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Metaphors and Terms in a Corpus on Political Discourse in Persian: a Cognitive Approach

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Bellaterra, September 2022

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To my wings, Khadijeh and Ahad

Without them, I could not have flown

this far away from the nest

Acknowledgement

Several people played a decisive role in doing the current study. I would like to express my most profound appreciation to my supervisors, Dr. Anna Aguilar-Amat and Dr. Patricia Rodríguez-Inés. We have tried to stay friends this whole time. Their understanding and emotional support have been invaluable. They provided me with encouragement and patience throughout this dissertation. Words cannot describe their help and support in every step of this process. I would also like to extend my deepest gratitude to the thesis defense committee members for their precious time and (virtual) presence. Their acceptance to a committee member boosted my self-esteem.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Sketch Engine's support group. The completion of my dissertation would not have been possible without their unparalleled support. They made all features available for the Persian language in the history of Sketch Engine. I would also like to recognize the assistance I received from Dr. Paul Rayson (Lancaster University). His guidance regarding statistics cannot be overestimated.

I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Mahdi Mohseni (in Germany), Dr. Afshin Rahimi (in Australia), Dr. Parvaneh Khosravi (in Iran), and Mr. Chaitanya Priyadarshi (at the UAB) for their extensive knowledge of (Persian) NLP. I very much appreciate the Tradumatica group and PACTE group for giving me the opportunity to attend meetings, receive insightful suggestions, and gain experience in academic events such as conferences and symposiums.

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Abbreviations

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

CMT: Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Exc.: Excerpt

FBT: Frame-Based Terminology

IRGC: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

KPs: Knowledge Patterns

KRCs: Knowledge-Rich Contexts

KWIC: Keyword in context

LD: LogDice

MiT: Metaphor in Translation

MP: Member of Parliament

NLP: Natural Language Processing

PALL: Persian Academy of Language and Literature

PDF: Portable Document Format

ST: Source Text

TC: Translation Competence

TS: T-score

TT: Target Text

TTR: Type-Token Ratio

Abstract

This is a corpus-based study on Persian political discourse in Iran's parliament and two news agencies with different political affiliations. The corpora contain 14 million words collected from January, 2016 to December, 2017. We have applied cognitive linguistics to this study to explore and categorize difficulties and ambiguities for an English-speaking translator translating metaphors and terms from Persian to English. It is a multidisciplinary study that includes cultural, political, religious, translation, cognitive, and corpus studies.

Persian metaphorical patterns have been extracted here based on Musolff's (2004 & 2016) scenario-based model for the first time. Furthermore, the Frame-Based Terminology theory has been applied to an inherently abstract domain: political texts. Investigating such big data would be impossible if it were not for Sketch Engine and its unique features and statistics. Based on data analyzed in this study, we have modified Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) model for conceptual metaphors according to the Persian language characteristics. We have shown what metaphors reveal about the hidden agenda of their users. This study has revealed shared conceptual mappings behind political terms and metaphors and their interdependence.

Based on the study of terms and metaphors, we have identified a dynamicity of terms specific to Iran's political system and discourse. We have also predicted which concepts' terminology will be more difficult for the English-speaking translator. This study also highlights the importance of extralinguistic knowledge, especially religious knowledge, in translating Persian political texts.

Resumen

La presente tesis es un estudio basado en corpus sobre el discurso político persa en el parlamento iraní y en dos agencias de noticias con diferentes afiliaciones políticas. Los corpus construidos contienen 14 millones de palabras recogidas entre enero de 2016 y diciembre de 2017. En este estudio se ha aplicado la lingüística cognitiva para explorar y categorizar las dificultades y ambigüedades relacionadas con metáforas y términos que se le podrían presentar a un traductor de habla inglesa que traduce del persa al inglés. Se trata de un estudio multidisciplinar en el que interseccionan estudios culturales, políticos, religiosos, de traducción, cognitivos y de corpus.

Se han extraído por primera vez patrones metafóricos persas basados en el concepto de escenario metafórico de Musolff (2004 y 2016). Además, la teoría de la Terminología basada en marcos (Frame-Based Terminology) se ha aplicado a un dominio inherentemente abstracto: los textos políticos. Investigar tantos datos sería imposible si no fuera por el programa Sketch Engine con todas las funciones y estadísticas que ofrece. A partir de los datos analizados en este estudio, hemos modificado el modelo de Lakoff y Johnson (1980) para las metáforas conceptuales según las características del idioma persa. Este estudio ha mostrado lo que las metáforas revelan sobre la agenda oculta de sus usuarios, así como las coincidencias conceptuales compartidas que hay detrás de los términos y las metáforas políticas, incluida su interdependencia.

A partir del estudio de los términos y sus relaciones analógicas, hemos identificado una dinamicidad de los términos específica del sistema y el discurso políticos de Irán. También hemos podido establecer una predicción respecto a qué términos de los conceptos estudiados supondrán mayores dificultades para el traductor de habla inglesa. Este estudio

también pone de manifiesto la importancia de los conocimientos extralingüísticos, especialmente los religiosos, en la traducción de textos políticos persas.

Resum

Aquesta tesi és un estudi basat en corpus sobre el discurs polític persa en el parlament iranià i en dues agències de notícies amb diferents afiliacions polítiques. Els còrpora construïts contenen 14 milions de paraules recollides entre gener de 2016 i desembre de 2017. En aquest estudi s'ha aplicat la lingüística cognitiva per a explorar i categoritzar les dificultats i ambigüitats relacionades amb metàfores i termes que se li podrien presentar a un traductor de parla anglesa que tradueix del persa a l'anglès. Es tracta d'un estudi multidisciplinari en el qual interseccionen estudis culturals, polítics, religiosos, de traducció, cognitius i de corpus.

S'han extret per primera vegada patrons metafòrics perses basats en el concepte d'escenari metafòric de Musolff (2004 i 2016). A més, la teoria de la *Terminologia basada en marcs* (Frame-based Terminology) s'ha aplicat a un domini inherentment abstracte: els textos polítics. Investigar tantes dades seria impossible si no fos pel programa Sketch Engine, amb totes les funcions i estadístiques que ofereix. A partir de les dades analitzades en aquest estudi, hem modificat el model de Lakoff i Johnson (1980) per a les metàfores conceptuals segons les característiques de l'idioma persa. Amb aquest estudi hem mostrat allò que les metàfores desvetllen sobre l'agenda oculta dels seus usuaris i s'han mostrat les coincidències conceptuals compartides que hi ha darrere dels termes i les metàfores polítiques, així com la seva interdependència.

A partir de l'estudi dels termes i les seves relacions analògiques, hem identificat una dinamicitat dels termes específica del sistema i el discurs polítics de l'Iran. També hem pogut establir una predicció respecte de quins termes dels conceptes estudiats suposaran majors dificultats per al traductor de parla anglesa. Aquest estudi també posa de manifest la importància dels coneixements extralingüístics, especialment els dels textos religiosos, en la traducció de textos polítics perses.

Terminology of this Thesis

Before presenting the main body of this thesis, a concise guide to its terminology is in order. It includes the reason behind choosing specific terms cases of interchangeable terms that may infer inconsistency in terminology and ambiguity. They are presented in alphabetical order of bold terms.

Cognitive Linguistics is an analytical approach to the natural language study founded by scholars such as George Lakoff, Ron Langacker, and Len Talmy in the late seventies and early eighties (Geeraerts & Cuyckens, 2007, p. 3). Cognitive Linguistics is the study of language's cognitive function, and "*cognitive* refers to the crucial role of intermediate informational structures in our encounters with the world" (Geeraerts & Cuyckens, 2007, p. 5). It assumes that "our interaction with the world is mediated through informational structures in the mind" and that natural language is a tool "for organizing, processing, and conveying that information" (Geeraerts & Cuyckens, 2007, p. 5). Cognitive Linguistics is especially interested in topics such as metaphor, mental imagery, "the conceptual interface between syntax and semantics", and "the relationship between language and thought" (Geeraerts & Cuyckens, 2007, p. 4). Cognitive-based Terminology theories "focus on the conceptual network underlying language", and they investigate the connection of syntax and semantics because linguistic forms are not separate from meaning (Faber, 2009, p.116).

The terminological choice among Fundamentalist, Principalist, and **Conservatives**: Generally speaking, they all have the same meaning. However, Fundamentalist has negative connotation and it seems that Principalist and Conservatives are used interchangeably maybe due to a lack of standardization in political terminology. Since they all refer to the same political concept (one of the main political wings that resist changes to fundamental bases of a country's political system), Conservative is used in this study to avoid any possible

ambiguity and as a more neutral term in comparison to Fundamentalist. Principalist has been used just once to prove a point in the given discussion. It is not related to the terminological policy of this study.

Hardline implies extreme Conservative parties (in Iran) are inflexible and do not compromise. Some non-Iranian news agencies call all Iranian Conservative politicians' hardliners'. Moreover, it has a negative connotation. Since this is an unbiased study, hardliner is avoided, and the neutral alternative (Conservative) is used; unless the context proves that the interlocutor is an extremist Conservative.

Instead of the Islamic Republic of Iran, To be short and save space, the country's name is written **Iran**. It does not imply any political affiliation or orientation of the authors of this study. The same fact applies to the use of Revolution instead of the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

'**Metaphor**' and 'conceptual metaphor' have been used interchangeably throughout this thesis. Nevertheless, to highlight the underlying cognitive process, it is called *a conceptual metaphor* from time to time. Since the main theoretical framework is Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) work, the reader may confuse our terminology of '(conceptual) metaphor' with a specific and strict understanding of Lakoff and Johnson's terminology.

Metaphorical studies and metaphor studies are used interchangeably in this study. Metaphorology (Steen,1994; cited in Deignan, 2008) is not used since it is less common.

Metaphorical patterns are also called patterns of metaphoric expressions (Koller, 2008); but, in this study, it is preferred to use metaphorical patterns. Goatly (2007) also uses metaphorical patterns and metaphorical themes (p. 5 & p. 183). For Lakoff and Johnson (1980), it is a metaphorical concept or simply a metaphor (p. 6). Throughout the book, they

are not consistent in using this or other terminology and interchangeably use the metaphor for the metaphorical concept.

Some researchers use the term *Majlis* referring to Iran's parliament, but in this study, the general and internationally well-known term, **parliament**, is chosen not to confuse the reader. Because Iran's political system is already complicated enough, it would make it even more challenging to grasp.

It means that '**political context**' throughout this study is the extralinguistic context, including parliament and news agency. So, parliamentary debates are from a political context distinct from news agencies' news (regardless of political affiliation). However, when just 'context' is mentioned, it refers to linguistic context or cotext, which means the words surrounding a given item (term, metaphor, and concept).

'**Source domain**' and 'domain' have been used interchangeably throughout the study. So, if just 'domain' is mentioned, it means source domain. 'Target domain' has been mentioned consistently throughout the text.

Terminological phrasemes are mentioned when referring to other authors' particular terminology and preferences. In the main discussion related to this study, 'multi-word unit,' 'term' or just 'unit' have been used interchangeably, while the frequency of 'term' is higher. Another reason to favour the use of 'term' is that in cognitive linguistics applied in this study, there is no distinction between word and term. **Terminological phraseme** has also been used in headlines and wherever the distinction or emphasis was needed. So, *terminological phraseme* and *term* are considered synonyms.

Terminology (with the capital letter) refers to the discipline itself. In contrast, the **terminology** refers to specialized terms related to a specific domain or, as Faber (2012) puts it, terminology as "the designation of specialized knowledge concepts" (p. 13).

By '**translator(s),**' it means both translators and interpreters because it includes both spoken (parliamentary debates) and written texts (political news).

As this is not a political study and the political section just informs the academic society with translational studies background, the political terminology will be used interchangeably without implying any political orientation. For instance, regardless of the distinction between '**wing**' and 'party', they are used interchangeably throughout the study.

Part I. Introduction

Every research is based on a motive or need as a driving force. Something that sparks researcher's interest and makes him/her studying a phenomenon. So, in this part, the motivation of this study will be explained along with clarifying possible misunderstandings about the purpose of this study. Furthermore, research questions and hypotheses will be followed. Then, due to Persian language's special features and Iran's specific political system, an introduction to each of them will be presented.

Chapter 1. Introduction

This chapter is an introductory chapter aimed at setting the scene for those who have never experienced living in a warzone during wartime to help them understand the personal motivation behind the aims of this study. Following this, some brief discussions of possible misunderstandings about this study's aims and multidisciplinary nature will be answered. After explaining the general content of each chapter, aims and research questions, and hypotheses will be addressed.

1.1. Setting the Scene

I was born in Iran almost eight years after Islamic Revolution and when Iran was in an imposed war with Iraq. When I was almost one year and a half, the war was stopped by mutual acceptance of fire-cease accord the so-called 598 resolution. When I was almost two years old, the founder of the Islamic Revolution passed away, and Iran's political and social situation got even more complicated. A central part of the images I have from my childhood consists of long lines for everything we needed, from gasoline to dairy products. We had to make lines for anything you could imagine. Long story short, all incidents around me were inseparably and inevitably interwoven with politics, and we were paying for the political decisions of others. They kept telling us that it was because of war and sanctions caused by the West because we wanted to resist them and be independent of them. Since the first general and national political events that I can remember, we were told that the world is watching us and we should prove to our enemies that we still are supporting the ideals of the Islamic Revolution. To this day, before and after the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian mass media focus on ideals of the Islamic Revolution and the importance of people's presence in nationwide demonstrations. The Reformist Mohammad Khatami tried to pave the way for constructive communication with the Westerns and proposed designing

2001 as the year of 'dialogue among civilizations in the UN[1]. Khatami tried to convince the Westerns that we have so many things in common and emphasized that those will help us overcome the worldwide issue of war and instability. He interviewed an American journalist for the first time in Iran's post-revolution history. Khatami tried to convince the world's public opinion that by chanting "down to America" in a public demonstration, people mean the US's government and not the American people; i.e. *we* distinguish the Americans from their government, and our problem is with the political system. He also reformed social conventions such as free relationships between boys and girls on the street. Now they could meet up freely without fear of being arrested or interrogated by civil police officers.

I went to the university one year after the end of Khatami's presidency and the first year of the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (a Conservative president)[2]. Another time, we get used to hearing the dominant political discourse about the double standards followed by the Westerns: Why can *they* have nuclear powers and *we* cannot; why do *they* do that thing and nothing happens, but when *we* do the same thing or want the same thing, *they* impose sanctions on *us* or threaten *us* of war; and so on. For the first time in the political history of Iran, the dominant political discourse featured common and even uncouth expressions, which made translators' jobs even more difficult. During his first period of presidency, Ahmadinejad announced 'nuclear Iran', describing the nuclear developments of Iran despite all sanctions. Zarif later criticized this term, Iran's then foreign minister, emphasizing that Ahmadinejad was unaware of what it could mean or what message it could

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[1] It is out of the scope of this study to address more information about the history or the function of this theory and why it did not work; so, for more information, check this link:
https://unchronicle.un.org/article/dialogue-among-civilizations-contexts-and-perspectives
[2] More details on the political situation of Iran and how its internal political system works will be presented in the following sections.

transmit to the world. Zarif was sure that a series of constructive debates with the 5+1 group would solve all the past misunderstandings and end in a win-win game. Thanks to his concerted attempt, after 13 years, Iran's nuclear case in the UN was closed by signing the Joint Plan of Action. The nuclear agreement was an inspiring event for me as a translator, which proved the importance of sound argumentation and every single term a politician uses.

So, long story short, as a victim of so many imposed sanctions and resolutions, on the one hand. On the other hand, as a PhD student of translation studies, I was motivated to play a role in finding at least one or two sources of miscommunications and misunderstandings in international talks with authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Misunderstandings drive us to the point that Iranian scholars do not have access to so many academic resources or cannot even publish their articles just because of their nationality and the US sanctions. In the worst case scenario, the patients are dying or fighting for their lives every day because authorities keep saying we are sanctioned. Sanctions are even more destructive than wars; one should live at least a month in a country under such sanctions to see how they work. To sum up the purpose of this study in a sentence: this study tries to explain and define political terminology and metaphors specific to Iran's religious-based political system that may cause misunderstandings. Moreover, hence, they worsen Iran's status in international relations, especially those shared with terroristic groups such as ISIS.

1.2. What This Thesis is about

It is a study conducted to determine potential sources of miscommunication in translations and interpretations of political texts from Persian to any other language. Based on cognitive semantic analysis, political terms are classified into two categories:

A) Those which already have equivalents, but they are misleading. Some definitions and points are suggested to be taken into account for translators translating political texts from Persian.

B) Those who do not have an equivalent. An equivalent will be suggested, and definitions and points will be considered on the part of translators translating political texts from Persian.

The gist of this study is that 'just knowing a language, in this case, Persian, does not make you a translator and just knowing some political terms does not guarantee the correctness of your translation. At least in the case of translating political texts from Persian, you will need to have political, religious, literary, and historical knowledge, among others.'

1.3. What this Thesis is not about

The most crucial point to bear in mind is that by no means is it a political study. Neither the division of political affiliations of news agencies, MPs, nor the terms used in discussions or introductions to Iran's political system are claimed to be exact and clear-cut. The same applies to the Islamic discussions of this study. In this study, based on the complexity of Iran's political system and its interconnectedness with Islamic concepts, every translational issue is inevitably approached with a concise account of other disciplines (Islamic, political, and literary).

1.4. Chapter Outlines

Chapter 1 discusses the motivations of this study and sets the scene to avoid misunderstandings about the aims of this study. It also clarifies the aims of this study and the research questions and hypotheses that this thesis will answer.

Chapter 2 is devoted to Iran's political system since it is a special system unfamiliar for Western readers of this study. It will discuss a concise political history of Iran, emphasizing the Islamic Revolution in Iran. It also comprises explaining the political climate between 2016 and 2017 during which the corpora of this study are compiled. Finally, it will discuss two main concepts at the heart of Iran's political system to pave the way for future discussions of Persian political terminology.

Chapter 3 is devoted to various aspects of the Persian language. From grammatical issues to semantics, from Persian word formation processes to phraseology. The final points of this chapter will be about technical challenges encountered during the preliminary phases of this study due to Persian Natural Language Processing (NLP) features.

Chapter 4 comprises discussions about metaphorical aspects of this study. Discussions of the definition and importance of metaphor studies and the interdependency of metaphor studies and translation studies will be presented. Also, the different development of metaphor theories in Iran and the West will be analyzed in this chapter. After establishing the theoretical framework of metaphorical aspects of this study, the invaluable role of corpus studies in this regard will be the closing section of Chapter 4.

Chapter 5 will connect discussions of terminology to metaphor and translation competence. Besides the theory applied to this study, a brief history of terminology theories will be addressed. After explaining the theoretical framework of terminological aspects, a concise history of translation and terminology in Iran will be offered. The final points of this chapter are related to translation competence and PACTE's model.

Chapter 6 is related to state-of-the-art translation technology in metaphor and terminology. Chapter 6 discusses the attempt of this study to define and predict

miscommunication, the applied method to deal with large corpora, and the application of unique statistics provided by Sketch Engine to the metaphorical aspects of this study.

Chapter 7 addresses topics related to corpus design and details of the Persian and English corpora compiled for the current study. Other than explaining some points about sampling, representativeness, and being balanced, this chapter will compare Persian corpora collected for this study with each other and with two other Persian reference corpora available in Sketch Engine.

Chapter 8 is concerned with the methodological framework and practical issues. How technical barriers are overcome is one of the topics discussed in Chapter 8. The pilot study, Sketch Engine's features related to metaphor and terminology, and protocols devised to investigate metaphor and terminology are other topics of this chapter.

Chapter 9 is devoted to analyzing data related to both metaphor and terminology. It analyzes conceptual elements and extracts conceptual mappings and scenarios related to each super source domain. Then, data related to terminology are analyzed to check the applicability of the given method and extract conceptual relations among terms. Finally, conceptual mappings that relate metaphors to terms are being analyzed.

Chapter 10 includes, on the one hand, a detailed discussion of research hypotheses and aims. On the other hand, it offers a classification of the difficulties and ambiguities in translating Persian political metaphors and terminology. It also offers a modified model for predicting the difficulty of Persian political terms for English-speaking translators. Furthermore, in line with the ambiguity in Persian political terminology, a specific model regarding the dynamicity of terms in Persian will be provided. Furthermore, a modified version of CMT appropriate to Persian metaphors will be offered in this chapter.

Chapter 11 is devoted to concluding remarks of this study regarding its aims and hypotheses. It will also offer suggestions for further studies.

1.5. Aims, Hypotheses, and Research Questions

This section will address the current study's objectives, hypotheses, and research questions.

1.5.1. *Aims of this Study*

Based on what has already been discussed, the aims of this study are as follows:

The general aim of this study is to investigate cognitive aspects of miscommunication due to ambiguity and the level of difficulty of metaphor and terminology for an English-speaking translator who translates political texts from Persian to English (their mother tongue). In order to fulfill this general objective, several specific aims have been set.

Aim 1: To elaborate a theoretical and methodological framework appropriate to political metaphors tailored to the characteristics of the Persian language and Persian metaphors.

Aim 2: To check the applicability of Frame-Based Terminology to Persian political terminology and see if any modifications are needed due to the specific features of the Persian language, the nature of the specialized knowledge domain of politics, and Persian political terminology.

Aim 3: To identify linguistic and extralinguistic aspects of metaphor and terminology specific to Persian political discourse and absent in the English one.

Aim 4: To contribute some findings to PACTE's translation competence model regarding metaphorical and terminological (sub)competences.

1.5.2. Research Questions

Here is the list of questions, some broader than others, that this study will attempt to answer:

1. What are the metaphorical patterns in the Persian political discourse? And what are their characteristics? Does political affiliation have an impact on the use of metaphors?

2. To what extent are those patterns and characteristics similar to English metaphorical patterns introduced by Musolff (2004 & 2016)? To what extent are they different?

3. Will metaphorical studies be helpful in political discourse translation from Persian?

4. What is Persian political terminology? And what are the characteristics? Do political parties have their specific terminology?

5. Is it sufficient to provide English equivalents for Persian terminology? What are the lexical gaps in terms of determined points of miscommunication?

6. Does frequency play a role in determining the importance of a (multi-word) term? Or just high-frequency terms must be investigated, and the low-frequency ones can be ignored?

1.5.3. Research Hypotheses

The current study will investigate the following hypotheses to approve, modify, or refute them:

1. Persian political discourse has metaphorical patterns. Political affiliation makes a significant difference in terms of both national and international affairs regarding metaphorical patterns.

2.   Although the categorization of patterns is a bit different between Persian and English, the general features are the same.

3.   Metaphorical studies in political translation from Persian are critical since metaphors frame terminology, and they share conceptual mappings of ontological relations. So, a translator's unawareness of them can cause miscommunication.

4.   Persian political terminology is special because of Iran's specific political system. One overriding characteristic of Persian terminology is the special status of religious concepts, which is potentially apt to miscommunication.

5.   Just providing English equivalents for Persian terms does not solve the problem of miscommunication and the difficulty of political translation. There are lexical gaps, and metaphorical, religious, and cultural knowledge can compensate for it to a great extent.

6.   Solely relying on frequency to determine the importance of a (multi-word) term does not suffice; since there are significant terms among those with low frequency.

Chapter 2. Iran's Political System

The Islamic Republic of Iran, previously known as Persia, is located in Western Asia. The official language of Iran is Persian or Farsi, and the official religion is Islam and, to be specific, *Shia* or *Shi'ite* Islam. As the complete name would suggest, the political system governing Iran is a combination of a theocratic and democratic system. In the following, a brief account of political history, central political institutions and how they work, the process of the parliamentary election, and the significance of the period of 2016-2017, which is the period of data collection, will be discussed.

2.1. Brief Political History of Iran

It is not primarily a political study. Since the focus of both linguistic and political issues in contemporary Iran, this concise history's starting point will be the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. After the Islamic Revolution, the country has renamed the Islamic Republic of Iran, shortly known as Iran. The first political parties in Iran were founded in 1908. However, their endeavor to influence society and apply the western model of political movements failed because of "opposition from traditional institutions and lack of knowledge among the people about its necessity" (Asayesh et al., 2011). From 1941 to 1953, political parties, though they did not have well-established organizations and mainly were short-lived, flourished because of central government weakness (Asayesh et al., 2011). From 1953 till the revolution in 1979, there is not enough evidence of independent and active political parties.

After the revolution, at least until 1997, Iran's history can be categorized – based on social, (inter)national, cultural, and political issues – as the War era (1981-1989), during which everything was under the influence of Iran-Iraq war. Other than some illegally political movements such as terroristic bombings during the first years of revolution and war, there were no significant social and political developments. The Reconstruction era (1989-1997)

was the post-war period. It was devoted to reconstructing the (infra)structures ruined during the war, so, again, political parties were ignored, and there was no vital development. The Reform era (1997-2005), whose starting point was the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, a Reformist candidate, who promised 'to start social reforms, create a civil society and boost political engagement" and in this way, political parties began to flourish. Other divisions can be added: for instance, the Conservative era (2005-2009), whose starting point was the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a new political face, as the president who defeated his main well-known rival Hashemi Rafsanjani; moreover, in his second course of the election, he defeated another famous Reformist, Mir Hussein Mousavi, which caused post-election social unrests called Green Movement. Since the election of Rouhani, Iran's current president, in 2013 can be called the Moderate era, which is a bit ambiguous what it means as a political affiliation. The point is that after the Green Movement, attributed to the Reformists, the Reformists would not have the chance in political events in the country, and some moderate and less '(extremist) left' ideologies would substitute them.

Political analysts, whether Iranian or non-Iranian, have categorized political groups and parties in Iran based on different criteria such as religion (Belal, n.d.), resulting in a dichotomy of '*Taqleedists*' vs. '*Ijtihadists*', economics (Asayesh et al., 2011) regarding religion-based vs. non-religion-based economy, and so on. As previously highlighted, this is not a political study – it is a study on political texts with translation-based orientation – in nature, and political issues are mentioned to inform academics of translational studies about the overall political situation of Iran. Bearing this in mind, political affiliation in Iran has always been a dichotomy of 'Conservative' or 'right-wing and 'Reformist' or 'left-wing. During Ahmadinejad's presidency, 'Principalists' tried to distinguish themselves from 'Conservatives', and in the current era, the 'Moderates' tried to be independent of 'Reformists'. Here the dichotomy of Conservative vs. Reformist is applied. However,

political researchers such as Bani Kamal and Ashurov (2017) believe in the existence of three political wings: Reformists, Moderate, and Principled (Conservative) (p. 6). The Moderate wing, consisting of Moderate figures of each of the main political parties, was founded during the 2013 presidential election in the inevitable absence of the Reformists or extremist Reformists because of post-presidential election unrests. The prominent Reformist figures mainly support it, and conservatives almost always rebuke it. Not to make the political division more difficult than it already is, 'Moderate' is taken as the (faction of) Reformist[3].

2.2. Iran's Political Institutions

Iran has a special political system of governing the country. There is a hierarchy of political institutions which needs to be introduced here to help the reader understand better how this system works, especially during national elections. In the following, an account of some duties of each institution will be explained (cf. Jones et al., 2009; Belal, n.d.).

The first and the most powerful institution is the Supreme Leader, chosen by the Assembly of Experts and can hold this position for life unless the assembly dismisses him. According to the constitution of Iran, he is responsible for appointing commander-in-chief of the armed forces, six of twelve members of the Guardian Council, all forty-two members of the Expediency (Discernment) Council, director of national radio and television network, prayer leaders of city mosques, members of National Security Council, the chief prosecutor. He has the power to dismiss the president. He can declare war or peace. He also has

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[3] It is true about the time that our data covers. In other words, those days, Moderate president was known as a figure supported by Reformists. By the end of Rouhani's presidency, Moderates became more inclined towards Conservative wings.

representatives in various sectors of the government, and they can intervene in any issue on behalf of the Supreme Leader.

After the Supreme Leader, the most powerful and influential institution is the president, the head of government and elected directly by the nation's vote and can hold this position for two consecutive terms (each term is four years). He is the head of the Council of Cultural Revolution, nominates the cabinet members, and submits the list to Majlis (parliament). Furthermore, He receives foreign ambassadors and endorses the Iranian ones. He determines economic policies and deals with foreign and security policies. He is also responsible for managing the budget. Moreover, "Eight vice presidents and a cabinet of twenty-two ministers serve under the president. The Council of Ministers must be confirmed by the Majlis, though their decisions are subject to the Council of Guardians' veto" (Jones et al., 2009, p. 17).

Iran's parliament named Majlis-e Shurā-ye Islāmi, shortly known as Majlis, literally translated as the Islamic Consultative Assembly, consists of 290 members (besides the representatives of each city and province, religious minorities, namely Armenians, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Assyrians have reserved seats in the parliament) and is responsible for passing the rules; qualifying/disqualifying candidates for ministers introduced by the president; approval/disapproval of budget, international treaties, agreements, protocols, and contracts. It has the power to ask ministers and presidents questions regarding their duties and request impeachment of them. It should be mentioned that its legislative duty is subordinate to the veto power of the Guardian Council.

The Guardian Council (GC) consists of twelve members: Six of them (Islamic clerics called faqih) are appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, and the other six members (lawyers are introduced by the head of Judiciary and the vote of the members of parliament). GC is responsible for checking the compatibility of laws with Islamic rules and the

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constitution. Moreover, "all candidates for parliamentary and presidential elections, as well as candidates for the Assembly of Experts, must be approved by the Council" (Jones et al., 2009, p. 18).

The Expediency (Discernment) Council consists of fifty members, including natural personalities and ex officio members from countries' various political institutions such as parliament and the Guardian Council. Its prominent role is the advisory body to the Supreme Leader. It also mediates when legislative disagreements between the parliament and the Guardian Council. As it is an advisory board, it consists of different special committees, including experts of that specific field. The Supreme Leader appoints the members, and each course of this council is a five-year term.

The Assembly of Experts is responsible for choosing the Supreme Leader, monitoring his efficiency in doing his job, and if he found him disqualified, dismissing the Supreme Leader. It has 88 members directly voted by people every eight years. It should be mentioned that the Guardian Council vets the candidates.

The Judiciary is another important political institution in Iran whose head is appointed by the Supreme Leader and is responsible for judicial issues of the country. It consists of three courts: "the Public Courts oversee civil and criminal cases; the Revolutionary Courts only try cases involving crimes against national security, narcotics …; and the Special Clerical Court … used to try crimes committed by the clerics" (Jones et al., 2009, p. 19).

Other councils are based on people's direct election such as Islamic Councils for Cities and Villages, Shorā-ye Islāmi-e Shar va Roustā, or other institutions such as Provincial Executive Committees, Hey'at-e Nezārat-e Ostān-ha, but has not been explained here because of the reasons previously mentioned related to the orientation and purposes of this study. In addition to this brief introduction, a brief account of how the general election of

parliament works in Iran might also be helpful to set the political climate of Iran in the readers' minds.

2.3. The Parliamentary Electoral System of Iran

Following the hierarchy mentioned above of political institutions especially those directly officiating by direct vote of nation, national and regional elections are widespread in Iran. Here, just the parliamentary election process will be explained because a considerable amount of our corpus is from parliamentary debates (cf. Bani Kamal & Ashurov, 2017).

The double-phase vetting process of nominees consists of the Provincial Executive Committees, Hey'at-e Ijrāei-ye Ostān-ha, under the supervision of the executive. And then, the Provincial Supervisory Committees, Hey'at-e Nezārat-e Ostān-ha, under the supervision of the Guardian Council. In other words, the Guardian Council has the right to have approbation supervision, nezārat-e estiswābi, which is a kind of introvert supervision. The Guardian Council classifies the nominees as 'qualified', 'disqualified', and 'unqualified', which means he has not been disqualified nor been qualified. Among these three categories, just those in the first one are considered candidates. The disqualified and unqualified ones can file an appeal to the Guardian Council to revise their qualification.

Various political groups make a coalition and introduce the final candidates under 'lists', especially in large cities where political activity is more important because people cannot investigate every single candidate, and they vote to the lists. In small towns, it usually does not work. One point about these lists is the possibility of a coalition of conflicting groups under the same wing. The problem is that the same candidates may be under the name of more than one list. It makes it challenging to decide the political affiliation of a parliament member; as a result, the difficulty in deciding to put one parliamentary debate in the

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subcorpus of which political affiliation. Let alone that there are some cases of floor crossing, i.e., changing political party, and it adds to the difficulty of detecting the political affiliation of members of parliament and collecting the corpus and subcorpus based on that. This difficulty was solved by intensive research into MP's web pages, the history of their political activities, and the omission of cases where making a firm decision was almost impossible.

Before closing this section, a final remark seems inevitably crucial: the importance of newspapers/news agencies is essential, especially during general elections in Iran. As Bani Kamal & Ashurov (2017) highlighted, "in addition to political wings … there is a highly politicized media existent in Iran… they function as political parties" (p. 7). Bani Kamal & Ashurov (2017) correctly indicate that pro-Conservative media are under fewer restrictions and are free to write and criticize as harshly as they want, while the pro-Reformist or pro-moderate ones face so many restrictions, financial fines, or even divestitures. For instance, during the 10th parliamentary elections, pro-Conservative news agencies such as Tasnim were actively and harshly criticizing the government's actions, especially in foreign policy and the nuclear deal between Iran and P5+1.

2.4. Political Climate 2016-2017

The time of data used in this study – from January 1, 2016, to December 30, 2017 – was politically crucial and included the end of the ninth course of the parliament, the general election of the 10th parliament, and the beginning of this new course of the parliament, among other crucial political issues under the influence of not just national but international political climate. A concise but informative account of the political climate during this period would be worth mentioning (cf. Bani Kamal & Ashurov, 2017; Fozi & Zareei, 2018).

The ninth parliament was the first parliament after the Green Movement, post-presidential election social unrests in 2009, attributed to the Reformists that resulted in the

disqualification of many Reformists. However, the most famous and notable Reformist leaders were imprisoned. Some other Reformists did not run for parliamentary candidacy to show their dissatisfaction with the current situation. They highlighted that they neither participate nor support any candidacy lists. In the absence of leading famous Reformist figures, new young unknown Reformists accompanied by few well-known Reformists formed 'public front of reformations', jibheh-ye mardomi-e islāhāt, and united with 'democracy front' and 'the house of labors'. The 2009 social unrests had not only influenced the Reformist wing but also split the Conservative wing into factions. Their main reason for this faction was the silence of some famous figures during the 2009 social unrests and not condemning the leaders of riots. Resistance faction, related to the Conservatives, won 26% of seats. The Conservatives gained 40% of the seats and the moderate Reformists almost 1%. The rest was divided among other parties such as non-affiliated candidates or other factions of the Conservatives. So, like the past two courses of parliament, the majority of seats were taken by the Conservatives.

Almost in the middle of the Conservative (9th) parliament, the Moderate President with somehow Reformist political affiliation took office and signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – in Iran, known as Barjām – between Iran and P5+1, which is a deal related to Iran's nuclear programs. Besides the usual competition between Conservatives and Reformists, there was a dichotomy of political completion between advocates of JCPOA and its opponents. The former was the Conservatives, and the latter was the Reformists and the moderates. As mentioned, every international agreement must be approved by the parliament to be implemented. So, the President needed a parliament in line with his policies.

During the preliminary process of the tenth parliament, like the ninth one, most Reformists were disqualified or preferred not to nominate at all. This time, unlike the Conservatives who were united, the Reformists were still very few. So, a couple of less-

known or unknown but qualified figures of Reformists with pro-government moderates and other parties made a list named 'Hope' (Omid), and all 30 names of this list were elected in Tehran. It was a landslide victory for Reformists, though they were not fortunate in other provinces. Another point about this parliament that makes it even more complicated is that there is no exact estimation of the percent of each political affiliation in this course of the parliament. The average estimation is that 42/56% are the Reformists, 36/65% the Conservatives, and 19/40% the non-affiliated members.

2.5. Critical Concepts in Islamic Political System of Iran

Some concepts are at the heart of the ideology of the Islamic Revolution founded by Ayatollah[4] Khomeini and developed by Ayatollah Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader. Any concept-oriented discussion of Persian political terminology without establishing the background for understanding these fundamental concepts will be inconceivable. The following sub-sections will address a brief account of etymology, Quranic references, interpretation, or status of two fundamental concepts.

2.5.1. *Arrogance: Etymology and Semantic Change*

Persian istikbar (arrogance) is an Arabic term that means vying and avoiding admitting the truth due to obstinacy and egotism. Arrogance and its derivations have been mentioned 48 times in Quran: 4 occurrences refer to Evil's arrogance, and the rest refers to human beings' arrogance. It is pejorative. In the Quran, it collocates with words such as blasphemy, tyranny,

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[4] It is an Arabic term borrowed from Quran which means 'the sign of God' and in Shia practiced in Iran, it is a title given to high-ranking clergies. Cf. آیت‌الله - ویکی شیعه (wikishia.net)

aristocrat, harassment and disobedience, vying, pride, and avoiding (Salimi & Fozi, 2020).

According to Salimi and Fozi (2020), there are four types of arrogance in the Quran:

servitude arrogance, political arrogance, economic arrogance, and scientific arrogance. The

one highlighted in Iran's political system is 'political arrogance'.

As mentioned in Salimi and Fozi (2020), political arrogance in the Quran refers to

arrogant politicians who govern the country, depreciate people, and consider themselves the

nation's guardians. So they enslave the nation and make them live in a way against their

beliefs. The examples mentioned in Quran and recognized by Salimi and Fozi (2020) are

dictators and dictatorial powers. In short, unjust governance is called political arrogance.

However, interestingly enough, they conclude that the enemy is arrogant and must be

countered according to Islamic strategies suggested in Quran. Alternatively, it must be

according to their interpretation of the Quran. They add that arrogance operates in mental

warfare, enslaving people, suppression, sedition and accusation, and social inequality.

In Sketch Engine, thesauri for arrogance are enemy, West, Israel, the US, sedition,

and tyranny. These thesauri approve the assumption that any country, any political entity

against Iran's political system (enemy), is regarded as arrogance. It is based on a political

interpretation of the Quran's verses which describe those against Islam and God as arrogant

people. In other words, since Iran is an Islamic country, arrogance is any disobedience from

it. So, the Quranic concept of arrogance has experienced a semantic change named

specialization or restriction. For Ayatollah Khamenei, the Islam Ayatollah Khomeini believed

is anti-arrogance, meaning anti-America, anti-hegemony, and against the interference of

foreigners in Iran's national affairs[5]. This quotation and many other similar ones extracted from his speeches published on his official webpage prove that arrogance refers to the enemy, specifically, America. For him, the solution for arrogance is resistance and insight.

2.5.2. *Jihad: Etymology and Semantic Change*

Jihad is not at the center of the ideology of Iran's political system as much as arrogance. Nevertheless, it is a sensitive concept due to various misinterpretations leading to Islamic terrorist groups worldwide. Therefore, it will be introduced briefly here. Jihad means diligence and tolerating every pain to accomplish a goal (Karimi & Bakhshi, 2020). However, in its political application, it refers to any resistance and defense in the face of an enemy to protect the independence and liberality of the country (Rostami Nasab & Ebrahimi, 2015; Karami et al., 2016). So, even in the sense of battle, Jihad is a defensive measure.

Jihad and its derivations have been repeated 41 times in Quran. It collocates with expressions such as 'in the path of God', 'believers', 'their belongings and lives' (Karami & Bakhshi, 2020). The general link among these words, to make it understandable in a simple way, is that 'believers would strive in the path of God and sacrifice their possessions to save or defend Islam'. Karami et al. (2016) conclude that in Quran, 'killing' has a close correlation with Jihad, but it has never substituted Jihad, and it has never been a synonym for Jihad. They highlight that Jihad does not equal killing and murdering. They continue that the purpose of Jihad is cultural approach and soft (warfare) strategies (p.146). Rostami Nasab and Ebrahimi (2015) categorize two general types of Jihad: external Jihad against an (external) enemy and

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[5] Ayatollah Khamenei's speech on June 4, 2021, published inفیش‌های استکبارستیزی (khamenei.ir)

internal Jihad or Jihad against self (internal enemy). They argue that both of these types of Jihad are related to each other in the sense that external Jihad needs triumph in internal Jihad (Rostami Nasab & Ebrahimi, 2015, p. 105). In other words, a person needs to overcome his/her inner self at first to do anything against the enemy. They also highlight the defensive nature of Jihad, which is defending righteousness and truth (p. 107).

The thesaurus feature of Sketch Engine shows that Jihad's thesauri are management, defense, battle, war, and security. So, in Persian political discourse, Jihad is more or less the same as the Quran. Therefore, it refers to defensive measures (wars) against enemies at various levels. The difference is that it has gained more meaning components and has gone through semantic broadening or generalization. Moreover, as will be explicated in the following chapters, Jihad in Iran's political discourse is mainly related to 'endeavor' and 'defensive measures'. The concept of Jihad in Persian political discourse correlates closely with resistance; since it is a resistive strategy in front of the enemy's pressures and invasions in various aspects.

In Persian political discourse and especially for Ayatollah Khamenei, Jihad has various types and incarnations such as cultural Jihad, economic Jihad, and major Jihad. Furthermore, each one of them includes a string of strategies. For instance, a resistive economy is part of economic Jihad, a defensive measure countering enemies' economic warfare. Otherwise stated, if the enemy imposes (cultural and economic) warfare, Iran defends its interests by (cultural and economic) Jihad. The most recent type of Jihad introduced by Ayatollah Khamenei is جهاد تبيين (jihad-e tabyein) whose literal translation would be 'explanatory Jihad' or 'Jihad in explanation and determining'.

Its first appearance dates back to May 23, 2016. It was interpreted as an insight-boosting movement necessary for "Great Jihad," which in turn means resisting and foiling the

enemy's plots. 'Explanatory Jihad' did not grab public attention and was not mentioned in hot debates back then. It was revived in Ayatollah Khamenei's speech on September 27, 2021. This time, more details of this term have been clarified, and it is interpreted as 'social media Jihad', which aims at countering the enemy's 'social media warfare'. Ayatollah Khamenei believes that the enemy tries to obscure Islam and Revolutionary Islam through "social media warfare" and 'social media Jihad' as part of "Great Jihad" should foil their plots. However, this 'social media Jihad' works by explaining and clarifying the truth and reality of the Islamic Revolution and Revolutionary Islam in social media for public opinion. In a nutshell, 'social media Jihad' is an enlightening movement that determines truth and reality for Iranians and prepares them for "great Jihad" to counter 'social media warfare'[6].

2.6. Summary

This chapter has discussed Iran's political system after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Four main eras have been realized after the Revolution: the War era, Reconstruction era, Reform era, and Conservative era. The Supreme Leader is the most powerful regarding Iran's political institutions, and the Assembly of Experts chooses him. After him, the president is the most powerful institution, and public elections select him. Well, since the political system of Iran is special, its political institutions are also special, and mostly, they are not comparable to other country's political systems. However, generally speaking, Iran's parliament is similar to the UK's House of Commons. Although, the number of members and their responsibilities differs. Some political experts believe that the role of the Supreme

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[6] Tasnim (tasnimnews.com) | جهاد تبیین» شرط لازم برای «جهاد کبیر» است- اخبار رسانه ها تسنیم»

Leader is similar to the King's role in a monarchical government. Moreover, Iranian political experts have constantly rebuked this impression.

Persian corpora of this study were collected when the country's political climate was recovering from 2009 post-election unrests. Influential Reformists were either imprisoned or disqualified for public elections such as the parliament. Some other Reformists did not run for parliamentary candidacy to show their dissatisfaction with the current situation. So, Moderateness became a new political affiliation that, at first, was oriented towards Reformists and was supported by them. Furthermore, the data are collected in that time.

Chapter 3. Introduction to the Persian Language

This chapter expounds an introduction to the Persian language and its main aspects relevant to this study. A variety of essential topics from language family to which Persian belongs to semantic and syntactic features specific to Persian will be covered in this chapter. Also, a discussion of particular word formation processes of Persian and phraseological topics will be addressed to pave the way for further related discussions in the following chapters. Since it is a corpus-based study, no chapter is complete if it does not consider technical issues in this regard. So, the final section is devoted to the technical challenges that Persian Natural Language Processing (NLP) poses.

3.1. Language Family

Persian or Farsi is a member of the Indo-Aryan branch of the Indo-European languages and a "direct descendant of old and middle Persian" (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 513). Even though Persian uses a modified version of the Arabic script, they are different in many respects because Arabic is from the Semitic family of languages (Ghayoomi & Daroodi, 2008, p. 140). Farsi is another name for Persian which according to Perry (2003), "the replacement of "Persian" by "Farsi" in recent Anglo-American usage 'implies a distinct contemporary vernacular and written standard divorced from any linguistic and cultural antecedents" (cited in Mahmoodi-Bakhtiari, 2018, p. 183). Furthermore, in December of 1992, the Academy of Language and Literature of Iran officially declared its strong disagreement on using Farsi or any other terms instead of Persian in the correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for some reasons. Among them are a) It has been centuries that the current term of Persian has been used and is still used in political, cultural, and academic publications, shreds of evidence, and documents. This term has gained a solid and rich history, meaning, and culture, and the acting of changing it means denying and ignoring its long history. b) The interchange

of Persian with other names will create the illusion of speaking a new language other than what the foreigners used to know (cited in Samiei Gilani, 1995).

Henceforth, based on this concise argument, we mention "Persian" and not "Farsi". Other than Iran, Persian is also spoken in Afghanistan and Central Asia. According to Karimi-Hakkak (2001), "in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979, the civil war in Afghanistan, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is also emerging as the language of a large—and growing—diaspora community." (p. 513). Persian is not the only language spoken in Iran but the official one; by Iranian languages, it is meant all spoken ones like Kurdish, Turkish, and Balochi, including Persian. As the focus of this study is on Persian, we discuss it and do not discuss other Iranian languages.

3.2. Persian Grammar

Rasekh-Mahand (2017) argues that the word order type of Persian is changing and becoming SVO type. His stipulation is based on Dabir Moghaddam's (2013) hypothesis and provides more solid evidence to approve Dabir Moghaddam's hypothesis. He argues that although Persian has "some features of SOV and some of SVO," and although, especially in written texts, the verb is the last constituent of a sentence and comes after an object, it mostly has features of SVO type and is changing its word order type. (Rasekh-Mahand, 2017, p. 1 & p. 17). Generally speaking, "word order is relatively free in Persian" and "it does not make use of gender" (Ghayoomi & Daroodi, 2008, p. 141). As we will study both formal spoken language transcribed and texts initially written, we will take account of this hypothesis, too.

Persian is considered a diglossic language (Henderson, 1975; Jeremiás, 1984; Mahmoodi-Bakhtiari, 2018). Based on nine main features of diglossia—function, prestige, literary heritage, acquisition, standardization, stability, grammar, lexicon, and phonology—

Mahmoodi-Bakhtiari (2018) argues that "Persian is diglossic, although not to the extent that Arabic is" (p. 190). He asserts that strictly speaking, Persian "is not close to classical diglossic languages" (Bakhtiari, 2018, p.190). Moreover, in this sense, he agrees with Perry (2003), who does not consider Persian as a diglossia. However, it does not imply that the distinction between spoken and written Persian is limited to "some deletions in syntax or some sound shifts in phonology". Moreover, on the other hand, "if we consider diglossia as a continuum, Persian may have a place on that continuum" (Bakhtiari, 2018,p. 210). He adds that "the unavoidable differences between the two varieties of Persian cannot be allocated within the study of the 'dialects of Persian'" (p.210). Because nowadays, "the population of the speakers of spoken Persian has grown, and the spoken Persian that was once the dialect of the people of Tehran has now become the spoken variety of Persian used by almost all Iranian Persian speakers" (p. 210).

Dehdari and Lonsdale (2008), calling Persian morphological and syntactic features "interesting", provide examples for these features (p. 19). "Verbs can express tense and aspect, and they agree with the subject in person and number. Nouns can host pronominal clitics marked for dative and genitive pronouns." (p. 19). Before stating some examples for the rules mentioned above, mentioning two points is necessary: a) Persian is a Semitic language, so it does not depict vowels in its written form; b) It has standard morphophonological changes such as "epenthesis, assimilation, and deletion occur at morpheme boundaries" besides some "vowel harmony" (p. 19). The following examples are the same ones from their work (p. 20):

(a) به دستت

be +   dæst + æt

DAT+ hand+ 2.S.GEN

"to your hand"

(b) دیدیمتان

di + d +im + etān

see +PAST+1.P.NOM+2.P.ACC

"We saw you."

(c) نمی‌آیم

næ + mi + ā +æm

NEG+ DUR+ come+1.S.NOM

"I am not coming."

The first line of each example is the Romanized Persian morphology. The second line is as follows: (a) is a noun-enclitic dative, (b) is a verb-enclitic accusative, (c) is vowel harmony and epenthesis. The third line is the English translation.

Another feature of the Persian language, which is in common with other European languages (e.g., Spanish, French, Italian), is its two forms of "you". The familiar "you"— *to* in Persian—is used "when an intimate relationship exists between the speaker and the addressee, or when the addressee is insubordinate position" (Eslami et al., 2018, p. 137). Furthermore, the deferential "you"—*shoma* or *ishān* in Persian—is used "when the relationship between the speaker and the addressee is an asymmetrical relationship, and the addressee is in a superior social position or when the speaker and the addressee do not have a close personal relationship" (Eslami et al., p. 137). Furthermore, linguists have argued that religious, political, and social levels and orientations directly affect the choice of address forms (Eslami & Eslami-Rasekh, 2007; Keshavarz, 1988, 2001), and they depicted significant changes in this phenomena pre-and post-revolutionary of Iran in 1979. Eslami and Eslami-Rasekh (2007) state that "Iranian female language use is an indication of differences in the ways they perform their gendered identities" (cited in Eslami et al., 2018, p. 138). Now that an account of the Persian language is addressed, a brief history of Persian translation and lexicography and terminology in Iran will be offered in respect.

3.3. Persian Semantics

This section will address a general introduction to the semantics of Persian to enable readers to perceive its similarities with English, on the one hand, and notice the differences, on the other hand. The simple definition for semantics would be 'the study of meaning'. This study has valued both referential and associative or emotive meanings by meaning. Especially in the discussion of phraseologies, some points about semantic prosody and positivity vs. negativity will be discussed where necessity demands. Componential analysis, semantic roles (thematic roles), and lexical relations such as synonymy, (gradable/ non-gradable) antonymy, and hyponymy exist in Persian, too. Other than these fundamental semantic relations, homophones and homonyms are also common in Persian:

- Homophones: contemptible خوار/خار thorn *khār*

- Homonyms: شیر *shir* meanings: lion, milk, faucet

Due to the use of Arabic script in Persian without diacritic marks, homograph is a widespread phenomenon in Persian, exemplified in the next section. Another semantic relation shared between Persian and English is polysemy, and the typical example is سر sar (head). Moreover, interestingly enough, some of the multiple meanings are the same as English 'head'. There is also metonymy in Persian:

- Container-content relation: سماور قل می زند

    sæmāvær ghol mi-zænæd

    Samovar is boiling.

    (The water inside the samovar is boiling)

- Whole-part relation: ماشینم پنچر است

    māshinæm pænchær æst

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My car is punctured.

(I have punctured tire)

- Representative-symbol relation: کلید پاستور را برای چهار سال در اختیار خواهد گرفت

  Kelid-e pāstor rā bærāye chæhār sāl dær ekhtiyār khāhæd gereft.

  He will possess the key of Pastor for four years.

  (He will be president for four years)

3.3.1. *Semantic Changes*

A brief yet critical discussion regarding semantic changes in Persian is inevitable here to better understand the discussion of phraseology. There are two general approaches to semantic changes in any given language. One is according to diachronic or synchronic semantic changes of one language. Another approach is loan words in a language and semantic changes done on them. Based on the purpose of this study and the demanding necessity felt in the following chapters related to analyses of lexicons and collocations, the second approach (related to loan words) will be discussed here. Furthermore, this succinct discussion does not focus on the passage of time and its effect on semantic changes.

Among more complicated and detailed typologies of loanwords in any language pairs proposed by various scholars in this field (Stern, 1931; Bloomfield, 1933; Sharifi Moghaddam & Farrahi Moghaddam, 2013), the very general one mentioned in Yule (2020) serves the best the purpose of this study. This typology can be applied to both loan words and diachronic changes of a language's words. According to Yule (2020), broadening of meaning occurs when a word gains more meaning in a target language (TL). For instance, the French loan word 'antenne' meaning 'signal receiver', has gained more meanings, and now in Persian, it means both 'signal receiver' and 'spy' (Sharifi Moghaddam & Farrahi Moghaddam, 2013, p.80). Another semantic change is the narrowing of meaning in which the

loan word loses some of its meaning components and becomes a more specific term. For instance, the French loanword 'manteau' means 'overcoat', 'mantle', and 'cloak'. However, it means a type of women's uniform in Persian (Sharifi Moghaddam & Farrahi Moghaddam, 2013, p.80). Sharifi Moghaddam and Farrahi Moghaddam (2013) also implicitly relate their extensive categorization of semantic changes to these two classes of 'broadening' and 'narrowing' of the meaning.

3.3.2. *Semantic Prosody*

Sinclair introduced semantic prosody in 1987 and it is a relatively recent concept referring to positive or negative meaning a word gains, especially after constantly collocating with certain other words. It benefits from corpus linguistics since corpus is a rich source for studying collocations in their context (co-text). It is also called discourse prosody, pragmatic prosody (Stubbs, 2002), and evaluative prosody (Partington et al., 2013). Gabrovšek (2007) clarifies the distinction between connotation and semantic prosody. For him, the connotation is "the 'additional' meaning of single-word items, identifiable as their semantic property, whether or not considered in a given context" (Gabrovšek, 2007, p. 24). Semantic prosody, on the other hand, is "the semantic property arising sintagmatically from certain multiword items (typically but not exclusively collocations)" (Gabrovšek, 2007, p. 24). He divides semantic prosody into two types in terms of the presence of the prosodic feature of a constituent in a collocation (p. 24). For instance, he argues that 'day after day has negative prosody because it has the additional meaning of 'being boring or annoying' while none of the constituents of this phrase has that negative prosodic feature (p. 15 & p. 24). In the case of 'to cause a fire', the prosodic feature is present (p. 24). It has negative prosody because 'to cause' has a negative prosodic feature and tends to collocate with negative, undesirable things.

Semantic prosody was officially introduced into Persian by Hosseini-Maasoum (2013)[7]. Very few articles in this field (Hashemnia et al., 2013; Hosseini-Maasoum et al., 2014; Hosseini-Maasoum et al., 2016; Peivandi et al., 2018) have been published so far. Another issue is that almost no work is done specifically on Persian semantic prosodic features. English studies heavily influence them compared with their correspondences in Persian. Alternatively, they are mainly concerned with verbal compounds and have overlooked other compounds. So, Persian resources are not rich in this respect. However, they can be helpful for the current study for two reasons.

The first reason lies in the value of these findings in English-Persian comparative studies, which are mainly corpus-based. For instance, Hosseini-Maasoum et al. (2014), in a corpus-based English-Persian comparative study, conclude that the Persian language also has negative, positive, and neutral semantic prosody (p.239). In a diachronic study of Persian verbal compounds, Hosseini-Maasoum et al. (2016) have concluded that the frequency of sentences containing collocations with negative semantic prosody is more than those with positive or neutral semantic prosody; i.e., more than 50% of collocations have negative semantic prosody (p. 31). They also refer to Louw (2000) and add that humans are gaining a negative attitude and perspective to their surrounding world. It is manifested in using more collocations with negative semantic prosody (Hosseini-Maasoum et al., 2016; p. 31).

The second reason is the constant emphasis on the importance of semantic prosody for translators and dictionaries they use. These semantic prosodies should be mentioned in Persian dictionaries to help the translator have a better understanding of this semantic aspect

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[7] In 2012, Modarres-Khiabani translated semantic prosody differently and had an oral presentation about it in the 2nd Semantic Workshop, which is unpublished. Hosseini-Maasoum created the Persian version of semantic prosody in 2013, which is widely used and has been the subject of published articles.

in choosing near-synonym equivalents (Hosseini-Maasoum et al., 2014, p.241; Hosseini-Maasoum et al., 2016, p.34). So, in this study, semantic prosody will be clarified when the necessity demands to equip the translator with information absent in Persian political dictionaries and glossaries.

3.4. Persian Word-Formation Processes

Regarding term-formation procedures, Persian has proved to be a productive language in both general and specialized domains in all communicative circumstances (Fathi, 2017; Abedi et al., 2012). Being productive does not mean that Persian has not borrowed words from other languages. There are many borrowings from Arabic, English, Russian, French, and Turkish. Word formation in English includes neologism, etymology, borrowing, compounding, clipping, coinage, conversion, and derivation (Yule, 2020). According to Abedi et al. (2012), predominant word-formation processes in Persian are etymology, coinage, borrowing, compounding, acronyms, and derivations (p. 6). They also conclude that "culture along with its branches including environment, literature, religion and family contribute highly to raising a new thinking style and forming new words in a language" (p. 20). They highlight the role of religion in the word-formation process, especially in the case of Persian due to the Arab Conquest of Iran from 633 to 654 AD.

Other than those shared word-formation processes with English, Persian has some interestingly specific ways of word-formation. For instance, repetition is a process of word formation in which one word is repeated and makes a new word. Abedi et al. (2012) give these examples: کم کم kæm kæm (little by little), دوان دوان dævān dævān (in a running manner), رفته رفته ræfte ræfte (gradually). This word formation is typical in Turkish too. This process in Persian is usually used in literary texts and oral language usage, and the words made in this way usually function as an adverb. Another type of repetition is similar to onomatopoeia and

is a prevalent one, especially in less formal communicative circumstances. For instance, غار

غار ghār ghār (caw) is the sound made by a crow. In Persian, it can become an adverb غار غار

کنان ghār ghār konān or a compound verb غار غار کردن ghār ghār kærdæn. A word can go

through numerous phases, according to Yule (2020), and this is one of them. A point needs to

be made before discussing the following typical word-formation process in Persian. English'

nominal couples' (kith and kin, bow and arrow) are similar to the Persian 'repetition' process

to some extent (Abedi et al., 2012, p. 11).

Another word-formation process in Persian is in line with repetition, and it is used in

(very) informal communicative situations. It is done using "similar word of a certain main

word to emphasize the status or clarify the meaning. The accompanied word normally means

nothing special and cannot stand alone by itself. They just exist to strengthen or aggravate a

situation or status." (Abedi et al., 2012, pp. 8-9). Words made in this way are called

'rhythmic words'. The following examples and their English equivalents are some of Abedi

et al.'s (2012) exact instances[8].

Table 3.1

Persian New Words Created by Word Formation Process of Rhythmic Words

New word	Part of speech	English equivalent
آت و آشغال *Āt o āshghāl*	N.	Trash, waste material

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[8] Persian scripts are added, and English transliteration has been changed according to our transliteration standard. It is worth mentioning that no copyright permission was required to reproduce this table.

خرت و پرت *Khert o pert*	N.	Tools of less use
کج و کج (همچنین: کج و معوج) *Kæj o mæj* (also: *kæj o mæ'æj*)	Adj.	Crooked

Abedi et al. (2012) also compare English and Persian word-formation processes. They conclude that compounding, coining, borrowing, and etymology are the most common processes between Persian and English. Blending and backformation are infrequent in Persian. Instead, compounding is more prevalent in Persian than in English. Although both English and Persian have acronyms and nominal couples, they are not as common in Persian as in English. For instance, acronyms are commonly used in military organs and companies' names (Abedi et al., 2012, p. 21).

3.5. Persian Phraseology

The phraseology or the study of collocation is a pretty recent field of research in the Persian language. Bateni (2007) offered a detailed study of Persian collocation in terms of 'positive sets' (on syntagmatic axis) and 'negative sets' (on paradigmatic axis). More details of how these axes work in Persian are inessential since recognition of collocation and measuring its strength is done by Sketch Engine through LogDice score. There are few studies, especially corpus-based studies, on Persian collocational patterns. However, these few studies (Bateni, 2007; Danyari & Dehbashi Sharif, 2014; Qureshi et al., 2017) have proved that Persian collocational patterns are significantly different from English. In comparison to English, Persian has more variation portrayed.

Danyari and Dehbashi Sharif (2014) have found 44 Persian collocational patterns and have compared them with English collocational patterns proposed by Benson et al. (1986).

The most common Persian collocational pattern is Noun + Adjective (Danyari & Dehbashi Sharif, 2014; Qureshi et al., 2017). For instance, شیطان sheitān (Satan) as a noun collocates with بزرگ bozorg (great) as an adjective to make 'Great Satan' refer to the US. Some other interesting Persian collocational patterns are as follows[9]:

Table 3.2

Interestingly Special Persian Collocational Patterns

Persian Collocational Patterns	Example
Noun + preposition + noun	لچک به سر
	Læchæk be sær
	Headscarf on head (wearing headscarf)
Adjective + preposition + noun	چپ اندر قیچی
	Chæp ændær gheichi
	Left and scissors (curved; disorderly)
Noun + verb	دست مریزاد
	Dæst mærizād
	(Your) hand not to fall/ sicken
	(well done, good job)

3.6. Technical Challenges of Persian NLP

The Persian language has unique characteristics which cause technical difficulties for language processing tools, and many authors have addressed them from their respective viewpoints (Marszalek-Kowalewska, 2018; Tofighy et al., 2011; Ghayoomi et al., 2010; Ghayoomi & Daroodi, 2008). Here an account on the categorization of these challenges will be addressed, which is based on Marszalek-Kowalewska's (2018) and Tofighy's et al. (2011) model, and the examples are of the present study:

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[9] Patterns and examples are partially reprinted from Danyari and Dehbashi Sharif (2014), but the author does translations. No copyright permission was required.

a) "Unclear word boundaries and resulting unclear phrase boundaries" because the Persian language has "pseudospaces or zero-width non-joiner (ZWNJ, \u200c in Unicode)" signaling "boundaries of words or compound parts" (Marszalek-Kowalewska, 2018, p. 343). This issue is categorized as "word spacing" by Tofighy et al. (2011). In theory, it seems to be clear-cut and straightforward. However, in practice, it is tricky and raises more challenges: On the one hand, when pseudospaces should be used, the white space is used and results in mistake by text processor because it is one word but is processed as two separate words, e.g., the Persian compound word جامعه شناسی jāme'eshenāsi 'sociology' is processed as جامعه jāme'e 'society' and شناسی shenāsi 'knowledge' instead of sociology; on the other hand, when white spaces should be used, pseudospaces are used or no space is used and, in turn, two or three separate words (phrases) are processed as a single word, e.g., the Persian phrase ازاوبازشنیدم azoobāzshenidam 'IHeardItAgainFromHim' is processed as one item. Furthermore, "the inconsistency in the use of white spaces in terms with detached morphemes creates another challenge" (Marszalek-Kowalewska, 2018, p. 343), e.g., the Persian prefix می combining with the Persian verb خواهد allows for three possibilities: attached میخواهد, pseudospace می‌خواهد, and white space می خواهد. Marszalek-Kowalewska (2018) also has another category named "complex tokens," whose boundaries distinguishing it from this category are not clear-cut, so it is merged into this type.

b) "Diacritics", or as Tofighy et al. (2011) categorize it, "homographs". Diacritic marks in Persian are often not indicated in words, and this makes a resource of ambiguity named "homographic lexemes": "It blurs the statistics and frequencies, as after tokenization, these words are counted as one, whereas the real frequency of each of them is difficult to establish" (Marszalek-Kowalewska, 2018, p. 343). For instance, the diacritics which makes the difference between two separate lexemes and its omission results in homograph and ambiguity: گِل guel 'mud' vs. گُل gol 'flower' or پَر par 'feather' vs. پُر por 'full'. A more

complicated example is کرم which can be pronounced kerm (worm), kerem (cream), karam (generosity), and korom (chromium).

c) "The Ezafe construction" is a phrase of nouns, adjectives, and prepositions in which the relationship between nouns and their modifiers are determined by a short vowel (Ezafe marker of kasre ِ) which is always pronounced but the written form is arbitrary. For instance, the Persian phrase دوستِ من dust-e man 'my friend' is often written as دوست من. The lack of this marker causes "problems in chunking, as well as to the semantic and syntactic processing of a sentence" (Marszalek-Kowalewska, 2018, p. 344).

d) "Encoding" is another challenge according to Marszalek-Kowalewska (2018) since Persian uses Arabic script and the encoding of Persian sometimes is conducted through the mixture of both of them: "as well as the Unicode characters for Persian, Arabic or ASCII characters tend to be used as well" (Marszalek-Kowalewska, 2018, p. 344). His actual example is "letters ک and ی can be expressed in Persian (\u06a9 for ک and \u064a for ی) or Arabic encoding (\u0643 for ک and \u06cc or \0649 for ی)" (Marszalek-Kowalewska, 2018, p. 344).

e) "Multiple types of writing for a word", for Tofighy et al. (2011), is among the problems imposed on both text processors and researchers would influence the frequency of a word since different forms of the same word would be counted as distinct lexemes (p. 652). For instance, in Persian, there are two forms for the same English word meaning 'iron': اتو and اطو out, and the Persian Academy of Language and Literature (PALL) has approved both of them; other than these forms, there are numerous writings for the word which is common among people, but the PALL has not approved them. Like اطاق and اتاق otāgh 'room' which the latter is not approved but is still common.

f) According to Tofighy et al. (2011), the challenge of more than 2800 declensional suffixes of Persian adds to the complexity of inflection in Persian by morphophonemic rules

they manifest: "In some cases, affixes, especially suffixes, may change regarding lemma," they also influence "the affixes intra-combination," and because of their phonetic characteristics, they influence "the affixes intra-combination (p. 652). For instance, the plural form of Persian words is by adding suffixes ها hā or ان ān, but sometimes, based on the morphophonetic rules, one more phoneme گ g is added, e.g., شرکت‌کننده sherkatkonande 'participant' is the single form, and the plural form can be شرکت‌کننده‌ها sherkatkonandehā or a more common one شرکت‌کنندگان sherkatkonandegān' participants'. Another interesting example can be the Persian first-person possessive adjective م m 'my', which inflecting the words, sometimes, needs one more morpheme. For instance, کتاب ketāb 'book' becomes کتابم ketābam 'my book'. However, in پرنده parande 'bird' it becomes پرنده‌ام parande'am 'my bird'. In considering the plural form of the previous example, شرکت‌کننده‌ها, it becomes شرکت‌کننده‌هایم sherkatkonandehayam 'my participants'. In the first case, کتاب, no morpheme was added, in the second one ا 'a was added, and in the last case, ی y was added to help the pronunciation and the flow of the morphemes.

Given the characteristics of the Persian language and inherent problems due to its aforementioned special features, many scholars have tried to develop tools and methods to investigate various topics on terminology and syntactic and semantic fields of Persian (Mohammadirad & Rasekh-Mahand, 2017; Amtrup et al., 1999, 2000; Bateni, 2008; Dehdari & Londsdale, 2008; Ghaniabadi, 2008; Abdi et al., 1393/2014; Khosravizadeh & Rezaiepour 1393/2014). These characteristics of the Persian language posed technical difficulties for the corpus analysis tool chosen, Sketch Engine. These technical aspects needed to be addressed, and they will be accounted for later in this work (chapter 8).

3.7. Summary

To summarize this chapter, reminding some points about various aspects of Persian seems useful. Persian (also called Farsi) is a member of Indo-European languages. It is a gender-neutral language and has relatively free word order. It is a diglossic language to some extent. Persian is a Semitic language, and, unlike English, it does not show vowels. However, it has vowel harmony. Persian and English have shared semantic relations such as synonymy, homophony, and homonymy. Persian lexicons also show semantic prosody, and just like English, the frequency of Persian collocations with negative semantic prosody is higher than that of neutral and positive semantic prosody. Persian is considered a productive language in both general and specialized domains. Predominant Persian word-formation processes are etymology, coinage, borrowing, compound, acronyms, and derivations. Compounding is more prevalent in Persian than in English among all of these processes. In the case of Persian, religion plays a special role in word-formation processes. Persian also has specific word-formation processes such as repetition. Phraseology and the study of collocational patterns is a new field of study in Persian. Persian collocational patterns are significantly different from English, and the variety of these patterns is greater in Persian. Some of the challenges posed on Persian NLP are factors such as unclear word boundaries, complex inflection, and encoding issues due to the use of Arabic script.

Part II. Literature Review

Every research is done to improve the knowledge of human beings concerning a phenomenon. It also intends to add new information to science and a particular field of study. Nevertheless, no research, even the most innovative ones, is done based on zero previous studies. Every scientist stands on the shoulders of earlier scientists. The current study is no exception and has previous related research as its foundation. As a result, in this section, a review of existing metaphor and terminology studies will be offered to understand what has already been done and what this research will add to this field of study.

Chapter 4. Metaphor in Translation

This chapter reviews previous research on metaphor studies and their relevance to translation studies. The first section will define metaphor, how it is related to translation studies, how differently the theory of metaphor has evolved in Persian and Western studies, and various examples to clarify the discussion. The second section concerns theoretical issues of metaphor in this study. It covers issues such as Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) conceptual metaphor theory, criticisms it has received, and our answers or solutions to them. Since it is a corpus-based study, the final section pertains to corpus linguistics. Issues such as challenges posed to corpus-based metaphor studies, along with its undeniable advantages, will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.

4.1. Metaphor: Definition and Importance

First of all, we will discuss metaphor and its definition so that the following discussions regarding its importance and role in this study will be understood better. Following establishing a definition of metaphor, other noteworthy topics such as the relationship between metaphor and translation studies and theories regarding metaphor studies will be discussed.

4.1.1. Definition of Conceptual Metaphor

From Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) experientialist approach, metaphor is defined as the unity of "reason" and "imagination"; it is "imaginative rationality" (Lakoff & Johnson, p. 193). According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), a conceptual metaphor is the description of an abstract phenomenon (target domain) in terms of a concrete phenomenon (source domain) based on ontological correspondence. This ontological correspondence contrasts with a traditional pre-existing similarity: "Properties of a source domain correspond to properties of a target domain" (Al-Harrasi, 2001, p. 77). For Goatly (2007), cognitively speaking,

metaphor is "thinking of one thing (A) as though it were another thing (B), and linguistically this will result in an item of vocabulary or larger stretch of text being applied in an unusual new way." (p. 11). These definitions are based on a unidirectional relation between source and target domain.

Musolff (2016) defines conceptual metaphor considering the possibility of bidirectional relations between source and target domains in CMT (p. 91). Moreover, he refuses the notion of an abstract phenomenon being described by a concrete phenomenon (p. 91). He calls it "re-metaphorzation" and defines metaphor "as a discursive, dynamic tool of assimilating any target topic to a more familiar set of concepts, in order to redirect and reshape its understanding by the respective communication partners" (p. 91). For him, the sociocultural context determines the 'familiarity' and 'topicality' of those concepts, and it is not related to the inherent conceptual features of metaphors (Musolff, 2016, p. 91). This study has taken this version of Musolff's (2016) definition of metaphor as its basis and adds to his idea of metaphor by stating that there is no necessity for the presence of a concrete phenomenon as the target domain. That is to say, in Persian, there are numerous cases of metaphors in which one abstract concept has been described by another even more abstract concept (section 9.1). Our study has also shown that quantities of metaphors describe a concrete phenomenon in terms of an abstract one (section 9.1).

Before reviewing the evolutionary process of metaphor theories, a point needs to be highlighted about the importance of metaphor in translation and how these two fields of study are inseparably interwoven. Among all scholars in metaphor studies (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Musolff, 2004 & 2016), Lakoff and Johnson (1980) highlight the general importance of conceptual metaphor by arguing that it is an intrinsic part of the culture and help build the human perception and courage to behave in a certain way. The importance of political

metaphor, for Musolff (2016), is that this type of metaphor has a pragmatic function which aims to offer a specific assessment of a given problem and to make sure that the public receives it accordingly so that they would act or have the same emotions as intended by the speaker (p.4). Nevertheless, it does not mean that the public, as the receiver of metaphor, does not have free will, and they will accept whatever metaphor they are exposed to in their everyday lives.

4.1.2. *Interdependence of Translation Studies and Metaphor Studies*

Apart from theorists who argue the importance of metaphor in various fields of studies, other scholars have specifically highlighted the role of metaphor in translation and the close connection and interdependency of translation and metaphor studies (Al-Harrasi, 2001; Shuttleworth, 2011, 2013 & 2017; Schäffner & Shuttleworth, 2013; Guldin, 2016). For Guldin (2016), "It [connection between translation and metaphor] highlights the fact that a sustained study of metaphors for translation and of translation metaphors can be profitable for the fields of both translation studies and metaphor studies." (p. 4). CMT as the most recent theory in the field of metaphor studies has extensively been applied to underline the interdependent relation between metaphor and translation studies. It has had the most substantial effect in this regard (Schäffner & Shuttleworth, 2013, p. 96). Although Schäffner and Shuttleworth (2013) are skeptical about the appropriateness of CMT for metaphor in translation (MiT), they agree that this approach can help translation scholars with cognitive processes in the mind of the translator (p. 96). They are skeptical because they believe that CMT has minimized the role of culture; meanwhile, they find this approach practical as they expound how various recent studies have proved that metaphor is a cognitive-demanding issue for translators (Schäffner & Shuttleworth, 2013, p. 96).

The solution for skepticism caused by a lack of cultural emphasis in this study is addressing cultural issues while discussing metaphors. Besides, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) also believed in the interactional nature of experience, which is interchangeable with culture, and the possibility of one nation understanding another nation's unshared experience based on shared ones. Furthermore, our study will help the English-speaking translators understand the cultural and other aspects of Persian metaphors based on shared ones. More details on the experientialist approach of Lakoff and Johnson will be explained in section 4.2. Shuttleworth (2011) provides a list of various mappings of metaphors similar to conceptual mappings in CMT and investigates how they are translated in scientific texts. Schäffner and Shuttleworth (2013), referring to Suttleworth's (2011) work, believe that just extracting those conceptual mappings is not enough, and the typological class of metaphor reveals more about translator behavior (p. 95). Typological class of a metaphor refers to "whether it is an example of concretisation, humanisation, dehumanisation or whatever" (Schäffner & Shuttleworth, 2013, p. 95). They add that this aspect of MiT is new, and there is a lot to be done (Schäffner & Shuttleworth, 2013, p. 97). Since no previous work has been done to reveal Persian conceptual mappings in political discourse, the current study first had to extract them. And then, in section 9.1, a typology of how these mappings work has been offered to help raise the translator's awareness and competence.

Al-Harrasi's (2001) work in MiT is significant to the current study since he has categorized conceptual metaphors integrating Islamic considerations into Arabic political discourse. Highlighting Lakoff and Johnson's typology of conceptual metaphor and schemata image, he has focused on conceptual metaphor. Based on his categorization of metaphors, 'intertextual metaphors' are especially relevant to this study. According to Al-Harrasi (2001), intertextual metaphors are those Islamic concepts mentioned in the Quran used metaphorically in Arabic political discourse. These intertextual metaphors are studied under

scenarios related to the religion source domain in this thesis. Although our method is different and both conceptual metaphor and schemata image are combined with having a holistic understanding of Persian political metaphors, some of his conclusions are valuable bases for this study. Al-Harrasi (2001) determines three realizations of intertextual metaphors: a) "lexical linguistic realizations", b) "quotation from Quran", and c) using archaic Quranic terms" (pp. 235-243). Since our corpora are in Persian, the last one has not been found. Another important conclusion he makes is that "a translator who does not have an encyclopedic knowledge of the culture of the ST [source text] would not understand several linguistic instances that are realizations of intertextual metaphors" (Al-Harrasi, 2001, p. 234). In the following chapters, it will become more evident that Persian political discourse is much richer in dimensions than Arabic, even in this respect.

4.1.3. *The Trajectory of Metaphor Theories: Persian vs. Western Theories*

The trajectory of Western metaphor theories has undergone developmental phases from Aristotelian rhetoric to semantics and semiotics, and now it has ended up at discourse and cognitive linguistics (Guldin, 2016, p. 3). Another change regarding this evolutionary trajectory is the level at which these studies are done. At first, it was done at the word level, then sentence, and finally, discourse (Ricoeur, 2003, p.1). This change of focus could happen because of developments in technology supporting corpus linguistics, making it possible to study corpora of millions of words in their cotext. The discussion of corpus-based metaphor studies will be mentioned in section 4.3. On the other hand, the trajectory of Persian metaphor theories has always been influenced by Western ones, and no original metaphor theories based on Persian metaphors have been stipulated. In other words, Iranian scholars have always relied on English metaphor theories to test them on Persian metaphors.

The review of Persian metaphor theories (Yaghoobi, 2015; Mokhtari et al., 2018; Gandomkar, 2019) reveals that, unlike Western developmental phases of metaphor theories, Persian metaphor theories are of just two types, i.e., traditional theory (Aristotelian theory of metaphor) and cognitive theory (Lakoff's theory of metaphor). The former has always been applied to literary metaphors primarily found in poems, and the latter has received little attention in both literary texts and other (scientific) texts in Persian. The main reason behind this could be Persian features in terms of the figurative use of language.

Persian is a literary and highly imaginative and generative language, and mere application of Western theories without considering Persian linguistic features is of little use (Mokhtari et al., 2018). Primary studies on Cognitive Metaphor Theory (CMT) in Persian emerged around 2007 (Gandomkar, 2019). One of CMT basics is "uni-directional metaphorization of the concept" (Musolff, 2016, p. 75). It means that one abstract phenomenon (target domain) is described in terms of another concrete phenomenon (source domain) to make it more tangible and perceptible. Furthermore, the direction between these two phenomena or concepts is uni-directional. For instance, in the metaphorical sentence of 'love is a journey, 'love' is the target domain and 'journey' is the source domain. According to CMT, the direction from the source to the target domain is one way, and it cannot say 'journey is love'.

Musolff (2016) has given an example that rejects this assumption of CMT based on historical analysis of how a metaphor related to 'parasite' has evolved from being source domain to target domain. More examples of directional and bi- and uni-directional relation between concepts will be explained in sections 4.1.3 and 9.1. What is important here is that this is a sporadic case in English, and if there is any case of bidirectional source-target relation, it has happened over time and needs historical analysis of a metaphor. However,

bidirectional source-target relationships are not an exception in Persian, and they are inherent in Persian metaphors; i.e., a concept can be both source and target domain at the same instant (no need for a diachronic approach).

4.1.4. *Examples of Conceptual Metaphors in Persian*

Gandomkar (2019), just like Lakoff and Johnson (1980), gives out-of-context daily expressions which indicate bidirectional relation in Persian conceptual metaphors. Her actual examples are[10]:

- از سرم دود بلند می‌شه

  Æz særæm dud bolænd mishe

  Smoke is rising from my head. (Human being is a car from which smoke is rising.)

  Source domain: car   **Target domain**: human being

- یک هفته است ماشین گوشه حیاط خوابیده.

  Yek hæfte æst māshin gushe-ye hæyāt khābide

  The car has been asleep in a corner of yard for one week. (The car is a human being.)

  Source domain: human being   **Target domain**: car

In the first example, one might say that smoke can arise from anything other than a car, but according to Persian speakers' experiential conceptualization or metaphorization, it refers to a car. Another better instance provided by Gandomkar (2019) is: 'Yesterday, Sasan's breaks failed in that fight' (p.201). As shown, Sasan as a human being is described as a car whose

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[10] Transliteration and translations into English are added.

breaks do not work correctly. It means that Sasan lost control and was outraged. More examples related to political metaphors of this study will be discussed in the following chapters.

Gandomkar's (2019) study of Persian conceptual metaphor is based on the target domain; i.e., the starting point of her examples of metaphorical patterns is the target domain. While ours is based on source domains, the starting point is the source domain. Another point that distinguishes the studies is that her examples are general conversational out-of-context sentences. However, ours contains in-context authentic examples mentioned in political texts. Nevertheless, her work to prove that bidirectional source-target domain relation is a rule and not an exception in Persian is of great importance to this study.

4.2. Theoretical Framework of Metaphor Study

In the current study, a combination of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is applied and tailored according to its corpus-based orientation. These approaches (CMT & CDA) are used to investigate political argumentation and, ultimately, to give some insights on how metaphors are constructed in the discourse of Iran's leading political groups. In this sense, metaphors are seen as sources or manifestations of power (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Koller, 2008; Musolff, 2004 & 2016). Since the emergence of CMT in Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) *Metaphors we live by*, many studies have discussed, criticized, and applied it. So, first, a discussion of its theoretical framework will be presented. Then, some advantages of CMT, along with some of its criticisms dealt with in this study, will be addressed.

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4.2.1. *Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) CMT*

Lakoff and Johnson (1980), by metaphor, mean 'metaphorical concept' which refers to their argument stating "human thought processes are largely metaphorical" (p. 6 italics in original). That is to say, a person's conceptual system based on which they interact with the world and experience the phenomena, and communicate with people in a specific cultural background is fundamentally metaphorical. So we conceptualize every phenomenon in terms of metaphor, and this conceptualization is highly cultural and might be different from one nation to another (p. 9). This conceptual system works unconsciously, and so are metaphorical concepts; but one way to explore them is through language (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 3). Another characteristic of metaphor or metaphorical concept is its systematicity; that is to say, since "metaphorical concept is systematic, the language we use to talk about that aspect of the concept is systematic" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 7). They argue that by finding patterns of metaphors through linguistic means, we can find patterns of thoughts or conceptual systems governing those metaphors and, in this way, "gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 7).

After criticizing both objectivist and subjectivist approaches to truth and how it affects the interpretation of metaphor, Lakoff & Johnson (1980) offer a third approach and try to end the mythical dichotomy of subjectivism and objectivism: experientialist approach. Confirming that "there is nothing radically new in our account of the truth", they briefly explain five characteristics of their experientialist approach to truth (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 181). The first characteristic states that understanding a situation or statement is partial and it is a result of experience or "interaction with the situation itself" and "since we understand situations and statements in terms of our conceptual system, truth for us is always relative to that conceptual system" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 180). For them, the conceptual system is at the center of understanding even though it is partial, and in this sense, this is what their approach has in common with correspondence theory.

In line with *coherence theory*, the second characteristic is that a statement needs to be associated with a coherent scheme and proportional to a conceptual system to be understood (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 180). Third, borrowed from pragmatic theory, understanding arises from experience and our construction of categories and dimensions of experience, i.e., our conceptual system, is both developed from and assessed by experience "through ongoing successful functioning by all the members of our culture" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, pp. 180-81). Fourth, conceptualization is not based on "inherent properties" of something, but they are related to "interactional properties," and they would be different from one culture to another (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 181). Fifth, someone with a very different conceptualization might have a different understanding of the world and even have a different approach to truth and reality (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 181). To recap their experientialist theory of truth: "we understand a statement as being true in a given situation when our understanding of the statement fits our understanding of the situation closely enough for our purposes." (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 179).

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) highlight that understanding or truth is based on interaction with the world and that it is not something inherent in a phenomenon or world (objectivism), nor is it something based on intuition and feelings (subjectivism). They indicate how their solution (experiential theory) compensates for shortcomings of both objectivism and subjectivism in viewing metaphor and its status in our everyday life. From an experientialist viewpoint, truth is regarding the conceptual system of someone founded on and assessed by that person's experiences or the others' from that culture emerged from interactions with the environment, whether physical or cultural environment (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 193). According to experiential theory, in opposition to objectivism, there is no "neutral" or impartial or objective conceptual system, and we understand the meaning proportional to our cultural conceptual systems, which are inherently metaphorical; i.e., include imaginative rationality, which helps to understand a non-physical phenomenon in terms of another physical kind of thing (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 194). Contrary to subjectivism, the experiential theory also argues that even imaginative understanding is relative to a conceptual system which itself is founded on successful interactions in the (cultural and physical) environment; so understanding metaphors consists of metaphorical entailment, which itself is imaginative rationality (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 194).

Let us exemplify this metaphorical entailment and its imaginative rationality. For instance, metaphor political systems are trees leads to various metaphorical expressions that are systematic and coherent due to entailments related to tree facts. A couple of facts are a) There are beneficial tree (blessed tree) and detrimental tree (evil tree); b) beneficial trees bear good fruits, and detrimental trees bear poisonous fruits; c) more beneficial trees must be planted, and detrimental trees must be avoided or rooted out; and so on. Based on these facts about trees, we have the following systematic and coherent metaphorical entailments which are interwoven with imaginative rationality based on Quranic verses:

i. There are beneficial and detrimental political systems.

ii. Sound political systems (e.g., Iran) yield excellent and delicious fruits (e.g., martyrdom), and inadequate political systems (e.g., Israel) yield bad and detrimental fruits (e.g., occupation of Palestine).

iii. More political systems such as Iran must be founded globally, and political systems such as Israel's must be destroyed.

The role of this view of metaphor in communicative circumstances is also essential. For Lakoff and Johnson (1980), metaphor plays a significant role in mutual understanding and interpersonal communication. To have successful communication between people with different cultural backgrounds, and thus different and supposedly unshared experiences (different conceptual systems) based on interactions with the cultural and physical environment, they must have a gift for realizing the right metaphors to convey appropriate parts of their unshared experiences or to underline the shared parts, while attempting to downplay the others (p. 231). For them, this is a skill which is called 'metaphorical imagination,' and it is essential for "creating rapport" and for "communicating the nature of unshared experience" or even for constituting "a shared vision" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, pp. 231-32). To acquire this skill, the capability "to bend your world view" and to "adjust the way you categorize your experience" is needed (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 231).

From a cultural perspective, they claim that "cultural values" must be in line with principal metaphorical concepts (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 22) and not the other way around. However, when analyzing metaphors, they interpret and explain them based on the cultural background that might have affected those metaphors. For Lakoff and Johnson (1980), metaphors are capable of "creating realities for us" (p. 156), and consistent patterns of metaphorical expressions can underline or dismiss some aspects of reality (p. 157) and in

this way, "control discourse and hence cognition" (Koller, 2008, p. 105). Deignan (2008) argues that "mental mappings are realized through linguistic metaphors … and it is the underlying mental mapping which results in systematicity at linguistic level" (p.150).

4.2.2. *The Dilemma of Abstract and Concrete*

Before proceeding to the next section and discussing criticisms on CMT, a brief account of what abstract and concrete mean in this study will be provided. The current study is based on CMT, and CMT adopts cognitive linguistics. According to cognitive linguistics, experiences can be abstract or concrete. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) adopt their terminology and classify these two experiences as basic-level concepts and abstract concepts and experiences. In this study, basic-level concepts are called concrete concepts, and abstract concepts and experiences are the same. For Lakoff and Johnson (1999), objects (e.g., door), animals (e.g., giraffe), actions (e.g., talking), social concepts (e.g., family), and emotions (e.g., sadness) are basic-level concepts (Al-Harrasi, 2001, p. 73). The human mind quickly recognized them due to their concrete nature (Al-Harrasi, 2001, p. 73).

Abstract concepts and experiences, on the other hand, are "concepts of death, love, anger, and political concepts such as struggle and development" (Al-Harrasi, 2001, p. 73). While our knowledge of basic-level concepts is 'rich and familiar', our knowledge of abstract concepts is 'poor and impoverished' (Al-Harrasi, 2001, p. 73). The latter has an "impoverished skeletal structure" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 58). For instance, "we know the structure of a prototypical cow … [but] our understanding of the structure of love is very poor" (Al-Harrasi, 2001, p. 73). Impoverished skeletal structure does not mean that the abstract concept or experience is poor, but it is a rich human experience with poor structure (Al-Harrasi, 2001, p. 73).

4.2.3. Addressing Criticisms of CMT

Like every other theory, Conceptual Metaphor Theory has been criticized, and various scholars have pointed out its inadequacies. In the following, three of them and our solution to each of them will be discussed:

a)   What distinguishes conceptual metaphor theory from other approaches lies in the idea that "the conceptual level of mapping is seen as central, while language is secondary" (Deignan, 2008, p.150). This secondary status of language is precisely where the criticisms arise: On the one hand, language is a peripheral issue, and mental mappings or 'thoughts' are primary; on the other hand, to find those underlying mental mappings, it is highly dependent on linguistic tools (Deignan, 2008, p.151). Because of this second position given to language status, some researchers (Vereza, 2008; Deignan, 2008) argue that most studies based on this theory have offered invented and out-of-context examples, so the samples are not authentic. This criticism does not apply to our study because it is corpus-based; i.e., all examples are extracted from authentic parliamentary debates and online published political news.

b)   Another criticism is concerned with how data are analyzed in this approach. For instance, Deignan (2008) criticizes this theory for its "over-simplified view of conceptual and linguistic metaphor and the connection between them" (p. 130). Another similar criticism which is somehow in line with this one, is that Cognitive Metaphor Theory, in general, and Lakoff's experientialist approach, in particular, is a form of reductionism (Goatly, 1997; Goatly, 2007; MacCormac, 1990). For Goatly (2007), the idea that almost all thoughts or thought mappings can be traced back to experiential metaphors (metaphors conceptualized by solely bodily experiences in the

social and physical environment) shows a solid proneness to be reductionist (p. 393). This downplay of culture in CMT has been compensated by considering cultural issues in metaphor studies in the last two decades, and it is considered an "extended" version of CMT (Shuttleworth, 2011, p. 303).

Furthermore, simplicity for considering some sentences as a metaphor that has never been determined as such before is not a negative point, and it happens because, for CMT, our life is interwoven with metaphors. So much so that we are unaware of them and use them even unconsciously. Even if we agree that CMT is oversimplified and redundant, it still does not mean that it cannot be helpful in other fields such as translation. For instance, in this study, CMT, together with CDA, helps English-speaking translators to understand Persian political metaphors better and translate them with less difficulty.

c)   The last criticism is pointed out by Low (1999), who highlights the difficulty or even the impossibility of validating "that a conceptual metaphor represents anything more than the analyst's individual interpretation" (cited in Littlemore, 2008, p. 200). This study has minimized this problem as much as possible by applying statistics and features of Sketch Engine. Subjectivity is a concern in any research, and it can be reduced to a great extent by the repetition of similar research by different scholars. Since this is the first attempt ever to find conceptual metaphors specific to Persian political texts, it is open to be validated by other researchers in this field. However, for now, it is safe to say that in every step of this study, everything has been done to minimize the analyst's intuitional interpretation.

4.3. Musolff's Scenario-Based Theory of Metaphor

Based on CMT, other than source and target domain, the scenario is at the center of Musolff's (2004 & 2016) work. A scenario is "an intermediate analytical category between the level of the conceptual domain as a whole and its individual elements" (Musolff, 2004, p. 13). It is a set of "little scenes or storylines" to convey "evaluative arguments and judgments" based on the "assumptions" they imply regarding an issue (Musolff, 2004, p. 17). Scenarios contain "assumptions". The scenario is what Lakoff (1987) calls "Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs)" (Musolff, 2004, p. 17). For instance, in the (super) source domain of HOUSE AND CONSTRUCTION, there is a scenario of the Islamic Revolution in Iran as a house with pillars. The assumptions regarding the role of a pillar in a building determine what the metaphor user meant by it and how the metaphor receiver will interpret or act upon it. Pillar is considered a conceptual element, and a cluster of related conceptual elements creates a scenario. Moreover, a cluster of scenarios related to a similar knowledge domain makes super domains. In other words, scenarios are at the intermediate level between conceptual elements and super domains.

Another crucial aspect of Musolff's (2004) theory is that he regards "political metaphors as integral aspects of argumentative reasoning, i.e. reasoning that typically aims to prove a *contested* issue and thus also *legitimize* a certain course of action" (p. 32 italics in original). He proposes this idea in response to his posited question: "how can a metaphorical mapping suggest a certain commitment *before* it has acquired 'reality' status through political practice?" (p. 32 italics in original). In fact, he goes beyond metaphor entailments explained in section 4.2.1 and believes that the warrant is based on "*presupposed* steps of argumentation, which are assumed by the interlocutors to be uncontroversial at the time of speaking but are not logically binding truth conditions" (Musolff, 2004, p. 33 italics in original). For Toulmin (1958), warrants demonstrate "the legitimacy of the [argumentative]

step involved and to refer it back to the larger class of steps whose legitimacy is being presupposed" (cited in Musolff, 2004, p. 33). And for Musolff (2004), if a political metaphor is used as "a conclusion about contentious issue of public concern" it serves as an argumentative warrant (Musolff, 2004, p. 33). So, "the presupposed knowledge about the source domain that is mapped onto the target domain can lead to inferences with a particular political slant or bias" (Musolff, 2004, p. 33). Presuppositions considered unproblematic and hidden in metaphors are means to encourage people to take actions in a specific way or to think in a certain way.

A point regarding antailment and presupposition is worth mentioning here. In pragmatics, entailment is a logical consequence of an utterance, while presupposition is the speaker's assumption before making a given utterance. In other words, speakers have presuppositions, while sentences have entailments. Entailments are sentence-dependent, while presuppositions are context-dependent. Entailment has been explained in section 4.2.1 and here we will expound presupposition. For instance, speaker A says "Marina's dog is beautiful". The presupposition here is that "Marina has a cat". If speaker B denies speaker A's statement and says that "Marina's dog is not beautiful", it does not change the presupposition and we know that it presupposes that "Marina has a dog". For Yule (1998), there are six types of presuppositions, but discussing them here is out of the scope of this study.

Musolff's (2004) example is 'the leaving train' metaphor used to highlight the necessity of joining the European Union based on the presupposition that "it is important to get on the train before it is too late" (Musolff, 2004, p.32). But Thatcher questions this presupposition by implying that "it is better not to be on a train if it is going in the wrong

direction" (Musolff, 2004, p.32). Musolff believes that such cases cannot be explained by *entailment* and *presupposition* is the solution.

4.4. Corpus Linguistics in Metaphor Studies: Pitfalls & Advantages

Corpus as authentic machine-readable texts has become the foremost tool for empirical linguistic studies in the last two decades. Stefanowitsch (2006) correctly states that empirical corpus-based metaphor studies have been slightly behind in this paradigm, but recently, corpus linguistics is becoming an empirical trend in metaphor studies, too (p. 1). Before reviewing other works to establish the importance of corpus in metaphor studies, a brief account of methodological considerations that the researcher must consider in his work will be addressed. Stefanowitsch (2020) warns against "the danger of bivariate designs" (p. 208). This bivariant design happens when the researcher studies two variables, and the statistics show that one variable affects the other (null hypothesis is rejected). However, the actual effect may be due to other hidden factors that the researcher has not considered (Stefanowitsch, 2020, p. 208). The unrealistically ideal solution is to have a balanced corpus; since it is impossible, Stefanowitsch's (2020) solution is to design research with multiple independent variables even if there is only one independent variable in research design (p. 108). He adds that "multivariate research designs are becoming the norm rather than the exception, and rightly so" (Stefanowitsch, 2020, p. 214). Furthermore, the current study has done this precisely to eliminate the effects of hidden variables on outcomes as much as feasible.

In the last two decades, especially after recent impressive advances in corpus linguistics and corpus-mining tools, a significant number of scholars have conducted corpus-based metaphor studies on various aspects of metaphor or have approved the importance of corpus in this field (Kövecses, 2005 & 2010; Babarczy et al., 2010; Berber Sardinha, 2011;

Semino, 2008 & 2017; Dunn, 2013; Heintz et al., 2013; Mohler et al., 2013; Wilks et al., 2013; W. Gibbs, 2017; Levchenko & Romanyshyn, 2019). This volume of corpus-based research in the field of metaphor may exist because the corpus is a rich source for extracting (semantic) patterns, and many researchers, including Babarczy et al. (2010), consider corpus the best method. Another advantage of recent developments in corpus-mining tools is that corpus studies enjoy a mixed methodology of qualitative and quantitative approaches. Koller (2008) perfectly highlights the role of the corpus in 'metaphorology' and investigating 'metaphorical patterns' in big corpora by stating that "the results … help ascertain the textual patterns of metaphoric expressions … while quantitative approaches facilitate the broad investigation, subsequent qualitative analysis complements such approaches by enabling in-depth detailed analysis of sample texts" (p. 121).

Among researchers advocating corpus linguistics and its significance in the study of metaphor (Charteris-Black, 2004; Lynne & Deignan, 2003; Koller, 2002), Deignan (2008) argues that CMT is of interest for researchers such as corpus linguists for two reasons. One reason is that "CMT recognizes the ubiquity of metaphor," and hence, it is helpful for this study to explore metaphorical patterns in naturally-occurring data of political debates and news (Deignan, 2008, pp. 149-150). Furthermore, "CMT provides an explanation for the systematicity in metaphorical uses that can be observed in some semantic groups" for arguing the recognized patterns (Deignan, 2008, pp. 149-150, emphases added).

However, in practice, using corpus (machine-readable text) as data to identify metaphors is not an easy job at all. A couple of critical issues arise in this individual study: a) How to deal with large corpora of more than 14 million words; b) what corpus-mining tools to use; c) how to find words/ collocations/ sentences that are either metaphor or a signal to a metaphorical use; and so on. These issues relate to the methodology and model of finding

metaphors in a corpus. Moreover, as Semino (2008) points out, different methods can be integrated; but the appropriateness of these methods depends on the purpose of the study. Furthermore, it is not an easy task to do, and as Stefanowitsch (2006) correctly indicates that spotting and eliciting accurate data is the first enigma in corpus-based studies. Among numerous corpus-based metaphor studies, very few (Steen et al., 2010; Berber Sardinha, 2011; Mohler et al., 2013; Dunn, 2013) have offered their model's clear and step-by-step protocol. Based on Natural Language Processing (NLP) considerations of Persian, the size of our corpora, and the purpose of this study, Sketch Engine will be the corpus-mining tool used in this study, and the protocol of this process will be explained in section 8.4.

4.5. Summary

To recapitulate this chapter, a couple of points are worth mentioning. Metaphor study is essential because metaphors are sometimes used to manipulate public opinion in various ways. Also, there is a close and bilateral relationship between translation studies and metaphor studies in the sense that the results of each of them can cast light on (cognitive) aspects that help researchers of the other field. The evolution of metaphor theories in Persian and Western studies is different. Unlike English metaphor theories, Persian theories are traditional (Aristotle) and conceptual (Lakoff & Johnson) theories.

Regarding the conceptual theory of metaphor, it must be said that Persian metaphors have specific features that are either rare or non-existent in English. They are related to the direction of source-target relation, which leads to metaphors in which abstract phenomena are described in terms of other abstract phenomena. According to the experientialist approach of CMT, different societies have different experiences, and hence, they have different conceptualizations of the world, which is manifested in metaphor. This different world

experience does not mean that communication among different cultural communities is impossible. This communication is an interactional experience: Based on shared experiences, unshared ones can be transferred. Criticisms on CMT are overcome by considering cultural issues and using authentic examples in their context (thanks to corpus and corpus-mining tools).

Chapter 5. Intersection of Terminology, Metaphor and Translation Competence

This chapter will discuss theoretical topics on terminology focusing on recently developed Frame-Based Terminology. Furthermore, a general and yet, a short history of translation and Terminology in Iran will be mentioned. Due to this study's predominantly theoretical and multi-disciplinary nature, an introductory discussion of translation competence and the role of metaphor and terminology in translation competence models will be the closing remarks of this chapter.

5.1. The Trajectory of Terminology Theories

Terminology theories have developed from prescriptive to descriptive (Faber, 2009, p. 107). Following Auger (1988), Cabré (1998) divides Terminology theories into four periods of time: "1) the origins (1930-1960), 2) the structuring of the field (1960-1975), 3) the boom (1975-1985), and 4) the expansion (1985-present)" (p. 5). Now a chronological discussion of significant Terminology theories will be addressed.

The discipline of Terminology started with Eugen Wuster in the 1930s. It is referred to as General Terminology Theory. The main objective of his theory was the standardization of terminology and having clear communication with no ambiguity (Cabré, p. 1998). The starting point of terminological work, for Wuster, was the concept and each concept had an unambiguous term (onomasiological approach). Wuster's General Theory also "ignored diachronic dimension of terms" (Faber, 2012, p. 17). After this first theoretical attempt for the discipline of Terminology, no new or significant terminological theory was developed for decades.

As a reaction to the dominance of GTT, Socioterminology was introduced by Gaudin in 1993. The name suggests integrating sociolinguistics with Terminology theory (Faber, 2009, p. 113). His primary focus was term variation, and he related it to social aspects and situational context in which experts and specialists communicate (Faber, 2009, p. 133). For socioterminologists, standardization is ignis fatuus, and polysemy and synonymy are inevitable in specialized texts (Faber, 2009, p. 133). Furthermore, it appreciates term variation and considers it as a sign showing that concepts are dynamic and using a term instead of other alternatives "can reflect the knowledge, social and professional status of a group of users, as well as the power relationships between speakers" (Faber, 2009, p. 113). Faber (2009) believes that the value of socioterminology "resides in the fact that it opened the door for other descriptive theories of terminology, which also take social and communicative factors into account, and which base their theoretical principles on the way terms are used in specialized discourse" (p. 114).

The next ground-breaking Terminology theory is Cabré's Communicative Theory of Terminology. Communicative Theory of Terminology highlights the complexity of specialized knowledge units from three angles: social, linguistic, and cognitive (Faber, 2009, p. 114). Faber (2009) points out that for Cabré (2003), "a theory of Terminology should provide a methodological framework for the study of terminological units" (p.114). According to Cabré (2003), both specialized knowledge units and general language words have cognitive, linguistic, and sociocommunicative constituents, and what makes the distinction is cognitive, syntactic, and pragmatic restrictions that approve belonging to a specific domain (cited in Faber, 2009, p. 114). According to the Communicative Theory of Terminology, terminological units are "sets of conditions" (Cabré, 2003, cited in Faber, 2009, p. 114). These conditions stem from "their particular knowledge area, conceptual structure, meaning, lexical and syntactic structure, and valence, as well as the communicative context

of specialized discourse" (Faber, 2009, p. 114). Faber (2009) believes that the Communicative Theory of Terminology is the best alternative for substituting General Terminology Theory (p. 114).

The next prominent Terminology theory is Sociocognitive Terminology developed by Temmerman in 1997 and later in 2000. As the name suggests, Sociocognitive Terminology theory benefits from both cognitive linguistics and sociolinguistics: "cognitive potential of the terminology" inspired by "prototype structure and metaphor" and term variation due to "verbal, situational and cognitive contexts in discourse and in a wide range of communicative environments" (Faber, 2009, p. 116). Moreover, this is the beginning of the cognitive shift in Terminology (Faber, 2009). Temmerman (1998) contrasts five principles of Sociocognitive Terminology with those of General Terminology Theory. The first principle of Sociocognitive Terminology states that the "unit of understanding" with prototype structure is the starting point and not the concept (Temmerman, 1998, p. 33). According to the second principle, the unit of understanding works in cognitive models and has intracategorial and intercategorial structures (Temmerman, 1998, p. 33). According to the third principle, the essentiality of information given in a definition varies according to the type of unit of understanding and type and level of specialization in that communicative situation (Temmerman, 1998, p. 33). The fourth principle states that, in the process of understanding, polysemy and synonymy are practical and should be described (Temmerman, 1998, p. 33). The fifth and last principle considers the diachronic study of units of understanding when the necessity demands, and it also asserts that terms are inspired by cognitive models (e.g., metaphors) that play a role in terminology.

As has already been mentioned, terminology theories have evolved from a strictly prescriptive to a descriptive approach. All previous attempts to develop theories and

methodological frameworks for Terminology have helped Terminology become a distinguished discipline. The following approach to Terminology was developed by Faber, which owes a lot to previous well-organized theories such as Communicative Theory of Terminology and Sociocognitive Terminology. This theory is called Frame-Based Terminology, and it will be discussed separately in the following section.

5.2. Frame-Based Terminology

Frame-Based Terminology (FBT) is a recently developed approach to terminology. It is a cognitive approach developed by Faber et al. (2005, 2006, 2007), which shares a set of assumptions with the Communicative Theory of Terminology (Cabré, 1998) and Sociocognitive Terminology (Temmerman, 1997, 1998). Frame-Based Terminology is applied in the environment domain in the LexiCon research group at the Universidad de Granada and OntoTerm, "a concept-oriented tool for terminology management" (Montero-Martínez et al., 2002, p. 177). According to FBT, "a distinction between terms and words is no longer fruitful or even viable," and "the best way to study specialized knowledge units is by studying their behavior in texts" (Faber, 2009)[11]. As the name suggests, Frame-Based Terminology benefits from Frame Semantics[12] (Fillmore, 1976; Fillmore & Atkins, 1992). Moreover, in this sense, it highlights the role context plays in determining the meaning of words. Frame Semantics also facilitates "the representation of larger knowledge configurations" (Cabezas-García & Faber, 2019, p. 6). Before proceeding to details of FBT, a

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[11] They are directly quoted from an adaptation of Faber's (2009) article published on Frame-Based Terminology - LexiCon Research Group (ugr.es).
[12] It also uses Lexical Grammar Model, but Frame Semantics has been used in this study.

succinct account of Frame Semantics and its seminal aspects for understanding the mechanisms of FTB and applying them will be illustrated.

5.2.1. *Frame Semantics Feeding into FBT*

In Frame Semantics, conceptual structures underlying word usage are considered semantic frames. To understand the meaning of words in a given language, one must know those so-called semantic frames (Faber, 2012, p. 29). In this vein, the same applies to terminology and terms as specialized language units (Faber, 2012, 46). According to Frame Semantics, interlocutors communicate based on thorough understanding or frames that their words carry: "hearer invokes a frame upon hearing an utterance in order to understand it" (Croft & Cruse, 2004; cited in Faber, 2012. P. 46). Adopting Frame Semantics, FBT argues that "specialized knowledge representation naturally includes semantic properties that help to describe the nature of objects and events" (Faber, 2012, p.160). So, in FBT, there are three central 'concept types' also called 'semantic properties' and 'conceptual categories' or 'ontological categories': event, object, and property (Montero-Martínez et al., 2002, p. 187). An event can be either a process or a state (Faber, 2012, p. 177). property divides into relations and attributes (Montero-Martínez et al., 2002, p. 187). Linguistically speaking, the property is the relation between a verb and its arguments (Faber, 2012, p.160). According to Frame Semantics, "at the most general level of event, conceptual categories are combined in scene-like configurations characterized by semantic roles, whereas conceptual networks represent the way concepts interact within more concrete events according to their internal structure and nature" (Faber, 2012, p.161). Moreover, this is where the study of metaphor and terminology intersect.

A special domain is called an event in FBT, and it comprises semantic roles, which are thematic roles: agent, patient, result, location, and instrument (Faber, 2012, p.161). Their

inventory of semantic roles is short because nominal forms (defining object concepts) are abundantly found in specialized languages, and verbs found in specialized language are limited and almost the same as those used in general language (Faber, 2012, p.162). In specialized texts, meanings are conveyed by object concepts, and that is why terminology involves noun and noun phrases. On the other hand, verbs are shared between general and specialized texts; and their particular importance in specialized texts lies in "the semantic nature of predicates" that limits "verb meaning and making it less polysemic" (Faber, 2012, p.162). The focus of the LexiCon project (where FBT is developed) is on "using thematic relations reflected in language as a gate to the mind of rather than mapping them onto syntax" (Faber, 2012, p.162). The focus of this study is the same, and our inventory of semantic roles is the same as theirs, and it is also short for the same reasons. Semantic roles are implicitly present in noun and noun phrases to encode events (Faber, 2012, p.162). A brief definition of each of them and examples from our study is in order.

- **The agent** is "an entity that causes [cause] an action" (Faber, 2012, p.162). Faber (2012) distinguishes between natural and human agents in environment event. However, our study showed that the distinction must be made between non-Iranian agents and Iranian agents. Non-Iranian agents are foreigners such as enemies, arrogance, some regional countries that cause problems. Iranian agents are those living in Iran but, whether intentionally or unintentionally, help the enemy achieve his goals in causing problems for Iran. The absence of non-human agents in Persian may be because the passive verb is a very infrequent structure in Persian, and we know that active verbs emphasize the doer of an action that is supposed to be human. So, due to the abundant use of active structure in Persian, such a distinction can not be made.

A point regarding political affiliation needs to be made here since our domain is politics. Our corpus was collected when the Reformists or Moderates were in power. So Reformists highlight the role of sanctions in the country's problems, while Conservatives insisted on human agents behind problems. So, one might conclude that sanctions are non-human agents for Reformists. However, ontological analysis refuted this assumption. Regarding the entity of sanction as a non-human agent, both political affiliations considered it an instrument by which the problem was caused. The distinction lies in the human agent behind problems: non-Iranian (enemy is causing problems) or Iranian agent (Reforms authorities are not competent enough to control damages caused by sanctions).

- **Patient:** "is an entity that is affected [affect] by an event" (Faber, 2012, p.162). For instance, in the political domain, poverty and economic problems of some Iranian families are because of enemies' economic warfare imposed on Iran. Metaphorically speaking, the whole country is a patient affected by these events. Another instance is that bureaucratic corruption is affected by some authorities' aristocratic mindset and lifestyle. The difference between their English environmental domain and our political one is that their patient semantic role is mainly a concrete phenomenon, while ours is mainly abstract[13]. This may be due to the differentiation of special domains being studied or due to a higher degree of abstractness in Persian (as discussed in chapters 4 and 10 related to metaphorical patterns) compared with English.

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[13] What is meant by abstract and concrete is discussed in section 4.2.2. based on Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

- **Result:** "is an entity originated by an event. Linguistically, this entity is the result of an accomplishment" (Faber, 2012, p.163). For instance, JCPOA is the result of effective diplomacy (according to Reformists) or Iran's deterrence (according to Conservatives). As Faber's examples imply, the result or accomplishment can be a negative or positive entity by definition. So, JCPOA is a positive entity (or result). An instance of a negative result in our study is cultural invasion resulting from enemies' infiltration. Again here, the degree of abstractness in the two cases is different.

- **Instrument:** "is an object used to carry out an action. Instrument generally refers to the tools, machinary and devices that are used to carry out human process events" c Due to the abstract nature of the political domain and semantic features of Persian, instances of concrete and tangible tools in our corpora are rare (if not zero). For instance, sanctions and international treaties are instruments that the enemy uses to break Iran's resistance.

- **Location:** is "the place where an event takes place or where an object exists" (Faber, 2012, p.163). In the political domain of our study, the location is Iran and its cities, the Middle East, and Europe, to name a few.

A couple of points as closing remarks of this sub-section are worth mentioning. Although most of the examples from LexiCon are concrete entities, a natural type of entity can be abstract too (Pustejovsky, 2001; cited in Faber, 2012, p. 183). However, their classification of abstract vs. concrete phenomena differs from ours. So, we still stay faithful to our main theoretical framework and definition of an abstract phenomenon. It must be reminded that entities do not have those semantic roles in their nature, and it is the conceptual templates or ontological combinations that determine their role. In other words, semantic roles "are also intimately linked to conceptual relations that connect concepts in a semantic network" (Faber,

2012, p.163). So, the same term can receive various semantic roles based on the conceptual relations it carries. That is to say, "the semantic roles have no linguistic theoretical value as such, but are used to characterize the roles that different concepts can fulfill within different subevents or subframes" (Faber, 2002, p. 156). Among all semantic roles discussed here, agent and patient are the most important and frequent ones in this study. The following sub-section will discuss these ontological combinations and other practical phases of developing Frame-Based Terminology from Frame Semantics.

5.2.2. *Two-Module Model Benefitting from FTB*

So far, only theoretical background and some basic terms related to Frame-Based Terminology have been discussed. One of the projects which have been done based on Frame-Based Terminology is OncoTerm (part of OntoTerm), which is a "truly concept-based terminology database in the subdomain of oncology" (Montero-Martínez et al., 2002, p. 185). Elaborating practical steps of this model accompanied with examples from our data will be helpful to comprehend even the theoretical framework of FBT. Montero-Martínez et al. (2002) developed a two-module model to study specialized collocations and compounds. It has Frame Semantics and ontological or conceptual relations in common with the central theory of terminology developed by Faber. The difference is related to different terminology Montero-Martínez et al. (2002) adopt when they discuss their model, besides the fact that

Montero-Martínez et al. (2002) discuss a considerably smaller inventory of semantic roles and conceptual relations[14].

Montero-Martínez et al. (2002) use the term 'terminography', which includes terminology since the results of a terminographical study may be terminology, termbase, glossary, or specialized vocabulary. Their study connects terminology to the field of Language for Specific Purposes (LSP) by terminological phrasemes, and this is where our studies intersect. Before explaining their model, a concise definition of their terminology and theoretical framework mostly shared with Frame-Based Terminology is indispensable. They go beyond the traditional view of collocation and compound, which saw them as static structures (Montero-Martínez et al., 2002, p. 178). Based on Meyer and Mackintosh's (1994, 1996) terminological phraseme, both collocations and compounds are units that regularize conceptual information related to a specific knowledge domain (cited in Montero-Martínez et al., 2002, 183). Montero-Martínez et al. (2002) paraphrase Meyer and Mackintosh's (1996) idea of how phrasemes help terminographers as follows:

(i) Phrasemes can indicate how a particular domain has been influenced by general knowledge and by concepts in related domains; (ii) they can contribute to identify the specialized concepts and units of specialized meaning (USM) of a particular domain; (iii) they will help to establish the conceptual system of a domain; (iv) they can be used for meaning disambiguation. (Montero-Martínez et al., 2002, 184)

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[14] Their article shows inconsistent terminology from time to time and uses two terms for the same concept. It has been tried to be avoided as much as possible, but sometimes, especially in direct quotations, it may have affected the terminology consistency of the thesis too.

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Among all four ways in which phraseme and terminography are related, the first one is even more important since it integrates metaphor into terminology. Montero-Martínez et al. (2002) are among those scholars who argue that general domains influence specialized domains via metaphorization (Riabtseva, 1992; Fuertes-Olivera & Pizarro-Sánchez, 2002; Faber, 2012). For instance, the conceptual metaphor "national problems are locked doors" has resulted in these collocational patterns: a lock of sanctions, negotiations, and problems.

Another important term used in this model is 'categorial template', an internal structure of the recurrent combination of conceptual categories (event and object) and shows both characteristics of concepts and the relation between them (Montero-Martínez et al., 2002, p. 186). For instance, adapting their categorial templates to ours, is-a; problem-event; affects; world-part; and solution-for are categorial templates that provide the framework for terminographical definition[15] of the terms regularizing the concept (Montero-Martínez et al., 2002, p. 186). For instance, terminographical definition of the concept 'Israel' integrating conceptual metaphors will be: 'Israel is a dangerous Carcinoma in Western Asia which has occupied Palestine and it is causing insecurity. The solution is to eliminate it totally to make the region free and secure. Iran and Resistance Front will achieve this solution'. It is a terminographical definition based on categorial templates found in our study in terms of both terminological and metaphorical considerations.

The next term used in this model is terminological phraseme. Montero-Martínez et al. (2002) define terminological phrasemes as "*chains of two or more lexical units which can be considered the formalization of conceptual combinations established according to certain*

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[15] Faber (2012) also advocates this type of definition, which is categorial, but she adds images to it to have a multimodal conceptual description (p. 33).

ontological patterns" (pp. 189-190 italics in original). Based on three main patterns of conceptual or ontological categories (event and object) combinations, phraseme templates have been established, leading to possible terminographic formalization (Montero-Martínez et al., 2002, p. 190). It is how the two-module model of terminography works. The first module is the ontological module which establishes phraseme templates. The second module is the terminological module which formalizes terminological phrasemes. The following examples will clarify this point:

I. Conceptual/Ontological combination: EVENT + RELATION + OBJECT

Phraseme template: HAVE-FEATURE_LOCATION_WORLD-PART

Terminological phraseme: world arrogance, regional power, regional top power, level of regional power

II. Conceptual/Ontological combination: EVENT + RELATION + EVENT

Phraseme template: HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION

Terminological phraseme: life-saving prescription of resistive economy, countering influence of Western culture, recognition of infiltration project

III. Conceptual/Ontological combination: EVENT + ATTRIBUTE

Phraseme template: HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION

Terminological phraseme: jihadi management, infiltration project

The first two lines of those mentioned above relate to the ontological module, and the third line pertains to the terminological module. In the OncoTerm project, these two modules are done in the application developed for this purpose, although information is entered manually, and the application provides the output in diagrams and other forms. Nevertheless,

the current study has manually been done since no such application was developed for Persian. Furthermore, more importantly, our purpose was to test the applicability of this theoretical framework on Persian political terminology. So, this is the first difference between the two studies.

This model, specifically, and Frame-Based Terminology, generally, have been conducted on specific domains (specialized knowledge domains) related to mainly concrete concepts that are tangible and perceptible in physical and situational experiences. In contrast, our study is done on political discourse (specific domain of politics), which is mainly abstract and demands more cognitive processes on the translator/reader to understand and communicate the message (specialized knowledge). So, this distinction should also be taken into account.

The third difference lies in the language itself. English is a widely used language, and every aspect is studied every day. In comparison, Persian is a less studied language whose most features have not been studied yet or have been studied based on traditional approaches. Even these scarce studies suggest that Persian is an abstract language in its very nature, and it relies heavily on metaphors and other figurative use of language. Let alone that its recurrent collocational patterns also have a unique and exciting feature. For instance, 'noun + noun' (including gerund + noun) and 'noun + adjective' are the most frequent collocational patterns in Persian.

The differences mentioned above led to subtle changes in the ontological module to tailor it and apply it to our study. Before elaborating on three conceptual combinations, it must be added that each of them also can lead to various forms, which are discussed in a seminal article by Montero-Martínez et al. (2002). Many more conceptual categories have been proposed by Faber (2012) too. However, due to the purpose of this study and the

structure of the most frequent Persian collocational patterns, just these three main conceptual combinations have been discussed and applied to this study. Another consideration is that Montero-Martínez et al. (2002) have worked on oncology-related terminological phrasemes and their phraseme templates include NEOPLASM, BODY-PART, and TREATMENT. However, this does not apply to our study, although it helps realize the conceptual relations via metaphorization. For instance, problems are described as illnesses, and solutions are like treatments. In the same vein, our first alternative instead of Montero-Martínez et al. (200) NEOPLASM and TREATMENT was PROBLEM and SOLUTION. Nevertheless, we discarded this alternative because the problem denotes negative phenomena, and many of our terminological phrasemes are related to positive phenomena and positive conceptual relations. So, general words encompassing any action and any (positive, negative, neutral) feature were chosen: FEATURE, WORLD-PART, ACTION, and DONE-BY.

Regarding the first ontological or conceptual combinations, this is similar to English with few modifications. The frequency of this combination is high since, linguistically speaking, the occurrence of the 'noun + adjective' collocational pattern in Persian is high. The second ontological combination refers to those terminological phrasemes realized by a gerund and verbal compounds in Persian. So their frequency is lower than the other two ontological combinations. The third one is the most similar ontological combination to the English one with the least combination. It also yields the most frequent terminological phrasemes since it is related to the 'noun + adjective' Persian collocational pattern. After discussing the theoretical foundation of FBT and its corresponding model, some last points about the theory's benefits will be addressed.

5.2.3. Advantages of FBT and Terminological Phrasemes

Before examining the advantages of Frame-Based Terminology, especially according to the aims of this study, a cursory glance at Cabré's (2003) theory of doors will pave the way for this sub-section. According to this model, there are three doors or ways to attain an object: a terminological unit (Cabré, 2003, p. 186). This terminological unit is "a polyhedron with three viewpoints: the cognitive (the concept), the linguistic (the term) and the communicative (the situation)" (Cabré, 2003, p. 187). The point is that the doors are not simultaneous, so we cannot access the object through more than one door. Furthermore, regardless of the entrance door, the object is directly accessed, and "the internal arrangement of rooms is not altered, what does change is the way one chooses to get there" (Cabré, 2003, p. 196). Our study enters through the cognitive door, as its starting point is a concept, and it obtains 'units of knowledge as its terminological unit to use the metaphor of a door and a chamber. Moreover, as Faber (2012) highlights Cabré's model, "one's choice of door (or focus) does not entail a rejection of the other two perspectives" (p. 20). So, FBT applied in this study enters through the cognitive door because it is the best door in terms of its aims, and talking about its advantages does not downplay the merits of other approaches.

One of the main advantages of FBT that motivated us to apply it in this study was the value it places on the role of metaphor. Frame-Based Terminology shares the importance of metaphor in terminology with the Sociocognitive Theory of Terminology developed by Temmerman et al. (2005) by stating that "metaphorical modeling is one of the mechanisms consciously or unconsciously used in the creation of scientific terms" (Faber, 2012, p. 24). Faber (2012) asserts that, in order to explain specialized knowledge or to conceptualize abstract phenomena, we use metaphors (p. 40). So, metaphor in terminology matters because it yields meaning extension and polysemy (Faber, 2012, p.41). Another vital aspect of metaphor in terminology, according to Faber (2012), is that "metaphor and metaphorical

mappings are also relevant because they influence our thinking about domains of human experience" and hence, specific domains (p. 41). She goes one step further and underlines the value of metaphor in the use of dictionary: "a reference to the metaphors motivating polysemy and metaphorical extensions can help users of dictionaries and terminological databases to understand the meaning of words" (Faber, 2012, p. 42). Faber (2012) distinguishes between image metaphor and conceptual metaphor and argues that conceptual metaphor is very productive and, in general, the metaphor "helps to shape scientific thought and theories" (p. 69).

Another merit of FBT rests in Fillmore's Frame Semantics. Based on Lakoff (1990) and Evans et al. (2007), Faber (2012) concludes that Frame Semantics is part of cognitive linguistics, mainly encyclopedic semantics, and "as an encyclopedic approach to meaning, it [Frame Semantic] makes no distinction between semantics and pragmatics" (p. 26). This lack of distinction between semantics and pragmatics has been of great help to our study. Faber (2012) adds that to understand both general and specialized words (language units), a knowledge of semantic frames (conceptual structures) behind their usage is necessary (p. 29). Moreover, semantics and pragmatics get connected in this sense, and the distinction between them loses its significance. In this regard, Faber (2012) clarifies FBT's focuses as: "(1) conceptual organization; (2) the multidimensional nature of terminological units; and (3) the extraction of semantic and syntactic information through the use of multilingual corpora" (p. 29).

Another positive point about FBT is the type of definition it uses to define terminological units (or, in our case, terminological phrases). Unlike conventional copy-paste definitions, FBT uses definitions based on paradigmatic and syntagmatic information extracted from corpus data (Faber, 2012, p. 30). In this study, the same has been done.

However, only definitions for ambiguous concepts have been provided because of our investigation's constraints and goals.

On the other hand, the Terminological phraseme clarifies the connection between terminography and LSP[16] by going beyond the traditional strict view of collocations and compounds (semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic view). Moreover, this is an addition to the specific importance of terminological phrasemes mentioned just earlier in the discussion of Montero-Martínez and his colleagues' OncoTerm project. Like FBT, terminological phraseme highlights the decisive role of conceptual metaphors in creating and understanding multi-word units in specific domains. Since the primary concern of this study is political metaphor and terms and the importance of their connection in the process of translation, these two main theoretical approaches suit the purpose of this study in the best possible way.

5.3. History of Persian Translation

The above introduction to the Persian language necessitates a brief account of the Persian translation tradition. Karimi-Hakkak (2001) categorizes Persian tradition into four eras: a) Ancient Persian empire is before the advent of Islam in the seventh century, and the information of its translation tradition is inadequate (p. 513), b) medieval Persia during which "the interaction between Arabic and Persian was the principal and determining feature of the activity" (p. 513), c) the post-Mongol era which is after the invasions of Mongol and Tartar in the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries; during this time, "new patterns of interaction emerged

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[16] Faber (2012) also connects FBT to LSP, but she believes that LSP is a general term and prefers to use "specialized language" and hence, "specialized language texts" (p. 6).

between Persian on the one hand and a number of Indian and Turkic on the other, making this history even more complex and multifarious" (p. 513) and d) the modern period in Iran begins in the middle of the nineteenth century following various modernization projects of translating from European languages (p. 513).

Old Persian was brought up into the Iranian plateau in the second millennium BC because Eurasian steppes' invasions, over time, became the language of Achamenians (559 – 330 BC) (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 513; Rezai Baghbidi, 2009, p. 36). It did not have written form, and its literature is assumed to be transferred orally, and "it was committed to writing in the fourth century AD" (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 513). Loosely speaking of the history of translation in Iran (formerly known as Persia), we can assert that it dates back to the Achaemenian empire as it was multilingual and "many of its documents were written not only in the various languages of the empire but in Babylonian and Elamite as well" (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 513). The more detailed knowledge of translation activities is available from the era in which the Sasanian dynasty in Persia was established (AD 224–652) and the rise of middle Persian (also known as Pahlavi) (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 513). The significant rise of translations during this time can be due to several reasons:

1) It was applied "as a way of combatting the rise of heretic tendencies within Zoroastrianism";

2) "the Sasanian kings encouraged translations from Greek and Latin. Much historical knowledge … was regained in this way … and Shapur II laid claims to parts of the Roman Empire based on descriptions provided by Roman historians" (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 514);

3) early in the sixth century, another king of this dynasty named Anushirvan ('the immortal soul') decreed the establishment of a clinic and medical school in which

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Iranian, Greek, and Syrian philosophers and physicians worked together (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 514). During this time, all medical, religious, and literary translations made the basis for the Persian literature of the Islamic era and "many narratives in medieval Europe … possibly through later translations or abridged versions in Syriac" (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 514).

Medieval Persia began from the second half of the seventh century, which was the advent of Islam, and, as Karimi-Hakkak (2001) states, "the Persian language constitutes the most concrete link between Islamic and pre-Islamic Iranian cultures" (p. 514). The abandonment of the Pahlavi script and the adoption of the Arabic script resulted in significant linguistic changes, and cases that the Arabic one lacked Persian consonants; they were added to it (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 514). For two centuries, the translation efforts were to survive pre-Islamic Iranian texts, and translations were from Pahlavi into Arabic; they were later translated from Arabic back into New Persian (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 514). During this time, the second trend in translation activities was the translation of the Quran into Persian, which was considered untranslatable because it was the holy words of God (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 515). This second trend was "undertaken by Persian converts to Islam," and the translations, "technically conceived as commentaries … none the less contained many word-for-word translations" (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 515). Their translation method was usually to preserve "the sentence structure and syntax of Quranic verses intact" and to supplement them with "extensive commentaries" (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 515).

During the tenth to twelfth centuries, the translations into Persian proliferated in various fields other than religious texts such as "medicine, astronomy, geography, history and philosophy" and from various languages such as Greek, Latin, Syriac, Aramaic, Chinese and Sanskrit "often through previous translations into Arabic" (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 515).

Their translation method was "essentially utilitarian and pragmatic in nature," and a dichotomy of approaches to translation was created: one for religious texts which were word-for-word, and the other one for scientific and secular texts, which was freer and gave prominence to Persian syntax (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 515). The translators of this medieval Persia were bilingual, enabling them to be both translators and authors of original works. Before closing the discussion of medieval Persia, it should be mentioned that "before the Mongol's invasions of the thirteenth century, Persian was primarily the language of literature and Arabic mainly the language of scientific inquiry in western Asia" and "Persian was the second most important language of the Muslim world, a position which it has preserved ever since" (Karimi-Hakkak, pp. 516–17).

The post-Mongol era: "by the thirteenth century, Persian was becoming well established in India as the language of religious, literary and legal learning and communication." (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 517). In 1582, after Emperor Akbar the Great's decree, Persian became the official government language of the Moghul Empire, and by significant translations from English, Persian became the gateway to European sciences (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 517). With the rise of Shi'ism and its establishment in Iran in the sixteenth century, the translation emphasis was changed back to religious texts. For this and a diversity of other reasons—such as "British colonialism in India and Russian incursions into Central Asia"—the approach to translation and the language of Persian in Iran and India diverged (Karimi-Hakkak, pp. 517–518). So, "translations were now made into Persian not so much from Arabic but from Indian and Turkic languages, as well as English and Russian," and the status of Persian as an international language was significantly undermined at the end of the twentieth century (Karimi-Hakkak, pp. 517–518).

In the late nineteenth century, the modern period in Iran witnessed a renaissance of translation activity. It was indebted to the Qajar dynasty (1795–1925), which after a century and a half, brought political stability to Iranian society: The relationship with European countries and the dispatch of students there, on the one hand, and the entrance of lithograph printing to Iran and the establishment of a polytechnic college in Tehran, on the other hand, revolutionized the translation activities in modern Iran. With the employment of European teachers and the use of foreign textbooks in this college, "translation and interpreting began to play a crucial part in the evolution of pedagogical processes in modern Iran" (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 518). In 1871, a new governmental office was founded which was responsible for coordinating "government-sponsored translation and interpreting activities" and, in this way, so many prominent European books, often from French in a diversity of disciplines such as politics, history, and literature, were translated into Persian and "became an integral part of various modernization projects" (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 518). The approach to translation during this time was free version and adaptation.

While the European orientalists and the Romantics studied and glorified Persian culture, literature, and civilization, especially in the pre-Islam era, Iran, now, was considered an underdeveloped country. The late nineteenth-century translations reminded the Iranians of their backwardness, on the one hand, and affected "all aspects of Iranian culture, from writing style to the position of women in society" and "played a unique and significant part in Iran's drive toward modernization", on the other hand (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, pp. 518–519). So, "Iran entered the twentieth century with an insatiable appetite for translation" and "translation has been at the base of a great many philosophical and scientific inquiries, cultural speculations, social activities, and political agendas in Iran throughout the twentieth century" as a characteristic of an earlier period of this century (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 519–20). The second trend in translation began to prevail following World War II: French, as the language

of Europe, was gradually replaced by English, and English turned to be taught at schools and universities of Iran, and it became the principal medium for translation (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 520). Through translation efforts of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party of Iran, on the one hand, and the British and the Americans try to play a part in Iran's political situation, on the other hand, "by the 1960s, translation activity had entered a new phase as competing political forces advanced their separate agendas, in part through translation." (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 520).

The Institute for Translation and Publication of books (founded in 1953) and the Franklin Institute of Iran (founded in 1954) played a significant role in the tradition of translation efforts. The translation was still a principal component of the language learning process. It was undertaken traditionally: Without any discussion of the theoretical aspects of translation, students read their suggested translations, and after a bit of discussion, the best possible translation was chosen (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 520). Another effort in teaching translation was conducted by Tehran University and the College of Translation in the 1970s, which was a new approach to teaching the translation of literary texts: They examined the existing translations and discussed their merits and faults, and they encouraged and established comparative studies along with extensive debates on the style and context of each text (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, pp. 520–521). As Karimi-Hakkak (2001) asserts, "translation pedagogy has never been studied in Iran as a crucial component of translation activity" (p. 521). However, it should be added here that some projects in translation pedagogy are being conducted by Allameh Tabataba'i University, which has become a pioneering university in translation studies in Iran in recent years, and they are not completed yet. The future will prove its efficiency and applicability.

After the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, the universities were closed for almost more than two years so that the Headquarters for Cultural Revolution could "redirect Iran's educational system toward its ideology" and during this time, based on intensive translation and editing programs, textbooks were prepared; "these have since been updated and are still in use in Iran's educational system" (Karimi-Hakkak, 2001, p. 521). In 1990, a professional journal named the Translator for translation began to be published by Ferdowsi University in Mashhad, and another professional journal is the Translation Studies published by Allameh Tabataba'i University. Now that we understand Iran's translation studies better, we can move on to the next subject, a history of Persian terminology.

5.4. History of Persian Terminology

The first terminological efforts in Iran date back to the tenth century and the times of Abu Ibn Sina, following the movement of linguistic purism leading to language policies (Marszalek-Kowalewska, 2018). Based on the purposes of the present study, a concise account of the current terminological efforts in Iran will be addressed. The direct responsibility for terminological efforts in Iran has been appointed to the Academy of language, which has always been a government-funded organization with more or less the same objectives; but, especially in different political times, their title has been changed. Two points about the title are worth mentioning here: this organization is called "Farhangestān" in Persian, and it was coined in the twentieth century "to denote an association of scholars" to replace its foreign equivalent "Academy" (Jazayeri, 1999), the next point is that following the purposes of this study and avoiding ambiguity, the use of "Farhangestān" has been avoided because its equivalent, "Academy", is more common in both Persian and English resources addressing this Iranian organization. The first Academy was established in 1935 strictly with linguistic

purism aims, but then it became more moderate and administrative, and under the influence of some political changes in Iran and the gradual death of its members, it was officially closed in 1954. The second Academy was established in 1970, and it was more efficient, to some extent, compared with the first one, but it was also doomed to closure in 1979 because of the political situation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The third Academy was established in 1990 and had been serving its duties and responsibilities since then.

The desire for linguistic purism heightened during the late Qajar dynasty in the nineteenth century, and Reza Shah Pahlavi, the first Shah (the Persian term meaning King) and the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, was endowed with it. In 1935, he decreed the foundation of a center, which was later called the first Academy, to purify the Persian language and avoid spreading Arabic and Turkish terms. Reza Shah Pahlavi appointed Mohammad Ali Foroughi as the head of this Academy. He was a sophisticated person who tried to avoid and resist other extremist movements abolishing the Persian language in the name of purism, linguistic nationalism, and national identity. The Modern Persian owes its life and status to this man's efforts. The political circumstances made the first Academy spend most of its time choosing equivalents for foreign terms and expressions. It could be said that it was mostly an avoiding and defeating role against extremist movements rather than an influential and constructivist role. In February 1937, they passed a regulation to revise the academic terminology and regulate a methodology for choosing equivalents for foreign terms. It applied a moderate approach, avoiding purism or anti-Arabic approach, to this aim so that it was successful in its mission and its suggested terms gained publicity. The first Academy approved 2000 equivalents for foreign terms and was officially closed in 1954 ("The history of Academy," 2013).

In November 1970, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the second and the last Shah of Pahlavi dynasty, announced his royal decree for "the establishment of an Imperial Foundation for

Persian Academies (Bonyād-e Shāhanšāhī-e farhangestānhā-ye Īrān). The charter of the foundation provided for the establishment of a Language Academy, Farhangestān-e zabān-e Īrān" which was later called the second Academy (Jazayeri, 1999). The second Academy consisted of four research centers, and the most active among them was the Center for Word Adoption, which had some subsections responsible for the terminology of different fields such as military, literature, and economics (Jazayeri, 1999). "The sources for selecting words were listed in the following order of preference: writings in Persian, local Persian dialects, other Iranian languages and dialects, Persian roots, and roots in other Iranian languages." (Jazayeri, 1999). Furthermore they had a publication named "what are your suggestions?" which included terms of specific fields like bibliography and gas technology in English, and French accompanying original contexts of the terms and they were sent to experts both in Iran and abroad to ask about their suggestions; then, they collected them and introduced them to the committee to inspect them before being presented for royal assets (Jazayeri, 1999). The second Academy approved 1470 Persian equivalents and "issued several publications on Persian dialects and ancient Iranian languages as well as a series of statistical studies and databases of the vocabulary of classical texts" and was officially closed during the Islamic Revolution Iran in 1979. Jazayeri (1999) argues that both the first and the second Academies had problems such as lack of linguistic research and "a consistent methodology for coining scientific terms"; using the first Academy's approved terms was obligatory, while the second Academy's was optional. Generally speaking, "government-related terms and place-names were virtually the only changes which gained wide currency, and under the Islamic Republic many of the latter have been changed back"; the organization of the second Academy was

better than the first one, and it was well-funded, but "excessive adherence to purification marred many of its decisions"[17].

In February of 1990, the Academy of Persian Language and Literature (APLL), also known as the third Academy, was officially established, and its primary objective was "the preservation of the strength and authenticity of the Persian language as one of the pillars of Persian national identity, as the second language of the Islamic world, and the bearer of Islamic learning and culture" (Jazayeri, 1999). Their purpose, as mentioned on their official website, is to help spread and strengthen the Persian language and to equip and enable it to fulfill the growing need for technology, culture, and science by taking the responsibility of coordinating the terminological efforts in coining and finding equivalents for foreign terms ("The history and the activity of terminology group," 2017). Currently, Iran has four Academies under the observance of one central committee and cover various literary, economic, and artistic fields from the subjective perspective ("About the Academy of Persian Language and Literature," 2017).

Currently, forty internal groups of experts and thirty external groups of experts, and more than six coordinating committees are working actively under the observance of the terminological group of APLL: Each group consists of at least five technical and scientific experts interested in terminology and one or two scholars of terminology ("The history and the activity of terminology group," 2017). By March 19, 2016, their efforts had resulted in publishing thirteen volumes of The Dictionary of Approved Terminologies, which contained about 45000 words. APLL has also published a thesaurus which in Persian is called Ganj Nāmeh, which means "the letter of treasure," and it contains almost seven million terms

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[17] FARHANGESTĀN – Encyclopaedia Iranica (iranicaonline.org)

collected from specialist mono- and bilingual dictionaries and terminologies. It is available for free on their website ("The history and the activity of terminology group," 2017).

5.5. Translation Competence

Now that theoretical backgrounds and fundamental topics related to two main aspects of this study (metaphor & phraseology) have been discussed, a succinct discussion of translation competence is in order to see their significance and status in translation competence. A very general definition of translation competence (TC) would be expert knowledge, skills, and attitudes that a translator must possess in the communicative process of translation (PACTE, 2003, p. 44). For Neubert (2000), translation competence is a cognitive system that enables the translator to handle (decision-making) tasks when he/she is translating (p. 3). Neubert (2000) also considers translation as a communicative act and believes that due to five parameters, translation is differentiated from other areas of communication: a) language competence, b) textual competence, c) subject competence, d) cultural competence, and e) transfer competence (p. 6). He adds that among all these five parameters, the 'transfer competence' differentiates the translator from other communicators (Neubert, 2000, p. 6). PACTE's translation competence model is the most appropriate to our study because it is all-encompassing and yet straightforward. It will be explained briefly in the following.

5.5.1. PACTE Translation Competence Model

The first version of PACTE's model was introduced in 1998, and the final version was published in 2003. Their model has considered both direct and inverse translations, and they distinguish between declarative knowledge (knowing what) and procedural knowledge (knowing how). PACTE's model consists of five competences, and each includes (predominantly) declarative or procedural knowledge. In addition to them, there are psycho-physiological components. At first, concise elaboration of PACTE's model of TC will be

mentioned, and then, it will be followed by preliminary points about how this study is related to TC and in what ways can feed into TC as an essential part of any translational act.

PACTE's translation competence consists of bilingual competence, extralinguistic competence, knowledge of translation competence, instrumental competence, and strategic competence (PACTE, 2017, p. 39). Bilingual competence is related to procedural knowledge in a bilingual communication (translation) (PACTE, 2017, p. 39). It includes "pragmatic, socio-linguistic, textual, grammatical and lexical knowledge in the two languages" to delimit interference of those given languages (PACTE, 2017, p. 39). Pragmatic knowledge is related to pragmatic conventions governing acceptable language acts in a given context (PACTE, 2017, p. 39). Socio-linguistic knowledge is related to those conventions of acceptable language use in both linguistic and social contexts (PACTE, 2017, p. 39). Other types of knowledge in bilingual competence are related to the knowledge of texture, genre, vocabulary, morphology, and syntax (PACTE, 2017, p. 40).

Extralinguistic competence of the TC model consists of both implicit and explicit declarative knowledge about general and particular areas of the world: bicultural, encyclopaedic, and subject knowledge (PACTE, 2017, p. 40). Knowledge of translation competence is predominantly implicit and explicit declarative knowledge about translation and its professional aspects (PACTE, 2017, p. 40). Instrumental competence is predominantly procedural knowledge about "the use of documentation resources and information and communication technologies applied to translation" (PACTE, 2017, p. 40).

The most crucial competence of the TC model is strategic competence which is at the center of their model. Procedural knowledge affects all other competences since it links them together (PACTE, 2017, p. 40). Strategic competence "controls the translation process" and not only ensures "the efficiency of the translation process" but also resolves "problems

encountered" (PACTE, 2017, p. 40). It operates a) to plan translation project by selecting the proper method; b) to assess the process and the results in terms of end purpose; c) to initiate various competences to neutralize their flaws; and d) to recognize translation problems and to solve them (PACTE, 2017, p. 40).

Other than the competences mentioned above, PACTE's model of TC also comprises psycho-physiological components. These components are "Different types of cognitive and attitudinal components and psycho-motor mechanisms." (PACTE, 2017, p. 40). Among all psycho-physiological components they mention, a couple are of particular interest to this study: cognitive issues such as perception, attention, and emotion; capabilities like creativity, analysis, and synthesis (PACTE, 2017, p. 40).

5.5.2. *Metaphor Competence*

How TC is related to metaphorical and phraseological aspects of this study will be explained in a short space of time. However, before that, a similar competence of TC suggested by Al-Harrasi (2001) regarding metaphor and how it fits in a TC model is worth mentioning. Al-Harrasi (2001) argues that since metaphor is "a conceptual process of mapping that is indispensable in making sense of abstract concepts and experience", Neubert's (2000) five-parameter TC is inadequate (p. 317). He recommends adding another competence named "conceptual competence: "The cognitive background which enables a person to adapt to and participate in a particular conceptual system" (Al-Harrasi, 2001, p. 317). Al-Harrasi (2001) goes one step further and speaks of 'metaphoric competence' which should be a particular sub-competence of conceptual competence (p.318). For him, "metaphoric competence has to do with acquiring knowledge of the different ways members of a particular society make (metaphoric) sense of their abstract experiences" and comprises both linguistic and cultural competence (Al-Harrasi, 2001, p. 318). He highlights that metaphoric competence is different

from both linguistic and cultural ones because it concerns "the conceptual mapping aspect of metaphor" (Al-Harrasi, 2001, p. 318). Al-Harrasi (2001) believes that a translator is metaphorically incompetent if:

A) "The translator can be traced in the translation itself, does not understand the metaphorical mappings behind the linguistic surface of the source text." (p.318)

B) "The translator fails to understand the difference between the metaphorical system in the source language and target language and keeps, for no apparent reason, an expression which realizes a metaphor in the source text that is likely to be taken literally by the target language audience." (p. 318)

According to Al-Harrasi (2001), an essential part of metaphorical competence is knowledge of the history of a metaphor (p. 319). Having integrated Al-Harrasi's metaphorical competence and PACTE's translation competence model, metaphorical competence comprises predominantly declarative knowledge of conceptual metaphors, and conceptual metaphors come under extralinguistic competence, and they are affected by the psycho-physiological component. Because extralinguistic competence is predominantly declarative knowledge, both implicit and explicit, about the world in general and special areas comprising (1) bicultural knowledge (about the source and target cultures); (2) encyclopedic knowledge (about the world in general); (3) subject knowledge (field-specific). Moreover, psycho-physiological components will always be there, affecting translation competence as a whole and also each subcompetence. As has already been mentioned, the psycho-physiological component comprises cognitive issues, creativity, analysis, and synthesis. On the other hand, dealing with metaphors and finding appropriate equivalents in the target text requires procedural knowledge as part of strategic competence.

Integrating translation competence and another aspect of this study, political multi-word units (terminological phrasemes), this study benefits from and feeds into various competences of TC proposed by PACTE. For instance, semantic prosodies, English equivalents suggested for lexical gaps, definitions of concepts, and collocations are related to bilingual, extralinguistic, strategic competences, and psycho-physiological components to turn the novice into expert knowledge. Instrumental competence would also come in to help compensate for shortcomings in knowledge of metaphors. Chapter 10 will discuss more details of the implications of this study for translation competence.

5.5.3. *Terminology Competence*

Before closing the discussion of translation competence, a succinct account of terminological competence is beneficial. Montero-Martínez and Faber (2009) examine terminology courses taught at Spanish universities and suggest developing tasks that can effectively improve terminological competence. For them, terminological competence is the expert knowledge and strategic abilities that a translator must gain to deal with ad hoc terminological work they should do in translating specialized texts. For them, translators are "language mediators" who "facilitate interlinguistic communication," and Terminology courses do not aim at training translators as terminologists (Montero-Martínez & Faber, 2009, p. 88). In this sense, this terminological competence becomes vital to this study since its developments improve the quality of communication and reduce the possibility of miscommunication.

Terminological competence matters because translators' expert knowledge is not the same as that of the producer of the original text and the translation receiver (Montero-Martínez & Faber, 2009, p. 88). So, translators "must learn how to rapidly situate terms within their respective conceptual systems" (Montero-Martínez & Faber, 2009, p. 89).

Montero and Faber (2009), referring to Wright and Wright (1997), state that translators very often become ad hoc terminographers and terminologists in the process of translation and, for Montero-Martínez and Faber, instead of arranging the whole specific knowledge, they must restructure small pieces of conceptual systems (p. 89).

Before illustrating components of terminological competence, establishing the relationship between translation and terminology would be beneficial. Both "are conditioned by semantic, pragmatic, contextual, and cultural factors that operate at the level of the source language and target language" (Montero-Martínez & Faber, 2009, p. 91). Even though they have existed for centuries, both Terminology and Translation are recent academic disciplines and interdisciplinary (Montero-Martínez & Faber, 2009, p. 91). The thought-provoking aspect is that this relationship is asymmetrical, and Terminology has always received a secondary status (Montero-Martínez & Faber, 2009, p. 91). Montero-Martínez and Faber (2009), paraphrasing Velásquez (2002), believe that "translation must use terminology as a means to achieve the interlinguistic transfer of specialized knowledge units" (p. 91). Now that we have underlined the significance of terminological competence, a concise explanation of its components is in order.

Terminological competence, as a module of general translation competence, is predominantly procedural knowledge that is needed to carry out the following processes:

- The identification and acquisition of specialized concepts activated in discourse;

- The evaluation, consultation, and elaboration of information resources;

- The recognition of interlinguistic correspondences based on concepts in the specialized knowledge field;

- The management of the information and knowledge acquired and its re-use in future translations (Montero-Martínez & Faber, 2009, p. 92).

According to Montero-Martínez and Faber (2009), terminological competence is not about learning a list of terms; it is about gaining the ability to "acquire the knowledge represented by these terms" (p. 92). It is the knowledge that is "necessary to facilitate understanding and succeed in the process of information transfer and communication" (Montero-Martínez & Faber, 2009, p. 92). Moreover, this is why the acquisition of terminological competence is essential in the communication mediated by the translator. Furthermore, this is how miscommunication at linguistic and extralinguistic levels can be avoided. This acquisition is a "cognitive and linguistic ability that permits the translator to model reality in consonance with cognitive schemas or world views that serve as a reference for each translation" (Montero-Martínez & Faber, 2009, p. 92). The knowledge of both conceptual systems behind terminology and the ability to find semantic and syntactic patterns of both languages are essential (Montero-Martínez & Faber, 2009, p. 92; Faber, 2009). This competence meets with terminological phrasemes extracted and explained in respective chapters.

The final point of this sub-section is about adapting Montero-Martínez and Faber's terminological competence with PACTE's translation competence model. Montero-Martínez and Faber (2009) consist of declarative and procedural knowledge, but predominantly procedural knowledge. It is also part of the very important competence of PACTE's model: the strategic competence.

5.6. Summary

This chapter was devoted to various significant topics relevant to Terminology and its status in Translation Studies. Reviewing the evolution of theories of terminology shows that they have evolved from prescriptive to descriptive, from attempts for term standardization to the admission of term variation. According to Faber (2009), we are in the cognitive shift of

Terminology. Furthermore, according to Cabré's (2003) 'the theory of doors', cognitive approaches to terminology start from a concept and arrive 'at units of knowledge' as their 'terminological units'. The theoretical framework of this study is also based on the cognitive approach and Frame-Based Terminology introduced by Pamela Faber. Based on this theory, terminological phrasemes will be extracted, which are one of the best ways to demonstrate the relationship between metaphor and terminology and see how metaphor affects the terminology of the political domain.

The history of translation in Iran has witnessed four main eras, and the fourth era dates back to the middle of the 19th century following various modernization projects of translating from European languages. A history of terminological and lexicographical works in Iran was also reviewed. After a couple of projects and academies, the Academy of Persian Language and Literature is in charge of terminological decisions and language policies.

The final section of this chapter has been devoted to translation competence and its significance. It is mentioned here because all theoretical aspects of metaphor and terminology have been discussed, so comprehending translation competence and relating it to the current study will be easier. The primary model as the basis of future discussions is 2003 PACTE's model. Metaphorical and terminological competences have also been introduced and adapted according to PACTE's translation competence model by classifying them as extralinguistic competence and strategic competence, respectively. While metaphorical competence is predominantly declarative knowledge, terminological competence is predominantly procedural knowledge.

Chapter 6. State-of-the-Art Translation Technology in Measuring & Predicting Miscommunication: Metaphor & Terminological Phrasemes

This chapter will explain the significance of the current study. The general feature is its mixed methodology and having the advantage of both qualitative (e.g., discourse analysis) and quantitative (e.g., p-value statistics) analyses. However, its unique features will be addressed extensively in the following section. The first section will establish the concept of miscommunication, its definition, and our model to characterize and predict it. The unique features of this study regarding metaphor study in Persian are covered in the second section. The third section will address FBT highlighting the role of phraseology and collocational patterns in Persian. The last section is devoted to explaining some statistics provided by Sketch Engine on which this study is based to highlight their significance to unique features of the study.

6.1. Miscommunication: Measurability & Prediction

Concepts such as communication and miscommunication are vague by their very nature. Defining them is hard, let alone measuring or predicting them. Since the primary motive of conducting the current study was avoiding miscommunication in the translation of Persian political texts, the first task would be defining miscommunication and criteria based on which miscommunication can be measured. According to online Cambridge Dictionary[18],

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[18] [miscommunication | translation English to Spanish: Cambridge Dictionary](#)

miscommunication is a 'failure to communicate ideas and intentions successfully'. Merriam-Webster's[19] definition is even vaguer: 'failure to communicate clearly'.

At first, we should see what communication means in translating specialized language texts[20]. Generally speaking, pragmatics takes care of the success of communication acts in linguistic interactions: "the meaning intended by the speaker or text sender and understood by the listener or text receiver" (Faber, 2012, p. 213). So, when these two meanings accord, the communication act has been fulfilled successfully, and when these two meanings differ, the communication act fails (Faber, 2012, p. 213). Pragmatics concentrates on 'extralinguistic context' and 'inferences' to study it (Faber, 2012, p. 213). What facilitates communication (in specialized language texts) is shared knowledge among participants in the act of communication (Faber, 2012, p. 237). Furthermore, this is where this study tries to help the translator.

Among different views of pragmatics, such as sociocultural pragmatics and cognition-oriented pragmatics[21], this study has adopted the perspectivist view of pragmatics mentioned in Faber (2012). The component view of pragmatics considers pragmatics as a constituent of a theory of language (Faber, 2012, p. 213). On the other hand, the Perspectivist view "emphasizes the pragmatic aspects of all parts of linguistics, and can serve as an umbrella for the various components and areas of linguistics" (Mey, 2001, paraphrased by Faber, 2012, p. 213). The advantage of this view is that it "coexists with the component view, and serves to expand rather than narrow the horizon on pragmatics" (Faber, 2012, p. 213).

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[19] Vague Definition & Meaning - Merriam-Webster
[20] Faber's (2012) terminological preference; she uses this instead of LSP.
[21] This is different from cognitive linguistics. Because Cognitive Linguistics "makes no principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics" (Fauconnier, 1997, paraphrased by Faber, 2012, p. 214).

All leading scholars in the field of translation (Nida, 1972; Newmark, 1991; Baker, 1992; House, 2016) have been concerned about communication, and massive works have been done on how translation is a means of communication or the role of the translator as a communicator (Hatim & Mason, 1997; Bassnett, 2002; PACTE, 2003). However, very scarce research has been done on miscommunication, sources of miscommunication, and how to predict them to avoid them. It can be said that the beginning of an indirect discussion of miscommunication in translation studies originates in Tytler's (1797) 'loss and gain' in the process of translation (cited in Munday, 2008). Another similar attempt to indirectly describe levels of miscommunication was made by Catford (1965) in his theory of 'translation shift'.

It can be said that the understanding of miscommunication goes hand in hand with translation errors that hinder the process of communication and cause misunderstanding or, as it is called here miscommunication. So, in the current study, miscommunication is described as a failure in transferring Persian political metaphors and terms to English at both linguistic and extralinguistic levels. So, sources of miscommunications in this study are limited to metaphor and terminology. The linguistic level is self-explanatory, but the extralinguistic level consists of cultural, religious, and political conceptualizations specific to Persian political discourse. Furthermore, a model for predicting the probability of miscommunication has been proposed in terms of presumably complex concepts due to the special religiopolitical system of Iran. How these concepts are selected is explained in section 8.2. This model is based on Prator's (1967) hierarchy of difficulty, expounded in section 10.5.

6.2. Political Metaphors: Large Corpora and Unique Statistics

The point emphasized throughout this study is the translational approach to metaphor and terminology. Since it is devoted to the Persian language and political discourse, one may assume it has adopted a linguistic approach to metaphor and terminology. Nevertheless, one

of the unique features of this study is its reliance on translational aspects of each phenomenon, and mere linguistic issues are explained when necessity demands to help improve the translator's awareness or translational competence. Of course, it is not to say that translation is independent of linguistics. It emphasizes the translational nature of this study and its aim to bridge the gap between solid political-translational knowledge of English-speaking translators and actual knowledge and awareness needed to translate Persian political texts.

Other than the translational approach of this study to metaphor, this piece of work is unique because it is for the first time that metaphorical patterns of Persian political texts are extracted. All previous metaphorical studies on Persian political texts have focused on testing the existence of one or two English patterns in Persian. No previous work has been done on extracting metaphorical patterns from authentic Persian political texts. This study is also outstanding because it is based on considerably large corpora, and investigating large corpora is not seen in metaphorical studies of languages such as Persian. Another salient feature is the application of statistics in metaphorical studies. The study of metaphors usually solely relies on frequency (Musolff, 2004; Musolff, 2016). However, thanks to the p-value statistics and LogDice score of Sketch Engine, the frequency of items related to each metaphorical pattern (source domain) in each corpus were analyzed to see if the variance of scores is significant or it is just because of different corpus size (section 10.2). Applying such statistics to metaphor studies and integrating this extent of quantitative analyses of statistics into qualitative discourse analyses of metaphor is unprecedented, at least in the case of Persian.

Last but not least important feature of the metaphor study conducted in this research is testing metaphors in three different corpora to analyze the possible role of political affiliation and political context. In other words, it is done to examine if two main political parties in Iran

use metaphorical patterns with different frequency and priority and to check if parliament is different from news agencies in this regard. In each phase of such comparison, all factors are fixed factors, and just one is a variable factor to check its effect. The reason lies in the translational approach of this study: to improve the translator's awareness and translational competence. The translator should consider if he/she is translating parliament debates or news articles; or if it is news, what is the political affiliation of that news agency. Furthermore, during the discussion of metaphors, some extra points about relevant idioms and figurative uses of language based on previous experiences of mistranslations from Persian have been mentioned.

6.3. Frame-Based Terminology Applied to Persian Political Discourse

One of the main features of this study is its translational perspective. That is to say, every aspect of the current research has been determined based on translational needs, precisely, English-speaking translators[22] of Persian political texts. So, all terminological processes, including the definition of terms, choosing term candidates, and filtering them, have been conducted considering the aforementioned translational perspective. As it has already been discussed in Section 5.2, this study applies Frame-Based Terminology and extracts terminological phrasemes in Persian political discourse. Also, terminographical definitions of ambiguous or non-existent English will be provided. It is done so to equip the translator with any possible communicative difficulties in the process of translation.

The first asset of this study in this regard is the application of FBT in the specialized domain of politics. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has been done in the

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[22] By English-speaking translator, it is meant those translators whose mother tongue is English and Persian is their foreign or second language.

domain of politics which is abstract in nature. This theory and terminological phrasemes have been applied to concrete, specific domains such as environment, military, and legal terminology. Regarding Persian Terminology, no previous work has ever been done adopting FBT in any specialized knowledge domain. So, this study is the first attempt to test the applicability of this theory to the political knowledge domain. It must be reminded that this study, as a PhD thesis with its limitations, could not afford to find an all-encompassing list of Persian political terminology. So, this theory has been tested on terminology related to determined concepts.

Since FBT does not distinguish between collocation and compound in its theory, a short discussion of collocation and its significance to our study will be beneficial. Newmark (1988) has highlighted the difficulty of translating collocations for two reasons: a) the arbitrary relation between those collocating words and b) the secondary meaning of one of them. Baker (1992), on the other hand, elaborately pinpoints reasons for this difficulty in terms of "the engrossing effect of source text patterning, misinterpreting the meaning of a source-language collocation, the tension between accuracy and naturalness, culture-specific collocations, and marked collocations in the source text" (pp. 54-63).

The general importance of collocation in the translation process of any language pairs, including Persian, has already been investigated (Mollanazar, 1990; Ebrahimi & Lesan Toosi, 2013; Danyari & Dehbashi Sharif, 2014). Danyari and Dehbashi Sharif (2014), based on a comparative study of Persian and English collocational patterns, conclude that English-speaking translators of Persian texts should be aware of those patterns to have a good translation (p. 65). Furthermore, the political text is no exception in this regard. Because, as previously stated, Persian has some distinct characteristics that manifest themselves in collocation as well. Consequently, our frame-based approach to terminology will also

consider domain-specific phraseology (terminological phrasemes) in addition to conventional terminology.

Last but not least important feature of terminological work done here is the analysis of results according to two variables: political context and political affiliation. These variables have been tested statistically based on two further criteria: use of terms (frequency) and strength of terms (LogDice). That is to say, if any of political affiliations or political contexts had their specific terminology and, if so, how strong and meaningful they have been. In every class of comparison, all factors were fixed, and there was just one variable factor to measure its effect. It was conducted to see if the translator should consider their effect when he/she is translating from Persian to English. Along with these related points, other extra information will be presented to help the English-speaking translator (as a reader) understand the English version of Iran's political texts written by Persian writers (or Persian translators into English).

6.4. Uniqueness of Sketch Engine: Features and Statistics

Sketch Engine is a user-friendly corpus-mining online tool that has pre-loaded large corpora with various features and offers statistically supported outcomes. Other than pre-loaded corpora, the user can upload his/her own corpus and investigate it. No other corpus-mining tool can support Persian in various ways with this degree of accuracy like Sketch Engine. Among plenty of available features of Sketch Engine, metaphorical patterns and terminology were investigated based on Word Sketch, Wordlist, and Concordance. In the terminology section, due to our Persian corpora's nature and unique requirements, other features were also of invaluable help: Word Sketch Difference, OneClick Dictionary, and Keywords.

Sketch Engine develops another tool specifically for term extraction named OneClick Term, which works more straightforward than the OneClick Dictionary feature. Nevertheless,

it does not support Persian, so it was used just for English terminology extraction. We should add that even the OneClick Dictionary feature of Sketch Engine does not work correctly on some of the supported languages, and Persian is one of them. However, the most crucial issue is that other features, especially Word Sketch, totally compensate for it.

Sketch Engine offers dispersion statistics, p-value statistics, keyness score, similarity score, and LogDice score. Dispersion statistics show the distribution of an item (word) in the corpus. Its application to our work was to check the ubiquity of a given metaphor in the corpus. Among all dispersion statistics (relative DOCF[23], ARF, ALDF[24], and frequency per million), ARF (Average Reduced Frequency) was the best one regarding our corpora. ARF is used to demonstrate the distribution of an item in a non-indexed corpus, and the score is not affected by corpus size; i.e., it is used to compare the results of the same given item in various corpora with different sizes. By non-indexed corpus, it is meant a corpus that is not "pre-divided into parts as the distance between tokens is the basis of this [ARF] measure" (Rodrigues Gomide, 2020, p. 113). However, since this statistic works only on single words and ours is multi-word units (collocations), it could not be applied to our corpora. Based on personal communication with the Sketch Engine support group, we concluded that other alternatives would not be as exact as ARF considering specific features of corpora and the purpose of the study. So, we did not use it.

P-value statistics were of great importance to this study, too. Before explaining these statistics provided by Sketch Engine, a simplified definition of p-value is in order. P-value is used to reject the null hypothesis, which states that there is no relationship between two

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[23] Relative document frequency.
[24] Average logarithmic difference.

variables or that one variable does not affect the other. The p-value is 'probability value', which tests to reassure that the results are not mere chance; i.e., they are meaningful. They are often used to compare two variables, but Sketch Engine offers two statistics that can compare more than two variables in corpus linguistics. Just reporting p-value is not enough, and 'the size of effect' or 'effect size' is also essential. Effect size depicts to what extent one variable has affected the other variable or how strong is the relationship between two variables. To put it differently, it shows the extent to which a null hypothesis is refuted or approved. In other words, effect size reduces the chance of false interpretation of p-value and gives more meaning to p-value statistics than they deserve.

Sketch Engine offers several statistics to calculate the p-value of two variables (and more than two variables) in addition to considering the effect size and the different sizes of corpora[25]. Among all offered p-value statistics in Sketch Engine (Log-Likelihood or G2, Bayes Factor BIC, Relative Risk, Log Ratio, and Odds Ratio), just Log-Likelihood or G2 and Bayes Factor BIC check the relation between more than two variables. These statistics are applied to metaphor studies for the first time, at least in the case of Persian. They check the degree of significance of variance among the frequency of metaphorical items in three corpora with different sizes. They are used to study the effect of political context and political affiliation on the frequency of using each metaphorical pattern (source domain).

Keyness score is another statistic developed by Sketch Engine to extract keywords and terms. It is based on the relative frequency and per million frequencies[26] in a given corpus compared with a reference corpus. It is used to extract terminology, compare corpora

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[25] 'Effect size' does not mean 'the effect that difference in corpus size may exert'. Cf. section 10.2.
[26] Normalized frequencies which can be used to compare the frequency of an item in corpora with different size.

based on these terms, and find unique features of a corpus other than specialized terms[27]. This statistics works on tagged and lemmatized corpus that term grammar[28] of its language does exist in Sketch Engine. So this feature does not work on Persian corpora as it does on English.

Nevertheless, it is of great help for our English and Persian corpora. The similarity score is used to compare two corpora and realize the degree of their similarity to each other (Section 7.2). Moreover, the LogDice score calculates the strength of a collocation. If it were not for these statistics, the outcomes of this study would be based on qualitative analyses, which would be impossible regarding the size of our corpora. There is no other corpus-mining tool supporting Persian while offering such a wide variety of options in statistics. Several studies (Kilgarriff, 2001; Kilgarriff et al., 2014; Rodrigues Gomide, 2020) have been done on statistics of Sketch Engine to explain how they are calculated, how they should be interpreted, and on what type of corpus can be applied.

6.5. Summary

This chapter has discussed the merits of this study and what distinguishes it from other similar studies. The first merit is that this study has tried to define and predict miscommunication by adopting a perspectivist view of pragmatics and hierarchy of difficulty in Second Language Acquisition (explained in Chapter 10). Another value of this study is that this is the first time that Persian political metaphors have been extracted and investigated based on Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Musolff (2004, 2016). Previous related studies have

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[27] Keywords and term extraction | Sketch Engine
[28] Term grammar is a set of rules written in CQL that tells Sketch Engine which strings of words should be identified as terms.

selected one English metaphorical pattern and have tested its existence in Persian political discourse. No original work has been conducted based on Persian (cognitive) linguistics and political context.

Another advantage of this study is related to terminology. It has adopted Frame-Based Terminology to extract terminological phrasemes in Persian political discourse. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time it has been applied to the specific domain of politics, and for the first time, it is applied to the Persian language. In this regard, the aim is to check its applicability and functionality in Persian political discourse and limited to the terminology of determined super-concepts. Because studying the whole terminology of Persian politics would be unfeasible for such a PhD thesis.

The last benefit is related to the methodology applied in this study. Both metaphor and terminology have been investigated by applying a mixed methodology to benefit from qualitative and quantitative analyses of these two main phenomena. It has been achieved thanks to Sketch Engine, which has made it possible to investigate large corpora and statistics (p-value and LogDice) to support or refute hypotheses. Sketch Engine is the only corpus-mining tool that offers various options (Word Sketch and Word Sketch Difference) to investigate Persian corpora.

Part III. Corpus Design and Research Methodology

This part consists of two chapters that are devoted to practical steps of this study. Chapter seven is devoted to features and processes of compliling corpora. And chapter eight will discuss methodological framework of this study regarding both metaphor detection and terminology extraction protocols.

Chapter 7. Corpus Design

Both English and Persian corpora were collected during the same time: from January of 2016 to December of 2017, and as Iran's official calendar is Solar calendar, this exact time was exchanged into Solar based on available and approved Persian webpages. This period was chosen because the current study aimed to analyze synchronic and recent data, and it did not aim at having a historical or diachronic perspective on political terminology and metaphor. Amongst various categorizations of corpora, those used in this paper are of 'special purpose corpus', which is neither a general reference nor a monitor corpus, neither a special nor a subcorpus. It means that "whenever the specific purpose for which the corpus is to be used … is the reason for creating or selecting the corpus", that corpus is referred to as 'special purpose corpus' (Pearson 1998, 48). The sampling method was 'stratified' in which, at first, the focused text categories (political texts) were selected and then, news tagged as politics, national affairs, foreign affairs, and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (political news of two news agencies broadly known as pro-Conservative and Reformist) were collected (Pearson 1998, p. 128). It is worth mentioning that Persian is among less-studied languages but is, according to Ostler (2008), 'probably upwardly mobile' (p. 458).

Before explaining details of corpora collection, a brief account of the 'balance' and 'representativeness' of a general corpus would be helpful. A representative general language corpus would include all topics, genres, and text types. An ideally balanced corpus would include all categories of authentic language uses. So, a general balanced and representative corpus is unrealistic (Kilgarriff & Grefenstette, 2003). Nowadays, it is believed that corpus must serve the purpose of the study and be suitable for that specific purpose. Therefore, if the corpus should be representative, the question is 'Representative of what?' Another concern is the corpus size: 'Is the corpus big enough?' Sketch Engine suggests that a corpus is big

enough if it contains both mid and low-frequency elements of the phenomenon under study. That is why our corpora are designed to serve specific purposes and they are not general corpora. So, the three corpora used in this study are special purpose corpora that are representative of our purpose of study.

The three corpora collected in this study are not general Persian political corpora because they do not include political, academic books and journals or political news broadcasted in Iran's social media or television. Nevertheless, they are representative of our purpose of study since they include both written and spoken discourse related to all political topics such as JCPOA, foreign and national affairs, and national security. They are also big enough because, other than high-frequency occurrences, mid and low-frequency of given phenomena were observed.

Before continuing to explain the data collection process in more detail, one point is of critical importance regarding the news agencies and the ninth course of parliament (from May 2012 to May 2016), in respect. After the national presidential election of Iran in May 2009, the Reformists and their candidate claimed "electoral fraud" or "election manipulation" or "vote rigging," leading to social and political unrest all around the country. Since then, most news agencies previously and broadly known as pro-Reformists were accused of being "extremists" and were closed down. So, other new journals or news agencies started to work with a scent of reformism and with more moderate political affiliations. Concerning the members of parliament, the first parliament after 2009 unrests was drastically exceptional in the contemporary political history of Iran because most Reformists were eliminated and considered "disqualified" and could not stand as candidates.

Moreover, the rest of them did not stand as candidates as a sign of protest, few stood as non-affiliated candidates, or even new political "faces" were introduced as Reformists. It

was not just among the Reformists, even the Conservatives who won the election, confronted with fractions and disagreements among the qualified candidates, and two other factions were born out of the Conservatives: Pro-Guardianship and the Resistance Frontier. Given this information, the following section will be devoted to more details about the process of collecting each corpus.

7.1. Persian Corpora

In this section, a concise and informative discussion of the procedure of collecting and editing three Persian corpora compiled in this study will be presented separately.

7.1.1. *Parliamentary Debates*

Parliamentary debates were accessible on the official webpage of Iran's parliament, and they were saved in word files. Full text of parliamentary debates related to a specific working day was saved. However, the tables and other irrelevant information, such as reading the Quran at the beginning of each session, were omitted to avoid misleading the results and to have homogenous and Knowledge-Rich Contexts (KRCs). KRCs refer to a group of sentences comprising valuable information that could be used for extracting Knowledge Patterns (KPs). These KPs are useful for revealing semantic relations, creating knowledge base, and providing definitions for concepts. This final function is important for the terminology section of this thesis. So, extracting KRCs from corpora is a tool for enhancing terminological resources (Schumann, 2012, p. 3626). For Schumann 2011, KRCs are "naturally occurring utterances that explicitly describe attributes of domain-specific concepts or semantic relations holding between them at a certain point in time, in a manner that is likely to help the reader of the context understand the concept in question" (p. 143). During the allocated time of this study, there was a general parliament election which was politically very important and exceptional.

7.1.2. Political News Agencies

In this respect, headlines, subheadings, and summary leads were omitted, and just the main body of news was copied to the corpus. The headlines were omitted because they consist of particular journalistic strategies and terms and would mislead our results, frequency list, and other statistics on which our conclusion would be founded. Tasnim[29] was chosen as a pro-Conservative news agency, and Iranian Labor News Agency (ILNA)[30] was chosen as a pro-Reformist one. In each of them, we searched all political news that were tagged so by the news agencies. Then, we had to review the retrieved news and omit some of them because, although they were tagged as political news, they were related to other topics such as military issues. Then, all relevant news of the same day were saved in a word file named after the date of publication so that even searching and making further inspections based on the date would be more feasible.

7.1.3. Persian Corpus Size

As explained in the previous sections, the Persian corpus consists of three corpora of different sizes. Table 7.1 provides the exact size of each corpus in terms of word count and Type-Token Ratio (TTR). TTR is the total number of types or unique words divided by the tokens or the total number of words in a corpus. If we desire to express it as a percentage, the outcome should be multiplied by 100. And this is what we have done to have the percentage of each TTR. TTR depicts vocabulary variation and, in the case of percentage, the closer TTR

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[29] Tasnim (tasnimnews.com) | خبرگزاری تسنیم | اخبار ایران و جهان
[30] ایلنا - خبرگزاری کار ایران (ilna.news)

is to 100, the greater the vocabulary variation[31]. On the other hand, the closer the TTR is to 0, the greater the repetition of vocabulary.

Since our studies involve three dissimilar-sized corpora, we cannot use TTR to compare the results. Comparing corpora with different sizes based on TTR is possible through Standardized Type-Token Ratio (STTR). Sketch Engine's support group assert that calculating STTR in Sketch Engine is not an easy task because it does not work with the order of words. It is the case of most corpus-query tools. It means that in Sketch Engine, we cannot retrieve the wordlist of the first 1000 tokens only. Their suggestion was to split each corpus into files containg the exact number of tokens (i.e. lines in vertical format) and then run the wordlist on each file separately. Of course, they admitted that it would be a time-consuming process. Since TTR is not at the center of this study and Sketch Engine offers other reliable statistics and procedures to compare corpora, we have not calculated STTR and here, we will just point out some general interpretations of the Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 demonstrates that all three corpora have very little lexical variation and they contain a lot of repetition. TTR is a descriptive statistics and it cannot be interpreted by itself. Therefore, more reliable statistics will be discussed in chapter 10. What TTR can tell us at this stage is that our three corpora serve the purpose of this study which is finding *repetitive* metaphorical patterns and terminology.

Table 7.1

The Size of Each Corpus in terms of the Number of Words they contain and their TTR

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[31] Corpus Linguistics: Method, theory and practice (lancs.ac.uk)

Corpus name	Corpus size	Total Size	TTR
Parliamentary debates	4,398,332		0.96 %
ILNA (pro-Reformist news agency)	5,826,200	14,079,880	1.19 %
Tasnim (pro-Conservative news agency)	3,855,348		1.65 %

7.2. Comparison of Persian Corpora

Sketch Engine enables the user to compare corpora of the same language and calculate the similarity of those corpora. It is done based on each corpus's highest keyness score of 5,000 highly frequent words. Keyness score is not affected by corpus size, so it is to compare results of unequal size corpora. Selected corpora are compared two by two. The value of 1.00 indicates that the two corpora are precisely the same. The value cannot be interpreted by itself. In other words, "one pair of corpora is more/less similar than another"[32].

Two other pre-loaded reference corpora in Sketch Engine were added to ensure that our corpora have been collected correctly regarding its political purpose. The TalkBank Persian corpus is pre-loaded in Sketch Engine collected from various Persian blogs done by Shlomo Argamon's research group at the Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT)[33]. OPUS project aims to compile parallel corpora of translated texts from web pages, and then it aligns and annotates them[34]. OPUS2 Persian is a parallel corpus of Persian-English-aligned

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[32] Boot camp online course materials. Cf. Kilgarriff 2001.
[33] TalkBank – Persian corpus from blog posts | Sketch Engine
[34] OPUS - an open source parallel corpus (nlpl.eu)

translated texts, enabling the researcher to have monolingual and bilingual searches in that corpus[35].

The first point that grabs the attention is the similarity between news agencies' corpora. The most similar pair of corpora is related to pro-Conservative Tasnim and pro-Reformist ILNA news agencies. Both news agencies show a slight similarity with TalkBank Persian corpus, which explains that they both relate to the same blog posts/ news genre. However, the value is still significantly different. In other words, the pair of news agencies are much more similar than the pair of TalkBank Persian with any news agency.

Comparing the value of parliament corpus with these two corpora reveals that it is significantly different from both news agencies, but not as much different as other corpora are from news agencies. It means that political context plays a role. That is to say; all three corpora are significantly different from other reference and general corpora; although they show subtle differences among each other.

Figure 7.1

The Comparison of Manually Collected Corpora of this Study with two Pre-loaded Corpora in Sketch Engine

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[35] OPUS parallel corpu | Sketch Engine

	OPUS2 Persian	TalkBank Persian (blog posts)	ILNA	parl.iran	Tasnim
OPUS2 Persian	1.00	6.22	8.22	8.47	7.97
TalkBank Persian (blog posts)	6.22	1.00	3.34	4.83	3.38
ILNA	8.22	3.34	1.00	3.80	1.62
parl.iran	8.47	4.83	3.80	1.00	3.79
Tasnim	7.97	3.38	1.62	3.79	1.00

Note. Shades of green color show that the two corpora are very similar. The bigger the distance//difference in color from orange to dark red, the more different the two corpora are.

7.3. English Corpus

From the very beginning, this study was designed to be based on comparable corpora for various reasons. However, finding English translations of the same Persian news articles andparliamentary debates was almost impossible because Persian is among less studied/ translated languages. Furthermore, Persian political texts, unlike scientific or literary texts, are usually analyzed for discursive purposes and they are not translated into English, for instance. Even in the case of news agencies both of which offer English version of news, no translation from Persian into English was found. Because of totally different political systems of Iran and the UK, the manually compiled English comparable corpus (of more than 20 million words) for this study was proved to be useless and it was discarded.

Based on general comparison of Persian corpora discussed in terms of Figure 7.1 and also based on analyses of extracted Persian collocations, the two news agencies were proved

to be very similar. In other words, the role of political affiliation was not significant at all. The parliament corpus proved to be different from the news agencies and a considerable number of terms found in the latter were absent in the parliament. In other words, the effect of political context was not significant. So, the compilation of an English corpus consisting of the English version of news articles published in the same news agencies during the same time would be enough. This time two issues arose: a) ILNA's English archive system did not allow going back to a certain date and we had to go through hundreds of pages to finally access January 1st 2017, for instance; b) Tasnim's English archive system was very user-friendly; but the problem was that the number of English news articles was really low. Since collecting news from ILNA was infeasible and the study had already proved insignificance of political affiliation, English corpus was compiled from Tasnim only. An English corpus of 1,230,830 words was compiled and uploaded on Sketch Engine for phraseological study of this thesis.

7.4. Summary

Three Persian corpora of more than 14 million words were collected based on a stratified sampling method. They are special-purpose corpora and include parliamentary debates and news articles published in pro-Conservative Tasnim and pro-Reformist ILNA from 2016 to 2017. They are therefore finite and synchronic, and they contain full texts. Sketch Engine's feature of comparing corpora of different sizes and keyness score it calculates, these Persian corpora proved to be significantly different from other reference and general Persian corpora pre-loaded in Sketch Engine. Since comparison of these three corpora showed no significant difference between the two corpora related to news agencies and due to unavailability of the English version of news published in one of the news agencies, the English corpus of this study was collected from pro-Conservative Tasnim news agency only. It consists of more

than one million words, and they are not necessarily English translations of the same Persian news.

Chapter 8. Methodological Framework for Metaphor and Terminology

This chapter will elaborate on the step-by-step methodological aspects of this study. The first three sections are dedicated to essential and primary methodological steps taken in this study which are shared and necessary procedures involved in investigating metaphors and terminologies. These three sections involve technical issues related to the Persian NLP considerations, a pilot study conducted to extract source domains of metaphors and super-concepts of terminologies and the instruction manual of using Sketch Engine features. The last two sections will address piecemeal protocols devised in this study to adapt Musolff's theory of scenarios and Faber's FBT according to the aims of this study, special conditions of a PhD thesis, available corpus-mining tools supporting Persian.

8.1. Overcoming Technical Barriers

Following the technical issues discussed in section 3.6, an account of Sketch Engine features and how much exactly it supports Persian seems inevitable. This online terminological tool supports Persian, but some of its crucial features, such as thesaurus and keywords, are unavailable for Persian. The reason is that, generally, Sketch Engine automatically tags and tokenizes corpora in Latin scripts such as Spanish and English; but in the case of Cyrillic script corpora such as Persian, this first automatic phase does not work. As it was imperative to this study and after making personal contact with the Sketch Engine support group, they warmly welcomed the idea to facilitate the tool to our Persian corpora for the first time in their history. So, the Persian corpora were tagged manually by using Persianp Toolbox available from https://persianp.ir/toolbox.html. A template of the result was sent to the Sketch Engine support group. After a couple of emails clarifying the Persian script and related technical issues, they changed our account and tools for processing the manually-tagged

Persian corpora. Finally, all features of the Sketch Engine tool became available for Persian corpora for the first time, and it was vital for this study.

8.2. Pilot Study: Creating and Probing the Subcorpus

We conducted a pilot study to find different aspects of the corpora at hand; establish criteria for choosing super concepts; make a general understanding of possible metaphors, and hence, the wordlist of conceptual elements for metaphor exploration. This pilot study is done on a subcorpus of our collected Persian corpus. We created the subcorpus in this way:

- Since Iran's political system is theocratic, 'Islamic' was selected as a keyword/word/term?? to explore Sketch Engine. It was probed via the Concordance feature of Sketch Engine, and it was done on the corpus of parliamentary debates because it was supposed to be a combination of the Reformists, the Conservatives, and the non-affiliated. The number of concordances was 9,079, and a random sample of 205 was chosen to be studied in more detail based on KWIC. Sketch Engine provides this random sample automatically and preserves the sample's representativeness. It led to a more than 65-thousand-word subcorpus as a source for the pilot study.

For the study of metaphors, the pilot study had two purposes: a) to check the applicability of Musolff's scenarios and source domains on our corpora, and b) to make a list of words to be searched in our corpora. The collected data in this phase proved that Musolff's model needs to be tailored according to the Persian corpora and, more specifically, according to Iran's special political system and hence, political discourse. Musolff's model consists of 12 super domains. Ours consists of 11, and the classification and naming are different from Musolff's. For example, as the specificity of Iran's political system is Islamic rules (*sharia*),

a super domain is devoted to religious metaphors named religion. Regarding the second purpose, an all-encompassing list of 90 words related to source domains was selected to explore Persian metaphorical patterns.

For the study of terminology, the subcorpus was probed, and the following criteria for choosing the list of super concepts were proved to be feasible. Based on the pilot study, the first criterion is the ideological foundation of Iran's Islamic Revolution and, hence, Iran's political system. In this regard, *arrogance*, *jihad*, *culture*, *freedom*, and *Islam* are chosen. The second criterion was the political issues when the corpus was collected: *justice*, *JCPOA*, *war*, *peace*, *security*, and *power*. The third criterion is the concepts proved to be essential in political discourse based on the Supreme Leader's speeches: *enemy*, *resistance*, *infiltration*, and *insight*. The criteria are not always clear-cut. So, for instance, *arrogance* and *jihad* can be categorized according to political ideology and the Supreme Leader's speeches; or *JCPOA* and *security* can be categorized based on both the Supreme Leader's speeches and the current issues. At this phase, what is more important than the preciseness of categorization is the significance and collocational behavior of the chosen super concepts. Some other selected concepts, such as *presence* and *independence*, practically proved to lack the capacity to become super concepts, and they did not have so many collocations. Nevertheless, they proved to be closely related with other concepts and collocations.

8.3. Sketch Engine Relevant Features

Before proceeding to the main discussion of methods applied to investigate metaphors and terminologies, a somehow instruction manual of Sketch Engine features will be helpful. Among all the invaluable features of Sketch Engine, three were of great importance: Wordlist, Word Sketch, and Concordance. To prepare for the main discussion of

methodology, a succinct discussion of each feature in terms of metaphors and terminology will be presented next.

8.3.1. *Sketch Engine Features Relevant to Metaphors*

Based on the advanced Wordlist feature of Sketch Engine, the previously prepared list of 90 words was searched in each corpus. The frequency of almost all words was too high to be managed manually, and going through each KWIC one by one was unfeasible. Nevertheless, we did not want to miss any metaphorical pattern, on the one hand, and wanted to have an overall impression of statistical variation of explored patterns. So, the following procedure was applied.

In the Wordlist results, more tabs are offered: Concordance, N-grams, Word Sketch, and Thesaurus (Figure 8.1). Among them, Concordance and Word Sketch proved to be impressively helpful. So in the Wordlist, the Word Sketch is selected to be shown in a new window. Then, two view options are activated: 'Show frequencies' and 'show scores' (Figure 8.2). Now we have both collocations and their statistics. Here again, skimming is more than enough to spot possible metaphors, including terminological metaphors (Figure 8.3). In both of these procedures, the final step is to examine the KWIC of occurrences provided by the Concordances feature (Figure 8.4).

Figure 8.1

Overview of Wordlist and Extra Features Provided for Every Given Word

Figure 8.2

Overview of 'View Options' in the Word Sketch Feature

Figure 8.3

Word Sketch feature for 'Pillar' in Pro-Reformist ILNA News Agency

Figure 8.4

Overview of KWIC for a Given Collocation

Word Sketch does not work correctly in the case of words with low frequency, such as 20 or even less than 10. So, it was replaced with the Concordance feature: It might not provide statistics, but the examples are so few, and checking each KWIC is easy to handle. In all cases, whether high or low frequency, the advanced settings of Concordance were set to ±3 words; three words before and after a particular word. For instance, for the given word house, three words before and after house were asked to be searched by the Sketch Engine Concordance feature. Furthermore, just T-score and LogDice boxes were checked (Figure 8.5).

Figure 8.5

Overview of Advanced options in the Concordance Feature

In the Concordance feature, three statistics (T-score, LogDice, and MI) are displayed by default, and if desired, others can be added (MI3, log-likelihood, min. sensitivity, MI.log_f). Based on the explanations of each of these statistics addressed on the official webpage of Sketch Engine[36], T-score and LogDice will be used to interpret the results. The former will be explained in section 8.3.2. T-score "expresses the certainty with which we can argue that there is an association between the words, their occurrence is not random"[37]. T-score "is affected by the frequency of the whole collocation which is why highly frequent word combinations tend to reach a high T-score despite not being significant collocations"[38]. It is not a shortcoming in this section of metaphorical patterns, but just in case, the scores will be compared with the LogDice score to guarantee solid reasoning. The strength of word combinations is not as crucial as the one in the terminology section in this section. So, a positive T-score, especially above 1.5, is considered meaningful. Also, LogDice higher than

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[36] https://www.sketchengine.eu/guide/glossary/?cat=statistics
[37] https://www.sketchengine.eu/guide/glossary/?cat=statistics
[38] The same reference as the previous footnote.

four are considered reliable. Because LogDice score below four mainly indicated preposition combinations.

Before closing this subsection, a crucial point regarding the Concordance feature is 'annotation'. In the annotation mode, the users can define as many labels as they want, see each label's frequency, and make a subcorpus containing any labeled items. In this sense, each item (collocation) has been assigned as being metaphorical use of language or non-metaphorical use of language. And then, the frequency of just metaphorical use of that given item can be considered.

8.3.2. *Sketch Engine Features Relevant to Terminology*

Since the Keywords feature (terminology extraction feature) of Sketch Engine did not support the Persian corpora to find multi-word key terms and it could detect just single-word key terms, the multi-word key term extraction was conducted based on collocations. Neither do OneClick Dictionary and OneClick Terms features of Sketch Engine support the Persian language for extracting terminology. However, the good news is that in Sketch Engine, there is not just one way to achieve the desired goal, and there are always alternatives. So, another alternative named Word Sketch replaced the direct option of multi-word key term extraction.

Word Sketch is a search tool based on 'lemma'. It means that the basic form of a word must be entered in the query section, i.e., for verbs, the infinitive form, and for the nouns, the singular form must be entered. For instance, for lemma go, it will find goes, went, and going. Nevertheless, it is not always an easy task because, as confirmed in Sketch Engine's manual, "the concept of the lemma is not always clearly defined and may differ between languages

(or even between two corpora in the same language)"[39]. Another issue is that the Persian corpora used in this study were tagged and lemmatized manually (not automatically done in Sketch Engine), and this makes the query of the given lemma a bit more complex: "Rare exceptions exist if the corpus was acquired from external sources including the original lemmatization"[40].

Furthermore, as pointed out in section 3.6 related to technical problems of Persian, 'encoding' the Persian corpus is tricky because the applied tool might have used Arabic encoding commands in some cases, which results in false or (unnecessarily) different outcomes. It mostly happens in the case of singular and plural forms of nouns, which, besides the encoding problem, is because there are two types of noun pluralization in Persian. One uses the Persian suffixes, and another uses Arabic suffixes or Arabic plural forms, which change the whole form of the noun and do not include suffix[41]. That is to say, in the case of Persian corpora, outcomes regarding this lemmatization problem are found abundantly, especially in the case of plural nouns.

Word Sketch is based on LogDice statistics which shows how strong the collocation is: the higher the score, the stronger the collocation. A low score indicates that the word would collocate with any other words. This score is always a positive number. LogDice is solely determined by the frequency of the node and collocate and the frequency of the entire collocation[42]. The most crucial point is that "LogDice is not affected by the size of the corpus

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[39] lemma | Sketch Engine
[40] lemma | Sketch Engine
[41] The detailed explanation of the Persian language's features is stated in chapter 3.
[42] All information about the statistics, how they work, and how they should be interpreted are available on Sketch Engine's official page: https://www.sketchengine.eu/guide/glossary/?cat=statistics. It is highly recommended to read carefully the webpage and the references and articles which are freely available.

and therefore can be used to compare the scores between different corpora"[43]. So, regardless of the size of corpora, they can be used to check and compare collocations in different corpora in terms of different political affiliations. According to the Sketch Engine manual for the offered statistics, there is no clear-cut score in LogDice that indicates higher or lower than that specific number, the variation is significant or not. So, based on our corpus and its statistical and textual behavior, scores higher than five are significantly important. Those below this number mainly consisted of preposition combinations. Depending on frequency and KWIC, those between 3 and 5 are considered worthy of being mentioned.

LogDice score >5 = significantly important

LogDice score 3-5= conditional importance (depending on Freq. and KWIC)

Furthermore, when comparing scores among corpora, the variance of at least 0.98 is considered a significant number to show that the observed difference between two or among three corpora is significant. It should be added that just the high LogDice score does not mean that the collocation is necessarily significant or related to political context. For instance, 'justice shares' or 'equity (capital),' whose score in Parliamentary debates is 11.69 is related to economics and is also a hot topic in politics.

Other vital features are Concordance and Word Sketch Difference. If the occurrences of a given item are high; or the item is not specific to the intended domain, Concordance is of great help. The samples containing that given item can be filtered based on criteria set by the user to show just the most relevant ones. This additional filter works based on the thesaurus, and if we set the concordances of 'enemy' for showing those samples containing, for

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[43] https://www.sketchengine.eu/guide/glossary/?cat=statistics

instance, 'human', it will show samples containing 'my', 'friend', and so on that imply some human-related information. It is beneficial because most terms are related to more than one 'specialized knowledge domain' or because the corpus is a reference and large one containing billions of words. It is also helpful in even meticulously collected corpora like ours.

If the researcher doubts the usage of two near-synonyms and wants to know about the degree of formality or semantic prosody (or connotational or emotive meaning), Word Sketch Difference is of great help. For instance, for Persian 'نفوذ' there are two English equivalents: 'infiltration' and 'influence'. Based on comparing them in Word Sketch Difference and filtering Concordance, it is revealed that 'infiltration' has strongly negative semantic prosody, and it is used to describe enemies' negative influence on Iran. However, 'influence' has positive semantic prosody, and it is used when it refers to Iran and its international status and influence. The value of Concordance and Word Sketch Difference for terminology and the process of finding equivalents for terms cannot be overstated.

8.4. Protocol for Identifying Metaphors

As demonstrated, investigating all occurrences of each conceptual element in its KWIC to spot metaphors is almost impossible, especially when the frequency is higher than 70. Because for each occurrence, at least 100 words are shown in KWIC that may indicate even a conceptual element related to another source domain. So, a frequency of 70 means studying at least 700 words, and it is already a considerable number. Let alone that in most cases, to find elements and presuppositions behind the metaphor, we will have to use some other Sketch Engine option and add more texts before and after the default one. In some cases, the sum of contextual words becomes around 300 to 500 words. Luckily, Sketch Engine also allows the user to get a random sample of concordances of a given word to reduce the number of displayed concordances while the representativeness of the original sample is kept

intact. So, it is highly recommended to investigate a random sample of occurrences of a widespread item to find probable metaphors.

After retrieving the frequency list of conceptual elements in Sketch Engine, Word Sketch and Concordance features view options can be adjusted to organize the list according to the LogDice score. As previously discussed, this score plays an essential role in this model for two reasons. In the first place, it shows the strength of collocation, and in the second place, it is not affected by frequency. So, it is reliable to check the strength of semantic relation between words of a given collocate. When the list of collocates is sorted by this score and among high-scored ones, we selected those which signaled potential metaphoric use of language based on common sense, "folk theories, and encyclopedic knowledge about source topic" (Musolff, 2016, p. 11). Then the context of each occurrence of given collocation provided in KWIC was studied to see if it was a false signal of metaphor or not. If it were a false signal of metaphor and did not have any metaphor, it would be discarded.

Nevertheless, if it contained metaphor, it would be saved and marked to be mentioned in the proposed table illustrated previously. Before closing the discussion about the significance of statistics in this study, a notable point must be stated. Since we found many metaphors among those with a frequency of 3, we should not overlook the importance of low-frequency collocations. Moreover, this fact lends itself well to the efficiency of this model to find such necessary though low frequent metaphorical elements in such a large corpus. The steps of this model can be summarized as follows:

1) A list of source domain words is copied in the advanced tab of the Wordlist feature of Sketch Engine.

2) Each word of the retrieved list will offer other features, among which Concordance and Word Sketch will be chosen and opened in new tabs.

3) In Word Sketch, the view option of showing scores should be chosen. In Concordance, the number of words before and after a given word can be chosen. And then, the LogDice box must also be ticked to enable us to see this score too.

4) Those highly scored collocates that are semantically meaningful and, based on the primary analysis of the pilot study, seem to be part of "folklore theories and 'encyclopedic' knowledge" will be chosen to study their KWIC and see if they were an indicator of metaphor (Musolff, 2016, p. 11).

This method is not just limited to finding metaphors; it can be applied or, at least, provide a foundation for spotting other figurative uses of language such as idioms. However, it must be taken into account that it works for metaphorically rich corpora like news and campaigning materials and, of course, in the case of political texts.

Last but not least point revealed in this study is that, in Sketch Engine, there are two critical features for detecting potential metaphors: Word Sketch and Concordance. The former works better for two-word units like 'evil shadow'. The latter is functional for multi-word units such as 'to gather under the same ceiling' in which there are three words between node 'gather' and the collocate 'ceiling'. If we solely rely on the Word Sketch feature, we will miss other figurative usages since it is for two words collocating and coming one immediately after the other one. Compared with Word Sketch, Concordance works better for a string of words, even if just one preposition comes between the two main words (such as 'shadow of war'). In other words, the LogDice score shown in the Concordance feature will be higher than the one shown in Word Sketch for the same collocation.

8.5. Protocol for Checking the Applicability of FBT

One of the features of Frame-Based Terminology is its emphasis on ontological phase or conceptual mappings behind specialized multi-word knowledge units (collocations/

terminological phrasemes) that have typically been ignored: verbal compounds. As it has already been discussed in section 3.5, Persian phraseology is different from English, and the most common patterns are 'noun + adjective' and 'noun + noun'. The frequency of verbal compounds collocating with our super-concepts was low. Instead, there is a type of noun (verbal noun) formed by a gerund, which is frequent and significantly collocates with the super-concepts of this study.

The current terminological study is based on comparable corpora of Persian and English. Both Persian and English corpora consist of authentic texts; i.e., they are not aligned translated texts of English-Persian language pair. The corpus-mining tool used in this study is Sketch Engine. Since this study aimed to find Persian political terms around specific concepts, and even Sketch Engine's OneClick Dictionary feature and OneClick Terms supported by Sketch Engine do not work on Persian corpus, another method was adopted. According to Cabré's (1998) typology of terminological studies, this is an ad-hoc terminology search. Since the aim was finding Persian political terms around specific concepts, the starting point was Persian corpora and extracting multi-word terms (terminological phrasemes) related to those given concepts. Based on the following model, 425 Persian terms were extracted in total[44].

1) Using advanced options of the Wordlist feature of Sketch Engine, a list of concepts was entered (Figure 8.6), and the Word Sketch and Concordance feature of each concept in the list was investigated to find term candidates.

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[44] Besides these terms, 70 more terms have been extracted that are available in Annex I.

2) Based on the LogDice score and frequency, a list of term candidates was generated. This list was sorted by parliamentary debates, Tasnim (pro-Conservative news agency), and ILNA (pro-Reformist news agency).

3) Those high scored term candidates were filtered in terms of *domain specificity* (politics and not economics), *lexicogrammatical considerations* (semantically essential structures such as adjectives which are common in Persian political discourse but are absent or occasionally used in English political discourse), and extralinguistic considerations (*cultural*, *religious*, and *literary* issues).

4) The same procedures of (1) and (2) were done on the English corpus.

5) As a complementary procedure, the English corpus was investigated using both Sketch Engine's OneClick Dictionary feature and OneClick Terms (Figure 8.7) supported by Sketch Engine.

6) English equivalents of previously extracted Persian terms were found and recorded in the given table.

7) In the case of ambiguity or the existence of more than one English term for a given Persian term, the Word Sketch Difference feature of Sketch Engine was of great help. Other than our English corpus, other English reference corpora preloaded on Sketch Engine were consulted. They were Brexit corpus without retweets (4,789,571 words), English Web 2020 (38,149,437,411 words), and OPUS2 English (1,139,515,048 words).

8) In the case of lexical gaps, based on similar collocational patterns found in English corpora in addition to academic publications and discussions found on webpages, suggested equivalents were offered.

9) In the case of mismatch between the English terms suggested by our English corpus and the reference ones, on the one hand, and those found in academic and relevant

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web pages, on the other hand, the final suggested equivalent was the one supported by reference corpora and academic webpages. The logic behind this decision was that English news articles collected in our corpus were supposed to be written by non-native journalists, and neither their English level nor their dominance over (English) political discourse was unknown[45]. In this way, intriguing any further ambiguity by introducing unknown or less-known terms into English would be reduced.

Figure 8.6

Overview of Wordlist's Advanced Options and Inserting the List of Concepts

Figure 8.7

Overview of Excel File of Keywords extracted by OneClick Terms

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[45] The only explanation regarding the English version of news published on Tasnim's official webpage is that they are written originally in English, and they are not translations of the same news published on the Persian webpage. We asked them about the translators and writers of that English news, but they never replied.

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1	method name: extract_keywords					
2	corpus: user/m.ebrahimi/ebglpqae_en					
3	subcorpus: -					
4	Item	Frequency	Frequency	Relative fr	Relative fr	Score
5	nuclear agreement	539	7895	385.68155	0.17557	328.932
6	nuclear deal	708	35489	506.60953	0.78919	283.709
7	arab country	422	7582	301.96219	0.16861	259.251
8	zionist regime	250	5655	178.88754	0.12575	159.793
9	iranian nation	239	3802	171.01649	0.08455	158.607
10	terrorist group	376	38174	269.04688	0.84890	146.058
11	syrian government	308	32951	220.38947	0.73275	127.768
12	islamic revolution	234	14364	167.43875	0.31942	127.661
13	close ally	197	8369	140.96339	0.18611	119.689
14	iranian diplomat	165	1632	118.06578	0.03629	114.896
15	pre-war population	159	814	113.77248	0.01810	112.732
16	iranian president	148	4582	105.90143	0.10189	97.016
17	historic deal	120	1036	85.86602	0.02304	84.910
18	israeli regime	124	3157	88.72823	0.07020	83.842
19	missile program	125	5574	89.44377	0.12395	80.469
20	foreign-backed militancy	110	88	78.71052	0.00196	79.555
21	syrian army	148	17649	105.90143	0.39247	76.771
22	territorial integrity	161	24382	115.20358	0.54220	75.349
23	saudi regime	112	3849	80.14162	0.08559	74.744
24	nuclear program	197	49988	140.96339	1.11161	67.230

extract_keywords

In this method, precision is prioritized, and recall is of secondary priority. The main reason is the aim of this study which was to find political terminology related explicitly to given concepts. The importance of those concepts to this study and how they were selected has extensively been discussed in section 8.2. However, the recall was taken into account because we aimed at finding all terminological phrasemes related to specific concepts. So, a balance of recall and precision was necessary. Nevertheless, if we had to choose one, the priority was given to precision.

Before continuing to the next chapter to discuss metaphor and terminology in detail, a final point must be addressed regarding terminographical definition. León-Araúz et al. (2016) have demonstrated the value of pattern-based Word Sketch for identifying semantic relations. The point is that they have developed their sketch grammars to find those patterns leading to

semantic relations necessary to unveil terminographical definitions and underlying conceptual mappings which relate the terms to each other. Nevertheless, such an additional procedure was not available for this study. Furthermore, the Word Sketch feature has impressively been developed since León-Araúz et al.'s (2016) work, and the patterns it provides are adequate for those purposes. However, it should be added that León-Araúz et al. (2016) developed those patterns to reduce the amount of noise in their results and limit the results to their pre-determined list of verbs and patterns. So, what matters to the current study is the undeniable importance of Word Sketch in identifying conceptual mappings and providing terminographical definitions.

Besides providing collocations based on the LogDice score, Word Sketch offers classified patterns related to a given item at the end of the same window. For instance, considering 'enemy'[46], Word Sketch offers information about 'verbs with the enemy as subject', 'verbs with the enemy as object', and 'modifiers of the enemy'. It is crucial information, but what can be amazingly practical for terminological definition are patterns classified as 'prepositional phrases' (e.g., "enemy" of, "enemy" with), 'enemy is a' (e.g., enemy, friend), 'possessors of the enemy' (e.g., Europe), and '… is an enemy' (e.g., taxation and body). Based on studying these patterns, terminographical definition and conceptual mappings are revealed.

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[46] The following examples regarding 'enemy' are extracted from reference corpus named "ACL Anthology Reference Corpus (ARC)," which consists of conference and journal papers in natural language processing and computational linguistics (ACL Anthology Reference Corpus | Sketch Engine).

Part IV. Data Analysis and Reflections

This part is concerned with detailed analyses of data related to both metaphor and terminology. Then, results and conclusions based on those data will be discussed to present contributions of this study to the field of translation studies in terms of its multi-disciplinary nature.

Chapter 9. Data analysis

In this chapter, at first, data analyses related to metaphorical patterns related to each source domain will be expounded separately. At the end of discussion of each source domain, a succinct conclusion of conceptual mappings and scenarios will be addressed. Following the Metaphorical Patterns section, data analyses related to super concepts and their terminological phrasemes will be mentioned.

9.1. Metaphorical Patterns

Based on Musolff's (2004, 2016) model of scenarios, ten source domains were detected in Persian corpora. The classification and naming of our Persian domains are also different from that of Musolff. Table 9.1 shows the classification of ten Persian source domains and their conceptual elements which are the starting point of probing corpus for metaphors.

Table 9.1

Super Domains and their Related Conceptual Elements

(Super-)Domains	Conceptual Elements
HOUSE & CONSTRUCTION	House, ceiling, pillar, roof, gate, yard, foundation, citadel, mill, fence, base, architect, key, lock, mirror, door
FAMILY & RELATIONS	Father, mother, child, brother, sister, parents, friend
NATURE & NATURAL DISASTERS	Tree, shadow, beach, ocean, root, leaf, flood, branch, sky, star, island, peak
GAME & SPORTS	Winning, losing, game, triumph, achievement
VEHICLE & MOVEMENT	Train, car, path, railroad, wheel, ship
HUMAN BEING, EMOTIONS & HEALTH	Body, visage/face, smile, mouth, eye, anger, sleep, silence, maturity, evolution, disease, tumour, cancer, prescription
ARTS, CULTURE & LITERATURE	Stage, show, scenario, actor/actress, image, sketch, epic, king
RELIGION	Heaven, Hell, Satan, non-*Mahram*, *haram*, duty, test, sacrifice, miracle, blessing, bounty

WAR & BATTLE	Trench, arena, fire, war, front
EDUCATION	lesson, school, grade, report card, GPA, exam

The conceptual elements mentioned in Table 9.1 are equivalents of Persian elements elected based on definitions and thesaurus in Merriam-Webster and Cambridge online dictionaries. The collocations mentioned in the following tables specific to each source domain are considered main elements or, as we prefer to call them, 'primary signals' of metaphorical patterns. They have been searched for directly, and statistics can support their significance. In Musolff's (2004) model, just frequency is provided, which is not reliable in this study since there are three corpora with three different sizes[47]. There are other words or even phrases or sentences that support the metaphorical pattern indirectly, and statistics cannot be provided for them (at least not in Sketch Engine) and yet they are vital to grasp/stipulate the metaphorical patterns and how they work in terms of elements such as presupposition. These indirectly supportive words and phrases are called 'secondary signals'.

Before addressing the discussion of each source domain, it must be noted that (metaphorical) expressions are recorded and discussed if they have met two criteria: a) being related to politics, b) having recognized elements and features of metaphor such as entailment source domain, and target domain. For instance, 'to ruin' collocates strongly with 'the house'. Based on an Iranian reader's common sense and folk theories, we realize that ruining someone's house can be used figuratively. So, we check the KWICs. An KWIC retrieves "the earthquake ruined many houses" or "the earthquake left many houses ruined". These sentences are not metaphorical expressions. Another KWIC retrieves "the government's

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[47] Cf. section 7.1.

wrong policy and its reliance on the JCPOA ruined people's houses". It is considered a metaphorical expression since it is related to politics, it has target domain (the government's wrong policy regarding the JCPOA) and source domain (peoples' economic situation), and entailment (just like the earthquake that ruins everything, so does the government's wrong policy).

In each table that follows??/within this chapter??, absolute frequency of each conceptual element, regardless of being metaphor or non-metaphor, is mentioned. Then, primary signals that are collocations containing that specific conceptual element and their absolute frequency, regardless of being metaphor or non-metaphor, is mentioned. However, in the discussion of metaphorical patterns' frequency in section 10.2, we will accumulate the frequency of metaphorical usage of collocations (primary signals) of each conceptual element in the following tables. Since annotating each conceptual element such as 'ceiling' with the frequency of 737 in the parliamentary debates was infeasible, we chose this method of using Word Sketch and relying on annotating only metaphorically significant collocations. Due to the purpose of this study and large corpora, we came up with this solution. The last point is that the Word Sketch works based on lemma. It means that both single and plural form of words are retrieved. For instance, the frequency of both 'fortified citadel' and 'fortified citadels' are counted under the single form mentioned in Table 9.2. So, sigularity or plurality has not affected the frequency of metaphorical patterns.

9.1.1. *Source Domain of* HOUSE AND CONSTRUCTION

The following table shows the conceptual elements, primary signals, and statistics in each corpus. Fr. stands for 'frequency', TS stands for T-score, and LD stands for LogDice. The door, lock, key, and gate proved to be closely interrelated and interwoven, so they are presented in the same row. Each excerpt is a selected example illustrating metaphorical usage

and interpretation of a given conceptual element; the first paragraph is the text in the Persian script, and the second is the literal translation. The author does the translation, and English equivalents are mainly selected based on the terminology section of this thesis and with the help of Sketch Engine features.

Table 9.2

Conceptual Elements, Primary Signals and Relevant Statistics of HOUSE & CONSTRUCTION *Domain in each Corpus*

HOUSE & CONSTRUCTION										
Conceptual Elements	**Primary Signals**	**Parliamentary Debates**			**ILNA**			**Tasnim**		
		Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD
Ceiling	Ceiling	737			160			79		
	Under one ceiling	-	-	-	10	3.16	7.55	3	1.73	2.56
	Desires ceiling (vs. desires floor)	-	-	-	3	1.73	8.64	-	-	-
	Under the ceiling (vs. out of the ceiling)	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	2.64	7.45
	Qualification ceiling (vs. qualification floor)	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.73	9.63
House	House	468			1,054			833		
	Nation's house	204	4.68	11.2	107	10.43	8.6	59[48]	7.80	8.31
	Serving house	6	2.45	7.54	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parties' house	3	2.23	8.08	-	-	-	-	-	-
	House's voice	3	1.73	8.99	-	-	-	-	-	-
	House of hopes	4	2.00	5.77	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pillar	Pillar	53			71			57		
	Tent pillar	-	-	-	13	3.87	12.4	4	2.45	11.41
	Revolution's pillar	-	-	-	6	2.40	4.5	7	3.26	4.18
	Religion's pillar (vs. Politics' pillar)	-	-	-	5	2.64	7.5	-	-	-
	Principal pillar	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	6.31
Roof	Roof	19			11			19		
	One roof & two weather conditions	11	3.32	9.74	4	2.00	8.80	1	-	-
Yard	Yard	8			29			25		

[48] Almost all instances are non-metaphorical.

	Backyard	3	-	13.41	3	-	11.99	-	-	-
Foundation		2			10			4		
Citadel	Citadel	253[49]			16			26		
	Unconquerable citadel	3	-	8.76	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Fortified citadel	-	-	-	10	2.00	11.4	8	2.45	11.41
	Inexpugnable citadel	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.73	10.39
Mill	Mill	11			21			17		
	Enemy's mill	6	2.45	10.21	12	3.31	7.34	8	2.82	6.53
	Millstone	-	-	-	3	-	7.99	-	-	-
Fence	Fence	7			41			34		
Base	Base	333			299			230		
	Base of family	14	3.99	9.32	16	3.45	8.23	9	2.99	8.69
	Consolidating ~	7	2.65	11.33	4	2.00	8.62	-	-	-
	Strengthen ~	4	2.00	7.13	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Base of … system	-	-	-	9	3.21	5.52	-	-	-
Architect	Architect	27			55			52		
	Architect of Revolution	27	5.19	8.55	35	5.90	6.87	40	6.30	6.55
	Architect & founder	-	-	-	3	1.73	9.08	-	-	-
Door	Door	44			102			46		
	Pastor's door	-	-	-	3	1.73	10.68	-	-	-
	Home's door	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	2.64	8.24
	Open(ing) door	-	-	-	8	2.82	7.21	6	2.82	5.88
	Locking the door	-	-	-	3	1.73	9.39	-	-	-
Lock[50]	Lock	43			45			40		
	Lock of sanctions	-	-	-	4	2.00	6.66	-	-	-
	Lock of negotiations	-	-	-	3	1.73	5.84	-	-	-
	Lock of problems	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.71	4.95
	Unlock	-	-	-	6	2.44	6.84	5	2.23	7.04
	Lock & key	-	-	-	3	1.73	8.90	5	2.24	9.50
Key	key	39			161			187		
	Key of (solving) problems	3	1.72	5.17	7	2.60	5.64	23	4.77	7.83
	Opening with the key	-	-	-	4	1.98	6.16	5	2.21	6.88
	Key of development	-	-	-	6	3.43	6.92	4	1.97	6.57
	Golden key	-	-	-	4	2.00	9.72	-	-	-
	Key of interaction	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.72	6.94
Gate	Gate	30			42			23		
	Gate of civilization	4	2.00	10.75	-	-	-	4	-	8.86
	Wide gate	-	-	-	3	1.73	8.88	-	-	-
	Gate of democracy	-	-	-	5	2.23	8.63	-	-	-
	Entrance gate	-	-	-	5	1.99	6.84	4	2.00	7.00

[49] This high frequency is due to the fact that the name of a city consists of 'citadel' in Persian and every time that they have been discussing this city or the MP of that city has arguing, the name is mentioned. This is a false (or noise) frequency.

[50] It is shared between vehicle and home scenario, so it will be presented in both tables.

9.1.1.1. Conceptual Elements in Context. Iran is described as a house that does not only belong to Iranians; Muslim people from other countries can also take it as their own home. Other countries are also described as houses, and those with which Iran has an excellent political relationship consider Iran as their own home. So international relations are imagined as relations between people living in different houses in a neighborhood, implying a global village.

(1)

ما در داخل خانه خود در موضع دفاعی صد در صد بودیم و با دشمن می جنگیدیم چرا که انقلاب اسلامی در حالی شروع شد که تهاجم همه جانبه علیه انقلاب از ابتدا آغاز شد. مجبور شدیم در خانه خود بجنگیم در حالی که...

We were in a-hundred-percent defensive position inside our house, and we were fighting with the enemy because the Islamic Revolution started while an all-encompassing attack against the Revolution had already been started. We were obliged to fight in the house while …

(2)

برادران و خواهران لبنانی و همه دانشگاهیان کشورهای اسلامی می توانند به ایران اسلامی به عنوان خانه خود نگاه کنند و پیشرفت های علمی ایران متعلق به همه جهان اسلام است .

Lebanese brothers and sisters and all academics from Islamic countries can see Iran as their own home, and Iran's scientific accomplishments belong to the Muslim World.

(3)

آقای الهام علی اف حضور در ایران را همچون حضور در خانه خود دانست و با اشاره به پیشرفت قابل توجه همکاری های دو کشور در سالهای اخیر ، افزود : در روابط خود با ایران کاملا محکم هستیم و به هیچ کس اجازه مداخله و اخلال در روابط دو کشور نمی دهیم.

Mr. Ilham Aliyev considered being in Iran as being in his own home and pointing to significant development in cooperation between the two countries in recent years, added that: we are totally definite in our relation with Iran, and we do not allow anyone to interfere and disrupt the relationship between the two countries.

This house (Iran) has rooms in different sectors such as economics and culture. The problematic sections are those whose doors are locked, and suggestive ways for solving these problems are the keys. The emphasis is on locked and closed doors, and there is no discussion of open doors. The point is which key works, how it works, and where is it or who has it. From a discourse analysis perspective, these internal locked doors highly correlate with the house's main door Iran's international relationships; i.e., the main door is the interaction and negotiations door. The key has been discussed regarding national and international problems more than the door itself. Before providing text excerpts and discussions, it must be pointed out that President Rouhani's candidacy symbol was a 'key', 'the key of prudence and hope'.

The Conservatives believe that the key is inside the house (in Iran), and the Iranian people and youngsters are the key. They believe that even if President Rouhani has the key, people should take the key and unlock the doors. They claim that the key is lost and they should search for it inside the house among people living in it. Alternatively, they insist that the key the president holds is the wrong one. In the parliament, there is an additional scenario that says that even if they have the right key, if they turn it in the wrong direction in the lock, they will lock it more and aggravate the situation.

Rouhani's rival in the presidential election emphasizes that people are the key and questions the whole story of 'lock' per se in social issues and implies that the president does not know what the locks are (where the problems are), let alone having the key (solutions):

(4)

ما کلید باز شدن قفل مشکلات کشور را مردم می دانیم. دولت یازدهم و دوازدهم در حوزه اجتماعی چه کرده و چه می کند ؟ «تدبیر» در این حوزه کجاست ؟ «کلید» حل مشکلات و بحران های اجتماعی در دست کیست ؟ اصلا آیا قفل های مشکلات اجتماعی در دولت شناسایی شده است که به فکر «کلید» آن باشند ؟

We recognize people as the key for unlocking countries' locks of problems. What have the eleventh and twelfth governments done in the social field, and what are they doing? Where is 'prudence' in this field? The 'key' of solving social problems and crises is in whose hand? Have they recognized the locks of social problems at all, let alone thinking of their 'key' in the government?

(5)

چه کسی بدش می آید که با برجام همه مشکلات یا حداقل مشکلاتی که انتظار می رفت حل شوند ؟ وقتی می بینیم کلید قفل را باز نکرد ، منطقا باید راه دیگری را دنبال کنیم جلیلی تصریح کرد : این کار باید بشود و اینجا کار من و شماست که بگوییم اگر در این موضوع این طور نشد ، پس حلّال ما این نبوده است . کلید این نبوده و چیز دیگری بوده است.

Who does not like that JCPOA solves all problems or, at least, the expected ones? When we see that the key did not work, we must logically follow another way. Jalili affirmed that this work should be done, and here my duty and yours is to say that if this issue has not worked, it has not been the solution. It has not been the key, and it must have been something else.

(6)

ما امیدواریم با مدد الهی و با کمک مردم ، کلید قفل مشکلات را با حضور جوانان و مردم باز خواهیم کرد. اگر دولت ، مردم و جوانان را به عنوان کلید حل مشکلات مردم قبول داشت ، قطعا وضعیت کشور به اینجا نمی رسید . کلید این قفل و قفل های بسیاری که زده اند ، مردم و جوانان خلاق خواهد بود .

We hope that with the help of God and people, we will unlock the lock of problems with the presence of youngsters and people. If the government had admitted that people and the youngsters were the keys to problem-solving, the country's state would not have ended in this way. The lock of this lock and many locks they have put on will be people and innovative youngsters.

(7)

متاسفانه دولت یازدهم از ابتدا ، اقتصاد کشور را با برجام گره زد ، درحالیکه مقام معظم رهبری بارها تذکر داده بودند که کلید حل مشکلات اقتصادی در داخل کشور است ، لذا پس از نقض برجام ، برداشته نشدن تحریم ها توسط آمریکا و به نتیجه نرسیدن این معاهده ، شاهد مشکلات اقتصادی زیادی از قبیل افزایش قیمت دلار در کشور هستیم.

Unfortunately, the eleventh government tied the country's economics with JCPOA from the beginning. In contrast, the Supreme had constantly been warning that the key to solving economic problems is inside of the country. As a result of America's breach of the JCPOA and the agreement's failure, we have seen various economic problems in our country, such as the rise in the price of the Dollar.

(8)

وی گفت : آقایان کلید را در بیرون کشور جستجو کرده اند ، در حالی که کلید حل مشکلات در دستان مردم ایران است .

He said: these men have been looking for the key outside of the country, while the key of solving problems is in the hands of the Iranian people.

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On the other hand, the Reformists argue that the key is outside the house (in international interactions), and the JCPOA is the key. They believe that Rouhani has the key and will unlock the doors and solve problems. They go one step further and claim that he had one key for his first term of presidency, and now he has come with a bunch of keys. They argue even if the key is lost, it is outside the house. Some of them go even further and describe people as the 'bits' or 'wards' of a key.

(9)

آقای روحانی چهار سال پیش با یک کلید آمد و توانست قفل تحریم های هسته ای را با آن باز کند و برجام را رقم بزند . روحانی این بار با یک دسته کلید آمده است . یک دست کلید است به زیر بغل عشق / از بهر گشاییدن ابواب رسیده ایشان قول داده است که سایر تحریم ها را نیز بر طرف کند و موضوعاتی چون حصر و رکود و فساد را از میان بردارد به شرط آنکه مردم زیادی به وی رای دهند . فی الواقع دندانه های کلید روحانی مردم اند و اگر آنان به صحنه نیایند ، از روحانی کاری بر نخواهد آمد ولو با رایی شکننده پیروز انتخابات شود . مفتاح شو مفتاح را دندانه شو دندانه شو من 29 اردیبهشت به ادامه مسیر تدبیر و امید رای می دهم.

Mr. Rouhani came with a key four years ago and could break the lock of nuclear sanctions and brought JCPOA. This time, Rouhani has come with a bunch of keys. (Literal translation of the poem): There are many keys in the hands of love/ it has arrived to open the doors. He has promised to lift[51] other sanctions and dissolve issues

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[51] It is worth mentioning that the verb 'lift' is used in the Persian political context. While in the English political context, the verb 'ease' is used. 'Lifting' implies annulling sanctions, while 'easing' implies making them less aggravating. Since this study is based on discourse analysis of the Persian political context, 'to lift' will be used instead of 'to ease'.

such as house arrest (of politicians related to the Green Movement) and recession and corruption under the condition that many people vote for him. The bits of Rouhani's key are people, and if they do not come to the ballot boxes, Rouhani would not be able to do anything, albeit a fragile victory. (Literal translation of the poem) become a key/ become the bit of the key/ become the bit. I will vote for the continuation in the path of 'prudence and hope' on Ordibehesht 29.

A Reformist expands the idea of 'one' key to a 'bunch' of keys and writes a poem highlighting that Rouhani will open locked doors (solving other problems). He describes people as 'bits' of the key(s) which Rouhani holds and thereby foregrounds the role of people's presence and voting for Rouhani. Without the 'bits' or 'wards,' the key will not work. Those votes surpassing the rival's votes are crucial because they make Rouhani the president, even if it is not a landslide victory (or decisive victory). If we imagine the bars of a graph, for instance, showing the votes of each candidate, those for Rouhani which stand out and surpass the others' are the bits of the key that will enable the key to function and open the door – not just the door of president's office, but the locked doors of problems. He closes his speech with another poem inviting people to become a 'bit' or 'ward' and vote for Rouhani.

It is a hypothetical role attributed to people different from the Conservatives. For the Reformists, people are part of the key, and as long as they are present and support the president (the key has its bits), Rouhani will solve the problems, and Rouhani holds the key. For the Conservatives, people hold the key; people will open the door. Their emphasis is on democracy and not much on diplomacy and foreign affairs.

This scenario might also conjure up that Rouhani needs people just when opening the door, and when he is done with them, he will not need them anymore. The presupposition

would be that people are like (toy) keys that are being used (being played with) whenever the holder (the president) needs them. The question is, who has the upper hand or power over the other party. a) People over the government (the holder of the key) people in the Conservatives' opinion). Alternatively, b) the government over the people (the holder of the key, the government in the Reformists' opinion).

Another similar scenario (using something or some party as long as you need them) is followed by prominent Reformists who helped the Moderate Rouhani take office for the first time. They mentioned we do not know if Rouhani just needed us to accompany him up to the door's threshold (president's office) or he would welcome us and invite us to the house (of the presidency). We should add that his speech does not have a complaining tone; i.e., he is just explaining the uncertainty of the situation and, of course, he hopes that Rouhani chooses Reformists to help him in the cabinet.

(10)

اگر پاسخ روحانی این است که اصلاح طلبان را صرفا تا درب پاستور می خواهد اشکالی ندارد و ما این کار را برای روحانی انجام می دهیم اما به نظر می رسد شیوه دوم مبنی بر این که علاوه بر درب پاستور پس از آن از ظرفیت اصلاح طلبان استفاده شود ، شیوه بهتری است .

If Rouhani answers that he wants the Reformists just up to the Pastor's door, it is fine, and we will do it for Rouhani. However, it seems that the second way suggesting that the Pastor's door is to make use of Reformists' capacities after that (door) is a better way.

(11)

بارها رهبری از نقش وزارت اطلاعات در مقابله با نفوذ و جلوگیری از نفوذ به کشور تقدیر کردند . لازمه مقابله با نفوذ این نیست درب های کشور بسته شود ، یک وقت در زمستان حشرات به منزل وارد می شوند

نوعا زمینه نفوذ کمتر است ، ولی وقتی بهار شد درب را باز می کنیم و احتمال ورود حشرات وجود دارد. راه جلوگیری از ورود حشرات بستن پنجره و محروم شدن از هوای بهاری نیست سربازان امام زمان توری هوشمندی است که جلوی نفوذ حشرات موذی را گرفته و امکان استفاده از هوای بهاری را می دهد .

The Supreme Leader has repeatedly appreciated the role of the Ministry of Intelligence in counteracting influence and averting influence. The necessity of counteracting this influence is not to close the country's doors. Sometimes in winter, insects enter the house, typically not favorable circumstances for influence; but when it is springtime, we open the doors, and there is a chance that the insects enter. Closing the window and depriving ourselves of spring weather is not the right thing to do to prevent the entrance of insects. Imam Zaman's (Anonymous) Soldiers are smart mosquito nets that prevent the penetration of vermin and allow us to enjoy spring weather[52].

The country is described as a house whose doors cannot be (kept) closed to avert the enemy's penetration. Doors are international relationships and negotiations with other countries, and the enemy's penetration is like the entrance of vermin. If we keep our doors closed, we deprive ourselves of spring weather. The alternative for closing the doors is installing an intelligent mosquito net/mesh, which allows us to enjoy the spring weather and avoid vermin. In this scenario, Imam Zaman's (Anonymous) Soldiers are described as mosquito nets, and the enemy's influence is described as the entrance of vermin. A concise

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[52] This is a quotation from the minister of the Ministry of Intelligence in Rouhani's Moderate government. It is also considered a Reformist-inclined position because it is not covered up in Tasnim.

definition of Imam Zaman's (Anonymous) Soldiers will be addressed at the end of this discussion.

The intriguing point is that it starts the argument with 'door,' but when he argues for the openness of international negotiations or relationships, he refers to 'window'. The drift of 'window' would be that they do not expect much openness in the relationships. This idea is supported in another excerpt in which it states the door was open (but not quite open) for a short time, and we took advantage of it and exchanged JCPOA.

(12)

در برجام نیز سازوکاری وجود دارد که چگونگی رسیدگی نقض برجام را نشان داده است . اگر هم برجام نقض شود ما به نقطه اول برمی گردیم . ایران نقضی انجام نداده است .... اگر امریکا لغو تحریم ها و قطعنامه ها را وتو می کرد ما در تحریم می ماندیم ولی در آن زمان امریکا وتو را انجام نداد . الان نیز امریکا در انزوا قرار گرفته است . درب یک لحظه باز شد و ما از این لحظه استفاده کردیم .

JCPOA has a mechanism that has demonstrated how to investigate the violation of JCPOA. Even if JCPOA is violated, we will go back to square one. Iran has not violated. … If America had vetoed the lift of sanctions and resolutions, we would have remained sanctioned; but America did not do that then. Moreover, now America is isolated. The door got opened for a moment, and we made use of this moment.

Resuming the main discussion of (11), interchangeability of 'door' and 'window' can also refer to an expression stating that 'if you do not allow someone enters through the door, he will come in through the window'. Corollary result would be that, regardless, there will be penetrations into the country's house, but we can take some measures to reduce the presumed detrimental consequences and relish the spring weather (procure agreements and treaties) simultaneously. There is an enemy and its influence in both news agencies with different

political affiliations, but for the pro-Reformist ILNA, the way to counteract it is not to limit international negotiations or relations.

The seasonal theme can be interpreted as transregional circumstances and Iran's geopolitical situation. Winter is when there is conflict in international relations or the region. So there are no or few relations, and even if the door is open (there are some few relations and negotiations), the risk of vermin entrance is low (enemy's influence). Springtime is the time of no conflict or high level of international relations. So the door is open, and the vermin entrance is accessible. The solution is not to close all doors and windows because the tenants might get hurt for the lack of air, light, and human contact. Alternatively, after the winter, when the doors have been closed, they can be opened to circulate the house's air.

The conceptual element of insects such as vermin, termites, ants used to describe negative target domains such as enemy or influence can be traced back to some Islamic narratives, among other possible sources. For instance, the Prophet Muhammad has described 'hidden *Shirk* or polytheism' as something more hidden and unrealizable than 'the movement of an ant on a black stone in a night'. The common point between this parable and the political metaphors is that both refer to condemned phenomena that human beings experience without being aware of them.

The last drift of this excerpt pertains to Imam Zaman's (Anonymous) Soldiers. It is a branch of the Ministry of Intelligence whose duty is to guarantee the sustainable security of Iran, counteracting both internal and external enemies. The principal motive behind its foundation is Imam Khomeini's guidelines and the principal basis of Iran's Islamic revolution

in counteracting the arrogance power. They activate in numerous fields from economic to political mischiefs, from military to non-military activities. Why is it called Imam Zaman? Based on Islamic (Shia Islam) teachings, Imam Zaman[53], the last Imam, is still alive and someday will emerge with Jesus Christ. Why is this subsection of the ministry called the soldiers of Imam Zaman? Because it is believed that Iran, after the Islamic Revolution, is trying to govern a society and make the people and circumstances ready for the emergence of Imam Mahdi. So, generally speaking, all Iranian authorities, specifically these soldiers, are helping in line with the emergence of Imam Mahdi.

(13)

رییس جمهوری افزود : ما غاصب را از باغ خود بیرون کردیم و درب باغ به روی مردم باز شده است و امروز عده ای کودک به درب باغ آمده و می گویند ، سیب و گلابی کجاست که می خواهیم میل کنیم . امروز این باغ که نهال های آن تازه غرس شده آماده باروری است ، اما برای به ثمر نشستن صبر لازم است .

> The president added: we have ejected the usurper from our garden, and the garden's door is open to people, and today some children have come to the garden's door and say where are apples and pears we want to consume. Today, this garden whose recently planted saplings are ready for fertility, but patience is required for it to fruit.

In the house scenario describing Iran, there are a garden and other nature- or village-related descriptions besides the house and its construction. This house has gardens which have been usurped for a long time. Nuclear technology and nuclear-based achievements are

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[53] One of its titles, among many others, means 'the leader of the time.'

described as the garden. The sanctions were the locks on its doors. JCPOA is the key that opened the door. However, the point is that it was only recently opened, while the garden had been locked for some years. So it needed new trees. The saplings (the lift of sanctions) have recently been planted, so everyone should be patient to see the fruits (especially the economic flourishing in Iran).

This excerpt refers to the first reactions to JCPOA, especially in the parliament because it was a Conservative parliament[54]. They were suspicious and skeptical, and they insisted so much on their concern regarding the outcomes and consequences of this nuclear agreement that a sarcastic key term was in the spotlight: 'worrywarts of JCPOA'. According to Reformists, as highlighted in this excerpt, the 'worrywarts' as the main criticizers of JCPOA were too impatient. They are described as nagging children who impatiently look for fruits (apples and pears).

Another element of the source domain implying 'global village' is the key term of 'headman'. The Persian equivalent of this term is 'كدخدا' (*kadkhodā*). In Persian, it is a compound: '*kad*' meaning 'village' and '*khodā*' meaning 'God'. It means 'the God of the village'. This keyword became a thorny issue in hot debates from a couple of months before the presidential election in 2013 till three years after Rouhani's election and triggered a host of debates another time after JCPOA and debates on its success or doomed failure. To understand the scenario, an account of where this started and the presuppositions needed to be addressed.

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[54] Cf. Section 2.4.

Almost three months before the presidential election in 2013, Rouhani was asked about his stance towards negotiations with America, and he replied: "The art is to turn the threat into damage and turn the damage into opportunity; accordingly, the negotiation with America is possible. Nevertheless, it is difficult, though I believe negotiation with America is easier than with Europe because Europeans have the position of 'May I …, sir?'[55] in front of America [in negotiations]. Thence, the future government must be able to reduce the level of the relationship with America from enmity to tension which is a level lower than the enmity. America is the village's headman, and agreeing with the headman is easier. Now that "the Supreme Leader, in his speech in Farvardin[56], left the path to the negotiations open, the future government can build up this relationship considering the redlines."

This quotation became the source of many hot debates against Rouhani and attitude among Conservatives and the government's critics for a couple of years. The first interpretation sprang from the etymologic ambiguity inherited in '*kadkhodā*': *khodā* means 'God' in Persian. So, America was described as the God and hence, polytheism. So, it led to many counter metaphors, which mainly consisted of religious source domains. Besides these religion-based arguments against this metaphor, the second presupposition was inherited in the assumed characteristics of the headman: The headman is a fair person who judges among people, especially at the time of conflict, and tries to reconcile the disputing parties. The dominantly negative argument will be discussed in detail, but first, a summary of arguments for the presupposition of 'headman' will be presented in the following paragraph. Then the detailed account of dominant presupposition will be resumed in the subsequent excerpts.

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[55] An embedded metaphor describes the European countries as students whose teacher is America, and they constantly ask permission from America for anything they want to do.
[56] The first month in Solar Calendar.

First, the polytheistic interpretation of the Persian term 'kadkhodā' was criticized heavily, which is self-explanatory. The interpretation was that the headman is not necessarily reasonable and fair. The headman is the village chief who might be a mischievous person bullying the others. America is that type of headman: An arrogant bully who tyrannizes others because of its economic power. America's sanctions do not need laws to be implemented; it suffices to sanction companies, and then, no one would dare have economic relations and transactions with Iranian companies.

The harshest reaction against considering America as headman and the polytheistic interpretation of the presuppositions is being discussed in excerpt number 13, a quotation of a Conservative member of parliament.

(14)

اما راهبرد دشمن در این عرصه و زمان ، راهبرد مقابله با جبهه حق از دروازه برجام به زعم خودش بود . راهبرد دشمن و شیطان بزرگ و صهیونیسم جهانی از طراحی برجام خلق گوساله سامری در این عصر و زمان بود تا جریان توحیدی موثر و انقلابی موثر اسلامی ملت ایران را دچار انحراف نماید و امید ملت مسلمان و موحد ایران را از نگاه به درگاه الهی به نگاه به دروازه دهکده جهانی که کدخدای آن شیطان بزرگ است معطوف نماید . راه مبارزه قرآنی با گوساله سامری در عصر حضرت موسی (علیه السلام) آتش زدن گوساله بود که صدای غیرتوحیدی خود را برای انحراف امت موسی بیان می کرد . راه حل نهایی ما هم نیز در این عصر و زمان اقدام مقابله به مثل در برابر نقض برجام و اجرای فرامین ولی امر مسلمین و اجرای قانون مجلس و سرانجام اگر نقض کردند ، ملت ایران برجام را در روز موعود به آتش بکشند .

However, in his opinion, the enemy's strategy was in this arena and at this time was the strategy of counteracting resistance frontier through the gate of JCPOA. The strategy of Enemy, Beelzebub, and Zionism behind planning JCPOA was to create Golden Calf in this era and to deviate the Islamic, revolutionary and monotheistic stream of the Iranian people and divert Muslim and monotheism Iranians' source of

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hope from divine gates to the gates of the global village in which the headman is Beelzebub. The Quran fight against Golden Calf in the Moses era was to burn the calf, making polytheistic voices deviate Moses's nation. In this era and at this time, our last measure as a reciprocal action in the case of the breach of JCPOA and as following the Supreme Leader's command and enforcing the parliament's law will also be setting JCPOA on fire by a nation if they violate JCPOA.

This excerpt follows two main metaphorical patterns besides a weak version of nature-related scenario (stream & deviate): one related to the house and the other related to religion. It can be called 'embedded metaphorical patterns' or 'metaphor in the metaphor'. Other than the self-explanatory house scenario, it refers to a parable shared between Islam and Judaism. In the Quran, *Suras* named *I'raf* and *Taha* have elaborately narrated this story. In the Torah, it is mentioned in Exodus 32 and King 12. Apart from some differences in the story each of them narrates, they both have the main idea in common. When Moses was out of the town on Mountain Sinai, someone named Aaron (in the Torah) or Sameri (in the Quran) created a Golden Calf and did some tricks, causing the idol to make a sound similar to a cow's sound. Then people started to worship it, and when Moses came back and saw them worshiping the idol after confessing their faith in God and after witnessing such huge miracles, he got so mad that he broke the tablets and burned the Golden Calf[57].

After introducing the gist of this domain's origin, the presupposition of this metaphor is conceivable. Here JCPOA is portrayed as Golden Calf, which has been created by the

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[57] Cf. golden calf | Old Testament | Britannica

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headman, also called Beelzebub, who plays the role of Aaron, and this time, the story has reoccurred in the global village (the equivalent of Mt. Sinai). In this recent incident, Moses can be Iranians descending from the Supreme Leader to the parliament's laws and ordinary people. Another more detailed hierarchy would be in this order: Supreme Leader as God who determines the main framework and commands, the laws passed in the parliament (endorsed by Supreme Leader's representatives) as the religious laws and guidelines based on which people playing the role of Moses should burn the JCPOA. It can be argued that JCPOA's clauses are the sound the Golden Calf was making, i.e., something evil to delude people and make them imprudently believe that JCPOA will solve all the problems and make their lives better.

These two metaphorical patterns are intricately blended, and it shows the profundity of religious or Islamic source domains in other source domains. It also confirms the method for collecting the subcorpus required for the pilot study, as explained in section 8.2. To resume the main discussion of this excerpt, we can explain the last and substantial point about the presupposition underlying the source domain of 'headman'. This Conservative MP argues that even if America is regarded as the evil headman (not a respective fair one), it does not solve this problematic metaphor and exacerbates the problem. We should not go to America's front porch or door and ask for the help of the devil headman of the (global) village, which is a polytheistic act[58]. Instead, we should go to the divine doors such as God's or Imams' house and ask for their help via prayers. This substitutionary scenario of going to God's house will be explained in examples 17-19. On the one hand, this dichotomy of evil and God and their different doors can also conjure up the portrait of Hell vis-à-vis Paradise. However, in the

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[58] Remembering that the Persian *kadkhodā* has God in it.

meantime, this account of embedded metaphors is sufficient to depict how closely they are interlocked.

(15)

خیلی ها می گفتند باید به مساله واقع بینانه نگاه کرد چون دنیا یک کدخدایی دارد و شاخ و شانه کشیدن برخی کشورها نیز به این خاطر است که ما با کدخدا رابطه نداریم و اگر این اتفاق بیفتد مشکلات ما با خیلی از کشورها نیز خود به خود حل خواهد شد اما اتفاقا امروز باید واقع بینانه نگاه کرد چرا بعد از چند سال مذاکره با امریکا ، کشوری مثل جیبوتی نیز برای ایران شاخ و شانه می کشد ؟ مگر قرار نبود با پذیرش مناسبات کدخدا ، مشکلات حل شود ؟ پس چرا برخی کشورها در همین سه سال گستاخ شده اند ؟

Most people said we should be realistic about the issue [Iran's nuclear program] for there is a headman in the world and that some countries twist our arm is because we do not have a relationship with the headman, and if this happens, our problems with most countries will be solved automatically. Nevertheless, today it must be viewed realistically. Why, after a couple of years negotiating with America, a country like Djibouti also twists Iran's arm? Was it not supposed for all the problems to be solved after accepting to have relations with the headman? Why have some countries become cheeky[59] in the last three years[60]?

(16)

آقای روحانی اینکه می گوید نیمه راهیم یعنی اعتمادسازی با دنیا و تنش زدایی صورت گرفته است . اگر ما صادقانه طی کنیم مسیر را اینگونه نیست که دنیا کدخدا داشته باشد . ایران با قدرتی که دارد می تواند نقش موثری داشته باشد . رامین در پاسخ به شریعتی گفت : دنیا یک واژه حقوقی است . کشورهایی که هیچ

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[59] Literal translation of the Persian is 'to become horn to someone'.
[60] The time of nuclear negotiations.

خصومتی با ما ندارند یا کشورهایی که با ما خصومت دارند . صد و هشتاد ، نود کشور مشکلی با ما ندارند و روحانی کلیدش را می دهد به کد خدا و می گوید باید با خود کدخدا صحبت کرد . این نگاه قیم پذیرانه روحانی بزرگترین معضل برای خود ایشان است . این نگاهی حقارت پذیر است .

That Mr. Rouhani says, we are halfway, which means mechanisms of trust formation with the world and détente have been done. If we honestly go through the path, [we will see that] it is not like that the world has a headman. Iran can play a significant role by using the power it has. Ramin answering Shari'ati, said: the world is a legal term. There are some hostile countries, and others are not hostile to us. One hundred and eighty or ninety countries are not hostile to us, and Rouhani gives the key to the headman and says we should speak to the headman himself. Rouhani is this view of accepting guardianship of America/ America as his tutor is his central dilemma. It is a contemptible view.

Excerpts 15 and 16 more or less refer to the same point: disputing the position of America as the 'headman'. Number 15 is the quotation of a Conservative who was an ex-member of the negotiation committee during Ahmadinejad's presidency; but then, negotiations did not go as planned, and they could not come to an agreement to sign any resolutions. This fragment controverts Rouhani's claim that making a deal with America (as the headman) will solve all the problems and the other countries (other villagers). The use of informal-cum-vulgar idiomatic expressions was widespread during Ahmadinejad's presidency; Ahmadinejad was the founder of this type of expression in Iran's political discourse.

In excerpt 16, a Conservative criticizes the president for accepting America's guardianship by calling it 'headman'. A quotation mentioned in pro-Reformist ILNA during a

presidential debate between a Reformist and a Conservative when Rouhani was campaigning for his second term of presidency, i.e., four years after the first appearance of 'headman' in political discourse. It also refers to the source domain of 'key' and criticizes that Rouhani blames the others while it is his fault. Here the 'key' is the control and management of the country or the house. He argues that Rouhani has given the key to the headman and if anyone inside the house has any problems, should go out of the house, go to the house of the headman, knock on his door, and request for his help; i.e., Rouhani keeps referring his people to America; if they have problems, it is America's fault.

Going to someone's door (or front porch) is the picturing of a traditional way of begging in Iran, which is still common in some cities, and that is why it is considered humiliating. The source of going to someone's door and knocking on his door, and asking for their help can be interpreted in two ways depending on whose door someone is knocking on. The first scenario is when he begs for something from a good or holly person, like when people go to the holy shrines of Imams and ritually knock on the big entrance gates, and it is for both announcing their presence and asking for permission to enter the holy place and then ask for their wants and needs and prays[61]. In this case, it is something not only positive but also highly recommended. Begging is despicable unless someone begs something from God or holy persons such as prophets and imams. The second scenario is when someone goes to the front porch of ordinary or even mischievous people. The following sections go into greater depth about this scenario, in which each country is described as a house with doors, as previously stated.

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[61] In a similar vein, this ritual of knocking something is also a part of visiting the tombs in the cemeteries. Before reading some verses of the Quran for the peacefulness of their souls, the visitor knocks on the tombs. A more detailed explanation of this and other similar rituals is out of the scope of this study.

(17)

وقتی از قرآن و دعاها فاصله گرفتیم ، وقتی خود و خدا را نشناختیم ، با یک مقام ظاهری ، خود را گم می
کنیم ، تصور می کنیم همه کاره انسان است . همه کاره منم . خدا را فراموش می کنیم . کبر و غرور بر ما
سایه می افکند . به جای رفتن به درب خانه خدا ، به درب خانه آمریکا می رویم . یادمان می رود همه کاره
خداست . به جای باز کردن باب مذاکره با خدا ، با آمریکا و اروپا مذاکره می کنیم . تصور می کنیم
مشکلات کشور ما به دست آمریکا حل می شود.

When we distance ourselves from Quran and prayers when we have not recognized
ourselves and our God, we detach ourselves (from God and prayers) when we get a
superficial position and assume that man is all-purpose. I am all-purpose. We forget
about God. Pride and arrogance overshadow us. Instead of going to God's house door,
we go to America's house door. We forget that God is all-purpose. Instead of opening
the negotiating door with God, we negotiate with America and Europe. We assume
that our problems will be solved by America's hand [help].

(18)

به اندازه که وقت برای مذاکره با آمریکا گذاشتیم ، اگر با خدا حرف می زدیم و به درگاه خدا استغاثه می
کردیم ، مشکلات کشور حل شده بود . چرا این آقایان و مسیولان کشور به سیره امام خمینی (ره) و امام
خامنه ای عمل نمی کنند ؟ مشکل بازرگان همین بود که به جای رفتن به درب خانه خدا ، باب آمریکا را می
کوبید . مشکل خاتمی هم همین بود . مشکل منتظری این بود که اهل استغاثه و نماز شب و انس با خدا نبود .

If we had spent that long time negotiating with America on speaking to God and
appealing for His help, the country's problems would have been solved. Why do not

these men and the country's authorities do not act according to the chronicle of Imam Khomeini and Imam Khamenei? Bazargan's[62] problem was also the same. Instead of going to God's house door, he knocked on America's door. Khatami also had the same problem. Montazeri's problem was that he was not used to appealing for God's help, saying night prayer (*Tahajjud*), and having the companionship of God.

(19)

مشکل ، آمریکا نیست بلکه مشکل ، عدم فهم قدرت خداست . مشکل اینجاست که به جای رفتن به درب خانه خدا ، درب خانه دشمن را می کوبیم . مشکل نشناختن دشمن و نقشه های دشمن است .

The problem is not America, but the problem is the lack of perception of God's power. The problem lies in that instead of going to God's house door; we knock on the enemy's house door. The problem is with not recognizing the enemy and his plans.

Excerpts 17 to 19 are the same person's quotations: the representative of the office of Supreme Leader at Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He mainly argues that we should ask for God's help and knock on His door, not the other countries'. On the other hand, he does not blame America and believes that authorities should perceive God's power, and if there is one person to beg to, that is God. He enumerates some politicians who were detoured from the main road of the Islamic Revolution and became traitors, although once they were among the founders of the Revolution. He postulates that they underestimated God's power

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[62] The name of some politicians who were among the main revolutionists, but, little by little, they were recognized as being traitors.

and their lack of firm conviction. Consequently, the same will happen to current authorities who follow the same strategy and go to America's house door and ask for his help.

Now that the image of the relations between Iran house and other houses is established, the more detailed aspects of this house can be examined. House is not the only construction image used to portray Iran; citadel is also exerted to metaphorically describe different sections of Iran's political system and how it works or the functions of each of them. One of the most elaborate descriptions of the citadel metaphor is developed by Ahamd Alamolhoda, who is the representative of the office of Supreme Leader in the province of Khorasan Razavi and a member of the Assembly of Experts. He is a far-right religious politician famous for figurative language and his extremist religious commands or *fatwa*. Here is his quotation, and then, the discussion will be presented.

(20)

نظام مقدس جمهوری اسلامی ما مثل یک قلعه است که اطراف آن یک دیوار بلند بالایی که هیچ کس از دیوار این قلعه نمی تواند بالا برود و آن دیوار و حصار محکم ، مقام ولایت هست ؛ در هر جریانی ، در هر نظامی ، نفوذ از دشمن و بیگانه از اطراف واکناف و ابعاد مختلف امکان پذیر است اما در نظام ما ، نفوذ از اطراف واکناف در این قلعه محکم امکان پذیر نیست چون حصار محکمی دارد که مقام ولایت و رهبری است که هیچ قدرتی از این دیوار نمی تواند بالا برود . حراست از دروازه های نفوذ به نظام اسلامی به عهده مردم است ...اما این قلعه یک دروازه وسیع و گسترده دارد و آن ، مردم سالاری است که از این دروازه اگر درست پاسداری و مرزداری نشود ، هر دشمنی امکان نفوذ پیدا می کند و لذا هر مرحله انتخابات چه انتخابات مجلس ، چه ریاست جمهوری ، چه شورا و چه انتخابات خبرگان ، هر موقعیت انتخاباتی پیش می آید ، زمانی است که این دروازه بازشده و باید با صیانت و پاسداری کامل صورت گیرد تا از این دروازه وسیع مردم سالاری ، دشمن به داخل نفوذ نکند . او ، حراست و صیانت از دروازه های نظام اسلامی و کشور را مسوولیت اصلی مردم دانست و گفت : این پاسداری و حراست در درجه اول ، مسوولیت خطیر همه شما مرد و زنی هست که می خواهید وارد نظام بشوید و در این نظام رای ، فکر ، فریضه و خواست خودتان را حاکم کنید چون امروز

تنها نظامی روی کره زمین است که مردم برای آن نظام آزادانه تصمیم می گیرند ، نظام مقدس جمهوری

اسلامی هست....

Our sacred system of Islamic Republic is like a citadel surrounded by a tall wall that no one can climb up, and that wall and the fortified fence is the position of Guardianship; in any current, in any regime, the penetration of enemy and alien from various borders, dimensions and surround is possible. However, in our political system, penetration into this fortified citadel from the surrounding and borders is impossible because it has a fortified fence which is the position of Guardianship and Leadership that no power can climb up this wall. Securing the gates of penetration into the Islamic regime is people's responsibility. Nevertheless, this castle has a wide gate, a democracy. If we do not secure this gate properly, every enemy can penetrate, and hence, the stage of the election, whether be it parliament election, presidential, council, Assembly of Experts election, or any other electoral event, is when this door is open. It should be secured and guarded entirely so that the enemy cannot penetrate through this wide door of democracy. He recognized people as the primary responsibility of people to protect and guard the gates of the Islamic system and country and said: This protection and Guardianship is, in the first place, grave responsibility of you men and women who want to enter the system and govern their vote, thought, will and act. Because the only regime on the earth that people decide freely for the system is the holy Islamic Republic system….

In this fragment, he vividly portrays different parts of the castle of Iran and the functionality of each of them. First of all, this is a sacred castle because it has the Guardianship of (the Islamic) Jurist. Its tall and inexpungable walls are the Guardianship of Jurist implemented by the Supreme Leader. It has only one massive 'gate', which is

'democracy', which is opened just at the time of elections, and people should protect this gate with their 'presence' so that the enemy cannot penetrate and just those who want to cast a ballot can enter. What makes this citadel different from other citadels (other countries) is that Supreme Leader's Guardianship protects it, and that is why no one (no enemy) can penetrate it; other citadels are expungable.

The purport of this source domain of 'gate' is that people are considered to be outside the gate, and only those who want to vote and implement their thought and vote can enter. So, if the wall is Guardianship so people should pass it at first and then be eligible to practice their ideas; i.e., they should be consent to the principle of Guardianship of Supreme Leader in the first place. This conjecture is sound since it is in line with the Constitution, according to which the adherence to the principle of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (the Supreme Leader) is a must to be qualified for all political positions. Nevertheless, it stresses the role of people, their 'presence', and how much it matters to protect the country from enemies.

Another element of the house scenario is 'fence,' which is thorny. It can connote both positive and negative meanings depending on what it refers to and its functions. If it is a fence that limits the national and international powers, it is a negative phenomenon and must be demolished. If it protects the country from any threats, it must be preserved or fortified. In the latter sense, it correlates with 'trench' and conjures up the WAR scenario, and the insistence on the role of martyrs and appreciation of their sacrifices is supportive of this correlation.

(21)

... نظام جمهوری اسلامی ایران را در عرصه های مختلف سیاسی ، اجتماعی ، اقتصادی و فرهنگی و بازتاب مثبت جهانیان را خلق کنیم و با این عمل هر یک از جناح ها را از حصار تنگ فکری رهایی بخشیده

...

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… Let us create a positive reflection of the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran in political, social, economic, and cultural areas and, in this way, free every political party from a tight intellectual fence …

(22)

تحریم یک تصمیم سیاسی بود با آثار و تبعات اقتصادی و اداری . این حصار فرو ریخت ولی درباره آثار و تبعات آن در هر حوزه ای باید مذاکره شود .

Sanctions were related to political decisions with economic and administrative consequences. This fence has collapsed, but its consequences in every area must be negotiated.

(23)

رهبر انقلاب اسلامی افزودند : اگر نیروی انسانی جوان کشور ، «متدین ، انقلابی ، با سواد و مصمم» بار آید ، می تواند در تحولات پر شتاب آینده ، حصار و حباب تاریخی وابستگی ایران را به معنای حقیقی کلمه بشکند و ایران و ایرانی را در شان و جایگاه واقعی خود قرار دهد.

The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution added that if young human resources of Iran be trained to be religious, revolutionist, literate, and determined; they can demolish the historical fence of Iran's dependency [on other countries] in the future accelerated upheavals and put Iran an Iranians in their actual status.

(24)

با تکیه بر دانش و اراده ملی در راستای تشکیل صنعت بومی دفاعی ...عبور سرافرازانه صنعت دفاعی کشور از حصار تحریم های ظالمانه... از جمله پیامدهای الهام بخش و برجسته دفاع مقدس فرزندان ملت ایران و تربیت یافتگان مکتب ولایت فقیه و عاشورا قلمداد می شود .

166

Triumphantly passing through the fence of oppressive sanctions in reliance upon national knowledge and willpower to establish local defensive industry is one of the inspiring and outstanding results of Iran's children in Holy Defense and those educated in the school of Ashura and Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.

(25)

یک مسیله دیگر در مورد مسجد هسته مقاومت است ؛ وقتی صحبت از مقاومت می شود همه ذهن ها به سمت مقاومت نظامی می رود اگرچه مقاومت نظامی نیز مد نظر است اما مقاومت اصلی فرهنگی است اگر حصار و خاکریز فرهنگی در کشور سست باشد همه چیز از دست می رود .

Another issue regarding the mosque is the resistance nucleus. When it comes to resistance, military resistance comes to everyone's mind. Although military resistance is also meant, the primary resistance is cultural. If the cultural trench and fence of the country be weak, everything will be lost.

(26)

وقتی که عزت حال شامل حال یک انسان ، یک فرد یا یک جامعه میشود ، مثل یک حصار عمل میکند ؛ نفوذ در او ، محاصره او ، نابودکردن او برای دشمنان دشوار میشود ؛ انسان را از نفوذ و غلبه دشمن محفوظ نگه میدارد .

When an individual, a person or a society, is granted glory, that glory functions as a fence, and penetrating him and ruining him becomes difficult for the enemy. [That fence] protects that person from the enemy's penetration and victory.

In (21) extracted from the parliament corpus, the fence is inside the house dividing the cohabitants into groups and does not let them unify. This barrier is political affiliations described as fences, and this fence needs to be demolished. Another support or warranty of the argument is the quotation of the Supreme Leader, which highlights the necessity of unity.

Again, in (22) extracted from ILNA, a reference has been made to JCPOA. Sanctions were fences besieging Iran's castle or building, and JCPOA demolished it and freed Iran. Excerpt (23) is the Supreme Leader's quotation in which Iran's dependency on other countries is depicted as a fence restricting Iran. This time, it is not set by an enemy or someone outside of the house; the Iranians have been restricting themselves, and the students must dismantle it. Like the case of 'key', he believes that the resolution is inside the house, the people. He adds the image of the bubble to confirm the imaginary fragility and easiness of destroying this restricting fence. Unlike the door element, ILNA also suggests an internal solution for destroying that restricting fence (Exc. 24). It adds that we destroy the fence and climb the mountain of development and authority to reach its peak (embedded metaphor). This climbing the mountain depicts that the castle is located on the hillside.

For Ahmad Alamolhoda, and based on his portrait of the castle expounded in (20), the Guardianship is a fence and is a synonym or equivalent of the wall (they both protect the castle). The chairman of Basij[63] in (25) mixes this element with the one related to the war scenario (trench/bulwark). In this embedded metaphor, the fence is used in warzones and bulwarks. For him, it protects the country and must be preserved and fortified. It has positive semantic prosody. In Tasnim (Exc. 26), concepts such as 'glory', 'willpower', and 'thought' are portrayed as the fence protecting people against the enemy's influence. This time, people are supposed to protect themselves, and should they and their minds be safe and protected, so will be the country. This fence is multi-layered.

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[63] Generally speaking, administrative boards of IRGC, Basij, and politicians like Alamolhoda are considered hardliners.

One thing shared in all political contexts (parliament and news agencies) and is an agreed-upon concept is that the architect and the engineer of this house of the Islamic Republic of Iran are Imam Khomeini. They also go one step further and describe the characteristics of this architect. He was 'intellectual', 'sage', 'farsighted' and had 'divine insight'.

(27)

<div dir="rtl">
تاسیس بسیج مستضعفین در روزهای نخست پیروزی شکوهمند انقلاب اسلامی حاصل دوراندیشی و بصیرت الهی معمار کبیر انقلاب نسبت به آینده انقلاب اسلامی … بود.
</div>

Establishing Basij in the early days of the astonishing triumph of the Islamic Revolution was due to its architecture's farsightedness and divine insight about its future.

Before discussing other features of Iran's construction, a sample is worthy of a more profound examination. Another instance of embedded metaphor is connecting the HOUSE scenario with the RELIGION source domain. It is an excerpt which is a quotation from the chairman of Basij[64]. He makes a connection between the 2009 post-presidential unrests and a religious-historical parable. Metaphorically speaking, Ayatollah Khomeini is portrayed as Prophet Moses, and those well-known Reformist politicians participating in unrests are considered those elites who remained silent and did not counteract Aaron, who created Golden Calf. In both stories, some noble politicians betrayed their leader in the absence of

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[64] It is a paramilitary force of IRGC whose full name in English would be 'the Organization for Mobilization of the Oppressed'; cf. Basij - Wikipedia

their leader. In both cases, so many people were misled, which was the elites' fault. They should have used their power to guide people to the right path.

(28)

وی افزود : موسی چه کسی است ؟ رهبر الهی است ، صاحب و معمار انقلاب در بنی اسراییل است ، این رهبر بزرگ مدت زمانی را از امت خود فاصله می گیرد ، در امت او چه اتفاقی می افتد ؟ بعضی از خواص مثل سامری به قدری ذی نفوذ … که امت موسی را گوساله پرست می کند ، این نقش خواص است . … تقصیر اصلی آن خواص اهل حقی بودند که سکوت کردند.

He added that who is Prophet Moses? He is a divine leader, the owner, and the architect of revolution among Israelites. He distances himself from them for a while, and what happens? Some elite such as Aaron is so influential that he makes Prophet Moses' nation worship the Golden Calf. It is the elites' role. The main culprits are those rightful elites that remained silent in that situation.

Iran's different systems, such as political, cultural, and judicial systems, are depicted as constructions. The building of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on a monotheistic perspective and religious worldview and, in this sense, is a challenge to the Western perspective. 'Challenge' conjures up the game's theme (theory). The judicial system was founded based on Imam Khomeini's command, and the architect of this building was

Beheshti[65]. The portrait of building type of cultural system is vivid: It is a refinery whose base is public culture.

(29)

نظام جمهوری اسلامی یک چالش اساسی مقابل این طرز تفکر بود . بنیان نظام جمهوری اسلامی ، بر اساس نگاه توحیدی است. ... اساس تفکر ما ، جهان بینی الهی است.

The political system of the Islamic Republic was a significant challenge to this mindset [liberal political system]… the foundation of the political system of the Islamic Republic is monotheistic. The basis of our thought is a divine worldview.

(30)

فرهنگ عمومی ، اساس و بنیان نظام فرهنگی در هر جامعه است ، که سده های متمادی از میان نسل های مختلف بشر عبور کرده.

Public culture is the basis of the cultural system in any society that has been transmitted among various generations of humankind for many centuries.

ILNA as a pro-Reformist news agency, goes one step further and paints a specific building for Moderation in politics. The country is a house/building under whose ceiling all revolutionary forces like children of late and present supreme leaders have gathered together; i.e., get united and avoid more fractions among themselves. They have passed a road named

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[65] He was a "jurist, philosopher, cleric and politician who was known as the second person in the political hierarchy of Iran after the revolution". Cf. Mohammad Beheshti - Wikipedia

Moderation, whose architect was Hashemi[66]. Now MPs are supervising/resident engineers to monitor authorities to make sure that they pass it correctly, arrive at the house, and get united. So the embedded metaphorical pattern in this excerpt is complicated. It is a blend of HOUSE, FAMILY and VEHICLE domains.

(31)

<div dir="rtl">

... کار ما به اینجا ختم نمی شود بلکه ما نمایندگان باید از طی درست مسیر از سوی دولتمردان مراقبت کنیم و نگذاریم راهی که آیت الله هاشمی به عنوان معمار اندیشه های اعتدالی آن را پایه گذاری کرده است ، به شکست منجر شود .

</div>

… This is not the end of our job, and we MPs should observe that cabinet members are going in the right direction. We should not let the road whose architect was Moderate thoughts of Hashemi Rafsanjani end up with failure.

There is a noteworthy point before expounding the element of 'pillar' and how it works in this scenario. The pillar in Iranian architecture, especially during Achaemenid Empire, was the symbol of 'power'[67]. In Islamic architecture, especially in holy buildings such as mosques, the pillar reflects the believer's emotions and his cultural and religious values. With their decorations and shapes and symmetric positioning, the pillars invite people to peace and tranquility[68]. These two interpretations can pave the way to have the

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[66] Considers Hashemi as a Moderate.
[67] http://shahed.ac.ir/Honar/SiteAssets/Lists/neg/NewForm/f.pdf
[68] ستونهای مسجد؛ و معماری اسلامی (rasekhoon.net)

presupposition regarding the function and characteristics of the pillar and those described as pillars in the political construction of Iran.

In political metaphorical patterns, the pillars of this construction of the Islamic Revolution are some famous politicians. For pro-Conservative Tasnim, IRGC, Nategh-Nouri, principles of the Revolution, Beheshti and his juristic companions, and Hashemi are deemed pillars of the Revolution. It also introduces an element: some internal enemy threatening the pillars by quietly destroying them. It stems from the RELIGION source domain explained in section 9.1.10. Aristocracy is depicted as a termite that has laid eggs in the pillars (Iranian authorities), and without recognizing it, someday the pillars will be destroyed and collapse. If they collapse, the whole building of the Revolution will be in danger. Aristocracy is castigated by applying other images such as 'fire burning to ashes the revolutionary spirit' or 'something like knife which cuts the tongue of arrogant opponents'. Counteracting aristocracy, besides arrogance power, was one of the main principles of and reasons behind the Revolutionary ideology of Imam Khomeini. The main criticism against Shah was the aristocracy of him and his family. As a result, this depiction of termites in pillars serves as an implied warning to people drifting away from Revolutionary values.

(32)

این اشرافی گری مثل موریانه به ستون های انقلاب حمله کرده است . اشرافی گری ریشه بسیاری از مشکلاتی است که در جامعه وجود دارد .

This aristocracy has attacked pillars of the Revolution like a termite. Aristocracy is the root of so many problems that exist in society.

Moreover, organizations and political parties are the pillars for the pro-Reformist ILNA, Hashemi, Nategh-Nouri. It can be said that the role of Hashemi is a bit more emphasized in ILNA than in Tasnim. ILNA also reminds us that Hashemi supported Rouhani and accomplished his purposes (Exc. 33). ILNA points out the importance of political affiliations and activities as the pillars of the building, a fact taken for granted by Tasnim. Usage of 'tribune' indicates the idea that just one political affiliation or movement has the voice to express its viewpoints. Then it asks for equality and fairness for all political viewpoints (Exc. 34). For ILNA, internal 'discord' is the reason that can distance the pillars from each other and ruin them (Exc. 35).

The solution is to stay together under the 'umbrella' of the Supreme Leader. It is an embedded metaphor. *Discord* is heavy rain from which people or politicians should run into the unity umbrella of the Supreme Leader (Exc. 36). It is a type of house scenario which ILNA follows. In ILNA, 'gathering under the ceiling' means 'getting united'. This time, the umbrella functions like a house. It is a ubiquitous expression used for under concepts, e.g., 'gathering under the umbrella of Islam'. The curved shape of an umbrella as a ceiling corresponds to the 'dome' in Islamic and religious architecture, such as mosques and holy shrines. Dome represents the vault of Paradise and is the symbol of power[69].

(33)

آثار و صحنه های وحشتناکی از سال 88 بر جای مانده بود و بسیاری از سیاسیون ما از میدان به دور شده بودند اما سال 92 با شهامت وارد میدان شدند . آن سال ، آیت الله هاشمی که ستون انقلاب اسلامی ایران است با حرکت های سیاسی بسیار خوب ، آقای روحانی را به اهدافشان رساندند .

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[69] Cf. The dome - symbol of power (hurriyetdailynews.com)

Two thousand nine unrests left Horrible remains and scenes, and many of our politicians were driven away from [competition] field. However, they came back courageously to the field. That year, Ayatollah Hashemi, one of the pillars of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, made Mr. Rouhani achieve his goals with very sound political movements.

(34)

ما وقتی در این باور هستیم که دیدگاه های مختلف به عنوان ستون های انقلاب هستند ، طبیعتا باید آنها را هم در همه عرصه ها و زمینه ها یکسان ببینیم . این که ما با یکدیگر حرف بزنیم اما همه تریبون ها در دست یک جریان باشد ... مبتنی بر عدالت نیست.

When we hold the belief that different viewpoints are pillars of the Revolution, consequently, we should see them equal in every area and aspect. The fact that we speak with each other but just one [political] movement holds the tribune … does not comply with justice.

(35)

معتقدم به برکت خون شهدا ... دشمنان خارجی توان شکست این انقلاب را ندارند و صرفا اختلافات درونی نظام می تواند عامل اصلی درجهت از هم پاشیده شدن ستون های انقلاب شود که قطعا ماندن همه ارکان نظام درکنار هم و در زیر چتر رهبری مانع از این نقشه شوم خواهد شد.

I believe that thanks to the blood of martyrs … foreign enemies are not capable of defeating this Revolution, and just internal discord in the political system can be the main factor in demolishing the pillars of the Revolution. Furthermore, staying together of pillars of the political system under the umbrella of Supreme Leadership will foil this sinister plot.

An additional aspect of the pillar is mentioned in the following excerpt from the pro-Reformist news agency. It is not clarified if it is the pillar of a building or tent, but the significance of drift lies in the role it assigns to people. He implies that people are the main pillars and describes hungry or poor people as collapsed pillars. He also implies the separation of religion from politics[70] and confirms that people are the pillars of religion, not politics, and the politics should not take advantage of them solely to draw them to the ballot boxes. The authorities should not take advantage of the presence of people and instead should solve their economic problems so that people can stand up and support the building. Another complementary element he uses to emphasize the significance of people is to make a religious comparison. For him, even if Imam Ali had been the Supreme Leader, the system would have failed unless people were present and stable.

(36)

... باید بفهمیم که اسلام مردم را ستون دین می داند نه ستون سیاست ، ما در منطقه مین هستیم و در امنیت کامل به سر می بریم و فرزندان ما به استقبال شهادت رفته اند و باید تمام تلاش این باشد که این ستون را حفظ کنیم . ... ستونی که زمین افتاده نمی تواند مشکلی را حل کند ، ملتی که جیب آن خالی است و سرپا نیست با تعارف نمی توان آن ستون را سرپا نگه داشت. داشتن رهبر خوب یک طرف قضیه است ، رهبر اگر علی بن ابی طالب (ع) هم باشد مادامی که مردم راضی ، حاضر و پایدار نباشند شکست او قطعی است . ...ما باید ادب و احترام را حفظ کنیم و این ادب و احترام سرجای خویش محفوظ است ولی باید ستون را سرپا نگه داشت

> ... We should realize that Islam considers people pillars of religion and not politics. We are in the mine-infected area, yet we have absolute security, and our children have welcomed martyrdom, and we should try our best to maintain these pillars. A fallen

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[70] A secular view which is refuted in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

pillar cannot solve any problem; the nation with an empty pocket (without money) that is not standing on its feet cannot be saved by [just] giving compliments. Having a good Leader is [just] one side of the coin. Even if the Leader is Imam Ali, his defeat is doomed if people are not content, present, and stable. We should remain polite and respectful [to the Supreme Leader], and this is done, but the pillars must be kept upright.

Intriguingly enough, besides the modern conception of a building or house, there are numerous references to 'tent' and 'the pillar of the tent' in news agencies. To what refers this tent and why tent in the first place? The tent is the political system of Iran. The origin of using this primitive residence can be traced back to early dwellings in Saudi Arabia, where Islam first appeared. This assumption and the undeniable role of Islam in Iran's policies are in accord. Another explanation for the use of 'tent' can be coupled with dwellings of nomads in Iran, which is still absolutely common. The blend of these assumptions, on the one hand, and the BUILDING scenario of Iran's political system, on the other hand, would be that the tent of the Supreme Leader is somewhere inside this construction (citadel and house). In the portrait of 'tent', whether in Saudi Arabia or Iran's nomads, one preposition is shared: the role of the 'patriarch' of the tribe.

Like the scenario of 'headman' discussed earlier, the patriarch is one of the tribe elders well-known for being fair, among other features, and can decide for every aspect of his people's lives. People have other assumed responsibilities in addition to the patriarch's duties; for example, they should always be courteous and obey all of his directives. Since the only element of 'tent' being pinpointed is 'the pillar of the tent' whose context alludes to the Guardianship of Supreme Leader; Iranian people should also respect the Supreme Leader and follow his guidelines, for he has a divine status and wants the best for his people and

(presumably) judges based on fairness and justice. It is an adjunct to the portrait of a citadel in which the wall was Guardianship of the Supreme Leader, and to be able to enter into the castle (voting), people should go through the wall (be agreed upon Guardianship).

Before addressing more details of the pillar, an intriguing point to consider is that in the overall image of Iran's building, some other politicians or authorities are taken as 'pillars' of the construction. Nevertheless, in the case of 'tent', just the Supreme Leader is portrayed as the pillar. It can be interpreted as the unique role of the Supreme Leader's Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. It is in line with the ascribed role of patriarch in the tribe. It also mentions that people should not leave the pillar alone and support it. So people have a supportive role too.

Now, we can discuss the roles of this pillar (of the tent) and what threats it. ILNA implies the role of the pillar (Guardianship of Supreme Leader) is to secure the tent (country and Revolution) and postulates that people should cooperate with the Supreme Leader (Exc. 37) and be aware of the enemy who wants to stagger the pillar and destroy the tent (Exc. 38). Tasnim, on the other hand, proclaims the securing role of the pillar (Exc. 39) and, by referring to 2009 post-election unrests, reprehends Hashemi for not supporting and standing by the pillar (Exc. 40).

(37)

<div dir="rtl">

باید با مقام معظم رهبری به عنوان ستون خیمه نظام همکاری کرد ...

</div>

We should cooperate with the Supreme Leader as the pillar of the tent …

(38)

<div dir="rtl">

دشمن به شدت ... ولی فقیه را مورد تهاجم قرار داده و به دنبال ... متزلزل کردن ستون خیمه یعنی ولایت فقیه ، این خیمه را از بین ببرد ، پس باید هوشیار بود و ...

</div>

The enemy has been attacking the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist badly. It seeks to stagger the tent's pillar, the Guardianship, and destroy the tent. So we should be alert and …

(39)

البته در استقرار امنیت پایدار نمی توان از کنار نقش محوری و موثر ولایت و رهبری به عنوان ستون خیمه انقلاب گذشت چرا که بخش مهم و اساس امنیت پایدار در کشور به جایگاه رفیع و بی بدیل رهبر و ولایت برمی‌گردد .

Of course, in establishing sustainable security, the pivotal role of the Guardianship and the Leadership as the pillar of the tent cannot be overlooked; the central part and the foundation of sustainable security is due to the lofty and unique status of Leadership and Guardianship.

(40)

در قصه فتنه 88 دشمن نظام را هدف گرفت و ستون خیمه نظام هم که رهبری و ولایت بود هدف قرار گرفته شد و انتظار بود ایشان (هاشمی رفسنجانی) با همان قدرت و اقتدار سابق ، ورود و حاضر شود و ایشان متاسفانه آن حضور را نداشت...

In the story of the 2009 sedition, the enemy targeted the political system. The Supreme Leader and Guardianship as pillars of the tent were also targeted [of this sedition]. Furthermore, it was expected that, just like always, he (Hashemi Rafsanjani) stood by [Supreme Leader's side] powerfully and authoritatively. Nevertheless, unfortunately, he was not present.

In addition to the house, Iran has also been characterized as a mill. Again, in this global village, Iran and other countries have their mills. Some of them are the enemies' mills. By and large, 'pouring water to someone's mill' is an idiom meaning helping them. This

idiom adds to figurative aspects of metaphorical patterns about Iran and its internal and international relationships in the following fragments. At first, those metaphors related to internal affairs will be presented, and then, those associated with internal relations will follow it.

Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, Basij, and Hashemi are viewed as millstones of the country mill. It means they are central parts of the mill, like the pillars of country houses or buildings (Exc. 41). A negative aspect of mill or millstone is related to economic problems, and in this regard, the millstone is like the locked doors in the house source domain. It is mentioned in Tasnim concerning JCPOA and how it failed to fulfill people's hope[71]. In the mill scenario, people are like wheat grains that are being ground under economic difficulties (Exc. 42). Each of the main political parties is also described as a mill, and if they do something wrong, it is like they are helping the rival by 'pouring water to their mill' (Exc. 43). The pro-Conservative Tasnim goes one step further and emphasizes the role of Guardianship and portrays it as the iron rod, which is the pivot holding the two millstones together. The role of Guardianship is to unify the two parties, which are devout Muslims with different political affiliations (Exc. 44).

Pouring water into the enemy's mill (helping the enemy) refers to any action undertaken inside the country mill, which, in turn, helps the other mill. For instance, chastising any of the three powers (in the tripartite system of Iran) or the president is deemed helping the enemy (Exc. 45-47). In an excerpt (47), the close correlation between the house and family scenarios is disclosed.

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[71] A vague reference to Rouhani's key of hope and prudence is possible.

(41)

آقای هاشمی ... سنگ زیرین آسیاب انقلاب بود ، ما هم اگر نقدی نسبت به ایشان داشتیم به معنای سو ظن که ایشان تغییر خط داده است نبود .

Mr. Hashemi was the millstone of the mill of Revolution, and if we criticized him, it did not mean that we had suspected that he had changed his démarche.

(42)

بنابراین مردمی که از فشار آسیاب هزینه های زندگی به تنگ آمده بودند ... خوشبینانه به وعده های رییس جمهور دل بستند.

So, people who were fed up with the pressure of mill of daily expenses … trusted the president's promises.

(43)

انتشار اخبار کذب از طریق شبکه های ماهواره ای و اجتماعی و تخریب دولت تنها راه ادامه حیات این اصلاح طلبان سابق است که از دور دستی بر آتش دارند و در عمل آب به آسیاب اصولگرایان می ریزند .

Broadcasting fake news via satellite TV channels and social media and damaging the government is the only way by the help of which these ex-Reformists can survive. Furthermore, by this, they pour water in the mill of Conservatives.

(44)

آسیاب با دو سنگ که رو هم می گذارند و میل وسط آن حرکت می کند اما اگر میل نباشد این دو سنگ روی هم بند نمی شوند . در جامعه دینی هم باید میل یا محوری باشد که متدینین را متحد کند .

The mill works with two pieces of stones moving with the help of an iron rod. If not for this rod, these two millstones could not have pivoted. In a religious community, there should be a rod or axis that unites the believers, too.

(45)

... اقدام ناشایسته ای که متاسفانه عده ای در حمله به سفارت عربستان انجام دادند و منافع ملی را در نظر نگرفتند و آب به آسیاب دشمن ریختند .

Some people did an inappropriate action by attacking Saudi Arabia's embassy without considering the national interest in pouring water into the enemy's mill.

(46)

... برخی در کشور آب به آسیاب دشمن می ریزند و با انتساب دروغ های عجیب و غریب به وزیر امور خارجه به تضعیف ایران می پردازند

Some countries pour water into the enemy's mill and keep weakening Iran by attributing strange lies to the Foreign Minister.

(47)

مسایل درون خانوادگی را نباید علنی بگوییم و نباید ببریم در شبکه های اجتماعی و آب در آسیاب دشمن بریزیم .

We should not announce intra-family issues publically, and we should not post them on social media and [hence,] pour water into the enemy's mill.

In general, backyard refers to any economic or political section that is not supervised and is used for illegal actions through influence peddling. It is like an abandoned house area

(Exc. 48)[72]. It also refers to any section that functions as a refuge (embedded conceptualization) where the alleged or wrongdoers take shelter. It is also connected with 'pantry' to imply a place they hide in (Exc. 49)[73]. The solution lies in a religious metaphor: The whole world is before God, and "the eyes of the Lord are in every place, keeping watch on the evil and the good"[74]. The modern or non-religious version of this solution is 'glass room'[75] which refers to 'transparency in politics'. In the house scenario, the glass room is the opposite of the pastry or backyard. In other words, everything must be visible (whether before the eyes of God or the nation). This glass room is plausible thanks to the communication and information revolution. It is done with the help of mass media, and they are 'people's tongues which say out loud what they see without stuttering' (Exc. 50). It will be expounded in the section related to the human domain. It has a cross-reference[76] to an Islamic occasion. It refers to Imam Ali's letter to Malek al-Ashtar, the governor of Egypt, which identifies civil rights and highlights justice[77]. The 'backyard' element has negative semantic prosody.

(48)

... ما می گوییم ... مناطق آزاد در خدمت اقتصاد ملی باشد ... نه اینکه حیاط خلوتی باشد ... ما می گوییم ای مجلس ، ای نماینده ای که به قرآن قسم خوردی ، امروز این مناطق آزاد را از تحت نفوذ باندها و سیاست بازی ها در آور...

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[72] Extracted from parliamentary debates corpus.
[73] Extracted from pro-Reformist ILNA corpus.
[74] Proverbs 15:3 retrieved from What Does the Bible Say About God Sees Everything? (openbible.info)
[75] It has nothing to do with 'glass ceiling,' also a common political term.
[76] Using Al-Harrasi's (2001) terminology is a case of 'intertextuality'.
[77] Letter of Ali ibn Abi Talib to Malik al-Ashtar - Wikipedia

… We say that … free economic zones should be at the service of the national economy … they should not be backyards … we say that "Oh the parliament! Oh you, the Member of Parliament, who has sweared to Quran! Save these free economic zones from being under the influence of lobbies…"

(49)

انقلاب ارتباطاتی و اطلاعاتی مانند همان انقلاب صنعتی است . اگر امروزه افراد ، احزاب ، گروه ها و نظام سیاسی درک کنند که چه تحولی رخ داده است ، می فهمند که همه کم و بیش به سمت اتاق های شیشه ای رانده می شوند و پستوهای مراکز قدرت و حیاط خلوت های صاحبان قدرت یا کوچک شده یا از بین رفته.

The information revolution and communication revolution are the same as the industrial revolution. Nowadays, if people, parties, groups, and political systems understand what has happened, they will realize that everyone is dragging into glass rooms. Furthermore, the backyards and pastries of the powerful have become smaller or destroyed.

(50)

طبیعتا اگر انسان عالم را محضر خدا بداند ، در این عرصه ، معصیت و فساد نمی کند . اما اگر فرد یا جریانی از این فضا فاصله گرفت و احساس کرد که می تواند حیاط خلوتی را برای فرار از پاسخگویی وبی قانونی و ... ایجاد کند زبان رسانه باید وارد میدان شود . رسانه به عنوان نماینده افکار عمومی برای مبارزه با فساد اثبات شده با رعایت قانون و اخلاق نباید دچار لکنت شود .

Accordingly, if a man recognizes that the world is before God [God sees us], he will not commit a sin. Nevertheless, if a person or a movement turns his back to this ideology and feels that he can create a backyard to avoid being responsible and doing illegal stuff … mass media should become the tongue that enters the arena [that

reveals everything]. As a voice of public opinion, the media should not stutter in its fight against proven corruption and adherence to ethics and rules.

Based on the idea that the authorities are serving people in different sections, the Iran building has different parts or departments in which the authorities serve them, e.g., 'nation's house', another term for the parliament (Exc. 51). This perspective is based on one of the main guidelines of Imam Khomeini, which states that people are our patrons and we should appreciate them and serve them[78]. The earlier application of this perspective dates back to Karim Khan Zand (1751-79), who called himself 'deputy of the people' (wakil-al-raaya[79]). The main idea is practicing justice and counteracting corruption[80]. It can also be said that the people are the landlord, and MPs are tenants (Exc. 52). The main element of this house is related to 'voice' which signals another embedded metaphor. This house of people is a human being who tries to be his client's voice. Their lawyers in this house cry out their clients' pains and want. So in the HOUSE scenario, MPs are like loudspeakers of their landlord, and in the HUMAN scenario, they are like vocal organs which cries out pains or health issues of the body to a doctor or anyone responsible to hear it and do something about it (Exc. 53).

(51)

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[78] صحیفه امام خمینی - جلد 16 - صفحه 25 | روح‌الله (rouhollah.ir)
[79] *Wakil* means lawyer, and *raaya* means people.
[80] WAKIL-AL-RAAYA – Encyclopaedia Iranica (iranicaonline.org)

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آقایی آمده با همه امکاناتش مردم هم می شناسند ، تحقیق کنند ، می خواهند او را به امکاناتش به عنوان یک خادم انتخاب کنند ، ... هرکدام مردم خواستند به عنوان نوکر و خادمشان انتخاب کنند ، این معنای رقابت در اسلامی است و لذا رقابت در قدرت در اسلام نداریم

A man [presidential candidate] has come with all his capabilities. People know him, and they [should] inquire, and they want to choose him and his capabilities as a servant. People [can] select whomever they want to as their servant. It is what competition means in Islam, and hence, there is no competition for power in Islam.

(52)

جا دارد دهم آذرماه مقارن با روز مجلس را به صاحبان خانه ملت و همکاران عزیز تبریک و تهنیت عرض نمایم.

I must congratulate Azar 10th, the Day of the Parliament, to the owners of the house of the nation's house and my dear colleagues.

(53)

امیدوارم بتوانم در خانه ملت صدای رسای آنان جهت بیان مشکلات تاریخی این منطقه باشم ... اجازه می خواهم که امروز از تریبون خانه ملت درد مردم را فریاد بزنم .

I hope I can be the sonorous voice of them expressing their historical problems in this region in the nation's house … let me shout people's pains from the tribune of the nation's house.

Before expounding the metaphorical role of 'mirror' in the HOUSE scenario and an account of the physical features of a mirror and its status in Persian literature, mysticism and architecture are inevitable. A mirror is a piece of glass or metal with a smooth surface that reflects the image of other things. In physics, it is a smooth surface that reflects most of the light it receives. In the past, they made mirrors with metal, and the mirrors were corrodible.

So, from time to time, they had to burnish the mirror. Mirror and metal are two interconnected concepts or elements in Iranian culture.

In Sufism or Muslim mystic, man's heart is the mirror which reflects the light of God (God's attributes and characteristics), the smoother this mirror is, the better it reflects God's image; that is to say, the heart of 'perfect man' is the mirror that shows a perfect image of God (perfectionism). Man is the embodiment of God's attributes. The heart is man's inner eye which can see God and become God through 'the meditation of the heart'[81]. It comes from man's zeal throughout history to see God so that he can understand it better, e.g., the parable of Prophet Moses seeing God's glory or back. It happened after the event of Golden Calf, and Moses was under so much pressure to show God or a divine sign to his people so that they would believe in God's existence. This parable is mentioned in various parts of the Quran[82] and Torah[83]. Alternatively, In religious parables, God says 'I am in broken hearts,' or 'the believer's heart is my house'[84].

In Persian literature, the mirror symbolizes *Sufi's* (practitioners of Sufism) heart and its smoothness represents 'sanctification' or 'purification of the self'[85]. It is one of the most ancient conceptual metaphors in Persian literature, specifically mystical literature. Good attributes are ascribed to even and smooth mirrors, while bad characteristics are ascribed to corrosion or dust on the mirror. So, a corroded or dusty mirror or heart cannot reflect God's light. Some presuppositions of the source domain of 'mirror' and conceptual mappings of the

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[81] The Sufi Meditation of the Heart | The Golden Sufi Center
[82] The Quranic Arabic Corpus - Translation
[83] What Did Moses See When He Saw the "Back" of God? | Crossway Articles
[84] مرکز تعلیمات اسلامی واشنگتن - حجت الاسلام والمسلمین حاج شیخ احمد بحرینی امام و مدیر مرکز تعلیمات اسلامی واشنگتن - (iec-md.org)
[85] آیینه ؛ ادبیات | Adabiyat_foroud (blogfa.com)

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heart are mirror: Heart is fragile or breakable; the heart is corrodible, the heart can get dusty, the heart can get burnished[86].

The emergence of mirror works in Iranian architecture dates back to *the Safavid* dynasty[87] (1501-1736), which had its origin in the Safavid order of Sufism. After the fall of Safavid and because of the economic problems, mirror work also was abandoned. The ne plus ultra of mirror work was in the Qajar dynasty (1789-1925). Besides the traditional belief of Iranians considering the mirror as a symbol of innocence, brightness, luck, and honesty, there is another explanation for mirror work in the building. In the sixteenth century, mirrors were imported from Europe, and they were smashed. So, innovative Iranian architects found a way to make use of them[88].

Now that the foundation of the mirror is established apprehending the metaphorical patterns will be easily perceptible. Like the source domain of pillars, political and even (para) military bodies are represented as mirrors that reflect the light of Revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini. For instance, Supreme Leader is described as the mirror which reflects all characteristics of Ayatollah Khomeini; so, he is the perfect successor for Ayatollah Khomeini. Alternatively, Hashemi is depicted as the mirror, reflecting Ayatollah Khomeini's light or features (Exc. 54). Excerpt (55) contains elements related to the HUMAN domain, so they will not be discussed here. In this excerpt, 'presidential election' is considered a mirror that perfectly reflects a Quranic verse's interpretation: "cooperate with each other in

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[86] استعارۀ مفهومی "آینه" در ادب عارفانه فارسی (sinaweb.net)
[87] بازشناسی الگوهای آینه‌کاری در بناهای قاجاری شیراز (shahed.ac.ir)
[88] تاریخچه آینه کاری: - هـنــر مـــعـــمـــاری ایــران و جــهــان (blogsky.com)

righteousness and piety"[89]. The presupposition is that participating in the election was like righteousness since it is a holy political system.

(54)

سلام و درود به رهبر عزیز و بصیر انقلاب حضرت آیت الله العظمی امام خامنه ای که الحق و الانصاف آیینه تمام نمای امام راحل عظیم الشان هستند که با رهبری و تدبیر حکیمانه خود تمامی استکبار را مبهوت ساختند ... آیت الله هاشمی آینه تمام نمای امام (ره) بود .

Greetings to Ayatollah Imam Khamenei, dear and insightful Leader of the Revolution, who is definitely a full-length mirror of Imam Khomeini who amazed the arrogance by his wise leadership and prudence … Ayatollah Hashemi was the full-length mirror of Imam Khomeini.

(55)

انتخابات ، آیینه تمام نمای حضور مردم و مصداق تمام «تعاونوا على البر و التقوى» بود .

The election was the full-length mirror of people's presence and a perfect symbol of "co-operate with each other in righteousness and piety."

The sample (56) represents the deep-seated contrast of 'mirror' and 'metal' in Persian literature and mysticism. It also employs the pun literary device to connect the 'phone ring' (*zang-e telefon*) and 'corrosion' (*zangār*). The speaker depicts the political system as a mirror and argues that every phone call asking for economic rent, discrimination, and patronage is

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[89] (5:2); *sūrat l-māidah*; translated by Muhammad Sarwar: The Quranic Arabic Corpus - Translation

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like a spot of corrosion on this mirror. Therefore people cannot see themselves in the mirror. Each phone ringing indicates the art domain, which will be discussed in section 9.1.7. The difference between these two circumstances is whether the film is seen at home or in a theater.

(56)

زنگ تلفن های رانتی است که آینه نظام را زنگار و مکدر می کند و نمی گذارد مردم خودشان را در آینه نظام ببینند ... زنگ تلفن های توصیه ای است که موسیقی متن فساد در کشور است.

The phone ringing to ask for economic rent corrodes the mirror of the political system and does not allow people to see themselves in the mirror of the system. The ringtone of phone calls asking for patronage is incidental music of corruption in the country.

The last excerpt is notable since, on the one hand, the Iran-Iraq war and soldiers participating in it are compared with the battle of Karbala[90] and Imam Hussein and his companions; on the other hand, Iranian soldiers are depicted as the mirror which reflects the light of Imam Hussein and the lesson they learned from Ashura[91]. It conjures up the fact, as mentioned above, that Iranian architects made innovative use of broken mirrors in the buildings. In the following excerpt, Imam Hussein was the mirror reflecting God's light, and his enemy wanted to break or destroy it, ignoring the fact that every broken piece of the mirror would still reflect the light. Iranian soldiers during wartime followed their Imam, and

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[90] Ashura | Definition, History, & Facts | Britannica
[91] The day on which the battle of Karbala happened.

no matter how hard the enemy tried to break and defeat them, they kept reflecting the light (Imam Khomeini's guidelines and the Revolution's principles).

In this excerpt, 'The holder of the mirror' refers to a traditional wedding ceremony. In the past, and still in some villages in Iran, when the bride is accompanied by people to go to the groom or his father-in-law's house someone walks in front of the bride and holds the mirror right in front of her face so that the bride watch herself in the mirror on the way home. In Sufism, the first stage in the process of becoming a 'perfect man' is 'holding the mirror,' and the final stage is becoming the 'mirror'[92]. The drift of this excerpt is that the soldiers participating in Holy Defense were 'holders of the mirror' reflecting their Leader's light, and those who were martyred became the 'mirror'; i.e. 'the perfect man.

Another nub links this scenario and the NATURE domain by introducing elements such as 'root' and 'blessed tree' or 'goodly tree'. It will be expounded in section 9.1.2. The common point of both domains is the ignorant enemy's plan to counteract the Islamic Revolution and defeat it, but they cannot.

(57)

وی با اشاره به شعری که امام حسین (ع) را به آینه دار بزرگ تشبیه کرده که نور خدا را منعکس می کند

بیان کرد : در این شعر بیان شده که یزید خواست که این آینه را بشکند تا نور خدا منعکس نشود ، غافل از

اینکه آینه وقتی بشکند تبدیل به هزاران آینه می شود که هر کدام نور خدا را منعکس می کنند و این آینه داری

در تبار شهدا دست به دست شده است . ... در دوران دفاع مقدس پیروان مکتب امام حسین (ع) به عنوان

آینه داران این حضرت عمل کردند و امروز از سواحل مدیترانه شهدا مکتب مقاومت را منعکس کرده و به دل

خواهان این حرف می تابانند.

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[92] http://ermiyaelahi.blogfa.com/post/265

He points out the poem, which describes Imam Hussein as the great holder of a mirror that reflects God's light. He expresses that in this poem, it is said that Yazid wanted to break this mirror so that God's light could not be reflected. Yazid was ignorant that it turns into thousands of mirrors when the mirror breaks, each of which reflects God's light. This [tradition of] holding the mirror has been handed down to martyrs. … In the era of Holy Defense, the followers of the doctrine of Imam Hussein functioned as holders of this Imam's mirror. Furthermore, today, from Mediterranean ports, martyrs are reflecting the light of Resistance School to the hearts of those believing in them [these beliefs].

9.1.1.2. Scenarios for HOUSE AND CONSTRUCTION Metaphors. To conclude the above-mentioned elaborate discussion, the following scenarios related to HOUSE AND CONSTRUCTION have been extracted.

a)   THE KEY OF SOLUTION FOR UNLOCKING THE DOORS AND SOLVING THE PROBLEMS ARE WHETHER ISIDE THE HOUSE OR OUTSIDE THE HOUSE. WHOEVER HOLDS THE KEY IS IN POWER. NOT ONLY DOES THE KEY MATTER, BUT ALSO HOW TO USE IT (IN WHAT DIRECTION TURNING THE KEY) IS ALSO IMPORTANT.

b)   IF THE KEY IS INSIDE THE HOUSE, PEOPLE AND OTHER NATIONAL RESOURCES (YOUNG PEOPLE) HOLD IT. IF THE KEY IS OUTSIDE OF THE HOUSE, IT IS LOST IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS HELD IN OTHER COUNTRY'S HOUSES.

c)   THE HEADMAN OF GLOBAL VILLAGE IS ALSO IN CHARGE OF HOLDING SOME KEYS IN THE CASE OF BOTH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LOCKED DOORS.

d)   USA, UN, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES ARE CONSIDERED AS HEADMEN. THE QUALIFICATION IS OPEN TO DEBATE.

e)   THE SUPREME LEADER IS THE MAIN PILLAR AND SEDITION AND ARSITOCRACY ARE DAMAGING THE PILLARS. IF THE PILLARS FALL, THE WHOLE HOUSE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM WILL FALL.

9.1.2. Source Domain of *NATURE AND NATURAL DISASTERS*

Generally speaking, the parliament corpus is not as rich as the news agencies' corpora regarding metaphor. It can be due to different political contexts and specific linguistic tools that are most common among journalists. It can also be explained according to the idea that in Iran, there are no political parties and the newspapers and news agencies try to bridge this gap, and they do the political activities. Another reason is that parliamentary debates are a type of conversation and oral language usage, and, according to Berber Sardinha (2011), metaphors are less frequent in conversations than in written texts. Chapter 10 will answer the last explanation, although discussing the reason is out of the scope of this study.

Compared with scenarios discussed in house and construction, scenarios related to nature and natural disasters are indivisibly interwoven with religious concepts and elements. They are totally or partially common among Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Actually, Islam and Judaism have a lot in common since both are monotheistic religions. The interesting point is that Quran has been devoted to the story of Moses so extensively that most Quran experts believe that Quran was about to become the Holy Scripture of the Jews. Another point about the discussion of excerpts in this section is that Iran is vividly described as Paradise in this scenario; that is to say, bearing in mind Iran's geopolitical situation, Iranians live in Paradise, and almost the rest of the world is in the Hell. The following section will discuss this idea's primary and secondary indicators.

Table 9.3

Conceptual Elements, Primary Signals and Relevant GEOGRAPHY, NATURE & NATURAL DISASTERS Domain in each Corpus

GEOGRAPHY, NATURE & NATURAL DISASTERS									
Conceptual Elements	Primary Signals	Parliamentary Debates			ILNA			Tasnim		
		Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD
Shadow	Shadow	112			667			409		
	Shadow of war	3	3.00	8.02	52	7.83	8.97	72	8.73	9.45
	Shadow of Islam	3	1.99	7.44	7	2.67	5.88	6	3.48	5.51
	Shadow of JCPOA	-	-	-	10	2.91	5.61	4	1.79	5.1
	Shadow of leadership	5	2.43	6.02	12	3.60	6.32	6	2.05	5.59
	Shadow of sympathy	-	-	-	6	2.43	7.94	-	-	-
	Shadow of security	-	-	-	8	2.91	5.34	7	2.49	5.89
	Shadow of threat	-	-	-	10	3.12	7.33	5	1.68	6.55
	Sinister shadow	7	2.64	11.17	18	4.23	9.92	10	3.31	9.76
	Dense shadow	3	1.73	8.94	9	2.98	7.96	3	1.71	7.15
	Shadow of presence	-	-	-	6	2.05	4.56	3	1.45	4.18
	Shadow of peace	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	2.62	7.81
	Shadow of (political) system	3	1.69	4.69	12	3.23	5.58	6	2.60	5.21
	Shadow of altruism	-	-	-	5	2.22	8.08	-	-	-
	Shadow of sanction	-	-	-	6	1.65	5.66	-	-	-
	Shadow of Guardianship	-	-	-	4	1.97	7.27	3	1.70	7.2
	Shadow of unity	4	2.23	9.29	22	4.85	8.44	12	3.70	8.29
	Shadow of talks	-	-	-	3	1.72	6.73	4	1.99	8.19
	Shadow of cohesion	-	-	-	3	1.68	6.05	-	-	-
	Shadow of authority	-	-	-	3	1.67	5.86	3	1.68	6.83
	Shadow of interaction	-	-	-	4	1.91	5.84	-	-	-
	Shadow of hope	-	-	-	3	1.51	4.52	-	-	-
	Shadow of defence	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.79	5.07
	Shadow of prudence	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.71	7.3
	Shadow of endeavor	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	7.53
	Shadow of independence	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	7.73
	Shadow of reticence	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.72	8.05
	Shadow of Guardianship of Jurist	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.98	7.94
	Shadow of (economic) depression	3	1.73	7.24	-	-	-	3	1.71	6.80
	Shadow of **terror** (& threat)	3	1.73	10.82	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Shadow of **resistive** economy	3	1.71	5.70	-	-	-	-	-	-

Root	Root	98			429			304		
	Drying out the roots	4	2.00	11.47	14	2.00	10.35	6	2.45	9.72
	Hatchet & root[93]	-	-	-	8	2.83	9.23	7	2.24	9.03
	Grow roots	-	-	-	11	3.00	9.72	10	2.83	10.16
	Roots of terrorism	-	-	-	28	4.65	8.36	9	2.41	7.86
	Root of oppression	-	-	-	7	2.44	8.25	5	1.98	8.12
	Root of insecurity	-	-	-	4	2.63	7.57	4	2.44	8.1
	Roots of corruption(s)	8	2.82	9.37	8	3.28	7.14	3	3.16	7.97
	Root of discord	-	-	-	7	2.22	7.26	7	1.72	8.02
	Root of crisis	-	-	-	5	2.19	6.37	-	-	-
	Root of Islamic Revolution	-	-	-	8	2.95	5.01	5	3.23	4.89
	Root(s) of sedition	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	3.26	7.34
	Deep roots	-	-	-	6	1.98	8.11	6	2.44	8.76
	Intellectual roots	-	-	-	9	3.14	8.51	4	1.97	7.56
	Root(s) of extremism	-	-	-	-[94]	-	-	3	1.73	7.62
	Root of enmity	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.71	6.92
	Cultural roots	-	-	-	8	3.52	6.80	5	2.74	6.45
	Root of discrimination	-	-	-	3	1.72	7.08	-	-	-
	Root(s) of arrogance	-	-	-	3	1.70	6.32	4	1.96	6.78
	Root of poverty	-	-	-	3	1.71	6.71	-	-	-
	Roots of violence	-	-	-	3	1.70	6.32	5	2.23	7.99
	Roots of tyranny	-	-	-	3	1.72	6.99	-	-	-
Ocean	Ocean	8			132			108		
	Roaring ocean	-	-	-	3	1.73	9.64	3	1.73	9.43
	Vast ocean	-	-	-	3	1.73	7.31	-	-	-
	Ocean of nation	-	-	-	4	1.93	4.28	9	2.95	5.67
Sky	Sky	172			184			86		
Star	Star	11			74			63		
	Shining star	-	-	-	3	1.73	9.01	-	-	-
Island	Island	83			57			32		
	Island of security	-	-	-	7	2.45	9.13	9	2.64	10.2
	Isand of sustainability	-	-	-	5	2.23	7.07	4	1.73	8.05
Flood	Flood	370			81			76		
	Flood of refugees	-	-	-	4	2.00	10.19	-	-	-
	Flood of allegations	-	-	-	3	1.73	9.46	-	-	-
	Flood of people's help	-	-	-	3	1.73	6.14	-	-	-
Beach	Beach	35			64			63		
	Beach of tranquillity	-	-	-	5	2.23	7.08	4	2.00	7.72
	Beach of security	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.97	4.90
	Beach of survival	3	1.73	9.09	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tree	Tree	33			46			45		
	Huge tree	-	-	-	7	2.45	13.72	11	3.16	13.41

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[93] The complete expression is 'to take an ax to the root' which is loosely equivalent for 'cook sb's goose'.

[94] There were instances of co-occurrence but they were combined differently; i.e. not 'Root(s) of extremism' but 'roots of something else in extremism'.

	Giant tree	-	-	-	3	1.73	12.88	11	3.32	13.41
	Tree of Islam	-	-	-	4	1.98	4.96	-	-	-
	Tree of Revolution	-	-	-	6	2.41	4.32	7	2.58	4.03
	Tree of security	-	-	-	3	1.69	3.71	-	-	-
	Tree of Basij	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.99	5.97
	Tree & blood	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.73	7.58
	Tree & fruit	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2.00	10.62
	Tree and blessed tree	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2.00	10.48
Branch	Branch	11			38			61		
Peak	Peak	20			36			25		

9.1.2.1. Conceptual Elements in Context. 'Shadow', unlike in the literature, also has a positive meaning in divine religions such as Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. In all Holy Scriptures, verses talk about trees and even holy trees. The concepts of 'tree', 'shadow', and 'garden' (Paradise as an overgeneralization of garden) are so profoundly interconnected that separate discussion of them would be arduous, if not unfeasible. The Islamic perspective of 'shadow' and 'tree' will be foregrounded in this account since it is the official religion of Iran's political system.

There are two metaphorical trees in Quran in terms of the nature of 'words': 'good' or 'blessed tree'[95] and 'bad' or 'evil tree'[96]. The former refers to 'good' or 'blessed word', and the latter refers to 'bad' or 'evil word'. The blessed tree is characterized as a tree whose roots are in the ground, and they are firmed, the branches are in the sky, and it fruits at any time with the permission of God. Some have interpreted the 'blessed' literally as referring to monotheistic word or *zikr* saying 'there is no God but God/Allah (*la ilaha illallah*), some take it as God's commands and rules, the others consider it as 'faith' which is the content and conception of 'there is no God but God'. On the other hand, it has also been considered as the

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[95] Chapter 14, Verses 24 & 25.
[96] Chapter 14, Verse 26.

'believer'; i.e., they walk in their path towards their final destination taking firm steps. Numerous characteristics of this tree can be summarized as follows[97]:

- It grows and is a dynamic (not a static) creature.

- It is clean and impeccable in any respect, so its fruit, shadow, blossom, and even the breeze coming off this tree are pure and impeccable.

- It has firm roots so that no tornado can root it out.

- The branches are placed in the sky, at the height (not in a sordid place), so they enjoy enough air and light and are far from contamination.

- It is fruitful and creator.

- It is not a seasonal tree; i.e., it fruits at any time, in any season.

- It yields its fruits according to divine rules and traditions with the permission of God, not by chance or without measurement.

On the other hand, 'bad' or 'evil tree' is an unrooted tree that is not fixed or stable. It has neither roots nor branches. It refers to 'unbelief' and 'atheist' or 'unbeliever'. There are other metaphorical usages of 'tree' in the Quran which do not directly describe the man as a tree but describe his deeds and words as trees. Other parallel celestial trees described in Quran are the tree of Tuba and the tree of Zaqqum. The former is placed in Paradise and has sweet fruits. The latter is in the Hell and fruits bitter crops. The most common interpretation of the tree of Tuba is that its roots are in the house of Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali (in

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[97] شجره طیبه اسلام و اهلبیت علیم السلام (hawzah.net)

Paradise), and every believer has one branch of this tree in his/her house. The tree of Zaqqum has bitter fruits eaten by those in Hell, and they turn into molten iron and boiled water in their stomachs.

Before proceeding to the status of trees in other religions, one final significant tree is noteworthy: Sidrat Al-Muntaha. It is the most mysterious tree in the Quran, and there is no detailed description. The literal meaning is that it is a gigantic tree located on the highest point of Paradise and is full of leaves and casts great shadow[98]. No angel can pass this tree, and Prophet Muhammad was the only one allowed to pass it during his Mi'raj. In Sufism, Sidrat al-Muntaha symbolizes the highest degree of closeness to God[99]. It has been argued that it is a mysterious tree and too difficult to be interpreted or described; so, it has been applied to conjure up something fundamental, which is the ultimate of man's imagination. In other words, it has been used because it is above human beings' imagination, not because it is a perfect or exact example.

Besides Quran, other Holy Scriptures also have metaphorical references to the tree. For example, in the Bible, a human being is considered a tree, and God is shown as a gardener. Just one example is John 15, whose NIV states that:

- I am the true vine, and my Father is the gardener (John 15:1).

- Remain in me, as I also remain in you. No branch can bear fruit by itself; it must remain in the vine. Neither can you bear fruit unless you remain in me (John 15:4).

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[98] What is meant by Sidratul - Muntaha that the Quran has mentioned? - Questions Archive - IslamQuest is a reference for Islamic questions on the internet

[99] سدرة المنتهی - ویکی شیعه (wikishia.net)

- If you do not remain in me, you are like a branch that is thrown away and withers; such branches are picked up, thrown into the fire, and burned (John 15:6)[100].

Alternatively, in Torah, we read, "It is a tree of life to all who grasp it, and whoever holds on to it is happy; its ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are peace. (Proverbs 3:17-18)". It is interpreted as referring to both 'man' and 'Torah' itself. In the case of 'man', the roots are ancestors, patriarchs, and matriarchs; the trunk is the Israelites; the branches are various tribes of Israel, and the fruit is the good deeds performed by the Jews[101]. The idea behind all these metaphorical expressions in Holy Scriptures is more or less the same: the clash of 'good' and 'evil'.

Another valuable source of information for interpreting trees and the relevant metaphorical patterns would be 'world tree' or 'cosmic tree', which has been extensively used in Persian literature. This mystical tree is a massive tree that connects the world to Paradise and represents regret and yearning for when the earth and Paradise were nearby. So this tree is a means to reach out to gods and speak to them. It is described as a tree whose top has covered the whole sky, and the roots have been spread in the whole earth. On the one hand, the description of the cosmic tree is exactly like the description of paradisiacal trees in Islamic parables.

On the other hand, Judaism's relationship between cosmic trees and fire or light is indivisible. For instance, Menorah, or seven-branched candelabrum in Jewish tradition,

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[100] For more verses and other cross-references: John 15:1 "I am the true vine, and My Father is the keeper of the vineyard. (biblehub.com)
[101] The Tree of Life – GalEinai – Revealing the Torah's Inner Dimension

symbolizes the tree of life in Torah[102]. Also, when God wanted to inform Moses that he had been chosen to be a prophet, God showed himself as a fire in a tree. Now that we have sufficiently established the background of 'tree', an account of 'shadow' and its characteristics is necessary to set the scene for following discussions of metaphorical patterns.

Persian literature and Quran have little, if any, in common when it comes to 'shadow' or 'tree's shadow'. In Persian literary tradition, the shadow symbolizes a person's personality's hidden or evil aspect. However, in Quran, the shadow has positive meanings, and it is even characterized as a blessing. It is necessary to make the earth habitable; i.e., if it were not for the shadow, the sunlight would make the earth inhabitable all day long. Shadow is also a feature of Paradise: Those living in Paradise rest in the sound shadow of trees under rivers. The dependency of shadow on light is also essential. Nevertheless, Quran goes one further step and ascribes some essential features to the shadow.

According to Quran, the shadows move, and their movement is gradual, just like the light in the morning; if they are sudden, they will be detrimental to the beings' existence. The shadows move around anything in nature and, based on physics rules and God's creation rules, fall on the ground and move according to the light on the other side of that thing. Quran describes the movement of shadow as 'prostration'. It is a sign depicting God's existence or light. This personification of the shadow is related to developmental or formative prostration, which means that the shadows prostrate not out of faith but out of surrender to God and His physics rules. In Jewish beliefs, man is created in the shadow of God, or he is the shadow of

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[102] menorah | candelabrum | Britannica

God[103]. They have in common that they both believe in the movement of shadow and that it is proof that there is a person (God). For Judaism, since the shadow reflects something or someone, it moves according to that thing or person. For instance, if the person dances, the shadow will dance with him/her.

Another point is that since the shadow is correlated with light: "The closer we are to our Creator, who is light, the bigger we will appear, and the more perfectly we will reflect Him[104]." The bigger here means the better or closer to perfection, reflecting God's qualities such as joy, peace, and self-control. In this sense, this belief and interpretation of shadow align with the mirror and its symbolism of 'perfect man' reflecting God's qualities (section 9.1.2.1).

How the scenario of nature and its central element, tree, is related to the house and construction scenario lies in the fact that the garden in Iranian architecture symbolizes Paradise. However, before discussing the importance of trees in Iranian gardens, it is necessary to discuss the significance and symbolism of trees in Sufism, as it has significantly influenced architects. In Sufism, all plants of a garden devote themselves to say praying and *zikr* (monotheistic words) of God, and in this regard, they are like angels: They both pray God whole their life. Branches spread in the sky are like a person's hands up in the sky. In the fall, the trees lose their leaves, and it is like a perfect *Sufi* who loses all his external and earthly belongings, so stands blithely in front of God in absolute poverty while he is supplicating. Since the plane tree's leaves are recognized as the human hand, these trees have

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[103] Me and My Shadow - An Example of the Amazing Hebrew Language » Kehila News Israel
[104] Me and My Shadow - An Example of the Amazing Hebrew Language » Kehila News Israel

usually been recognized as the chaplain of other praying plants in a garden. For *Sufis*, the tree is the symbol of revival.

Every tree has purposefully been planted in Iranian gardens, and they have never been planted accidentally. Some trees are planted to cast a shadow on both sides of the main walkways. Sometimes just a plane tree is used, and sometimes a combination of plane tree and cedar is used for this purpose. Around the garden, next to the walls, are paths where non- or fruit-bearing shadow-cast trees are planted in rows adjacent to the river. To allow for changes in the Iranian garden's color, design, and volume, evergreen, and deciduous trees have traditionally been planted beside the rivers and pathways. The evergreen next to the deciduous tree reminds of life, revival, offspring, eternality, and youthfulness.

Now that we have set the image of the garden and explained the tree's role and typology, the shadow, and its typology would pave the way for more detailed discussions of excerpts. Based on the discussion above of trees in the Quran, it can be concluded that shadow has both positive and negative semantic prosody in political texts. It highly depends on the figure it reflects: the blessed or evil tree, the Tuba tree, or the Zaqqum tree. The overall image of this scenario is that *the nation (as a human being) has stepped onto (an Islamic Revolutionary) path filled with trees (in the heavenly garden of Iran), casting a shadow on him. This path ends in the heavenly house (Guardianship of Imam Zaman) or Sidrat al-Muntaha; so, on his way home, he should avoid evil shadows (arrogance, enemy) and walk under the blessed shadows (leadership, Islam).* The first excerpt of this section clearly describes the Islamic Republic of Iran as Paradise among other numerous metaphors since it is filled abundantly with metaphors.

(1)

۱۲فروردین ، روزی است که ملت ایران به جمهوری اسلامی «آری» گفت ، آری سبز ، به نشانه روییدن و

طراوت و شادابی و ... دوازده فروردین ، آزمون بود ، صراطی بود که صالحان از آن گذشتند ؛ در صف

های ممتد ایستادند و رای دادند ، به آسانی از آن عبور کردند و به بهشت جمهوری اسلامی قدم نهادند اما

گروهی که اهل این راه و پوینده این صراط نبودند از آن بهشت دور ماندند و در وادی نه به حسرت نشستند.

> Farvardin 12th is the day that the Iranian nation said 'yes' to the Islamic Republic; a
> green *yes* as a sign of growing and verdure and freshness and … Farvardin 12th was
> an examination, a path that the righteous passed it. They made lines to vote for the
> Islamic Revolution to enter the Heaven of Iran quickly. Nevertheless, some groups
> were not advocates of this path, and they were not passersby of this path. So, they had
> to stay regretfully out of Heaven in the purgatory of [saying] 'no'.

Generally speaking, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 is referred to as a 'tree' in public discourse. It is highlighted that it was a 'sapling' at first, but now it is a huge tree (Exc. 2). From the very beginning, it has been watered by the blood of martyrs, and it inheres in the pivotal role of martyrdom and Islam for Iran's political system (Exc. 3). Memorial and appreciation of martyrs have the same functionality and are necessary for both the verdure of the tree and its strength (Exc. 4). In this scenario, the gardener is the Supreme Leader (Exc. 5). Not just the Iranian Revolution, but other essential organizations have also been portrayed as a tree or even sacred trees. For instance, Imam Khomeini was the first to call Basij the 'blessed tree'. The blossom of this tree is visiting God (martyrdom or martyrs) with the scent of spring (Exc. 6). *Basijis* are like gilded leaves hanging on luminous branches of the blessed tree (Exc. 7). Our hope is described as the seed which Rouhani has planted in his first presidential term, and now that it is a fertile tree, some of his rival candidates want to destroy it (Exc. 8). The Revolution tree is planted in the fertile soils of Holy Defense, and every

Iranian was like a tree that sprouted and stood up to the enemy (Exc. 9). Excerpt (9) implies that the fertility of the soil is because of the blood of martyrs.

(2)

امریکایی ها از روز اول پیروزی که انقلاب یک نهال باریک بود ، دشمنی را شروع کردند و امروز هم که جمهوری اسلامی به درخت سرسبز و تناوری تبدیل شده ، به همان توطیه های بی نتیجه ادامه می دهند.

> The Americans started this enmity from the first day of victory of the Revolution when it was a slender sapling. And now that it has turned into a green and stout tree, they keep pursuing their futile conspiracies.

(3)

این درخت تنومند انقلاب را خون شهیدانی مثل شهید حججی ها با این سطح آگاهی تنومند کرده است .
The Revolution's massive tree has grown stout from the blood of martyrs like Hojaji with this level of awareness.

(4)

اصل شهادت ، آبیاری درخت اسلام و انقلاب بوده و یاد شهدا نیز مایه شادابی درخت اسلام و انقلاب است. قطعا یاد شهدا فرهنگ شهادت را در جامعه زنده نگه خواهد داشت و استحکام درخت تنومند انقلاب و آسیب ناپذیری آن را موجب خواهد شد.

> The principle of martyrdom has been the water for the tree of Islam and the Revolution. Furthermore, the memorial of martyrs is a delight for the tree of Islam and the Revolution, too. Definitely, the memorial of martyrs will revive the culture of martyrdom in the society, and it will result in the solidity of the stout tree of the Revolution and its invulnerability.

(5)

هفته بسیج این شجره طیبه که به دستان معمار توانای انقلاب اسلامی امام خمینی غرس شد را تبریک می گویم.

I congratulate the week of *Basij*, this blessed tree planted by Imam Khomeini, the potent architect of the Islamic Revolution.

(6)

بسیج ... شجره طیبه و درخت تناور و پرثمری است که شکوفه های آن ، بوی بهار وصل ... می دهد .

Basij is the blessed tree and a fruitful and robust tree whose blossoms have the scent of the spring of reuniting …

(7)

امروز وظایف شما عزیزان و نسل جوان که علقه بسیجی و ارتباط تنگاتنگی با این شجره طیبه دارید و یک برگ زرینی بر شاخه نورانی شجره طیبه بسیج هستید بسیار سنگین است ...

Dear you all and the young generation who have an attachment to *Basij* and have a close relationship with this blessed tree and are golden leaves on luminous branches of the blessed tree of *Basij*, you have essential duties today. …

(8)

... چرا واقعیت ها به مردم گفته نمی شود و با امیدی که امروز در دل مردم درخت باروری شده ، جنگ می کنید.

Why the truth is not told to people, and you fight with the hope that it has become a fertile tree in people's hearts today.

(9)

بسیج ... از ثمرات مبارک درخت تناور انقلاب اسلامی است که از زمین حاصلخیز و پرافتخار دفاع مقدس ،

... رویید.

> *Basij* is blessed fruitage of the stout tree of Islamic Revolution, which sprouted infertile and honored soil of Holy Defense.

The authorities such as MPs and the government are part of the trunk. Different parties are the branches or are sitting on different branches of the same tree. The discord is at the level of the branch, and they all have a shared tree and root; i.e., at the level of the root, there is no discord, and they are united (Exc. 10). A ubiquitous expression in this regard is 'sitting on the branch and cutting the roots'. It implies the internal enemy, authority, or political celebrity who has gained power because of this political system but begins to destroy it. They should bear in mind that if the tree falls[105], they will fall off too since they are sitting on the branch of the same tree (Exc. 11). The root of this tree is Islamic history and affairs. The root is the Supreme Leader. The soil with its roots is Muharram and Ashura (religious theme). The point is that Imam Khomeini and people are like trees that have the same root; i.e., they are inseparable, and Imam Khomeini was part of people, and he was down-to-earth (Exc. 12).

The martyrs are both the water and the fruit of the Revolution tree. The secret of the strength of this tree is its martyrs. So, based on excerpts 13 and 14, the Revolution will be safe and robust as long as martyrs or individuals are willing to give their lives for the Revolution tree.

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[105] Like the pillars in the previous domain.

The super concept of *security* has been described as a tree. However, the pro-Reformist ILNA has gone one step further and added a source domain of religion: Freedom is depicted as a sacrifice by the tree of security (Exc. 15). It implies one of the main traditions (sacrificing a lamb or camel) during Hajj Rituals. It is hidden in another aspect, which portrays the martyrs' blood as the water for the Revolution tree's growth; in other words, the militants are slaughtered in front of the tree, the root (leadership) absorbs it, and the tree develops.

(10)

ما در اصل انقلاب که مانند ریشه های یک درخت است وحدت داریم ولی ممکن است در شاخه و برگ ها اختلاف وجود داشته باشد اما این اختلافات باید به وحدت تبدیل شوند .

We agree with the principle of the Revolution, which is like the root of a tree. However, there may be discord on branches and leaves. However, these discords should be turned into unity.

(11)

نزدیک شدن به انتخابات و تمسک به موضوعات مختلف برای رقابت های سیاسی و انتخاباتی نبایستی به زیر سوال بردن دستاوردهای نظام و دولت منجر شود . برخی این روزها به گونه ای سخن می گویند که مصداق بر شاخه نشستن و بن بریدن است

Approaching the [presidential] election and using any pretext related to various topics [to win] political and electoral competitions should not result in questioning the government's achievements and the political system. Some people these days give lectures in the style of 'sitting on the branch and chopping the roots.'

(12)

علی شریعتی همواره در صحبت های خود ... می گفت امام خمینی (ره) و ملت یک ریشه هستند و هیچگاه از هم جدا نمی شوند .

Ali Shari'ati, in his speeches, always said that Imam Khomeini and the nation are [of] the same root, and they will never separate.

(13)

... این درخت تنومند انقلاب را خون شهیدانی مثل شهید حججی ها با این سطح آگاهی تنومند کرده است. فرمانده سپاه با ابراز اینکه محصول این درخت تنومند انقلاب اسلامی افرادی مثل شهید محسن حججی هستند ، تصریح کرد ...

…The Revolution's massive tree has become stout by martyrs' blood such as Hojaji with this level of awareness. Expressing that crops of this stout tree are martyrs such as Hojaji, the commandant of IRGC affirmed that …

(14)

صدیقی با بیان اینکه انقلاب هرگز غروب ندارد ، ابراز داشت : فکر نکنید این جوانان و نوجوانان اندک هستند . ... ما شهید حججی های بسیاری داریم و این جریان ادامه دارد. این جریان ، یک تفکر و یک شجره طیبه ریشه داری است که به اذن خداوند همیشه میوه خواهد داشت .

Stating that the sun of the Revolution will never set, Sedighi expressed that "do not think that these young and adolescent people are a few. We have martyrs such as Hojaji, and this movement will grow. This movement is a thought and a deep-rooted blessed tree that will always yield fruits with God's permission.

(15)

او هیچ گاه آزادی را پای درخت امنیت قربانی نکرده است . ما وزیر اطلاعاتی را می خواهیم که مردم از اسمش و مامورش نترسند بلکه این خاینین باشند که از نام او و مامورانش بترسند.

He has never sacrificed freedom by the tree of security. We need the minister of intelligence that people are not afraid of his name and his agents, but those are traitors who are scared of his name and agents.

For a Conservative MP, people's distrust is like a worm that hollows the Revolution tree (Exc. 16). For Tasnim (Exc. 17), sedition is one of the tree pests and the remedy is discernment. In this metaphor, the dichotomy of 'hard' vs. 'soft war' has been illustrated. Hard warfare or external enemies are like wolves that attack the country and the system violently and in broad daylight. On the other hand, soft warfare or internal enemies are like termites that attack in silence and from the inside. The solution for the first one is 'resistance' and 'indurance' and for the second one is 'insight' and 'alertness'. Poverty, financial corruption, and unemployment are other tree pests that threaten the Revolution tree.

For Alamolhoda (Exc. 18), since the Revolution tree has been watered by martyrdom, it is immuned to tree pests. Iran-Iraq war was to take out the seed of the Revolution before it would sprout, but it did not work (Exc. 19). The pro-Conservative Tasnim describes 'Dey 9 epic'[106] as pruning the Revolution tree (Exc. 20). However, an official member of Basij does not consider it enough and asks for unrooting sedition and adds that it is the season of pruning (Exc. 21). For him, sedition is something like a weed that must be stubbed, and it is not just a couple of branches of the same tree. Terroristic groups are described as a

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[106] 'Dey' is the name of a month in the Solar Calendar, and this date is December 30, is marked by the pro-government rallies as a response to post-election unrests in 2009. Cf. December 30, 2009 Iranian pro-government rallies - Wikipedia

phenomenon that is mushrooming, and martyrs such as Motahari have rooted them out and have thrown them into the garbage can (Exc. 22).

In response to those who believe that the omission should purify the Islam of clergymen, Ayatollah Khomeini said that clericalism is a tree that has got aphids (corrupt clergymen). So, the aphids must be eliminated, and we cannot cut the tree for this reason (Exc. 23).

Another threat to this tree is the 'hatchet' which is recognized for cutting the roots of the Revolution tree. An internal issue that works as a hatchet, for Rouhani, is the destruction of people's hope[107] by his rival (Exc. 24). The external example of a hatchet is a sanction devised to stub Iran's roots. Despite enemies' attempts to root out and destroy the Revolution tree, it is indestructible thanks to martyrs such as Hojaji. Moreover, as far as this tree has fruits like him, it will be immortal, like an immortal or eternal sun that never sets.

(16)

... و این سلب اعتماد مردم که همچون کرمی است که درخت انقلاب را از درون پوک می کند دوباره ترمیم شود ، اثرش از هزاران برجام بیشتر است.

... And if people's distrust, which is like a worm that hollows the Revolution's tree from inside be amended, its effect is more influential than thousands of JCPOAs.

(17)

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[107] Prudence and hope were Rouhani's keywords and motto.

گرگها وقتی حمله می کنند ، زوزه می کشند و با صدای بلند حمله می کنند و لذا فرصت برای واکنش خواهد بود (فرار یا مقاومت) اما موریانه ها چون هجوم آورند اولا پنهان و ناپیدا هستند و از درون ، زمینه را برای هجوم می یابند و ثانیا بی سروصدا و به نرمی بافتشان به جان داشته ها و سرمایه ها می افتند . ایستادگی در مقابل گرگها شجاعت می خواهد و آمادگی و دفع خطر موریانه ها ، بصیرت و رصد و پیشگیری ! ...بنابراین دو عنصر « 1 . ایستادگی و مقاومت» با نگاه به گرگهای در کمین نشسته و مهیای تهاجم به عنوان دشمنان بیرونی و « 2 . بصیرت و هشیاری» با عنایت به شرایط داخلی و ضعف ها و آسیبهای مرموز درونی ، در جهت حیات یک موجود زنده و پویا به طور همزمان لازم و ضروری است . ... حکایت این روزهای جامعه و کشورمان ایران که در معرض تهاجمات گوناگون سیاه و سفید ، پنهان و آشکار و نرم و سخت قرار گرفته است …

Wolves attack while they are howling in a loud voice. So, there is time for reaction (scaping or resisting). However, termites are hidden, and they find the right time for attack from the inside; and secondly, they attack belongings and facilities in silence [due to] their soft bodies. Resisting in front of wolves requires courage and readiness, and averting the danger of termites [requires] insight, sighting, and precaution! It is the story of our society and country these days that Iran is exposed to various black and white, hidden and vivid, soft and hard invasions …

(18)

کسانی که با غیر نیت خدا وارد عرصه شوند از همان اول حرکتشان با ذلت و نکبت آمیخته است و آخرش نیز بی نتیجه است. نظام بر پایه خون شهید استوار است . اکنون نزدیک 40 سال است که پای این درخت انقلاب خون ریخته شده و این خون ها بی نتیجه نمی ماند .

Those who participate without Godly intentions are mixed with abjection and abomination from the beginning and prove futile. This Revolution tree has been watered by martyrdom for almost 40 years, and this blood cannot be futile.

(19)

به همین دلیل تصمیم گرفتند بذر این درخت تنومند را تا هنوز جوانه نزده است به در آورند و از آن آینده محتوم جلوگیری کنند . عامل دیگر جنگ انگیزه های بلندپروازانه و جاه طلبی های صدام بود.

That is why they decided to take out the seed of the Revolution before it would sprout and avoid its absolute future. Another reason behind the [Iran-Iraq] war was Saddam's grandiose motivations and ambitions.

(20)

بعد از 30 سال شجره طیبه جمهوری اسلامی نیاز مبرم به هرس داشت . 9 دی 88 فرزندان انقلاب اسلامی بریدند برگ های زاید این درخت را .

After 30 years, the blessed tree of the Islamic Republic was in desperate need of pruning. In Day of 2009, the children of the Islamic Revolution cut the rotten leaves of this tree.

(21)

این بازنگری در برخی ساختارهای کشور امری واجب به نظر می رسد که انجام آن نظام را هم در برابر دشمنان خارجی و هم بد اندیشان داخلی بیمه خواهد کرد و تا زمانی که این مهم انجام نشود بسیاری از اقدامات اصلاحی تنها بخشی از ساقه و برگ مشکل را قطع کرده و ریشه مسایل دست نخورده باقی خواهد ماند .

This revision of some of the country's [political] institutions seems necessary. Doing it will indemnify the political system against both external enemies and internal malicious ones. And so long as this is not done, many reformist actions have cut just some parts of branches and leaves, and the root of issues will remain untouched.

(22)

به یاد بیاوریم روزهای اول پیروزی انقلاب اسلامی و رشد قارچ گونه گروهک های التقاطی را که ... با اقدامات تروریستی توانستند خسارت های زیادی را بر درخت نوپای انقلاب وارد سازند و نهایتا با روشن شدن ماهیت منحرف ... آنها توسط اندیشمندانی چون شهید مطهری و شهید بهشتی که از صدا و سیما پخش شد ریشه آنها برای همیشه از جا کنده شد و به زباله دان تاریخ پیوستند.

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Let us remember the early days of the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the mushrooming of syncretist groups that, with terroristic actions, could damage the young tree of Revolution so hard. Moreover, finally, with their deviant nature being clarified by intellectuals such as Motahari and Beheshti broadcasted from national media, their roots were stubbed and thrown into the garbage can of history.

(23)

ایشان استدلال می کردند که ما هم ایرادهایی به روحانیت داریم . ما می گوییم این درخت شته زده است و باید شته را از بین برد اما منهاییون می گویند باید ریشه را از بین برد.

He argued that we find faults with clericality, too. We say that this tree has got aphids, and the aphids must be eliminated. However, *Menhayiyun* [those who believe that the omission should purify Islam of clergymen] say that the root must be stubbed.

(24)

شرط ورود به عالم سیاست و حکمرانی بر قلب مردمان ، داشتن اندیشه برای رشد و توسعه ملک و ملت است و نه تیشه برای زدن ریشه ؛ بر امید ملت نتازید .

The condition of entering into politics and reigning over people's hearts [win people's hearts] is to possess the thought for growth and develop the territory and the nation and not a hatchet for stubbing the roots. Do not assault on the nation's hope.

The shadow and its interpretation are highly dependent on the phenomenon it describes, i.e., whether it is 'blessed or Tuba tree' or 'evil or Zaqqum tree'. The former reflects good and positive phenomenon as it has roots in Paradise and is closer to God and His will. The latter reflects nasty or negative events since it has roots in Hell. The nation

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should gather under the shadow[108] of the blessed trees and avoid the shadow of evil one. Shared positive shadows, regardless of political affiliation[109], are the shadow of unity, Guardianship[110], presence, Islam, leadership, security, (political) system, talks, and authority. Generally speaking, the positive shadow means 'thanks to something' or 'as an accomplishment of something'.

For ILNA, there are other positive shadows too: shadow of sympathy, altruism, cohesion, hope, and interaction. Meanwhile, for Tasnim, the shadows of peace, prudence, endeavor, and independence are positive. Parliament-specific metaphorical shadows are a shadow of (martyrs') blood and a resistive economy. Other secondary elements in all or, at least, one of them indicating positive semantic prosody of shadow are a shadow of people's resistance, sacrifice, people's support, and God's help.

On the other hand, regardless of political affiliation, the negative shadows are the shadow of terror, threat, and war. For ILNA, the shadow of sanction is highlighted too, which is harmful. Negative shadows for Tasnim are the shadow of reticence and recession. For the parliament, the shadow of terror has negative semantic prosody. A secondary element in all or, at least, one of them indicating negative connotations of the shadow is the shadow of Iranophobia.

One essential and yet thorny shadow is the shadow of JCPOA. Its interpretation highly depends on the political affiliation. It is a positive shadow for the Reformists since a conflict with Iran was avoided, sanctions were lifted, the economy is going to grow, Iran has

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[108] Like the roof in house scenario.
[109] They have been found in the corpora but not necessarily with the same interpretation.
[110] Can be considered as the Sidrat al-Muntaha.

become a solid and influential country on the international stage, and so on. On the contrary, Conservatives believe JCPOA is a negative shadow. It has opened up the way for the enemy's penetration. It is something worse than war; it has not made any changes to the economy and so on.

The most controversial debates were related to the shadow of war. While the Reformists insist on the benefit of JCPOA to get the country out of the shadow of war, the Conservatives have two trends. They either completely deny the existence of the shadow of war or list a variety of other factors as the cause of its disappearance. It was so dominant and vital that, during presidential election campaigns, the choice between Rouhani and Raisi was described as the choice between the shadow of war and the shadow of peace. The Reformists extensively imbued people with the idea that if Raisi were chosen, Iran would be put in danger of war (Exc. 25 & 26). Their supportive argumentation was JCPOA and how it saved Iran from the shadow of war. Reformists' other keyword in their campaign was 'halfway', explained in section 9.1.5. The shadow of war was so controversial that it is the only metaphorical pattern in this scenario debated a lot in the parliament.

Those Conservatives who implicitly admitted the existence of the shadow of war have two approaches. One idea is that not only have not Rouhani's government destroyed this shadow, but it also has aggravated the situation (Exc. 27). The second idea is that other issues such as 'Holy Shrine Defender'[111], IRGC, military forces, Revolutionary thought, and people's presence have protected Iran from war (Exc. 28). For the Reformists, besides JCPOA, prudence and negotiations have also played a role. Of course, they are the basis on

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[111] Soldiers and martyrs of the war in Syria and Iraq.

which JCPOA was accomplished. Furthermore, about the role of people's presence in avoiding or destroying the shadow of war:

- It is peripheral to the military and deterrent power even for the Conservatives.

- Moreover, for the Reformists, it is manifested the best in a quotation of Rafsanjani's son. He says, 'as the Supreme Leader has indicated, people's presence has driven away from the shadow of war by *going to the ballot boxes and voting for Rouhani, for driving away from the shadow of war*' (Exc. 29).

Conservatives highly disagree with the Reformists on the issue of any (further) international negotiations or agreements. They equalize it with 'bowing their head in shame' or 'walking in a path ending to mirage' (instead of a house or Sidrat al-Muntaha tree) (Exc. 30 & 31). The United States's commitment to JCPOA is described as a mirage; i.e., it is unreal. In Quran 24:39, the unbelievers' deeds are described as a mirage in the desert, and when the thirsty unbeliever gets to it, he finds no water; on the other hand, the believers have God, and they already have what they want, and they do not experience those difficulties[112]. Also, in Bible, more or less, the same comparison has been made based on the source domain of 'mirage'. For instance, Jeremiah 15:18 and Isaiah 49:10 describe unbeliever as someone thirsty who suffers from endless hardship, and whatever he does to solve it, he becomes thirstier and cannot find the actual water; on the other hand, the believer has God who guides him to the water and wells[113].

(25)

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[112] Surah An-Nur - 39 | Quran.com
[113] Mirage in the Bible (3 instances) (knowing-jesus.com)

مردم ایران با رای شان به آقای روحانی ، سرنوشت کشور را انتخاب کردند زیرا یک انتخاب ... سایه جنگ را به کشور بازمی گرداند و یک انتخاب ، سایه جنگ را از کشور دور می کرد که ایرانیان دومی را برگزیدند . او افزود : انتخابی که سایه جنگ را با کمک ملت ایران از کشور دور می کرد ، فردی است که با تکیه بر شعور توانست برجام را محقق کند . ...

The Iranians chose the destiny of Iran by voting to Mr. Rouhani; because one choice would return the shadow of war [on top of] the country, and the other choice would distance the shadow of war from the country. Moreover, Iranians chose the latter. He added that the choice that would distance the shadow of war with the help of people is someone who has been able to accomplish JCPOA by relying on conscientiousness.

(26)

نشست ریاض نشان داد سایه جنگ با ... تداوم دولت روحانی نه تنها رخت بر نبسته بلکه آثار و نشانه های خود را نشان می دهد .

The meeting in Riyadh showed that the shadow of war not only has not disappeared by the continuity of Rouhani's government but also shows his signs and consequences.

(27)

... اما محض اطلاع آقای روحانی به واسطه برجام پای دشمنان به ایران باز شد ، چشمان نامحرم آنان در مراکز حساس به صورت آنلاین مستقر شد. آمریکا در خواب هم نمی دید ، بتواند به رآکتور اراک دست پیدا کند ، برجام کاری کرد ، قلب رآکتور اراک توسط خودی ها بتون شد ! کدام جنگ می توانست برای آمریکا چنین دستاوردی داشته باشد ؟

For your information Mr. Rouhani, due to JCPOA, the enemies put a step into Iran, and their *non-mahram* eyes [monitoring cameras] were installed online insensitive centers. The US could not even dream of accessing Arak's nuclear complex in his

sleep. JCPOA did a thing that resulted in filling the heart of the Arak nuclear reactor with cement[114] by insiders! Which war could have brought such an achievement for America?

(28)

بدانید آنچه سایه جنگ را از کشور ما دور کرده ، اولا شجاعت و تدابیر رهبر عزیز در کنار صبر ، ایمان و وحدت ملت ایران و ثانیا اقتدار و توانمندی نیروهای مسلح و ایثارگران مدافع حرم بوده است.

You should know that what has driven away from the shadow of war from our country is, firstly, courage and prudence of [our] dear Leader besides patience and faith and unity of the nation. Secondly, it has been due to the authority and capability of the Holy Shrine Defender and military forces.

(29)

این دور شدن سایه جنگ به خاطر این بود که مردم فردی را انتخاب کردند که عقلانیت را سرلوحه کار خود قرار داد.

People chose a person with rationality at the top of their to-do list, which helped dispel war's shadow.

(30)

ما هم می خواهیم سایه شوم جنگ از این کشور برود ، اما سایه شوم جنگ با لبخند ، کرنش ، تواضع و رکوع در برابر دشمن از بین نمی رود . سایه شوم جنگ با ایستادگی و مقاومت در برابر دشمن از بین می رود.

We want that the sinister shadow of war gets disappear from this country, too. However, the sinister shadow of war does not disappear by the smile, bowing head,

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[114] Refers to pouring concrete into the core of Arak nuclear reactor: U.S. says concrete has been poured at Iran's Arak reactor | Reuters

modesty, and genuflection before the enemy. It is gone by resistance before the enemy.

(31)

رهبر انقلاب اسلامی ... تاکید کردند : اگر ... به شیطانها به خصوص شیطان اکبر اعتماد کنیم و عقلانیت را در سایه امید به شیطانها به کار ببندیم ، نتیجه ی آن ، سراب است.

The Leader of the Islamic Revolution affirmed that if we trust Satans, especially the great Satan, and be rational under the shadow of hope for Satans, the result will be a mirage.

The Reformist MP referring to JCPOA considers it a victory and praises it due to the division of labor between political and military powers. He makes a balance between military and diplomatic power by stating that now, thanks to JCPOA, we have 'gun in one hand and an olive branch in another' and 'generals and diplomats are standing back to back' (Exc. 32). Olive branch as the symbol of peace implies that JCPOA has handseled peace. Before closing the tree-based metaphors, it is worth mentioning that ILNA has described tyranny as a phenomenon that looks like a tree but is a razor in nature (Exc. 33). It argues that *whom* the tyrant does not matter; the most critical question is *what* the nature of tyranny is. We should be careful in how to deal with it. It is used to suggest negotiations with enemies instead of being harsh to them. It implies peaceful resistance in front of the enemy. The argument is that if you hit or approach the razor with so much force, you will cut yourself, and you will be the one who bleeds and will die. So violence is not the solution.

(32)

تقسیم کار و تفکیک قوای سیاسی و نظامی در امر سیاست خارجی به این نتیجه فرخنده رسیده است که جمهوری اسلامی اکنون در یک دست اسلحه و در یک دست شاخه زیتون دارد و دیپلمات ها و سردارانش پشت در پشت هم دارند.

This promising result has led to the division of labor and political and military powers in foreign affairs. The Islamic Republic has a gun in one hand and an olive branch in the other hand. Moreover, his generals and diplomats stand back to back.

(33)

اساسا مرحوم طالقانی مثل بقیه متفکران نظریه استبداد در جهان اسلام معتقد است باید ماهیت استبداد را شناساند چیستی استبداد مهم است تا کیستی مستبد ، کیستی مستبد اهمیت ندارد. ... بهترین مقابله با مستبد مقاومت صلح آمیز است ؛ چون استبداد شبیه به تیغ است اگر شما شدید به آن برخورید بیشتر می برد . مرحوم طالقانی متوجه بود که با استبداد نباید با خشونت مواجه شد .

Essentially, Taleghani, like other theorists in the theory of tyranny in the Muslim World, believed that the nature of tyranny must be presented. Whom, the tyrant, does not matter; the most critical question is the nature of tyranny. … The best way to counter the tyrant is peaceful resistance because tyranny is like a razor. It will cut you more profound if you hit or approach the razor with so much force. Taleghani was aware that tyranny must not be confronted with violence.

Rouhani's first presidential term is a tree whose fruit is JCPOA ready for being harvested and brought onto people's tables; i.e., now it is the time to implement JCPOA and have a flourished economy. Nevertheless, rivals' accusations and sabotages are like a flood threatening the tree to be eradicated.

(34)

ما به عنوان کسانی که در مقابل وعده های اغواگرانه برخی از افراد در ایام انتخابات و در مقابل سیل تهمت

ها و تخریب های آن ایام ، تمام قد از شما دفاع کردیم ، معتقدیم که دولت دوازدهم دولتی است که می تواند

میوه برجام را بچیند و از این میوه به سفره های همه مردم سهم دهد.

As those who defended you from tempting empty promises of other candidates during electoral competitions and from the flood of accusations in those days, we believe that the twelfth government is a government that can pick up the fruits of JCPOA and gives people's share.

Another element in political discourse is natural disasters such as floods, tornadoes, whirlpools, earthquakes, and vast and high tides. In Iranian political discourse, the refugees have been portrayed as a 'flood' but not necessarily a negative phenomenon. For instance, Syrian refugees are like a flood that has awakened the Western Block and the United States and made them realize the consequences of terrorism in Syria. The negative meaning of flood scenario is when the target domain is enemy, negative Western propaganda against Iran, unemployed young people, and attachment to the enemy. Other than unemployed young people, the rest target domains have large dams called 'people' or 'nation' on their way, so they will never reach their goal of destroying the Revolution. The Revolution tree has also been resisting and surviving from so many storms of various problems since it was a sapling until now that it is a giant and mighty tree (Exc. 35).

Those attached to the enemy are not part of the dam (just like other target domains); they have their houses built on the ravine. The foundation of their house is on the wind—like

the evil tree. For Imam Khomeini, they are asleep, and they dream of the US, and may God wake them up; if not, the nation's 'slap' and 'outcry' will waken them up(Exc. 36). It conjures up the metaphorical description of negligence as sleep in a Hadith[115] attributed to Imam Ali and the Prophet Muhammad. According to this Hadith, people are sleep, and they wake up when they die. People are neglected in this world, recognizing the truth of life and existence in the afterlife. Based on this Hadith, those attached to the enemy are sleep and ignorant of the essence of the enemy, and they will wake up when the flood of enemy or nation's slap wakes them up because God has not awakened them. However, the point is that, in this case, it is too late, and they are dead. In this excerpt, a pun is hidden in the Persian version: *sili* (slap) and *seil* (flood). The notion of waking up asleep is a ubiquitous metaphor discussed in the HUMAN domain.

(35)

یاد و خاطره همه شهدای انقلاب اسلامی به ویژه هدای دفاع مقدس را گرامی داشته و اعلام می داریم که خود را مدیون رشادت های آنان دانسته که با بذل جان خود نهال جمهوری اسلامی ایران را تبدیل به درخت تنومندی نموده اند که هرچه زمان می گذرد اقتدار و تاثیرگذاری آن در صحنه های بین المللی افزایش یافته و در مقابل طوفان های سیاسی ، امنیتی ، نظامی و اقتصادی بین المللی و منطقه ای محکم و استوار ایستادگی می نماید .

We commemorate all martyrs of the Islamic Revolution, especially those of Holy Defense, and we announce that we owe [everything] to their gallantry. They dedicated their lives generously to the sapling of the Islamic Republic of Iran to make it a huge tree. Moreover, over time, the authority and influence of this tree have been increasing

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[115] The parable of Prophet Muhammad's life and traditions as a source of Islamic legislations.

at international levels. Furthermore, it is resisting tenaciously in front of political, security, military, and economic tornados at international and regional levels.

(36)

در پایان باید به برخی از دلبستگان به دشمن و کسانی که خانه در مسیر سیل ساخته و بنیاد آرزوهای خویش بر باد قرار داده اند و امید به آمریکا و قدرت های پوشالین دنیایی بسته اند ، این جمله امام راحل (ره) را یادآور شویم که «آنها که خواب آمریکا را می بینند خدا بیدارشان کند» (صحیفه نور ، ج 19 ، ص 127) که در غیر این صورت با نهیب و سیلی ملت بیدار خواهند شد.

Finally, we should recall a quote from Imam Khomeini directed at individuals attached to the enemy who have built their homes on the ravine and whose dreams are based on the wind. They have pinned their hopes on the US and mundane phony powers. Imam Khomeini says, "God may awake those who dream about America" (Sahifeh-ye Noor, Vol. 19, p. 127); otherwise, they will wake up by the outcry and slap of the nation.

Rouhani gave a speech after he won the presidential election for the second term in which he portrayed the situation by pointing to so many elements. He enumerated all Iranian ethnic groups and portrayed them as stars. He calls himself 'servant'. People shined in the darkness caused by the hurricane of accusations against Rouhani. They welcomed the government by creating sparkling tides. Furthermore, of course, the Supreme Leader is the one who guided the high tides of people's electoral excitement towards the beach of peace and tranquillity.

(37)

سلام و درودم بر من بر بر مقام معظم رهبری که حکیمانه و مشفقانه امواج پر تلاطم انتخابات آنچنان به ساحل آرامش هدایت کردند که شور انتخاباتی به سمت استقبال ملت هدایت شد.

I salute the Supreme Leader who has guided the high tides of election toward the beach of peacefulness compassionately and wisely, and electoral excitement was guided toward the people's acclamation.

The seditions and conspiracies are like tides surrounding the Revolution ship, and the ever successful Iranians will pass the ship through these tides in the shadow of the Supreme Leader's guidelines. Just Tasnim has paid attention to 'tide' and 'high and huge tides'. Sanctions and plots or conspiracies against Iran are negative high tides.

(38)

ملت بزرگ و امتحان پس داده و غیورمان در سایه هدایتها و منویات رهبر حکیم و فرزانه اش ، به سان همیشه با ایستادگی و مقاومت و بصیرت و ایمان راسخ ـ به فضل اله ـ این بار هم کشتی انقلاب را با اقتدار و عزت مثال زدنی از امواج فتنه ها و توطیه ها عبور خواهد داد و مصونیت و ثبات و جاودانگی خواهد بخشید.

Our excellent, tested, and zealous nation will pass the ship of Revolution with exemplary authority and glory through the tides of seditions and conspiracies in the shadow of sage and wise Supreme Leader's guidelines and intentions with ever-existing resistance, faith, and insight. [And hence,] they will grant immunity, stability, and eternity [to this ship].

The portrait of the sea will remain incomplete without describing the beach and some of its features. Overall, the beach depicts positive concepts because it is where people have arrived after whirlpools, typhoons, and other disasters in the middle of the sea; in other words, now it is time to rest on the beach. It is also a specific source domain which Quran has also utilized to describe believers as people on a ship in the middle of sea tornado of hardship; when they survive and reach the beach of peace and survival, they forget about God they cried for during the tornado and get disgraceful again[116]. This last part also is indirectly suggested in political metaphors. The public political discourse indicates that Iranians are already at the beach of peace and security, and if people complain, it is out of disgracefulness. So, the authorities continually remind the nation what tornados they have left behind, and now they are at the safe beach, and they should be thankful. That is why they insist that other countries are still in the middle of sea fighting with tornados of so many difficulties. For that reason, the nation should be grateful for enjoying the beach of security or the Paradise of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The helmsman of Iran's ship in wartime was Hashemi as the president. The most common target domain, in this case, is the Supreme Leader and Imam Khomeini; i.e., they are the helmsmen of Iran ship.

This metaphorical pattern connects with other scenarios such as religion and education. The metaphor originates from Noah's Ark and a hadith from Prophet Muhammad, in which *Ahl al-Bayt* (Prophet Muhammad's family) is described as the Ark of Salvation. If people want to survive, they should get on the Ark[117]. Just like the source domain of 'mirage' distinguishes a believer from an unbeliever. In an excerpt (Exc. 39), the Supreme Leader is

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[116] Quran 17: 67 cf. Recite Quran - Al-Isra' [17:67]
[117] Hadith al-Safina - WikiShia

described as the Ark of salvation, as if he is a family member of Prophet Muhammad. The following excerpt compares the journey from the tornado of seditions to the shore of survival to passing or failing an exam. So other than the pattern related to the NATURE scenario, elements of EDUCATION, HUMAN BEING, and VEHICLE scenario have been utilized. First of all, it says 'in Revolution's life as if the Revolution is a person who ages. In Conservative discourse, 2009 post-election unrests are called 'sedition', while in Reformist or Moderate discourse, there is no special term for it, and they usually do not talk about it. So, 'sedition 2009' is a tornado made by the enemies to drown Iran's ship. It was like an exam for even those straight-A students of Revolutionary School. This time, even the Revolutionists failed, and they were abdicated. The ship of Revolution is on the right way, and it is the only way to win and survive.

(39)

هنر رهبری الهی انقلاب اسلامی در این است که همچون سفینه نجات کشور و ملتی را از دل تمامی تهدیدات به ساحل امنیت و آرامش سوق دهند این همان شرح صدری است که خداوند متعال در اختیار کسانی که می خواهد آنها را هدایت کند قرار می دهد .

> The heavenly Leader of the Islamic Revolution's genius rests in the fact that, like the Ark of Salvation, he pushes the country and the nation through all perils to the beach of security and tranquillity. It is 'the expansion of chest'[118] that God grants to those He wants them to be guided.

(40)

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[118] This refers to a Quran verse where tells the story of the Prophet Moses when he wanted to go to Pharaoh, and he asked for courage and helped from God: متن قرآن, سوره 20: طه, آیه 25 - آیه 34 (parsquran.com)

متاسفانه در فتنه 88 کسانی را در مقابل نظام و انقلاب دیدیم که سوابق درخشانی از زندانی شدن در دوران رژیم پهلوی تا حضور در جبهه های جنگ را در کارنامه داشتند و این فتنه هم که نفوذی ها عامل رقم خوردن آن بودند با درایت و زعامت رهبر معظم انقلاب به ساحل نجات رسید . او با بیان اینکه بسیاری از افراد بزرگ انقلاب اکنون مردود شده اند...

Unfortunately, individuals confronting the Revolution and the political system in 2009 had a remarkable history of captivity during the Pahlavi administration and fighting in the Iran-Iraq war on their report card. Moreover, the Supreme Leader's wisdom and superiority brought this sedition, orchestrated by undercovers, to the shores of salvation. He stated that many of the Revolution's outstanding figures had been flunked [rejected or fired]...

Before illustrating this excerpt, an account of Thomas Schelling's 'game theory' and 'boat-rocking strategy' is essential. According to this strategy, people are in a still and floating boat. Then someone in the boat wants the boat to change the location and go to another place. He will not be able to do this by himself; he will need the others' help. So he starts to rock the boat and warns the rest of the passengers that if they do not start paddling, he will keep rocking the boat until everyone drowns. The feature of this strategy is that the starter has taken the risk, and the rest of them will paddle to take the boat to where he wants.

Based on Thomas Schelling's strategy of rocking the boat, the Conservative opponent of JCPOA and any further negotiations with the United States describes negotiations as boat and states that Trump wants to change the boat. This time Trump wants the boat of Iran's missile program, and that is why he has started to rock the JCPOA boat. So for this Conservative, Trump wants to change the boat, not just changing the direction or place of the boat as in theory mentioned above. For him, Trump wants to take the boat to another place so

that Israel and Saudi Arabia can get on this boat too. Another element is the beach, and he rebukes some Iranian politicians who think if Hillary Clinton was elected and she was in this boat, the story would be different: 'They thought the boat would have been on the coast of JCPOA and everyone would have been sunbathing on the deck'.

He describes more details of the sea in which this boat is located. Trump's demands are described as a sea that has no beach; i.e., his claims are endless, and the boat will never be able to anchor on the coast. He warns Iranian politicians who have a sidelong glance at the paddle and deep down want to negotiate with the United States; this is a complicated game, and it has just started. If Trump recognizes their sidelong glance at the paddles, he will be motivated more to keep rocking the boat; so, Iran will lose the game.

(41)

ترامپ با سخنرانی جمعه هفته گذشته خود تکان دادن قایق برجام را آغاز کرد . هدف او تنها تغییر مکان قایق نیست . ترامپ می خواهد با اضافه کردن موضوعات غیرهسته ای (موشکی و منطقه ای) اساسا قایق را عوض کند . با تغییر در مفاد زمانی ، آن را از محل فعلی به جای دیگری ببرد و بالاخره سرنشینان جدیدی اولین و تنها استقبال کنندگان از استراتژی ترامپ یعنی رژیم صهیونیستی و عربستان سعودی - را هم سوار قایق کند . ...اولین نکته ای که در این موضوع باید مد نظر داشت آن است که برخی سعی دارند تکان های قایق برجام را به شخصیت فردی و تنفرانگیز ترامپ نسبت دهند و اینگونه وانمود کنند که اگر به جای ترامپ ، فرد دیگری مثلا هیلاری کلینتون - امروز سوار این قایق بود اوضاع فرق می کرد و الان همه لبخند به لب ، در کنار ساحل دستاوردهای برجام لنگر انداخته و بر عرشه آن مشغول لذت بردن از آفتابی تابان بودیم! اما واقعیت آن است که چنین تکان هایی مدت ها پیش از حضور جنجالی ترامپ نیز پیش بینی می شد و مسیله ای اتفاقی و ناشی از بدشانسی قایق نیست.

Trump has started to rock the boat with his speech on Friday last week. His aim is not just to change the location of the boat. Trump essentially wants to change the boat by adding non-nuclear topics (missile and regional topics). He wants to take the boat from its current location to another by changing temporal provisions. Finally, he

wants to board the boat with new passengers: Saudi Arabia and Israel, the first and the only ones who welcomed Trump's strategy. The first point to be considered regarding this issue is that some [Iranian politicians] try to attribute the rocking movements of the JCPOA boat to the individual and disgusting personality of Trump. So, they pretend that if there were someone else such as Hillary Clinton onboard instead of Trump, everything would have been different. We would have anchored off the coast of JCPOA with smiles on our cheeks, and everyone would be enjoying the glorious sun on the deck. Nevertheless, the truth is that such rocking movements have been anticipated long before Trump's boisterous presence. Moreover, this is not either an accident or the misfortune of the boat.

(42)

مدت هاست که عده ای در داخل ... مشغول کوک کردن این ساز هستند که ترامپ دیوانه است و باید از او بترسید و حرفی نزنید و کاری نکنید که قایق را غرق می کند و حتی از این فراتر رفته و ... می گویند بهتر است تا قایق غرق نشده پارو بزنیم و برویم آنجایی که ترامپ می گوید ! ... این عده یا نمی دانند یا خود را به ندانستن زده اند که دریای مطالبات آمریکا از ایران ساحل ندارد و تا ناکجا باید پارو زد . ... آنهایی که می هراسند و زیر چشمی به پارو نگاه می کنند ، باید بدانند که فقط انگیزه تکان دادن و احتمال غرق قایق را بیشتر می کنند . بازی پیچیده است و این تازه آغاز آن است.

It has been quite a long time that some people [politicians] inside the country insist that Trump is crazy and we should be afraid of him, and we should not speak or act in a way that he drowns the boat. They go one step further and say that we should paddle to the place that Trump wants before the boat is drowned. These people, whether do not know or pretend not to know that the sea of America's demands has no beach, and we will have to paddle to nowhere. Those who are scared and give a sidelong glance at the paddle should know that they increase the motivation of rocking and hence, the probability of drowning the boat. It is a complicated game, and it has just started.

The nation is also described as 'ocean', and authorities are just droplets of this ocean (as a positive interpretation). Some authorities or people following enemy's seditions are like (contaminating) droplets in this ocean which will be purified, or they cannot contaminate the whole ocean. This ocean was moved once by Imam Khomeini and led to the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty. There is an embedded metaphor of the religion source domain inside the source domain of the ocean. The ocean of people is considered equivalent to the Red Sea, which was moved and opened up for Moses and Israelites to cross it but got closed, and the Egyptians drowned in it. This story is mentioned in various chapters of the Quran, such as Ash-Shu'ara. Based on this parable, the Conservative author warns the enemies that even if they can penetrate Iran, an ocean of people will fall on them and sink them.

(43)

قدرت نرم اسلام و انقلاب ، طاغوت را در اشکال گوناگون آن در عصر ما هدف قرار داده است . عمر فرعونیان و قارون های منطقه ... به سر آمده است . آنها به زودی در انقلاب موسایی ملتها و در امواج خروشان اقیانوس پر تلاطم انسانی انقلاب اسلامی ، غرق و نابود خواهند شد .

Islam's soft power and the Revolution have targeted various forms of contemporary Taghuts[119]. It is the end of life of regional Pharaohs and Garons. They will drown and destroy before long in nations' Moses-like Revolution and tumultuous tides of the human ocean of Islamic Revolution.

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[119] An Islamic term that roughly means 'tyrant': Taghut - Wikipedia

The sun in Iran's sky is the Islamic Revolution in 1979. This sun will never set. It is the sun because it shines or should shine to everyone regardless of religious differences and political affiliation. Not just the Revolution, but the authorities have also been described as the sun. There is a rainbow in Iran's sky, maybe after the heavy rain of problems and enemies. There are also stars in Iran's star-studded sky, and their primary function is to illuminate the path of Revolution towards its goals. People's presence by the ballot boxes, Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, Iranian scientists such as Mirzakhani, martyrs such as Hojaji, and Islamic clerics (*ulema*) are described as stars. Since the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist governs the land of Iran, the sky above it is also the sky of Guardianship. Those wishful Iranians waiting for the United States to come and solve Iran's economic recession are described as people entertaining themselves by watching the US virtual dreamy sky. It is based on the motto of the American Dream (cf. war domain, section 9.1.9.1).

The main correlation of this domain is with VEHICLE domain on account of stars; that is to say, stars illuminate the path towards the main goals such as Sidrat al-Muntaha and Imam Zaman's government. Why night? The role of and emphasis on the star is highlighted way more than the sun. It may be because there is just one sun and so many stars in nature that function as the source domain of this scenario. It may imply that Iran's sky is still luminous even in the dark moments of the night, which can be any problems or obstacles. It must be added that, just like a shadow, the night is not necessarily evil. In Quran 6:96, it is

mentioned that night is created for 'rest and tranquillity'[120]. So, no adverse inferences are related to the night sky; since it is starry.

The other closely correlated with this domain is ARTS. The Moderate Conservative describes people's presence by the ballot boxes as a sparkling star that will shine forever in Iran's sky. The enemy, as a screenwriter, tried his best to avoid people voting in the general election by writing every scenario for Iranians. However, the nation was brilliant and did not perform according to their scenario.

(44)

ملتی که از امام خود الهام می گیرد و راه را از طریق نگاه به آن ستاره درخشان جستجو می کند از آن ستاره پرنور ولایت مسیر را می یابد هرگز شکست نمی خورد.

The nation inspired by his Imam [leader] and looks for the path by that bright star and finds the path by that bright star of Guardianship will never be defeated.

(45)

حضور گسترده ، پرشور ، آگاهانه و قابل انتظار مردم کشورمان ... همچون ستاره ای درخشان در آسمان ایران خواهد درخشید . به رغم تمامی سناریو ها ، برنامه ها و اقداماتی ... ملت آگاه و تیزبین ایران ، موافقت قطعی و غیرقابل خدشه خود را با تداوم دولت یازدهم در قالب دولت دوازدهم اعلام کردند .

The massive, passionate, conscious, and expectable presence of the nation … will definitely shine like a bright star in Iran's sky. Despite all scenarios, plans, and actions … aware and acute Iranian people announced their definite and flawless agreement on the eleventh government's continual form in the twelfth government.

(46)

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[120] Al-An'am-96, Surah The Cattles Verse-96 - The Noble Qur'an (Compare all Quran Translations in English) (noblequran.org)

اکنون در راستای اهداف و سیاستهای تبیین شده توسط معمار انقلاب اسلامی که از ستارگان آسمان شهادت نورانی شده است به نحوی که مقام معظم رهبری با همت و اراده والا فرمودند : با وجود این ستارگان (شهدا) راه را گم نمی کنیم و باید از پیچ و خم در مسیر انقلاب عبور نماییم

Now, in line with aims and policies determined by the architect of Islamic Revolution, which has become luminous by stars of the sky of martyrdom and as the Supreme Leader said with great endeavor and willpower: with the help of these stars (martyrs), we do not get lost in this path, and we should pass the winding path of the Revolution.

Another intriguing nature-based element of his scenario is 'island'. The negative aspect of this source domain is describing each political party as a separate island that must avoid discord, and they should unite like different rooms of the same house, which should come together under the same ceiling (section 9.1.1.1). However, typically, the positive connotation of the island has been emphasized more. For instance, Iran is an island of security with no crises. Actually, in this sense, it reminds us of isolationism policies. The last excerpt explains that not only is Iran a safe and secure place, but also it brings safety and security to other regional countries. So, once again, like the element of Paradise, Iran is the best place, and it is safe. While the rest of the world is dealing with many problems, it is not safe.

(47)

ایران اسلامی جزیره ثبات و امنیت در متلاطم منطقه خاورمیانه است و این امر مرهون اقتدار و صلابت نیروهای مسلح کشورمان است .

Islamic Iran is a stable and secure island in the turbulent region of the Middle East, and this is because of the authority of our country's military forces.

The mountain's peak is the equivalent of Sidrat al-Muntaha; i.e., the highest point the Revolution wants to achieve. So the route to the ultimate goal of the Islamic Revolution goes through skies, seas, lands, and mountains. Each path has its barriers and issues. In the case of the mountain, defiles are sanctions, problems, and accusations. Just as martyrs were the tree's fruits (on top of the tree), they have conquered the mountain's peak. Iran has already conquered so many peaks, which is why the arrogance power is against it. For instance, the missile program is one of the peaks that Iran has already conquered. However, it is still on its way to the peak of perfection and delivering the Revolution to its principal owner (Imam Zaman). This perfection is in line with Sufism teachings of the perfect man explained in section 9.1.1.1.

(48)

شهدای انقلاب اسلامی اسوه های تابناکی هستند که می توان از آنها الگو گرفت ... آنها رفتند و به قله افتخار رسیدند و ما امروز میراث بزرگ آنان را پاس می داریم .

Martyrs of the Islamic Revolution are brilliant role models that can be followed … They went and conquered the peak of honor, and today, we honor their incredible legacy.

(49)

به زودی ملت 40 سال عقب نشینی آمریکا در ایران و منطقه را جشن می گیرد ، چرا که از گردنه های صعب العبوری به سلامت عبور کرده و گردنه های دیگر را تا رسیدن به قله ، یکی پس از دیگری طی خواهد کرد . آمریکایی ها از تحریم ها نتیجه نمی گیرند.

The nation will soon celebrate the 40th anniversary of America's retreat from Iran and the region; because they have already passed [many] defiles, and they pass them one by one until they reach the peak. The Americans will not succeed by sanctions.

Rouhani has also used the dichotomy of 'peak' and 'valley' to describe people's choice between him and Raisi (his rival in the presidential election), like in the case of shadow: shadow of war or peace. Choosing Rouhani is described as choosing the path towards the peak.

(50)

<div dir="rtl">
در روز جمعه باید میان دو راه ، یکی را انتخاب کنیم . یا به سمت قله برویم و پرچم ایران را به اهتزار درآوریم یا خدای ناکرده به سمت دره برویم و عزت خود را از دست بدهیم.
</div>

On Friday, we should choose one of the two paths. Whether we move towards the peak and wave the flag of Iran or, may God forbid it, we go down to the valley and lose our glory.

9.1.2.2. Scenarios for NATURE AND NATURAL DISASTERS Metaphors.

To conclude the above-mentioned elaborate discussion, the following scenarios related to NATURE AND NATURAL DISASTERS have been extracted.

a) AT FIRST, THE BLESSED TREE OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION WAS A SAPLING. IT HAS BEEN WATERED BY THE BLOOD OF MARTYRS WHO SACRIFIECED THEIR LIVES FOR ITS TRIUMPH. NOW, IT IS A HUGE TREE.

b) THE AUTHORITIES ARE PART OF THE TRUNK. DIFFERENT PARTIES ARE THE BRANCHES OF THE SAME TREE. THE DISCORD IS AT THE LEVEL OF BRANCH AND THEY ALL HAVE A SHARED TREE AND ROOT.

c) THE ROOTS OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION ARE IN THE SOIL OF *MUHARRAM* AND *ASHURA*. THE SECRET OF THE STRENGTH OF THIS TREE IS ITS MARTYRS. IT IS NOURISHED BY MARTYRS' BLOOD.

d)   THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF IRAN ARE FRUITS OF THAT BLESSED TREE WHICH ARE HEAVENLY PRODUCTS. THE ENEMY WANTS TO ROOT IT OUT.

e)   *BASIJ* IS A BLESSED TREE AND ITS MEMBERS ARE LIKE GILDED LEAVES HANGING ON LUMINOUS BRANCHES.

f)   HOPE IS DESCRIBED AS SEED WHICH ROUHANI HAS PLANTED IN HIS FIRST PRESIDENTIAL TERM AND NOW THAT IT IS A FERTILE TREE, SOME OF HIS RIVAL CANDIDATES WANT TO DESTROY IT

g)   THE SHADOW OF BLESSED TREE MUST BE FOLLOWED AND THE SHADOW OF EVIL TREE MUST BE AVOIDED.

h)   TERRORISM, SANCTIONS, WAR, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND WESTERN NEGATIVE PROPAGANDA AGAINST IRAN ARE AMONG NATURAL DISASTERS (FLOOD, STORM, ETC.).

9.1.3.   Source Domain of *FAMILY AND RELATIONS*

The main feature of the elements of this domain is that they are self-explanatory and symbolic concepts are rare. The only element needing to be elaborated more is 'brother', which has specific status in Islam. All in all, the factor of political affiliation is not significant in this domain. They all recognize the Supreme Leader as the father, and the love or bond of children with the father is a divine one, and it is based on their love towards Islam and Islamic concepts. None of them describe the father's love towards his children other than occasionally mentioning his 'fatherly sympathetic advice'. The only difference political affiliation makes is urging conversation and reconciliation among brothers. This section is arranged in this way: First of all, the family per se will be expounded, and then the family members will be elaborated in descending hierarchy from father to child and even the next generation of this family. Some lesser frequent concepts and metaphors related to this domain will be discussed at the end of this section.

Table 9.4

Conceptual Elements, Primary Signals and Relevant Statistics of FAMILY & RELATIONS

Domain in each Corpus

FAMILY & RELATIONS										
Conceptual Elements	**Primary Signals**	**Parliamentary Debates**			**ILNA**			**Tasnim**		
		Fr.	**TS**	**LD**	**Fr.**	**TS**	**LD**	**Fr.**	**TS**	**LD**
Brother	Brother	1,037			338			294		
	Brother & sister	17	4.12	9.03	7	2.65	9.26	3	1.73	8.24
	Big/old(er) brother	6	2.30	6.10	7	2.64	9.13	3	1.73	8.14
	Little/ younger brother	14	3.70	8.03	-[121]	-	-	3	1.73	8.27
	Friend and brother	9	2.98	7.87	43	6.55	10.55	19	4.35	9.56
	Religious brother	-	-	-	4	1.69	6.59	-	-	-
	Revolutionary brother	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	2.16	5.83
Love	Love	327			207			187		
	To love/adore	-	-	-	14	3.74	10.89	13	3.70	11.03
	Love & passion/ devotion	3	1.73	8.21	3	1.73	8.84	-	-	-
	Love of Imams	3	-	6.47	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Love of *Ahl al-Bayt*[122]	-	-	-	5	2.23	8.27	5	2.23	8.32
	Divine love	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.97	6.57
	Love of leadership	-	-	-	5	2.16	4.95	10	3.10	6.18
	Love of *Jihad*	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.72	6.94
Child	Child	248			331			277		
	Little child	6	2.63	8.22	4	1.99	7.28	4	1.99	7.73
	Nation's child	-	-	-	11	3.21	5.70	10	2.30	5.7
	Imam's child	-	-	-	23	3.51	7.09	24	4.47	6.83
	Zealous child	-	-	-	11	3.31	9.30	4	2.00	7.97
	Vigorous child	-	-	-	11	2.65	9.36	6	2.45	8.7
	Cavalier child	-	-	-	3	1.73	7.56	4	2.23	8.11
	Child of Islam	-	-	-	4	1.61	5.02	-	-	-
	Child of Revolution	4	1.94	5.66	19	2.24	6.06	20	1.83	5.64
	Valiant child	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2.00	8.16
Mother	Mother	186			224			199		
	The ~ of all sanctions	-	-	-	7	2.63	7.28	7	2.63	7.83
	The ~ of all negotiations	-	-	-	3	1.70	6.08	-	-	-
	The ~ of all bombs	-	-	-	7	2.65	9.90	3	1.73	8.98
	The ~ of terrorism	-	-	-	3	1.68	5.03	-	-	-

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[121] There were two cases of this concordance in ILNA; but, since the frequency is lower than 3, the scores could not be calculated in Sketch Engine. So, this does not mean that this pattern was not found in this corpus.

[122] Prophet Muhammad's family.

Father	Father	127			328			355	
	Spiritual father	-	-	-	7	2.64	8.25	8	2.64	8.95
	The father of (Iran's) **missile** (program)	-	-	-	6	2.43	7.17	6	2.42	7.48
Friend	Friend	223			599			529	
	Friend & brother	9	2.98	7.87	43	6.55	10.55	19	4.35	9.56
	Friend & enemy	3	1.72	7.48	36	5.97	8.72	55	7.37	9.08
Family	Family	764			1,346			806	
	Large family	8	2.91	7.15	21	4.43	7.20	13	3.46	6.91
	The Revolution family	5	2.08	5.72	20	4.01	5.88	3	1.17	3.96
	Family of Reformists	-	-	-	6	2.27	5.87	-	-	-

9.1.3.1. Conceptual Elements in Context. The Revolution family is the central family in this source domain which is described as a large one. Politicians, authorities, and political parties are members of this family. The father of this family is the Supreme Leader who has some rights that his children should practice, who are ordinary people and other authorities. He is the Revolution family's father and the father of the world's monotheists. It is a divine role with which he has been endowed. The Prophets and Imams are assumed to be the spiritual fathers of all authorities, including the Supreme Leader, and they, as their spiritual children, are supposed to act on necessities of this given status. The corollary contraposition of Paradise and Hell is present in this domain, too: The Revolution family is paradisiacal, and if people immigrate to other countries, they will become a member of a hellish family.

When it comes to the Revolution family members, ordinary people are excluded in all three corpora, regardless of political affiliation or context. However, when speaking of children's duties and fathers' rights, ordinary people and the authorities are alike and should obey any Supreme Leader's commands. Children's emotional bond with their father is a divine love: love of Guardianship and Imam Mahdi's successor. Another intriguing drift is

that (pseudo-Islamic[123]) the father's rights are mentioned in various parts, but those of children which parents should observe are not mentioned at all. For instance, according to a Quranic parable[124], parents should consult with their children on important issues, one of the children's rights. Although, according to the account as mentioned earlier in chapter 2, people are indirectly consulted on important occasions.

(1)

... این به این معنا نیست که حسن روحانی بخواهد در یک جناح خلاصه شود ، چرا که او رییس جمهور است و بعد از مقام معظم رهبری که پدر امت و شخص اول مملکت است ، وی رییس ملت محسوب می شود و نباید نگاه جناحی داشته باشد.

> ... This does not mean that Hassan Rouhani is restricted to a particular party; because he is the president and after the Supreme Leader who is the father and the first person of the country, he [the president] is the president of the nation, and he should not have a factional view.

(2)

ملت ایران ملتی آزاده است که در طول تاریخ هیچ گاه به استیلای جباران و سفاکان تن نداده است . امروز نیز با رهبری پدر معنوی موحدان عالم ، مقام معظم رهبری پرچم مبارزه با ظلم و ستم را در سرتاسر جهان در دست گرفته است .

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[123] It is mentioned 'pseudo-' intentionally because, in the Quran, the obeyance of parents is conditional. Children should obey their parents unless they ask them to do something against God's laws. Unconditional obedience of the father has been implied in all corpora since the Supreme Leader has been recognized as a perfect Islamic figure who will never order something against God's laws.

[124] حقوق فرزندان بر والدین در قرآن (tebyan.net)

The Iranian nation is a free nation that has never acceded to the domination of the despots and bloodthirsty countries throughout history. Today the Supreme Leader also holds the flag of countering tyranny as the spiritual father of world monotheists.

(3)

جریانات سیاسی رسمی کشور از اصلاح طلب تا اعتدال گرا و اصولگرا علاقه مند به ولایت فقیه و فرزندان این نظام هستند .

Official political movements of the country, from Reformist to Conservative and Moderate, are interested in the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, and they are children of this political system.

(4)

آیت الله هاشم هاشم زاده هریسی ... با اشاره به رویش های فراوانی که هرساله در خانواده انقلاب اتفاق می افتد ، گفت : هر روزه و هرساله جوانان انقلابی قدم به این جامعه انقلابی می گذارند و چنین رویش هایی کاملا طبیعی است اما چرا باید شاهد ریزش ها باشیم ؛ ریزش باید به حداقل برسد . ... نباید با یک عده قهر کنیم ... و یا حتی به گونه ای رفتار شود که عده ای از کشور فرار کنند و به دامن بلاد کفر پناه ببرند . ممانعت از خروج مومنان از انقلاب وظیفه شرعی ماست ... به بیان دیگر ممانعت از جهنمی شدن حتی یک فرد مومن ، وظیفه شرعی همه ماست و اگر کوتاهی کنیم ، مرتکب گناه شده ایم .

Ayatollah Hashem Hashemzadeh Herisi … pointing to abundant germinations that happen annually in the family of Revolution, said that every day and every year revolutionist young people enter into this Revolutionary society and such germinations are usual. However, why we should witness abscissions; we should minimize abscissions. We should not sulk … or behave in a way that some run away from the country and shelter themselves in blasphemous countries. Preventing the exit of believers [from the country] is our canonical responsibility … In other words,

preventing a believer from going to Hell is the canonical responsibility of all of us. Furthermore, if we duck, we have sinned.

(5)

روایات اسلامی بر این نکته تاکید دارند ، که فرزند باید نیاز پدر را قبل از خواست و اذعان به نیاز از سوی او ، برطرف نماید ؛ این مهم همان ملاک ولایت پدر بر فرزند بوده ،.... بحث ولایت فقیه به عنوان بحثی صرفا تیوری نبوده و بحثی اجرایی و عملی است که باید در منظر و مرآی حاکمیت به طور کامل احساس و دیده شود. وی تاکید کرد : ولی امر به عنوان نایب امام زمان (عج) ، آن قدر در میان امت مقبولیت ، محبوبیت و نفوذ دارد که هیچ گاه نمی گذارند چیزی از خواسته های ایشان بر زمین بماند ....

Islamic narratives highlight the point that the child should fulfill his father's need before the father acknowledges the need. It is the criterion for a father's guardianship over his child. The argument of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist is not just a theoretical issue; it is a practical and operational argument that must be seen and felt in governmental aspects. He affirmed that the guardian [of all Muslims] as Imam Mahdi's successor has so much influence, acceptability, and popularity among the nation that no one will let his needs remain unfulfilled…

Besides (spiritual) father, other phenomena or people are taking the hypothetical role of father. For instance, Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam was called the father of Iran's missile program. Alternatively, one of the commanders of IRGC states that if the United States has the mother of all bombs, we have the father of all bombs. This comparison may be based on the assumed superiority of men over women. Alternatively, it may refer to the fact that men usually weigh more than women since he immediately mentions the weight of the Iranian

bomb[125]. The United States has also been called the father of all supporting anti-Revolution movements.

(6)

حسن طهرانی مقدم پدر موشکی ایران بوده و بسیاری از دستاوردهای موشکی حال حاضر کشور ، مرهون تلاش ها و مجاهدت های او و تیم همکارش می باشد .

Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam was the father of Iran's missile program. Many of his achievements in missile programs are beholden to his and his team's endeavors.

(7)

... اگر آمریکایی ها مادر بمب ها را دارند ما پدر بمب ها را داریم ... صنایع دفاع به سفارش نیروی هوافضا بمب هایی تولید کرده که وزن آنها 10 تن است و از هواپیماهای ایلوشین رها می شود .

If the US has the mother of all bombs, we have the father of all bombs …; on the aerospace force's order, the defensive industry has made bombs that weigh 10 tons and are dropped from Ilyushin aircraft.

(8)

... امروز عربستان ، امارات و پدر همه آنها آمریکا از گروه های ضد انقلاب برای ایجاد ناامنی علیه ما پشتیبانی می کنند .

…Today, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the US as the father of all, support anti-Revolution groups to cause insecurity.

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[125] The US bomb weighs 8,500 kg, the Iranian one weighs 10,000 kg.

Contrary to father, 'legal guardian' or 'custodian' has a negative metaphorical meaning. It implies that they do not need a guardian when someone has a vigorous father. For instance, a far-right Conservative rebuking JCPOA mentions the United States as one of the world guardians who has imposed JCPOA on Iran and condemns obeying what they order Iran to do. He also condemns the Moderate government for parroting what these world guardians say (Exc. 9). This excerpt also has elements of the nature domain which has already been discussed in section 9.1.2.1, and Rouhani's keyword while running his presidential campaign: 'halfway'. The latter will be discussed in section 9.1.5.1. In an excerpt (10), Rouhani, in his presidential campaign speech, indirectly complains about the interference of military forces, especially IRGC, in administrative issues of government and call them 'guardians' who should mind their own business and let the government, the father, do his job[126]. So the element of 'legal guardian' has both internal and international use, and in either case, it has a negative meaning.

(9)

ابتدا گفتند این برجام برای رفع تحریم ها بوده بعد گفتند آفتاب تابان است و آب و نان ما به آن بستگی دارد بعد گفتند سایه جنگ را از سر کشور برداشت . صنعت هسته ای را تعطیل کردند ، دانشمندان را بیکار کردند و حالا می گویند در نیمه راهیم . چه باید بکنیم ؟ هرچه این قیم های جهانی گفتند باید عمل کنیم ؟ ... در قضایای منطقه تسلیم آمریکایی ها باشیم ؟ این نیمه راه است ؟ وقتی یک عاقل متوجه شد یک مسیر اشتباه بوده باید بازنگری کند و برگردد نه اینکه اصرار کند و هرچه قیم های جهانی گفتند تکرار کند .

At first, they said the JCPOA had been for lifting the sanctions. Then, they said it was the brilliant sun, and our water and bread [economy] depend on it. Then, they said it

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[126] These remarks and other similar remarks evoked sharp criticisms on the part of IRGC and Conservatives.

had driven away from the shadow of war from the country. They have shut down the nuclear industry. They have left scientists unemployed. Furthermore, now they say we are halfway. What [else] should we do? Should we do what world custodians ask us? … Should we be surrendered to the Americans in regional issues? Is this halfway? When a wise person recognizes that the path was wrong, he should reflect and return. He should not insist and repeat what world custodians have said.

(10)

ما با همه نهادهای انقلابی دوست و برادر هستیم ولی ما قیم نمی خواهیم . ... ما می گوییم هرکس باید کار خود را انجام بدهد. ما دست نظامیان را می بوسیم ولی نظامیان باید کار نظامی خود را ادامه دهند . به کار خود بازگردید که کار خویش نیکوست.

All revolutionary organizations are our friends and brothers. Nevertheless, we do not want a custodian. We say that everyone should do his job. We kiss militants' hands, but militants should keep doing their military jobs. Go back to your [own] job that your job is good.

Mother is another family member who has been mentioned in this scenario. The presupposition of this element lies in the feminine aspect of the (traditional) mother or woman with positive semantic prosody. A mother, as a woman, tends to be kind and not aggressive, talk about problems, and give birth to her children. It is in contrast with those Western metaphorical meanings of mother, at least found in our corpora, in which the mother is an authoritative woman who, if it gives birth to anything, are bombs and sanctions. For instance, Rouhani states that the 'mother of all bombs' era has ended, and 'mother of all

negotiations' has begun. Mother of all bombs refers to "The GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast," developed by the United States[127].

Another metaphor is the 'mother of all sanctions', which is the name given by Trump to CAATSA. A law was passed to impose sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Russia. A Reformist MP reacts to this description of CAATSA by stating that 'the mother of all sanctions gave birth to mouse'. The Persian expression 'the mountain gave birth to mouse' means 'someone brags a lot about what he/she is doing, but finally, he/she achieves nothing important'. It can be more or less equivalent of 'never was a mewing cat a good mouser'. MP meant that CAATSA was not as effective as Trump was boasting. Another point regarding this US act against Iran is hidden in excerpt (12), which is the quotation of a military and political figure, Shamkhani, broadly known as a Conservative. He calls the mother of all sanctions as 'mongrel mothers'. He wants to undermine this act by implying that sanctions are based on unfounded accusations.

The only negative attribute ascribed to mother in the Persian corpora was 'mother of terrorism', used to describe Israel. The common ground for making this simile is *a mother's fertility*: Israel generates or gives birth to more terrorist groups in the region.

(11)

امروز روزگار رونمایی از مادر بمب ها نیست ... بیایید از مادر مذاکرات رونمایی کنیم ، گفت : امروز روزگار رونمایی از مادر تحریم ها نیست ، بیایید از مادر همکاری ها رونمایی کنیم ؛ مذاکره ای بزرگ بر سر جهان جدیدی که در آن کشوری مانند ایران ، برج بلند دمکراسی است ؛ برجی که دست کم 111 پله از 111 سال پیش تاکنون دارد . ایران آماده همکاری براساس احترام متقابل و منافع مشترک است.

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[127] GBU-43/B MOAB - Wikipedia

Nowadays, it is not the time to announce the mother of all bombs … Let us announce the mother of all negotiations. He said, "today, it is not the time of announcing the mother of all sanctions; let us announce the mother of all cooperations; such a great negotiation over a new world in which a country like Iran is the tall tower of democracy; the tower that has at least 111 stairs for the past 111 years[128]. Iran is ready for cooperation based on mutual respect and shared interests."

(12)

وی در خصوص تمدید قانون کاستا علیه ایران که به مادر تحریم ها معروف است ، اظهار داشت : کنگره آمریکا امروز می خواهد قانون کاتسا را تمدید کند ، زمانی آمریکا بمب مادر تولید می کرد . از زمانی که آنها بمب مادر تولید کرده اند تا الان که ایران توسعه یافته و به کشوری مقتدر تبدیل شده است . همه این موارد نشان از بی اثر بودن این مادرهای بی ریشه در اقدامات بنیادین ملت ایران که دفاع از هویت ملی و سرزمینی خودشان هستند ، است.

Regarding the renewal of CAATSA, known as the mother of all sanctions, he stated that Congress wants to renew the CAATSA today. Once upon a time, the US was making the mother of all bombs. From the time they created the mother of all bombs, Iran has matured into a powerful country. All of them indicate the flimsiness of these rootless mothers [mongrel mothers] in the nation's fundamental actions, which are defending their own territorial and national identity.

(13)

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[128] It referred to the first Persian Consitution in 1906; cf. Iran's 1906 Constitution | Foundation for Iranian Studies (fis-iran.org)

خوشبختانه مادر تحریم ها دیروز موش زایید ، دیدیم همان افرادی که قبلا هم تحریم شده بودند ، مجددا در لیست تحریمی قرار گرفتند اما نکته این است که همه ما باید بدانیم در این کشور رهبری ، مردم ، انسجام داخلی ، قدرت دفاعی و دیپلماسی با هم هستند و کسی نمی تواند بین این ها جدایی افکند .

Fortunately, the mother of all sanctions gave birth to mouse yesterday. We saw that the same people who have already been sanctioned are again on the list of sanctioned people. Nevertheless, the point is that we all should know that in this country, leadership, people, national coherence, defensive power, and diplomacy stick together, and no one can separate them.

Another Persian expression that has become a source of metaphor is 'the dry nurse kinder than the mother'. Like 'guardian', 'dry/wet nurse' has negative semantic prosody. The origin of this expression dates back to when two women, claiming to be a child's birth mother, went to Imam Ali to judge between them. Imam Ali asked them to put the child in the middle, and each of them pulled the child, and who got the child is the birth mother, and the other is the wet nurse. They did the same, but when one of the women got the child, Imam Ali gave him to the woman who did not pull so hard and did not get him. The reason was that the birth mother would prefer to lose the child than hurt him by pulling him; she would want him to be safe and healthy even if he will be in the arms of someone else.

A Reformist activist describes Trump and the United States as 'dry nurse' trying to solve the Iranians' problems while the Iranian people do not want dry nurses since they already have their mother (the Supreme Leader). Another Reformist calls a far-right Iranian expatriate 'the dry nurse kinder than the mother' because he made a video criticizing Zarif for saying Iran will not make an atomic bomb. This Iranian ex-pat claims he loves Iran and thinks he is helping Iran or is supporting Iran's Supreme Leader while he has no idea that the

Supreme Leader has issued *fatwa* announcing atomic bomb as *haram* (forbidding making atomic bomb).

(14)

کار ترامپ از سخنان تهدیدآمیز علیه ایران گذشته ، او بهانه ای برای نقض برجام ندارد و به هجو روی آورده است . برجام برجا خواهد ماند . وی ادامه داد : ترامپ آنقدر به برخی متحدان خود در خاورمیانه دل بسته که حتی خلیج همیشه فارس ایران را هم خلیج عربی نامید . مردم ایران دایه نمی خواهند.

Trump's threatening words against Iran are washed-up. He does not have an excuse for breaching the JCPOA, and he has turned to lampoon. The JCPOA will remain strong. He continued that Trump is in so much love with some of his alliances in the Middle East that he calls the Persian Gulf as Arabic Gulf. The Iranian people do not want a dry nurse.

(15)

از جمله این تحرکات این است که یکی از ایرانیان مقیم خارج از کشور که با کشورهای مختلف ارتباط دارد و گفت وگوی ویدیویی درباره برجام نیز انجام داده و حتی حملات بسیار شدیدی علیه آقای ظریف نیز داشته دایه مهربانتر از مادر شده و می گویند چرا گفتید بمب اتم نخواهیم ساخت اما متوجه نیست که این اصلا فتوای رهبری است و ایشان این موضوع را حرام اعلام کرده است .

One instance of such activities is an Iranian ex-pat with relationships with various countries. This ex-pat has been in a videoconference, and he has made harsh remarks against even Mr. Zarif. He [this Iranian ex-pat] has become a dry nurse kinder than the mother and says, why did you say we will not make an atomic bomb? He has no idea that the Supreme Leader has issued *a fatwa* announcing the atomic bomb as *haram*.

The significantly higher frequency of 'the Revolution family' in ILNA and its higher score, compared with Tasnim's, depicts how hard the (Moderate) Reformists try to stay in power and play a role in Iran's political system, emphasizing that they are also a family member. That is why they also insist on *unity* and *reconciliation*, and they even had the keyword of 'national reconciliation. They insist on brotherhood and the equality of brothers. In this sense, 'religious brother' is meant. However, some references to 'evil brother' are also spotted, referring to the enemy and its influence. Before addressing more details of this element, it must be reminded that so many political positions are unavailable for women in Iran. For instance, never will be a woman a mayor, president, and judge. They can be MP or members of city or village councils. That is why there is no conceptualization of *sister*, and the emphasis is on *brother*.

As mentioned earlier in this section, children refer mainly to political currents, electoral candidates, military forces, MPs, and political celebrities such as Hashemi. The shared characteristics of these children (who are like siblings) are that they are zealous, cavalier, vigorous, and valiant children of Islam and Revolution. For instance, the Supreme Leader says that the Reformists and the Conservatives are the same; they all are Revolution's children. Metaphorical patterns arise because, like in real-life situations, siblings might misunderstand each other or disagree on some issue; so, the hypothetical siblings of this scenario would have problems with each other. One of the reasons for this gloominess or even moroseness is electoral campaigning activities. Rouhani suggests that all candidates are like brothers, and those who have lost the election get filled with spite; this will harm the political system.

Nevertheless, the most profound dispute occurred in 2009 and post-election unrest. The Reformist considers it brothers' resentment and hopes it will soon turn into compassion

and unity; of course, it will be thanks to the Supreme Leader as the father. He provides the source domain of prayers and other religious images, discussed in section 9.1.10.1. Now, what if there is a problem? What should they do?

First, they should not publicize their discords and problems because this will make the enemy happy. They should solve their problem among themselves and in the privacy of home. Then, the Reformists have some solutions. They insist that the source of spite is not having communication and being ignorant of one another's feelings and situation. So the solution is to meet up and talk about what bothers them.

(16)

… رهبری فرمودند «برای من اصلاح طلب و اصولگرا یکی است و همه فرزندان انقلاب هستند.»

… The Supreme Leader asseverated that "for me, Reformists and Conservatives are the same and they both are children of the Revolution".

(17)

روحانی ، «مردم سالاری دینی» را از برکات جمهوری اسلامی خواند و گفت : بدون شک این دستاورد بزرگ ، مرهون راهبری امام راحل و رهبر معظم انقلاب اسلامی است که با نگاه راهبردی و مشی پدرانه و با سعه صدر ، بستر رشد فرزندان انقلاب با سلایق سیاسی مختلف را فراهم کرده اند .

Rouhani considered the 'religious democracy' as one of the blessings of the Islamic Republic and said, "there is no doubt that this outstanding achievement is beholden to the guidances of the late Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini] and the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution. He [Ayatollah Khamenei] has provided the condition for growing children of the Revolution with various political orientations by strategic viewpoint and fatherly démarche and the expansion of chest [patience].

(18)

آرزو دارم تمامی دلخوری ها و نقارها و کینه ها از تمام اعضای خانواد بزرگ انقلاب اسلامی برداشته شود و

جایش را به محبت و عشق و علاقه و برادری بسپارد و همه با هم پشت سر رهبر عزیزمان با اقتدا به شهدای

گرانقدرمان ، در مسیر حاکمیت ارزشهای دین خدا گام برداریم و کشوری نمونه و نظامی ایده آل برای بشریت

فراهم آوریم و خود این زمینه و بستر اصلی حضور آقا امام زمان (عج) را فراهم نماید.

I hope that all resentments, discords, and spites among all members of the Islamic
Revolution's big family are solved and replaced by affection, love, and brotherhood.
Moreover, we all together take steps behind our dear Leader and follow our valuable
martyrs in the path of the sovereignty of religious values. Furthermore, we make an
exemplary country and an ideal political system for humans. It, in turn, will provide
the main subgrade for the emergence of Imam Mahdi.

(19)

مسایل درون خانوادگی را نباید علنی بگوییم و نباید ببریم در شبکه های اجتماعی و آب در آسیاب دشمن

بریزیم . چرا باید اجازه دهیم که دشمن بخواهد از یکسری منافذ ورود پیدا کند و به کشور و به نظام جمهوری

اسلامی آسیب برساند ؟

We should not say out loud our intra-family issues, and we should not post them on
social media and, in this way, pour the water into the enemy's mill. Why should we
allow the enemy to penetrate through some holes and harm the country and the
political system of the Islamic Republic?

(20)

در شرایط حساس کنونی و با توجه به وضعیت ویژه ای که در منطقه حاکم است هیچ راهی جز وحدت در

داخل خانواده انقلاب نداریم ...

In the current sensitive condition and given the extraordinary situation in which the
region is, we have no option other than unity inside the family of the Revolution …

(21)

امروز گمشده ما در حوزه فرهنگ گفت وگو است . آنچه که در خانواده انقلاب و بین فرزندان امام و رهبری کم شده ، گفت وگو است . بین فرزندان انقلاب گفت وگو کم شکل می گیرد و وقتی گفت وگو کم می شود ، ناچار به حدس زدن درباره دیگران هستیم و وقتی حدس می زنیم از آنها غول هایی می سازیم که باید دن کیشوت وار به آنها حمله کنیم .

Today, our lost thing in the cultural domain is talk. What has been reduced among Imam's [Ayatollah Khomeini] children and the Supreme Leader is talk. A few talks have been made among children of the Revolution, and when there are a few talks, we inevitably have to make guesses about others. Moreover, when we guess, we make demons out of them, and then, we will have to attack them like Don Quixote.

Men and women are generally being addressed as 'brothers and sisters in the sense of religious siblings to diminish the effect of the concept of *non-Mahram*[129]. In Iranian popular culture, calling (the opposite sex) brother or sister was typical, especially for men. Men used to take their feminine neighbors as their mothers and sisters, and men would defend them if any men (usually from another neighborhood) wanted to bother them. It is related to *honor* and the importance of being *honorable* in popular culture. After Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Islamic basis of this phenomenon was highlighted even more and became popular in a political context, too[130]. Since colleagues in governmental organizations and departments have addressed each other, brother or sister, it is precisely the case in the parliament.

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[129] Non-Mahram is someone Muslims can get married to, so concealment of the body in front of them is obligatory.

[130] It is out of the scope of this study to discuss how much popular culture affected the political discourse of Iran after the Revolution.

Members of parliament begin their speech with 'brothers and sisters' instead of 'ladies and gentlemen. So this is a deep-seated element of the family scenario.

Brotherhood or religious brotherhood is overtly emphasized. It is a common concept also mentioned in the Bible and Torah, but some references to the Quran will be discussed here. Based on Islamic teachings, people get united by a brotherly bond to get in God's path. It is a divine bond, and God makes it possible even among those no one can imagine: "And He has united their (- believers') hearts in mutual affection. Had you spent all that is in the earth, you could not have united their hearts so, but Allah united their hearts in mutual affection. He is indeed All-Mighty, All-Wise"[131]. If God wills and if they hang on to God, people who are like enemies will become friends: "Hold fast to the means of access to Allah all together, and do not be disunited, and remember Allah's favors to you, when you were enemies one to another. He united your hearts in love so that by His grace you became brethren"[132]. Generally speaking, the concept of brotherhood refers to *unity*.

Another primary indicator in this pattern is 'big' vs. 'little' brother. The latter is usually used to show 'humbleness'. The same applies to 'little child'. It is significantly more frequent in the parliament than the news agencies since it publicizes their opinion. It is once used as a negative metaphor to describe one country as inferior to or dependent on another. The other element, big brother, just in the parliament, is used to show 'respect' and, at the same time, 'humbleness' to highlight another person's superiority. In this sense, it has positive semantic prosody. In Tasnim, there is only one case of the metaphorical meaning of

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[131] Amatul Rahmân Omer: Surah Al Anfal (The Spoils of War) Ayat 63, Al Anfal (The Spoils of War) 63, 8:63 (namazzamani.net)
[132] Amatul Rahmân Omer: Surah Al Imran (The Family of Imran) Ayat 103, Al Imran (The Family of Imran) 103, 3:103 (namazzamani.net)

big brother, which applies to the relationship between two political parties. It is a richer primary indicator in ILNA. For ILNA, 'big brother' has negative semantic prosody because of the presupposed personal traits of an older brother in the family.

An older brother is supposed to bully the younger brother into doing what he wants, or the younger brother tends to follow in an older brother's footsteps. For instance, Bahraini and Emirati officials are described as the younger brother of Saudi Arabia. Following their big brother, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates buy weapons to suppress their nation and make such claims against Iran to stir up Iranophobia and anti-Iranianism (anti-Iranian sentiments). In the following excerpt, Saudi Arabia is clearly described as a bullying big brother. Arabic countries have been described as brothers and their older brothers in Saudi Arabia.

In the excerpt (24), 'big brother' is connected with sword dancing in Arabia called *Al-Ardah*, in which Trump also participated and danced. Based on the news story mentioned in *The Hill*, Trump has not been the first resident of the White House who has participated in Al-Ardah, and it adds that 'sword' and 'saber' have become a symbol in the US international relations: It exerts "symbolic power"[133]. Al-Ardah is a folkloric group dance done only by men. In the past, warriors did it before going to the war "to display weaponry, raise morale and uplift the heroic spirit of the participants"[134]. Nowadays, it is performed to celebrate nationally important occasions, weddings, and graduation parties. It has become the symbol of "solidarity, camaraderie, national pride and unity"[135].

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[133] Trump isn't the first White House resident to engage in a sword dance | TheHill
[134] Saudi Arabesque Al-Ardha – The National Sword Dance of Saudi Arabia - Saudi Arabesque
[135] Atharna | Warriors Dance in Riyadh

Now, how this dance was reflected in Iran's media is essential. Since Saudi Arabia plays the role of the Arab world's big brother and now, Trump has danced with them, wielding diplomatic power by showing off swords and sabers; so, Saudi Arabia's big brother role is granted to the United States. That is why four Arab countries have cut ties with Bahrain; i.e., now, the United States decides for its little Arab brothers. Another portrait in the same excerpt is a bit erotic, at least based on Islamic-Iranian culture. The friendly international relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia is described as 'courtship'. The vice president states that 'you cannot dance in one place and then the court in another place'.

Before closing the discussion of brotherhood, it must be reminded that Table 9.4 shows that 'brother' collocate with 'friend' and 'friend' collocates with 'enemy'. So, a discussion of this type of relationship is worth mentioning here. First of all, Iran's friendly relationships with other countries, which has led to Iran's influence and power in the Middle East and the world, are based on 'love'. It means that Iran has gained their hearts, so countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon are faithful to Iran. Unlike some other countries have made, money has not created this friendly relationship. So, those countries with friendly relationships with Iran are like his brothers.

Another aspect of the 'friend' notion is related to its antonymous relationship with the 'enemy'. Excerpt (26) emphasized that JCPOA was not supposed to diminish America's enmity towards Iran. The speaker is a Reformist who tries to defend JCPOA because some Conservatives were accusing that the Iranian JCPOA committee had a hidden agenda and caballed with America. So, this Reformist argues that Iran has not befriended America just by signing JCPOA, and the enmity continues. Since America is regarded as *arrogance* and Conservatives insist on this enmity towards arrogance, this Reformist builds his

argumentation in this way. Excerpt (27) highlights that Iran is the friend of regional countries, and it should not be taken as the enemy while the US is taken as a friend.

(22)

وی درباره ادعاهای مقامات امارتی و بحرینی علیه کشورمان درخصوص عدم پایبندی به برجام و مسایل منطقه ای عنوان کرد ... کسانی که این ادعا را دارند ، در کنار برادر بزرگتر خود درحال خرید و فروش سلاح و سرکوب مردم خود تلاش می کنند . حرف این کشورها قابل اعتنا نیست و سخنانشان در حوزه ایران هراسی و ایران ستیزی است.

Regarding Bahraini and Emirati officials' claims about our country and our breach of JCPOA and some regional issues, he said … those who make these claims are trying to suppress their people and to do weapon trading next to their big brother. Their words are ignorable, and their remarks are related to Iranophobia and being anti-Iran.

(23)

قطر ، کشوری که با ما در برخی مسایل اختلاف نظرهای جدی دارد ، همسایه ای است که ما نمی خواهیم بی ثبات شود . همینطور نمی خواهیم استقلال این کشور همسایه بر اثر قلدری برادر بزرگتر سعودی زیر سوال رود.

Qatar, a country with seriously different opinions over some regional issues, is a neighbor [country] that we do not want to be unstable. Also, we do not want the independence of this neighboring country to be questioned by his bullying big brother, Saudi Arabia.

(24)

معاون سیاسی رییس جمهوری در این رشته توییت نوشت : 1) نوشته بودم دوران ایتلاف سازی و برادر بزرگتری به پایان رسیده و سلطه گری سیاسی ، قبیله بازی امنیتی ، اشغال و تجاوز نتیجه ای جز بی ثباتی دربرندارد . ... 4) شکاف و فروپاشی ایتلاف نخستین نتیجه رقص شمشیر در ریاض است ؛ نمی توان یک جا با شمشیر رقصید و جای دیگر به معاشقه پرداخت ! جای برادر بزرگتر عوض شده است ؟ ! 5) عربستان

، مصر ، امارات و بحرین که در برابر کشوری کوچک به این میزان شکننده اند ، راهی جز دموکراسی در

داخل ، و گفت وگو در منطقه ندارند ؛ عصر قبیله پایان یافته است!

In a Tweet thread, the vice president posted that 1) I had written that the time of allying and being the big brother had been over. Political imperialism, security tribalism, occupying, and aggression have no result other than instability. 4) Split in and fall of the alliance is the first result of sword dancing in Riyadh; you cannot dance in one place and then the court in another place. 5) Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Emirate, and Bahrain, who are this fragile fronting a small country, have no option other than having democracy inside the country and having talks in the region. The era of tribalism is over.

(25)

آنان نمی توانند درک کنند که اگر جمهوری اسلامی ایران تاکنون توفیقاتی داشته ناشی از پیام حقش بوده ، پیام

حقی که به دل ملت های منطقه مانند لبنان ، عراق و سوریه نشسته است و می پرسند چرا در این مناطق

هستیم . دل هایی که با عشق خریداری می شود وفادار می ماند معاون رییس جمهور تاکید کرد : این در حالی

است که ما مثل دیگران در این مناطق دلار هزینه نمی کنیم ... دیگران سعی کردند دل ها را با دلار بخرند

اما دلارها که تمام می شود پیوندها از بین می رود ، اما دل هایی که با عشق خریداری می شود وفادار می

ماند ، آنان ، این را نمی توانند بفهمند .

They cannot understand that if the Islamic Republic of Iran has been prosperous so far, it has been due to its righteous message. Its righteous message has touched the hearts of regional nations such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. Moreover, they ask why we are present in these regions. Those hearts bought by love stay faithful. The vice president affirmed that the others are spending dollars in these regions, and we are not … They tried to buy the hearts by dollars, but the ties are cut when the dollars are over. Nevertheless, those hearts bought by love stay faithful. They cannot understand this.

257

(26)

<div dir="rtl">

هیچ چیزی دشمنی آمریکا را نسبت به ما و سپاه و این مردم کاهش نخواهد داد . برجام هم قرار نبود این کار را بکند و نخواهد کرد . برخی می گفتند با وجود برجام چرا آمریکا سپاه را تحریم کرد که می گفتم اگر آمریکا این دشمنی ها را نکرده بود ، شما باید به ما اعتراض می کردید که شما در برجام چه کردید که آمریکا با ما دوست شده است و این نشان می دهد هیچ چیز پشت صحنه نبوده و ما فقط درباره موضوع هسته ای مذاکره کرده و تحریم های مربوط به هسته ای برداشته شده اما دشمنی آمریکا ادامه دارد و دشمنی ما نیز با نظام سلطه و سلطه گری آمریکا پابرجا است.

</div>

Nothing will diminish America's enmity towards us and IRGC and the nation. Neither was JCPOA supposed to do so, and it will not. Some said why America sanctioned IRGC despite the JCPOA. Moreover, I said if America had not shown this enmity, you would have complained that what we have done in [the negotiations related to] the JCPOA that America has become our friend. It shows that there has been nothing behind the scenes, and we have negotiated just over the nuclear issue. Moreover, nuclear-related sanctions have been lifted. However, the US enmity continues, and our enmity towards hegemony and America's hegemony remains active.

(27)

<div dir="rtl">

ما برای یمن ، عراق ، سوریه و حتی عربستان هم خواهان توسعه و پیشرفت هستیم و همه بدانند ، راهی جز برادری ، دوستی و کمک به همدیگر وجود ندارد و اشتباه می کنید اگر فکر کنید ایران دوست شما نیست و آمریکا و رژیم صهیونیستی دوست شما هستند ...

</div>

We desire development and growth for Yemen, Syria, and even Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, everyone should know that there is no way other than brotherhood, friendship, and helping each other. Moreover, you are mistaken if you think Iran is not your friend, and America and the Zionist regime are your friends …

The family tree of the Revolution family has also been indicated. It has offspring, and the Iranians born every decade after the Revolution are considered one descendant of this family. So, four decades after the Revolution, the fourth descendant is born. The Supreme Leader's assistant and advisor[136] distinguishes soft warfare and hard warfare and how the enemy has been trying to attack from the first descendant up to the third descendant of the Revolution family. Back then and at the time of the first generation, the enemy pursued seizing Iran's territory. However, now at the third generation, he has changed his policy, and he pursues seizing minds (of predominantly young people). The first generation did not allow the enemy to seize Iran's territory in hard warfare, and now, the second and third descendants should not let the enemy seize their 'thoughts and minds' in the soft warfare. So, the Revolution family has always been involved in a type of war.

(28)

نسل اول انقلاب اسلامی با مقاومت و ایثار ، با خلق حماسه تن در برابر تانک ، به دشمن اجازه «تصرف سرزمین ایران» را نداد ، اکنون نسل دوم و سوم انقلاب نیز نباید به دشمن اجازه «تصرف افکار و اذهان» را بدهند ؛ شما دانشجویان نباید اجازه بدهید سواره نظام جنگ نرم آمریکا ، قلب های مردم را فتح کند ، فرهنگ شهادت و آموزه های دفاع مقدس می تواند به مثابه یک دژ مستحکم در برابر این هجوم نرم ایستادگی کند.

The first generation of the Islamic Revolution did not allow the enemy to seize Iran's territory by resistance, altruism, and heroic action of fronting the tank with the bare body[137]. Now, the Revolution's second and third generations should not allow the enemy to seize their thoughts and minds either. It would help if you, students, did not

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[136] The Supreme Leader is also the Supreme Commander of (all) the Forces.

[137] It refers to the story of Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh in the Iran-Iraq war who "wrapped himself in a grenade belt from a nearby corpse, pulled the pins out, and jumped underneath an advancing Iraqi tank, killing himself and disabling the tank". Cf. Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh - Wikipedia

allow cavalries of America's soft warfare to conquer people's hearts. The culture of martyrdom and Holy Defense's teachings are like a fortified citadel that resists in front of this soft invasion.

(29)

با همه این دل نگرانی ها ، اما دل آراميم از آينده انقلابی که اکنون حتی فرزندان نسل چهارم آن نیز وارد جبهه های هزار کیلومتر آن سوتر آن شده اند تا به دنیا نشان دهند که چگونه در ميانه پرآشوب ترين منطقه جهان می توان جزیره ثباتی به نام جمهوری اسلامی ايران را سرپا نگه داشت .

Despite all these worries, we are calm [and sure] about the future of the Revolution since even children of its fourth generation are also present in the fronts thousands of kilometers far from here. [They are there] to show to the world the ability to survive the stable island named the Islamic Republic of Iran in the middle of the most chaotic region of the world.

Not that all children are legitimate in this scenario, primarily if it refers to a negative concept. As an example, ISIS is widely considered an illegitimate child, although the parents are mentioned as Saudi Arabia and Israel. Alternatively, the world arrogance is described as parents of ISIS who have trained their children in this way. Since, in all cases, the parents are known, the child cannot be considered illegitimate; unless their marital status is common-law marriage or domestic partnership. Because, according to Islamic laws, this type of marriage is illegal.

(30)

شما نه تنها برای پیشگیری از قتل عام مردم بیگناه کاری نکردید بلکه با داعش که فرزند نامشروع عربستان و اسرایيل است همکاری کردید ...

You did not do anything to prevent the massacre of the innocents, but you cooperated

with ISIS, is the illegitimate child of Saudi Arabia and Israel …

(31)

الان می بینیم با تمام وقاحت می گویند ایران را تحریم کردیم با وقاحت به سازمان ملل نامه می نویسند ایران

را حامی تروریسم می دانند ولی خودشان ملت ها را به خاک و خون می کشند و داعش ها را این ها تربیت

کردند . او ادامه داد : الان یمن و سوریه و افغانستان گرفتار تروریسم است و مادر و پدر تروریسم استکبار

جهانی هستند ، اما ایران را متهم می کنند.

Now we see them saying with absolute obscenity that "we sanctioned Iran," and they

write a letter to the United Nations with obscenity and consider Iran as supporting

terrorism. However, they slay nations, and these [countries] have trained ISIS. He

continued that now, Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan are involved in terrorism, and the

father and the mother of terrorism are global arrogance, but they accuse Iran.

The type of relation or love between the parents[138] of the Revolution family is not

discussed at all. It might be due to the Islamic culture of Iran in which couples avoid talking

about their love relations or showing public affection to each other[139]. The only element

related to marriage relations is 'honeymoon', which the Conservatives use in a highly

sarcastic way. For instance, the period the president had asked for is finished, and the

prominent Conservative describes sarcastically this time as the honeymoon of the president,

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[138] If there is a mother, it is not just about the father.

[139] It was different in larger cities such as the capital. However, according to the law, if legally married couples kiss each other in public and the judge finds it erotic, or against social conventions, he can sentence them to prison and lashes.

and now that honeymoon is over, he should report the process and achievements of JCPOA. He also refers to the 'garden of pear'[140] previously used by the president to mock the Conservatives nagging about JCPOA.

Another instance is also implicitly related to JCPOA. After months of negotiations between Iran and the 5+1 group, Zarif was spotted strolling and laughing with Kerry on the street in Geneva. It evoked harsh criticisms of hardliners. So, the following excerpt is based on this event and describes it as a walk of couples on honeymoon.

(32)

یکی از مصیبت های اقتصادی که فعالان ما را زمین گیر کرده انتظار بیجا از برجام است همه فعالان اقتصادی منتظرند اتفاقی بیفتد ... در واقع یکی از مشکلات برجام به غیر از تحقیر و ذلیل کردن ایران ، چهار سال انتظار فعالان اقتصادی که بیشترین ضربه را به اقتصاد ما وارد کردند ... ماه عسل شش ماه بود که تمام شد و الان دولت به مردم پاسخ دهد . در واقع آنچه دولت وعده می دهد باغ گلابی است . اما باغ گلابی را این شاخص های اقتصادی نشان نمی دهد .

One of the economic calamities that have paralyzed our activists is an unreasonable expectation from JCPOA. All economic activists are waiting for something to happen …; one of the problems of JCPOA, other than humiliating Iran, is economic activists' four-year wait which was the enormous damage to our economy … honeymoon was six months, and it is over. Now, the government should answer to people. Actually, what the government promises are the garden of pear. However, economic indices do not show these pear gardens.

(33)

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[140] Discussed in the NATURE domain.

آمریکایی ها می گفتند شما می خواهید با ما دوست شوید ، خیلی خوب است و ما با شما مشکل نداریم و دوست

می شویم ، روی خوشی که دیدیم تیم اوباما و کری به ایران اما با محتوای '' تقریبا هیچ '' نشان دادند …

وزرای خارجه دو کشور مرتب با هم گپ می زدند ، قدم می زدند و در ماه عسل بودند .

> The Americans said, you want to be our friends; well, we do not have problems with
> you, and we become friends. The smile of Obama and Kerry's team to Iran was
> shown by 'almost nothing' content [of JCPOA] … Foreign ministers of the two
> countries were constantly chatting and walking, and they were on their honeymoon.

The corpora have also observed the element of 'legacy' or 'heritage'. For example, Mohsen Rezaei, a prominent Conservative and officer of IRGC, considers the Revolution as the heritage of Imam Khomeini and continues his speech by referring to elements related to NATURE and GAME domains[141]. In another case, president Rouhani adds that JCPOA is nobody's inheritance; i.e., it belongs to everyone and not to a specific person or political party.

(34)

انقلاب اسلامی مهمترین میراث امام و ایثارگران است که امروز بیش از همیشه به این انقلاب نیازمند هستیم .

ما نیازمند انگیزه و روحیه انقلابی هستیم و جامعه ما برای پیشرفت خود به این انگیزه ها و هویت انقلابی نیاز

دارد …

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[141] They are discussed in respective sections.

Islamic Revolution is the most important heritage of Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini] that

we need more than ever. We need revolutionary spirit and motivation. Our society

needs these motivations and revolutionary identity for development …

(35)

«مگر برجام ارث پدر خاصی است ؛ دیپلمات ها خادمان شمایند و پرورش یافتگان دانشگاه های ما هستند ؛

حال اگر تلاش های آنها نبود به کجا می رسیدیم ؟ می گویند همه اشکالات رفع نشده است ؛ ما هیچ وقت نه

معجزه را ادعا کردیم و نه گفتیم همه مشکلات یک شبه حل می شود » .

JCPOA is not a unique heritage from the father, is it? Diplomats are your servants,

and they are graduates of our universities. Where would they be going now if it was

not for their endeavors? They say that not all problems have been solved; never have

we ever claimed an act of miracle. Neither have we ever said that problems would be

solved overnight.

Last but not least important element related to this domain is 'divorce'. Since in

Islam, it is the most hateful *halal*[142] in God's eyes, it is not discussed, or it has no status in

political discourse. One of the rare occasions is the quotation of a prominent Reformist:

Those who got the required votes to become MP divorced the 'List of Hope' after being

elected. Reformists did not have many allies for the parliament elections, according to the

reasoning in section 2.4. So they allied with lesser-known politicians and made a list of

candidates known as 'List of Hope'. All 30 candidates on this list in Tehran won the election,

and it was also successful in other cities. However, when they won the seat, most started to

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[142] *Halal* means lawful, permissible.

change their affiliation and joined the Conservatives or did not behave according to the Reformist code of conduct. So, figuratively speaking, they divorced the List of Hope.

(36)

<div dir="rtl">

هر روز بیش از پیش مشخص شد که تعداد اعضای فراکسیون امید به مراتب کمتر از لیست انتخاباتی امید است و به قول عارف ، برخی «امید» را صرفا تا درب «بهارستان» می خواستند و به تعبیری دیگر ، بعضی امیدی های پشت درهای بهارستان ، پس از انتخابات «امید» را طلاق دادند!

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Every day it becomes more evident that the number of members of the faction of hope is significantly lower than the one of electoral list of hope. Moreover, as Aref said, some people wanted 'hope' just up to the door of 'Baharestan'. In other words, they were on the list of hope behind the door [on the porch], and they got divorced from 'hope' after the election.

9.1.3.2. Scenarios for FAMILY AND RELATIONS Metaphors. To conclude the above-mentioned elaborate discussion, the following scenarios related to FAMILY AND RELATIONS have been extracted.

a)   SUPREME LEADER IS AN AUTHORITATIVE FATHER WHO ALWAYS HAS FATHERLY SYMPATHETIC ADVICES.

b)   THE PROPHETS AND IMAMS ARE ASSUMED TO BE THE SPIRITUAL FATHERS OF ALL AUTHORITIES INCLUDING THE SUPREME LEADER AND THEY, AS THEIR SPIRITUAL CHILDREN, ARE SUPPOSED TO ACT ON NECESSITIES OF THIS GIVEN STATUS.

c)   THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ISLAMIC JURIST (THE SUPEREME LEADER) IS THE LOVE BOND BETWEEN FATHER AND HIS CHILDREN. IT IS A DIVINE LOVE BOND.

d)   THE NATION MUST OBEY ANY COMMANDS THE SUPREME LEADER AS THE FATHER GIVES.

e)   POLITICAL PARTIES (AT NATIONAL LEVEL), ISLAMIC COUNTRIES (AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL) ARE BROTHERS AND THERE MUST BE UNITY AMONG THEM.

f)   POWERFUL POLITICAL PARTIES (AT NATIONAL LEVEL) AND COUNTRIES (AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL) ARE LIKE BIG BROTHERS. AFTER FATHER, BIG BROTHER IS RESPONSIBLE AND IN CHARGE OF MAKING DESCISIONS.

g)   THE FAMILY OF IRAN IS A PARADISIACAL FAMILY AND IF PEOPLE IMMIGRATE TO OTHER COUNTRIES, THEY WILL BECOME A MEMBER OF HELLISH FAMILY.

h)   ENEMIES ARE THOSE COUNTRIES (FAMILIES) WHO DO NOT GET ALONG WITH THE FAMILY OF IRAN.

i)   FRIENDS ARE THOSE COUNTRIES (FAMILIES) WHO ARE IN GOOD AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE FAMILY OF IRAN.

9.1.4.   Source Domain of GAME AND SPORTS

Game expressions and metaphors expounded in this section can be divided into two categories: those shared in international political discourse and those specific to Iran's political discourse. The former springs from 'game theory' devised in economics being used in politics on an international scale. The latter pertains to Islamic and Iranian culture and falls into two categories: those originally generated in Iran and those created based on the adaptation of international ones. Now that the categorization is set forth, an account of the common ground between 'game' and 'war' and how closely they are related is necessary. The border between 'game' and 'war' is so blurry that it sometimes makes it impossible to distinguish. So the KWIC and secondary elements/indicators were analyzed to make it more feasible and less dependent on intuition. Nevertheless, the borderline examples will be pinpointed.

Table 9.5

Conceptual Elements, Primary Signals and Relevant Statistics of GAME & SPORTS

Domain in each Corpus

GAME & SPORTS									
Conceptual Elements	**Primary Signals**	**Parliamentary Debates**			**ILNA**			**Tasnim**		
		Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD
Match	Match	15			94			82		
	Nuclear arms race	-	-	-	5	2.20	5.07	0	0	0
	Soccer match	-	-	-	13	2.47	10.85	6	2.24	10.35
	Arms race[143]	-	-	-	10	3.00	10.42	6	2.45	10.00
	The winner of ~	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.73	7.66
Game	Game	115			493			366		
	Play in sb's playground[144]	7	2.64	8.49	39	6.24	10.16	24	4.89	9.70
	Zero-sum game	-	-	-	6	2.21	7.03	-	-	-
	Political game	3	1.71	6.55	22	3.50	6.03	30	2.97	7.25
	Childish game	-	-	-	4	1.73	8.19	-	-	-
	Dangerous game	-	-	-	6	1.72	8.11	3	1.73	7.93
	(Enemy's) **puzzle** game	-	-	-	3	1.73	5.47	3	1.73	7.94
	Single-card play	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.73	8.77
	Game rules	-	-	-	7	2.82	9.07	8	3.00	9.91
	Game of democracy	-	-	-	4	2.22	7.6	-	-	-
	Game of power	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2.32	5.01
	Game of politics	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2.36	6.31
Win	Win	138			743			652		
	Win-win	10	3.16	10.21	174	13.18	11.91	128	11.30	11.65
	Win & lose	3	-	8.8	12	3.46	8.97	5	2.23	7.90
Lose	Lose	7			39			34		
	Lose-lose	-	-	-	12	3.46	12.30	6	2.45	11.50
	The others' loss[145]	-	-	-	3	1.73	7.05	-	-	-
	The opponent's loss	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.73	10.32
Triumph	Triumph	265			2,005			1,824		
	Triumph of Islamic	81	9.68	10.26	585	25.1	10.8	645	26.4	10.5

[143] It is also mentioned in 'competition' row because in the Persian, it has two interchangeable equivalents.
[144] It is the equivalent of the English idiom "play sb's game".
[145] Equivalent of "one man's loss is another man's loss".

	Revolution				6			4	3
	Magnificent triumph	7	3.32	10.25	13	3.73	7.77	9	4.23	7.26
	Great triumph	9	3.13	7.57	69	7.14	8.65	68	7.19	8.93
	Triumph & presence	3	1.67	5.33	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Triumph of diplomacy	3	1.73	7.72	6	2.30	6.07	-	-	-
	Secret of triumph	10	3.16	10.7	40	6.16	9.35	18	4.35	8.35
	Nation's triumph/ victory	6	4.44	6.19	39	5.09	6.99	34	4.83	7.18
	Triumph of blood	-	-	-	7	2.58	6.58	-	-	-
Achievement	Achievement	55			369			209		
	Great(est) ~	3	1.73	10.17	31	4.89	9.72	15	3.29	8.97
	~ of JCPOA	7	2.64	7.87	37	6.26	7.39	29	4.54	7.83
	~ of Resistance	-	-	-	3	1.68	5.61	4	1.81	6
	~ of Diplomacy	-	-	-	6	2.42	6.98	-	-	-
	~ of Democracy	-	-	-	4	1.99	7.47	3	1.72	7.52
	Diplomatic ~	-	-	-	6	2.44	8.00	-	-	-
	~ of *Basij*	-	-	-	5	1.88	4.52	7	2.49	6.9
	~ of Revolution	-	-	-	55	3.73	7.53	57	7.12	7.15
	Nuclear ~	-	-	-	8	2.84	5.74	8	2.72	7.02
	~ of (political) **system**	-	-	-	20	4.11	6.44	19	4.06	6.66
Competition	Competition	253			734			486		
	Healthy competition	11	3.46	10.35	27	5.65	9.89	18	4.12	9.78
	Unhealthy competition	-	-	-	6	2.00	6.86	6	2.00	8.42
	Electoral competition	4	2.23	8.79	155	6.05	11.04	140	6.06	11.58
	Competition ground	-	-	-	18	3.71	8.36	16	2.60	8.58
	Competition field	-	-	-	18	4.22	8.52	11	3.13	8.17
	Political competition	-	-	-	51	4.83	7.19	30	4.05	7.19
	Regional competition	-	-	-	6	1.56	6.13	4	-	6.62
	Open competition	-	-	-	15[147]	4.43	7.89	12	3.41	7.67
	Arms race	-	-	-	7	2.44	7.92	3	1.72	7.37
	Edge of competition[146]	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2.64	8.54

9.1.4.1. Conceptual Elements in Context. Both 'war' and 'game' portray at least two parties (teams and troops), each with its strategy for achieving the goal (winning and not being defeated). They both happen on a piece of land (field and arena). Even though some rules govern both, it appears that laws are more likely to be broken in times of war. What

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[146] It seems to be a mistranslation, and hence, misinterpretation of 'competitive edge' into Persian.
[147] None of them is used metaphorically.

distinguishes them is that 'war' includes violence and portraits such as trench and bomb. In a 'game', there is no violence, and it is done for the sake of joy. In reality, and in the case of studying excerpts to categorize them, the distinctions turn out to be not clear-cut.

Moreover, sometimes they are mixed, and we have a blended/embedded metaphor that adds to recognition's complexity. For instance, for the Reformists, losing the game (specifically, any negotiations) is like 'war' and winning the game is like 'peace'. They emphasize the importance of 'win' or 'peace' for all parties involved in the game, while the Conservatives deny the win-win deal, let alone playing with the enemy. The (far-right) Conservatives deny playing with the enemy altogether and believe that the country as a person should negotiate (metaphorically, play) with just friends. While in the family scenario, political affiliation is not a significant factor, and both of them view most of the elements, such as 'father', in more or less the same way; in Game theory, political affiliation makes a huge difference.

This game theory is specifically foregrounded in Iran's nuclear program negotiations, which produced JCPOA. Moreover, it is the starting point of differences that the political affiliation factor makes. Taking one step back will be more helpful to see the big picture. There is an ongoing 'arms race in the world, and 'nuclear arms race' is like a discipline of this race. Iran was considered a participant in this competition, and that is why it made it necessary to negotiate with Iran to prevent it from having nuclear arms. During Rouhani's (Moderate or moderate Reformist) presidential, the negotiations lasted for three years, and the end product was JCPOA. It has been recognized as a game or competition with consequences and presuppositions. First of all, a concise introduction to game theory and its application to this scenario. Secondly, we will discuss international issues related to game and competition elements in metaphors. Thirdly, national elements in game-related metaphorical patterns will be expounded. Lastly, some elements will be reviewed to set the scene for understanding how

culture and religion play a role in this scenario. Throughout this section, whenever it is necessary, some examples of misinterpretations are highlighted.

Before addressing the main discussion of metaphorical patterns and their elements, an introduction to 'Game theory and its application in politics is ineluctable. Von Neumann and Morgenstern proposed the application of 'game theory' in politics in 1947. Various types of games have been introduced based on different criteria. However, the one related to this scenario is based on outcomes and persons (Nagel, 2002). Iran's nuclear and missile programs are a 'prisoner's dilemma'. The only difference is that, in the case of the missile program, no negotiation has happened yet because, for Conservatives, this one is 'optional prisoner dilemma', which is a type of 'prisoner's dilemma'. Regarding the number of players, the prisoner's dilemma is a two-person game, and, in this case, Iran is considered one person and P5+1 as another person or a team of people with the same opinion or purpose. Regarding the outcome, it is a non-zero-sum game in politics which means that it is a type of cooperative game and the gain of one player is not the loss of the other one (Davidai & Ongis, 2019).

Prisoner's dilemma is a game that tries to explain why two people might not cooperate, though the best way to serve both interests is in collaborating. Imagine that two criminals have been arrested, but the police do not have enough evidence to sentence both of them. So they get interrogated separately without any communication with each other. They are offered to whether confess or turn the other one. If they confess, each will be sentenced to 3 years in jail (lose-lose outcome). If each of them betrays the other one and that person remains silent, the betrayer will be set free, and the other one will be sentenced to 10 years in jail (win-lose outcome). If they both cooperate and remain silent, they will receive a one-year sentence for carrying a gun (win-win outcome). Although the win-win situation seems to be

the last one because they both win and get just one year in jail, this game hypothesizes that they do not cooperate. Nagel (2002) offers another win-win solution: Both A and B can confess that C was the criminal and both will be set free, and if they were criminals, the main loser of this game would be society.

The Reformists refute the zero-sum game because they believe in win-win situations. They argue that the loss of one country (player) is the loss of the whole region or even the world. For instance, Zarif assures that zero-sum thought of some regional countries in trying to gain security at the cost of other's loss is a 'lose' for everyone; i.e., the whole region, including those countries, will become insecure. This thought is teaming up with foreigners. He suggests that for having a secure region, regional countries should get united (team up with each other) and not team up with outsiders. The latter is like playing a zero-sum game. We should team up with regional countries.

(1)

… فقط در یک منطقه امن و توسعه یافته است که امنیت و پیشرفت ایران تامین می شود … کسانی که تلاش می کنند که به قیمت حذف و ناامنی دیگران امنیت کسب کنند جز ناامنی و ذلت کسب نکرده اند . تفکر بازی با حاصل جمع صفر که تفکر سرسپردگی به بیگانگان است نباید مانع از آثار انتخاب مردم شود.

… Iran's security and development can be realized only in a safe and developed region … Those who try to attain security at the expense of others' insecurity and eliminate them have attained nothing but insecurity and abjection. The doctrine of a zero-sum game, which is the doctrine of servility to aliens, should not impede the effects of people's choice [in the election].

(2)

در جریان بحث هسته ای ، آمریکا تیوری بازی با حاصل جمع صفر را دنبال می کرد ؛ در حالیکه نگرش جمهوری اسلامی این بود که هیچ یک از طرفها احساس بازنده بودن نکرده … باشند .

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In the process of nuclear negotiation, the US was pursuing the theory of the zero-sum game, while the attitude of the Islamic Republic was that none of the parties had the feeling of looser.

(3)

نمی توان تصور برد بر اساس باخت دیگران را داشت ، زیرا امنیت را نمی توان به قیمت ناامن کردن دیگر کشورها بدست آورد .

You cannot conceive a win based on others' losses because security cannot be achieved at the expense of making other countries insecure.

(4)

فرصت دیگر نزدیکی ایران به ترکیه است چون ترکیه از حامیان و دوستان قطر است . ترکیه نمی تواند نسبت به شرایط کنونی و تحولات اخیر بی تفاوت باشد و همین مساله موجب می شود تا فرصت جدیدی برای همکاری با ایران مهیا شود ... از طریق گفت وگو و دیپلماسی و یارگیری می توان بر مشکلات موجود فایق شد.

Another chance is Iran's adjacency to Turkey; because Turkey is Qatar's supporter and friend. Turkey cannot be indifferent about the current situation and recent upheavals. Furthermore, this leads to a new opportunity for cooperation with Iran … Problems can be solved through diplomacy and teaming up.

Before diving deep into the main discussion of the game, players, and other elements, a point needs to be clarified. According to Iranian authorities, the building block of game/competition between Iran and the whole world is that Iran's political system is a genuine and special one which became a challenge confronting liberal democratic systems. It is a system based on a monotheistic perspective, which is the origin of rivalry/enmity against Iran (Exc. 5).

(5)

نظام لیبرالی غربی مدعی بود که لیبرالیسم پایان تاریخ است و تمام نظام های دنیا وقتی به عقلانیت می رسند ،
به نظام لیبرال دموکراسی منتهی می شود . نظام جمهوری اسلامی یک چالش اساسی مقابل این طرز تفکر بود
بنیان نظام جمهوری اسلامی ، بر اساس نگاه توحیدی است.

The western liberal regime claimed that liberalism is the end of history and the world's all regimes end up liberal democracy when they follow reasonableness. The political system of the Islamic Republic was a severe challenge to this doctrine. The foundation of the political system of the Islamic Republic is based on a monotheistic view.

During Conservative Ahmadinejad's presidency, an optional prisoner's dilemma was played; i.e., Iran abstained from playing the game. Moreover, finally, when they started negotiating, Iran's win-win strategy was to have nuclear technology, and the justification was that 'if other countries have nuclear technology or atomic bomb, why cannot we have the same technology'. It was taken as a sign of Iran's attempt to participate in a nuclear arms race. This dominant discourse during his presidency became the starting point of international concern for 'peace' and the source of crippling sanctions and UN Security Council Resolutions one after another. While the whole world was trying to stop Iran by sanctions and even threat of war, conservatives insisted on the resolutions' worthlessness by calling them 'scrap of paper' or 'junk paper'.

His presidency featured misunderstandings because of mixing up populisms and popular culture in his speeches regardless of where and to whom he addressed. For instance, an idiom[148] became popular in the Persian political discourse during Ahmadinejad's presidency. His specific discourse opened a new chapter in Persian populism and caused many troubles to European translators of Ahmadinejad's speeches and hence, deep misunderstandings and miscommunications. For instance, in a press conference[149], he warns the West to stop 'acting like a child' and not 'twist the lion's tail'. The mistranslation arose from the Persian equivalents, both of which contained the word 'play': 'child-play'[150] and 'play with the lion's tail'[151]. The latter part of the sentence must have misguided the European translators[152] to translate the former as 'playing with children and hence, 'child abuse'. So warning the enemies by saying 'do not play with the lion's tail'[153] has been maintained the status in Iran's political discourse.

(6)

تذکر دوم بنده به نخست وزیر رژیم انگلیس است که توصیه می کنم ایشان حد و اندازه خودشان را بدانند و به هر حال با دم شیر بازی نکنند ...

My second admonish goes to the vice president of England's regime, and I recommend that he know his boundaries and not twist the lion's tail …

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[148] This study aims not to investigate idioms or other figurative uses of language, but this one has some features that are worth elaborating to help with the discussion of metaphor.
[149] On June 5th, 2007.
[150] It is just a word-by-word translation.
[151] It is the literal translation.
[152] News articles published in *el pais*, *la matien*, *la crodonia*.
[153] The English version is 'do not twist lion's tail.'

After Ahmadinejad, Moderate[154], Rouhani took office, and from the very beginning of his presidency, the prisoner's dilemma was on the table; they wanted to negotiate and play the game based on a win-win strategy. So they started to firstly clear up miscommunications by assuring that Iran is not pursuing atomic bombs and wants peaceful nuclear technology. Moreover, according to Nagel's (2002) model, they offered other alternatives to P5+1 to reach a win-win (outcome of) game. Nagel (2002) also confirms that this type of game needs open-minded players who do not resist new ideas; in other words, Conservatives usually do not agree on adopting this strategy.

Excluding these extremist Conservatives' opinions, other criticisms target the strategy or the outcome of JCPOA without denying the importance of negotiations altogether. For instance, neo-Conservative Haddad-Adel criticizing the win-win strategy adopted in negotiations for nuclear case states that the United States' win was 'infiltration' in Iran and the region. Another Conservative criticizing JCPOA goes one step further and suggests adding a lesson to textbooks and teaching the students that the outcome of a win-win strategy with the enemy is 'sheer lose'. As will be explained in the next paragraph, Reformists regard JCPOA as a triumph of diplomacy. However, in excerpt (9), the Conservative MP declines this idea and, sarcastically reminding Zarif laughing with Kerry in Geneva[155], states that JCPOA was not the triumph of the 'diplomacy of smile'. Instead of that, the diplomacy of authority and glory worked. It was for a military power that P5+1 negotiated with Iran over nuclear programs and not diplomacy.

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[154] The coalition was formed between Reformists and Moderates.
[155] Explained in the family scenario.

For the Conservatives, JCPOA has had no achievements, and if there are any, it is to understand that they cannot trust the United States. Not only has JCPOA brought no achievements, but also it has ruined all nuclear achievements. They overemphasize on 'almost zero' achievement of JCPOA.

(7)

دولت هم برجام را از اول نوعی معامله برد ـ برد می دانست . مقصود از برد ایران روشن بود و رفع تحریم های ظالمانه و احقاق حقوق ملت ایران بود اما درباره مقصود آمریکایی ها از برد مورد نظر آنها چندان حرفی زده نشد . ... برد آمریکایی ها از برجام نفوذ در ایران و تغییر رفتار جمهوری اسلامی ایران در داخل کشور و در منطقه است.

The government considered JCPOA as a kind of win-win deal. The intention of Iran's win was clear: to annul oppressive sanctions and justice for the Iranian people. However, no one talked about Americans' intention of winning and what they meant by the win. … Americans' win in the JCPOA was infiltration in Iran and changing the Islamic Republic's behavior inside the country and in the region.

(8)

حال که آفتاب حقیقت کمی روشن شده است ، من از وزیر محترم آموزش و پرورش که قرار بود از طریق وزارتخانه متبوع ، درسی را به عنوان برجام در برنامه درسی دانش آموزان قرار می خواهم که حتما در پایان آن درس بنویسند که نتیجه اعتماد به گرگ به کجا رسیده است ، چگونه زمان و سرمایه های کشور به وعده های آمریکایی گره خورد و تمام مملکت چهار سال معطل ماند... لازم است در همان درس بنویسند نتیجه اتخاذ سیاست برد ـ برد در مذاکره با دشمن باخت محض است .

Now that the sun of truth is shining partly, I request the esteemed education minister who was supposed to add a unit named the JCPOA to students textbooks to write at the end of that unit what was the result of trusting the wolf, how time and country's investments were tied to Americans promises, and the whole country was up at the air

for four years. It is necessary to write at the same unit that the outcome of a win-win strategy with the enemy is the sheer loss.

(9)

برادران محترم ! حضور هیات های تجاری اروپایی در ایران نه به دلیل پیروزی دیپلماسی لبخند بلکه به دلیل نیاز اقتصاد بحران زده اروپا به بازار مصرف (80) میلیونی در ایران اسلامی است . امروز پس از تعلیق تحریم ها و گشایش در مناسبات تجاری و بانکی و فروش آزادانه نفت ، از حیث امور فوق تازه در شرایط سالهای قبل از تحریم قرار خواهیم گرفت.

Esteemed brothers! The presence of European business committees in Iran is not because of the victory of diplomacy of the smile, but because Europe's sagging economy needs the 80-million consumer market of Islamic Iran. Today, after suspending sanctions and openings in business and banking relations and free oil trades, we will get to the conditions we had in those years before sanctions.

(10)

البته برجام یک دستاورد بزرگی هم داشت و آن هم این بود که مردم فهمیدند به آمریکا و دشمن هیچ اعتمادی نیست و فقط دیپلماسی اقتدار و عزت جواب می دهد و این شعار که لبخند به آمریکا همه مشکلات ما را حل می کند را برای مردم آشکار کرد که اشتباه است .

Of course, the JCPOA had an outstanding achievement, and it was that people realized that they could not trust the US and other enemies; only the diplomacy of authority and glory worked. It made it clear for people that the slogan of smiling to America solves all problems is wrong.

(11)

متاسفانه دولت یازدهم کارنامه خوبی در سیاست خارجی در مواجهه با قدرت های جهانی بویژه آمریکا به جای نگذاشت . به همین دلیل به تعبیر و اعتراف مقامات دولتی ، در برجام به دستاورد «تقریبا هیچ» رسیدیم.

Unfortunately, the eleventh government did not leave a sound report card in foreign policy regarding encountering global powers, especially the US. That is why, as government officials confess, we got 'almost zero' achievement in the JCPOA.

Contrary to Conservatives' criticisms, JCPOA is considered a triumph for the Reformists. There was a competition between 'diplomacy' and 'contrast', 'pressure and threat', 'unpeaceful options'. It was a game because the negotiating committee is described as a diligent team, the coach is the Supreme Leader with his shrewd guidance, and people may be patient spectators of the game who resist the arrogance's seditions. Sometimes the border between game and war becomes even blurrier such as in the case of the excerpt (48).

The concepts of triumph and achievement closely correlate. JCPOA as a sign of triumph is an achievement itself and has also brought achievements, at least in the Reformists' opinion. For the Reformists, it is the achievement of intelligent diplomacy; i.e., diplomacy has won the competition, and JCPOA is like a prize or achievement. The competition was between Iran's diplomacy and arrogance. Kerry has also confirmed that it was a diplomatic achievement, and he is proud of it. While Conservatives deny any achievements, Reformists emphasize JCPOA's achievements by regarding it as something even more critical than the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran. They believe it has brought peace to the whole world. It has prevented war.

(12)

همکاران عزیز ، نمایندگان محترم ! خوشبختانه صبر و شکیبایی ملت بزرگ ایران اسلامی در برابر توطیه های استکبار و صهیونیسم جهانی با هدایت های داهیانه و مستمر مقام معظم رهبری و مجاهدت های خستگی ناپذیر تیم دیپلماسی و تلاش دولتمردان به پیروزی دیپلماسی منجر شد .

Esteemed colleagues! Esteemed members of parliament! Fortunately, the patience of the great nation of Islamic Iran in front of arrogance and Zionism with constant and shrewd guidance of the Supreme Leader and diplomatic team's diligence and government's attempts led to the victory of diplomacy.

(13)

توافق هسته ای یک نمونه نادر از پیروزی دیپلماسی بر تقابل است . تضعیف این توافق یک اشتباه خواهد بود .

The nuclear agreement is a rare example of the victory of diplomacy over contrast. Weakening this agreement will be an error.

(14)

همه از جمله کارشناسان آمریکایی می دانند این بهترین توافق ممکن از هر لحاظ ، نه تنها برای ایران که هم برای آمریکا بود . این پیروزی دیپلماسی بر فشار و تهدید بود چراکه این اعمال دیگر کارساز نیست.

Everyone, including US experts, know that this was the best possible agreement in every aspect, not only for Iran but also for America. It was the victory of diplomacy against pressure and threat because these measures are not functional anymore.

(15)

کری ... نوشت : امروز دومین سالگرد یک دستاورد قابل توجه دیپلماتیک است . توافقی که بی شک جهان را به جایی امن تر تبدیل کرد ؛ توافق هسته ای . با گذشت دو سال ، ثابت شد که دیپلماسی جواب می دهد . او ادامه داد : من به بسیاری از دستاورد ها و اقداماتم در دوران وزارت امور خارجه دولت رییس جمهور اوباما افتخار می کنم.

Kerry wrote that today is the second anniversary of a notable diplomatic achievement. An agreement that undoubtedly changed this world into a safer place; the nuclear agreement. After two years, it is proved that diplomacy works. He continued that I am proud of so many of my achievements and actions in the foreign ministry of President Obama's government.

(16)

به جرات باید گفت بعد از ملی شدن صنعت نفت کاری بزرگتر از برجام نداشته ایم و دستاوردهای برجام به

مراتب از ملی شدن صنعت نفت بزرگتر بوده است.

Beyond any reasonable doubt, it must be said that after the nationalization of the oil industry, we have not had any other works more significant than the JCPOA, and the JCPOA's achievements have been significantly more significant than the nationalization of the oil industry.

(17)

ما در مناسبات بین المللی در شرایط حساسی هستیم که موقعیت ما را بسیار شکننده کرده است و با اولین خطا

ممکن است کشورهای منطقه درگیر جنگ شوند چیزی که دیگر جبران پذیر نیست . اگر خطایی شود یک

بازی باخت ـ باخت به همه تحمیل می شود همانطور که در سوریه همه باخته اند و برای بیست سال آینده این

کشور باخته است .

We are in such a sensitive situation regarding international relations that it has made our circumstances so fragile. Moreover, with the [very] first mistake, regional countries may get involved in a war, which is not compensable. If anything goes wrong, a lose-lose game will be imposed on everyone as everyone has lost [the game] in Syria, and this country has lost [the game] for the next twenty years.

As is mentioned earlier in this section, nuclear negotiations started to prevent Iran from participating in a nuclear arms race. Furthermore, Iran's missile program is at stake since the world is concerned if Iran wants to participate in an arms race, and Iran is a threat to the world's peace because Iran is accused of supporting terrorism. What is going on in Iran regarding this issue? For Conservatives, any negotiations are childish games caused by lame excuses: The first time, it was a nuclear program, and now, it is the missile program and

FATF. So, if Iran says yes to play every game (excuses), they start, it will lead to JCPOA 2, 3,... It is impossible because it is against Iran's independence as the central pillar of the Islamic Revolution. Who is the designer of such games? The enemy, specifically the US, has planned it.

(18)

احمد سالک کاشانی (اصفهان) به ریس جمهور محترم در خصوص اینکه چون توافق با FATF بازی جدید آمریکا برای ورود به برجامی دیگر است که این بار شفافیت در برنامه هسته ای ، قدرت منطقه ای و حمایت خدشه ناپذیر جمهوری اسلامی ایران از محور مقاومت در منطقه را هدف قرار داده است ، بررسی دقیق شود

.

Ahmad Salek Kashani (Isfahan) [requests] the esteemed president regarding the agreement of FATF to inspect it meticulously since it is America's new game to enter into another JCPOA that has targeted the Islamic Republic of Iran's transparency in the nuclear program, regional power, and full support of axis of resistance in the region.

(19)

آمریکا و آژانس بازی خطرناکی را شروع کردند که قبل از برجام هم همین بازی برای گرفتن امتیازات بیشتر و همچنین بهانه جویی برای تحریم های بیشتر انجام داده بودند و با آنکه این بازی با پرونده «پی ام دی» پایان یافت ولی دوباره می خواهند همین فریب و نیرنگ را کلید بزنند .

America and International Atomic Energy Agency started a dangerous game, and the same game had been played before the JCPOA, too, and it was to gain more scores and make more excuses to impose more sanctions. Moreover, although this game was over with the case of 'PMD', they wanted to do the same trick another time.

(20)

ایران کشوری امن و متکی بر خود است و براساس ارزش های اسلامی از همزیستی مسالمت آمیز همه ملل

حمایت می کند و دچار بازی های کودکانه برخی کشورها نمی شود.

Iran is a safe and self-dependent country and supports the peaceful coexistence of all nations based on Islamic values, and it does not get involved with childish plays of some countries.

(21)

ما اجازه بدهیم در میدان بازی که دشمنان کشور برای ما طراحی کردند بازی کنیم ما را در لیست سیاه قرار

بدهند ، ما را تحریم کنند ، منافذ بین المللی را بر ما ببندند ، مردم ما را در تنگنا قرار بدهند و وقتی ما تلاش

می کنیم از این دام کشور را رها بکنیم متهم بشویم به نفوذ ؟

We accept to play in a playground designed by the country's enemies, we let them put us on the blacklist, to sanction us, to close international resources to us, to put people under pressure, and when we try to free the country from this trap, we are accused of infiltration?

On the other hand, Reformists and Moderates try to provide examples of negotiations in the early ages of Islam between Imams and their enemies. Regardless of political affiliations, this scenario has extensively explored the source of terrorism and its faithful supporters and who is on the terrorism team. For example, Araghchi states that US nuclear modernization program is like an invitation for a new arms race. President Rouhani says that the region (or the field of) race does not matter, we do not admire the arms race in any region, but sanctions against North Korea are not the solution. A Conservative criticizes Rouhani for putting all his eggs in JCPOA's basket while Trump won the election, and now he is allying with Iran's enemies: They are competing for opposing Iran's nation.

(22)

وی از برنامه دارندگان سلاح های هسته ای برای مدرن سازی این سلاح ها نیز انتقاد و اظهارداشت : این اقدام منجر به آغاز یک دور جدید از مسابقه مدرن سازی سلاح های هسته ای است .

He also criticized the plan to hold nuclear weapons for modernizing these weapons and asserted that this action caused a new set of competition for modernizing nuclear weapons.

(23)

در حالی که در واشنگتن نتیجه انتخابات به نفع یک جنگ طلب و اسلام ستیز تمام شده است ، او قول داده که برجام را پاره کند ، در حالی که زمزمه انتخاب و انتصاب نزدیکان وی برای تشکیل دولت است از کسانی است که در خصومت با ملت ایران مسابقه گذاشته اند ، در حالی که رییس دولت ما همه تخم مرغ های خود را در سبد برجام گذاشته و مبهوت نتایج انتخابات در آمریکاست ...

While a warmonger and an anti-Islam person have won the Washington election, he has promised to tear up the JCPOA. At the same time, it is heard that he wants to select his cabinet from those who are competing for enmity against Iran's nation. Our president has put all his eggs in the JCPOA's basket, and he is amazed by the outcome of the US presidential election …

The US-Iran relationship is described as a game in which the United States always has lost, and the only time he has won is because of JCPOA's win-win game. If the United States wants to withdraw from JCPOA, he will lose this game. In excerpt (25), it is underlined that JCPOA was a win for all players, so no one, including the US, can say they have lost in that game. However, if they want to withdraw from it, they want to change the game. So, Iran will also take a measure corresponding to this change.

JCPOA is described as a card game after Trump takes office because he tries to change the game by calling JCPOA unfair and decides to withdraw from this agreement. So, whether the United States withdraws and how Iran and other P5+1 countries react to this make the situation like gambling and playing card games. For instance, Zarif avoids answering the questions regarding Iran's reaction to the US's withdrawal from JCPOA by saying that no gambler shows his cards. The most common expression in this game is 'the cards are turned', which is the equivalent of 'tables are turned'. The Iranian authorities emphasize that any country withdrawing from JCPOA will become isolated. For instance, Trump will withdraw from international treaties, and this has got the table turned, and his teammates (Europe, Russia, and China) are leaving him. It turns the table in favor of Iran, for the United States is Iran's rival, and those who leave him behind become Iran's potential teammates or friends. Other actions related to games and sports have described this idea of 'isolation' by expressions such as 'driving into the corner of the ring'[156] and 'checkmate'.

(24)

ایران و آمریکا در طول 40 سال گذشته مسیر پر پیچ و خمی را طی کردند ، آمریکاییان همواره شکست خوردند از طبس گرفته تا جنگ 8 ساله ، دخالت در امور تا فشار بر ملت از طریق تحریم اما شاید بتوان گفت یک جا هم موفق شدند آن هم جایی که سر فرود آورند و حضور پیدا کردند پای میز مذاکره پای میز مذاکره با احترام با نمایندگان ملت ایران حرف زدند و نتیجه برد برد و بود . ... روحانی افزود : آمریکا اگر راه دیگری انتخاب کند شکست خواهد خورد ...

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[156] The English equivalent is 'driving into a corner.

Iran and the US have perambulated a winding path for 40 years. The Americans have always lost from Operation Eagle Claw[157] to eight-year war, [from] interfering in the affairs [of Iran] to put pressure on the nation via sanction. Nevertheless, they succeeded in one case, and it was when they bowed and sat at the negotiation table. They talked respectfully with the representatives of Iran's nation, and the result was a win-win. Rouhani added that if America chooses another way, it will lose.

(25)

در نهایت امروز قرارداد و توافقی حاصل شده که هیچ کس در دنیا نیست بگوید ایران بواسطه برجام ضرر کرده است . روحانی با اشاره به اینکه رییس جمهور آمریکا ، مخالفین و آنهایی هم که ضد جمهوری اسلامی ایران هستند ، با عصبانیت این توافق را بدترین توافق تاریخ آمریکا دانسته و می گویند ایران سر بقیه کلاه گذاشته که البته این حرف هم درست نیست ، افزود : آنچه در برجام اهمیت داشته و دارد موضوع تفاهم و برد برد بوده و هرگز برد باخت مطرح نبوده است . رییس جمهور ادامه داد : قطعا برجام به نفع کشور ، منطقه و کل جهان بوده و هست و هرکس بخواد به برجام صدمه بزند به خودش و کشورش صدمه زده است

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Today, finally, an agreement has been achieved that no one in the world says that Iran has incurred a loss due to the JCPOA. Rouhani pointed out that the US president, opponents, and those against the Islamic Republic of Iran angrily consider this as the worst agreement in the history of America. Moreover, they say that Iran has swindled the others. Of course, neither is this word accurate. Rouhani added that what has been and is essential in the JCPOA is the subject of understanding, and win-win and win-lose have never been discussed. The president continued that the JCPOA has been

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[157] It is the name of an American operation designed to set free American embassy staff who were captives in April 1980. Cf. Operation Eagle Claw - Wikipedia

beneficial for the country, the region, and the whole world, and it is. Furthermore, anyone who wants to undermine the JCPOA has damaged himself and his country.

(26)

او در پاسخ به خبرنگاران بریتانیایی و آلمانی در هفته گذشته گفته بود : من نمی خواهم بگویم قرار است با توافق هسته ای چه کار کنم . در واقع من یک سیاست مدار نیستم . کدام قماربازی قبل از اینکه با کارت هایش بازی کند دستش را رو می کند ؟

He answered British and German correspondents last week by saying that I do not want to say what I will do with the nuclear agreement. I am not a politician. What type of gambler shows his cards before the game?

(27)

... اتحادیه اروپا نیز موضع گیری را ضد آمریکا داشته و ورق به نفع ایران برگشته است . در گذشته همه کشورهای مدعی در کنار آمریکا در یک طرف بودند و جمهوری اسلامی در یک طرف دیگر ، اما امروز این قضیه متفاوت شده و آمریکا در یک طرف تنها مانده است و ناقض یک عهدنامه بین المللی است.

The European Union has also positioned against the US, and the table has been turned in favor of Iran. In the past, all countries were taking America's side at the other end of the spectrum, and the Islamic Republic was at the other end. Nevertheless, today, it is different, and the US has been left alone and [is considered as] an impediment to an international treaty.

(28)

نطق فاخر و شجاعانه و مدبرانه رییس جمهور ایران علاوه بر انعکاس شایسته استدلال و منطق ایران به جهان ، ترامپ را در گوشه رینگ به انزوای مضاعف کشاند . ... دکتر روحانی به درایت این بازی را مدیریت کرد .

The declamatory, courageous, and wise speech of Iran's president not only properly reflected Iran's argument and logic to the world but also drove Trump into the corner of the ring even more. … Dr. Rouhani wisely managed the game.

(29)

بعد از 40 سال این برای اولین بار است که آمریکایی ها یک موضوع را توجیه می کنند وآمریکا در این چالش سیاسی در انزوا است . امیدواریم بتوانیم کیش و مات را انجام دهیم و طرف مقابل دست از این بازی ها بردارد .

After 40 years, the Americans justify an issue for the first time, and the US is in isolation in this political challenge. We hope we can checkmate and the opposite side stops playing this game.

Generally speaking, any problem in international affairs is like a game. For the Reformists, politicians engage in that game by negotiating. So, every negotiation is like playing a game. If they come to a conclusion and produce an agreement, the outcome of the game will be 'peace' for everyone since the strategy was a win-win. If both players do not get the sense of winning and cannot produce an agreement, then 'war' will be the outcome. So all players will lose the game since it turned out to be a lose-lose game. There is no win-lose situation for them: Either everyone wins a peaceful and secure region and the world, or everyone loses in a war-stricken and insecure region and world. 'Win' is the equivalent of 'peace' and 'lose' for 'war'. In excerpt (31), Rouhani highlights that JCPOA proved that Iran is powerful in 'peace', too. Excerpt (17) also contains a point related to this discussion. A Reformist's quote is trying to make his point that voting for Rouhani is better because he will bring peace, and if Conservative Raeisi wins, he will bring war because they do not believe in negotiations and are against it JCPOA. In other words, if Rouhani loses, Iran will lose the game in the region and the world, and it will become a lose-lose situation for all players.

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(30)

خواست ما نسبت به همسایگان روابط دوستانه است ، به دلیل اینکه روابط خصمانه هم به ضرر ما و هم به

ضرر آنهاست . این باخت باخت می شود . ما با همه همسایگان مان جز 2 تا 3 همسایه روابط خوبی داریم که

آن دو سه تا هم برمی گردد به عربستان سعودی . وی با بیان اینکه اگر بین ما مشکلی وجود دارد راه حلش

گفتگوست

Our want is a friendly relationship with neighbors; because hostile relationships are
detrimental for all of us. It means lose-lose. We have good relationships with all of
our neighbors other than 2 or 3 of them. Those 2 or 3 also are due to Saudi Arabia. He
mentioned that if there is any problem, the solution is negotiation.

(31)

دیپلمات های ما آنقدر قوی هستند که با شش قدرت جهانی حرف بزنند و به توافق برسند ... ما به عنوان

توانمند سیاسی با قدرت ظاهر شدیم . نشان دادیم ما تنها در جنگ قوی نیستیم در صلح هم قوی هستیم . تنها در

اقتصاد قوی نیستیم در سیاست هم قوی هستیم ما اتحاد جهانی علیه ایران را شکستیم.

Our diplomats are so strong that they can talk to six world powers and come to an
agreement … We appeared as a politically powerful [country]. We showed that we are
mighty in war and peace. We are not influential just in economics. Nevertheless, we
are also powerful in politics. Moreover, we shattered international unity in Iran.

On the other hand, for Conservatives, you cannot play a win-win game with the
enemy, even if you accept to play with them in the first place. It makes a distinction between
the Conservatives and the Reformists in international affairs. Instead of spending a long time
playing a win-win game with the enemy, they suggest investing time in national development
by supporting Iranian manufacturers. For them, a win-win strategy means the enemy wins

everything, and they will take away all achievements of the country. Actually, in the Persian version, a pun is based on the homonyms of برد: *bord* meaning 'win' or 's/he won' and 's/he took away'. The Conservatives agree to negotiate with the enemy under one condition: Negotiating from the position of power without letting them score us and even without scoring them.

(32)

سرنوشت قطعی و حتمی این است که کسانی که به دنبال بازی برد ـ برد با دشمن هستند ، نتیجه ای جز باخت به دست نمی آورند . مگر می شود کسی به دنبال برد دشمنش باشد و در عین حال خودش نیز بردی داشته باشد ؟ ! ساده لوحانه تر از این ، در دنیا یافت نمی شود ! وی افزود : اگر فرصت هایی که برای بازی برد ـ برد با دشمن صرف شد ، صرف رونق بخشیدن به تولید در داخل و حمایت از تولیدگران داخلی می شد ، امروز در چنبر رکود اقتصادی گرفتار نمی شدیم و چرخ اقتصاد ما این چنین سست و ناتوان نمی چرخید !

The sure and inevitable destiny is that those seeking a win-win game with the enemy do not get any results other than losing. How is it possible to seek for the enemy's win and, at the same time, to expect a win for himself, too? The most naive belief in the world! He added that if the opportunities spent on a win-win game with the enemy were devoted to boom national manufacturing and support national manufacturers, today, we would not be caught up in the coil of economic depression, and the wheel of our economy would not turn slowly.

(33)

راهبرد برد ـ برد یعنی دشمن ببرد و چیزی هم باقی نگذارد ! دستاورد '' تقریبا هیچ '' که این روزها مقامات دولتی از آن یاد می کنند همین است .

Win-win strategy means letting the enemy take away [everything], and it does not leave anything! Government officials reminisce the 'almost zero' achievement these days.

(34)

شهید بهشتی می فرمود «مذاکره با دشمن ایرادی ندارد اما به شرط اینکه نه امتیازی به او بدهی و نه امتیازی

بگیری ، بلکه باید با زبان قدرت با دشمنان سخن بگویی و او را مرعوب خود بسازی» ؛ این سخن یعنی ما

اصلا نمی توانیم مذاکره برد ـ برد با دشمن داشته باشیم .

According to Shahid [the martyr] Beheshti, negotiating with the enemy is not an issue unless neither they nor we score. One should negotiate with the enemy from the position of power and make them intimidated. This quote means that we cannot have a win-win negotiation with the enemy.

Another hypothetical competition is the regional one between Iran and Saudi Arabia to become the first power in the Middle East. It is depicted as a card game where countries are either players or cards. If the country is in a position of power, it will play with other countries as its cards. For example, during his conflict with Saudi Arabia, Qatar used Iran as a card to win the game. However, for President Rouhani, teams are like families, and he says that Iran and Saudi Arabia are not rivals; they are family members (teammates) and should avoid clashes. Competition should be over the more powerful region, not the stronger country. Conjuring up win-win vs. win-lose situations argues that all teammates/ family members should be strong to have a strong team/ family (region). Competition between two teammates/ family members is destructive.

In one of its manifestos, Basij mentions that regional competitions are the United States' fault. Its interests lie in creating an arms race in the Middle East to sell its weapons. However, peace and stability in the region define Iran's regional interests. Another Conservative politician highlights the role of ultra-regional interferences as the reason behind insecurity in the Middle East. So, both Reformists and Conservatives disapprove of this regional competition. Reformists express it without pointing the finger at any country as the

source of discord between regional countries. On the other hand, Conservatives accuse ultra-regional forces of creating competitions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In reaction to Saudi Arabia considering Hamas and Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen as a terrorist group, a Conservative describes it as a race between Arabic countries to serve the United States and Israel.

(35)

من قبول ندارم موضوع ایران دلیل اصلی این تحولات و بروز تنش میان ریاض و دوحه باشد . قطر تلاش می کند از کارت ایران در برابر عربستان استفاده کند او با بیان اینکه مطرح شدن نام ایران به خاطر آن است که قطر تلاش می کند بتواند از کارت ایران استفاده کند ، اظهار داشت : قطر و عربستان از مدت ها پیش با یکدیگر اختلافات دیرینه ای دارد که این اختلافات را می توان در ابعاد سیاسی ، مذهبی ، فرهنگی و اقتصادی مشاهده کرد .

I do not believe that Iran is the main reason for these upheavals and Riyadh-Doha tension. Qatar tries to use the card of Iran confronting Suadi Arabia. He said that mentioning the name of Iran is because Qatar tries to be able to use the card of Iran. He affirmed that it had been a long time since Saudi Arabia and Qatar had ancient disagreements, and these disagreements are visible in political, religious, cultural, and economic aspects.

(36)

روحانی افزود : من قبلا هم گفته ام بحث در اینکه کدام کشور در منطقه ما قوی تر باشد ، باید کنار گذاشته شود قوی ترین کشور در منطقه نباید به عنوان هدف اول دنبال شود ، منطقه قوی تر باید مدنظر ما باشد نه اینکه در رقابت های منطقه ای یک کشور در منطقه بخواهد برابر دیگر کشور ها قد علم کند و قدرت خود را به رخ بکشد و تفرقه و شکاف را بیشتر کند . ما یک خانواده هستیم در منطقه مهم خاورمیانه و غرب آسیا نمی توانیم از هم فاصله بگیریم بگذاریم خانواده قوی در جمع خوب زندگی می کند نه اینکه یک فرد در خانواده قوی باشد و بقیه ضعیف باشند . به فکر منطقه ای قوی تر باشیم و رقابت های مخرب و بی جا را کنار بگذاریم.

Rouhani added that I have already said that the discussion of which country should be the strongest in the region must be discarded. Being the strongest country in the

region should not be the priority, but a more powerful region must be our consideration. To make the rift worse, one country should not stand up to other countries and show off its power in regional competitions. We are a family in the critical region of the Middle East and West Asia. We cannot distance ourselves from each other. A strong family lives in good company; not one person is strong, and the rest of the family is weak. Let us think of a more powerful region and withdraw from destructive and unnecessary competitions.

(37)

ثانيا عربستان با تروريست خواندن حماس و اخوان المسلمين قصد دارد قطر را از حمايت از اين جنبش هاى اسلامى بازدارد و به اين ترتيب در خدمت به اسراييل و آمريكا گوى سبقت را بربايد . به همين دليل مى بينيد كه ترامپ رييس جمهور آمريكا از عربستان در برابر قطر حمايت كرده است و قطر را حامى تروريسم مى نامد و اسراييل نيز خرسندى خود را مخفى نكرده است.

Secondly, Saudi Arabia intends to prevent Qatar from supporting Islamic movements by calling Hamas Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen terrorist groups. Moreover, it wins the competition of serving Israel and America in this way. That is why you see that the president of the United States, Trump, has backed Saudi Arabia countering Qatar and calling Qatar the supporter of terrorism. Moreover, Israel has not hidden his contentment either.

After clarifying the general idea of the game/competition, detailed elements of this scenario will help to complete this portrait. One element is the playground, and in whose playground players are playing. If someone plays in the enemy's playground, they are serving the enemy's interests, and, in this sense, it is similar to the conceptual element of 'mill'

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explained in house and construction scenarios. The English version of this idiom is 'playing into somebody's hands. A Conservative MP criticizes JCPOA broadly and harshly. He refers to Hans Christian Andersen's 'the emperor's new clothes' and compares those praising JCPOA with sycophants in that story. JCPOA was not a victory, so it had zero achievements, and flatterers praised 'nothing'. He regards this action as playing on the enemy's ground, i.e., for the enemy and against the country. Here Iran and its political system are like the emperor with no clothes on, and flattering Reformists and authorities are playing for the enemy by hiding the truth. The discord between the politicians and being couraged by the arrogance's *smile*[158] are other actions regarded by the Conservatives as playing in the enemy's playground.

(38)

متاسفانه به جای عذرخواهی از مردم طلبکارانه از نتایج نامشهود و غیرواقعی برجام سخن می گویند که انسان را یاد آن داستان «پادشاه و خیاط می اندازد .... به راستی چرا امروز عده ای برجامی که نتایجی ندارد را پرنتیجه جلوه می دهند ؟ انسان می ماند که آنها کدام طرف بازی می کنند ، در زمین خودی یا زمین دشمن ؟ در هر صورت نفوذ همین است.

Unfortunately, instead of apologizing to people, they talk about unreal and invisible results of the JCPOA with a sense of entitlement. It reminds us of the story of the king and the tailor. … Indeed, why do some overplay the JCPOA today that has no results. One gets confused about whose ground they are playing; in our ground or the enemy's ground? Anyway, this is infiltration.

(39)

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[158] Another reference to the smiling faces of Zarif and Kerry.

امروز و در شرایط جدید ما به انسجام ملی و هم داستانی همه دلسوزان و جناح ها نیازمندیم . کوبیدن بر طبل تفرقه ، بازی در زمین دشمن مکار و حیله گری است که به دنبال تحمیل خود از طریق برجام و امثال برجام است .

Today and in the new circumstance, we need national coherence and unity among all officials and parties. Hitting the drum of discord is playing in the deceitful enemy's ground seeking to impose himself via the JCPOA and the like.

The clash between the Reformists and the Conservatives manifests itself once again. Conservatives insisted on the ineffectuality of JCPOA and tearing it up if Trump does this. Reformists believed that tearing up the JCPOA is like self-injury and playing in the enemy's playground. Another sign of playing for the enemy is becoming 'hopeless' since Rouhani's motto was also 'hope and prudence'.

(40)

... ولی این که توقع داشته باشند ، آمریکا هر کاری کرد ما برجام را پاره کنیم که منافع مان در برجام را از بین ببریم که به آمریکا ضربه بزنیم ، نوعی خودزنی است . در زمین دشمن بازی نخواهیم کرد ... هر زمان که منافع ما در برجام تامین نشود ، تعهدات طرف مقابل انجام نشده و نقض برجام صورت بگیرد ، ما برنامه خود را آماده کرده ایم و ... بازگشت سریع ایران در غنی سازی پیش بینی شده است . ما کاملا هوشمندانه تصمیم می گیرند و در زمین دشمن بازی نمی کنیم.

However, expecting that we tear up the JCPOA because of whatever America did and we lose our benefits in the JCPOA to harm the US is a kind of self-injury. We will not play in the enemy's ground … whenever our benefits in the JCPOA are not obtained, the other party has not acted upon his commitments, and the JCPOA has been violated; we have prepared our plan and … Iran's fast return to the enrichment has been predicted. We decide intelligently and do not play in the enemy's ground.

(41)

<div dir="rtl">

... تصمیم و هدف قدرت های بزرگ بویژه آمریکا و آنچه در منطقه شاهدیم نسبت به ایران ، نهایتا برای این

است که مردم را به آینده ناامید و کم امید کرده و در فعالیت ها و سرمایه گذاری ها دچار تردید کنند ؛ لذا همه

باید هوشیار باشند که در زمین دشمن بازی نکرده و در این دام نیافتند.

</div>

… Great powers and especially America's decision and purpose in the region for Iran
is finally making people disappointed about the future and making them doubtful
about activities and investments. That is why everyone should be aware not to play in
the enemy's ground and not get trapped [by this plan].

Where is the playground of each player in international relations? Moreover, who
determines it for countries? The answer to these questions is interwoven with the issue of
'teaming up'. For the Reformists, *democracy* and *negotiation* are like 'teaming' with other
countries to set common goals and unite together to avoid war. A criterion for choosing
teammates is to know their international relations that determine their playground. For
instance, in excerpt (43), a political scholar argues that Russia is not a hundred-percent
trustworthy teammate for Iran in international affairs because Russia wants the whole world
to be his playground and thinks big. That is why it makes ties with both Iran and Turkey; i.e.,
Russia wants to interact with each player in a manner that serves its interests better. So
Russia will manipulate Tehran-Ankara ties according to its benefits.

On the contrary, the President's advisor believes that the Iran-Turkey-Russia tie will
help change the playground in a way that suits all these countries. The Middle East is a
critical playground, and Iran must be very cautious and avoid emotionally triggered actions in
a playground that someone else has determined for Iran. In this case, ISIS as a terrorist group
is like a game designed by others to threaten and demolish Iran's security.

(42)

فرصت دیگر نزدیکی ایران به ترکیه است چون ترکیه از حامیان و دوستان قطر است . ... این دیپلمات عالی
رتبه سابق کشورمان تاکید کرد : از طریق گفت وگو و دیپلماسی و یارگیری می توان بر مشکلات موجود فایق
شد.

Another opportunity is the closeness of Iran and Turkey; because Turkey is one of
Qatar's supporters and friends. This high-ranking former diplomat of our country
affirmed that problems could be solved through talks, diplomacy, and teaming up.

(43)

این کارشناس ارشد مسایل سیاسی با بیان اینکه بازگشت به خاورمیانه بخشی از بازی روسیه در معادلات
جهانی است ، یادآور شد : ایران و ترکیه بازیگرانی در سطح معادلات منطقه ای هستند در حالی که روس ها
زمین بازی شان را در سطح میدان جهانی می دانند و همین موجب می شود روس ها هم با ایران روابطی را
برقرار کنند و هم با ترک ها و با هر کدام از این بازیگران به نحوه دلخواه خود تعامل داشته باشند . پس روسیه
بازیگر صد در صد قابل اعتماد هم برای ترکیه و هم برای ایران نیست بلکه می خواهد منافع خویش را تنظیم
و روابط تهران و آنکارا را بر اساس منافع خود در معادلات منطقه ای موازنه و تنظیم کند .

This senior political expert mentioned that returning to the Middle East is part of
Russia's game in international equations. He reminded that Iran and Turkey are
players at the level of regional equations, while Russia's playground is at the level of
the whole world. It makes Russia have a relationship with both Iran and Turkey and
interact with them as they desire. So, Russia is not a hundred-percent trustworthy
player for either Iran or Turkey. It wants to set his interests and, then, balance and set
Iran-Turkey relations according to his [own] interests in the region.

(44)

مشاور رییس جمهور با اشاره به اجلاس سه جانبه روسای نیروهای مسلح ایران – روسیه – ترکیه ، اظهار

کرد : از طریق هم افزایی توان نظامی و اطلاعاتی با هوشمندی دیپلماتیک و ایتلاف سازی چندجانبه می توان

با بینشی راهبردی زمین بازی را تغییر داد.

The president's advisor, pointing to the Iran-Russia-Turkey trilateral meeting of
armed forces chiefs, stated that the playground could be changed with strategic insight
through military and information synergy accompanied with diplomatic intelligence
and multilateral alliance formation.

(45)

البته تحولات جهانی نیز نگران کننده است و اتفاقاتی که در غرب رخ می دهد و چهره های خشن و جنگ

طلبی که چه در آمریکا و چه در اروپا سرکار می آیند یک موضوع را به ما هشدار می دهد و آن اینکه باید

مراقب باشیم که هر تصمیم و اقدام ما باید بر مبنای عقلانیت و منافع ملی باشد و هیچ حرکت احساسی که

زمین بازی آن را دیگران برای ما ترسیم می کنند ، نباید اتفاق بیافتد . معاون اول رییس جمهور اضافه کرد :

امنیت امروز ایران برای خیلی ها تبدیل به مسیله شده است ؛ گروه های تروریستی و داعش با هدف ضربه

زدن به امنیت ایران ایجاد شدند

Of course, global upheavals are also alarming, and incidents that occur in the West,
rough people and warmongers that have come to power in whether America or Europe
all warns us that we should be careful and every decision we make or every action we
take should be based on rationality and national interests. [It warns that] no emotional
action should be taken that lets the others adjust the playground.

Now that the main issue related to game and competition on an international scale is
set forth, we can address other target domains related to national affairs described as a game.
The presidential election is the most critical (national) game. It is a 'game

of *religious* democracy' in which there is no loser, and every candidate has already won since it is an Islamic competition and they compete for serving people; i.e., running as a candidate, per se, is a win. The real winner in this game is the nation. According to a famous clergyman, the exciting difference between Iran's general elections and those in non-religious and Western governments is that the competition is for winning 'servitude' and not 'power'. If it turns into the race for power, then the field or playground will become the 'evil field,' and the enemy will come to play his role in this evil field. Another clergyman suggests that presidential debates must be like 'clerical debates', which are logic-centered without spite or complex. He adds that stating any remark that debilitates the political system is *haram*.

Alternatively, a Reformist creates a religious portrait to elaborate immoral issues in presidential competitions. He believes that those who would do anything to gain power and win this competition are ready to sacrifice all Revolutionary, religious, and moral values before the statue of power because they believe the end justifies the means. The Supreme Leader emphasizes that everyone should participate and vote considering God's will and satisfaction, and in this way, God will bless the votes, and what is the best for the nation will happen.

Another religious concept regarding the vote is whether it is *halal* or *haram*. It was the first time that these religious terms emerged in the political history of Iran. This neologism was introduced by a clergyman who supported the Conservative candidate. He says that his candidate has earned 16 million *halal* votes in a semi-official gathering. Moreover, this became the source of so many debates since it implied that Rouhani's votes were *haram*, which is a powerful and negative word in Islamic terminology. It was interpreted as an insult to those who voted for Rouhani as if they were unbelievers.

Furthermore, it was considered as an act of promoting disunity. Then the Conservative clergyman clarified by saying that he meant those votes that intentionally or unintentionally go to another candidate's ballot box is *haram*, and those that truly belong to the candidate are *halal*. Interestingly enough, such a deep-seated religious mindset is depicted in excerpt (52). A disqualified candidate describes his situation as a believer who wanted to do the righteous deed and serve the nation, and God has already considered his good deed. Moreover, he is even happier because he has gained a righteous deed for his life hereafter without going through trouble.

(46)

انتخابات شبیه مسابقات ورزشی است برنده ای دارد و بازنده ای . برد و باخت مهم است اما اصل ورزش مهم تر از آن است . با باخت یک تیم و برد تیم دیگر ورزش تعطیل نمی شود . در میدان سیاست هم مهم تر از برد یک جناح و باخت جناح دیگر حفظ اساس مردم سالاری مهم است . انتقال قدرت در طول تاریخ ایران همواره خونین و خشن بوده است . به برکت انقلاب اسلامی است که انتقال نرم قدرت در ایران از طریق مردم سالاری دینی نهادینه شده است . مردم سالاری دینی یکی از مولفه های مهم عزت و اقتدار ملی ماست که باید از آن پاسداری کنیم .

Elections are like athletic contests and have winners and losers. Winning or losing is important, but the principle of playing sports is more important than that. Playing sports does not stop due to the defeat of one team and the winning of another team. Also, in politics, preserving the principle of democracy is more important than the winning of one wing and the defeat of another. Throughout the history of Iran, the power transmission has always been rough and bloody. Thanks to the Islamic Revolution, soft power transmission through religious democracy has been established. Religious democracy is one of the essential components of our glory and national authority that we should preserve.

(47)

رای در نظام جمهوری اسلامی ترجیحی است رای در نظام جمهوری اسلامی برای حذف دیگران و یا غلبه بر دیگران نیست بلکه رای ترجیحی است ؛ یعنی کاندیدای منتخب را بر کسی که رای دوم را می آورد ، ترجیح می دهند ، بنابراین رای ترجیحی اینگونه نیست که بگوییم طرف مقابل شکست خورده چون او هم آمده وظیفه اش را انجام داده است و انجام وظیفه ، شکست نیست ؛ پیروزی است . این حضور برای انجام تکلیف الهی و ارزش های انسانی در صحنه انتخابات است و به معنای عرضه داشتن خود به توده مردم و انتخاب ترجیحی مردم است ...

The vote in the political system of the Islamic Republic is preferential. The vote in the political system of the Islamic Republic is not for eliminating or dominating others, but it is preferential. It means that the elected candidate is preferred to the second candidate. So, a preferential vote does not mean the other candidate's defeat. Because he also has come to do [according to] his duty. Furthermore, doing duty is not a defeat; it is a victory. This [running for presidential candidacy] presence is for doing divine duty and human values in the scene of elections, and it refers to presenting oneself to the mass of people and their preferential election …

(48)

... ریاست جمهوری ... رقابت در خدمت است ... می خواهند او را به امکاناتش به عنوان یک خادم انتخاب کنند ، نه یک صاحب قدرت ؛ چند نفر آمدند امکانات و برنامه های خودشان را نشان دهند ، هرکدام مردم خواستند به عنوان نوکر و خادمشان انتخاب کنند ، این معنای رقابت در اسلامی است و لذا رقابت در قدرت در اسلام نداریم ... رقابت برای کسب قدرت امری غیردینی و غربی است ... از یک طرف انتخابات یک میدان توطیه ، یک میدان فتنه ، یک میدان ابلیسیه و شیطانیه برای دشمنان ما هست که دشمنان ما ... مردم و چهره ها را به جان هم بیندازند ، مردم را دچار شک و تردید کنند ... این میدان کار برای دشمنان است.

The presidential election is a competition for serving … [people] who want to choose someone based on his capabilities as a servant and not a power-holder. A couple of

people came and showed their capabilities and plans. Moreover, people choose the one they want as their servant. It is the meaning of Islamic competition. We do not have competition for power in Islam … Competition for gaining power is a non-religious and Western thing … On the other hand, the election is an arena of conspiracy, sedition, and Satan for our enemies so that they can pit people against [political] celebrities, make people doubtful … this is the arena of the enemy to work [for his aims].

(49)

می توان رقابت انتخاباتی داشت ولی رقابت ، رقابت طلبگی باشد . ... بهتر است این مناظره به مانند مناظرات طلبگی باشد . مناظره طلبگی منطق محور است و عقده و کینه در آن وجود ندارد . گفتن حرف هایی که باعث تضعیف نظام می شود ، حرام است ... اگر خروجی حرف های آنها باعث تضعیف شدن نظام است گفتن آن حرف حرام است.

It is possible to have an electoral competition, but it is like clerical debates. … It is better for these debates to be like clerical debates. Clerical debates are logic-centered. There is no spite or complex. Stating any remark that debilitates the political system is *haram* … If the outcome of those words causes debilitation of the political system, expressing them is *haram*.

(50)

متاسفانه امروز در عرصه رقابت انتخاباتی بسیاری از طالبان قدرت به هیچ امر اخلاقی پایبند نیستند و در عمل نشان داده اند «هدف وسیله را توجیه می کند» . آنان تنها برای کسب قدرت تلاش می کنند و چه باک اگر تمامی ارزش های انقلابی و اخلاقی و دینی را در پای «تندیس قدرت» قربانی کنند .

Unfortunately, nowadays, many power-seekers do not observe any ethical principles in electoral competition, and they have shown in their actions that the end justifies the

means. They try to gain power, and they do not care if they sacrifice all religious, ethical, and revolutionary values before the statue of power.

(51)

… بنابراین همه باید با در نظر گرفتن رضای الهی و با خالص کردن نیت ها در عرصه رقابت ها و تبلیغات انتخابات فعالیت کنند . رهبر انقلاب اسلامی با تاکید بر اینکه اگر فعالیت های انتخابات با هدف رضایت الهی باشد ، خداوند به آنها برکت خواهد داد و آنچه که به نفع ملت ایران است ، پیش خواهد آمد.

… So, everyone should consider God's satisfaction and purify their intentions regarding electoral competitions and campaigns. The Leader of the Islamic Revolution affirmed that if electoral activities aim to satisfy God, God will bless them and what benefits the Iranian nation will happen.

(52)

اگر خواست خدا بر این قرار می گرفت که در میان احراز صلاحیت شده ها باشم ، خدا را شکر می کردم و اکنون که مشیت الهی جز این است به طور مضاعف خدا را شاکرم ؛ چراکه معتقدم اگر با اخلاص وارد این عرصه خطیر شده باشم ، خداوند متعال هم اجر مجاهدت در رقابت سالم انتخاباتی یک ماه آینده و هم ثواب امر خطیر اداره اجرایی چهارسال آینده کشور را بدون هرگونه زحمت ظاهری به حساب آخرتم واریز کرده است.

If God's will had been my accreditation, I would have been thankful to God. Moreover, now that His providence is not so, I thank God even more. Because I believe that when I enter sincerely into this solemn arena, God both wages diligence in healthy electoral competition for one month and deposits the meritoriousness of solemn act of administering the country for the next four years to the account of my afterlife without any apparent inconvenience.

This national game of democracy has its own rules. It is a competition for 'democracy' and, at the same time, democratic rules govern it. The players should observe

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these rules and accept the results achieved through those rules. Moreover, according to those rules, some pioneering Reformist figures received red cards and were disqualified from political games after the 2009 unrests. Nevertheless, Hashemi helped Rouhani become the president, and, in this way, he helped the Reformists get back to political games and competitions (Exc. 33 in section 9.1.1.1 and Exc. 54 in this section). Even in the 2016 parliament elections, some famous Reformists were disqualified, and it is described as receiving a red card in advance when the game has not started yet; in other words, they were not given a chance to play. In this excerpt, those Reformists are called 'generals,' which can conjure both 'golden general' in Japanese chess and generals in the war scene. Moreover, this can show how much blurry the borderline between these two scenarios can become.

(53)

… در انتخابات ریاست جمهوری گذشته ، فاصله رای ریاست محترم جمهور با کاندیدای بعدی حتی 51 درصد هم نبود چیزی حدود 50.07 درصد بود ، نصف جمعیت رای دهنده به رییس جمهور رای ندادند ، اما چون قانون و دموکراسی را قبول کردیم ، نتیجه انتخابات طبق همین قاعده بازی مورد قبول همه قرار گرفت و رییس جمهور قانونی مورد قبول همگان حتی مخالفان قرار گرفت .

… In the last presidential election, the esteemed president's margin of victory was not even 51 percent. It was almost 50.07, and half of the voters had not voted for the president. However, since we accepted rules and democracy, the result of the election was accepted based on this same game rule. Furthermore, the legal president was accepted by everyone, even by the opponents.

(54)

در انتخابات هفتم اسفند 94 قبل از شروع به کار و بازی ، تعدادی از ژنرال های ما را با کارت قرمز اخراج کردند .

Many of our generals were given red cards and sent off the field in the 2016 election on February 26th before the election and game's start.

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Though they insist on the importance of the game itself and not the results, there is a winner vs. loser dichotomy for some Conservatives, and it is part of the game of democracy. Even on a national scale, Reformists believe in the possibility of a win-win strategy that brings unity and is also an update or a better version of the win-lose game. Another Reformist answers a question regarding how to end house arrest Reformists after the 2009 unrests by saying that designing a win-win game in politics is difficult, but it is not impossible. For Reformists, 2009 incidents were lose-lose situations. Furthermore, it is the time of win-win, which refers to 'national reconciliation proposed by Reformists to absolve the Reformists in house arrest. Bottom line, for Reformists, a win-win strategy aims to bring *unity*, whether it is an international issue or a national one. However, the Conservatives' side of the story is different.

Regarding presidential elections, Conservatives criticize the Reformists for talking of win-lose: How come they talk of win-win in their negotiations with the enemy, but when it comes to the friend, they pursue win-lose?

(55)

آشنا با بیان اینکه هر گونه راه حلی باید متکی به اقدامات و پیشرفت های دسته جمعی و دوری جستن از یکجانبه گرایی ، انحصار طلبی و اصرار بر برد خود و باخت دیگران باشد ، یادآور شد : وقتی از بی معنا بودن بازی برد - باخت در دنیای امروز سخن می گوییم باید در نظر داشته باشیم که این اصل در مورد تعدد و تکثر هویت های مذهبی ، فرهنگی و قومی نیز صدق می کند . وی افزود : بازی برد - برد بین هویت ها بدین معناست که چیرگی و اقتدار هویت و وحدت ملی به معنای تضعیف و حذف هویت های متکثر مذهبی ، قومیتی ، فرهنگی و زبانی نیست بلکه در تلاقی فرهنگ ها و هویت های متکثری است که آموخته اند در کنار یکدیگر مسالمت آمیز زندگی کنند.

Ashena expressed that any solution should depend on collective actions and developments, and [it should] avoid unilateralism, monopolism, and insisting on

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oneself's win and others' lose. He reminded us that when we say that nowadays, the win-lose game is nonsense, we should consider that this principle also applies to the plurality of religious, cultural, and ethnic identities. He added that a win-win game among identities signifies that the dominance and authority of national unity and identity do not mean weakening and eliminating plural religious, ethnic, cultural, and lingual identities. Nevertheless, it means the intersection of plural cultures and identities that have learned cohabitation in peace.

(56)

من معتقدم آنچه که در 88 رخ داد بازی باخت – باخت بود و از سال 92 بنا را بر این گذاشتیم بازی برد – برد داشته باشیم و باید با رفتار همگرایی مسایل را حل کنیم.

I believe that what happened in 2009 was a lose-lose game, and we have opted for the win-win game since 2013, and we should solve the problems in a convergent manner.

(57)

اصلاح طلبان همواره از گفت وگو استقبال می کنند و آن را بهترین راه حل برای از میان بردن اختلافات می دانند . اصلاح طلبان معتقدند وقتی با دشمن می توان گفت وگو کرد پس به راحتی می توان با در نظر گرفتن منافع ملی مذاکره را پیش برد . وی ادامه داد : زمانی که مساله دشوار هسته ای از طریق گفت وگو حل می شود مسایل درون خانوادگی نیز قطعا با گفت وگو حل و فصل خواهد شد .

Reformists have always welcomed conversation, and they consider it the best solution for resolving discords. Reformists believe that when it is possible to have a conversation with the enemy, it is easy to continue negotiations considering national interests. He continued that when the problematic nuclear issue is solved through conversation, intra-family issues will be solved with the conversation, too.

(58)

در گفت وگو ها وقتی به دشمن می رسند از لفظ برد برد استفاده می کنند و می گویند ما مناظره ای با شما می

کنیم که برد برد باشد اما وقتی به دوست می رسند حرف از برد و باخت می زنند و به دنبال افشا گری و زدن

رقیب هستند که این صحیح نیست.

During conversations, when it comes to the enemy, they use the term win-win, and they say, "we will have a win-win debate with you". However, when it comes to friends, they talk of losing and winning, seeking revelation and beating the rival, which is not proper.

Now that winner, strategies, and rules of competition (elections) are discussed, one final point remains worth mentioning. Rouhani was the winner of the 2017 election, and this victory was figuratively described as the victory for peace, reconciliation, and unity against war and disunity. It is the victory for rationality discourse against radicalism. It is also portrayed as the morning: the morning of victory. So it is an embedded metaphor. Victory in this competition is like morning sunshine after nights (difficult times) of competition.

Moreover, it was not his victory; it was the nation's victory. Government's achievements are nation's achievements; they are inseparable, for government is nation's representative. Whether national or international, people are the real winners in any competition. People's *presence* by the ballot boxes is the achievement (result) of the Revolution and a deed to democracy in the country. However, what is the secret to this victory? It is Guardianship, following Supreme Leader's guidelines, and unity. Interestingly enough, public elections are also described as 'democracy exercises', and the more elections people participate in (the more exercises they do), the more democracy gets absorbed in society's culture and spirit.

(59)

این پیروزی ، پیروزی صلح و آشتی بر تنش و خشونت بود او با بیان اینکه ملت بزرگ ایران پیروز اصلی

انتخابات هستند ، گفت : پیروز انتخابات جمهوریت و اسلامیت است . پیروز انتخابات آزادی و استقلال است .

پیروز انتخابات حاکمیت ملی است ... این پیروزی ، پیروزی وحدت و انسجام ملی بر انشقاق و چند دستگی

بود.

This victory was a victory of peace and reconciliation against tension and violence. He mentioned that Iran's great nation was the primary victor of the election. Republicanism and Islam were the election's victors. The victor of the election is liberty and independence. Besides, national sovereignty is the election's victor. This victory was the victory of unity and national coherence against division and disunity.

(60)

روحانی دولت را نماینده مردم ایران دانست و اظهارداشت : بیان موفقیت ها و پیروزی های دولت چیزی جز

بیان موفقیت ها و پیروزی های ملت نیست . دولت چیزی نیست جز نماینده مردم

Rouhani considered himself the Iranian nation's representative and declared that expressing the government's successes and victories is nothing but expressing the nation's successes and victories. The government is nothing but the nation's representative.

(61)

رییس سازمان عقیدتی سیاسی ارتش ، در پایان با بیان اینکه ولایتمداری از جمله نکات برجسته و درس های

دفاع مقدس است ، تاکید کرد : ولایتمداری تنها راه تضمین کننده پیروزی ملت ایران در برابر دشمن است .

At the end of his speech, the head of Ideological-Political Organization of armed forces expressed that Guardianship is among highlighted points and lessons of Holy Defense. He affirmed that Guardianship is the only way to guarantee the victory of Iran's nation in front of the enemy.

(62)

یونسی ، بر ضرورت تمرین بیشتر دموکراسی و مردم سالاری در کشور تاکید کرد و گفت : در چنین
شرایطی است که مردم سالاری در جان و روح و فرهنگ جامعه نفوذ می کند.

Younesi insisted on the necessity of more exercises of democracy in the country. He said that it is in such circumstances that democracy absorbs in the society's spirit and culture.

What kind of game or competition is the presidential election? It has been described as a soccer and 'pigeon-playing'[159] game. In soccer, for example, Conservative Bahonar considers political parties as soccer teams participating in league matches (elections) and adds that the most important thing is the national team's success. He mentions that now that the league season has finished, the election is terminated, so it is time to think of the national team and national coherence and security by putting aside the discords.

Pigeon-playing is not specific to Iran. It is called the 'pigeon game' in the United States, taken there by Italian immigrants[160]. The game is played on the rooftops, and two or more players fly their marked pigeons, and the competitors try to catch the other players' pigeons by stimulating pigeons to intermingle and land on their rooftop with the new flock. Another way of playing this game is based on how long and how far one's pigeon can fly to announce the winner. The players may gamble on pigeons and results. The players set the rules, prize, and strategy before the game. Some players may hire someone else on the rooftops to wave a piece of black cloth, prevent the pigeons from landing on the rooftop, and make them fly for longer. At least in the Iranian version of this game, it is considered

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[159] This game's general structure and interpretation will be discussed at the end of this section.
[160] THE PIGEON GAME: A FADING SPORT IN NEW YORK - The New York Times (nytimes.com)

cheating and breaking the rules. A Conservative describes the presidential election as a 'pigeon game' and regards introducing more than one candidate from each political affiliation as 'cheating' in the game. He expounds that it is like playing pigeon game on the rooftop of *power*, and it is like insulting people as voters and damaging national security.

(63)

این دوره از انتخابات آرایش سیاسی گروه ها ، احزاب ، رجال سیاسی و مذهبی اضلاع رقابت ، شبیه نوعی کفتربازی است که نگارنده این نوع مدل رقابت را کفتربازی سیاسی روی بام قدرت نام می نهم . این رویکرد در انتخابات کنونی که ممکن است مورد رنجش مردم از باب لطمه به اقتدار و امنیت ملی شود ، مذموم است . با آنکه معمول است در هر انتخابات از هر ضلع رقابت با هر ضلع سلایق سیاسی یک نفر به میدان پا بگذارد اما متاسفانه از هر ضلع 2 یا 3 یا بیشتر نامزده شده اند .

In this course of the [presidential] election, the political arrangement of groups, parties, political and religious men from [all] sides of the competition was like a type of pigeon game. I, as the author, call it a political pigeon game on the roof of power. This approach in the current election which may hurt people due to damaging national authority and security, is heinous. Although the norm is that one person from each side of the competition or each side of political preference enters into the arena of competition; but, unfortunately, each side has 2, 3, or more candidates.

There were other competitions alongside the main presidential competition. For instance, there are 'empty-promise race' and 'slogan race' among some candidates to deceive the voters, which is a sign of demagogism. Another unhealthy competition among authorities is the competition for depreciating the Revolution's achievements. A former MP criticizing JCPOA states that once, there was a race for altruism in Iran and, with the emergence of JCPOA, this will change into the race for capital and jollification. The probable reason

behind this conclusion is that JCPOA was supposed to bring foreign investment and economic prosperity. His justification for this argument is that Imam Khomeini founded the Revolution to fight against capitalism and jollification. The reason might be the presumption in most religions that money is filthy.

(64)

... این مسیله به ویژه در فضای انتخاباتی کشور که حزب محور نیست ، خاصه در زمان انتخابات ریاست جمهوری شدت می یابد . به همین دلیل بعضا نامزدها در طرح وعده های مردم پسند مسابقه می گذارند .

... This issue worsens significantly in the electoral atmosphere of the country that is not party-oriented, specifically in the period of the presidential election. That is why sometimes candidates compete with others for popular empty promises.

(65)

البته ما بعضا همه با هم مسابقه گذاشتیم در اینکه هرچه در انقلاب صورت گرفته را به نوعی بگوییم بد بوده است ؛ اصلا این طور نیست . انقلاب کارهای بسیار بزرگی کرده است.

Of course, sometimes we compete with each other to say that whatever has happened in the Revolution[161] is terrible. This is not true at all. The Revolution has done great things.

(66)

وی با بیان فرمایشات امام خمینی (ره) درباره جنگ مکتب جمهوری اسلامی ایران علیه دنیای پول و خوشگذرانی تاکید کرد : افرادی که میلیونها حقوق دریافت می کنند و می گویند قانونی است جزو مکاتبی هستند که امام خمینی (ره) در پی جنگ با آنها بود . نماینده سابق مجلس شورای اسلامی گفت : بحث من این

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[161] It refers to contemporary Iran after the Islamic Revolution.

نیست که برجام چیزی به دست آورده است من نگران این هستم فرهنگی که ملتی را به جایی می رساند در راه

ایثار مسابقه می گذاشتند ، از بین برود .

He quoted Imam Khomeini's remarks condemning jollification and materialistic issues. He affirmed that those whose salary is millions of Rials, and they say that this is legal, are part of the doctrine against which Imam Khomeini was in the war. The former MP said I am not concerned about what the JCPOA has achieved. I am [just] worried about the demolishment of the culture that led people to compete for altruism.

The puzzle is also another game used to describe various concepts such as infiltration, 2009 sedition[162], Iranophobia, and even peace. It refers to any action taken as 'putting a piece of the puzzle to complete it, and the puzzle is any plot designed for someone else to act on it. It is mainly used with negative semantic prosody. It was once used to imply positive meaning: Astana Peace Talks is described as a piece to complete the peace puzzle in the Syrian crisis.

(67)

آمریکایی ها 110 میلیارد دلار نخود و لوبیا به حکام وهابی عربستان نفروخته اند ، آنها انواع جنگ افزار و مدرن ترین سلاح های کشتار جمعی را به ریاض فروخته اند . این اولین گام واشنگتن در پسابرجام در تکمیل پازل گسترش سایه جنگ و ایران هراسی است.

The Americans have not sold 110-billion-dollar legumes to Saudi Arabia. They have sold them various types of weaponry and the most modern weapons of mass

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[162] It is the same term used for describing 2009 post-election unrests.

destruction to Riyadh. Washington's first step in the post-JCPOA era is to complete the puzzle of spreading Iranophobia and the shadow of war.

(68)

امیدواریم نشست آستانه موفق باشد و طرفین به راهکار و توافق دست یابند تا قسمتی از پازل صلح کامل شود

.

We hope that the Astana talk is successful and the parties achieve a solution and agreement so that a part of the peace puzzle is completed.

Besides presidential-election competitions, other games/ competitions may have a negative or positive connotation. For instance, aristocracy competition (with negative semantic prosody), martyrdom race for defending Iran (with positive semantic prosody), servitude-to-God race, and puzzle are among them. For example, Hojaji, whom ISIS decapitated, is one of the winners of the race for servitude to God. It highlights, once again, the role of martyrdom in Islamic teachings that are the basis of Iran's Revolution.

(69)

صادقی مقدم با اشاره امنیت کشور در سایه تدابیر رهبری انقلاب اظهار کرد : جوانان امروز برای دفاع از این کشور مسابقه می دهند و دشمن هرگز نمی تواند چشم طمعی به آنها داشته باشد.

Sadeghi Moghaddam pointed to national security under the shadow of [thanks to] prudence of Revolution's Leader and stated that today, young people compete [with each other] for defending the country. Moreover, the enemy can never cast greedy eyes on them.

(70)

شهید حججی نماد استمرار عاشوراست . ... همین ها هستند که ... در این میدان سر و جان باخته اند تا

در مسابقه «بندگی» به نتیجه برد برد برسند.

Shahid [martyr] Hojaji is the symbol of the continuity of Ashura. … They are those who … has lost head and life [the most precious things they had] in this field to gain win-win result in the race of 'servitude'.

(71)

انقلاب ما پیامش ضداشرافی گری است ، زیرا اشرافی گری امری نیست که توقف داشته باشد و تبدیل به

یک مسابقه بین مسیولان می شود . مردمی که مشکلات بسیار سخت دارند نگاه شان به زندگی مسیولان است .

حقوق های نجومی خلاف انتظار مردم است . کسانی که الگوهای مردم هستند نباید با اشرافی گری سازگار

باشند.

The message of our Revolution is anti-aristocracy because aristocracy does not have an end, and it turns into a contest among authorities. People who have complicated problems watch the lives of authorities. People do not expect staggering paychecks [of their authorities]. Those who are people's role models should not accord with the aristocracy.

Before closing this section on the Game scenario, we need to explain a typical structure; since it is a source of misunderstanding from time to time. It is formed by combining the verb 'playing' with any noun. It does not necessarily mean playing with something or someone, as we have already seen in the case of 'child-playing'. It may mean doing something (the first part of this compound) a lot and excessively or doing things in a manner mentioned in the first part of this compound. For example, 'Twitter-playing' means 'tweeting' too much. So, in excerpt (72), a Conservative critic believes that the foreign minister keeps tweeting (tweets a lot), which is not a diplomatic action bringing national and

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international security to the political system. The point is that this structure is usually used with negative semantic prosody.

(72)

<div dir="rtl">

دیپلماسی کشور را با توییت بازی وزیر خارجه نمی شود به سمت حفظ امنیت داخلی و خارجی نظام هدایت کرد .

</div>

A country's diplomacy cannot maintain national and international security by the foreign minister's Twitter-playing [tweeting].

9.1.4.2. Scenarios for GAME AND SPORTS Metaphors. To conclude the above-mentioned elaborate discussion, the following scenarios related to GAME AND SPORTS have been extracted.

a)   THE GAME IS BETWEEN IRAN'S DIPLOMACY AND ARROGANT POWERS.

b)   IRAN DOES NOT NEGOTIATE WITH ENEMY AND ARROGANCE SINCE IT DOES NOT PLAY WITH ENEMIES. NEITHER DOES IT TEAM UP WITH TRANSREGIONAL POWERS IN REGIONAL GAMES SUCH AS THE CRISIS OF SYRIA OR IRAQ.

c)   IRAN TEAMS UP WITH FRIENDS SUCH AS CHINA, RUSSIA, AND EUROPE.

d)   FOR REFORMISTS, JCPOA IS THE PRIZE OR ACHIEVEMENT OF THE GAME OF NEGOTIATIONS. FOR CONSERVATIVES, IRAN HAS LOST THE GAME.

e)   FOR REFORMISTS, THERE IS WINNING FOR EVEY PLAYER PARTICIPATING IN THIS GAME. FOR CONSERVATIVES, THERE IS NO WINNING FOR ARROGANCE AND ENEMY.

f)   THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE USA FROM JCPOA IS CHEATING IN THE GAME AND CHANGING IT.

g)   IN NATIONAL PUBLIC ELECTIONS, EVERY CANDIDATE IS WINNER FROM THE MOMENT THEY RAN FOR CANDIDACY.

h)   THE REAL WINNERS OF THIS GAME ARE PEOPLE AND THE PRIZE IS MAINTENANCE

OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, DEMOCRACY, AND GUARDIANSHIP.

9.1.5. Source Domain of VEHICLE AND MOVEMENT

One feature of this source domain is that it is mainly devoted to portraying national affairs, and that is why, at first, arguments related to national affairs will be presented. Then the international ones will be discussed. However, a brief discussion of Islamic concepts about vehicles and movement is inevitable before expounding conceptual elements.

Table 9.6

Conceptual Elements, Primary Signals and Relevant Statistics of VEHICLE &

MOVEMENT Domain in each Corpus

VEHICLE & MOVEMENT									
Conceptual Elements	Primary Signals	Parliamentary Debates			ILNA			Tasnim		
		Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD
Path	Path	822			3,130			2,017		
	Path to development	20	4.84	7.16	103	11.13	8.74	55	8.18	9.44
	Right path	7	2.98	8.55	103	8.65	9.63	50	7.31	9.19
	Main route	12	4.07	8.11	21	5.05	7.33	12	3.20	6.95
	Path of service	4	1.66	5.06	23	5.24	7.66	14	2.98	7.24
	Path of rationality	4	2.23	8.21	11	3.95	7.21	3	1.65	5.41
	Path of (political) system	3	1.39	4.44	5	0.56	3.94	6	0.81	4.78
	Path of JCPOA	6	2.39	6.80	33	5.11	6.68	4	0.97	4.37
	Path of Guardianship	3	1.73	6.82	7	2.53	5.93	4	1.84	5.62
	Bright path	3	1.64	5.78	8	3.74	6.89	8	2.69	6.95
	Path to justice	-	-	-	10	4.55	7.33	-	-	-
	Wrong path	-	-	-	9	3.07	6.52	10	2.77	7.46
	Path of peace	-	-	-	11	4.06	6.97	-	-	-
	Luminous path	-	-	-	8	3.15	6.67	8	2.98	7.33
	Path of Revolution	7	2.50	6.18	41	9.20	7.90	65	7.64	7.23
	Detour	-	-	-	10	2.98	6.89	3	1.70	5.53
	Path of moderateness	-	-	-	32	5.99	8.08	6	2.17	6.81
	Path of growth	-	-	-	34	6.55	8.11	23	4.65	8.18
	Divine path	-	-	-	8	4.11	7.11	5	1.98	5.68
	Path of honor	3	1.71	6.47	7	3.37	6.69	-	-	-

	Path of negotiations	-	-	-	7	2.38	5.66	6	2.28	6.47
	Path to unity	-	-	-	9	3.59	6.53	5	1.93	5.99
	Difficult path	-	-	-	11	2.79	6.97	-	-	-
	~ of transcendence	-	-	-	22	4.65	7.69	6	2.40	6.81
	Path of righteousness	-	-	-	20	4.61	7.07	17	4.19	7.65
Train	Train	272			126			78		
	Train of Revolution	4	1.94	5.94	6	2.37	4.48	13	3.53	5.07
	To get off the train	-	-	-	3	1.73	8.36	10	3.16	10.23
	Train of development	4	1.94	4.92	3	1.66	3.97	-	-	-
Railroad	Railroad	160			79			37		
	Derail/run off the rail	-	-	-	3	1.99	5.83	-	-	-
	~ of development	-	-	-	3	1.72	6.10	-	-	-
	~ of Revolution	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.79	4.23
	Tracklaying	-	-	-	3	1.73	10.9	-	-	-
Car	Car	200			107			140		
	Car of economics	-	-	-	10	3.14	6.69	7	2.61	6.68
	Car of economic development	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	2.20	6.19
Wheel	Wheel	46			76			107		
	Wheel of nuclear technology	4	2.45	8.66	-	-	-	4	1.98	6.28
	Wheel of industry	7	2.64	7.2	7	2.64	7.37	3	1.72	6.71
	Wheel of economics	8	2.82	6.33	15	3.59	7.29	19	4.34	8.11
	~ of development	3	1.98	4.73	4	1.69	4.63	3	1.97	5.58
	Wheel of production	4	1.98	5.25	7	2.44	6.61	7	2.43	7.13
Ship	Ship	125			214			128		
	Ship of Revolution	4	1.97	6.02	4	1.83	3.72	-	-	-
	Ship & leadership	3	1.69	5.13	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Ship of (political) system	-	-	-	3	1.58	3.66	-	-	-

9.1.5.1. Conceptual Elements in Context. As it has already been argued, Iran's ultimate goal, final destination, is to pave the way for the re-emergence of Imam Mahdi[163] by creating an Islamic society that will welcome him and support him. So the whole society and government are on the way to fulfilling the goals of the Islamic Revolution. One Islamic concept is sirat al-mostaqim or 'The Straight Path. It consists of ten criteria to sustain equality, justice, and humanity shared among Islam, Christianity, and Judaism (The Ten

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[163] Also known as Muhammad al-Mahdi and Qa'im.

Commandments)[164]. The path is not the only Islamic source domain here. The other one is Safinat al-najah or 'The Ship of Salvation. The primary source of this element should be the story of Noah and his ship. So, it is not specific to Islam. For instance, according to Orthodox Christianity, the true church is The Ship of Salvation[165]. For Shia Islam or Shi'ism practiced in Iran, Imam Hussein is regarded as The Ship of Salvation based on a Hadith attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. The point is that if someone wants salvation, they should step onto The Straight Path, and in hard times, they should get on The Ship of Salvation; i.e., they should obey God's and Imams' commands.

The path is the element that has mainly been argued. Both at sea and on land, it is a straight line, and there is only one correct path to achieve the destination, at least, for Conservatives. The vehicle varies from car and train to ship. Iran is on the right and brilliant way to development, and the final destination is the government of Imam Mahdi; since the Supreme Leader is his successor and is trying to make everything ready for his emergence. It is the right way because it is based on Islamic teachings and the Supreme Leader is like a compass to keep the vehicle of society on the right way. MPs are like tracklayers making the railroad ready for the train of the government, and the president should drive the train on this railroad. It is bright and luminous because of the light of both martyrs and Guardianship.

Since the main path is the right and the correct one, any detour is regarded as the detour from Islam. So there is only one correct way, and even during presidential elections, the bipolarity of Reformists and Conservatives is considered a fork in the road and must be avoided. While Conservatives denounce any changes in the direction of the path, Reformists

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[164] Islam Way of Life/Straight Path - Wikibooks, open books for an open world
[165] The Ship of Salvation / OrthoChristian.Com

deliberate the positive aspects of change in the direction. For the Reformists, the destination is the same, and taking the right or left does not matter. Right and left way implies right and left-wing. So for Conservatives, both the destination and the path are essential. While for Reformists, the destination is essential, the route is not essential as long as it leads them to the final destination.

An instance of the detour is the 2009 post-election unrest called the 2009 sedition[166]. Just as JCPOA plays a pivotal role for the Reformists, it is with the 2009 sedition and its significance for Conservatives. Conservatives deliberate that the 2009 sedition happened because some political leaders detoured from the road map designed by the Supreme Leader. They detoured from the highway of the Revolution and thought that people would follow them. Nevertheless, people did not leave their leader alone, and the vehicle of sedition ended up in the valley. This Conservative MP goes the extra mile to overgeneralize this incident to an early Islamic situation where Imams or religious leaders were abandoned. So he concludes that if their people were just like the Iranian people who did not follow the enemy and backed their leader, then Imams would not be alone in their battles with the enemy.

Another vehicle-related portrait pertains to liberating leaders of the 2009 sedition. Some political figures solicit liberating Reformist leaders from house arrest, and their justification is that if they commit the same error again, they can put them back in jail. Conservatives react to this justification by regarding national security as a car. For them, it is like driving off the car into the edge of the cliff and seeing if it falls off, then they can pull it back (Exc. 13).

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[166] 2009 unrests and 2009 sedition are interchangeably used in this study. Reformists use the former, and the Conservatives use the latter.

Other than a detour, 2009 unrest is depicted as getting off the train of Revolution, which means losing political power or position. The overall picture depicts the Revolution as a moving vehicle (a train), with citizens and officials as passengers. Each section is sometimes described as a locomotive of this train. What makes a difference between main political affiliations is that Reformists believe that Conservatives detrain everyone who disagrees with them, while they should be tolerant of opponents and maintain unity among politicians. On the other hand, Conservatives argue that the Reformists got old and tired of the journey and got off the train; i.e., they could not commit to Revolution's ideals anymore. Another scenario is that they have never got on the train and have missed the train in the first place. President Rouhani, as the winner of the presidential election, goes one step further and highlights the role of the nation in this scene by saying that some people (Conservatives) tried to get some other groups (Reformists) off the train, but people entrained them again. He means their vote to Rouhani was like a ticket given to Reformists. He underlines that all people with various ideologies and lifestyles are welcomed on this train.

(1)

خیلی اوقات انقلاب می شود اما مردم کنار زده می شوند و بانیان انقلاب به کنار می روند و شعارها و ایده ها عوض می شود اما در انقلاب ما علی رغم همه چالش ها اعم از جنگ و مشکلات اقتصادی و این که گاهی برخی مسیولان در این خط و آن خط بودند ، مردم خط مستقیم ولایت را پیگیری کردند و هر سال در انتخابات ها و راه پیمایی های مختلف بالنده ، طوفنده و پرخروش به مسیر انقلاب ادامه دادند و این مسیر تا ظهور حضرت مهدی (عج) ادامه خواهد یافت .

Revolutions happen most of the time, but people are put aside, the revolution's founders sidestep, and slogans and ideas change. Despite all obstacles, including war and economic issues and some leaders were shifting lanes, people in our movement

chose the direct lane of Guardianship. Moreover, this path will continue until the emergence of Imam Mahdi.

(2)

ما که معتقد به مدیریت حضرت حق هستیم ، می دانیم که ملت و انقلاب ما براساس فرمان خدا بوده ، لذا ملت ما به پیروی از رهبری موحد ، نظیر آیت الله العظمی خامنه ای ، در مسیر حق حرکت می کند ، دست غیب و امدادهای مرموز الهی را همیشه همراه مقاومت و انقلاب و جنگ تحمیلی و نیز در فتنه های سال های 77 و 88 دیده ایم ، دست خدا از آستین مومنین بیرون آمده است .

Since we believe in the management of God, we know that our nation and revolution have been based on God's command. That is why our nation moves in the righteous path following a monotheistic leader such as Ayatollah Khamenei. As we have always seen, God's invisible hand and divine mysterious helped in 1999 and 2009 seditions and accompanying resistance, the Revolution, and Holy Defense; God's hand has come out of the believers' sleeves.

(3)

این سخن امام بزرگوار است به عنوان پیرو راه امیرالمومنین (علیه السلام) ... اگر ملت بزرگ ایران یکپارچه در کنار رهبر معظم انقلاب نمی ایستادند و در طول سالهای متمادی بر این راه روشن پای نمی فشردند ، امروز رهبری معظم سکاندار انقلاب اسلامی نبودند ، این شایسته سالاری و این ایستادگی در کنار شایستگان و روشن نمودن مسیر مدیریت و رهبری نظام با قرارگرفتن شخصیتی آراسته به عدالت و فقاهت و ظرفیت های شایسته مدیریت ، راه عزت و اقتدار ملت اسلام را هموار نموده است.

It is the quote of the grand Imam[167] as the follower of the path of Imam Ali … If the grand people had not stayed uniformly by the Supreme Leader of the Revolution and if they had not insisted on this bright path, today, the Supreme Leader would not have been the helmsman of the Islamic Revolution. This meritocracy and qualified people's maintenance and illuminating the path of management and leadership of the political system has paved the way for the Islamic nation's glory and authority by appointing a person ornamented with justice, jurisprudence, and merited management capabilities.

(4)

شاید برخی در داخل کشور تحت تاثیر تبلیغات و رسانه های خارجی بگویند که مرا چرا باید در این جنگ حضور داشته باشیم اما حالا همه فهمیدند که حضور ما برای جلوگیری از انحراف مسیر درست اسلام که توسط معمار کبیر انقلاب اسلامی ترسیم و توسط مقام معظم رهبری دنبال می شود ، است.

Some people in the country who are under the influence of propaganda and foreign media may say why we should get involved in this war. However, now everyone understands that our involvement is to prevent detours from the correct path of Islam that was mapped by the Islamic Revolution's grand architect and is followed by the Supreme Leader.

(5)

ولایت فقیه ، جایگاه مهندسی نظام و حفظ خط و جهت نظام و جلوگیری از انحراف به چپ و راست است . نقش ولایت فقیه این است که در مجموعه ی پیچیده و درهم تنیده تلاش های گوناگون اداره کشور ،

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[167] Ayatollah Khomeini.

نباید مسیر حرکت نظام دچار انحراف از هدف ها و ارزش ها شود ، پاسداری و دیده بانی حرکت کل نظام به

سمت هدف ها آرمان و عالی اش ، مهم ترین و اساسی ترین نقش ولایت فقیه است .

The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist has the status of engineering the political system, maintaining the political system's track and direction, and avoiding detours to the right and left. The role of The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist is that the path of the movement of the political system should not deviate from purposes and values amongst a complicated and interlocked collection of various attempts to handle the country. The most essential and fundamental role of The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist is safeguarding and monitoring the movement of the whole political system towards its ultimate aims and ideals.

(6)

باید توجه کنیم ما مجلسی ها بنا بر فرمایش مقام معظم رهبری ریل گذار و یار و یاور دولت هستیم که باید

کمک کنیم دولت جمهوری اسلامی ایران در دنیا بدرخشد محکم ، قوی در مقابل همه توطیه ها و برنامه های

براندازی که دشمنان قسم خورده برای ملت بزرگ و انقلاب اسلامی دارند را بتوانیم خنثی و از بین ببریم.

According to the Supreme Leader, we should pay attention that we members of parliament are tracklayers and companions of the government. Moreover, we should help the Islamic Republic of Iran's government shine globally. [We should] stay solid and tenacious and foil archenemies' conspiracies and plots for [our] great nation and the Islamic Revolution.

(7)

ولی فقیه قطب نمای حرکت جامعه اسلامی و جایگاه مهندسی و حفظ مسیر و حفظ نظام و عامل جلوگیری از انحراف در خط مشی نظام است و اطاعت پذیری بی قید و شرط از ولی فقیه شاخص ، ملاک ، معیار و سنجش و پذیرش عملکرد خواص سیاسی و مسیولین کشور است.

The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist is the compass of Islamic society's movement, and it has the status of engineering and maintaining the path and preserving the political system, and avoiding detour in the political system's policies. Unconditional obedience of the Guardianship is the criterion, index, and axiom for gauging and accepting the performance of the country's political elites and authorities.

(8)

وی با اشاره به ضرورت حفظ تفکر انقلابی در پیمودن مسیر پیش رو افزود : تفکر انقلابی در جامعه ما باعث موفقیت شده است ، هر جا به سمت تفکر لیبرالی رفتیم ضرر کرده ایم .

He pointed to the necessity of preserving revolutionary thought in traversing the path before us and added that revolutionary doctrine in our society has led to success. Whenever we have walked in the direction of liberal doctrine, we have incurred a loss.

(9)

باید با ایجاد یک رویکرد مثبت در سیاست خارجی ، کلان نگری و فعال سازی دیپلماسی پارلمانی ، ریل گذاری لازم را برای حرکت سریع تر قطار سیاست خارجی و اقتصاد بین المللی دولت بعد از برجام فراهم کنیم.

We should lay required rail tracks for faster movement of foreign policy's train and international economics of post-JCPOA government by creating a positive approach in foreign policy, holism, and activating parliamentary diplomacy.

(10)

فاصله نگیریم اختلاف نظرها اختلاف سلیقه ها آنقدر زیاد نیست چرا که ما در اصول و اهداف متحدیم در مسیر متحدیم حال اینکه یکی بگوید این راه را برویم زودتر به هدف می رسیم و یا اگر به چپ برسیم دیرتر می رسیم و به راست برویم زودتر به هدف می رسیم اصول یکی است .

Let us not distance [from each other]. The difference of opinion and diversity of opinion is not that much. Because we are united regarding the principles and purposes, we are united in the path. One may say if we take this way, we will get to the purpose sooner; or he may say that if we turn to the left, we achieve [the goal] later and [if we] turn to the right, we achieve the goal sooner. Principles are the same.

(11)

میوه تلخ شجره ملعونه فتنه 88 ثمره زاویه ، از نقشه راهی بود که رهبری معظم انقلاب تبیین نمودند و دستاوردهای عزت بخش انقلاب دستاورد ارزشمند حرکت در این راه است . امیدوارم که مجلس دهم با الهام از آموزه های اسلام و اصول قانون اساسی این اصل را استحکام بخشیده و در سایه استحکام اصل کلیدی و محوری ولایت فقیه مسیر عزت و اقتدار ملی هموار گردد .

The bitter fruit of the evil tree of 2009 sedition was the product of deviation from the roadmap determined by the Supreme Leader. Moreover, glorifying achievements of the Revolution are due to moving in this path. I hope that the tenth parliament fortifies this principle by inspiration from Islamic teachings and constitutional principles. Furthermore, in the shadow of the fundamental principle of the Islamic Jurist Guardianship, the path of glory and national authority is smoothed.

(12)

... بصیرت و بینش مردم و حرکت پشت سر رهبر انقلاب و نیز وجود پربرکت امام خامنه ای باعث شد که نظام از فتنه سال 88 سربلند بیرون بیاید و سقوط نکند . وی اضافه کرد : خواص حلقه ارتباط با رهبری نیستند ، اعتقادات مردم و باورهای دینی شان بزرگراه اتصال به رهبری است . اگر خواص بی بصیرت کج رفتند و

اگر ماشین ، حرکت آنها و خانواده های شان را منحرف کرد ، اما مردم پشت سر رهبری حرکت کردند . ...

اگر در کربلا نیز مانند 9 دی در ایران اقدامی انجام می شد ، هیچ امامی تنها نمی ماند.

… People's insight and discernment and moving behind the Revolution's leader, in addition to the blessed being of Imam Khamenei, led to the political system's success in the 2009 sedition, and it was not overthrown. He added that the elites are not the connecting link to the Supreme Leader, but people's beliefs and their religious faith are the highways that connect to the Supreme Leader. If the unperceptive elites detoured and their car deviated them and their family's course of movement, people moved behind the Supreme Leader. If in Karbala the same thing as Dey 9 epic[168] had happened, no Imam would have been left alone.

(13)

… این پیشنهاد مثل آن است که به فردی توصیه کنیم برای تجربه ، ماشین خود را تا لبه پرتگاه ببرد و امتحان کند که آیا در چنین حالتی خودروی او به پایین پرتاب خواهد شد یا خیر ؛ اگر دید خودروی او در آستانه سقوط است ، می تواند آن را به حالت اولیه برگرداند ! برخی پیشنهادها درباره رفع حصر ظاهرا خیرخواهانه است و ما نیز به دنبال سوتعبیر و قضاوت درباره آن نیستیم اما مهمترین ایراد آن عدم توجه لازم به ظرافت و پیچیدگی های مسیله «امنیت» است.

… This suggestion is like recommending someone to do an experience and drive his car into a cliff's edge and check if his car falls off or not. If he sees that the car will fall off, he can restore its previous position. Some suggestions about liberating from home arrest are apparently well-meaning, and we are not trying to misinterpret or

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[168] On December 30, 2009, people came to the streets to condemn the 2009 unrests. Cf. Dey 9 epic and a great insight for a great nation - Tehran Times

judge them. However, the biggest problem regarding this suggestion is the lack of required attention to delicacy and complexity of 'security'.

(14)

پیاده کردن یکی یکی از قطار انقلاب به این صورت اگر مصداق حق الناس است انجام دهید ، هیچ اشکالی ندارد . عالی جنابان و عالی مقامان ! توصیه می کنم آدم ها را بیشتر با نقاط قوتشان نگاه کنید نه نقاط ضعفشان و از له و نابود کردن کسانی که یک عمر با اعتقاد رای داده اند ، جبهه رفته اند ... به این شکل خودداری کنید

.

If detraining them one by one from the train of Revolution in this way is an instance of people's right, it is okay. Your Highness! Your Excellency! I recommend you see people through their strong suit and not their weak points. Moreover, [I recommend] you to avoid destroying them in this way; those who have devoted their lives to vote faithfully, to fight for Iran, to ….

(15)

... از دیگر سو ، صف جاماندگان از قطار انقلاب دیده می شود که هم به واسطه دلبستگی به دنیا و خستگی از راه مبارزه و هم ترس از هیمنه دشمن ، با هم متحد شده و به دنبال تحریف مکتب امام (ره) و راه و رسم اصیل انقلاب هستند .

On the other hand, the line of those who have missed the train of Revolution is seen as getting united and wanting to distort Imam's [Khomeini] doctrine and deviate the authentic way of Revolution. [They do it] because of attachment to the world, tiresomeness in the path of fighting [for the Revolution's ideals], and also the fear of the enemy's solemnity.

(16)

... انقلابیون می دانند که چطور امثال بازرگان ها و منتظری ها را به دلیل همنشینی و پیوند با منافقین از

دست دادیم و آنها چه زود خود را از قطار انقلاب پیاده کردند و تا سرحد رویارویی با امام خمینی (ره) پیش

رفتند .

The Revolutionists know how we lost people like Bazargan and Montazeri due to their companionship and link with *munafiqun*[169] and how quickly they got themselves off the train of Revolution. Moreover, they advanced to the point where they confronted Imam Khomeini.

(17)

در قطار انقلاب همه اقشار ، افکار ، ایده ها ، چهره ها و سبک های مختلف زندگی حضور داشتند . اگر به

تصاویر روزهای اول انقلاب بازگردیم این حضور را می بینیم . اماما ! بعضی تلاش کردند گروهی را از این

قطار پیاده کنند ، اما امروز بار دیگر مردم تصمیم گرفتند که همه به قطار انقلاب بازگردند و همه کسانی که

پیاده شده بودند ، سوار شوند.

There were all classes, thoughts, ideas, faces, and lifestyles in the train of Revolution. If we review images of the Revolution's first days, we see this presence. Oh, Imam [Khomeini]! Some attempted to derail some groups from this train; nevertheless, people today opted to re-board everyone on the Revolutionary train so that all those who had got off the train could get on the train.

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[169] *Munafiqun* in Arabic means hypocrites, and in Quran, it refers to false Muslims. Cf. Munafiq - Wikipedia

Another national political event that became at the center of path conceptual element was the presidential election. During presidential campaigns, Rouhani insisted on a fork-on-the-road decision that people should make: Whether to let the vehicle be on the right path to the development or crash it into the valley. The argument was that Ahmadinejad drove the vehicle to the valley, and Rouhani has lifted it and put it back on track with the help of JCPOA. The first term of his presidency was devoted mainly to removing debris blocking the path, and the vehicle moved slowly. Iran is on the development path, and it is halfway there. Now it is people's choice to make: Accelerate the vehicle in the right path or make the car crash into the valley. Choosing Rouhani was choosing the path of moderateness and rationality, and people did it. Hashemi was the one who directed the train of Revolution to the path of moderateness. While Reformists insist on being halfway to development, Conservatives argue halfway to what? For Conservatives, the government is on the wrong path, and it means that they should return, no matter how far they have gone (Exc. 9 in section 9.1.3.1). Moreover, Rouhani believes that the vehicle is on the right path and just its motion must be accelerated (Exc. 22).

Hashemi founded the path of moderateness and was the first president after the Iran-Iraq war, and his presidency was called Era of Construction (section 2.1). He was among the pioneers of advocating economic developments in Iran. Nevertheless, his method has always been criticized. For instance, Conservative points out the proportionality between the vehicle and the road and debates that his car of development was like an imported car which was not appropriate for Iran's political and cultural road. So, he started to change the roads to make them compatible with the car, and it was the first sign of cultural invasion, and back then,

Ayatollah Khamenei[170] was the first one to warn it. Before going to the subsequent discussion, it is worth mentioning that presidential elections, especially the controversial ones, are like stops or stations in the main path. Each station adds to the difficulty of this path and the significance of people's presence. Despite all sanctions aiming at making people disappointed in the political system and preventing them from voting, the nation always is present at the station to get on the train of Revolution.

(18)

ظریفیان با بیان اینکه دولت یازدهم را می توان دولت آواربرداری از مشکلات و ریل گذاری برای انتظام بخشی به امور دانست ، ابراز داشت : آنچه ضروری است این است که در دولت دوم آقای روحانی باید لوکوموتیوهای قدرتمندتری در این ریل گذاری ها شروع به حرکت کرده و وعده های آقای روحانی و مطالبات جامعه را محقق کند.

> Zarifian expressed that the eleventh government can be considered to remove debris of problems and lay rail tracks for regularizing some part of [ongoing] affairs. He expressed that what is necessary is that in the second term of Mr. Rouhani's presidency, more powerful locomotives must be moving on these rail tracks, and Mr. Rouhani's promises and the society's demands must be met.

(19)

... آنان درک می کنند که شما تازه از آواربرداری خرابی های دولت قبل فارغ شده اید و قطار دولت را در ریل مناسب آن قرار داده اید و باید به شما فرصت داد تا برنامه های درست خود برای سازندگی کشور را اجرا کنید .

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[170] The current Supreme Leader.

… They understand that you have recently become free from removing debris of previous government, and you have put the train of government on the right rail track, and you must be allowed to run your correct programs for constructing the country.

(20)

… اگر جریان اصولگرایی همچنان ادامه داشت امروز کشور ما نیز مانند کشور ونزویلا بود . آقای روحانی و تیمش با صبوری و کارهای کارشناسانه این قطار را که در ته دره گرفتار شده بود بالا آورده و روی ریل قرارداده است .

If [the domination of] Conservative current had continued so far, today, our country would have become like Venezuela. Mr. Rouhani and his team lifted the train stuck at the bottom of the valley with patience and expertized measures. Furthermore, he has put it back on the rail track.

(21)

من می آیم تا با ادامه رویکرد «تدبیر و امید» و گفتمان «آزادی و امنیت ؛ آرامش و پیشرفت» مسیری را که تاکنون با همراهی شما طی کرده ام کامل کنم و با کمک شما ایرانی شایسته مردمانش بسازم تا در نیمه راه نمانیم . ما با تداوم مسیر عقلانیت می توانیم فردایی بهتر برای یک یک شما و آینده ای بسیار بهتر برای فرزندانمان رقم بزنیم.

I have come to complete the route I have accomplished so far with your company by continuing the approach of 'prudence and hope' and the discourse of 'freedom and security; peacefulness and development'. And [I have come] to construct Iran that its people deserve so that we do not remain stuck in the middle. We can create a better tomorrow for every one of you and make a better future for our children by continuing the path of rationality.

(22)

روحانی خاطرنشان کرد : نه اینکه آنچه تاکنون انجام داده ایم و پیموده ایم به صد درصد مطلوب دست یافته ایم نه اینکه از آنچه ما اکنون انجام دادیم رضایت کامل داریم اما می خواهیم بگوییم مسیر را درست انتخاب کردیم

و باید این مسیر درست را با حرکتی بسیار پرشتاب تر و با تحولی بالاتر و با تغییری که شایسته ملت ایران

است راه آینده را ادامه دهیم

Rouhani reminded us that we are not completely satisfied and have not achieved hundred-percent desired [results] regarding what we have already done, but we want to say that we have chosen the right path. Moreover, we should continue the right path in a more accelerated manner, and we should continue the path of the future with higher transformation and a change that Iranian people deserve.

(23)

دولت سازندگی ... از همان آغاز دریافت که ماشین توسعه اقتصاد نمی تواند بر بستر فرهنگ دینی و انقلابی

، حداقل با خصوصیاتی که از جنگ و شهادت گرفته بود ، حرکت کند . بنابراین دست به کار ایجاد ارزشهای

فرهنگی متناسب مثل مصرفگرایی و تجملگرایی و نهایتا غربگرایی در کشور شد .... از سال 68 به موازات

حرکت نظام سلطه در تهاجم نرم به انقلاب اسلامی ، ماشین توسعه و سازندگی در کشور ـ در حالی که بستر

مناسب فرهنگی خود را به عنوان جاده حرکت خود می ساخت ـ رهبر عالیقدر انقلاب اسلام پیش و بیش از

همه فرایند ساخت و ساز این جاده را دید و خطر آن را با عنوان «آغاز تهاجم فرهنگی» اعلام کرد ...

The Reconstruction government[171] …, from the beginning, realized that the car of economic development could not move on the bed [road] of religious and revolutionary culture; at least, [it was not possible due to] its characteristics taken from war and martyrdom. Consequently, he began to create cultural values appropriate for consumerism, luxuriousness, and Westernization. … In 1989, parallel to the hegemony's move for soft invasion of the Islamic Revolution, the car of reconstruction and development was building its appropriate cultural bed [background] as its road [to be able] to move. The excellent Supreme Leader of the

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[171] It refers to Hashemi's government known as Reconstruction Era, explained in section 2.1.

Revolution saw the process of constructing this road before anyone else, and more than anyone else, he announced its danger by calling it 'the beginning of cultural invasion'…

(24)

در واقع مسیر پر فراز و نشیب انتخابات در ایستگاه های مهمی مثل دوم خرداد 76 و سوم تیر 84 و 22 خرداد 88 و... از یک سو و نیز انتخابات مجلس نهم که گزینه تحریم در آن پررنگ شد ، نشان داده است که با هر تمایلی از نظر فکری و سیاسی ، حضور در انتخابات ، بر تحریم آن ، برتری دارد.

The sloppy pathway of election in essential stations such as 23 May 1997, 24 June 2005, 12 June 2009, and … on the one hand, and the ninth parliamentary election during which the option of sanctioning it was stressed have proved that participating in elections is prior to sanctioning it regardless of political and intellectual orientation.

The Straight Path of Revolution is not an easy path without any obstacles. Enduring until the end of the path is difficult, but there are assistance and deus ex machina. It is a dangerous and tortuous route with twists and defiles of ISIS, sanctions, and arrogance. The Supreme Leader is the compass, and everyone should follow his guidelines, and God will help. One of the main keywords of Ayatollah Khamenei is insight and recognizing the enemy, and for him, this is the primary tool that helps people endure the problems until the end of the path. Another thing that can help them pass the road is unity; they should unify against the enemy's seditions.

(25)

رهبر انقلاب اسلامی در تبیین ضرورت دشمن شناسی به عنوان شرط اصلی تداوم مسیر تحقق اهداف نظام و

ملت خاطرنشان کردند : امریکا به معنای واقعی کلمه ، دشمن خبیث و اصلی است و این حقیقت نه از سر

تعصب و نگاه بدبینانه بلکه ناشی از تجربه ، فهم درست مسایل و دیدن واقعیات میدان است.

Islamic Revolution's Supreme Leader determined the necessity of recognizing the enemy as the primary condition of continuing the path of achieving goals of the nation and the political system. He affirmed that the US is the primary and wicked enemy, and this truth does not come from prejudice or pessimism; but it is due to experience, correct understanding of issues, and seeing realities of the arena.

(26)

آرمان های انقلاب همچنان زنده است و ... هنوز تا رسیدن به اهدافی که انقلاب داشت راه درازی پیش رو

داریم . طی کردن این مسیر سخت با همبستگی و اتحاد میسر است و نیز با تذکر دایم به آرمان های والای

انقلاب و هوشیاری در برابر توطیه های سهمگین و سنگینی که علیه کشور و ملت ، ما به خصوص از بیرون

مرزها ، وجود دارد.

The Revolution's ideals are still alive, and … there is still a long way before us to achieve the Revolution's goals. Traversing this thorny path is made possible with unity and solidarity and constant reminding of the Revolution's transcendent ideals and consciousness in the face of grand conspiracies, especially from abroad against the country and the nation.

(27)

فرستادگان الهی ، عیسی (ع) ، محمد (ص) و تمام رهبران انقلابی تاریخ ، امروز چشم به ما دوخته اند

. مسیر سخت و پر چالشی که ما پیش رو داریم ، مسیری است که آینده تاریخ را رقم خواهد زد . بنابراین

«انقلابی ماندن» و تلاش برای ستیز با منحرف کنندگان انقلاب ها از یک سو ، و تبیین و توصیف

دستاوردهای انقلاب های کشورمان برای مردم از سوی دیگر ، مهم ترین راهبردهای ما برای ادامه راه است

.

Divine messengers [such as] Prophet Jesus and Prophet Muhammad and all revolutionary leaders of history are watching us today. The difficult and challenging path that is before us is the path that makes the future of history. So, on the one hand, 'staying revolutionist' and attempting to fight with those who deviate revolutions and, on the other hand, determining and describing the achievements of our revolution for people are our most important strategies to continue this path.

(28)

ضمن ارج نهادن به دستاورد بسیار ارزشمند مذاکرات هسته ای و تشکر و قدردانی از مقام معظم رهبری ، رییس جمهور محترم و دکتر ظریف و تیم مذاکره کننده که کشور را از گردنه سختی عبور دادند با حفظ ارزشها باید کلیه تحریم ها و موانع پیشرفت از سر راه ملت برداشته شود.

Meanwhile, I honor valuable achievements of nuclear negotiations, and I appreciate the Supreme Leader and the esteemed president and Dr. Zarif, and the negotiating team for passing the country from a difficult defile. All sanctions and obstacles in the path of the nation's development must be lifted; while values remain intact.

(29)

آری تحمل الگویی که توانسته با حاکمیت دین ، نیاز های همه جانبه ی جامعه را پاسخگو باشد ، برای ایادی شیطان سخت است ، ... امت اسلامی را مجهز به عنایت حضرت احدیت در رویارویی با شیطان می دانیم و نصرت حق را در این مسیر پر تلاطم بر باطل به عنوان اصل لایتغیر الهی اعتقاد داریم .

Yes, tolerating a role model who has been able to answer all needs of a society with the governance of religion is difficult for Satan's allies … We consider the Islamic community equipped with God's favor in confronting the Devil. Furthermore, we believe in the righteousness' victory over the wrong in this turbulent path as a divine unchangeable principle.

(30)

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در پایان با تاکید بر لزوم درک شرایط حساس و سرنوشت ساز امروز ، که تحولات منطقه و دستاوردهای

شگرف '' مقاومت اسلامی '' در نبرد با '' تروریسم تکفیری '' ... عبور موفق و سربلند دنیای اسلام و ملت

ایران از پیچ تاریخی بزرگ و راه یابی به دروازه های تمدن نوین اسلامی را نوید می دهد ... به فضل الهی

در این مسیر مبارک ، منویات ... امام خامنه ای (مدظله العالی) را قطب نمای تلاش و کوشش خود قرار

دهیم .

In the end, I highlight the necessity of understanding the critical and fateful condition
[we are facing] today due to regional upheavals and outstanding accomplishments of
'Islamic resistance' combating 'Takfiri terrorism'…. It annunciates the Muslim
World's and the Iranians' successful and proud traversal of a historical twist [in the
road] and arrival to modern Islamic Civilization …. By the grace of God, we take
Imam Khamenei's quotes as the compass of our endeavors in this blessed path.

Now that the overall picture of the path is illustrated, more physical details can be
demonstrated. For example, Guardianship and martyrs are road lights illuminating the path
and showing the direction. However, seditious rioters wanted to dim these lights so that
people could not find the divine path. Another point is that Raesi, Rouhani's rival, believes
that Iran has no dead-end road, and it means that every problem has a solution and is building
a strong government. So, there is no dead-end road; but there is, and it is, 'trusting the West'
at the international level. Trusting P5+1 is like a dead-end road in which Rouhani's
government is stuck, and it is because of JCPOA.

In the past, when there were gravel pathways in Iran, there was a tradition of watering
them from time to time, specifically on special occasions such as welcoming essential guests.
Excerpt (35) conjures this by asserting that the blood of martyrs has watered the Quran-based
path of Revolution, and it will fulfill its goals. So, they have watered and still are watering the

path with martyrs' blood to welcome Imam Mahdi and the victory of Islam or righteousness. It reminds us of the role of blood in the NATURE domain, where the emphasis was on watering the tree of Revolution with martyrs' blood. Since martyrdom is a religious concept, there is a reference to Islamic conceptual elements.

Throughout this scenario, just like the previous ones, the Conservatives persist that the solution to problems is inside the country: people and other national resources. So, having an eye on outsiders is rebuked as in excerpt (36). The government is seen as the driver of Iran's car, but he becomes distracted because he focuses on the vehicle's exterior and veers off course. Ayatollah Khamenei has warned him a couple of times.

(31)

ولی فقیه فرمان های الهی را روی زمین هدایت می کند و چراغ راه الهی برای انقلاب اسلامی است . فتنه گران می خواستند ولی فقیه را تضعیف کنند تا نتواند راه الهی را به جامعه نشان دهد .

The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist guides divine commands on the earth, and it is a divine traffic light for the Islamic Revolution. Seditionists wanted to derogate the Guardianship so that he could not show the divine path to the society.

(32)

... هر گاه در جامعه ای و در نقطه ای چنین انسانهای بزرگی پدید آمدند بر امثال ما است که در پرتو آنان راه را تشخیص دهیم و پای در صراط مستقیم عروج الی الله گذاریم و دل و جان خود را حیات بخشیم . سلام بر سرور شهیدان ، چراغ روشن همه ی نسلها و دورانها و سلام بر همه ی شهیدانی که در راه او قدم نهادند .

... whenever such great people have emerged in society and a place, they have been [there] for us to recognize the path in their lights and to step into the Straight Path of ascension to God and revive our spirit. Peace be upon the master of all martyrs [Imam Hussein], the bright light of all generations and eras, and peace be upon all those martyrs who followed in his footsteps.

(33)

ایران اسلامی بن بست ندارد و کلید واقعی حل مشکلات حضور و اراده همه ما مردم برای تحول جدی در

مدیریت اجرایی کشور است و گام اول در ایجاد این تغییر ، تشکیل دولتی توانمند و آگاه است

Islamic Iran does not have a dead-end, and the real key to solving problems is
people's presence and willpower for a severe upheaval in the administrative
management of the country. Moreover, the first step in making this change is creating
a conscious and mighty government.

(34)

سه سال از عمر دولت گذشته ، مشتان آقای روحانی خالی است ، او همه تخم مرغ های خود را در سبد مذاکره

با آمریکا و برجام قرار داده است . الان در بن بست اعتماد به غرب و آمریکا گرفتار شده است . نه راه پس

دارد نه راه پیش...

The government is three years old, and Mr. Rouhani's hands are empty. He has put all
his eggs in the negotiating basket with the US and the JCPOA. Now, he is trapped in
the dead-end of trusting the West and the US. He can move neither forward nor
backward …

(35)

... فرمانده کل سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی ... در سخنانی اظهارداشت : تردید نداشته باشید راهی که با

خون شهیدان آبیاری و بر اساس اصول مسلم قران است نهایتش پیروزی است.

… commander in chief of IRGC …, in one of his speeches, expressed that there is no
doubt that the path watered by martyrs' blood and the path based on inevitable
principles of Quran ends up to the victory.

(36)

بعضی کشورها از نگاه به بیگانه آسیب دیدند از جمله لیبی که هم بحث هسته ای و هم بحث موشکی را از

دست دادند . نگاه به بیگانه غلط است و با تذکرات مردم و رهبری هم مسیر عوض نشد و همین مسیر ادامه

دارد . ما کلید حل مشکلات را به جای بیگانگان مردم می دانیم .

Some countries, such as Libya, incurred a loss in nuclear and missile issues due to foreigners' eyes. Having an eye on the foreigner is wrong. Moreover, the path was not changed [even] after people's and the Supreme Leader's warnings, and the same path is continued [to be traversed]. We realize people, instead of foreigners, as the key to solving problems.

Before presenting the international aspects of these conceptual elements, discussing some details related to vehicles is worth addressing that refer to national affairs. Reprehending aristocracy, the politician in excerpt (37) described authorities as poor passengers when they started their jobs by getting on the train of Revolution. Moreover, now that they are getting off, they are multimillionaires. Contrary to these aristocratic authorities, according to Ayatollah Khomeini, poor people are the only passengers who will stay on the train until the final station. The poor and the oppressed are the center of attention in Revolutionary discourse devised by Ayatollah Khomeini since the Islamic Revolution aimed to help and defend the oppressed from arrogance. As a result, the Revolutionaries have gotten the impoverished and oppressed aboard the train, and as a result, these passengers will always be grateful to them and will not disembark. A probable consequence is that they are more actively present in general elections, which is why they are the main target of presidential campaigns and propaganda. So much so that some politicians criticize the candidates for considering the poor as the 'vote machine': they fool them with money and empty promises like raising the wage to get the vote. Another inference, which is out of the scope of this study and is worthy of more investigation in political studies, is that maybe that is why being rich is reprehended this much. If people get rich, they will get off the train just like rich authorities, and they will not support the Revolution by their *presence*, which is the key to the

train's existential nature (Revolution). In other words, the train is useless if there is no passenger.

The next significant topic is the conflict of 'motive force' and 'drag force' of vehicle: whether to hit the breaks or the accelerator. Sanctions are considered locks on the wheel or drag, but now that they are lifted, it is time to plan according to the motive force of (economics) car. The locks are opened, and it is time to hit the accelerator. Another vehicle-related source domain relates to traffic signs, and the train is used to discuss the 2009 sedition. Seditious rioters are of two types: with (traffic) and without (traffic) signs. The former is the foreign enemy, and the latter is those political figures who once were among the revolutionists. These sedition entities are depicted as two trains on the same railroad because their destination is the same, and they cooperate against Iran's political system.

Once again, martyrs' blood finds its place in vehicle-related metaphors. Martyrs' blood is described as the motor oil for the Revolutionary car, which has never stopped working. Every drop of their blood has been utilized to strengthen people's faith and spin the car's engine blades. Being on the topic of car, we should add that Conservatives believe that the Reformists made a forged cul-de-sac of sanctions and, with the help of JCPOA, demolished it and claimed that economics' car would move forward. They argue that the car has not moved forward yet because it is a problematic car, and the President as the driver, should have inspected the car and should have had it repaired. President Rouhani assumed that both industry's wheel and nuclear technology's wheel would turn coordinately, but the wheels were not coordinated, and this car problem did not help improve Iran's economic situation.

Another vehicle source domain is a ship that reminds us of The Ship of Salvation. The captain of this ship is Ayatollah Khamenei, who guides it through a whirlwind of predicament towards the beach of security. As explained early in this section and in the

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family scenario, this is a divine position, and he has inherited it from God and the Prophet. The common related expression to highlight the unity or incite urgent actions to solve problems is 'we (authorities) are on the same ship'. The common ground of this ship and The Ship of Salvation is that we should stay on this ship, and if we jump off or leave it, we will lose our life. Getting off the vehicle has already been explained in the argument of 'train'.

(37)

کسانی که دیروز وقتی سوار قطار انقلاب شدند پول کرایه تاکسی را نداشتند ، بپردازند ، ولی امروز وقتی از قطار انقلاب پیاده می شوند یا شده اند ، میلیاردها ریال سرمایه دارند ...

Those who did not have enough money to pay for their taxi when they boarded the Revolutionary train; now that they have disembarked or been detrained, they have billions of Rials in their pockets...

(38)

... امام خمینی (ره) فرمودند انقلاب و نظام برای محرومان و مستضعفان است . ایشان فرمودند که تنها کسانی که تا آخر خط با این انقلاب می آیند محرومان و مستضعفان هستند . امروز هم می بینیم هر کجا این انقلاب نیاز به حضور ، تحمل و خون دل خوردن و خون دادن داشته ... این مردم مستضعف و پابرهنگان بودند که بدون هیچ منتی پای انقلاب ایستاده اند.

Imam Khomeini said that the Revolution and the political system [of Iran] is for the oppressed and the underprivileged. He said that the only people coming to the end of the line with this Revolution are the oppressed and the underprivileged people. Today we also see that wherever this Revolution has needed presence, tolerance, suffering in silence, and giving blood … this has been the oppressed and the poor have taken the Revolution's side without any obligations.

(39)

فقر و مبارزه با فقر برنامه می خواهد . ... من به عنوان یک بچه کارگر و یک کارگر که زندگی سختی هم داشتم ؛ واقعا دلم نمی خواهد به فقرا مانند ماشین رای نگاه شود

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Poverty and combating poverty need a plan. … As the child of a worker who had a difficult life, I really do not want anyone to see the por as the voting machine.

(40)

<div dir="rtl">

ما می گوییم دولت وقتی برای کنترل برنامه ای می آورد باید محرکش را هم بگوید . بازدارندگی تنها ، رفع مشکل نمی کند . … تا الان ما می گفتیم تحریم است ، نکردیم ، از (4) سال بعد دیگر نمی گویند تحریم است ، می گویند چکار کردید ؟ دیگر ما نمی توانیم بگوییم پسابرجام هم مثل قبل از قضیه تحریم هاست ، این که نمی شود . آیا شما برای (4) سال بعد می توانید با قفل کردن بیشتر ، ترمز کردن بیشتر کشور را اداره کنید ؟ ما از این می ترسیم.

</div>

When the government says that it has for controlling [economic problems], it must also say what its motive force is. Deterrence or drag force by itself cannot solve problems. … So far, we have been saying there are sanctions, and we cannot do anything. Four years later, they will not say there are sanctions; they will ask about what you have done. We cannot say that post-JCPOA was like pre-JCPOA anymore. It is impossible. Will you be able to administer the country for four years by locking more and hitting the break? We are afraid of it.

(41)

<div dir="rtl">

این دو گروه یعنی سران فتنه داخلی و خارجی تقریبا در یک مسیری قرار گرفتند که آن مسیر ، مسیر دشمنان تابلودار ، آشکار و معاند نظام از اول پیروزی انقلاب تاکنون بوده است . متاسفانه هر دو با هم در یک ریل قرار گرفتند .

</div>

These two groups, national and foreign seditionists, were on almost the same path. The path has been the path of apparent enemies with traffic signs from the beginning of the Revolution's victory. Unfortunately, both of them were put on the same railway.

(42)

مسیولان نظام و نخبگان کشور را که موتور تدبیر و مدیریت کشور با آنها گرم بود و حرکت می کرد مانند

شهید بهشتی مطهری را تررور کردند رییس جمهور ما را تررور کردند این چه ظرفیتی است و چه ملتی

است که همه این داغ ها را هضم کرد اما چرخ موتور انقلابش یک روز هم راکد نشد بلکه با هر خون بر تدین

و ولایت مداری شان افزون شد.

They assassinated the country's authorities and elites such as Shahid [martyr] Beheshti and Bahonar that the engine of prudence and management was working due to them. They assassinated our president. What capability and nation we have that have overcome these bereavements, but the blades of the revolutionary engine did not dull once. On the contrary, every droplet of blood added to their faith and Guardianship-orientedness.

(43)

بحث ما این است کسانی که می گفتند هم چرخ سانتریفیوز بچرخد هم چرخ صنعت ... آیا می توان با مدیریت

درست کشور را از این بن بست های ساختگی توسط بعضی نجات داد و به جلو حرکت داد یا خیر . ... وظیفه

رییس جمهور این است که ماشین را بشناسد و ببیند چه ایراداتی دارد . بعد انتخابات 92 با روحانی دیدار داشتم

. گفتم این ماشین که شما اکنون در راس آن هستید ایرادات جدی دارد اگر بر طرف نکنید نمی توانید کاری

کنید .

We say that those who were saying both industry's wheel and nuclear technology's wheel will turn coordinately … Can we save the country from forged cul-de-sacs and move it forward with the proper administration of the country or not? … The president must know the car and see its problems. After the 2013 election, I had a meeting with Rouhani. I told him that the car you are driving has severe problems, and if you do not solve them, you cannot do anything.

(44)

سلام بر ... بنیانگذار نظام مقدس جمهوری اسلامی ایران با آرزوی طول عمر باعزت برای مقام معظم

رهبری که با راهنمایی و رهبری داهیانه خود کشتی نظام مقدس جمهوری اسلامی ایران را در دریای پرتلاطم

جهان کنونی به سوی ساحل نجات رهبری نمودند ...

Peace be upon the founder of the sacred political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and I wish long and glorified life for the Supreme Leader who saved the ship of the sacred political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a turbulent sea of the current world with his shrewd guidelines and leadership …

(45)

رییس جمهور تاکید کرد : ... همه ما برادر و کشتی نشینان یک کشتی هستیم ، همه عضو یک جامعه هستیم

چرا دین و مذهب بین ما باید اختلاف ایجاد کند مسایل سیاسی برای رقابت خوب است انتقاد برای رفع نقص و

دلسوزی لازم و ضروری است ، اما نگذاریم کینه و اختلاف ایجاد شود.

The president highlighted that … we all are brothers and on the same ship. We are members of the same society. Why should religion divide us? Political affairs are Good for competition. Criticism for solving shortcomings and compassion are necessary. However, we should not let the creation of spite and discord.

(46)

اگر می گویی ولایت فقیه ادامه ی «ما مضی البدریون» است . این یک کشتی است که تو را جلو می برد . در

طوفان های سهمگین چه کسی نجات می یابد ؟ کسی که سوار این کشتی شود . چه کسی غرق می شود ؟ کسی

که آن را ترک کند . ... جلوتر از این بروی غرق می شوی ، عقب هم بمانی غرق می شوی .

If you say that the Guardianship is the continuation of "the same transcendent status of martyrdom,". It is a ship that moves you forward. Who survives in deadly whirlpools? The one who is in this ship. Who drowns? The one who leaves it. … if you overpass it, you drown. If you fall behind, you will drown, too.

Now that national affairs are established in terms of metaphorical patterns, it comes to discussing international affairs and how they are reflected in metaphors. A Reformist politician contemplates that Rouhani is a pro-development president and puts the country's train on development railroad. Here, development through enhancing international relationships and negotiations is meant. For him, this is the right path, and he adds that when another president takes office who does not advocate development, he drives the train to detour.

In another instance, President Rouhani emphasizes that the only path to international peace is that Trump chooses the path of rationality and respects the Iranians' rights by adhering to JCPOA. If he deviates from this path and withdraws from JCPOA, he will step onto a dangerous path. Alternatively, it is an irreversible path, and the United States cannot recede; if it does so, Iran will also try other ways (paths). They believe that Trump blocks the path of negotiation, and he is receding to the times of Bush senior and junior. Blocking the path implies that Iran wants to negotiate, but the US party does not agree, and he is the one to be blamed, not Iran.

(47)

به همین دلیل وقتی دولتی موافق توسعه روی کار می آید ، کشور در ریل توسعه قرار می گیرد و دولت بعدی که مخالف توسعه است کشور را در مسیر انحرافی قرار می دهد . دولت روحانی رویکرد توسعه محورانه دارد ... همین رویکرد توسعه محورانه در همه شاخص ها اثر مثبت خود را می گذارد و ما در زمینه بین المللی به دنبال گفت وگو و صلح با جامعه جهانی هستیم و همین رویکرد باعث می شود ... تحریم ها برداشته شود.

As a result, when a pro-developments government takes office, the country is placed on the development railroad[172]. Moreover, when the next government is against developments, it detours the country. Rouhani's government has a development-orientation approach … This development-orientation approach per se affects all indices positively, and we seek peace and conversation with the world community at the international level. Moreover, this approach leads to … the lift of sanctions.

(48)

روحانی ادامه داد : تنها راه باقیمانده برای آمریکا ، اینست که به حقوق ملت ایران و به نظام جمهوری اسلامی و انقلاب اسلامی ایران ، احترام بگذارد و بداند تنها در سایه احترام و احقاق حقوق مردم و پیش گرفتن راه مسالمت و صلح منافع مردم آمریکا نیز بهتر می تواند تامین شود. … روحانی اظهار امیدواری کرد...روزی بیاید که آمریکایی ها هم در مسیر عقلانیت قرار گرفته …

Rouhani continued that America has only one way: respecting the Iranians' rights, the political system of the Islamic Republic, and the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Furthermore, it should know that the Americans' interests are served only in the shadow of respecting and practicing people's rights and moving [forward] in the path of peace. … Rouhani expressed his hope for … someday the Americans will be on the path of rationality, too …

(49)

حقیقت این است که آمریکا بعد از اجرایی شدن برجام ، مرتکب نقض مکرر روح برجام شده است اما خطرناک تر اینکه آمریکا در عصر ترامپ بخواهد … در مسیر خطرناک افزایش تشنج با ایران ، گام بردارد . این مسیر مانع از موفقیت توافقی خواهد شد که جامع ترین توافق تاریخ هسته ای جهان و مدلی برای خلع سلاح جهانی است.

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[172] This expression is the equivalent of English 'to be put in train'.

Truth be told, the US has continually been violating the spirit of the JCPOA; but the more dangerous thing is that if the US wants to walk in the dangerous way of increasing the tension with Iran in Trump's era. This way will impede the success of the agreement that is the most comprehensive nuclear agreement in the history of the world, and it is a model for world disarmament.

(50)

رفتار فعلی ترامپ مسیر مذاکره برای حل مشکلات بین المللی را می بندد و عقب‌گرد به دوران ناموفق بوش پدر و پسر است .

Trump's current behavior blocks the path of negotiations for solving global problems, and it is receding to unsuccessful times of Bush senior and junior.

(51)

او تاکید کرد : دولت قبلی آمریکا از سر لطف با ما وارد مذاکره نشد بلکه همه راه ها را امتحان کرده بود و ناکام مانده بود . ... اگر آمریکا از مسیر برجام بازگردد ما هم راه های دیگر را امتحان می کنیم او همچنین در ادامه افزود : دولت جدید باید بدانند سیاست های غلط نمی تواند برای آنها کارساز باشد.

He emphasized that the previous US government did not negotiate with us to do us a favor, but it had tried all [possible] ways, and it had been left blighted. … If the US retreats from the path of JCPOA, we will try other ways, too. He also added that the new [US] government must know those wrong policies cannot work for them.

9.1.5.2. Scenarios for VEHICLE AND MOVEMENT Metaphors. To conclude the above-mentioned elaborate discussion, the following scenarios related to VEHICLE AND MOVEMENT have been extracted.

a)   IRAN IS IN THE RIGHT WAY BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON ISLAMIC TEACHINGS. THIS RIGHT WAY IS CALLED STRAIGHT PATH.

b)   ANY DEVIATION FROM THE STRAIGHT PATH OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IS DETOUR FROM THE RIGHT WAY OF ISLAM.

c)   ANY DETOUR MUST BE AVOIDED BECAUSE DETOUR TAKES THE VEHICLE TO THE VALLEY.

d)   THOSE (POLITICIANS) WHO DO NOT BELIEVE IN THE REVOLUTION'S IDEALS AND PRINCIPLES ARE NOT PASSENGERS OF THE TRAIN OF REVOLUTION. THEY HAVE MISSED THE TRAIN AND HAVE NOT GOT ON THE TRAIN; OR THEY WERE TIERD OF THE JOURNEY AND GET OFF THE TRAIN. ONLY THE POOR AND OPPRESSED ARE PASSENGERS WHO WILL STAY IN THE TRAIN UNTIL THE FINAL STATION.

e)   PEOPLE CAN CHOOSE TO ACCELERATE THE VEHICLE IN THE RIGHT PATH (BY CHOOSING REFORMIST CANDIDATE) OR TO MAKE THE CAR CRASH INTO THE VALLEY (BY CHOOSING CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATE) IN PRESINDTIAL ELECTION.

f)   CULTURAL INVASION AND OTHER SIMILAR PHENOMENA ARE CONSIDERED AS MAKING CHANGES IN THE ROAD OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION (THE STRAIGHT PATH) WHICH IS HEINOUS.

g)   AT EVERY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AS A TRAIN STATION, THE ENEMY TRIES TO DISHEARTEN PEOPLE AND PREVENT THEM FROM VOTING (GETTING ON THE TRAIN OF REVOLUTION). YET PEOPLE ALWAYS SHOW UP (ARE PRESENT) AT THE STATION AND CATCH THE TRAIN.

h)   THE PATH OF REVOLUTION HAS BEEN WATERED BY THE BLOOD OF MARTYRS TO WELCOME IMAM MAHDI AND THE VICTORY OF ISLAM OR RIGHTEOUSNESS.

9.1.6. Source Domain of HUMAN BEING, EMOTIONS, AND HEALTH

This source domain is about human beings and anything related to them, including emotions, actions, character, body parts, and ailment. This section will discuss conceptual elements to prove that society, country, and the whole world is described as human being. They will also assist us in seeing how metaphorical patterns are utilized to describe national and international affairs and to help us see these issues from Iran's viewpoint. In this source domain, the inter-influence between national and international affairs is so strong that organizing the presentation of discussion in this respect will not be fruitful. So, the priority will be addressing issues described as human beings and some of their characters and behaviors. Secondly, the evolution of human beings, specifically, the Islamic Revolution's evolution as a person, will be argued. Then some organs and their interdependency will be discussed. Finally, health issues, ailments, and their treatments will be presented.

Table 9.7

Conceptual Elements, Primary Signals and Relevant Statistics of HUMAN BEING, EMOTIONS & HEALTH *Domain in each Corpus*

HUMAN BEING, EMOTIONS & HEALTH										
Conceptual Elements	**Primary Signals**	**Parliamentary Debates**			**ILNA**			**Tasnim**		
		Fr.	**TS**	**LD**	**Fr.**	**TS**	**LD**	**Fr.**	**TS**	**LD**
Disease	Disease	145			145			92		
	Economics' disease	3	1.73	4.89	-	-	-	3	1.70	5.04
	Chronic disease	4	2.00	10.44	7	-	10.82	4	-	11.54
	Fatal disease	3	1.73	10.24	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cancer	Cancer	45			41			18		

Tumour	Tumor	3			39		13.86	57		
	Carcinoma[173]	-	-	-	37	5.83	11.5	46	6.40	13.88
	Abscess[174]	-	-	-	3	1.73	5.94	-	-	-
	ISIS tumor	-	-	-	5	2.23	7.05	3	1.72	5.75
	Israel tumor	-	-	-	6	2.45	4.11	11	3.31	8.64
	Regional tumor	-	-	-	5	2.21		7	2.62	5.34
Prescription	Prescription	82			115		12.21	124		
	Healing prescription	10	3.16	13.03	10	2.65	-	12	3.46	12.09
	Lifesaving ~	4	2.00	11.95	-	-		5	2.24	10.89
Maturity	Maturity	11			68			47		
	Political maturity	3	1.73	6.65	23	5.17	6.14	8	2.80	5.17
	Revolution's ~	-	-	-	4	1.95	3.74	-	-	-
	Social maturity	-	-	-	3	1.71	4.51	5	2.22	6.09
	To mature	-	-	-	8	2.45	7.53	10	3.16	9.00
	Growth & maturity	-	-	-	8	2.82	6.85	-	-	-
Evolution	Evolution	5			51			48		
	~ of Revolution	-	-	-	3	1.69	3.32	5	2.17	3.7
Silence	Silence	93			505			260		
	Seal of silence	3	1.73	8.95	3	1.72	6.81	4	1.99	8.95
	Keep silent	10	3.13	5.98	27	5.08	6.79	21	4.50	6.79
	Expedient silence	-	-	-	8	2.83	9.43	-	-	-
	Deadly silence	-	-	-	8	2.83	8.94	9	2.83	10.53
	Meaningful/pregnant ~	-	-	-	4	-	8.34	4	1.73	9.21
	Absolute silence	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.73	8.21
Sleep	Sleep	51			126			133		
	Sleep of negligence	3	2.00	10.88	6	2.64	9.87	6	2.83	9.71
	USA's dream	3	1.73	6.52	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Restful sleep	-	-	-	4	2.00	9.10	7	2.64	10.30
	Sinister sleep	-	-	-	3	-	8.41	-	-	
	Enemies' dreams	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	2.61	6.28
	Disturbed sleep	-	-	-	3	1.73	9.26	-	-	-
	Interpretation of dream	-	-	-	3	1.73	8.14	5	2.23	8.42
Anger	Anger	25			107			93		
	Nation's anger	4	2.00	10.55	9	2.96	5.46	9	2.96	5.68
	Revolutionary anger	-	-	-	6	2.44	6.98	7	2.81	6.70
	Enemies' anger	-	-	-	4	1.98	6.04	6	2.43	6.70
	Holy anger	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.71	5.78
Body	Body	23			64			54		
	Body & soul	-	-	-	3	1.73	7.48	-	-	-
Visage	Visage	61			459			435		
	Beautiful visage	3	1.73	11.83	-	-	-	5	2.23	8.54
	True face	5	2.45	9.62	31	5.65	9.78	32	5.73	10.26
	Furious face	-	-	-	14	3.16	9.49	14	2.45	9.91

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[173] The word-for-word translation of the Persian version is 'cancerous tumor'.
[174] The word-for-word translation of the Persian version is 'filthy/infectious tumor'.

	Hideous face	-	-	-	11	3.32	9.57	11	3.32	9.67
	Radiant/luminous face	-	-	-	5	2.23	8.20	9	2.23	9.18
	To threaten face	-	-	-	14	3.72	8.44	10	3.15	8.68
	Corrupted face	-	-	-	14	3.74	9.57	8	2.83	8.96
	Visage of Islam	-	-	-	47	6.81	8.39	37	6.00	7.85
	Face & mask	-	-	-	5	2.24	8.43	10	3.16	9.48
	Face & makeup	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	3.32	9.53
	To change face	-	-	-	9	2.94	6.71	5	2.16	6.30
	Devil's face	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.72	7.38
	Arrogance's face	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.96	6.76
Smile	Smile	23			67			81		
	Enemy's smile	-	-	-	4	1.99	5.85	6	2.43	6.09
	Smile & frown	-	-	-	4	2.00	10.71	-	-	-
Mouth	Mouth	27			54			56		
	Punch in the mouth	7	2.65	12.42	3	1.73	10.61	6	2.45	10.80
	Arrogance's mouth	3	1.73	10.45	-	-	-	-	-	-
	To shut the mouth	-	-	-	4	2.00	9.36	5	2.24	10.22
	Enemies' mouth	-	-	-	4	-	5.44	3	1.72	5.72
Eye	Eye	652			624			539		
	Thorn in the eye[175]	-	-	-	5	2.24	8.02	6	2.45	8.49
	Enemy's eyes	-	-	-	14	3.69	7.52	29	5.34	8.66
	Blind eyes	5	2.23	7.91	8	2.83	9.08	6	2.45	9.06

9.1.6.1. Conceptual Elements in Context. Iran is described as a person with emotions, traits, and human actions. Other countries are also regarded as people with specific characters and behaviors, whether friends or enemies. Islamic Revolution's identity is determined based on his anti-arrogant confrontation. Iran is a successful and independent person observed by the enemy. He is on his way to achieving his goals. However, the enemy stares at Iran's weakness. So his success makes the enemy mad and the friend happy. From where does this enmity come? Iran's Islamic Revolution was like a slap in the face of arrogance, so he seeks revenge. This being said, the enemy's happiness and madness determine whether Iran is on the right path or not. For instance, the dichotomy of Reformist

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[175] It is very similar to the English idiom 'be a thorn in one's flesh/ side'. Generally speaking, this Persian idiom also implies more or less the same meaning, but, in the political domain, it has more intensified negative semantic prosody.

and Conservative as a sign of discord makes the enemy happy. Alternatively, Iran's development makes the enemy mad.

One of the enemy's features that he must be cautious about is his 'smile'. No one should trust his smile. A smile means, for instance, when the enemy requests negotiations. For extremist Conservatives, the government should not trust this smile and should not negotiate. The enemy shows a smiley face, but they hide their cast-iron hand. It is more or less equivalent to carrot and stick policy. The enemy is mad at the political system, and it is because of the slap mentioned above. Nevertheless, Iran's foreign minister, Zarif, assures that Iran depends on its people and inner security, and the other's smile or frown does not make it happy. Iran does not need the others' approval (smile) or disapproval (frown).

One of the main actions that countries, as people, do is 'sleeping'. Everyone (every country) sleeps. Iran also sometimes sleeps. Sleeping means ignoring a critical issue. However, the point is that we can wake those who are *really* asleep. If someone is pretending to be asleep, we can never wake them up. For instance, the United States keeps pretending to be asleep by breaching JCPOA and putting Iran on the blacklist of terrorist countries. He knows Iran is biding to JCPOA and yet withdraws from it. He knows Iran and Iranians are not terrorists and yet puts them on the blacklist.

The contrast between asleep and awake is highlighted in Islam too. The Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali said that 'people are asleep and wake up when they die'. Sleeping here is interpreted as living an ignorant and negligent life. In another hadith, Imam Ali says that 'if you sleep when your leader needs you, you will wake up with the enemy kick'. Accordingly, in excerpt (9), the world is described as a person experiencing sleep of

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negligence, and Imam Mahdi's emergence will wake him up, and Iran's ultimate goal is to prepare the world for that[176]. Alternatively, for Conservatives, 2009 sedition is described as an alarm for sleepy authorities to remind them that the enemy might be awake and attack if they sleep.

One element related to sleep is 'lullaby'. Intriguingly enough, a Conservative describes repeatedly talking about 'peace' as a lullaby to put people to sleep and then attack them at the right time. Peace has become a tool for maintaining war. A case of this type of peace that must be rejected is Palestine's case. They have sieged the Gaza stripe and opened fire on it and then talk of peace. It is an imposed peace, and it is not acceptable. Alternatively, in another instance, arrogance is described as a being whose survival depends on avoiding the oppressed countries from developing, and that is why they impose sanctions on other countries (other beings). So it is continually devastated and cannot sleep because, on the one hand, it is always afraid of the oppressed revenge, and, on the other hand, it always plans to exploit more countries and nations. For instance, Iran's missile program steals the United States' sleep and disrupts his disturbed sleep.

Another element related to sleeping is the dream and its interpretation, which usually means that the enemy can see his plans accomplished in his dreams; i.e., his dreams never come true. Iran can prevent their dreams from being interpreted in reality by learning from *Ashura*; i.e., Iranians are not afraid of dying, and if the enemy kills them, they do not die; they become a martyr.

(1)

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[176] It will also be explained in the discussion of evolution.

هویت انقلاب ما رویارویی با نظام استکبار است و اگر از این هدف دور شویم هویت ما تغییر کرده است .
پیروزی و قدرت ما هم از همین اندیشه ریشه می گیرد.

Our Revolution's identity confronts the arrogance, and our identity has changed if we distance from this aim. Our victory and power are rooted in this doctrine.

(2)

روحانی ... یادآور شد : انقلاب اسلامی زنده است و سرزنده تر از گذشته به مسیر تعالی خود ادامه می دهد .

Rouhani reminded that the Islamic Republic is alive and continues its path to transcendence livelier than before.

(3)

استکبار جهانی که سیلی محکمی از انقلاب اسلامی خورده بود پس از این پیروزی بزرگ ... دسیسه ها و فتنه های بسیاری برانگیخت و با تمام قدرت سخت و نرم خود علیه نظام نوپای انقلاب اسلامی اقدام نمود.

Global arrogance was given a hard slap in the face by the Islamic Revolution. After this great victory, [global arrogance] plotted so many big seditions, and it used all its soft and hard power against the toddler of the Islamic Revolution.

(4)

پیشرفت ما موجب عصبانیت دشمن می شود . نباید سرعت پیشرفت بر اساس اخم و لبخند دشمن تنظیم شود ... . در تفکر انقلابی ، «پیشرفت یک ملت» بر «عصبانیت دشمن» ترجیح دارد . جلیلی ... خاطرنشان کرد : دشمن از تفکر انقلابی می ترسد و می هراساند چون در این تفکر منافع ، حقوق و سرمایه های یک کشور پای لبخند دشمنان ریخته نمی شود .

Our development makes the enemy mad. The pace of our development should not be set according to the enemy's smile and frown …. In a revolutionary doctrine, 'a nation's development is prior to 'the enemy's anger. Jalili … reminded that the enemy is afraid of revolutionary doctrine; because, according to this doctrine, a country's rights, interests, and capitals are not given for having the enemy's smile.

(5)

دولت نباید با لبخند اروپایی ها بار دیگر پای میز مذاکره قرار گیرد .

The government should not sit at the negotiation table again due to the Europeans'
smile.

(6)

موحدی کرمانی عنوان کرد : طاغوت ظاهر خوبی از خود نشان می دهد تبسم می کند ، لبخند می زند می گوید
در کنار هم می خواهند مشکلات را حل کنند به تعبیر رهبری دست چدنی آنها را باید دید.

Movahedi Kermani said that Taghut looks good; it smiles and says they want to solve
problems together. Using the Supreme Leader's terminology, their cast-iron hand
should be seen.

(7)

ظریف خاطرنشان کرد : ایران تنها کشوری است که امنیت خود را از داخل و از مردم خود می گیرد و به
کشورهای خارجی متکی نیست و با لبخند یا اخم خارجی ها خوشحال نمی شود .

Zarif affirmed that Iran is the only country whose security comes from inside the
country and its people, and it does not depend on foreign countries. Moreover, it does
not become happy with foreigners' smiles or frowns.

(8)

جلیلی افزود : برای دشمنی که به دنبال بهانه جویی است هرچقدر هم بهانه زدایی کنیم ، بهانه های جدید تری
خواهد آورد . کسی که خواب است را میتوان بیدار کرد اما کسی که خود را به خواب زده ، هرگز !

Jalili added that no matter how much we deal with his excuses for the enemy who
seeks nit-picking, he would make new excuses. Someone asleep can be awakened, but
the one who pretends to be asleep cannot be awakened.

(9)

جبهه مردمی نیروهای انقلاب اسلامی ... امیدوار است با تدبیر و همدلی همه مسیولان و پرهیز جدی از
دوقطبی سازی های دشمن شادکن ، این توان با تکیه بر نیروهای داخلی افزایش یافته و انقلاب اسلامی ایران

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بتواند به رسالت تاریخی خود برای بیدار کردن همه ملت های جهان از خواب غفلت ... و زمینه ساز ظهور منجی عالم ، حضرت مهدی موعود (عج) باشد.

Popular Front of the Islamic Revolution Forces … hopes that this capability can be increased by prudence and empathy of all authorities and avoiding bipolarity which makes the enemy happy. Furthermore, the Islamic Revolution of Iran can do its historical mission to awaken nations worldwide from the sleep of negligence and pave the way for the emergence of Imam Mahdi.

(10)

... اگر ما اینجا خواب برویم ، جبهه دشمن ، پشت سنگر خودش معلوم نیست خواب رفته باشد ؛ او بیدار است ، علیه ما توطیه خواهد کرد . به نظر من ، فتنه سال 88 هم همین بود ؛ برای ما یک زنگ بود ، یک زنگ بیدارباش بود.

If we fall asleep here, it is not clear whether the enemy's front has fallen asleep behind his trench or not. It is awake, and it will conspire. In my opinion, the 2009 sedition was the same thing; it was an alarm for us. It was an awakening alarm.

(11)

چنین صلحی یعنی شکست قطعی و یکی از راه های دشمن برای به خواب بردن انسان ها دم زدن از صلح است ، تا با خیال آسوده و در فرصت مناسب بر کسانی که با آنان ادعای صلح کردن را دارد ، حمله کند .

Such peace is means decisive defeat, and one of the ways that the enemy uses to put people into sleep is talking about peace. [They do so] to attack those in peace with quickly and at the best time.

(12)

یکی از روش های اساسی و مهم استکبار جهانی ، برای حفظ سلطه و برتری خود بر جهان و ادامه بقا و حیات خویش ، جلوگیری از پیشرفت ملت های مستضعف است. استکبار ، در این جهت ، از انجام هیچ گونه اقدامی اعم از ... اعمال تحریم ها و محدودیت های بین الملل ، به بهانه های مختلف دریغ نمی ورزد. مستکبر ، همواره در خوف و اضطراب به سر می برد و از انتقام کشورهای تحت سلطه ، هراسان است . از

سوی دیگر ، تلاش روزافزون در به دست آوردن هرچه بیشتر منافع و منابع دیگران ، خواب راحت را از

چشمان استکبار ربوده است ...

One of the main ways of global arrogance to preserve hegemony and superiority is to prevent the oppressed nations from developing. In this vein, the arrogance does not withhold any actions, including imposing sanctions and international limitations, due to various excuses. The arrogant are always afraid and anguished, alarmed about the oppressed countries' revenge. On the other hand, increasing attempts to gain others' benefits and resources have stolen sleep from the arrogance …

(13)

انتشار برنامه کنترل رژیم موشکی MTCR درست دو روز بعد از امضای برجام در شورای امنیت ، تلاش سازماندهی شده آمریکا و غرب برای جلوگیری از فعالیت های موشکی جمهوری اسلامی ایران است که خواب آشفته را از چشمان آمریکا و همدستانش ربوده است.

Publishing Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) just two days after signing the JCPOA in the United Nations Security Council is America's and the West's organized attempt to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran's missile activities that have stolen the United States and his allies' disturbed sleep.

(14)

هفته دفاع مقدس جلوه ای از عاشورای حضرت اباعبدالله الحسین (ع) است که خواب های دشمنان را علیه نظام اسلامی بی تعبیر گذاشت .

The week of Holy Defense is a display of Ashura that left the dreams of the Islamic political system's enemies unfulfilled.

Now that this human being and his actions are expounded, his evolution can be discussed. The Islamic Revolution was born to live a 'good life' or a 'blessed life'. All religions share the concept of a good life, but each has its view of what this good life entails. Generally speaking, it is interpreted as doing righteous deeds to have a blessed life both in this life and life hereafter. So this Revolution is a person born to live a good life. From the beginning of his birth, his enemies wanted to kill this infant, yet they have never been able to do so. They can accomplish this in their dreams because IRGC kills any threat in its embryo. So any threat is like a being that never gets the chance to evolve. It is also mentioned that the Revolution person will be turning 40 on his next birthday. Forty is a unique number; e.g., the Jewish people strayed 40 years in the wilderness of Sinai before arriving at the Promised Land. Forty is interpreted as the time needed for a new generation; i.e., it shows maturity and perfection of a process. At the age of 40, according to Moderate Rouhani, the Revolution must avoid extremes and stay in the path of moderateness. So, he argues that voting for him is the sign of maturity of both the society and the Revolution.

In general, this is an Islamic evolution and growth. What drives Iran through this process of evolution is '*jihadi* management', which consists of Islamic instructions practical in various aspects of managing the society. Other factors are security, IRGC, and clergy. The final phase of the evolution of the Islamic Revolution is to hand it over to Imam Mahdi. In his speeches, Ayatollah Khamenei explains the five-phase process of evolution within these years. The first phase is creating the Islamic Revolution; the second is creating an Islamic political system; the third is Islamic government; the fourth is an Islamic country; the final stage is accomplishing the perfect slogan of the Islamic Revolution, which is creating an Islamic world and civilization. According to him, Iran is now going from the fourth phase of evolution to the fifth one. The final phase of this process is like a final station in section 9.1.5.

(15)

سردار دهقان ... خاطرنشان کرد : فضای کشور یک فضای اسلامی ، انسانی و همراه با رشد و تکامل است

که با رهبری مقام معظم رهبری به سمت هدایت و رشد اسلامی گام بر می دارد .

Major General Dehghan affirmed that country's atmosphere is an Islamic and human

atmosphere with growth and evolution, and it makes steps towards Islamic guidance

and growth by the leadership of the Supreme Leader.

(16)

حاتمی با بیان اینکه طلوع خورشید انقلاب اسلامی ایران به رهبری معمار کبیر انقلاب حضرت امام خمینی (

ره) با رویکرد «انقلاب فرهنگی و اسلامی» پا به عرصه حیات طیبه خود گذاشت و به پیروزی رسید ،

خاطرنشان کرد : بر این اساس پیام انقلاب اسلامی ایران به دنیا یک پیام کاملا فرهنگی است ...

Hatami stated that the rise of the sun of Iran's Islamic Revolution with the leadership

of Imam Khomeini, the great architect of the Revolution, was born to have a blessed

life with an Islamic-cultural approach. And it triumphed. He affirmed that, in this

regard, the message of the Islamic Revolution of Iran is a cultural message to the

whole world …

(17)

سردار جلالی در پایان خاطرنشان کرد : در بخش دفاعی با ایجاد آمادگی دفاعی و تفهیم آن به دشمن آماده خفه

کردن هر تهدید در نطفه هستیم .

Major General Jalali ended his speech by affirming that we are ready to kill any threat

in its embryo in the defensive section by creating defense training and making the

enemy understand it.

(18)

روحانی خاطرنشان کرد : ما در آستانه چهل سالگی انقلاب هستیم مردم ما باید مردم ما آثار چهل سالگی را حس کنند و

بدانند انقلاب دچار بلوغ شده است . مردم باید ببیند افراط ها و خشونت ها کنار رفته و احساس اعتدال و

آرامش بیشتری کنند .

Rouhani affirmed that the Revolution would be turning forty on his next birthday, and people should feel the effects of being forty years old and know that the Revolution has reached its maturity. People should see that extremities and asperities have been put aside and sense moderateness and peacefulness.

(19)

در نظام «مدیریتی جهادی» ، دستورالعمل های اسلام در ابعاد مختلف به عنوان شیوه های کاربردی برای

اداره جامعه در نظر گرفته شده و هدف نهایی آن ، نهادینه شدن ارزش ها در جامعه و تبدیل آن ها به معیاری

موثر جهت اداره شایسته جامعه و رشد و تکامل آن است.

In a system with 'jihadi management', Islamic instructions in various dimensions are considered practical ways of administering the country. Moreover, its ultimate goal is institutionalizing values in the society and turning them into effective criteria for appropriate administration of the society and its growth and evolution.

(20)

ایشان روند تکامل انقلاب اسلامی را به پنج مرحله تقسیم فرمودند . ... 1 - مرحله ایجاد انقلاب اسلامی... 2 -

مرحله ایجاد نظام اسلامی... 3- مرحله ایجاد دولت اسلامی... 4 مرحله ایجاد کشور اسلامی... 5-مرحله

ایجاد تمدن اسلامی : اگر توانستیم این مرحله را به سلامت طی کنیم ، آنگاه مرحله بعدی ، ایجاد دنیای اسلام

است . » به این ترتیب مرحله نهایی انقلاب ... دستیابی به تمدن عظیم اسلامی خواهد بود

He [the Supreme Leader] has divided the Islamic Revolution's evolution into five phases. 1. The phase of creating the Islamic Revolution, 2. The phase of creating an Islamic political system, 3. The phase of creating Islamic government, 4. The phase of creating an Islamic country, 5. The phase of creating Islamic civilization. If we can

pass these five phases successfully, the next phase is creating the Islamic world. So, the final phase of the Revolution will be achieving a great Islamic civilization.

The outstanding conceptual elements are the vertebral column, heart, eyes, face, hand, and memory when it comes to the human body and its organs. Generally speaking, the vertebral column refers to the nucleus of the argument. Since it is the body's anchor, it describes the main points. If a person's backbone breaks or injures, he/she cannot walk properly, or even he/she will become disabled. For instance, in the parliamentary debates corpus, a country is described as a body with a vertebral column (economy) with severe problems such as unemployment, water crisis, and economic depression. If they do not cure them as soon as possible, the whole body will become disabled.

Moreover, consequently, national security will be in danger. In ILNA corpus, army and economy are described as the body whose vertebral column is army ground forces and petroleum industry, accordingly. For instance, it says that the United States' sanctions targeted the petroleum industry as the backbone of its economy (to disable the country).

For Tasnim, other than the economy, Constitution is the vertebral column of Iran's political system since it is codified based on Islamic laws (*sharia*). In addition, the IRGC and one of its paramilitary units, the Basij, are seen as Iran's backbone and even the anchor of all oppressed people. Another extra point about Tasnim is that it describes ISIS and the United States as someone whose vertebral column is broken. In the case of ISIS, it means that it is defeated in Syria. The latter is based on Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign. His keyword was 'crippled America'. In an excerpt (Exc.26), the Conservative authority argues why we should be afraid of sanctions imposed by a country whose president confesses that his country's vertebral column is broken.

Another element describing the main point of argument is the heart. For instance, the Middle East is considered the heart of the world. Iran, as well as Palestine, is considered the heart of the Muslim World. However, Palestine has the cancer of Israel. On a national scale, the parliament is considered the heart of the political system. Moreover, the Assembly of Experts[177] is considered the heart of Iran's Islamic political system since it supports the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and Ayatollah Khamanei.

The organ mainly related to the enemy and the like is the 'eye'. Every positive thing about Iran is considered a thorn in the eyes of the enemy, making him blind. It is like the case of making the enemy mad explained earlier in this section. For example, people's presence and voting is like a thorn in the enemy's eyes and makes him angry or blind because it shows people are still supporting the political system. Or in another excerpt, it is mentioned that the West closes its eyes on terrorism and pretends not to see (reminding of pretending to sleep). They (Iran's enemies) categorize terrorism into good and bad terrorism. Furthermore, IRGC is a thorn in the eyes of Israel and the United States since it is anti-Zionism.

A typical Persian expression translated into English as 'to the blindness of someone's eyes' is also worth elaboration. Its English version may be 'right to someone's face'. For instance, an IRGC officer states that Iran will move forward and hand over the government to its primary possessor, Imam Mahdi; he will do it to the blindness of the enemy's eyes.

A borderline case of the eye between national and international affairs is pointed out in Basij's manifesto. Not gazing out of the country and keeping an eye on the enemy is a

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[177] As explained in section 2.2, this assembly is responsible for choosing and even disqualifying the Supreme Leader.

requirement for attaining the aims of a resistive economy. It argues that they cannot watch the enemy with one eye and with another one, watch the Supreme Leader; if they do this, they cannot get anywhere. Both eyes must look at the same thing, and it must be Ayatollah Khamenei's guidelines.

Before closing the discussion of the eye, clarifying a widespread expression related to the eye which can indirectly be recognized as a metaphor is worth mentioning. The literal translation of that expression is 'eye and light'. It refers to something that makes someone happy or excited. That is to say, when we become happy, our eyes become sparkling; they light up. The 'light' in this expression also underlines that light helps the eyes see things better. It also reminds us of the relation between light and mirror explained in section 9.1.1.

Another reason behind this combination might be the light's importance in the house and the eye in the body to see things. Eyes play a significant role in Iranian culture; since it is placed on the upper part of the face, and eyesight is vital. For instance, to welcome a guest, which is very important in Iranian culture, the host says, 'you have stepped onto my eyes'. Intuitively, the nation is the political system's 'the eye and the light', or martyrs as the Revolution's 'the eye and the light'. It means that they are essential, and the country is proud of them and cares about them a lot.

With that being said, regarding eye and blindness, a fan of Conservative presidential candidates uses a metaphor that both contrasts with the typical pattern and, at the same time, clarifies what type of light is meant. By referring to 'trusteeship', he emphasizes that no president or authority in Iran's Islamic political system owns the government or the power; it is like a holy trusteeship. The power is entrusted to the president. He adds that winning that specific candidate will be the brightness of everyone's eyes: "we do not want blindness of eyes; we want everyone's eyes to be bright; and Oh God, may this brightness turn into Godly

light". This metaphor conjures up the Sufism belief, according to which the heart of the believer is like a mirror that reflects God's light (section 9.1.1). A man of great faith, a fortiori, has a luminous or bright face and eyes[178], and it comes from the light of faith in God.

The next element is the face or envisage. It is mainly devoted to the true face of a person and that some people try to hide, threaten or corrupt someone else's face (to denigrate someone). In this regard, closely related secondary indicators are 'mask' and 'wearing makeup'. An excerpt (33) posited that they wanted to corrupt Iran's face by Iranophobia, but the JCPOA showed Iran's real and peaceful face. On the other hand, it showed the United States' true and untrustworthy face. Also, arrogance, terrorism, and ISIS are described as people with hideous faces. Another excerpt says that America and Zionism have created terrorist groups such as ISIS to corrupt envisage of Islam, and Iran is responsible for showing Islam's truly merciful face. To wear makeup is used in pro-Conservative Tasnim. This source image originates in the Supreme Leader's quotation. Two instances of trying to make up America's face area) using some euphemism describing the US after JCPOA and also b) convincing people that the United States is not Iran's enemy anymore. An instance of the former is using 'great powers' instead of 'world arrogance' and negotiating with America.

Last but not least important element is the arm. Every person has two arms, and Iran's arms are negotiating committee during JCPOA's meetings and Major General Soleimani. Both of them were equally important and helpful for the peace-making process.

(21)

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[178] There are even some prayers to get the bright face of a believer.

از استاد ارجمندم آقای دکتر عارف ... می خواهم درخواستی داشته باشم که به سه معضل بزرگ کشور یعنی بیکاری ، رونق اقتصادی و بحران آب ... به عنوان ستون فقرات معضلات کشور به آن بپردازند .

I want to request from Dr. Aref, my noble master, … to pay more attention to three significant predicaments in the country: unemployment, economic depression, and water crisis … as the vertebral column of the country's predicaments.

(22)

در حقیقت با تدوین قانون اساسی انقلاب اسلامی که منشور اصلی و محوری جمهوری اسلامی است ، ارکان جامعه اسلامی مهندس شد ، این قانون که تبلور ارزش های اسلامی است و منطبق با احکام اسلام تدوین شده ، به مثابه ستون فقرات نظام اسلام است و مرکز اصلی سلسله اعصاب نظام اسلامی تلقی می شود .

In fact, with the codification of the Islamic Revolution's constitution, as the central and pivotal charter of the Islamic Republic, the pillars of Islamic society were built. This constitution crystallizes Islamic values, codified based on Islamic rules. It is like the vertebral column of the Islamic political system, and it is considered the main center of the Islamic political system's nervous system.

(23)

اگر کسی واقع بین بوده و از فتنه به دور باشد و ملی بیندیشد ، نمی تواند منکر شود که بسیج مهم ترین ستون فقرات ایران و نقطه عطف اتکا جهانی مستضعفین به هنگام رهایی از استعمار است . دیپلمات پیشین کشورمان افزود : بسیج ستون فقرات امنیت ایران است و آنهایی در دستگاه دیپلماسی اثر می گذارند که دیپلماسی مقاومت را گسترش می دهند.

If someone is realistic and away from sedition and thinks nationally, he cannot deny [the fact] that Basij is Iran's vertebral column and the turning point of world oppressed reliance at the time of release from colonialism. This former diplomat of Iran added that Basij is the vertebral column of Iran's security, and those who spread diplomacy of resistance are affecting the diplomacy system.

(24)

معاون سیاسی سپاه پاسداران با بیان این مطلب که صدای شکسته شدن ستون فقرات تروریست ها در حلب سوریه به گوش می رسد ، گفت : روند موجود ، نشان دهنده شکست تروریست ها در سوریه است .

The political deputy of IRGC addressed the point that the sound of terrorists' vertebral column being broken in Aleppo, Syria, is being heard. He said that the current progress shows terrorists' defeat in Syria.

(25)

شما می خواستید تمرکز قدرت سیاسی ، نظامی ، عملیات روانی ، اقتصادی و تهاجم فرهنگی خود را بر قلب جهان اسلام یعنی این سرزمین مبارک قرار دهید اما خود امروز در بیابان ها سرگردان هستید .

You wanted to focus your political, military, economic power and mental operations and cultural invasions on the heart of the Muslim World, meaning this blessed territory; but, now, you yourselves are wanderers in deserts.

(26)

امروز نزدیک به نیمی از مردم امریکا در انتخابات شرکت نکردند و کسانی که شرکت کردند به کسی رای دادند که مانیفست انتخاباتی او «امریکای فلج» بود . ... ندیدن واقعیت ها آن است که مدهوش قدرتی شویم که به اذعان منتخب امریکا ، ستون فقرات آن شکسته است . عدم واقع بینی آن است که از تحریم های فلج کننده قدرتی بترسیم که به اذعان منتخب امریکا خودش فلج است !

Today, almost half of the Americans did not participate in the election, and those who participated voted for someone whose electoral manifesto was 'crippled America'. … Not seeing realities is when we are amazed by the power that the elected president of America confesses that its vertebral column is broken. It is unrealistic if we are afraid

of crippling sanctions of the power that the elected president of America admits is crippled!

(27)

حال که در آستانه یکی از شاخص های مردم سالاری دینی و یکی از مولفه های قدرت یعنی انتخابات ریاست جمهوری ... هستیم متحد و یکدل و به کوری چشم دشمنان با حضور حداکثری پای صندوق های رای به ندای رهبری لبیک گفته و با انتخاب اصلح به فردی مقتدر ، دشمن نترس و شجاع رای می دهیم تا سیادت و آقایی ما را در مقابل استکبار جهانی استیلا ببخشید .

Now that we are on the threshold of one of the religious democracy indices and one of the components of power, namely presidential election … we accept the Leader's invitation, and we will be present unitedly and with maximum attendance at the ballot boxes to the blindness of the enemy. Moreover, by selecting the best person, we vote for an authoritative and courageous person who is not afraid of the enemy so that he can dominate our supremacy and lordship before the global arrogance.

(28)

آنچه اتفاق افتاد نتیجه تقسیم تروریسم به خوب و بد است ، نتیجه تعریف نادرست از مفهوم تروریسم است . آنها از یک طرف ایستادگی بر حق حزب الله و حماس را ... ترور می نامند ، از طرف دیگر چشم خود را بر کانون های تولید و حمایت از تروریسم در منطقه می بندند ...

What is happening today results from dividing terrorism into good and evil [terrorism]. It is the result of an incorrect definition of the concept of terrorism. On the one hand, they call rightful resistance of Hezbollah and Hamas … terror. On the other hand, they close their eyes to centers of producing and supporting terrorism in the region …

(29)

ملت ایران سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی را سد مستحکم در برابر نفوذ دشمنان و ... خار در چشم آمریکا و

رژیم نامشروع و جعلی اسراییل و ضد انقلاب می داند .

The Iranians consider the IRGC as the fortified dam confronting the enemy's

infiltration and … as a thorn in America's and illegal and fake Israeli regime's eyes

and all who are against the Revolution.

(30)

امروز شما در خط مقدم مبارزه هستید و باید حماسه خلق کنید ... . شرط تحقق این مساله این است که ما به

جای دیگری چشم ندوزیم . کسی که یک چشم به دشمن و یک چشم به ولی امر داشته باشد به جایی نخواهد

رسید.

Today, you are at the front line of combat, and you should make an epic … the

condition of achieving this aim is that we do not gaze at other places. Someone who

has one eye on the enemy and another eye on the guardian [of all Muslims] will not

reach anywhere.

(31)

سردار رمضان شریف سخنگو و مسیول روابط عمومی کل سپاه دریادواره 950 شهید عملیات کربلای 5

لشکر ویژه 25 کربلا و سرداران و 33 شهید بیشه سر بابل با بیان اینکه شهدا چشم و چراغ ایران اسلامی

هستند ...

The spokesman and public relations officer of IRGC, Major General Sharif, expressed

that martyrs are eyes and lights of Islamic Iran in the memorial of martyrs of Bishe

sar, Babol …

(32)

ما طی این مذاکرات توانستیم قدرت های بزرگ را وادار کنیم تا حقوق هسته ای ما را به رسمیت بشناسند ، پروژه ایران هراسی را با شکست مواجه نماییم . چهره مخدوشی که از ما در جهان ایجاد کرده بودند را بازسازی کنیم و نشان دهیم که دولت و مردم ایران منطقی ، صلح دوست و در عین حال در دفاع از حقوق خود مقتدر خواهند بود .

During these negotiations, we could impel great powers to officialize our nuclear rights and defeat the Iranophobia project. We could restore the corrupted face they had created for us globally, and we showed that Iran's government and nation are rational and peaceful. In the meantime, we will be decisive in defending our rights.

(33)

آمریکا و صهیونیسم بین الملل با هدف مخدوش سازی چهره تابناک اسلام عزیز نقشه شوم خود را از طریق به راه اندازی گروه های تروریستی ، تکفیری و بروز و ظهور جنایات دهشتناک ضد بشری و انعکاس آن به همه نقاط عالم در منطقه حساس غرب آسیا و در میان کشورهای اسلامی عملی کردند ... همه تلاش خود را برای نشان دادن چهره تاریک از اسلام عزیز به نمایش گذاشت .

The US and international Zionism aimed at distorting the bright face of dear Islam, and they put their vicious plan into action by establishing terrorist and takfiri groups and making brutal anti-humanist crimes in the sensitive region of West Asia and broadcasting them to the whole world … They put all attempts into action for showing a dark envisage of dear Islam.

(34)

به تعبیر رهبر معظم انقلاب اسلامی : «یکی از کارهای آمریکایی ها در این سالهای آخر ، این است که کسانی را وادار کنند به بزک کردن چهره ی آمریکا ؛ به این که این جور وانمود بکنند که آمریکایی ها اگر هم یک روزی دشمن بودند ، امروز دیگر دشمنی نمی کنند ؛ هدف این است . هدف این است که چهره ی دشمن برای ملت ایران پنهان بماند تا از دشمنی او غفلت بشود و او بتواند دشمنی خودش را اعمال کند ...

According to the Supreme Leader, one of the things that the Americans have done in these recent years is impel some people to put makeup on America's face. They want to pretend that even if the US was an enemy in the past, it is no longer the enemy. This is their purpose. They aim to hide the enemy's face from Iran's nation so that its enmity is ignored and it can put its enmity into action ….

(35)

در این مرحله ، دشمن نفوذ به ادبیات رایج سیاسی و ارزشی کشور را در دستور کار قرار داد تا اینکه برخی اصطلاح همچون '' قدرت های بزرگ '' را جایگزین '' استکبار جهانی '' کرد و مبارزه با آمریکا به مذاکره و حتی تعامل با آمریکا تقلیل یافت . … اعتماد به آمریکا و بزک کردن چهره آمریکا در افکار عمومی ، محور اصلی فتنه نفوذ است … مهمترین پروژه آمریکایی ها در دوره فعلی آن بود که به اتکای برجام ، پسابرجام را به عرصه ای برای نفوذ تبدیل کنند.

In this stage, the enemy penetrated the country's valued and political literature on the agenda. So, 'global arrogance' was replaced by 'great powers', and 'countering the US' was belittled to 'negotiating' and even' interaction with the US'. Trusting America and putting makeup on its face in public opinion is the central axis of the sedition of infiltration … America's most important project in the current era was to turn the post-JCPOA era into an area for infiltration with the help of the JCPOA.

(36)

امروز روزی است که تحریم های ظالمانه علیه ملت نستوه ایران … برداشته شده است و این اتفاق مهم را به … به ویژه دو بازوی قدرتمند نظام یکی بازوی سخت افزاری نظام سردار حاج قاسم سلیمانی و دیگری بازوی نرم افزاری نظام جناب آقای دکتر ظریف و همه ملت سرافراز ایران تبریک عرض می نمایم .

Today is the day that oppressive sanctions against Iran's tenacious nation … have been lifted, and I congratulate this vital event to … especially two powerful arms of

the political system: One is the political system's arm of hardware, Major General Soleimani; and another is the arm of software, Dr. Zarif and the whole proud nation.

Now that body and its organs are explicated, the closing discussion of this section is final remarks on ailments and proposed treatments. On the whole, any problem or deficiency is described as a disease, and the solution is the prescription. The most critical problem described as a disease is economic problems and unemployment at the national level. It is described as cancer and the worst cancer compared with others that have already infected Iran's body. The MP considers congress members doctors who can cure the country's problems. However, the healing and lifesaving prescription for economic problems is the 'resistive economy' proposed by the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader's prescription (guidelines) originates in Ayatollah Khomeini's thoughts, and the primary treatment or medicine for Iran's growth is 'anti-arrogance'. Since the Revolution's identity is determined by being anti-arrogance.

An interesting point about prescription is made by Raisi, presidential candidate and Rouhani's main rival, which highlights the importance of a national prescription. He demonstrates the duty of the seminary to provide a prescription based on Islam and dependency factors as a response to the country's needs and problems. It will be a cheaper prescription. If they do not carry out their duty, then an expensive and diversionary prescription will be imposed on society as a creditable one. What is this expensive prescription? For him and other Conservatives, it is 'compromise' (with the enemy) which is usually the consequence or equivalent of negotiations.

Guardianship and the Supreme Leader play a significant role in this scenario, too. The Guardianship belongs to Imam Mahdi, and he appoints the Supreme Leader. The Supreme

Leader has inherited Guardianship from Imam Mahdi, whether people want it or not. In an excerpt (Exc. 42), Iran is described as a pharmacy that is open 24/7 for patients, and even if the doctor (Imam Mahdi) is not present, his successor is at the pharmacy to give medicine to patients. Whatever medicine this successor gives is legal because the doctor appoints him. If it were not for Guardianship, the political system would have been vanquished. For instance, 2009 unrest is described as an illness cured by *hijama* or wet cupping therapy, traditional Islamic medicine. In this way, the filthy or infectious blood (the seditionists) got out of the Revolution's body, and the political system was saved.

At the international level, FATF is regarded as the poison that must be avoided if it deteriorates the political system. Extremist Conservatives have blistered the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It is considered a way of infiltration. It is described as a sleeping pill prescribed by the West to put Iran into sleep to penetrate the society. However, Iran and society are awake and will not let Uncle Sam steal anything from Iran as he did through the JCPOA. In another excerpt, a Conservative considers talking about the advantages of the JCPOA as speech pathology, which does not help solve economic problems, and all they do is talk about the JCPOA. For Conservatives, the JCPOA is like a sterile person (like zero achievements in the game scenario in section 9.1.4). It is also described as a prescription that did not cure Iran's sickness, and now Reformists are suggesting the same thing for the case of war in Syria. They suggest a political solution for the Syrian Civil War by negotiating involved parties to bring peace. Terrorism, ISIS, and Israel are like diseases (such as cancer, tumor, or contagious virus) that have infected the body of Islam as a human being. The healing prescription for this illness is unity instead of disagreement and quarrel. For Ayatollah, Khamenei terrorism is a shared pain between Islamic World and the West.

(37)

دوستان ! به داد سرمایه گذاری هایی که قرار است با همدیگر اتفاق نظر پیدا بکنیم ، این بیماری بیکاری را

در این کشور با این سرمایه گذاری ها حل بکنیم ، به داد اینها برسید.

Friends! Come to rescue the investments that are supposed to be agreed upon, and the

unemployment ailment will be cured.

(38)

بیایید به حال بزرگترین سرطان کشور که در شریان های اقتصادی آن جاری است چاره ای بیندیشیم . نظام

پولی و بانکی کشور دچار سرطان بدخیمی است ، نیازمند درمان ریشه ای است و این درمان جز از

طبیبان خانه ملت بر نمی آید.

Let us contemplate the most extensive cancer of the country in the vessels of the

economy. The country's monetary and banking system suffers from malign cancer,

and it needs fundamental treatment. Moreover, no one has it other than physicians in

the parliament.

(39)

ملت رشید و سرافراز ایران ،'' اقتصاد مقاومتی '' و تلاش همه جانبه برای اقدام و عمل به آن را

''نسخه نجات بخش کشور '' برای عبور موفق و افتخارآمیز از دام تحریم های ظالمانه '' نظام سلطه '' و ''

دیکتاتوری مدرن اقتصادی '' دانسته...

[Now I announce to] the brave and proud nation of Iran that 'resistive economy' and

all-encompassing efforts to put it into action is 'the lifesaving prescription' for

successfully and proudly passing oppressive sanctions imposed by the hegemony and

modern economic dictatorship ….

(40)

این ... وصایای جاودان آن حضرت را که امروز در رهنمودها و سفارشات مقام معظم رهبری (مدظله

العالی) تبلور یافته است را نسخه پیش روندگی انقلاب و ملت ایران به سمت آرمان های متعالی قلمداد و آورده

است : تردیدی نیست ژرفنای میراث فکری و وصیت نامه سیاسی الهی امام راحل (ره) «استکبارستیزی» و

«نه گفتن به استکبار و عدم تبعیت از خواسته های شیطان اکبر»است

These eternal wills of Imam Khomeini that are now crystallized in the Supreme Leader's guidelines are recognized as a prescription for moving the nation and the Revolution towards ultimate ideals. There is no doubt that the depth of intellectual legacy and Imam's political will is 'anti-arrogance' and 'saying no to the arrogance' and 'not following the Major Satan's wills'.

(41)

رییسی گفت : ... استخراج مولفه های پیشرفت مومنانه و رفاه مردم در سایه اسلام و استقلال ، کار حوزه های علمیه است و اگر حوزه به این وظیفه خود به درستی عمل نکند ، الگوی انحرافی و پر هزینه همچون نسخه سازش را به عنوان نسخه های معتبر به جامعه تحمیل خواهند کرد.

Raisi said that extracting components of development for believers and people's welfare in the shadow of Islam and independence is the duty of seminaries. Moreover, if the seminary does not do its job correctly, a deviated and expensive role model such as the prescription of compromise will be imposed on society as a creditable prescription.

(42)

ولایت فعلی» متعلق به امام زمان است. فعلیت ولی فقیه نیز به فعلیت امام زمان است و امام زمان اینها را انتخاب کرده است ... امام چه در زندان باشد و چه نباشد ، چه مردم بخواهند و چه نخواهند ولایت متعلق به اوست . علما هم تحت ولایت امام زمان هستند . ... برای شما یک مثال می زنم . تا زمانی که مرض و بیماری هست دواخانه باید باز باشد و بیمار را درمان کند . اگر صاحب دواخانه نباشد ، امور بیماران بلاتکلیف می ماند . اگر صاحب دواخانه بواسطه اعتماد ، امور مغازه را به کسی مانند نوکرش یا فرزندش بسپارد ، دوایی که وی به دست مریض می دهد مشروع است . اگر هم نماینده وی را بیرون کنند و دشمن جای او را بگیرد غصبی است و باید از او گرفت . اگر ولایت فقیه نبود از نظام چیزی نمی ماند.

The current Guardianship belongs to Imam Mahdi. The currentness of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist is also dependent on Imam Mahdi's currentness, and Imam Mahdi has elected them … Whether Imam is in jail or not, whether people want it or not, the Guardianship belongs to him. The clergymen are also under the Guardianship of Imam Mahdi … I will give you an example. Until there are ailments, the pharmacy must be open, and the patients must be healed. Patients' affairs will remain unattended if the pharmacy owner is not there. If the pharmacy owner delegates the task to his servant or his son, the drug received by the patient is legal. If his representative is dismissed and the enemy replaces him, it is usurped, which must be taken back from him. If it were not for the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, nothing would have been left from the political system.

(43)

نظامی که بعد از 22 بهمن 57 سر کار آمد ، جمهوری اسلامی بود اما بعد از 30 سال شجره طیبه جمهوری اسلامی نیاز مبرم به هرس داشت . 9 دی 88 فرزندان انقلاب اسلامی بریدند برگ های زاید این درخت را . 9 دی 88 روز حجامت جمهوری اسلامی بود.

The political system that came to office after the Revolution in 1979 was the Islamic Republic. However, the blessed tree of the Islamic Republic was in desperate need of pruning. In Day of 2009, the children of the Islamic Revolution cut the rotten leaves of this tree. Day of 2009 was the day of doing *hijama* on the Islamic Republic.

(44)

چنانچه FATF مسیر انقلابی نظام را تضعیف نکند امری مستحسن است و در غیر این صورت سم مهلکی است که باید از آن گریخت و این نیاز به برنامه سیاسی دارد قبل از آنکه اقتصادی باشد.

If FATF does not attenuate the revolutionary path of the political system, it is acceptable. Otherwise, it is a deadly poison that must be avoided, and it needs a political plan before any economic plans.

(45)

2030 چیست که تعلیم جهان از دل ماست هان که جمهوری اسلامی ایران اینجاست اگر از غرب رسد نسخه

خودش بیماری است قرص خواب است ولی چاره ما بیداری است ... جسم برجام چو روحش به فنا رفت که

رفت ذوق بیهوده ز برجام خطا بود خطا تکیه بر عهد عمو سام خطا بود خطا عهد با دزد سر گردنه بستیم ای

دوست بارها عهد بشکسته و نشکستیم ای دوست هر چه می شد که ببرد از کیسه ما برد برد که برد برد – برد این

بود ؟

2030[179] [Agenda for Sustainable Development]; while teaching the whole world is in our heart. Huh! Here is the Islamic Republic of Iran. If any prescription is received from the West, it is a disease by itself. It is a sleeping pill, but our solution is wakefulness. … The body of the JCPOA, just like its spirit, is gone with the wind. Useless excitement for the JCPOA was wrong. Relying on Uncle Sam's premise was wrong. Oh, my friend! We made a pact with the highwayman. Oh, my friend! He has broken his promises plenty of times, and we have not. He has taken from our sack whatever he could. Was this [the meaning of] win-win?

(46)

تا کی می شود با گفتاردرمانی کار کشور را معطل و حل مشکل مردم را به تاخیر انداخت ؟

For how long the country's affairs can remain pending and postpone solving people's problems by speech pathology?

(47)

مقایسه این دستاورد عظیم در این مرحله پرافتخار از مقاومت نیروهای انقلاب با عقیم ماندن برجام ... نشان

می دهد که راه اصلی و ثمر بخش تنها پرداختن به تقویت بن مایه های درونی و اقتصاد مقاومتی است نه چشم

دوختن به بیرون مرزها .

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[179] This whole excerpt is written in a poem in the Persian version, but it is translated as prose.

Comparing this huge accomplishment in this honorable stage of revolutionary forces' resistance with sterile JCPOA … shows that the principal and the fruitful way is just concentrating on strengthening internal themes and resistive economy; and not looking out of our borders.

(48)

… کدامین موفقیت و گشایش را از دستاوردهای برجام دیده اید که این گونه پیروزمندانه و با غرور ، مشابه آن را پیشنهاد داده و برای دیگر موارد نسخه پیچیده اید ؟

What success or conquest have you seen from the JCPOA that you proudly and triumphantly suggest something similar and prescribe it for other cases?

(49)

یکی از ماموریت های مهم سازمان همکاری های اسلامی تقویت و تحکیم '' همبستگی اسلامی '' در بین کشورهای عضو است که متاسفانه … به فراموشی سپرده شد و وحدت و همبستگی اسلامی که نسخه شفابخش برای بیماری عارض بر پیکر امت اسلامی است جای خود را به جدال های بیهوده سپرده است.

One of the most critical missions of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is a consolidation of Islamic solidarity among member countries … that is forgotten. Moreover, Islamic unity and solidarity, which is the healing prescription for the ailed body of the Islamic community, is replaced by useless battles.

(50)

البته نوشتن پیام رهبری به جوانان اروپا و آمریکای شمالی به این معنا نیست که جوانان سایر کشورها را فراموش کنیم … در نامه دوم ، مقام معظم رهبری از کلیدواژه '' تروریسم درد مشترک '' نام بردند . ظرفیت های بسیاری برای تعامل صحیح و شرافتمندانه دنیای غرب با جهان اسلام را دارد.

Of course, the Supreme Leader's message for European and North American young people does not mean that we forget about the youth of other countries … In the second letter, the Supreme Leader used the keyword of 'terrorism, shared pain'. There

is a vast capacity for correct and honorable interaction between the West and the Muslim World.

9.1.6.2. Scenarios for HUMAN BEING, EMOTIONS, AND HEALTH Metaphors. To conclude the above-mentioned elaborate discussion, the following scenarios related to HUMAN BEING, EMOTIONS, AND HEALTH have been extracted.

a) FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE BIRTH OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, HIS ENEMIES WANTED TO KILL THIS INFANT AND YET THEY HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO DO SO.

b) ISLAMIC REVOLUTION GOES THROUGH EVOLUTION. THE FINAL PHASE OF EVOLUTION IS CREATING ISLAMIC CITIZENSHIP BY IMAM MAHDI'S GOVERNMENT.

c) CRITICAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANS ARE THE VERTEBRAL COLUMN AND ANY DAMGE TO THEM WILL KILL THE PERSON OF IRAN.

d) RESPECTFULLY IMPORTANT ENTITIES ARE EYES OF THE COUNTRY. MARTYRS ARE THE EYE AND THE LIGHT OF IRAN.

e) IRAN'S SUCCESS, IRGC, PEOPLE'S PRESENCE ARE LIKE THORNS IN THE EYES OF ENEMIES. IRAN BLINDS THE ENEMY.

f) IRAN'S SUCCESS MAKES THE ENEMY MAD. AND ITS FAILURE OR WEAKNESS MAKES THE ENEMY HAPPY.

g) ONLY THOSE WHO ARE REALLY IGNORANT OF ISSUES CAN GET AWAKEN. YOU CANNOT AWAKE THOSE WHO PRETEND TO BE ASLEEP.

h) ISRAEL IS A CARCINOMA THAT MUST BE REMOVED.

i)   THE SUPREME LEADER HAS THE LIFESAVING PRESCRIPTION FOR EVERY PROBLEM. HE HAS INHERITED THIS HEALING POWER FROM IMAM MAHDI AND AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. SO, NO DISEASE CAN KILL IRAN.

9.1.7. Source Domain of ARTS, CULTURE, AND LITERATURE

This source domain is mainly used to depict international affairs and even if it describes national affairs, what matters is how it is viewed by or presented to other countries; hence, becoming an international issue. It highly correlates with HUMAN and WAR source domains; in other words, it is blended with them, and there are numerous cases of embedded metaphors. It is directly related to the HUMAN source domain since the assumption is that phenomena such as nations or countries are humans performing a show or their pictures are drawn and exhibited. This scenario's mixture with WAR source domains pertains to the fact that Persian صحنه sahneh (stage, scene) is used to describe both war scenes (war source domain) and theatre scenes (art source domain). Other contextual secondary signals are employed to overcome this challenge and determine whether it is primarily geared towards the military end of the continuum or the art end. In borderline cases, sahneh is assumed to be an element of the ART source domain since it describes war as a show or a drawing of a war scene.

The arrangement of this section will be in the following order. First, elements related to the show, such as scenario, stage, and actors, will be discussed. Then, the discussion of drawing and hypothetical exhibition will be presented. The third subsection will be devoted to music and musical instruments. Last but not most minor part will include references to famous stories and fairy tale elements as a source of metaphor.

Table 9.8

Conceptual Elements, Primary Signals and Relevant Statistics of ARTS, CULTURE &

Domain in each Corpus

ARTS, CULTURE & LITERATURE									
Conceptual Elements	Primary Signals	Parliamentary Debates			ILNA			Tasnim		
		Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD
Show	Show	52			318			288		
	Ridiculous show	-	-	-	4	1.73	9.02	-	-	-
	Show of authority	-	-	-	14	3.73	8.42	14	4.23	9.12
	Show of unity	-	-	-	9	3.28	7.3	-	-	-
	Show of power	-	-	-	6	2.37	5.63	8	2.76	6.32
	Show of national **coherence**	-	-	-	5	2.22	7.17	-	-	-
Epic	Epic	170			355			410		
	Great epic	3	2.83	9.98	9	2.99	8.65	12	3.15	9.06
	Grand epic	3	2.00	9.56	3	1.73	8.31	4	2.64	8.53
	Political epic	4	2.43	6.95	8	2.60	4.44	6	2.16	4.94
	Saga of presence	13	3.98	7.93	15	3.74	5.66	21	4.48	6.99
	Immortal epic	-	-	-	11	2.23	10	10	2.82	10
	Bless of (9-Dey) **epic**	-	-	-	3	-	7.47	-	-	-
	Historical epic	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	3.14	8.41
Stage[180]	Stage	350			1,175			1,004		
	Behind the scenes	7	2.64	8.91	40	6.14	9.48	56	7.33	10.24
	Scene of democracy	3	1.73	7.82	-	-	-			
	Election scene	12	3.71	8.72	57	7.81	7.4	74	8.91	8.3
	Political stage	4	2.00	6.88	50	6.54	7.14	24	4.55	6.58
	Presence & stage	15	3.83	7.60	144	11.85	8.80	99	9.83	9.07
	Stage of Revolution	4	1.92	5.61	12	2.77	5.34	19	3.60	5.38
	Scene of diplomacy	-	-	-	5	2.14	6.12	-	-	-
	Stage of serving	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.54	5.35
	Islam & stage	-	-	-	4	1.62	4.63	3	1.07	4.08
Scenario	Scenario	4			39			41		
	White House's scenario	-	-	-	3	2.00	8.22	-	-	-
	Possible scenario	-	-	-	3	-	6.32	-	-	-
	Scenario of unity	-	-	-	3	-	5.86	-	-	-
	Implementation of a scenario	-	-	-	4	-	5.28	4	-	4.56
	New scenario	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	6.06
	Arrogant system's scenario	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	5.44
	Enemy's scenario	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	3.72

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[180] As it will be explained in the following discussion, stage and scene will be mentioned interchangeably in this column.

Category	Term									
Actor	Actor[181]	3			65			37		
	Regional actor	-	-	-	22	1.99	8.41	7	1.98	8.13
	Transregional actor	-	-	-	6	-	9.39	-	-	-
	Key actor	-	-	-	4	-	8.75	-	-	-
	Effective actor	-	-	-	10	2.23	7.98	-	-	-
	Main actor	-	-	-	17	2.99	7.83	9	1.72	7.47
	Bad actor	-	-	-	3	-	7.11	-	-	-
	Independent actor	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	7.95
	Foreign actor	-	-	-	9	-	6.25	3	-	3.79
	Wise/smart actor	-	-	-	3	1.73	10.16	3	1.73	10.73
	Political actor	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	1.70	5.57
Image	Image	38			244			192		
	Clear image	-	-	-	5	2.23	9.26	3	1.73	9.01
	False image	-	-	-	3	1.72	7.93	5	2.00	9.51
	Real image	-	-	-	5	2.22	7.8	4	1.99	7.93
	Image of Islam	-	-	-	6	2.38	5.49	4	1.89	4.71
	To frame[182]	-	-	-	4	2.23	8.91	-	-	-
Sketch	Sketch	37			182			159		
	~ of roadmap	-	-	-	7	2.64	8.89	3	1.73	7.73
	~ of foreign **policies**	-	-	-	3	1.67	4.61	3	-	5.16
	~ of Iran's **future**	-	-	-	12	-	5.07	10	3.14	7.20
	Correct sketch	-	-	-	4	2.23	7.85	-	-	-
	~ of vision	-	-	-	6	2.45	8.74	-	-	-
	Sketch of Islam	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	3.26	6.18
	Portrait sketch	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	5.48
King	King	7			65			42		

9.1.7.1. Conceptual Elements in Context. Before expounding detailed elements of 'show' at the national level, discussing the essence of this show is ineludible. The most important national shows are performed in national political events (on the political stage), e.g., presidential and parliament elections. A Conservative MP believes that the epic parliament election, above all, is a divine show performed thanks to God. Then, it has happened thanks to people's sacrifice due to the Supreme Leader's wise guidance. So, the implication is that the director is the Supreme Leader. It is also a show of power, i.e., Iran's power is presented to the world. In line with 'power' is 'authority'; so, the show of authority

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[181] Since Persian is not a gender-sensitive language, the feminine form is omitted.
[182] In the Persian version, it is a phrasal verb consisting of the word 'image'.

is presented. Iran shows its authority by missile program and JCPOA. Conservatives mainly highlight the former, while the latter is essential to Reformists.

Not all shows are real or with positive semantic prosody. For instance, what the West is doing regarding their violations of the JCPOA is a puppet show that (supposedly naïve) Iranians are watching. They wait for the finale that shows their problems are solved. Alternatively, what the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh does is like performing a ridiculous show supporting ISIS behind the scenes. In another case, Trump harshly criticized the JCPOA in his first speech after his presidency and warned America to withdraw from it. A letter signed by Reformists was reflected as a 'show' from a series of previous ones during the presidential campaigns. This show signals another main and even more dangerous one. It is a dangerous show because it can cost world peace since the JCPOA was signed for this purpose.

A significant drift of this scenario is that people's presence is the overriding factor in national affairs. If people do not show up on the stage, if they are not present, there is no show; hence, there is nothing to show to other countries (specifically, to the enemy). Since the driving reasoning for encouraging people to be present in any critical national event is that the enemy is watching you. Then, it is safe to begin the discussion with Iranian actors in terms of national affairs. In every national election, people (actors) do one of their best performances on the stage (religious democracy) and perform an epic show. 'To perform an epic show' is, more or less, the equivalent of 'to make a history'. This expression is almost exclusively used to describe people's heroic actions, like participation in national political

events such as 22 Bahman[183] demonstrations and important public elections. So much so that it is called 'the saga of presence'.

Since people are leading actors of this show, people's presence shows their satisfaction with and confirmation of the political system. It is also a sign of unity. All in all, it makes the enemy (the viewer) disappointed and mad. People's presence at elections is a unity performance on the stage that amazes the world. Moreover, it shows Iranians' peace-making orientation in a war-stricken area.

At the national level, the main actors are said to be people. Political parties and figures are also considered actors. For instance, it is said that Reformists try to bring 2009 seditionists back to the political stage of Iran. Alternatively, some of the nominated cabinet members receive motions of no confidence at the parliament because they are considered the main actors of the 2009 sedition. The excerpt (14) shows a political expert's quote on the borderline case of national and international affairs. For him, the Moderate affiliation of Rouhani is why Iran's role has been changed from an isolated actor into an effective one in the region. So much so that no negotiations in the region can be validated without Iran's presence.

At the international level, the conceptual element of 'actor' in the art source domain is the overlap of the GAME source domain and, in some cases, even the WAR source domain[184]. Sometimes 'actor' and 'player' are used interchangeably, which adds to the difficulty of categorizing and interpreting cases. The 'stage' has an inseparable connection with 'field'

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[183] 11 February, which is the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution.
[184] It could be due to the inherent connection between the game and war scenarios.

and 'arena'. One reason might be that, on an international scale, countries as actors on the political stage do not perform for the same show; i.e., each has its scenario and presents the show based on that. It conjures up a competition like Oscar in which different governments play their role on the political stage, and the best leading actor will be awarded; so, they compete with each other over the award. However, the main questions are 'what is the award?' and, more importantly, 'who decides who the winner is.' The answer to the former might be 'world peace,' which may be why there is no peace. They should stop competing and play or act as teammates or co-actors. A better alternative scenario seems to be human scenarios in which all countries are like organs of the same body and, so, all of them should cooperate adequately to maintain a healthy body (peaceful world). Alternatively, if it is a game, the win-win strategy should be highlighted, or the winners should be society, people, and viewers. International rules and organizations such as the UN are jurists about the second question. What if 'people' as the audience are jurists? Alternatively, at least there must be an audience award. In this respect, one possible inference from excerpts is that Iran asks for the addition of religious concepts to the idealogy of peace and has a spiritual phenomenon when it insists on 'glorified peace' or 'dignified peace'[185].

Now that the scene is set, the international aspect of this element can be illustrated better. Countries are considered as actors highlighting main and leading actors. For instance, JCPOA made the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy an influential actor on the international stage since it was an opportunity for both America to show its validity and the EU to manifest its identity and independence. JCPOA also made Iran an active actor on the

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[185] More detailed discussion on religious and political aspects of this idea is out of the scope of this study since discourse analysis has its limitations, and conclusions based on intuition are avoided throughout this study.

international stage and proved his absence would be a loss for the whole world; since Iran is seeking peace, and the world should not be afraid of Iran (referring to the concept of Iranophobia). Iran wants to be among 7 or 8 main actors in the world theatre and considers himself the region's leading actor. It evokes the game scenario in which Iran and Saudi Arabia compete to be the region's leading power. Iran considers himself a good actor while, not surprisingly, Iran is a bad actor for Trump.

The central scene at the international level is the Syrian civil war in which many actors play a role. Some of them are foreigners, which means they are transregional actors such as America. Moreover, some others are regional actors, such as Iran and Russia. Iran considers himself an intelligent actor in the scene of the Syrian civil war. What has caused the Syrian crisis is the presence of transregional actors and those who support terrorism. Iran insists that every regional problem can be solved without the interference of foreigners. So, foreign actors must leave the stage since they put the region's security in danger. Zarif confirms that Iran does not aim at omitting regional actors; the problem is just with transregional ones. If any regional actor has been excluded from casting, it has been due to their own mistakes and wrong choices.

An IRGC high-ranking officer points out that what directs people as actors is 'the culture of martyrdom' and not the enemy's will on any stage of politics, society, and culture. It can be inferred that the enemy cannot play with the nation or pull their strings to make them act in a certain way since the strings are in the hand of God through martyrdom as a religious concept. Another religious reference is that Ayatollah Khomeini staged Islam because he had a divine duty, i.e., he had God's trusteeship. It is not the stereotypical or open-minded Islam or the English version of Shi'ism; it is a 'resistive Islam' that supports the oppressed and hungry people while resisting arrogance.

Now that what goes on the stage is clarified, the element of 'behind the scenes will be expounded. It is exclusively used to describe negative issues or mischievous plots. For instance, a Conservative MP argues that the main reason behind (behind the scenes) the alliance of Reformists and Moderates is, first of all, to transubstantiate the Revolution and to dampen revolutionary spirit and, then, to isolate revolutionary forces and keep them away from critical centers. A point needs to be clarified here. 'Revolutionary force' is a very general and vague term. It refers to anyone who is enamored of the Revolution and is a devout believer. They can be of all age ranges in any social, political, military, etc. position. They are usually considered as hardliners and extremists. But one thing is definite and clear: They have Supreme Leader's support and encouragement. The Leader always discourages national mass media from calling these groups' extremist'. Another national case of this element is related to 2009 unrests. It is said that England and America were vividly engaged in the streak of riots. So, the riots were like a show and, behind the scenes, those countries were directing it.

'Behind the scenes is also significant in international affairs. For instance, behind the scenes of a ridiculous show of enlisting IRGC as a terrorist group is Zionism established in the United States. The parliamentary chairman argues that terrorism and counteracting it is like a toy for Global Coalition, the United States, and Zionists. They also pretend to fight against ISIS on the stage; while, behind the stage, they support it.

All actors play according to the scenario. So, let us examine how scenario and stage director function in this metaphorical pattern. Human rights and supporting it is like a show. On the stage, organizations such as the UN are like stages on which the human rights show is performed. Supporting human rights is a bad show or a fiasco. The stage directors of this show are countries such as the United States and Saudi Arabia. The former is the source of

terrorism and arrogance, the arch-enemy of democracy and religion, especially Islam. As a member of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the latter lacks a democratic structure. So they both are the worst directors, and based on the artist's CV (report card), the outcome of this show is predictable.

There are numerous scenarios based on which everyone works. For instance, the Pan-Arabism scenario referring to the unification of all Arabic countries to establish a single nation (show) may not lead to a successful show because of existent discord among some Arabic countries (actors). Another metaphor related to the cooperation of the United States and Saudi Arabia against Iran is manifested in a Hollywoodian scenario. According to Iranian authorities, it is not based on a true story; it is of the sci-fi genre and based on lies. According to this scenario, Iran was accused of assassinating a Saudi ambassador in Washington in 2011.

Although 2009 sedition is a national issue, the playwright is world arrogance. It did not work, and the show was another fiasco. The enemy wrote the scenario of destroying the Revolution because the percentage of people's participation was a record in the whole world. So they could not stand it, and they got encouraged by discord because of the prevalent bipolarity of Reformist vs. Conservative and wrote and directed this scenario. Some players, whether ordinary people or politicians, implemented it unintentionally; though, they played a significant role in preparing the conditions for this show. At least for Conservatives, this was the scenario of 'infiltration' intensified in the era of post-JCPOA; since this time, they want to penetrate the minds of decision-makers of the political system.

The most prominent national scenarios belong to the Reformists. They had two scenarios, especially during presidential campaignings, that may have been for the sake of winning votes. One scenario was 'national reconciliation which pursued setting free those

politicians accused of 2009 unrests. In this way, their advocates who boycotted the elections and did not want to participate would vote for Rouhani so that their leaders would be set free. Another scenario related to the 'war and peace' dichotomy is discussed in section 9.1.2, devoted to the 'shadow of war'. This scenario aimed to encourage voters, as actors, to vote for Rouhani to maintain peace with the help of the JCPOA.

Closing the discussion of 'scenario' without adding some religious element would be unimaginable. A religious official[186] argues that national and international enemies write their scenarios against Iran, and God writes another one above them and foils their plots. It refers to a verse of the Quran (3:54) which states that 'and the disbelievers planned, but Allah planned. Moreover, Allah is the best of planners.' It refers to the plot of crucifying Jesus Christ. According to the Quranic version of this story, when disbelievers came to arrest Jesus, God put his face on another man who was in Jesus' house and raised Jesus to heaven. Since it was dark, they thought they had captured Jesus, taken him to the king, and crucified him. Nevertheless, God had already saved him and had foiled their plots. According to the Islamic version of this incident, Jesus will stay there with God until the Day of Resurrection, also called the emergence of Imam Mahdi in Shi'ism.

(1)

امروز در پرتو نظام مقدس جمهوری اسلامی مجلس دهم شکل گرفت و تبلوری از اراده مستحکم ملت را توام با بینش و آگاهی به نمایش گذاشت . این حرکت عظیم و حماسه بزرگ مردمی در وهله اول مدیون نمایش الهی

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[186] Since it is a religious-political system, religious figures are eligible to comment on every political issue, and it is reflected and even acted upon in society.

زعامت و اوامر داهیانه مقام معظم رهبری در تمام عرصه های انقلاب جهانیان را به حیرت واداشته است.

Today, in the ray of the sacred political system of the Islamic Republic, the tenth parliament was formed, and it exhibited a crystallization of the nation's firm will be accompanied by insight and awareness. This vast movement and the immense popular saga is, first of all, indebted to the divine show that has permanently shadowed the nation, the country, and our independence. Moreover, secondly, [it is beholden] to the nation's sacrifice under shrewd commands of the Supreme Leader in all Revolutionary aspects that have amazed the world.

(2)

روحانی تصریح کرد : انتخابات نمایش قدرت ملی ایران است و تخریب و یاس آفرینی به اسم انتخابات در جامعه باید متوقف شود

Rouhani asserted that the election is the show of Iran's national power, and destroying and making disappointment in the name of election should be stopped.

(3)

با افتخار روز 29 اردیبهشت در انتخابات شرکت کنید اصل انتخابات مهم است . حضور شما بازی کردن در صحنه ای است که خود بازیگر اصلی آن هستید و بی شک انتخاب شما اثر ... دارد و همانطور که مقام معظم رهبری هم گفتند اگر سایه جنگ و تحریم رفع شد به دلیل حضور مردم بود .

Participate proudly in the election of Ordibehesht 29th; [because] what is important is the principle of election. Your presence is acting in the scene that you are the main actors, and there is no doubt that your election has effects. Furthermore, as the Supreme Leader mentioned before, if the shadow of war and sanction disappeared, it is because of people's presence.

(4)

مگر بنا نبود که دارایی های بلوکه شده ایران به کشور بازگردد ؟ ... ملت تا کی باید منتظر خیمه شب بازی
غربی ها و عدم عمل به تعهداتشان باشند ؟

Were they not supposed to return Iran's blocked assets? For how long should the
nation wait for the puppet show of the West and their lack of commitment?

(5)

وی ادامه داد : ائتلافی هم که علیه داعش تشکیل شد یک نمایش مضحک بیش نبود و جالب آنکه همان
کشورهای مرتجعی که داعش و جبهه النصره را به وجود آوردند نیز عضو چنین ائتلاف نمایشی شدند .

He continued that Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh was nothing more than an absurd
show. Interestingly, those same reactionary countries who created Daesh and Jabhat
al-Nusrat are also members of this scenic coalition.

(6)

ما باید رای بدهیم ، جوابگوی رای مان باشیم . نگران نباشید ، دولت ال می کند ، بل می کند . دولت هیچ
کاری نمی کند و اگر کاری هم بکند ما به مردم وعده دادیم از استقلال ، آزادی ، عزت و ولایت فقیه دفاع کنیم
و در مقابل فتنه بایستیم . ایشان بازیگر نقش اول فتنه است .

We should vote, and we should be responsible for our votes. Do not worry that the
government will do this and that. The government will do nothing, and if it does
something, we have promised people to defend independence, freedom, glory, and
Guardianship and stay in front of sedition. This person is the leading actor of sedition.

(7)

برجام اتحادیه اروپا را به عنوان یک بازیگر موثر در صحنه جهانی تبدیل کرد وی با بیان به یاد داریم

«سرویس اقدام خارجی اتحادیه اروپا - (EESA) »در میانه بحران هسته ای ایران تاسیس شد ، خاطرنشان

کرد : اصلی ترین دست آورد آن هم نقش مثبت اش در مذاکرات هسته ای و موفقیت این مذاکرات است.

The JCPOA turned the European Union into an influential actor on the world's stage. He said, "we remember that European External Action Service was established in the middle of Iran's nuclear crisis. He reminded that the main achievement of this service was its positive role in nuclear negotiations and the success of this negotiation.

(8)

رییس جمهور تاکید کرد : در برجام به اثبات رساندیم که ملت ایران و دولت و نظام جمهوری اسلامی راستگو

است ... ایران کشوری است که می تواند در مسایل مختلف جهان به عنوان یک بازیگر فعال در صحنه باشد

و غیبت ایران در صحنه های سیاسی و بین المللی یک خسارت در جهان بود . ... ما می خواستیم بگوییم

ایران هراسی اشتباه است . از ایران نترسید چراکه ایران به دنبال صلح است.

The president confirmed that, in the JCPOA, we proved that Iran's nation, government, and political system of the Islamic Republic are veracious …. Iran is the country that can be an active actor on the stage regarding the world's various affairs. Moreover, Iran's absence in political and international stages was a loss for the world. … we wanted to say that Iranophobia is wrong. Do not be afraid of Iran because Iran seeks peace.

(9)

وی سیاست جمهوری اسلامی ایران در موضوع حل بحران های اخیر در منطقه از جمله در سوریه را مبتنی

بر راه حل سیاسی دانست ... اما برخی بازیگران خارجی و حامیان گروه های تروریستی در منطقه با

رویکرد نادرست خود مانع تراشی می کنند .

He considered the Islamic Republic of Iran's policy in solving recent regional crises, including the Syrian crisis, based on political solutions … but some foreign actors and supporters of terrorist groups in the region cause obstructionism by their incorrect approaches.

(10)

معاون وزیر امور خارجه کشورمان نیز در این دیدار ابعاد مختلف داخلی ، منطقه ای و بین المللی بحران های منطقه را تشریح و نقش آفرینی منفی بازیگران خارجی را از عوامل اصلی تداوم بحران دانست .

The country's deputy minister for foreign affairs also explained various national, regional, and international aspects of regional crises. [He also] considered the negative role of foreign actors as the main reason for the permanent crisis.

(11)

ترامپ اضافه کرد : « شما در آینده نزدیک شاهد اقدام ما خواهید بود چرا که ایران بازیگر بدی است و ما آن ها را به عنوان یک بازیگر بد زیر نظر خواهیم داشت. »

Trump added that shortly, you will see our action; because Iran is a bad actor, and we will monitor it as a bad actor.

(12)

ان شاالله بتوانیم از گردنه ترامپیسم عبور کنیم همانگونه که تاکنون از بحران های مختلف عبور کرده ایم . امیدواریم کشور در جایگاهی قرار بگیرد که جز 8 – 7 کشور بازیگر اصلی در دنیا باشیم .

If God wills, we transverse the defile of Trumpism as we have already passed various crises. We hope that the country receives the status of being among 7 to 8 countries that are the world's leading actors.

(13)

طرفین در این دیدار بر نقش و جایگاه ایران به عنوان بازیگر اصلی منطقه ای ، ضرورت همکاری ایران و فرانسه ... ، اهمیت تقویت صلح و ثبات منطقه ، ...تاکید کردند.

In this meeting, both parties emphasized the role of Iran as the leading actor of the region, the necessity of Iran-France cooperation …, the importance of reinforcing peace and stability in the region….

(14)

انتخاب مجدد حسن روحانی به عنوان رییس جمهور ایران چه تاثیری را در جایگاه و نقش آفرینی بین المللی ایران می تواند به همراه داشته باشد ؟ در چهار سال گذشته ، ایران از یک کشور منزوی ، تنها و تحت تحریم به یک بازیگر موثر و مهم تبدیل شده است ، به نحوی که ـ دست کم در سطح منطقه ـ هیچ مذاکره ای بدون حضور ایران وجاهت و اعتبار ندارد .

What effect can have the reelection of Hassan Rouhani as the president of Iran on Iran's international role and status? In the past four years, Iran has been changed from an isolated, alone, and sanctioned country to an important and influential actor. So much as that no regional negotiation is accredited without Iran's presence.

(15)

محمدجواد ظریف ، وزیر امور خارجه در توییتر خود نوشت : ایران به دنبال حذف دیگر بازیگران منطقه ای نیست . مقصر فقط اشتباهات و انتخاب های نادرست خودشان است.

The foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, tweeted that Iran does not seek to omit other regional actors. Only their own mistakes and incorrect selections are culpable.

(16)

در واقع طرح سخنان تقابلی با مواضع رهبر انقلاب در حالی روز به روز پررنگ تر می شود که در پشت صحنه جریان متحد اعتدالی و اصلاحاتی اول به دنبال استحاله انقلاب و از بین بردن روح انقلابی گری و سپس به دنبال منزوی کردن نیروهای انقلاب در جامعه و طرد آنها از مراکز حساس است.

Addressing speeches that are contrapositive of the Leader's stance are getting underlined every day; while behind the scenes of united moderate and reformist movements, two purposes are followed: One is the transubstantiation of the

Revolution and killing revolutionary spirit, the second purpose is the isolation of Revolutionary forces in the society and their exclusion from critical centers.

(17)

… در نیمه دوم سال 88 و مخصوصا در سال 89 ، یک جریان کاملا براندازی که به صورت شفاف و روشن آمریکا و انگلیس پشت صحنه بودند فعال شد ….

… in the middle of 2009 and especially in 2010, an overthrowing movement was activated. Behind the scenes, there were vividly America and England ….

(18)

… 6 سال است که جمهوری اسلامی ایران در مقابل تجزیه سوریه ایستاده است ، حال عده ای سو استفاده کرده اند آمریکا و انگلیس از پشت صحنه و اسراییل از روی صحنه از این قضیه حمایت می کنند.

… it has been six years that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been standing up to the decomposition of Syria. At the same time, some have been misusing this. America and England support this situation behind the scenes, and Israel supports it on the stage.

(19)

سردار سلامی خاطرنشان کرد : تاریخ انقلاب نشان داد آنجایی که ایستادیم و مجاهدت کردیم صبر کردیم پیروز شدیم . نشان داده شد وقتی منطق جهاد و شهادت الگوی مسلمانان در برابر دشمنان سلطه گر می شود هیچ واقعیتی نه در صحنه سیاسی و فرهنگی و نظامی با اراده دشمنان رقم نمی خورد .

Major General Salami affirmed that the history of the Revolution showed that where we resisted and exerted all our Powers, we triumphed. It has been shown that when the logic of jihad and martyrdom becomes the role model of Muslims countering hegemonic enemies, no reality in the political, cultural, and military stage is achieved due to the enemy's will.

(20)

امام یک وظیفه الهی داشت و میخواست دنیا را برای ظهور حضرت حجت آماده کند لذا یک کشور وابسته ...

را امام با روح مکتب اسلام احیا کرد و یک جامعه مستقل با هویت اسلامی نه اسلام متحجر یا روشنفکر و

شیعه انگلیسی بلکه اسلام مقاوم و ... اسلام دادرس پابرهنگان به صحنه آورد و اسلام را احیا کرد ...

Imam [Khomeini] had a divine duty, and he wanted to prepare the world for the reemergence of Imam Mahdi. So, he revived a dependent country with the spirit of Islamic doctrine. Furthermore, he staged an autonomous community with an Islamic identity. It is not the reactionary or open-minded Islam or the English version of *Shi'ism*; it is a 'resistive Islam' that supports the oppressed and hungry people while resisting arrogance.

(21)

هیچ ضربه ای مهلک تر به رشد حقوق بشر و محافظت از آن نیست که مردم دنیا مدعیان و سردمدارانی را

ببینند که کارنامه رسوایی دارند و ضمنا صحنه گردان این نهادها باشند ! برای شورای حقوق بشر هیچ امری

تحقیرآمیزتر از آن نیست که دولتی مانند ایالات متحده آمریکا ... عضو شورای حقوق بشر باشد یا رژیمی

عقب مانده و وابسته مانند رژیم سعودی که ... کمترین ساختار مدنی با حداقل دموکراسی را ندارند و عضو

شورای حقوق بشر بشود.

There is no deadly blow to the growth and maintenance of human rights like when the world sees forefronts with scandalous report cards as stage directors of these organizations. The membership of the US … or a dependent and lagged regime such as Saudi Arabia that does not have the minimum civil construction with minimum democracy in the United Nations Human Rights Council is the most derogatory fact regarding this council.

(22)

جبهه دشمن با درک ناکارآمدی و شکست ترفندها و توطیه های خود علیه انقلاب اسلامی درصدد برآمده است دوره پسابرجام را دوران تضعیف و فروپاشی و یا تسلیم نظام اسلامی قرار دهد و در این رهگذر سناریو '' رخنه '' و '' نفوذ '' در حصار اراده و رویکرد تصمیم سازان ... نظام را عملیاتی کرده است ...

The enemy's front understood the inefficiency and failure of his conspiracies and tricks against the Islamic Revolution, and he has meditated in changing the post-JCPOA era into the era of debilitation, overthrown, and submission of the Islamic political system. Meanwhile, he has been acting out the scenario of 'penetration' and 'infiltration' within the decision-makers of the political system...

(23)

برجسته کردن تهدیدات یعنی اسیر سناریو جنگ و صلح شدن ... . طرح بحث سناریوی آشتی ملی تاکنون این تبعات را در اردوگاه اصلاح طلبان به همراه داشته است : 1 . بروز اختلاف نظر در میان سران اصلاحات و جریان تجدید نظر طلب درباره آشتی ملی.

Foregrounding threats means becoming captive in [the prison] of war-peace scenario …. So far, proposing the scenario of national reconciliation has had the following consequences for the Reformists: 1—the emergence of discord among Reformist forefronts and the movement of national reconciliation that asks for reconsideration.

(24)

روحانی مدعی شد در همه جزییات از رهبری پیروی کرده و سناریوی «برجام دستاورد کل نظام است نه دولت من و بنابراین نقض برجام هم ، شکست کل نظام است نه دولت من» را کلید زد . در همین سناریو روحانی در ماه های پایانی دولتش همچنان وعده داد و دعوت به امید کرد . باز هم از رفع خطر جنگ گفت....

Rouhani claimed that he had followed the Supreme Leader in every detail [of the JCPOA] and started the scenario that 'the JCPOA is the achievement of the whole

political system and not of his government. So, the breach of the JCPOA is the failure of the whole political system and not of his government'. Furthermore, in the same scenario, he still gives promises and invites hopefulness in the last months of his presidency. Again, he talks of solving the danger of war ….

(25)

چه جریان نفاق در داخل و چه جریان کفر در خارج هر چه در توان داشتند علیه انقلاب به کار گرفتند ، حال از مجرای مذاکرات و برجام گرفته تا سایر مجاری دیگر ، اما می بینیم خدا سناریو را طوری تنظیم می کند که همه چیز و همه توطیه ها خنثی شود ، از یک طرف یک حرکت جاهلانه از ناحیه ترامپ که نام خلیج فارس را چیز دیگری بگوید تا تمام ایرانی ها حتی ملی گراها علیه آمریکا موضع می گیرند و یک محسن حججی هم از این طرف پیدا می شود تا تمام سحرهایی که دشمنان داخلی و خارجی علیه ارز ش های انقلاب به کار می گیرند همه آنها خنثی شود .

The hypocrisy movement inside the country and the blasphemy movement outside the country have tried their best to counter the Islamic Revolution through negotiations and the JCPOA or other means. However, we see that God constructs the scenario that foils all plots somehow. On the one hand, Trump's foolish act called the Persian Gulf another name, and all Iranians took a stand against America. On the other hand, someone like Mohsen Hojaji emerges who broke all spells that internal and foreign enemies cast against Revolutionary values.

Another part of the ART domain pertains to drawing, pictures, framing, and how they are exhibited. Drawing and framing are closely related to a conceptual element of the human domain: face. It focuses on showing a correct or wrong image of something's face. For instance, America's disloyalty to JCPOA has drawn an even worse image of his face in Iranians' public opinion. Israel, as an arrogant, tries to draw a furious and primitive picture of Islam by supporting terrorism.

On the other hand, the seminary and IRGC's mission is to draw the right picture of Islam's face. This divine mission is trusted to Islamic Revolution to save humanities in this way. It can be interpreted as a reaction to what they believe the United States is doing. A military figure mentions that America is up to draw the future for humanities and broadly speaks of his plan for 'the future of world order. The fact is that in such an order, Muslim countries and Muslims are always ignored. So, Muslim World leaders should draw their own future of world order.

In the case of national affairs, the Supreme Leader draws the country's future. Instead of 'the future of world order', they offer their alternative: 'modern Islamic Civilization'. This civilization is the ultimate goal of the Islamic Revolution[187], in which there is no place for Zionism. Again' presence' plays a significant role. People's presence in elections is like a picture the whole world is watching. This presence is like a confirmation stamp of the Islamic Revolution. It shows the glory of Iran and its Islamic political system.

(26)

آمریکا به عنوان کشوری که در عرصه جهانی به بدعهدی ، پیمان شکنی و پایبند نبودن به توافق ها شناخته شده و مشهور است در آزمون اجرای برجام نیز چهره ای بسیار بدتر از گذشته در افکار عمومی ملت ایران از خود ترسیم کرده است .

As the country notorious for disloyalty, perfidiousness, and noncommitment to agreements globally, America has drawn its face picture in the Iranians' public opinion that is even worse than in the past during the exam of implementing the JCPOA.

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[187] Explained in section 9.1.6 regarding phases of Revolution's evolution.

(27)

با شکل گیری گروه های تروریستی دیدیم چه امنیتی برای اسراییل به وجود آمد . وزیر اطلاعات ...
جلوگیری از رشد و توسعه کشورهای اسلامی ، ترسیم چهره خشن و بدوی از اسلام و ایجاد حس اسلام
هراسی ، ... در خانه ها و سرزمین های اسلامی نه در برابر اسراییل را از دیگر اهداف استکبار در ایجاد و
حمایت از گروه های تروریستی برشمرد ...

We saw how much security was enforced for Israel by creating terrorist groups. The
minister of intelligence considered preventing Islamic countries from development
and growth, drawing a brutal and primitive envisage of Islam, inciting Islamophobia
in Islamic houses and countries, and not [inciting feelings] against Israel are among
other aims of the arrogance in creating and supporting terrorist groups ….

(28)

رسالت مشترک حوزه های علمیه و سپاه ، پیش برندگی و تعمیق انقلاب اسلامی این امانت و دیعه ی الهی
برای نجات بشریت است و بی تردید روحانیت انقلابی و سپاه ، وعده های الهی را با پیاده سازی نقشه جامع
انقلاب اسلامی برای ترسیم سیمای جهان اسلام تحقق خواهند بخشید.

The shared mission of seminaries and the IRGC is to promote and deepen the Islamic
Revolution, a divine endowment to save a human being. Moreover, there is no doubt
that the Revolutionary clergy and the IRGC will realize divine promises for drawing
the envisage of the Muslim World by following the comprehensive plan of the Islamic
Revolution.

(29)

سردار وحیدی ... خاطرنشان کرد : امروز حکومتی مانند آمریکا به دنبال ترسیم آینده جهان بشریت است و
بی پروا از ترسیم نظم نوین جهان آینده جهان صحبت می کند و در نظم مورد نظر آنها کشورهای اسلامی و
مسلمانان همواره نادیده گرفته می شوند.

Major General Vahidi affirmed that today, a government such as America is looking
for delineating the future of human beings, and it talks audaciously about the future of

world order. Furthermore, Islamic countries and Muslims are always ignored in their desired order.

(30)

وی با بیان اینکه ما چشم انداز کلی و رهنمودهای مقام معظم رهبری در ترسیم آینده کشور را در اختیار داریم ، گفت : تمدین نوین اسلامی یک مرجع بزرگ برای ترسیم آینده کشور است و فروپاشی نظام مجعول صهیونیستی یک افق روشن برای آینده بوجود می آورد.

He mentioned that we have the 20-Year National Vision [of Iran] and the Supreme Leader's guidelines in delineating the country's future. He said that modern Islamic Civilization is an excellent reference for the country's future, and the overthrown of the forged regime of Israel will provide a bright horizon for the future.

(31)

حضور مردم در انتخابات ، مهر تایید به اصل نظام است ... و همه دنیا به این تصویر نگاه می کنند .... مردم شریف استان ایلام هم در کنار ملت سرافراز ایران با حضور پرشور و آگاهانه خود بار دیگر تصویر شکوهمندی از عزت و عظمت نظام اسلامی را نشان دادند.

The presence of people in the election is a confirmation stamp of the Islamic Revolution, and the whole world watches this picture. Besides the proud nation of Iran, the noble people of Ilam province depicted a magnificent picture of the glory of the Islamic political system once again by their passionate and deliberate presence.

People's presence is also described as a symphony of unity. Regarding musical instruments, a Reformist portrays discord as a drum and complains that every time there is an opportunity to make reconciliation with politicians accused of 2009 unrests, some extremist politicians hit the drum of discord and want to dismiss Reformist serving politicians from the

political stage. Instead, people have composed the melody of unity by voting to Rouhani. Agreement on some issues is also described as unison. For instance, all authorities agree on Iran's missile program, and there is unison or concord because it is related to national security. In another example, a Reformist party considers 22 Bahman demonstrations as the chant of glorified peace and friendship for the whole world. It announces that this peace will be realized in the ray of unity, sympathy, and solidarity among all classes in a society. So, what the Iranians chant in these demonstrations is the cry of all nations for peace, a glorified peace blessed with fighting arrogance and independence.

Excerpt (36) has been explained partly in section 9.1.1, but one more point needs to be added here to show the complexity of this embedded metaphor. The ringtone of every call for economic rent and patronage is like the incidental music of a movie, and the movie itself is the film of corruption. So it is not a piece of delightful music, and people do not want to watch such bad movies. A religious concept present in almost every scenario and directly correlates with (national) security is martyrdom. In this scenario, it is regarded as a song. Holy Shrine Defenders abandon the materialistic joys and sing the song of love (of God or martyrdom) following their symphony conductor, Major General Soleimani.

An element of any artwork is 'copyright' mentioned in this section. Since in any political system, parties try to get the approval of the prominent Leader (reminding the role of the father in the FAMILY scenario), there is a tendency among Iranian political parties and activists to prove that they have the Supreme Leader's approval. Moreover, they sometimes express their affiliations and ideas as if Ayatollah Khamenei is theirs. Regarding this issue, a well-known Conservative states that 'the love of Leader' does not have copyright, and he belongs to everyone. So, any attempt to take side with the Leader or imply that the Leader is

on the side of one party is considered 'discord', which is precisely what the enemy wants; i.e., it is a piece of the enemy's puzzle inflitration[188].

The final point related to the musical aspect of this domain is related to foreign affairs. Iran's enemies (America and Israel) were performing a symphony of sanctions and restrictions against Iran. However, friendly countries did not resonate with them and, instead, they chose Iran and helped Iran.

(32)

در داخل کشور هم برخی از جریانات تندرو و افراطی بر طبل تفرقه می کوبند و بر حذف نیروهای انقلاب از صحنه خدمت اصرار دارند .... هر وقت زمزمه حل مسائل داخلی به میان می آید ، بلافاصله این جریان به صحنه می آید و بهانه ای تازه برای رویارویی سیاسی نیروهای انقلاب خلق می کند .

Inside the country, some extremist movements hit the drum of discord and insisted on eliminating Revolutionary forces from the stage of servitude …. Whenever the whisper of solving internal issues is heard, this movement comes to the stage immediately and creates a new excuse to confront the Revolutionary forces politically.

(33)

مردم ما به کسانی که می خواستند مقام رهبری را مصادره کنند نه گفتند ... مردم خواستند اعلام کنند ما یک ملت هستیم و صدای ما باید شنیده شود ، همه مردم ترانه و صدای موسیقی وحدتشان یکسان بود همه اقوام مذاهب و روستایی و شهری مثل هم رای هم دادند .

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[188] Another case of embedded metaphor.

Our people wanted to say no to those who wanted to expropriate the Supreme Leader …. The people wanted to declare that we are a nation and our voice should be heard. Everyone's song and melody of unity were the same. All tribes, religions, villagers, and townspeople voted in the same way.

(34)

… مسیولان نظام به دفعات بر توان و قدرت موشکی ایران که در راستای تامین امنیت ملی کشور طراحی و تولید شده است تاکید کرده اند و در این خصوص اتفاق نظر و همنوایی در کشور وجود دارد .

… the country's authorities have constantly emphasized that Iran's missile power has been designed and produced to provide national security, and there is concord and unison in this regard.

(35)

بی تردید گرامیداشت سالروز پیروزی شکوهمند انقلاب اسلامی در راهپیمایی 22 بهمن ماه … استمرار فریاد آزادیخواهی ، … عدالت ، عزت … ایستادگی بر ارزش های نظام مقدس جمهوری اسلامی … و نوای صلح و دوستی عزتمندانه برای همه جهانیان در پرتو وحدت ، همدلی و همبستگی همه آحاد جامعه است.

Undoubtedly, the commemoration of the anniversary of the Islamic Republic's magnificent victory in 22 Bahman demonstrations is the persistence of the chant of freedom, justice, glory, and resistance to the Islamic Republic's values. It is the chant of glorified peace and friendship for the whole world in the ray of unity, sympathy, and solidarity among all classes in a society.

(36)

زنگ تلفن های رانتی است که آینه نظام را زنگار و مکدر می کند و نمی گذارد مردم خودشان را در آینه نظام ببینند . زنگ تلفن های توصیه ای است که موسیقی متن فساد در کشور است.

The phone ringing to ask for economic rent corrodes the mirror of the political system and does not allow people to see themselves in the mirror of the system. The ringtone of phone calls asking for patronage is incidental music of corruption.

(37)

<div dir="rtl">

شهدایی که در این دوران با گذشتن از خوشی های دنیوی با داشتن فرمانده دلها ، سردار قاسم سلیمانی ،
سرود عشق و دلدادگی را می سرایند.

</div>

The martyrs abandoning materialistic joys sing the song of love (of God or
martyrdom) following the Leader of hearts, Major General Soleimani.

(38)

<div dir="rtl">

البته «نفوذ» هم کار خودش را می کند و از طریق برخی تریبون های مدعی ! پازل دشمن را در جداسازی
رهبری از توده های مردم تکمیل می کند . عشق به رهبری «کپی رایت» ندارد که در انحصار کسی باشد !
... شادی شهدای مدافع حرم هم صلوات !

</div>

Of course, 'infiltration' also does his job and, through the tribune of claimants,
completes the enemy's puzzle of separating the Leader from the masses. The love of
Leader does not have copyright, and he is not exclusive rights of anyone. … peace be
upon the spirits of martyrs of Holy Shrine Defenders.

(39)

<div dir="rtl">

... آنها علاوه بر فشار اقتصادی اجتماعی را به وجود آوردند که برای فشار به ایران ، سایر کشورها را نیز
همنواکنند ، اما بعضی از کشورهای دوست ما ... با آنها همنوا نشدند ؛ غیر از اسراییل و آمریکا که شیطنت
می کنند هیچ کشوری با آنها همنوا نشده بلکه با ایران همنوا شده اند که باید از این فرصت استفاده شود.

</div>

… other than the social and economic pressure they put on Iran, they tried to make
other countries resonate with them. Moreover, some friendly countries did not
resonate with them. Other than the US and Israel that make mischief, no country
resonated with them and, instead, they resonated with Iran. This opportunity must be
used [in the best way].

Last but not least, essential points of this section pertain to world literature and fairy tale creatures. As pointed out in section 9.1.4, for Conservatives, JCPOA has not had any achievements, and it is portrayed as the naked emperor[189] in this respect. So, those (especially Reformists) who praise it are like sycophants praising the emperor's non-existent clothes. Another intertextual reference is related to *Gulliver's Travels* by Jonathan Swift. A Conservative argues that Iran is on its way to achieving its ultimate divine goals and conquering the peaks of development, and in this path, he should avoid governmental authorities like Gulliver.

Two possible explanations for this description can be offered. One explanation is based on the assumption that Gulliver was searching for his father traveling from one land to another, and the other is based on Gulliver's gullibility and lack of savvy. According to the former, some authorities are looking for the hypothetical (God) father's approval[190] in any aspect of a country's development instead of relying on national potentials. The latter explanation criticizes some gullible authorities and thinks that JCPOA and P5+1 will help solve the country's problems. All in all, this Conservative again highlights the importance of national resources and demands Reformists to stop being gullible. This is an embedded case of metaphor that connects HUMAN, VEHICLE, FAMILY, and ART scenarios with each other.

Fairy tale characters such as demons are also present in Iran's political discourse. The widespread usage of the demon in contemporary Iran emerged shortly after Islamic Revolution. It was based on the contrast between angels and demons and religious inference. The example was 'the demon goes, and the angel comes'. Here, the demon is Shah, and the

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[189] In the story named the Emperor's New Clothes.
[190] As discussed in section 9.1.3, the international godfather is the United States and other powerful countries.

angel is Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Revolution. In the case of international affairs, in excerpt (42), the American embassy siege in Tehran[191] is depicted as an action that brought the demon of colonialization to his knees.

(40)

متاسفانه به جای عذرخواهی از مردم طلبکارانه از نتایج نامشهود و غیرواقعی برجام سخن می گویند که انسان را یاد آن داستان پادشاه و خیاط می اندازد .... لذا چاره ای نمی بینند که همچون داستان خیاط و پادشاه عده ای بر پیکر عریان برجام لباس فاخر تصور کنند و به فریب افکار عمومی بپردازند .

Unfortunately, instead of apologizing to the people, they talk about invisible and unrealistic outcomes of the JCPOA as if they are creditors. Moreover, this reminds us of the story of the emperor and the tailor …. So, just like the story of the Emperor's New Clothes, they have no choice other than to imagine the naked body of the JCPOA in finery and deceiving the public.

(41)

در مسیر آرمان های الهی با اتکا بر قدرت و بازوی جوان ایرانی به سوی قله های پیشرفت حرکت خواهیم کرد و من اعتقاد قلبی دارم در مسیر درست ولی سختی در حال حرکت هستیم و در این مسیر باید گالیورهای دولتی را کنار بزنیم .

On the way to [reaching] divine ideals, we will move towards the peaks of development by relying on the power of Iranian young people. Moreover, my sincere belief is that we are on the right but a difficult path. Moreover, in this path, we should push governmental Gullivers aside.

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[191] November 4th, 1979.

(42)

واقعه سیزده آبان که به تعبیر معمار کبیر انقلاب اسلامی ، انقلاب دوم نامیده شد ، یادآور به زانو درآمدن دیو

استعمار و کوتاه کردن دست استکبار جهانی از کشور عزیزمان ، ایران اسلامی است.

The event of November 4th [American embassy siege in Tehran], which is the second revolution according to Imam [Khomeini], reminds him of bringing the demon of colonialization to his knees and cutting the hand of global arrogance from the Islamic Iran, our dear country.

9.1.7.2. Scenarios for ARTS, CULTURE, AND LITERATURE Metaphors. To conclude the above-mentioned elaborate discussion, the following scenarios related to ARTS, CULTURE, AND LITERATURE have been extracted.

a) PUBLIC ELECTIONS ARE DIVINE SHOWS PERFORMED THANKS TO GOD.

b) THE THEME OF SHOW IS IRAN'S POWER AND AUTHORITY.

c) IN NATIONAL PUBLIC ELECTIONS SHOWS, PEOPLE ARE ACTORS AND THEIR PRESENCE ON STAGE IS VERY IMPORTANT. IF THEY ARE NOT PRESENT, THERE WILL BE NO SHOW.

d) NATIONAL PUBLIC ELECTIONS ARE DIVINE (PUPPET) SHOWS SINCE THE STRINGS ARE IN GOD'S HAND AND THE CULTURE OF MARTYRDOM DIRECTS PEOPLE. SO, ENEMY CANNOT PULL THE STRINGS AND MAKE PEOPLE ACT ACCORDING TO HIS SCENARIO.

e) IN THE INTERNATIONAL SHOW OF PEACE IN SYRIA, TRANSREGIONAL ACTORS MUST LEAVE THE STAGE FOR THE SUCCESS OF SHOW. SOME REGIONAL ACTORS HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM CASTING BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN MISTAKES.

f) THERE IS A COMPETITION AMONG COUNTRIES TO BE THE LEADING ACTOR OF PEACE SHOW IN MIDDLE EAST.

g) ARROGANCE WRITES SCENARIOS FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOME ARABIC COUNTRIES PLAY A ROLE IN IT.

h) 2009 SEDITION AND AMERICA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM JCPOA ARE HOLLYWOODIAN SCENARIOS WRITTEN BY ARRAGANCE. BUT THEY TURNED INTO FIASCO.

9.1.8. Source Domain for EDUCATION

Since the educational environment and its elements are well-known, at least, to academia, the link between source and target domain becomes self-explanatory in most cases. So, they are easily comprehensible. However, more clarification about their roles and types may be needed in some cases, such as teacher, student, and exam. It is blended with the human source domain since countries are often considered students, which presupposes them as human beings. The education source domain is the best one explaining thoughts and teachings behind Islamic Revolution since it expounds 'school'.

The arrangement of this section is as follows. First of all, we will present the school discussion, its characteristics, and some students. Then we will debate the exam and related topics, such as where it will be held and who will be checking the results. Then, the exam and its related issues, such as where it is held and who checks the results, will be argued. Thirdly, we will discuss the report card and the grades. Then, lessons and what has been learned during education will be offered. Moreover, the final discussion will be allocated for the book, dictation, and some lesser-discussed lessons.

Table 9.9

Conceptual Elements, Primary Signals and Relevant Statistics of EDUCATION Domain in each Corpus

		EDUCATION								
Conceptual Elements	**Primary Signals**	**Parliamentary Debates**			**ILNA**			**Tasnim**		
		Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD
Report card	Report card	78			342			284		
	Successful report	4	2.00	11.71	16	3.16	8.91	3	1.70	6.54
	Brilliant report	3	2.24	11.50	25	3.87	11.06	18	2.83	11.13
	Black report	3	1.73	10.22	17	3.46	10.47	5	2.44	9.16
	Report of political system	3	1.70	4.70	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Report in human rights	-	-	-	3	1.72	7.11	-	-	-
Grade	Grade	39			79			47		
	Passing grade	5	2.45	10.12	8	2.83	10.36	10	3.32	11.64
	High score	-	-	-	6	2.45	8.72	-	-	-
	Good mark	-	-	-	8	2.81	6.11	3	-	5.45
GPA	GPA	75			15			16		
School	School	44			234			332		
	Islamic School	8	2.83	8.42	20	4.47	8.16	33	5.68	7.71
	School of Ahl al-Bayt	3	1.73	10.49	20	4.47	10.79	41	6.48	11.45
	Revolutionary School	3	1.72	5.37	11	3.21	5.17	5	-	5.20
	School of Ashura	-	-	-	8	3.87	9.49	20	4.47	10.28
	Shia School	-	-	-	13	3.60	11.15	11	3.31	10.30
	Quranic School	-	-	-	6	2.44	7.45	7	2.62	7.69
	School of Resistance	-	-	-	9	2.98	7.29	5	2.39	6.59
Lesson	Lesson	145			318			701		
	Example[192]	5	2.45	11.07	12	3.00	10.26	20	4.00	9.93
	Lesson of resistance	4	2.00	9.22	6	2.61	7.06	9	2.90	6.83
	~ of altruism	-	-	-	3	-	5.86	3	1.71	6.67
	~ of loyalty	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.73	7.05
	~ of freedom	-	-	-	3	1.73	7.98	-	-	-
	~ of martyrdom	-	-	-	3	1.70	6.20	-	-	-
Exam	Exam	49			81			78		
	Difficult exam	-	-	-	4	2.00	8.52	4	1.73	8.82
	Divine exam	5	2.45	9.91	4	-	7.07	-	-	-
	Big exam	-	-	-	5	2.22	5.59	3	-	5.16

[192] In Persian, it is called 'warning lesson'. So it contains 'lesson'.

9.1.8.1. Conceptual Elements in Context. In general, as the name suggests, the political teachings of the Islamic Revolution come from Islamic School. Because they believe that Islam is a political school and the majority of its teachings are devoted to politics. They also hold the view that Prophets and Imams were primarily political figures. So, the founder of the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, was once a student of this school who became the teacher and taught other students to become teachers and examples in the future. Then, based on the Islamic School and, most importantly, the School of *Ashura*, the Revolutionary School was founded by Ayatollah Khomeini.

At first, let us see some features and teachings of Islamic School introduced by various Iranian authorities in different positions. Islam is said to be a *humanizing* school, so it makes humane students. One of the most outstanding teachings of the Islamic School is martyrdom. It also features the culture of altruism and self-sacrifice, which are in line with the nature of martyrdom. Moreover, that is why various authorities, especially clergymen, incessantly remind people that they should be thankful to God for living in Islamic Iran based on Islamic School. The culture of martyrdom is also the source of Iran's power, and it will be explained in the following paragraphs.

As a branch of Islam, Shi'ism is also like a school with specific teachings. One of its main principles is the governance of Guardianship of (the Islamic) Jurist, which is the superior characteristic of Shia School. As mentioned before, in Iran's political system, the Supreme Leader is supposed to be Guardianship. This Guardianship is the reason behind Iran's security in such an insecure region. Another doctrine of this Islamic school is coexisting with other religions, and it can be generalized to foreign policies of an Islamic community. Another major doctrine, which has the potentiality of being a school in itself, is the event of Ashura.

Based on all the teachings mentioned above that Ayatollah Khomeini had learned, he established the Islamic Revolutionary School. Imam Khomeini School has made Iran *Om al-Ghora* (the mother of all oases). 'The mother of all oases' refers to Mecca, a city in Saudi Arabia. According to Islamic political studies, the Muslim World is like a single community. Any Islamic country that can establish Islamic governance and extend its sovereignty beyond country borders will become the leader of all other Islamic countries or 'the mother of all oases'[193]. Larijani proposed this theory in the 80s, and it was based on the thoughts of Ayatollah Khomeini[194]. For Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran needed to keep its position as 'the mother of all oases' to preserve Islamic schools. So, thanks to him, Iran is now 'the mother of all oases'. Another important teaching of Revolutionary School is 'resistance': Countries should resist US hegemony. Other revolutionary leaders in the Middle East have learned this lesson from Iran's Revolutionary School.

The central axis in which the Revolution moves is Ashura School which has taught the lesson of martyrdom. As we can see, it is an embedded case of MOVEMENT, RELIGION and EDUCATION scenarios. Iranians have learned their lesson from Ashura and consider their Guardianship (the Supreme Leader) as Imam Hussein and his enemies as the troops of Yazid. So they will sacrifice their lives (to get martyred) to save the country and the Supreme Leader from the enemy. That is why Iran is safe and potent.

Iran's power comes from its people. People play a significant role in every scenario, which is not an exception. Nevertheless, the thought-provoking question is,' which type/class of people is the source of this power?' It argues that those who follow the teachings of Ahl al-

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[193] پرسمان دانشگاهیان (porseman.com)
[194] نظریه ام‌القری – ویکی‌پدیا، دانشنامهٔ آزاد (wikipedia.org)

Bayt (Family of the House) School are where Iran's power originates. The family of the House, according to Shia, are Prophet Muhammad, his daughter (Fatimeh), his son-in-law (Ali), and their children (Hassan and Hussein). Imam Hussein is the one who was martyred in Ashura. Those Iranians who follow Ahl al-Bayt are the reason for Iran's power; they believe in martyrdom just like their teachers (Ahl al-Bayt)[195].

It reminds of HOUSE scenario in which those Iranians who believed in the Guardianship of Ayatollah Khamenei could enter into the castle of Revolution through the gates of public elections (democracy). So, democracy, power, and other fundamental political concepts that highly emphasize nation and their roles are concerned with this class: religious people believe in principles of a religious-political system.

This concept of Ahl al-Bayt is also the bond of people, as students, with their leader, as the teacher. In that vein, it reminds us of the FAMILY scenario in which the bond of children with their father was Islamic concepts such as divine love. The Revolutionary School is religious. That is why every political discourse of Iran underlines Islam much; i.e., it keeps the family and the campus members together. This religious and Islamic bond makes the enemy mad, and Iranians should adhere to it by maintaining their unity and (Revolutionary) values. These concepts are inseparably interwoven with each other.

(1)

تبریک و تهنیت عرض می کنم ... هفته وحدت بی تردید نماد و پیام صلح و دوستی برای پیروان راستین دین و مکتب انسان ساز اسلام ناب محمدی است.

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[195] Answering the question of whether Ahl al-Bayt believed in this type of martyrdom and political beliefs or it is just the authorities' interpretation (if not manipulation) is out of the scope of this study.

I congratulate 'the Week of Unity', which is, undoubtedly, the symbol and the message of peace and friendship for true believers of the humane-making school of pure Muhammadian Islam.

(2)

امروز روزی است که مکتب حسینی و مهدوی (ع) به عنوان کامل ترین و تنها راه نجات بشر به صورت شفاف به جهان معرفی شود . حقیقت این است که ایمان به انسان کامل امام زمان (ع) و پیوستن به او و یاری او در برقراری عدالت و عزت و آزادی ، تنها راه و البته بهترین و کامل ترین است .

Today is the day that Imam Hussein and Imam Mahdi School are introduced as the most perfect and the only way to save human beings. The truth is that the faith in the perfect personality of Imam Mahdi and joining and helping him in bringing justice, glory, and freedom is the only and, of course, the perfect way.

(3)

محمدجواد ظریف ... گفت : شهادت نه تنها یکی از استوارترین آموزه های مکتب اسلام است بلکه از محکم ترین پایه های اقتدار ملی ما نیز محسوب می شود .

Mohammad Javad Zarif said that martyrdom is not only one of the firmest teachings of the Islamic School, but it is also considered one of the most solid bases of our national authority.

(4)

در مکتب اسلام ، از خود گذشتگی در راه خدا و دفاع از حق در بالاترین حد ، ارزش گذاری شده است و فرهنگ ایثارگری و شهادت طلبی در متن اسلام از درخشش و ویژگی برجسته ای برخوردار است.

At the Islamic School, devotion in the path of God and defending the rightfulness have been evaluated at the highest level. Furthermore, the culture of altruism and seeking martyrdom in the content of Islam is considered an outstanding feature.

(5)

سردار سرلشکر محمد باقری ... باید خدا را شکر کنیم که در مکتب اسلام و ایران اسلامی و مکتب اهل بیت تنفس می کنیم و دینی داریم که بر فضلیت علم و دانش تاکید دارد.

Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that we should thank God that we are breathing in Islamic and Ahl al-Bayt School and the Islamic Iran and [for the fact that] we have the religion which affirms the superiority of knowledge and science.

(6)

... برای جامعه ای مثل ایران که مکتب عاشورا ، محور اصلی آن حرکت است ، مقابله با تهدید سخت نظامی آسان ترین کار مقابله است . ...شهادت یک فرهنگ است و به عنوان یکی از مولفه های قدرت ملی ما به حساب می آید و جوانان ما با بهره گیری از فرهنگ و مکتب عاشورا آموختند که هر دشمنی قصد حمله به کشور را داشته باشد در صف یزیدیان قرار دارد و امروز این فرهنگ در سوریه و لبنان و عراق و یمن و هرجا که صدای انقلاب اسلامی طنین انداخته به وضوح دیده میشود.

… countering military threats is the easiest thing for a society like Iran that its central axis in which it moves is the Ashura School …. Martyrdom is a culture, and it is considered one of the components of our national power. Our young people have learned from Ashura's culture and school that any enemy that intends to attack the country will be considered as the troop of Yazid. Moreover, today, this culture is seen vividly in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and any country where the voice of the Islamic Revolution reverberates.

(7)

خضیر الخزاعی ... حاکمیت ولایت فقیه را امتیاز مکتب تشیع دانست و ... گفت : مصداق روشن موفقیت این نوع نظام ، ایران است که در میان نا امنی های منطقه ، کاملا امن است .

Khazir al-Khazaei considered the governance of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist as the bonus of Shia School, and he said that the apparent proof of this type of system's success is Iran which is safe among all regional insecurities.

(8)

مکتب امام راه متفاوتی از سکولاریزم را نشان می دهد ... و می فرماید : «قرآن کریم و سنت رسول الله آن قدر که در حکومت و سیاست احکام دارند در سایر چیزها ندارند ، بلکه بسیاری از احکام عبادی اسلام عبادی ـ سیاسی است که غفلت از آنها این مصیبت ها را به بار آورده است . پیامبر اسلام مثل سایر حکومت های جهان تشکیل حکومت داد ، لکن با انگیزه بسط عدالت اجتماعی.

Imam's School shows a different path from secularism, and he [Ayatollah Khomeini] says that Quran and the Prophet's tradition [*sunnah*] have laws regarding governance and politics more than any other domain. Many of the worship laws of Islam are devotional-political laws, and neglecting them has caused these disasters. Prophet Muhammad founded a government just like the rest of the world. His government was motivated by the expansion of social justice.

(9)

رهبری امام (ره) و پیوند مردم با قرآن و مکتب امام ایران سلطنت زده را به ام القرای جهان اسلام تبدیل کرد و نقطه اتکای آن مستضعفان شدند .

The leadership of Imam [Khomeini] and the connection between the people and the Quran and Imam's School changed monarchical Iran into the mother of all oases in the Muslim World. Moreover, it became the fulcrum of all the oppressed.

(10)

دبیر ستاد حقوق بشر افزود : ... من بحث آقای ظریف را درباره اینکه قدرت ما مردم هستند به این معنا قبول دارم ، اما مردم پیرو مکتب اهل بیت (ع) ، قدرت ما از این رو است که امروز ایران در منطقه نیرو و قدرتی است تاثیرگذار ، ... ما به عنوان ایرانی باید منبع قدرتمان را بشناسیم . مادامی که ما مردم ، پیرو مکتب اهل بیت (ع) باشیم ؛ توجهات الهی می آید ، قدرتها می آید ، دشمنان را شکست می دهیم ...

The secretary of High Council for Human Rights added that … I agree with Mr. Zarif in the sense that our power comes from the people; but, [from] the people following the School of Ahl al-Bayt. From This comes our power, and today we are the

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influential power and force in the region. … as Iranians, we should know the source of our power. As far as we, the people, follow the School of Ahl al-Bayt; we will receive divine regards and powers; we will defeat enemies …

(11)

... آنچه امروز جامعه اسلامی را قوام و استحکام می بخشد پیوند امت با ولایت است که نقطه اوج آن را در ایران اسلامی شاهدیم و دشمنان از همین پیوند امت اسلامی عصبانی شده اند.

… What strengthens the Islamic community today is the nation's connection to the Guardianship, and we witness it at the highest level in Islamic Iran. Moreover, the enemies are angry because of this connection in the Islamic community.

Different eras of Islamic Revolutionary School are like academic years, and the students are like classmates who become teachers to train the next generation of Revolution. Among the first generation of classmates in this school were Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Hashemi, who trained other students such as Rouhani. Ayatollah Khomeini was a student of Imam Hussein's[196] School, and Ayatollah Khamenei (the current Supreme Leader) is Ayatollah Khomeini's student. One of the courses that Ayatollah Khomeini was used to teaching was 'democracy'. Major General Soleimani and other Holy Shrine Defenders are also graduated from the school of Quran and Ahl al-Bayt and learned the lessons of Guardianship and martyrdom. So, they could defeat ISIS.

One student can have different teachers for different courses. For instance, one of Rouhani's campaign managers says that Rouhani is the student and friend of Ayatollah

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[196] Who was involved in the Ashura event.

Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei. While on the other hand, a Conservative considers him a student of Ayatollah Hashemi and regards this as negative criticism. He argues that just as Hashemi discouraged people before the enemy and America, he is with Rouhani as his student. Rouhani also calls America' headman,' and has learned it in Hashemi's class.

(12)

… سیدی از تبار حیدر کرار و حسین کربلا که عدالت و شجاعت و آزادگی را بی محابا فریاد زد و عرض ارادت مکرر به محضر فرزند جان و دل و تربیت شده مکتب امام روح الله و سیدی که ذوب در ولایت حضرت بقیه الله الاعظم (روحی فداه) است….…

… a sayyid from the lineage of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein who roared for justice, courage, and freedom with no fear. Moreover, I send my regards to the child trained in Imam Khomeini School and the sayyid melted in the Guardianship of Imam Mahdi …

(13)

ملت ما اگر امروز در کنار مرقد مطهر امام راحل و آموزگار مردم سالاری و یا در کنار خانه ملت ، شهیدانی را تقدیم می کند بخاطر این است که اهل خشونت نبوده و طرفدار مردم سالاری و صندوق رای است و این ملت با زبان فرهنگ و هنر راه مقاومت و ایستادگی خود را پاس می دارد.

Today, our nation dedicates the martyrs next to the holy shrine of Imam [Khomeini] and the teacher of democracy or next to the nation's house [the parliament]. It is because they [the Iranians] have never been pugnacious people, and they advocate democracy and the ballot box. Moreover, this nation appreciates the path of resistance with language, culture, and art.

(14)

... ما این اتفاق را محکوم می کنیم و معتقد هستیم آقای روحانی فرزند انقلاب و حوزه و از شاگردان و یاران

امام خمینی (ره) و مقام معظم رهبری هستند

… we condemn this incident, and we believe that Mr. Rouhani is the son of the Revolution and seminary, and he is the student and companion of Imam Khomeini and the Supreme Leader.

(15)

آقای هاشمی ! شما در دوران طولانی دنبال سلب شهامت و جرات ملت در برابر دشمن و آمریکا بودید .

شاگرد مکتب شما آقای روحانی عبارت «آمریکا کدخدا است را در محضر شما آموخته است .

Mr. Hashemi! You have been looking for ways to deprive people of courage and bravery in the face of the enemy and the US for a long time. Mr. Rouhani, a student of your school, has learned 'America is the headman' in your class.

(16)

آموزه های ما در مکتب قرآن و عترت و در سایه سار برخورداری از نعمت ولایت فقیه این دستاورد عظیم را

محصول الطاف و امداد الهی ، حکمت و تدبیر رهبر حکیم و شجاع ، ایمان و اراده راسخ و بصیرت و دشمن

شناسی ناشی از فرزند زمان خویش بودن می داند.

Our teachings in the Quran School and the shadow of the Guardianship's blessing consider this as an outstanding achievement which is the outcome of divine help, the shrewd and courageous Supreme Leader's prudence, faith and firm willpower, insight, recognition of enemy due to being the child of this time.

The exam is the thorniest conceptual element of this domain because it is blended with the religious concept of 'divine test' and distinguishing the border between the two categories (education vs. religion) is almost impossible. So, the cases will be discussed regardless of this distinction, and they can be interpreted as proof to show how many conceptual elements of the religion source domain are present in the exam scenario. Like the

public election, every significant event is an exam, and every time people pass it successfully, the enemy gets disappointed.

One of the most intriguing excerpts is part of an MP's speech addressed in the parliament. He argues that MPs are taking exams until the last breath they take. The exam is related to the course of Quran and Ahl al-Bayt. When they die, and the report card is given to them, Imam Mahdi will be present, too. They should pass the exam to not be ashamed in front of Imam Mahdi, Ayatollah Khomeini, and Revolutionary martyrs[197]. The drift of this quotation is that since the legislation is drafted based on Islam and since the country and the Revolution is said to be governed indirectly by Imam Mahdi, they should not disappoint him.

From another example, it can be inferred that MPs are not the only ones taking this exam. All those who are serving people and have any responsibility are participating in this exam, and may God help them pass the exam successfully. A martyred Commander during the Iran-Iraq war believed that besides being an exam, serving in Iran's Political System is 'trusteeship,' and it is a God-given responsibility. The former president's deputy expands the horizon of the Revolution and argues that the whole Islamic Revolution is like an exam being monitored by Imam Mahdi. Those who have failed this exam, how can they pass the one related to Imam Mahdi himself? It means that those who fail to adhere to Revolutionary goals will not go to the next phase of the exam, becoming Imam Mahdi's companion and helping him spread justice and peace in the whole world.

Authorities are not the only ones taking the exam in Iran's political system. The nation is also taking various exams from the early years of the Islamic Revolution. The exams

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[197] As mentioned earlier, they are living with God and are monitoring us.

for ordinary people are the Iran-Iraq war, sanctions, and other problems. Even natural disasters such as earthquakes are described as exams for both people and authorities. On the other hand, the only metaphorical use of exams in foreign affairs is JCPOA. It is an international exam, and Iran wins because Iran plays according to the rules, and other countries support it. It is an embedded case of the metaphorical pattern.

(17)

امیدوارم که مردم ما از عهده این امتحان هم چون امتحانات دیگر ، سرافراز برآمده و دشمن مایوس را مایوس تر نمایند .

I hope people can successfully pass this exam [parliamentary election] just like others and disappoint the enemy even more [than before].

(18)

ابراهیم کارخانه ... تا زمانی که نفس می کشیم در حال امتحان هستیم . آنگاه که نفس بند آمد ، مدت امتحان به پایان می رسد و ما را می برند تا نتیجه امتحان خود را ببینیم . نکند که خدای ناکرده در سر جلسه امتحان عمر از کتاب قرآن و عترت نمره قبولی نگیریم و در پیشگاه حضرت ولی عصر (عجل الله تعالی فرجه الشریف) و امام و شهدا شرمنده باشیم.

Ebrahim Karkhaneh … [said that] until we are breathing, we are taking exams. When we no longer breathe, then the exam is finished. Moreover, they take us to see the results of our exam. May God forbid it if we fail in the field of the Quran, and then, we Will be ashamed in front of Imam Mahadi, Imam Khomeini, and the martyrs.

(19)

شهید جهان آرا می گفتند می شود یک روز امام حکومت دینی تشکیل دهد ما در آن سوپور بشویم و با زبان خود خیابان را جارو بزنیم ؟ آوایی تاکید کرد : مسیولیت گرفتن در نظام ، امتحان بسیار سخت و بار سنگینی

است که بر دوش ماست . در همه حکومت ها بار مسیولان سخت است اما اینگونه نیست که 300 هزار شهید

طلبکار آدم باشند . خدا کند ، خدا ما را به حال خودمان واگذار نکند.

Shahid [the martyr] Jahan Ara said would it be possible that one day Imam [Khomeini] founds a religious government and we could be street sweepers, and we could leak the streets with our tongues[198]? Avayi affirmed that having responsibility in the political system is a challenging exam and a heavy burden on our shoulders. In all governments, it is difficult; but it is not like 300 thousand martyrs being creditors of the officials. May God do not leave us alone!

(20)

انقلاب اسلامی آزمون حضور در محضر مهدوی است ؛ آنهایی که در این آزمون شکست خوردند در انقلاب

مهدوی چگونه تاب خواهند آورد ؟

The Islamic Revolution is the exam of *presence* held before Imam Mahdi. How will failures of this exam survive in Imam Mahdi's revolution?

(21)

... برجام اکنون یک آزمونی در صحنه جهانی شده و معلوم می شود آن دولتی که یاغیانه ، مقررات بین

المللی را زیر پا می گذارد ، کیست و آن کشور ، ملت و دولتی نیز که احترام بین المللی را به سوی خود جلب

می کند و مورد حمایت همه کشورهای جهان به جز دو کشور قرار دارد ، دولت و نظام ایران است .

Now, the JCPOA has become an exam at the international level, and it is clear which country is the one that rebelliously violates international laws. Iran's nation and government are the nation and the government that receive international respect, and all countries in the world other than two support them.

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[198] As a sign of being honored to clean his path.

Generally speaking, a report card refers to someone's work experience and resume. This element is intermingled with a religious concept: 'ever-abiding good deeds'. It means that someone does some good deeds in this world that outlive them and benefit even after death. An MP in excerpt (22) argues that voting for an amendment is like an ever-abiding good deed recorded in MPs' report card, and they will receive its benefits even when they are not MPs anymore.

As the report card consists of scores related to different courses and the student may pass and fail others, politicians' and governments' report cards may have different grades. A high-ranking military officer considers some of the 2009 seditionist as students with positive grades in courses such as Holy Defense and revolutionary fightings against Shah. However, they failed in the exam of sedition.

Another course in the nation's report card is public elections, especially presidential elections. When they create 'the saga of presence', they add a golden page to the report card of religious democracy. This image of the 'golden page' adds to the report card's importance and highlights, even more, the success of the student. The importance of 'presence' in this conceptual element does not end here. People's presence is like a confirmation stamp on public servants' (authorities) report cards in Iran's political system. A Reformist MP implies that politicians (with different political affiliations) are competitive students, and Reformists have never been behind their competitors in the course of *devotion to the Revolution and Imam Khomeini's thoughts and fidelity to the Supreme Leader*. Their '*bright* report card' is the proof of this success. The bright report card is the antonym of the black one, which will be discussed in the upcoming paragraphs.

For Conservatives, *Basij* has had a successful report card at the national level, and Ayatollah Khomeini signed it by saying that *Basij* and Basijis are the perfect symbols of altruism and love of God. They also criticize the government for the resistive economy course on the report card and ask it to explain its actions so far. A Reformist illustrates this element differently. He argues that as the evaluation of a student's report card is based on GPA, and the grades of mathematics and literature may vary, the same must be applied to evaluating the government's performance. So, although the government's actions in some fields have not been very successful, its general performance is good and acceptable.

(22)

با این رای تاریخی که می فرمایید ان شا الله سبب بشود به عنوان باقیات الصالحات در کارنامه عمل همه شما ثبت و ضبط بشود و ... اشتغالی رخ می دهد ، اقتصاد مقاومتی و همه چیز و همه چیز در دل این ها می تواند جمع بشود .

If God wills, this historical vote of yours will be recorded as an ever-binding good deed in your report card, and … job opportunities will be created, resistive economy and everything can come together in this [bill].

(23)

... متاسفانه در فتنه 88 کسانی را در مقابل نظام و انقلاب دیدیم که سوابق درخشانی از زندانی شدن در دوران رژیم پهلوی تا حضور در جبهه های جنگ را در کارنامه داشتند و این فتنه هم که نفوذی ها عامل رقم خوردن آن بودند با درایت و زعامت رهبر معظم انقلاب به ساحل نجات رسید . او با بیان اینکه بسیاری از افراد بزرگ انقلاب اکنون مردود شده اند ...

… Unfortunately, in the 2009 sedition, we saw those people confronting the system and the Revolution that had a brilliant history of imprisonment during the Pahlavi dynasty, and they had 'presence in the war' in their report card. Furthermore, this sedition caused by undercovers was also guided to the beach of salvation with the

Supreme Leader's guidelines. He mentioned that many great revolutionists had flunked now …

(24)

<div dir="rtl">

حماسه تاریخی اردیبهشت 96 ، برگ زرین کارنامه ملت ماست ، ملتی که با رشد و بلوغ سیاسی خود به مردم سالاری جلوه ای نو داد و نام ایران را بر قله بلند افتخار و اقتدار در منطقه و جهان نشاند .

</div>

The historical saga of Ordibehesht 2017 is a golden page in our nation's report card. The nation gave a new image to democracy with its political growth and puberty, and it sets Iran's name on top of a high peak of honor and authority in the world and the region.

(25)

<div dir="rtl">

… انتخابات تبلور مردم سالاری است و در حقیقت فرصتی برای به صحنه کشاندن اقشار مختلف مردم در عرصه های سیاسی و اجتماعی و مهر تایید و تشویق بر کارنامه عملکرد خدمتگزاران نظام است . … مردم حواسشان باشد چه کسانی یاس به جامعه تزریق می کنند .

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… elections are the crystallization of democracy, and in fact, they are an opportunity for bringing all social classes on the stage of social and political domains. They are confirming and encouraging stamp on the report card of servants of the political system. … People should be careful about who is injecting disappointment into the society.

(26)

<div dir="rtl">

تابش با بیان اینکه اصلاح طلبان در تعلق خاطر به انقلاب و اندیشه حضرت امام (ره) و قانون اساسی و وفاداری به رهبری معظم انقلاب هیچگاه عقب تر از رقبایشان نبوده اند و این را کارنامه روشن آنان نشان می دهد … گفت : درس مهم هفتم اسفند برای ما … درس از یاد نبردن نعمت مشارکت آگاهانه ، نعمت وحدت سرمایه های اصلاحات و نعمت برخورداری از … اعتماد مردم .

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Tabesh said that Reformists have never been behind their competitors in [the course of] devotion to the Revolution and Imam Khomeini's thoughts and the constitution

and fidelity to the Supreme Leader. Moreover, their bright report card is proof of this success. … He said that the critical lesson of parliamentary election [in 2017] for us was not to forget the blessing of conscious participation, the blessing of unity among Reformists, and the blessing of … people's trust.

(27)

در مورد دهه ی شصت کارنامه ی موفق بسیج را امام راحل امضا کرده است که ... فرمودند : ... حقیقتا اگر بخواهیم مصداق کاملی از ایثار و خلوص و فداکاری و عشق به ذات مقدس حق و اسلام را ارایه دهیم ، چه کسی سزاوارتر از بسیج و بسیجیان خواهند بود !

About the 80s, Imam Khomeini signed Basij's successful report card. [Imam] who … said that … if we want to offer a perfect symbol of altruism and love of God and Islam, who will deserve it more than *Basij* and Basijis?

(28)

طباطبایی خاطرنشان کرد : اما همانطور که در ارزیابی کارنامه یک دانش آموز به معدل نمرات وی نگاه می کنند و نمرات ریاضی و فارسی وی ممکن است یکسان نباشد ، درباره دولت یازدهم هم باید بر این مبنا قضاوت کرد . وی ادامه داد : دولت روحانی در زمینه جوانگرایی نمره قبولی نمی گیرد ، اما نمره آن در حوزه تنش زدایی و سیاست خارجی خوب و قابل قبول است .

Tabatabai reminded that as the evaluation of a student's report card is based on GPA, and the grades of mathematics and literature may vary, the same must be applied to the judgment of the government's performance. He continued that Rouhani's government does not attain the passing grade in the field of orienting toward young human resources, but its grade in foreign policy and reducing tension is acceptable and reasonable.

At the international level, countries are like students that may have report cards of failure, especially in the case of an enemy country. For instance, Saudi Arabia has a

'*black* report card' means that it has failed to do its responsibilities. Another 'black report card' belongs to England and in the course of 'human rights. That is to say, England has failed in the field of human rights. The world arrogance also has black report cards because of Yemen, Iraq, and Syria crimes. The United States and its alliance also pretend to fight against terrorism and present this show[199] as a positive point on their report card. At the other end of this phenomenon is Iran which has a *brilliant* report card in the course of fighting terrorism.

For Reformists, a positive grade in the government's report card is the JCPOA related to the foreign policies course. Nevertheless, this is not true for Conservatives, and the JCPOA had no achievements, and it was a big lie. So the Conservative journalist sarcastically criticizes Rouhani's government by saying that the big lie of JCPOA must have been the only positive score in the government's report card. It is not the only existent lie in his card, and his presidential campaign and his proclaimed achievements are full of falsehood. So, for Conservatives, the government did not have a successful report card in foreign policies. They also criticize the US for breaching the JCPOA as a negative point in his report card.

(29)

من این نکته را ... عرض کنم که کارنامه سیاه عربستان ... بر هیچکس پوشیده نیست . ولی من متعجب از کسانی هستم که منافع ملی و امنیت بسیار خوب کشورمان را در نظر نمی گیرند و خودسرانه با اقداماتی که در سفارت عربستان داشتند تمامی ... حمایت هایی که عربستان از تروریست ، داعش و غیره داشت را تحت الشعاع قرار دادند .... وزیر خارجه انگلیس با کارنامه سیاه حقوق بشری اش خود را ارتقادهنده حقوق بشر در دنیا معرفی می کند.

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[199] Embedded with ARTS domain.

I should point out that the black report card of Saudi Arabia … is in everyone's access. However, I am surprised by those who do not consider national interests and security, and arbitrary actions against Saudi Arabia's embassy obscured Saudi Arabia's support for terrorism and ISIS. … The foreign minister of England presents himself as a promoter of human rights despite his black report card in human rights.

(30)

آمریکا و متحدانش به اعتراف خود آقای ترامپ و اسناد متقن موجود گروه های پلید تروریستی و تکفیری را به وجود آوردند و اکنون مبارزه نمایشی با آنها را به عنوان کارنامه مثبت خود ارایه می دهند .

According to Trump's confession and statutory documents, America and its allies created terrorist and takfiri groups, and now, they present their scenic combat with terrorism as their positive report card.

(31)

بر اساس بررسی های کمیسیون های امنیت ملی و سیاست خارجی مجلس از گزارش های وزارت امور خارجه و سایر دستگاه ها ... توافق هسته ای حداقل 917 تحریم پیش روی ایران را لغو کرده و این مساله به تنهایی خود بیانگر موفقیت و کارنامه درخشان برجام است.

Based on the Commission of National Security and Foreign Policies' inspections of reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other organizations, … the nuclear agreement has annulled at least 917 sanctions on Iran. It, by itself, indicates the brilliant report card of the JCPOA.

(32)

لغو تحریم ها «تقریبا هیچ» حرف راستی نداشت ! مهم ترین ادعای دروغ دولت را باید با اختلاف زیاد به رفع همه تحریم های بانکی و اقتصادی علیه ایران مربوط دانست ، شاید این دروغ بزرگ مهم ترین کارنامه مثبت دولت هم باشد ! ... متاسفانه دولت یازدهم کارنامه خوبی در سیاست خارجی در مواجهه با

قدرت های جهانی بویژه آمریکا به جای نگذاشت . به همین دلیل ... در برجام به دستاورد «تقریبا هیچ»

رسیدیم .

Annulling sanctions had 'almost no' truths! The government's most crucial lie should
lift all economic and banking sanctions against Iran; maybe this big lie is also an
essential part of the government's positive report card! … Unfortunately, the eleventh
government did not have a sound report card in foreign policy regarding confronting
world powers, especially the US. That is why … we achieved 'almost no'
achievement via the JCPOA.

(33)

... آمریکا کارنامه خوبی در ایفای تعهداتش در برجام ندارد و لازم است که دستگاه دیپلماسی کشور واکنش

مناسب تری در برابر بدعهدی های آمریکایی ها اتخاذ کند.

… America does not have a sound report card in fulfilling its commitments to the
JCPOA, and the country's diplomatic service must take better reactions to America's
disloyalty.

Based on all those teachings and exams, people and authorities have learned their
lessons and taught some lessons to other countries. One of the most frequent lessons is the
'warning lesson', called 'example' in English. For instance, an MP scorns Zarif, Iran's
foreign minister, for not learning from examples of previous negotiations and agreements.
America has been being defeated for 40 years, and it should be an example for him to know
that sanctions and other types of pressures do not work. Trump should learn from the
example of previous US governments and understand that Iran is a powerful country, and that
is why all US previous governments had to sit behind the table of negotiations with Iran.

In the case of national affairs, the 2009 sedition is like an example that warns us about the upcoming even bigger seditions. On the other hand, a Reformist MP argues that the first public election after 2009 unrest, a parliamentary election, had some lessons. They have learned to accept their even more difficult duty in new conditions. They have learned not to forget people's conscious participation and unity among advocates of the Reformist party. They have learned that people trust them. Moreover, all these features are blessings. This excerpt is highly blended with religious scenarios (Exc. 26).

Another national event that taught so many lessons was the Holy Defense[200]. It taught the lesson of altruism, a feature of martyrs who sacrifice their lives for the country and its goals. People still have those features and are ready to get martyred, which the enemy should learn. This war also taught that the government should rely on internal resources like the young people and not wait for other countries to help them. Holy Defense has also taught Iran to destroy dead-ends and not get trapped in such places. So it is blended with a conceptual element of VEHICLE scenario in which it was underlined that Iran has no dead-end road.

Events and figures in early Islamic history have also taught Iranians many lessons. For instance, a journalist and political critic believe that the authorities should learn from Imam Ali that 'the end does not justify the means. He argues that Imams were political figures and their actions are sources of learning various policies. For him, Imam Ali taught a lesson of freedom. The lesson of Resistive Economy was taught by the Prophet Muhammad's policy when he and his followers were in economic blockade for three years. Another lesson

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[200] Iran-Iraq war.

learned from the Prophet is democracy. Though Prophet Muhammad received revelations, he used to consult with his companions.

As has already been mentioned, religious similes and source domains are present in every scenario. However, the speaker sometimes exaggerates when he is describing a person or event. For instance, a late General of IRGC was used to regard Ayatollah Khamenei as the son of Imam Ali and emphasized that authorities should learn lessons from Iran's past and early Islamic history. The lesson is that the Supreme Leader must be robust, and everyone should do his/her job bearing this in their mind. In another case, the intelligence minister considers Ayatollah Khomeini as 'worthy or righteous son' of Imam Hussein, and he cried for helping Islam. So he founded Islamic Renaissance based on lessons he learned from Ashura, and Ayatollah Khamenei, his righteous successor, followed in his footsteps. Because of those lessons (e.g., martyrdom), the enemy does not dare to attack Iran, and, as already mentioned, Iran is robust and secure. Both cases are interwoven with the FAMILY scenario (Exc. 41).

Another case of exaggeration relates to Imam Mahdi and the belief that he is still alive. Ayatollah Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader, regards Ayatollah Khomeini as a live Imam, and the country is still administered based on his lesson (plan). Based on (Shia) Islamic beliefs, all Imams and even martyrs live in another world with God and are omnipresent creatures that see us, and we can talk to them and ask them favors. So, this excerpt conjures up that Ayatollah Khomeini is like Imam Mahdi and is omnipresent and governs the country (Exc. 42).

Iran learned some lessons, but he also taught some of them to other countries. It reflects Iran's ideology to spread Islam and export the Revolution. One of the main lessons Iran and its martyrs teach is 'resistance'; since Iran is the School of Resistance, and that is

why it leads Axis of Resistance[201]. Other (oppressed) countries should learn to resist arrogance. Another lesson is 'democracy', which Iran teaches by public elections during which it exercises democracy.

(34)

روحانی با اشاره به اینکه آمریکایی ها 40 سال فشار ، تحریم ، تحریک و بسیج برخی از کشورهای منطقه علیه ملت ایران را تجربه کرده و در همه مراحل با شکست مواجه شده اند ، خاطرنشان کرد : آمریکایی ها باید از شکست های پیاپی خودشان در مواجهه با ملت ایران ، درس عبرت بیاموزند. ... دولت جدید آمریکا از تجربه دولت های قبلی درس بگیرد و ببیند آنها چگونه در پای میز مذاکره نشسته اند .

Rouhani pointed out that Americans have experienced 40 years of pressure, sanction, instigating, and uniting some regional countries against Iran's nation, and they have always been defeated. He affirmed that the Americans must learn the example from consecutive defeats confronting Iran's nation. … the new US government should learn the lesson from previous governments and see how they sat down at the negotiation table.

(35)

... باید از فتنه ها درس عبرت گرفت و همانطوری که مقام معظم رهبری فرمودند فتنه ای بزرگ تر در پیش خواهد بود ، امروز شاهدیم دشمن ... به دنبال اینست که فتنه بزرگتری را پیگیری کند و باز هم برای رسیدن به اهداف خود از نیروهای خود فروخته داخلی استفاده می کند ... تا بتواند فتنه دیگری را در درون نظام مقدس ما پایه ریزی کند.

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[201] Also known as Resistance and Deterrence Axis.

… The example must be learned from seditions. Furthermore, as the Supreme Leader said, bigger sedition will come. Moreover, today, we see that the enemy … wants to plot bigger sedition, and it wants to use its internal mercenaries to achieve its aims … to establish another sedition inside our sacred political system.

(36)

ما از دفاع مقدس درس ایثار و خوداتکایی گرفتیم و فهمیدیم باید دست به زانوی خودمان بگیریم بر همین اساس امروز در جایگاهی هستیم که هیچ گونه کم وکسری برای تولید سخت افزار و مهمات نظامی نداریم …

We have learned the lesson of altruism and self-reliance from the Holy Defense, and we understand that we should rely on ourselves. Accordingly, today, we are in a position that we do not lack anything for producing military weapons …

(37)

رییس ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح افزود : ما در دفاع مقدس درس بن بست شکنی را فرا گرفتیم و جمهوری اسلامی هیچ گاه در هیچ بن بستی گرفتار نمی شود مگر اینکه ما خودمان بن بست های خیالی بسازیم همانطور که در دوران جنگ نیز عده ای قصد این کار را داشتند.

The head of General Staff of the Armed Forces added that we learned the lesson of destroying dead-end [roads]. Moreover, the Islamic Republic never gets trapped in a dead-end; unless we build imaginary dead ends for ourselves, just like in wartime when some intended to do so.

(38)

پیامبر عزیز ما در اولین درس اقتصادی خود … به همه ما آموخت اقتصاد اسلامی و اقتصاد تولیدی همان اقتصاد مقاومت و ایستادگی در برابر کفر و ظلم است ، یعنی آنکه کم بخوریم ، کم مصرف کنیم و بسیار پس انداز کنیم تا بتوانیم اثبات کنیم که از فشار ، فرصت می سازیم …

Our dear Prophet, in his first economic lesson … taught us that the Islamic economy and economics of production are the same as the resistive economy and resisting in

front of blasphemy and tyranny. It means that we eat less, consume less, and save a lot

to prove that we turn the pressure into the opportunity …

(39)

مطهری افزود : باید از سیره و روش پیامبر درس گرفت . با اینکه به ایشان وحی می شد ، پیامبر با اصحابش

مشورت می کرد و یک نوع دموکراسی در رفتار ایشان وجود داشت . به اصحابش … یاد می داد که در امور

اجرایی اهل مشورت باشید ؛ نه استبداد .

Motahari added that we should learn lessons from the Prophet's conventions and

behavior. Although he received revelations, he used to consult with his companions.

Moreover, there was a type of democracy in his behavior. He taught his companions

to consult in their affairs and not [to be a] dictator.

(40)

… تاریخ گذشته ایران و صدر اسلام ، خب اینها همه مملو از تجربیات تلخ بود و عبرتهایی بود که باید از

آنها درس می گرفتیم . دایما تکیه کلامش این بود که ما باید مشت مقام معظم رهبری را پر کنیم ، ایشان فرزند

امیرالمومنین علیه السلام است و باید مشت ایشان پر باشد .

… the history of Iran and early Islamic history is filled with unpleasant experiences,

and there were examples from which we should learn. His [a late General of IRGC]

habitual phrase was that 'we should make the Supreme Leader powerful'. He is the

son of Imam Ali, and he must be robust.

(41)

خلف صالح امام حسین (ع) ، امام خمینی ، هم نتوانست شرایط موجود را تحمل کند و فریاد کشید که ای

علمای اسلام به داد اسلام برسید . وزیر اطلاعات با اشاره به پایه گذاری نهضت اسلامی توسط امام راحل

با درس گرفتن از قیام عاشورا اظهار کرد : امام (ره) این فرهنگ را پایه نهاد و با رهبری خلف صالحش

ادامه یافت و اگر امروز می بینیم دشمنان جرأت توطئه و اقدام عملی علیه نظام جمهوری اسلامی ایران را

ندارند به خاطر این فرهنگ حسینی است .

The worthy or righteous son of Imam Hussein, Imam Khomeini, could not stand the circumstances, and he roared for helping Islam. The minister of intelligence pointed to the establishment of the Islamic Renaissance based on lessons he learned from Ashura. Imam [Khomeini] founded this culture, which his righteous successor continued. Moreover, today, if we that the enemy does not dare to conspire and do anything against the political system of the Islamic Republic, it is because of this culture of Imam Hussein.

(42)

رهبر انقلاب اسلامی ، «برخورداری از روحیه و ذهن و عمل انقلابی» را بزرگترین درس امام خواندند و

افزودند : هرگز نباید این درس راهگشا و سعادت بخش را فراموش کرد . ایشان ... افزودند : امام ملت ایران

، میراث فرهنگی نیست بلکه رهبر و امام زنده و حاضر است و با سخن و فکر و آرمان خود ، همچنان این

ملت را هدایت می کند.

The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution regarded possessing Revolutionary spirit, mind, and action as the most prominent lesson Imam taught us. He added that we should never forget this problem-solving and blissful lesson. He added that Imam is not a cultural heritage, but he is an omnipresent and alive Imam, and he is still guiding the nation with his speech, thought, and ideal.

(43)

مصطفی کواکبیان ... گفت : انتخابات ما می تواند درس مردم سالاری و دموکراسی را به بسیاری از کشور

های دنیا یاد بدهد .

Mostafa Kavakebian said that our election could teach the lesson of democracy to many countries in the world.

Last but not most of the minor conceptual elements of this scenario are related to book and dictation as part of being educated. For example, the Islamic Revolution is like a book, and Iranians have inherited it from their (Revolutionary) predecessors. This book safeguards the Iranians and, together with (Ayatollah Khomeini's) 'thought', it strengthens Iranians on their way towards transcendence. It paves the way to having a proud future. At first, he speaks of Islam and emphasizes that Islam has brought ballot boxes, as a symbol of democracy, to Iran, and then it refers to the path and Iran's future destination. It implies that this is an Islamic book like the Holy Quran, which directs Iranians towards the Straight Path of Revolution. This excerpt is an embedded case and interplay of VEHICLE, RELIGION, HUMAN, and EDUCATION scenarios.

The book of the holy political system has golden and luminous pages related to epic events in the history of the Revolution. One of these pages is a presidential election. People wrote this page by the unanimous presence of the ballot boxes. The theme of this page is the nation's victory; i.e., people are the real winners of elections. Events in the 60s (the 80s in Gregorian calendar) in Iran is like a book that changed even the world's history because it revived the history and religious school. He emphasizes that Ayatollah Khomeini's school is the school of all Prophets. It was in this school that terms found their genuine meaning.

(44)

در کشور ما اسلام برای ما صندوق آرا آورد و حاکمیت ملی آورد و جمهوریت آورد و این ها برای ما تقویت فرهنگ اسلام آورد. ... فرهنگ ما هم باید فرهنگ دولت و در چارچوب قانون باشد تا به اهداف اولیه مان در سال 57 برسیم تا کتاب میراث گذشتگان ما را حراست کند و اندیشه ، ما را برای حرکت به سوی تعالی تقویت کند و زمینه را برای آینده ای پر غرور رقم بزند .

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In our country, Islam brought us ballot boxes, national governance, and republicanism; and these things brought us fortification of Islamic culture. … Our culture should also be like Government's culture and in line with the laws so that we can achieve our primary goals in 1979 so that we can safeguard the book of our ancestors' heritage. Moreover, the thought can strengthen us for moving towards transcendence and pave the way for a proud future.

(45)

بار دیگر ملت شریف و بزرگ ایران ... صفحه درخشان و نورانی دیگری از برگ های زرین نظام مقدس جمهوری اسلامی ایران را ورق زدند ...

Once again, the honored and great nation of Iran … turned another brilliant page of golden pages of the sacred political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran …

(46)

این اتفاقات از عظمت امام و انقلاب و جزو برگ هایی از کتاب دهه 60 ... است ؟ ... خیلی ها در مورد حضرت امام (ره) ... می گویند '' تاریخ را اصلاح کرد '' ، بعضی می گویند '' تاریخ را ورق زد و صفحه دیگری از تاریخ را خواند '' ولی من می گویم امام (ره) کتاب تاریخ سیاسی ، اجتماعی ، انسانی ، فرهنگ را عوض کرد . او تاریخ و مکتب انبیا الهی را زنده کرد . در مکتب امام (ره) که همان مکتب انبیا الهی است الفاظ معنی واقعی خود را پیدا کردند .

Are these events due to the glory of Imam [Khomeini], the Revolution, and part of pages of the 80s book? … So many people say that Imam Khomeini 'reformed the history'; some say that 'he turned over the leaves [of history book] and read another page, but I say that Imam [Khomeini] changed the book of political, social and human history and the culture. He revived the history and the school of divine prophets. Imam's School is the same as the school of divine prophets; terms found their genuine meaning.

Dictation connotes negative meaning in national and international issues. MP says they independently decide at the national level because they are not students copying what is dictated. At the international level, it is said that not only does Iran not let other countries dictate their often wrong policies to him, but also dictates his aims to the arrogant. He does not accept others' dictations since they are not the big brothers who do homework and dictation. Iran dictates what it aims. It is standing on the top of the mountain of success; i.e., Iran has the upper hand in international relations and speaks from a position of power. The mountain and dictating on top of it conjure up the classroom stage on which the teacher (Iran) stands and lectures or, in this case, dictates. As we can see, this scenario is connected to HUMAN and NATURE scenarios.

(47)

ما به نظرات خودمان رای می دهیم ، ما دیکته کسی نیستیم شب بیرون جلسه بگذارند ، صبح بله قربان بگوید .
ما اینجا خودمان تصمیم می گیریم .

We [members of parliament] vote to our own opinion; we do not copy what others dictate. [It is not like that] they meet up outside [the parliament] at night; and in the morning, we say 'yes, sir!'. Here, we decide ourselves.

(48)

… اکنون دیگر به نحوی نیست که یک کشور با حق یک یک رای در سازمان ملل متحد بخواهد اقتدارگرایی و یکجانبه گرایی داشته باشد و سیاست های معمولا غلط خود را دیکته کند و در نهایت کشورها دیگر نیازی به برادر بزرگتر ندارند و خودشان تصمیم می گیرند .

… now, that is not how a country with the right to vote in the United Nations wants to have authority and unilateralism and to dictate his usually wrong policies. Moreover,

finally, countries do not need big brothers anymore, and they can decide for themselves.

(49)

<div dir="rtl">

… جمهوری اسلامی ایران به جهت روحیه انقلابی و انتخاب استراتژی های دقیق … در قله موفقیت تغییر و تحولات بین المللی و منطقه ای ایستاده و اهداف خود را بر نظام استکباری دیکته می کند.

</div>

… the Islamic Republic of Iran is standing at the peak of success in global and regional changes and upheavals due to its Revolutionary spirit and selecting accurate strategies. Moreover, it dictates its goals to global arrogance.

9.1.8.2. Scenarios for EDUCATION Metaphors. To conclude the above-mentioned elaborate discussion, the following scenarios related to education have been extracted.

a) MARTYRDOM IS THE MOST OUTSTANDING TEACHING OF THE SCHOOL OF ISLAM.

b) GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ISLAMIC JURIST IS THE MAIN LESSON OF SCHOOL OF SHI'ISM. RESISTANCE IS AN IMPORTANT LESSON OF REVOLUTION SCHOOL.

c) THE TEACHER AT ISLAMIC REVOLUTION SCHOOL IS AN AUTHORITATIVE ONE AND THERE IS A ONE WAY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HIM AND HIS STUDENTS. ALL STUDENTS (PEOPLE AND AUTHORITIES) MUST BEHAVE ACCORDING TO HIS TEACHINGS. YET THERE IS AN ISLAMIC BOND BETWEEN THE CAMPUS MEMBERS.

d) DIFFERENT ERAS OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY SCHOOL ARE LIKE ACADEMIC YEARS AND POLITICIANS ARE CLASSMATES WHO BECOME TEACHERS TO TRAIN THE NEXT GENERATION OF REVOLUTION.

e) EVERY CRUCIAL EVENT LIKE PUBLIC ELECTION IS AN EXAM WHICH IS A DIVINE TEST. AND EVERY TIME PEOPLE PASS IT SUCCESSFULLY, THE ENEMY GETS DISAPPOINTED. 2009 SEDITION WAS AN EXAM IN WHICH THE REFORMIST ELITES FAILED.

f)	TERROROISM, HUMAN RIGHTS, ETC. ARE INTERNATIONAL EXAMS IN WHICH, ACCORDING TO REPORT CARDS, ARROGANT POWERS HAVE FAILED AND IRAN HAS PASSED.

g)	THE BOOK OF HOLY POLITICAL SYSTEM HAS GOLDEN AND LUMINOUS PAGES WHICH ARE RELATED TO EPIC EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF REVOLUTION. ONE OF THESE PAGES IS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

9.1.9. *Source Domain of WAR AND BATTLE*

One of the main features of this source domain is the significant role that dead metaphors play. Dead metaphors have become part of political terminology, increasing the possibility of being overlooked. As explained in chapter 4, metaphors will be studied regardless of this dichotomy. Since they are political terms, their scores are higher than the average scores mentioned in previous scenarios, specifically in the case of T-scores. Another point is the deep-rooted correlation between game and religion domains. The latter is because *Jihad*, as an Islamic concept, is a war in nature. So the parties involved in the metaphorical war are divided based on a religious view of 'right and wrong' or 'angels and demons'; i.e., those supported by God vs. those supported by the devil. The common ground of this domain and GAME source domain is field or arena, i.e., where this encounter occurs. So, the cases will be considered borderline to prove the depth of correlation between scenarios in some aspects. Finally, political affiliation does not play a significant role in this domain; so, the political affiliation of the speaker will not be mentioned in the following discussion.

Table 9.10

Conceptual Elements, Primary Signals and Relevant Statistics of WAR & BATTLE Domain in each Corpus

WAR & BATTLE									
Conceptual Elements	Primary Signals	Parliamentary Debates			ILNA			Tasnim		
		Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD	Fr.	TS	LD
War	War	554			3,430			3,659		
	Soft warfare	20	4.47	10.62	92	9.89	9.94	177	13.43	10.76
	Mental warfare	5	2.23	8.61	33	5.81	8.47	28	5.17	8.19
	Currency war	7	2.62	7.67	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Economic warfare	19	4.24	6.87	35	5.27	7	64	7.44	8.27
	Cultural war	-	-	-	16	3.56	6.57	21	4.10	7.07
	War against God	6	2.42	7.24	-	-	-	-	-	-
	War of volitions	-	-	-	4	2.00	5.25	-	-	-
	Real war	-	-	-	6	2.26	5.52	18	4.11	7.43
Arena	Arena	180			937			882		
	Political arena	8	2.64	8.75	12	3.30	6.36	12	3.34	7.08
	Arena of (taking) **actions**	10	3.44	7.45	33	5.82	8.08	40	6.32	8.85
	Foraying arena	-	-	-	4	2.00	7.29	3	1.73	6.78
	Jihadi arena	-	-	-	10	3.29	8.05	12	3.57	8.48
	Diligent arena	-	-	-	6	2.44	7.45	4	1.98	6.94
	Arena of combat	-	-	-	13	3.47	6.9	18	4.14	7.65
	Conqueror of the arena	-	-	-	28	5.28	9.27	10	3.13	7.86
Trench	Trench	32			85			77		
	Defensive trench	4	2.00	6.48	4	2.21	5.04	4	-	5.15
	Important trench	3	1.73	6.22	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Serving trench	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Counteracting trench	-	-	-	4	1.98	6.08	-	-	-
	Trench of liberty	-	-	-	4	1.99	6.46	-	-	-
	Behind the trench	-	-	-	5	2.21	7.82	-	-	-
	Main trench	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	5.89
	Trench of prayer	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.99	8.32
	Key trench	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	9.82
Front	Front	170			2,326			2,787		
	Front of Revolution	5	2.20	6.32	49	6.49	7.18	87	8.34	7.55
	Truth/Right Front	5	2.61	6.50	28	5.19	7.66	37	5.29	8.31
	Blasphemous Front	3	2.00	10.16	8	2.22	6.77	21	4.57	7.90
Fire	Fire	210			459			489		
	Fire at will	-	-	-	86	9.26	10.45	96	9.78	10.95

9.1.9.1. Conceptual Elements in Context. The scenarios of this source domain are not as detailed as previous ones, and general issues and an overall portrait of war and conflict are described. The first part of the discussion will be devoted to international affairs, and then, an account of national affairs will be presented. However, before discussing the elements of this section, two points need clarification. According to national and international affairs, the first one is related to metaphorical war and its division. Of course, this

categorization is not always clear-cut, just like the real war in which at least two countries get involved, and the war becomes an international issue, comparing how it will affect other countries and, at the same time, a national issue of each of those countries. So it is metaphorical; for instance, soft warfare is both an international issue affecting Iran's relations with other countries and a national issue because Iran is involved in a war and should govern the country according to wartime circumstances. So borderline cases may be discussed in any of the two main categorizations.

The second point is related to religious concepts and, in this case, Jihad. One of the thorniest Islamic concepts is Jihad since it has intrigued many wars. Any concept in any field is open to many interpretations, and it is even more dominant in religious conceptualizations. The etymology and interpretation of Jihad are mainly discussed in section 2.5.2, but it is worth reminding. The basis of discussions about sensitive Islamic concepts and metaphors is how Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei interpret them as Supreme Leaders of Iran. Because they have authoritative power, and their terminology is the basis of any decision and movement in Iran. The complexity of Persian political terminology adds that the Supreme Leader introduces some keywords that are vague and open to different interpretations, though he tries to elaborate on them. So, providing definitions for them is very difficult, if not impossible. Having borne this fact in mind, we will present the analysis of metaphors.

Regarding International affairs, Iran is a war zone because the enemy and the arrogance is against Islam. Iran is an Islamic country, so they impose various sanctions and restrictions on Iran. Iran is also metaphorically in the mine-infected area because of wars in the neighboring countries and yet is safe and secure. It is thanks to people welcoming martyrdom. It is embedded with an element of the house source domain: pillar. These (religious) people willing to get martyred are like pillars protected. Because if they fall, the

whole house (political system) will collapse. It was a borderline case of national and international affairs. In the international war zone, there are two main fronts. Iran, oppressed countries, and the Axis of Resistance are on the Right Front. The other party of this metaphorical war is the Blasphemous Front which consists of those countries against Islam such as arrogance and those that ally with them from time to time, e.g., some European countries and Saudi Arabia.

The Right Front will conquer the Blasphemous Front since God has promised so in Quran, and this will come true by the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei. The arena of this war is the whole world. The enemy has always wanted to penetrate the Right Front of Iran, and one way of accomplishing this goal is the JCPOA. In line with an economic war, infiltration is described as a sword, Iran's shield is resistance, and the sword is a resistive economy. This sword is still dull, and it needs to be sharpened and taken out of the scabbard. So, it still has not fulfilled its true potential. At this international level, diplomacy is also seen as war. For instance, US breaching of JCPOA and Saudis sabotage in the process of implementation of JCPOA are regarded as mines implemented in the way of achieving JCPOA. In a similar vein, members of the Iranian committee in the process of JCPOA are described as combatants in the diplomatic arena who could earn triumph in the war of diplomacy.

The trench is a frequent element in this scenario which functions at both national and international levels. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is considered a trench to defend people's rights and interests in international relations. Iran is like the first trench of countering terrorism, arrogance, and the enemies of Islam. As a part of the Right Front, Iran follows the enemy and defeats them in every aspect, and conquers their key trenches. This portrait reminds us of the concept of Om al-Ghora discussed in section 9.1.8.1 related to the spread of

Islam in the whole world, which is the ultimate purpose of the Islamic Revolution. In this sense, it is similar to the final phase of evolution argued in the EVOLUTION scenario.

(1)

نماینده ولی فقیه در سپاه در ادامه تصریح کرد : مقطع امروز حساس ترین مقطع تاریخ از بعثت تاکنون است و ثمر و نتیجه بعثت ، عاشورا و غدیر به اینکه ما چگونه بتوانیم زمینه تبلور جهانی شدن اسلام را فراهم کنیم بستگی دارد . وی با بیان اینکه امروز ما در تقابلی همه جانبه با جبهه کفر قرار داریم ، گفت : از سویی ، جبهه حق با رهبری ولی فقیه و از سوی دیگر جبهه ای از کفر ، شرک و نفاق قرار داشته و گستره این تقابل کل جغرافیای زمین میباشد .

The representative of the Supreme Leader in IRGC affirmed that the current epoch is the most crucial epoch since the prophetic mission [of the Prophet Muhammad]. Moreover, the result of the prophetic mission, Ashura and Ghadir Khumm[202], depends on how we can provide the background for the globalization of Islam. He said that today, we are all-out opposition to the Blasphemous Front. He added that, on the one hand, there is the Right Front with the leadership of the Guardianship [the Supreme Leader]. On the other hand, the Front includes blasphemy, discord, and polytheism. The scope of this counterposition is the whole planet Earth.

(2)

باید بفهمیم که اسلام مردم را ستون دین می داند نه ستون سیاست ، ما در منطقه مین هستیم و در امنیت کامل به سر می بریم و فرزندان ما به استقبال شهادت رفته اند و باید تمام تلاش این باشد که این ستون را حفظ کنیم .

We should realize that Islam considers people pillars of religion and not politics. We are in the mine-infected area, yet we have absolute security, and our children have welcomed martyrdom, and we should try our best to maintain these pillars.

(3)

... قطعا خداوند یار و یاور جبهه حق و عدالت خواهی و مبارزه با زر و زور و تزویر خواهد بود. همچنین این وعده به ما داده شده بود که نگران کاستی ها نباشید و وقتی صحبت نصرت الهی است آن مقدار توانی که انسان ها به میدان می آورند مهم نیست ، مهم اخلاص و تلاش و جهاد است که خداوند تضمین فرموده که مابقی نیاز را او تامین می کند و نصرت الهی یاور ما خواهد بود و در این صورت هیچ کسی را یارای غلبه بر جبهه حق نخواهد بود .

… Definitely, God will help the Right Front and the front that seeks justice and battles hypocrisy, bullying, and aristocracy. We were also promised not to be worried about shortcomings. When it comes to divine help, people's power in the arena does not matter; what is essential is sincerity, endeavor, and Jihad. Moreover, God has guaranteed that God will provide the rest of what is needed. Moreover, divine help will be with us, and, in this case, no one can conquer the Right Front.

(4)

آنها با شمشیر نفوذ می خواهند مقابل جامعه و نخبگان بایستند و هواداران خود را وارد حاکمیت و نظام حکومتی جمهوری اسلامی ایران کنند . اکنون سپر ایستادگی و مقاومت قوی داریم اما شمشیر ما کند است و شتاب خوبی برای بهبود اقتصاد نداریم . باید شمشیر را از نیام خارج و اقتصاد مقاومتی را به طور جدی ، عملی کرد .

They want to confront the society and the elites with the sword of infiltration and intrude their fans into the Islamic Republic of Iran's governance and political system. Now, we have a strong shield of resistance. However, the sword is dull, and our

acceleration in economic recovery is not that good. The sword must be taken out of the scabbard, and a resistive economy should be followed vigorously.

(5)

همه اینها دستاوردهای برجام است . ... البته آمریکا بدعهدی دارد و صهیونیست ها و سعودی ها کارشکنی می کنند همانطور که مسیر مذاکرات را هجده ماهه از مسیر مین گذاری شده پیش بردیم . مسیر اجرای برجام را هم با همه بدعهدی ها پیش می بریم

All of them are achievements of the JCPOA. … Of course, America is uncommitted, and the Zionists and the Saudis are sabotaging [implementation of the JCPOA]. We advanced in the path of negotiations throughout a mine-infected way. We advance the path of implementing the JCPOA with all disloyalties, too.

(6)

اما رزمندگان عرصه دیپلماسی که پیروزی غرورآمیز خود را مدیون رهنمودهای ارزنده و هدایتگری های پیامبرگونه مقام معظم رهبری ، درایت و تدبیر دولت محترم ... هستند بدانند که نام دکتر ظریف و یارانش با طلا در تاریخ انقلاب اسلامی و کشور عزیزمان به نیکی نوشته خواهد شد و آیندگان به خود خواهند بالید که همان رزمندگان دوران دفاع مقدس با تمام غیرت و مردانگی در عرصه جنگ نابرابر دیپلماسی هم سربلند ... درخشیدند .

However, the combatants in the diplomatic arena owe this victory to the valuable and prophet-like guidelines of the Supreme Leader and the government's prudence …. They should know that the name of Dr. Zarif and his companions will be written in golden ink in Islamic Revolution's history. Moreover, the future generation will brag about those combatants in the Holy Defense shined with all zeal and manliness in the asymmetrical warfare of diplomacy, too.

(7)

وزارت امور خارجه وظیفه خود می داند که بدون لحظه ای درنگ و اتلاف وقت برای برخورد با این حرکات هیجانی و مخرب ، با تمام توان چون سالیان گذشته در سنگر دفاع از منافع کشور و مردم ... به تلاش های حرفه ای و تخصصی خود ادامه دهد .

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers it as its duty to counter such destructive and emotional actions with no hesitation, and it continues to make all its professional efforts in the trench of defending the country's and the nation's interests … just like previous years.

(8)

... ایران سنگر مقابله با دشمنان اسلام است و خون شهدای مدافع حرم همه توطیه ها را خنثی میکند.

… Iran is the trench of countering enemies of Islam, and the blood of martyrs of Holy Shrine Defenders foils all plots.

(9)

... انقلاب مبارک اسلامی در حال فتح سنگر های کلیدی جهان است . انقلاب بزرگ اسلامی ... نه تنها تمرکز راهبردی دشمن بر قلب جهان اسلام را فروپاشانده ، بلکه در حال تعقیب دشمنان در جبهه های وسیع و در ابعاد مختلف این نبرد بین حق و باطل است .

… the Islamic and blessed Revolution conquers all key trenches in the world. The great Islamic Revolution … not only crushed the enemy's strategic focus on the heart of the Muslim World but also chased enemies in this combat between the right and the wrong in wide trenches and every aspect.

The Islamic Revolution itself is described as a war in which the Revolutionists (the Right Front) defeated Shah and Pahlavi dynasty (the Wrong Front). Since Iranian authorities have always emphasized that this Revolution was a cultural event and was not accomplished through military measures, the war is regarded as a metaphor. In this war, 'the blood defeated

the sword'. Ayatollah Khomeini created this metaphor in his announcements and speeches amid the Revolutionary movement. Almost two months later, the Islamic Revolution was achieved. He regarded *Ashura* as an instance of 'the victory for blood against sword' and implied that people should take the same brave action, though they are powerless encountering Shah. Because, as mentioned above, God has promised that the Right Front will always win. So, the source of this metaphor is also a religious event. The use of 'sword' as an ancient war material reminds of 'tent' in the house domain, and the possible reasons have already been discussed extensively in section 9.1.1.1. This ancient source domain was also mentioned in the discussion of international affairs. Moreover, blood as a symbol of martyrdom has been discussed in other domains such as NATURE[203] and VEHICLE[204].

In the metaphorical war between Iran and the enemy, Revolution's borders must be protected from infiltration and deviation of national political currents that no longer abide by Revolutionary ideals. The solution is 'unity': unity in abiding by the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. This unity will also help to encounter regional and global threats. It is where soft warfare and a type of *Jihad* become profoundly intermingled. For Ayatollah Khamenei, the Great Jihad, mentioned in these excerpts, is not a military one, and it means 'diligence in resisting the enemy and not obeying the enemy'[205]. It is different from the two main categorizations of Major vs. Minor Jihad. Major Jihad is the most difficult one, 'strife against self' or the struggle against the self. Minor Jihad means 'strife and diligence in repelling the enemy'. For Ayatollah Khamenei, Great Jihad is a type of Minor Jihad.

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[203] Watering the tree of Revolution with the blood of martyrs.
[204] Martyrs' blood as the motor oil of the car of Revolution.
[205] جهاد کبیر یعنی چه؟ (kowsarblog.ir)

Great Jihad is the same as soft warfare. Various classes of people or occupations are regarded as officers participating in this war. The Supreme Leader is the commandant, and different organs of the government are garrisons. Excerpt (14) is an embedded case since it regards Ayatollah Khamenei as 'the son of Fatimeh'[206]; so, it is related to both FAMILY and RELIGION domains. The following excerpt shows a connection between war, arts, and health domains.

Ayatollah Khamenei believes that regarding national problems, students must propound their views 'like a doctor in order to find the cure'. It may refer to constructive criticism and trying to offer solutions instead of criticizing the government. He also points to international issues and states that the students can position themselves freely against the enemy, though 'diplomacy needs oil paint' and that is up to the others (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and the students must express themselves out loud. 'Oil paint' probably means foreign policies that moderate the severeness of positioning in international affairs. It reminds of 'makeup' and shows things more beautiful than the reality discussed in the HUMAN domain. Then he adds that students, as officers of soft warfare, must fire at will when there is a disruption in any garrisons (governmental organs).

The concept of 'fire at will' became a hot debate for a while. This keyword is one of the most challenging terms in providing a definition. It has been open to many interpretations, from 'giving the green light to the extremists to meddle in the country's administration to 'cultural actions against enemy's influence'. It has been clarified that 'fire at will' does not mean opening fire aimlessly and in any direction. The Supreme Leaders define the path and

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[206] A member of *Ahl al-Bayt* (Prophet Muhammad's family).

roadmap, opening fire according to those guidelines. Who is eligible to do so? Those informed and educated appropriately, such as students and clergymen. They are responsible for cultural garrison and are in the spiritual trench. They must be focused and equipped with discernment to distinguish right from wrong in the flood of (fake) information. So, it is an embedded case of metaphor.

Ayatollah Khamenei's official webpage explains that it is related to soft warfare against Iran, and that is why they are called 'officers', but they are not called either 'soldiers' or 'commandant'. Because soldiers wait for the command and go precisely according to what they have been asked to do; i.e., soldiers cannot decide and do not have willpower. Neither are they commandants since commandants are responsible for determining significant policies. They are young officers present in the scene, and both act according to the commands and see the scene well. They both think and act out based on the framework or policies.

The enemy has imposed cultural warfare and, by the passage of time, its pieces of equipment and facilities of this cultural warfare become more complicated. Since they are in the Blasphemous Front, they use diabolic tools. Since it is a cultural war, people will win this war with the help of 'insight' and 'awareness'. Again, what class of people? Religious and pro-Guardianship people. Another reason for Iran winning this cultural war is the Prophet-like leadership of Supreme Leaders. Again, it is related to the RELIGION domain. Another type of soft warfare is economic warfare, which aims to occupy people's welfare trench and put them under economic pressure to give up on the Islamic Revolution. Soft warfare aims to siege young people's hearts and minds, but people will resist with the help of the Supreme Leader's guidelines.

Another dominant scenario of this source domain devoted to national affairs is 'trench'. The intriguing point relating this scenario to the HOUSE scenario is that various organs of government are regarded as trenches in which authorities are serving people, just like various rooms of the house of government (or Revolution). Since the political system is religious and sacred, trenches or organs are also sacred. The most frequent and emphasized serving trench is the parliament, just like the HOUSE scenario, in which MPs represent the nation and fight for their rights. However, the point is that not all MPs are serving. In other words, there is infiltration in this trench, so the rest must protect the trench from them, too. Those infiltrated MPs are entrenching behind the Guardianship and betray Revolutionary ideals in the name of Guardianship (the Supreme Leader). Another instance of such fellow soldiers serving the enemy's purposes is the 2009 seditionists.

Trenches are also like classrooms of the EDUCATION domain: The founders of Revolution are fellow soldiers just like classmates in the education domain. For instance, Hashemi was Ayatollah Khamenei's fellow soldier and stayed in the serving trench until the end of his life. *Basij* is another trench to protect from the enemy's attack and defend Revolution's achievements. Since there are various trenches serving various purposes, *Basij* is also present to fulfill its duties in coordination with other fellow soldiers. Since some politicians have always criticized the presence of *Basij* in every governmental organ, the chairman of *Basij* justifies it by highlighting that the Revolution is a blessed Front and what matters is to fulfill the duty in every trench. That is to say, the crusader (jihadist) is not supposed to stay in the same trench the whole time and should go from one trench to another and should protect the Revolution from different aspects.

Other places described as trenches are universities (the trench of science and liberty) and mosques (the trench of culture). For Ayatollah Khamenei, in the imposed soft warfare,

the enemy attacks spiritual trenches, which are faith and volition. Consequently, those affected by the enemy's soft warfare will show the country's forte-like flaw in their propaganda. This soft warfare is even more dangerous than military war. So, the role of trenches such as universities and mosques becomes more critical in these situations. In this respect, university students, journalists, and writers become the officers of soft warfare, and they should counteract such attacks.

Last but not the most minor crucial national issue is the presidential election which is the shared target domain between GAME and WAR source domains. A famous clergyman suggests that people should vote for someone who believes in cultural warfare dominating social media and is the combatant of this war. They should not vote for someone who does not see this as a war and, instead, considers it as a cultural interaction. In line with the importance of elections and its reflection in metaphors, authorities invite all people to come to the arena of election and 'punch in the enemy's mouth' as explained in the HUMAN scenario.

The blurriness of the border of GAME and WAR domains deeply blended with the RELIGION domain in the case of election is manifested in Alamolhoda's quotation in the best possible way. Comparing Iran's political currents with those in the era of Prophet Muhammad, he considers the presidential election as the arena of war and competition. In the era of Prophet Muhammad, there were two currents: one based on religion and Quran and the opposing one seeking power. For him, the same was true during that election. The political current supporting Rouhani equaled to those seeking power and, as mentioned before, it is forbidden in an Islamic political system. He concludes that if this group runs for the presidency, the election will go beyond competition and become like a war. Because the origin of such an encounter is 'right vs. wrong' or 'angels vs. demons'.

(10)

... انقلاب اسلامی پیروزی خون بر سلاح ... بود و در حقیقت پیروزی اعتقاد بود ، گفت : دنیای کفر ...
طالبان و القاعده و در نهایت داعش را ایجاد کرد ... و همان تکبیرهایی که برای کشتن امام حسین (ع) در
روز عاشورا سر می دادند ... امروز نیز این جریان دست ساز انگلیس و استکبار گروهک هایی که بینش
درست جهانی ندارند ... را ایجاد کردند .

… the triumph of the Islamic Revolution was the victory for blood against weapons…
and it was the victory of belief. He said that the blasphemous world … created
Taliban, al-Qaeda, and ISIS … those who said 'Allah is great' when they were killing
Imam Hussein in the event of Ashura; today, this movement created by England and
the arrogance has also led to the creation of groups that do not have a sound
worldview.

(11)

خوشبختانه در خط اقتدای به سیدالشهدا (علیه السلام) از روزی که امام بزرگوار ما فرمودند ماه محرم ،
ماه پیروزی خون بر شمشیر است ، انقلاب مقدس اسلامی ما در تداوم خط عاشورا تا آنجا رفته که دشمن را
عصبانی ، مصیبت زده و مستاصل کرده است .

Fortunately, in line with imitating Imam Hussein, ever since the day that the great
Imam [Khomeini] said Muharram is the month of the victory for blood against sword,
our holy Islamic Revolution has continued the line of Ashura to the point where it has
made the enemy angry, afflicted, and desperate.

(12)

مقام معظم رهبری مدت هاست در بیانات خود گفتمان جبهه انقلاب اسلامی را به عنوان راهبرد در مقابله با
آفات و چالش های نظام اسلامی مطرح می نمایند ... . نمایندگان عزیز ! دوقطبی ... حقیقی ، دوقطبی جبهه
انقلاب و جبهه ضدانقلاب است و سایر گفتمان ها و سلایق سیاسی باید در ذیل این دوقطبی انقلابی و

ضدانقلابی خود را تعریف کنند ... . وحدت حول محور ولایت ، ... در میان همه سلایق سیاسی تعریف شده

ذیل جبهه انقلاب که بر حفظ آرمان های انقلاب اسلامی اعتقاد دارند ، امری ضروری و اجتناب ناپذیر است

It has been a long time that the Supreme Leader has propounded the discourse of the Islamic Revolution Front as a strategy for countering the Islamic political system's challenges and pests …. Dear members of parliament! The true … bipolarity is the bipolarity of the Revolutionary Front and anti-Revolutionary Front. The rest of political discourses and preferences should define themselves under these two fronts …. Unity in the axis of Guardianship … is indispensable for all political preferences defined under the name of the Revolutionary Front that believes it is preserving the Islamic Revolution's ideals.

(13)

در این شرایط جهانی با وجود بحران های منطقه ای ، در حالی که برخی از کشورها بر طبل تفرقه می کوبند ، بنده از ضرورت مراجعه به منشور برادری امام خمینی سخن می گویم ، تا با ایجاد وفاق درونی جبهه انقلاب توان مقابله با تهدیدهای منطقه ای و جهانی را داشته باشد.

In the current global circumstance with regional crises, while some countries hit the drum of discord; I pronounce the necessity of referring to Imam Khomeini's charter of brotherhood so that the Revolutionary Front can gain the ability to counter regional and global threats by the creation of internal concord [in the Revolutionary Front].

(14)

وارد محل سخنرانی که می شوی خیل عظیم افسران جنگ نرم با شعارهای '' ای پسر فاطمه ، منتظر تو هستیم '' ، '' این همه لشکر آمده به عشق رهبر آمده '' منتظر ورود فرمانده شان هستند ؛ ... که نایب امام وارد حسینیه امام می شوند و پس از استقرارشان در جایگاه ، دلها و شعارها آرام می گیرد.

When you enter the location where the speech [of Ayatollah Khamenei] will be addressed, the large crowd of officers of soft warfare is waiting. They chant, 'Oh, the son of Fatimeh! We are waiting for you, and ' this whole division[207] has come for the love of the Leader'. … and the successor of Imam [Mahadi] enters and takes a seat, and hearts and chants become tranquil.

(15)

امام امت در ادامه به دانشجویان توصیه می کنند در نوع برخورد با مشکلات درونی کشور باید " طبیبانه و علاج جویانه " مسایل را مطرح کنند اما در مقابل با دشمنان در موضع گیری آزادند گرچه در دیپلماسی " رنگ و روغن " نیاز دارد که کار آن با دیگران است اما دانشجویان باید حرفشان را با صدای بلند در برابر دشمنان بزنند . رهبر ... می گویند : " در جنگ هم اگر اخلال در قرارگاه مرکزی پیش بیاید نیروها آتش به اختیار می شوند ؛ ... وقتی این جوری دستگاه های مرکزی اختلال دارند ، آن وقت اینجا شما آتش به اختیارید "

The Imam of the nation advises the students to confront national issues and express them like a physician to find a cure. However, confronting enemies can position freely, although diplomacy needs oil paint. It [diplomacy] is someone else's job, but students must express themselves in a loud voice before enemies. The Leader … says that, in a war, if a disruption of garrisons happens, the forces can fire at will. So, when there is disruption of central organs, you can fire at will.

(16)

معنای آتش به اختیار این نیست که بی هدف به هر سو شلیک کنیم . خطوط کلی و راهبردی این آتش به اختیار در احکام نورانی امر به معروف و نهی از منکر رساله رساله امام و رساله مقام معظم رهبری آمده است . ...

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[207] Figuratively speaking, the military division is meant here.

افسران جنگ نرم که عمدتا از دانشجویان و طلاب حوزه علمیه هستند نباید دچار حواس پرتی شوند . ... نقشه راه آنها مشخص است . آنها باید از میان سیلاب اطلاعات و آوار آن سالم بیرون آیند ...

Fire at will does not mean shooting aimlessly. The overall lines and strategies of fire at will are outlined according to illuminated laws of promoting virtue and preventing vice[208] mentioned in Imam's [Khomeini] and the Supreme Leader's treatise. … The officers of soft warfare, who mostly are students and clergymen, should not get distracted … Their roadmap is specified. They should survive the flood and the debris of [fake] information ….

(17)

«گفتیم افسران جوان جنگ نرم ؛ نگفتیم سربازان ، چون سرباز فقط منتظر است ... یعنی سرباز هیچ گونه از خودش تصمیم گیری و اراده ندارد و باید هرچه فرمانده می گوید ، عمل کند . نگفتیم هم فرماندهان طراح قرارگاه ها و یگانهای بزرگ ، چون آنها طراحیهای کلان را می کنند . ... حقیقتا افسران جوان ، فکر هم دارند ، عمل هم دارند ، تو صحنه هم حضور دارند ، اوضاع را هم می بینند ، در چهارچوب هم کار می کنند »

.

We [the Supreme Leader] said young officers of soft warfare; we did not say soldiers because soldiers wait [for commands] …. It means that the soldier does not have any willpower and cannot decide, and he should act on what his commander says. We did not say commander either; because they plot extensive programs. … Verily, young officers think, act, are present in the arena, see the situation, and work within the framework.

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[208] Also called 'enjoining good/ right and forbidding bad/ wrong'.

(18)

<div dir="rtl">

از آنجایی که دشمنان با تمام ابزار و امکانات وارد تهاجم فرهنگی شده اند اما ملت ایران اسلامی پیروز جنگ فرهنگی خواهد بود به شرط آن که به تکلیف خود که همانا بصیرت ، آگاهی و هوشیاری است عمل کنیم.

</div>

Enemies have done cultural invasion with all their tools and facilities, but Iran's nation will be triumphant of cultural war under one condition: If we act according to our duty which is insight and awareness.

(19)

<div dir="rtl">

بعد از هشت سال دفاع مقدس استکبار جهانی ساکت ننشست و علیه کشورمان جنگ نرم یا جنگ فرهنگی را به راه انداخت اما ، هیچ کدام از این روش های استکباری دشمن با رهبری های پیامبرگونه امام (ره) و مقام معظم رهبری به پیروزی نرسید .

</div>

After eight years of Holy Defense, global arrogance did not sit quietly, and he started soft or cultural warfare against our country. However, none of the arrogant methods of the enemy was successful because of Imam's [Khomeini] and the Supreme Leader's prophet-like leadership.

(20)

<div dir="rtl">

آمریکایی ها در جنگ نرم علیه ملت ایران به دنبال تسخیر دل ها و افکار جوانان ایران هستند و مطرح می کنند که '' ما کشوری هستیم که می گوییم آینده چگونه باید باشد '' . پوردستان گفت : دشمن با اعمال تحریم علیه ملت ایران تلاش کرد تا به اقتصاد ایران آسیب بزند ، اما ملت ایران با پیروی از تدابیر رهبر معظم انقلاب در مقابل این تهدیدات ایستادگی کردند .

</div>

The Americans say that they want to conquer young Iranians' hearts and thoughts, and they express that "we are the country that says how the future should be".

Pourdastan said that the enemy tried to harm Iran's economy. However, Iran's nation resisted these threats by following the Supreme Leader's guidelines.

(21)

من در زمانی که برای ثبت نام انتخابات می رفتم به همسرم گفتم ؛ همان طور که از مادرم برای جبهه اجازه می گرفتم . الان هم مجلس را جبهه می دانم . مجلس را سنگر و خانه مردم می دانم . .... .این سنگر را با تمام توان نگه می داریم . نمی گذاریم آنها که ریاکارانه دم از ولایت فقیه می زنند ، پشت ولایت فقیه موضع و سنگر بگیرند .

When I was going to register for candidacy [of the parliamentary election]; I told my wife that just like I asked for my mother's permission when I went to warzone; now I consider the parliament as the front [warzone]. I consider the parliament as the trench and people's house. … We keep this trench with all our powers. We do not let those hypocrites who claim [the love of] Guardianship to position and hide behind the trench of Guardianship.

(22)

یوسف نجفی ... خدای را شاکرم که باز بعد از چند سال توفیق داد تا در سنگر مقدس مجلس حضور داشته باشم .

Yousef Najafi … I thank God that blessed me with being present once again in the holy trench of parliament after a couple of years.

(23)

... سی و هشتمین سالگرد پیروزی انقلاب اسلامی را در حالی پشت سر گذاشتیم که ... یار قدیمی امام و همسنگر رهبری معظم انقلاب آیت الله هاشمی رفسنجانی در میان مان خالی است.

We have passed the thirty-eighth anniversary of the Islamic Revolution's victory while … Imam's [Khomeini] companion and the Supreme Leader's fellow soldier were missed.

(24)

رییس سازمان بسیج مستضعفین ... افزود : لازم است مدافعین گاهی سنگرانشان را عوض کنند قرار نیست یک مجاهد خدا تا ابد در یک سنگر بماند جابه جایی از نظر ما یعنی از سنگری به سنگر دیگر رفتن است . ... یعنی مسیول یک سنگر را برای دفاع به عهده می گیرد اگرچه شاید صورت دفاع امروز عوض شده باشد اما اصل همان اصل دفاع از انقلاب اسلامی که بود هست ؛ امروز سنگر ها عوض شده است و در انقلاب اسلامی مسولیت ها امانت است .

The chairman of Basij … added that defenders must change their trench occasionally. A combatant in the path of God is not supposed to stay in one trench for good. Changing different responsibilities, in our opinion, is going from one trench to another. It means that when one authority takes the responsibility of one trench to defend it, although the appearance of defense may have changed today, the principle is the same: defending the Islamic Revolution. Today, trenches have been changed, and, in Islamic Revolution, responsibilities are the [divine] trusts.

(25)

به تعبیر رهبر انقلاب : «جنگی که وجود دارد ، از جنگ نظامی اگر خطرش بیشتر نباشد ، کمتر نیست ... در جنگ روانی و آنچه که امروز به او جنگ نرم گفته می شود در دنیا ، دشمن به سراغ سنگرهای معنوی می آید که آن ها را منهدم کند ؛ به سراغ ... ارکان اساسی یک نظام و یک کشور ؛ دشمن به سراغ این ها می آید که این ها را منهدم بکند و نقاط قوت را در تبلیغات خود به نقاط ضعف تبدیل کند ؛ فرصت های یک نظام را به تهدید تبدیل کند» .

According to the Supreme Leader, the war that exists, if it is not more dangerous than military war, is not less dangerous …. In mental warfare and soft warfare, the enemy goes for spiritual trenches to destroy them. It goes for … fundamental pillars of a country and political system to destroy them. It does so to turn the strong suit into weak points in its propaganda. It does so to change a country's opportunities into threats.

(26)

دشمنان در حال جنگ تمام عیار فرهنگی با ما هستند که فضای مجازی بخشی از این میدان نبرد است که اخلاق و هویت نظام اسلامی را هدف قرار داده است . کسی باید انتخاب شود که این جنگ را باور داشته و رزمنده این میدان باشد ، زیرا بعضی باور ندارند و می گویند این جنگ نیست و یک تعامل فرهنگی است .

Enemies are in an all-out war against us, and cyberspace is part of this arena [warzone] that the ethics and identity of Islamic political system are targets. Someone must be elected who believes in [the existence] of this war and is the combatant of this arena because some people do not believe it and say that this is not a war and a cultural interaction.

(27)

آیت الله حسین نوری همدانی … افزود : لازم است همه به میدان بیایند ، زن و مردم و پیرو و جوان با حضوری شکوهمند در انتخابات ، در مقابل دشمنان حماسه ای دیگر خلق کنند و مشت محکمی به دهان آنها بزنند.

Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani … added that this is necessary for everyone to come to the arena. Men and women, the young and the elderly, should create another saga before

the enemy with their fabulous presence in the election. They should punch so hardly in the mouth of enemies.

(28)

علم الهدی به وجود دو جریان در جامعه امروز اشاره و خاطرنشان کرد : یک جریان پیغمبر ، جریان انقلابی اسلام که به نظر به نگاه مکتبی دین و قرآن داشتند ... در مقابل این ها هم یک عده قدرت یاب بودند که می گفتند قرآن ... بهانه است ، قدرت اصل است ؛ امروز نیز ما در جامعه گرفتار این دو جریان هستیم ، یک سری جریان های سیاسی قدرت یاب هستند ، آن روزی که وارد میدان جنگ و رقابت قدرت می شوند ، همه هستی انقلاب و اسلام را به حراج می گذارند برای اینکه قدرت خود را به دست بیاورند و رقیب را کنار بزنند.

Alamolhoda pointed out the existence of two mainstreams in society these days. Moreover, he said that the mainstream of the Prophet and Revolutionary mainstream of Islam had a doctrinaire view of religion and Quran …. Contrary to this mainstream, some power detectors said Quran … is an excuse and the principle is the power. Today, we are involved with these two mainstreams, too. Some mainstreams are power detectors, and the day they enter into the arena of war and competition, they auction off all of Islam and the Revolution to gain power and put the competitor away.

9.1.9.2. Scenarios for war and battle Metaphors. To conclude the above-mentioned elaborate discussion, the following scenarios related to WAR AND BATTLE have been extracted.

a) IRAN AND OTHER OPPRESSEF COUNTRIES ARE IN THE RIGHT FRONT WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY GOD. AMERICA AND OTHER ARROGANT COUNTRIES ARE IN THE BLASPHEMOUS FRONT SUPPORTED BY DEVIL.

b)   THE RIGHT FRONT WILL CONQUER THE BLASPHEMOUS FRONT SINCE GOD HAS PROMISED SO IN QURAN.

c)   IRAN IS A SAFE PLACE IN THE MINE-INFECTED AREA BECAUSE OF WARS IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

d)   ECONOMIC WAR IS THE MAIN WAR AGAINST IRAN IN WHICH INFILTERATION IS A SWORD. RESISTENCE IS IRAN'S SHIELD AND RESISTIVE ECONOMY IS HIS SWORD.

e)   MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS A TRENCH TO DEFEND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

f)   IRAN IS THE FIRST TRENCH OF COUNTERING TERRORISM, ARROGANCE AND THE ENEMIES OF ISLAM.

g)   UNIVERSITIES, PARLIAMENT, ETC. ARE TRENCHES OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. AUTHORITIES ARE IN THE SERVING TRENCHES OF GOVERNMENTAL SECTIONS.

9.1.10. Source Domain of RELIGION

One of the most salient features of this scenario is that its elements, whether primary or secondary, are present in all scenarios. It is proof of how metaphorical patterns demonstrate the religio-political ideology of the Islamic Revolution. The overarching feature of this scenario is that both source and target domains are abstract[209] and intangible phenomena. It contrasts the general perception of conceptual metaphor and its function, for metaphors are figurative uses of language helping to understand abstract concepts (target domains) by relating them to concrete phenomena (source domains) based on ontological correspondence.

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[209] The discussion of 'abstract' vs. 'concrete' has been mentioned in section 4.2.2.

However, in this scenario, it is violated. For instance, the enemy (target domain) is described as Satan (source domain). Before beginning to discuss elements, it should be indicated that so many detailed conceptual elements have already been discussed in previous scenarios, and they will not be discussed here. Those elements are Straight Path, Blessed Tree, Imam Hussein, and Ashura.

Table 9.11

Conceptual Elements, Primary Signals and Relevant Statistics of RELIGION *Domain in each Corpus*

RELIGION										
Conceptual Elements	**Primary signals**	**Parliamentary debates**			**ILNA**			**Tasnim**		
		Fr.	**TS**	**LD**	**Fr.**	**TS**	**LD**	**Fr.**	**TS**	**LD**
Heaven	Heaven	44			59			70		
	Heaven and Hell	-	-	-	3	1.73	10.08	5	2.24	10.22
	Fragrance of ~	-	-	-	3	1.73	9.80	-	-	-
	(taking) **people** to Heaven	-	-	-	5	2.23	6.89	6	2.44	7.42
Hell	Hell	13			32			67		
	Hellfire	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.73	7.47
Bounty	Bounty	115			297			244		
	Political system's ~	3	1.68	5.08	11	3.21	5.73	8	2.50	5.5
	Blood's bounty	10	3.16	10.92	42	6.24	10.92	39	6.24	11.13
	Presence's bounty	4	1.98	5.83	8	2.85	5	9	2.73	6.14
	Islam's bounty	-	-	-	6	2.37	5.71	6	2.34	5.28
	Revolution's ~	6	2.43	6.33	32	5.84	6.86	43	6.12	6.78
	Divine bounty	-	-	-	6	2.42	7.35	8	2.82	7.79
	Democracy's ~	-	-	-	3	-	7.58	-	-	-
Blessing	Blessing	226			311			221		
	Divine blessing	6	2.44	9.18	22	4.57	9.25	15	3.86	8.75
	Grateful for ~	-	-	-	22	4.69	10.65	12	3.46	10.16
	~ of Guardianship	5	2.23	8.32	3	1.71	6.71	8	2.99	8.57
	~of security	-	-	-	17	4.03	6.17	6	2.36	5.43
	Great blessing	5	2.20	6.73	14	3.30	8.62	25	4.97	8.11
	Appreciation of ~	-	-	-	14	3.74	9.29	8	2.82	8.80
	~ of independence	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	2.22	8.22
	Ingratitude	-	-	-	15	3.87	10.55	9	3.00	10.31
Duty	Duty	1,632			597			402		
	Divine duty	-	-	-	9	3.28	7.75	10	3.13	8.02
	Sharia duty	10	3.44	7.77	18	4.58	9.8	20	4.58	10.48

	Religious duty	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.72	7.05
	Revolutionary duty	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.88	5.45
Sacrifice	Sacrifice	363			291			107		
	The first sacrifice	-	-	-	3	1.69	6.14	3	-	6.49
	Victim of terrorism	3	2.23	8.43	32	5.72	8.68	16	3.99	8.98
Miracle	Miracle	6			85			87		
	Great miracle	-	-	-	3	1.71	4.85	4	1.97	5.54
	Divine miracle	-	-	-	3	1.72	6.33	5	2.44	7.33
	~ of Revolution	-	-	-	8	2.78	4.73	15	3.38	5.28
	Millennium miracle	-	-	-	5	2.24	11.51	-	-	-
Haram	*Haram*	56			125			122		
	Hahal and *haram*	11	3.32	11.09	36	6.00	12.32	23	4.83	11.80
Test	Test	49			81			78		
	Divine test	5	2.45	9.91	4	-	7.07	-	-	-
Satan	Satan	49			139			157		
	Great Satan	39	6.24	9.83	65	8.05	9.26	98	9.89	10.15
	Major Satan	-	-	-	3	1.73	8.02	4	1.99	8.28
	Party of Satan	-	-	-	3	1.69	4.76	-	-	-
Non-*Mahram*	Non-*Mahram*	18			18			3		

9.1.10.1. Conceptual Elements in Context. The general portrait described in scenarios of this domain is that *Iran is like a Heaven created by Ayatollah Khomeini, and the enemy is like Devil*[210]*, who was expelled from Heaven*, and most related elements have already been revealed in previous scenarios. According to the Quran, the origin of this enmity is that God asked all his angels to prostrate before Adam; but Satan was the only one who did not follow God's order because he was arrogant and considered himself superior to Adam[211]. That is also why 'arrogance' is a critical concept in Iran's political discourse. Supreme Leaders have always emphasized the pivotal role of the anti-arrogant ideology of the Islamic Revolution. Just like Satan did not accept Adam's existence and superiority, it is with enemy and arrogance that did not accept Islamic Revolution and its superiority or power.

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[210] The general terms of Satan and Devil will be used interchangeably throughout the discussion, and Islamic equivalents such as Iblis, Shaitan, and Jin are not mentioned here. Because it is out of the scope of this study. On the other hand, discourse analysis of elements did not indicate the necessity of making such a distinction.
[211] Iblis - Wikipedia

In Quran, it is mentioned that Satan requested an opportunity to prove God wrong and make human generations disobey God. Moreover, God accepted it, and those who follow Satan and become arrogant and ungrateful of God's graces will go to Hell ever since. The enemy will try to mislead everyone and encourage them to disobey Islamic Revolution's rules and ideals until the political system is alive or exists. So, any country (on an international scale) and any Iranian (on a national scale) who follows the enemy becomes the political system's enemy and is doomed to Hell.

The Great Satan is the United States behind Iran's other enemies, like little devils. This metaphor originates in Ayatollah Khomeini's political discourse. So the United States must not be neglected; since neglecting it is like neglecting Devil. As it has already been mentioned, the headman of this global village is also Great Satan. Both Great Satan and Major Satan are instances of terminological metaphors[212]. The enemy is also like Yazid, who was the enemy of Imam Hussein. They both have become members of the party of Satan. The party of Satan is the counterpoint of the party of Allah. The origin of this metaphor is Quran 58:19, which states that "Satan has overcome them and made them forget the remembrance of Allah. Those are the party of Satan. Unquestionably, the party of Satan – they will be the losers."[213] Their feature is that they have forgotten about God, and Satan has overarched them.

(1)

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[212] More instances of terminological metaphors are provided in Annex II.
[213] The Quranic Arabic Corpus - Translation

از اول انقلاب پشت سر ضد انقلاب آمریکایی ها بودند ، پشت سر جنگ تحمیلی آمریکا بود . ... باید خیلی مواظبت کرد ، جایگزینی دشمنی شیطان بزرگ آمریکا با جایگزینی شیطانک های کوچکی که به حساب نمی آیند در برابر انقلاب اسلامی یک انحراف بسیار استراتژیکی است ...

From the beginning of the Revolution, Americans were behind anti-Revolutionary [movements]. Behind the imposed war [Iran-Iraq war], there was America. … We should be careful. The replacement of America's, the Great Satan, the enmity of Islamic Revolution with little devils that are overlooked is a strategic deviation. …

(2)

ملت بزرگ و شجاع ایران با شناخت تاریخی از آمریکا او را همواره شیطان بزرگ و مورد نفرت خود قرار داده و دخالت ها و جنایاتش را از سال 1320 تاکنون که با حیله های جدید در پسابرجام خود نمایی داشته رصد می کنند و هرگز او را فراموش نمی کنند چون غفلت از آمریکا غفلت از شیطان است .

Iran's terrific and brave nation has always considered America as Great Satan due to historical knowledge of America, and they hate it. Moreover, they observe its interventions and felonies from 1941 until now manifest in the post-JCPOA era. They never forget it [the US]; neglecting the US is neglecting Satan.

(3)

حضرت اباعبدالله الحسین (علیه السلام) می فرماید : ‹‹مثل منی با همچو یزید بیعت نخواهد کرد این فرمایش سرور آزادگان برای همیشه تاریخ است و مصداق یزیدیان زمان همان شیطان بزرگ ، استکبار جهانی ، ... و دیگر کشورهایی است که خوی سلطه گری دارند.

Imam Hussein says that "someone like me will not pledge allegiance to Yazid". It is the quotation from the lord of free people [that lasts] forever in history. Moreover, examples of contemporary Yazidis are the Great Satan, global arrogance, … and countries with a hegemonic temperament.

(4)

ریيسی با اشاره به مشخصات افراد و گروه ها در قرآن گفت : قرآن دو جبهه را معرفی می کند ؛ حزب الله و حزب شیطان . ویژگی حزب شیطان این است که خدا را فراموش کردند و شیطان بر آن ها مسلط شده است .

> Raisi pointed to characteristics of people and groups mentioned in the Quran. He said that Quran introduces two fronts; the party of Allah and the party of Satan. The characteristics of the party of Satan are that they forgot God, and Satan has overarched them.

Excerpt (5) is filled with metaphors, and March 30-31, 1979, is described as a test and the Straight Path that the righteous passed. They made lines to vote for the Islamic Revolution to enter the Heaven of Iran quickly. Those who said 'no' to the Revolution had to stay out of Heaven in the purgatory. It reminds us of the HOUSE scenario in which those who participate in elections can enter the castle of Revolution. It brings us to the next point about Iran's political system. Since Islamic Revolution is a religious-political system and God or Prophets indirectly appoint all authorities, their duties are based on Sharia, and their responsibility is sacred and is entrusted to them by God. So, authorities' responsibilities equal the concept of 'trusteeship'.

Trusteeship in Quran is interpreted vastly and differently. The one relevant to Iran's political context and discourse analysis, as mentioned earlier, is based on Allameh Tabatabaei's interpretation, also shared with Sufism. For him, the (divine) Trust is 'perfection' in terms of acting upon the righteousness so that God would purify that person and become his guardian. So the Trust is a divine guardianship entrusted to the perfect person because God has purified him, and no one but God can intervene to change it. According to Sufism, it is related to the concept of the mirror, which states that the heart of a perfect man is like a mirror that reflects God's light. So he has the guardianship of other creatures on behalf

of God. The more he can protect the divine Trust, the more perfect he becomes in his guardianship; since he is God's trustee.

The divine duty in Iran, at the international level, is to counter arrogance until the emergence of Imam Mahdi. At the national level, running for candidacy, having political activities, participating in public elections, and voting for someone are considered Sharia duties. Any economic activity is also considered a divine duty because it is like participating in *jihad*, which defends Iran from economic warfare imposed by the enemy. Fidelity to the Revolution's ideals and maintaining national unity are other divine duties. An influential clergyman points to the 'national reconciliation' plan related to vindicating 2009-unrests leaders and Reformists supporting it. He argues that it is the Sharia duty of Revolutionary authorities to prevent people from seeking asylum in blasphemous countries. Those who take refuge in other countries go to Hell, and the authorities should avoid it by the plan of 'national reconciliation.

For Rouhani, what makes Iran's political system different from the Western one is that candidates do not compete for power; but they come together to do their divine duties in the presence of God. Rouhani also emphasizes that elections conducted in Iran are based on people's opinions originating in Islamic teachings (during Imam Ali's government) and not in the post-Renaissance Western world. Iran's elections must not be like the United States since Iran is Islamic territory. Another religious element regarding the election and its significance is argued in excerpt (11). People's presence matters because the election is like a socio-political operation (like the war against the enemy), and each ballot is like a blood droplet of martyr that affects the stabilization of the political system. Furthermore, Ayatollah Khomeini and Khamenei lead the country like prophets, and obeying them is like obeying prophets.

(5)

دوازده فروردین ، آزمون بود ، صراطی بود که صالحان از آن گذشتند ؛ در صف های ممتد ایستادند و رای دادند ، به آسانی از آن عبور کردند و به بهشت جمهوری اسلامی قدم نهادند اما گروهی که اهل این راه و پوینده این صراط نبودند از آن بهشت دور ماندند و در وادی نه به حسرت نشستند .

March 30-31 was a test, and the righteous passed the Straight Path. They stood in lines and voted for Islamic Revolution. They traversed it quickly and put a step into the Heaven of the Islamic Republic. However, those not advocating this path and not exploring the [straight] path stayed out of Heaven in the purgatory.

(6)

فرمانده کل سپاه شعار و محور اصلی انقلاب اسلامی را مقابله با نظام سلطه و استکبار جهانی دانست و متذکر شد : تاکنون این تکلیف الهی نصیب انقلاب اسلامی شده و با درایت مقام معظم رهبری تا ظهور امام عصر (عج) ادامه پیدا می کند .

Commander in chief of IRGC considered countering arrogance and hegemony as the main slogan and axis of the Islamic Revolution. He reminded that, so far, this divine duty has been given to Islamic Revolution, and it will continue until the emergence of Imam Mahdi by the Supreme Leader's wisdom.

(7)

گرم کردن عرصه انتخابات و مهیا ساختن مشارکت حداکثری مردم در پای صندوق های آرا ، هم وظیفه ملی و هم تکلیف شرعی تمامی شهروندان است .

Heating the election and providing conditions required for maximum participation in the election is both national and divine duty of all citizens.

(8)

انتخابات در جامعه اسلامی را دوگانه پیروزی و شکست نمی یابم ... انتخابات در غرب بر مبنای منفعت محوری است و جناح ها و گروه ها ... می خواهند به قدرت دست یابند ، در حالی که در اسلام و انقلاب اسلامی ما برای انجام تکلیف الهی دور هم جمع می شویم تا وظیفه مان را در پیشگاه خدا و بندگان خدا انجام دهیم

I do not find elections in the Islamic community as a dichotomy between victory and failure …. In the West, elections are benefit-oriented, and parties and groups … want to gain power. While in Islam and our Islamic Revolution, we come together to do divine duty in the presence of God and His servants.

(9)

ممانعت از خروج مومنان از انقلاب وظیفه شرعی ماست ... ما باید مراقب باشیم حتی یک نفر هم از انقلاب و نظام قهر نکند یا ناراضی ، منزوی و خانه نشین نشده و به کشورهای کفر پناهنده نشود ... . به بیان دیگر ممانعت از جهنمی شدن حتی یک فرد مومن ، وظیفه شرعی همه ماست ...

Preventing believers' exit from the Revolution is our Sharia duty. … we should be careful that not even one person sulks or becomes unsatisfied with the political system. [We should be careful that not even one person] becomes a recluse and seeks asylum in blasphemous countries …. In other words, preventing even one person from going to Hell is our Shria duty …

(10)

رییس جمهور ... گفت : مبنای ولایت و حکومت از دیدگاه علی (ع) نیز انتخاب و نظر مردم بود . روحانی افزود : انتخاباتی که ما امروز در کشور انجام می دهیم ... پیروی از تفکر غرب نیست و به دنبال رای مردم به عنوان هدیه دنیای غرب پس از رنسانس نیستیم ، بلکه ما دارای مذهب ، مرام و دینی هستیم که امیرالمومنین علی (ع) مبنای حکومت را در آن ، نظر ، خواست و آرا مردم می داند .

The president … said that, for Imam Ali, the basis of governance was people's choice and opinion, too. Rouhani added that the type of election we have today in the country … is not following Western thought, and we do not seek people's vote as a gift from the post-Renaissance West. However, we have the religion that Imam Ali considers people's wants and vote as the basis of its governance.

(11)

... «شرکت و حضور در انتخابات برای مردم ، هم یک فریضه سیاسی است ، هم یک فریضه دینی ... این مهم ترین مساله در باب انتخابات است ، یعنی حضور مردم . » بنابراین نفس حضور به عنوان یک وظیفه و تکلیف دینی و انقلابی و ملی ، موضوعیت دارد . چه آن که به منزله یک عملیات سیاسی اجتماعی تلقی می شود و هر برگ رای ، به سان قطره خون شهیدی ، چه بسا در تثبیت نظام و تقویت آبرو و عزت کشور و میهن اسلامی مان ایران اثر خواهد داشت.

… "participation and presence in the election is both a political and a religious duty … this is the most important issue regarding the election which means people's presence". So, the presence per se matters as a religious, national, and Revolutionary duty. Because it is like a socio-political operation, each ballot is like a blood droplet of martyr that affects the stabilization of the political system and fortification of our Islamic country's glory and reputation.

(12)

رییس جمهور تصریح کرد : نباید اجازه دهیم که انتخابات پیش رو در کشورمان ، همانند انتخابات آمریکا باشد ، چرا که اینجا سرزمین ، اسلام ، پیامبر (ص) و امیرالمومنین (ع) است .

The president affirmed that we should not allow the upcoming election in our country to be like America's elections because it is the land of Islam, the Prophet [Muhammad], and Imam Ali.

(13)

رویکرد اول با پیروی کامل و بی کم کاست از معماران بزرگ انقلاب حضرت امام خمینی رحمه الله علیه و

حضرت امام خامنه ای حفظه الله که پیروی از پیامبر عظیم الشان اسلام و ایمه معصومین سلام الله علیهم

اجمعین است ، پیشرفت توام در مسیر تعالی دنیوی و اخروی مردم و کشور را ... تعقیب می کند

The first approach pursues development in the path of ascendence of people and the
country in this life and life hereafter with the total and complete pursuit of Imam
Khamenei and Imam Khomeini, grand architectures of the Revolution, and following
them is like following the Prophet Muhammad and Imams.

Iran is blessed with many graces. Any positive concept is described as a blessing. For
example, people themselves and their resistance and the country's security are described as
graces granted to Iran thanks to the implementation of Islam in the country. Other blessings
are being Iranian and Muslim and having Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. People are
blessings, and authorities are blessed. Any responsibility in this political system is a blessing.
Authorities must be grateful for this blessing granted and show this gratefulness by serving
people. So, serving people is the symbol of appreciating this blessing, and misusing their
power symbolizes ingratitude. Given unity as a blessing, a case of ingratitude is 'discord' and
'bipolarism' (of Reformist vs. Conservative). While independence is a blessing, compromise
with the enemy is ingratitude for that grace—both political affiliations consent to these
issues. The only difference is that Reformists trying to give more importance to JCPOA
consider it a blessing. Above all, the most vital blessing is the Islamic Revolution itself, and,
just like any other blessings, it must be preserved (to show gratefulness).

An influential clergyman regards Ayatollah Khamenei as a blessing that must be
appreciated. He reminds us that the Revolution is a blessing that must be appreciated; if not,
God will take it away from people. He goes one step further and warns that God keeps his

promises, and if people do not appreciate the Revolution and do not endure preserving it, God will keep His word and will not make an exception. Consequently, the blessing of the Revolution will be taken from (ungrateful) people, and others will replace those people. The inference is that the Revolution will be preserved, but the people will be gone. Before advancing the discussion, it is worth mentioning that the basis of this argument is Quran 8:53 and how it is interpreted. It says that "Because Allah will never change the grace which He hath bestowed on a people until they change what is in their (own) souls: and verily Allah is He Who heareth and knoweth (all things)"[214]. A university professor interprets this verse so that ingratitude for the blessing of Revolution will have one of the two consequences: loss of the blessing or replacement of that blessing with a plague. So, God does not take the blessing of Revolution away from them; He keeps His promise. However, they themselves, due to ingratitude, change it into a plague that destroys them.

Nevertheless, that clergyman interprets it so that ungrateful people will be replaced by those who deserve Revolution and appreciate it. The paradox lies in the claim that they both are blessings. The inference would be that people are not blessings or less important than the other (the Revolution). Both cases prove the hypothesis of discrimination against ordinary people in terms of their beliefs. In other words, it shows discrimination between those religious people who believe in the Guardianship of Supreme Leader and those religious or non-religious people who do not believe in this religio-political ideology.

The Guardianship is a great blessing, and people get the opportunity of appreciating it by participating in public elections. Another influential clergyman elaborates how the

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[214] Surah Al-Anfal - 53-75 | Quran.com

blessing of Guardianship works and underlines its importance in the election. He argues that the legitimacy of Iran's political system is gained through the blessing of the Supreme Leader's Guardianship. This concept of Guardianship is above people's vote. The elected president by people's vote is not legitimate unless proved by the Supreme Leader. When the Supreme Leader approves of someone, obeying his orders becomes Sharia obligatory. If he does not approve of the one elected by the people, no one can follow that person. If they do so, it is like they follow evil.

(14)

کشور ما از نعمت بزرگی همچون مردم برخوردار است خدا امام را به ما داد و شهیدانی که در راه حق شهید شدند باید قدر نعمت ولایت را دانست .

Our country is blessed with extraordinary grace, such as people. God gave us Imam [Khomeini] and martyrs that got martyred in the path of rightfulness. The blessing of Guardianship should be appreciated.

(15)

حسن تامینی لیچایی ... خدا را شاکریم به جهت همه نعمت هایی که به ما داد نعمت ایرانی بودن ، نعمت مسلمان بودن ، نعمت داشتن ولایت ، نعمت داشتن مجلسی قانونگذار و مومن و برادران بسیار خوبی مثل شماها .

Hassan Tamini Lichayi … we thank God for all blessings He gave us [such as] the blessing of being Iranian, Muslim, having Guardianship, the blessing of parliament, and good brothers [MPs] such as you.

(16)

علوی اختلاف را مایه هلاکت دانست و افزود : در شرایطی که آمریکا ، رژیم صهیونیستی و دشمنان منطقه ای به دنبال تخریب ایران هستند باید وحدت داشت چرا که ملت متحد ، شکست ناپذیر می شود . وی شکر نعمت مسیولیت در حکومت اسلامی را خدمتگزاری به مردم دانست....

Alavi regarded discord as a bane and added that the unity must be preserved in the circumstance where America, the Zionist regime, and regional enemies seek to destroy Iran. Because the united nation becomes undefeatable, he also acknowledged that appreciating the blessing of [having a] responsibility in an Islamic government is [actually] serving people ….

(17)

قدرت و توانایی مدیریت و احراز مناصب مدیریتی یک نعمت است ... این نعمت را چه جور مصرف میکنیم ؟ اگر در جهت خدمت به مردم و هدایت جامعه به آن سمتی که مطلوب دین خدا است این مدیریت به کار رفت ، خب این شکر نعمت است ؛ اگر چنانچه در این جهت به کار نرفت ، معطل ماند یا عکسش به کار رفت ، این کفر نعمت است . گاهی این کفران نعمتها ، به حدی است که قابل جبران هم نیست

The power and ability of management and qualification for managerial positions is a blessing … How do we use this blessing? If this management serves people and guides society in a direction desired by God's religion, then this is gratitude. It is ingratitude if it is not used in this way and left unused or used in the opposite direction. Sometimes, the ingratitude is not compensable.

(18)

آیت الله العظمی نوری همدانی با اشاره به نقش تعیین کننده ولی امر در ایجاد انسجام و وحدت کلمه در جامعه افزود : در نظام ولایی شکل گیری دو قطبی و دوگانگی بی معنی بوده و مصداق کفران نعمت است.

Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani pointed to the decisive role of Guardianship in creating unity and coherence in the society. He added that bipolarity and dichotomy formation are meaningless in a Guardianship-centered system and are an instance of ingratitude.

(19)

میراث خواران جنگ آنها هستند که دست اندرکار تیوریزه کردن سازش با دشمن هستند و نعمت استقلال را کفران می کنند و جامعه را به ذلت وابستگی سوق می دهند .

Those having a hand in theorizing compromise with the enemy are ungrateful for the blessing of independence, driving society towards abjectness and dependency. These people are destroying the heritage of the [Iran-Iraq] war.

(20)

خداوند با هیچ کس عقد اخوت نخوانده و اگر نعمات الهی را ناسپاس کنیم ، یقینا آن نعمت را از مردم گرفته و قومی دیگر را جایگزین می کند ، لذا امروز باید تمام همت ما حفظ انقلاب از تمام مخاطرات باشد .

God is no one's brother[215], and if we are ungrateful for divine blessings, the given blessing will be taken away from people, and another tribe will replace them. So, today, we should try our best to preserve the Revolution from all risks.

(21)

به کجا می رویم و با این نعمت بزرگ انقلاب چه می کنیم ؟ ! فیض و رحمت خدا بیکران و عمومی و همگانی است ولی به تناسب شایستگیها و لیاقتها به مردم می رسد ، ... هنگامی این مواهب وسیله ای برای ... ظلم و بیدادگری و تبعیض و ناسپاسی ... گردد ، در این هنگام نعمتها را می گیرد و یا آن را تبدیل به بلا و مصیبت می کند.

Where are we going, and what are we doing with this great blessing of the Revolution? God's mercy is infinite, and it is available for everyone. However, what people receive is proportional to their qualifications and merits. … when these blessings become a means for tyranny, discrimination, and ingratitude; then, He takes the blessings or changes them into a plague.

(22)

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[215] It means that He does not have a family relationship with anyone; so, He will not compromise his rules because of a unique love bond with someone.

... تنها در صورتی که ولی فقیه فردی را منصوب کند ، اطاعتش واجب می شود ؛ لذا امام (ره) فرمود :

اگر فردی به اتفاق آرا انتخاب شود ولی از سوی ولی فقیه نصب نشود ، اطاعت از او اطاعت از طاغوت است

. .... با بیان اینکه باید قدر نعمت ولی فقیه را بدانیم که مشروعیت بخش نظام اسلامی است ...

… obeying someone becomes obligatory only when the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist appoints that person. Therefore, Imam [Khomeini] said that if someone is elected unanimously, but the Guardianship does not appoint him, then obeying him is [like] obeying taghut. … He stated that we should appreciate the blessing of Guardianship that legitimizes the Islamic system …

The next element closely collocating with blessing is bounty. The typical structure is 'something's bounty', which is very common, and it means 'thanks to something'. It is a dead metaphor. Bounty refers to the results and achievements of blessings; so, every blessing results in other things which will be discussed. Here again, every positive phenomenon is regarded as a bounty and blessing. The political system itself is like a blessing and, thanks to this, Iran is a safe country. Another closely related bounty is Imam Hussein and his teachings that have led to defeating arrogance and hence, Iran's safety. The most frequent collocation with the bounty is with 'blood'. It refers to the significance of martyrdom which has been extensively discussed. So, it is another reason behind Iran's safety; i.e., Iran is a safe and secure country thanks to martyrdom.

(24)

نیک می دانید امروز کشور عزیزمان ایران به برکت نظام مقدس جمهوری اسلامی از امن ترین کشورهای

منطقه می باشد .

You know it well that today, Iran, our esteemed country, is one the safest countries in the region, and it is the bounty of the sacred political system of the Islamic Republic.

(25)

هشت سال همه دنیا در برابر ما ایستادند و ما به عشق حسین به عشق شهادت یک وجب از میهن مان را از دست ندادیم و در نتیجه پیروزی ما در هشت سال دفاع مقدس بر همه دنیای استکبار به برکت حسین مان بود .

اگر ما (36) سال امن ترین نقطه دنیا هستیم به برکت حسین است ،

The whole world stood up to us for eight years, and we did not lose an inch of our homeland due to the love of Imam Hussein and martyrdom. So, our victory against arrogance in eight years of Holy Defense was Imam Hussein's bounty. If we have been the safest place in the world for 36 years, it is Imam Hussein's bounty.

Other Islamic concepts used in this domain are *mahram* and non-*mahram*. In Islam, close family members (father and brother), uncle, father-in-law, grandfather, nephews are *mahram*. It means that a woman does not need to wear *a hijab* in her relations with them and cannot marry these people. However, a cousin, brother-in-law, and any stranger (not a family member) are regarded non-*mahram*, and a woman should wear *hijab* in front of them and, under some conditions, she can get married to them. The general implication of these terms is that any stranger or outsider is like non-*mahram* and any family member and insider is like *a mahram*. The probable source of this religious metaphor is Ayatollah Khomeini's famous quote demanding that "do not let the Revolution be in the hands of non-*mahrams*". It

implies that the Revolution is like a woman who is the honor[216] of all Iranians and should protect her.

This concept revived once again after JCPOA and the rumors that the Iranian committee had some more secret agreements with P5+1, and they are hiding something from everyone. Conservatives insisted on this concept and argued that the committee considered Iranians and the nation non-*mahrams*, while America and Israel were *mahrams*. Nevertheless, this figurative use of language was not the only case. Another MP argues that people are not non-*mahram*, and there must be transparency between people and the government to supervise the government. All in all, it refers to transparency and the necessity of avoiding having secrets among family members (insiders).

(26)

آقای ظریف ! اشتباه و خطا بود که می گفتید همه چیز محرمانه است . ملت را ، نخبگان را و نمایندگان مجلس را نامحرم فرض کردید و آمریکا ، انگلیس و نتانیاهو را محرم .

Zarif! It was wrong when you said that everything is confidential. You assumed the nation, MPs, and the elites as non-*mahram*. [While you considered] America, England, and Netanyahu as *mahram*.

(27)

مردمی که می خواهند بر خود حکومت کنند باید نامحرم محسوب نگردیده و به تمامی اطلاعات لازم و جاری کشور مجهز باشند تا اگر غفلتی از سوی مسیولین در مقابله با فساد رخ داد خود به میدان بیایند ،

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[216] The concept of honor and its status in Iranian popular culture has been discussed in the FAMILY domain.

People who want to govern themselves should not be considered as non-*mahram*. They should have access to all necessary and current information; so that if any authority neglects to counter corruption, they [people] can come to the arena[217].

Divine test is another element that refers to the decisive situation and fork-on-the-road decision. In general, God tests people to see if they make the right choice. For instance, participating in the election is like a divine test, and people should pass it and make the discouraged enemy even more discouraged. The minister of Intelligence considers serving people a blessing emphasizing that it must be appreciated by serving more. He adds that responsibility (governmental position) and financial facilities are like divine tests, and they must be seen as a means to serve. That is how God tests authorities.

(28)

وزیراطلاعات ... خاطرنشان کرد : نگاه به مسیولیت و امکانات مادی ، امتحانی الهی است و باید به این مسایل به عنوان ابزار خدمت رسانی نگریسته شود و خدمت به مردم نعمتی از سوی خداوند متعال است و شکر این نعمت باید با خدمت رسانی بیشتر همراه باشد .

The minister of Intelligence … asserted that responsibility and materialistic facilities are viewed as a divine exam, and they must be seen as tools for serving [people]. Serving people is a blessing from God, and gratitude for this blessing should be accompanied by more services.

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[217] It means 'to take action'.

Another religious element relates to the miracle and how vital issues are regarded miracles. JCPOA is considered Golden Calf explained in excerpt (14) in section 9.1.1, which is like an idol created by the enemy, great Satan, to counter the Right Front of Iran and deviate people's beliefs in monotheism and Islamic Revolution. Prophet Moses' solution was to set it on fire, and now, the solution is to counteract breaches from JCPOA and set it on fire. A member of a Conservative fraction states that JCPOA should not be viewed as a miracle; since Reformists appreciated JCPOA so much as if it was like a miracle. The most common miracle-based metaphor is related to the 'resurrection of the dead. Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei are considered Jesus Christ who has called the dead person back to life. The dead person in Iran and Iranians. So, the Islamic Revolution, per se, is a miracle.

In the following excerpt, heavily blended with vehicle scenario, the element of miracle is also added to underline the miraculous capabilities of the Islamic Revolution. It says that Iran has already passed the security, defense, and politics stations. Moreover, it will pass the station of economics too and will solve economic problems with the 'staff of Revolution'. It refers to Moses' staff which turned into a serpent (Exodus 7:10; Quran 20:69). So all economic problems will be solved miraculously.

(29)

... چرا برجام را معجزه اله میداند و بعد از آن اینگونه طرف مقابل برجام وا زیر سوال می برد . ... دولت نیز نباید برجام را معجزه بداند.

Why do they consider the JCPOA as God's miracle? And then the opposite side questions the JCPOA like this. … the government should not regard the JCPOA as a miracle, either.

(30)

یادآوری می کنم ... و سایه جنگ را اقتدار ملی ما و دم مسیحایی رهبر و مقتدای ما حضرت آیت الله العظمی امام خامنه ای (مدظله العالی) (حضار صلوات فرستادند) از کشور برداشته است . موفقیت برجام هم به برکت این اقتدار بوده است....

I remind you that … the shadow of war is driven away due to our national authority and the Supreme Leader's Jesus-like breath[218]. The success of the JCPOA was also the bounty of this authority ….

(31)

امام خمینی (ره) 38 سال پیش با انقلاب خود که متکی بر اندیشه های الهی و با حمایت و همراهی مردم آن را به پیروزی رساند ، روحی پرامید در درون ملت ایران دمید و ملت ایران را سربلند کرد و رژیم ستمشاهی و سلسله های طولانی حکومت پادشاهان بر این سرزمین را که دست نشانده های استکبار و وابستگان به غرب و شرق بودند ، پایان بخشید ...

Thirty-eight years ago, Imam Khomeini ensouled the nation with hope by the Revolution that depended on divine thoughts and people's help. He made the Iranians proud. Furthermore, he ended the Pahlavi dynasty and other dynasties that were puppet states of arrogance and the East and the West …

(32)

آیت الله یزدی ادامه داد : هیچ کس نباید تصور کند که انقلاب را ایجاد کرده بلکه انقلاب معجزه بزرگ تاریخی بوده و به مدد امام عزیز و پیوستن اقشار به ایشان توانستند ... انقلاب را پیروز کنند.

Ayatollah Yazdi continued that no one should suppose he had created the Revolution. Nevertheless, the Revolution has been the grand historical miracle that dear Imam [Khomeini] could triumph with the help of [all social] classes.

(33)

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[218] It refers to the resurrection of the dead by Jesus Christ.

ما ایستگاه امنیت و دفاع و سیاست را پشت سر گذاشته ایم و در حال گذر از ایستگاه اقتصاد هستیم . رضایی

... گفت : باید به انقلابی گری و ارزش های انقلاب برگردیم . بدون این ارزشها نمیتوانیم از ایستگاه اقتصاد

عبور کنیم . ... دولتی های ما باید انقلابی باشند تا بتوانیم مشکلات را با عصای معجزه کننده انقلاب مرتفع

کنیم .

> We have already passed the stations of security, defense, and politics. Now, we are passing the station of economics. Rezaei … said we should go back to Revolutionary values and be a revolutionist. Without these values, we cannot pass the economic stop. … Our government must be Revolutionary to solve problems with a miraculous staff of Revolution.

As a religious concept, the element of sacrifice has also been discussed in this scenario. The origin of sacrifice goes back to the parable of Prophet Ibrahim, who wanted to sacrifice his son to follow God's command and to abandon attachment to the material world so that they could be enlightened with Godly wisdom. Now, there is a tradition during *Hajj* (pilgrimage) based on that historical event. In Iranian culture, besides that religious events, they sacrifice lamb before important and warmly welcomed guests. The excerpt (34) conjures up this cultural and religious festival by saying that Iranians' glory was used to be sacrificed before foreigners and arrogance before the Revolution. Regarding national affairs, power as a negative concept in Iranian political discourse is described as an idol before which Rouhani's supporters are ready to sacrifice Revolutionary, moral, and religious ideas (Exc. 50 in section 9.1.4.1).

(34)

وحیددستجردی به ترور ، ارعاب ، شکنجه و چپاول اموال عمومی زمان قبل از انقلاب اشاره کرد :

... در واقع همه آنچه عزت مردم ما بود در پای بیگانگان و استکبار جهانی قربانی می شد . ... .

Vahid Dastjerdi pointed out terror, horror, torture, and misuse of public assets [in Iran] before the Revolution. He added that … in fact, people's glory was sacrificed before global arrogance and foreigners ….

The dichotomy of *halal* vs. *haram* is also mentioned in this scenario. The former is something permissible by Sharia, and the latter is forbidden according to Sharia. One of the leading causes of this element is the halal vs. haram vote which has already been discussed. Another instance of this element is blended with HOUSE domain which states that 'you cannot reach the *halal* roof of bliss through *haram* stairs'. It refers to the presidential election during which the president would sacrifice any values to stay in the presidency. So, poisoning the election atmosphere is like *haram* stairs used to win the election and reach the *halal* rooftop of bliss.

(35)

از پلکان حرام نمی شود به بام سعادت حلال رسید . متاسفانه عده ای همه ارزش ها حتی نظام را هم فدای پیروزی در انتخابات می کنند به قدری فضا را مسموم کرده اند که ما انتقاد منطقی و سازنده هم به دولت نمی توانیم انجام دهیم

You cannot reach the *halal* roof of bliss through *haram* stairs. Unfortunately, some sacrifice all values of even the political system for winning the election. They have poisoned the election atmosphere so much that we cannot have reasonable and constructive criticism of the government.

This scenario also indicates embedded cases of metaphorical patterns that can be discussed better now; since all scenarios have already been presented. A Conservative

combines RELIGION domain with HOUSE domain while he is scorning JCPOA. He argues that fans of JCPOA presented it as a holy shrine and did not let anyone criticize it, i.e., as if it was a holy phenomenon and there cannot be any negative point about it. For him, JCPOA was like a house that Iran paid the price by reducing its nuclear activities, but the landlord, the great Satan, does not hand in the house. Now, Iran has to file a complaint in the police station of Ban Ki-Moon, i.e., UN. The common ground of both scenarios is the specification of the place (holy shrine) and the assumption that the landlord is great Satan.

(36)

... از برجام امامزاده ای درست کرده ایم که هیچ کس از چون و چرای آن سوال نکند ، جناب عراقچی می گوید قضیه برجام مثل این است که خانه ای خریده ایم ، سند هم به نام شما خورده ولی صاحب خانه آن را فعلا تحویل نمی دهد ... آن روز که کارشناسان دلسوز گفتند راه سواستفاده شیطان بزرگ را در برجام ببندید ، آنها تندرو و مخالف دولت خطاب گردیدند ، اما امروز خود ناچار شدید که از بدعهدی و راهزنی مستکبرانه آمریکا به پاسگاه جناب بان کی مون شکایت برید امروز هر کس هر چه می خواهد بگوید ، ولی آینده روشن خواهد کرد که چه کسانی منافع ملی و نقشه شیطان بزرگ را درست تشخیص داده بودند

We have turned the JCPOA into a holy shrine that no one [is permitted] to ask about it. Mr. Araghchi says that the JCPOA is like a house that we have bought, and we have the house deed, but the landlord does not give the house … The day concerned experts said, "block the path of great Satan's misuse in the JCPOA" you addressed them as extremists and the government's opponents. However, today, you had to file a complaint in the police station of Ban Ki-Moon due to America's disloyalty and robbery. Today, no matter who says what, the future will clear up who had correctly recognized national interests and the great Satan's plot.

9.1.10.2. Scenarios for RELIGION Metaphors. To conclude the above-mentioned elaborate discussion, the following scenarios related to WAR AND BATTLE have been extracted.

a)   IRNIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC referendum is a test and STRAIGHT PATH that the righteous passed it. THOSE WHO SAID 'YES' COULD EASILY ENTER THE HEAVEN OF IRAN. THOSE WHO SAID 'NO' TO THE REVOLUTION HAD TO STAY OUT OF THE HEAVEN IN THE PURGATORY.

b)   THE UNITED STATES IS THE GREAT SATAN.

c)   THE ENEMY WILL TRY TO MISLEAD EVERYONE AND WILL ENCOURAGE THEM TO DISOBEY ISLAMIC REVOLUTION'S RULES AND IDEALS UNTIL POLITICAL SYSTEM IS ALIVE. ANY COUNTRY OR ANY IRANIAN WHO FOLLOWS THE ENEMY ACTUALLY BECOMES THE ENEMY OF POLITICAL SYSTEM AND IS DOOMED TO HELL.

d)   AUTHORITIES' RESPONSIBILITIES ARE SACRED AND ENTRUSTED TO THEM BY GOD. THEY HAVE DIVINE DUTY.

e)   IN IRAN'S PUBLIC ELECTIONS, CANDIDATES COMPETE FOR DIVINE DUTY. AND EACH BALLOT IS BLOOD DROPLET OF MARTYRS.

f)   RESISTANCE, SECURITY, AND GUARDIANSHIP ARE SOME OF BLESSINGS GIVEN TO PEOPLE.

g)   PEOPLE APPRECIATE BLESSINGS BY PARTICIPATING IN PUBLIC ELECTIONS.

h)   INGRATITUDE FOR THE BLESSING OF REVOLUTION WILL DRIVE IT AWAY AND IT WILL BE REPLACED BY PLAGUE WHICH DESTROYS THE COUNTRY.

i)   AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI CALLED THE DEAD BODY OF IRAN BACK TO LIFE BY THE VICTORY OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION.

9.2. Terminological Phrasemes

In this section, at first, an elaborate discussion of terminological phrasemes related to specified super concepts is addressed. Moreover, at the end of each subsection, concluding remarks are mentioned under the title of 'Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots' to point out the shared conceptual mappings that connect metaphor to terminology. The aforementioned section demonstrates how metaphors frame terms and share conceptual mappings of ontological relations, which is why metaphorical studies deserve more attention in translation studies and political studies. Based on the method explained in section 8.2, a list of fifteen super concepts was compiled to be explored in both English and Persian. The terminological phrasemes around those concepts were essential to finding semantic relations among them and hence, conceptual mappings behind the terminology. So the frequency of each terminological phraseme and its score was extracted and compared.

Each table is devoted to terminological phrasemes of one single super concept in the following. They are not recorded in a hierarchical order of score or frequency. Another critical point is that in this stage, the categorization of the findings based on criteria such as part of speech of the given super concept is avoided to restrain distancing from our primary concern, i.e., semantic and conceptual networks and not syntax. For instance, all collocations with 'culture' are recorded without considering if the words are 'modifiers of' or 'nouns modified by', related to the lemma of culture (a separation made by Word Sketch feature). Furthermore, the English equivalents, especially those terms specific to the Islamic-Iranian political context, are mostly literal to make the terminological phrasemes perceptible for non-Iranian readers.

In the following, each super concept is presented in a separate table depicting its terminological phrasemes in three corpora:

- Parliamentary debates

- ILNA, which is a pro-Reformist news agency

- Tasnim, which is a pro-Conservative news agency

On the one hand, these three corpora represent two different political contexts: a) parliament and b) political news. Moreover, on the other hand, they stand for three types of political affiliations: a) Conservative (Tasnim), b) Reformist (ILNA), and a combination of both plus non-affiliated (the parliament). Words in the parentheses indicate that they are optional, i.e., they might be omitted in one or two corpora. Bold words in more than two-word units mean that the score and frequency mentioned in the row are related to the correlation between them and the given concept. Some collocations are shared among some tables (other than those explained to seem repetitive in the English version). It is intentional to prove that regardless of the super concept as a starting point of searching for collocation, the results (frequency & score) will be the same.

The final point regarding the following discussions of each super concept is that from now on, 'terminological phraseme' will be replaced by 'term' and 'terminology'. As pointed out in the 'Terminology of Thesis', this is done for the sake of brevity. Another point is that terminological phrasemes mentioned in the tables of each subsection are put in double quotation marks and those collocations, which are essential and need to be highlighted, are in single quotation marks. The super concepts are italicized in the case of emphasis.

9.2.1. Justice/ edalat (عدالت)

This subsection is devoted to 'justice' and its terminological phrasems[219]. Justice is among the minor challenging super concepts in this study regarding unambiguity and standardization of its terminology. Almost all terms have either well-established English equivalents or cognitively undemanding literal translations. More details will be discussed following the below tables.

Table 9.12.1

The Frequency of 'Justice' in each Corpus

Parliamentary debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
871	1,360	788	3,019

Table 9.12.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Justice' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in each Corpus

		Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
	Terminological Phrasemes	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency
1	عدالت جنسیتی Gender justice	9.91	19	10.38	47	8.66	7
2	عدالت آموزشی Educational equity	9.56	25	8.98	21	9.17	13
3	عدالت اجتماعی Social justice	9.55	92	9.21	83	9.84	68
4	عدالت محور	8.69	11	8.52	20	6.98	9

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[219] Referred to as 'terms' or 'terminology' in the following discussions.

	Justice-oriented						
5	عدالت محوری Justice orientation	8.82	9	8.73	15	8.68	8
6	عدالت سرزمینی Territorial justice	8.58	8	0	0	0	0
7	شعار عدالت Justice slogan	7.48	4	6.64	6	7.31	6
8	عدالت منطقه‌ای Regional equity	7.09	4	0	0	0	0
9	اصل عدالت Principle of justice	6.62	9	0	0	0	0
10	عدالت فرهنگی Cultural justice	5.89	5	0	0	0	0
11	عدالت اقتصادی Economic justice	5.12	5	4.52	5	5.23	5
12	عدالت در سلامت Health justice	4.79	5	4.92	6	6.19	7
13	عدالت مالیاتی Tax justice	4.74	4	0	0	0	0
14	عدالت قضایی Judicial justice	4.5	4	6.05	7	0	0
15	عدالت توزیعی Distributive justice	0	0	7.56	6	0	0
16	معیار عدالت Maxim of justice	0	0	5.18	5	0	0
17	دیده بان شفافیت و عدالت Transparency & Justice Watch	0	0	6.81	17	6.9	9
18	عدالت طلبان Seekers of justice/justice seekers	0	0	6.99	14	7.87	14
19	عدالت خواهان Justice advocates	0	0	4.11	10	0	0
20	ارزش عدالت Value/ merit of justice	0	0	4.31	5	0	0
21	عدالت در توزیع Distributive justice	6.83	17	0	0	7.6	14
22	عدالت اسلامی Islamic justice	3.07	9	0	0	4.16	10
23	عدالت سیاسی Political justice	0	0	2.37	7	0	0
24	عدالت عرفی Customary justice	0	0	0	0	7.89	4
25	عدالت رسانه ای Media justice	0	0	0	0	7.86	6

26	گفتمان عدالت Discourse of justice	0	0	0	0	8.12	9
27	عدالت جهانی Global justice	0	0	0	0	4.14	4
28	جنبش جهانی عدالت Global justice movement	0	0	0	0	5.26	4
29	عدالت سوسیالیستی Socialist justice	0	0	0	0	-[220]	1
30	**شاخص** های عدالت اجتماعی Social justice index	0	0	6.96	5	0	0

9.2.1.1. Terms in Detail. Before discussing terms and variables of political context and affiliation and their effect, a brief account of translational aspects such as English equivalents offered for Persian terms in Table 9.13 is necessary. Number 15 is the same as number 21 in the English version, but it is different in Persian. The English "distributive justice" has been translated as "justice in distribution," and that is why it has been retrieved separately for one corpus (ILNA) in Sketch Engine. It may be due to a lack of standardization in terminology in Persian or the lack of domain-specific knowledge of the author. Number 29 is also an example of a translational mistake in borrowing "social justice" from English, and it is the author's fault. However, since a translational approach to terminology is adopted, it is worth mentioning.

Number 4 and 5 are of the same root, and the difference is that number 4 is used as an adjective, and number 5 is a noun. It is not common in English, but it is prevalent in Persian. So, although the terms do not exist in English, the word-for-word equivalent is perceptible enough. Number 18 and 19 are synonyms. Furthermore, the number 18 can be expressed in

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[220] Since the frequency is one, the LogDice cannot be calculated.

two ways in English. That is to say, they are not regarded as separate terms, so we cannot conclude that one Persian term has two English equivalents.

Almost all terms have well-established English equivalents since they are mainly borrowed from other languages, especially English. Even in any case of a lexical gap, the word-for-word translation into English seems easy to understand without causing ambiguity or miscommunication. The only tricky Persian term is "Islamic justice," which is ambiguous. The term seems to be a near-synonym for "social justice" but with added attributes. It also refers to the general concept of 'justice'. So, instead of justice, it is said "Islamic justice". It means 'full-blown justice just like the one done in Iran, which gives the nation the right for being anti-arrogance'. It is in line with Iran's ideology to spread Islam and export the Revolution to the rest of the world by being a role model of a just (Islamic) community. "Islamic justice" was one of the ultimate goals of the founding Islamic Revolution. The rest of the terms are accessible because they do not need an extralinguistic explanation. As the LogDice score shows, it is not a strong term.

Regarding the role of the political context in the strength of terms, it is noticed that parliament shows less diversity in using terms. Nevertheless, there are five terms specific to parliament, and most of them have a high score which shows that they are strong terms. They are: a) "territorial justice", b) "principle of justice", c) "cultural justice", d) "tax justice", and e) "regional justice". While it can be argued that (a) and (d) are specific to the parliament because they are related to national legislation, and (b) is used in argumentation in debates as a warranty, it is interesting that (c) is mentioned in neither of news agencies.

Considering those shared among the three corpora, we cannot conclude the role of political context. Because in very few cases, the variance of LogDice score is significant, and even in these cases, the score is once close to one news agency, and the other time, it is very

close to another. So, the terminology of justice does not show sensitivity to political context. However, political affiliation plays a role, and each news agency has specific terminology. Tasnim had six terms, and ILNA had four. Tasnim-specific terms are related to different types of justice, while ILNA-specific terms are concerned with the concept of justice per se.

Among terms shared among all three corpora, the variance of score attributed to "gender justice" is meaningful in the sense that in pro-Reformist ILNA, it has the highest score (10.38), and in the pro-Conservative Tasnim, it has the lowest score (8.66). This can be explained by the fact that some gender issues are taboo based on religious background, and Tasnim is a Conservative news agency. Figure 9.1 shows the scores of each term in each corpus.

Figure 9.1

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Justice' in each Corpus

9.2.1.2. Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. The super concept of *justice* is among the most undemanding concepts for English-speaking translators. Terminographical definition was provided for "Islamic justice", the only ambiguous term. All three main phraseme templates are present in the terminology of this super concept.

HAVE-FEATURE_LOCATION_WORLD-PART (related to EVENT + RELATION + OBJECT): "global justice" and "territorial justice" refer to justice being done in a particular geography.

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "seekers of justice" refers to those who take actions to do justice.

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "Islamic justice" and "social justice" refer to a type of justice with specific features that affects the quality of people's lives.

No direct connection to any specific metaphorical patterns has been made. However, based on ontological combinations of EVENT and OBJECT and ATTRIBUTE, terminological phrasemes can be relevant to a couple of scenarios discussed in section 9.1. For instance, in the heavenly house of Iran, there are full-blown justice thanks to Islamic Revolution, and it must be like a lesson for another country living in the same global village to do the same. This justice results from the Islamic Revolution and Iran's anti-arrogance paradigm. Islamic Revolution was like a solution (remedy) for the country's problems (ailments). So, justice is just one of the goals or achievements of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Moreover, Iran recommends (even prescribes) it to other nations.

Jihad is among the most challenging super concepts of this study, and that is why it has already been elaborated in section 2.5.2. In this section, both Jihad (noun) and Jihadi (adjective) will be studied to extract the relevant terminology. Following the below tables, a discussion of terminological phrasemes (terms) will be addressed.

Table 9.13.1

The Frequency of 'Jihadi' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
85	356	472	913

Table 9.13.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Jihadi' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in each Corpus

		Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
	Terminological Phrasemes	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency
1	روحیه جهادی Jihadi spirit	11.8	11	10.41	27	10.9	53
2	رویکرد جهادی Jihadi approach	8.76	3	0	0	5.24	4
3	حرکت جهادی Jihadi movement	8.2	3	7.92	18	8.49	23
4	مدیریت جهادی Jihadi management	7.55	13	10.6	118	10.87	102
5	اقدام جهادی Jihadi action	5.72	4	5.1	7	6.25	9
6	عمل جهادی Jihadi labour	5.6	3	4.72	3	0	0
7	کار جهادی Jihadi work	3.78	3	5.47	16	4.65	23
8	هسته جهادی Jihadi nucleus	0	0	8.1	3	0	0

9	همت جهادی Jihadi endeavor	0	0	8.08	5	8.67	8
10	تفکر جهادی Jihadi thinking	0	0	6.96	3	8.64	11
11	فرهنگ جهادی Jihadi culture	0	0	4.7	6	5.48	8
12	نیروهای جهادی Jihadi forces	0	0	3.05	4	0	0
13	دیپلماسی جهادی Jihadi diplomacy	0	0	0	0	7.29	4
14	اردوهای جهادی Jihadi expeditions	0	0	10.14	11	10.8	24
15	نگاه جهادی Jihadi view/perspective	0	0	0	0	6	4
16	تلاش جهادی Jihadi effort	0	0	0	0	5.86	6
17	گروه های جهادی Jihadi groups	9.53	4	7.58	20	8.33	38
18	طرحهای دفاعی، امنیتی و جهادی Defensive, **Security** & Jihadi plans	6.16	3	0	0	0	0

Table 9.13.3

The Frequency of 'Jihad' in each Corpus

Parliamentary debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
1,321	616	617	2,554

Table 9.13.4

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Jihad' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in each

Corpus

		Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim

494

	Terminological Phrasemes	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency
19	جهاد فرهنگی Cultural jihad	3.97	7	5.71	5	4.27	6
20	روح جهاد Spirit of jihad	0	0	8.22	7	5.54	4
21	حکم جهاد Decree of Jihad	0	0	7.19	7	5.34	5
22	فرهنگ جهاد Jihadi culture	5.81	10	6.83	7	7.79	10
23	جهاد کبیر Great jihad/ Great Endeavor	0	0	9.53	14	9.92	18
24	جهاد فی سبیل الله striving in the path/ cause of God	0	0	9	8	9.06	8
25	جهاد اکبر Major jihad	0	0	8.24	7	9.33	15
26	جهاد علمی Scientific jihad	0	0	8.19	15	8.23	15
27	جهاد اصغر Minor jihad	0	0	7.88	4	0	0
28	جهاد مسلحانه Armed jihad	0	0	7.87	4	8.22	5
29	جهاد فکری Intellectual jihad	0	0	7.2	4	0	0
30	جهاد با نفس Strife against self	0	0	5.83	4	0	0
31	جهاد مقدس Sacred jihad/ Holy war	0	0	4.14	4	6.52	6
32	جهاد اقتصادی Economic jihad	0	0	0	0	5.74	4

9.2.2.1. Terms in Detail. As mentioned in section 2.5.2, Jihad (Jihadism) is a complex concept and has a specific function in Iran's political system. Jihad is among the most challenging concepts of the current study, and so is its terminology. The great majority of the terms are absent in English or have different semantic prosodies and interpretations. Terms related to this concept are exposed to various interpretations and have multi-faceted functions which may have negative, positive, or even neutral semantic prosody. So in each case of collocation, the positivity, negativity, or neutrality will be pinpointed.

The highest score is related to 'jihadi spirit'. The significantly highest score is for parliamentary debates (11.8), and Tasnim and ILNA come in the following places (10.9 and 10.41, respectively). The point is that it has positive semantic prosody: A feature of especially authorities that would help them overcome any difficulties or obstacles. It is based on the two aspects of Jihad: a) endeavor and b) resistance. The variance of scores between the parliament and the news agencies is significant. So, political context plays a role. However, political affiliation does not matter.

"Jihadi movement" is related to national affairs and is a very generic term that includes any action or movement in the path of God to help people; that is to say, it has positive semantic prosody. "Jihadi management" is supposed to be the characteristic of authorities and managers in the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The highest score is related to Tasnim (10.87) and then to ILNA (10.6) and the parliament (7.55). The score of this collocation in the parliament is significantly low, which means that political context is essential regarding this term. Nevertheless, political affiliation does not matter.

Numbers 6 and 7 are synonyms, but they are recorded separately, and the average score will be discussed in detail. Moreover, number 5 is their near-synonym. "Jihadi labor" and its synonyms can be applied to any work done for "resistive economy," and it has positive semantic prosody. In the political discourse of Ayatollah Khamenei, they also highly collocate with 'revolutionary action'. For Ayatollah Khamenei, they all are defined as being diligent when working/ serving for the Revolution's ideals and only focusing on the purpose without paying attention to obstacles and peripheral issues.

"Jihadi nucleus" is a part of "cultural jihad" with positive semantic prosody. It is the name of a self-organized section in the Ministry of Justice that serves cultural aims such as cultural evolution in the Ministry of Justice with the cooperation of the clerks and their

families. Numbers 9 and 16 are also near-synonyms, and the same approach is applied to them. They intensify the value of being diligent and restless when working in the Islamic political system.

"Jihadi thinking", "jihadi view", and "jihadi culture" are parts of "cultural jihad" and "intellectual jihad," which are defensive measures countering enemies' "soft warfare". "Jihadi thinking" is related to the doctrine of 'jihad,' indicating the importance of striving and fighting for ideals not just confronting enemies but also, for instance, corrupted Iranian authorities. So, it connotes positive meaning. In this case, the political context plays a role, and the political affiliation matters: it is stronger in pro-Conservative Tasnim news agency. "Jihadi view" is a strategy related to "jihadi management". It has positive semantic prosody: Authorities must have jihadi viewpoints. Culture plays a significant role in the Islamic Revolution in Iran[221], and most concepts collocate with culture. While "cultural jihad" is a type of Jihad, signifying "striving, endeavoring in the path of culture,"; the other collocation, "Jihadi culture" is a type of culture, signifying "a culture or even doctrine of the value of jihad and foregrounding jihad". "Intellectual jihad" also has positive semantic prosody and two senses: a) in the sense of efforts made by intellectuals and academics for codification and implementation of civil rights, b) in the sense of intellectual battle against the enemy's "soft warfare"[222].

"Jihadi diplomacy" is related to foreign affairs and is a type of diplomacy combined with "jihad". It is an endeavor accompanied by "jihadi management" and "jihadi endeavor" the 'battle' sense of this Jihad refers to the talks between the right and the wrong or the good

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[221] It was a cultural revolution.
[222] In this sense, it is based on the Supreme Leader's guidelines.

and the evil. So, it denies win-win talks with the evil and believes that the evil should not 'win' anything[223]. In this type of diplomacy, instead of "enemy infiltration" in win-win negotiations, the influence of the Islamic Revolution must be transmitted to other parties of negotiation. So, the result of "jihadi diplomacy" is Iran's influence and hence, the spread of the Islamic Revolution. "Jihadi expedition" is related to "jihadi groups" in the sense of 'going to the unprivileged parts of Iran and helping their people'. So it has positive semantic prosody.

"Jihadi group" has two meanings: a) a synonym for 'resistance groups'[224] and b) the name of (cultural and non-military) groups of students in different fields who go to the unprivileged parts of Iran to help their people[225]; both with positive semantic prosody. So, based on the frequency division, this collocation is mainly used to describe and report national jihadi groups trying to develop unprivileged areas of Iran (with positive semantic prosody). Studying the KWIC of this collocation in the corpus of parliament demonstrated that the main concern of the MPs was avoiding the confusion of 'jihadi groups' with 'terroristic groups' on both national and international scales.

"Spirit of jihad" means the essence of Jihad, and it is absent in parliament corpus. It is also sensitive to political affiliation since the variance of the LogDice score is significant. "Great jihad", "major jihad", and "strife against self" are synonyms, and they are an antonym of "minor jihad". Based on the results of OneClick Terms (Sketch Engine), it must be said that the English version of Tasnim news agency suggests "Great Endeavor". It must be to

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[223] آذربایجان غربی (basirat.ir)

[224] Whose aim is to resist or fight against the infiltration or intervention of foreign countries in their national affairs.

[225] In so many fields, from medicine to construction and even environmental issues such as planting trees.

avoid potential confusion and misunderstanding on the part of the English-speaking reader of the text. It also highlights that aspect of Jihad related to 'endeavor'. There are two types of Jihad in terms of inner vs. outer enemy of oneself: a) "great/major jihad" is the most difficult and important one because it is a battle between the person and his/her ego ("strife against self"), b) "minor jihad" which is the battle between one person and the other(s) whom he/she considers as his/her enemy. So the sense (a) carries positive semantic prosody, and the sense (b) can be neutral. The variance of score in the case of "major jihad" is significant and can be stated that it is a stronger collocation in Tasnim and ILNA prefers "great jihad" in comparison with "major jihad".

"Scientific jihad" is used with positive semantic prosody and is related to scientific efforts and accomplishments made by academics. It is in line with "intellectual jihad". The variance of scores is not significant. "Armed jihad" with scores of 8.22 and 7.87 respectively in Tasnim and ILNA is used with positive semantic prosody and in the sense of 'war'. The thought-provoking point is that, in the case of pro-Reformist ILNA, it is just applied to Palestinian groups trying to liberate the Gaza strip; while in the case of Tasnim, other than this sense, it is used to describe revolutionary forces in Iran which tried to get armed against then monarchy. It must be reminded here that Jihad in the sense of war or any military action also has a positive meaning in the Islamic political terminology of Iran. It is because it is a defensive measure in line with Resistance.

"Striving in the path of God" is the prototype of Jihad: When someone says Jihad, the first collocation that comes to mind is this one. It is self-explanatory regarding semantic prosody, i.e., it has positive semantic prosody. It is almost equally strong in both corpora; i.e., political affiliation does not affect term strength.

"Sacred jihad," internationally known as "holy war," is significantly a stronger collocation in Tasnim (6.52) than in ILNA (4.14). It is a thorny term. The points of similarity between ILNA and Tasnim are positive semantic prosody and the overall sense of 'warfare'. The different senses will be pinpointed concerning the usage in the two news agencies. In Tasnim, it refers to four topics: 1) a strategy of "resistive economy" in "economic warfare"[226], 2) related to Palestinian resistance forces, 3) warfare against the arrogance, and 4) Imposed war between Iran and Iraq. In ILNA, it refers to 3 topics, two of which are in common with Tasnim (numbers 1 & 2); the third one is related to control of narcotics and drug trafficking. So, other than a subtle similarity between its international meaning and just one of its senses used in Tasnim, the general application of "holy war" has nothing to do with its international usage.

"Economic jihad" is in line with "resistive economy" and has positive semantic prosody. It refers to defensive measures against "economic warfare" imposed on Iran, for instance, by sanctions. To sum up this account on jihad-based terminology and the effect of variables of political context and political affiliation, there are cases in which both of these variables play a role; i.e., terminology of news agencies are distinct from the one in the parliament, and also each has their terminology in line with their political affiliation. Figure 9.2 is the illustration of what has already been argued regarding Jihad.

Figure 9.2

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Jihad' in each Corpus

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[226] They are mentioned in double inverted commas because they are collocations discussed in their proper turn.

Jihad

9.2.2.2. Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. The super concept of *jihad* is among the most undemanding concepts for English-speaking translators. Terminographical definition was provided for "Islamic justice, "the only ambiguous term. Among three main phraseme templates, two are present in the terminology of this super concept. A point regarding the ontological combinations and, hence, the phraseme template is that the concept of *jihad* carries the notion of 'doing something' and 'taking action. So, generally speaking, it is a type of event (formalized as a noun in a given text) that its features are described by other events (formalized as adjective). Alternatively, *jihad* is an attribute (formalized as an adjective) to specify or highlight Islamic effect on the type of another event (formalized as a noun). In the latter, the event of *jihad* itself is under the influence of Islam and transmits this impression or effect to any event it accompanies. The following examples will clarify the point.

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "economic jihad" is a type of jihad that counters "economic warfare" and defends the economic system of Iran from the enemy's "economic warfare".

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "jihadi management" is a type of management that authorities should have to resist the problematic situation of Iran and handle problems.

Based on the discussion mentioned above and the religious and defensive nature of *jihad*, it is directly related to metaphors related to game and war source domains[227]. Jihad is in a close relationship with *resistance*. Iran has been in wartime since Islamic Revolution in 1979 because the Great Satan (USA), who is arrogant, has refused to accept the Revolution and has become Iran's archenemy. So, Iran is resisting in the path of God to maintain the Islamic community. America and its allies impose sanctions and other warfares on Iran, and Iran defends itself by various types of jihads. For instance, opposed to "economic warfare", there is "economic jihad". National problematic issues originate indirectly from sickness and treatment scenarios mentioned in the health source domain. For instance, bureaucratic corruptions are like an ailment in the body of Iran, and one one the treatments is "jihadi management," which includes "jihadi action", "jihadi spirit", "jihadi work", and so on. "Jihadi management" also refers to a type of management needed for foiling an enemy's plots in various aspects.

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[227] Needless to point out their close metaphorical overlaps and the religious component of all metaphorical patterns.

In the case of game scenarios, "jihadi diplomacy" rejects a win-win strategy because it paves the way for the enemy's win by infiltration. "Jihadi diplomacy", instead, offers a jihadi approach to international negotiations that guarantees Iran and its Islamic Revolution's influence in the world. Other terms can also be related to scenarios of these source domains or even to other source domains. It is because metaphors have many main conceptual mappings in common, and they determine terminology used by politicians to a great extent. For instance, Ayatollah Khamenei, as the father of a family or the teacher in the class, has a powerful authority and has commanded "economic jihad" and "jihadi management" as the solution for the country's numerous problems.

9.2.3. *Power or qodrat (قدرت)*

Power is the richest concept among 15 super concepts investigated in this study in terms of potentiality for generating terminology. It is also among relatively easy concepts due to the fact that it is shared by all political systems. Yet its terminology has showed cases of ambiguity, sometimes, due to coexistence of a term and a loanword. Details will be discussed after the below tables.

Table 9.14.1

The Frequency of 'Power' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
491	4,513	3,586	8,590

Table 9.14.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Power' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in each Corpus

	Terminological Phrasemes	Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
		Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency
1	قدرت نرم Soft power	9.65	8	8.12	33	8.77	43
2	قدرت مقاومت Resistance capability	9.25	8	5.33	6	0	0
3	کانون های قدرت Concentration of power	9.25	6	5.98	8	7.22	13
4	قدرت مانور Maneuvering power	9.23	5	7.04	15	7.39	15
5	قدرت بازدارندگی Deterrence	9.17	5	8.76	51	9.17	54
6	صاحبان قدرت Power-holders	8.9	5	7.73	25	8.08	25
7	قدرت منطقه ای Regional power	8.75	5	8.62	68	8.78	49
8	قدرت شیطانی Satanic/evil power	8.51	3	6.14	8	6.07	6
9	قدرت دفاعی Defensive power	8.29	5	9.48	108	9.77	130
10	مبنای قدرت Basis of power	8.01	4	5.54	6	0	0
11	انتقال قدرت Power transmission	6.77	3	6.48	11	0	0
12	قدرت نظامی Military power	7.58	3	9.06	101	9.3	87
13	قدرت اول Superpower	4.8	3	6.79	23	6.93	19
14	جنگ قدرت Power war	5.42	3	5.95	12	5.51	8
15	قدرت صدای ایران Iran's voice power	6.13	3	0	0	0	0
16	قدرت امنیتی Security power	6.11	5	0	0	4.26	9
17	قدرت طلبان (Domineering) power seekers	5.48	4	0	0	5.51	6
18	قدرت های بزرگ Big/ great/ top powers	0	0	10	229	9.92	165
19	قدرت های جهانی World powers/ global powers	0	0	9.8	162	9.15	74
20	ساختار قدرت Power structure	0	0	7.47	22	6.6	9
21	قدرت موشکی Missile power	0	0	7.96	35	8.42	38
22	قدرت ملی National power	0	0	7.86	70	8.52	75

23	قدرت اقتصادی Economic power	3.29	5	7.48	53	7.34	33
24	قدرت سخت Hard power	0	0	7.35	22	7.04	14
25	قدرت برتر Dominant power Sovereignty supreme authority	0	0	7.29	18	7.37	15
26	قدرت دیپلماسی Power of diplomacy	0	0	6.41	12	6.11	7
27	قدرت های پوشالی Phony/puppet power	0	0	6.15	8	6.08	6
28	موازنه قدرت Balance of power	0	0	7.29	17	7.74	18
29	مولفه های قدرت Components of (political) power	0	0	8.67	46	9.39	59
30	عناصر قدرت Elements of (political) power	0	0	7.36	19	7.92	22
31	ابزار قدرت Instruments of power	0	0	7.13	17	6.03	6
32	ابر قدرت Superpower	0	0	6.79	12	8.22	25
33	مراکز قدرت Concentration of power	0	0	6.52	14	6.27	9
34	توزیع قدرت Distribution of power	0	0	5.94	7	4.06	6
35	توازن قدرت Balance of power	0	0	5.78	6	0	0
36	خلا قدرت Power vacuum Power void	0	0	5.77	6	0	0
37	منابع قدرت Sources of power	0	0	5.67	8	7.76	23
38	قدرت های استکباری Arrogant powers	0	0	8.36	38	8.65	37
39	قدرت های فرامنطقه ای Transregional powers	0	0	8.31	37	5.87	21
40	قدرت های سلطه گر Hegemonic powers/ Domineering powers	0	0	6.95	14	8.07	24
41	قدرت چانه زنی Bargaining power	0	0	6.85	13	6.82	10
42	قدرت های غربی Western powers	0	0	6.8	15	6.6	11
43	قدرت سیاسی Political power	0	0	6.62	43	6.66	28
44	قدرت معنایی Spiritual power	0	0	6.59	11	0	0

45	قدرت اجرایی Executive power	0	0	6.11	12	0	0
46	قدرت مادی Material power	0	0	6.08	8	7.33	15
47	قدرت بازدارنده Deterrence	0	0	5.94	7	0	0
48	قدرت تاثیرگذاری Affecting/influencing power	0	0	5.92	7	0	0
49	قدرت تعامل Power of interaction	0	0	5.9	9	4.12	7
50	قدرت های بیگانه Foreign powers	0	0	5.9	7	6.02	6
51	قدرت هسته ای Nuclear power	0	0	5.81	14	4.51	11
52	قدرت تحلیل Analysing power	0	0	5.8	7	7.21	15
53	قدرت گفتمانی Discursive power	0	0	5.73	7	0	0
54	قدرت های (بلوک) شرق Eastern powers	0	0	5.73	6	4.55	9
55	قدرت های مستکبر Arrogant powers/ Arrogance	0	0	5.72	6	6.77	10
56	قدرت نفوذ Power of influence	0	0	5.7	7	6.71	11
57	قدرت مطلق Absolute power	0	0	5.7	6	4.06	6
58	قدرت علمی Scientific power	0	0	5.56	7	7.26	19
59	قدرت اصلی Main power	0	0	5.45	8	5.45	6
60	قدرت فرهنگی Cultural power	0	0	5.37	8	3.7	8
61	قدرت اسلام Islam's power	0	0	5.37	9	5.56	10
62	قدرت های موثر Effective powers	0	0	5.34	6	4.05	7
63	قدرت ملت ایران Iranian people's power	0	0	5.29	14	5.08	9
64	قدرت مردمی People's power	0	0	5.27	6	0	0
65	قدرت داخلی National power	0	0	5.09	6	4.78	14
66	قدرت مردم People's power	0	0	5.8	23	5.05	16
67	قدرت حضور Power of presence	0	0	4.5	8	4.85	6
68	دیپلماسی قدرت Diplomacy of power	0	0	0	0	4.91	12
69	قدرت گفتمان سازی Discourse-making	0	0	0	0	4.06	7

70	قدرت رهبری Leadership's power	0	0	0	0	4.87	6
	power						
71	قدرتهای زورگو Bullying powers	0	0	0	0	6.67	9
72	قدرت دریایی Sea power	0	0	6.3	12	7.44	22
73	قدرت هوایی Air power	0	0	4.36	11	6.48	10

9.2.3.1. Terms in Detail. *Power* is a concept that is the common ground of so many fields such as economics and physics. In other words, it is not just related to politics, and it makes the process of filtering term candidates a bit difficult. Consequently, so many collocations proved to be strong (based on their LogDice score) were related to the economics and had been recorded chiefly in the parliament corpus since the argumentations of the legislative procedures contain many economic issues. Since most terms are well-established with the least ambiguity, not all of them will be discussed.

"Soft power" has the highest score in the parliament corpus (9.65), and the following two scores are for Tasnim and ILNA with 8.77 and 8.12, respectively. The variance of scores is significant in terms of political context. This term contrasts with "hard power" and was first introduced by Joseph Nye in 1990[228]. While the "hard power" is coercive, "soft power" is non-coercive and even co-optive, and it works through culture, among all others[229].

"Resistance capability" is related to Iranians' resistance under challenging situations such as "economic warfare" imposed by *arrogance*. This term does not exist in English and is a lexical gap. The provided English equivalent is based on similar patterns found by Word Sketch and OneClick Terms in Sketch Engine. "Concentration of power" is a borrowed term

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[228] Soft power - Wikipedia
[229] Soft power - Wikipedia

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from English that has been translated literally into Persian without standardization. It is interchangeably called "power centers" or "concentration of power". That is why it is recorded separately in numbers 3 and 33. However, the critical point is that it has gained more componential meanings and broadened semantically in Persian. In English, it refers to the national and governmental distribution of power as a gauge of justice. Number 3 has a significant score variance among all three corpora. Numbers 3 and 33 generally mean those with power, so they are near-synonyms of "powerholders". They have general and ambiguous meanings, and it is difficult to determine their semantic prosody. So, they will be illustrated as one same term in each corpus:

- The parliament has two aspects: internal affairs, which refers to 'power behind the throne and their abuse of power and hence, corruption. In this sense, *power* usually accompanies 'wealth'; in other words, it usually is 'holders of power and wealth'. The other aspect is related to foreign affairs in the sense of superpowers' soft power exercised to influence public opinion or impose more sanctions on Iran. In both respects, it has negative semantic prosody.

- ILNA: Like the parliament, it has a national-affair-related aspect with the same meaning and semantic prosody. The only difference is that it often does not accompany 'wealth'. Unlike the parliament, it does not have a foreign-affair-related aspect. Instead, it attaches a historical-religious aspect to "concentration of power" and attributes Iran's power to Islam and (the holy shrine of) Imam Reza in Mashhad (Iran). So, it has positive semantic prosody in this sense since it means the (soft) power of Iran in the region.

- Tasnim: Like ILNA, and unlike the parliament, it has no foreign-affair aspect. Like the other two corpora, the collocation is related to Iran's internal affairs. However, the thought-provoking difference is that this pro-Conservative news agency has positive

semantic prosody since it means "power-holders" and those with influence and authority with no abuse or corruption. In other words, "concentration of power" is Iran's political system and official power. Those who cannot find their way into it start disobedience and sedition.

"Maneuvering power" in Iran's political context is generally a synonym of "power of choice" or 'successful strategic management. In this sense, it does not have well-established English equivalents, and this suggested one also needs more explanation. It should not be confused with military or economic terminology. The intriguing point is that in Tasnim, it also collocates with 'media': "maneuvering power of media" or "media maneuvering power", for instance, "media maneuvering power of enemy/ foreign social media". Especially in this sense, it seems equal to "soft power" and related to *infiltration* or 'brainwashing'.

"Power-holders" is more or less the synonym of "centers of power" and semantically behaves like that. Context determines the positivity/negativity of its semantic prosody: If it refers to foreign power-holders or powers behind the throne, it has negative semantic prosody; if it refers to Iran's power and influence in the region/world, it implies positive meaning. The highest score of this collocation is recorded in the parliament (8.9). The second score is related to Tasnim (8.08), which does not show a significant variance. In the case of ILNA, the score (7.73) is significantly lower than the one in the parliament (but the variance of scores between the two news agencies is not significant).

Other than "regional power", the English corpus of this study suggested "regional superpower" and "region's top power". It refers to countries such as Iran, which are considered influential in the Middle East. In the case of "satanic/evil power", regarding semantic prosody, the name is self-explanatory: negative semantic prosody. The highest score is related to the parliament (8.51), significantly higher than both news agencies (6.14 & 6.07

in ILNA & Tasnim, respectively). Generally speaking, it refers to *arrogance*, America, and Zionism.

The highest "defensive power" score is recorded in Tasnim (9.77). The score variance between news agencies is not significant, although the score recorded in the parliament is significantly lower than in both news agencies. So, the political context makes a difference; but political affiliation does not affect the strength of this term. Generally speaking, this term is significantly strong in all three corpora. In all three corpora, "defensive power" has a close relationship with 'missile' as a part of 'defensive industry', 'deterrence', and *security*.

"Superpower" is a stronger term in news agencies. That is to say, political context matters. Nevertheless, political affiliation does not make a difference. For this same English term, there are two Persian terms that both are common. It has synonyms and near-synonyms in both English and Persian: (a) big/ great/ top power, (b) world power, and (c) sovereignty and supreme authority. Synonym (a) includes adjectives that the English corpus has suggested with more or less the same score. Synonym (b) is tricky because the English corpus suggested "global power" while "world power" is the well-established one in English. So, the latter is the correct equivalent. Regarding (c), it must be mentioned that the English corpus suggested: "dominant power"; while in English, "sovereignty" and "supreme authority" are approved terms. So, it is suggested to use those prevalent in English[230].

"Power seeker" is a word-for-word translation of Persian terms because it is a lexical gap. It has negative semantic prosody because it implies someone who seeks some

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[230] The seemingly incorrect English terms are mentioned to help English-speaking readers understand English versions of Persian news agencies.

'hegemonic power', or as English corpus suggests, 'domineering power'. Alternatively, accepted words such as "warmonger" and "powermonger" can be coined. This latter one is shorter and connotes the wanted negative sense. "Missile power" is a literal English translation of Persian terms recorded in news agencies. So, the political context is essential. "Missile power" is related to the authority that is gained by Iran's missile program. It aligns with "defensive power" and ultimately leads to "defensive power".

"Arrogant power" is called just 'arrogance' in English. However, it is much stronger in Persian. Arrogance in Persian politics includes countries such as America and Israel. It has other forms such as "Arrogant powers". Its near-synonyms are "bullying powers" and "hegemonic powers". The shared point among these three terms is that some countries are arrogant and have not accepted the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and they want every country, including Iran, to obey them.

"Transregional powers", "Foreign powers", and "external powers" are synonyms, and they all exist in both English and Persian. "Hegemonic powers" in Persian are used in two ways: a) transliteration of English' hegemony' (with no translation) or b) Persian translation of 'hegemony'. It is also called 'coexistence of a term and a loanword'. The former is less common than the latter. However, the thorny issue is that when Persian translators translate or even write English news articles, they almost always retranslate that Persian equivalent as another English term. That is why even our English corpus did not retrieve 'hegemony' and instead, 'domineering' was a strong term with a high tendency to collocate with power. So, English-speaking readers of English versions of news agencies should bear this in mind, and whenever they see 'domineering', they should consider it the same as 'hegemony'.

"Material power" is the opposite of "spiritual power". The former has negative semantic prosody in Persian terminology, while the latter has positive semantic prosody.

"Spiritual power" also means a bit different from English terms in the Persian religious aspect of the term is highlighted. In other words, in Persian, it means that Iran's power is a spiritual one, and it depends on its people and their resistance besides the nature of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. "Affecting/influencing power" is synonymous with "power of influence". Another similar collocation is "effective powers". The English corpus suggests 'affecting', while 'influencing' is well-established in English political terminology. So, 'affecting' is not suggested. Its cause is the same as 'domineering' and 'hegemony'.

To sum up this discussion, it must be said that power and its terminology are relatively easy because most of the terms have well-established English equivalents or have been borrowed from English. Regarding political context, parliament significantly shows less terminology. Moreover, in the case of shared terms among all corpora, the variance of scores of most terms is significant. So, the terminology of this term is sensitive to political context. Regarding political affiliation, it does not affect term strength. Since the score variance of only 12 terms (out of 58 shared terms among news agencies) is significant. Figures 9.3.1, 9.3.2, and 9.3.3 are helpful to visualize this discussion.

Figure 9.3.1

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Power' in each Corpus

Figure 9.3.2

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Power' in each Corpus

Figure 9.3.3

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Power' in each Corpus

Power

Parl. Deb. | ILNA | Tasnim

(LogDice vs Terms chart)

9.2.3.2. Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. The super concept of power is among the relatively easy concepts for English-speaking translators. All three main phraseme templates are present in the terminology of this super concept. However, the first one has just two terminological phrasemes. The terminology of this super concept has shown considerable diversity of conceptual relations, and it has not limited to located_at, done-by, and affected. The example of the second phraseme template is one of the diverse types of conceptual relations recorded in the terminology of *power*. It needs to be clarified that phraseme templates adapt to those proposed by Montero-Martínez et al. (2002) in section 5.2.2. The most crucial part which is shared and fixed is the ontological combination of EVENT, OBJECT, and ATTRIBUTE. The relationship between them covers many possibilities, some of which have already been discussed. So, the template may show DONE-

BY, but the example is used to expound another type of relation. It is done for the sake of brevity and demonstrating the possibility of other relations.

HAVE-FEATURE_LOCATION_WORLD-PART (related to EVENT + RELATION + OBJECT): "Regional power" is used to describe the country which is the top power in the region (Middle East). The conceptual relation is LOCATED_AT according to León-Araúz et al. (2016).

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT):

"Power of influence" means 'to what degree a country has influence and the strength of that influence'. According to León Arauz et al. (2016), one of the conceptual relations is DELIMITED-BY. It seems that "power of influence" is the opposite of this category. So this type of conceptual relation found in this study can be called STRENGTHENED-BY. León Arauz et al. (2016) also admits that conceptual relations introduced in their study are not the only possible ones, and they have limited themselves to several possible conceptual relations.

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "cultural power" is a type of power that is cultural. It refers to a country's "soft power" in spreading its culture to other countries. So, cultural power is a subordinate or hyponym of "soft power".

Another point about the terminology of *power* is the terminological variation that falls into various categories, and each has a different reason. León-Araúz et al. (2016) refer to categories of terminological variation proposed by Freixa (2006) and Bowker and Hawkins (2006). in the case of terminological variation registered in the terminology of *power*, they may be categorized as 'cognitive variation' due to "different perspectives or even different ideologies" (Freixa, 2006, paraphrased by León-Araúz et al., 2017, p. 226). They also can be categorized as "functional variation" due to variation of "registers described in terms of field,

tenor, and mode" (León-Araúz et al., 2016, p. 226). Also, "discursive" terminological variation "to avoid repetition" has been seen (León-Araúz et al., 2016, p. 226): "top power", "main power", "big power", and "great power". As emphasized by León-Araúz et al. (2016), finding the reasons behind this phenomenon needs another in-depth investigation which is out of the scope of this study.

Regarding metaphor and terminology, it is safe to conclude that terminology of *power* is mainly related to the religion domain especially manifested through scenarios related to war and battle. In line with such a metaphorical perspective, Iran is on the Right Front, and the enemy and "bullying powers" such as *arrogance* are in the Blasphemous Front. Iran is more powerful and influential because it comes from God and Islam. If the enemy has soft and hard power, Iran also has soft and hard power in every aspect.

9.2.4. War or jang (جنگ)

War is among the relatively easy super concepts of this study. Most of its terminology exists in English and has a one-to-one equivalent. At first, the tables related to the statistics of this super concept and its terminology will be presented. Then, a discussion of terms and terminographical definitions of ambiguous or non-existents will be offered. After the related graph, concluding remarks regarding conceptual mappings behind terminology and metaphors will be addressed.

Table 9.15.1

The Frequency of 'War' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
554	3,667	3,902	8,123

Table 9.15.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'War' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in each

Corpus

	Terminological Phrasemes	Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
		Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency
1	جنگ تحمیلی Imposed war	12.8	99	11.49	276	11.53	298
2	جنگ نرم Soft warfare	10.62	20	9.94	92	10.76	177
3	جنگ جهانی World war	9.19	16	8.78	69	9.06	72
4	جنگ روانی Mental warfare	8.61	5	8.47	33	8.19	28
5	جنگ الکترونیک Electronic warfare	8.12	4	7.24	14	8.18	27
6	جنگ ارزی Currency war	7.34	4	0	0	0	0
7	جنگ اقتصادی Economic warfare	6.46	12	7	35	8.27	64
8	جنگ شیمیایی Chemical warfare	6.82	5	0	0	0	0
9	جنگ نابرابر Asymmetrical warfare	6.71	4	6.32	7	6.25	7
10	جنگ نظامی Military war	6.26	5	6.6	16	7.78	31
11	جنگ با خدا War against God	5.46	4	0	0	0	0
12	جنگ آب Water war	4.19	6	3.6	7	0	0
13	جنگ های نیابتی Proxy wars	8.52	4	9.63	71	10.02	98
14	جنگ سخت Hard war	0	0	7.78	24	8.19	32
15	اعلام جنگ Declaration of war	0	0	6.04	18	6.94	22
16	حوزه جنگ نرم Field of soft warfare	0	0	5.09	8	4.63	21
17	جنگ سرد Cold war	0	0	8.63	35	8.02	24
18	جنگ هشت ساله	0	0	8.34	29	7.95	23

	The eight-year war					
19	جنگ داخلی Internal/civil war	0	0	8.28	47	8.02	34
20	جنگ صفین *Siffin* war	0	0	6.84	10	0	0
21	جنگ سایبری Cyberwarfare	0	0	6.76	10	6.57	9
22	جنگ ویرانگر Destructive war	0	0	6.68	9	0	0
23	جنگ مسلحانه Armed war	0	0	6.66	9	7.42	16
24	جنگ فرهنگی Cultural war	0	0	6.57	16	7.07	21
25	جنگ فرسایشی Attrition warfare	0	0	6.52	8	4	6
26	جنگ لفظی Verbal warfare	0	0	6.5	8	0	0
27	جنگ طولانی Long war	0	0	6.37	8	5.97	6
28	جنگ احد *Uhud* War The Battle of Uhud	0	0	6.33	7	0	0
29	جنگ ترکیبی Hybrid warfare	0	0	6.24	7	0	0
30	جنگ احتمالی Possible war	0	0	6.22	7	0	0
31	جنگ جدید New war	0	0	6.22	15	4.03	10
32	جنگ مستقیم Direct action	0	0	6.11	7	4.62	10
33	جنگ طلبان Warmongers War hawks	0	0	6.05	11	0	0
34	جنگ قدرت Power war	0	0	5.95	12	5.51	8
35	جنگ مذهبی Religious war	0	0	5.9	6	6.32	8
36	جنگ تحمیلی **استکبار** Arrogance-imposed war	0	0	4.12	7	0	0
37	جنگ استکبار Arrogant war	0	0	0	0	4.78	12
38	جنگ رسانه ای Social media warfare	0	0	0	0	5.86	9
39	مدیریت جنگ War management	0	0	0	0	6.67	14
40	جنگ های نامنظم Irregular battles/	0	0	0	0	7.03	12

	warfare						
41	جنگ افزارها Weapons; weaponry	0	0	0	0	6.9	11
42	جنگ مالی Financial warfare	0	0	0	0	5.98	7
43	جنگ 33 روزه Thirty-three-day war 2006 Lebanon war	0	0	0	0	7.56	75
44	جنگ احزاب *Ahzab* war The battle of the Trenches	0	0	0	0	5.86	11
45	جنگ جمل *Jamel* war The Battle of the Camel	0	0	0	0	4.74	10
46	جنگ عقیدتی/ شناختی Cognitive warfare	0	0	0	0	5.0	3

9.2.4.1. Terms in Detail. *War* and its related terminology are relatively easy for the non-Persian translator since most have well-established English equivalents. However, a few points need to be clarified. "Imposed war" means the Iran-Iraq war, which started in 1980 and lasted for eight years. However, it is called so in Iran because Iraq imposed the war on Iran. The same is true for "Thirty-three-day war," which refers to the "2006 Lebanon War". The former is well-known in Persian, while the latter is well-established in English political texts. So, the "2006 Lebanon War" is suggested.

"War against God" comes from the Quran, which considers 'charged interest' in banking as fighting against God. So the main collocation is not political, but sometimes its meaning is expanded, and the rate of corruption and divorce in Iran is also considered "war against God". "*Siffin* war" was a war in the early history of Islam that led to divisions in the Muslim community. Other historical-Islamic wars are "*Jamel* war", "*Ahzab* war", and "*Uhud* war". They are mentioned here to highlight that just political knowledge does not

suffice. We refer to them because of some political points they have. For instance, in "Siffin war", one of the politicians of Muawiyah commanded troopers to hang the Quran on their swords. And, they did it. So, Imam Ali's soldiers were deceived and said they could not fight against the Quran and God. In this way, Imam Ali had to agree on arbitration to conquer the battle.

"Cultural war" does exist in both Persian and English terminology. However, it refers to the foreign enemy and its "cultural invasion" in Persian. While in English, it refers to national cultural conflicts among parties and groups. "Direct action" is the English equivalent of a Persian term whose word-for-word translation would be 'direct war'. Nevertheless, since the priority is given to using those well-established English terms and introducing new terminology is being avoided in this study, it was decided to mention "direct action" as the standardized equivalent. However, it must be borne in mind that this Persian term has stronger negative semantic prosody, and it is harsher than English.

Figures 9.4.1 and 9.4.2 show that parliament is not terminologically rich. So, it can be said that political context makes a difference to some extent. Moreover, in the case of those terms shared among three corpora, score variance is not significant in most cases. Nevertheless, since each news agency has some terms specific to itself, it is safe to say that political affiliation makes subtle differences.

Figure 9.4.1

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'War' in each Corpus

Figure 9.4.2

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'War' in each Corpus

War

Parl. Deb. ● ILNA ● Tasnim

Cultural war: 7.07 / 6.57
Attrition warfare: 4 / 6.52
Verbal warfare: 6.5
Long war: 5.97 / 6.37
Ohod war: 6.33
Hybrid warfare: 6.24
Possible war: 6.22
New war: 4.03 / 6.22
Direct action: 4.62 / 6.11
Warmongers: 6.05
Power war: 5.51 / 5.95
Religious war: 6.32 / 5.9
Arrogance-imposed war: 4.12
Arrogant war: 4.78
Social media warfare: 5.86
War management: 6.67
Irregular battles: 7.03
weaponry: 6.9
Financial warfare: 5.98
Thirty-three-day war: 7.56
Ahzab war: 5.86
Jamal war: 4.74
Cognitive warfare: 5

9.2.4.2. Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. The super concept of *war* is relatively rich in terms of terminology. It is also among the relatively easy concepts for English-speaking translators. All three main phraseme templates are present in the terminology of this super concept. However, the first one has just two terminological phrasemes. It needs to be reminded that phraseme templates adapt those proposed by Montero-Martínez et al. (2002) in section 5.2.2. The most crucial part which is shared and fixed is the ontological combination of EVENT, OBJECT, and ATTRIBUTE. The relation between them covers many possibilities, some of which have already been discussed. So, the template may show DONE-BY, but the example is used to expound another type of relation. It is done for the sake of brevity and demonstrating the possibility of other relations. Most of the *war* terminology can be classified as EVENT + ATTRIBUTE ontological combination.

HAVE-FEATURE_LOCATION_WORLD-PART (related to EVENT + RELATION + OBJECT): "*Uhud* War" or "The Battle of Uhud" and "2006 Lebanon war" are two terms that show the location of an event. The second example also shows the time of war.

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "Warmongers" or "war hawks" are those who are willing to cause war. So, the conceptual relation is of CAUSES.

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "Hybrid warfare" is a type of warfare that imposes pressure on people's lives in more than one way. Transregional enemies imposed it on Iran. Unlike "attrition war," which takes a long time to accomplish its goals, "hybrid warfare" is designed to achieve given goals in a short time.

The terminology of *war* has references to NATURE and RELIGION source domain. For instance, "attrition war" is like the process of attrition in nature, which causes changes to something so gradually and within an extended period. The same happens to "attrition war": A long-term war that affects people's lives little by little. It must be added that this is not the only aspect of this type of war, and it is not the complete terminographical definition of "attrition war". It is just one aspect revealed by the help of entailments of metaphor hidden in the term. An aspect that metaphor users have emphasized to warn that "hybrid warfare" is more dangerous because it is severer than "attrition war," and it is designed to demolish Iran in a short time. So, "hybrid warfare" needs immediate attention and plans to foil enemies' plots.

In the case of references to religious elements such as "*Siffin* war", it is used to make their political point and remind that the same will happen. Al-Harrasi (2001) considers these examples an intertextual metaphor belonging to a generic metaphor named PRESENT IS

PAST (p. 226). in the case of the "*Siffin* war", Imam Ali could have conquered the enemy if his soldiers had listened to him and did not fall for the enemy's sedition. Iran can conquer its enemies if people and authorities obey the Supreme Leader's commands and are aware of enemies' various types of wars. So, shared conceptual mappings of metaphor and terminology help the reader realize that they should avoid past mistakes to prevent defeat in the current war.

There are also other cases of terms that some metaphor is hidden in their very nature, and the interlocutor uses them without being aware of their metaphorical nature. These terms are classified as dead metaphors, e.g., "soft warfare" and "cold war". Any specialized knowledge domain consists of such terms. Such terminology is the best manifestation of the close relationship between terminology and metaphor.

9.2.5. *Peace or solh (صلح)*

The super concept of *peace* is undemanding for English-speaking translators when translating Persian political texts. It is because all Persian terminology related to *peace* has well-established English equivalents. Table 9.16.1 shows the highest frequency of *peace* refers to the pro-Reformist ILNA news agency. A brief explanation of some points will be addressed after the following tables pertained to statistics of peace-related terminology.

Table 9.16.1

The Frequency of 'Peace' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
70	1,587	703	2360

Table 9.16.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Power' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in

each Corpus

		Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
	Terminological Phrasemes	**Score**	**Frequency**	**Score**	**Frequency**	**Score**	**Frequency**
1	صلح جهانی World peace	5.64	3	8.2	32	7.67	12
2	مذاکرات صلح (سوریه) (Syrian) peace **talk**	0	0	9.45	53	8.24	10
3	ضامن صلح Guarantor of peace	0	0	8.46	14	0	0
4	منادی صلح و دوستی **Message** of peace & friendship	0	0	7.89	9	8.62	6
5	فرهنگ صلح Culture of peace	0	0	7.85	20	0	0
6	نیروهای حافظ صلح Peace**keeping**[231] force	0	0	7.82	9	0	0
7	گفتمان صلح Peace discourse	0	0	6.94	7	0	0
8	گفت وگوهای صلح Peace talks/ peace- building conversations	0	0	6.86	5	0	0
9	مجمع جهانی صلح اسلامی Islamic World Peace Forum	0	0	6.49	9	0	0
10	صلح عادلانه و پایدار Sustainable just peace	0	0	6.85	5	9.12	10
11	صلح پایدار Sustainable peace	0	0	7.89	54	9.27	16
12	صلح خواه Pacifist	0	0	5.67	8	6	4
13	حافظ صلح Peacekeeper/peacekeeping	0	0	0	0	8.24	5
14	صلح عادلانه Just peace	0	0	0	0	9.12	10

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[231] In the Persian version, it is a compound word and the score is related to 'keeping' component.

9.2.5.1. Terms in Detail. *Peace* is among easy concepts because its terms have English equivalents that are either well-established or easy to perceive. Regarding number 8, there are two English terms for the same Persian term. The same applies to number 13: Both English terms can be used as the equivalent for the given Persian term. Interestingly enough, the concept of *peace* and its terminology is significantly low in parliament and pro-Conservative Tasnim news agencies. Also depicted in Figure 9.5, pro-Reformist ILNA news agency is rich regarding the terminology of *peace*. So, it is safe to say that political context does not play a significant role. However, political affiliation is essential and affects the terminology of *peace*.

Figure 9.5

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Peace' in each Corpus

9.2.5.2. Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. No peculiar or burdening terminology variation was recorded in the terminology of *peace*. Although its limited terminology compared to other concepts, *peace* has demonstrated instances of all three phraseme templates. The number of terms related to LOCATION is limited to two instances.

HAVE-FEATURE_LOCATION_WORLD-PART (related to EVENT + RELATION + OBJECT): "Syrian peace talk" and "world peace"

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "Peacekeeper" refers to any attempt to maintain peace or peaceful conditions in a place.

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "sustainable peace"

The terminology of *peace* has demonstrated direct references to the HOUSE source domain. "Peace-building conversations" conjures up that *peace* is like a house that must be constructed to keep people (the residents of the house) in a safe and peaceful situation worldwide. So, "pacifists" are architects of *peace*. Building a house is not enough, and complementary procedures are needed to preserve the house's excellent and safe status. "Guarantor of peace", "peacekeeper," and "peacekeeping forces" are among those entities that work for the maintenance of peace. In this way, the house of *peace* is just and sustainable.

9.2.6. *Enemy or doshman (دشمن)*

The The super concept of *enemy* has limited terminology and is estimated to be relatively easy for English-speaking translators. The reasons will be explained shortly after Tables

9.17.1 and 9.17.2 dedicated to the enemy's statistics and terms in three Persian corpora. Table

9.17.1 shows that the frequency of *enemy* in the parliamentary debates is significantly lower

than in both news agencies.

Table 9.17.1

The Frequency of 'Enemy' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
329	4,096	4,628	9,053

Table 9.17.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Enemy' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in

each Corpus

		Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
	Terminological Phrasemes	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency
1	نفوذ دشمن Enemy infiltration	10.59	15	8.15	33	7.75	26
2	دشمن مکار Deceitful enemy	9.89	5	0	0	0	0
3	دشمن مستکبر Arrogant enemy	9.17	3	0	0	5.94	7
4	دشمن **اصلی** (انقلاب) (Revolution's) **principal** enemy	7.12	5	7.14	24	7.4	27
5	دشمن خارجی Foreign enemy	6.74	5	7.43	37	8.39	56
6	دشمنان اسلام Islam's enemies	9.31	13	9.05	109	8.97	118
7	دشمنان قسم خورده Sworn/ mortal enemy	0	0	8.06	27	8.93	55
8	دشمنان انقلاب اسلامی Islamic Revolution's enemies	0	0	7.75	79	7.52	91
9	دشمن مشترک	0	0	7.43	29	7.77	30

	Common enemy						
10	دشمنان نظام System's[232] enemies	0	0	7.36	49	7.42	48
11	دشمنان خدا God's enemies	0	0	7.12	19	0	0
12	دشمن بیرونی External enemy	0	0	6.62	10	5.75	6
13	دشمن ستیزی (being) Anti-enemy	0	0	5.88	6	0	0
14	دشمنان **جهان** اسلام Muslim world's enemies	0	0	5.87	12	0	0
15	دشمن فرضی Mock enemy	0	0	0	0	6.62	45
16	دشمن شناسی Recognition of enemy	0	0	6.03	7	4.44	10
17	دشمن داخلی Domestic enemy	0	0	6.1	11	6.8	17

9.2.6.1. Terms in Detail. The majority of terms related to the *enemy* have approved

English equivalents, so they are considered easy. They do not tend to cause miscommunication or

confusion. However, it does not mean that these terms are not challenging for the translator.

Describing a concept with at least one or two adjectives is a pervasive feature of the Persian language.

It is also pervasive in Persian political texts. The *enemy* is one of those concepts accompanied by a

negative adjective most of the time. In Persian, one of them is "deceitful enemy". This collocation

was found in our English corpus, neither in Word Sketch nor in OneClick Terms (Sketch Engine).

Instead, other similarly negative collocations were found in the English corpus: "vicious enemy" and

"wolfish enemy".

Number 13 is a compound noun that does not exist in English. It is "being anti-

enemy" and is in line with "recognition of enemy". For Ayatollah Khamenei, Iranians must

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[232] Refers to Iran's political system.

be 'insightful' and equipped with 'discernment' to recognize the enemy, counter the enemy (be anti-enemy) and foil its plots. So, number 16 is also absent in English, and here we have to provide a provisional equivalent to make it perceptible for English-speaking readers.

Both Table 9.17.2 and Figure 9.6 demonstrate that the political context makes a difference in the use of terms; i.e., several terms are absent in the parliament corpus. There are three terms specific to ILNA that also have a high LogDice score: "God's enemies", "anti-enemy", and "Muslim world's enemies". There is only one term specific to Tasnim, and it also has a high LogDice score: "mock enemy". The parliament also has one term for itself, with a significantly high LogDice score: "deceitful enemy". So, ILNA is richer in terms of the number of specific terms that have not been recorded in the other two corpora. These three terms have religious elements and imply that, for ILNA, Iran's enemies are God's or Islam's enemy or vice versa.

Figure 9.6

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Enemy' in each Corpus

Enemy

9.2.6.2. Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. The super concept of *enemy* is estimated to be undemanding for English-speaking translators because most of its terminology has a one-to-one English equivalent. There is no ambiguity at the heart of the concept itself, and it is shared among all political systems in the world. There is no (confusing or ambiguous) terminology variation, and terms are more or less standardized. Two out of the main three phraseme templates have been recognized regarding the terminology of this super concept.

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "recognition of enemy" and "enemy's infiltration"

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "Deceitful enemy"

The super concept of *enemy* is in close relationship with *insight* and *influence* or *infiltration* super concept. It is because that all of them are the Supreme Leader's keywords. Everyone should be insightful to recognize the enemy. The next step will be realizing enemy's plots such as infiltration and foiling those plots.

The terminology of *enemy* reminds us of the war source domain and religious elements that have already been discussed in various sections. Iran is on the Right Front and its enemies on the Blasphemous Front. The shared conceptual mapping is easy to grasp: Those against Islam and God are Iran's enemies; also, those against Iran's political system are (external or domestic) enemies. The latter is because Iran's political system is divine and sacred, and any action against it is considered blasphemous and against God's will and command.

9.2.7. Resistance or moqavemat (مقاومت)

Resistance and its adjective *resistive* are assumed to be relatively difficult for the English-speaking translator. Tables 9.18.1 and 9.18.2 are related to statistics of *resistance* in each corpus. Tables 9.18.3 and 9.18.4 are related to statistics of *resistive* in three corpora. As the tables show, the frequency of this concept is high. Compared to news agencies, parliament has the lowest frequency of *resistance*, while it has the highest frequency regarding *resistive*. Following the tables, a succinct explanation of terminology related to metaphor via shared conceptual mappings will be addressed.

Table 9.18.1

The Frequency of 'Resistance' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
269	1,668	1,919	3,856

Table 9.18.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Resistance' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in each Corpus

	Terminological Phrasemes	Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
		Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency
1	جبهه مقاومت Resistance Front	11.32	19	10.92	210	11.23	300
2	نماد مقاومت Symbol of resistance	9.83	5	7.74	9	7.2	7
3	جریان مقاومت Resistance current/ movement	9.78	13	7.96	41	8.75	55
4	محور مقاومت Axis of Resistance	9.59	9	10.86	112	11.5	179
5	قدرت مقاومت[233] Resistance capability	9.25	8	5.33	6	0	0
6	قدرت جبهه مقاومت Power of resistance front	0	0	0	0	3.91	8
7	فرهنگ مقاومت Culture of resistance	7.88	5	6.12	6	6.85	9
8	خط مقاومت Resistance line	7.64	3	8.55	25	8.82	33
9	مقاومت اسلامی Islamic resistance	5.17	10	7.46	114	7.47	104
10	روحیه مقاومت Spirit of resistance	0	0	7.56	9	7.86	14
11	مکتب مقاومت Doctrine of resistance	0	0	7.2	6	6.59	5

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[233] In parliamentary debates, it is an economic term; while in ILNA, it describes people's resistance in difficult situations.

12	مقاومت مردم People's resistance	0	0	6.6	8	5.54	17
13	نیروهای مقاومت Resistance forces	0	0	8.28	50	8.44	58
14	هسته های مقاومت Resistance nuclei	0	0	0	0	7.4	8
15	زنجیره مقاومت Chain of resistance Resistance bloc	0	0	0	0	7.27	7
16	دیپلماسی مقاومت Diplomacy of resistance	0	0	0	0	6.43	5
17	تفکر مقاومت Resistance thought	0	0	0	0	6.38	5
18	اصل مقاومت Principle of resistance	0	0	6.03	6	5.94	5

Table 9.18.3

The Frequency of 'Resistive' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
1,779	1,546	1,064	4,389

Table 9.18.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Resistive' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in

each Corpus

		Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
	Collocations	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency
19	اقتصاد مقاومتی Resistance/ resistive economy	13.44	1,726	13.27	1,458	13.2	980
20	سیاست های مقاومتی Politics of resistance	6.1	8	5.17	8	5.44	5
21	ستاد فرماندهی اقتصاد	7.92	55	8.38	71	7.99	41

	مقاومتی General headquarter of resistive economy						

9.2.7.1. Terms in Detail. *Resistance* includes relatively tricky terms. One of the basic concepts of the Islamic Revolution's political system aligns with Iran's anti-arrogance paradigm. In other words, Iran resists world arrogance and its sanctions. "Resistance front", "resistance line", and "axis of Resistance" (also known as Resistance and Deterrence Axis) are synonyms. Before explaining the meaning of these terms, it must be added here that both Word Sketch and OneClick terms suggested "Resistance Axis". However, since "Axis of Resistance is the perfectly standardized one in English, we suggest that translators use the latter. These three terms refer to allied countries such as Iran and Iraq, mainly Shia. "Resistance front" is more or less a general term that can apply to any resistant groups in any (Muslim) country.

An instance is the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan. However, in Persian, it refers to allied countries (including Iran) to counter *arrogance* and to have a free and independent Middle East. Another point is that the "resistance front" denotes an anti-Israel and anti-Western coalition in English political discourse. Nevertheless, the coalition aims to free the Middle East from transregional forces. It must be admitted that its primary purpose is Palestine, and that is why it is anti-Israel, but now it is gaining more general meaning, especially nowadays that it includes Iraq. At least in their official speeches, Iranian authorities are not anti-Western; but they are against any transregional powers present in countries such as Iraq and Syria. This phenomenon is considered the 'dynamicity of terms' in this study, aligning with León-Araúz et al.'s (2016) perspective.

Generally speaking, dynamicity of terms refers to the evolution and changes of terms used to describe cocepts in a specialized knowledge domain. Kageura (2002) considers dynamicity a characteristic of term formation (cited in León-Araúz et al., 2016). Dynamicity

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concerns with the advent of terms and the processes leading to new forms (of those terms). The crux of dynamicity of terms is that "conceptualization or concept formation itself is dynamic" (León-Araúz et al., 2016, p. 152). León-Araúz et al. (2016) argue that conceptualization behind term formation is a "situated conceptualization" which means that concept formation is context-dependent or situation-dependent (León-Araúz et al., 2016, p. 152). That is to say an entity is perceived by space, agents, and objects involved in it (León-Araúz et al., 2016, p. 152).

"Resistance forces" are supported by the "resistance front" and are present in countries such as Iraq and Syria. "Resistance nuclei" are centers that are suggested to be built in Iran and worldwide to disseminate the thought and culture of resistance. In this sense, it is a phase of "cultural jihad" to counter arrogance. About number 15, we should add that "Chain of resistance" is a word-for-word translation of Persian collocation, while "Resistance bloc" is the one extracted by OneClick Term and is a well-established English term. So, the latter is the correct one suggested to be used. The final point is about number 19, which was challenging because "resistance economy" is extracted in the English corpus. While in English texts found on official and academic web pages, "resistive economy" is a well-known term. So, they both mean the same thing: An economy resistant to sanctions and "economic warfare" imposed on Iran.

Figure 9.7 shows that political contexts matter since a corpus shows some terms that are absent in the other. Nevertheless, it does not make a significant difference in terms of terms strength; i.e., terms are more or less equally strong in all political contexts. Political affiliation also does not affect the strength of terms related to *resistance*, but it affects the use of some terms. In this sense, five terms are just recorded in pro-Conservative Tasnim news agency. So, this suggests that this concept has a special place in Tasnim's political ideology.

Figure 9.7

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Resistance' in each

Corpus

9.2.7.2. Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. Terminology of *resistance* is assumed to be relatively tricky for English-speaking translators due to terminology variation, lexical gaps, and the special dynamicity of terms. Among three phraseme templates, the following two templates have been used to formalize resistance terminology. There is only one instance of EVENT + ATTRIBUTE relation. Almost all terms of this super concept are EVENT + RELATION + EVENT instances.

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "Diplomacy of resistance," which is diplomacy that adheres to principles of resistance. It can be categorized as delimited-by conceptual relation León-Araúz (2016).

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "Islamic resistance"

Resistance is closely related to *arrogance*. If there is a spectrum, they are at the opposite end of that spectrum. Resistance is like a solution and strategy for countering arrogance and its ravenous appetite for power and desire to make every country obey them. Since, for Iran, arrogance chiefly means America, every government and group against America or resists America's influence has the potentiality of becoming part of "resistance movement". Moreover, this is the "doctrine of resistance".

Besides an obvious connection with war concepts, *resistance* terminology has also shown a meaningful relationship with the EDUCATION source domain. For instance, as mentioned in Table 9.9, "lesson of resistance" and "school of resistance" depict that *resistance* is not just a (para) military strategy. *Resistance* is a *culture* related to "resistance thought" and "spirit of resistance" that must be taught to people, especially those in countries that resist *arrogance*. Moreover, for this reason, "resistance nuclei" or centers must be built.

9.2.8. *Arrogance or istikbar (استکبار)*

Section 2.5.1 discussed introductory issues regarding *arrogance*. Moreover, it has been mentioned throughout the thesis to establish the correlation of *arrogance* with other concepts. It is time to discuss *arrogance* terminology in detail to clarify other aspects. *Arrogance* is among complex super concepts for English-speaking translators for some reasons being addressed after the following tables.

Table 9.19.1

The Frequency of 'Arrogance' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
141	623	773	1,537

Table 9.19.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Arrogance' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in each Corpus

		Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
	Terminological Phrasemes	**Score**	**Frequency**	**Score**	**Frequency**	**Score**	**Frequency**
1	**مزدوران** استکبار (جهانی) Mercenaries of (global) arrogance	11	4	8.18	4	8.27	5
2	دنیای استکبار Arrogance world	10.62	4	8.66	30	8.83	28
3	استکبار جهانی Global arrogance	11.75	68	11.24	204	11.9	233
4	(نظام) **سلطه** و استکبار (system of) **hegemony** & arrogance	7.88	3	7.97	21	8.24	33
5	**توطیه** های استکبار جهانی Global arrogance's **plots**	0	0	9.04	16	8.96	16
6	ایادی استکبار Arrogance allies	0	0	8.27	4	0	0
7	**دشمنی** های استکبار جهانی Global arrogance enmity	0	0	7.73	5	0	0
8	دشمنی استکبار Arrogance enmity	0	0	0	0	7.27	4
9	جبهه استکبار Arrogance front	0	0	7.15	12	9.15	54

10	عوامل استکبار Agents of arrogance	0	0	6.95	8	0	0
11	جهان استکبار Arrogance world[234]	0	0	5.63	6	7.29	15
12	نظام استکبار Arrogance system	0	0	5.24	8	5.41	8
13	جریان استکبار Arrogance current	0	0	4.83	4	0	0
14	استکبار ستیزی Anti-arrogance	0	0	9.25	10	10.24	27
15	**روحیه** استکبار ستیزی **Spirit** of anti-arrogance	0	0	0	0	8.02	8
16	استیصال استکبار Desperation of arrogance	0	0	6.27	4	0	0
17	**تهاجم** فرهنگی استکبار Cultural **invasion** of arrogance	0	0	5.92	4	6.41	7
18	سیاست های استکبار Politics of Arrogance	0	0	2.99	6	5.92	6

9.2.8.1. Terms in Detail. *Arrogance* is among the most challenging concepts in Persian political terminology. Not because it has no equivalent in English, but because its etymology and interpretation in Persian are much more different from those in English. *Arrogance* or *istikbar* comes from the Arabic term *kibr*, which means swagger and pride. It is also mentioned in various Quranic verses[235]. It is one of the basic concepts of the Islamic Revolution's political ideology since it is an anti-arrogance political system. In Persian terminology, *arrogance* specifically implies America (at global level) and Israel (at regional level). Due to this brief overview of this concept, it is safe to say that terms related to *arrogance* are either lexical gaps (absent in English) or with added meaning components.

The great majority of English equivalents are suggested with (in)direct help of Sketch Engine. By direct help, it means Sketch Engine's Word Sketch and OneClick Terms have

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[234] In the Persian version, the synonym is used and it is not repetitive.
[235] C.f. section 2.5.1.

provided the given English equivalent. By indirect help, it means this corpus-mining tool has provided patterns and relevant terminological information to suggest equivalents that can be perceptible for the English-speaking reader.

Number 2 and 11 are the same in English, but different but synonymous words have been used in Persian. It is like saying 'arrogance world' or 'arrogance global', but since the former is more common (based on frequency-related data), it is used for both Persian terms. "Arrogance world" is the synonym of "Global arrogance"; i.e., they refer to the same phenomenon. "Arrogance world" has a close correlation with "arrogance system", "arrogance current", and "arrogance front". "Arrogance front" is the opposite of "resistance front". In the case of other collocations with *arrogance*, understanding and translating its collocations becomes less complicated when the concept is well-defined for the reader/ translator.

Figure 9.8 demonstrates that political context has affected the strength of the first two terms out of four shared terms. However, regarding terms, it must be said that political context matters; since most of the terms are absent in the parliament corpus. On the other hand, political affiliation has affected the strength of 4 terms out of 7 shared terms. So, it is significant in most cases. Political affiliation is also important regarding the use of specific terms. Figure 9.8 shows that pro-Reformist ILNA has five terms not present in pro-Conservative Tasnim. Tasnim only has two specific terms that are not present in ILNA.

Figure 9.8

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Arrogance' in each Corpus

Arrogance

9.2.8.2. Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. The super concept of *arrogance* is among the most challenging terms because of its dynamicity, which has led to a concept that is different from both its original Quran meaning and its English equivalent. Furthermore, it may cause ambiguity inherited in this concept. Furthermore, nine out of 18 extracted terms for *arrogance* do not have English equivalents. That is why this concept is assumed to be difficult for English-speaking translators.

Regarding phraseme templates, two of them have been seen in the terminology of *arrogance*. In the case of the second template, which is related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT, instead of DONE-BY as the category of conceptual relation, it would be better to name it DOER. Terms that suggest this modification are "agents of arrogance", "mercenaries of arrogance", and so on. Terminological phrasemes such as "arrogance front", "arrogance current", and "arrogance system" suggest that member-group (MEMBER-OF) is a better substitute for part-whole (PART-OF) relation suggested by León-Araúz et al. (2016).

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HAVE-FEATURE_LOCATION_WORLD-PART (related to EVENT + RELATION + OBJECT): "global arrogance"

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "Global arrogance's plots" and "cultural invasion of arrogance"

The predominant metaphorical scenario in the terminology of *arrogance* is related to the WAR source domain. It is hidden in terms such as "arrogance front" as a "Blasphemous Front" type. So there is always a war between right and wrong, between Right Front and Blasphemous Front. Iran is on the Right Front, and the arrogance in the Blasphemous Front. Moreover, God is with the Right Front.

Also, one conceptual element of the HUMAN source domain has been recorded, which is lost in the English version due to translational considerations. It is related to "Arrogance's allies". The word-for-word translation of the Persian term is 'arrogance's hands'. In Persian, ایادی is an Arabic term which is the plural form of 'hand'. It conjures up that *arrogance* is like a human being who hatches plots with the help of his hands (arms). It has negative semantic prosody because it implies that those allied countries do not have any willpower, and they follow America's commands as arrogance. It lies in the fact that hands do not move voluntarily and follow the brain's commands. Terrorist groups such as ISIS and "mercenaries of arrogance" are "arrogance allies".

9.2.9. *Security or amniyat (امنیت)*

The super concept of *security* is among this study's easy concepts, which is assumed not to cause translation difficulties for English-speaking translators. Table 9.20.1 shows that it is highly frequent in all three corpora, and the highest frequency of *security* has occurred in the

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pro-Reformist ILNA news agency. A concise discussion of its terminology and the role of political context and political affiliation will be offered after the below tables.

Table 9.20.1

The Frequency of 'Security' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
1,307	7,451	4,351	13,109

Table 9.20.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Arrogance' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in each Corpus

		Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
	Terminological Phrasemes	**Score**	**Frequency**	**Score**	**Frequency**	**Score**	**Frequency**
1	امنیت غذایی Food security	10.98	80	7.1	28	7.18	17
2	امنیت پایدار Sustainable security	9.72	34	9.39	149	9.84	114
3	امنیت داخلی Internal/national security	7.24	14	7.7	55	7.98	39
4	امنیت روانی Psychological security	7.17	5	6.22	95	5.87	7
5	امنیت کشور Country's security National security	6.62	48	7.67	273	7.76	168
6	امنیت عمومی Public security	6.58	9	6.75	30	6.96	19
7	امنیت انتخابات Election security	6.42	7	6.79	56	6.53	30
8	امنیت اجتماعی Societal security	6.04	9	6.65	31	6.44	15
9	امنیت اقتصادی	5.47	7	7.18	56	6.57	22

	Economical security						
10	امنیت مردم People's security	5.11	9	5.94	47	6.56	48
11	امنیت فرهنگی Cultural security	4.52	10	3.84	16	3.29	7
12	امنیت منطقه Regional security	5.94	21	8.7	211	8.46	103
13	امنیت مرزها (ی مشترک) Border security	0	0	7.75	51	7.95	35
14	امنیت دریایی Maritime security	0	0	6.8	27	5.7	8
15	امنیت هسته ای Nuclear security	0	0	6.15	24	0	0
16	امنیت زنان Women's security	0	0	5.91	19	0	0
17	امنیت جمعی Collective security	0	0	5.87	13	6	8

9.2.9.1. Terms in Detail. *Security* is one of the most accessible concepts since most of its terminology exists in English and has well-established equivalents with the slightest possibility of miscommunication. Number 3 and number 5 are synonyms, and they mean the same thing. The point is that in English, they are all called "national security," or in American English, it is called 'homeland security. However, in Persian, it is called "internal security" or "country's security" if we use literal translation. It is a discursive terminological variation to avoid repetition. So, to avoid any possibility of ambiguity and hence, miscommunication, "national security" is suggested to be used. However, both national and internal security have been recorded in English corpus.

Figure 9.9 shows that, unlike most previous concepts, parliament corpus is rich regarding security. Six out of 12 shared terms among all three corpora are sensitive to the political context in terms of term strength. So, no firm conclusion can be made in this regard. Given the political affiliation, just one out of 15 shared terms has significant score variance, and ILNA has just two specific terms to itself, while Tasnim does not have any. So it is safe to conclude that political affiliation does not affect either term strength or use of terms.

Figure 9.9

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Security' in each

Corpus

9.2.9.2. Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. *Security* terminology is assumed to be easy for English-speaking translators because Persian terms have approved English equivalents; there is no cognitive or other complicated terminological variation. There is no dynamicity of terms that may cause ambiguity or other cognitive difficulties. Regarding phraseme templates, all three main templates have been registered. However, in the case of the second template, the conceptual relation is other than DONE-BY. Moreover, it must be replaced by TYPE-OF. However, the template is kept intact for

discussion consistency and to keep patterns the same as previous sections. Furthermore, the ontological or conceptual combination (EVENT + RELATION + EVENT) is the same, and the relation is open to being modified.

HAVE-FEATURE_LOCATION_WORLD-PART (related to EVENT + RELATION + OBJECT): "National security" and "regional security"

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "Public security" and "nuclear security"

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "sustainable security"

There is no direct reference to metaphors in the terminology of *security*. However, the study of KWIC of terms conjures up the HOUSE source domain. Iran is a safe and secure house in a dangerous neighborhood or region (Middle East). To have "sustainable security", the security of other countries or other houses must be guaranteed too. This neighborhood's security can be realized by those living there and not by the interference of transregional governments. Another point revealed by the study of KWIC is that *security* has a very close relationship with the concept of 'martyrdom'. Iran's security depends heavily on those who are ready to get martyred to secure Iran and the region's "sustainable security".

9.2.10. Influence/ Infiltration or nofuz (نفوذ)

Influence or *infiltration* is one of the Supreme Leader's keywords. Most of the terms related to *influence* are easy to understand for English-speaking translators. However, it is generally assumed to be relatively tricky for an English-speaking translator due to some reasons explained below.

Table 9.21.1

The Frequency of 'influence' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
288	1,080	896	2,264

Table 9.21.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'influence' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in

each Corpus

		Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
	Terminological Phrasemes	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency
1	مصادیق نفوذ Instances/signs of infiltration	9.17	4	0	0	0	0
2	خطر نفوذ Hazard of infiltration	9.06	5	8.54	16	7.07	4
3	پروژه نفوذ Infiltration project	8.93	9	8.98	24	8.86	15
4	جریان نفوذ Current of infiltration	7.68	3	6.19	11	8.81	45
5	نفوذ دشمن Enemy infiltration	10.59	15	8.15	33	7.75	26
6	نفوذ اجانب Foreigners' infiltration	10.43	7	0	0	0	0
7	نفوذ **فرهنگ‌غربی** Penetration of Western **culture**	8.6	9	0	0	0	0
8	نفوذ فرهنگی Cultural penetration	7.53	13	7.56	20	8.03	22
9	نفوذ اقتصادی Economic infiltration	5.26	5	0	0	4.88	4
10	زمینه (های) نفوذ Area(s) of Infiltration	0	0	5.73	8	6.32	7
11	قدرت نفوذ Power of infiltration	0	0	5.7	7	6.71	11
12	نفوذ منطقه ای Regional influence	0	0	8.24	26	7.55	8

13	نفوذ کلام Words influence	0	0	8.15	8	0	0
14	نفوذ علمی Scientific influence	0	0	6.03	4	0	0
15	نفوذ امنیتی Security influence	0	0	5.59	4	7.53	9
16	نفوذ معنوی Spiritual influence	0	0	6.26	10	8.34	8
17	نفوذ فکری Intellectual influence	0	0	0	0	7.29	5
18	نفوذ **نرم** دشمن Enemy's **soft** infiltration	0	0	0	0	7.09	4
19	نفوذ **گفتمان** انقلاب اسلامی Influence of Islamic Revolution **discourse**	0	0	0	0	6.84	4
20	نفوذ سیاسی Political infiltration	0	0	4.33	7	6.6	20
21	**شناخت**[236] پروژه نفوذ **Recognition** of infiltration project	0	0	0	0	5.53	5

9.2.10.1. Terms in Detail. The most crucial point regarding *influence* is that generally speaking, the English equivalent is 'influence' unless overemphasis of the negative aspect is intended. In the Persian version, all are called *nofuz*; but Word Sketch Difference conducted on our English corpus suggests 'infiltration' in the case of overemphasis on the negative aspect of influence. Nevertheless, the same procedure on OPUS2 English and Brexit[237] corpora suggest the use of 'influence'. All in all, if it refers to Iran, just 'influence' is used. If it describes other countries' role, both 'influence' and 'infiltration' might be used; unless the negative aspect is at stake. Then, 'infiltration' is used. Infiltration, in this sense, is the near-synonym of 'espionage'.

The following two examples found in the English corpus are absent in Persian corpora. "Malign influence" is used by Western politicians referring to Iran's detrimental

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[236] It highlights the importance of 'consciousness' about and 'recognition' of enemy his infiltration methods. It is based on SL's discourse.

[237] "The Brexit corpus is a language corpus made up of English articles from the Web, blogs, comments, and tweets relating to Brexit, a referendum on an exit by the United Kingdom from the European Union." Retrieved from Brexit Prediction corpus search | Sketch Engine

influence (negative semantic prosody). So, for English-speaking readers/ translators, there is only one term, 'influence', and it has two Persian equivalents. Another term found in English corpus is "surreptitious infiltration," which Persian politicians and journalists use to refer to Saudi Arabia's role in the Yemen crisis. So, Persian writers overemphasized the negative influence and used 'infiltration'. The explanation is that English 'influence' has two meanings in Persian: 'effect' and 'infiltration'. The former has neutral semantic prosody, while the latter has negative semantic prosody.

It may cause ambiguity for (native) English-speaking readers of English versions of Persian news articles. Because when Persian writers/translators want to talk about Iran's influence, they use it in the sense of 'effect' and 'positive effect'. Moreover, when they want to talk about the influence of an opposing entity, such as *arrogance*, they use it in the sense of 'infiltration'. The final point or explanation could be the lack of standardization in political terminology in Iran. Here, terminological variation is due to cognitive reasons caused by variation in (political) ideology. Discussing terminology and language policy in Iran and providing standard equivalents or definitions are out of the scope of this study. This study can point at possible sources of miscommunication to pave the way for having alert English-speaking translators from Persian in the case of political texts.

The next main point regarding the terminology of this concept is that they are in line with different arrogance-backed wars imposed on Iran to break people's resistance. For instance, we have both "soft warfare" and "soft infiltration". Based on analysis of KWIC of "security influence", it is defined as the enemy's attempt to infiltrate Iran's security and sensitive sections such as nuclear plants. Moreover, "security influence" is an important issue, but what is even more critical and should be avoided is intellectual, cultural, and political influence.

The terminological behavior of this concept is also ambiguous compared with other concepts. Maybe it is because it has not well-established conceptualization in Persian terminology either. However, it is one of the main keywords of Ayatollah Khamenei's speeches. Figure 9.10 shows that, other than one case, political context does not affect term strength. It also shows that each corpus has two to four terms specific to itself. Just in the case of four terms, the score variance is significant. So, the political affiliation also does not affect term strength.

Figure 9.10

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Influence' in each Corpus

9.2.10.2.   Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. The super super concept of *influence* directly relates to *war, especially* "soft warfare". Just like the war that has so many types and aspects, *influence* also has various aspects and types. It is relatively complex because of terminological variation due to cognitive reasons. Another reason is related to the dynamicity of this concept. *Influence* is still in the dynamicity process of concept, explained in chapter 10. It means that its exact meaning and actual examples have not been established so far. So it is open to personal and ideological interpretations. Whether or not it has the potentiality of becoming a well-established concept will be determined in the future of Iran's political discourse. For instance, *arrogance* was once like *influence*, and it was ambiguous and not well-established. After the (completion of) process of dynamicity of this concept, the definition, meaning, and examples of *arrogance* are well-recognized in Persian political discourse.

Influence has a PHASE-OF conceptual relation with "soft warfare". It means that "soft warfare", as a type of *war* imposed on Iran, has phases or stages, and *influence* is one of them. All three main templates have been registered in the *influence* terminology regarding phraseme templates. We also had to modify the second template. For instance, "economic infiltration" and "cultural penetration" are instances of TYPE-OF conceptual relation. Another modification is HAS-FUNCTION related to "infiltration project," meaning enemy's project that has the functionality of influencing Iran.

HAVE-FEATURE_LOCATION_WORLD-PART (related to EVENT + RELATION + OBJECT): "Regional influence"

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "Recognition of infiltration project"

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "Enemy's soft infiltration"

The final point of this subsection is concerned with those conceptual mappings that connect metaphors to terminology and show how metaphor affects the use of terms. Based on the discussion of section 9.1.1.1 and the study of KWIC of terms mentioned in Table 9.21.2, the concept of influence or infiltration is related to the house source domain. Enemy infiltration is like the entrance of vermin into the house of Iran, and it must be avoided. This unpleasant entrance can occur in various ways, and for Conservatives, JCPOA is one of the entrance doors that the enemy has used to achieve his goals. JCPOA will be discussed in the next section.

9.2.11. JCPOA[238] or barjam (برجام)

JCPOA is assumed to be relatively challenging for English-speaking translators due to the neologism and dynamicity of terms it has shown. Further information about the terminology of JCPOA and the effect of political context and affiliation will be discussed after the following tables.

Table 9.22.1

The Frequency of 'JCPOA' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
947	7,421	4,323	12,718

Table 9.22.2

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[238] Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Terminological Phrasemes of 'JCPOA' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in

each Corpus

	Terminological Phrasemes	Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
		Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency
1	نقض برجام Breach/Violation of JCPOA	10.49	36	10.57	347	11.19	316
2	اجرای برجام Implementation of JCPOA	10.19	146	10.47	415	10.94	305
3	روح برجام Spirit of JCPOA	8.74	13	8.39	68	8.15	34
4	سند برجام JCPOA's Fact sheet	8.5	12	5.94	13	6.9	15
5	مذاکرات برجام JCPOA negotiations	8.29	8	7.03	30	7.15	18
6	دستاوردهای برجام Achievements of JCPOA	7.92	5	7.37	37	7.83	29
7	مفاد برجام Provisions of JCPOA	7.56	5	7.42	34	7.34	18
8	تعهدات برجام JCPOA commitments	7.12	4	6.86	26	6.16	9
9	برجام داخلی Internal JCPOA	6.05	5	0	0	3.37	6
10	مخالف برجام Opposing JCPOA	2.55	4	7.64	45	6.66	13
11	حفظ برجام Preserving/ Saving/ protecting/ maintaining the JCPOA	0	0	7.74	57	6.89	18
12	چارچوب برجام The framework of the JCPOA	0	0	7.51	40	6.22	9
13	دوران پسا برجام Post-JCPOA era	0	0	6.08	13	0	0
14	آینده برجام The future of JCPOA	0	0	5.94	17	6	10
15	سالگرد برجام Anniversary of JCPOA	0	0	5.79	11	0	0

16	موفقیت برجام JCPOA's success	0	0	5.78	12	0	0
17	ظرفیت های برجام JCPOA's capacities	0	0	5.16	9	0	0
18	منتقدان برجام Critics of JCPOA	0	0	5.15	7	5.9	7
19	برجام نفتی Petrolic JCPOA	0	0	5.12	7	0	0
20	روح و **جسم** برجام the text and the **spirit** of the JCPOA	0	0	0	0	6.19	8

9.2.11.1. Terms in Detail. Before addressing details of *JCPOA*, a brief explanation of the term itself, its origin, and its semantic process[239] in Persian are necessary. *JCPOA* is an abbreviation in English, while it is an acronym (*barjam*) in Persian. Regarding the typology of this acronym, it is an acronym pronounced as a word containing non-initial letters. At first, it is imported into Persian from English based on the title of the nuclear agreement between Iran and P5+1. Then, the semantic change called 'broadening' or 'semantic generalization' has gained more general meaning. So much so that any national plans or achievements to compensate for sanctions and improve people's quality of life is called "internal JCPOA" or "internal *barjam*". Another neologism based on this broadened use of JCPOA is called "petrolic JCPOA," which refers to achievements in the petroleum industry during Rouhani's presidency that led to a rise in oil price and hence, economic recovery. Also, any negotiations with other countries over Iran's other programs, such as the 'missile program' was referred to as JCPOA I, JCPOA II, and JCPOA III. The lifespan of these neologisms was short, and they are not that popular anymore.

"Post-JCPOA era" means the ordinary circumstances in Iran after implementing JCPOA significantly flourishing economy that it was supposed to bring for Iran after lifting

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[239] This process can also be categorized as 'dynamicity of term.'

sanctions. Before discussing the role of political context and affiliation, one point regarding syntactic difference between English and Persian is worth mentioning. One of the most common Persian collocational patterns is 'noun + noun' comprising gerund or verbal noun (functioning as a noun) and the noun, the object[240]. For instance, numbers 10 and 11 are of this type of construction. The extra point about number 11 is that the English corpus showed variance in the choice of the verb; i.e., for expressing the same noun in Persian, various English verbs have been used. It is due to discursive terminological variance to avoid repetition. Based on frequency, "preserving the JCPOA" is suggested.

"Spirit of JCPOA" refers to inferences drawn from the text and what is mentioned in this nuclear agreement. In the agreement, some facts are written officially, and also, there are unwritten inferences made later on. In Persian, the former is called the 'body of JCPOA,' and the latter is called the "spirit of JCPOA". The literal translation of the number 20 is 'the spirit and the body of JCPOA'. However, Word Sketch analysis of English corpus suggested: "the text and the spirit of the JCPOA," which is a better equivalent.

Figure 9.11 implies that the parliament corpus is not as rich as other corpora regarding terms. Moreover, it affects the strength of terms in just three cases. Given the political affiliation, ILNA has significantly more terms specific to itself. It can be because ILNA is a pro-Reformist news agency, and JCPOA is considered the achievement of Reformist presidency time. Political affiliation has affected the strength of terms in 2 instances out of 13.

Figure 9.11

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[240] Section 5.2.2.

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'JCPOA' in each Corpus

9.2.11.2.   Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. The difficulty of JCPOA-based terminology is due to two reasons: a) various neologisms that do not have well-established English equivalents and b) the dynamicity of terms that have led to the semantic broadening of JCPOA. Terminological variation is due to discursive reasons, and it will not cause translation difficulty or the possibility of miscommunication.

Regarding phraseme templates, just one template has been found. Other than the conceptual relation of DONE-BY, relations such as TYPE-OF (Petrolic JCPOA), PART-OF (Spirit of JCPOA), and RESULT-OF (JCPOA commitments) are also present in the terminology of JCPOA. The only phraseme template is:

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "Opposing JCPOA" and "preserving JCPOA"

There are direct references to the HUMAN source domain regarding conceptual mappings shared between metaphor and terminology. JCPOA is considered a human being who has spiritual (spirit of JCPOA) and physical (body of JCPOA) aspects. Just like a human being, it must be respected and preserved. Every country must be faithful to it and adhere to its commitments regarding JCPOA. Another metaphorical aspect regarding JCPOA is that it is also a treatment for numerous problems described as diseases. That is why its semantic has been generalized to other national and international crises.

9.2.12. Freedom or azadi (آزادی)

The super concept of *freedom* is assumed to be easy for English-speaking translators. At first, tables relating to freedom statistics and its terminology will be offered. Following the tables, a concise discussion of terms and the role of political affiliation and context will be addressed. After the figure of freedom-related terminology, the final points will discuss conceptual relations and mappings that connect metaphor and terminology.

Table 9.23.1

The Frequency of 'Freedom' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
205	2,019	1,630	3,854

Table 9.23.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Freedom' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in each Corpus

		Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
	Terminological Phrasemes	**Score**	**Frequency**	**Score**	**Frequency**	**Score**	**Frequency**
1	**نهضت** (های) آزادی (بخش) Freedom movements	10.25	4	8.28	16	11.72	164
2	آزادی بیان Freedom of expression	9.41	12	8.58	161	8.54	88
3	آزادی مردم People's freedom	5.11	8	5.03	20	5.31	17
4	حق آزادی ... Right to freedom of ...	3.64	3	7.67	25	6.07	5
5	تضمین آزادی Guarantee the freedom/ ensuring freedom	0	0	7.06	7	0	0
6	اصل آزادی Principle of freedom	0	0	6.92	12	6.15	5
7	الگوی آزادی خواهان Role model for freedom fighters	0	0	6.84	6	0	0
8	احساس آزادی Sense of freedom	0	0	6.3	6	7.57	11
9	آزادی رسانه ها Media freedom	0	0	7.39	18	7.12	10
10	آزادی مسیولانه Responsible freedom	0	0	7.39	8	0	0
11	آزادی عقیده Freedom of belief	0	0	7.32	8	7.12	5
12	آزادی های گروهی Freedom of association	0	0	6.74	6	0	0
13	آزادی عمل Freedom of action	0	0	6.71	15	7.05	13
14	آزادی های مذهبی Freedom of religion	0	0	6.63	6	0	0
15	آزادی های قانونی Legal/ constitutional freedom	0	0	6.62	10	0	0
16	آزادی اجتماعات Freedom of assembly	0	0	6.6	5	0	0
17	آزادی های اجتماعی Social freedom	0	0	6.59	15	6.03	6
18	آزادی های اساسی Fundamental freedoms	0	0	6.43	12	6.66	8
19	آزادی های سیاسی Political freedom	0	0	6.02	24	6.56	21
20	آزادی های عمومی Public freedom	0	0	6	8	0	0
21	آزادی آموزش Educational freedom	0	0	5.75	5	0	0

22	آزادی احزاب Freedom of Political parties	0	0	5.64	9	0	0
23	آزادی مطبوعات Freedom of the press	0	0	7.36	34	7.3	6
24	آزادی اندیشه Freedom of thought Freedom of conscience or ideas	0	0	6.86	28	7.86	11
25	آزادی های فردی Individual freedom	0	0	6.84	26	0	0
26	آزادی های مدنی Civil liberties	0	0	6.28	17	0	0
27	آزادی های مشروع Legitimate/legal/constitutional freedoms	0	0	8.09	55	7.96	9
28	گفتمان آزادی Discourse of freedom	0	0	0	0	5.26	8
29	آزادی انضمامی Concrete freedom	0	0	0	0	5.14	5

9.2.12.1. Terms in Detail. *Freedom* is among easy concepts since its terminology is universal and Persian terms have well-established English equivalents. There are two English terms for one Persian term in the case of number 15 and number 24. in the case of number 27, which is a synonym of number 15, one Persian term can be expressed in three ways in English. The only point is that 'legitimate' or 'legitimacy' in Persian has nuances of religion. In other words, it refers to those freedoms that are legitimate according to Islamic rules (*sharia*).

Regarding political context, Figure 9.12 depicts that the parliament corpus significantly lacks terms related to *freedom*, which is taken for granted. Political context also affects the strength of terms in 2 cases out of 4. Regarding political affiliation, pro-Reformist ILNA news is significantly rich regarding the use of terms; i.e., there are 12 terms mentioned just in ILNA. Political affiliation has affected the strength of terms in 3 cases out of 15.

Figure 9.12

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Freedom' in each

Corpus

Freedom

● Parl. Deb.　● ILNA　● Tasnim

(Chart with y-axis labeled "LogDice" ranging 0–34, x-axis labeled "Terms")

9.2.12.2. Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. The terminology of *freedom* is assumed to be easy, but it does not mean that it will not cause any challenges for English-speaking translators. Some cases of terminological variation have been registered, which must be taken into consideration. Some are related to the Persian language, and others are related to the English language. For instance, English 'liberty' and 'freedom' have one Persian equivalent, and it is آزادی *azadi*.

Among three main phraseme templates, two have been registered in the terminology of *freedom*. The most common ontological combination is EVENT + RELATION + EVENT, and the most common conceptual relation is TYPE-OF. For instance, "Freedom of assembly" and "social freedom" are types of freedom. Another relation is PHASE-OF which is formalized

in "Discourse of freedom," which refers to discourse (of freedom) as a phase of achieving freedom.

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "Guarantee the freedom"

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "responsible freedom"

Investigation of KWIC of these terms has revealed that they are related to FAMILY and RELIGION source domains based on the concept of brotherhood and equal rights of freedom. For instance, political parties are like brothers, and all of them have the right to express their ideas. It, in turn, is related to "freedom of expression", "freedom of political parties", "political freedom", and so on. A detailed discussion of the role of brotherhood, especially Islamic brotherhood, has already been discussed in section 9.1.3.1. We should remind that Islamic rules determine every type of freedom, definition, and maxims of *freedom*.

9.2.13. Islam or islam (اسلام)

Islam is a relatively easy super concept since its terminology has approved English equivalents. The discussion of terms and the roles of political affiliation and context will follow the statistics of the super concept and its terminology. Concluding remarks are related to metaphor and their shared conceptual mappings that have led to those terms.

Table 9.24.1

The Frequency of 'Islam' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total

		719	4,136	4,827	9,682

Table 9.24.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Islam' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in each

Corpus

		Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
	Terminological Phrasemes	**Score**	**Frequency**	**Score**	**Frequency**	**Score**	**Frequency**
1	جهان اسلام Muslim world/ Islamic world	11.34	77	12.01	885	11.86	737
2	امت اسلام Islamic community	9.32	12	9.09	64	9.04	72
3	دشمنان اسلام Enemies of Islam/ Islam's enemies	9.31	13	9.05	109	8.97	118
4	مبانی اسلام Principles of Islam	8.56	7	0	0	0	0
5	مکتب اسلام Islamic school	8.25	5	7.5	20	6.93	16
6	شهدای اسلام Martyrs of Islam Muslim martyrs	8.23	8	0	0	3.88	8
7	حریم اسلام Islamic sanctity	7.97	5	0	0	0	0
8	احکام اسلام Islamic laws/ Sharia	8.18	11	0	0	0	0
9	معیارهای اسلام Islamic criteria	7.92	4	0	0	0	0
10	قطب اسلام Islamic hub	7.82	4	0	0	0	0
11	تاریخ اسلام History of Islam	7.39	5	7.98	35	7.25	24
12	اسلام عزیز Beloved Islam	4.75	5	7.94	29	7.86	30
13	آموزه های اسلام Teachings of Islam	6.41	5	6.5	10	6.97	16
14	فرهنگ اسلام Islamic culture Muslim culture	6.2	9	6.27	12	6.12	11
15	نماد اسلام Symbol of Islam	6.05	4	3.77	6	4	8
16	وحدت جهان اسلام Muslim unity	6.05	5	6.13	44	6.25	47
17	رزمندگان اسلام Warriors of Islam	0	0	9.04	5	8.65	53

18	حاکمیت اسلام Sovereignty of Islam	0	0	6.45	11	6.44	12
19	تعالیم اسلام[241] Teachings of Islam[241]	0	0	6.22	7	6.58	12
20	عظمت اسلام Glory of Islam	0	0	6.16	8	5.98	8
21	برکات اسلام Blessings of Islam	0	0	5.71	6	3.96	8
22	دیدگاه اسلام Islamic viewpoint	0	0	5.59	6	3.92	8
23	قدرت اسلام Islam's power	0	0	5.37	9	5.56	10
24	اندیشه **سیاسی** اسلام Islamic **political** thought	0	0	4.88	12	0	0
25	اسلام **هراسی** Islamophobia	0	0	9.05	55	8.82	53
26	فلسفه ی **سیاسی** اسلام Political philosophy of Islam	0	0	0	0	5.17	11
27	اسلام آمریکایی American Islam US-favored version of Islam	0	0	7.56	26	8.16	44
28	اسلام واقعی Real Islam	0	0	7.34	18	7.98	31
29	اسلام رحمانی Merciful Islam	0	0	7.23	15	6.47	10
30	اسلام **ناب** محمدی **Pure** Muhammadan Islam	10.78	20	8.05	106	10.55	174
31	نظام اسلام Islamic system	0	0	4.95	37	8.38	99
32	تمدن اسلام Islamic civilization	0	0	4.74	12	7.28	21
33	آرمان های اسلام Ideals of Islam	0	0	4.72	13	6.13	10
34	اسلام اصیل Genuine/ original Islam Authentic Islamic	0	0	4.13	7	6.48	10
35	اسلام تکفیری Takfiri Islam	0	0	4.47	10	4.91	15
36	اسلام راستین True Islam	0	0	0	0	6.19	8

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[241] In the English version, it seems repetitive, but in the Persian version, it occurs with another equivalent, and it is mentioned twice to have the average score of its occurrence and hence, a better perception of its collocational behavior.

37	جریان اسلام Islamic movement	0	0	0	0	4.85	6

9.2.13.1. Terms in Detail. Before addressing some detailed discussions of *Islam* and its terminology, an outstanding lexicogrammatical feature is worth mentioning. Providing numerous adjectives for describing Islam has resulted in many synonyms or near-synonyms. Furthermore, the role of adjectives for describing different types of Islam and the negativity or positivity of their semantic prosody is highlighted in this concept. Some are easy to understand, such as "real Islam", "beloved Islam", and "true Islam". Others are a bit tricky and may cause confusion and miscommunication, such as "authentic Islam" or "genuine Islam," which in Persian is the synonym of "pure Muhammadan Islam" with positive semantic prosody. While in English, "authentic Islam" refers to Islam defined by ISIS ideology, and it has negative semantic prosody. This ISIS-supported type of Islam is described as "Takfiri Islam," which means 'blasphemous Islam'. The same applies to the "Islamic movement," which in English correlates closely with ISIS and other Islamic terrorist groups; while in Persian, it refers to (revolutionary) movements in Islamic countries.

Numbers 1, 14, and 17 have two well-established English equivalents for the one Persian term. Regarding number 27, Word Sketch (in Sketch Engine) has found both English equivalents. "American Islam" was first used by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Revolution. It contrasts with 'revolutionary Islam', which is the Islam favored by revolutionists, and it is anti-arrogance. So, for Ayatollah Khomeini, 'revolutionary Islam' minus 'revolution' becomes "American Islam," which serves the interests of America.

Figures 9.13.1 and 9.13.2 demonstrate that parliament pays special attention to this concept and has some terms that have only been registered in the parliament. The political context has affected term strength in 3 out of 11 shared terms among three corpora. Political

566

affiliation has affected term strength in 5 cases (out of 28), and no significant effect on having a specific term has been recorded. So, political affiliation does not matter.

Figure 9.13.1

*The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Islam' in each Corpus*

Figure 9.13.2

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Islam' in each Corpus

Islam

9.2.13.2. Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. Terms related to *Islam* are assumed to be relatively easy for English-speaking translators. Although some challenges are foreseen, they can be overcome. There are terminological variations in English and Persian mainly due to discursive reasons. So they should not cause severe problems in the communicative process of translation. However, cases of different conceptualization of the same term (e.g., authentic Islam) must be translated with a grain of salt.

The terminology of *Islam* has shown examples of all three phraseme templates. Another conceptual relation is the TYPE-OF which is seen in "American Islam" or "US-favored version of Islam" and "Takfiri Islam".

HAVE-FEATURE_LOCATION_WORLD-PART (related to EVENT + RELATION + OBJECT): "Muslim world"

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "Sovereignty of Islam" and "teachings of Islam"

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "Pure Muhammadan Islam", "real Islam", and "merciful Islam"

The terminology of *Islam* has direct references to conceptual elements of EDUCATION and HUMAN source domains. Moreover, the analysis of KWIC words has revealed that Islam is similar to a school, where the best political ideas are taught. The lesson plan is based on "true Islam" and "principles of Islam". One of the teachings of this school is martyrdom. Other conceptual elements are related to the HUMAN source domain. They are adjectives that describe Islam as a human being. For instance, "merciful Islam" and "beloved Islam" conjure up a person you love and compliment him/ her. Also, section 9.1.6.1 approves that Islam is like a beautiful envisage and that "Islamophobia" tries to corrupt it.

9.2.14. Culture or farhang (فرهنگ)

The super concept of *culture* is a relatively tricky concept for English-speaking translators. After tables on culture statistics in all three corpora, a brief discussion of terminology and the role of political affiliation and context will be presented. Following Figure 9.14, concluding remarks regarding the relationship between metaphor and terminology of *culture* will be pointed out.

Table 9.25.1

The Frequency of 'Culture' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
804	2,162	1,560	

Table 9.25.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Culture' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in each Corpus

	Terminological Phrasemes	Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
		Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency
1	نفوذ فرهنگ (غربی) Influence of (Western) culture	8.6	9	4.09	5	0	0
2	انتقال فرهنگ Cultural transmission	6.74	4	6.76	7	6.21	12
3	فرهنگ ایثار و شهادت Culture of **altruism** & martyrdom	10.98	38	8.95	27	9.2	23
4	فرهنگ قرآنی Quranic culture	9.2	10	7.86	12	8.45	13
5	فرهنگ عمومی Public culture	8.82	35	8.33	41	8.27	22
6	فرهنگ دینی Religious culture	8.63	9	8.83	38	7.68	12
7	فرهنگ ایرانی ـ اسلامی Iranian-Islamic culture/ Iranian and Islamic culture	8.32	9	7.98	34	7.46	12
8	(نفوذ) فرهنگ **غربی** Western culture	8.3	8	7.61	14	8.84	27
9	فرهنگ غنی Rich culture	8.16	5	8.63	21	7.81	8
10	فرهنگ مقاومت Culture of resistance	7.88	5	6.12	6	6.85	9
11	فرهنگ ناب Pure culture	7.85	4	7.04	7	7.23	6
12	فرهنگ اسلامی Islamic culture Muslim culture	6.31	23	5.92	40	6.15	41
13	فرهنگ **جهاد** و (شهادت) Culture of *jihad* Jihadi culture	6.28	4	6.83	7	7.79	10
14	فرهنگ **انقلاب** اسلامی Culture of Islamic Revolution	5.71	4	4.25	6	5.26	16

15	خرده فرهنگ ها Subcultures	0	0	6.92	6	7.75	7
16	فرهنگ عاشورا Culture of *Ashura*	0	0	8.61	22	8.18	10
17	فرهنگ صلح Culture of peace	0	0	7.85	20	0	0
18	فرهنگ بسیجی *Basiji* culture	0	0	7.79	12	9.51	33
19	فرهنگ **عفاف** و حجاب Culture of hijab	0	0	7.76	11	0	0
20	فرهنگ شهادت Culture of martyrdom	0	0	7.69	15	7.34	9
21	فرهنگ عبودیت Culture of servitude	0	0	7.13	7	0	0
22	فرهنگ غلط False culture	0	0	7.07	8	4.85	5
23	فرهنگ جامعه Social culture	6.14	4	7.06	31	7.35	24
24	فرهنگ اهل بیت Culture of *Ah al-Bayt*	0	0	6.46	5	7.41	7
25	فرهنگ حسینی Culture of Imam Hussein	0	0	6.35	5	0	0
26	فرهنگ سیاسی Political culture	0	0	5.81	21	6.17	16
27	فرهنگ ملی National culture	4.13	8	5.65	12	6.73	16
28	فرهنگ دفاع مقدس Culture of Holy Defense	4.41	3	5.56	8	6.37	12
29	فرهنگ کار Work culture Culture of work	5.18	8	5.37	16	4.55	6
30	فرهنگ مشترک Shared culture	0	0	6.09	8	4.88	7
31	فرهنگ صبر Culture of patience	0	0	4.69	6	0	0
32	فرهنگ ازدواج Culture of marriage	0	0	4.41	5	0	0
33	فرهنگ جهانی World/global culture	0	0	4.06	8	0	0
34	فرهنگ مشارکت Culture of cooperation Cooperative culture	0	0	3.69	5	0	0
35	فرهنگ دموکراسی Culture of democracy	0	0	0	0	7.04	5

9.2.14.1. Terms in Detail. The terminology of *culture* is relatively difficult. Other than those with approved English equivalents, numbers 12, 33, and 34 are Persian terms with two English equivalents. None of them are assumed to cause difficulty or miscommunication. Others are perceptible in English but may have extra meaning components in Persian, e.g., "Culture of jihad" and "culture of martyrdom". These two, in addition to "Culture of Holy Defense", "culture of Ashura", and "Culture of Imam Hussein," are all closely interwoven with the concept of martyrdom. They imply that a culture of readiness for getting martyred must be promoted in society.

"Culture of marriage" refers to promoting a culture of easy, cheap, and Islamic weddings among young people. Terms such as "culture of patience" and "culture of resistance" are related to encouraging people to be patient and calm during hardship caused by sanctions and, consequently, economic problems. "Culture of servitude" is a bit ambiguous and difficult to explain. It refers to the spiritual aspect of life and being a good servant of God, but this, in turn, demands an economically stable situation in the country. It may come from an Islamic belief that 'poverty lives next door to blasphemy'.

Figure 9.14 shows that parliament has fewer terms compared with news agencies. The political context has not affected term strength at all. Political affiliation is important since ILNA has eight terms absent in the other two corpora. Political affiliation has affected term strength in 5 cases (out of 23), so it does not matter in this regard.

Figure 9.14

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Culture' in each Corpus

Culture

Parl. Deb. ILNA Tasnim

9.2.14.2. **Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots.** The terminology of *culture* is assumed to be almost difficult for English-speaking translators because some terms do not have English equivalents, and even if one is provided, it will need an extensive definition. For instance, "Basiji culture" refers to a type of culture pursued by the para-military force of Basij. This culture comprises the culture of resistance before arrogance, the culture of love for jihad and martyrdom, the culture of self-esteem and the belief that Iranians can do anything if they trust in God's limitless power, and a culture of servitude and sincerity. "Basiji culture" has arisen from the "culture of Ashura".

This much complexity and interdependency of terminology of culture maybe because the Islamic Revolution is a cultural revolution and deeply under the influence of Islam. On the other hand, it is overemphasized that Islam is an all-encompassing religion and has teachings and instructions for every aspect of life from social to political and economic

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issues. So, it is no wonder if *culture* has been collocated with a wide variety of other concepts.

All three main phraseme templates have been recorded in the terminology of *culture*. Most terms are related to TYPE-OF conceptual relation and have a specific aim or function. For instance, "culture of martyrdom" is a type of culture that nurtures a culture of martyrdom to encourage people to sacrifice their lives for the Islamic Revolution's ideals. "Culture of Ashura" is a hyponym of "culture of martyrdom" and "culture of resistance".

HAVE-FEATURE_LOCATION_WORLD-PART (related to EVENT + RELATION + OBJECT): "World culture"

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "Influence of (Western) culture" and "cultural transmission"

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "Rich culture", "false culture", and "shared culture"

The study of KWIC of terms mentioned in Table 9.25.2 shows that *culture* terminology is directly related to EDUCATION and NATURE source domains and especially religious conceptual elements of those domains. For example, "basiji culture" has learned lessons of martyrdom and resistance at the school of Ashura; now, it is becoming a school where these lessons are taught (cf. section 9.1.8). Another metaphor is related to the NATURE source domain. For example, Basij is the Blessed Tree in heaven and martyrs are like fruits of this tree (cf. section 9.1.2). So, these cases and other similar metaphors show the importance and conceptualization of *culture* in Persian political discourse.

9.2.15. *Insight or basirat (بصیرت)*

Basirat as one of the Supreme Leader's keywords is among the difficult super concepts of this study for English-speaking translators. At first, two tables related to insight statistics and its terminology in each corpus are provided. Then, the terminographical definition of *insight* and the role of political affiliation and context will be addressed. Following the relevant Figure of insight-related terms, final points regarding shared conceptual mappings of metaphor and terminology will be discussed.

Table 9.26.1

The Frequency of 'Insight' in each Corpus

Parliamentary Debates	ILNA	Tasnim	Total
33	345	551	929

Table 9.26.2

Terminological Phrasemes of 'Insight' and their Frequency and LogDice Score in each Corpus

		Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
	Terminological Phrasemes	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency	Score	Frequency
1	روز بصیرت Day of insight	5.66	3	0	0	6.14	9
2	پرچم بصیرت Flag of insight	0	0	8.05	3	6.45	5
3	سند بصیرت Proof of insight	0	0	6.86	3	0	0
4	بصیرت افزایی Boosting insight	0	0	10.7	25	10.99	34
5	بصیرت آفرین Insight-creating	0	0	8.55	4	8.82	6
6	بصیرت انقلابی Revolutionary insight	0	0	6.96	5	6.71	8

7	بصیرت دینی Religious insight	0	0	6.6	4	4.88	4
8	بصیرت لازم Necessary/required insight	0	0	5.22	3	0	0
9	بصیرت سیاسی Political insight	0	0	4.59	8	6.42	17
10	بصیرت الهی Divine insight	0	0	4.55	3	6.64	4
11	بصیرت جامعه Society's/ social insight	0	0	2.97	6	4.82	14
12	مظهر بصیرت Symbol of insight	0	0	0	0	8.75	5
13	اوج بصیرت Zenith of insight	0	0	0	0	8.17	4
14	اهل بصیرت Insightful people	0	0	0	0	7.43	4
15	وقت بصیرت Time for insight	0	0	0	0	4.6	4

9.2.15.1. Terms in Detail. The concept of *insight* does exist in English, but since it is not a keyword in English politics, its terminology has not been developed as much as Persian's. *Insight* is in close relationship with the concept of *the enemy* since it is like a discernment that helps someone recognize the enemy and take the appropriate action at the right time. It is a revolutionary Muslim's weapon in the "great jihad". Referring to Frame Semantics, *insight* is an INSTRUMENT that everyone must have, and by using it, they can realize the enemy. For Ayatollah Khamenei, *insight* is a collection of recognitions: recognition of time, recognition of needs, recognition of priorities, recognition of enemy, recognition of friend, and recognition of tools that must be utilized against the enemy.

Contrary to "insightful people", there are also 'unperceptive authorities' who get fooled by arrogance and ignore the country's and nation's priorities. It happens rarely, and it is because they lack insight and its recognitions mentioned above. Insight is the correct understanding of truth regarding a country's interests.

Most terms are absent in English, so they are considered lexical gaps. Most of the English equivalents provided in Table 9.26.2 are just suggestions and aim to understand Persian terms as much accurately as possible. Only numbers 1 and 9 were found in the English corpus using the Word Sketch feature of Sketch Engine.

Figure 9.15 shows that parliament is almost devoid of this terminology. There are 4 Tasnim-specific terms, while there are 2 ILNA-specific terms. Political affiliation has also affected term strength since five out of 8 terms have shown significant variance in their given LogDice score.

Figure 9.15

The LogDice Score of Terminological Phrasemes Related to 'Insight' in each Corpus

9.2.15.2. Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots. The super concept of *insight* generates terms assumed to be difficult for English-speaking translators. It is because of lexical gaps: 12 terms out of 15 Persian terms mentioned in Table 9.26.2 do not have well-established English equivalents. The dynamicity of *insight* seems to be completed because the Supreme Leader has elaborated the definition of *insight*. However, since this concept has been conceptualized differently in English, it would be difficult for English-speaking translators to take into account these added meaning components in the process of translation.

Regarding phraseme templates, two of them have been registered in the terminology of *insight*. Regarding the ontological combination of EVENT + RELATION + EVENT, there are also instances of TYPE-OF relations: "revolutionary insight", "religious insight," and "political insight".

HAVE-FEATURE_DONE-BY_ACTION (related to EVENT + RELATION + EVENT): "Boosting insight" and "insight-creating"

HAVE-FEATURE_AFFECTED_POPULATION (related to EVENT + ATTRIBUTE): "Divine insight"

The study of KWIC of terms mentioned in Table 9.26.2 demonstrates that it is related to the VEHICLE source domain, PATH scenario, and straight path. As it has already been expounded in section 9.1.5, there is only one correct path, like the Straight Path mentioned in the Quran. Right now, Iran is on that path, and any detour is reproached. Recognizing the status of the logic of (Iran's Islamic) Revolution and recognition of the Straight Path designed

by Ayatollah Khomeini is sheer *insight*. Those who lack insight (the unperceptive) step into the detour and get fooled by arrogance.

Chapter 10. Discussion

This chapter is devoted to concluding remarks regarding this study's metaphorical and terminological aspects. First of all, discussions relevant to metaphorical patterns, modification of CMT regarding Persian metaphors, the role of political affiliation and political aspects, and relevant research hypotheses will be addressed. Then, difficulties translating Persian political discourse for the English-speaking translator will be categorized according to ambiguity and hierarchy of difficulty. Furthermore, the applicability of FBT to Persian political terminology will be checked, and its advantages and adaptations will be addressed. Since it is a multi-disciplinary study, final points are devoted to this study's contributions to translation competence.

10.1. Features of Persian Metaphorical Patterns

The general conclusion is that Persian political texts are demanding for translators because general political knowledge will not help the translators succeed in Iran's case when translating from Persian to English and other languages related to a Western political stance. It is inseparably interwoven with religious, cultural, and literary concepts.

10.1.1. Persian Metaphorical Patterns and Political Affiliation

Regarding the first research hypothesis, this study has shown how the religio-political ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran is reflected in metaphorical patterns or how metaphorical patterns are proof of the religio-political ideology behind the Islamic Revolution. It has also demonstrated how various scenarios are related to each other and even complement each other. Metaphorical patterns and the consistent relationship among them, along with a deep dive into discourse analysis of conceptual elements in context, have proved that politicians may claim something in contrast with their true political ideology. For instance, they continuously claim that people are essential and the nexus of their power

without discrimination. However, discourse analysis of metaphorical patterns demonstrates that only religious people abiding Guardianship of the Supreme Leader are at the pivotal part of power relations in Iran.

Political affiliation does not make a significant difference in viewing the main elements of metaphorical patterns, especially of significant issues that are the bases of the Islamic Revolution's political system, such as 'Guardianship', 'martyrdom', and 'Arrogance'. It is justifiable because political parties and politicians cannot be official and functional if they do not abide by those basics. The central concept in national affairs is Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, and both political affiliations consider the Supreme Leader a holy, unquestionable, and infallible person. So if he is the father, he is an authoritative one regardless of political affiliation. Depending on the scenario, if he is a teacher or commander, his guidelines must be followed unquestionably. Any disobedience is considered a blasphemous act.

People or nation is another current conceptual element overemphasized in the Persian political discourse. However, those having faith in the Guardianship of Supreme Leader and participating in public elections enter into the castle or school of Revolution, so they are in a safe place. Guardianship and founders of Revolution are like pillars of power or inexpungable walls. However, people protect them, and they owe their existence and meaning to that group of people believing in the divine duties of politicians and are ready to sacrifice their lives to protect Islamic Revolution. Political affiliation does not make a significant difference in viewing people and their roles in Iran's political system.

As the concealed but critical concept of the Islamic Revolution's basis, martyrdom is the borderline concept between national and international affairs. It highly correlates with people's fidelity and faithfulness to Islamic Revolutionary ideals. The higher the level of

fidelity, the higher the probability of sacrificing one's life and getting martyred to preserve the Revolution. Those people are the source of the Revolution's power since they are ready to protect and save the Revolution from internal and external threats. It is how basic concepts such as power, martyrdom, arrogance, nation, guardianship, and independence work in Iran's political system. Furthermore, political affiliation does not make a significant difference in this viewpoint.

Arrogance as the primary umbrella term for Iran's enemies includes an arrogant country that does not accept Iran's independence and does not respect Iran out of its pride. The origin of this enemy view is expounded in the RELIGION scenario. All political affiliations share this viewpoint, and the only difference is that Reformists do not overemphasize it as much as Conservatives do. The major countries considered as arrogance are the United States and Israel. The United States is also called 'Great Satan', which is also explained in the religion domain.

The only difference political affiliation makes is that Reformists and Moderate Conservatives support international negotiations and believe in foreign diplomacy. However, extremist Conservatives do not believe in foreign diplomacy and consider it negotiations with the enemy. Even those Conservative supporting negotiations do not accept the achievements of Reformists in this regard. So, it does not mean that Conservatives do not support international relations; they only disapprove of the Reformists' way of doing it. The only difference political affiliation makes at the national level is regarding 2009 post-election events. For both of them, it was against the rules. For Reformists, it was 'unrest', and now, it is the time of 'reconciliation'. Nevertheless, it was 'sedition' for Conservatives, and it will be neither forgiven nor forgotten.

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Regarding the second hypothesis, although the classification of Persian metaphorical patterns is different from the English counterparts discussed in Musolff (2004, 2016), they share most features. There is a similarity or connection among metaphorical patterns in terms of a conceptual element's entailments as a source or target domain. CMT introduced by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) can explain it. In CMT, instead of traditional components of metaphor (tenor, vehicle, and ground), there are the source and target domains. In CMT, there is an arbitrary conceptual relation between source and target. That is why they argue that not only do we use metaphors, but we also think in metaphors. CMT considers the traditional view of metaphors as 'resemblance metaphor' based on the resemblance between tenor and vehicle.

For instance, the Supreme Leader is described as the father in the FAMILY scenario, the commander in the WAR scenario, wall surrounding the castle of Revolution in the HOUSE scenario. It is because the entailments are shared. For instance, the father's role in the FAMILY scenario is similar to the headman's role in the village and the teacher in the EDUCATION domain. They share the conceptual relation of 'being in charge of managing a group of people or 'having the superior position'. It is also the same as the role of commander in war, and children and soldiers share the presupposition of obeying father's/commander's wants. Alternatively, the tree's role in NATURE is the same as the person's role in the HUMAN scenario. The shared entailment is that they grow and have an evolutionary life span. A person is described as a tree with roots, and the tree's root is a person's identity because a person without identity cannot live. However, the point is that this conceptual relation between source and target is more complicated in Persian than in English. It will be discussed in section 10.1.3.

Persian political discourse has shown that the RELIGION domain includes umbrella scenarios, and all the other scenarios spring from that one. In other words, there is a hierarchical relationship among the scenarios. Religion is on top of all others because religious conceptual elements and portraits are outstandingly present in all scenarios related to every single source domain. In the case of English, Musolff (2004) claims that the HOUSE scenario is the one that is present in all other scenarios and is the underlying scenario of all the others. However, he does not provide any proof to support this claim, for instance, by applying discourse analysis or other clues. Another difference between Persian and English political metaphors is the direction of source-target relation. While in English, uni-directional source-target relation is dominant and bi-directional one is an exception and needs a historical approach to metaphor analysis; in Persian, bi-directional relation is a rule and happens simultaneously. In other words, there is no need for a historical or diachronic analysis of Persian metaphors.

10.1.3. Modified Version of CMT

Figure 10.1 demonstrates our proposed model for this bi-direction source-target relation in Persian political metaphors. In this model, concepts such as source and target domain are related to the surface structure[242] of a metaphor and lead us to the deeper structure, which is more important. On the deep structure, the source domain is not necessarily concrete; i.e., it can also be abstract. Nevertheless, the target domain is more or less abstract. In this deep structure, the relation between abstract and concrete concepts (phenomena) is also bi-

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[242] Borrowed from Chomsky's terminology of surface structure and deep structure.

directional. So, this model will highlight *abstract* and *concrete* aspects[243] of concepts in deep structure.

Figure 10.1

Modified Version of CMT for Persian Metaphors

The outcome of this model is that there are three possible processes of creating conceptual metaphors (metaphorization) in terms of both the direction and the abstract or concrete nature of concepts:

i. An abstract concept is described in terms of a concrete concept

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[243] Discussing the degree of abstractness and what distinguishes abstract from concrete is out of the scope of this study's translational nature and purposes.

Democracy is described as the gate of the castle.

ii. **A concrete concept is described in terms of an abstract concept**

Basij (an organization) is described as Blessed Tree (Heaven).

Iran is Heaven.

iii. **An abstract concept is described in terms of another abstract concept**

Martyrdom is described as the fruit of the Blessed Tree.

The best manifestation of exceptional cases of bi-directional source-target (or, in our terminology, concrete-abstract) relation in Persian metaphor is revealed in the RELIGION source domain, which is the umbrella source domain of all other domains that accumulate the dominance of bi-directional source-target relation in Persian metaphors. In these cases, the actual concrete understanding[244] of, for instance, a tree accompanied by religious images perceived by the Quran would help the metaphor user to imagine and understand Blessed Tree in Heaven.

A final point about these three possible processes is their relevance to translation studies. Process (i) is assumed to cause the slightest difficulty for English-speaking translators in the decision-making process or understanding how that particular metaphor works. Process (ii) does not exist in English metaphorical patterns, and if there is any, they are rare and evolve over time. So, it is assumed to be difficult for an English-speaking translator to process it and transfer it to the receiver of the translated text. About (iii), it does not exist in English, and we predict it will be the most challenging type of metaphor for English-speaking translators in the translation process.

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[244] Experientialist approach of Lakoff & Johnson (1980).

If we consider these three processes as parts of a continuum starting from easy to difficult, (i) is at the starting point; (ii) is at the middle; and (iii) is at the end. We should warn that it should not lead to wishful thinking that the first process is easy for the translator without causing any trouble because the same process of metaphorization exists in English. It just means that identifying the metaphor and perceiving the process of its creation is more comprehensible for English-speaking translators. Since most instances of the process (iii) are identified in the religion source domain, it is assumed that this domain would be the most difficult one for English-speaking translators of Persian political texts. This type of hierarchy of difficulty is based on the model explained in section 10.6.

10.1.3.1. Modified Version of CMT: Criticisms and Answers. Some may argue that one concept may be abstract for one person, and the same concept may be concrete for another person of the same society. It is related to the strong version of the Whorf-Saparian hypothesis, which makes translation impossible. On the other hand, section 4.2.2 has argued what is considered abstract or concrete in the current study.

Some may call this type of abstract phenomenon imaginative knowledge or imaginary things. We have discussed it in section 4.1.4 as 'imaginative rationality'. However, in line with the experientialist approach, it seems that it is not an imaginary concept for those Iranians who believe in Heaven and are raised by reading descriptions of Heaven mentioned in the Quran. It is abstract in the sense that it is not tangible, but, for them, it does not mean that it is imaginary. Martyrdom and those who sacrifice their lives to go to Heaven prove the reality of such elements related to the extralinguistic issue. Again, more detailed discussions of abstract versus concrete phenomena and imaginative rationality are out of the scope of this

study, and this brief and concise clarification of our understanding of abstract and concrete serves the aim of this study.

10.2. The Role of Political Context and Political Affiliation: Statistical Evidence

The role of political context has already been shown by Figure 7.1 related to comparison among the three corpora collected for this study and two other corpora provided by Sketch Engine. It approves that political context makes a difference, not by chance. Besides this general statistical evidence, other specific statistics have been calculated to investigate the extent of political context's significance (effect size of p-value).

Since Musolff's corpora are both small and metaphor-specific research corpora, he could easily search corpora based on his conceptual elements related to source domains while ensuring the accuracy of frequency numbers. In other words, frequency numbers would show the word's metaphorical occurrence and not its literal and non-figurative use. However, in our study, solely relying on the frequency of main conceptual elements related to source domains would be misleading since not all occurrences were metaphorical. To overcome this problem, we took into account only the frequency of primary signals ('lexemes' in Musolff's term). So, the sum of all frequencies related to one source domain was considered the number of that source domain's frequency. This total number is the basis for other statistics to check its reliability and assure that it is not by chance or due to a different corpus size. However, before providing p-value statistics and their interpretations, descriptive statistics related to frequency and percentage of metaphors found in each corpus is worth mentioning.

Figure 10.2 depicts the frequency of conceptual elements of each source domain in each corpus regardless of metaphorical or non-metaphorical use of those elements. For instance, the HOUSE AND CONSTRUCTION source domain has conceptual elements such as

house, ceiling, door, and key. The sum of all those elements' occurrences, wether metaphor or non-metaphor, is 2074, 2117, and 1672 in the parliament, ILNA, and Tasnim corpus respectively. Figure 10.3 demonstrates the frequency of only metaphorical conceptual elements related to each source domain in each corpus. For instance, regarding the HOUSE AND CONSTRUCTION source domain, only 311 out of 2074 occurrences have been metaphorical occurrences in the parliament corpus. Figure 10.4 shows the percentage of each source domain in each corpus. For instance, 15% of all conceptual elements' occurrences related to the HOUSE AND CONSTRUCTION source domain were used metaphorically in the parliament corpus.

Since frequency and percentage are descriptive statistics, their differences and wether they are meaningful or not needs further investigation especially regarding the dissimilar-sized corpora. This discussion will be covered shortly in this section. However, at this point, Figure 10.4 demonstrates that the GAME AND SPORTS source domain has the highest percentage of metaphorical use in all three corpora. It means that, compared with other source domains, this domain's conceptual elements are more prone to be used metaphorically in all three corpora.

Figure 10.2

Frequency of Conceptual Elements of each Source Domain in each Corpus

Figure 10.3

Frequency of Metaphorical Conceptual Elements of each Source Domain in each

Corpus

Figure 10.4

Percentage of Metaphors related to each Source Domain in each Corpus

Figure 10.5 displays the frequency of all conceptual elements found in each corpus regardless of source domain and metaphorical or non-metaphorical use. For instance, in the parliament corpus, 14417 occurrences of all conceptual elements, wether metaphorical or non-metaphorical use, related to all source domains were found. Figure 10.6 displays the frequency of only metaphorical uses of conceptual elements related to all source domains in each corpus. For instance, 1150 out of 14417 occurrences have been used metaphorically. It means that 7.98% of occurrences have been metaphors. Figure 10.7 displays the percentage of metaphors found in each corpus regardless of source domain. Figure 10.7 demonstrates that the highest percentage of metaphorical use of conceptual elements belongs to Tasnim where 17.98% of occurrences have been metaphors. Furthermore, the least percentage belongs to the parliament where only 7.98% of occurrences have been metaphors.

Figure 10.5

Frequency of all Conceptual Elements in each Corpus

Figure 10.6

Frequency of Metaphorical Conceptual Elements in each Corpus

Figure 10.7

Percentage of Metaphors found in each Corpus

Now that descriptive statistics have paved the way by giving a general impression of metaphors found in this study, we can discuss statistics showing the significance or insignificance of these frequency differences in each corpus. Table 10.1 shows the descending order of 10 source domains in three corpora based on just the frequency of primary signals:

Table 10.1

Descending Order of Frequency of Primary Signals Related to Source Domains in each Corpus

	Parliamentary Debates		ILNA		Tasnim	
Order	**Domain**	**Freq.**	**Domain**	**Freq.**	**Domain**	**Freq.**
1	HOUSE	311	GAME	1,636	GAME	1,482
2	GAME	189	VEHICLE	624	WAR	663
3	RELIGION	113	ARTS	538	ARTS	439
4	VEHICLE	110	WAR	480	HUMAN	434
5	WAR	95	HUMAN	403	RELIGION	420

6	FAMILY	93	NATURE	399	VEHICLE	389
7	HUMAN	76	FAMILY	325	NATURE	374
8	ARTS	68	HOUSE	302	FAMILY	258
9	NATURE	49	RELIGION	265	EDUCATION	219
10	EDUCATION	46	EDUCATION	210	HOUSE	139

Table 10.1 shows differences in the order of source domains based on frequency. Since the size of each corpus is different, the effect of corpus size and effect size of discrepancy among the results shown in Table 10.1 is not eliminated yet. So, we solved this problem using p-value statistics (section 6.4) provided by Sketch Engine. A negative score of Bayes Factor BIC is 'in favor of the null hypothesis. Here, the null hypothesis is that 'there is no relationship between observed frequency and political context'. Table 10.2 indicates that other than the house source domain, the observed frequency differences are significant to a great extent. In other words, just in the case of the house source domain, the observed frequency variation among the three corpora is insignificant, and there is no relation between political context and frequency of using this source domain.

Table 10.2

P-Value of Observed Frequencies of Primary Signals Related to Source Domains in Three Corpora

	Observed Frequencies		Totals	Expected Frequency		LL[245]	Bayes Factor BIC

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[245] Log Likelihood.

	Parl.	ILNA	Tasnim		Parl.	ILNA	Tasnim		
HOUSE	311	302	139	752	234.91	311.17	205.91	47.20	-35.11
GAME	189	1636	1482	3307	1033.05	1368.42	905.52	1402.49	1320.19
RELIGION	113	265	420	798	249.28	330.21	218.51	253.47	171.17
VEHICLE	110	624	389	1123	350.81	464.69	307.50	295.64	213.34
WAR	95	480	663	1238	386.73	512.28	338.99	560.28	477.98
FAMILY	93	325	258	676	211.17	279.73	185.10	116.31	34.01
HUMAN	76	403	434	913	285.21	377.80	250.00	329.82	247.52
ARTS	68	538	439	1045	326.44	432.42	286.14	397.52	315.22
NATURE	49	399	374	822	256.78	340.14	225.08	344.87	262.57
EDUCATION	46	210	258	514	160.57	212.69	140.74	192.35	110.05
Total	4398332	5826200	3855348	14079880					

Now, an even more critical question emerges: How do we know that the significance of observed frequency variation is due to the variable of political context and not the political affiliation? Although the general answer has already been given by Figure 7.1, the more specific statistical proof is Table 10.2. When we omit frequencies related to parliamentary debates, the p-value statistics change drastically. So it proves two points simultaneously: a) Political context matters and b) Political affiliation does not play a significant role. The latter will be discussed very soon. As previously mentioned, a negative score of Bayes Factor BIC means it favors the null hypothesis. However, the range of this score, whether positive or negative, also matters. According to Effect Size Calculator developed by Lancaster University and available via Sketch Engine, the following interpretations of scores are plausible[246]:

0-2: not worth more than a bare mention

2-6: positive evidence against/in favor of the null hypothesis

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[246] Log-likelihood and effect size calculator (lancs.ac.uk)

6-10: strong evidence against/in favor of the null hypothesis

> 10: very strong evidence against/in favor of the null hypothesis

Table 10.3

P-Value of Observed Frequencies of Primary Signals Related to Source Domains in Two Corpora Related to the News Agencies

	F1	RF1	F2	RF2	LL	%DIFF	Bayes	ELL	R Risk	Log Ratio	Odds Ratio
House	302	0.01	139	0.00+	13.06	43.77	−3.02	0.00000	1.44	0.52	1.44
Game	1636	0.03	1482	0.04−	75.99	−26.95	59.90	0.00000	0.73	−0.45	0.73
Religion	265	0.00	420	0.01−	128.37	−58.25	112.28	0.00000	0.42	−1.26	0.42
Vehicle	624	0.01	389	0.01+	0.86	6.15	−15.23	0.00000	1.06	0.09	1.06
War	480	0.01	663	0.02−	153.36	−52.09	137.28	0.00000	0.48	−1.06	0.48
Family	325	0.01	258	0.01−	4.73	−16.64	−11.36	0.00000	0.83	−0.26	0.83
Human	403	0.01	434	0.01−	49.37	−38.55	33.29	0.00000	0.61	−0.70	0.61
Arts	538	0.01	439	0.01−	10.52	−18.90	−5.56	0.00000	0.81	−0.30	0.81
Nature	399	0.01	374	0.01−	23.20	−29.40	7.12	0.00000	0.71	−0.50	0.71
Education	210	0.00	258	0.01−	44.56	−46.14	28.47	0.00000	0.54	−0.89	0.54

Note. F1 refers to the observed frequencies in the first corpus (ILNA). RF1 refers to the relative frequencies in the first corpus (ILNA). F2 refers to the observed frequencies in the second corpus (Tasnim). RF2 refers to the relative frequencies in the second corpus (Tasnim).

In comparison with Table 10.2, Table 10.3 has more p-value statistics "because %DIFF, Relative Risk, Log Ratio and Odds Ratio are only applicable to pairwise comparisons"[247]. Table 10.3 demonstrates that the observed frequencies of four source domains are not significant, and there is no relationship between political affiliation and the frequency of

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[247] Log-likelihood and effect size calculator (lancs.ac.uk)

those source domains. In the case of HOUSE and ART source domains, there is positive evidence supporting the null hypothesis. This time, the null hypothesis is: 'There is no relationship between the observed frequency and the political affiliation'. Furthermore, VEHICLE and FAMILY source domains demonstrate solid evidence favoring the null hypothesis. It is proved that the observed variation in frequencies of some source domains was not affected by political affiliation. So, they can be omitted from Table 10.3. By doing so, the descending order of source domains in terms of frequency in the two news agencies will be what Table 10.4 depicts.

Table 10.4

Descending Order of Source Domains whose Frequency was Significant

Order	ILNA	Tasnim
1	Game	Game
2	War	War
3	Human	Human
4	Nature	Religion
5	Religion	Nature
6	Education	Education

Table 10.4 arranges the six remaining source domains in a descending frequency hierarchy in each news agency. It demonstrates that among all six rows, just numbers 4 and 5 have significant frequency variance between the two news agencies. So, the overall conclusion based on Tables 10.3 and 10.4 is that political affiliation does not influence the use of metaphors except for RELIGION and NATURE source domains. In pro-Reformist ILNA, NATURE is more frequent than RELIGION, while in pro-Conservative Tasnim, RELIGION is more frequent than NATURE.

Two final points need to be reminded of before closing the discussion of the effect of variables such as political context and political affiliation. First of all, the insignificance of

political affiliation in metaphorical patterns means that both Conservatives and Reformists use metaphors of the same conceptual mappings of the exact source domains with almost the same frequency and ubiquity. For instance, in the source domain of vehicle and movement, they both have the conceptual mappings, like IRAN IS A VEHICLE MOVING TOWARDS ITS DESTINATION. If any, the role of political affiliation, occurs at the level of *scenario* and *presuppositions* behind those scenarios. For instance, there is the scenario of the train (and its passengers) in the VEHICLE AND MOVEMENT domain. From the viewpoint of Reformists, Conservatives detrain every politician who disagrees with them. While for Conservatives, those Reformists were tired of the journey, and they got off the train. Another alternative is that those Reformists had already missed the train and never got on it. An example of how political affiliation difference works at the level of presupposition is the case of *the headman* in the scenario of IRAN IS LOCATED IN A GLOBAL VILLAGE. Conservatives heavily criticized Rouhani for calling America headman of the world. At the same time, Reformists argued that being a headman does not necessarily mean a good and fair person.

Secondly, genre-specific features may affect the results of this study, whether it be metaphors or terminology. For instance, studies (Berber Sardinha, 2011) have shown that conversations and oral language usages are not rich in metaphors, and metaphors are more common in written texts. The current study has confirmed it in the case of Persian too. Since parliamentary debates are oral language usages (conversations), some may criticize the conclusion and claim that the observed difference is due to this fact. Even though it may be true, two points are still worth mentioning.

First of all, the researchers of this study were aware of this fact and its influence, and they have tried to reduce its effect as much as possible by bearing it in mind the whole time while analyzing and making conclusions based on data. Secondly, this assumption of fewer

metaphors expected in conversations does not apply to this study or, at least, does not influence it drastically. In other words, its effect is negligible due to the argumentative essence of parliamentary debates, which distinguishes it from regular everyday conversations to some extent—on the other hand, considering official political contexts and situations and parliament and news agency as two primary resources were the aim of this study. Therefore, including parliamentary debates as oral political discourse was inevitable.

Another genre specificity relevant to this study is concerned with the genre of news. For instance, the news is filled with wordplays, and its text type usually has the function of appealing to the reader and convincing him/her to do or think in a certain way. First of all, wordplays are predominantly seen in headlines and pretexts, and this is why every single news article has been edited manually. This process is explained in section 7.1.2. This study has adopted a sociocognitive approach to types of texts and their functions regarding text type. It means that instead of 'text type', "textual force" is taken into account (Tsiplakou and Floros, 2013). This approach for translation studies implies that "what is translated is, ultimately, the force of a text, above and beyond its structural features as inference-inducing mechanisms" (Tsiplakou and Floros, 2013, p. 127). This 'textual force' is also related to translation competence because "the awareness of an actual textual force beyond the apparent textual function may prove very fruitful in terms of a tertium comparationis" (Tsiplakou and Floros, p. 127). Finally, what is essential is that the researcher has been aware of such factors affecting her data, and she has analyzed them accordingly while trying to reduce adverse effects as much as possible. Furthermore, such factors and their effects do not reject the beneficialness of the results for translation studies. Because regarding the general purpose of this study, those factors are negligible.

Finally, the last but not least outcome of this aspect of the current study would be what English-speaking translators from Persian must know and what linguistic features they are supposed to expect regarding different political contexts. That is to say, when they are translating speeches of parliamentary debates from Persian, they do not need to have a deep understanding of metaphors at religious, cultural, and political levels; not at least, as much deep as in the political context of news agencies.

10.3. Comparison of Persian and English Metaphorical Patterns

As it has already been mentioned in various parts, this study is based on Musolff's (2004 & 2016), and the comparison addressed in this section is based on his findings and not on other relevant studies. He discusses scenarios related to five source domains out of the twelve domains he had proposed. However, they are merged into four source domains according to our categorization. Musolff's scenarios related to PERSON and BODY PARTS source domains are merged into one domain of HUMAN BEING, EMOTIONS, AND HEALTH in this study. In English and Persian, conceptual elements such as life-cycle, poison, and cure are mentioned. The difference is that there is no discussion of 'kiss of life in Persian. In English, there exists the discussion of the premature birth of the European Union[248], while in Persian, there is just the birth of a healthy child named the Islamic Revolution.

In English, 'heart' is at the center, and critical political entities are described as the heart. In Persian, on the other hand, 'vertebral column is used to describe critical political entities. In English, the typical presupposition is a healthiness of a given body part or person (a political entity), while in Persian, the typical presupposition is a sickness of a given human

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[248] According to Musolff (2004), its frequency is much less than that of German metaphors.

body. There is less discussion of sickness in English, while there is considerable discussion of sickness referring to a range of ailments in Persian. In English, mortality is possible even in national problems (ailments) scenarios. In Persian, mortality is discussed just in the case of international issues such as terrorism as an ailment, and in the case of national issues, the conceptualization of immortality is hidden. Some other conceptual elements in Persian are absent in English metaphors. For instance, extensive uses of face, visage, generation, evolution, and attributing human emotions and actions to political entities were dominant in Persian, while they were absent or rare in English.

There is no female role such as mother or sister in Persian metaphorical patterns in the family scenarios. The emphasis is on male roles such as father and brother. The only references to mothers are related to negotiation and terrorism. The former assumes a positive and peaceful role for the mother. While the latter connotes negative meaning. The common ground is a woman's fertility giving birth to negative or positive phenomena.

Furthermore, there is no sign of single motherhood. In English, on the other hand, although the dominant scenario is 'strict father' and there are still traces of male-dominant cultures, nurturant parent and single motherhood are discussed primarily in recent political discourse. In Persian, there are two more concepts in this regard, and both have negative semantic prosody: 'dry/wet nurse' and 'guardian'. It must be reminded that religion lies at the heart of Persian metaphors related to kinship and family, while this feature is not observed in English.

There is no reference to conceptual elements related to love affair, (love) triangle, courtship, and romance in Persian. The only type of love or emotional bond between the family members of Iran is divine love. While in English, there are numerous references to these concepts when they discuss the relationship between parties and countries. Unlike

English, Persian family metaphors do not discuss divorce. It has been mentioned once to describe the possibility of separation of Moderates and Reformists. In Persian, the relationship problems among family members are discussed, and Reformists suggest reconciliation. However, in English, such concepts are absent. Another element found in Persian absent in English is big vs. little brother. Big brother sometimes is presupposed to be a bully (not kind to little brother), and little brother is always respectful to his older brother. There is also a brief discussion of illegitimate children in Persian metaphors, and it refers to phenomena such as ISIS.

Given the source domain of VEHICLE AND MOVEMENT, most conceptual elements are shared between English and Persian but with nuances of semantic aspects in Persian. They both refer to problems as obstacles, but twists and defiles are also discussed in Persian. They both discuss a ship as a vehicle in a multi-vehicle journey, but in Persian, shipwreck is not mentioned at all. There are problems like human and ailment scenarios in Persian, but none of them can destroy the vehicle or lead to a cul-de-sac. They both use metaphors related to tickets, cars, and engines. Some additional conceptual elements that have only been recorded in Persian metaphors are traffic signs, captain, or driver. In Persian, the driver of the vehicle is the Supreme Leader.

The main difference between English and Persian scenarios related to this domain is that train or any vehicle is used to describe national issues in Persian, while in English, it is mainly used to discuss international issues of European integration. What is at stake in English is being punctual and being at the train station to get on the train of the European Union, while in Persian, getting off the train of the Islamic Revolution and the reason behind it is in jeopardy. Persian metaphors have shown no reference to air travel or airplane than English. In English, moving forward and backward is mentioned, while in Persian, other than

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a few references to moving forward, the main emphasis is moving upward and downward. English metaphors are highly devoted to the pace of vehicles (slow and fast lanes), while in Persian, the pace does not matter, and the only reference to acceleration is mentioned as a supporting argument for the Moderate presidential candidate.

In Persian, Islamic Revolution is the Ship of Salvation, while in English, Clinton is described as an unsinkable Titanic. In Persian, the only path is the Straight Path both at sea and on land, and any alternative is considered a detour. In English, on the other hand, a detour is not mentioned, but there is not enough evidence to conclude that there is only one path without alternatives. In both English and Persian, political entities have been described as a person who moves and walks in a direction without mentioning any vehicle. Musolff (2004) preferred to mention it briefly in this domain, while we have already discussed it in detail in the source domain of HUMAN BEING, EMOTIONS, AND HEALTH.

The source domain of HOUSE AND CONSTRUCTION is the one that most of its elements are shared between English and Persian. Conceptual elements of the backyard, window, door, basis, foundation, roof, architect, strength, collapse, garden, wall, rooms, fence, and pillar are the shared ones. They have more or less the same metaphorical meaning in English and Persian, but they cannot be said with absolute certainty because Musolff has not provided a detailed account of them. Some nuances of the metaphorical meaning of some of these concepts are as follows. In Persian, the architect of the house of the Islamic Revolution has been appointed: Ayatollah Khomeini. The element of collapse in Persian is mentioned very few times just as a warning. Musolff mentions different rooms of a house in a table and does not provide text excerpts, but even this much evidence for differentiating rooms is not mentioned in Persian. Actually, in Persian, the house of Iran has so many rooms, but the

underlined point about them is that they all are serving rooms; i.e., there are authorities in them who are serving the nation. So, the name of the room does not matter.

Both English and Persian talk of a shared house, and the only difference is that it is a common European house; while in Persian, it is Muslims common house. In other words, Iran is a shared house for all Muslims. There is no discussion of the bridge, rent, or landlord in Persian. Instead of a bridge, there are other constructions such as a mill, fort, and citadel. Musolff mentions furniture as a conceptual element but does not elaborate on it. Instead of furniture, in Persian metaphors, there is a quite elaboration of decoration, especially mirror. While conceptual elements such as lock and key are highlighted in Persian metaphors, English metaphors do not have these two elements.

10.4. What Metaphors Reveal about Iran's Political Ideologies

Before closing the metaphor discussion, we should point out one final issue based on earlier discussions and Patterson's (2022) study on metaphors in *Jihadi* texts. Patterson's (2022) study is based on a corpus of 1,272,003 words compiled from www.jihadology.net. This webpage consists of texts related to groups with a jihadi ideology such as al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab). She applies Charteris-Black's (2004) critical metaphor analysis, which comprises individual and social resources. Individual resources involve "cognition, emotion, pragmatic, and linguistic knowledge" (personal communication). "Influence of ideology, culture, and history" form social resources (personal communication). Patterson (2022) identifies three central ideological dichotomies: a) light vs. dark, b) prey vs. predator, and c) seed vs. weed. She also finds traces of the 'blood's significance in metaphorical patterns mentioned in *Jihadi* texts (personal communication).

We have applied a different metaphor analysis model on a different corpus. Nevertheless, we share some findings. Among three dichotomies discussed in Patterson's

(2022) work, Persian political discourse shares the dualism of 'light vs. dark' and 'prey vs. predator'. Emphasizing that Iran is Heaven and the West is Hell, the enemy is like a wolf invading Iran, and negative semantic prosody given to the enemy's shadow are instances of dichotomous ideology.

Conceptual mappings behind political metaphors reveal that Iranian politicians' discourse shares dichotomous ideologies with extremist discourse, even though they do not admit it or their political discourse at the international level does not show it. For instance, they use terror to make people adhere to the anti-arrogance paradigm by insisting that Iran is a safe island and the rest of the world is dangerous. It is one of the primary signs of dualism in the extremist discourse (Schwager, 2004). Another criterion of extremist discourse is the insistence on the zero-sum game, God's commands, and the evil nature of the enemy (MacDonald et al., 2008).

Another point is regarding the *blood* and its role in Iran's political ideology due to the conceptualization of *Jihad* in a defensive sense. In Persian political discourse, the blood is the symbol of martyrdom, which is why it is considered sacred. It guarantees Iran's security. Consequently, it implies that politicians talk of democracy for those religious people willing to get martyred to maintain Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.

Patterson (2022) concludes that metaphors are based on "shared and entrenched conceptualizations of inherent 'goodness' vs. 'evil'" in these ideological juxtapositions (personal communication). It is also seen in some Persian political metaphors. She also points out that "jihadists are both victims (of the West) and defenders (of the faith)" (personal communication). In the case of Persian political discourse, Iranians and especially martyrs are both victims and defenders. Patterson (2022) correctly highlights that "dichotomous discourse seeks to disregard the complexities of identity (religion, geography, nationality,

gender) for the purpose of manipulation and persuasion" (personal communication). Our study has also shown it.

The difference between Patterson's (2022) findings regarding Jihadi dichotomous discourse and Persian political discourse is that Iran's political discourse does not encourage brutal crimes. In Persian dichotomous discourse, blood and martyrdom are sacred phenomena, and they must be done when defending the Islamic country demands it. It does not justify brutal actions in the name of defending Islam.

10.5. Features and Difficulties of Translating Persian Political Terminology

Just Like metaphorical patterns, the terminology of parliamentary debates is not as rich as the news agencies'. Again, it might be due to the oral and conversational nature of debates in the parliament. Section 10.2 has already discussed this question and its answer.

Political context does affect the use of terms in the sense that parliament, as a different political context, is not as rich as news agencies and has a smaller number of terms. In other words, there are so many terms that are used in news agencies, while they do not exist or are not common in the parliament. However, political context does not affect the strength of terms; i.e., the strength of political terminology is not sensitive to the political context and where it is used. Political affiliation does affect the use of terms in the sense that each news agency has specific terms absent in the other news agency, which can be because of their political affiliation. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that this difference is not significant; at least, it is not significant based on the findings of this study. Although variance of term strength (showed by LogDice score) in terms of political affiliation is recorded, it is not significant to make a firm conclusion.

Another critical issue is that many terms are ambiguous, even in Persian. In the following, a categorization of ambiguity causing translation difficulty and hence, miscommunication in Persian political terminology is addressed.

10.5.1. Ambiguity due to Dynamicity of Terms

One source of ambiguity in Persian political terminology is the dynamicity of terms. It is partially related to semantic changes on loanwords common in all languages, such as specialization[249]. This phenomenon is seen in most languages, but what makes it specific in the case of Persian political terminology is some 'conditions' that will be named 'filter' in this discussion.

The starting point of this dynamicity is usually a Western political loanword. Then, a religious filter is applied to it. This religious filter has two phases: a) A Quranic term (etymologically, Arabic term) is introduced as the equivalent of that Western term; then, b) the Supreme Leader, as a religio-political figure, elaborates the Quranic term and changes nuances of meaning. The second phase of the religious filter is realized when the Supreme Leader uses a concept or term that becomes the keyword of his speech. Then, news agencies broadcast his speech highlighting those keywords. The critical point is that up to this stage of dynamicity, the term may remain vague and ambiguous since it has neither its Arabic semantic features nor its Persian semantic features. In some critical situations, the official webpage of Ayatollah Khamenei provides further explanations to reduce the level of ambiguity and misinterpretation. Mass media are also responsible for establishing the term's meaning in line with Supreme Leader's guidelines by providing examples for that term.

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[249] C.f. section 3.3.1

The movement from the Supreme Leader's stage to the mass media stage is not a direct and one-way move. It is a back-and-forth movement until the term, and its examples have been established. Sometimes, the Supreme Leader even complains about his speech's misinterpretation and keywords in mass media. The final stage is related to the end-user experiencing coexistence of terms and loanwords. The end-user can be academia, ordinary people, and politicians. So, both can be used interchangeably for a couple of reasons and lead to terminological variation, which will be explained in the following sub-section.

An example of this process is 'arrogance' or *istikbar* in Persian (Figure 10.8). As mentioned, the starting point of dynamicity of a term is usually a borrowed term from English or other Western languages. So, 'imperialism' was introduced into Persian. Then, based on the semantic features and meaning components of 'imperialism', a term, 'arrogance' with similar features, was adopted from Quran. Of course, there had been differences between the two terms.

On the other hand, 'imperialism' had already been established in Persian terminology. So, 'arrogance' needed to be elaborated to find its place in Iran's political terminology. In this regard, the Supreme Leader, the most powerful authority in Iran's political system, determines the meaning as the religious filter applier. After each speech that Ayatollah Khamenei addresses, mass media highlight keywords for a couple of days and exemplify keywords. For instance, that speech states that the US and Israel are considered arrogant countries. After a while, sometimes after years and decades, the end-user is exposed to the coexistence of terms and loanwords.

Ayatollah Khamenei's official webpage is one of the primary and accredited resources to discover the Supreme Leader's opinion and ideology about everything. In an article titled "Why 'arrogance' and not 'imperialism'" published on Ayatollah Khamenei's

official webpage[250], 'arrogance' has four characteristics, and it is recognized based on them. Those four characteristics are swagger, refusing righteousness, permitting crimes, and fraud. Then, following examples for each of them, the author concludes that the US is arrogant globally and Israel is at a regional level. The article also highly recommends that 'arrogance' must be utilized instead of 'imperialism'.

Figure 10.8

Dynamicity of Arrogance

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
250 چرا «استکبار» و نه امپریالیسم؟ - دیگران (khamenei.ir)

The Persian dynamicity of political terms' significance lies in the 'religious filter' that the Supreme Leader implements. The drift of this process is that etymologically speaking, neither of the two terms are Persian. They are either Western (mainly English or French) or Arabic. It shows that, presumably due to religious reasons and political ideologies, Arabic terms are preferred to Western terms.

Another critical point is that any term whose process of dynamicity is not completed yet tends to be highly ambiguous even for Persian native speakers. It happens especially when the term is stuck in a back-and-forth movement between the Supreme Leader filter and mass media filter. The final point is when the Supreme Leader establishes and approves the term. This approval can be drawn from his speech or his official webpage. It is not to say that all terms find their way to the end-user. Sometimes the term is abandoned totally before reaching the end user. Sometimes it is abandoned because public opinion refuses the term and does not use it frequently. For instance, 'fire at will' discussed in section 9.1.9.1 had a short life, and the end-user never accepted it. Figure 10.9 shows the dynamicity of terms in Persian political terminology and assumes where that ambiguity happens.

Figure 10.9

Dynamicity of Terms in Persian Political Terminology

Other than the ambiguity of some terms for even Persian native speakers, there are other cases where the starting point is not necessarily Western terms. That is to say, there are shared terms in both English and Persian, but in Persian, they have been overemphasized, and hence, more terminology has been created around them compared with English. It usually happens when they become keywords in Ayatollah Khamenei's speech. For instance, both *insight* and *influence* exist in English; but they are not very strong concepts with rich terminology like Persian. So, there is no lexical gap in itself; but there is an overemphasis which leads to terminology that, at best, needs reinterpretation in English. So, although the process of dynamicity of term is a little different from Western loanwords, the importance and the effect of the Supreme Leader filter cannot be overstated.

10.5.2. Ambiguity due to Terminological Variation

Due to the dominance of General Theory of Terminology for decades and orientation to one-to-one equivalents and standardization in terminology, any terminological variation is avoided and even refused. The assumption is that they may confuse the translator and cause translation difficulty due to ambiguity, leading to miscommunication. Nevertheless, the truth is that not all types of terminological variations cause translation difficulty. It may be the case of amateurs in the translation field, but for experienced translators, terminological variation is a norm, and they have admitted it and have found strategies to deal with it. So, this procedural expert knowledge is related to translation competence and, especially, terminological competence.

Discussing all reasons behind all categories of terminological variation is far beyond the scope of this study. However, data analyzed in section 9.2 will support a succinct discussion of those types that have been seen in the terminology of super concepts and making assumptions about which one tends to cause miscommunication due to ambiguity.

Among all categories of terminological variation proposed by Freixa (2006) and Bowker and Hawkins (2006) that León-Araúz et al. (2016) mention in their work, three have been shown in Persian political terminology investigated in this thesis:

a)   Functional terminological variation due to register (mode, tenor, field)

b)   Discursive terminological variation due to stylistic preferences or avoidance of repetition

c)   Cognitive terminological variation due to variation in conceptualization or ideological perspective

Among these three categories, (c) is the primary concern of the current study, reflecting political affiliation, and it is hypothesized to be the most difficult one for both

novice and professional translators. The cognitive terminological variation must be considered when terminology courses are designed to improve terminological competence.

10.5.3. Ambiguity due to Lack of Standardization

Sometimes translation difficulty is because the term has been borrowed from other languages, and due to the lack of standardized terminology planning strategies in Iran (Fathi, 2017), the Persian equivalent remains ambiguous and open to personal interpretation of the user.

It happens when an English term is *mis*translated into Persian, and then another word-formation procedure or semantic change is done on it, and it becomes a totally new or even different term in Persian. Then, when Persian translators want to *back*-translate this same term into English, they translate it literally or in a word-for-word manner. In this way, even the English term is ambiguous and incomprehensible for the English-speaking user. For instance, 'measure' also means 'action' in English. It was mistranslated almost ten years ago, and its literal meaning of 'measuring something' entered into Persian. The phrase was 'wrong measure' meaning 'wrong action'; but it was *mis*translated as اشتباه محاسباتی (*eshtebah-e mohasebati*) 'wrong measurement' or 'miscalculation'. It even became a keyword in every important speech in Iran. Then, it was *back*-translated into English with the same mistake. There are still traces of this error in English texts written by Persian writers. The aggravation of this procedure is highlighted when we want to categorize Persian terminology or establish semantic relationships among them.

Another notorious example of this case is the English term called 'hegemony'. At first, it entered into Persian as a loan word, and it was just transliterated into Persian. Then, it was translated and became a well-established and widely used term. The previous transliterated version was still typical in more specialized discussions, which were synonyms. The problem arose when it was supposed to be used in English texts written by Persian

writers/translators. It was *back*-translated into English as 'domineering' and not as 'hegemony'. So, our English corpus, which Persian writers supposedly write, has suggested 'domineering' instead of 'hegemony'. However, since 'hegemony' is an already well-established term in English, 'domineering' was discarded. 'Domineering' in this sense could be mistaken for other terms such as 'dominant power'. This phenomenon also affects the categorization, which will be explained in section 10.6.

10.6. Proposed Model for Predicting Miscommunication in Terms of Translation Difficulty

This study has tried to make (mis)communication assessable by investigating two primary sources of miscommunication (terminology and metaphor) at a religious, cultural, political, and literary level when an English-speaking translator translates from Persian into English. In this vein, a model is proposed to predict the probability of miscommunication in translating Persian political terms and metaphors into English. This model is based on contrastive linguistics and Prator's (1967)' hierarchy of difficulty. He introduced this hierarchy in ascending order of difficulty regarding a native English speaker who learns Spanish (cited in Brown, 2000, p. 209). The assumption behind applying this model to the present study is that the higher the difficulty level, the higher the probability of miscommunication. This typology assumes a translator whose mother tongue or first language is English and attempts to translate from Persian, which is their second or foreign language.

Although this hierarchy of difficulty was initially proposed for second language acquisition, it can also be applied to this study. This study has adopted Cognitive Linguistics. Moreover, Cognitive Linguistics adopts "an encyclopedic approach to semantics in which knowledge of word meaning and knowledge of word use are both regarded as types of semantic knowledge" (Faber, 2012, p. 222). So, Cognitive Linguistics is 'usage-based' and

usage-based theories, according to Faber (2012), postulate that "language builds up a conventional inventory of units that a speaker can use for communication" (p. 222). The catalog of units (or terms) is created by "hearing and using the language," and the units get entrenched through use (Faber, 2012, p. 222). As it has already been discussed, these language units are not empty, and "they designate an inventory of entrenched concepts and categories" (Faber, 2012, p. 222). So, acquiring a language comprises "entrenching, building, and extending concepts through use" (Faber, 2012, p. 222). In this hierarchy of difficulty, the translator is considered a learner who must acquire this knowledge as part of his/her translation competence to succeed in the process of communicating the intended message. Like language acquisition, translation competence acquisition is also subject to mother tongue interference. Prieto Velasco and Faber (2012) refer to this acquisition of terminology and terminography as "specialized knowledge acquisition" (p.260).

Given this study's scope, it can be applied to concepts, terms, and metaphors found in political corpora discussed in chapter 9. The examples presented here are in English and Persian extracted from concepts and terms discussed in section 9.2. The names of categories have directly been borrowed from the original model proposed by Prator (1967), as summarized and mentioned in Brown (2000).

The first category, also called 'level zero' or 'transfer', is the easiest one that presumes the translator's least or no difficulty; since there is a one-to-one equivalent for the English term in Persian. The closer the language pairs are, the more they have in common, and the easier the translation would be. Since Persian is an Indo-European language, several shared semantic and syntactic structures must be shared. Nevertheless, this is overridden by the special political system of Iran, which heavily influences terminology and conceptual mappings of Persian political texts. So even among one-to-one equivalents, there might still

be some different subtle components that may not cause miscommunication. It is highlighted here because this typology, by no means, aims at oversimplifying categorization of equivalents and prediction of miscommunication. Neither does it intend to claim a clear-cut boundary among categorizations—example: English' justice' and Persian 'عدالت' (*idalat*).

The second category is 'level 1' or 'coalescence', in which two English terms become one term in Persian. So, some features or components are missed from a componential analysis perspective. The translator must ignore some distinctions they have used to in their mother tongue. Example: English 'freedom' and 'liberty' become 'آزادی' (*azadi*). The third one is 'level 2' or 'underdifferentiation', in which there is an English term that has no equivalent in Persian. The translator should forget about it. It must be underlined here that this does not necessarily mean there is no equivalent for the English term because the semantic or conceptual mapping of the Persian language does not support it. On the contrary, the equivalent may exist, but it is not common in official political texts for some reasons, among which are religiously forbidden or illegitimate. For example, English' intersex human rights' can have a Persian equivalent, but it does not have because such issues are never discussed in the news or parliamentary debates.

The fourth category called 'level 3' or 'reinterpretation' includes terms that exist in both languages, but they have additional meaning components (in Persian) or in Brown's (2000) words, they are "given new shape or distribution" (p. 210). This additional meaning component could occur at religious and cultural levels. So, the translator needs to bear this reinterpretation in mind and try to render it in some way in translation because they are apt to

be lost[251] in this process. For example, English' arrogance' exists in Persian, but it plays a pivotal role in Iran's political system's conceptual mapping or semantic network. The ideological aspect has already been discussed in section 2.5.1, and the religious background and associated metaphorical patterns have been discussed in section 9.1. However, we should add that in the case of Persian political terminology, 'arrogance' includes countries such as USA and Israel.

Category of 'level 4' or 'overdifferentiation' happens when a Persian term does not exist in English. The translator needs to learn a (totally) new term and translate it. Here is where the 'lexical gap' in the proper sense happens. Examples: Persian 'بسيج' (*Basij*) and ' اهل بصيرت' (*ahle basirat*) which do not have a good equivalent in English; and the former is usually transliterated just like *jihad* and *hijab*. In the case of these lexical gaps, some English equivalents have been suggested to reduce the difficulty level to 'level 3' or even' level 0' if the term or concept is not that difficult or new to English-speaking users. The last and presumably the most difficult category is 'level 5' or 'split'. It refers to the translational situation where one English term has two or more Persian equivalents, and the translator needs to "make a new distinction" when translating from Persian (Brown, 2000, p. 210). Example: English recognizes 'jihad'; but it has various types in Persian political terminology including 'جهاد كبير', 'جهاد اصغر', 'جهاد اكبر', and 'جهاد نفس'.

Figure 10.10

Proposed Model for Predicting Miscommunication in Terms of Translation Difficulty

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[251] The phenomenon of loss and gain in translation.

Before addressing the application of this model on the findings of this study, some points should be illustrated. First of all, the inter-rater reliability of this model is not calculated, and it is an attempt to predict possible miscommunication to some extent. Secondly, categorizing terms is not an easy task to do in itself. For instance, English "national security" has two Persian equivalents: "country's security" and "internal security". Nevertheless, it cannot be categorized as 'level 5' or 'split'. Because it is not that difficult, and in Persian, they are synonyms and are used interchangeably.

On the other hand, some semantic and translational procedures mentioned in section 4.2.1 make this categorization process even more complicated. For instance, "domineering power" mentioned in English corpus can be mistaken for 'dominant power,' and the rater may categorize it as 'level 1' or 'coalescence' in which two English terms (domineering power & dominant power) has one Persian term (قدرت های سلطه گر). Another instance is the case of 'wrong measure' which can be categorized as 'level 4' in which Persian اشتباه محاسباتی (*eshtebah-e mohasebati*) seems to lack English equivalents.

10.6.1. Applying the Model to Super Concepts

Now that the categorization has been established, it is time to see how it helps predict miscommunication due to the difficulty of terms around given super concepts. The terminology of every single concept has previously been extracted in section 9.2. Then, each term is assigned to one of the sixth levels discussed in section 10.5. On the other hand, 'level zero' or 'transfer' and 'level 2' or 'coalescence' are considered 'undemanding'. 'Level 3'or 'reinterpretation' is considered as 'relatively demanding'. 'Level 4' or overdifferentiation' and 'level 5' or 'split' are considered 'highly demanding'. Finally, each term has been categorized as 'undemanding', 'relatively demanding', or 'highly demanding' based on what level it has previously been assigned.

Instead of 'easy' and 'difficult', 'undemanding' and 'demanding' have been used to avoid the impression that, for instance, easy concepts are so simple that their terminology will not cause any difficulties. Furthermore, this terminology has been applied to make it in line with the cognitive approach of the study; i.e., to imply that the cognitive process of understanding and transferring terminology of some terms is less demanding or more demanding than others.

Before addressing each super concept's details and figures, some points regarding figures are worth mentioning. Concepts and their relevant terminology are presented in ascending order of difficulty. So, the first couple of concepts are easy or undemanding, and the final ones are difficult or demanding. About all figures' color code, 'green' is assigned to 'undemanding terms', and in front of it, the number of terms categorized as 'undemanding' is written on the figure's left side. In the related slice of pie graph, 'undemanding' terms' percentage is written. For instance, if 13 out of 17 enemy-related terms are categorized as 'undemanding', on the left side is written 13, and the green slice shows 76%. It means that

almost 76% of terms related to 'enemy' are assumed to be undemanding. The color code of 'relatively demanding' terms is orange, and the 'highly demanding' terms are red. The same norms for the green color code apply to both orange and red.

Figures 10.11 and 10.12 depict that 0% of terms related to 'peace' and 'security' demand the translator and lead to miscommunication. Given the concept of 'freedom', one term out of 29 terms is considered level 3 of difficulty. So, only 3% of terms are predicted to cause miscommunication. Regarding the concept of 'justice' (Figure 10.14), 29 out of 30 terms are classified as level 0, and just one term is in level 4 classification. So, 97% of terms related to this concept are assumed to be undemanding for the translator without causing any miscommunication.

Figure 10.11

Difficulty Level of Terms related to Peace

Figure 10.12

Difficulty Level of Terms related to Security

Figure 10.13

Difficulty Level of Terms related to Freedom

Figure 10.14

Figure 10.15 displays that 8 out of 37 found terms are assumed to be relatively demanding to highly demanding for the translator (21% of terms). In other words, most terms related to the concept of 'Islam' are well-established in English terminology, and the probability of miscommunication is reduced to a great extent. The next concept is 'enemy'. Figure 10.16 shows that only 4 out of 17 terms are classified as level 4 difficulty. In other words, almost 24% of terms are presumably highly demanding for the translator and hence, possibly a source of miscommunication.

Figure 10.15

Difficulty Level of Terms related to Islam

Figure 10.16

Difficulty Level of Terms related to Enemy

The terminology of 'war', as shown in Figure 10.17, is also straightforward, and only 27% of terms are classified as level 3 to level 5; i.e., 12 terms are either relatively demanding or highly demanding for the translator—the following presumably undemanding terminology

associates with 'power' as shown in Figure 10.18. Only 24 out of 75 terms have been categorized as demanding, ranging from level 3 to 5. So, it is predicted that 33% of terms are probably the source of miscommunication.

**Figure 10.17**

Difficulty Level of Terms related to War

Figure 10.18

Difficulty Level of Terms related to Power

Power

- undemanding 49
- relatively demanding 3
- highly demanding 21

4%
29%
67%

We predict that relatively difficult terms are related to 'influence', 'JCPOA', and 'culture'. Figure 10.19 displays that 9 out of 21 terms regarding 'influence' are in the category of level 4. So, 43% of terms are highly demanding for the translator and are a presumable source of miscommunication. Figure 10.20 reveals that 9 out of 20 terms concerning 'JCPOA' are in the level 4 category. It means that 45% of terms are assumed to cause difficulty on the translator's part and be liable to miscommunication. Regarding 'culture' terminology, Figure 10.21 displays that 18 out of 35 terms (51%) are from relatively to highly demanding for the translator and be a source of miscommunication.

Figure 10.19

*Difficulty Level of Terms related to Influence*

Figure 10.20

*Difficulty Level of Terms related to JCPOA*

Figure 10.21

Difficulty Level of Terms related to Culture

Culture

- undemanding 17
- relatively demanding 6
- highly demanding 12

34%
17%
49%

'Resistance', 'insight', 'Jihad', and 'arrogance' are assumed to be concepts that generate complicated terms; since more than 50% of their terminology is in the range of level 3 to level 5. Figure 10.22 shows that 13 out of 18 terms concerned with 'resistance' (62%) are categorized as levels 3 and 4 (from relatively demanding to highly demanding). Figure 10.23, related to 'insight', reveals that 87% of terms (13 out of 15) are presumably (from relatively to highly) demanding for the translator and tend to cause miscommunication. As Figure 10.24 displays, 29 out of 32 terms of 'Jihad' are categorized as demanding, ranging from level 3 to level 5. It means that 90% of its terminology tends to cause miscommunication. The final concept is 'arrogance,' and 100% (18 out of 18) of its terms are difficult, ranging from level 3 to 4 (Figure 10.25). We can introduce an arbitrary difficulty hierarchy of concepts in terms of difficulty percentages (level 3 to level 5).

Figure 10.22

*Difficulty Level of Terms related to Resistance*

**Figure 10.23**

Difficulty Level of Terms related to Insight


Figure 10.24

Difficulty Level of Terms related to Jihad

Jihad

- undemanding 3
- relatively demanding 2
- highly demanding 27

84%

9%

6%

Figure 10.25

Difficulty Level of Terms related to Arrogance

Arrogance

- undemanding 0
- relatively demanding 9
- highly demanding 9

50%

0%

50%

The final suggestion of this study regarding the difficulty classification of concepts found in Persian political texts is as follows.

629

0% - 40% difficult terms = undemanding to relatively undemanding concept

40% - 60% difficult terms = relatively demanding concept

60% - 100% difficult terms = demanding to highly demanding concept

10.7. Applicability of FBT to Persian Political Terminology

As mentioned earlier, to the best of our knowledge, Frame-Based Terminology has not been applied to political terminology in either English or Persian. So, it is the first time that FBT is applied to a specialized knowledge domain that is predominantly full of abstract concepts. One of the aims of this study was to check the applicability of this theory to Persian political terminology. By doing so, we meant to find out about shared conceptual mappings that connected terms, on the one hand, and that related terms to metaphors.

The terminological aspect of this study showed that among three ontological combinations introduced by Montero-Martínez et al. (2002), 'EVENT + RELATION + EVENT' and 'EVENT + ATTRIBUTE' are the most frequent ones. Regarding conceptual relations in 'EVENT + RELATION + EVENT', it must be pointed out that some of the conceptual relations examined in León-Araúz et al. (2016, p. 167) were also registered in Persian political terminology. These are conceptual relations found in Persian political terminology: TYPE-OF, PART-OF, PHASE-OF, DELIMITED-BY, LOCATED-AT, ATTRIBUTE-OF, RESULT-OF, AFFECTS, CAUSES, HAS-FUNCTION, AFFECTED-BY. In addition to these relations, another category in Persian political terminology seems to be the opposite of DELIMITED-BY: STRENGTHENED-BY. It is usually found in terminological phrasemes that contain *power*.

Since the theoretical approach of this study was Cognitive Linguistics and the methodology was based on corpus linguistics, this theory of terminology proved to be helpful for the following reasons:

- Adopting a cognitive approach to terminology and being highly dependent on corpus.

- The best theory to show the shared conceptual mappings between metaphor and terminology to prove that metaphors do affect political terminology

- The best theory to disambiguate complicated political concepts in Persian political discourse and to reveal ontological relations among them

- The best theory to show the multidimensional nature of specialized knowledge units (terms): cognitive component, linguistic component, and sociocommunicative component

- The use of terminographic definitions and this study proved that it is the best way to define Persian political terms.

The reasons mentioned above are not necessarily limited to FBT, but they have been accomplished thanks to FBT's theoretical background, which is shared with Communicative Theory of Terminology, sociocognitive terminology, and Frame Semantics. However, some aspects of FBT did not apply to this study for some reasons. Before explaining them, we should remind that this study aimed to check the applicability of this theory and see to what extent it works for Persian political terminology. It aimed at checking theoretical aspects of FBT when it is applied to an abstract domain such as politics. Those aspects that could not be followed in this study and the reasons behind them are as follows:

- One of the main features of FBT developed by Faber and applied in LexiCon and other similar terminological projects is the addition of image in the definition provided

for a term. Since our domain was politics and terms and concepts are abstract by the very definition, adding images was impossible. For instance, diplomacy or arrogance is not concrete and cannot be captured in a picture.

- LexiCon has developed an application for showing conceptual relations among terms. Applications such as Protégé[252] are developed for similar purposes. However, it was not used for one main reason: The terminological purpose of this study was to check theoretical aspects of FBT and draw conceptual relations/ mappings for more than 400 terminological phrasemes extracted in this study was unfeasible. Other freely available online tools such as Visme[253] exist, but manually drawing the mappings would be subjective and open to criticism. So, we settled down for a verbal explanation of those conceptual relations especially integrated into terminographical definitions.

10.8. Translation Competence

Some scholars have recognized metaphor and terminological competence as a distinct part of translation competence to highlight their importance. However, this study has relied on their findings and has integrated them into PACTE's translation competence model. By doing so, the results of this study have shown that, at least in the case of Persian political discourse, we should consider the followings points regarding translation competence:

- Interference is not exclusive to bilingual competence or linguistic issues. It can happen due to cultural, religious, and historical differences. So, extralinguistic

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[252] protégé (stanford.edu)
[253] Crea Presentaciones, Infografías, Diseños y Videos | Visme

competence should also be concerned about interference in the communicative process of translation, and the translators should be educated in this regard too.

- The psycho-physiological component should focus more on cognitive processes behind terminological and metaphorical competences, which affect the translator's perception, analysis, and creativity.

- Even in Iran's formal and serious political context, predominantly declarative knowledge of metaphor and terminological metaphor is indispensable.

- At least in the case of Persian political discourse, strategic competence also includes recognizing and dealing with ambiguous terms. Recognizing ambiguous terms needs declarative knowledge and solutions (where to find accreditable references, terminographical definitions, and suggested English equivalents provided in this study) are related to procedural knowledge of strategic competence.

Chapter 11. Conclusion

As the name suggests, concluding remarks about this study will be addressed in this chapter. Based on discussions mentioned in chapters 9 and 10, hypotheses and aims will be presented. And then, further suggestions and future lines of research will be mentioned to encourage researchers of this field to realize what aspects need further investigations.

11.1. Hypotheses of this Study

We conducted this study to answer questions posited in section 1.5.2. Now, we discuss the research hypotheses mentioned in section 1.5.3 to see if they have been approved or modified.

Hypothesis 1 modified: Persian political discourse has metaphorical patterns. However, political affiliation does not significantly differ at the patterns or super domains level. There are some minor differences regarding national and international affairs at the scenario level. Political affiliation does not make a difference regarding fundamental issues such as the role of Supreme Leader and Guardianship, anti-arrogance paradigm, and martyrdom.

Hypothesis 2 confirmed: Although patterns categorization differs slightly between Persian and English, the general features are the same.

Hypothesis 3 confirmed: Discussions mentioned in chapter 9 under the title of "Metaphor and Terminology: Connecting the Dots" point that metaphorical studies in political translation from Persian are critical since metaphors frame terminology and share conceptual mappings of ontological relations. So, although demonstrating this criticalness empirically was outside the scope of this thesis, we may say that a translator's unawareness of metaphorical patterns can cause miscommunication.

Hypothesis 4 modified: Persian political terminology is special because of Iran's specific political system. One overriding characteristic of Persian terminology is the special status of religious concepts, which is potentially apt to miscommunication. Other sources of miscommunication in this respect are ambiguity due to the dynamicity of terms, terminological variation, and lack of standardization. Significantly, the dynamicity of terms specific to Persian political discourse increases the probability of miscommunication.

Hypothesis 5 confirmed: Just providing English equivalents for Persian terms does not solve the problem of miscommunication and the difficulty of political translation. There are lexical gaps, and metaphorical, religious, and cultural knowledge can compensate for it to a great extent. For instance, religious knowledge shared among different religions mentioned throughout the study can help the translator overcome metaphors. An accredited source of information in this regard is the Supreme Leader's official website.

Hypothesis 6 confirmed: Solely relying on frequency to determine the importance of a (multi-word) term does not suffice; since there are significant terms among those with low frequency.

11.2. Achieving Aims of this Study

To conclude this study and its various aspects, a concise discussion of the aims being achieved is in order.

Aim 1: The study was done to predict potential sources of miscommunication when an English-speaking translator translates Persian political discourse. Cognitive aspects of miscommunication due to ambiguity and difficulty level for a translator as a foreign language learner were studied in the case of metaphor and terminology at both linguistic and extralinguistic levels. A theoretical framework was proposed for recognizing where

ambiguity happens, and the reasons behind it were realized. Regarding translation difficulty, the model proposed by Prator (1967, cited in Brown, 2000) was adapted accordingly.

Aim 2: A methodological framework appropriate to Persian political metaphors was elaborated. It also showed that the theoretical framework of CMT related to the direction of source-target relation needs to be changed to explain Persian metaphorical characteristics.

Aim 3: FBT is approved to apply to Persian political terminology. It also proved to be the best theory to show the shared conceptual mappings between metaphor and terminology. It proved that metaphors do affect political terminology. It was also the best theory to disambiguate complicated political concepts in Persian political discourse and reveal ontological relations.

Aim 4: Specific characteristics of Persian political discourse in terms of linguistic and extralinguistic aspects of metaphor and terminology have been recognized.

Aim 5: The importance of both declarative and procedural knowledge in metaphorical and terminological components of translation competence was approved, and some implications were suggested in this regard.

11.3. Further Suggestions

The undeniable truth in any research, especially in a PhD dissertation, is its limitation due to financial issues, allotted time, and academic facilities. This study is done during an exceptional time in the history of humankind due to the Covid-19 pandemic, months of lockdown, and more than one year of off-campus activities. Everyone adapted to the new situation as soon as possible, but it was not an easy task without negative consequences. Aside from this, the cyberattack in October of 2021 disabled the university's computer services. We have not accessed our institutional username in Sketch Engine for almost three

months. It means that the final double-checking of outcomes in Sketch Engine was impossible.

Other than these unpredictable conditions, this study is limited to its purposes, and any perfectionism and idealization would make its conductibility impossible in the allotted time. So, this study's achievements are like building blocks for other researchers to develop the aims of this study in the following directions:

- To test sources of ambiguity and miscommunication besides the proposed typology to approve, modify or refute the proposed model.

- To design process-oriented research containing metaphors that are assumed to be difficult to check their level of difficulty for English-speaking translators.

- To calculate a text's difficulty level containing those concepts and terms predicted to be difficult, check the applicability of the modified model of the hierarchy of difficulty.

- To use Protégé and other similar tools to design conceptual relations in Persian political terminology.

- To design translator training courses comprising materials from this study and consider findings of this study to see its effect on training competent translators in terms of realizing and dealing with difficulties regarding metaphor and terminology.

- To study the effect of metaphors on output quality in Machine Translation (e.g., چتر *chatr* is translated as an umbrella, although it refers to the concept of sponsorship). This study can be done on any language pair.

- To study the management of metaphors when selecting keywords for the compilation of comparable corpora (i.e., the need to include metaphorical and non-metaphorical terms in different proportions).

- To consider special tags or marks-up for metaphor in corpus tagging.

- To highlight the necessity of metaphor in Artificial Intelligence (Neural Machine Translation, Knowledge Engineering, and Document Classification).

- To provide metaphor glossaries for disambiguation of encrypted metaphorical content.

11.4. Future Lines of Research

In line with what has been discussed so far and to finish this thesis, setting future lines of research to motivate researchers is worth mentioning.

- This research on the metaphorical-terminological scenarios of political discourse could be extended to other pairs of languages, e.g., capitalism in the United States of America vs. communism in North Korea. It also can be conducted in any situation of political-parliamentary antagonism. For instance, in the case of Spain, it would be Spain (unionism) vs. Catalonia (separatism).

- Likewise, the study of metaphorical networks could be applied to Communication Sciences to delve into the construction of journalistic language and the mass media that influence public opinion in democratic states.

- Thirdly, it would be interesting to study the role of metaphor in dialectical confrontations between leaders so that the public knows the tools to distinguish rhetorical skill from strategic technical movements in each case.

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Annex I. Persian Political Terminological Phrasemes

Seventy terminological phrasemes other than those related to super concepts:

	Persian Term	**English Term**		**Persian Term**	**English Term**
1	ضرورت حضور	Necessity of presence	36	نعمت ولایت	Blessing of Guardianship
2	تداوم حضور	Continuity of presence	37	اصل ولایت	Principle of Guardianship
3	پیام حضور مردم	Message of people's presence	38	ولایت شیطان	Satan's guardianship
4	حضور زنان	Women's presence	39	ولایت شرعی (تشریعی)	Sharia Guardianship
5	حضور گسترده	Massive presence	40	ولایت تکوینی	Formative Guardianship
6	حضور مردم	People's presence	41	تبعیت از ولایت	Adherence to Guardianship
7	حضور حداکثری مردم	Maximum presence of people	42	لغو تحریم ها	Lifting sanctions
8	حضور پرشور	Passionate presence	43	رفع تحریم ها	Lifting sanctions
9	حضور فعال	Active presence	44	تمدید تحریم ها	Extension of sanctions
10	حضور موثر	Effective presence	45	تعلیق تحریم ها	Suspension of sanctions
11	حضور پررنگ	Bold presence	46	قانون تحریم های ایران	Iran Sanction Act
12	حضور نظامی	Military presence	47	دوران تحریم	Era of sanction
13	حضور حماسی	Epic presence	48	کاسبان تحریم	Sanction trader
14	حضور باشکوه	Magnificent presence	49	تشدید تحریم ها	Intensifying sanctions
15	حضور مقتدرانه	Authoritative presence	50	دور زدن تحریم ها	Circumvention of sanctions
16	خیانت در امانت	Breach of trust	51	تحریم های ظالمانه	Oppressive sanctions
17	امانت الهی	Divine trust	52	تحریم های هسته ای	Nuclear sanctions
18	مردم شهید پرور	Martyr-training people	53	تحریم های غیر هسته ای	Non-nuclear sanctions
19	نهضت حسینی	Husseini movement	54	تحریم های اقتصادی	Economic sanctions
20	شعور حسینی	Husseini conscience	55	تحریم های یک جانبه	Unilateral sanctions
21	اعتماد به شیطان	Trusting Satan	56	تحریم های ثانویه	Secondary sanctions
22	وسوسه شیطان	Temptation of Satan	57	تحریم های اولیه	Primary sanctions
23	مطیع ولایت	Submissiveness to Guardianship	58	تحریم های نفتی	Sanctions on oil sector
24	مردم مظلوم فلسطین	Oppressed Palestinian people	59	تحریم های فلج کننده	Crippling sanctions

25	(مردم) ولایت مدار	Guardianship-oriented people	60	تحریم های ناعادلانه	Unfair sanctions
26	ولایت مداری	Guardianship-orientedness	61	تحریم های بانکی	Banking supervision/ Bank sanction
27	محور ولایت	Axis of Guardianship	62	تحریم های موشکی	Ballistic missile sanctions
28	ولایت مطلقه فقیه	Absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist	63	تحریم های دشمن	Enemy's sanctions
29	ولایت محوری	Guardianship-orientedness	64	تحریم های تسلیحاتی	Arms embargo
30	ولایت الهی	Divine Guardianship	65	مردم شریف ایران	Iran's noble people
31	خط ولایت	Line of Guardianship	66	اعتماد مردم	People's trust
32	ضد ولایت	Anti-Guardianship	67	خدمت به مردم	Serving people
33	سربازان ولایت	Soldiers of Guardianship	68	حقوق مردم	People's rights
34	پرچم ولایت	Flag of Guardianship	69	مطالبات مردم	People's demands
35	حریم ولایت	Sanctum of Guardianship	70	مردم انقلابی	Revolutionary people

Annex II. Persian Political Terminological Metaphors

Fifty Persian political terminological metaphors (TM):

	Persian TM	English TM		Persian TM	English TM
1	مکتب حسینی	Imam Hussein School	26	ستون دین	Religion's pillar
2	حزب شیطان	Party of Satan	27	ستون سیاست	Politics' pillar
3	شیطان بزرگ	Great Satan	28	قفل مشکلات	lock of problems
4	آسمان ولایت	The sky of Guardianship	29	گوساله سامری	Golden Calf
5	آسیاب دشمن	Enemy's mill	30	مدافعان حرم	Holy Shrine Defenders
6	آسیاب انقلاب	Revolution's mill	31	میوه برجام	Fruit of JCPOA
7	رأی حلال	Hilal vote	32	ساحل دستاوردهای برجام	Beach of JCPOA's achievements
8	دست قدرت الهی	God's hand of power/ God's powerful hand	33	دریای مطالبات آمریکا	America's sea of demands
9	سایه جنگ	Shadow of war	34	ستاره پرنور ولایت	Bright star of Guardianship
10	طبل جنگ	Drum of war	35	ستارگان آسمان شهادت	Stars of the sky of martyrdom
11	طبل تفرقه	Drum of discord	36	جزیره ثبات و امنیت	Stable and secure island
12	افسران جنگ نرم	Officers of soft warfare	37	مادر بمب ها	Mother of all bombs
13	دریای صلح	Sea of peace	38	مادر مذاکرات	Mother of all negotiations
14	ساحل امنیت	Beach of security	39	مادر تحریم ها	Mother of all sanctions
15	ماشین جنگی دشمن	Enemy's war machine	40	قیم های جهانی	World custodians
16	چشم طمع دشمنان	Enemies' covetous eye	41	مادرهای بی ریشه	Rootless mothers/ mongrel mothers
17	درس مقاومت	Resistance lesson	42	سواره نظام جنگ نرم آمریکا	Cavalries of America's softwarfare
18	دهان استکبار جهانی	Global arrogance's mouth	43	فرزند نامشروع عربستان	Illegitimate child of Saudi Arabia
19	سبد برجام	JCPOA's baske	44	پل نفوذ	Bridge of infiltration
20	سایه اسلام	Islam's shade	45	دیپلماسی لبخند	Diplomacy of smile
21	چهره اسلام	Islam's face	46	دیپلماسی اقتدار	Diplomacy of authority
22	شبیخون فرهنگی	Cultural raid	47	چرخ فناوری هسته ای	Wheel of nuclear

					technology
23	خانه ملت	Nation's house	48	چرخ اقتصادی	Wheel of economics
24	خانه امید	House of hopes	49	قطار انقلاب	Train of Revolution
25	ستون انقلاب	Revolution's pillar	50	برکت مردم سالاری	Democracy's bounty