Argonaut*], Jul. 19, 1901, 3; "It would seem...", *Singapore Free Press*, Sep. 19, 1901, 2.

⁷² See, for example, Correspondent, "Manila," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Sep. 23, 1901, 3; "Mr. John Dix Morgan...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Sep. 21, 1901, 2; Correspondent, "Politics in the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 10, 1901, 2; "The Philippine Weather Bureau," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 25, 1901, 2; Correspondent, "Building Against Earthquake in the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Nov. 6, 1901, 3; Correspondent, "Constabulary in the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Nov. 18 and 19, 1901, 5; Correspondent, "Manila," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 3, 1901, 5; Correspondent, "Manila," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 9, 1901, 3.

remarks evaluating them.⁷³ Instead, they only reproduced the American authorities' comments stressing the need of following a harsh policy.⁷⁴

The same lack of empathetic denunciations about this hard treatment of the Philippine resistance continued when, during 1902, information about the Senate's Investigation committee and its media effect in the U.S. arrived to the Pacific. Admittedly, the most newsworthy topics regarding the situation in the archipelago were, with increasing importance: the resolution of the Catholic Church properties, the Currency and Tariffs question, clashes between Filipinos and Americans in scattered places of the islands and, among everything else, the Senate Investigations on the conduct of the war.

To inform about them, however, the analyzed newspapers totally relied on Reuters' telegrams and American media from Manila and the U.S. Although some followed the matter with more frequency than others, none of them included any other proximity sources, like British merchants or Filipinos, which could contribute from personal experience to explaining or contrasting the facts.

As soon as the Hearings of the Committee on Affairs in the Philippines started, at the end of January 1902, they began receiving telegrams about the topic. On the one hand they informed that the American press was denouncing the "marked severities" its officers and soldiers committed.⁷⁵ They insisted in reprinting, at the same time, the same amount of pronouncements by American leaders, like Governor Taft or the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, defending that the war had been conducted in the most civilized manner, discussing the possibility of reducing the troops in the archipelago,

⁷³ On the continuity of hostilities, see, among others "Details of the Samar Massacre," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], Oct. 12, 1901, 3; "Aguinaldo's Successor," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 30, 1901, 3; "The U.S. Commission in the Philippines...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Nov. 13, 1901, 2; "General Chaffee on the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 17, 1901, 3.

⁷⁴ "The *Manila Critic*...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 14, 1901, 2. Along the same lines of following a harsher policy, see "The *Manila American*...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Sep. 20, 1901, 2. More on the alleged uncivilization of the Filipinos "U.S. Senator's Opinion of the Filipinos," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], Oct. 18, 1901, 3; "Another Desperate Fight in Samar," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], Oct. 29, 1901, 2.

⁷⁵ As examples of the U.S. media demand of inquiries, see "Wanted an Inquiry," *Telegrams, China Mail* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], Jan. 22, 1902, 4; "The *Evening Post* is a paper...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 5, 1902, 2; "Several of the American...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 20, 1902, 2.

insisting in Filipino brutality in the Balangiga massacre, and stating that, in case soldiers actually committed atrocities, they were exceptions and would be severely punished.⁷⁶ Thus, they sent the message that the American elites defended the army's general behavior, justified the harsh methods employed and, in case they were true, they were exceptions that would be severely punished.

It was in April, when the anti-imperialists began to testify, when the most severe accusations appeared and more telegrams arrived pointing out that the U.S. public opinion was outraged.⁷⁷ The *China Mail*, the *Telegraph*, and the *Free Press* generally only published short telegrams about the matter, but the *Daily Press* dedicated more space to hear the witnesses and the judgments. That way, the British public in the region learned that there were evidences of torture by Americans, that they produced "a painful impression," and that "public opinion demanded a full enquiry."⁷⁸ One of the most outrageous examples were the orders by Major Littleton Waller and General Jacob Smiths to "make the interior of Samar a howling wilderness" by "killing and burning" everyone older than ten years of age.⁷⁹ That moment was the climax of the whole polemic in the U.S., and the studied press described it as "the most profound crisis in the history of the United States Regular Army."⁸⁰

However, while those anti-imperialist versions of the events were being disclosed, the analyzed newspapers were also criticizing the personal interest or arrogance of the standing Revolutionary Filipino leaders, informing about the supposed savagery of their troops in the remaining conflict zones, pointing out that American harsh methods were

⁷⁶ "Governor Taft, in testifying...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 17, 1902, 2; "Secretary of War Root," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], Feb. 18, 1902, 2; "Taft, testifying before...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 25, 1902, 2; "General Hughes...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 3, 1902, 2; "General Otis...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Mar. 28, 1902, 2.

⁷⁷ For a detailed analysis of the Senate investigations, see, among M. P. Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism*, 115–149; Murphy, *No Middle Ground*, 107–136.

⁷⁸ "Torture by Americans in the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Apr. 16, 1902, 2. Also, "Extraordinary U.S. Military Scandal," *China Mail*, Apr. 26, 1902, 4; "Military Army Atrocities in the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Apr. 30, 1902, 2.

⁷⁹ "Killing and Burning in the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Apr. 23, 1902, 2.

⁸⁰ "Philippine Military Scandals," *Hong Kong Daily Press*, May 1, 1902, 2.

the only way to effectively stop them, and demonstrating how concerned the authorities were about punishing misbehavior.

For example, while transmitting the trickling of surrendered Filipino generals, the only comments which the *China Mail* offered on the subject was a critical comment on one of General Malvar's proclamation and its insistence to remain in power: "Malvar has issued another proclamation. True it is in the interests of peace, but shows how strong the ruling passion is in death. 'Let me do the proclaiming, and I care not who does the rest!' is the Filipino's paraphrase of 'let me make the songs and I care not who makes the laws.'"⁸¹

For its part, the *Daily Press* reprinted chronicles from the *Manila Times* that narrated the last confrontations that had taken place. One of them was "Heavy Loss in Samar," which described the attack of a multitude of "bloodthirsty insurgents" against a few Americans. The text argued that "in the face of such hordes of savages, who infest the island of Samar at the present time, all the vaunted and much talked of 'peace negotiations' are an empty farce [...]. Fire, cold steel, hot lead and hemp will prove more effectual in the end than any negotiating or legislating that may be enacted."⁸²

Even the *Singapore Free Press*, which had earlier taken every possible opportunity to criticize the American occupation and their disrespect for the Philippine aspirations for self-government, shared similar accounts. At this point, it seems fair to explain that, although St. Clair had not kept with the Philippine propaganda campaign that had so uproariously characterized his paper, especially between 1898 and 1899, when all the anti-imperialist versions of the events came out, he had temporarily left the editorship of

⁸¹ "Malvar has issued..." News from the Philippines, Local and General, *China Mail*, May 26, 1902, 4. Another of such comments appeared when the *China Mail* informed about Felipe Buencamino's declaration in the House of Representatives' Committee. There, Buencamino declared that "the Filipinos looked towards Congress to give them a just and liberal government under American sovereignty, and that even as it was at present they had more liberty than they would have had under Aguinaldo." Also, he declared that "the Filipino revered and venerated George Washington as next in their hearts after Rizal, and that all should have faith in the Philippines." Making fun of this notable Filipino's alleged self-interest for going from supporting the Malolos government to support American sovereignty, the newspaper entitled the text "Mr. Facing Both Ways" (*China Mail*, Jun. 17, 1902, 5).

⁸² "Heavy American Loss in Samar," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], Jan. 6, 1902, 3. See also "Terrible outrage in the Philippines," *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], Apr. 22, 1902, 2.

the newspaper. According to a text published in early April, St. Clair was on his way home because “he had been selected to go with the European Company of the Straits Contingent to the Coronation [of King Edward VII, celebrated in August 1902]”.⁸³

The same text argued that after 15 years work in Singapore, it stated, St. Clair deserved “his present holidays, 10 months,” and left in charge “his junior partner, Mr. W. Makepeace”. Makepeace was, therefore, the one in charge of the newspaper during those months and, as a consequence, the one who marked the editorials’ tone and decided which content they should publish about the Philippines. Demonstrating how personalist this journalism still was, as it completely depended on the views of the editor in charge, the *Free Press* changed the portrait it had previously offered of the Filipinos.

In the most critical editorial he published, Makepeace argued that the U.S. were not “doing as well in the Philippines as their friends would have them, either in finishing their war, or in organizing peace establishments, or in securing probity in the administration of the Islands.” After admitting that the charges of misconduct were a “nasty blot on an Army that has[had] behaved, under very trying circumstances with great credit,” it also justified the violence implying that their enemies were uncivilized, ungrateful people: “so far from welcoming the energetic and victorious American, the Filipino when he gets the chance cuts him in piece with barbarity, or at the best submits sullenly.” Finally, it charged all America’s problems, unsurprisingly, to the lack of a proper colonial structure, similar to the British one.⁸⁴

In addition, the telegrams about the court-martials he chose to publish were texts like the defense of Major Waller, “charged of murdering insurgents by shooting them.” Again, it presented his acts as a natural reaction to Philippine savagery. The defense referred to the treatment meted out “to the Arabs who[,] in the 1882 Egyptian campaign[,] cut off the heads of prisoners and struck them on lances in the sand,” and to the ‘Boxers’ “who mutilated the dead and wounded.” In both cases, the defense argued,

⁸³ “Singapore Journalist in Colombo,” *Singapore Free Press*, Apr. 22, 1902, 3.

⁸⁴ “It cannot be said...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, May 1, 1902, 2.

“the Arabs and Chinese were executed at once.” Having established these precedents, well-known to British audiences, Waller’s defense presented the Filipinos as follows:

He had found the natives in Samar treacherous and savage in every way, and it was not till after the savage massacres of U.S. troops at Balangiga that he ordered the men to be shot. This defense taken in conjunction with the following throws rather a lurid light on the ways of the gentle Filipino. ‘A band of fifty outlaws captured three members of the Philippine constabulary. They tied the men hand and foot, gouged out their eyes with sticks, laid them on the sand with the sun beating on them, and then, beginning at the feet, cut them in pieces with bolos -when the rescue party arrived the only evidences left were small portions of human flesh and bone.’⁸⁵

Precisely, those were the same messages that the Republican administration in the U.S. used to respond to the outrage caused nationwide by the Senate Committee. Soon after the April and May outrages in the press, President Roosevelt, through a series of famous discourses, supported the army and its “exemplary behavior” in the campaign. He tried to protect the Army attributing the scandals to exceptional cases. Those would be severely punished but, moreover, added that such reprehensible behavior was a natural response to Philippine brutality, the only useful method to end the conflict for good.⁸⁶

By passing on the Senate Investigation information with a focus on the Imperialist Administration’s messages and the defenses of the soldiers, the analyzed press was

⁸⁵ “The Ways of the Philippine Insurgents,” *Singapore Free Press*, Apr. 25, 1902, 3. Other texts published signaling Filipino lack of civilization in this newspaper are “There is a flavour...,” *Singapore Free Press*, Apr. 29, 1902, 3; “The Samar Affair,” *Singapore Free Press* [reprinted from *Manila Times*], May 8, 1902, 2.

⁸⁶ “The American Chamber of Commerce...”, News from the Philippines, Local and General, *China Mail*, May 5, 1902, 3; “Roosevelt Praises the Army,” Late Telegrams, *China Mail*, May 27, 1902, 5; “The U.S. Navy,” *China Mail*, May 29, 1902, 3; “The Situation in the Philippines,” Telegrams, *China Mail*, Jun. 3, 1902, 4; “Roosevelt and the Army” and “American Officers Honored,” American Telegrams, *China Mail*, Jun. 24, 1902, 2; “President Roosevelt,” Telegrams, *China Mail*, Jul. 16, 1902, 4. Among the historians that have interpreted the Roosevelt administration’s response that way, see Paul A. Kramer, “Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire: The Philippine-American War as Race War,” *Diplomatic History* 30, no. 2 (2006): 169–210; Einolf, *America in the Philippines*, 135–152; M. P. Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism*, 139–147.

therefore offering an interpretative frame that supported Roosevelt's arguments and justifications.

Finally, the Senate committee was suspended for summer recess and came back in the fall weakened and without almost any media attention.⁸⁷ Affairs in the Philippines had lost observance given that, on July 4, 1902, President Roosevelt declared the formal ending of the conflict, although resistance in some parts of the Islands, especially in the South, would continue until 1913.⁸⁸

Commenting on Roosevelt's proclamations during that June, when he had "hinted at the ultimate independence of the Philippines when capable of self-government," the *Daily Press* defended that the United States was still only beginning its task in the Philippines. Although they were "entering upon their task with great earnestness" and the condition of the country had steadily ameliorated, "the day when self-government can[could] be granted to the Filipinos looks as yet very distant."⁸⁹

The *China Mail* did not publish any comment regarding the proclamation, although his previous ones make it easy to deduce that it also supported American continuity in the Islands. As for the *Free Press*, after the change of editor, it also portrayed Filipinos as completely incapable of self-government. In doing so, it directly contradicted some of the past editorials.

Back in 1898, in one of the editorials he had wrote to defend the Filipino's right to self-government, St. Clair compared their level of civilization with that of the Cubans, whose, at least, nominal independence had been guaranteed since before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. He argued that the Cubans' relations with the American General Shafter, and their inhumanity to the Spanish wounded and prisoners, were not comparable with the Filipino's dealings with Admiral Dewey and their "consistent humanity and generosity" towards their enemies. As a consequence, St. Clair argued

⁸⁷ "American Senators Have a Fight," Late Telegrams, *China Mail*, Jul. 14, 1902, 5.

⁸⁸ Correspondent, "Philippines Completely Pacified," Telegrams, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jul. 5, 1902, 2.

⁸⁹ "It is scarcely to be wondered...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jun. 4, 1902, 2; "The announcement...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jun. 10, 1902, 2; "There is no reason to believe...", *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Jun. 21, 1902, 2.

that “whatever the cause of the Cubans be worth, that of the Philipinos, from the poignancy of their sufferings, and the hopelessness of their sighs for the barest rights of humanity, deserves[d] an infinitely deeper and more practical sympathy.”⁹⁰

Instead, in his editorial from July 18, 1902, Makepeace commented on the problems their “cousins the Americans” were facing regarding the situation in Cuba, which had “started on its career of independence heavily handicapped.”⁹¹ There was a growing belief that “official optimism pictured a much more prosperous future than the facts warranted.” Seeing this state of things in Cuba, “the references of President Roosevelt and other politicians with regard to the independence of the Philippines” appeared “so fraught with danger to thoughtful minds accustomed to the solution of Eastern problems:”

...any attempt to give self-government to the Philippines on the lines of that given to Cuba, or indeed on any lines consistent with the Declaration of Independence, would be, as we have repeatedly said, absolutely disastrous to the prosperity of the islands and the well-being of their people. It was a mistake to ever lead them to imagine that ‘independence’ would be possible in anything like the near future. The recrudescence of the idea is as great a mistake as the original one. [...] We may look therefore for difficulties, awkwardness and at points for failure in Cuba.’ And a hundred-fold more so in the Philippines, where they have not had twenty years of hard experience and discipline to give their citizens some good qualities possessed by Cubans which compare favorably with those of the citizens of the South American Republics.⁹²

As has already been demonstrated, the defense of the U.S.’s permanence in the Philippines is coherent with all newspapers’ previous defenses of establishing a protectorate along British lines. In spite of that, their uncritical reprinting of Manila pro-American texts and their own comments emphasizing the savagery and illegitimacy of

⁹⁰ “Of the latest war...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Aug. 2, 1898, 2.

⁹¹ On Cuba’s relations with the U.S. after the Spanish-American War see, among many others, Louis A. Pérez Jr., *Cuba Between Empires 1878–1902* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983).

⁹² “Our cousins...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jul. 18, 1902, 2.

the last Philippine insurgency contrasts with some of their earlier comments about the revolutionary leaders' cause, even once its resistance turned to a Guerrilla War in 1900.

All these newspapers had previously been critical of different aspects of the American Conquest. In addition, they all had acknowledged the existence of American opposition to the expansion. In the case of the *Singapore Free Press*, St. Clair had even praised Senator George F. Hoar's opposition to the ratification of the Peace Treaty. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, he corresponded with this senator and shared his views of events.⁹³ This is why these British newspapers' lack of careful attention to the anti-imperialists' mobilization during the Senate investigations, more detailed coverage of their witnesses, and critical comments of the atrocities seem illogical. Furthermore, this silence cannot be explained alleging this press lacked that information.

Certainly, the American Civil Government had established a very rigid control of the information and the press in the islands.⁹⁴ But still, at that point in time, army scandals were *vox populi* in the U.S., they were mentioned in news telegrams, and even referenced in the studied press with euphemism like "active campaign" and "punitive measures." Moreover, it is interesting that they used American newspapers from Manila as a replacement for the alternative and complementary sources that they had used until that moment and that could offer more critical accounts: Philippine sources and other foreign observers that were in the islands.⁹⁵

According to literature on the Hong Kong Junta, although its activity reduced drastically, it remained active until 1905. Moreover, Filipino propagandistas with whom the analyzed press had maintained links until late in the war, especially with the *Hong Kong Telegraph* and the *Singapore Free Press*, were actively campaigning in the U.S.

⁹³ See Chapter 5, 242–256.

⁹⁴ Glòria Cano, "Filipino Press between Two Empires: *El Renacimiento*, a Newspaper with Too Much Alma Filipina," *Southeast Asian Studies* 49, no. 3 (2011): 395–430

⁹⁵ Curiously enough, the only proximity sources of letters to the editor that they printed at that point time were from an American soldier that denied everything that happened in Samar: A. J. Clarke, "The State of the Philippines," *Singapore Free Press*, May 5, 1902, 3.

As for other foreign observers, there is evidence that at least some British residents in the region were well aware of the atrocities committed, and it is surprising that they did not share it with other people in Hong Kong and Singapore. Although these speculations are not solid enough to conclude that newspapermen from the area self-censored, we do have evidence that newspapermen writing about the Philippines were in touch with British authorities that knew exactly what was happening.

For example, as Thomas R. Metcalf explained, in 1902 “the British were especially angry at the expulsion of their commercial agents by the Americans for simply conducting their business during a period of rebel control on Samar.” To explain it, the Consul wrote to the Foreign Office: “The methods adopted by the American military authorities to restore their prestige were so drastic as to render the presence of witnesses undesirable.” Later, he reported “that the officer “who collected evidence against the firms is to be tried by court martial on charge of using torture to extract evidence.”⁹⁶

Curiously, after informing that “the agents of Smith, Bell & Co. And Warner Barnes & Co., the two largest British firms in Manila, have been ordered by the military authorities to leave the Island of Samar,” the *Daily Press* only mentioned that “it was probably to give a clear field for an active campaign against the insurgents,” and commented that “the British Consul was investigating.”⁹⁷ To the best of the knowledge provided by this analysis, the results of that research were never published.

As demonstrated in the following section, other articles from some of these same papers suggest that their silence and changes of opinion came from their defense of the British army's conduct in the Boer War.

⁹⁶ Thomas R. Metcalf, “From One Empire to Another: The Influence of the British Raj on American Colonialism in the Philippines,” *Ab Imperio* 2012, no. 3 (2012): 29, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2012.0106>.

⁹⁷ “The agents of Smith...,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 16, 1901, 2; “British Expulsion in the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 25, 1901, 3.

4. A reminder of the Anglo-Boer War in the Far East

As Paul Kramer noticed, “ironically, what the newly connected Anglo-Saxon imperial powers had most in common by 1899 was colonial revolt.”⁹⁸ Not only in the metropolis, but also in the Pacific there was awareness of those similarities, as “in the wartime Philippines Americans and Britons compared the two wars,” and both the pro-American *Manila Times* and the pro-Filipino *La Independencia* published regular news about South Africa, “the American paper nearly always above war reports from the Philippine Archipelago itself.”⁹⁹

In Hong Kong and Singapore, the press established parallelisms between the two campaigns as well. For example, after Aguinaldo’s capture, the *Telegraph* had compared the American relation with this general with the British’s’ own relations with Boer leaders, joking that the idea of expecting the General’s collaboration with the Americans to prompt all the natives’ surrender was like expecting “to induce Mr. Kruger to stomp the country haranguing everybody in favour of the annexation of the Transvaal!”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons,” 1335. For comparisons in the contemporary media of both conflicts, see also Thomas Sobottke, “The Imperial Enterprise: Anglo-American Reaction to the Spanish-American and Boer Wars, 1898–1902” (Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 2008); Jennifer Ann Sutton, “The Empire Question: How the South African War, 1899–1902, Shaped Americans’ Reactions to U.S. Imperialism” (Ph.D. diss., Washington University in St. Louis, 2012); James Todd Uhlman, “Dispatching Anglo-Saxonism: Whiteness and the Crises of American Racial Identity in Richard Harding Davis’s Reports on the Boer War,” *The Journal of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era* 19, no. 1 (2020): 19–47, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781419000434>. In addition, growing literature compares some of their dimensions, like their use of counterinsurgency methods. Among them, see Jonathan Hyslop, “The Invention of the Concentration Camp: Cuba, Southern Africa and the Philippines, 1896–1907,” *South African Historical Journal* 63, no. 2 (2011): 251–76, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02582473.2011.567359>; Iain R. Smith and Andreas Stucki, “The Colonial Development of Concentration Camps (1868–1902),” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 39, no. 3 (September 2011): 417–37, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2011.598746>.

⁹⁹ Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons,” 1337.

¹⁰⁰ “The Capture of Aguinaldo,” Notes and Comments, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Apr. 9, 1901, 2. Also, when rumors of Aguinaldo’s capture started, the *Telegraph* had stated: “Aguinaldo has been so frequently disposed of during the last year or so, however, that our American friends must forgive us if we are a bit skeptical on the subject... probably, like our very own de Wet, he has only been surrounded and is conducting an American mishap elsewhere.” “It is reported that Aguinaldo...,” Local and General, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Apr. 1, 1901, 2. Along the same line of relating both wars, see “A writer in the *Japan Weekly...*,” *Hong Kong Daily Press* [reprinted from *Japan Weekly Advertiser*], Jan. 4, 1902, 3; “The Statement by Lord Cranborne,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 14, 1902, 2; “All you say about...,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Feb. 14, 1902, 2; “The *Saturday Review...*,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, May 21, 1902, 2.

The parallelisms between the different belligerents of both colonial wars were even more evident in a review about the theatre play *The Big Boer War Pantomime*, which the Baroufusky Circus performed in Manila in March 1902. The writers considered that it was an entirely pro-Boer play. While they admitted that the management of the theatre had “the right to color the result of the battles for either one of the contestants,” they criticized that American authorities allowed their soldiers, dressed in their uniforms and using their arms and equipment, to take part in it:

The production is entirely pro-Boer, and represents the English as cowards while the Boers are patriots. One edifying spectacle in connection with the production is that of American soldiers, dressed in their uniforms, with their rifles, belts and ammunition, taking the part of English soldiers and running away from a lot of Filipinos dressed up as Kaffirs. This especial scene pleases the Filipinos in the audience immensely, and they applaud the Boers mightily. In fact, the Filipinos take sides with the Boers all the way through, and it does not need any sixth sense to see that they consider the entire performance allegorical of the Philippine insurrection.¹⁰¹

By openly articulating the relations between Boers and Filipinos versus Americans and Britons, the text, which was originally published in the *Manila Times* and later reprinted in the *China Mail*, eloquently exemplifies the clear comparisons about the wars Kramer talked about. The similarities between the Anglo-Boer War and the Philippine Insurrection were, therefore, outspoken, as the cover of a Puck magazine from 1901 also illustrates (see Image 14 below).

¹⁰¹ “Boer War Pantomime,” *China Mail* [reprinted from the *Manila Times*], Apr. 12, 1902, 5. On theatre plays used by Filipinos to contest American occupation, see Vicente L. Rafael, “White Love. Census and Melodrama in the U.S. Colonization of the Philippines,” in *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History*, 19–51; Adam Lifshay, *Subversions of the American Century. Filipino Literature in Spanish and the Transpacific Transformation of the United States* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2016).



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MISERY LOVES COMPANY;—BUT THEY HOPE SOON TO BE OUT OF IT.

Figure 14. The British Empire and the U.S. face similar “misery.” Louis Dalrymple, “Misery loves company; —but they hope soon to be out of it,” illustration published in New York by J. Ottmann Lith. Co., in *Puck* magazine on March 20, 1901. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, in Washington, D.C. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2010651389/>.

As previous sections of the dissertation prove, however, neither that commonality nor the wider context of the “strengthening of the Anglo-American Bond,” in the *Daily Press*’ words, had prevented the analyzed press of being critical with the turbulent American arrival to the Philippines.¹⁰² To different degrees, they had all attacked the U.S. lack of diplomacy in dealing with the Philippine Republic, their failure to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict, and their treatment of the natives as a savage population against whom their soldiers practiced “rabbit-hunt”. On some occasions, they had praised the resistance of the revolutionary forces even once they had turned to guerrilla war.

Although the progressive decrease of these pro-Filipino messages since mid-1899 was probably a result of different reasons—as previously stated, the changing nature of the war, or the redirection of the Hong Kong Junta’s propaganda efforts to the U.S. scenario—one of them was the conflict in South Africa, especially for the months before the formal end of the Philippine-American War. All messages of support to the Filipinos and criticisms against the U.S. definitely ceased when their publication became unquestionably incoherent with defending the British army repression of the Boers. In fact, their perceptions of the Philippine resistance turned to be overcritical.

The South African War had begun in October 1899 with attempts to occupy the Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Great Britain alleged wanting to protect the rights of British citizens in both regions, the ‘*utilanders*,’ but this argument uncovered vast economic interests in both regions and notable geostrategic concerns. After a first phase of major battles and Boer triumphs, the British Army was reinforced and advanced through both territories in the autumn of 1900. While retreating, Boer resistance turned into guerrilla warfare, only some months after Emilio Aguinaldo ordered the same change of strategy.¹⁰³

¹⁰² “The anticipated opposition...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Dec. 19, 1901, 2. For other celebratory mentions of the Great Rapprochement, see “On the Eve,” *China Mail* [reprinted from *London Chronicle*], Jun. 16, 1898, 3; “Ironclad Friendship,” *Singapore Free Press*, Dec. 18, 1899, 2; “When Friend Meets Friend,” *China Mail*, May 31, 1900, 2; “Captain Mahan,” *Speeches on the War*, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Feb. 26, 1900, 3; “Independence Day,” *Local and General*, *China Mail*, Jul. 4, 1902, 4.

¹⁰³ On the South African War, see, among many others, Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979); Bill Nasson, *The South African War, 1899–1902* (London: Arnold, 1999); Martin Meredith, *Diamonds, Gold, and War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).

To face it, the British Army used harsh counterinsurgency methods: destroying farmhouses, taking hostages, imposing collective punishments and, as resistance continued, burning all the Boer farm buildings, killing farm animals and destroying crops to starve the guerrillas. Finally, the displaced Boer civilians were interned in badly organized concentration camps with high mortality rates.¹⁰⁴

To justify these strategies, British authorities, as Roosevelt had done, argued that Boers were irregular combatants who, by resorting to guerrillas, were violating the rules of civilized warfare and, therefore, fell out of their protection.¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, the British “methods of barbarism” were harshly criticized by dissident British voices, like the famous journalist W.T. Stead. They managed to insert their criticisms and report the atrocities committed in the war in a national media environment that, since its inception, had closely reported the war.¹⁰⁶

As Krishan Kumar synthesizes, the exposition and discussions of the methods employed in South Africa had profound reverberations in British society. Since the 1857 Indian Mutiny, the British Empire had suffered publicized challenges in all its regions, and these conflicts raised awareness of its costs. Such concerns culminated in the South

¹⁰⁴ Hyslop, “The Invention of the Concentration Camp,” 258–59. Also, Smith and Stucki, “The Colonial Development of Concentration Camps;” Aidan Forth, *Barbed-Wire Imperialism. Britain’s Empire of Camps, 1876–1903* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017); John Sheehan, “Methods of Barbarism: The Boer War,” in *A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency and Warfare*, ed. Edward J. Erickson (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 95–114.

¹⁰⁵ On the denigration of the Boers as uncivilized and brutal, just as the U.S. was doing with Filipinos, see Simon Popple, “From ‘Brother Boer’ to ‘Dirty Boers’: Colonizing the Colonizers through the Popular Representations of the Boer in the British Illustrated Journal 1899–1902,” *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 5, no. 2 (2012): 137–56, https://doi.org/10.1386/jwcs.5.2.137_1.

¹⁰⁶ The literature on the British media and the South African War is extensive. Among many other notable contributions, see Paula M. Krebs, *Gender, Race and the Writing of Empire: Public Discourse in the Boer War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Kenneth O. Morgan, “The Boer War and the Media (1899–1902),” *Twentieth Century British History* 13, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 1–16, <https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/13.1.1>; Mark Hampton, “The Press, Patriotism, and Public Discussion: C.P. Scott, *The Manchester Guardian*, and the Boer War, 1899–1902,” *The Historical Journal* 44, no. 1 (2001): 177–97, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3133666>. In addition, the use of those tactics was also discussed and condemned in the international press. See Donald Lowry, “‘The World’s No Bigger than a Kraal’: The South African War and International Opinion in the First Age of ‘Globalization,’” in *The Impact of the South African War*, ed. David Omissi and David Thompson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 268–88.

African conflict, which sparked an “intense and wide-ranging debate about the current condition and future prospects of the British Empire.”¹⁰⁷

More than anything else it was the Boer War that called into question Britain’s purpose in its empire, and exposed shortcomings that threatened its future. Britain’s scorched-earth policy, the farm burnings, the concentration camps, later the use of Chinese coolie labor in the mines, all were widely reported and discussed at home; all caused bitter divisions. As Lord Rosebery, the Liberal leader, wrote in a letter to the *Times*, the differences between supporters and opponents of the war “is not simply on the war, but is a sincere, fundamental, and incurable antagonism of principle with regard to the Empire.”¹⁰⁸

This wide-ranging debate, therefore, naturally arrived in the analyzed Pacific media.¹⁰⁹ The studied press rabidly defended the continuance of the empire they served in Asia and supported the British war efforts in South Africa. Among the arguments it used that this analysis can exemplify are the following: that the Army had behaved in a most humane and lenient way; that Boer resistance actually required a harsher treatment because they did not follow the rules of civilized warfare; that those severe measures were also necessary to control the civilian population; and that criticisms about the war were exaggerated and unpatriotic. While they published these kinds of defenses, they often established direct comparisons with the allegedly legitimate actions of their “American cousins” in the Philippines.

On the one hand, the October 18, 1901 *Daily Press*’ editorial illustrates both the argument that the army had been behaving in a most lenient way, and that its use of more radical methods was legitimate against certain enemies. It commented the execution of Hans Lotter, leader of a guerrilla commando, in the Cape Colony. Although pro-Boers in the Continent and England itself had criticized the decision, the

¹⁰⁷ Krishan Kumar, *Visions of Empire. How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 348.

¹⁰⁸ Kumar, 349–50.

¹⁰⁹ On the reception of news on the Boer War throughout the British Empire, see Potter, “News Distribution and the South African War,” in *News and the British World*, 36–55.

Daily Press expressed confidence that, given the “marked humanity of our conduct of the war in South Africa, any crimes inducing our generals to inflict the death penalty must have been of a heinous nature.”

Precisely, another of the justifications of the execution was that Mr. Chamberlain had ordered that “if the war degenerated into a struggle with *banditti*, the policy pursued by the Americans in the Philippines would be followed in South Africa.”¹¹⁰ That both were fighting against *banditti* was again repeated in the *Daily Press*’ editorial of November 1st. It celebrated that, although it was clear that Filipinos were not yet conquered, Americans were showing “no lack of vigor and foresight in the face of the fresh disturbances” in Samar, Cebu and Leyte. They justified that reaction by attacking the Filipino leader, General Vicente Lukban:

A policy of ‘no quarter’ is as necessary against him as it was against Commandant Lotter in South Africa, though Lukban seems the more gentlemanly scoundrel of the two. Such men as he can have no place in the Philippines of the future. Many *insurrectos* of very doubtful antecedents have been pardoned and even given office under American rule, but there must be a limit to this generosity. Nominal friends, who are ready to become enemies again when they get the chance, are undesirable in the archipelago, in South Africa, and everywhere else, and the sternest measures against such people are perfectly justifiable.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ “With regard to the recent execution...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 18, 1901, 2. Also “The fact that the criticism...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Oct. 10, 1901, 2.

¹¹¹ “A curious story...,” editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Nov. 8, 1901, 2. Remember how, instead, when Emilio Aguinaldo was captured after leading for almost a year and a half a guerrilla war, they had called him a “brave enemy who can resist no more.” Interestingly, in an analysis by Donald Chaput of General Lukban’s demonization in the American press, Chaput contends that, while the U.S. press painted him as “a reckless, thieving, bandit who took advantage of a hopeless revolutionary struggle for personal gain,” he actually did “what he could to control his semi-disciplined bolomen:” “In a widely distributed general order in early 1900, he made each officer responsible for his subordinates, spoke harshly against robbery, destruction of property, and unlawful collection of war contributions. In July of the same year, he urged polite treatment of prisoners, saying that the enemy may surrender by using a white flag and turning in his weapons. ‘Any Filipino who sacks, robs, or maltreats Americans who present themselves to our forces will be immediately shot to death.’” (Donald Chaput, “The American Press and General Vicente Lukban, Hero of Samar,” *Leyte-Samar Studies* 1 (1947): 26) Chaput’s analysis manifests, again, the attempts of the Filipino civilization campaign to follow the rules of warfare and, on the other hand, how the media and their foreign observers could just ignore it.

On the other hand, different texts demonstrate that such measures were also justified against civilian population. The *Telegraph*, for example, reprinted a *The Times* article to delegitimize Emily Hobhouse's famous criticisms of the situation in the concentration camps in South Africa. It argued that mortality was not a result of the "brutal methods" the British employed but to the "filthy habits of Boer women themselves," an argument that, according to Kenneth Morgan, was common.¹¹² With such defensive attitude, it would have been incoherent to make any critical comment when, some days later, it announced that "the Filipinos in the island of Samar have been ordered by the American authorities to concentrate in the towns."¹¹³

Finally, an example of the last argument which the studied press used often to defend the British war effort in South Africa, the anti-war movements' lack of patriotism, appears in the *Daily Press*' editorial from May 2. During 1902, when the Senate Investigations were uncovering evidences that those "sternest measures" in the Philippines were leading to atrocities, the studied press defended the general prosecution of the war.

The text argued that the sensation in the U.S. caused by the army scandals in the Philippines were similar to the British one following similar revelations about the South African War. In that case, only "disloyalists and fanatics" ignored that the British authorities had not tolerated any abuses. Next, they celebrated that the American leaders would punish without quarter "any inhuman treatment of Filipinos," but added that probably those actions would probably be provoked:

With regard to the war in the Philippines, great humanity, for the most part, has marked its conduct by the United States troops. Reckless charges of massacre, torture of prisoners, etc., have been brought by those corresponding in America to the Steads of England. The present accusations, however, seem to have a stronger foundation, and as was only to be expected, the immediate result has

¹¹² J. Emerson Neilly, "The Boer Concentration Camps. Lessons of Mafeking's Plague Trench," *Hong Kong Telegraph*, November 29, 1901, 3. Morgan, "The Boer War and the Media," 3. Besides reprinting the text, another evidence that the *Telegraph* shared this opinion is the following editorial comment: "The Concentration Camps in South Africa," Local and General, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Dec. 12, 1901, 2.

¹¹³ "The Filipinos..." Local and General, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, Dec. 20, 1901, 2.

been a popular outcry for the disgrace and punishment of the guilty. No doubt much capital will be made out of the affair by the papers in America which, like *Life*, base their curious notions of humour on pictures of Boer or Filipino corpses under the brutal British or American heel; but the sentiment of the United States, like that of Great Britain, while averse to the methods of *Life* or the *Review of Reviews*, is and has always been against the conduct of war on any but civilized lines. Should the courts-martial now proceeding in Manila result in the production of strong evidence against the accused, we may be sure that the penalty will not be light. It is only in countries where militarism has been elevated into an idol or in actually savage lands that barbarity against foemen carries no disgrace.¹¹⁴

As recent historiography has pointed out, some American anti-imperialists also attacked the Boer war and activists from both movements established connections.¹¹⁵ Therefore, showing sympathy to some anti-imperialists, as the studied press had done before, would now be incoherent with their positions on the Boer War.

Conclusion

During the Spanish-American War and the conventional phase of the Philippine American War, the analyzed press published a vast amount of information that came from American and European sources, like continental newspapers and Reuters' news services, but also from direct witnesses of the events, like British merchants in the Philippines and Filipinos themselves. All that information allowed them to show critical evaluations of the American occupation and adopt distinctive attitudes regarding the American treatment of the Philippine Revolutionary Government. They all defended the

¹¹⁴ "The sensation..." editorial, *Hong Kong Daily Press*, May 2, 1902, 2. Also, "In the course of the rabbid..." *Hong Kong Daily Press*, Nov. 22, 1901, 2.

¹¹⁵ For a comparison between both movements, see Steven C. Call, "Voices Crying in the Wilderness: A Comparison of Pro-Boers and Anti-Imperialists, 1899–1902" (master's thesis, University of Nebraska, 1991); Call, "Protesting Against Modern War: A Comparison of Issues Raised by Anti-Imperialists and Pro-Boers," *War in History* 3, no. 1 (January 17, 1996): 66–84, <https://doi.org/10.1177/096834459600300103>. On the connections between both movements, see M. P. Cullinane, "Transatlantic Dimensions of the American Anti-Imperialist Movement, 1899–1909"; M. P. Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism: 1898–1909*, 75–92.

ultimate establishment of a protectorate in the Islands and supported that the Malolos government could participate in it. From their point of view, Aguinaldo and the American authorities could achieve a diplomatic arrangement and avoid a costly and bloody war.

When the Philippine-American War began, especially the *Hong Kong Telegraph*, the *Singapore Free Press*, and the *Hong Kong Daily Press* kept recognizing Filipino's aspirations to self-government and defended their right to occupy an important role in the administration of the territory. They kept encouraging the establishment of a protectorate following British governance models, even when the Philippine Republic's government disbanded and Filipino resistance turned into a war of insurgency. As the British Empire's involvement in the South African War was internationally criticized and divided British society, the analyzed press defended the imperial struggle against the Boers. As parallels between the latter and the Philippine guerrillas increased, their messages of support waned.

“Aguinaldo’s Englishmen” in the U.S.
The Civilization Campaign in the U.S. Press

Previous chapters have shown that Filipino revolutionaries organized a well-designed campaign to oppose the image of savagery that greatly supported the rhetoric of “benevolent assimilation” and the related U.S. policy of military occupation. This campaign resonated in English-language press of Hong Kong and Singapore. Some of the media outlets in these port cities acknowledged the strength of the Philippine Republic and consequently suggested that its leaders be included in the future government of the archipelago.

In addition, some journalists argued that the leaders had demonstrated a higher degree of civilization than expected and could play essential roles in a protectorate designed after British models. Besides offering a more nuanced view of the revolution, editor William St. Clair actively collaborated in the Filipino civilization campaign along with the merchant Howard W. Bray and journalist Chesney Duncan, whom the Hong Kong Junta hired as press representatives. One of their contemporaries even called one of them “Aguinaldo’s Englishman.”¹

Publishing their message in the Pacific British press, however, was also a means of reaching the wider audiences of the so-called “civilized world.” The ultimate targets of the propaganda of the Malolos Government and its allies in the British media were U.S. audiences that held sway over American policy towards the Philippines. This is why I will conclude my dissertation by analyzing the impact they had on the media in the U.S.

This chapter pays special attention to their influence in the American press between 1898 and mid-1899. As shown in previous chapters, this was when the Filipino media campaign for recognition and the collaboration between Filipinos and British sympathizers was most intense. Also, this was before Filipino nationalists expanded

¹ “Mr. Spencer Pratt and the Philipinos of Singapore,” *Overland China Mail*, Jun. 25, 1898, 213.

their collaboration to include American anti-imperialists in the U.S., a relationship that historians have already analyzed.

This chapter begins by monitoring how general-interest media outlets in North America reacted to the civilization campaign during the Paris peace conference and before the outbreak of the Philippine-American War.² It argues that the Philippine Republic and its media allies managed to have some of their messages reprinted in the U.S., but these represented only a minority of the content being produced about the “great debate.” Neither the imperialists nor the anti-imperialists gave their messages much consideration while discussing the best policy regarding the archipelago.

Second, this chapter examines the early relationship between the Hong Kong Junta, its British allies, and American anti-imperialists, particularly Massachusetts Senator George F. Hoar. Recent contributions to the historiography have shown that the relationship between the anti-imperialist movement and the Filipinos evolved over time, as did their strategies against the acquisition of colonies by the U.S. This section of the chapter references those studies to explain the challenges that Filipinos and their media allies initially encountered when they tried to promote their civilization campaign in the U.S. alongside the anti-imperialist movement. I will then show how they overcame these difficulties by convincing Senator Hoar, a key figure in opposing U.S. expansionism, of their views and arguments. The chapter argues that Howard W. Bray and William St. Clair were decisive in influencing the senator.

² Here, I focus on the reception of this message specifically from the generalist press because I understand it was the Filipino revolutionaries’ primary goal. There is already extensive and growing literature dealing with the reaction of the African American and other minorities’ press, like the Irish and German newspapers, to imperialism. Among others, see George P. Marks III, *The Black Press Views American Imperialism* (New York: Arno Press, 1971); Willard B. Jr. Gatewood, *Black Americans and the White Man’s Burden, 1898–1903* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975); Gatewood, *“Smoked Yankees” and the Struggle for Empire: Letters from Negro Soldiers, 1898–1902* (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1987); Brian H. Shott, “Mediating America: Black and Irish Press and the Struggle for Citizenship, 1870–1914” (Ph.D. diss., California Santa Cruz, 2015); Shott, “Forty Acres and a Carabao: T. Thomas Fortune, Newspapers, and the Pacific Unstable Color Lines, 1902–03,” *The Journal of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era* 17 (2018): 98–120, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781416000372>; Shott, ““Smoked Yankees”, ‘Wild’ Catholics and the Newspaper ‘Lions’ of Manila the Multiplicity of Race in the Philippine-American War,” in *Racial Difference and the Colonial Wars*, ed. Noor and Carey, 211–42.

Finally, this chapter reflects on the significance of these British media allies in furthering the final impact of the Filipino civilization campaign. At this point, the dissertation will have demonstrated their influence in the English-language press of Hong Kong and Singapore and the effectiveness of some of their interventions on behalf of the Filipino civilization campaign in the U.S., most notably the influencing of an important anti-imperialist at a time when the anti-imperialist movement was reluctant to engage with Filipinos. Following this, the last section of my dissertation argues that the Filipino alliance with specific British individuals constituted a network of advocacy and broadens our understanding of this phenomenon. They cultivated solidarity relationships with American anti-imperialists and also British imperialists.

1. The Civilization Campaign in the U.S. Media System

In a series of four long chronicles, American soldier A. H. Myers made the following confession in March 1899: “the incontestable and authoritative facts that I have gathered unfortunately explode the opinion that I myself (in common with many other Americans at home) had erroneously formed on the subject.” He admitted that “gross misrepresentations have been made by the American officials and others” and argued that the public press, “as a recognized champion of the oppressed[,] should lay before the American public facts that are well known here.”³

Myers confessed to what the Hong Kong Junta and its British allies had long alleged: Americans’ perception of the Philippines was biased. As we have previously seen, especially in the analysis of the 1898 War, the Paris peace conference, and the first year of the Philippine-American War, the Philippine Republic was fighting to correct this. As a result of all those efforts, the Hong Kong Junta managed to have some of its messages printed in the U.S. media. Altogether, however, they were but drops in a sea of confusing information and contending voices.

In the months leading up to the 1898 War and throughout the conflict, according to Bonnie M. Miller, the “U.S. media consolidated popular support for war around the

³ A. H. Myers, “America’s Transgressions in the Philippines,” *Singapore Free Press*, Mar. 24; Mar. 25; Mar. 28, and Mar. 29, 1899, 3.

symbolic ideal of Cuban liberation, without explicit consideration of the politics of its postwar settlement.”⁴ In comparison to the large amount of information that appeared in the U.S. press about the Caribbean, reporting on the Philippines and its inhabitants was sparse until the Battle of Manila Bay, on May 1 1898.

Initially, the press assumed that the revolutionary movement and its leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, welcomed U.S. involvement in the islands and would collaborate with the U.S. military. As a consequence, Miller argues, American publications were initial laudatory in their representations of the Filipino leader. Visual illustrators drew him in “Western clothing, neatly groomed, resolute, and often with ‘white,’ Westernized facial features.” Another publication called Aguinaldo “a ‘brainy leader’ worthy of directing the future of the Philippines.” Another described him as “young, handsome, brave as a lion, patriotic and self-sacrificing.”⁵

Another example that Miller cites comes from the *San Francisco Examiner*, which later would take a pro-imperialist stance. On this occasion, the *Examiner* published another of these heroic descriptions with the following caption: “The rebel chief has been complimented by the American Admiral [Dewey] for his bravery and excellent military qualities, and bids fair to be proclaimed the emancipator of his people.”⁶ Soon enough, however, the portrait of Aguinaldo in U.S. newspapers would radically change.

The press did not accurately portray the complexity of the Filipino revolutionary movement and its aspirations. No matter how skillfully Aguinaldo made a case for Philippine Independence, the “Filipinos’ aspirations,” as Christopher A. Vaughan observes, “were irrelevant to U.S. editors.” For example, “a brief item in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, reporting Aguinaldo’s plans to take control, then declare independence and turn the country over to an elected assembly, was buried on page eight and headlined in small print, ‘Aguinaldo Plans to Become a Dictator.’”⁷

⁴ B. M. Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest*, 9–10.

⁵ B. M. Miller, 197.

⁶ B. M. Miller, 197.

⁷ Christopher A. Vaughan, “The ‘Discovery’ of the Philippines by the U.S. Press, 1898-1902,” *The Historian* 57, no. 2 (1995): 307. Also, Vaughan, “Obfuscating the New Other;” Philipp Ablett,

Vaughan selected a representative example of how most of the newspapers in the U.S. reacted upon gaining awareness of the Philippine Republic's aspirations for a higher degree of self-government that might clash with American designs in the islands. The images of both the revolutionary leadership and the broader population evolved. Miller eloquently describes this change in the following terms:

The melodramatic paradigm underwriting the iconography of intervention was no longer sustainable, and the narrative of rescuing oppressed women and children was replaced by the moral logic of the "white man's burden." Pro-imperialist image makers abandoned the symbols of Cuban nationalism and borrowed conventions of ethnic and racial caricature to re-create images of former Spanish subjects into candidates for American guardianship.⁸

The published portraits of Emilio Aguinaldo also evolved. Instead of appearing "young, handsome, brave as a lion, patriotic and self-sacrificing," like he did back when he supported the U.S. army, Aguinaldo and his fellow revolutionaries were portrayed as degenerate rebels who aimed to establish a dictatorship among masses of semi-barbarians.

As documented in previous sections of this dissertation, the Hong Kong Junta responded directly to those charges. In Chapter 1, research showed how it tried to demonstrate that Filipino revolutionaries were not "crowds of *negritos* appearing from the woods" and Aguinaldo was not "an animal chief" with a "thirst for glory," quoting Howard W. Bray and Isidoro de Santos commenting on how the revolutionaries were being portrayed.⁹

One might think the messages of Filipino revolutionaries never made it to U.S. newspapers or were censored given the typical portrayal of the inhabitants of the Philippines as only semi-civilized—a topic that has been analyzed in depth in the

"Colonialism in Denial: U.S. Propaganda in the Philippine-American War," *Social Alternatives* 23, no. 3 (2004): 23; S. C. Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation*, 86–87.

⁸ B. M. Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest*, 17–18. On the racialization of the Filipinos and the consequences for warfare, see Kramer, "Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire."

⁹ See Chapter 1, 68.

extensive body of literature dealing with media reactions to the Philippine-American War.¹⁰ However, that was not the case.

According to John Britton, the U.S. media system was porous, which is to say, foreign states and political movements could insert their messages into the U.S. public sphere and managed to create a “new level of political intimacy.”¹¹ In some cases, these movements benefited from geographical proximity. The main factor, however, was the extensive network of submarine and telegraphic cables that increased the speed at which information traveled as well as the distance.¹²

A case study similar to that of the Philippines was that of the Cuban Junta. Britton explains how the Junta “employed a diversified media approach to elicit public support for the revolution in that Spanish colony.” It reached big cities like New York and Chicago and many more localities across the United States by sending its messages through wire services and print media—it’s appearances in Heart’s *New York Journal* and Pulitzer’s *New York World* being its most famous implants.

In addition, the Junta organized public “sympathy meetings,” such as carnivals and theatrical productions. Meanwhile, Spanish authorities in Cuba unintentionally increased the effectiveness of the Junta’s messaging by censoring U.S. reporters on the island. As a consequence, according to Britton, the “melding of this propaganda

¹⁰ Besides the already cited texts regarding newspapers’ reactions, extensive work focuses on how different journalistic publications, like magazines, or graphical cultural products, represented the Philippines. Among others, see Richard E. Welch Jr., “The ‘Philippine Insurrection’ and the American Press,” *The Historian* 36, no. 1 (1973): 34–51; Welch Jr., “American Atrocities in the Philippines”; Julie A. Tuason, “The Ideology of Empire in National Geographic Magazine’s Coverage of the Philippines, 1898–1908,” *Geographical Review* 89, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 34–53, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1931-0846.1999.tb00200.x>; James Landers, “Island Empire: Discourse on U.S. Imperialism in *Century*, *Cosmopolitan*, *McClure’s*—1983–1900,” *American Journalism* 23, no. 1 (2006): 95–124, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08821127.2006.10677998>. For a recent contribution that deals with representations of the Filipino in different media of the “imperial archive,” see Balce, *Body Parts of Empire*.

¹¹ John A. Britton, *Cables, Crises, and the Press: The Geopolitics of the New International Information System in the Americas, 1866–1903* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2013), 319.

¹² Besides Britton, another recent examination of the relationship between the telegraph and globalization is Roland Wenzlhuemer, *Connecting the Nineteenth-Century World: The Telegraph and Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

campaign with press sensationalism produced a wave of publicity favorable to the junta.”¹³

Along similar lines, Filipino revolutionaries also tried to cultivate “political intimacy.” For them, however, the distance between the Philippines and the U.S. made it difficult to introduce themselves and communicate their aspirations to the American public. Nevertheless, a detailed search for their presence in mainstream American newspapers between the 1898 War and the outbreak of the Philippine-American War turned up evidence that shows that they managed to disseminate their messages.

Felipe Agoncillo became the main conveyer of Filipino messages to Americans upon visiting the U.S in the fall of 1898. As shown by Frederick G. Hoyt in his analysis of the media coverage of Agoncillo’s tour, many newspapers followed the Filipino representative around, documenting his activities, and highlighting how his contingent dressed in Western clothes, appearing “civilized.”¹⁴ The interviews he gave and his statements were wired across the nation. Newspapers also printed dispatches that transmitted messages from the Juntas in Hong Kong, London and Paris.

To see how their arguments evolved, consider, as an example, their messages that appeared in the *New York Times*. As expected, the Philippine proclamations that were published in this newspaper highlighted the readiness of the inhabitants of the Philippines for self-government and their expectation that the U.S. would recognize the sovereignty of the Philippine Republic.¹⁵ This new authority, Agoncillo and his contingent argued, was “thoroughly republican.” Filipinos had a representative government, and questions like those regarding its dealings with foreign countries

¹³ Britton, 321. For other accounts of the Cuban Junta communication efforts in the U.S., see George W. Auxier, “The Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta in Precipitating the Spanish-American War,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 29, no. 3 (1938): 296–305; Lilian Guerra, “Contradictory Identities, Conflicted Nations: Cuban Émigrés in the United States and the Last War for Independence (1895–1898),” in *Whose America? The War of 1898 and the Battles to Define the Nation*, ed. Virginia M. Bouvier (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2011), 61–91.

¹⁴ Frederick G. Hoyt, “Agoncillo’s Mission to America: Reality Confronts Mythology,” *Bulletin of the American Historical Collection* 7, no. 14 (1979): 32–50.

¹⁵ “Hopes of the Filipinos,” *New York Times*, Sep. 27, 1898, 3; “Aguinaldo’s Agent Angered,” *New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1898, 1; “Agoncillo Asks Explanation,” *New York Times*, Jan. 25, 1899, 1.

“would go before the Assembly, and Aguinaldo’s attitude must, under the Constitution, be determined by the action of that body.”¹⁶

All of this implied that the Philippine Republic was a stable, competent, fair and representative institution, which deserved to participate in political debates and negotiations with other “civilized” nations. Along these lines, Agoncillo, before the start of the peace conference in Paris, insisted that the Philippine Republic at least be heard in the negotiations. When the U.S. and Spain disregarded these demands and excluded the Filipinos, Agoncillo signaled that the Philippine Republic was reasonable and would be willing to discuss and possibly accept “American protection.”¹⁷

Although the primary goal of their campaign was to gain independence for the Philippine Republic, Agoncillo and the Juntas often made statements alluding to the brotherhood of the U.S. and the Philippines and their willingness to consider American protection.¹⁸ Agoncillo’s most complete answer to the question regarding what kind of protection the Philippine Republic might accept appeared in September 1898: “If it [protection] meant simply the control of the Islands by the United States, the Government of this country assuming the responsibility of maintaining good order and controlling the revenues of the islands, I do not think the feeling against such a move would be strong, though the Filipinos are anxious to govern themselves.”

He warned, however, “should it be planned that the United States take the islands for the purpose of colonization, which might eventually crowd out the native population, in my opinion there would be greater difficulty in bringing the people of the islands to submission.” In other words, Agoncillo wanted the U.S. to recognize Filipino sovereignty, but repeatedly hinted that he was open to negotiating an arrangement that might be more beneficial for the U.S.¹⁹

¹⁶ “Hopes of the Filipinos.”

¹⁷ “Agoncillo is at Paris” *New York Times*, Oct. 18, 1898, 1.

¹⁸ “Agoncillo is at Paris;” “The Episcopal Council,” *New York Times*, Oct. 7, 1898, 10.

¹⁹ “Hopes of the Filipinos.”

As the peace conference came to an end and it became increasingly clear that Americans had no intention of recognizing the sovereignty of the Philippine Republic, the Filipinos made proclamations denouncing any possible sale of the islands to the U.S. as “nonsensical.” They stated: “we are anxious to be united and allied to our good friends, the Americans; but beyond this, we are determined at all hazards to remain independent.”²⁰

On December 25th, the *New York Times* published an article, “Plea of the Filipinos,” that contained the most complete criticism of the resolution of the peace commission. The text, which Agoncillo signed, exemplified once more the key arguments of the Filipino civilization campaign. It began by arguing that legally only the Filipino people could decide their own future. Next, Agoncillo explained that Spain did not have any right to sell the islands because it no longer possessed them.

In defense of his argument, Agoncillo reviewed the history of the relationship between Spain and the Filipinos, emphasizing that Filipinos were peaceful and loyal but had energetically protested “by force of arms” when “the peninsular powers attempted to impose their absolute sovereignty on the islands” in defense of their “political personality.” Contextualizing the Filipino struggle back in time, Agoncillo recalled how the Filipinos had successfully expelled the Spanish during the 1898 War.

Finally, the Filipino representative addressed the U.S., explaining how the Revolutionary Army collaborated with the U.S. military. He also recalled the polemical promises made by the U.S. to the Filipinos during Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo’s meeting. He concluded by noting that Filipino troops were the ones who expelled the Spaniards and they were in control of most of the territory.²¹

In the days that followed, the Filipinos insisted that they wanted to maintain peace and were willing to “work as allies” of the U.S., but they warned that the U.S. had promised them independence and through its actions, had already, in effect, recognized their

²⁰ “Agoncillo and the Treaty,” *New York Times*, Dec. 16, 1898, 8.

²¹ “Plea of the Filipinos,” *New York Times*, Dec. 25, 1898, 4.

autonomy.²² Also, they explained that they would only resist an American occupation “by the force of arms” if they saw that their liberties were “in danger at the hands of the Republic whose name they have always believed was associated with freedom and to which they first came for recognition.”²³

In summary, Agoncillo and the Juntas, in the fall of 1898, managed to get the *New York Times* and many other newspapers to publish proclamations containing key messages from of the Filipino civilization campaign. In addition to publishing these texts by Agoncillo and the Hong Kong, Paris and London Juntas, U.S. newspapers also reprinted some of the content from the British Pacific press that previous chapters presented. Although they were reprinted very occasionally, their appearance confirms the U.S. media interest in obtaining information on the Philippines from sources close to the archipelago, and the latter capacity to reach and affect U.S. public opinion.

Texts from the British Pacific press were generally not wired but instead mailed or carried by travelers journeying between Asia and the U.S. As a result, by the time newspaper editors received this content, it was already weeks old. Nevertheless, many American newspapers, accessed through modern databases, contain editorials and opinion articles about the Philippines by William St. Clair, Chesney Duncan and Howard W. Bray, individuals who commonly published in the British Pacific press.

In contrast to Agoncillo and the Juntas, whose messaging and propaganda advocated independence but conceded to the possibility of American protection, St. Clair, Duncan and Bray embraced the prospect of U.S. protection. They adopted many of the supporting arguments used by the Junta. The Filipinos, they explained, had fought long and honorably for their freedom, collaborated with the U.S., and now controlled the islands. The authors made these points not to demand that the U.S. recognized Filipino independence, however, but to advocate a protectorate following British models.

²² “Filipinos Are Ambitious,” *New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1899, 1. Also “Pompous Protest by Aguinaldo,” *New York Times*, Dec. 17, 1898, 6.

²³ “Agoncillo Asks Explanation,” *New York Times*, Jan. 25, 1899, 1; “Filipinos Are Ambitious”; “Natives Predict a Battle,” *New York Times*, Jan. 10, 1899, 1.

For example, on October 19th, the *Chicago Daily Tribune* republished an editorial from the *Singapore Free Press* of September 8th. The *Tribune* entitled the text “Hopes and Fears of Filipinos Observed at Short Range,” emphasizing the privileged position of the *Free Press*. As in many of St. Clair’s editorials which I analyzed in previous chapters, the text argued that “the efforts of the Filipinos to erect a constitutional government among themselves” were not “a derogation from American authority.” He claimed that “the nearer the Filipinos have come to the creation of a sound domestic administration the more fully is the American intervention on their behalf justified and the more definite appears the claim of the Filipinos to the protection of the American people.”²⁴

Howard W. Bray’s text denouncing the misrepresentation of the Filipinos in the *Singapore Free Press* appeared in the *Washington Evening Star* on November 18th. As seen in Chapter 3, this text denounced Spanish authorities and foreigners willing to preserve the *status quo* and condemned operations of “political trickery” in the islands that twisted the representations of the Philippine government. In addition, Bray criticized American yellow journalism and correspondents who proved themselves incapable of distinguishing between reality and biased information. Bray finished by emphasizing that Filipinos should have the opportunity to govern themselves.²⁵

A final text exemplifying how content from the British Pacific press was reprinted on the west coast of the U.S. was Chesney Duncan’s lengthy piece in the *Los Angeles Times* analyzing the misunderstanding between the Americans and the Filipinos. Originally published in the *Hong Kong Telegraph* on December 13th, 1898, this was the same text previously mentioned in Chapter 3 in which Duncan announced his intention to publish a “journal devoted to the interests of the Filipinos and of peace.” The article explained that the journal would contain convincing evidence on the Philippine

²⁴ “Hopes and Fears of Filipinos Observed at Short Range,” *Chicago Daily Tribune* [reprinted from *Singapore Free Press*], Oct. 19, 1898, 6. For a lengthier reading of this text, see Chapter 3, 157. Other texts from the *Singapore Free Press* reprinted in the U.S. were “Terms with Aguinaldo,” *New York Times*, Jun. 12, 1898, 2; “Honors to a Consul General,” *New York Times* [reprinted from *Singapore Free Press*], Jul. 25, 1898, 5; “The Frailes and the Filipinos,” *New York Sun* [part of the text is an editorial from *Singapore Free Press*], Sep. 12, 1898, 3 “For Manila’s Heroes,” *Los Angeles Times* [reprinted from *Singapore Free Press*] Dec. 13, 1898, 2.

²⁵ “Alleged Friction at Manila,” *Washington Evening Star* [fragment reprinted from *Singapore Free Press*], Nov. 18, 1898, 5. For a lengthier analysis of this text, see Chapter 3, 163–164.

Republic's fruitful collaboration with the U.S. Army and show that the Filipinos were "very anxious for peace and earnestly desire to avoid conflict with the United States." The journal would also convey the hopes and the ability of native leaders to govern themselves. Finally, the article cited another text in the *Singapore Free Press* suggesting the British protectorate as an ideal model for the Philippines.²⁶

In addition to all this content, there were some positive reports on the Philippine Republic sent home by Americans, especially U.S. journalists and soldiers. It is necessary to contextualize, however, the favorable portraits of the Malolos Government that the Hong Kong Junta and its British media allies were promoting in the U.S.

First of all, the newspapers that published these messages generally ignored the wider evolution of the revolution. As Hoyt explained, Agoncillo and his contingent were "viewed with considerable interest, described in detail, interviewed extensively, treated with respect and consideration, and rather consistently discussed in flattering terms" when they toured the U.S.²⁷ According to Hoyt, however, most newspapers in the U.S. did not provide readers with enough information on the Philippine Revolution to fully understand the message of these visitors. As a result, there was confusion even "in designating the specific person or entity to which these men were responsible."²⁸

That lack of context was not easily corrected. For one, not all newspapers followed the *New York Times* in publishing the proclamations of Agoncillo and the Junta messages, and occasionally when they did, they denied the credibility of the content. For example, when the war finally broke out and the Filipinos claimed they weren't the ones who started the hostilities, the *Elmore Bulletin* published their telegrams with the following headline: "Senseless Chatter. Filipinos Make Statements Which Are Utterly Ridiculous."²⁹

²⁶ Chesney Duncan, "Government of the Philippines," *Los Angeles Times* [reprinted from *Hong Kong Telegraph*], Jan. 22, 1899, 2. For a more complete contextualization of this text, see Chapter 3, 161.

²⁷ Hoyt, "Agoncillo's Mission to America: Reality Confronts Mythology," 48.

²⁸ Hoyt, 45–46.

²⁹ "Senseless chatter. Filipinos make statements which are utterly ridiculous," *Elmore Bulletin*, Feb. 8, 1899, 1. Other examples are "Filipino Tin Thunder of the Hongkong Junta," *San Francisco Call*, Apr. 13,

A greater problem than whether or not U.S. newspaper editors would decide to publish Filipino statements on the revolution, however, was the fact that they were printing a large number of contradicting articles from other sources, most notably American political and military authorities, whom American audiences accepted as having more credibility. First, the McKinley administration, which pioneered new techniques in propaganda and public relations, mounted a public campaign to promote the retention of the islands “on grounds of destiny and moral obligation.” The campaign included a tour around the Midwest. It provided the president’s speeches to all of the local newspapers in advance to spread the message that “the United States was duty bound to help those people it had liberated.”³⁰

Second, the U.S. military authorities in Manila were restricting the information that was allowed to leave the islands. The military was the main source of information for American journalists present in the islands, and it progressively increased its censorship, letting “nothing go that can hurt the administration.”³¹ Eventually, both authorities would begin to lose their credibility. As previously explained, even the war correspondents would denounce the censorship imposed by the military. During the months leading up to the Philippine-American War, however, the military was still their main source of information.

Multiple authors including Vaughan have explained how U.S. authorities saw “an altruistic ‘civilizing’ mission” as the main objective of colonization. Vaughan says “the ‘Other’ selected for ‘civilizing’ had to be demonstrably in need of what Americans had to offer.” The American media cultivated this way of thinking by conveying “the idea

1899, 4. As examples of how they blamed the Filipinos of the outbreak of hostilities and the need of going on fighting them, see “The Proposed Plan of General Otis. [...] The Whipping of the Filipinos Seems a Necessity,” *Washington Times*, Mar. 10, 1899, 1; “Confirmed from Hong Kong,” *Brownsville Daily Herald*, Apr. 7, 1899, 1.

³⁰ George Herring, “Imperial Tutor,” 35. On McKinley’s public relations strategies, see also Hildebrand, *Power and the People*, 30–51; Stephen Ponder, *Managing the Press: Origins of the Media Presidency 1897–1933* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 1–15; Susan Brewer, “Selling Empire: American Propaganda and War in the Philippines,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 11, no. 40 (2013): 1–30.

³¹ Jeffery Smith, *War and Press Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 123; S. C. Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation*, 86–87; B. M. Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest*, 238–40.

that a majority of Filipinos were still in a state of semi-barbarism.”³² In presenting those messages, the U.S. media relied once more on the racial ideologies that had served as the foundation for its earlier “justifications of the government’s campaigns of pacification and extermination” during the 19th century, which authors including Richard Slotkin, Richard Drinnon and John Coward analyzed.³³ This allowed the authorities who supported U.S. expansionism to argue that America had a responsibility to tutor the Filipinos.

As said and done, the Filipinos had suffered a long fight against Spain, demonstrated their readiness for self-government, explained how the Americans had implicitly recognized their independence during the Spanish-American War, and expressed a willingness to find a diplomatic arrangement. All of this, however, was published side by side with other articles written from an opposite point of view.

For example, returning to the *New York Times*’ coverage, on January 7th, it published Agoncillo’s request to be recognized as representative of the Philippine Republic on the first page of the newspaper. The article encouraged “an understanding between the U.S. and the Philippino nations” by expressing the desire of Filipinos to maintain their friendly relationship with the U.S.³⁴ Next to this article, however, appeared two lengthier texts. One of them cited political authorities who denied that the U.S. had ever recognized the “so-called Philippine Republic,” by maintaining that U.S. consuls in Asia had never promised Filipinos independence in exchange for their collaboration.³⁵

³² Vaughan, “Obfuscating the New Other,” x. Also, Welch Jr., *Response to Imperialism*; Vaughan, “The ‘Discovery’ of the Philippines”; B. M. Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest*.

³³ Richard L. Kaplan, “American Journalism Goes to War, 1898–2001: A Manifesto on Media and Empire,” *Media History* 9, no. 3 (December 2003): 212, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1368880032000145533>; Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); Richard Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: Atheneum, 1992); John M. Coward, *Indians Illustrated. The Image of Native Americans in the Pictorial Press* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2016). For a comprehensive essay on the U.S. media and race, see Juan González and Joseph Torres, *News for All the People. The Epic Story of Race and the American Media* (London: Verso, 2011), 2. For the specific context of the media during the Progressive era, see chapter 10, “The Progressive Era and the Colored Press,” 161–82.

³⁴ “Agoncillo Asks Recognition,” *New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1899, 1.

³⁵ “Relations with Aguinaldo,” *New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1899, 1.

The other article, entitled “Defied by Filipinos,” implied that Filipinos were preparing to fight the Americans.³⁶

Examples like these confirm Richard Kaplan’s theory on the behavior of the American media during war, which clearly applies to American news coverage of the Philippine question. The U.S. media, Kaplan explains, operated “within a fairly restricted range of views and information.” Relying on information provided by the authorities, the media acted as conveyers of government propaganda. It shared decontextualized bits of information that were “reabsorbed in an all-encompassing dramatic tale of the injured and righteous nation,” which had no choice but to fight against a foreign enemy.³⁷ In this case, the perceived threat came from ungrateful Filipino rebels who, after being liberated from Spanish tyranny, attacked their liberators and challenged U.S. sovereignty.³⁸

Did Americans who opposed U.S. expansion reference the arguments of the Filipino civilization campaign when opposing the annexation of the Philippines? The existing literature on the Anti-Imperialist League says it did not. The next section of this chapter, delves this matter in more detail. Later, the chapter reveals how Filipinos and their British allies tried to overcome its reticence and gain its support.

2. Anti-Imperialists and the Filipino Campaign

Between the fall of 1898 and the summer of 1899, as the media campaign of the Hong Kong Junta for recognition peaked in intensity and reached its highest point in the Pacific British press, the anti-imperialist movement was still in its formative stages. Most of the opposition to the U.S. occupation of the Philippine Islands was organized by the Anti-Imperialist League (henceforth AIL), which came into existence from a meeting in Boston on June 17, 1898.

³⁶ “Defied by Filipinos,” *New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1899, 1.

³⁷ Kaplan, “American Journalism Goes to War,” 209. For a thought-provoking reflection on how freedom of information is no guarantee of an unbiased, democratic debate, see Sam Lebovic, “The Inadequacy of Speech Rights,” in *Free Speech and Unfree News* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 7–36.

³⁸ B. M. Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest*, 237.

The organizers of the meeting argued that the Teller Amendment was applicable to all Spanish territories occupied by the United States during the war against Spain. Originally intended for Cuba, the Teller Amendment gave the U.S. military Congressional authorization to intervene in the Caribbean on the condition that the U.S. “disclaimed any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over the islands” and would later hand over power to the local population.³⁹

After this meeting, the organizers created a Committee of Correspondence to solicit support from across the nation. It was not until November 18, 1898, that its members institutionalized the AIL. Over the course of the two following years, the League focused on fighting two big campaigns. The first aimed to prevent the U.S. Senate from ratifying the Paris Peace Treaty. The second was to stop William McKinley from winning the presidential election of November 1900, which would give him four more years as president to continue implementing his expansionist agenda.

The existing body of literature about the AIL explains that the main characteristic of the movement was its heterogeneity. Its members included everyone from *Mugwumps* and conservative Republicans to Southern Democrats. They were united by their consensus that annexing the Philippines would betray their understanding of U.S. history and American principles and would have negative consequences for the country. It was these ideas, and not a shared concern for the well-being of the Filipinos that motivated their opposition to the conquest of the Philippines.

Although its members had diverse political leanings, a majority of anti-imperialists, citing the adage that the “Constitution Follows the Flag,” worried that annexing the Philippines would mean extending the rights and obligations of citizenship to Filipinos and incorporating them into the U.S. Along these lines, several groups of anti-

³⁹ Cited in Fabian Hilfrich, *Debating American Exceptionalism: Empire and Democracy in the Wake of the Spanish-American War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 15. The following paragraphs are based on Hilfrich’s and other analysis of the Anti-Imperialist League. The classic books about this organization include Daniel B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1972); Berkeley E. Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate 1890-1920* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970); Robert Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire. The Anti-Imperialists 1898-1900* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986). Other recent studies thoroughly used here are M. P. Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism*; Murphy, *No Middle Ground*.

imperialists opposed annexation precisely because they wanted to exclude Filipinos from U.S. citizenship. Some anti-imperialists believed that incorporating a “Malayan race” into the U.S. would worsen the country’s racial composition.⁴⁰ Others worried that Filipinos might become a competing labor force. Along similar lines, other anti-imperialist, including the representatives from Louisiana, feared having to compete with Filipino sugar producers on equal terms.⁴¹

Interestingly, as explained by Fabian Hilfrich, this exclusionary racism was complementary in effect to the belief in the purity and universality of American democratic principles, including the idea that “any race or people should freely choose its own system of government because only that would adequately reflect its customs and culture.”⁴² Some anti-imperialists also argued that sending American soldiers to violate the freedoms of Filipinos would betray the nation’s principles.

According to Hilfrich, the inherent contradictions of anti-imperialism were reconciled through cultural relativism. Many anti-imperialists believed that all people were capable of and entitled to self-government. At the same time, however, they doubted that Filipinos “could ever rise to the level of American self-government.” As exemplified by William J. Bryan, American anti-imperialists believed “the Filipinos are not far enough

⁴⁰ Among the earliest analysis focused in the anti-imperialist movement’s racism are Christopher Lasch, “The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man,” *The Journal of Southern History* 24, no. 3 (1958): 319–31 and James P. Shenton, “Imperialism and Racism,” in *Essays in American Historiography. Papers Presented in Honor of Allan Nevins*, ed. Donald Sheehan and Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 231–50. Other historians replied them arguing that there were anti-imperialists that did respect the Filipinos, such as George F. Hoar, whose case is further analyzed below, or Fiske Warren [Richard E. Welch Jr., “Anti-Imperialists and Imperialists Compared: Racism and Economic Expansion,” in *American Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1974), 118–25]. However, recent historiography has convincingly demonstrated how race and the willfulness of excluding Filipinos from U.S. citizenship was a motor of the movement. These more recent works include Eric T. L. Love, *Race over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865–1900* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 159–195 and Hilfrich, *Debating American Exceptionalism*. Hilfrich offers a detailed analysis of the anti-imperialists’ aim to exclude the Filipinos of their democracy in his second chapter “Democracy and Exclusion: The Issue of Race”, 39–75.

⁴¹ To read some examples of the diversity of arguments sustained by different members of the anti-imperialists, see one of the several compilations of their public interventions: Gerald E. Markowitz, *American Anti-Imperialism 1895–1901* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1976); Phillip Foner and Richard C. Winchester, eds., *The Anti-Imperialist Reader: A Documentary History of Anti-Imperialism in the United States* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984); John Nichols, *Against the Beast: A Documentary History of American Opposition to Empire* (New York: Nation Books, 2004).

⁴² Hilfrich, *Debating American Exceptionalism*, 54.

advanced to share in the government of the people of the United States, but they are competent to govern themselves.”⁴³

AIL leaders were well aware that many of the organization’s members held racist ideologies and mostly desired to keep Filipinos out of the U.S. As a result, when the League was founded in November 1898, its constitution established that only U.S. citizens could join the organization as members. The document specifically denied entry to Filipinos to avoid alienating members and affiliates who would have opposed it.⁴⁴

Along the same lines, George S. Boutwell, as President of the Anti-Imperialist League, believed the organization “should have nothing to do directly with the Filipinos:” “although he was glad that individual anti-imperialists should have such relations provided that the League should not, in the public mind, be involved in their acts.”⁴⁵

According to Jim Zwick, the first historian to have investigated the relationship between anti-imperialists and Filipinos, “Boutwell’s concern with how the League was viewed by the public, which was shared by many other anti-imperialists, is important to stress because it influenced numerous other decisions, from the house of officers and public speakers to the creation of new organizations to engage in work that was likely to create controversy.”⁴⁶

The interventions of anti-imperialists in the press followed the same pattern of combining exclusionary racism with a defense of democratic values. According to Hilfrich and Eric T. Love, even northern anti-imperialists, who had important roots in abolitionism, included aspects of racism in their arguments early in the debate; it was a tactical move based on the assumption that “racism was the biggest obstacle to expansion.”⁴⁷ But as the next pages demonstrate, the defense of these values sometimes incorporated elements from the messages of the Filipino civilization campaign.

⁴³ Hilfrich, 54.

⁴⁴ M. P. Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism*, 22–23.

⁴⁵ Zwick, “The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity,” 68–69.

⁴⁶ Zwick, 69.

⁴⁷ Hilfrich, *Debating American Exceptionalism*, 40; Love, *Race over Empire*, 159–195.

Many publications by anti-imperialists combined two ideas. Sometimes, they defended the lack of Filipino readiness for self-government. On other occasions, they argued that Filipinos were ready to govern themselves, but not as Americans did. A clear example of those tensions appeared in the *Nation*, a weekly paper with roots in abolitionism and identified with the anti-imperialist movement. In September 1898, this journal published a piece of news arguing that the U.S. should not assume responsibility for civilizing and converting “8,000,000 half savages of whom we never heard until the other day, of whose tastes and character we know nothing, who have got on for about 2,000 years without our assistance, who belong to a church which professes to know more than we do about the divine purposes with regard to them, and who live about a month’s journey away from us.”⁴⁸

A couple of weeks later, however, the *Nation* compared the Philippine and American revolutions. Evidently, its writers were influenced by the messages of the Hong Kong Junta. The article explained how “Filipinos under the presidency of Aguinaldo” had traveled to Paris “with instructions to visit other European Powers” to request “recognition as an independent nation.” In addition to receiving this announcement, the authors also reported having been given “a declaration of principles resembling in many particulars the Declaration of American Independence.”

Upon receiving this content, the *Nation* reproduced key ideas from the Filipino civilization campaign. It observed how the Philippine government represented most of the archipelago’s provinces, where “good order and perfect tranquility” reigned and laws were “administered by officers elected by the people according to regulations adopted when the government was formed” in June 1898. In addition, the *Nation* reported that the 9,000 prisoners of war held by the Filipino government were “treated with all the usages and regulations of civilized warfare and humanitarian sentiment.” Taking all of this into account, the author of the article in the *Nation* offered the following reflection:

Now, what kind of figure shall we present to the world and to ourselves in

⁴⁸ “Apropos of the Philippines,” *The Nation*, Vol. 67, No. 1734, 216.

fighting a people who come forward bearing in one hand the guns that we gave them, and in the other a Declaration of Independence modelled upon our own? How much more becoming shall we appear —how much better shall we be— than George III and his cohorts in the days of the Revolution?⁴⁹

During the fall of 1898, the *Springfield Republican* published many other examples of anti-imperialist commentary looking down upon civilization in the Philippines yet adopting certain elements from Filipino proclamations and saying that Filipinos had proved themselves worthy of self-government.⁵⁰ These examples demonstrate not only that Filipino messages were present in the U.S. public sphere, but also that some anti-imperialists reflected upon them and adopted a variety of components when promoting the universality of select American values. In some instances, they used evidence of the capacity of Filipinos for self-government to argue that the U.S. should leave the inhabitants of the Philippines alone.

Such comments, however, were in the minority. For starters, the defense of Filipino civilization was not a main concern of the anti-imperialist press. Even if it had been, those publications were not the majority. According to Richard E. Welch Jr.'s analysis of 180 newspapers, 68% supported the policies of the McKinley administration in the Philippines, and only 32% opposed them.⁵¹ Considering that his sample of texts was mostly published in January 1900 when the war had already lost support, the percentage of papers that opposed McKinley was probably even lower in the fall of 1898. As a result, all of this analysis supports Vaughan's statement that, "for all the intellectual vigor of the Filipino discourse, it had little impact on the American public."⁵²

⁴⁹ "It was announced some days ago..." *The Nation*, Vol. 67, No. 1736, 250.

⁵⁰ As examples of Filipino messages in the *Springfield Republican*, see "Filipinos discuss Taxation," Sep. 26, 1898, 5; "Filipinos Demand a Hearing," Sep. 27, 1898, 5; "Mr. Aguinaldo's Protest," Dec. 25, 1898, 1; "The Filipino Junta....," Dec. 31, 1898, 9. As examples of mentions to the recognition of the Filipinos, see "Earth Grabbing and Morality," Sep. 15, 1898, 10; "Formal Surrender of Iloilo," Dec. 28, 1898, 7. As an example of doubts regarding their preparations and the U.S. responsibility to intervene, see "Our Moral Responsibility," Sep. 18, 1898, 8. As examples of attacks to Filipino preparedness, see "Notes of Life About Manila," Sep. 25, 1898, 14; "Incapable of Self-Government," Dec. 27, 1898, 10.

⁵¹ Welch Jr., "The 'Philippine Insurrection' and the American Press," 36.

⁵² Vaughan, "Obfuscating the New Other," xiv.

The great tactical failure of the anti-imperialists, says Miller in her work on political cartoons, was that they portrayed Filipinos as savages, just as imperialists did:

Anticolonialists thus undercut their own mobilizing power by focusing on protecting U.S. interests from an external racialized threat, whereas imperialists skillfully claimed the moral high ground with their willingness to accept the burdens of occupation while at the same time reaping the gains. Had the anti-colonialists chosen to represent the colonies as capable of self-government, they could have drawn from the rallying power of Cuba Libre to argue that the only honorable course was independence. The anticolonialist *Boston Transcript* recognized the political opportunism in the tact of blackening the Cuban image: “The American caricaturist appears to enjoy a peculiar pleasure in representing the Cuban as a negro dwarf, wearing an old hat and a pair of sandals, and not much of anything else... Now as a matter of fact the Cubans of white blood outnumber the colored islanders two to one.” The *Transcript*’s attempt to place Cubans on the white side of the color line was submerged, however, in a sea of racist anticolonialist images. The failure of the anticolonialist opposition was in part a visual one. Anticolonialist artists were trapped by their own racialized vision, because visualizing a morally acceptable alternative to acquisition would have required imagining colonial subjects as self-governing citizens.⁵³

As the next section explores, Filipinos and their British media allies encouraged some anti-imperialists to follow precisely that strategy: to defend the capacity of Filipinos for self-government. They managed to leave a lasting impression on the influential anti-imperialist George F. Hoar, a senator from Massachusetts who insisted upon the readiness of Filipinos for self-government when arguing against annexation and inspiring others to do the same.

⁵³ B. M. Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest*, 216.

3. The Early Building of an Advocacy Network

Given the complex, paradoxical nature of the anti-imperialist movement, Zwick and the historians following in his footsteps of tracing the roots of the group's "oppositional solidarity" toward Filipinos state this collaboration became pronounced after 1900 and even more so after 1902.⁵⁴ They also point out some earlier examples, however, like the collaboration between the delegation of Felipe Agoncillo and the prominent international lawyer Jackson H. Ralston in late 1898 and lasting until the outbreak of the Philippine-American War.

Ralston represented Agoncillo and the Philippine Republic and also provided the AIL with office space in Washington, D.C. He stopped working with the Filipino representatives "rather shabbily," however, when the war began and the American public blamed the Filipinos and Agoncillo, specifically, for the outbreak of the conflict. On February 6, two days after the first shots of the war were fired, Ralston issued a statement announcing that he would no longer provide his services to the Philippine Republic. According to Zwick, his communication "anticipated the League's position towards the Filipino independence movement during the war." Zwick noticed that "although statements of sympathy for the Filipinos and their struggle for independence were still made by anti-imperialists during the war, they opened of the door to charges of disloyalty and treason that most of the League's officers wanted to avoid."⁵⁵

In addition to Ralston and Agoncillo's relationship, the literature on American anti-imperialists and the Philippines has also examined the Republican senator from Massachusetts, George F. Hoar, who was an early supporter of the Filipino cause and had been in contact with Filipino representatives since 1898. As explained by his biographer, Richard R. Welch, Jr., Hoar, by mid-January, was "in correspondence with

⁵⁴ Zwick, "The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity"; M. P. Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism*; Murphy, *No Middle Ground*.

⁵⁵ Zwick, "The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity," 67–68.

the Philippines committee in London and was increasingly convinced that the Filipinos had the capacity as well as the right of self-government.”⁵⁶

According to Welch, the senator was in contact “with the Philippine Islands Committee in Europe, and a British businessman in Hong Kong, Howard W. Bray.” Both the Committee and Bray “selected Hoar as the most sympathetic and influential of the anti-imperialists in the Senate and sent him a steady stream of suggestions.”⁵⁷ In addition, Welch noted that Senator Hoar, precisely at this time, developed an alternative to annexing the Philippines: the establishment a protectorate.⁵⁸ His biographer, however, did not connect this idea to the “steady stream of suggestions” provided by the Filipinos and Bray. The following pages establish this correlation.

The evidence that I have encountered in both Filipino documents and the Pacific press renders the revision of this connection interesting to understand the reach of the Filipino civilization campaign and its British media allies’ influence. First, in his editorial published on January 11, 1899, William St. Clair, head of the *Singapore Free Press*, praised Senator Hoar’s criticism of the ratification of the Treaty of Paris and claimed that he had written to Hoar only “two mails ago.”⁵⁹

The following day, Agoncillo sent a letter to Aguinaldo praising the Filipino leader’s proclamation. “In combination with the telegrams which we have lately sent to the Associated Press,” Agoncillo said, it would certainly have some effect on the U.S. He then observed how Hoar’s denunciation in the Senate of the U.S. policy in the Philippines “had created a great sensation in the United States.” Interestingly, Agoncillo commented that Hoar’s opinions were “a result of this [of Filipino proclamations] and

⁵⁶ Richard E. Welch Jr., *George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 235.

⁵⁷ Welch Jr., 235.

⁵⁸ Richard E. Welch Jr., “Senator George Frisbie Hoar and the Defeat of Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1900,” *The Historian* 26, no. 3 (1964): 362–80.

⁵⁹ “We are well...,” editorial, *Singapore Free Press*, Jan. 11, 1899, 2.

of the direct communications of Mr. St. Clair to said senator.” He explained that St. Clair had been exchanging letters with him for some time.⁶⁰

Now that we know that William St. Clair’s goal was to promote the creation of a protectorate in the Philippines based on British models and that he supported the Filipino civilization campaign, a new question arises: how intense and influential was this exchange of letters between Hoar and the Filipinos’ British advocates?

A revision in Hoar’s papers confirms that, during the crucial months when the Treaty of Paris was being negotiated and the Senate was debating its ratification, between the fall of 1898 and February 1899, William St. Clair, in addition to Agoncillo and Howard W. Bray, was insisting upon the capacity of Filipinos for self-government. Above everything, however, he insisted on the necessity of establishing a protectorate in the archipelago along British lines.

Records in Hoar’s archive confirm that the senator’s position on the Philippine question was influenced by these transnational dialogues. It wasn’t until he established these contacts that he began arguing that Filipinos were highly civilized and misrepresented in the U.S. Only then did he say that Americans should recognize Filipino independence and establish a protectorate in the islands.

Initially, says Welch, “it was primarily the impact of territorial expansion upon the domestic institutions of America that inspired George F. Hoar to oppose the Treaty of Paris.”

His was in a very real sense a conservative reaction—he feared for the traditions of the past and the social and political institutions of the present. He spoke in behalf of the liberties of the Puerto Rican and the Filipino, but at all times his ultimate concern was the preservation of liberty at home. Subjugation of colonial peoples was not only unjust, it was self-destructive.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Taylor, *Philippine Insurrection against the United States*, vol. 3 (addendum available in vol. 5), exhibit 533, 36.

⁶¹ Welch Jr., *George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans*, 221–22.

As early as October 26th, 1898, Hoar wrote to a fellow anti-imperialist senator named Carl Schurz to say that it was necessary “to satisfy the people [by saying] what ought to be done with the Philippines if we do not take them.”⁶² Between then and January 1899, both senators wrote back and forth to each other, developing an alternative to annexation. They did not employ the term “protectorate” because, according to Welch, it had unpopular connotations due to problems in the Samoan condominium, a joint protectorate of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. The model that Hoar and Schurz envisioned for the Philippines, however, would be included in that category: “temporary American aid and occupation terminable at the decision of the Filipinos, and permanent protection of Filipino sovereignty and neutrality by international agreement.”⁶³

Schurz’s reasoning, again, reflects the “cultural relativism” of the anti-imperialist movement described by Hilfrich. He did not directly address the Filipino capability to establish an independent government but instead argued that “it was their affair” and they were “entitled to trial.” Although “quite possibly they would not maintain orderly government in Anglo-Saxon fashion,” Schurz argued that “they may succeed in establishing a tolerable order of things in their own fashion.” Therefore, the U.S. did not need to annex and rule them. All it had to do was “simply put them on their feet.” Schurz wanted the U.S. to temporarily keep its troops in the islands until the Filipinos had the opportunity to construct a government and organize forces of their own. In addition, he suggested that the U.S. might encourage an agreement between the powers interested in the region to avoid foreign aggression.⁶⁴

During the fall of 1898, also Hoar searched for “a plan for dealing with the matter other than by taking any charge of these islands, either temporarily or permanently.” He quickly came to the conclusion that the ability of the Filipinos to stand on their own would allow the U.S. to avoid the problem of getting involved:

⁶² Cited in Welch Jr., 222.

⁶³ Welch Jr., “Senator George Frisbie Hoar and the Defeat of Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1900,” 363.

⁶⁴ Welch Jr., 366–67.

I hope the insurgent chiefs may be wise enough and strong enough to establish a stable government of their own which can be left in their hands. Perhaps they have turbulence and revolutions, as the States South of us had so long after they got their independence. But if they can take care of themselves even for a year or two, I think we shall be well out of it. The same considerations apply, in my judgement, to Cuba and Porto Rico.⁶⁵

It was precisely in this context that Felipe Agoncillo, the London Hong Kong Junta, and their British media allies provided crucial information supporting Hoar's hope that "insurgent chiefs" were "wise enough" to govern the Philippines.

Hoar and Felipe Agoncillo discussed how Filipinos might demonstrate their capacity for self-government. On October 6, 1898, Hoar replied to a letter from the Filipino representative. The senator listed what he believed should be the basic points of U.S. policy towards the Philippines. First, he declared, "the Spanish Army will be sent home." Second, "the Islands shall be temporarily held by the United States as Trustees, pending the establishment of a stable government by the people thereof."

Hoar told Agoncillo that, if they were in agreement, "the duty developing upon Aguinaldo and his friends" would be "to present a constitution for such stable government [,] which doubtless" would be "considered by the U.S. government." Hoar believed that if such constitution was "founded upon correct principles," the Filipino cause could be "carried through to a successful end." Hoar encouraged Agoncillo to follow the example of the U.S. Constitution. After reciting its principles, Hoar suggested that he could prepare a draft constitution for the Philippine Republic and submit it to Agoncillo for consideration.⁶⁶ From then on, Hoar received multiple texts from Filipino revolutionaries confirming their capacity for writing a constitution and other signals of their achievements as a civilization.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ George F. Hoar to Carl Schurz, December 5, 1898, George Frisbie Hoar Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society [henceforth, Hoar Papers], Carton 71, Folder "1898 Dec. 1-5." Along the same lines, see Hoar to William D. Sohler, December 1, 1898, Hoar Papers, Carton 71, Folder "1898 Dec. 1-5."

⁶⁶ Hoar to Filipe[sic] Agoncillo, October 6, 1898, Hoar Papers, Carton 70, Folder "1898 Oct. 6-10."

⁶⁷ For examples of the information Hoar received from the Filipinos, see E. Madrigal to Hoar, December 2, 1898, Hoar Papers, Carton 71, Folder "1898 Dec. 1-5;" Felipe Agoncillo to Hoar, December 10, 1898, Hoar Papers, Carton 71, Folder "1898 Dec. 6-10;" Telegram Philippine Committee to Hoar, December

At the same time, Hoar was also receiving information from both William St. Clair and Howard W. Bray confirming the readiness of the Filipinos for self-government. As early as December 22, 1898, St. Clair had written Hoar suggesting that a protectorate along British lines was the justest and most effective solution to the Filipino problem. According to the editor, the “key to the whole difficulty expressed in the United States” was understanding that the American public had only considered two options: annexation or abandonment. The proclamation of a protectorate, however, was the only solution that would work for good, St. Clair explained, while being “in harmony with the existing constitution and national values of the United States.” It would allow the Filipinos to achieve their “true civic and national freedom and social development.”

In defense of such an arrangement, St. Clair sent Hoar “several copies of the *Singapore Free Press*” that contained “articles on this all-important matter.” He believed Hoar would find them “absolutely impartial and unbiased.” In the same letter to Hoar, St. Clair asked the senator to circulate the texts among his fellow legislators for their careful consideration. The letter went on to explain that America’s success in the Philippines depended on “following the example of Britain” and its protectorates. As examples, St. Clair suggested the case of the Federal Malay States and the resident system in India. To learn more about the latter, he encouraged Hoar to read *Our Indian protectorate* by C.L. Tupper, published in 1893.⁶⁸

Hoar’s archive does not contain any other letters from St. Clair, nor did I find a reply from Hoar to the editor. Some of Hoar’s letters to Schurz, however, suggest that the senator read and circulated the copies of the *Singapore Free Press* given to him by St. Clair. After the Senate ratified the Paris Peace Treaty on February 6, Hoar wrote to Schurz lamenting that they might have prevented the ratification if the fighting in Manila had not begun two days earlier, on February 4. To truly understand why the fighting started, Hoar warned, they had to wait for the Filipino version of the events in the *Free Press*. Clearly, Hoar read and believed the content of this newspaper because

13, 1898, Hoar Papers, Carton 71, Folder “1898 Dec. 11–15;” E. Madrigal to Hoar, December 13, 1898, Carton 71, Folder “1898 Dec. 11–15;” A.R. [Probably, Antonio Regidor], “To the Press of the United States, Civilized Condition of the Philippines,” Hoar Papers, Carton 72, Folder “1899 (n.d.)”

⁶⁸ William G. St. Clair to Hoar, December 22, 1898, Hoar Papers, Carton 71, Folder “1898 Dec. 21–25.”

he was able to recite many of the key ideas of the Philippine civilization campaign as explained by St. Clair. In the same letter to Schurz, Hoar wrote:

Aguinaldo's provisional constitution, which I daresay you have seen and which ought to be published widely through the country, is a masterpiece of a temporary form of government for persons engaged in a revolution for the achievement of their liberties. I do not believe there are ten men now living who could have upon it, and I doubt there are ten men now living who could have made so good a one. These people were in possession of their own country, a large part of which Spain never had occupied or possessed. They were in arms for their liberties. A single word of sympathy or encouragement, or a disclaimer of a purpose to subjugate them and govern them without any regard to their wishes, would have prevented this bloodshed. Who is to blame for what actually occurred we cannot tell until we get their version of the story. There is an excellent paper published at Singapore called the *Singapore Free Press*, which has accounts which seem to be quite trustworthy. I suppose we shall get that in a few weeks.⁶⁹

Meanwhile, Hoar had received several telegrams and letters from Howard W. Bray, who insisted that the Filipinos and their cause had been misrepresented. Bray once again repeated the main ideas of the Filipino civilization campaign. He provided Hoar with information that included copies of the *Singapore Free Press* and British newspapers published in Hong Kong:

...And have now the pleasure to enclose translation of a letter from an American Doctor in Manila published in one of the principal Philippine papers. I send this because Dr. Brown appears to be one of the few men who have grasped the situation in a few months better than most people in many years. I also enclose some cuttings from the *Singapore Free Press*, whose Editor, Mr. W.G. St. Clair, is undoubtedly one of the best authorities on the Philippine question due to his long experience and residence amongst the Malay races, and to the intimate part

⁶⁹ Hoar to Schurz, February 9, 1899, Hoar Papers, Carton 73, Folder "1899 Feb. 8-9."

he took in the relations which led to the return of General Aguinaldo from Singapore under orders from Admiral Dewey. I further send the “Hongkong Telegraph” of 14th Jan. containing some very interesting news from various sources on the present situation in the Philippines.⁷⁰

In summary, Filipino revolutionaries and their media allies provided information to the U.S. press and the anti-imperialist Senator George F. Hoar during the peace negotiations and the months preceding the start of the Philippine-American War on February 4, 1899, and the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in the U.S. Senate on February 6. Hoar not only received wired proclamations and telegrams but also maintained correspondence with Filipino revolutionaries and British observers in the Pacific. These two groups provided Hoar with lengthy articles supporting the claim that Filipinos were prepared for self-government and countering the malicious misrepresentation of Filipinos in the U.S.

These sources became even more important once the war began. U.S. authorities and their media outlets blamed Filipinos for the outbreak of hostilities and suggested that Felipe Agoncillo had instigated them. As a result, Agoncillo had to flee the country, and Americans who maintained relations with the Filipino revolutionaries were considered traitors. In particular, Hoar, in an effort to protect himself, attacked an editor whose newspaper revealed his interactions with the Filipino leaders in Washington, D.C. Hoar wrote this journalist arguing that “a charge against an American citizen of being in conference with the subject of a public enemy during the war is a most gross and injurious charge, and that such a charge against a Senator of the United States is a charge imputing to him conduct which would justify his expulsion from the Senate and punishment as a criminal.”⁷¹ Since Filipino sources were generally mistrusted, receiving

⁷⁰ Howard W. Bray to Hoar, January 18, 1899, Hoar Papers, Carton 72, Folder “1899 Jan. 18.” Other letters from Bray are during these months are Telegram from Bray to Hoar, Hoar Papers, Carton 72, Folder “1899 (n.d.);” Bray to Hoar, January 13, 1899, Hoar Papers, Carton 72, Folder “1899 Jan. 13;” Telegram from Bray to Hoar, January 12, 1899, Carton 72, Folder “January 12;” Bray to Hoar, January 18, 1899, Hoar Papers, Carton 72, Folder “1899 Jan. 18;” Telegram from Bray to Hoar, February 6, 1899, Hoar Papers, Carton 73, Folder “1899 Feb. 6–7;” Bray to Hoar, March 31, 1899, Hoar Papers, Carton 73, Folder “1899 March 26–31;” Bray to Hoar, May 1, 1899, Hoar Papers, Carton 74, Folder “1899 May 1–10.”

⁷¹ Hoar to David S. Howland [editor of the *Worcester Evening Gazette*], April 22, 1899, Hoar Papers, Carton 74, Folder “April 21-25.”

information from British observers, whom Hoar perceived as unbiased and neutral, was an important source to discover whether or not U.S. authorities and the media were representing the situation in the Philippines accurately.

The change in Hoar's public discourse on the conquest of the Philippines shows that his arguments were again being shaped by information from the Hong Kong Junta and its British allies. As Servando Halili points out, in a speech in the Senate on January 9, 1899, "Hoar's first argument was based on the naiveté of the Filipinos towards the American system." Hoar claimed that "Filipinos were completely foreign to the U.S."⁷² By contrast, in his intervention of April 17, 1900, the senator, "aside from reemphasizing the unconstitutionality of annexing the islands," expressed "his belief in the Filipino's readiness for self-government." He concluded, "there was no need for annexation."⁷³ My previous close analysis of the senators' archive demonstrates that his convictions changed upon processing all the information from Agoncillo, Bray, and St. Clair.

As a consequence of this defense of the Filipinos, Hoar became a target of the expansionist press, which characterized him as Aguinaldo's follower and a traitor to the American cause, as illustrated on the cover of a *Puck* magazine in January 1900 (see Image 15 below).⁷⁴

⁷² Servando D. Halili Jr., *Iconography of the New Empire: Race and Gender Images and the American Colonization of the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2007), 24.

⁷³ Halili Jr., 24.

⁷⁴ For an analysis of those caricatures and their gender biases, see: Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood. How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Halili Jr., *Iconography of the New Empire*.



Figure 15. Senator Hoar as seen during the Philippine-American War. J. S. Pughe, “Letting his light shine,” illustration published in New York by J. Ottmann Lith. Co., in *Puck* magazine on January, 1900. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/2010651293/>.

Both Welch and Halili contrast Hoar's defense of the Filipinos with the general discourse of the anti-imperialist movement, which I outlined above. Halili says "the more prominent stances [of the movement] focused on unfounded and irrational fears and speculations associated with race."⁷⁵ Likewise, Welch noted that the majority of anti-imperialists "were not immune to the racist conceptions and currents of the 1890's" and emphasized "the alien nature of the Tagalog rather than the civilizing duty of the white man."⁷⁶ Instead, according to Halili, Hoar's way of thinking was "based on his thorough understanding of the United States Constitution and the principles of the Declaration of Independence and, contrary to the dominant racialized discourses of the time, the capability of the Filipinos for self-government and political independence."⁷⁷

What is most significant is that Hoar was able to convince other anti-imperialist leaders that Filipinos were capable of self-government and that it was necessary to disseminate their texts. On the one hand, it is clear that the senator shared all his information with Carl Schurz, as was revealed by his comments on Aguinaldo's constitution and the *Singapore Free Press*. It would seem, however, that Hoar also shared information with industrialist and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie, also an anti-imperialist. In a letter dated February 9, Carnegie thanked Hoar "for Agoncillo's memorial" and stated: "If we could only get the people of the United States to read it [the Philippine Constitution], there would be no doubt for their decision."⁷⁸

Hoar also shared information with Edward Atkinson, the Secretary of the AIL and author of the League's constitution, which excluded Filipinos from membership. In the fall of 1898, Atkinson wrote to Hoar with the League's arguments for not ratifying the Treaty of Paris. His reasons were mostly based on how the treaty would affect American soldiers, the American economy, etc.⁷⁹ After reading the Filipino texts

⁷⁵ Halili Jr., *Iconography of the New Empire*, 25.

⁷⁶ Welch Jr., *George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans*, 241.

⁷⁷ Halili, *Iconography of the New Empire*, 24.

⁷⁸ Andrew Carnegie to Hoar, February 7, 1899, Hoar Papers, Carton 73, Folder "1899 Feb. 6-7."

⁷⁹ Among others, see Edward Atkinson to Hoar, November 14, 1898, Hoar Papers, Carton 71, Folder "1898 Nov. 11-15;" Copy of Atkinson to William McKinley, November 14, 1898, Hoar Papers, Carton 71, Folder "1898 Nov. 11-15;" Atkinson to Hoar, December 16, 1898, Hoar Papers, Carton 71, Folder "1898 Dec. 16-20;" Atkinson to Hoar, "Addenda to "The Hell of War and its Penalties," January 1899,

provided by Hoar, however, Atkinson replied: “I think it would be of great importance if the Philippine Constitution and other papers issued by Aguinaldo could be put together and spread before the country. They struck me, as they did yourself, as being very remarkable compositions, dignified, sincere and effective. It would be especially desirable if the constitution could be printed.”⁸⁰

From that moment on, the AIL began reproducing Filipino texts and distributing them to other anti-imperialists to make them aware of the advanced state of civilization in the Philippines. Although many of the League’s members were generally conservative, Zwick explains, the organization “did distribute numerous documents written by Filipinos during its first three years.” Zwick cites, among others, Emilio Aguinaldo’s *The True Version of the Philippine Revolution*, the constitution of the Philippine Republic and other official documents, Agoncillo’s statements to the U.S. Congress, and the Central Filipino Committee’s address *To the American People*.⁸¹

As for the impact, Zwick points out that “the availability of these materials within the United States undoubtedly made at least a small contribution towards changing the initial impression, held even by many anti-imperialists, that Filipinos were incapable of governing themselves.” Zwick referenced the following evidence:

When he collected his anti-imperialist speeches into a bound volume for distribution during the 1900 presidential campaign, for example, George S. Boutwell added a note to one of the addresses stating, “Upon the information received during the last year my confidence in the ability of the Filipinos for the work of self-government is much greater than it was in November, 1898.”⁸²

The overall strategy of the AIL changed in the years ahead. Between 1898 and 1900, the organization focused on fighting legal battles to prevent the ratification of the Treaty of

Hoar Papers, Carton 72, Folder “1899 Jan. 1–5;” Atkinson to Hoar, January 4, 1899, Hoar Papers, Carton 72, Folder “1899 Jan. 1–5.”

⁸⁰ Atkinson to Hoar, February 24, 1899, Hoar Papers, Carton 73. Folder “1899 Feb. 24–25.”

⁸¹ Zwick, “The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity,” 71.

⁸² Zwick, 71–72.

Paris and McKinley's reelection. It based its arguments and disquisitions mostly on American principles. Most earlier works of history on the AIL end with the League's defeat in both campaigns and its declining influence thereafter. Recent works by Michael P. Cullinane and Erin Murphy, however, continue past this point, analyzing anti-imperialism as a wider social movement that survived the demise of the Anti-Imperialist League and encompassed diverse social groups and modified its strategies.⁸³

Both Cullinane and Murphy emphasize that anti-imperialism became a social movement following the political defeats of the Anti-Imperialist League in 1898–1900. Instead of trying to change the U.S. government's policy toward the Philippines through legal arguments, anti-imperialists focused on changing public opinion by informing their fellow Americans about the consequences of the war. Rather than emphasizing the unconstitutionality of the occupation, they challenged the official narrative about the pacification campaign in the Philippines and its success by exposing the violence of war. In doing so, the elite Caucasian men who led the campaigns of the AIL from 1898 to 1900, began appealing to other anti-imperialist groups: white working-class men, black anti-imperialists, white women, and Filipinos.⁸⁴

According to Zwick, within the AIL, individuals who advocated a different approach to collaboration with the Filipinos began gaining influence. "With few exceptions," says Zwick, "those who most distinguished themselves both by establishing local League branches and by pursuing a solidarity agenda within them were either already involved with the single tax movement or would soon join it." Although they were few in number, they republished each other's texts, amplifying their position.⁸⁵ It was in this context that Galicano Apacible established a solid relationship with the Cincinnati Liberty League, and Clemencia and Sixto López improved their relations with U.S. anti-imperialists.⁸⁶

⁸³ M. P. Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism*, 115–48; Murphy, *No Middle Ground*, 89–166.

⁸⁴ Murphy, 93.

⁸⁵ Zwick, "The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity," 68.

⁸⁶ Alzona, *Galicano Apacible*, 82–125; Zwick, "The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity," 71–72; Prieto, "A Delicate Subject."

During this new period of Filipino-American solidarity, some anti-imperialists were still reading the Pacific press and paying attention to what Bray and St. Clair were saying about the conflict in the Philippines. As late as October 1900, Schurz mentioned an interview that Consul Spencer Pratt gave to the *Singapore Free Press* in a letter to a fellow anti-imperialist named Herbert Welsh, who was gathering information on events in the Philippines for propaganda purposes.⁸⁷ In another instance, Schurz and Welsh commented on an interview that was originally published in the *Hong Kong Telegraph* then reprinted in the *Cincinnati Enquirer*.⁸⁸ Welsh cited content in the *Singapore Free Press* on multiple occasions. He referenced St. Clair's editorial of May 4, 1898, when describing the encounter between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo and the promise of independence under American protection.⁸⁹

As previously explained in Chapter 4, the Pacific British press, from 1900 onwards, kept promoting a protectorate in the Philippines along British lines. These newspapers, including that of the *Singapore Free Press*, however, increasingly diverted their attention to British conflicts in China and South Africa. In supporting the British Army in South Africa, they also moderated and, in some cases, changed their position on the situation in the Philippines. Meanwhile, the anti-imperialist movement began criticizing the South African War alongside the Philippine-American War, and a parallel was drawn in international public opinion between the AIL and British critics of the Boer War, the latter despised by the British press in the Pacific.⁹⁰ Therefore, from 1900 onwards, the Filipino civilization campaign in the Pacific became less effective. The AIL and Filipino nationalists focused on exposing the violence of war in the Philippines, but they no longer benefited from their earlier connections with British observers.

⁸⁷ Carl Schurz to Herbert Welsh, October 10, 1900, Carl Schurz Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., General Correspondence, 1842–1932 [henceforth, Schurz Papers], Reel 69.

⁸⁸ Schurz to Welsh, October 30, 1900, Schurz Papers, Reel 69.

⁸⁹ Herbert Welsh, *The Other Man's Country. An Appeal to Conscience* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1900), 54–56, 221–41. Review the analysis of St. Clair's text in Chapter 3, 139–141.

⁹⁰ M. P. Cullinane, "Transatlantic Dimensions of the American Anti-Imperialist Movement, 1899–1909."

4. Transimperial ¿Anti-Imperialism?

We can conclude that the networks of advocacy created by the Filipinos to spread their views, while not without limitations, were more important than previously acknowledged in the historiography. Before establishing connections with U.S. anti-imperialists, the Filipinos cultivated a strong relationship with influential British newspapers that helped them disseminate nationalist propaganda. Chesney Duncan translated Filipino proclamations which he distributed through the Associated Press. Howard W. Bray and William St. Clair published their views on the Philippines in editorials and opinion pieces that reached some newspapers in the U.S. and even influential politicians like George F. Hoar. Building upon the efforts of Felipe Agoncillo, Bray and St. Clair developed a fruitful relation with the Anti-Imperialist League that “gave to Filipinos their best opportunities to be heard in America,” in the words of Maria Lanzar Carpio.⁹¹

Even though the British observers never supported Filipino independence and had always insisted upon the British model of a protectorate in the Philippines, they provided the Malolos Government with a vital service. They tried to inform an American audience that would rarely have read *La Independencia* or *El Heraldo de la Revolución* of the real situation in the Philippines and the perspectives of Filipinos.

Beyond measuring the impact of the British intermediaries, we can appreciate how their relationship with Filipino revolutionaries and American anti-imperialists shines new light in the “world of inter-imperial contacts” outlined at the beginning of my research project.⁹² As was explained in the Introduction, a growing body of literature is focusing on the transimperial dialogues surrounding the projects of empire building. My analysis of the inter-imperial exchange of information between British observers and American

⁹¹ Lanzar cited in Zwick, “The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity,” 66. See, Maria Lanzar-Carpio, “The Anti-Imperialist League” (Ph.D. diss., Michigan, 1928).

⁹² See Introduction, 12.

anti-imperialists responds to the suggestion of Jay Sexton and Ian Tyrrell that we should apply the same inter-imperial framework to the study of the opponents of empire.⁹³

Sexton and Tyrrell argue that “since U.S. anti-imperialism existed within a wider framework of reactions to the spread of formal and informal empires, it is also worth asking what formal comparison can tell us.” Moreover, some “foreign actors sought to influence U.S. policy by a complex circulation of ideas that actually originated in the United States.” Just as the studied propagandists had done, “they deployed the language and symbols of American anti-imperialism for their own purposes against American conceptions of regional and global power.” Sexton and Tyrrell explain that “the American anti-imperialists of the later nineteenth century lived in the world of the Anglo-American rapprochement in which reciprocal transatlantic reform influences were marked.”⁹⁴

The case study explored in the chapter above confirms this claim by documenting an important collaboration between groups that we traditionally have not associated with one another: Filipino revolutionaries seeking independence but considering a degree of American protection, British imperialists interested in what form that protection might take, and American anti-imperialists searching for an alternative to annexing the Philippines. They all entered into a dialogue hoping to shape the future of both the Philippines and the American Empire.

⁹³ Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton, *Empire's Twin: U.S. Anti-Imperialism from the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2015), 15.

⁹⁴ Tyrrell and Sexton, 15. Among the few works that had followed that line before Twin and Sexton's claim and for contributions made from that moment on, see: Alan Raucher, “American Anti-Imperialists and the Pro-India Movement, 1900–1932,” *Pacific Historical Review* 43, no. 1 (1974): 83–110; Zwick, “The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity”; Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons”; Call, “Protesting Against Modern War”; Erez Manela, “Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony and the Revolt against Empire in 1919,” *The American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (2006): 1327–1351; Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); M.P. Cullinane, “Transatlantic Dimensions of the Anti-Imperialist Movement, 1899–1909;” M. P. Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism*. As examples of more recent contributions that follow that line, see Andrew Chatfield, “The Imperial Collusion: The Anglo-American Campaign against Indian Nationalism in the United States and the Anti-Imperialist Response, 1917–20,” *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 42, 1 (2019): 1–15, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2019.1557031>; Marc William Pallen, “Transimperial Roots of American Anti-Imperialism: the Transatlantic Radicalism of Free Trade, 1846–1920,” in *Crossing Empires*, ed. Hoganson and Sexton, 159–82.

The historiography on both British and American anti-imperialisms acknowledges that term “anti-imperialist” constitutes a wide range of positions. Most anti-imperialists did not contest the existence of empire but rather its methods of expanding and operating.⁹⁵ Some individuals took an anti-imperialist position in one scenario and an expansionist position in the next, and people’s attitudes often changed over time.⁹⁶ Neither Duncan nor St. Clair conform even to such a broad definition of anti-imperialism. They praised the efforts of the British Empire in Asia and suggested the U.S. followed its example. Also, the sources of the media in which they published were actively attacking famous anti-imperialists, like Emily Hobhouse or William T. Stead, who criticized the Second South-African War.

That said, Duncan and St. Clair, in the early stages of the conflict, were promoting the Filipino propaganda effort in ways that U.S. anti-imperialists were not. Their efforts in promoting the message of the colonized in metropolitan public spheres and influencing the nature of imperial relations resemble those described by Priyamvada Gopal as anti-imperial collaborations in *Insurgent Empire: Anticolonial Resistance and British Dissent*.⁹⁷ Their story demonstrates the need to further explore inter-imperial dialogues between expansionists and anti-imperialists and the connections that both groups established between empires.

⁹⁵ The traditional works that defended this position include LaFeber, *The New Empire*; William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, (New York: Dell, 1962); John Rollins, “The Anti-Imperialists and Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy,” *Studies on the Left* 1 (1962): 9–24.

⁹⁶ On British anti-imperialism, see Bernard Porter, *Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa, 1895–1914* (London: Macmillan, 1968); Stephen Howe, *Anticolonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Nicholas Owen, *The British Left and India: Metropolitan Anti-Imperialism 1885-1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); George Claeys, *Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850–1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Mira Matikkala, *Empire and Imperial Ambition. Liberty, Englishness and Anti-Imperialism in Late Victorian Britain* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

⁹⁷ Gopal, *Insurgent Empire*.

Conclusion

After the Spanish-American War and during the peace conference, the Filipino civilization campaign managed to spread some of its messages in the U.S. press. The media reprinted Filipino leaders' claims that they were prepared for self-government because they received them through different channels: through Felipe Agoncillo's political lobbying; the spread of his messages and those of other Filipino Juntas in Hong Kong, London, and Paris through the wires; and the occasional reprinting of texts by Howard W. Bray, Chesney Duncan, and William St. Clair.

Regardless of these efforts, the media environment where they arrived was flooded with messages by the expansionist U.S. authorities, both in Washington D.C. and Manila. They controlled, especially between 1898 and 1899, the narrative about the Philippines' events and the nature of their inhabitants. The growing anti-imperialist movement, during these years, did not embrace the defense of the Filipino capability for self-government as a primary argument to avoid the occupation.

Despite this, the efforts of the revolution's press representatives managed to influence Senator George F. Hoar, a key figure in the American anti-imperialist movement. Hoar considered Filipino demonstrations of their capability for self-government, information by Howard W. Bray on the misrepresentation of the situation in the islands, and William St. Clair's lengthy articles on those themes and his advocacies for a protectorate following the British example. Consequently, Hoar also used some key arguments of the Filipino civilization campaign. Moreover, this senator shared all this information with fellow anti-imperialists.

Conclusion

The conclusion details the contribution of this dissertation to the broader historiography of transimperial dialogues and colonial discourses on the Philippines during the 1896–1902 imperial transition. In the first place, it synthesizes how Filipino revolutionaries tried to engage with English-language audiences. Secondly, it summarizes how the British intermediaries that received their propaganda reacted to defend their own empire’s political agenda, which, in some cases, included reaching influential U.S. anti-imperialists. Despite each actor’s final goals, their interactions shaped the colonial discourse about Filipino preparedness for political modernity as told in the Pacific. Next, the text reflects on how the debates between these actors from very different political spectrums tried to bridge the gap between their positions and discuss the nature of the American relation with the Philippines. Finally, the conclusion points out future lines of enquiry to advance the research that has been undertaken so far.

The examination of the intellectual exchanges between British journalists from Hong Kong and Singapore and Filipinos during the revolution has demonstrated that Filipino revolutionaries exploited the geographical proximity and the intense networks of information existing between the Philippines and these port cities. They monitored international public opinion and spread their propaganda. Reviewing the effects of the Filipino media campaign in that region allows us, in the first place, to better understand its messages, methods, and impact.

The analysis has also established that the revolution’s Filipino media representatives, based in Hong Kong, inherited previous methods from the Propaganda Movement and enriched their discourses regarding Filipino civilization and capacity for self-government by responding to specific concerns of international public opinion reflected in the media in the Pacific. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, as early as 1897, they replied to comments in the Hong Kong and Singapore press regarding both combatants’ respect for the laws of warfare. This topic remained essential to their propaganda campaign until the Malolos Government’s defeat.

In addition, the dissertation has emphasized how the revolutionaries rapidly understood the need to directly communicate with English-language observers to legitimize their struggle in front of international audiences. As a result, they hired press representatives and cultivated the sympathy of people with media influence. Their success in recruiting these media allies is most evident in the echo their messages achieved in some Hong Kong and Singapore newspapers.

Regardless of how clearly these media outlets listened to these Filipino voices, these port cities' press did not replicate Philippine propaganda neatly. While all their editors and reporters paid attention to the revolutionaries' messages and their control of the islands, British journalists' sympathy towards the Filipino cause varied drastically — and, as a consequence, so did their portraits of the inhabitants of the islands. Regardless of their editors' empathy, in all cases the press under study reacted to events in the Philippines in the way that best suited British interests in the region.

All the analyzed press supported the continuity of an imperial regime in the archipelago that preserved peace. Consequently, during the Philippine Revolution of 1896–1897, they defended the view that Spain should implement the necessary reforms to soothe widespread local discontentment. During the 1898 War and the peace negotiations, they supported the position that the U.S. should negotiate with the Malolos Government and arrange a protectorate — following British governance models — to avoid a bloody war that would perpetuate instability in the archipelago. When the U.S. failed to set a diplomatic solution, the newspapers under study continued to defend the view that American authorities should stop the Philippine-American War and follow British examples of colonialism. Their criticisms of U.S. actions in the archipelago and any support messages to the Filipino revolutionaries drastically ceased, however, when their resistance was identified with the Boer's defiance to the British Army in South Africa.

The prioritization of the defense of the British Empire's interests led individual British journalists in Asia to become directly involved with the course of events in the Philippines by directly collaborating with the different combatants. Although they adopted very different strategies, they all demonstrate how, far from devoting

themselves to objective reporting, their work was deeply politicized— and, on occasions, for sale.

This was the case of Henry O’Shea, editor of Shanghai’s *China Gazette*. As examined in Chapter 2, O’Shea worked for the Spanish military authorities during the 1896–1897 revolution to control and influence the regional public opinion in favor of the Spanish efforts to suppress the insurrection. Besides a possible economic arrangement, O’Shea seemed convinced of the importance of preserving the “prestige and superiority of the white race” among Asians, which led him to rabidly defend the decaying imperial power against the natives of the Philippines.¹ Although his level of partisanship is not comparable to that of O’Shea, Thomas H. Reid’s reporting also showed a clear bias towards the U.S. occupation. That is exemplified by the credibility that the newspaper he edited, the *China Mail*, attributed to the Hong Kong Junta’s messages in comparison with those of its contemporaries, but also by Reid’s defense of the American “benevolent assimilation” in Negros’ newspaper *La Libertad*.²

Finally, also the revolutionaries’ British sympathizers used journalism to advance a political cause. In Chesney Duncan’s case, he worked for the Malolos Government during the fall of 1898 until mid-1899. After working as an editor for the *Hong Kong Telegraph* and defending the Spaniards’ brutal suppression of the insurrection in 1896–1897, the Hong Kong Junta hired him as their “General Adviser.” While doing so, he was working to provide information between Aguinaldo’s government and the U.S. authorities to reach a diplomatic solution —possibly, the arrangement of a protectorate. More clearly, that was the primary goal of William St. Clair, editor of the *Singapore Free Press*. This newspaper was the loudest advocate for Filipino capacity for self-government. It made clear, however, that his editor never supported Filipino independence. Instead, in reproducing the Filipino civilization campaign, St. Clair defended that the U.S. should establish a protectorate following British lines. As for Howard W. Bray, although Filipinos employed and paid him, he publicly defended that he advised Aguinaldo to accept American protection. Some of the few sources that

¹ See Chapter 2, 98.

² See Chapter 4, 181–183.

mention Bray suggest he may have expected a notable role in Aguinaldo's government.³

To sum up, all of these individuals were political actors deeply embedded in the machinery that created the complex and contested cultural representations about Filipino savagery versus Filipino civilization. Their different strategies to encourage peace and stability in the Philippines led them to hide, manipulate, or highlight the Hong Kong Junta's messages. Ultimately, those representations aimed to justify the application of a particular political solution. This line of enquiry demonstrates that the region's newspapers emerged as yet another battlefield of the Philippine Revolution. They were contested loudspeakers whose messages could travel and be reprinted in other parts of the empire and the U.S. The fact that three very different actors —Spanish General Camilo Polavieja, the American authorities with their censorship, and the Hong Kong Junta— all tried to court the sympathy of these media outlets and contacted their employees directly highlights their relevance as intermediaries. Whoever controlled the media controlled the discourse.

Similarly, the efforts of Filipino revolutionaries and their British media allies to spread their message and reach the United States also highlight another evident connection. Their capacity to send messages from Hong Kong and other diplomatic sites to the U.S. through the Associated Press in the fall of 1898, as established in Chapter 5, exemplifies how communication advances could foster the inclusion of these foreign voices in metropolitan public spheres. The dominance of expansionist sources —much more credible to the American public— and American racial perceptions of the Filipinos, however, made it difficult for any messages trying to contrast the American official version of events to modify the U.S. citizenry vision of the Filipinos and their capacity for self-government.

The dissertation, therefore, argues for the presence of both informative connections and disconnections. Although the networks of information and ideas that linked the Philippines, the British colonial ports, and the U.S. allowed Filipino revolutionaries to

³ See Chapter 2, 109–110.

spread their propaganda, their voices had to compete with louder British discourses advocating for a protectorate in the Pacific, and the expansionist messages that flooded the U.S. press during the beginning of the war.

As for the connections of the British media allies of the Filipinos—in particular, William St. Clair’s attempts to influence American public opinion through his texts, but also writing to American Senator George F. Hoar—, they highlight how these British actors tried to join the conversation regarding the nature of an American Empire under construction in the Philippines. In this way, the dissertation complicates our understanding of the transnational dialogues that influenced the development of empires by exploring the making of an unexpected collaboration. British imperialists tried to bridge positions between Filipino revolutionaries and influential U.S. political elites by defending a political arrangement—the malleable formula of a protectorate—that they thought both Aguinaldo’s government and American anti-imperialists could accept.

In light of this contributions, the dissertation opens up several future lines of research. They include, in the first place, expanding the analysis on the reaction of the Hong Kong and Singapore English-language press to the construction of the American Civil Government in the Philippines and the progressive incorporation of Filipinos into it. Although American attempts to coopt Filipino elites began right at the beginning of the war, the press under study was focused on the continuity of hostilities and paid very little attention to events following this relationship, such as the creation of the Partido Federal in December 1900.⁴ Even when, after Emilio Aguinaldo’s capture, the press ceased its criticism of the American methods of war, it complemented the coverage of the Senate Investigations of Affairs in the Philippines with only a few chronicles that focused on the work of the Civil Government.

Some analyses indicate that, in seeing the integration of Filipinos in the government, the British press—and also, particular observers in British Malaya, like Hugh Clifford—criticized the American Government and argued that it was introducing Filipinos into the government too early. According to Kramer, “in the eyes of many Britons,

⁴ Salamanca, *The Filipino Reaction to American Rule*; M. Cullinane, *Ilustrado Politics*; Kramer, *Blood of Government*; Go, *American Empire and the Politics of Meaning*.

Americans definitively proved that they were insufficient Anglo-Saxons by their promise of eventual self-government and rapid and extensive employment of Filipinos in the colonial bureaucracy.” Other Britons “mistakenly criticized Americans for insufficiently harsh, hierarchical, or public racism against Filipinos.”⁵ Also according to Geoffrey Seed, “those policies of the United States which looked to the establishment of democratic principles of government, or which seemed to envisage autonomy for the Philippines in the foreseeable future, were the ones subjected to the earliest, and most vigorous criticism.”⁶ It would be interesting to see what the press under study, which so insistently advocated for a protectorate, thought about this process.

The impression of these British supporters of the Filipino civilization campaign and its effects on U.S. anti-imperialism, once their messages of support ceased, should also be enlarged. My analysis of their relationship with the anti-imperialist movement through George F. Hoar focused on the years 1898 to 1900 because, as explained in Chapter 4, that was when their campaign pressing for the negotiation of a protectorate with the Malolos Government waned. Reviewing into detail if other anti-imperialists tried to reach St. Clair again could illuminate the interesting tension these early sympathizers faced when the parallelisms between the South African War and the Philippine-American War made their empathic views towards Filipino resistance unsustainable. Herbert Welsh, the leading researcher of evidence about the reality of the Philippine Islands during the Senate Investigation of Affairs in the Philippines, would be an excellent point of departure.

On the other hand, while this dissertation has focused on the spread of Filipino discourses in the British Pacific media and its consequences in the U.S. press, this research could be expanded to follow the diffusion of the content published in the Pacific in Great Britain. By investigating the connections between the studied media and the British metropolitan press, this project could also broaden our comprehension of how information circulated between different regions of the British Empire. Along the line of studying the British Empire’s relation to the Philippine-American War, an in-

⁵ Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons,” 1347–48.

⁶ Seed, “British Views of American Policy in the Philippines,” 51.

depth analysis of British diplomats' reaction to this campaign for civilization in some Hong Kong and Singapore papers also remains an interesting future line of research.

Finally, while this dissertation has examined the media collaboration that spread the Philippine civilization campaign and shaped colonial discourses, the cross-imperial dialogues presented here should also be analyzed following a different perspective. The dialogues between British imperialist William St. Clair, and American anti-imperialist Senator George F. Hoar, and both men's defense of adapting the malleable formula of a protectorate to the Philippine-American relation, highlights the inexactitude of applying the generic term of "anti-imperialist" to a wide diversity of positions regarding the best formula for the Philippines.

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