

**The process of political professionalisation in small
scale democracies:**

A comparative study of European Micro-states

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*Pels meus imprescindibles:
Per la meva mare, el meu pare, els avis, i la Núria.
I per a la Nina.*

Acknowledgment

*Feliç i trist
Som com troncs baixant pel riu
Però és bonic
I si tens amics
Fins i tot pot ser divertit
(Pau Vallvé)*

Aquell primer dia d'il·lusió, aquella primera desil·lusió, els primers resultats, les primeres lectures, l'obsessió malaltissa per millorar, la sol·litud del procés, la grandesa dels congressos, tot això, conjuntament, sigui per bé o per malament, tot això, ha estat part d'aquest llarg viatge que ha significat fer un doctorat.

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Abstract

This thesis is focused on studying the causes and consequences of political professionalisation, by analyzing empirically the cross-country differences. Despite the literature claiming that political professionalisation is the result of the enlargement of the population with voting rights and/or the increase of the size of their government. By studying the process of political professionalisation in European micro-states and some macro-states, I solved an existent indetermination problem about the effect of population and government size on both professionalisation dimensions, as well as, testing the political professionalisation consequences on representation. Hence, the first article shows that the variation in the degree of legislative professionalisation across countries is explained, above all, by the government size. In a second step, the analysis focuses on the individual professionalisation, which in contrast to the legislative professionalisation, the analysis underlines how population size is the determinant for the variation of politicians' professionalisation across countries. The last part of the thesis concentrates on revisiting the influence of population size and political professionalisation on the descriptive and substantive representation. Interestingly, the results show how legislative professionalism and population size are determinants for the descriptive representation, while the existence of agency-problems is explained by the individual professionalisation.

Resum

Aquesta Tesi Doctoral se centra a estudiar les causes i les conseqüències de la professionalització política, mitjançant l'estudi empíric de les diferències entre països. Malgrat que la literatura afirma que la professionalització política és fruit de l'ampliació de la població amb dret a vot i/o de l'augment de la mida del seu govern. La tesi que teniu a les mans, mostra com és de necessari estudiar el procés de professionalització política de forma comparada en els microestats europeus i alguns macroestats, per poder resoldre un problema d'indeterminació existent sobre l'efecte de la població i la mida del govern en ambdues dimensions de la professionalització, així com poder provar les conseqüències de la professionalització política sobre la representació política. Així doncs, el primer article mostra que la variació del grau de professionalització legislativa entre països s'explica, sobretot, per la mida del govern. En un segon pas, l'anàlisi se centra en la professionalització individual, que a diferència de la professionalització legislativa, l'anàlisi subratlla com la mida de la població és el determinant de la variació de la professionalització dels polítics entre països. L'última part de la tesi se centra a revisar la influència de la grandària de la població i la professionalització política en la representació descriptiva i substantiva. Curiosament, els resultats mostren com la professionalitat legislativa i la mida de la població són determinants per a la representació descriptiva, mentre que l'existència de problemes d'agència s'explica per la professionalització individual.

Table of contents

	Pag.
Abstract	ix
List of figures	xvi
List of table	xviii
1. General Introduction.	1
1.1. The process of political professionalisation, its determinants and its consequences.	4
1.2 The debate about population size and professionalisation.	10
1.3 European Micro-states: the natural experiment of the dissertation.	11
1.3.1 Legislative characteristics.	13
1.3.2 Characteristics of Politicians' professionalisation.	17
1.4 The structure of the dissertation.	21
2. Social Proximity Matters? Revisiting the effect of population and government size on parliaments professionalisation.	38
2.1. Introduction.	39
2.2 The role of population.	40
2.3 The interest of studying the professionalisation of the Micro-states' parliaments and associated hypotheses.	45
2.4 Research Design.	47
a)Data and Method.	47
b)Hypotheses.	48
c)Operationalisation of variables.	48
2.5 Results of the Empirical Analysis.	51
a) Legislative professionalisation by country size and government size: aggregate data.	51

b) Statistical analysis: the effect of government size and population size on legislative professionalisation.	53
2.6 Conclusions.	58
Appendix A	65
Appendix B	66
3. Polity Size Matters? The effect of country size on politicians' professionalisation.	68
3.1. Introduction.	69
3.2 Politicians' professionalisation determinants in large-scale democracies	70
3.3 The effect of country size on the individual professionalisation process.	74
3.4 Research Design.	76
a) Data and Method.	76
b) Hypotheses.	78
c) Operationalisation of variables.	80
3.5 Results of the Empirical Analysis.	84
a) Is the country size a determinant? Individual and legislative professionalisation of European Micro-states and Germany	84
b) Statistical analysis: the effect of country size on politicians' professionalisation.	86
3.6 Conclusions.	97
Appendix A	106
4. Are they one of us? The effect of political professionalisation on the political elite's social closure and principal-agent problems	108
4.1. Introduction.	109
4.2 The vicious circle of politics: the tension between descriptive and substantive representation and the professionalisation of politics.	110

4.3 The puzzle of state size in terms of descriptive and substantive representation: the case of European Micro-states.	117
4.4 Research Design.	119
a)Data and Method.	119
b)Hypotheses.	120
c)Operationalisation of variables.	121
4.5 Results of the Empirical Analysis.	125
a) Are micro- and macro-states different? Descriptive representation, political responsiveness, and accountability	126
b)Statistical analysis: the effect of individual professionalisation on descriptive representation and principal-agent problems.	129
4.6 Conclusions.	139
Appendix A	148
Appendix B	157
5. Conclusions	159
5.1. Revisiting the effect of government size: the endogeneity problem.	163
5.2 The effect of population size on individual professionalisation: political parties.	164
5.3 Descriptive representation and agency-problems: the consequences of political professionalisation?	166
5.4 Limitations and Future Research.	167

List of figures

	Pag
1. General Introduction.	
Figure 1.1 Percentatge of women in parliament over time in European Micro-states.	19
2. Social proximity matters? Revisiting the effect of population and government size on parliaments professionalisation.	
Figure 2.1 Potential causal relations between government size or population size and legislative professionalisation.	44
Figure 2.2 Effect of government size on legislative professionalisation index.	57
3. Polity Size Matters? The effect of country size on politicians' professionalisation.	
Figure 3.1 Predictive Marginal effect on Age Frist Public Office.	88
Figure 3.2 Predictive Marginal effect on Individual professionalisation index.	90
Figure 3.3 Predictive Marginal effect on Age First Public Office.	95
Figure 3.4 Predictive Marignal effect on Individual professionalisation index.	96
4. Are they one of us? The effect of political professionalisation on the political elite's social closure and principal-agent problems.	
Figure 4.1 Theoretical expectations of political professionalisation's effect on descriptive and substantive representation.	112

Figure 4.2 Politicians' professionalisation effect on public-minded politicians.	138
Figure 4.3 Politicians' professionalisation effect on political accountability.	139
Figure 4.4 Summarize of the consequences of political professionalisation on descriptive and substantive representation.	140

List of tables

	Pag.
1. General Introduction	
Table 1.1 Population and Government size characteristics in twelve different countries.	3
Table 1.2 Three decisive distinction Max Weber.	5
Table 1.3 European Micro-states' Legislative professionalisation characteristics.	13
Table 1.4 European Micro-states' Individual professionalisation characteristics.	17
Table 1.5 Educational Background of Micro-states parliaments (1980-2019).	20
Appendix A.	
Table A.1 Politicians and legislative professionalisation database sources.	36
2. Social proximity matters? Revisiting the effect of population and government size on parliaments professionalisation.	
Table 2.1 Descriptive data of the article dependent variable.	52
Table 2.2 Descriptive data of the article independent variables.	53
Table 2.3 Determinants of legislative professionalisation.	54
Table 2.4 Cross-sample analysis	56
Appendix A.	
Table A.1 Descriptive data of the article's dependent variable by country.	65
Table A.2 Descriptive data of the article's independent variable by country.	65
Appendix B.	

Table B.1 Determinants of the components of legislative professionalisation index.	66
--	----

3. Polity Size Matters? The effect of country size on politicians' professionalisation.

Table 3.1 Descriptive data of the article's dependent variables.	84
Table 3.2 Descriptive data of the article's independent variables.	85
Table 3.3 Determinants of Politicians' Professionalisation.	87
Table 3.4 Determinants of Politicians' Professionalisation within Micro-states.	89
Table 3.5 Determinants of Previous Party Experience.	92
Table 3.6 Determinants of Politicians' Professionalisation.	94

Appendix A

Table A.5.b Determinants of Previous Party Experience within Micro-states.	106
--	-----

4. Are they one of us? The effect of political professionalisation on the political elite's social closure and principal-agent problems.

Table 4.1 Socio-demographic descriptive data.	126
Table 4.2 Descriptive data of the article's dependent variables.	127
Table 4.3 Descriptive data of the article's independent variables.	128
Table 4.4 Socio-demographic SDI determinants I.	130
Table 4.5 Socio-demographic SDI determinants II.	131
Table 4.6 Occupations' SDI determinants I.	133
Table 4.7 Occupations' SDI determinants II.	134
Table 4.8 Agency-problems determinants I.	135

Table 4.9 Agency-problems determinants II.	137
Appendix A	
Table A.1 to A.24 Socio-demographic and article's independent data by country	148-156
Appendix B.	
Table B.1 Occupations' SDI Determinants III.	157

1. General Introduction

The causes and consequences of political professionalisation are one of the cornerstones of contemporary political science research. This phenomenon and its consequences have been widely discussed in media and literature, but although political professionalisation has been on the research agenda for many years, the conventional wisdom of political professionalisation assumes a causal mechanism that explains political professionalisation and its negative consequences, sometimes explicitly and at other times implicitly.

The literature establishes that, after the locus of democracy shifted from communes, cantons, and city-states to the modern industrial nation-state, countries have been characterized by representative government and the professionalisation of their politics. The professionalisation literature has suggested that both features are highly connected and are the result of the enlargement of the population with voting rights and/or the increase of the size of government (Grissom & Harrington, 2013).

Contemporary political units enlarged the size of their population, which affected the nature of political deliberation and made direct democracy impossible, while increasing the difficulty of dealing with societal problems (Reynaert, 2012). Consequently, contemporary large-scale democracies, due to their polity size and the implementation of universal suffrage, made representative democracy and its professionalisation necessary to deal with the heterogeneous interests, ideologies and problems that exist in their societies. However, large-scale democracies were not only bigger than old democratic city-states but also acquired new state functions (Marshall, 1950). The state and its main objective of protecting its population from foreign intrusion or domestic violence was no longer the only main function of the central state. The new modern state welfare had to deal with economic insecurity and providing services and income on the basis of individual rights. In addition, governments also increasingly began to take an interest in many other social issues such as public education, public health, length of working hours and relations between employers and workers (Kuhnle & Sanders, 2010). Thus, population size, but also new competencies, created the necessity to change the characteristics of public offices. On the one hand, such characteristics demanded a high level of policy expertise from policymakers, as well as full-time dedication to politics for a long period of time (Saafeld, 1997; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). On the other hand, to be able to perform the public officers' new role in the policymaking process, political

institutions, such as parliaments, had to be able to command the full attention of their members, provide them with adequate support resources, and, in general, set up procedures that facilitate law-making (Mooney, 1995). Population and government size thus seem to have an effect on both partially overlapping dimensions of professionalisation: one individual and the other institutional. Individual professionalisation refers to public office holders who obtain their main source of income from their political activity, devote themselves to it full-time, and expend long periods in politics (Borchert, 2011); institutional professionalisation refers to the resources devoted to increasing legislative and executive engagement with the policy process and enhancing the policy effectiveness of politicians (Maestas, 2000; Rosenthal, 1996; Squire, 1992).

When looking at the professionalisation of politics across different territorial levels, we thus do not have a clear idea of why variation is observed in different political units. There is a problem of indeterminacy, as the political competencies of governments and population characteristics co-vary in literature comparison between local versus national politics, so the actual role of population and government size is unclear. This leads to the question: Do either of these two factors affect the degree of countries' political professionalisation independently, or do the negative consequences of political professionalisation depend on the population? In fact, although the professionalisation of politics has been on the research agenda for many years, there are very few studies focusing on a comparative analysis of political professionalisation. In this vein, the literature has largely studied and debated the professionalisation of legislators (Clucas, 2007; Dilger et al., 1995; Fiorina, 1994; Oñate, 2010; Squire, 1992), and such studies are normally focused on qualitative analysis or on the sociodemographic consequences of political professionalisation. With the exception of the US Congress and comparative analysis of their state legislature (King, 2000; Malhotra, 2006; Mooney, 1995), institutional professionalisation is still understudied, and there are no comparative analyses and indicators of political professionalisation. For that reason, this dissertation contributes to filling these gaps.

More precisely, this dissertation contributes to the political professionalisation literature by disentangling empirically the role of government size and population characteristics on the causes of political professionalisation, as well as testing the literature's expectations about the consequences of political professionalisation. This dissertation uses European micro-states, usually understood as those sovereign states with less than

500.000 citizens (Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015), as a sort of natural experiment¹ to maximize the differences in terms of population size and reduces the difference in institutional competencies that exist when academia compares local and national spheres. For instance, as the data of the original database of this dissertation show, the European micro-states (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Malta, Monaco and San Marino) and their six peer states (Denmark, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Germany and the United Kingdom) have larger and significant differences in terms of population than in government size characteristics – defined in this dissertation by government spending. The selection of the cases was based on the methodology of most similar cases, so those macro-states selected went against my hypothesis about the existence of differences between micro- and macro-states. In fact, the existing close relationship between these micro- and macro-states is based on either their geographical proximity and/or past colonial relations. Moreover, the legislative professionalisation literature underlines the influence of such peer states on the level of legislative professionalisation. More precisely, while micro- and macro-states are largely different in terms of population (micro-states have a mean of 131.697 inhabitants compared to the 44.156.589 mean of macro-states), regarding government size, this is reduced to 1,26 points of difference. Micro-states register a mean of 17,87% of general government consumption expenditure in per cent of GDP compared with large-scale democracies’ mean of spending 19,21% of the GDP.

Table 1.1 Population and Government size characteristics.

	Population [mean]	Government Size [%]
Andorra	63.943	17,4
Denmark	5.358.077	25,0
France	61.288.947	22,9
Germany	81.745.656	19,4
Iceland	305.020	23,4
Italy	57.846.410	18,9
Liechtenstein	32.582	11,6
Malta	389.860	17,5
Monaco	32.917	22,9
San Marino	27.743	16,6
Spain	41.977.692	17,4
Switzerland	7.298.572	11,6
United Kingdom	53.580.770	19,3

¹ As Lago (2012) described, “a natural experiment is a situation in which an intervention of “nature” approximates the property of a controlled experiment”. In other words, as Robinson et al. (2009) underlined, a natural experiment is referred to as experimental because they occur such that the researcher can separate observations into treatment and control groups through identifiable contemporaneous differential impact. In this research the condition of Micro-states.

*Data Source: the original database is constructed using information obtained from official documents and government websites.

I argue that, to better understand political professionalisation and its consequences, it is necessary to adopt a comprehensive view and to integrate states' government size and population characteristics to disentangle the problems of indeterminacy. This is precisely what I have developed in the following pages, arguing that both characteristics have implications on political professionalisation, which in turn challenges some of the assumptions introduced by the professionalisation literature. This dissertation thus addresses how population size affects political professionalisation – both in the individual and legislative dimensions – and its consequences. First, I specifically research legislative professionalisation and the impact of population size on the process of legislative professionalisation. Second, I focus on individual professionalisation and analyse if country size is a determinant of individual professionalisation. Third, I also investigate whether political professionalisation is a determinant for descriptive and substantive representation, and how country size could modulate such effect. Therefore, I try to test the literature's positive expectation of the effect of legislative professionalism on the descriptive and substantive dimensions of representation. I also test the negative effect that scholars have suggested politicians' professionalisation should have on the existence of agency-problems. By doing so, this thesis offers a better understanding of the causal mechanisms of political professionalisation and a comparative analysis of its consequences.

1.1 The process of political professionalisation, its determinants and its consequences.

Modern democracy, with the establishment of mass democracy, the enlargement of the state population size, and its competencies, sets the perfect conditions to develop political professionalisation. Different scholars have underlined how most political offices, at the national level, have been occupied by professionals in contemporary democracies (Borchert & Zeiss, 2003; Von Beyme, 1995). In other words, the political professionalisation of national politics has become a contemporary characteristic of large-scale democracies (Musella, 2014).

The political professionalisation literature has underlined how the professionalisation of politics consists of two partially overlapping dimensions: individual and institutional. The path of professionalisation path in contemporary politics entails not only a process in which politicians go from being “cherished citizen into pariah politician” (Borchert & Zeiss, 2003), but a process in which political institutions increase the resources devoted to enhancing legislative and executive engagement with the policy process, as well as the policy effectiveness of politicians. Thus, the concepts of institutional and politicians’ professionalisation are therefore related but separate constructs. The goal of the latter is to maintain or further the position of the individual legislator: It involves the desire and the opportunity for lengthy service (Moncrief, 1994). The goal of the former is to make the institution more effective. Institutions not only bring more expertise to the policy process, but they might also create more responsive policies (Grissom & Harrington, 2013).

Institutional professionalisation is usually focused on legislative assemblies, thus, in this thesis it is referred to as “legislative professionalism” (King, 2000; Malhotra, 2006; Moncrief, 1994; Mooney, 1995). Professionalized legislatures are conceptualized to be able to spend more time developing legislation, deliberating policy alternatives and interacting with other political bodies. So, as the literature argues, legislative professionalisation is defined by three basic components: salary, time demand of service and finally, the staff and resources of the legislative assemblies (Maestas, 2000; Mooney, 1995; Rosenthal, 1996; Squire, 1992).

A professional politician, meanwhile, is a person who works in politics full time, has long period of experience in politics and obtains their main income through their political activity (Borchert, 2011). Therefore, as Weber (1958) established in *Politics as a Vocation*, the professionalized politician differs from the amateur politicians in three main indicators based on the politicians’ time-demand regime and monetary budget.

Table 1.2. Three decisive distinctions of Max Weber (1958).

Amateur	Professional
Occasional –Brief stint in politics-	Habitual –long period in politics-
Part-time	Full-time
Living for politics –main income resources obtained by non-political activity-.	Living off politics –main income resources obtained by political activity.

Source: Based on Weber’s (1958) book.

The habitual and full-time regime points out the intensity of political activity and its permanence in the system of professional politicians. Professionalized politicians are thus characterized by a full-time regime and long-term involvement in politics (Borchert, 2011). Finally, living off political characteristics is a consequence of the former characteristics; the main income of politicians is obtained from their political activity. In other words, once politicians became involved in politics full time, it was no longer necessary to reconcile politics with a regular occupation.

In contemporary politics, representation and political professionalisation have therefore become core to politics. Since at least the beginning of the 20th century, the corollary of the representative government has been the so-called professionalisation of politics (Musella, 2014). Accordingly, political scientists have been concerned about the consequences of political professionalisation on the quality and legitimacy of democratic representation and institutions (Berry et al., 2000; Best & Vogel, 2018; Borchert, 2000, 2008, 2011; Pitkin 1967) – that is, scholars have been largely debating if professionalized parliaments and politicians really improve the legitimacy and quality of democracy.

The literature generally assigns good repercussions to legislative professionalisation. Scholars associate it with higher expertise in the policy process, but also with more responsive policies (Grissom & Harrington, 2013; Mestas, 2000; Owing & Brock, 2000; Rosenthal, 1996; Squire 1992; Thomson, 1986).² In fact, each of the components of legislative professionalisation responds to a concrete objective and implication for the higher efficiency of legislative institutions (Owing & Brock, 2000).

First, the implementation or increase in salary responds to a specific purpose: attracting better-qualified members (Maestas, 2000; Squire & Moncrief, 2019). It lets the institutions maintain politicians' longer tenure, creating, in this way, a more experienced legislative body (Berkman, 2001; Rosenthal, 1996) with higher political skills and legislative knowledge (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Thompson (1986) and Moncrief (1992) have underlined how a more experienced legislative body has a greater capacity for deliberation and facilitates the implementation of long-term policies and more complex regulatory policies addressing more intersectional issues (Moncrief & Squire, 2019). Thus, as Arel-Bundock et al. (2018) have shown, those legislatures in US states

² Other scholars have pointed out how legislative professionalisation helps the rise of state legislative campaign committees (Rosenthal, 1995), a better-divided government (Fiorina, 1994), and the density of state interest groups (Berkmann, 2001)

that are more professionalized tend to adopt more complex tax policies, and they are able to adjust such policies to keep them competitive.³ Accordingly, there is a rise in time-spending on policy development and deliberation. Legislatures need to spend more time on legislative activities (Boehmke & Shipan, 2015), so being a politician became a full-time occupation. Finally, related to the effects of public staff on the efficiency of parliaments, it is necessary to point out how legislative professionalisation calls for a larger public staff. The larger number of civil servants working in legislative assemblies lets legislators be better informed (Moncrief & Squire, 2019), which creates the possibility to have a greater impact on the policymaking process and increasing efficiency (Rosenthal, 1996).⁴

In contrast with the positive common wisdom of legislative professionalisation, the literature attributes negative consequences for democracy to the professionalisation of politicians (Allen, 2013; Azary, 2017; Petracca, 1991). For example, Allen (2013) has pointed out how the prominence of professional politicians may lead to reduced public engagement with democracy. In other words, scholars have underlined the idea that professional politicians are primarily interested in re-election (Fiorina, 1994), due to their objective of safeguarding their political position and establishing a long political career (Best & Vogel, 2018).

As O'Grady (2019) underlines, the professionalisation of politics is a two-edged sword. Although legislative professionalisation gives politicians the opportunity to have more capabilities and conditions to be more efficient and responsive (Arnesen & Peters, 2018; Kearney & Sinha, 1988; Maestas, 2000), the literature on professionalized politicians has explained how they use their advantage to reach votes to occupy offices later, and finally, have a long political career (Fiorina, 1994). Politicians' professionalisation thus influences the existence of agency problems and facilitates the social closure of the political elite (Berry et al., 2000). In other words, individual professionalisation has an effect on the descriptive and substantive dimensions of representation (Pitkin, 1967). That is, individual professionalisation affects the representation in parliaments of certain historically marginalised social groups, and both political responsiveness and accountability. As Borchert (2000) has underlined, politicians' professionalisation works

³ This type of professionalisation is relatively understudied outside the United States, but see the study by Eliassen and Pedersen (1978), which analyses the cases of the legislatures of Denmark and Norway.

⁴ Rosenthal (1996, p. 172) explains that, besides this, the professionalized assemblies of the US states increases the number of civil servants motivated by the idea of equalizing the legislative and executive branches of the government, reinforcing the idea of the separation of powers.

against the institutionalization of electoral uncertainty in democracy (Przeworski, 1991) which lets citizens control their representatives. The typical pattern of politicians' professionalisation is the intention to limit career uncertainty to maintain their political positions and careers.

Although political professionalisation has been on the research agenda for many years, there are few studies identifying the causes of professionalisation – legislative or individual – or assessing its effects from a comparative perspective. In fact, the existing data on politicians' professionalisation are usually based on case studies from national politics, and they are normally centred on qualitative analysis or on the socio-demographic consequences of individual professionalisation (Borchert & Zeiss, 2003; Oñate, 2010; Squire & Moncrief, 2019). Consequently, the individual professionalisation literature does not have cross-national indicators for the degree of politicians' professionalisation. On the other hand, analysis of legislative professionalisation has focused on national parliaments and, with the exception of the United States, this type of professionalisation is relatively understudied. Currently, there is no single study within Europe empirically measuring the degree of professionalisation at either the national or regional level. In addition, within the US literature, most of studies have focused on the proper measurement of professionalisation and less so on identifying its causes or assessing its effects.

The studies that have attempted to determine the causes of political professionalisation have suggested that there are individual and contextual factors that influence this process. The literature suggests two major characteristics of territories that seem to affect their level of political professionalisation: population characteristics and the competencies of the state. Regarding population characteristics, in the sense of both the absolute number of citizens and their heterogeneity, scholars have argued that big and diverse populations make the needs and problems of citizens complex, as well as affecting their tractability (King, 2000; Malhorta, 2006; Mooney, 1995). For that reason, large states require higher levels of legislative resources and expertise among politicians to be more efficient. In other words, a large and diverse population fosters a higher degree of political professionalisation.

The literature has also suggested how contemporary states have been professionalized in response to the growth of public services provided by the state, and government spending is usually referred to as government size (King, 2000; Malhotra, 2006; Mooney, 1995). Hence, as Kuhnle and Sander (2010) have argued, the modern state, after abandoning the

pre-industrial concept of the protectionist state, began to deal with many new social issues such as public education and health, workplace conditions, length of working hours or the relations between employers and workers. These new social functions of the modern state and the demands of a rapidly growing public sector to satisfy them have modified how public offices are exercised.

Besides the influence of these contextual factors on political professionalisation, the academic literature has explained how politicians' professionalisation is influenced by individual factors as well, particularly individual motivations (Bochert, 2011). Professional politicians do not differ markedly from a practitioner in any other distinguished profession: they want to stay and rise to higher positions. The ambition of politicians is thus a key variable to understanding the professionalisation process. In this vein, as the sociology of professions illustrates, safeguarding one's career and the aspiration to hold various positions of increasing relevance (Astudillo & Martinez-Canto, 2019) are something natural in any professional worker. Hence, professional politicians' motivation to maintain their political career and experience career advancement creates the frame to achieve a larger political experience.

1.2 The debate about population size and professionalisation.

The effect of population size on democracy has been widely studied. In fact, from classical philosophers like Plato or Aristotle to more contemporary scholars – like Dahl and Tufto or Corbett and Veenendaal – political scientists have been worried about how population size may create incompatibilities with the establishment of democracy. First, the classical debate questioned if democracy is feasible in nation-states. After the locus of democracy shifted from communes, cantons and city-states to the nation-state, research has underlined how a large population size has changed the nature of deliberation and made it difficult to deal with society's set of problems (Grissom & Harrington, 2013; Reynaert, 2012). The nation-state thus made impossible the existence of any sort of direct politics. Contemporary large states thus needed representative democracy as a solution for establishing democracy, and political parties thus became the necessary link between society and the state (Katz & Mair, 1995).

The literature has, however, provided a second debate about the effect of population on the contemporary characteristics of large-scale democracies: political professionalisation (Musella, 2014). The academic literature, sometimes explicitly and at other times

implicitly, has argued how small size makes the process of professionalisation harder. Scholars have argued that a large and diverse population complicates citizens' needs and problems, as well as their tractability (King, 2000; Malhorta, 2006; Mooney, 1995). A large, diverse population thus fosters the necessity of higher levels of legislative resources and greater expertise from politicians to be more efficient and resolve heterogeneous interests, ideologies and problems. In other words, a large, diverse population fosters a high degree of legislative professionalisation (Malhotra, 2006). For example, as Guérin and Kerrouche (2008) have illustrated in their investigation, the common wisdom in European local politics is the voluntary and amateur character of the representatives. So, in our day a figure like Cincinnatus, would be a major, not a national premier.⁵

Despite this, the problem of comparing city-states and nation-states – or the common comparison between local and national politics – is that small-scale polities are not only different in terms of population size, but also competencies. The acquisition of new state functions to satisfy the new economic and social needs of citizens (Marshall, 1950) made the objective of protecting them from foreign intrusion or domestic violence no longer the only main function of the central state. The welfare of the new modern state has had to deal with economic insecurity, providing services and income on the basis of individual rights. Governments have also increasingly begun to take an interest in many other social issues such as public education, public health, length of working hours and relations between employers and workers (Kuhnle & Sanders, 2010). The competencies of local politics, however, are sensibly lower than those of the national governments. In this way, the literature has suggested how the growth in public services provided by the state and the demands of a rapidly growing public sector to satisfy the new demands modified the way in which public offices were exercised. Not only population size, but also new state competencies may have created the necessity for changing the characteristics of public offices.

The conventional wisdom establishes that two characteristics of the nation-state – that is, its large population size and its new competencies in diverse policy areas such as health care, education or economic management – fostered the process of political professionalisation for both politicians and political institutions. When looking at the

⁵ Cincinnatus became a legendary figure of civic virtue. The consul of the Roman Republic was a farmer until he was called to the war, due to his abilities as a military leader, to avoid imminent invasion. Cincinnatus accepted the responsibility, but under the condition that when he achieved victory he would be allowed to return to his farm.

professionalisation of politics across national and subnational levels, we do not have a clear idea of why variation is observed in different political units: There is an indeterminacy problem (King et al., 1994), as the political competencies of governments and population characteristics co-vary, so the actual role of population and government size is unclear. This leads to the question: Do either of these two factors affect the degree of countries' political professionalisation independently, or do the negative consequences of political professionalisation depend on the population or government size characteristics? This dissertation uses European micro-states, usually understood as those sovereign states with less than 500,000 citizens (Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015), as a natural experiment to maximize the differences in terms of population size and reduce the difference in institutional competencies that exist when comparing local and national spheres.

1.3 European Micro-states: the natural experiment of the dissertation.

Small countries and micro-states in particular are still a rather neglected area of research in political and social sciences (Wolf, 2016). This is regrettable because, as other scholars (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018) have suggested, their specific combination of properties makes micro-states an excellent setting to analyse the effect of variables of interest. In my case, I want to gauge the effect of population size on the causes and consequences of political professionalisation. How does the literature define small countries? What does the common wisdom understand as the smallness of a state? As defined by Kocher (2003), small states are at the lower end of a chosen scale variable or a combination of chosen scale variables. Traditionally, the definition of smallness is determined by variables such as number of inhabitants, total area of the state, the economic size or development status or composite indexes of multi-dimensional approaches.

Regarding this multiplicity of scales to determine smallness, scholars have differentiated between size variables, which directly determine size (i.e. the number of inhabitants or area) and structural variables with either consequence for or connections with size. In that sense, such definitions have pointed out how small countries differ in terms of population (compare e.g. San Marino and Malta), in terms of area (compare e.g. Monaco and Iceland) or geographic characteristics, along with differences in economic welfare or culture and economic or social characteristics (compare e.g. European micro-states or Caribbean

islands). Nevertheless, the most important common feature is, of course, that they are all internationally recognized, sovereign states. For empirical studies like this dissertation, however, it is necessary to employ a definition of smallness or size. In this vein, and as Kocher (2003) has discussed in his research, clearly, there is more to the definition of smallness than population, but it is clear that population size is the most important proxy for country size.

Given that European micro-states are characterized by a very small population size while still being sovereign territories in contrast to regions and municipalities, this dissertation selected them as a natural experiment that maximizes the comparison of country differences in terms of population size while minimizing countries differences in terms of government competencies and thus government size.⁶ As a result, the fact that micro-states do not have “microgovernments” in relation to their societies (Kocher, 2003) helps to resolve the indeterminacy problem present in the literature comparison between local and national politics. In other words, this natural experiment allows this dissertation to disentangle empirically the role of population characteristics on the causes of political professionalisation and their consequences.

Because small states are excluded from most investigations, focusing on the analysis of micro-states allowed me to gather information and data about the political characteristics of such states and fill the gap that some scholars have used to justify the exclusion of micro-states in their analyses (Powell, 1984; Vanhemen, 1997). This dissertation thus creates an original across-time and across European micro-state and macro-states database which consists of the personal and legislative characteristics of the professionalisation of such states and gives a first image of what the characteristics of such states are. In addition, it allowed an initial comparison between micro- and macro-states to understand their differences.

Restricting the analysis to these European countries was based on three main arguments. First, the selection of micro-states was based on their specific combination of properties which makes them an excellent setting to analyse the effect of the variables of interest. In this first article, the inclusion of micro-states made it possible to gauge the effect of population and government size on legislative professionalisation while reducing the endogeneity problem. Second, the selection of the European micro-states in particular made it possible to ensure that the political and economic characteristics were comparable

⁶ Table 1 shows the tiny differences between micro- and macro-states

across contexts; this was easier to control by taking into account European micro-states only as opposed to including other micro-states (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). Third, the selection of the macro-states was also based on the close relationship with the European micro-states either because of geographical proximity or past colonial relations⁷. It thus not only made theoretical but also practical sense to focus on European micro- and macro-states.

1.3.1 Legislative professionalisation characteristics.

In its initial assessment of the legislative professionalisation of European micro-states, Table 3 displays the important and significant differences between European micro-states in relation to the components that the Squire Index⁸ (2007) defines as crucial to capturing legislative professionalisation: salary, parliamentary budget⁹ and sitting days.

Table 1.3. European Micro-states' legislative professionalisation characteristics

	Part/time or Full/time	Salary (mean)	Parliaments' Budget (mean)	Sitting Days (mean)
Andorra	Mixed	26.927	6.627.324	17
Iceland	Full-time	112.954	18.596.429	105
Liechtenstein	Part-time	23.031	3.172.800	21
Malta	Part-time	36.371	9.796.012	108
Monaco	Part-time	27.489	53.95.266	12
San Marino	Part-time	7.562	267.607	60

*Salaries and parliament budget are corrected applying the Purchasing power parities (PPPs) rates.

* Data source: the original database is constructed using information obtained from official documents and government websites.

Table 4 describes how, despite the fact that European micro-states share a common characteristic of being sovereign states with under 500,000 inhabitants and, with the exception of Malta,¹⁰ not members of the European Union, there are differences in the professionalisation path. Table 3 highlights the differences in the mean annual salary of

⁷ Due to the data availability of politicians' professionalisation, the second article of this dissertation focuses on the large-scale state paradigm of professionalisation in general and of individual professionalisation (Weber, 1958): Germany. To see the specific justification, please see Chapter 2.

⁸ As Bowen and Green (2014) conclude, the Squire Index is the most prominent professionalism index which accurately captures the core conceptual differences between citizen and professional legislatures.

⁹ Given that there is a lack of information about the particular support staff that each of the micro-states' parliament has, this dissertation uses the parliament budget, as suggested by Squire (2007).

¹⁰ Malta has belonged to the EU since 2004.

micro-state deputies. In line with the full-time regime characteristic, it is underlined that Iceland (11,295.38 PPP\$) has, by far, the highest annual salary compared with the other European micro-states. The lowest salary, San Marino, is particularly interesting because it was not until 1985 when the state established an attendance fee of 100,000 lire (law n.99 20/05/1985 art. 2); this law was later modified in 1989 (law n. 89 27/07/1989) to provide a fee of 65,000 lire for public employees and 200,000 lire for private employees.¹¹ Another example of the part-time character of the parliament is Liechtenstein, where official documents define the parliament as a “working parliament” (Liechtenstein Parliamentary Service, 2014, p. 21), ensuring that national politicians do not live off politics. Because of the amateur essence, the parliamentarians in the northern European micro-state are in a part-time regime, and their income is calculated with the assistance of the parliamentarian sessions.

Monaco and Malta are other examples of amateur parliaments, but in these cases without an explicit definition as such in their official documents. The Monegasque parliamentary principality establishes that the elected members of the National Council are part-time parliamentarians and all practise an alternative profession (European Parliamentary Assembly, 2007, p. 277). Since the reform of the constitution in 2002, the budget of the institution increased from 1,2 million of euros to 2,4 million of euros which made it possible to increase the number of permanent civil servants and their salary. The parliamentary allowance comes to about 2.500 euros per month, although before the increment of the budget, the allowance was 1.250 euros per month. Finally, in this group we find Malta, the Mediterranean island model for part-time status, where they are paid 36.370 PPP\$ per year.¹² One crucial aspect of the Maltese MPs’ part-time status is the fact that their parliamentary work normally starts on Monday to Wednesday between 4 p.m. and 7.30 p.m. (Sansone, 2019). In a comparative perspective, despite the fact that Maltese members of parliament are the European Union’s lowest-paid, it is necessary to take into account their part-time working conditions.

Table 3 also shows how Andorra and Iceland are cases in which politicians are not in a part-time regime in politics. In the justifications of each micro-state there are implicit

¹¹ This law is still in effect, and the fees are 33,70 euros for public employees and 103,29 euros for private employees.

¹² It is 1.1 times higher than the national average salary in Malta, which was 18.744 euros per year in 2016 (Lindsay, 2016), while MPs have an average salary of 21.145 euros.

motivations (efficiency, better quality, more stability), but there are also explicit motivations too, as in the case of the southern European micro-state, which looks to equalize access to politics after the approval of their constitution¹³ (Act of the president's meeting, num. 3/94, on 8 February 1994).

If in-depth analysis is applied, it is seen that, although both states approved their regulations in the 1990s, Iceland opted for a full-time position with a fixed salary¹⁴ (1995/88 law, on 28 June in Iceland), while Andorra opted for a mixed-method approach, in which part-time and full-time politicians coexist. The Andorran mixed regime responds to the capacity for political parties to select one out of every three candidates to become full-time politicians. Moreover, although there is a fixed salary in Andorra,¹⁵ it is results from calculating the salary in terms of the volume of work depending on the politician's dedication. Hence, part-time politicians earned 2.120 euros in 2018, and full-time politicians were granted a salary supplement of 1.847,08 euros.¹⁶

In comparison, it is seen how Iceland, with an annual salary of 11.295,80 PPP\$, is the state that has the most similar results in terms of salary with other European countries. France, Germany and the United Kingdom registered an annual salary between 90.565 to 159.213 PPP\$, much more than the 23,031.42 PPP\$ paid by Liechtenstein or the 27.488,73 PPP\$ for Andorran part-time politicians,¹⁷ who are much closer to the 36.370,53 PPP\$ annual salary of Malta's politicians or the 27.488,73 PPP\$ of the Monegasque case. In sum, it can be argued that there are two different paths in the analysed micro-states, one looking for the stability and efficacy of the professionalisation and the other trying to preserve the proximity and the working character of the institution. Despite this, Andorra and Iceland, which opted for a more professionalized parliament, registered different pathways. Iceland followed a similar trend to the other European

¹³ In that sense, the parliament agreed to implement a fixed salary calculated by the average national salary, taking into account that it is a part-time position. (Act of the syndicate's meeting, num. 4/94, on 2 February 1994). Before the constitution, the compensation for politicians was 150.000 pta every three months.

¹⁴ Icelandic politicians' average salary in 2018 was 7.385,83 euros. I am here referring to the average salary as a consequence of the data provided by the parliament, which was not divided between the fixed remuneration and the complements.

¹⁵ Salary was established in the Sindicatura's minutes of 2 February 1994.

¹⁶ The national average salary in Andorra in 2017 was 2.076,30 (Andorra en Xifres, 2017).

¹⁷ Although full-time politicians earn 47.604,96 euros per year, we used the part-time politicians' record because it is much more representative. Being a full-time politician is an optional decision for political parties, and it is not the common trend at all, in the last legislature: only 6 out of 28 are full-time politicians.

countries, while Andorra – and recently Malta¹⁸ – seem to be at the beginning of a process of professionalisation. This tendency is seen not only in terms of salary but in parliamentary budget. The mean annual parliamentary budget for Iceland is 18.596.429 (PPP\$), for example, while San Marino parliament’s budget is only 267.607,10 (PPP\$). Malta, the state with the most similar number of inhabitants, but with a part-time regime, is closest to Iceland in relation to parliamentary budget category (i.e. 9.796.012 [PPP\$]), a similarity that reinforces the previously mentioned process of political professionalisation in Malta.

Finally, in the analysis of the parliamentary sessions, it is important to take into account the sitting days and the session length to show the particularities of the European micro-states’ legislative characteristics. The parliamentarian agenda in Iceland is set up in four terms, with July and August as a recess period (Standing order of Althing, article 10). Liechtenstein is set up in two periods of parliamentarian sessions where the Parliament meets for about eight to ten sessions lasting from one to three days, depending on the amount of work (Liechtenstein Parliamentary Service, 2014, p. 25).¹⁹ The San Marino parliament meets 11 out of 12 months of the year, with the exception of August, and the length of the sessions varies from two to eight days.²⁰ In Monaco, as their constitution points out, the National council meets *ipso jure* in two annual ordinary sessions, the first session opens on the first working day of April running to 30 June, and is devoted to examining the legislation (Art. 58, Chapter VII, National Council, Constitution of Monaco),²¹ and the second session opens on the first working day of October. Apart from that, the Monegasque constitution determines that each session may not last longer than three months, and if necessary, they can meet in an extraordinary session, convened by the Prince or at least two-thirds of the members (Art. 59, Chapter VII National Council, Constitution of Monaco). Andorra schedules sessions during two concrete periods, the first between March and June, and the second between September and December. During

¹⁸ In 2016, several political parties and an internal government report proposed full-time parliament and professional salaries (Lindsay, 2016).

¹⁹ The “working parliament” soul of Liechtenstein’s Parliament may be influenced by the “Militia Myth” of Switzerland and their semi-professional model as a consequence of their close relations (Wesli, 2003, p. 382).

²⁰ Such meetings are guided by the Consiglio Generale regulation. In such cases, article 20 of the regulation does not establish the time duration and the sitting days, but says that it depends on the bureau of the Parliament. The information about the common path of time duration and sitting days is thus based on an interview with a former parliamentarian from San Marino.

²¹ Information available from the Monegasque Government webpage. Available in: <https://en.gouv.mc/Government-Institutions/Institutions/Assemblies-and-constitutional-bodies/The-National-Council>

those periods, the parliament meets for 16,7 sessions per year on average, but depending on need, the number can be changeable (parliament regulation of Andorra, title II, chapter I, article 51/1).²² Finally, in Malta, the constitution schedules that there is a session in the Parliament every year, at a minimum (Art. 75, Chapter VI, Part 1, Constitution of Malta). The Maltese parliament, in the last two years of the legislature, on average, met 108 days, evidencing that the Maltese and Iceland parliaments are the ones that register more sessions per year.

1.3.2 Characteristics of Politicians' professionalisation.

Scholars like Schlesinger (1966) and Lawless (2012) have pointed out how legislative professionalisation creates a structure of opportunities for potential candidates to follow a concrete *cursus honorum*, as well as selective incentives payments for public services that influence the characteristics of their professionalisation. Taking into account the above-mentioned differences in legislative professionalisation between European micro-states, Table 4 assesses the characteristics of politicians' professionalisation in small-scale democracies. A common characteristic of European parliamentarians who develop a political career is the shared early age at which they entered politics. Cotta and Best (2007, p. 14) have analysed how European parliamentarians register an average age between 40 and 50 years old at the beginning of their parliamentary trajectories. In the European micro-states, the original database shows how states like San Marino and Malta register a mean age of access around five years younger than the around mean age of about 40 in Andorra, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Monaco (Table 5). As Schlesinger (1994) has argued, the age when parliamentarians accede to their first public office is a good indicator of their life span dedicated to politics.

²² In Andorra's Parliament, as its regulations make clear (Parliament regulation, title II, article 51), there are three types of sessions scheduled: traditional, ordinary and extraordinary. The only sessions that are pre-established are the traditional ones, and the others are scheduled as needed.

Table 1.4. European Micro-states' individual professionalisation characteristics.

	Age first office (mean)	% of adult life in politics	Seniority (times)	Previous experience in Pol. parties. (%)
Andorra	43,3	14,8	1,7	12,2
Iceland	40,9	26,3	2,5	50,6
Liechtenstein	41,3	19,6	1,8	29,6
Malta	35,8	39,0	3,1	40,5
Monaco	41,7	25,7	2,6	17,2
San Marino	35,2	44,8	2,8	47,2


* Data source: the original database is constructed using information obtained from official documents and government websites.

Another relevant dimension to studying the professionalisation of politicians is their previous experience in political parties. According to Fiers and Secker (2007, p. 152), in 2000, 50% of European parliamentarians had already held a relevant position in a political party, evidencing a strong connection between parliamentarians and party organizational structures. In this way, and in line with what Corbett and Veenendaal (2018) have suggested, micro-state data show that, in general, politicians have lower experience in extra-parliamentarian organizations (Table 4). Except for Iceland, the other European micro-states are also below 50%.

Regardless of the differences in previous party experience, the percentage of adult life²³ in politics reveals interesting characteristics of politicians' professionalisation. Beyond San Marino and Malta, the tendency in the European micro-states is to spend less than 25% of the life span in politics. Moreover, regarding the seniority of politicians (understood as the number of times in parliament), two different clusters can be seen in the European micro-states. The first is composed of Malta, Iceland, Monaco and San Marino, with almost three legislatures per politician. The other group is composed of Andorra and Liechtenstein, offering lower scores, with almost two legislatures on average.

²³ Following the approach of Astudillo and Martínez-Cantó (2019), the proportion of adult life in politics is calculated since 18 years old. In this thesis, the adult life involved in politics is calculated since the age of 21, because this is the legal age to be candidate in San Marino.

Finally, as the literature has suggested, political professionalisation helps to maintain the perpetuation model (Putnam, 1976) and lets a privileged elite monopolize public positions. It is thus interesting to analyse such effects on the characteristics of European micro-state representatives. To begin with, one of the common characteristics that the insiders have in western democracies is the historical monopolization of politics by men (Verge & Astudillo, 2019). The study of the presence of women in parliaments is a crucial aspect of understanding the characteristics of the political elites in European micro-states. Figure 1.1. Percentage of women in parliament over time in European Micro-states



Source: own creation

Figure 1 shows the evolution of women’s descriptive representation in parliaments. The results indicate that there is a common increases trend in the percentage of women. Despite this, in Andorra, Liechtenstein and Iceland, this progression has recently been truncated. In Andorra, although they reached parity in 2011, the following elections decreased to 36%. In the case of Liechtenstein, the state achieved 28% as their maximum historic in 2009, and then the following elections reduced the percentage to 12%. Finally, in Iceland, a decrease was seen after two consecutive elections, in 2016 and 2017, with the percentage falling from 45% to 38%. Regardless of the positive progression of European micro-states with the incorporation of women in parliaments, in a comparative perspective, only Andorra and Iceland have similar percentages to other large-scale democracies like France or Spain in the most recent election. On the other hand, Monaco

(33,3%), San Marino (24,1%), Liechtenstein (12,90%) and Malta (15.4%) are far from the group of European parliaments that have at least 40% of women in the parliament such as Finland, Sweden, France and Spain (EIGE, 2019).

Table 1.5. Educational background of micro-states parliamentarians (1980-2019).

	Andorra	Liechtenstein	Iceland	Malta	Monaco	San Marino
Elementary	8,0	0	4,7	1,6	1,4	0
Vocational	8,9	45,7	14,0	6,2	10,8	15,3
University studies	80,1	47,2	76,7	68,8	75,5	80,6
PhD	3,0	7,1	4,6	23,4	12,2	4,2

* Data source: the original database is constructed using information obtained from official documents and government websites.

The education level of the parliamentarians is another important variable for analysing the homogenization of the political elite (Oñate, 2010; Coller, et al. 2019). Tronconi and Vierzichelli (2007, p. 365) underlined the existence of an increase in the education level of politicians in recent decades. The results for the European micro-States show that in almost all of them, except Liechtenstein, the percentage of parliamentarians with university degrees (bachelor's and master's degrees) is greater than 50% (Table 6). High education levels among MPs in the micro-states have been constant for almost all states.. Liechtenstein, in that case, suffered a high-level homogenization across time, starting with a majority of vocational training in 1986 (61,1% versus 27,8% of university studies), and finishing with a majority of university studies in 2017 (57,3% versus 46,7% in vocational studies).

Table 1.6. Percentage of the parliamentarians' professions in Micro-states' parliaments.

	Andorra	Liechtenstein	Iceland	Malta	Monac	San Marino
Lawyers	16,3	12,7	11,2	31,0	0	13,5
Managers	33,7	23,1	11,8	7,8	15,8	16,5
Civil Servants	5,2	0,75	10,1	4,0	24,3	12,6
Teachers/Professors	9,2	15,0	20,3	8,5	2,6	9,3
Engineers/Architect/Chemists	6,9	7,8	1,0	11,1	11,2	5,7
Liberal professions	4,3	4,5	2,4	0,2	5,3	0
Administratives	4,3	8,1	4,3	1,7	0	2,4
Working class	3,3	5,6	2,8	21,8	0	6,3
Health Services	7,5	10,0	4,3	2,6	23,7	13,2
Merchants/Traders/Banker	4,6	3,0	16,6	4,0	2,0	10,8
Others					8,6	

* Data source: the original database is constructed using information obtained from official documents and government websites.

Finally, in terms of the professions of parliamentarians, it can be seen how the existing predominance of civil servants and professors is not present in micro-states, which are rather characterised by the presence of managers and lawyers. Therefore, as Oñate (2010, p. 35) has pointed out, micro-states are still in the early stage where business people and liberal professions are still dominant.

1.4 The structure of the dissertation.

This dissertation studies the literature on political professionalisation by empirically disentangling the role of government size and population characteristics on the causes of political professionalisation and their consequences. By departing from the literature that relates political professionalisation with population and government size, this thesis critically assesses how this relationship has been conceptualized and puts forward another approach to explain variation across countries as well as the consequences of such characteristics on political professionalisation. Consequently, the dissertation analyses the impact of population characteristics and government size conditions in the process of legislative professionalisation. In a second step, it moves to the individual level of politicians' professionalisation to achieve two goals: first, it analyses the country size or government size condition as causal factors of professionalisation, and second, the role of political parties is assessed as a causal mechanism that links the influence of country size on individual professionalisation. In a final step, the dissertation examines the effect

of political professionalisation on the descriptive representation and the existence of principal-agent problems. Throughout the dissertation, political professionalisation is analysed in European micro-states and select European large-scale democracies. This thesis has been structured as a compendium of three articles that analysed political professionalisation from different perspectives. Each paper has specific research questions, in line with the research gaps identified in the literature on the professionalisation of politics.

The first article addresses the question of why there is a variance in legislative professionalisation in some contexts. The literature has largely studied and debated the professionalisation of legislators (Clucas, 2007; Fiorina, 1994; Squire, 1992; Oñate, 2010), but, with the exception of the US Congress and state legislatures (King, 2000; Malhotra, 2006), institutional professionalisation is still understudied in Europe. Hence, the article revisits the influence of population size and government size on legislative professionalisation and considers three causal relations between these variables. First, the article analyses the scenario in which government size is just a causal mechanism through which the country characteristics affect the degree of legislative professionalisation. The second possible scenario that the article analyses is the one in which both population characteristics and government size may or may not influence – independently from each other – the degree of legislative professionalisation. Finally, the last scenario analysed refers to the possibility of an interaction effect between population and government size. Thus, the effect of government size on legislative professionalisation may be modulated by the state population characteristics. The consideration of such approaches in this article suggests that the causal mechanism explaining legislative professionalisation may differ from that assumed by previous theory.

To test these arguments, I have built a new and original database to properly capture the causes of legislative professionalisation. Research in the field has focused on the measurement of legislative professionalisation, but as has been argued, it has made assumptions about the causes of that professionalisation. The present database draws an original cross-time and cross-national picture of the legislative professionalisation characteristics and its government size and population size characteristics. The resulting dataset includes a total of 212 legislative terms held in 12 European micro- and macro-states between 1978 and 2019. It also uses other economic and institutional factors that the literature suggests may have an impact on legislative professionalisation. The adoption of a comparative perspective makes it possible to provide enough variability to

identify the causes of legislative professionalisation. It is fundamental to compare micro- and macro-states to break the co-variation between population size and government size characteristics and understand the causal relationship between these variables and legislative professionalisation. Because some scholars have suggested that the causal association between legislative and government size is far from certain, there is also a need to test the alternative causal relations between these variables by employing this perspective. Taken together, there are strong arguments that support the decision to build a new dataset using European micro-states in the research design.

The first paper provides evidence against Mooney's (1995) expectation about the existence of an endogeneity problem in determining a causal effect of government size on legislative professionalisation. The contribution of this paper is to reveal that government size, even after controlling for state population, has a significant and positive effect. Moreover, the article reveals that, although population size is not a legislative professionalisation determinant, it modulates the effect of government size on legislative professionalisation. The article thus confirms how micro-states' political characteristics make legislative professionalisation less necessary to provide better accountability and higher efficacy compared with large-scale democracies.

The second article moves to the individual level and studies the causes of politicians' professionalisation in European micro-states and Germany. Disentangling the role of population size on parliamentarians' professionalisation is precisely the main goal of the second article. In particular, I investigate to what extent either country size or government size are causal factors of politicians' professionalisation. The article also assesses the role of political parties as the causal mechanism that links the influence of country size on individual professionalisation. That is, the article represents an attempt to disentangle if population size is an explanatory factor in the process of politicians' professionalisation. The literature suggests that polity size and its heterogeneity affect the nature of deliberation and the difficulty of dealing with societal problems (Grissom & Harrington, 2013; Reynaert, 2012). A larger population seems to have an effect on the greater necessity for professionalized politicians to deal with the heterogeneous interests, ideologies and problems of the societies in which they live. In fact, the literature has pointed out that the causal mechanism that could explain the country effect on individual professionalisation is related to the role of political parties as a gatekeeper. Although in national politics the influence of political parties is well-established, such a causal mechanism is not ensured in smaller political entities. Small-scale democracies allow

politicians to organize and pursue their political campaigns by themselves, and this leads citizens to vote in a more candidate-oriented manner, no matter the electoral system. Political parties, due to such closer relations between citizens and politicians, therefore have less developed and weak extra-parliamentarian organizations, and thus they have lower capacities to monopolize the recruitment process. In sum, politicians do have not to deal with the political party selection criteria of having previous experience in public administration. After considering the first theoretical expectation – small country size reduces the level of politicians’ professionalisation – the article analyses the causal mechanism that explains the influence of country size on individual professionalisation. By the creation of a new and original database for politicians’ professionalisation, the article tests the influence of population size on individual professionalisation and analyses the causal mechanism that explains that influence. I created a new database due to the existing lack of comparative indicators and datasets on politicians’ professionalisation, as the available data were based on case studies, which are normally focused on qualitative analysis or on the sociodemographic consequences of political professionalisation (Borchert & Zeiss, 2003; Oñate, 2010; Squire & Moncrief, 2019). Trying to analyse the effect of population size on individual professionalisation comparatively, I therefore built a database drawing on original cross-time and cross-national individual professionalisation characteristics, politicians’ party service, and government and population size characteristics. The resulting dataset includes a total of 6,940 parliamentary mandates (2,809 individuals) held in six European micro-states and Germany between 1978 and 2019. It also uses other individual and institutional factors that the literature contemplates may affect politicians’ professionalisation. The adoption of a comparative perspective makes it possible to provide enough variability to identify the causes of individual professionalisation. The comparison between European micro-states and Germany is fundamental to break the existing co-variation between population and government size characteristics to properly understand the causes of politicians’ professionalisation and the causal mechanism that explains the influence of population size. In this vein, Germany was selected not only for its condition as a large-scale democracy but, in addition, because it is the large-scale paradigm of the professionalisation of politics in general (Weber, 1958) and of individual professionalisation in parliaments, as well as the long-term political party commitment that has characterized politicians’ biographies (Wessels, 1997). In other words, as a consequence of German political parties’ monopoly over political recruitment, party

service has become an indispensable prerequisite for any political hopeful (Borchert & Golsh, 2003, p. 150). Indeed, German scholars describe such long-term organization commitment by politicians as *Ochsentour*. Taken together, there are strong arguments that support the decision to build a new dataset around European micro-states and Germany in the research design.

The main evidence of this second article highlights that the condition of the micro-state has a negative effect on politicians' professionalisation. Curiously enough, country size affects professionalisation even after controlling for government size and if the analysis focuses just on European micro-states. The larger the population of a micro-state is, the younger the age when a politician has access to public office. In addition, larger micro-states have a higher degree of individual professionalisation. Overall, the analysis shows how country size, and not government size, is a determinant for individual professionalisation. Furthermore, the article reveals that, effectively, country size matters in reference to the monopolization of the political recruitment process and application of *ex ante* control of candidates' reliability by political parties. Finally, the article analyses if, even though political parties in micro-states have a lower capacity to monopolize public offices, they are still determinants of political professionalisation. The results confirm the literature hypothesis that political parties are a determinant for politicians' professionalisation in both large- and small-scale democracies. Therefore, despite the political characteristics of micro-states – individualistic character and lower parties' institutionalization (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018) – partisan experience facilitates politicians' professionalisation.

Finally, the third article focuses on the consequences of the two types of political professionalisation: legislative and individual. In particular, I investigate the effect of political professionalisation – legislative and individual – on the so-called “social closure” of the political elite (low degree of descriptive representation) and the existence of “agency problems” (low degree of substantive representation). Both results have already been implied by scholars in the inherently negative consequences of political professionalisation on democratic representation (Borchert, 2000; Best & Vogel 2018; Childs & Cowley, 2011; Gay, 2002; Mintre & Sinclair-Chapman, 2013; Norris, 1997). In fact, the common wisdom supported by contemporary political scientists suggests politicians' professionalisation as the cause of agency problems and the presence of a social closure of the political elites (Serrano & Bermúdez, 2019), although the link is less clear in the case of legislative professionalisation. This argument is based on the typical

pattern in which politicians' professionalism is the intention to limit career uncertainty and maintain political positions, in contrast to, as Przeworski (1991, p. 12) underlined, representative democracy, which seeks to institutionalize electoral uncertainty to let citizens have the capacity to apply ex post control of their representatives. Thus, political professionalisation affects democratic representation because of a concrete interplay of the determinants of politicians' professionalisation: political ambition, institutional characteristics and the goals of political parties.

Although the literature suggests that the professionalisation of politics constitutes the explicative variable for the existence of descriptive representation and agency problems, many doubts remain regarding the causal mechanism explaining the existence of such problems. Classical philosophers like Plato or Aristotle, as well as some contemporary scholars, suggested that the variable explaining such problems is based on the population characteristics of the state (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018; Diamond & Tsalik, 1999; Philips, 1995). In this vein, as Anne Philips has argued (1995, p. 226) small polities should have a more descriptive or mirror representation as a contemporary case of direct democracy. Or, as Dahl and Tufte (1973) have highlighted, small polities, with a localized government, boost legitimacy by encouraging policymakers to be more responsive and accountable to the needs of citizens.

However, scholars who have studied micro-states, such as Corbett and Veenendaal (2018), have found that small-scale democracies' political characteristics can have positive and negative repercussions in terms of the isolation of the political elite, as well as on responsiveness and accountability. First, in reference to descriptive representation, Corbett and Veenendaal (2018) have argued that the part-time nature of small states does not always enhance representativeness. They found that although smallness works against professionalisation, politicians in small states tend to be highly educated citizens who are active in other aspects of social life and have sufficient economic resources to live without a proper salary derived from politics and to be able to finance their own electoral campaigns. Second, regarding substantive representation, Diamond and Tsalik (1999) have suggested that personalism and social proximity could incentivize the elite's social closure. Due to the limited pool of candidates and the influence of certain high-profile citizens, politics can become limited to certain sectors of society, causing a feeling of 'clubbish' politics and contributing to the pervasive logic of patron–client politics (Corbett & Veendendaal, 2018). There is thus a gap in the literature in determining the

variables that would explain the existence of agency problems and the social closure of the political elite. Accordingly, to properly understand this causal mechanism, it is necessary to revisit the influence of population size and political professionalisation on descriptive representation and agency problems.

The research testing this causal mechanism is divided into two parts: first, the article uses statistical analysis to test theoretical expectations of the influence of both variables – population size and political professionalisation – on descriptive representation. Later, the effect of political professionalisation and country size on citizens' perception of the existence of political responsiveness and accountability problems is tested. The analysis uses an original data set consisting of the individual and legislative professionalisation characteristics of 12 European sovereign states and the aggregate socio-demographic characteristics of parliamentarians in their national parliaments. An original database was built due to the aforementioned limitation in comparative data on political professionalisation for both individual or legislative professionalisation in Europe. The main argument defended in this article is that political professionalisation constitutes an explicative variable for descriptive and substantive problems. More concretely, it is argued that individual and legislative professionalisation affect different dimensions of representation. On the one hand, legislative professionalism is a determinant for the parliamentary representation of certain historically marginalized groups²⁴ (Coller, Jaime and Mota, 2019). On the other hand, politicians' professionalisation is a negative determinant for substantive representation. Therefore, the analysis validates the argument of scholars like Borchert (2000) or Maravall (2003) who have argued that politicians' professionalisation creates an inherent conflict with political responsiveness and political accountability. Finally, the article reveals that country size helps to reduce the disparity between certain social groups in society and their presence in parliament. The third article also shows that population size is not an explicative variable for the existence of agency problems.

To sum up, this dissertation presents new and rich evidence that contributes to our understanding of the causes and consequences of political professionalisation. Although this has been a classical and attractive field of research for many decades, it still represents

²⁴ As Coller et. al (2019) argued there are certain social groups find out higher difficulties to have access to the representation institutions. A process that Weber (1984) defined as social closure.

a promising and vibrant, though understudied, field in which there remain many unanswered questions and gaps. For all these reasons, studying the political professionalisation process was both required and merited.

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Appendix A.

Table A.1. Source of Legislative and Individual professionalisation data.

	Sources:
Legislative professionalisation [Salary / Parliament Budget and Sitting Days]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Parliament websites and official documents of micro and macro-states. ● Andorran Studies Institute documents. ● Brans, M and Guy Peters, B. (eds) (2014). <i>Rewards for High Public Office in Europe</i>. Routledge, New York. ● Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database. Available at: https://data.ipu.org/compare?field=chamber%3A%3Afield_auth_secretary_general&region=europe&structure=any_lower_chamber#map ● Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority. Available at: https://www.theipsa.org.uk/mps-pay-and-pensions
Politicians professionalisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The database is constructed by the online biographies of each MPs. The author found out the data in the Parliament websites and personal web pages.

2. Social Proximity Matters? Revisiting the Effect of Population and Government Size on Parliament's Professionalisation

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of population size and government size on the legislative professionalisation process in the European micro-states and six large-scale democracies covering the period from 1980 to today. Using an original dataset consisting of the legislative professionalisation characteristics and government size of twelve European sovereign states, the article demonstrates that, first, government size, even after controlling for the population size of countries, is a positive determinant for legislative professionalisation. Second, although being a micro-state or a bigger state does not affect the legislative professionalisation, the article underlines that population size does modulate the government size effect on legislative professionalisation. In other words, the article sustains the argument that government size is a determinant for legislative professionalisation and describes how the population size characteristics intensify the effect of government size on legislative professionalisation.

2.1 Introduction

Today, democratic politics in large-scale countries is characterised by both representative government and the professionalisation of their politics. The academic literature has suggested that both features are highly connected and may be the result of the enlargement of the population with voting rights and/or the increasing size of their governments (Grissom and Harrington, 2013).

The change of the locus of politics from the old city-state to the modern industrial nation-state therefore meant that polities had a population size that made direct democracy impossible, but also that new state functions would need to be acquired to satisfy the new economic and social needs of citizens (Marshall, 1950). On the one hand, these new state functions demanded a high level of policy expertise from policymakers, as well as a full-time dedication to politics over a long period of time (Saafeld, 1997; Samuels and Shugart, 2010). On the other hand, for these public officers to be able to perform their new role in the policy-making process political institutions, such as parliaments, had to be able to command the full attention of their members, provide them with adequate support resources, and in general set up procedures that facilitated law-making (Mooney 1995). Clearly, the professionalisation of politics consists therefore of two partially overlapping dimensions: one individual and another institutional. While “individual professionalisation” refers to public office holders who obtain their main source of income from their political activity, have a full-time dedication to it, and expend long periods in politics (Borchert, 2011), “institutional professionalisation”²⁵ refers to the resources devoted to increasing legislative and executive engagement with the policy process, and enhancing the policy effectiveness of politicians.

This article focuses on the professionalisation of state institutions, and more specifically of their parliaments, for empirical and theory-building reasons. First, the literature has largely studied and debated the professionalisation of legislators (Clucas, 2007; Dilger, et.al, 1995; Fiorina, 1994; Squire, 1992; Oñate, 2010), but, with the exception of the US Congress and their state legislatures (Mooney, 1995, King, 2000, Malhotra, 2006), institutional professionalisation remains understudied in Europe. Second, the few studies

²⁵ When focusing exclusively on the professionalisation of legislatures, both at the national and subnational levels, scholars use the term “legislative professionalisation” (Mooney 1995). Since in this article we solely focus on the professionalisation of parliaments, and not in other state institutions, we use the term “legislative professionalisation”.

on this type of professionalisation suggest that it is determined, among other factors, by the population characteristics of the countries – in terms of their absolute number of people and their heterogeneity – and the enlarging responsibilities of governments, or government size (Mooney, 1995). However, the actual role of the size of the government, after controlling for the population size of the country, is unclear. Do either of these two factors independently affect the degree of countries' legislative professionalisation? Is government size the result of the size of their population? Or does the effect of government size on legislative professionalisation depend on the size of their population?

We seek, therefore, to increase our general knowledge about the institutional professionalisation of states by empirically disentangling the effects of government size from population characteristics. Subsequently, we compare six European micro-states, usually understood as sovereign states with less than five hundred thousand citizens (Veenendaal and Corbett, 2015), with their most similar European “macro-states” (Skocpol and Somers, 1997). As a result, the article analyses to what extent population size characteristics may modulate the effect of government size on parliaments' professionalisation. The article thus contributes to the academic literature by clarifying the role of both government and population size on legislative professionalisation.

The article first reviews the arguments offered by the literature about the role of population and government factors on the professionalisation of parliaments in contemporary democracies. Later, it shows how the political characteristics of micro-states could affect the process of legislative professionalisation. Then, we offer our hypotheses, the characteristics of our database, and the operationalisation of variables and indicators. Finally, the article undertakes the statistical analysis to disentangle to what extent government size affects legislative professionalisation and tests the possibility that population size modulates the effect of government size on legislative professionalisation.

2.2 The Role of Population and Government Size on the Process of Parliament Professionalisation in Large-Scale Countries.

Since at least the beginning of the 20th century, the corollary of the representative government has been the so-called professionalisation of politics (Musella, 2014). The conventional wisdom establishes that, after the locus of democracy shifted from

communes, cantons, and city-states to the nation-state, two characteristics of the latter, a big population size and its new competencies in diverse policy areas such as health care, education, and economic management, fostered the professionalisation of both politicians and political institutions.

On the one hand, politicians began a process in which they worked full-time in politics for longer periods, and obtained their main source of income from their political activity (Borchert, 2011). The European literature on the professionalisation of politics has focused almost exclusively on this type of “individuals’ professionalisation” (Borchert, 2003). On the other, politicians, seeking to increase their effectiveness as policymakers by increasing legislative engagement with the policy process, and to gain independence from other decision-making actors, legislated to equip political institutions with better resources (Owings & Borck, 2000; Rosenthal 1996; Squire 1992; Thomson 1986; Mestas 2000; Grissom and Harrington, 2013). Because this type of professionalisation of political institutions usually focuses on legislative assemblies, it is usually referred to as “legislative professionalism” (Moncrief; 1994; Mooney, 1995; King, 2000; Malhotra, 2006).²⁶ This is the term that we use in this article. The concepts of the professionalisation of politicians and parliaments are therefore related but separate constructs.²⁷ The goal of the former is to maintain or further the position of individual legislators and involves both the desire and the opportunity for lengthy service (Moncrief 1994). The goal of the latter, however, is to make the institution more effective. Parliaments that are professionalised are able to spend more time developing legislation, deliberating policy alternatives, and interacting with other political bodies. They not only bring more expertise to the policy process, but they could also create more responsive policies (Grissom and Harrington, 2013).

Consequently, no matter how consequential legislative professionalisation is for improving the efficacy or responsiveness of governments, this type of professionalisation

²⁶ Scholars like Moncrief (1994) refer to the first type of political professionalisation as “careerism” and the second as “legislative professionalisation”.

²⁷ Although legislative professionalisation is a willful policy output of lawmakers (Malhotra, 2006), the professionalisation of parliaments also affects the professionalisation of lawmakers (Borchert, 2003). Still Moncrief (1994) showed that Canadian provincial legislative assemblies undergo a similar trend toward professionalisation but that careerism was less evident.

is relatively understudied outside the United States.²⁸ Currently, there are no studies within Europe empirically measuring the degree of professionalisation of European legislative assemblies, either at the national or regional level. In addition, within the US, the literature largely focuses on its proper measurement, and less so on identifying its causes or assessing its effects. The studies that have attempted to determine the causes of legislative professionalisation, focusing mainly on US state legislatures, suggest that, among other factors on which we later comment, two major characteristics of territories seem to affect their level of legislative professionalisation: (a) the size and heterogeneity of their population, and (b) the size of government spending in public services (Mooney 1995, King 2000, Malhotra 2006). The causal relationship between these three variables, legislative professionalisation, population characteristics, and government spending is, however, less clear than it seems.

Concerning population characteristics, in the sense of both the absolute number of citizens and their heterogeneity, scholars have argued that large and diverse populations complicate the needs and problems of citizens, as well as their tractability (Mooney, 1995; King, 2000; Malhotra, 2006). For this reason, large states require higher levels of legislative resources and politician expertise to be more efficient. In other words, a large and diverse population fosters a high degree of professional legislature (Malhotra, 2006). In this vein, studies such as the *Global Parliamentary Report* of the Interparliamentary Union (2012) reveal that population size seems to matter for other legislatures' characteristics. Countries with smaller populations are more likely to have unicameral parliaments, and unicameral parliaments tend to be smaller than bicameral parliaments. Total parliamentary budgets tend to be higher in the most populous countries, whereas the amount spent on parliament per capita tends to be higher in smaller countries. The staff per parliamentarian also seems to be linked to countries' population size.

The literature has also suggested how legislatures have professionalised in response to the growth of public services provided by the states, and therefore government spending, usually referred to as "government size" (King, 2000; Mooney, 1995; Malhotra, 2006). As Kuhnle and Sander (2010) argued, modern states, after abandoning the concept of the classical *laissez-faire*, began to deal with many new social issues such as public education

²⁸ See, however, the study by Eliassen and Pedersen (1978) on the professionalisation of Danish and Norwegian legislatures.

and health, workplace conditions, and the length of working hours, or the relations between employers and workers. Consequently, these new social functions of the modern state and the demands of a rapidly growing public sector to satisfy them modified the way in which public office was exercised. Legislators who were better paid, spent more time on the job, and obtained better support and greater resources for staff became more adept at dealing with state bureaucracies, increased their expertise in the policy process, and therefore were better able to respond to citizens' needs and demands. Therefore, as Malhotra showed (2006:566), focusing on the US state legislatures, an increase in public spending compels the legislature to increase its level of professionalism. In sum, scholars argue that due to the population characteristics and/or the emergence of new state competencies that lead to bigger governments, political institutions in general and parliaments in particular became more professionalised to improve the government's capacity to solve citizens' demands.

However, scholars like Mooney (1995) or King (2000) have implicitly suggested that the causal association between legislative professionalisation and this second factor, government size, is far from certain. This connection could simply be the result of the population characteristics of the states. On the one hand, the greater and the more heterogeneous the population, the greater its needs and demands, the greater the public services the state must provide to meet them, the greater the size of the government, and, therefore, the greater the amount of time and resources devoted to legislative business (King 2000). On the other hand, the greater the population, the greater the total personal and business income, and the greater the principal tax bases to finance those services. Less populous countries cannot afford as much professionalism as more populous ones (Mooney, 1995).²⁹ Thus, it is necessary to revisit the influence of population and government size on the legislative professionalisation.

We argue that there are, in principle, three alternative causal relations between these variables. The first causal explanation is an aforementioned scenario. Population features explain government size, and the latter explains the professionalisation of institutions. In this scenario, government size is just a *causal mechanism* through which the

²⁹ Other scholars have argued, however, that although country size plays a role in determining government size, they are *negatively* related. In the presence of diseconomies of scale for at least a few publicly provided goods, smaller countries should exhibit larger public sectors, and higher public expenditure relative to GDP, than larger ones (Kocher, 2002).

characteristics of countries' population affect the degree of the professionalisation of their parliaments.³⁰ In the end, it is the population characteristics of countries that matters.

The second possible scenario is one in which both population characteristics and government size may or may not independently influence the other regarding the degree of the legislative professionalisation. In contrast to the previous scenario, in this one government size is not simply explained by population characteristics. Other factors intervene (Peters 2018)³¹, and therefore its impact on legislative professionalisation is independent of the size and heterogeneity of their populations.

Figure 2.1. Potential causal relations between government size or population size and legislative professionalisation.

Scenario I	Scenario II	Scenario III
Population size explain government size, and the latter explains the legislative professionalisation.	Population and government size may independently influence the degree of the legislative professionalisation.	The effect of government size on legislative professionalisation is modulated by the population characteristics of the states.

Data Source: Own elaboration

Finally, the last scenario refers to the possibility that the effect of government size on legislative professionalisation is modulated by the population characteristics of the states. This scenario suggests that countries with small population sizes, such as small-scale democracies, tend to accordingly possess a higher degree of social homogeneity, a direct form of citizens' political involvement, a weak institutional structure, and a personalistic type of politics (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018), that in turn may modify the effect of

³⁰ We cannot exclude the possibility that the connection between government size and legislative professionalisation is simply spurious. In other words, population size explains government size, and at the same time the legislative professionalisation, but government size, once we control for population size, does not explain legislative professionalisation. For the sake of simplicity, we analyse this scenario with the first in which government size is a causal mechanism of the characteristics of countries' population.

³¹ Among these other factors, a classical one is the political ideology of governments. The left and right differ on the solutions they offer for the social and economic problems of their societies (Peters, 2018). While social-democrats bet for higher interventionism and increased public expenditures, especially for welfare programmes, conservatives trust in the free markets.

government size on the professionalisation of their parliaments. In other words, in contrast to the first scenario, population characteristics do not explain the size of governments, but they do modulate the effect of the latter variable on the professionalisation of countries' parliaments.

Hence, aiming to shed some light on this controversy about the exact role of government and population size on parliaments' professionalisation, this article analyses the legislative professionalisation of the European micro-states with their most similar European large-scale democracies across both countries and time.

2.3 The Interest of Studying the Professionalisation of the Micro-states' Parliaments and Associated Hypotheses.

Small countries, particularly micro-states, are still a rather neglected area of research in political and social sciences (Wolf, 2016). This is regrettable because, as other scholars (Corbett and Veenendaal 2018) have suggested, their specific combination of properties makes micro-states an excellent setting to analyse the effects of variables of interest. In our case, we can gauge the effect of population and government size on legislative professionalisation while reducing the endogeneity problem.

First of all, given that they are characterised by the very small size of their population and that they are sovereign territories in contrast to regions and municipalities, we are maximising differences in terms of population *size*³² in our comparison country, while, in principle, we minimise country differences in terms of government competencies and therefore size. As a result, the fact that micro-states do not have “microgovernments” seems to put into question the argument of our first scenario where “government size” is simply the causal mechanism through which “population characteristics” in terms of size and heterogeneity affect this type of professionalisation. A first comparison between micro and bigger states seems to suggest that, *if the size of governments, both within micro-states and bigger states, is associated with a higher degree of legislative professionalisation*, this association cannot be endogenous to the population size (population size explains both government size and the degree of legislative professionalisation).

³² As we argue later in very small countries, citizens' attitudes and preferences tend to be more homogenous than in bigger ones (Dahl and Tufte 1974; Kocher, 2002; Wolf, 2016).

Secondly, micro-states are also a good setting to explore our second scenario, in which either population characteristics or government size could explain the professionalisation of parliaments in order to process social demands. In the case of the micro-states this level of professionalisation is unclear, according to the general literature review in the previous section.

On the one hand, the small size of their populations may have two effects that reduce the need for a high level of professionalisation of politics in general, and political institutions in particular. First, a small population size favours a high degree of social homogeneity and ideological cohesion (Wolf, 2016; Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018). In these states, there usually exists, for example, a widespread consensus on macroeconomic policies. As a result, micro-state politicians do not have to deal with the contradictory needs and demands faced by their counterparts in larger states. Citizens' needs and demands can be faced by an "amateur legislature" with a weak institutional structure. Second, small size also favours social proximity between citizens and politicians, and thus direct citizen involvement in politics. In principle, this facilitates a principal-agent relation. But, at the same time, it also favours a lack of party institutionalisation and a personalisation of politics (Sutton, 2007) where single, highly educated individuals coming from economically prosperous sectors, who are active in other aspects of community life and who are able to combine their part-time political activities with their jobs in the private sector, dominate the political process for decades. In other words, in micro-states the amateur character of politics does not preclude political positions being controlled by an elite (Larmour, 2012; Collier, 2013). In sum, due to the higher levels of homogeneity and consensus in micro-state society along with the personalistic character of politics and the politicians' capacity to control the political arena, we would expect that small-scale democracies are characterised by a substantially lower degree of political professionalisation in general, and institutional in particular.

On the other, however, micro-states do not have "micro-governments" by norm, that is, governments that may fail to provide public goods because they are produced and provided by citizens themselves, non-governmental organisations, or neighbouring bigger countries (such as national defence or international relations). On the contrary, Kocher (2002) clearly illustrates that, as Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) have already suggested, there is in fact a negative relationship between countries' population size and government size: the smaller the country's population, the bigger their government. This association has not declined over time due to more open countries and the global and/or transnational

provision of public goods. As a result, if the previous hypothesis about the effect of the government size on legislative professionalisation is correct, we would expect government size to lead to the same degree of parliament professionalisation in the micro-states as in the bigger ones. Consequently, it is not clear from a theoretical point of view what degree of legislative professionalisation we would expect to find in the micro-states, and if it is actually lower on average than in their bigger neighbours.

There is, finally, the possibility that the effect of the size of the government on legislative professionalisation is actually smaller in the micro-states because of, precisely, their population size. If we remember that, in principle, legislative professionalisation's goal is to increase the effectiveness of policymakers (Owings & Borck, 2000; Rosenthal 1996; Squire 1992; Thomson 1986; Mestas 2000), small-scale democracies have lower incentives to establish higher professionalised institutions in general, and parliaments in particular, even though their governments have to provide the public services of a "normal" sovereign state.

2.4 Research Design

a) Data and Method

The empirical analysis comprises two parts that examine to what extent population and government size have an effect on legislative professionalisation. In the first part, we show that the degree of legislative professionalisation is substantially lower in the micro-states than in macro-states. We also show that their difference in population size is much bigger than in government size. In the second part, we undertake a statistical analysis to evaluate the effect of these two variables after controlling for other possible factors that may also affect the degree of legislative professionalisation, and to see if population size modulates the effect of government size on legislative professionalisation.

The article conducts a comparative study of six European micro-states (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Monaco, and San Marino) and six large-scale democracies in Europe (Denmark, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). We have studied all the European micro-states that are democracies, so the Vatican is excluded. We have selected the six large-scale democracies that have a close relationship with our six micro-states either because of geographical proximity or past colonial relations. As

the literature has underlined (Berry and Berry, 1990; Gray, 1973; Mooney, 1995), the level of legislative professionalisation may be influenced by their peer states.

The empirical analysis is based on an original database built by one of the authors. It was built using information obtained from national government websites, newspapers, published studies on European states, and international organisation websites. Due to the availability of information and the years of election celebrations, the precise periods for each state are: Andorra (1981-2019), Liechtenstein (1986-2017), Iceland (1995-2017), Malta (1982-2017), Monaco (1978-2018), and San Marino (1983-2016), and Spain (1978-2019), France (1978-2019), Italy (1978-2019), United Kingdom (1978-2019), Switzerland (1978-2019), and Denmark (1986-2019).

b) Hypotheses

Based on the previous theoretical discussion about the possible influence of population and government size, we present the following hypotheses. According to the first two possible causal explanations described in section two, we would expect:

H1: Ceteris paribus, the higher the population size, the higher the degree of legislative professionalisation.

However, as we saw, the role of government size on the degree of legislative professionalisation is not clear. As a result, we offer two alternative hypotheses:

H2a: Ceteris paribus, the larger the size of the government, the higher the degree of legislative professionalisation.

H2b: After controlling by population size, the size of the government does not affect the level of legislative professionalisation.

Finally, we also saw that there are theoretical reasons, linked to the particular effects of social homogeneity, social proximity, and a more direct form of citizens' political involvement in countries with very small populations, to expect that the effect of the size of governments on the professionalisation of parliaments actually depends on the size of their populations, as a result our final hypothesis establishes:

H3: The smaller the state, the lower the influence of government size on legislative professionalisation.

c) Operationalisation of variables.

Dependent Variable: Level of Legislative Professionalisation.

In order to explain variations in the level of legislative professionalisation, we must first measure it. This is no easy task because it is a multi-faceted concept with no obvious or unambiguous individual indicators. Fortunately, the interest in this subject in recent years has yielded several useful indices of this concept. This article therefore uses the revisited professionalisation index constructed by Squire (2007). As Bowen and Green (2014) concluded, the Squire Index is the most prominent professionalism index which accurately captures the core conceptual differences between citizen and professional legislatures. The index is composed of three main indicators: the salary of the parliamentarians, the support staff of the parliament, and the sitting days of the parliament. However, given that we lack information regarding the particular support staff that each of the micro-state parliaments employed, we use the parliament budget as suggested by Squire (2007). The legislative professionalisation is calculated as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Salary} + \text{Parliament budget} + \text{Sitting days}}{3}$$

We have standardised the components of the index, but in our case, taking into account the fact that we are comparing different national states, we do not establish a parliament as a benchmark to calculate the index like Squire (2007). Our index rescaled the components of the variable to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Thus, each component value on the standardised variable indicates its difference from the mean of the original component in the number of standard deviations.

Main independent variables: population (country) size, government size.

To measure the main independent variables of the analysis, government size, population, the article operationalises both concepts as follows:

Government size. As we have discussed in the theoretical section, the size of governments is a relevant structural characteristic to predict the degree of legislative professionalisation. This variable captures the increase in public sector competencies that explain the growing need for parliaments to become professionalised in order to better serve their constituents and meet their demands. Given that power can be measured in a variety of policy areas, the article uses budget-making to capture the capacity of the legislative power. To measure it, we follow Häge (2003:8-10) and use the general

government consumption expenditure in the percentage of gross domestic product of their countries (GDP). As a result, we can compare countries with different government sizes. The data used for the government size index is based on the United Nations' statistics division database.

Population size. To measure the “size” of countries, we first use a dichotomous variable to capture the effect of micro-state political characteristics. The variable assigns zero to macro-states and one to the European micro-states. Second, for the models of the cross-sample analysis, the article uses the population of each state as Dahl and Tufte did (1973). Moreover, as scholars such as Garrison and Harrington (2013) have argued, this variable captures not only country size but the heterogeneity of their populations as well. We have logged this variable in order to take into account the difference in terms of populations between European micro-states and the large-scale democracies³³.

Control Variables

In order to test our hypotheses, we have also introduced a number of control variables. These are other factors that the current literature suggests may have an impact on legislative professionalisation.

State Wealth: Squire and Hamm (2005) and Grissom and Harrington (2013) argued that state wealth is an important variable to understand the variations in the level of parliament professionalisation. State resources are vital in ensuring that the professionalisation of the institution, the salaries of lawmakers and supportive staff, office space, etc., can be financed. Thus, the richer the state is, the higher the possibilities of affording higher legislative professionalisation. We use the logged GDP per capita to measure the level of state wealth. We logged the variable GDP per capita to improve the fit of the model.

Political System Institutionalisation: As Polsby argued (1968), the more institutionalisation there is in a political system, the more state legislatures become organisationally developed. As a result, this scholar established a causal relationship

³³ We expect an increase in population size to have less impact on legislative professionalisation at high values than at low ones. That is, the impact of the difference between having a population of 60.100.000 inhabitants and one that is 60.000.000 on legislative professionalisation is likely less strong than having a population of 150.000 inhabitants and one that is 50.000.

between the political system institutionalisation and the professionalisation of legislatures. Organisational complexity requires higher legislative professionalisation. Here, we follow Robbins (2010) in measuring political system institutionalisation. Consequently, we calculate the absolute change in vote shares among parties that have participated in consecutive elections. We then divide this result by the total share accrued by those same parties in consecutive elections.

Democracy Age: As Marshall (1950) argued, the new competencies of the democratic state are a reaction to citizens' economic needs and social rights. Therefore, given that the consolidation of the welfare state increases as time passes, the older the democracy, the more consolidated the welfare state, and the greater demand for the professionalisation of legislatures.

Institutional Isomorphism: As the literature argued (King, 2000; Mooney, 1995), another critical variable to explain legislative professionalisation in one state is the legislative professionalisation of neighbouring states (Berry and Berry 1990, Gray 1973). States often emulate their peers when they are developing a policy (Mooney, 1995), because such experiences become a kind of pilot study for other states, thus reducing the cost of adopting it. We use Mooney's (1995) operationalisation of institutional isomorphism. This is calculated as the mean index score for a given year for all states, excluding the state in question, minus the state's index score for the given year.

2.5 Results of the Empirical Analyses

a) Legislative Professionalisation by Country size and Government

Size: Aggregate Data

In its initial assessment of the effect of government size and population on legislative professionalisation, the article gives a comparative overview of the main political traits of the European micro-states and large-scale democracies. Tables 1 and 2 use the original database of the article; the units mentioned are the European micro-states and the corresponding large-scale democracies.³⁴

³⁴ The results by country are included in Appendix A.

Table 2.1. Descriptive data of the article dependent variable

	Micro-states	Macro-states	Diff. Sig
Legislative professionalisation index [mean]	-0,5242	0,5160	t=11.1428,p=0.000
Salary [mean]	33.216	92.310	t= 7.9281,p=0.0000
Parliament Budget [mean]	683.566	370.665.313	t= 11.916,p=0.0000
Sitting Days [mean]	46	136	t=14.146, p=0.0000

*The differences have been calculated with Welch's t-test due to their unequal variances.

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$.

Table 2.1 displays the important and significant differences between European micro-states and large-scale democracies in relation to our dependent variable, the legislative professionalisation index. Micro-states register a half-point less from the mean of the standard deviation of our twelve case studies, while macro-states are a half-point above the overall standard deviation. In other words, micro-states have a lower degree of legislative professionalisation. Advancing one step forward and trying to underline the difference between micro and large-scale democracies, Table 2.1 also highlights the differences in the legislative professionalisation index components. Precisely, Table 2.1 shows how the mean annual salary of micro-state deputies is less than half the annual salary (33216.38 PPP\$) of their counterparts in large-scale democracies (92310.08 PPP\$)³⁵. Nevertheless, such a tendency is seen not only in terms of salary but in parliamentary budget and sitting days. For example, the number of sitting days for macro-state MPs is almost three times higher (135.59 sessions annually) than for their micro-state counterparts (46.17 sessions annually). Finally, the mean annual parliamentary budget for micro-states is 683566 (PPP\$), while in macro-states the mean is 370665313 (PPP\$). To summarise these findings, our first broad comparison confirms the findings of Corbett and Veenendaal's (2018) analysis with other qualitative comparative data. Put simply, micro-states are less legislatively professionalised than large-scale democracies.

³⁵ It is important to point out that most of the micro-states, with the exception of Iceland, have a part-time regime. Andorra has a mixed regime, in which part-time and full-time politicians coexist.

Table 2.2. Descriptive data of the article independent variables

	Micro-states	Macro-states	Diff. Sig
Population [absolute number]	131.697	38.847.722	t=24,5101, p=0.0000
Government Size [%]	17,85	19,15	t=3,0505, p=0.0024

*Except for Government Size - with equal variances-, the differences have been calculated with Welch's t-test due to their unequal variances.

But despite such legislative professionalisation differences between micro and macro-states, Table 2.2 also exhibits how there is a smaller but significant difference in terms of government size. While micro-states register 17.89% of general government consumption expenditure in GDP percentage, large-scale democracies spend 19.15% of their GDP. Consequently, there is a covariation between our dependent variable and our independent variables, since we cannot identify which of them – if any – really matter. Therefore, we have to introduce controls in our quantitative analysis to unravel the causal mechanism that explains the variance in the degree of legislative professionalisation between states.

b) Statistical Analysis: the effect of Government Size and Population size on Legislative Professionalisation.

We now proceed to a statistical test of our alternative hypotheses concerning the impact of population and government size on legislative professionalisation. In the following analysis, our units, or observations, are national parliaments per year in our twelve selected countries. Given that we treat each parliament-year of the same country as a “separate observation”, we have estimated two random effects panel regression models with observations clustered by country and year. In these models, the standard errors of estimates are corrected to take into account the fact that we have repeated observations for each parliament across legislative terms.

In our first models of Table 2.3, we test our hypotheses H1 (the effect of population size), and H2a and H2b (the effect of government size). We clarify if there is an endogeneity problem in the establishment of a causal effect of government size on legislative

professionalisation. Our second models of Table 2.4 analyse to what extent population size actually modulates the effect of government size on legislative professionalisation.

Government Size

The model 1 shows (see in Table 2.3) the effect of government size on an institutional professionalism index.³⁶ The model 3 reveals how government size, even when controlled by the state population, has a significant and positive effect on the institutional professionalism index (the larger the government within the respective country, the higher the level of legislative professionalisation). Thus, such results confirm the argument put forth by Borchert (2011), in which it was established that enlarging the competencies of the state becomes a determinant for legislative professionalisation. Legislatures are more professionalised in those states where their governments have larger public competencies, even after controlling by their condition of micro-state or large-scale democracy.

Table 2.3. Determinants of legislative professionalism

	(1) Legislative professionalism	(2) Legislative professionalism	(3) Legislative professionalism
Government Size	0.0345*** (0.00785)		0.0336*** (0.00801)
Micro-state		0.0980 (0.234)	0.0586 (0.210)
(Log) GDP per capita	0.0326 (0.0459)	0.0271 (0.0513)	0.0293 (0.0489)
Institutional Isomorphism	-1.78e-09*** (1.38e-10)	-1.73e-09*** (1.69e-10)	-1.79e-09*** (1.59e-10)
Age democracy	0.00737*** (0.00143)	0.00985*** (0.00195)	0.00788*** (0.00182)
Political system Institutionalisatio n	0.00533 (0.0109)	0.00204 (0.0112)	0.00498 (0.0109)
_cons	-1.460** (0.502)	-0.954 (0.512)	-1.471** (0.507)
<i>N</i>	211	211	211

³⁶ The results by the components of the index are included in Appendix B.

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Population Size

On the other hand, in our analysis, the comparison between small-scale democracies and large-scale states underlines that the population size characteristics has not a significant effect (Model 2), even before and after it is controlled by government size (Model 3). Such results therefore form the basis of the conclusion that the explicative factor for a higher degree of legislative professionalisation is the government size.

In addition, all the three models of Table 2.3 reveal that there are other systemic characteristics acting as determinants for the professionalisation of legislatures. The analysis demonstrates the positive effect of the democracy's age. Thus, in terms of the effect of years of democracy, the model reveals that the older the democracy, the higher the degree of legislative professionalisation. Hence, as Marshall (1950) argued, due to the fact that democracies increased their needs and social rights as a result of the consolidation of the welfare state, their complexity and demands for legislative professionalisation increased. That is to say, new democracies with a lower consolidation of the welfare state have lower complexity regarding government competencies, and therefore lower standards of legislative professionalisation.

Finally, as Mooney (1995) exemplified, the analysis determines the influence of peer states on the variance of legislative professionalisation standards. In this sense, the results identify how institutional isomorphism is a significant and negative determinant. Subsequently, the lesser the influence held by peer states, the higher the existence of amateurism standards.

Table 2.4. Cross-sample analysis.

	(Micro-state) Legislative professionalis m	(Micro-state) Legislative professionalis m	(Micro-state) Legislative professionalis m	(Macro-state) Legislative professionalis m	(Macro-state) Legislative professionalis m	(Macro-state) Legislative professionalis m
Government size	0.0268*** (0.00547)		0.0167*** (0.00356)	0.0717*** (0.00596)		0.0724*** (0.00568)
(Log) Population		0.268*** (0.0223)	0.245*** (0.0207)		0.0956 (0.0507)	0.111*** (0.0320)
(Log) GDP per capita	-0.157*** (0.0374)	0.0383 (0.0321)	0.0424 (0.0290)	-0.0762 (0.0709)	0.245* (0.106)	-0.0157 (0.0697)
Institutional Isomorphism	-1.37e-10 (3.89e-10)	-1.15e-09*** (2.90e-10)	-1.22e-09*** (2.62e-10)	-1.77e-09*** (5.47e-11)	-1.76e-09*** (9.40e-11)	-1.67e-09*** (5.98e-11)
Age democracy	0.00702*** (0.000711)	0.00497*** (0.000540)	0.00470*** (0.000490)	0.00625*** (0.000823)	0.00204 (0.00112)	0.00688*** (0.000804)
Political system institutionalisation	-0.119*** (0.0352)	-0.0982*** (0.0232)	-0.134*** (0.0222)	0.0352* (0.0142)	0.0625** (0.0212)	0.0380** (0.0135)
_cons	0.527 (0.456)	-3.862*** (0.524)	-3.911*** (0.473)	-0.961 (0.679)	-4.237** (1.568)	-3.555*** (0.991)
<i>N</i>	98	98	98	113	113	113

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$


Besides this, and focusing on Table 2.4, the article reflects, running a cross-sample analysis, how despite of the common positive effect of government size on legislative professionalisation index, the effect of government size is higher in macro-states than micro-states. That is to say, the results validate the third theoretical scenario suggested about how population size characteristics modulate the effect of government size on the legislative professionalism.

In this vein, as Figure 2.2 shows, despite micro and macro-states share the positive effect of government size on legislative professionalism, the results underline how being a macro-state heighten the effect of government size on the legislative professionalisation index. In conclusion, such results confirm the third hypothesis that argues how micro-states' political characteristics – specifically, personalistic politics, social proximity, and

direct forms of citizen involvement (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018) – lessen the need for highly professionalised legislatures to provide better accountability and higher efficacy in comparison with large-scale democracies.

Furthermore, the cross-sample analysis underlines another interesting effect of population size. Precisely, it shows how in micro-states, there is an effect of the population size characteristics. In this way, even if it is controlled by government size, the larger the population of the micro-state is, the higher the degree of legislative professionalism. Hence, in comparison with the macro-states, the increase of population size in micro-states, due to their condition of extreme cases –sovereign states with 500.000 inhabitants–, is a determinant of the need for highly professionalised legislatures to be more efficient and provide a better representation.

Figure 2.2. Effect of government size on Legislative professionalisation index



As in Table 2.3, models of Table 2.4 reveal that there are other systemic characteristics acting as determinants for the professionalisation of legislatures. Precisely, the Table 4 models underlined how the control variables are still registering the same effects on the legislative professionalisation index. Accordingly, the age of the democracy and institutional isomorphism are determinants of the parliament’s professionalisation. Age

of the democracy, on the one hand, is a positive determinant for the professionalisation of the institutions. Secondly, institutional isomorphism still determines the influence of peer states on the characteristics of legislative professionalisation. Finally, Table 4 shows how the political system institutionalisation has a different effect depending on the characteristics of population's size. In that sense, the results underline how in micro-states, the development of organizational complexity is not a determinant for the legislative professionalisation. Because, as Corbett and Veenendaal (2018) argued, due to their political characteristics- personalistic politics, social proximity, and direct forms of citizen involvement– lessen the need for highly professionalised legislatures.

2.6 Conclusions

This paper investigated the effect of enlarging state competencies on legislative professionalisation. Precisely, the article analyses the effect of government size, population on legislative professionalisation. The article used a new dataset consisting of the legislative professionalisation characteristics of every parliamentary mandate of the European micro-states and their most similar large-scale European democracies.

The professionalisation of politics is a characteristic of the contemporary political systems, whose causes and consequences have been highly studied and debated. Despite this, there are only a few researchers that have addressed the analysis of the determinants of legislative professionalisation. In addition, the literature assumes how legislative professionalisation is determined by population and institutional structure (Mooney, 1995). However, scholars like Mooney (1995) and King (2000) have implicitly suggested that the causal association between legislative professionalisation and government size, is far from certain. This connection could simply be the result of the population characteristics of the state. Thus, the article represents an attempt to empirically and comparatively revisit the effect of government size and population size. Specifically, first, the analysis evaluates the effect of government size and population size on legislative professionalism after controlling for other possible factors that may also affect such professionalisation. Second, the article test if population size modulates the effect of government size on legislative professionalisation.

Therefore, firstly, we tested the Mooney (1995) expectation about the existence of an endogeneity problem in determining a causal effect of government size on legislative professionalisation. In this sense, the statistical (Table 3) model reveals how government size, even when controlled by the state population, has a significant and positive effect. Hence, such a result confirms Borchert's (2011) argument that underlined how increasing state competencies made it necessary to register higher standards of legislative professionalisation. On the other hand, and answering the second hypothesis – the condition of the state population as a determinant of professionalisation, even when controlled by government size – the results do not confirm the positive effect determined by the previous findings of the literature comparing US federal states (King, 2000; Mooney, 1995).

Secondly, the article analyses to what extent population size modulates the government size effect on legislative professionalisation. The analysis reveals (Table 4 and Figure 1) that, effectively, size modulates the effect of government size on legislative professionalisation. Put simply, the analysis discerned how despite the shared positive effect between micro and macro-states, the smaller the state, the lower the effect of government size on the legislative professionalisation index. Therefore, such results confirm how micro-states' political characteristics – personalistic politics, social proximity, and direct forms of citizen involvement (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018) – lessen the need for higher professionalised legislatures to provide better accountability and higher efficacy in comparison with large-scale democracies.

In summary, the article helps to clarify the role of government size and state population on legislative professionalisation. In addition, the paper points how population size modulates the effect of government size on the legislative professionalisation standards. Precisely, the analysis underlines how a larger state population size intensifies the effect of government size on legislative professionalisation.

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Appendix A.

Table A.1. Descriptive data of the article dependent variables by country.

	Legislative professionalisatio n [mean]	Salary [mean]	Parliament Budget [mean]	Sitting Days [mean]
Andorra	-0,73	23.726	6.146.052	16
Denmark	0,46	92.051	144.441.099	105
France	1,08	90.565	613.760.122	227
Iceland	0,23	112.953	18.596.429	105
Italy	2,00	160.723	934.237.319	153
Liechtenstei n	-0,74 -0,26	18.657 38.398	3.172.800 9.796.012	20 110
Malta	-0,75	25.542	5.395.266	12
Monaco	-0,67	6.931	267.607	60
San Marino	-0,30	44.100	87.375.644	70
Spain	-0,35	39.504	65.338.219	72
Switzerland	0,86	135.898	325.942.287	154
United Kingdom				

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$.

Table A 2. Descriptive data of the article independent variables by country.

	Population [mean]	Government Size [%]
Andorra	63.943	17,4
Denmark	5.358.077	25,0
France	61.288.947	22,9
Iceland	305.020	23,4
Italy	57.846.410	18,9
Liechtenstein	32.582	11,6
Malta	389.860	17,5
Monaco	32.917	22,9
San Marino	27.743	16,6
Spain	41.977.692	17,4
Switzerland	7.298.572	11,6
United Kingdom	5.358.077	19,3

Appendix B.

Table B.1. Determinants of the components of legislative professionalism index.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Salary	Salary	Salary	Parliament budget	Parliament Budget	Parliament budget	Sitting days	Sitting days	Sitting days
Government Size	0.0330*		0.0304*	0.0373***		0.0384***	0.0349*		0.0338*
	(0.0142)		(0.0145)	(0.00744)		(0.00760)	(0.0154)		(0.0158)
Micro-state		-0.0673	-0.0721		0.0818	0.129		-0.0631	-0.0690
		(0.351)	(0.353)		(0.148)	(0.154)		(0.399)	(0.341)
(Log) GDP per capita	-0.0102	-0.00449	-0.00222	0.183***	0.170***	0.172***	-0.0807	-0.0592	-0.0690
	(0.0828)	(0.0882)	(0.0880)	(0.0463)	(0.0504)	(0.0489)	(0.0917)	(0.101)	(0.0973)
Institutional isomorphism	-1.50e-09***	-1.43e-09***	-1.46e-09***	-2.86e-09***	-2.90e-09***	-2.93e-09***	-9.48e-10***	-8.14e-10*	-8.99e-10**
	(2.41e-10)	(2.82e-10)	(2.82e-10)	(1.15e-10)	(1.37e-10)	(1.39e-10)	(2.45e-10)	(3.21e-10)	(2.94e-10)
Age democracy	0.00924**	0.0100**	0.00907*	0.00301**	0.00392**	0.00380**	0.00822**	0.00957*	0.00803*
	(0.00239)	(0.00306)	(0.00312)	(0.00105)	(0.00133)	(0.00139)	(0.00230)	(0.00349)	(0.00306)
Political system institutionalisation	-0.0111	-0.0135	-0.0113	-0.0204	-0.0230	-0.0211	0.0451	0.0450	0.0462
	(0.0205)	(0.0206)	(0.0205)	(0.0119)	(0.0127)	(0.0119)	(0.0235)	(0.0235)	(0.0236)
_cons	-0.965	-0.414	-0.953	-2.853***	-2.096***	-2.874***	-0.431	-0.0507	-0.488
	(0.910)	(0.885)	(0.917)	(0.518)	(0.521)	(0.522)	(1.016)	(1.012)	(1.026)
<i>N</i>	218	219	218	212	213	212	217	217	217

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

3. Polity Size Matters? The Effect of Country Size on Politicians' professionalisation.

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of country size on the individual professionalisation process in six European micro-states and a large-scale democracy – Germany – since 1980. By doing so, the article revisits an ongoing debate about the extent to which either country size or government size are causal factors of the individual professionalisation process. Using an original data set consisting of 6940 parliamentary mandates – 2809 individuals – at the national parliament, the article shows that country size is a determinant for the degree of individual professionalisation. Moreover, the article shows how political parties' gatekeeper role is a causal mechanism that explains the influence of country size on individual professionalisation. The article, therefore, sustains the argument that country size is a determinant for individual professionalisation and describes how political parties' gatekeeper role is the causal mechanism that explains the influence of population size on politicians' professionalisation.

3.1 Introduction

Democratic politics in large-scale polities are characterised by the implementation of a representative government, in which holding public offices have been increasingly professionalised. In fact, the academic literature explains how the enlargement in terms of both the population with voting rights and government size that contemporary political units experienced, set up the perfect frame to develop the controversial legislative and individual professionalisation. Therefore, the political professionalisation of national politics became a contemporary characteristic of large-scale democracies (Musella, 2014).

The current literature mentions that individual professionalisation, in large-scale democracies, is determined by politician ambition, the institutional structure of opportunities and party goals (Maestas, 2000; Bochert, 2003; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008). However, even though in national politics the influence of political parties on political professionalisation is well-established, in smaller political entities, such influence is not ensured. In fact, due to the high levels of social intimacy and direct forms of communications that exist in small-scale political units, the representative delegation process through political parties becomes less necessary and more personalistic. Actually, political parties are less developed and have weak extra-parliamentarian organisations (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018). As a consequence, political parties have lower capacities to gain monopolisation of the recruitment process. Therefore, the political party's role as a gatekeeper seems to be a causal mechanism between the population size of the country and individual professionalisation.

Despite this, the comparison between large and small-scale political units, like local politics and the nation-state, has not only been characterised by population size but with the existing differences of competencies. Literature relates that political competencies may also affect political professionalisation. The political competencies that a government has make its political management more complex, therefore it asks for higher institutional professionalisation³⁷. As a result, as the literature has underlined, having

³⁷ When focusing exclusively on the professionalisation of legislatures, both at the national and subnational levels, scholars use the term "legislative professionalisation" (Mooney, 1995). Since in this article it is solely focused on the professionalisation of parliaments, and not in other state institutions, it is used the term "legislative professionalisation".

more competencies demand of public office holders more expertise in the policy process as well as higher levels of investment in terms of personal efforts and time. In other words, nation-states request more staff and qualified policymakers with a full-time dedication (Saafeld, 1997; Samuels and Shugart, 2010). Hence, as the literature points out (Lawless, 2012; Schlesinger, 1966), such professionalisation of state institutions creates a *cursus honorum* and gives selective incentives to individual professionalisation. In sum, either country size or government size could be the explanatory factor for individual professionalisation.

This article represents, therefore, an attempt to disentangle empirically the effects of country size on the professionalisation of parliamentarians. In order to do so, it compares six European micro-states – usually understood as those sovereign states with less than 500,000 citizens (Veenendaal and Corbett, 2015) – with a large-scale democracy, Germany. In doing so, the article first analyses the extent to which either country size or government size are causal factors of individual professionalisation. Second, the article assesses the role of political parties as a causal mechanism that links the influence of country size and individual professionalisation.

The article first reviews the arguments offered by the literature about the determinants of individual professionalisation in contemporary democracies. Later, the article determines how a country's size could affect the process of individual professionalisation. Then, the article presents its hypothesis, data characteristics, and operationalisation of variables and indicators. Next, the article undertakes the statistical analyses to disentangle if country size affects political party condition as a politician's professionalisation determinant. Finally, the article tests the causal mechanism that explains the influence of country size through political parties' gatekeeper role on politicians' professionalisation.

3.2 Politicians' professionalisation determinants in large-scale democracies.

The modern democracy, with the establishment of mass democracy, set the perfect conditions to develop political professionalisation. In fact, after the locus of democracy shifted from communes, cantons and city-states to the nation-state, contemporary political units enlarged their population size and competencies, which set the perfect conditions to

develop the controversial legislative and individual professionalisation. Therefore, the political professionalisation of national politics became a contemporary characteristic of large-scale democracies (Musella, 2014).

Consequently, individual and legislative³⁸ professionalisation started to be largely studied by political scientists. In fact, different scholars underlined how most of the political offices, at the national levels, were occupied by professionals in contemporary democracies (Von Beyme, 1995; Borchert and Zeiss, 2003). Hence, the process in which politicians give up a previous occupation and move into a full-time dedication to politics became the normal path. In that sense, the literature generated common wisdom of the negative consequences of the monopolisation of political positions by professionalised politicians (Azary, 2017; Allen, 2013; Petracca, 1991).

A professional politician is a person who spends full-time in politics, has a long period of experience in it, and obtains their main income by his/her political activity (Bochert, 2011). Indeed, as the literature underlined, due to politicians' ambitions to maintain their careers, individual professionalisation creates accountability and representation problems (Ericksen, 2018; Maestas, 2000). In other words, as Borchert and Zeiss (2003: 9) defended, individual professionalisation refers to the process characterised by the transformation of a 'cherished citizen into the pariah politician'.

However, the process of individual professionalisation, as the academic literature explains, was not only related to politicians' ambition motivations but by a concrete interplay between the individual motivations, the institutional structure of opportunities and party goals (Maestas, 2000; Bochert, 2003; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008).

As Borchert (2011) underlines, professional politicians do not differ markedly from a practitioner in any other distinguished profession, they want to stay and rise to higher positions. Therefore, the ambition of the politician is a clue variable to understand the

³⁸ The institutional professionalism concerns resources expended to increase legislative and executive engagement with the policy process, or to enhance the ability of politicians to increase their effectiveness as policymakers and leaders (Owings and Borck, 2000; Rosenthal, 1996; Squire, 1992; Mestas, 2000).

professionalisation process.³⁹ In this way, the salary, the first component related to the professionalisation process (Squire and Moncrief, 2019) constitutes a great incentive to enter and continue politicians' service in the legislature (Cotta and Best, 2007). Indeed, the salary allows the legislator to focus their energy on their legislative responsibilities, thus, politics become the exclusive occupation.

Other important motivations of the professional politician are career maintenance and career advancement. As the sociology of professions illustrates, safeguarding one's career and the aspiration to hold various positions of increasing relevance (Astudillo and Martínez-Cantó, 2019) are something natural in any professional worker. In that sense, in politics, as Thompson and Moncrief (1992) pointed out, the establishment of the salary and the ambition to have career maintenance creates the frame to achieve greater political expertise.

Moreover, institutional particularities and political parties' characteristics also influence individual professionalisation. In terms of institutional particularities, it is important to understand the effect of the enlargement of state functions after the establishment of the new welfare state (Marshall, 1950; Rosenthal, 1996; Kuhnle and Sander, 2010). After the increase of public administration competencies (Borchert, 2011), public offices asked for a higher level of expertise and technical understanding. Thus, such demands modified the way in which offices were exercised, asking for higher levels of investment in terms of personal and time energy (Grissom and Harrington, 2013; Carreras, 2017). Therefore, higher workloads demanded legislative professionalisation. In that sense, as authors like Schlesinger (1966) and Lawless (2012) argued, legislative professionalisation created a structure of opportunities for the potential candidate – concreate *cursus honorum* to fulfil – and selective incentives – payments for public services – that led to life-off politics.

Finally, related to the figure of political parties as a professionalisation determinant, the literature highlights how political parties become essential for the development of politicians' political careers (McAllister, 1997; Wessels, 1997; Samuels and Shugart, 2013). After the implementation of universal suffrage, political parties became an

³⁹ The ambition of the politician is a hard factor to operationalise empirically. In that sense, if we would like to capture the ambition of the politicians, it will be necessary to do surveys or interviews. The article assumes that politicians in general have some degree of ambition.

essential actor of representation. The growth of voters made direct participation unfeasible, thus, political parties become politicians' instruments to win elections and articulate people's concerns. Besides this, the potential voters made it impossible that the politician can conduct a political campaign by him/herself; politicians need an extra-parliamentarian organisation to reach their potential voters (Aldrich, 2011).

Even though political parties created such instrumental character – win elections to implement some policy changes – most political parties, at least in Western Europe, suffered a transformation process in which the organisation became the intrinsic goal of the political party (Michels, 1962; Panebianco, 1990; Downs, 1957; Schlesinger, 1994; Strom and Müller, 1999). As Panebianco pointed out (1990: 15), this is the central part of the process of institutionalisation,⁴⁰ in which an organisation acquires value in itself (Selznick, 1956). Therefore, the organisation was not anymore an instrument for the (re)selection of the candidate. In other words, consolidated parties, with a developed extra-parliamentarian organisation, evolved coordinated strategies (Scharpf, 1997: 55) to preserve their power and maintain the institution (Panebianco, 1990).

In this way, politicians become the agents of the extra-parliamentarian organisation. Thus, politicians are not only representing and servicing citizens but they are working and representing political parties (Maravall, 2003). This process was reinforced because, at the same time, and in part due to the acquisition of value of the organisation, citizens changed their electoral behaviour. Citizens' votes go from a candidate-centred vote to a party-centred vote. However, political parties may face the so-called agency problems in the political recruitment process. Political organisations need politicians to follow their instructions to fulfil their intrinsic goals. So, as a way to avoid adverse selection and moral hazards (Samuels and Shugart, 2010),⁴¹ institutionalised parties use their condition of political gatekeeper to create controls to test politicians' 'reliability' (ibid.). As a result, aspiring to certain political positions involves demonstrating skills designed for required tasks and loyalty to the political party (ibid.).

⁴⁰ Party institutionalisation is the process by which the party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of behavior and attitudes within and outside the party (Randall and Svasand, 2002).

⁴¹ Adverse selection is the process by which the political party selects a candidate that is not adequate. Meanwhile, moral hazard means that even though the person is a good candidate, when he/she joins into the parliament he/she is not working for the party, only for their reselection.

As Samuels and Shugart (2010: 63) argued, political parties apply an *ex ante* and *ex post* control to test candidates. In this way, political parties subject candidates to an implicit interview process in which politicians compete to demonstrate their usefulness and reliability (ibid.). In that sense, as in any other professions, such an implicit interview is based on a selection criterion, precisely, previous experience. In other words, political parties, in their search for a suitable candidate, base the political recruitment selection on the political and partisan experience of the candidate. That is, ambitious candidates that want to aspire to top political positions have had to hold various positions of increasing responsibility and authority in public administration and within a party to ensure their reliability and demonstrate their qualities (Astudillo and Martínez-Cantó, 2019: 3).

In sum, institutionalised political parties prefer qualified politicians, with a full-time dedication and socialised in the party's culture and practices (Hazan and Rahat, 2001). This is more so where citizens vote for parties, not independent candidates who are unlikely to be selected. In consequence and trying to persuade ambitious politicians to be involved in politics and in the organisation, political parties look for an individual incentive to justify politicians' efforts and time in the political party (Schlesinger, 1984). Briefly, politicians' professionalisation is also motivated by the candidate selection of the institutionalised political parties.

3.3 The effect of country size on the individual professionalisation process.

Academic literature, some explicitly and others implicitly, argues how small size makes the process of professionalisation harder. In other words, as Guérin and Kerrouche (2008) illustrated in their investigation, the common wisdom in European local politics is the voluntary and amateur character of the representatives.

Authors like Reynaert (2012) or Garrissom and Harrington (2013) underlined how polity size and its heterogeneity affect the nature of deliberation and the difficulty in dealing with society's set of problems. Consequently, a larger population has an effect on the greater necessity of professionalised politicians to have greater chances of solving heterogeneous interests, ideologies and problems. In sum, it means that population size affects the influence of individual professionalisation.

In fact, literature pointed out that the causal mechanism that could explain the country's effect on individual professionalisation is related to the role of political gatekeeper. Accordingly, even though in national politics the influence of political parties on political professionalisation is well-established, in smaller political entities, such influence is not ensured. In fact, due to the social proximity between citizens and politicians in smaller political units, the representative delegation process through parties becomes less necessary.

Precisely, the national politics' causal mechanism establishes that contemporary large-scale democracies need representative democracy, thus, political parties become the necessary link between society and the state (Katz and Mair, 1995). As a consequence of such representation monopoly, political parties become political gatekeepers which makes politicians become agents of the extra-parliamentarian organisation. As a result, politicians need to fulfil political party selection criteria: previous experience in public administration and within the party (Astudillo and Martínez-Cantó, 2019). Thus, aspiring to certain political positions involves holding various positions of increasing responsibility and authority in public administrations and within a party (Astudillo and Martínez-Cantó, 2019: 3). In conclusion, political parties contribute to having higher standards of politicians' professionalisation.

In contrast, the lower standards of professionalisation in local politics are based on the existence of some sort of direct politics due to the close relationship between citizens and representatives. The small size allows politicians organise and conduct the political campaign by themselves, and makes the citizens' vote more candidate-oriented no matter the electoral system. Therefore, political parties, due to such closer relations between citizens and politicians, have less developed and weak extra-parliamentarian organisations, thus, they have lower capacities to gain the monopolisation of the recruitment process. In sum, politicians do not have to deal with the political party selection criteria of having previous experience in public administration.

Despite this, the problem of this comparison between local and national politics is that local politics are not only different in terms of population size, but in competencies. The political competencies that a government has make its political management more

complex, therefore, it asks for higher legislative professionalisation. Additionally, as Schlesinger (1966) underlined, such legislative professionalisation creates a *cursus honorum* and gives selective incentives to a life-off politics. In other words, competencies also contribute to individual professionalisation. In brief, the local versus national comparison gives place to a co-variance scenario in which it is not possible to determine if population size or competencies are the explicative variables of individual professionalisation variance.

Therefore, aiming to solve such questions, the article introduces the analysis of European micro-states – sovereign states with less than 500,000 inhabitants. Precisely, the article runs an analysis comparing the level of politicians' professionalisation in European micro-states and a large-scale democracy, Germany. In this regard, the analysis maximises the differences in terms of size and reduces the difference in institutional competencies that exist when academia compares local and national political spheres.

3.4 Research design

a) Data and Method

The empirical analysis consists of two parts to analyse to what extent the variable country size has an effect on individual professionalisation. First of all, the article analyses if either country size or government size, or both are causal factors of individual professionalisation. In this first analysis and trying to avoid the bias that can produce the inclusion of Germany in the analysis results, the article runs another model to determine the effect of size within European micro-state politicians' professionalisation. Thus, the article aims to control if the influence that population size could have is derived from other characteristics of our benchmark, Germany. Later, the article studies the causal mechanism that explains the influence of country size on individual professionalisation. Precisely, the article assesses the effect of country size on politicians' professionalisation through the political parties' gatekeeper function.

In this regard, the article has faced some important limitations in terms of available information. Even though the literature concerning micro-states underlines the lower institutionalisation of the political parties and individual professionalisation (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018), it is not possible to run a comparative and quantitative analysis

between large state democracies and micro-states because of the lack of available information. Besides the omission of the micro-states in the literature (Veenendaal and Corbett, 2015), there is a lack of comparative information about politicians' professionalisation of large-scale democracies. The existing data on politicians' professionalisation is usually based on case studies, and they are normally centred on qualitative analysis or on sociodemographic consequences of political professionalisation (Squire and Moncrief, 2019; Oñate, 2010; Borchert and Zeiss, 2003). Consequently, there are no comparative indicators of politicians' professionalisation neither in micro-states nor in large-scale democracies. For that reason and trying to analyse the effect of population size on individual professionalisation, the article has created an original database for the European micro-states and Germany. Germany was selected as a benchmark because it is the large-scale state paradigm of professionalisation of politics in general (Weber, 1958) and of individual professionalisation in parliaments. Moreover, Germany was selected due to another characteristic of its politics: the long-term political party commitment present in politicians' biographies (Wessels, 1997). In other words, as a consequence of the monopoly over the political recruitment process by German political parties, party service becomes an indispensable prerequisite for any political hopeful (Borchert and Golsch, 2003: 150). In fact, German political science describes such long-term organisational commitment by politicians as *ochsentour*.

Regarding the characteristics of the database, it is composed of those politicians who have won a parliamentary representation to determine their degree of professionalisation along with their previous experience in their political party. As normally the professionalisation literature does, the article focuses on the politicians of the national parliaments. In particular, the article studied all parliamentarians that had political representation in the legislative body. Despite this, due to the availability of information and the years of the election's occurrence, the exact periods for each country were Andorra (1981–2019), Liechtenstein (1986–2017), Iceland (1995–2017), Malta (1982–2017), Monaco (1978–2018), San Marino (1983–2016) and Germany (1990–2017).⁴²

⁴² The analysis of Germany starts in 1990 due to it being the first election after the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

In total, the article analysed 6940 parliamentary mandates – 2809 individuals. Our original dataset was built from information primarily obtained from parliament websites, newspapers, internal party documents and politicians' biographies.

b) Hypotheses

Accordingly, to understand the variation between Germany and the micro-states, but also the variance within micro-states, it is necessary to recognise the particularities that explain the presence of a different logic in terms of politicians' professionalisation.

In this sense, our first hypothesis aimed to test the extent to which either country size or government size affects individual professionalisation. Hence, the article firstly seeks to test if once it is controlled by the government size; country size is a determinant for individual professionalisation.

H1a: Ceteris paribus, on average small democracies have a lower degree of politicians' professionalisation than Germany.

H1b: Ceteris paribus, the smaller the population size is within small democracies, the lower the degree of politicians' professionalisation.

Secondly, after analysing this first theoretical expectation – small size reduces the level of politicians' professionalisation – the article analyses the causal mechanism that explains country size influence on individual professionalisation. In this way, the first argument points out that size influences the organisational function of parties. In fact, as argued previously, due to the high levels of social intimacy and direct forms of communications that exist in micro-states, the representative delegation process becomes less necessary (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018). As Corbett and Veenendaal (2018) underlined, the political parties in most of the European micro-states present a weak extra-parliamentarian organisation, low institutionalisation, low professionalisation, low membership and highly personalist politics. For example, in the case of Monaco, where the parties are called 'mouvements', they have a really weak extra-parliamentarian organisation, with no clear intra-party objectives (Grinda, 2007). Another example is Andorra, where despite the existence of a relatively stable pattern of party competition, the creation of a formal extra-parliamentarian organisation of the political parties is still

really young since they were established after its first constitution of 1993 (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018).

Therefore, political parties, due to the closer relations between citizens and politics and their weak extra-parliamentarian organisation, have lower capacities to have monopolisation of the recruitment process. Despite this, those micro-states' political parties that are institutionalised, are still interested in winning elections and have the intrinsic goal of maintaining the extra-parliamentarian organisation. Thus, such political parties keep using their role as a political gatekeeper, but in this case, they look for well-known candidates, although the organisation cannot ensure their reliability and technical skills. In that sense, such strategy responds to the personalistic politics (ibid.) present in European micro-states. Owing to the proximity of the politicians to their voters, even though European micro-states are parliamentary democracies, the electoral decision is based on the candidate more than the party. In fact, it is because of the low membership of micro-state political parties (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018) that political recruitment from the centre, based on selecting insiders, becomes harder. Additionally, due to the thin pool of candidates that can demonstrate the 'agency experience', political parties have to choose outsiders with vote-drawing ability and a supra-partisan public image (Samuel and Shugart, 2010). In sum, micro-states, due to their personalistic politics and the lower capacities of political parties to monopolise the political recruitment of such organisations, have lower control over the access of insiders to political positions. Thus, our second and third hypotheses aimed to respond to the question raised by Corbett and Veenendaal (2018: 6) on how country size affects parties' functions with regard to the recruitment and nomination of candidates. Precisely, the second hypothesis is:

H2: Ceteris paribus, on average small-scale democracies have a lower likelihood that an MP has previous party experience than Germany.

Finally, and as argued previously, based on what the literature pointed out about how size should affect the party condition as a determinant of politicians' professionalisation, our third hypothesis is:

H3: Those MPs with previous party experience still have a significantly higher degree of individual professionalisation.

c) Operationalisation of Variables

Main dependent variables: party experience and politicians' professionalisation.

To measure the role of political parties as gatekeepers, the article uses a proxy that pretends to capture the extent to which political parties are capable of monopolising the recruitment process and imposing their selection criteria. In that sense, the article focuses on the outcome of the partisan control of the recruitment process. For that reason, the article uses previous experience in political parties as a way of measuring if partisan experience is a determinant for being selected as a parliamentarian. In other words, the article wants to test to what extent political parties are capable of applying an *ex ante* control and selecting those candidates who have been formed and socialised by the party.

- *Previous experience in a political party.* This variable captures the experience of the parliamentarian in any relevant position in the extra-parliamentarian organisation. The variable assigns zero to politicians with no previous experience in a political party, and one to those that had experience.⁴³

On the other hand, to measure the degree of politicians' professionalisation, the article uses two different indicators. The reason for using two different variables to measure politicians' professionalisation is to capture all the particularities of a complex concept such as individual professionalisation. As Weber (1958) established, a professional politician is defined by two decisive factors based on time and monetary budget. Therefore, professional politicians differ from amateurs because they have long experience in politics, spend full-time in politics, and in addition, their main income resources are obtained by political activity. As a result, the article uses two different strategies from the literature to capture politician's professionalisation: *the age when the politician accessed public office for the first time* and *a composed index of politicians' professionalisation*.

⁴³ The previous experience of the candidates refers to the experience of the candidates in the party that they represent in such elections.

First, the age when the politician accessed public office for the first time⁴⁴ is related to the assumption that Schlesinger (1994) argued, that the age when parliamentarians acceded to their first public office is a good indicator of the life span dedicated to politics.

Second, and trying to be more accurate in the professional politician definition, the article also created an index including the percentage of adult life dedicated to politics and the political time-spent (part-time or full-time). Thus, the index of individual professionalisation (INPI) includes, as Astudillo and Martínez-Cantó did in their article (2019), the proportion of adult life involved in politics, and added the type of political dedication.

- Proportion of adult life involved in politics since the age of 21 years.⁴⁵ The proportion is calculated by dividing the total number of years holding any public office by the total years of adulthood (age 21+) (Astudillo and Martínez-Cantó, 2019).
- Type of political dedication (full-time or part-time). To control by the political dedication in politics, each type is assigned a concrete value: full-time (1) or part-time (2).

Finally, the proportion of adulthood involved in politics is divided by each value. It is considered that part-time and full-time explain if they are living for or living off politics, as if they are full-time politicians, their main income resource is from politics.

Main independent variables: country size, government size and partisan variables

To measure the size of the countries, the article first uses a dichotomous variable to capture the effect of micro-state political characteristics. The variable assigns zero to Germany and one to the European micro-states. Moreover, for the models that analyse the variation within micro-states, the article uses as the country size, the population of each state as Dahl and Tufte did in their book, *Size and Democracy* (1973). In the article, the population is logged to consider the difference in terms of population between Iceland

⁴⁴ Because of the particularities of micro-states, politicians cannot have public positions in regions. However, in Malta's case, politicians can add European politics as a sphere of the political career.

⁴⁵ Due to the legal age to be a candidate in San Marino being 21 years old, our starting point for adulthood is 21 years old.

– 306.001 inhabitants and Malta – 282.560 inhabitants, and the rest of the European micro-states – Andorra (63.747 inhabitants), Liechtenstein (32.881), Monaco (32.638 inhabitants) and San Marino (27.692 inhabitants).

Secondly, to measure, government size,⁴⁶ the article uses, as Häge (2003: 8–10) did previously, the general government consumption expenditure in per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). In that sense, the article avoids overstating the size of the public sector when using the total government expenditure in per cent GDP.

Finally, to analyse the causal mechanism that explains the influence of country size on individual professionalisation, the article uses previous experience as the main independent variable. In this way, as defined previously, the variable captures the experience of the parliamentarian in any relevant position in the extra-parliamentarian organisation.

Control variables

In order to test the article's hypotheses, the control variables of both statistical analyses are based on the factors that the literature argues have an effect on individual professionalisation and political party gatekeeper function.

Thus, the analysis includes the main sociodemographic indicators that are usually linked with the study of individual professionalisation and the study of elite characteristics. Namely, it uses gender, age of the candidate, level of studies and profession. The article controls by gender due to the historical monopolisation of national politics in Western Democracies (Verge and Astudillo, 2019). In that sense, the expectation is that due to the power and desirability of the national positions (Astudillo and Martínez-Cantó, 2019) women will have lower probabilities of being professionalised. The level of studies is another important variable of the homogenisation of the political elite due to the common trend in national politics to increase the education level of politicians in the last decade (Trinconi and Vierzichelli, 2007). In that sense, because of political parties' interest in well-educated candidates, due to their technical skills, professionalised politicians should be higher educated. In terms of profession, the article focuses on the professions because

⁴⁶ The investigation admits that despite the fact that micro-states are sovereign states not all of them have the same level of capacities.

as the literature underlined (Oñate, 2010; Cotta and Best, 2007; Borchert and Zeiss, 2003), a predominance of professional backgrounds between the political elite, civil servants and professors, exists.

In addition, the analysis includes legislative professionalisation as an institutional indicator that, as the literature pointed out, could have an effect. As Squire and Moncrief (2019) argued, the development of legislative professionalisation facilitates individual professionalisation. To measure the level of legislative professionalisation the Squire Revised Index (Squire, 2007) is used. This index includes three main indicators: the salary of the parliamentarians, the staff of the parliament and the sitting days of the parliament. In that sense, due to the lack of information concerning the particular staff that each of the micro-states parliaments had, the article uses the alternative measure that Squire (2007) defined, the parliament budget. In contrast to Squire's investigation, in this case, and because we are comparing different national states; the article does not establish a parliament as a benchmark to calculate the index and it standardised each of the components of the index. In sum, legislative professionalisation is calculated by summing each of the standardised components and then divided by three.

Finally, the analysis includes some control variables related to countries' characteristics. The article includes the age of the democracy, calculated following the instructions used by Boix, Mill and Rosato (2012).⁴⁷ In that sense, the age of the democracy also influences political party gatekeeper function. As Palanza, Scartascini and Tomassi (2016) argued, political party institutionalisation increases with the age of the democracy. Therefore, the article has to control by age of democracy as an influent variable in the gatekeeper function, considering that parties with a higher level of institutionalisation have greater control of political recruitment. Finally, the article includes an economic variable like the annual growth of the national GDP (Soós, 2016; Rasmussen and Henrik, 2017).

⁴⁷ Boix, Mill and Rosato (2012) determined the condition of a democracy based on two conditions. First, a country must have free and fair elections for the legislature. Second, the country must allow at least half the male population to vote.

3.5 Results and the Empirical Analysis

a) *Is country size a determinant? Individual and legislative professionalisation of European micro-states and Germany.*

As the first way of assessing the effect of country size on politicians' professionalisation, the article gives a comparative overview of the main political traits of the European micro-states with our macro-state, Germany. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 use the original database of the article and the units are the countries.

Table 3.1. Descriptive data of the article's dependent variables.

	Micro-states	Germany	Diff. Sig
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	17,1	37,1	t=39.21, p=0.0000
Age first Public Office [absolute number]	39,1	36,8	t= -9.67, p=0.0000
Previous Party Experience [%]	36,60	77,39	t=35.98, p=0.0000

*Except for Age first public office- with equal variances-, the differences have been calculated with Welch's t-test due to their unequal variances.

Table 3.1 shows that there are important and significant differences between Germany and the European micro-states in relation to our dependent variables, the previous party experience, the age of the politician at first public office and individual professionalisation index. Politicians in micro-states occupied their first public office when they were 39 years on average, while in Germany politicians had access three years before, on average. Apart from that, the individual professionalisation index demonstrated how, in Germany, politicians have more than doubled the politicians' professionalisation degree than in the micro-states. Finally, the table describes the existing differences in terms of party service. In European micro-states, only 36.60% of parliamentarians had previous party experience, while 77.39% of Bundestag parliamentarians registered previous experience in their extra-parliamentarian organisation. This confirms Corbett and Veenendaal's (2018) argument about how the existence of lower institutionalised political parties and the political characteristics of micro-states clearly have repercussions on the party service results.

In line with such differences, Table 3.2 shows how, in terms of legislative professionalisation and its components – salary, parliament budget and sessions, there are substantial and significant differences too. Precisely, it can be underlined how, in general terms, micro-states register lower results in all components – salary, parliament budget, sessions. For example, in terms of salary, the mean annual salary of micro-states was 34.994,45 (PPP \$), while in Germany, the mean salary was 96.603,8 (PPP \$). In terms of the sessions in parliament, micro-states registered 47 sessions annually compared to 62 sessions in Germany. Finally, the parliament’s annual budget mean for micro-states was 6.617,331 (PPP\$), while in Germany, the mean was 775.337.316 (PPP\$).

Table 3.2. Descriptive data of the article’s independent variables.

	Micro-states	Germany	Diff. Sig
Population [absolute number]	178.661	81.745.656	t=7.9e+03, p=0.0000
Government Size [%]	18,2	19,4	t=14.43, p=0.0000
Legislative professionalisation* [mean index]	-0,0021	1,2052	t=75.01, p=0.0000
Annual Salary [mean]	34.994	96.604	t= -4.01, p=0.0002
Parliament Budget [mean]	66.173.331	775.337.316	t= -10.52, p=0.0000
Sessions [mean]	47	62	t= -2.28, p=0.0272

*The differences have been calculated with Welch’s t-test due to their unequal variances.

*Due to the legislative professionalisation proxy is standardized by calculating the standard deviation above the mean of the article cases, the legislative professionalisation proxy of micro-states in articles 1 and 2 changes.

However, despite such political professionalisation differences between the micro-states and Germany, Table 2 shows that there was also a lesser, but significant, difference in terms of government size. While the micro-states registered 17,19% of general government consumption expenditure in per cent of the GDP, Germany spent 19,37% of GDP. Therefore, government size seems to also have an effect on party service and professionalisation characteristics. This is also a covariation between legislative and individual professionalisation. Consequently, there is a covariation between all independent and dependent variables, so it is not possible to know which variable matters. Thus, it is necessary to introduce controls in a quantitative analysis to unravel the influence of such variables.

b) *Statistical analysis: the effect of country size on politicians' professionalisation.*

In the following statistical analysis, in the first and second parts, our units of analysis, or observations, are the parliamentarians elected in each general election in our six micro-states and Germany. Given that the article treats each time an individual is elected as a parliamentarian as a 'separate observation', and the same individual may be elected several times as a representative, the article has estimated a series of random effects panel regression models. In these panel models, the standard errors of estimates are corrected to consider repeated observations for each individual across legislative terms. In the first analysis, the dependent variables are the age of politicians when they accessed their first public office and the individual professionalisation index. The second analysis is divided into two parts, first the dependent variable is the previous party experience, and in the second part, the dependent variable is again the indicators of individual professionalisation proxies.

The effect of country size on politicians' professionalisation

The article has built four models where it tested the effect of country size on two dependent variables: the age when the politician accessed parliament for the first time and the index of politicians' professionalisation, or INPI. The article uses the micro-state condition and the population to capture the effect of country size on individual professionalisation.

The results of our models in Table 3.3 – Germany and micro-state comparison and Table 3.4 – within micro-state analysis, indicate how country size is always a determinant of having a higher degree of individual political professionalisation (*hypotheses 1a and 1b*). Table 3 highlights how the micro-state condition is a negative determinant for politicians' professionalisation. On the one hand, micro-state conditions negatively influence the age of the politician when accessing the first public office. As Figure 3.1 shows, the country size clearly affects the age of the politician on holding the first public office. While in Germany, a politician held the first public office when he/she was 37,38 years old, in micro-states, the mean was 43,18 years old.


Table 3.3. Determinants of Politicians' Professionalisation.

	(1) Age First Office	(2) INPI
Micro-state	5.803*** (0.904)	-23.52*** (2.593)
Government Size	-0.0932* (0.0377)	0.0872 (0.157)
Women	-0.0250 (0.332)	-1.586 (0.978)
Elementary Education	Ref.Category	Ref.Category
Vocational Training	-1.785 (0.986)	4.669 (3.328)
University Studies	-3.502*** (1.011)	9.268** (3.372)
PhD	-2.560* (1.059)	6.341 (3.515)
Lawyers and Jurists	Ref.Category	Ref.Category
Managers	-0.253 (0.499)	1.466 (1.609)
Civil Servants	1.159* (0.585)	-1.772 (1.924)
Teachers/Professors	1.960*** (0.465)	-2.260 (1.438)
Engineers/Archt./Chemists/Mathematicians	4.251*** (0.583)	-9.336*** (1.752)
Liberal Professions	1.084* (0.454)	-2.342 (1.447)
Administratives	-4.437*** (1.215)	13.58*** (3.946)
Working Class	0.830 (0.598)	0.506 (1.937)
Health Services	3.772*** (0.613)	-7.766*** (1.953)
Traders/Merchants/Bankers	-1.959** (0.683)	12.49*** (2.284)
Others	0.0801 (0.454)	0.0870 (1.400)
Age politician	0.0984*** (0.00567)	1.367*** (0.0224)
Age democracy	-0.0118*** (0.00279)	0.120*** (0.0113)
Growth GDP	0.00379 (0.00913)	-0.122** (0.0379)
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes
_cons	37.32*** (1.296)	-43.59*** (4.681)
<i>N</i>	6888	6886

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 3.1. Predictive Marginal effect on Age First Public Office.



On the other hand, the micro-state condition exerted a negative influence on the individual professionalisation index. Precisely, model 2 (Table 3.3) and Figure 3.2 demonstrate how the micro-state condition subtracted 23.52 points on the individual professionalisation index in comparison with Germany. Furthermore, the statistical models of Table 3.4 highlight how even within micro-states, the population had the same negative effect on both individual professionalisation proxies. Accurately, the larger the population of a micro-state, the younger the politician on holding their first public office. Moreover, the larger the population of the micro-state, the higher the individual professionalisation index.

Interestingly, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 reveal a non-significant effect of government size on three out of four of the models. Thus, these results highlight that government size seems not to be a determinant for individual professionalisation. In other words, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 point out the significant effect of country size on politicians' professionalisation in all models and reveals a non-effect of government size. Therefore, the article contributes to

the literature unravelling the concrete effect of country size and competencies in relation to individual professionalisation.


Table 3.4. Determinants of Politicians' Professionalisation within Micro-states.

	(3) Age First Office	(4) INPI
(Log) Population	-11.83*** (2.115)	11.59* (5.068)
Government Size	-0.134 (0.0711)	0.216 (0.194)
Women	0.377 (0.607)	-2.125 (1.343)
Elementary Education	Ref.Category	Ref.Category
Vocational Training	-2.197 (1.353)	5.621 (3.198)
University Studies	-2.081 (1.344)	5.066 (3.138)
PhD	-1.653 (1.504)	3.465 (3.520)
Lawyers and Jurists	Ref.Category	Ref.Category
Managers	1.094 (0.795)	-0.363 (1.835)
Civil Servants	0.219 (0.965)	3.379 (2.289)
Teachers/Professors	1.861* (0.824)	-1.696 (1.892)
Engineers/Archts./Chemists/Mathematicians	0.259 (1.063)	1.255 (2.395)
Liberal Professions	1.790* (0.782)	-2.662 (1.835)
Administratives	-2.795 (1.645)	9.990** (3.785)
Working Class	1.538 (1.109)	-1.282 (2.695)
Health Services	2.075* (0.895)	-1.989 (2.057)
Traders/Merchants/Bankers	-1.713 (1.114)	12.62*** (2.658)
Others	0.883 (0.883)	0.463 (2.073)
Age Politician	0.337*** (0.0194)	0.712*** (0.0454)
Age Democracy	0.0119* (0.00477)	0.00166 (0.0126)
Growth GDP	-0.0847** (0.0258)	0.214** (0.0699)
Micro-states dummies	Yes	Yes
_cons	163.9*** (22.77)	-165.8** (54.61)
<i>N</i>	1630	1629

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 3.2. Predictive Marginal effect on Individual professionalisation index.



In addition, the models of Table 3.3 and 3.4 reveal that there are other systemic and individual characteristics as determinants for the professionalisation of politicians. In the first place, both models confirm the positive effect of politician age on individual professionalisation. Precisely, the effect of age on the age when the politician has the first public office defines how there is a possible cohort effect in one of the two models (model 1, Table 3.3). In other words, new MPs that have access now to the parliament, are selected at a younger age than older MPs. Moreover, Table 3.3 underlines how university studies have a positive effect on the degree of individual professionalisation. Thus, the analysis confirms the homogenisation of the political elite increasing the education of politicians (Trinconi and Vierzichelli, 2007). Apart from that, Table 3.3 indicates how some professions facilitate having a higher degree of professionalisation. In fact, the models of Table 3.3 appoint how being a trader or banker are the professions that mostly facilitate entering the first public office at a younger age, and have a higher degree on the index of individual professionalisation.

Finally, the models of Table 3.3 show that the age of the democracy is a determinant for individual professionalisation. The age of a democracy has a positive effect on individual professionalisation proxies. On the one hand, the higher the age of the democracy, the

earlier their politicians have access to the first public office. On the other hand, the results of the professionalisation index manifest how the older the democracy, the higher the degree of individual professionalisation. Interestingly, the analysis of the variance of micro-states (Table 3.4) indicates how, in the case of age of the democracy, the influence is not as robust as in Table 3.3. The results indicate how the age of the democracy is only significant in one out of two models, in comparison with the significance of the growth in the GDP of the country in both models. In that case, such an explanatory variable has the same influence on each of the professionalisation proxies, therefore, the more growth in the country's GDP, the higher the degree of professionalisation.

The effect of country size on politicians' professionalisation through political parties' gatekeeper role

The article now sees the effect that country size has on politicians' professionalisation through political parties' gatekeeper role building three additional models. The article starts analysing the effect of country size on the previous party experience of parliamentarians. Later, the second analysis tests the effect of previous party experience on politicians' professionalisation proxies: the age when the politician first accesses parliament and the index of politicians' professionalisation, or INPI. The article uses the micro-state condition to capture the effect of country size on individual professionalisation.⁴⁸

The first analysis demonstrates (Table 3.5) the negative effect of the micro-state condition on the political gatekeeper role of political parties. The statistical model reveals how being a micro-state reduces the probability that MPs have partisan experience. In this way, it follows that, in micro-states, political parties select more outsiders probably with vote-drawing ability and a supra-partisan public image (Samuel and Shugart, 2010). This confirms the previous conclusion that country size has an effect on party service. Moreover, as previously stated, Germany may produce this effect, not because of its size but for another unknown factor, thus, the article replicates the analysis within European micro-states (See Appendix A). The results underline the robust effect of size on the political gatekeeper role of political parties.

⁴⁸ The article runs a model, included in the Appendix, in which it analyses the effect of previous party experience on politicians' professionalisation proxies within micro-states.

Table 3.5. Determinants of Previous Party Experience.

	(5) Previous Party Experience
Micro-state	-16.14*** (0.989)
Government Size	-0.0244 (0.104)
Women	-0.186 (0.325)
Age Politician	0.244*** (0.0138)
Elementary Education	Ref.Category
Vocational Training	0.688 (1.411)
University studies	1.395 (1.443)
PhD	0.342 (1.486)
Lawyers and Jurists	Ref.Category
Managers	1.738** (0.615)
Civil Servants	-0.566 (0.700)
Teacher/Professor	-1.183* (0.493)
Engineers/Archt./Chemists/mathematician	-1.314* (0.593)
Liberal professions	-0.661 (0.507)
Administratives	-0.742 (1.636)
Working Class	-0.488 (0.661)
Health Services	-4.483*** (0.944)
Traders/Merchants/Bankers	0.296 (0.855)
Others	-0.627 (0.470)
Age democracy	0.0642*** (0.00750)
Growth GDP	-0.192*** (0.0265)
Country dummies	Yes
_cons	-4.212 (2.588)
/	
Insig2u	4.848*** (0.0687)
N	6940

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The statistical model highlights how even within micro-states, a larger population increases the probability that a politician has partisan experience. Hence, the results

validate our second hypothesis, as well as the micro-state literature's hypothesis, which appointed that country size will produce a positive effect on the control of access to political positions. In this way, the lower standards of party institutionalisation of micro-states (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018) and the personalistic character of its politics, make that political recruitment of micro-state's politicians be not based exclusively on the previous experience of their candidates.

In addition, Table 3.5 reveals that there are other individual and systemic characteristics as determinants for having greater experience in the extra-parliamentarian organisation of political parties. Regarding individual characteristics, the model appoints that the age of the politician, and their profession, are explanatory factors for having experience in the party. In fact, in relation to politicians' professions, the model reveals how being a manager is the profession that most facilitates having previous experience in political parties' extra-parliamentarian organisations. In terms of the age of the candidate, the model of Table 3.5 indicates how being older facilitates the probability of having previous experience in a political party. The logic behind such a result appoints a problem of the cost of opportunity. The cost of opportunity of a well-established professional, normally in older age, is higher than those persons who start their professional career. For that reason, older politicians who are present in the legislature have greater interests in being in the parliament, therefore, they are highly interested in demonstrating their reliability to a political party. Briefly, older politicians are more concerned to demonstrate their reliability in the *ex ante* and *ex post* control of political parties. Finally, as the literature argued (Mainwaring, 1998; Basedau and Stroh, 2008), the analysis also underlines how the age of the democracy is a relevant factor to allow political parties control the political recruitment process.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ I conducted another model including electoral system as a control variable, but there was no influence.

Table 3.6. Determinants of Politicians Professionalisation.

	(6) Age First Office	(7) INPI
Previous Party Experience	-1.201*** (0.124)	8.579*** (0.514)
Legislative Professionalisation	-1.510*** (0.124)	5.569*** (0.477)
Women	0.179 (0.327)	-2.306* (0.976)
Elementary Education	Ref.Category	Ref.Category
Vocational Training	-1.969* (0.940)	5.060 (3.297)
University Studies	-3.492*** (0.971)	8.598* (3.353)
PhD	-2.806** (1.031)	6.845 (3.514)
Lawyers and Jurists	Ref.Category	Ref.Category
Managers	-0.132 (0.491)	0.446 (1.623)
Civil Servants	1.040 (0.575)	-1.521 (1.932)
Teachers/Professors	1.682*** (0.462)	-0.713 (1.454)
Engineers/Archts./Chemists/Mathematicians	3.996*** (0.580)	-8.536*** (1.767)
Liberal Professions	1.325** (0.449)	-3.036* (1.458)
Administratives	-4.422*** (1.208)	13.93*** (4.078)
Working Class	0.610 (0.612)	1.707 (2.000)
Health Services	3.321*** (0.652)	-5.459** (2.094)
Traders/Merchants/Bankers	-2.020** (0.708)	12.99*** (2.392)
Others	0.117 (0.449)	-0.0718 (1.403)
Age Politician	0.190*** (0.00883)	1.077*** (0.0310)
Age Democracy	-0.0284*** (0.00449)	0.139*** (0.0179)
Growth GDP	0.00188 (0.00837)	-0.0296 (0.0366)
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes
_cons	36.67*** (1.390)	-50.92*** (4.506)
<i>N</i>	6479	6477


Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

After determining that the micro-state condition hinders the selection of candidates with previous party experience, Table 3.6 tests if having previous experience in political parties' extra-parliamentarian organisations affects the process of politicians'


professionalisation. The results of our models in Table 3.6 indicate how previous experience in a political party is always a positive determinant to having a higher degree of individual political professionalisation. The results reaffirm the argument of McAllister (1997) and Samuels and Shugart (2013) concerning the relevance of the partisan component in the professionalisation process. In fact, as the models in Table 3.6 determined, parliamentarians who register previous experience in their political parties, had access to the parliament for the first time when they were younger (Figure 3.3). Thus, the models confirm that even with the individualistic character of micro-states that are included in the analysis, and their lower parties' institutionalisation (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018), partisan experience facilitates politicians' professionalisation. Therefore, despite the micro-states' particular characteristics, political parties in micro-states are still applying previous experience as a determinant for candidate selection. In other words, as Panebianco (1990) argued, such political parties are interested in a professional-bureaucracy structure. In fact, as shown in Figure 4, the parliamentarians that have no previous experience in the extra-parliamentarian organisation of their political party registered more than eight points of difference with those that had previous experience in their political parties. In other words, such results underline how party service becomes a springboard to get to public offices faster and have more time in parliament.

Figure 3.3. Predictive Marginal effect on Age First Public Office.



In addition, the models of Table 3.6, as with Table 3.3, reveal that there are other systemic and individual characteristics as determinants for the professionalisation of politicians. In first place, both models confirm the positive effect that literature determines about legislative professionalisation. The professionalisation of the institution facilitates the development of higher individual professionalisation (Squire and Moncrief, 2019). Apart from that, and in relation to the individual characteristics that facilitate professionalisation, the models of Table 3.6 reinforce the effect of most of the variables described in Table 3.3. Despite this, Table 3.6 pointed out how gender had a negative effect on the professionalisation index. Even with such a difference, Table 3.6 underlines how university studies and being an administrator, trader or banker still facilitated having a degree of individual professionalisation. Additionally, the models of this table revealed that the age of the politician had a significant and positive effect on individual professionalisation proxies. Finally, it was shown that the age of the democracy remains significant and had a positive effect on the degree of individual professionalisation.

Figure 3.4. Predictive Marginal effect on Individual professionalisation index.



3.6 Conclusions

This paper addressed the debate concerning the role of country size on politicians' professionalisation and one of the most cited causal mechanisms: the role of political parties. Politicians' professionalisation is a characteristic of contemporary political systems, whose consequences and justifications are highly debated in the media and academia, although the topic remains under-examined in smaller polity units.

First, the academic literature suggests how the enlargement of the population but also the acquisition of new state competencies, made contemporary political units request higher qualified policymakers with a full-time dedication (Saafeld, 1997; Samuels and Shugart, 2010). Therefore, the article evaluates if either country size or government are the causal factors of individual professionalisation. Precisely, the article analyses if once it is controlled by the government size, country size is a determinant for the individual professionalisation proxies: the age of politicians when they get access to the first public office and the individual professionalisation index.

Hence, the first analysis underlines how the micro-state condition has a negative effect on individual professionalisation. Secondly, and after controlling by government size, the analysis shows that the country size affects even if the article focuses just on European micro-states. The larger the population of a micro-state, the younger the age when a politician has access to public office. In addition, larger micro-states have a higher degree of individual professionalisation. Thus, the analysis shows how country size, and not government size, is a determinant for individual professionalisation.

Later, the article assesses the reason explaining the influence of country size on the individual professionalisation process. In this sense, the article analyses the effect of country size on the political parties' role as a gatekeeper. The literature has well-established that political ambition, institutional structure and political parties are determinants for politicians' professionalisation in large democracies. In small units, the role of political parties is still debated and under-studied (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018). Consequently, the article tests if, due to the country size characteristics of the European micro-states, their political parties still maintain their role as a political gatekeeper. The analysis reveals that, effectively, the size matters when it is referred to monopolise the

political recruitment process and apply an *ex ante* control of candidates' reliability by political parties.

Afterward, the article analyses if, even though political parties in micro-states have a lower capacity to monopolise public offices, they are still a politicians' professionalisation determinant. The results of our models indicate how previous experience in a political party is always a positive determinant to having higher standards of individual political professionalisation. In that sense, these results confirm the literature hypothesis that political parties are a determinant for politicians' professionalisation in both large-scale and small-scale democracies. Thus, the article contributes to the micro-states' literature answering the question introduced by Corbett and Veenendaal (2018), in which it is debated how size affects parties' function with regard to the recruitment and nomination of candidates. In sum, the article not only helps to unravel the covariation between country size and competencies in relation to individual professionalisation, but it describes the causal mechanism of population size in politicians' professionalisation.

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Appendix A.

Table A.5b. Determinants of Previous Party Experience within Micro-states

	(5b) Previous Party Experience
(Log)Population	14.11*** (4.051)
Government size	-0.0563 (0.117)
Women	-0.317 (1.648)
Age Politician	0.117** (0.0365)
Elementary Education	Ref.Category
Vocational Training	-2.981 (2.320)
University Studies	-3.483 (2.367)
PhD	-4.184 (2.868)
Lawyers and Jurists	Ref.Category
Managers	0.913 (1.340)
Civil Servants	-0.315 (1.583)
Teacher/Professor	-2.590 (1.552)
Engineers/Archit./Chemists/Mathematician	-0.0260 (1.578)
Liberal professions	-1.409 (1.421)
Administratives	-2.762 (2.659)
Working Class	-2.982 (1.774)
Health Services	-3.371 (1.780)
Traders/Merchants/Bankers	-1.828 (1.693)
Others	-1.032 (1.434)
Age Democracy	0.0364*** (0.00901)
Growth GDP	-0.0332 (0.0452)
Micro-state dummies	Yes
_cons	-166.9*** (44.20)
/	
Insig2u	5.389*** (0.161)
N	1686

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

4. Are they one of us? The effect of political professionalisation on the political elite's social closure and principal-agent problems.

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of political professionalisation on descriptive representation and the principal-agent problems in the European micro-states and six large-scale democracies since 1980. In doing so, the study revisits an ongoing debate about the consequences of having a professionalised political elite. Using an original data set consisting of the individual and legislative professionalisation characteristics of 12 European sovereign states and the aggregate socio-demographic characteristics of parliamentarians in national parliaments, the study shows that while legislative professionalisation is a determinant for descriptive representation, the professionalisation of politicians is a negative determinant for political responsiveness and accountability. Moreover, the study underlines population size as a determinant for the descriptive representation of certain socio-demographic characteristics or occupations, and describes the null effect of population size on the negative causal relationship of politician professionalisation on political responsiveness and accountability.

4.1 Introduction

Contemporary politics are characterised by the implementation of representative democracy in large-scale polities, in which holding public office has been increasingly professionalised (Borchert, 2000). Therefore, in contemporary politics, representation and political professionalisation has become core to politics. In fact, the corollary of the representative government has been, since at least the beginning of the 20th century, the so-called professionalisation of politics. Accordingly, political scientists have been worried about the consequences of political professionalisation on the quality and legitimacy of democratic representation and institutions (Berry, et al., 2000; Best & Vogel, 2018; Borchert, 2008; Pitkin 1967). In other words, scholars have been largely engaged in a debate as to whether professionalised parliaments and politicians improve the legitimacy and quality of democracy. However, as underlined by O’Grady (2019), the professionalisation of politics may be a two-edged sword. The literature generally attributes positive consequences to legislative professionalisation. Scholars associate institutional professionalisation with more responsive policies (Maestas, 2000) and increased diversity among legislators, making the legislatures demographically resemble those they are supposed to represent. In contrast, some literature attributes negative consequences for democracy as a result of politicians professionalisation. Scholars have underlined the idea that professional politicians are primarily interested in re-selection (Fiorina, 1994), due to their objective of safeguarding their political position and establishing a long political career (Best and Vogel, 2018).

Consequently, the common wisdom underlined by contemporary political scientists suggests that the causes of agency problems and the presence of social closure of the political elites in sovereign states is because of political professionalisation. However, scholars that have studied the micro-state found that small-scale democracies’ political characteristics can have positive and negative effects in terms of the isolation of the political as well as responsiveness and accountability (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). In this vein, the literature argues that small-scale politics should be more descriptive, or mirror representation as a contemporary case of direct democracy (Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008). In addition, some scholars emphasise the point that what explains that small polities boost legitimacy by encouraging policymakers to be more responsive and accountable to the needs of citizens are the smallness and social proximity characteristics (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018; Dimond & Tsolik, 1999; Philips, 1995). Hence, there is a

gap in the literature with regard to determining the explicative variable of the existence of agency problems and the social closure of the political elite. As a result, it is necessary to revisit the influence of population size and political professionalisation – institutional and individual – in terms of the disconnection of government action with the interests of citizens and the monopolization process of political positions by a political elite.

Therefore, this study seeks to increase the general knowledge of the consequences of political professionalisation of states by empirically disentangling the consequences of political professionalisation from population size characteristics. Consequently, the study compares six European micro-states, usually understood as sovereign states with less than 500,000 citizens (Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015), with their most similar European macro-states (Skocpol & Somers, 1997). In doing so, the study analyses to what extent population size characteristics may modulate the consequences of professionalisation on descriptive representation and the existence of agency problems. In this way, the study contributes to the academic literature by clarifying the consequences of the professionalisation of politics, both individual and legislative.

The study first reviews arguments offered by the literature regarding the tension between democratic representation and the professionalisation of politics. Subsequently, it discusses the theoretical puzzle of how population size characteristics can affect the existence of agency problems and social closure. Next, the study offers hypotheses, the characteristics of the database, and the operationalisation of variables and indicators. Finally, the study undertakes a statistical analysis to test the effect of political professionalisation and population size on descriptive representation, along with political responsiveness and accountability.

4.2 The vicious circle of politics: the tension between descriptive and substantive representation and the professionalisation of politics

After the establishment of nation states and the progressive growth of population in the world's polities, representative democracy became the solution for implementing democracy in large-scale states. In this way, the concept of representation became core to contemporary politics.

Yet, as Pitkin (1967) argued, the concept of representation is a multi-dimensional concept in which democratically elected representatives do not only have to speak, advocate, and act on behalf of others in the political arena, but they also have to accomplish four concrete dimensions. First, the representatives must be authorised to act by the citizens. Second, politicians should be accepted by citizens. Later, Pitkin points out the necessity of a resemblance between the socio-demographic characteristics of the principals and the agents. Finally, it is necessary that the citizens have the means to hold their representatives accountable for their actions, and the author evaluates if such actions are taken on behalf of citizens' interests (Pitkin, 1967).

Even so, Arendt (1965) pointed out how representative democracies, after a process of institutionalisation, suffered an oligarchisation process in which citizens' representatives act not as agents of the people, but of themselves (Pitkin, 2004, p. 39). As scholars such as Borchert (2000) have argued, such a process is related to another characteristic transition that contemporary politics suffered: the process of professionalisation of politics.

First, the change of locus from communes to the nation state was characterised by population enlargement of political units, which saw the growth of public services provided by the state as a reaction to the new economic needs of citizens and the incorporation of new social rights (Marshall, 1950). Consequently, these new social functions of the modern state, and the demands of a rapidly growing public sector to satisfy the requests of populations, modified the way in which public offices were exercised (Carreras, 2017; Grissom & Harrington, 2013). In other words, contemporary states requested more staff and qualified policymakers with a full-time dedication (Saafeld, 1997; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Moreover, legislation, with the aim of increasing politicians' effectiveness as policymakers, equipped political institutions with better resources (Maestas, 2000; Rosenthal, 1996; Squire, 1992). Consequently, public offices and their representatives became professionalised. Thus, while politicians became better paid, were engaged full-time as political representatives, and established a political career, the resources of public offices were increased so that they would have greater legislative and executive engagement with the policy process, thus enhancing the ability of politicians to increase their effectiveness.

However, as underlined by O’Grady (2019), the professionalisation of politics may be a two-edged sword. In fact, as Figure 4.1 summarises, the literature has argued different effects on descriptive and substantive representation⁵⁰, depending on the dimension of political professionalisation.

Figure 4.1. Theoretical expectations of Political professionalisation’s effect on descriptive and substantive representation.

	Descriptive representation	Substantive representation
Legislative professionalisation	Positive effect. It will help the descriptive representation of certain historically marginalized social groups	Positive effect. Legislative professionalism should help politicians to be more efficient.
Politicians professionalisation	Unclear effect. Literature defines the relationship between social closure and political professionalisation but it has not established the causal relation.	Negative effect. Individual professionalism should increase politicians’ autonomy from citizens and made them less public-minded.

Data Source: Based on Pitkin (1967) definition of substantive and descriptive representation.

On the one hand, scholars associate legislative professionalisation⁵¹ with higher expertise in the policy process, and also with more responsive policies (Maestas, 2000). In other words, having a more professionalised legislative institution permits it to spend more time on legislative activities (Boehmke & Shipan, 2015), attracts better-qualified members, creates greater capacity for deliberation, and facilitates the implementation of long-term policies (Squire & Moncrief, 2019). In addition, proponents of this type of professionalisation also thought it would increase diversity among legislators, and cause the legislatures to demographically resemble those they are supposed to represent. Better paid legislatures should attract, for example, more women and citizens from the lower classes (Bell & Prince 1980). However, others scholars disagree. Diamond (1977) and

⁵⁰ As Pitkin (1967) defined, descriptive representation is defined by the extent to which a representative resembles those being represented. Whereas, substantive representation refers to the activity of representatives. Precisely, if the actions taken by representatives are on behalf of or on the interest of the citizens.

⁵¹ When focussing exclusively on the professionalisation of legislatures, both at the national and subnational level, scholars use the term ‘legislative professionalisation’ (Mooney, 1995). As the analysis in this study focusses on the professionalisation of parliaments, and not on other state institutions, the study uses the term ‘legislative professionalisation’.

Carroll (1985), for example, found that men tended to be overrepresented in better-paid and higher-status legislatures. Rosenthal (1996) even suggested that legislative professionalisation reduced occupational diversity. The study by Squire (1992) of the effects of professionalisation of US state legislatures found mixed results. Higher levels of legislative professionalisation were found to be positively related to the percentage of minorities in the legislatures, but negatively related to the proportion of women serving. Finally, occupational diversity also decreased as the level of professionalisation increased.

On the other hand, as Berry et al. (2000) determined, politicians professionalisation has an effect on descriptive representation. In fact, before the introduction of a salary that let politicians live off politics, the political realm was exclusively occupied by those who could reconcile politics with their regular occupation; in short, the higher strata of society. Hence, the implementation of a full-time regime for politicians, with its attendant salary, seems to help the incorporation of different socio-economic groups into politics. However, despite these effects of political professionalisation, the literature highlights how it gives an incumbency advantage to the professionalised politicians (Carey et al., 2000; Cox & Morgenstein, 1995; King 1991), and could reduce the positive effect of living off politics. In particular, as certain scholars have argued (Berry et al., 2000; Moncrief, 1999) political professionalisation provides some advantages of monopolising public positions, thus working against descriptive representation. In the first place, full-time politicians gain an electoral advantage thanks to their higher visibility and name recognition. In addition, political professionalisation lets politicians have the capacity to reduce electoral uncertainty, by buffering the influence of external political determinants and the effect of national economic conditions (Berry et al., 2000, p. 14).

Furthermore, as Borchert (2000) himself argued, politicians professionalisation at the same time created an inherent conflict with substantive representation. Specifically, the author sustains that politicians professionalisation affects two of the basic characteristics of democratic representation: political responsiveness—the capacity of governments to execute policies that correspond to society's demands (Plescia et al., 2019), and political accountability—the ability of constituents to sanction their representative for failing to act in accordance with their wishes or demands (Pitkin, 1967). Actually, while the typical pattern of professionalism is the intention to limit career uncertainty in order to maintain political positions, representative democracy, as Przeworski (1991, p. 12) underlined, seeks to institutionalise electoral uncertainty to let citizens have the capacity to apply an

ex-post control of their representatives. Consequently, the political professionalisation process entails the existence of agency problems and the closure process of the political elite (Pitkin, 1967).

As Borchert (2011) emphasises, a professional politician does not differ markedly from a practitioner in any other distinguished profession; they want to stay in, or rise to, higher positions. The ambition of the politician is a key variable in understanding the individual professionalisation process and the desire to control career uncertainty (Borchert, 2008). In fact, while legislative professionalisation defined the availability, accessibility, and attractiveness of the political career, politicians' self-interest in developing a political career becomes the key to understanding their interest in controlling career uncertainty⁵² (Borchert, 2008; Lawless, 2012; Schlesinger, 1966; Thompson & Moncrief, 1992). Consequently, professional politicians are primarily interested in re-selection (Fiorina, 1994), due to their objective of safeguarding their political position and establishing a long political career (Best & Vogel, 2018, p. 354)⁵³. With regard to such characteristics, literature attributes negative consequences to politicians professionalisation. As Allen (2013) has pointed out, as a result of politicians' interest in safeguarding their political position and establishing a long political career (Best & Vogel, 2018) the prominence of professional politicians may lead to reduced public engagement with democracy.

Finally, the new democratic nation states were also characterised by the implementation of the representative government through the intermediation of political parties. As a result, politicians, at least in Western European politics, are subject to not only the interests of citizens, but those of political parties, too (O'Grady, 2019). Therefore, as the literature highlights, political parties, because of their monopoly of the political recruitment process, become essential for the development of politicians careers (Samuels & Shugart, 2013). In this way, professional politicians' paths to political offices are not only subject to citizens' preferences, but they are instinctively subject to party preferences, too (O'Grady, 2019, p. 549). Thus, due to the characteristic process of political recruitment, monopolised by political parties (McAllister 1997, Samuels &

⁵² As Borchert (2000, p. 8) determined, politicians' self-interest is defined by a reliable source of income, a realistic chance of maintaining their jobs (reselection), and the chance of a political career.

⁵³ Hence, political professionalisation, due to the above-mentioned characteristics, changes politicians' objectives, and becomes more office-seeking and vote-seeking than policy-seeking (Strom, 1990).

Shugart, 2013; Yardimci-Geykçi, 2015), the social closure of the political elite and agency problems are affected by political parties and their recruitment criteria, too. Actually, although the parties were created as an instrument of representation, these political actors underwent a transformation whereby the maintenance of the organisation became the intrinsic goal of the political party (Downs, 1957; Schlesinger, 1994; Strom & Müller, 1999). In other words, due to the process of the institutionalisation of the organisation (Panebianco, 1990), political parties acquired value in themselves (Selznick, 1956), and these organisations were no longer just an instrument for the (re)selection of the candidate. In fact, political parties evolved coordinated strategies (Scharpf, 1997) to preserve their power and maintain the institution (Panebianco, 1990). In this regard, and because of the voluntary character of political parties, the strategy of such actors has been to offer highly qualified politicians an opportunity to be involved in their organisation, and thus the chance to occupy a remunerated public position and to establish a political career.

In this way, politicians become the agents of an extra-parliamentary organisation. Thus, politicians are not only representing and servicing citizens, but they are working and representing political parties, too (Maravall, 2003). In fact, even though professionalised politicians' interests can encourage good representation, in order to fulfil their objective of being re-elected, the monopolisation of the political recruitment by political parties, and their goal of maintaining political power, favour the existence of agency problems. As the literature on cartel parties argues (Katz and Mair, 1995), the condition of political parties as necessary actors in a representative democracy, and the lack of real competition between them⁵⁴, minimises the uncertainty of the de-selection of such actors with regard to the distribution of seats in parliament. Therefore, the security of political parties, derived from their monopolisation of political representation, means that they do not need to cover all the citizens' interests, and they can still be represented in parliaments. Consequently, politicians who want to have access to public positions are not only controlled by citizens but by political parties. Hence, political parties use their status as political gatekeepers to create controls to test politicians' 'reliability' (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). As a result, aspiring to certain political positions involves demonstrating skills

⁵⁴ Katz and Mair (1995) suggest that due to the political parties' goal of maintaining their power, such organisations act as if they are competing with each other in elections, but this does not actually happen in order to ensure their presence in public institutions.

required for particular tasks and loyalty to the political party (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). In other words, political parties, in their search for suitable candidates, base the political recruitment selection on the political and partisan experience of the candidate. That is, ambitious candidates who aspire to top political positions have had to hold various positions of increasing responsibility and authority in public administration and within a party to ensure their reliability and to demonstrate their qualities (Astudillo and Martínez-Cantó, 2019:3). Therefore, candidates are aware of the need to be loyal to their political party. Indeed, they understand the relevance of political parties as a determinant for their political career, and are aware of the advantages of basing the risk of de-selection on predictable party criteria (Borchert, 2008; Best and Vogel, 2018). For this reason, professional politicians try to gain autonomy from the electorate in order to dismiss the risk of de-selection by unpredictable voters, at the same time as fulfilling the recruitment criteria of their organisation. As a consequence, for citizens it becomes harder to punish those politicians that implement policies that are not convenient for them, because in the end, the political organisation decides who makes the party list. In this way, as Maravall underlined (2003), citizens see how their capacities to control the politicians that do not act to promote their interests have been limited.

In summary, the specific interplay of politicians professionalisation determinants – political ambition, institutional characteristics, and the goals of political parties – have created agency problems, and let a privileged caste monopolise public positions (Allen and Caireny, 2017; Best and Vogel, 2018; Collet, et al., 2019). In fact, as the literature indicates, the outcome of the interplay between the recruitment process made by political parties, the politicians' motivations, and the incentives created by the institutional structure of opportunity (Maestas, 2000; Borchert, 2003; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008) set up the perfect frame in which a professionalised representative elite starts the vicious circle of politics (Borchert, 2008). Consequently, politicians professionalisation creates a problem in terms of principal-agent relations – substantive representation – and an unclear effect regarding descriptive representation. Accordingly, the literature seems to suggest that for optimum democratic representation it is necessary to have professionalised legislatures, but it is better to have amateur politicians who will be more accountable and responsive to their principles. All in all, while legislative professionalisation seems to have good consequences for descriptive and substantive representation, politicians

professionalisation seems to have negative effects on substantive representations. In other words, professional politicians seem to generate the existence of agency problems.

4.3 The puzzle of state size in terms of descriptive and substantive representation: the case of European Micro-states.

As we have just seen, the common wisdom underlined by contemporary political scientists suggests that the cause of agency problems and the social closure of the political elites in big-size states is politicians professionalisation, although it is less clear in the case of the legislative professionalisation.

If the previous arguments about the effects of the professionalisation of politics are true, we would expect a better descriptive or mirror representation in the micro-states as contemporary cases of direct democracy—given the lower degree of their political elites' professionalisation and higher amateurism⁵⁵ (Guérin and Kerrouche, 2008; Philips, 1995), (Philips, 1995: 226). At the same time, as Dahl and Tufte (1973) and Remmer (2004) suggested, small polities should be characterised by higher citizen involvement, better accountability, and efficacy and transparency, thus encouraging policymakers to be more responsive and accountable to the needs of citizens, therefore resulting in a lower level of agency problems between the principal and the agent.

However, scholars who have studied micro-states, such as Corbett and Veenendaal (2018), found that small-scale democracies' political characteristics can have positive and negative repercussions in terms of the isolation of the political elite as well as in relation to responsiveness and accountability. First, with regard to descriptive representation, Corbett and Veenendaal (2018) have argued that the part-time nature of small states does not always enhance representativeness. These authors found that even though smallness works against professionalisation, politicians in small states tend to be highly educated citizens who are active in other aspects of social life, and who have enough economic resources to live without a proper salary derived from politics. Thus, they are able to finance their own electoral campaigns. These scholars also found that women and minorities are still marginalised in most micro-states. These sociodemographic features are the product of the typical social proximity and personalism of micro-state politics.

⁵⁵ Political professionalism in micro-states is generally characterised by a part-time regime, low salaries in politics, and the necessity that public officeholders combine their public function with a private occupation (Ott, 2000).

Based on the close personal connections and institutional characteristics, political recruitment in micro-states is based on personal characteristics and being well-known.

Second, in relation to substantive representation, Diamond and Tsaliks (1999) suggested that personalism and social proximity could incentivise the social closure of the elite. Due to the limited pool of candidates and the influence of certain high-profile citizens, politics can be limited to certain sectors of society, causing a feeling of the ‘clubbiness’ of politics which contributes to the pervasive logic of patron–client politics (Corbett and Veendendaal, 2018).

How can we explain this puzzle? The first possible explanation is that there is in fact no causal connection between the degree of professionalisation, either legislative or with regard to politicians, and either descriptive or substantive representation. Scholars have just noticed that politics in ‘normal’ countries – that is, in ones that are not micro-states – tend to have professionalised politicians and, at the same time, in these countries there are important descriptive and substantive representation deficits. As a result, the common wisdom has jumped to the conclusion that both phenomena are causally related, when in fact their relation is in reality spurious—both phenomena are explained by a third variable that we have not found yet. To properly understand the causal mechanism that explains the existence of agency problems and the social closure of the political elite, it is necessary to revisit the influence of population and political professionalisation on the existence of descriptive and agency problems.

A second possibility is that the *positive* condition of micro-states having a lower proportion of professionalised politicians is cancelled out by the *negative* one of also having a lower degree of professionalised institutions, starting with their parliaments. As a result, we find no difference between micro- and macro-states in their descriptive and substantive representation performance.

Finally, a third possibility is that the kind of negative evaluation of the micro-states’ descriptive and substantive representation is the product of comparing their actual representation performance with a very high positive expectation, given their micro status. In other words, this is not the product of making an explicitly empirical comparison between the representation performance of the micro-states with the representation performance of the macro-states. Once this comparison is made, micro-states actually perform better in terms of the descriptive and substantive representation of their populations than macro-states.

In order to make this comparison, this study compares legislative and politicians professionalisation of European micro-states between countries and over time with the most similar large-scale democracies, in order to cast light on this puzzle. Given that micro-states are characterised by the very small size of their population and a lower degree of professionalisation (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018), these nations are a good setting to revisit the causal mechanism that explains the agency problems and the social closure of the political elites. In particular, the comparison between these European micro-states and six European large-scale democracies enables us to test the argument about how political professionalisation entails the existence of agency problems and the closure of the political elite. Moreover, such uncertainty indicates a large discussion in the literature about how micro-states' political characteristics – lower professionalisation, social proximity, and personalistic particularities – can affect political representation, responsiveness, and accountability.

4.4 Research design.

a) Data and Method

The empirical analysis consists of two parts to determine to what extent political professionalisation has an effect on descriptive representation and principal-agent problems. In the first part, this study has shown that the degree of legislative and individual professionalisation is substantially lower in the micro-states in comparison to the macro-states. The study also shows that there are significant differences in terms of descriptive representation and tinnier regarding differences in political responsiveness and accountability between micro-states and macro-states. In the second part, the study undertakes statistical analysis to evaluate to what extent political professionalisation has an effect on these three variables, once it is controlled for other possible factors that may also affect the descriptive and principal-agent problems. Furthermore the aim of the analysis is to see if there is an interaction effect between political professionalisation and population size.

This study performs a comparative study of six European micro-states (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Monaco, and San Marino) and six large-scale democracies in Europe (Denmark, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The study has concentrated on all the European micro-states that are democracies, thus the Vatican has been left out. The six large-scale democracies have been selected because they have

a close relationship with our six micro-states, either because of geographical proximity, or past colonial relations (Berry and Berry, 1990; Gray, 1973; Mooney, 1995).

The empirical analysis is based on an original database built by the author. In this regard, the study has faced some limitations in terms of available information. Even though the literature of micro-states underlines the lower professionalisation of politics in these territories (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018), it is not possible to run a comparative and quantitative analysis between large state democracies and micro-states because of the lack of available information. In addition to the omission of the micro-states in the literature (Veenendaal and Corbett, 2015), there is a lack of comparative information about politicians professionalisation in large-scale democracies. The existing data on politicians professionalisation are usually based on case studies, and they are normally focussed on qualitative analysis or on socio-demographic consequences of political professionalisation (Squire and Moncrief, 2019; Oñate, 2010; Borchert and Zeiss, 2003). Consequently, there are no comparative indicators of legislative and politicians professionalisation, either in micro-states, or in large-scale democracies. For this reason, the study uses an original database built using information from national government websites, newspapers, published studies on European states, and international organisation websites. Due to the availability of information and the years of the elections' celebration, the exact periods under analysis for each state are: Andorra (1981–2019), Liechtenstein (1986–2017) Iceland (1995–2017), Malta (1982–2017), Monaco (1978–2018), San Marino (1983–2016), Spain (1978–2019), France (1978–2019), Italy (1978–2019), the United Kingdom (1978–2019), Switzerland (1978–2019), and Denmark (1986–2019).

b) Hypotheses

Based on the previous theoretical discussion about the possible influence of political professionalisation and population size, the study presents the following hypotheses. According to the first possible causal explanations described in section II, the first and second hypotheses would be:

H1a: Ceteris paribus, the higher the degree of legislative professionalisation there is, the better the descriptive representation.

H1b: Ceteris paribus, the higher the degree of legislative professionalisation there is, the lower the perception of political responsiveness and accountability problems.

H2a: Ceteris paribus, the degree of politicians professionalisation is unrelated to the quality of descriptive representation.

H2b: Ceteris paribus, the higher the degree of politicians professionalisation there is, the higher the perception of political responsiveness and accountability problems.

However, as has been argued before, there is a second potential scenario in which the *positive* condition of micro-states having a lower proportion of professionalised politicians is cancelled out by the *negative* one of also having a lower degree of professionalised institutions, starting with their parliaments. As a result, the study offers two alternative hypotheses:

H3a: Ceteris paribus, the size of the country (as either a micro- or macro-state) is unrelated to the descriptive representation performance.

H3b: Ceteris paribus, the size of the country (as either a micro- or macro-state) is unrelated to citizens' perceptions of political responsiveness and accountability problems.

Finally, the study has also argued that the kind of negative evaluation of the micro-states' descriptive and substantive representation described in the second scenario could be a product of comparing their actual representation performance with a very high positive expectation, given their micro status. Therefore, if a comparison is made between micro- and macro-states, the small-scale democracies will actually perform better in their descriptive and substantive representation. As a result, the fourth hypothesis establishes that:

H4a: Ceteris paribus, micro-states perform better in terms of descriptive representation than macro-states.

H4b: Ceteris paribus, in micro-states citizens have a better perception of political responsiveness and accountability than citizens in macro-states.

c) Operationalisation of variables

Main dependent variables: Descriptive representation, Political responsiveness and accountability.

In order to explain variation in the level of descriptive representation of a legislature, the study measures the social gap between citizens and the political elite. Specifically, the study has created a social distance index (SDI) based on the ones constructed by Portillo-Pérez and Domínguez (2020). Social Distance index=

$$\left(1 - \left| \frac{\% \text{ Social group } X \text{ in parliament}}{\% \text{ Social group } X \text{ in society}} \right| \right)^2$$

In this sense, the study has reformulated the social distance index by calculating the deviation from the parity between the social group representation in parliaments and such groups in society. Hence, the results of the SDI vary from zero to infinity, where zero implies equality in the social profile of representatives and citizens. Thus, the greater the result is, the greater the disparity of such social groups in parliament. Specifically, the study studies the social profile of MPs focussing the analysis on four socio-demographic variables: age, sex studies, and occupation (Portillo-Perez and Domínguez, 2020:106).

Additionally, in order to measure the dependent variables in our second analysis – principal-agent problems – the study uses two dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI [Kaufmann and Kraay, 1999])⁵⁶ to capture political responsiveness and political accountability⁵⁷. First, the study uses the dimension⁵⁷ that captures citizens' perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain as a political responsiveness proxy. In other words, the study uses the perception of citizens as to what extent elites are capturing the state for their interests. Second, the study uses the voice and accountability dimension of the WGI indicator as a proxy of political accountability. In this way, such dimensions capture the available channels of communication of the country, and the citizens' perception of capacity to control and select politicians.

As Kaufmann et al. (2010) have conceptualised, both proxies range from around -2.5 to 2.5. Thus, the closer the variable assigned to the positive values is to 2.5, the better the

⁵⁶ Data available on: <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/> (accessed on: June 25, 2020).

⁵⁷ The dimensions of Worldwide Governance do not differentiate between citizens with voting rights and those who do not vote. Therefore, the study takes into account the point that the micro and macro-states standards of political accountability and responsiveness could be biased by the responses of those who cannot vote.

perception of the proxy by citizens. As a result, regarding the political responsiveness proxy, the closer the result is to 2.5, the better the citizens' perception is that public power is not exercised for private gain. Next, the voice and accountability results underline that the closer the result is to 2.5, the better the perception of citizens is about available channels of communications and their capacity to control and select politicians.

Main independent variables: individual, legislative professionalisation and population size

To measure the main independent variables of the analysis, individual and legislative professionalisation, and their interaction with population, the study operationalises both concepts as follows.

Individual professionalisation. In order to operationalise the individual professionalisation, the study uses as a proxy the relative salary of parliamentarians. In this way, salary is not only one of the main resources available to define a highly professionalised state legislature (Carey et al., 2000), but, as Weber (1958:84) argued, income is the variable that determines the professional politician condition. Besides this, the relative salary enables us to capture the individual incentives to serve as a parliamentarian (Squire and Moncrief, 2019). In other words, it reflects the attractiveness of the salary in the context of the state (Squire, 1988). Therefore, the study is using a proxy that captures the capacity of politicians to become full-time politicians, and identifies the incentives to being (re)selected. For this reason, and based on Squire's (1988) comparison, the relative salary is calculated as follows:

$$\left(1 - \left| \frac{\text{Average Salary in parliament}}{\text{Average salary of state}} \right| \right)^2$$

Hence, the relative salary outcome calculates the differences between the salary in parliament and the average salary of the state. Consequently, the higher the outcome of the relative salary is, the greater the difference between the salary in parliament and the average salary of the state. That is to say, the higher the outcome is, the greater the individual incentive to serve as a parliamentary representative.

Legislative professionalisation. In order to explain variation in the level of legislative professionalisation, the study must first operationalise it. This is no easy task because it is a multi-faceted concept with no obvious and unambiguous single indicator.

Fortunately, the interest in this subject over the past years has yielded several useful indices of this concept. Therefore, this study uses the revisited professionalisation index constructed by Squire (2007). As Bowen and Green (2014) concluded, the Squire Index is the most prominent professionalism index which accurately captures the core conceptual differences between citizen and professional legislatures. The index is composed of three main indicators: the salary of the parliamentarians, the support staff of the parliament, and the sitting days of the parliament. However, given that the study lacks information on the particular support staff of each of the micro-states' parliaments, it uses the parliamentary budget, as suggested by Squire (2007). The legislative professionalisation is calculated as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Salary} + \text{Parliament budget} + \text{Sitting days}}{3}$$

Considering that the study is comparing different national states, it has standardised the components of the index, but in this case, it does not establish a parliament as a benchmark to calculate the index like Squire did (2007). The index rescales the components of the variable to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one⁵⁸. Therefore, each component value on the standardised variable indicates its difference from the mean of the original component in a number of standard deviations. Thus, a positive outcome of the legislative professionalisation index indicates that the value for the state is higher than the state's mean. For example, a value of 0.5 indicates that the value for that case is half a standard deviation above the mean, while -0.45 indicates that such a case has a value of -0.45 standard deviation lower than the state's mean.

Size of the state. To measure the size of countries, the study uses a dichotomous variable to capture the effect of micro-state political characteristics. The variable assigns zero to macro-states and one to the European micro-states.

Control variable

In order to test the hypotheses, the study has also introduced some control variables. These are other factors that the current literature suggests may have an impact on controlling the descriptive representation and the existence of agency problems.

⁵⁸ The variables are standardised to make sure that all variables contribute evenly to the index when the items are added together.

Consequently, and considering the aggregate database characteristics, specific controls are applied for the institutional and system indicators. This study also adds:

Age democracy. As the literature argues (Palanza et al., 2016; Dahlberg et al., 2015), the age of democracy has a direct consequence for the political recruitment process and different aspects of political performance. Therefore, it is necessary to control for the age of the democracy as an influential variable in the profile of representatives and the existence of clientelistic relations between politicians and citizens. For example, Dahlberg et al. (2015) emphasised the point that the influence of the age of democracy on the existence of agency-problems is explained by the lack of institutional consolidation. In such a situation, elites tend to provide targeted transfers to narrow groups of voters (Keefer, 2007).

GDP per capita. As Maestas (2000) argued, the state per capita income is a useful proxy to measure the state's development and its policy capacity. Indeed, it measures the capacity to fulfil and represent the citizens' interests. In addition, as Matland (1998) argued, the increase in material wealth in a country helps minorities to have appropriate roles. In advanced industrialised nations, there are secular trends and cultural patterns towards post-materialist values that seem to challenge, for example, traditional sex roles, and which facilitate the entry of more women into positions of power (Stockemer, 2009). The study logged the variable GDP per capita to improve the fit of the model.

Electoral system. As the literature has underlined (Matland and Studlar 1996; Norris, 1985; Schwindt-Bayer and Squire, 2014), the type of electoral system influences minorities' representation in legislatures. Proportional representation electoral systems are more favourable to women than majoritarian systems or single-member district plurality rules. Regarding the influence of electoral system on the existence of agency problems, Hoblot and Klemmensen (2008) pointed out that proportional systems have higher incentives to encourage a broader representation of popular opinion.

Legislated gender quota. The study has to take into account the states that have legislated quotas. It is obvious that having legislated quotas has an effect on the characteristics of the political elite.

4.5 Results of the Empirical Analyses

a) Are micro- and macro-states different? Descriptive representation, political responsiveness, and accountability.

For the first way of assessing the effect of political professionalisation on descriptive representation, and the existence of agency problems, the study gives a comparative overview of the main traits of such variables of the European micro-states and large-scale democracies⁵⁹. Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 use the original database of the study, and the units are the European micro-states and the large-scale democracies.

Table 4.1. Socio-demographic descriptive data.

	Macro-states		Micro-states	
	% In parliament	% In society	% In Parliament	% In society
Average Age	49,2	37,6	47,2	36,1
Tertiary Education	73,7	23,5	80,3	10,4
Women	20,1	51,1	15,8	52,2
Educators	16,8	8,9	11,0	5,1
Civil Servants	9,9	12,1	7,1	13,9
Business people and Merchants	20,0	18,5	26,3	28,3
Liberal Prof.	14,6	11,2	18,2	9,3
Health Services.	3,8	11,1	10,1	8,2
Working Class	10,4	10,9	5,2	13,0

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the existing differences of coefficients in terms of the dependent variables of the study between micro- and macro-states. First, Table 4.1 describes how significant differences between micro-states and macro-states coefficients exist in terms of descriptive variables. With regard to socio-demographic characteristics, micro-states and macro-states register a huge bias in terms of gender representation; both groups of states have around 20% of women in their parliaments. In fact, women are less represented in micro-states than in macro-states. Moreover, the average age of the parliamentarians in micro-states is 47, in contrast to the macro-states where the average age is 49. In relation to the percentage of parliamentarians that have tertiary education, the data indicates that 80% of micro-states MPs hold a university degree, while in macro-

⁵⁹ See Appendix A for a descriptive overview of the main traits of descriptive representation of each country, along with their professionalisation characteristics.

states it is a little bit lower, with 73% of the parliamentarians holding a degree. However, despite this slight difference, it is particularly interesting to see how the 80% registered in micro-states parliament mean a higher bias with the percentage of people that have a university degree in the society, while the 73% registered in macro-states, despite being biased too, the result is more similar to the register of their society, 23.48%.

In relation to the dominant profession that exists within the parliamentarians, Table 4.1 highlights how in both groups of states (micro and macro), educators, businesspeople, and the liberal professions are the most common among the representatives. In addition, Table 4.2 demonstrates how the differences between micro- and macro-state coefficients are significant.

Table 4. 2. Descriptive data of the article's dependent variables.

	Macro-states	Micro-States	Diff. Sig.
Political	1,5	1,4	t=1.0174, p=0.3100
Responsiveness	1,3	1,26	t=135686, p=0.1179
Accountability	0,1	0,1	t=0.2192, p=0.8269
SDI Average age			
SDI Tertiary Education	13.2	115.0	t=-6.6392, p=0.0000
SDI Women	0,4	0,5	t=-5.0873, p=0.0000
SDI Educators	2,5	18,4	t=-5.1784, p=0.0000
SDI Civil Servants	0.5	0,4	t=2.5214, p=0.0122
SDI Business people and Managers	1,3	27,2	t=-2.3387, p=0.0200
SDI Liberal Prof.	1.0	5.8	t=-2.5567, p=0.0117
SDI Health Services.	0,4	8.23	t=-2.3402, p=0.0208
SDI Working Class	0,7	3,7	t=-2.1643, p=0.0320

*Except the Accountability and SDI of Women, the differences have been calculated with Welch's t-test due to their unequal variances.

*All variables are reflecting the mean of the index.

Furthermore, Table 4.2 describes the perceptions of citizens with regard to political responsiveness and accountability. In this sense, the results emphasise how there is a poorer perception of the control of politicians in micro-states compared to large-scale democracies. In line with such differences, micro-state citizens have a worse perception in terms of their politicians acting in their own self-interest. Therefore, such results reinforce Corbett and Veenendaal's (2018) argument as to how social proximity and the personal nature of deliberations, along with the weakness of micro-states' institutional structure, set the perfect framework to permit single individuals to control the entire

political arena while promoting their interests. Despite this, the differences are not statistically different, thus it is not possible to reject the proposition that the micro-state condition has no effect. However, this result is particularly interesting if one takes into account how the differences are substantial and significant in terms of political professionalisation, both individual and legislative. Table 4.3 shows that MPs' salary in macro-states is more than double that of the average salary of their society. In contrast, the relative salary of micro-state MPs is slightly lower than the average income of their citizens. In summary, there is a huge difference in terms of individual incentives to serve as a parliamentarian (Squire and Moncrief, 2019) and being (re)selected.

Table 4.3. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables.

	Macro-states	Micro-States	Diff. Sig.
Population [absolute number]	38.444.338	127.612	t=250561, p=0.0000
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	2,5	0,7	t=5.0266, p=0.0000
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	0,5	-0.5	t=12.924, p=0.0000
Annual Salary [mean]			
Parliament Budget [mean]	76.489	33.216	t=7.9281, p=0.0000
Sitting days [mean]	370.665.313	683.566	t=11.916, p=0.0000
	77	46	t=14.146, p=0.0000

*The differences have been calculated with Welch's t-test due to their unequal variances.

Moreover, and focussing on the legislative professionalism characteristics, Table 4.3 underlines how in terms of the legislative professionalism index and its components – salary, parliamentary budget, and sessions – micro-states register lower results and significant differences in all components. For example, in terms of the sessions in the parliament, micro-states register 46 sessions annually, while in macro-states, the annual sitting days are 77 sessions. The parliament's annual budget mean for micro-states is 683.566 (PPP\$), while in macro-states it is 370.665.313 (PPP\$). Therefore, such results indicate that for most of the politicians in micro-states there is a lower availability, accessibility, and attractiveness with regard to establishing a long political career. As a consequence, and in terms of individual incentives, micro-states should have lower

incentives to control electoral uncertainty. Nevertheless, as the WGIs show, this is not the perception of their citizens. Hence, to unravel the political professionalisation and population influence on the above characteristics of descriptive representation and principal-agent problems, it is necessary to run a multivariate statistical analysis.

b) Statistical analysis: the effect of individual professionalisation on descriptive representation and principal-agent problems.

In the following statistical analysis, our units of analysis, or observations, are the national parliaments per year of our twelve selected countries. Given that the study treats each parliament-year of the same country as a ‘separate observation’, the study has estimated a series of random effects panel regression models with observations clustered by country and year. In these models, the standard errors of estimates are corrected to take into account repeated observations for each parliament across legislative terms.

In the first analysis, the study tests the hypotheses H1a (the effect of legislative professionalisation on descriptive representation), and H2a (the effect of politicians professionalisation). Finally, the first analysis tests the hypotheses H3a and H4a (the micro-state’s condition effect on descriptive representation). In this case, the dependent variables are the social distance indices of the socio-economic variables. In the second analysis, the study tests H1b (the effect of legislative professionalisation on political responsiveness and accountability) and H2b (the effect of politicians professionalisation) as well as H3b and H4b (the micro-state’s condition has an effect on the existence of agency-problems), and the dependent variables are the political responsiveness and accountability perception of citizens.

The effect of political professionalisation on political descriptive representation

The study has built different models where the effect of individual and legislative professionalisation is tested, in addition to the effect of the population size on four dependent variables: the social distance index of women (Tables 4.4 and 4.5); the social distance index based on tertiary education (Tables 4.4 and 4.5); the age social distance index (Tables 4.4 and 4.5); and the occupation social distance index (Tables 4.6 and 4.7).

The results of Table 4.4 indicate how legislative professionalisation has a particular and different effect on the descriptive representation of women, tertiary education, and age descriptive representation in micro- and macro-states. In addition, Table 4.5 confirms the hypothesis H2a which underlines the neutral effect of politicians professionalisation on descriptive representation. Consequently, such a result underlines the point that the relation described by the literature about the effect of political professionalisation on descriptive representation was determined by the legislative professionalism.

Table 4.4. Socio-demographic's SDI determinants I

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	SDI Women	SDI Women	SDI Women	SDI Tertiary educatio n	SDI Tertiary educatio n	SDI Tertiary educatio n	SDI Mean Age	SDI Mean Age	SDI Mean Age
Legislative professionalis m	-0.120*** (0.0330)	-0.138*** (0.0335)		57.06*** (11.67)	57.09*** (11.80)		-0.00756 (0.00615)	-0.00423 (0.00770)	
Micro-state		-0.342* (0.145)	-0.297 (0.154)		82.71 (63.66)	48.89 (58.93)	-	-0.0307 (0.0232)	-0.0451 (0.0334)
(Log) GDP per capita	-0.193*** (0.0258)	-0.168*** (0.0269)	- 0.0835*** (0.0196)	-31.06** (11.23)	-38.08*** (11.41)	-38.17*** (11.56)	-0.00685 (0.00613)	-0.0313*** (0.00756)	-0.0524*** (0.00772)
Age democracy	- 0.00711** (0.00108)	- 0.00894** (0.00124)	- 0.0111*** (0.00102)	-2.084*** (0.542)	-1.451** (0.525)	-1.160* (0.482)	- 0.00332*** (0.000317)	- 0.00101*** (0.000236)	- 0.00149*** (0.000326)
Proportional electoral system	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category
Majoritarian electoral system	-0.335*** (0.0682)	-0.326*** (0.0675)	-0.248*** (0.0584)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mixed electoral system	-0.284*** (0.0480)	-0.276*** (0.0477)	-0.340*** (0.0393)	-142.0 (91.42)	-131.0 (73.35)	-73.01 (67.99)	-0.118 (0.0670)	-0.0810* (0.0328)	-0.106* (0.0435)
Legislated gender quota	-0.0562 (0.0324)	-0.0426 (0.0322)	-0.0643** (0.0247)	19.41 (13.60)	14.55 (13.62)	13.54 (12.17)	-0.00159 (0.00817)	-0.0190 (0.00996)	-0.0151 (0.0102)
_cons	2.984*** (0.255)	3.004*** (0.254)	2.229*** (0.169)	532.5*** (111.2)	527.0*** (109.4)	523.3*** (103.8)	0.449*** (0.0566)	0.514*** (0.0694)	0.788*** (0.0608)
<i>N</i>	245	245	433	164	164	220	154	154	295

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

* There is a data gap in Monaco's case. Therefore, due to the missing data has a coincidence with the period that there is a majoritarian electoral system in Monaco, models 3 to 6 have no cases of a Majoritarian electoral System.

Table 4.5. Socio-demographic's SDI determinants II

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	SDI Women	SDI Women	SDI Women	SDI Tertiary education	SDI Tertiary education	SDI Tertiary education	SDI Mean Age	SDI Mean Age	SDI Mean Age
Politicians' professionalism	-0.0129	-0.0131		-2.504	-2.742		-0.00140	-0.00120	
	(0.00738)	(0.00735)		(2.563)	(2.565)		(0.00296)	(0.00297)	
Micro-state		-0.279	-0.297		39.37	48.89		-0.0681	-0.0451
		(0.167)	(0.154)		(54.86)	(58.93)		(0.0380)	(0.0334)
(Log) GDP per capita	-0.174***	-0.147***	-	-27.44*	-35.61**	-38.17***	-	-	-
	(0.0300)	(0.0320)	0.0835***	(11.55)	(11.51)	(11.56)	0.0556***	0.0532***	0.0524***
			(0.0196)				(0.0129)	(0.0131)	(0.00772)
Age democracy	-	-	-	-1.445**	-0.887	-1.160*	-	-	-
	0.00930*	0.0109***	0.0111***				0.000920*	0.00109*	0.00149**
	(0.00114)	(0.00131)	(0.00102)	(0.526)	(0.485)	(0.482)	(0.00039)	(0.00042)	(0.00032)
Proportional electoral system	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category
Majoritarian electoral system	-0.252**	-0.250**	-0.248***	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.0807)	(0.0805)	(0.0584)						
Mixed electoral system	-0.322***	-0.318***	-0.340***	-64.71	-49.85	-73.01	-0.0856	-0.118*	-0.106*
	(0.0583)	(0.0584)	(0.0393)	(90.11)	(65.20)	(67.99)	(0.0559)	(0.0569)	(0.0435)
Legislated gender quota	-0.108*	-0.0984*	-0.0643**	-10.35	-16.21	13.54	-0.0357	-0.0608	-0.0151
	(0.0503)	(0.0501)	(0.0247)	(22.83)	(22.66)	(12.17)	(0.0310)	(0.0341)	(0.0102)
_cons	2.957***	2.910***	2.229***	454.3***	484.4***	523.3***	0.767***	0.783***	0.788***
	(0.293)	(0.295)	(0.169)	(112.1)	(108.1)	(103.8)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.0608)
N	269	269	433	190	190	220	174	174	295

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

* There is a data gap in Monaco's case. Therefore, due to the missing data has a coincidence with the period that there is a majoritarian electoral system in Monaco, models 4 to 6 have no cases of a Majoritarian electoral system.

Specifically, with regard to the effect of legislative professionalism, Table 4.4 reveals how such professionalisation, as the literature predicted (see Figure 4.1), has a significant and positive effect in terms of women's representation. In fact, due to the SDI variable capturing the deviation from the parity between the parliamentarians and society, the negative result shown in Table 4.4 indicates how there is a lower disparity between the representation of women in parliament and the presence of women in the society. In other

words, the descriptive representation of women is higher in those sovereign states that register higher levels of legislative professionalisation. Moreover, model 2 indicates how the micro-states conditions influence this positively, too. With accuracy, it reduces the SDI of women's representation in parliament. Hence, the results describe the effect of population on the consequences of professionalisation in women's descriptive representation (H2). Therefore, population size reinforces the legislative professionalism positive tendency. In contrast, models 5 and 6 (in table 4.4) indicate how legislative professionalisation has a significant and positive effect on the presence of tertiary education. In that sense, this result confirms not only the Putnam (1976:28) argument that established the educational background as a key factor to access to the political elite, but it also corroborates the relationship underlined by the professionalisation literature (Borchert, 2008; Squire and Moncrief, 2019) that indicates how higher political professionalisation attracts better-qualified members. All in all, the statistical analysis points out how the establishment of a full-time regime and a salary for the political activity in the states have a significant impact on facilitating the entry of women into parliament and incentivising the greater social distance between the percentage of tertiary education in parliament and in society.

Furthermore, Tables 4.6 and 4.7 underline the differences in the effect of legislative and politicians professionalisation, along with the population size characteristics effect, on occupational characteristics. In this way, and in line with what it is found in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, the analysis points out how individual professionalisation is not a determinant for the descriptive representation of occupations in parliaments, but it underlines the effect of legislative professionalisation on civil servants. Interestingly, Table 4.6 highlights how the micro-state condition has an effect on the presence of civil servants and the working class in parliaments⁶⁰. Regarding the effect of legislative professionalism on civil servants, the results reveal how the higher the degree of legislative professionalism, the lower the disparity of civil servants in the state. However, despite such an effect on model 1, model 2 highlights how the significant effect of professionalism disappears once it is controlled by the micro-state characteristics. In other words, population size characteristics are the causal mechanism that explains the better

⁶⁰ The study includes in Appendix B, the analysis of political professionalism and microstate characteristics' effect on other occupations that are represented in their parliaments.

descriptive representation of civil servants in parliaments. Finally, the result concerning the working class is particularly interesting. In this case, model 5 of the analysis underlines how the disparity of the working class is negatively affected by the population size characteristics, once legislative professionalism is controlled for.

Table 4.6. Occupation's SDI determinants I.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	SDI Civil Servants	SDI Civil Servants	SDI Civil Servants	SDI Working Class	SDI Working Class	SDI Working Class	SDI Business people	SDI Business people	SDI Business people
Legislative professionalism	0.173*	0.0944		-0.0739	-0.0195		-0.596	-0.345	
	(0.0698)	(0.0612)		(0.0480)	(0.0529)		(1.202)	(1.299)	
Micro-state		-0.506**	-0.432**		0.323*	-0.497		2.289	4.324
		(0.160)	(0.134)		(0.135)	(0.856)		(3.640)	(3.263)
(Log) GDP per capita	0.0404	0.122*	0.154**	-0.00197	-0.0535	-0.869	4.128***	3.511**	1.673
	(0.0649)	(0.0595)	(0.0495)	(0.0465)	(0.0494)	(0.562)	(1.186)	(1.245)	(0.961)
Age democracy	-0.00399	-	-	-0.00147	-	-0.00887	-0.112***	-	-0.0823*
	(0.00232)	0.00705**	0.00560**	(0.00110)	0.0000856	(0.00984)	(0.0299)	0.0993**	(0.0331)
Proportional electoral system	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category
Mixed electoral system	-0.0678	-0.111	-0.239**	-0.0461	-0.0543	-0.962	-4.612*	-4.364*	-6.359***
	(0.104)	(0.0927)	(0.0808)	(0.0797)	(0.0808)	(0.827)	(1.920)	(1.944)	(1.532)
Legislated gender quota	-0.526***	-0.553***	-0.374***	0.116	0.170*	-0.782	-1.155	-0.734	0.0206
	(0.0936)	(0.0889)	(0.0760)	(0.0752)	(0.0760)	(1.155)	(1.810)	(1.829)	(1.360)
_cons	0.432	0.0285	-0.466	0.463	0.762	10.47*	-30.18*	-25.64*	-7.876
	(0.635)	(0.574)	(0.458)	(0.462)	(0.469)	(5.169)	(11.85)	(11.95)	(8.649)
<i>N</i>	188	188	261	195	195	337	188	188	261

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

* There is a data gap in Monaco's case. Therefore, due to the missing data has a coincidence with the period that there is a majoritarian electoral system in Monaco, models have no cases of a Majoritarian electoral system.

Table 4.7. Occupation's SDI determinants II.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	SDI Civil Servants	SDI Civil Servants	SDI Civil Servants	SDI Working Class	SDI Working Class	SDI Working Class	SDI Business people	SDI Business people	SDI Business people
Politicians professionalis m	0.0184 (0.0139)	0.0149 (0.0133)		-0.00926 (0.0107)	-0.00426 (0.0111)		-0.0344 (0.256)	-0.0863 (0.270)	
Micro-state		-0.424* (0.185)	-0.432** (0.134)		0.260 (0.133)	-0.497 (0.856)		-0.771 (3.013)	4.324 (3.263)
(Log) GDP per capita	0.117* (0.0575)	0.171** (0.0576)	0.154** (0.0495)	0.0460 (0.0443)	0.00482 (0.0485)	-0.869 (0.562)	6.084*** (1.051)	5.540*** (1.144)	1.673 (0.961)
Age democracy	-0.00320 (0.00178)	- 0.00577* (0.00177)	- 0.00560** (0.00144)	-0.00304** (0.000965)	-0.00124 (0.00132)	-0.00887 (0.00984)	-0.128*** (0.0210)	-0.132*** (0.0300)	-0.0823* (0.0331)
Proportional electoral system	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Categor y	Ref. Categor y	Ref. Categor y
Mixed electoral system	0.0595 (0.108)	0.0378 (0.104)	-0.239** (0.0808)	-0.202* (0.0902)	-0.189* (0.0913)	-0.962 (0.827)	-6.007** (2.162)	-5.417* (2.181)	-6.359*** (1.532)
Legislated gender quota	-0.428** (0.138)	-0.484*** (0.136)	-0.374*** (0.0760)	-0.186 (0.0948)	-0.0593 (0.113)	-0.782 (1.155)	-4.898* (2.131)	-4.876 (2.639)	0.0206 (1.360)
_cons	-0.472 (0.566)	-0.681 (0.540)	-0.466 (0.458)	0.138 (0.455)	0.311 (0.465)	10.47* (5.169)	-48.66*** (10.90)	-42.30*** (11.09)	-7.876 (8.649)
<i>N</i>	203	203	261	207	207	337	203	203	261

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

* There is a data gap in Monaco's case. Therefore, due to the missing data has a coincidence with the period that there is a majoritarian electoral system in Monaco, models have no cases of a Majoritarian electoral system.

In summary, the first analysis, which tests the effect of political professionalisation on political descriptive representation, concludes that there is a positive effect of the legislative professionalisation that the literature describes, but such an effect is limited to some particular historically marginalized groups (H1a). Moreover, the analysis indicates the neutral effect of the politicians professionalisation on such a representation dimension (H2a). Later, the analysis shows how the micro-state characteristics have an effect on the descriptive representation of certain historically marginalised minorities—women, civil servants, and the working class (H3a). Finally, the results underline how the micro-state

status facilitates a better descriptive representation of women and civil servants, but it shows the negative effect on the descriptive representation of the working class (H4a).

The effect of political professionalisation on the existence of agency problems

The study has built different models where the effect of political professionalisation – individual and legislative – is tested on political responsiveness and accountability. In this sense, the study analyses the implications of having a professionalised political elite and parliaments on the citizens’ perception of political responsiveness and accountability. In addition, the second analysis tests the effect of population size on the existence of agency-problems.

Table 4.8. Agency-problems determinants I.

	(1) Public- minded politicians	(2) Public- minded politicians	(3) Public- minded politicians	(4) Voice and accountabil y	(5) Voice and accountabil y	(6) Voice and accountabil y
Legislative professionalis m	-0.0960 (0.0559)		-0.0963 (0.0560)	-0.0470 (0.0244)		-0.0491 (0.0253)
Micro-state		-0.259 (0.357)	-0.385 (0.379)		-0.0118 (0.102)	-0.0918 (0.111)
(Log) GDP per capita	-0.0649 (0.0524)	-0.0114 (0.0543)	-0.0411 (0.0543)	-0.0469* (0.0216)	-0.0221 (0.0215)	-0.0383 (0.0226)
Age democracy	-0.00520* (0.00246)	-0.00477 (0.00245)	-0.00712** (0.00269)	-0.00153 (0.000836)	-0.00157 (0.000856)	-0.00218* (0.000934)
Proportional electoral system	Ref.Categor y	Ref.Categor y	Ref.Categor y	Ref.Category	Ref.Category	Ref.Category
Majoritarian electoral system	-	-	-	-0.161 (0.107)	-0.130 (0.109)	-0.155 (0.117)
Mixed electoral system	-1.073** (0.404)	-0.992* (0.417)	-1.096* (0.445)	-0.290** (0.0970)	-0.273** (0.101)	-0.285** (0.108)
_cons	2.782*** (0.514)	2.221*** (0.493)	2.826*** (0.524)	2.002*** (0.219)	1.727*** (0.198)	1.996*** (0.220)
N	180	229	180	217	268	217

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

* San Marino and Monaco are not included in the WGI indicator. Thus, because Monaco during a period

of time was under a majoritarian electoral system, in this case, there are no cases of a Majoritarian electoral system in models 1-3.

The results of Table 4.8 show how legislative professionalism is not a determinant for the existence of agency-problems (H1b). Conversely, Table 4.9 reveals how, in line with the expectation of the literature (see Figure 4.1), politicians professionalisation is a negative determinant for the citizens' perception of responsiveness and accountability (H2b). In addition, the analysis reveals that population size characteristics are not a determinant for the representation problems related to political responsiveness and accountability (H3b and H4b). Consequently, such a negative effect counterargues the positive effects that some scholars have suggested regarding the effect that a small population should have on political responsiveness and accountability (Dahl and Tufte, 1973; Remmer, 2004). In other words, the analysis helps to solve the theoretical puzzle that exists in the literature of professionalisation about determining the explicative variable of the agency problems' existence. First, such an outcome effectively asserts that there is a causal connection between the degree of politicians professionalisation and substantive representation. Second, the analysis statistically proves how size does not affect the type of representation.

In this vein, Table 4.9 validates Borchert's (2000) argument about how politicians professionalisation gives place to an inherent conflict with two of the basic characteristics of democratic representation: political responsiveness and accountability. In fact, the results indicate how the greater the politicians professionalisation, the worse the perception of citizens of their politicians' as public-minded. Regarding the effect of politicians professionalisation on the accountability proxy, the results indicate how, as Borchert suggested (2000), the higher the degree of politicians professionalisation, the lower the perception of citizens that they have the capacity to control and select their politicians. Hence, as Allen (2013) pointed out, the prominence of professional politicians leads to a reduction in public engagement with democracy.

Table 4.9. Agency-problems determinants II.

	(1) Public- minded politicians	(2) Public- minded politicians	(3) Public- minded politicians	(4) Voice and accountabilit y	(5) Voice and accountabilit y	(6) Voice and accountabilit y
Politicians professionalis m	-0.0563*** (0.0122)	-0.0555*** (0.0122)		-0.0171** (0.00554)	-0.0172** (0.00560)	
Micro-state		-0.268 (0.328)	-0.259 (0.357)		-0.0438 (0.123)	-0.0118 (0.102)
(Log) GDP per capita	0.0381 (0.0499)	0.0579 (0.0522)	-0.0114 (0.0543)	0.0125 (0.0213)	0.0171 (0.0225)	-0.0221 (0.0215)
Age democracy	-0.00138 (0.00215)	-0.00288 (0.00239)	-0.00477 (0.00245)	-0.000637 (0.000875)	-0.000935 (0.000967)	-0.00157 (0.000856)
Proportional electoral system	Ref.Categor y	Ref.Categor y	Ref.Categor y	Ref.Category	Ref.Category	Ref.Category
Majoritarian electoral system	-	-	-	-0.0322 (0.121)	-0.0278 (0.132)	-0.130 (0.109)
Mixed electoral system	-0.539 (0.357)	-0.566 (0.393)	-0.992* (0.417)	-0.193 (0.113)	-0.189 (0.125)	-0.273** (0.101)
_cons	1.345** (0.488)	1.353** (0.495)	2.221*** (0.493)	1.277*** (0.213)	1.269*** (0.216)	1.727*** (0.198)
<i>N</i>	202	202	229	232	232	268

Standard errors in parentheses


* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

* San Marino and Monaco are not included in the WGI indicator. Thus, because Monaco during a period of time was under a majoritarian electoral system, in this case, there are no cases of a Majoritarian electoral system in models 1-3.

Moreover, models 2 and 3 (Table 4.9) shows how the social proximity that exists in micro-states does not enhance citizens' perceptions of the responsiveness and accountability of their politicians. To be precise, as Figure 2 highlights, even though there is a difference in terms of the political responsiveness perception of micro- and macro-states in absolute numbers, there is no difference in the effect that politicians professionalisation has on political responsiveness. Thus, as has been mentioned, such results counteract the positive effect authors like Dahl and Tufte (1973) have argued


regarding how smallness may heighten responsiveness. In line with such results, models 5 and 6 underline the same non-significant effect of population size characteristics.

Figure 4.2. Politicians' professionalisation effect on public-minded politicians.



Interestingly, Figure 3 highlights how even though it seems that the micro-state condition has a heightened negative effect on politicians professionalisation, such an effect is not significant. Despite this, the non-significant results of population size characteristics on political responsiveness and citizens' perceptions of accountability, underline how social proximity does not help agency problems (H4b).

Figure 4.3. Politicians' professionalisation effect on political accountability.



4.6 Conclusions

In this paper, the debate about the effect of political professionalisation on descriptive representation and agency problems is addressed. In particular, the study analyses the effect of individual and legislative professionalisation on the descriptive representation and agency-problems. Moreover, the analysis tests the effect of population size characteristics on descriptive and substantive representation. The study has used a new dataset consisting of the socio-demographic and political professionalisation characteristics, individual and legislative, of the European micro-states and some European large-scale democracies.

The professionalisation of politics is a characteristic of contemporary political systems, and its consequences and justifications are highly debated in the media and academia. Despite this, there is common wisdom in the literature about the negative effect of professionalisation on democratic institutions' quality and their legitimacy. In this sense, the literature assumes that political professionalisation entails agency problems and a gap in terms of descriptive representation. However, despite this, the topic remains under-examined. Thus, this study represents an attempt to analyse empirically and comparatively the effect of political professionalisation on descriptive representation and

on agency problems. In addition, the analysis studies how micro-states' population size characteristics affect the descriptive representation and agency problems.

First, the study has tested Pitkin's expectation (1967) about the negative effect that legislative' professionalisation has on the closure of the political elite. In this sense, the statistical models (Tables 4.4 to 4.7) reveal how legislative professionalism is a determinant for the existence of social distance in terms of gender, the background of the parliamentarians, and for civil servants. Specifically, Table 4.4 demonstrates how a higher legislative professionalism facilitates the better representation of women in parliaments, but, in contrast, such professionalism worsens the descriptive representation of tertiary education and civil servants. In addition, the models confirm the existence of an effect of population on women, civil servants, and working-class descriptive representation. In this vein, the population size characteristic helps to reduce the social distance index of all the categories except that of the descriptive representation of the working-class.

Figure 4.4. Summarize of the consequences of political professionalisation on descriptive and substantive representation.

	Descriptive representation	Substantive representation
Legislative professionalisation	Positive effect.	No effect.
Politicians professionalisation	No effect.	Negative effect.

Data Source: own creation.

Secondarily, the study analyses to what extent political professionalisation and population size characteristics have an effect on agency-problems. The results of Table 4.9 reveal that individual professionalisation is a determinant for the existence of political responsiveness and accountability problems. In fact, the analysis has indicated how politicians professionalisation is a negative determinant for citizens' perception of their politicians as being public-minded. Apart from that, the analysis reveals that the higher the degree of politicians professionalisation, the worse the citizens' perception of having the capacity to control their representatives. Therefore, such results validate the argument of scholars like Borchert (2000) or Maravall (2003) who have argued that politicians professionalisation gives place to an inherent conflict with political responsiveness and

accountability. In other words, as Allen (2013) pointed out, the prominence of professional politicians leads to a reduction in public engagement with democracy.

Regarding the effect of population size characteristics on the existence of agency problems, Tables 4.8 and 4.9 shows how population size characteristics are not a determinant for political responsiveness and political accountability. In particular, the results indicate that even though there is a difference in terms of the agency-problem proxies of micro- and macro-states in absolute numbers, there is no difference in the effect that politicians professionalisation has on political responsiveness and political accountability. In this vein, the analysis helps to solve the theoretical puzzle that exists in the professionalisation's literature about determining the explicative variable of the agency problems' existence. First, the previous outcomes effectively indicate that there is a causal connection between the degree of politicians professionalisation and substantive representation. Furthermore, the analysis statistically proves how size does not affect the type of representation.

In summary, this study helps to clarify the role of political professionalisation on the elite's isolation and the existence of agency problems. In addition, the paper points out the relevance of population size as a determinant of descriptive and substantive representation. Finally, this work highlights the level of social distance in the socio-demographic characteristics of European micro-state MPs and those of the six selected European large-scale democracies.

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Appendix A.

Table A1. Socio-demographic descriptive data,

Andorra		
	% in parliament	% in society
Average Age	46,8	N,A
Tertiary Education	77,2	16,6
Women	17,1	51,8
Educators	7,0	1,2
Civil Servants	4,5	13,7
Business people and Merchants	43,7	66,4
Liberal Professions	15,3	7,2
Health Services,	3,1	3,3
Working Class	9,2	14,7

Table A2. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables,

	Andorra
Population [absolute number]	62.163
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	1,0
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	-0,5
Annual Salary [mean]	23.726
Parliament Budget [mean]	6.131.670
Sitting days [mean]	17

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$,

Table A3. Socio-demographic descriptive data,

Liechtenstein		
	% in parliament	% in society
Average Age	46,8	N,A
Tertiary Education	53,6	9,9
Women	12,4	50,8
Educators	6,6	29,5
Civil Servants	3,3	11,0
Business people and Merchants	1,3	3,4
Liberal Professions	6,6	10,1
Health Services,	1,6	14,8
Working Class	8,2	16,0

Table A4. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables,

	Liechtenstein
Population [absolute number]	32.056
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	0,4
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	-0,5
Annual Salary [mean]	18.658
Parliament Budget [mean]	3.166.667
Sitting days [mean]	29

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$,

Table A5. Socio-demographic descriptive data,

Iceland		
	% in parliament	% in society
Average Age	48,4	36,0
Tertiary Education	80,1	5,0
Women	12,4	50,8
Educators	19,7	9,8
Civil Servants	10,4	11,2
Business people and Merchants	20,0	18,5
Liberal Professions	12,4	13,0
Health Services,	5,4	13,2
Working Class	6,6	12,9

Table A6. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables,

	Iceland
Population [absolute number]	305.020
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	1,0
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	-0,49
Annual Salary [mean]	112.954
Parliament Budget [mean]	18.520.000
Sitting days [mean]	105

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$,

Table A7. Socio-demographic descriptive data,

Malta		
	% in parliament	% in society
Average Age	46,9	36,2
Tertiary Education	92,1	14,8
Women	6,8	50,6
Educators	7,9	8,5
Civil Servants	4,1	12,3
Business people and Merchants	8,9	33,8
Liberal Professions	30,8	12,0
Health Services,	21,9	12,3
Working Class	1,9	21,9

Table A8. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables,

	Malta
Population [absolute number]	378.520
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	0,02
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	-0,49
Annual Salary [mean]	38.398
Parliament Budget [mean]	9.866.667
Sitting days [mean]	111

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$,

Table A9. Socio-demographic descriptive data,

Monaco		
	% in parliament	% in society
Average Age	46,9	N,A
Tertiary Education	89,3	N,A
Women	16,7	58,4
Educators	16,8	N,A
Civil Servants	7,7	N,A
Business people and Merchants	2,3	0
Liberal Professions	15,4	N,A
Health Services,	19,2	N,A
Working Class	7,7	N,A

Table A10. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables,

	Monaco
Population [absolute number]	32.452
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	0,49
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	-0,51
Annual Salary [mean]	25.542
Parliament Budget [mean]	5.431.034
Sitting days [mean]	12

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$,

Table A11. Socio-demographic descriptive data.

San Marino		
	% in parliament	% in society
Average Age	44,5	N,A
Tertiary Education	86,5	N,A
Women	13,6	50,3
Educators	9,7	3,2
Civil Servants	11,7	21,6
Business people and Merchants	31,9	31,5
Liberal Professions	13,5	4,7
Health Services,	4,8	8,6
Working Class	2,1	8,9

Table A12. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables.

	Iceland
Population [absolute number]	27.269
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	0,7
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	-0,51
Annual Salary [mean]	6.932
Parliament Budget [mean]	267.607
Sitting days [mean]	60

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$,

Table A13. Socio-demographic descriptive data.

Spain		
	% in parliament	% in society
Average Age	46,3	36,5
Tertiary Education	89,3	23,9
Women	23,7	50,9
Educators	22,8	6,0
Civil Servants	9,9	12,1
Business people and Merchants	7,3	55,1
Liberal Professions	25,4	9,5
Health Services,	4,6	6,4
Working Class	8,9	10,3

Table A14. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables.

	Spain
Population [absolute number]	41.624.048
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	0,48
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	-0,25
Annual Salary [mean]	44.100
Parliament Budget [mean]	87.857.143
Sitting days [mean]	69,86

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$,

Table A15. Socio-demographic descriptive data.

France		
	% in parliament	% in society
Average Age	52,00	36,09
Tertiary Education	89,90	23,93
Women	13,85	51,43
Educators	19,58	7,32
Civil Servants	12,15	15,88
Business people and Merchants	29,76	47,72
Liberal Professions	7,04	12,26
Health Services, Working Class	6,16	12,49
	12,78	12,18

Table A16. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables.

	France
Population [absolute number]	61288947
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	1,09
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	1,35
Annual Salary [mean]	90565,26
Parliament Budget [mean]	613809524
Sitting days [mean]	227,87

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$.

Table A17. Socio-demographic descriptive data.

Italy		
	% in parliament	% in society
Average Age	49,13	39,26
Tertiary Education	68,35	10,95
Women	15,51	51,46
Educators	16,02	6,88
Civil Servants	0,65	13,02
Business people and Merchants	18,92	52,79
Liberal Professions	14,52	9,10
Health Services, Working Class	4,47	6,94
	9,85	12,27

Table A18. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables.

	Italy
Population [absolute number]	57.731.190
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	10,3
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	3,1
Annual Salary [mean]	160.724
Parliament Budget [mean]	931.818.182
Sitting days [mean]	153

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$,

Table A19. Socio-demographic descriptive data.

United Kingdom		
	% in parliament	% in society
Average Age	49,9	37,2
Tertiary Education	67,1	28,7
Women	14,8	51,1
Educators	13,3	8,7
Civil Servants	13,7	11,7
Business people and Merchants	23,1	52,1
Liberal Professions	13,3	12,3
Health Services,	1,2	11,6
Working Class	10,8	9,7

Table A20. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables.

	United Kingdom
Population [absolute number]	59.630.000
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	1,08
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	0,48
Annual Salary [mean]	135.896
Parliament Budget [mean]	325.000.000
Sitting days [mean]	154

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$,

Table A21. Socio-demographic descriptive data.

Switzerland		
	% in parliament	% in society
Average Age	49,4	38,3
Tertiary Education	63,8	27,3
Women	21,1	51,0
Educators	11,4	7,1
Civil Servants	6,9	9,3
Business people and Merchants	20,2	58,6
Liberal Professions	20,6	12,9
Health Services,	3,4	11,8
Working Class	14,5	10,5

Table A22. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables.

	Switzerland
Population [absolute number]	7.327.139
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	0,13
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	-0,45
Annual Salary [mean]	39.504
Parliament Budget [mean]	65.200.000
Sitting days [mean]	72

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$,

Table A23. Socio-demographic descriptive data.

Denmark		
	% in parliament	% in society
Average Age	48,0	38,8
Tertiary Education	63,0	26,1
Women	31,9	50,5
Educators	17,5	17,8
Civil Servants	3,2	10,8
Business people and Merchants	11,8	37,7
Liberal Professions	5,2	11,8
Health Services,	3,1	17,8
Working Class	N,A	10,1

Table A24. Descriptive data of the article's independent variables.

Population [absolute number]	Denmark 5.340.381
Individual Professionalisation [mean index]	0,07
Legislative Professionalisation [mean index]	-0,3
Annual Salary [mean]	92.052
Parliament Budget [mean]	142.800.000
Sitting days [mean]	105

*Salary and parliament budget values are calculated in PPP\$,

Appendix B.

Table B1. Occupations' SDI determinants III.

	(1) SDI Educator s	(2) SDI Educator s	(3) SDI Educator s	(4) SDI Liberal prof.	(5) SDI Liberal prof.	(6) SDI Liberal prof.	(7) SDI Health Services	(8) SDI Health Services	(9) SDI Health Services
Legislative professionalis m	-5.950*	-4.938		-0.259	-0.759***		0.0427	0.176	
	(2.648)	(3.051)		(0.214)	(0.169)		(0.201)	(0.223)	
Micro-state		1.819	5.297		-1.693***	-0.688		0.670	0.401
		(7.155)	(7.420)		(0.357)	(0.741)		(0.470)	(0.364)
(Log) GDP per capita	-3.113	-3.382	-1.631	-0.358	-0.391*	-0.203	-0.303	-0.377	-0.0898
	(2.895)	(3.107)	(2.492)	(0.201)	(0.180)	(0.163)	(0.235)	(0.245)	(0.183)
Age democracy	-0.0332	-0.0214	0.00536	-0.0103*	-	-0.0145*	-0.00751	-0.00478	-0.00379
	(0.0565)	(0.0705)	(0.0779)	(0.00518)	(0.00359)	(0.00705)	(0.00404)	(0.00474)	(0.00406)
Proportional electoral system	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category	Ref. Category
Mixed electoral system	26.08***	26.97***	34.24***	1.411***	0.987***	2.015***	-1.784***	-1.963***	-1.635***
	(4.605)	(4.813)	(4.041)	(0.346)	(0.286)	(0.302)	(0.367)	(0.374)	(0.292)
Legislated gender quota	-4.558	-5.117	-6.247	-1.505***	-1.289***	-0.873***	-0.684	-0.493	-0.244
	(4.555)	(4.817)	(3.695)	(0.309)	(0.285)	(0.219)	(0.444)	(0.470)	(0.362)
_cons	39.03	39.87	14.78	5.359**	7.130***	3.982**	4.809*	5.113*	1.990
	(29.21)	(30.35)	(22.79)	(1.993)	(1.745)	(1.331)	(2.375)	(2.417)	(1.737)
<i>N</i>	188	188	261	196	196	330	180	180	254

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

*There is a data gap in Monaco's case. Therefore, due to the missing data has a coincidence with the period that there is a majoritarian electoral system in Monaco, models have no cases of a Majoritarian electoral system.

5. General Conclusions

The main purpose of this dissertation has been to disentangle the causes and consequences of political professionalisation – legislative or individual – and to provide new theoretical and empirical evidence about the effect of government size and population characteristics on political professionalisation, a causal mechanism that has been assumed or understudied by previous research. As I argued at the beginning of the doctoral dissertation, this new approach is the consequence of solving an existent indeterminacy problem about the effect of population and government size on both professionalisation dimensions – individual and legislative – as well as testing the consequences of political professionalisation on representation. However, there is a surprising lack of comparative and empirical analysis about why and when the variance in political professionalisation exists. Throughout this dissertation, my goal has therefore been to revisit the reasoning behind the effect of government size and population characteristics on professionalisation and consequently explore the mechanisms that lead political professionalisation to vary across contexts, as well as to investigate the consequences of the degree of political professionalisation.

Since the professionalisation of politics began to be analysed, two main streams have been predominant. The first is that population size is the causal mechanism of political professionalisation, based on the necessities created by the enlargement of polities. This approach has claimed that increases in population size made direct democracy impossible and increased the difficulty in dealing with societal problems that demanded higher legislative resources and expertise from politicians. From this perspective, it has been assumed that the causal mechanism of the amateur character of European local politics is their smaller and homogeneous population. The second causal mechanism has scrutinized the role of government size on political professionalisation. From this perspective, researchers have analysed the effect of government competencies on political professionalisation. Within the latter approach, prior research has compared city-states and nation-states or local and national politics in which the population and government size co-vary. However, government size emerges as a reasonable explanation why political professionalisation is higher in some cases or why contemporary nation-states become professionalized. The acquisition of new state functions to satisfy the new economic and social needs of citizens (Marshall, 1950) meant the objective of protecting them from foreign intrusion or domestic violence was no longer the only main function of the central state. The new modern state welfare had to deal with economic insecurity,

providing services and income on the basis of individual rights (Kuhnle & Sanders, 2010). In addition, governments also increasingly began to take an interest in many other social issues such as public education, public health, length of working hours and relations between employers and workers. Or, in terms of the differences between local and national politics, the competencies of local politics are sensibly lower than those of national governments. In this way, the literature has suggested how the growth in public services provided by the state and the demands of a rapidly growing public sector to satisfy the new demands modified how public offices were exercised.

Throughout this dissertation, the causal factor that explains the professionalisation of politics has been reconsidered and conceptually tackled in a coherent way, overcoming previous attempts by the literature that have made some crucial assumptions. After reviewing the theoretical underpinnings behind the causes and consequences of political professionalisation, this dissertation has looked for a new conceptualization of the relationship between population characteristics, government size and the causes and consequences of professionalisation. In other words, throughout this dissertation, such factors have been reconsidered by calling into question their expected impact. As I have argued, the literature has avoided the indeterminacy problem, although there is a powerful theoretical gap to properly understanding the causal mechanism that explains the variance of political professionalisation between contexts. Hence, this dissertation sought to fill this gap through three cohesive papers.

Do population and government size affect the degree of countries' legislative professionalisation independently? Is there an endogeneity problem in determining the causal effect of government size on legislative professionalisation? In the first paper, these questions were explored by running an across countries and across-time analysis of the legislative professionalisation of European micro-states with their most similar European large-scale democracies. In this first paper, it was argued that three potential causal relations between government size and population size can explain the influence of these variables on legislative professionalisation.

The results revealed how government size, even after controlling for state population, has a significant and positive effect. Therefore, the first article's results confirm that enlarging state competencies heighten the necessity for greater legislative professionalisation. Alternatively, the article did not confirm the positive effect of state population – controlled by government size – determined by previous findings comparing US federal states. Regardless of the result, the analysis underlined how population characteristics do

modulate the effect of government size on legislative professionalisation. The statistical analysis pointed out how being a micro-state reduces the effect of government size on the legislative professionalisation index. All in all, such results confirmed my expectation regarding the expected impact of micro-state political characteristics on legislative professionalisation.

In the second paper, the focus of the analysis switched to individual professionalisation. As shown in the introduction of this dissertation, and in the article, differing substantially across micro-states, politicians' professionalisation in micro-states is comparatively lower than in the big country of reference: Germany. As in the first article, however, to properly understand the causal factors that explain such variance, it was necessary to resolve again the existent co-variation between government size and population characteristics. Beyond solving that co-variation, the article also assessed the role of political parties as a causal mechanism, which scholars have highlighted as the variable explaining the influence of country size on individual professionalisation. This approach underlined the fact that a small-scale democracy, due to its closer relations between principal and agents, reduces the necessity of a strong and developed extra-parliamentarian party organization that contributes to reducing the degree of politicians' professionalisation. From this perspective, in micro-states, political parties have a lower capacity to monopolize the political recruitment process, so politicians can have access to public positions without the need to fulfil party criteria. As a consequence, aspiring to certain political positions does not require having previous experience in public administration or within the party. In fact, in micro-states, such political recruitment criteria respond to personal characteristics.

The empirical analysis, performed in seven different countries, showed that, in contrast to the legislative professionalisation, population characteristics and not government size are the determinant for individual professionalisation. The analysis revealed that population characteristics even explain the variance existent between micro-states. Moreover, the article assessed the causal mechanism explaining the influence of country size on the individual professionalisation process. Confirming our hypothesis, the article showed that size matters in reference to parties' role in monopolizing the political recruitment process. Thus, political parties in micro-states have a lower capacity to monopolize public offices. Finally, the article underlined that political parties are still a determinant for politicians' professionalisation, regardless of the lower capacity to monopolize among micro-state political parties. Overall, these results confirmed the

literature hypothesis that political parties are a determinant for politicians' professionalisation in both large- and small-scale democracies; given that they are less needed in micro-states, the degree of professionalisation among politicians is lower in these countries.

All in all, the first and second article reconsidered the causal mechanisms that explain legislative and individual professionalisation and underlined the differences in determining the explicative variable for both dimensions of professionalisation. On the one hand, the first article underlined how government size affects legislative professionalisation. On the other hand, regarding the explicative variable of politicians' professionalisation, the second article revealed that population size explains the variance across states. In sum, the results highlighted the relevance of studying both professionalisation dimensions separately.

Finally, in the third paper, I investigated the consequences of legislative and individual professionalisation. Research on this article took a novel approach and not only examined the consequences of political professionalisation, but revisited the influence of population and political professionalisation on descriptive and substantive representation to properly understand the causal mechanisms that explain the elite's social closure and the existence of agency problems. The article provided three different solutions to the theoretical puzzle presented in the literature. First, I tested empirically Pitkin's argument (1967) about whether political professionalisation entails the closure of the political elite and whether it has an effect on the existence of agency problems. Second, I analysed whether the positive condition of micro-states having a lower proportion of professionalized politicians was cancelled out by the negative one of also having a lower degree of professionalized institutions. Finally, I analysed a third possibility that the kind of negative evaluation of micro-states' descriptive and substantive representation is the product of comparing their actual representation performance with a very high positive expectation, given their micro-state status.

In general terms, the results showed that political professionalisation affects descriptive representation and agency problems; however, the results detailed different effects for legislative and politicians' professionalisation. On the one hand, the results showed how legislative professionalism is a determinant of the existence of social distance in certain socio-demographic characteristics and occupations – that is, gender, studies background, and being a civil servant. On the other hand, the models testing the consequences of substantive representation revealed how politicians' professionalisation is the negative

determinant. Regarding the effect of population size characteristics on the existence of agency problems, the article pointed out that, while population size is a determinant for the descriptive representation of certain social groups, being a macro- or micro-state is not a determinant for political responsiveness and political accountability. In this vein, the analysis helped to solve the theoretical puzzle presented by the literature on determining the explicative variable for the existence of agency problems and descriptive representation.

These three papers formed the core of this dissertation. Each piece of research can be taken as part of a common research project, with political professionalisation as the common link. Prior to presenting a reflection on the shortcomings of the dissertation and future lines of research, a summary of the main contributions of each paper is presented in the following sections.

5.1 Revisiting the effect of government size: The endogeneity problem.

The first article focused on the professionalisation of state institutions, more specifically of their parliaments, for empirical and theory-building reasons. First, with the exception of the US Congress and US state legislatures, legislative professionalisation is still understudied in Europe. Second, the few studies on this type of professionalisation do not clarify the role of the size of the government, after controlling by country population size. Consequently, the article sought to increase the general knowledge about state legislative professionalisation and critically assessed the theoretical underpinnings behind the “conventional wisdom”, showing how some assumptions on which the argument is founded are too strong to take for granted. The article’s new argument was that it is necessary to control by population characteristics to properly disentangle the role of government size on legislative professionalisation.

The first novel contribution was revisiting the possible existence of endogeneity in the role of government size on legislative professionalisation and to study more correctly than previous studies. This has been done, first, as I said previously, by controlling for population size and, second, by examining the possibility that population modulates the effect of government size on legislative professionalism. For this purpose, a new large and original dataset was built. This strategy proved appropriate in light of the results obtained by the empirical analysis. Just “eyeballing” the original descriptive data, the

variance in the legislative professionalisation between micro- and macro-states was confirmed, as well as the existence of the indeterminacy problem between government size and population. It was thus necessary to introduce controls in the quantitative analysis to unravel the causal mechanism explaining the variance in the degree of legislative professionalisation between states.

The article proceeded to analyse the causal mechanism explaining the existent variance across states. The results showed that the scenario in which population size modulates the effect of government size best explains the causal mechanism through which the characteristics of country population affect the degree of legislative professionalisation. The article presented three insights: first, the paper highlighted how government size, even when controlling for state population, is a positive determinant for legislative professionalisation. Second, the paper did not confirm the positive effect determined by the previous findings of the literature comparing US federal states (King, 2000; Mooney, 1995). Consequently, and as the final insight, it reconsidered the positive influence of population size on legislative professionalisation. The paper highlighted how although micro- and macro-states share the positive effect of government size on the legislative professionalisation index, the condition of being a micro-state reduces the positive effect of government size on the professionalisation of institutions. To sum up, the first paper shed light on the role of government size and state population on legislative professionalisation.

5.2 Effect of population size on individual professionalisation: Political parties.

A dissertation that endeavours to understand the causes of political professionalisation needs to understand the determinants of individual professionalisation. This is not to say that there is not a well-established causal mechanism in the literature that explains the variance of individual professionalisation, which is clearly not the case. However, the clear influence that the literature argues for in national politics, is not assured in smaller political entities, so it needs to be re-assessed.

The second paper of this thesis focused explicitly on disentangling the effect of population size on individual professionalisation, after controlling for government size. Beyond this idea, the second article assessed the causal mechanism explaining the influence of population size on individual professionalisation: the influence of population can be the

result of the lower capacity to monopolize the political recruitment process by political parties in small-scale democracies. In this way, population size influences the organizational function of parties and makes them less necessary (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). As a consequence, aspiring to certain political positions does not require having previous experience in public administration and within the party. Hence, in micro-states, political parties have a lower capacity to monopolize the political recruitment process, so politicians can have access to public positions without the need to fulfil party criteria. By identifying the condition of political parties as a determinant in micro-states, although they do not monopolize the political recruitment process, I confirmed two important hypotheses: first, that size matters when it refers to political parties' role as a gatekeeper, and second, it confirmed that political parties are still a determinant of politicians' professionalisation in small-scale democracies.

The results showed that the micro-state condition is a negative determinant for individual professionalisation. Interestingly, and after controlling for government size characteristics, population size is still a determinant if the analysis focused just on European micro-states. This article was particularly interesting in that it met three objectives at once: first, to disentangle how country size, and not government size, is a determinant for individual professionalisation; second, it showed how population size reduces the capacity to monopolise political recruitment by political parties; and third, the findings confirmed that, despite the lower capacity to control political recruitment, political parties are still a determinant of individual professionalisation. The article thus contributes to the literature by answering the question introduced by Corbett and Veenendaal (2018) about whether size affects parties' function with regard to the recruitment and nomination of candidates. Overall, these findings open up the scope for future research around the recruitment process in small-scale democracies.

In sum, and comparing the explicative variables that determine the degree of legislative or individual professionalisation, this dissertation helped in clarifying the differences in the determinants of both political professionalisation dimensions. On the one hand, as the first article showed, legislative professionalisation is affected by the government size, while on the other hand, the second article underlined how population size is the determinant for understanding variance across the states.

5.3 Descriptive representation and agency problems: The consequences of political professionalisation?

The third and the last paper of my dissertation focused on the consequences of political professionalisation, both legislative and individual. On the one hand, the third article explored the consequences in terms of descriptive representation and tested to what extent such consequences are conditioned by state size. On the other hand, the article empirically analysed the theoretical expectations that would explain the implications of having professionalized elite on the legitimacy of representative institutions. Moreover, I have followed previous theoretical insights to account for the heterogeneous consequences of political professionalisation for the existence of agency problems in different population size contexts. This is crucial because, as Corbett and Veenendaal (2018) have underlined, the population size and professionalisation characteristics of micro-states can cause mixed effects on representativeness, responsiveness and accountability. These ideas had not yet been empirically tested.

The paper explored the consequences of political professionalisation – individual and legislative – and how population characteristics can modulate that influence. In this article, I ran a panel analysis of 12 different countries between 1980 and 2019. These data made it possible to test the theoretical puzzle presented in the literature about the influence of political professionalisation and population size on descriptive and substantive representation. The findings showed that, regarding descriptive representation, legislative professionalisation and population size have an effect on the closure of the political elite. Most importantly, the paper systematically revealed that legislative professionalism is a determinant of the existence of social distance in terms of gender, education background of the parliamentarians and civil servant status. Thus, the existent gap between the citizenry and the parliamentary elites (Coller, Jaime & Mota, 2018) is affected by legislative professionalisation process. More precisely, the results showed how higher legislative professionalism improve the representation of women in parliaments, but, in contrast, such professionalism worsens the descriptive representation of tertiary education and civil servants. In addition, the models confirmed the existence of an effect of population on women, civil servants and working-class descriptive representation. In this vein, the population size characteristic helps to reduce the social distance index of all the categories except for the descriptive representation of the working class.

Regarding the effect of political professionalisation and population size on substantive representation, no effect was reported for legislative professionalisation. In contrast, the analysis found a significant relationship between politicians' professionalisation and the existence of agency problems. Concretely, the analysis pointed out how politicians' professionalisation is a negative determinant for citizens' perception of their politicians as public-minded. Apart from that, the analysis revealed that the higher the degree of politicians' professionalisation, the worse is the citizens' perception of having the capacity to control their representatives. These results validated the argument of scholars like Borchert (2000) or Maravall (2003) who claimed that politicians' professionalisation gives place to an inherent conflict with political responsiveness and political accountability. Finally, the article reported the effect of population size characteristics on the existence of agency problems, revealing that even though there is a difference in terms of the agency problem proxies of micro- and macro-states in absolute numbers, there is no difference in the negative effect that politicians' professionalisation has on political responsiveness and political accountability. All in all, the analysis helped to solve the theoretical puzzle in the professionalisation literature about the explicative variable of the social closure of the political elite and the existence of agency problems.

5.4 Limitations and Future Lines of Research.

It is clear that all research is limited in some way by the theoretical assumptions that underpin it, as well as by its empirical challenges. As is often the case, the development of this thesis has left some questions open and points to several future lines of research that may improve the arguments and the findings presented hitherto. Some of the avenues for research are related to the analysis of institutional professionalisation.

First, there is need to reconsider the analysis to identify the causes or assess its effects. The studies that have attempted to determine the causes of legislative professionalisation, focusing mainly on US state legislatures, have used the Squire Index (2007). Although Bowen and Green (2014) concluded that such an index most accurately captures the core conceptual differences between citizen and professional legislatures, a disaggregated analysis could offer the possibility of understanding the effect and consequences of each of the components on the different contextual situations. The classical analysis assumes that each of the components is explained by the same causal mechanism in each of the case studies. If researchers do not want to take for granted the assumption that the causal explanation of each component has to be the same, they must at least consider not sticking

to the legislative professionalism index. The findings in this dissertation showed that even between micro-states, which are similar in terms of population size, there are differences in the characteristics of their components. This warns researchers of the need to revisit the traditional point of view by moving towards a more comprehensive view of the causes of legislative professionalisation.

Second, because legislative professionalisation is still understudied in Europe, there is a lack of data on the components of professionalisation. Scholars should thus make an effort to collect data on parliamentary staff. Squire suggests that parliamentary expenditures and staffing levels are highly correlated, and incorporating either one or staffing numbers produces remarkably consistent state rankings. However, having the information about staff and the type of such support staff captures the real objective of the component, which is how much assistance legislators receive during a session to increase their ability and capacity as policymakers and increase the policymaking influence relative to the executive.

Third, and focusing on micro-state legislative professionalism, scholars should prioritize the analysis of the consequences of being a “working parliament”. This makes reference to appropriately measuring and defining the characteristics of the professionalisation of parliaments in micro-states. The logic of parliaments in some micro-states, for example in Liechtenstein, works in commissions, in which parliamentarians of different political parties meet to appraise proposals that the government has passed to the state parliament and to carry out the tasks of the commission topic. Thus, to properly understand the differences between professionalized parliaments and working parliaments, scholars should analyse the characteristics of such commissions and test how they could have repercussions on individual professionalisation. Throughout this dissertation, I have run a statistical comparative analysis, so my goal was to compare how population size characteristics affect legislative professionalisation. However, the commissions of a working parliament are an important characteristic for understanding the logic of micro-state professionalisation standards. Hence, future works will need to pay more attention to the commissions to properly understand micro-state legislative professionalisation patterns.

Other further avenues for the research are related to the necessity to continue studying politicians’ professionalisation. First, a key factor of individual professionalisation needs to be revisited: the ambition of politicians. Findings on individual professionalisation assume that the ambition of politicians is regular in different national contexts. In this

vein, the second article assumed that politicians in general have some degree of ambition to take into account the variable in the operationalization of individual professionalisation and not avoid its effect. Due to the condition of ambition as a key variable for understanding the professionalisation process, further research is necessary to comprehend the differences in ambition depending on different contextual factors. Regarding the comparison between large- and small-scale democracies, the assumption that the politicians' ambition is similar is far from being well-established. Micro-state politicians in a part-time regime and a low mean salary are unlikely to follow the same reasoning that a professionalized and partisan politician would have in a large-scale democracy. Therefore, future research should apply qualitative investigations and conduct interviews with politicians to tease out these factors.

Second, other factors need to be researched more extensively. As the reader of this dissertation has by now realized, efforts have been made to research how population characteristics affect the political career of parliamentarians. The analysis took into account the political career characteristics and the political regime prior to achieving MP status in the current legislature. However, it remains to be understood what happens after they leave the parliament. Are they moving to another public institution? Are they using their political status to gain access to the private sector? Population characteristics could have a potential effect on such a path, but future research needs to be conducted to consider this and other hypotheses.

Third, future works will need to research further the party service role in micro-state politicians' professionalisation. This dissertation only focused on assessing the causal mechanism explaining the effect of population on politicians' professionalisation. The analysis revealed that even with a lower capacity to monopolise the political recruitment process in a micro-state, political parties are still a positive determinant for politicians' professionalisation. However, it remains to be clarified if some positions within the extra-parliamentarian organization of political parties are more relevant for such an effect, or if that effect is common for all political parties.

Another set of avenues for further research has to do with the consequences of political professionalisation. The third article of this dissertation focused on the consequence of political professionalisation for descriptive representation and the existence of agency problems. Related to the effect of descriptive representation, the dissertation provided insights into socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, occupation and educational background, but left out other important characteristics such as race, migrant

status and religion. Descriptive representation of such characteristics would be particularly interesting per se, but even more so in micro-state cases. As Corbett and Veendendaal have argued (2018), most micro-states of the world have a culturally homogeneous population and tend to produce a dominant cultural code. Consequently, the representation of minorities in such a homogeneous society could make their representation harder on political institutions, and politicians' professionalisation could worsen their representation.

Regarding the consequences of politicians' professionalisation on the existence of agency problems, the third article of this dissertation undertook a comparative analysis testing the consequences of political professionalisation on substantive representation. The analysis used a proxy based on citizens' perceptions of political responsiveness and political accountability. Therefore, and as was explained in the third article, because the dimensions of worldwide governance do not differentiate between citizens with voting rights and those without, both proxies could be biased by the response of those who cannot vote. In this vein, future research should take into account an important characteristic of micro-states and the difficulty that inhabitants have to achieve nationality as a potential explicative variable that could intervene in citizens' perception of the existence of agency problems. In addition, and again, due to systematic exclusion of micro-states in academia, future research should make an effort to include most of the micro-states to gain a complete and comprehensive view of each of these states. For example, as was detailed in the last article of this dissertation, San Marino and Monaco were not included in the dimension that captures citizens' perception of political responsiveness.

Overall, this thesis has gone one step further by raising a new general theory about the causes and consequences of political professionalisation – individual and institutional. Taken together, the three papers presented have sought to better specify the causal mechanisms of politicians' and legislative professionalisation and their consequences on representation. As is the case when something is new, many questions remain unanswered, but what is certain is that this dissertation has offered a new approach to the common wisdom in the literature about the causal mechanisms of political professionalisation and its consequences. This dissertation has been a first attempt to fill a gap in the professionalisation literature, a contemporary topic that has aroused strong debates among citizens and academics alike. I hope this dissertation can be a promising path for improving the knowledge about a key characteristic of contemporary nation-

states and for understanding the, until now, under-studied characteristics of European micro-states.

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